GENDER REPRESENTATION IN CHINESE POLITICAL NEWS COVERAGE OF CORRUPTION

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University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon

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ABSTRACT

The many high-speed developments since China implemented its policy of Opening and Reforming in 1978 include more freedom for women to work and choose lifestyles. However, many studies claim that women still face challenges and gender discrimination in their work environment and in the family. This study addresses one area that has received little attention, which is the question of gender equality in media discourse. My aim is to identify gender images in news reports and news stories about corruption, including power relations behind those images, by addressing three research questions: (1) How are women, overall, described in news reports and comments about corruption in China; (2) Is there any difference between the ways in which women and men are depicted in news reports about corruption? If so, what is the difference; and (3) What do any observed differences reveal about the nature of power and gender relations in contemporary China?

My analysis employs quantitative Content Analysis and qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis, applied to media reports and articles from the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and four commercial websites - Sina, Sohu, Fenghuang, and Wangyi - for the period from 2012 to 2017. The data reveal that women are under-represented with respect both to the number of corrupt cadres cited in the reports and in reporting on personal life issues. The analysis highlights the role that traditional cultural expectations continue to play in influencing the ways in which women are described in the news stories about corruption. Women are depicted as people who violated their family duties in family as well as individuals who caused much corruption among men. By analysing the relations between male cadres, women and the ruling party, I demonstrate that by owing corruption to individuals, the government mitigates its pressures and covers up systematic flaws in causing corruption. By decoding the nature and role of gender images in news reporting on corruption, my study contributes to understanding the influence of political power and
patriarchal power in constructing gender norms in corruption news, showing how traditional culture can intertwine with contemporary political and media systems.
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my husband, Feifei Han, and my son, Simon.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PERMISSION TO USE ........................................................................................................i
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................. iv
DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................... v
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ ix
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. xi
NOTE ON TRANSLATION ............................................................................................... xii

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Gender Inequality: From Past to Present ................................................................. 3
  1.2 Media Discourses and Social Changes ................................................................. 7
  1.3 Anti-Corruption Campaign and Corruption in Media Discourses ...................... 9
  1.4 Research Questions and Chapter Organization ............................................... 11

## CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................. 14
  2.1 Women’s Roles and Status in Contemporary China.............................................. 14
    2.1.1 Women’s Roles and Status in Maoist Era (1949-1966) ................................. 14
    2.1.2 Women’s Roles and Status in Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) ............. 16
    2.1.3 Women’s Roles and Status after 1976 ....................................................... 17
  2.2 Research on Gender Representation in News Media ........................................... 21
    2.2.1 Gender and News Media ........................................................................... 21
    2.2.2 Gender and Political News ......................................................................... 25
    2.2.3 Gender and News in China ....................................................................... 28
  2.3 Explanations of Gender Representations in News Media .................................... 30

## CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................ 32
  3.1 Limitations of Existing Related Literature ......................................................... 32
  3.2 Foucault’s Theory of Power-Knowledge ............................................................ 34
    3.2.1 Power-Knowledge ....................................................................................... 35
    3.2.2 The Media as Panopticon ........................................................................... 42
  3.3 The Influence of China’s Social Content on Gender Representation in News about Cor... 46
    3.3.1 Traditional Culture ..................................................................................... 46
    3.3.2 Media System ............................................................................................. 56
    3.3.3 Political System .......................................................................................... 60
CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................... 63
  4.1 Research Questions .................................................................................. 63
  4.2 Content Analysis ...................................................................................... 64
  4.3 Critical Discourse Analysis ..................................................................... 65
  4.4 Data .......................................................................................................... 69
  4.5 Search Procedure ..................................................................................... 71
  4.6 Coding Procedure for Content Analysis (CA) ........................................ 72
  4.7 Analyzing Procedure for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) .................. 76

CHAPTER 5 CONTENT ANALYSIS FINDINGS ...................................................... 79
  5.1 Frequency Distributions of Each Variable for News Reports .................. 79
  5.2 Bivariate Analysis for Gender Representations of News Reports .......... 86
  5.3 Chapter Conclusions and Discussions .................................................... 92

CHAPTER 6 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS FINDINGS ONE: THE OFFICIAL MEDIA .............................................................................. 94
  6.1 Text Representations of CCDI Corruption News Articles ..................... 94
  6.2 Discourses of CCDI Corruption News Articles ....................................... 101
    6.2.1 Descriptions of Women: Women’s Fault ......................................... 101
    6.2.2 Descriptions of Men: Men’s Fault .................................................. 116
  6.3 Intertextuality Analysis of CCDI Corruption News Articles ................ 136
    6.3.1 Examples of Male Cadres Whose Corruption was Related to Personal Issues ................................................................. 136
    6.3.2 The Example of Male Cadres Whose Corruption was not Related to Personal Issues .............................................................. 147
    6.3.3 The Example of Female Cadres Whose Corruption was not Related to Personal Issues .............................................................. 152
  6.4 Chapter Conclusions and Discussions ..................................................... 158

CHAPTER 7 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS FINDINGS TWO: MAINSTREAM COMMERCIAL MEDIA ................................................................. 164
  7.1 Text Representations of Four Websites ---- Fenghuang Net, Sina, Sohu, and Wangyi Net ................................................................. 164
  7.2 Discourses of Fenghuang Net, Sina, Sohu, and Wangyi Net ................... 167
    7.2.1 Women’s Descriptions ..................................................................... 167
    7.2.2 Men’s Descriptions .......................................................................... 180
  7.3 Intertextuality Analysis of Commercial Websites’ Corruption News Articles .......................................................... 197
    7.3.1 Examples of Male Cadres Whose Corruption was Related to Personal Issues ................................................................. 197
LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1. Variables, definitions, and attributes of news report for content analysis..........73
Table 4.2. Themes and codes of news articles for critical discourse analysis .....................77
Table 5.1. Frequency distributions for each variable of content analysis..........................80
Table 5.2. Frequency distributions for news reports on corruption by male and female cadres by year..........................................................86
Table 5.3. Frequency distributions by levels of cadres and sex........................................87
Table 5.4. Frequency distributions for job-related crimes by sex........................................88
Table 5.5. Frequency distributions for corrupt cadres' original occupations by sex...........88
Table 5.6. Frequency distributions for news reports focused on economic crimes of corrupt cadres by sex .................................................................89
Table 5.7. Frequency distributions for news reports focused on political crimes by sex .....89
Table 5.8. Frequency distributions for news reports focused on personal life problems of male and female cadres .................................................................90
Table 5.9. Frequency distributions by regions and sex of cadres ......................................91
Table 6.1. Codes, definitions and frequencies of themes related to descriptions of women .94
Table 6.2. Codes, definitions and frequencies of themes related to descriptions of men.....98
Table 7.1. Frequency distributions for themes and codes related to male cadres and female cadres, reported by commercial websites ........................................164
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1. Elements of the theoretical framework ...................................................36

Figure 5.1. Number of news reports on corruption on the website of CCDI by year ..........79
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACWF</td>
<td>All-China Women’s Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Content Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Central Commission for Discipline Inspection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMD</td>
<td>Guomindang, also translated as the Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTE ON TRANSLATION

As Chinese names are ordered surname first and given name last, all Chinese names in this thesis are in this order, such as Qian Zenghong. However, the author’s name is in the western order.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Confucianism has greatly influenced Chinese history, dominating Chinese society and regulating its social relations since the Han Dynasty (汉朝, 206 BC – 220 AD). According to Confucianism, a woman’s role should be limited to the domestic sphere, while women should not have rights regarding education, choosing whom they marry, or dealing with family properties.

Although the status of Chinese women has undoubtedly improved since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), gender discrimination and gender inequality still exist. In the Maoist era, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committed itself to emancipate women by incorporating them into the workforce. In addition to gaining the right to work outside of the home, women also gained a number of other rights relating to areas such as education and marriage. However, the CCP’s decision to implement its open-door policy and shift to a market economy in 1978 has complicated matters, as women face more challenges from work-family conflicts and work-related discrimination. In this sense, studying gender representation in media discourses provides opportunities to know how these conflicts and discriminations shape people’s thoughts on women and gender equality.

Upon taking power in 2012, President Xi and the CCP launched an anti-corruption campaign that is widely considered to be the most expansive and influential in contemporary Chinese history. However, the Chinese government also recognizes that the media is a critical tool for promoting propaganda; as such, it has required that corruption news reports and comments adhere to the standard drafts provided by state-owned news agencies. In this sense, studying how gender is represented in corruption news reports and comments can be a useful method for verifying whether the Chinese government is living up to its promise of
promoting gender equality or, alternatively, whether gender images in corruption scandals may be presented in particular ways in order to help the government build its legitimacy.

This study uses Foucault’s power-knowledge theory to examine how women are portrayed in both official and commercial media discourses related to corruption news and power relations behind media images. Specifically, both Content Analysis (CA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) are used to explore the organization of words, sentences and paragraphs regarding gender relations in news reports and news articles. The results of this study verify that traditional gender ideology plays an important role in defining proper behaviours of women in corruption scandals, revealing particular ways in which the ruling party exerts its influence on women via attributing corruption to women. Quantitative Content Analysis results indicate that women are under-represented in the number of reported cases of corruption, while Critical Discourse Analysis provides details about women’s positions and status in corruption cases. This analysis reveals that women are frequently compared in corruption news against traditional expectations, such as the image of “the greedy wife,” which serves to generate negative public opinions. Even though men’s images are also related to traditional cultural expectations, males are less likely to be represented as sources of trouble. However, systematic factors that may cause corruption are seldom touched by news coverage, and the ruling party appears blameless in corruption scandals. In order to examine how patriarchal power and political power are exercised on women via corruption news, some institutional factors are discussed; then, attention is given to the reasons why the ruling party utilizes gender images in corruption.

This study contributes to the existing literature by analyzing detailed gender discourses and comparing them with traditional gender norms and examining how power is exercised in multiple intersecting ways in constructing gender inequalities in both private and public places. By describing women involved in corruption as “sources of trouble,” the news
reports draw on traditional gender norms. The media reports represent the exercise of patriarchal and political power on women as one apparatus of a more omnipotent pervasiveness of the penetration of power throughout daily life via the All-China’s Women Federation (ACWF), the education system, family, and the media system. These images of women suggest that China is still a patriarchal society in which men and male-dominated institutions set rules and norms for women to follow. Gender equality is an empty discourse. My thesis explores gender images in Chinese news reports about corruption news, revealing how the Chinese political system utilizes traditional culture through a state-controlled media system in order to maintain power relations.

1.1 Gender Inequality: From Past to Present

Confucianism played a key role in shaping Chinese society via the creation of gender norms and a gender-based hierarchy. Traditional Confucian culture is a patriarchal culture, as it emphasizes the dominance of men over women. *Biographies of Exemplary Women*, the “earliest extant book devoted solely to the moral education of women” (He-Yin, 1907, p. 125) says a woman should follow all decisions made by her husband after getting married (*Ji fengchang junzi, weiming shi cong*; 即奉承君子，惟命是从) (Gushiwenwang, n.d.). Mann (2011) claims that many ancient stories, in addition to the classic book, also indicate the unbalanced power relations between men and women: women need to stay at home to avoid meeting men outside the family in order to maintain their chastity and virtue. On the other hand, according to Confucianism, a man should strive to be a morally superior person (*junzi*, 君子) who lives in a big house and has a good position in the government (Clark & Wang, 2004; Jiang, 2009). According to these precepts, women should remain in the home and oversee domestic affairs, while men should deal with affairs outside the family. The separation between men and women is essential for cultivating proper behaviours (Mann, 2011; Huang, 1984). A wife’s lifelong responsibility is to raise children and manage the
household, so women were deprived of basic freedom, while men should abide by traditional rituals and laws (He-Yin, 1907). On the whole, Confucianism devalued women, and boys were regarded as being considerably more valuable than girls. In traditional Chinese culture, once women married, they were considered to leave the family. As such, a man raising daughters was seen as “watering another man’s garden” (Rai, 1992, p.20). Given that women had a diminished status under Confucian, it is unsurprising that they did not have equal rights in a number of areas, including education, employment, and marriage.

Concubinage in ancient society also demonstrated gender inequalities and social inequalities. Unlike wives who joined the husband’s family via the betrothal process (Ebrey, 1986), concubines were from poor families and were sold to rich families (He-Yin, 1907; Mann, 2011; McMahon, 2010). Concubines were supposed to be reproductive tools to give birth to sons or daughters (Mann, 2011; Du, 2017; Ebrey, 1986). Concubines could never have the same status as the wife (Mann, 2011). Du (2017) used examples from the Qing dynasty to demonstrate that concubines who gave birth to sons could have a social and legal status protected by the Confucian filial piety, and they could control and manage household properties. However, those examples also revealed unequal gender status, as the same rights were not extended to concubines who gave birth to daughters and to those who were not able to give birth. Generally, concubines could be discriminated against and abused by the wife, while sons who were born to concubines would be counted as the wife’s sons (Mann, 2011). Qiu (1905) described in her novel Stones of the Jingwei Bird how the concubine was ill-treated by the wife who regarded the concubine as a prisoner at home.

While some changes occurred over time, the influence of Confucianism on women and family life remained powerful into the twentieth century. Some possibilities for change were influenced by the May Fourth movement as women in the Republic of China period (1911-1949) experienced the development of modernity and new culture. The New Culture
Movement, which aimed at building a modern nation with “freedom, equality, and independence” (p.12), attacked Confucianism norms and rules (Wang, 1999). Through these movements, women learned about the right to choose people to marry, the right to divorce, the right to enter schools and universities, and the right to deal with family property, and so on. However, such rights did not guarantee that society had achieved gender equality, as most of the movements did not spread to the whole of China, and the major beneficiaries were women in urban areas. Although some women had freedom in choosing people to marry, some of them became concubines and replaced the wife to accompany their husbands on formal occasions, as many cadres’ wives felt uncomfortable to do so (Shi, 2018). According to Guomindang (GMD) civil code, concubines tended to be regarded as household members (Shi, 2018), while social circles tended to identify them as minor wives (Tran, 2009; Shi, 2018). The concubines of cadres were college-educated and young. However, even though those concubines were elite women, they also suffered social discrimination and stigma (Shi, 2018). This period, as a whole, did not emancipate the majority of women in China, and the boundaries between old and new cultures were blurred.

Women’s social status changed greatly following the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), although these improvements were based on rights granted by the party. Following the revolution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched a series of initiatives to increase women’s social status, but perhaps the greatest of these was the decision to give women the right to work outside of the home. The CCP believed that labour force participation was critical to the emancipation of women so that women were fully capable of contributing to economic productivity (Landes, 1998; Q. Chen, 2012). In this period, the famous slogan was “women can do what men do;” however, this led women to be measured by male standards, many of them had to do jobs which were not suitable for
women, such as the rebar worker, and women also had additional responsibilities related to domestic roles and political activities.

Although women’s equal rights to family property, education, and work had been guaranteed by legislation and policies during the Maoist period, women continued to experience various forms of gender discrimination in the post-reform period. In 1978, China adopted an open-door policy, which marked the beginning of its transition towards a market economy. Besides promoting a market economy, there were many tremendous transformations, including promotion of “privatization, increasingly stark social inequalities, rent-seeking and corruption, a consumer-oriented popular culture, vast amounts of foreign direct investment” (p.155) in free trade areas, increasing investments in energy resources, and entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Rofel, 2013). However, this transition has posed a number of problems for women attempting to find jobs, as it has led to greater levels of various forms of gender discrimination, such as unequal hiring requirements, lower salaries and wages, reduced access to good jobs, and forced early retirement (Summerfield, 1994; Du, 2016). For instance, based on the 1990 Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status (Zhongguo funv shehui diwei diaocha, 中国妇女社会地位调查), women earned 77.5%, on average, of the earnings of their male counterparts while, by 2010, the figure had fallen to 65.8% (Sohu.com, 2016; Fincher, 2018). In short, from the distant past to the present, gender equality has not been achieved by women in China.

With respect to domestic relationships, in contemporary society, polygyny has been banned. However, with the rapid development of the economy, many economically developed places report that many people keep second wives (Xiao, 2011). For instance, in Guangdong province, the ACWF received 20,246 complaints about keeping second wives in 1996 (Sina News, 2000). Gerth (2011) points out that mistresses are a way that cadres can transform political power into wealth and lead a luxurious life. Keeping a mistress or second
wife is sometimes seen as the resurgence of traditional concubinage, as mistresses tend to have long-term extramarital relationships with men and are economic dependents on those men (Xiao, 2011). Mistresses or second wives seldom receive respect from the public.

Given this persistent gender inequity across several dimensions of family and public circumstances, an examination of gender discourses in daily life, especially as framed through representations of men and women in mass media, can offer important insights into contemporary gender roles and expectations. According to Fairclough (1995, p. 2), media has power which can influence “knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations, social identities.”. In the case of China, the state has had the potential to shape these discourses through the role that the CCP has had through several decades of control over the media system. This thesis investigates the ways in which gender images are represented in news reports about corruption news in order to shed light on how gender discourses in news media may reflect or contribute to prevailing gender inequalities in Chinese society.

1.2 Media Discourses and Social Changes

Since 1978, the Chinese state has exerted control over the media discourses about the state although other forms of media have also emerged in relation to different kinds of content. During the Maoist period (1949-1979), the media was entirely funded by the state, which meant that the state exerted strict control over the number of media outlets that existed, as well as the length, content, and format of any content produced by these outlets (Hassid, 2008). All the financial support came from the government (Hassid, 2008). During this period, in order to stress gender equality, all men and women were called comrades (tongzhi, 同志). Women were often portrayed as genderless mothers (clothes did not indicate gender, and gender was rarely spoken about publicly), peasants, and workers. However, with the Opening and Reform Policy in the 1980s, the state media system started to move from totalitarianism to market authoritarianism, resulting in what Winfield and Peng (2005) have
described as a system with two lines: the bottom line and the Party line. Media institutions can be divided into three categories based on their positioning in the field: the official mainstream media; trade papers and regional media; and fringe media (Winfield & Peng, 2005). Official mainstream media, such as Xinhua News Agency, People's Daily and CCTV, are directly owned and operated by the state (Winfield & Peng, 2005). Trade papers and regional media are not directly controlled by the state government, while fringe media, such as internet websites, are financially and managerially independent and have the most freedom from government control, although, in reality, the CCP also has the “great firewall” that censors the Internet.

In China, media content and discourses work for political power but reflect the contemporary social context and culture as well, so there are some interesting characteristics since media reform. On the one hand, the media representation of women has shifted to reflect changing roles within emerging social and cultural contexts. As more and more women entered the labour force and began to assume different work and family roles, a new depiction of a “strong woman” who focused more on professional success than family began to emerge; however, in the late 1990s, media depictions of women once again shifted, placing more emphasis on beauty and sexuality (Yuxin & Ho, 2006). On the other hand, state media continued to promote President Xi Jinping’s image as “Xi Dada” (big daddy Xi) during the first several years of his presidency (Fincher, 2018). “Xi Dada” reflects President Xi Jinping’s aspirations to manage the nation as the father of the Chinese nation (Fincher, 2018). Since China does not have an independent media system, it is necessary to examine how women are portrayed in official media discourses, particularly with respect to whether women have achieved gender equality as the Chinese government claims. One way to assess this is to understand how women are represented in news reports concerning corruption, which is a major focus of government attention. If women have truly achieved equality with
men, it would be expected that they would be similarly positioned to be involved in corrupt activities and to be depicted and treated in the same way as men when they are accused of or exposed for committing corrupt acts.

1.3 Anti-Corruption Campaign and Corruption in Media Discourses

Launched in 2012, China’s anti-corruption campaign has generated considerable media discourse on corruption, all of which is tightly controlled by the CCP. My analysis follows that of Keliher and Wu (2016), who define corruption broadly as cases in which public officials or government officials obtain personal gain by abusing their power and at the expense of the public interest. In China, this type of corruption includes economic crimes, official malfeasance, and individual misbehaviour indicating moral decay (Zhu, Lu, & Shi, 2012). For instance, bribery and embezzlement belong to the category of economic crimes, while having a mistress is an example of individual misbehaviour (Zhu et al., 2012). At present, Chinese officials are in the midst of the nation’s biggest anti-corruption campaign to date, as President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has spread throughout the whole country. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is regarded as “higher profile, less compromising, and more sustained than those of the past” (Keliher & Wu, 2016, p. 6). Based on data obtained from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s (CCDI) website, 414,000 officials have been disciplined by the party for corruption, with another 201,600 having been prosecuted since November 2012 (Keliher & Wu, 2016). Keliher and Wu (2016) argue that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has changed China’s political culture in various ways, such as not giving a red-envelope. Although many studies examined Xi’s anti-corruption campaign from a political perspective, few studies have analysed gender dynamics and representations of gender in these corruption cases.

State ownership of the media enables the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to manipulate the information the public receives, which in turn allows it to shape the dominant
political narrative (Walker & Orttung, 2014). For example, both the Xinhua News Agency and the People’s Daily are supposed to influence public opinion about national and international events. Although China has so-called fringe media, and its media system has changed its framework in recent years by adopting “Western news values and practices to sustain operations or to flourish in China’s authoritarian market economy” (Luther & Zhou, 2005, p. 857), the media system is not free from censorship. Instead, it is still largely controlled by the Chinese government, as has been illustrated by key examples such as the firewall software used by the government to block Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—actions which have led to Google dropping its service to mainland China. The government fully controls the coverage of official cases of corruption that are highly politically sensitive and that could potentially cause social unrest. For example, in high-profile cases “such as the former Beijing party secretary Chen Xitong and mayor Wang Baosen in 1995, newspapers were] required to use the so-called standard draft (Tonggao, 通告) provided by the Xinhua News Agency” (Zhu, et al., 2012). Such rules can be found in the sixteenth and seventeenth articles in the Provisions for the Administration of Internet News Information Services (Hulianwang Xinwen Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding [2005]): “units of Internet News Information Services should forward public news (including political news, economic news, military news, diplomatic news, and comments) from central, provincial, and local news units.” This thesis has been motivated by these special features of the Chinese media system and its approach to reporting on official corruption, and it seeks to identify and highlight the rules relating to the reporting of political news. Moreover, this thesis is centrally concerned with developing an understanding of differences in how men and women are represented in the media’s coverage of corruption cases and identifying the factors that contribute to these differences.
1.4 Research Questions and Chapter Organization

While the CCP has created a great number of job opportunities for women since 1978, female cadres in China have always been significantly outnumbered by their male counterparts. According to the Xinhua News Agency’s report, *The First Time that the Chinese Government Clearly Decided the Ratio of Female Suffragettes* (Wu & Zhang, 2007), it was decided at the Tenth National People's Congress that women should represent at least 22% of the total representatives at future Congresses. However, the election results showed that women ultimately only accounted for 20.24% of the elected representatives, which was slightly lower than the regulated ratio (Wu & Zhang, 2008). Besides low ratios, there are very few opportunities for women to become high-profile-level cadres. For instance, since the PRC was founded in 1949, only five women, including Wu Guixian, Chen Muhua, Wu Yi, Liu Yandong and Sun Chunlan, have been the Vice-Premiers of the State Council (Guan, 2018).

Despite persistent female underrepresentation in government positions, the Chinese government continues to claim that it has made great efforts to promote gender equality. According to the white paper *Gender Equality and Women’s Development in China* (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015), the total number of women employed nationwide in 2013 was 346.6 million, which accounts for approximately 45% of the total employed population. However, throughout the white paper, there is no mention of whether women have been treated equally in media discourses. This gap raises the need to examine how gender is portrayed in news discourses, and especially in those related to corruption.

This study’s main purpose is to utilize an analytical framework (Foucault’s power-knowledge) to explain gender inequality in media discourses and to answer the following research questions:
(1) How are women, overall, described in news reports and comments about corruption in China?

(2) Is there any difference between the ways in which women and men are depicted in news reports about corruption? If so, what is the difference? and

(3) What do any observed differences reveal about the nature of power and gender relations in contemporary China?

A review of women’s roles and status in contemporary China can provide insights into the relationship between expectations towards women and the broader social and political environment. Insights into these issues are particularly important for policymakers who wish to promote gender equality.

Using the power-knowledge theory as a framework, this study draws upon content analysis and critical discourse analysis to identify media discourses that reproduce and promote traditional gender expectations. This theory is applied to two aspects of these discourses: first, to explore how power is exercised in media discourses, that is, what do the media representations in news reports on corruption reveal about traditional gender relations and the nature of government power and interests in contemporary China and, second, to make possible an understanding of the ways in which traditional discourses about gender and politics represent the penetration into daily life of broader power/knowledge relations.

This study has nine chapters. Chapter One provides an introduction to the study, including a brief summary of gender inequality, media systems and the government’s recent anti-corruption campaign, and a discussion of the key research questions. Chapter Two contains a literature review that focuses on how women’s duties changed following the founding of the PRC, as well as the existing research on gender representation in news media. Chapter Three details this study’s theoretical framework, including the relationship between
power and knowledge, traditional feminity and masculinity, the ruling party’s construction of its image, the function of leader’s speeches and three power-knowledge apparatus (the ACWF, the family system and the education system), and the relationship between the Chinese media system and the Panopticon. Chapter Four describes the methodology that is used to conduct this research, including a detailed account of the research methods, research data, and how that data will be used. News reports from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) are used to conduct content analysis of numerical representations of female cadres and depictions of females. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is applied to news articles from the CCDI and the commercial websites, Sina.com, Sohu.com, Ifeng.com, and 163.com, to determine whether and how women and men are depicted differently by governmental and commercial news media sources. Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven present the findings of the CA and CDA. As will be shown in Chapter Five, the CA results indicate that female cadres are under-represented in corruption news reports, while the CDA results suggest that women in corruption news stories are more likely to be portrayed as “sources of trouble.” Chapter Six and Chapter Seven also explore the relationships between men, women and the ruling party. Chapter Eight discusses factors which influence gender relations that are found in corruption news. Specifically, this chapter explains how the ACWF promotes the CCP’s ideologies and policies while ignoring women’s issues, how the family imparts traditional ideologies, how the education system normalizes the CCP’s achievements and how media censorship works to tighten the ideological control. Chapter Eight also provides insights into the relationship between traditional culture and the legitimacy of the CCP. Finally, Chapter Nine provides an overview of the research findings, outlines directions for future research, and offers some concluding thoughts.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter addresses the literature that analyses women’s social positions and media representations. It first reviews studies that highlight women’s roles and status in contemporary China, then summarizes the literature on gender representation in the news before reviewing studies that explore gender inequality in news media. Because there is relatively little literature on gender representation in the news about corruption, I focus on gender issues in news media.

2.1 Women’s Roles and Status in Contemporary China

In this section, I discuss women’s roles after 1949 ---- the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). There are three periods in the post-revolution era: the Maoist era, the Cultural Revolution, and the Opening and Reform era. The Chinese government continues to claim in official propaganda that it is committed to gender equality, but in many aspects, this is not the case. Although the infamous oppression towards women in traditional society was considered the worst period, current society is still a patriarchal society (Jiang, 2009; Xiao, Mehrotra, & Zimmerman, 2011).

2.1.1 Women’s Roles and Status in Maoist Era (1949-1966)

In this period, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believed that women were emancipated through their participation in work and being given a series of rights by law. However, it turned out that these forms of women’s emancipation were for the country’s economic growth and women’s images were genderless.

The Maoist era, which was from 1949 to 1966, was a period during which the CCP was struggling to maintain their power and dominance, while individuals were expected to subordinate their interests to the party (Leung, 2003). At that time, the way to indicate power and dominance was to control the means of production and distribution of resources and to
develop the economy (Leung, 2003). In this sense, women’s participation in work came to be regarded as a way to advance the new country’s economy and a way to promote gender equality (Stacey 1984; Schein 2001; Du 2016; Chen, 2009). To motivate women’s participation, Chairmen Mao Zedong proposed a famous slogan: “women can hold up half the sky.” Women participated in almost all industries just as men did, even doing some jobs that required heavy labour. To help the development of society and gain support from women, besides encouraging women to participate in work, the central government sought to emancipate women via revising the Marriage Law and the Land Reform. The new Marriage Law was implemented in 1950, under which women were entitled to equal rights with men with laws to ensure that they had joint property rights to inheritance, marriage and divorce; and some age-old practices were banned, including concubinage, dowry, child marriage, and foot binding (Hershatter, 2004; Sargeson, 2013; Xiao et al., 2011). Later, Land Reform was implemented, under which land was allocated to individual peasants, no matter male or female, and women were motivated to participate in production activities (Leung, 2003).

However, such changes after the foundation of the People’s Republic China (PRC) were regarded as supports for the state rather than as a means for women’s liberation. First, to prove gender equality in labour participation, women had to contribute to production equally with men (Wolf, 1985). Mao did not truly respect women as individuals but encouraged women to work to bolster economic production. Second, the Marriage Law did not change much, compared with the achievement of the May Fourth Movement. Third, for the Land Reform, women did have the right to take part in production activities; however, the land was still registered under the names of men who were still considered as the heads of the family (Leung, 2003). These strategies were meant to support the state, the power of CCP, and economic production. Although Mao claimed that the Marriage Law and Land Reform were to liberate women and construct a liberal socialism social order, such measures did not
change the gender order or gender relations radically. At that time, women’s associations were founded nationwide, and women were working outside just like men. Simultaneously women took part in domestic labour, such as cooking and washing. This was still a gendered division of labour, however, as “little had been done to remove the feudal patriarchal attitudes and concepts that gave rise to gender relations of male dominance” (Leung, 2003, p. 365). What’s more, women’s behaviour was sexually conservative, and men were still the breadwinners (Xiao et al., 2011). For instance, women at that time were genderless, depicted as soldiers, mothers, peasants and workers. Women’s images were highly connected with the family and the party.

2.1.2 Women’s Roles and Status in Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)

During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), class differences were greatly emphasized by official propaganda, and daily life was highly politicalized, while gender was considered as secondary to the large project of the revolution. From the mid-1960s, the government built a restricted political hierarchy based on individuals’ family origins. For instance, if an individual belonged to the “good class,” which included peasants, workers, revolutionary cadre, and revolutionary soldiers, he or she would benefit from a series of benefits in “job allocation, promotions, wages, housing, migration to cities, and social services” (Yang & Yan, 2017, p.66). Another political campaign which greatly influenced people’s lives were “the Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement” (shangshan xiaxiang yundong, 上山下乡运动), in which millions of educated youth in cities were sent for reeducation to rural areas to work as farmers and workers. As women gained public roles as proletarian fighters and revolutionaries in that period, gender equality was promoted by the state in the form of encouraging women’s participation in the labour market and encouraging women to dress as men. In some extreme cases, women wore shapeless clothing just like men and behaved in a masculine manner. Such women were so-called “iron
women.” In official propaganda, notions of “iron girls/ iron women” were used to praise women who did work in traditionally male-dominated area (Yang & Yan, 2017; Honig, 2000; Yihong, Manning, & Chu, 2006; Sun & Chen, 2015), although these women still needed to carry on the noble functions of mother and wife at home (Leung, 2003). In the Cultural Revolution, women in the public realm were desexualized and expected to be completely loyal to the party. At that time, gender issues were largely replaced by class conflicts and gender inequality was masked by men-like working standards and images.

In sum, from 1949 to 1976, although CCP tried to change women’s status to more equal levels, gender inequality still perpetuated throughout society. Women’s participation in work contributed to the nation’s production rather than gender reform, and the government did not change gender inequalities in many areas, including the gendered division of household labour and gender discrimination in wages and the workplace (Sun & Chen, 2015; Bian, Logan & Shu, 2000). To some degree, women suffered triple burdens during the Maoist period: perform duties as a wife, a worker and a party member.

### 2.1.3 Women’s Roles and Status after 1976

In 1978, the Chinese Government decided to implement a policy of Opening and Reform. This reform aimed at economic development. However, this reform caused women to suffer even more discriminations in social life and serve as tools for political power, while anti-discrimination legislation became an empty discourse.

Such reform brought changes to many aspects of life, especially in the labour market, and changed the working environment (Westwood, 1998; Leung, 2003). According to Gender Equality and Women’s Development in China (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015), women’s status has been greatly improved over the past two decades, and the state ensures equal employment rights for women. However, the reform did not greatly improve women’s social status, but made women suffer even more
gender discrimination in labour market, including gender income gap, gender inequality in high-level positions, forced early retirement, high rates of being laid-off, and gender discrimination in hiring (Summerfield, 1994; Du, 2016).

The Labour Insurance Regulations of 1984 clearly stated that women in high-risk professions could retire five years earlier than men who do the same job (Leung, 2003), and women would have to retire at the age of 55, while men would have to retire at the age of 60. These regulations appeared to be trying to protect women from discriminatory practices, but in practice, they placed women in a weaker status and prohibited women from working in the same conditions as men (Leung, 2003). Many forms of discrimination against women are evident. One example is that women are discriminated against in college admissions. Many of China’s top universities set gender ratios for enrollment, which female applicants need to have much higher scores than their male counterparts, as men were supposed to be more employable than women after graduation (Sharma, 2013). Another example is that many companies did not want to pay women for maternity leave, so they claimed in the job advertisement that they would prefer men in the position. Ironically, even some women in leadership positions wanted fewer women in their companies (Rai, 1994). In 1993, in order to protect women’s equal rights to employment, housing and education, the government released anti-discrimination legislation (Xinhua, April 14, 1992; as cited in Leung, 2003). Although legislation ensured equal treatment between men and women in the working environment, actual practices did not guarantee gender equality. Also, many employers and companies cut welfare, such as medical care, for working women (Leung, 2003). What is more, by the reform, much social welfare provision and social services which used to belong to the state responsibility were privatized, such transitions have changed care responsibilities to the family, especially women (Du & Dong, 2010; Cook & Dong, 2011; Ji & Wu, 2018; Qian & Jin, 2018; Ji et al., 2017; Sun & Chen, 2015; Kan & He, 2018; Yang, 2013; Li &
In Confucianism, women were expected to take care of the whole family, so China has a long history of leaving the care of the elderly and children to women (Abrahamson, 2016). However, such transitions created double labour for women, as they needed to work outside but take care of the family at home as well.

On the other hand, women’s rights to give birth were also subject to government policies. Under the One-Child Policy, implemented in 1979, one married couple could only have one child, although some exceptions were made, such as for members of ethnic minority groups, who were allowed to have two children. Generally, couples were encouraged to do sterilization after having one child, two children or three children, and wives were encouraged to do IUD insertions (White, 2006). In extreme cases, if a married couple had a second child, this woman would be compelled to undergo abortion (Howden & Zhou, 2014). According to BBC News (2000), since 1980, at least 250 million births were aborted (Yun, 2013). However, things became worse when such a policy combined with male-favouritism, which was deeply rooted in China’s traditional culture (Howden & Zhou, 2014). In some cases, people would seek an abortion if they were not pregnant with a baby boy. This issue is more serious in the countryside, as ultrasonography is widely available. However, based on the Article 35 (Congressional – Executive Commission on China, n.d.), Population and Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic China (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegovu Renkou Yu Jihua Shengyu Fa), “use of ultrasonography or other techniques to identify fetal sex of non-medical purposes is strictly prohibited.” Another issue related to male-favouritism is female infanticide, which is an ancient traditional practice in China. In terms of female infanticide, female newborn children would be killed by drowning or being exposed to the elements. Yun (2013) argues that, “The unprecedented oppressive practice and trend of female infanticide in China has immeasurable negative social implications not only on gender imbalance but also on perpetuating sexism and oppression against women in Chinese
society” (p. 590). Critics claim that the One-Child policy violates human rights, could cause emotional hardship for some families which lost their only child, and could cause difficulties for the family’s second child to get a legal identity (Howden & Zhou, 2014). However, in order to solve problems with an ageing population and a shrinking labour force, the Chinese government had relaxed the one-child policy in 2011 by allowing both parents come from one-child family to have two children, while in 2013, families with one parent from a one-child family could have two children (Howden & Zhou, 2014). What is more, the government announced at the end of 2015 that all married couples could have two children (Fincher, 2018). Since no baby boom has yet appeared, the government has promoted the policy by considering the provision of birth rewards and subsidies and lowering the legal marriage age. Fincher (2018) observes that media campaigns have been launched to improve birthrates, encouraging urban, educated women to marry and have babies.

These transitions mainly happened in urban areas, while in rural places, the situations have not changed much. According to Jiang (2009), women are still subservient to men, do all housework, and do not make important decisions. In some cases, women cook a lot of dishes for guests, but cannot sit with men and guests at the table (Jiang, 2009). What is more, after Deng’s reform, many men went to cities to look for jobs, and because of the Hukou system (Household register system), they did not have access to welfare services in the city, so their wives and children had to stay in the countryside, contributing to a system of “men working, women farming” (Liang et al., 2014, p. 908). While these men were undocumented migrant workers, the number of women who stayed at home in rural places was more than 47 million in 2005 (Liang et al., 2014). In this sense, some rural places still have traditional labour divisions in which women stay at home and men do jobs outside.

Although the Constitution says individuals have the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech, women’s movements and feminists’ activities are restricted or controlled
by the state. While the market economy allows news media to produce sensational news and attention-grabbing news on women’s issues, issues related to women’s rights are seldom reported by news agencies (Chen, 2009). In recent years, after President Xi Jinping took power, the government has exerted ideological control more tightly. Voices representing women’s rights and feminists’ activities have been muted. There are various tools to control their voices, including restricting NGO registrations and deleting blogs and posts on social media (Fincher, 2018). In 2017, when the #METOO movement spread to China, many women tagged this topic in Weibo (Chinese version of Twitter) and shared their experiences and ideas about sexual harassment; however, Weibo authorities deleted all posts related to the #METOO movement.

In sum, despite Deng’s reform, women still suffered discrimination, especially in the workplace and in public discourse, as well as in domestic spheres, reinforced by regulations as well as in practice, maintaining long traditions in which China’s society has not fully respected women. In many aspects, Chinese women do not receive equal treatment as men. My research focuses on whether women receive equal status as men in the news about corruption and how these representations may be related to broader gender patterns in Chinese society. The following section will review gender relationships in news media and the relationship between gender and corruption news in China.

2.2 Research on Gender Representation in News Media

2.2.1 Gender and News Media

The central issue in the analysis of gender representations in the media is whether the media has played a role in promoting particular images of femininity and masculinity (Lemish, 2008). This issue has been explored in different contexts with reference to different forms of media and media content such as commercial advertisements, newspapers, television news, and dramas. In terms of gender relations in the news media, various aspects
are typically explored, including differences between male and female images (Bogren, 2013; Armstrong, Boyle, & McLeod, 2012; Niemi & Pitkänen, 2017; Grandy, 2014; Patterson, Emslie, Mason, Gergie, & Hilton, 2016; Simon, 2014; Zhang, Bang, & Jamil, 2015; Maiorescu, 2016; Sendén, Sikström, & Lindholm, 2015; Musto, Cooky, & Messner, 2017; Wang, 2009), reporters’ perspectives on news selection (De Cabo, Gimeno, Martínez, & López, 2014; North, 2016; Liao & Lee, 2014; Shor, van de Rijt, Miltsov, Kulkarni, & Skiena, 2015; Astafurova & Aleksandrova, 2016), viewers’ selection of news (Kleemans, Hendriks Vettehen, Beentjes, & Eisinga, 2012), elder women’s underrepresentation on news media (Lemish & Muhlbauer, 2012), and negative and positive images of women (Debbagh, 2012).

In the literature on gender representation in news media, gender boundaries which exist between male and female images represent the most heated topic. With respect to women, gender differences in media images are negative; that is, such differences are related to female underrepresentation, male overrepresentation, and gender stereotypes. Cullity and Younger (2009) found that in some pre-eminent media sources, such as BBC, women were under-represented in headlines and images in the news front pages. Armstrong, Boyle, and McLeod (2012) observed news coverage of protests and found men were more likely to be subjects of stories, and appeared more frequently as sources in stories and bylines, while women were more likely to appear in non-political news. Sendén et al. (2015) found that females were under-represented in news messages, as he was mentioned about nine times more than she. Even in Finland, a “female-friendly” country, women were found to be under-represented as experts in the news (Niemi & Pitkänen, 2017). Women’s under-representation in news media contributes to broad gender inequalities (Sendén et al., 2015; Niemi & Pitkänen, 2017). However, such an imbalance in media representation is found in other kinds of news all around the world. For instance, females and males were connected with different features in the news about alcohol, but changing these images was not easy. While women
who drink were more likely to be described as problematic, men’s drinking problems were connected with violence or disorder (Patterson et al., 2016). Wang (2009) claimed that tabloid news in Taiwan focused on physical attractiveness and marriage issues which presented women as “money worshipers,” “belligerent,” and the focus of family and social pressures regarding marriage and sexuality. Wang (2009) concluded that such stereotypes used to describe female artists’ representations were heavily based on gendered ideas and prevailing thoughts on marriages. However, gender boundaries in media representations is a worldwide persistent question. Wang (2009) observed that gender stereotypes persist in certain social contexts, while Simon (2014) argued that changing these negative images required a power struggle. These results show that media images tend to be highly stereotyped and deep-rooted in cultures.

Although gender representation is conveyed through news texts to audiences, news reporters’ preferences also contribute to this representation. Studying British news texts, Astafurova and Aleksandrova (2016) argue that reporters’ gender identity has an influence on how news is reported. Female reporters typically pay more attention to the economic, legal and political consequences of disasters in relation to certain social groups or individuals, while male reporters tend to use political, economic, legal and scientific terms in their reports (Astafurova & Aleksandrova, 2016). Similarly, De Cabo et al. (2013) claim that female reporters tend to include more females than males in their reports in Spanish online newspapers. However, by interviewing 459 professional journalists in Hong Kong, Liao and Lee (2014) claimed that married journalists were more likely to show gender preferences in selecting news topics. Besides reporters’ gender and marital status, Chen (2009) pointed out that uncritical and patriarchal social contexts could lead media workers to be unconscious with respect to gender issues or to be unable to offer alternative perspectives due to pressures
from institutions. Changing gender representation in news media is not only about changing content, but also changing attitudes of reporters and social environments.

Other literature depicts gender relations in news media from specific perspectives. From the viewers’ perspective, Kleemans et al. (2012) argued that men were more likely targets than women for tabloid packaging, while Wang (2009) concluded that one main focus of audiences when reading tabloids is physical attractiveness. Things become worse when gender is combined with age. According to Lemish and Muhlbauer (2012), old women are under-represented in popular culture. However, female images can appear in two different forms. For example, studying Moroccan broadcast news and comparing news content from two channels, Debbagh (2012) claims that both traditional women’s roles and independent women’s roles are portrayed in news media. While women are associated with domesticity from conservative perspectives, women are also depicted as economically independent (Debbagh, 2012).

In sum, the literature on gender and news summarized in this section reveals that gender boundaries between female and male images in news media were widely found by previous studies. Gender issues exist in various aspects, including reporter and viewers’ preferences in selecting the news and other media representations. Although things appear a little better in the study of news in Morocco, reasons for these differences should be explored, by expanding the analysis beyond a few specific social contexts and societies, and by drawing on a wider range of methodologies than the most commonly used ones that focus only on either content analysis or critical discourse analysis solely in order to provide a more thorough picture of gender representations in news media. In order to study the portrayal of gender in the news about corruption, I also examine gender relations in reporting on political issues.
2.2.2 Gender and Political News

Many publications explore the relations between gender and news concerning politics. Generally, these studies can be divided into three categories: gender representations in news coverage about female political candidates (Kittilson & Fridkin, 2008; Major & Coleman, 2008; Meeks, 2013; Hayes, Lawless, & Baitinger, 2014; Gershon, 2012; Zurbriggen & Sherman, 2010; Hooghe, Jacobs, & Claes, 2015; Bode & Hennings, 2012; Kim, 2012), politicians’ wives’ images in news coverage of election campaigns (Higgins, & Smith, 2013; Harmer, 2016; Winfield & Friedman, 2003), and women’s images in news about political criminals (Lavie-Dinur, Karniel, & Azran, 2015).

Gender differences in political candidates are the main focus of scholarship related to gender and political news. Studying editorial cartoons during the 2008 U.S. presidential election campaign, Zurbriggen and Sherman (2010) claimed that Barack Obama was more likely than Hilary Clinton to be favoured by the cartoons, whereas Clinton, in contrast to Obama, was more likely to be portrayed as ugly. Similar results were found in Belgian News Broadcasts (2003-2011). According to Hooghe et al. (2015), female politicians were allocated less speaking time in general news broadcasts, compared to their male counterparts. Studying election news coverage in Canada, Australia, and the United States, Kittilson and Fridkin (2008) claimed there tended to be fewer media coverage devoted to female candidates, but also such reporting was more likely to describe candidates’ traits by gender. However, studying news coverage of four female politicians - Elizabeth Dole, Claire McCaskill, Hillary Clinton, and Sarah Palin - Meeks (2013) found that women received more news coverage than their male peers, though gender stereotypes existed in terms of novelty, issues, and trait coverage. For instance, women who successfully won political office were described as novelties and norm breakers, although the number of these women has been increasing for ten years (Meeks, 2013). Another study, focusing on Vice Presidential
Candidates in the 2008 U.S. elections, had similar results. Although Sarah Palin received more coverage than Joseph Biden among newspapers, televisions, and blogs, gender gaps existed in such coverage (Bode & Hennings, 2012). While news articles were likely to mention Palin’s family and physical appearance, news articles about Biden were likely to mention electability and issues (Bode & Hennings, 2012). The significance of gender representations in press media coverage was also verified in a study of New York Times’ articles related to Clinton and Palin, which concluded that the newspaper reinforced gender stereotypes by emphasizing women’s novelty (Meeks, 2013). The situation tends to be worse if gender intersects with race identity. According to Gershon (2012), female politicians who were minorities received less, and slightly negative media coverage compared with their counterparts. On the contrary, Major and Coleman (2008) argued that media coverage had different foci based on candidates’ gender and identity. While female candidates received more attention in relation to female issues, minority candidates received more coverage on race issues (Major & Coleman, 2008). Although news media portrays female candidates in stereotyped ways, female candidates can manage their images on their own websites. Studying news coverage of a Korean election campaign, Kim (2012) concluded that the female candidate, Geunhye Park, tends to build a diverse image on her personal websites by showing interest in various social aspects. However, in most cases, in these studies, no matter where female candidates are from and how much news coverage female candidates or politicians received, long-standing gender stereotypes, including a focus on physical appearance, existed in the coverage, especially for female candidates who were racial or ethnic minorities.

There has been some analysis of media coverage of First Ladies’ physical appearance as well as that of female candidates (Major & Coleman, 2008). For instance, Winfield and Friedman (2003) found four major types of representation of “First Ladies: as an escort, in a
protocol role, in anoblesse oblige role, and as a policy advisor” (p.548). The news media in the U.S. tend to focus less on politicians’ wives’ physical appearance than is the case in Britain, where politicians’ wives are still struggling with expectations to be an omnipotent role model for the public. Studying the 2010 General Election, Higgins and Smith (2013) claimed that mainstream newspapers still focused on wives’ physical appearance, and Labour and the Conservatives were more likely to integrate politicians’ wives into the election campaign. Specifically, based on coverage of British election campaigns from 1918 to 2000, Harmer (2015) argued that politicians’ wives were described, variously, as clever and beautiful women, traditional stay at home wives, and having their own ideas on politics. Because the number of women candidates is less than male candidates, wives can be a means to attract women voters (Harmer, 2015). Do media portrayals of politicians’ wives have the same qualities as female candidates? Apart from physical appearance, both politicians’ wives and female candidates should be traditional and political. But female candidates were given more coverage on their opinions on policy issues. Female images in political news tend to be shown based on gender traits; female candidates tend to have fewer media coverage compared with male candidates; and wives of politicians should be traditional and political.

We have seen that most news coverage conveys positive images about politicians’ wives and gender gaps between male and female politicians’ images, but what is the case for females who committed or are implicated in political crimes? Gender representations in the news about corruption is an under-researched area. By studying news coverage of Israeli female political criminals, Lavie-Dinur, Karniel and Azran claimed (2015) that news coverage described the motivations of female political criminals as failure to fulfill their traditional roles. Traditional roles or gender stereotypes are connected with women in the public sphere, and gender stereotypes can become criteria which people may use to judge
women’s behaviour. The next section discusses the relatively limited studies of women’s images and gender relations in news media in China.

2.2.3 Gender and Corruption News in China

As the discussion of previous studies has shown, media representations of gender are complex, influenced by factors that include social environments and patriarchal ideologies, reporters’ personalities, and viewers’ selections. Although news about corruption can be categorized as political news, very little literature has addressed gender discourses in the news about corruption in China. Using discourse analysis to study 28 news reports on official corruption in state media, Chen (2017) found that “keeping a second wife” (bao ernai, 包二奶) was emphasized by news media when reporting officials’ corruption. By doing this, the gendered narrative has transformed the official corruption from a matter of political failure to sexual issues (Chen, 2017). Such a narrative came from traditional political storytelling, such as describing women as foxy witches (hulijing, 狐狸精) while owing the collapse of a dynasty to women, and was utilized by the government when talking about corruption cases. However, after interviewing 35 women, Chen (2017) found that interviewees resisted the official gendered narrative.

There are two points worth discussing here. First, the article focused on “keeping a second wife” as the central point of the description of women in corruption news. Chen (2017) explained this phrase to refer to having concubines in traditional society, a practice condemned by the CCP in the 1950s. However, I would suggest using the word “bao ernai” directly without translation, as this phrase carries more information than just being translated as “keeping a second wife.” Many previous studies translated “bao ernai” as keeping a mistress or keeping a second wife. Superficially, “bao ernai” and mistress and second wife have one thing in common: they are affairs outside legal marriages. However, the Chinese phrase “bao ernai” is a conjunction between Chinese history, traditional culture and laws.
First of all, in traditional Chinese society, a man could have one wife (qi, 妻) and many concubines (qie, 妾). In a rich family, the wife is called “shaonainai (少奶奶),” and “ernai (er means second in English, nai short for shaonainai)” can be understood as a way to distinguish another woman from the wife. However, as this word originally stems from concubines, nowadays, it is discriminatory to call women who are not the wife but the mistress as “ernai.” Second, to know the reason why “ernai” is discriminatory, we must decode concubines’ status. In traditional society, concubines had lower status in a family, as illustrated in two ways. As observed in chapter 1, women had a lower status than men in ancient society, but there was also a hierarchy among women. In traditional society, if a woman was a wife, then she had a higher status than a concubine; if a woman was a concubine, she was considered to have higher status than a prostitute; if a woman was a prostitute, she had a higher status than a female slave. On the other hand, women had no choice to be concubines, as they came from poor families and were usually sold to rich families (He-Yin, 1907). However, a female slave or a prostitute could be concubines of the rich families if the husband of the family wanted. In ancient society, a female slave or a prostitute could be daughters from poor families or from criminal families, while a wife should come from a family which had a similar social status to the husband’s family. So, concubines could be abused by the wife of the family. So, concubines in ancient society did not only mean that a woman came from a poor family but also that she had a lower status than a wife. Keeping concubines carried information about social structure and hierarchy, and was banned by the CCP. In contemporary society, “bao ernai” is illegal. From the above analysis, “bao ernai” is a discriminatory phrase for women, so translating this as mistress or concubine might miss historical backgrounds and discrimination against certain women. In this sense, examining the social context behind phrases in news about corruption would help to determine whether these phrases actually impart discrimination against women.
The second point to mention here is political storytelling. Chen (2017) observes that China has a long history of blaming women for dynastic political crises, and the CCP had used this tradition to describe Jiang Qing (江青), who was Mao’s wife, as a ‘foxy witch’ when the state media talked about Mao’s mistakes in the Cultural Revolution. Although foxy witch has its cultural script, such a female image cannot be understood fully through a cultural approach, as political power controls the media system. As Fincher (2016) observes, media, especially state media, works to support government decisions and propaganda. Therefore, it is important to explore how, besides traditional cultural influences on women, the CCP exerts its power on gender issues or corruption issues. How does the CCP intertwine with the traditional culture script to form gender discourses in China? How does media censorship promote this tradition, especially in a period in which that media system has become more commercialized?

2.3 Explanations of Gender Representations in News Media

This section focuses on theoretical frameworks employed in previous studies. Within existing research, there is very limited analysis that focuses directly on gender representation in Chinese news about corruption, although several studies focus on gender representation in news media. Most of these studies are empirical or descriptive empirical studies though some employ feminist theory or cultural approaches to understand gender representation. Feminist theories have been used mostly to understand resistance and ways to empower women, while cultural approaches are more likely to be used to explain gender stereotypes.

According to Chen (2017), women were depicted in news reports on corruption as “a source of trouble.” However, by interviewing 35 participants, the author argued that people who participated in the interviews did not refer to women as a source of trouble. Based on the feminist politics of media, such counter-narratives could be regarded as resistance. After pointing out that older women were under-represented in popular culture, Lemish and
Mühlbauer (2012) suggested that feminist therapy could empower older women by having them watch movies and television programs which involved powerful female roles. On the other hand, some studies explained gender gaps in news media with reference to cultural factors (Chen, 2017; Bogren, 2013). Referring to the descriptions of women in news reports about corruption as “a source of trouble,” Chen (2017) pointed out that such narratives came from enduring misogyny within political storytelling traditions, which prevented women from participating in politics. Similarly, Bogren (2013) claimed that women’s images in news about psychotropics use and drinking depended on how certain cultures recognized the psychoactive substance and whether “bad” characteristics were connected with drinking among women. A cultural approach is powerful when analyzing cultural backgrounds which generate women’s images. But it is only one part of the picture for analyzing news about corruption. In order to study Chinese corruption news, it is important to know not only how Chinese traditional culture defines gender relations, but also how the political system utilizes such gender relations, and how media systems help to reinforce gender differences in news reports and comments about corruption.

In sum, although most previous studies on gender images in news reports about corruption have tended to be empirical, the most commonly employed theoretical frameworks - a feminist approach/theory that pays attention to resistance and empowerment of women, and a cultural approach that focuses on reasons that produced gender images in news media – have not been able fully to provide an integrated picture to explain gender representation in news about corruption in China. In the next chapter, I outline an alternative approach, based on Foucault’s analysis of power-knowledge relations, as the theoretical framework for this study.
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Limitations of Existing Related Literature

On the whole, academic literature on gender representations in news media reveals that women are under-represented or stereotyped in media coverage, demonstrating and reinforcing significant gender boundaries. The literature concerning gender representation in political news is mainly focused on media coverage and images of female politicians. It reveals that despite increased media coverage for female politicians, women are still stereotyped. As observed in the previous chapter, women who do not conform to expected or normative gender roles, such as those who commit corruption or resist official propaganda, are described as “bad women” or depicted as “a source of trouble.”

I question whether cultural approaches used in some previous studies to explore the cultural roots of media representations are adequate for understanding gender representation in news about corruption. The scholarship of cultural approaches demonstrates that media content is presented in ways that are deeply-rooted in traditional gender norms. However, some issues require understandings that take into consideration factors beyond the cultural approach. For instance, in China, state-media continue to use the phrase “bao ernai” – originally related to ancient China’s social hierarchy and discrimination towards women who were concubines - to describe officials’ extramarital affairs. To know the reasons why they use this phrase, one author (Chen, 2017) traced the traditional cultural norms and rules used to describe women as sources of trouble ---- women were considered to be responsible for the crackdown of a dynasty. However, traditional discourses are not produced and reproduced automatically, but are embedded in processes related to the exercise of power. According to Foucault (1990; 1979), this power is omnipresent and everywhere, and determines domains of knowledge. In his work *The History of Sexuality Volume I* (1990), Foucault found that
educational institutions and devices had imparted discourses of children’s sex, that is “since the eighteenth century it has multiplied the forms of discourse on the subject; it has established various points of implantation for sex; it has coded contents and qualified speakers” (p.29). In this sense, Foucault’s analysis of power-knowledge relations makes it possible to decode power operations in the process of imparting aspects of traditional cultures within modern societies. Gender discourses are widely imparted across social settings through school, family, media, and other institutions.

The media system is especially significant in shaping and conveying regulatory discourses in contemporary China. In previous chapters, it has been observed that China does not have a fully independent media system, and corruption-related news is tightly controlled by the state. Given this situation, how does the government of China execute constant surveillance and censorship of the media system, and what messages does it convey through these media? How can state power be exercised in an overt or hidden way? What is more, according to Foucault (1990), power extends far beyond the state and its regulatory mechanisms, as “a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (p.93). A focus on this invisible power, as well as more visible power relations, is a useful analytical tool for me to explore why certain discourses, including some elements of traditional cultures, circulate in modern Chinese society. My research, which addresses the extent to which these representations may or may not be indicative of contemporary media coverage of women in reports about corruption in China, is informed by Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge but not limited to this model. Based on the research questions, this study focuses on the way women’s images are constructed within this media coverage and seeks to identify power relations that are related to discourses about women. Because these news reports and news articles come especially from the government’s official news agency, it is important to pay
attention not only to cultural factors, but to the power structures embedded within the broader social – political context in China in order to understand this issue.

I am particularly interested in what this may reveal about power relations and the construction of gender roles in a society that maintains an official policy of gender equity. In other words, in what ways do cultural traditions and political systems intersect to influence these descriptions of women? Do cultural traditions form the power that is invisible in daily life? Do political systems exert direct power exercise on gender discourses?

Foucault’s power-knowledge model focuses not so much on the subject of knowledge as on mechanisms by which knowledge is produced (Mills, 2003). The relations of power-knowledge enable me to explore how power-structure influences everyday life and how knowledge reflects power. This study focuses on how traditional characteristics related to women became descriptions of women in corruption news, and how public discourses influence people’s attitudes on women, especially “bad women” in corruption news. In terms of methodology, I use critical discourse analysis, so Foucault’s theory is aligned with this method.

3.2 Foucault’s Theory of Power-Knowledge

One of the major topics of Foucault’s work is the relation of power-knowledge, which he developed in many of his works, including History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish. This theory is quite powerful, as it challenges the status quo by deconstructing the self-evidence of institutions and their power-knowledge base (Newnham, 2014). Foucault used power-knowledge to analyze various social problems and topics, such as madness, clinical practice, medicine, sexuality, and prisons. I first review the relations between power and knowledge and the Panopticon, and then I will map out my use of this theory for my analysis.
3.2.1 Power-Knowledge

Foucault’s notion of power is different from traditional power, which allows one to exert influence upon another person without consent. In Foucault’s masterpiece, *History of Sexuality*, he analyzes the power mechanisms behind sex discourses in everyday life. According to Foucault (1990), “power is everywhere… permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing.…” (p.93). By analyzing the historical process of sexuality, Foucault points out that sex discourses were incorporated into medical and scientific discourses, emphasizing how such combinations operate as mechanisms of control over the entire population. Controlling the population helps to strengthen the state, so a series of mechanisms developed to make people’s biological features become a focus of political strategy (Foucault, 2007; Ahonen, Tienari, Meriläinen, & Pullen, 2014). This power is named as biopower, which refers to ways in which humans may be governed or controlled as living beings, guiding, regulating and directing individuals at a distance (Foucault, 1979, 1990, 2007, 2008; Power, 2011; Ahonen et al., 2014). In other words, power is not related to an entity that exists in specific locations but is, rather, decentralized, silent, inconspicuous and pervasive (Joas & Knobl, 2009). By directing people’s actions and attitudes in everyday life, power produces knowledge and language to depict a discourse (Foucault, 1979; Malatzky & Bourke, 2018). As a way to transform power relations and produce power, discourses are powerful in constructing objects and the truth (Pitsoe & Letseka, 2013). In this sense, biopower works through corruption news discourse by sending messages about behavioural standards related to people involved in corruption scandals. News discourse transforms power relations through the ways in which it constructs the “truth of corruption.” Because corruption news discourse contains traditional gender ideologies (Chen, 2017) and is controlled by the ruling party, I decode the news discourse from two aspects - traditional gender relations and politicians’ words. Specifically, as Figure 3.1 shows, I focus on how these discourses
represent women, men, husband-wife relationships, and politicians’ slogans. Then, I focus on power relations behind news articles; and relations between the traditional culture and the political power. To illustrate power relations, I will focus on several structural factors. Figure 3.1 shows the main elements in the theoretical framework.

**Figure 3.1 Elements of the theoretical framework**

Throughout China’s history, Confucianism has restricted women’s body and thoughts in two ways. First, women should be chaste (*jie*) and virtuous (*zhen*); that is, women’s bodies can only belong to their husbands; if the husband dies, the wife has to commit suicide to remain her faithful to him (Du & Mann, 2003). The best example is suicide committed by widows, as 12,323 widows committed suicide during the Qing dynasty (Du & Mann, 2003). It should be noted that widow suicide also happened at the fall of the Song dynasty and the Ming dynasty, because of fear of rape. Chastity and virtuousness strictly controlled women’s bodies. Requirements related to chastity and virtuousness did not solely emerge as requirements or speeches from intellectuals but reflected the government’s recognitions as well (Du & Mann, 2003). The government praised women who committed suicide after the death of their husbands, as those women were recorded by the *Biographies of Exemplary Women* (*lienü zhuanyu*). Women who refused to follow those requirements would receive punishment and condemnation from the public. In this sense, those women whose body did
not belong to husbands or who had extramarital relations with men were intolerable in ancient society. They were recognized as unchaste and unvirtuous. Many ancient proverbs and stories condemn women as sources of trouble, but seldom condemn wives as sources of trouble. It is necessary to know whether women, who did not appear as wives, received criticism from authors who produce news about corruption.

Second, the husband-wife relationship is the core of Confucian norms and rules (Zang, 2003), emphasizing that women should put the family as the priority in showing their gender identity. Actually, a wife should marry the husband and put the husband’s family as the first priority (Ko, Haboush, Piggott, 2003). In the Maoist period, women attained the ability to pursue careers outside of the home, which represented a great leap forward in terms of gender equality (Yunjuan & Xiaoming, 2007; Xiaoying, 2010; Sun & Chen, 2015). However, due to the withdrawal of publicly funded services in the market transition, women had to work outside of the home and take care of the family at the same time. In order to understand how these dual responsibilities are represented in media discourse, I will focus in part on whether authors of news reports about corruption refer to traditional wifehood to judge women’s behaviours and how women are expected to behave in terms of their roles in the private sphere and in the public sphere.

In Foucault’s terms, bio-power is used to examine attitudes and power exercised on women’s bodies and behaviours. I examine both state and commercial media’s discourses – the words, phrases and sentences they use to describe women involved in corruption scandals.

As traditional gender power structures suggest that men were breadwinners, it is important to examine gender relations in news about corruption. I will focus on discourses related to men and the relationship between men and women. Traditionally, both men and women were required to be virtuous and moral. The ideal men should be morally superior
and would be called “junzi” in Chinese (Clark & Wang, 2004). The core virtues of Confucianism for a man are “ren (humanity, benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (property), zhi (wisdom), xiao (filial piety), ti (brotherly love-love and respect for one’s elder brother)” (Jiang, 2009, p.232). Both education and rituals are ways for a man to become virtuous in the Confucianism sense; after being educated by Confucian classics, a man would be recognized as a good person and citizen (Clark & Wang, 2004). As ancient China was a scholar-gentry class dominated society (Leung, 2003), the ultimate goal of education was to pass the imperial examinations, to be an official and to govern the state with virtuous leadership. Nowadays, at an individual level, the ideal man has changed a little bit, as Liu (2019) observes that hegemonic masculinity has changed from the traditional “wen-wu” ideal (“wen” refers education attainment, and “wu” means physical power) to a complex model with “sex differentiation; heterosexuality; virility; consumerism; and achievement of status, power, and wealth” (p. 298). In order to understand these discourses, I will focus on the way men are depicted in news stories about corruption, including any expectations conveyed for male cadres, and whether different expectations are attributed to corrupt cadres. Then, I will examine the gender relations in the news reports, including whether men take the most responsibility for corruption scandals as they are supposed to be more powerful than women.

The Chinese government likes to build a positive image of Chinese history to make the current system look like the only possible mode of rule for Chinese society. The CCP highlights what it considers to be great achievements, such as the return of Hong Kong, so the CCP emphasizes achievements through different media forms, such as middle school textbooks, TV programs and movies. For instance, the film My People, My Country (wo he wode zuguo), which is a movie to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Foundation of PRC, consists of seven achievements, including the Foundation of PRC, the successful explosion of first atom bomb in the 1960s, the event of the Chinese women volleyball team’s Olympic
gold medal in 1984, the return of Hong Kong, the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the event of the manned spacecraft Shenzhen-11’s return to Earth (Zhang, 2019). On the other hand, for social issues or disasters caused by the CCP or other sensitive matters, such as the brutal suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests and the Cultural Revolution, the CCP simplifies these issues or avoids touching them in various media platforms and historical inquiry. Ironically, Hong Kong’s months-long anti-government protests in 2019 have made Hong Kong issues become sensitive, but the state media try to avoid reporting news that is not good for CCP ruling. It is noteworthy that the textbook of a course about politics does not mention corruption issues (Wang, 2011). In this sense, it is necessary to know how the CCP views corruption scandals and what causes it attributes to corruption, including how corruption can be linked to gender issues, in the ways that news reports about corruption are framed.

Chinese politicians play an important role in establishing gender norms in contemporary China and influencing people’s perceptions of gender. According to Scott (1986), gender is a social construction which is focused on a sexed body and penetrates into various spheres; specifically, “gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power” (p.1067). Even traditional gender discourses that are outdated are utilized by politicians. Premier Zhou Enlai, for example, proposed a role model for women that continued to be connected with traditional women’s roles. He said that women had two production tasks: one is material production; another one is to give birth to more children (Xue, 2016). The slogans of Chairman Mao, as the first Chairman of the PRC, had great influence in Chinese society. Deng Xiaoping, as the person who changed China into a modern society with the opening and reform policy, also employed gender discourses to
support his policies. Similarly, President Xi Jinping also proposed many patriarchal slogans in conjunction with his efforts to strengthen controls on the media system and public speech (Fincher, 2018). For corruption news coverage, I will examine slogans proposed by the current leader of China, President Xi Jinping, to see how the interaction between knowledge of sexuality and political power can influence what people may believe. My analysis will address the content of slogans, how they function in corruption news coverage and the connections between slogans and policy-making.

Both biopower and disciplinary power combine to explain why people believe and normalize their behaviours in order to meet politicians’ requirements. According to Foucault (1990), power, when exercised through discourses about sex, operates in four ways: prohibitions on children’s sex; individualization of sex issues; constant presence in the exercise of power; and devices of sexual saturation. Power cannot exist without an apparatus which produces and reproduces an ever-greater quantity of discourse about sex (Foucault, 1979). One of my research questions, to find out power relations and power structures behind gender discourses in news reports about corruption, seeks to address how institutions govern the knowledge about gender and promote the interests of the CCP. There is a quasi-government organization that is mandated to solve women’s issues and promote gender equality. The organization is the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) (quanguo fulian; 全国妇联). An exploration of this organization can provide insights into how the state represents Chinese women’s day-to-day experiences (Johns, n.d.; Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998). Specifically, I will pay attention to relationships between the ACWF and the ruling party, how the ACWF uses disciplinary power to normalize government policies, and how the ACWF establishes norms for “women” via the exercise of biopower.

The second apparatus is the family system. According to Foucault (1979, 1990, 2008), the family is an example of sovereign power, while disciplinary power could be
regarded as a supplemental power exercise in the family. Sovereign power, which is related to blood-conquest, reconfirms its authority via rituals (Foucault, 2008). In this sense, the family is a power hierarchy with unequal positions among its members (Taylor, 2012). Considering that the family plays essential roles in socialization, I will examine whether the family power structure reproduces patriarchal norms. Whereas the disciplinary system involves permanent supervision, supervision is supplementary to the family (Foucault, 2008). As a sovereign institution, the purpose of a family is to be solid and static (Foucault, 1990). Specifically, via the gradual exercise of disciplinary power, the goal of the family is to produce healthy, normal adults (Taylor, 2012). In this sense, parents monitor their children’s behaviour or ask their children to perform certain behaviours, such as reciting ancient poems. My study will explore whether parental disciplinary power over children reproduces traditional norms.

Foucault’s biopower and disciplinary power work in explaining how school programs could be effective in controlling the student population. For instance, by using Foucault’s biopower, Kalmbach Phillips and Nava (2011) point out that some Latino\a-clustered schools in the USA hire Latino\a teachers to establish role models for Latino\a students in order to control the population of Latino\a students. One way to normalize the power is to emphasize the English language ability of teachers, as speaking English is the norm (Kalmbach Phillips & Nave, 2011). As a socialization institution, education is one of the daily bases for the CCP to indoctrinate the population with state propaganda (Huang, 2015). To establish “the ruling party,” the Chinese government has exerted ideological-political education among young people since 1949 (“Chinese ideo-political education,” 2014). Ideological-political education contains moral education, psychological education, patriotic education, civic education, and professional ethics classes (“Chinese ideo-political education,” 2014; Wang, 2018). Specifically, ideological-political education in China is carried out from elementary school to
universities. I am less interested in whether passing those ideological-political courses is an important criterion for receiving further education than in how this ideological-political education normalizes the CCP's leading roles in social events in key ways, such as changing the history textbooks or making political education courses compulsory in universities.

In sum, for Foucault, power is fundamentally relational (Foucault, 1979, 1980, 1990, 2002; Heizmann & Olssen, 2015), and no structure in social and personal life can escape from the exercise of power (Ghinâraru, 2014). Using Foucault’s power-knowledge enables me to examine discourses and various power structures employed through various institutions, including family, education, the All-China Women’s Federation, and politics, and integrate the exercise of overt and hidden forms of power. However, we cannot fully understand gender relations without analyzing these in conjunction with the media system in China, as it is necessary to know how this media system makes traditional gender roles omnipresent. Because the Chinese media system is not independent and bears some special characteristics, I analyze it with reference to Foucault’s concept of Panopticism.

3.2.2 The Media as Panopticon

There are several issues that should be considered for an understanding of China’s media system. Firstly, unlike in western countries, China’s media system cannot empower different voices. Most western countries have powerful and independent media systems based on principles of freedom of speech and human rights. Although the Chinese government has claimed continuously that Chinese citizens have freedom of speech, it is an empty discourse, as the government treats the media as its mouthpiece and propaganda tool. Secondly, the management of the media system is based on visible regulations and invisible censorship. Here, the Chinese government exerts media censorship without legislation. Thirdly, in recent years, the central state authority has controlled the media system more and more tightly and
applied punishments for people who disobey their requirements. All the above characteristics make the media system special and worthy of separate analysis.

Foucault uses the concept of the panopticon to illustrate how the exercise of power can be practiced in daily life via discourses and gestures. In the book *Discipline and Punish*, “Foucault uses this juxtaposition (of two events) to argue that the public infliction of pain has been displaced by a new mode of discipline of the body, via surveillance, correction, and training in an enclosed space” (Power, 2011, p.39). Prisons designed in accordance with Bentham’s model of the panopticon are the tool to exercise power over individual bodies and coordinate individual bodies with others (Foucault, 1975; Power, 2011; Ghinăraru, 2014; Garrison, 2017). In the panopticon, the supervisor from the central tower can see all prisoners, but prisoners cannot see the supervisor. In this sense, prisoners are objects of information, and they are not allowed to have communicational exchanges (Ghinăraru, 2014). Prisons are not only for observation but for changes and corrections to behaviour as well (Foucault, 1979; Ghinăraru, 2014). However, while defining the generality of the panopticon, Foucault claimed that the purpose was for the relation of discipline rather than the relation of sovereignty, and discipline in this context means a type of power (Ghinăraru, 2014). In Foucault’s explanation of prisons, individuals are not pre-given and atomized individuals but focal points in a focal-field model; that is, individuals are subjects in a broad social context with discourses and gestures which are mandated by the network of power (Garrison, 2017). Power (2011, p.39) emphasizes that, “The prison is the exemplary organizational location for a double sense of discipline in Foucault’s sense ---- both as constraint over the individual and as an individuating positive body of knowledge.”

I apply this model of the Panopticon to an understanding of the Chinese media system by demonstrating how regulatory power and disciplinary power work together to make people follow government propaganda and requirements. Special attention will be given to
regulations, laws, and censorship related to the Internet. Before the Internet was introduced into China, the main source that Chinese people got information was from newspapers and television (Yu, 2006). However, the Internet seriously changed the media culture, as people can get information from different sources and can express their ideas and thoughts. Now, China has the largest population of netizens in the world. The Chinese government always controls the media system, and the Internet has become a site of disciplinary power (Yu, 2006). Voices can be muted if they violate the CCP’s bottom line. As punishment is a political strategy (Foucault, 1979), I will analyze how such a strategy works well in aligning people’s voices in accordance with the CCP’s expectations. In reviewing the way state authorities mute different voices, I will identify aspects related to the bottom line of the CCP and the way the party monitors the media system.

The final question concerns aspects of traditional gender discourses that may continue to be conveyed through the media system, family sphere, education system, government organs and politicians’ speeches. What is the essential function of these discourses, that is, why does the government want to promote women’s image in a traditional way? For Foucault, a prison system modelled on the Panopticon represents more general ways in which power relations are maintained, in this case, as a strategy to exercise power over the human body. Through constant surveillance and punishments, individuals learn to behave in expected ways. In this sense, discourses indicate ideals for individuals, and punishments ensure that discourses work effectively. By examining the web of discourses circulated across different institutions, I want to find out which factors account for power relations that make it possible for traditional gender discourses to be reproduced across various media forms. Power and knowledge imply one another, as power cannot be exercised without a corpus of knowledge. This leads to the question of whether, in the case of contemporary China, traditional women’s roles may, in some cases, meet the needs of the ruling authorities, just as
in ancient China, the ruling class adopted Confucianism to meet its needs to rule the society without unrest.

In Foucault’s theory, power is closely connected with context (Foucault, 1979, 1990, 2007, 2008; Ahonen et al., 2014). Since power and context are intertwined, identifying context is necessary in order to identify the mechanisms and techniques employed in the operation of power. Ahonen et al. (2014) point out that, “Context is understood as a malleable entity (re)produced in taken-for-granted practices and discourses, ways of organizing social reality, that are subject to change over time” (p.265). Power exists in certain contexts, and context helps to maintain power-knowledge relations and to produce and reproduce discourses as a way to maintain power relations. Identifying power relations should first be about identifying the context. In my study, the main focus is to examine how biopower affects women via examining women’s and men’s media discourse. Specifically, I will focus on women’s roles as wives, as women, and as mistresses (in Chinese, the mistress can be referred to as ernen, xiaosan and qingfu). For men, I will need to examine their roles as men, as husbands, and as officials or leaders that are the ultimate goal for morally superior men; and I will examine metaphors used to describe corrupt cadres (metaphors with Chinese characteristics). To fully understand gender relations in news about corruption - all of which is released by the official media - I will also pay attention to the ways in which the government manages its image in two ways: the discussion of the causes of corruption and the government’s responsibilities in corruption, and quotations of politicians’ thoughts and speeches which indicate how they treat corruption. In this sense, knowledge about women’s bodies and images cannot be understood without identifying features of the Chinese social context that help to construct and reinforce these forms of representation. Thus, the following specific contextual features are related to three aspects: Confucianism and its gender ideology; media system’s functions to the CCP and how media represent women after the
media reform; and political system’s flaws, including corruption, and how the government controls the media system.

3.3 The Influence of China’s Social Context on Gender Representation in News about Corruption

One purpose of this thesis is to identify the reasons why gender images are presented as they appear in news reporting on corruption. The previous section introduced several theoretical elements to analyse how power-knowledge relations shape gender representations. To describe whether public knowledge about women’s roles in China has connections with broad power relations, three explanatory factors show in the literature. These explanatory factors are traditional culture, contemporary media system, and political system.

3.3.1 Traditional Culture

Traditional cultural practices dominated Chinese society for thousands of years, and Confucian norms and rules have deeply influenced gender relations in contemporary China. My analysis begins with Confucius (551 BCE-479 BCE), whose influence has extended across more than 2500 years of history in China. Confucianism had become predominant in Ancient China since the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220CE), as the Han Dynasty adopted it as state doctrine included in the education system (Yun, 2013). During the long history, Confucianism continued to develop through interactions with other famous schools, such as Legalism, Monism, Daoism, Buddhism, and so on, and has penetrated almost all aspects of society, including “social norms, political ideologies, cultural traditions, educational systems, and ethical standards” (Yun, 2013, p.584; Yao, 2000; Fairbank and Reischauer, 1989; Ho, 1962; Yang, 1967). Because Confucianism has influenced people’s thoughts and behaviours, in order to understand traditional culture’s influence on women, it is necessary to examine Confucianism.
3.3.1.1 Confucius’s Ideas towards Women

According to Gao (2003) and Clark and Wang (2004), Confucius wrote very little about women, but it appears from his work that he did not think women and men should be equal ---- “The Master said: Only women and small men seem difficult to look after. If you keep them close, they become insubordinate; but if you keep them at a distance, they become resentful (wei nvzi yu xiaoren nan yang ye, jin zhi ze shu, yuan zhi ze yuan; 唯女子与小人难养也，近之则怨，远之则怨)” (Confucian Analects 17:23). Sometimes, people argue that “women” here refers to “female children” and “look after” means to “nourish,” but, at least, such a comment does not indicate that Confucius respected men and women equally (Jiang, 2009). Jiang (2009, p. 231) observes that, “Although he does not say that men are easy to cultivate, by overtly saying that women are hard to cultivate without saying the same thing about men, he implies that women are harder to nourish than men and therefore inferior to men.”

In another place, Confucius says:


[The sage king] Shun had five ministers and society was well managed. King Wu said: “I had ten able people as ministers.” Confucius commented, “It is difficult to find talented ones, isn’t it? The times of Tang [Yao’s dynasty] and Yu [Shun’s dynasty] were very rich in talent. [Among King Wu’s ministers] there was a woman, so there were only nine people”. (Jiang, 2009, p.231).

On this occasion, Confucius apparently looked down on women by not counting a woman as a human. Jiang (2009) contends that, although some scholars may argue that such a comment praised women’s ability to address public affairs and Confucius believes women are as talented as men, this makes no sense. According to Jiang (2009, p. 232), “If Confucius believed that men and women are equal, he would have said ‘there was one woman, so only nine men’ instead of saying that ‘there was one woman, so only nine people’.” Clearly,
although Confucius did not say a lot about women’s and men’s status, he did not put women on the same level as men.

3.3.1.2 Ideas from Confucius’ Followers

Confucianism has had an extensive influence on China’s society. Although he said little about women, most of the norms and principles were developed by his followers.

Mencius, the most important follower and interpreter of Confucius, wrote: “When a daughter marries, her mother instructs her. Sending her off at the gate, she cautions her, saying, ‘When you go to your family, you must be respectful, and you must be cautious. Do not disobey your husband.’ To regard obedience as proper is the Way of a wife or concubine” (Clark & Wang, 2004, p.396). Mencius was more concerned about men than women. In the Book of Mencius, he wrote about the Five Relationships, that is, “love between father and son, duty between ruler and subjects, the distinction between husband and wife, the precedence of the old over the young, and trust between friends” (Jiang, 2009, P.232).

Although Mencius mentioned the distinction between husband and wife, he did not mention details about it, and he did not mention females in other relationships. These Five Relationships became a key element of the value system, which is an essential patriarchal system and such value system developed over thousands of years” (Leung, 2003). According to Jiang (2009), Mencius’s ideal moral men should be guided by the principle that,

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A\text{ man lives in the spacious dwelling, occupies the proper position, and goes along the highway of the Empire. When he achieves his ambition he shares these with the people; when he fails to do so he practices the Way alone. He cannot be led into excesses when wealthy and honored or deflected from his purpose when poor and obscure, nor can he be made to bow before superior force. This is what I would call a great man [da zhangfu 大丈夫]” (p. 233). \]

Man is the main focus for Mencius, while women’s virtue is obedience. The Confucian Book of Rites also highlights women’s subservience to the man: “Woman is a follower (cong). When she is young, she obeys her father, when she gets married, she obeys
her husband, when her husband dies she obeys her son” (Chen, 1990, p. 531; Clark & Wang, 2004, p. 396). Compared with Confucius’s own ideas regarding women, Mencius’ ideas appear to express more direct sexism.

As previously described, Confucianism became the national doctrine and incorporated into the education system since its adoption by the Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE). Thus, society was cultivated by Confucianism’s “central doctrine,” which “encompasses goodness, benevolence, consideration, humanity, and kind-heartedness. Related teachings emphasize such qualities as loyalty to government, respect for authority, reciprocity, self-cultivation, and neighborliness” (Yun, 2013, p. 585). Gender relations were combined with a binary concept of Daoism, yin-yang (阴——阳). “Yin, (阴) etymologically, means the shady side of the mountain and yang (阳) means the sunny side” (Yun, 2013, p. 585). The yin-yang binary was not a contradictory concept but meant harmonious relationships. Traditionally, “yang” means male and “yin” means female. The Five Classics (Wujing, 五经), one of the most important Chinese classical writings, describes gender relationships in a hierarchical way by using this binary:

*Things emerge and contract by following yang. All things end and begin by following yang. The rectitude of the Three Kings rose to its utmost in following yang. In this way it can be seen that they esteemed yang and demeaned yin…Men, however, mean, are in all cases yang; women, however hobble, are all yin [italics added]…Categories of evil all are yin, whereas categories of good all are yang; yang is a matter of virtue (德), yin is a matter of punishment (刑).* (Raphals, 1998, p. 163; Yun, 2013, p. 586).

Such a statement indicates a foundation of distinct gender ideologies established through Confucianism. Although the religious ideals over time were combined with other concepts and ideologies, this basic notion of gender relations was not changed and became more discriminatory towards women.
3.3.1.3 Women’s Roles and Duties in Ancient China

Ancient China was a patriarchal society, and, as Clark and Wang (2004, p. 395) emphasize, “THE MISERY OF CHINESE WOMEN throughout history is well known: the binding of feet, female infanticide, loveless marriages, second wives, the widow’s obedience to the eldest son, widow suicide, and concubinage”. In this part, I elaborate on women’s roles in ancient Chinese society.

Chinese women had a long history of being subjugated by men. A woman played roles as a daughter, a wife and a mother, but none of these roles treated women as an individual human being (Gao, 2003; Clark & Wang, 2004; Jiang, 2009; Yun, 2013; Kung & Ma, 2014; Du, 2016). The most famous norms expressing that women were totally subservient were the three obediences (sancong; 三从). The three obediences means women must obey their father before marriage, obey their husband after marriage, and obey the oldest son after the husband’s death (Gao, 2003). In traditional society, a married woman did not count as a member of her native family. An old Chinese saying indicates: “a married daughter is like the water that is thrown out of doors” (Gao, 2003, p.119). The three obediences ruined many people’s lives, since “the birth of a daughter in traditional China was a disappointment; the birth of a second daughter brought grief and perhaps death to the infant; the birth of a third daughter was a tragedy for which the mother was most assuredly blamed” (Wolf, 1985, p. 1).

Specifically, in ancient society, a woman’s life would be determined by the tasks they performed for different family members, to do all the housework, bear children, and take care of the elderly; only by doing this could women be praised by society (Curtin, 1977). What is more, women did not have the right to claim a divorce. For instance, according to Lessons for Women (Nujie; 女誡), a classic literary work authored by Ban Zhao (班昭) in the Eastern Han Dynasty (25AD – 220 AD), the husband is the heaven for the wife, and the wife cannot leave
the husband, as the heaven is unavoidable (fu\u6728\u5f53\u4e16. Tian\u6210\u51e0\u6570, fu\u6210\u51e0\u76d1; 夫者\u4e16\u5f53。天\u53ef\u540e\u4e0d\u5f00, 夫\u53ef\u540e\u4e0d\u5f00) (Ban, n.d.). They could claim divorce only in certain conditions which were named Seven Reasons for Expelling One’s Wife (qichizhiao; 七出之条) - “disobedience to the husband’s parents, failing to bear a son, adultery, jealousy, contracting a harmful disease, malicious gossip, and theft” (Park & Cho, 1995, p.125). In ancient China, if a wife was considered to have failed to bear a son, she would be blamed by the husband’s family for not carrying on the family name. She could be sent back to her original family, or, in some rich families, her husband could have more than one wife (Gao, 2003). In sum, women did not have equal rights as men in the family but could be blamed by the whole family due to giving birth to girls and marital problems.

Another social norm is that widows committed suicide after their husbands’ death. “A notable Confucian exemplar was ‘chaste women’ (lienv; 烈女), who were basically widows who had vowed not to remarry or, at the extreme, even committed suicide after their husbands’ deaths, in order to demonstrate their unshaken determination to preserve fidelity and loyalty to their (deceased) husbands until death” (Kung & Ma, 2004, p. 135). Such behaviour was regarded as the worship of chastity, which was highly praised by traditional society.

Although women were supposed to belong to the family, they did not have equal rights with males in many aspects. Women in China were expected to stay at home and do everything for the family and even sacrifice for the family and marriage, but they did not have the right to receive an education and to get government jobs or engage in social activities. Although women took care of the family, women were not the head of the family. Males were the heads of the family, and they had the right to control and inherit the family property, but women did not have such rights (Changli, 2010).
Another practice that was supposed to confirm women’s status was footbinding. Footbinding, starting from the Song dynasty (宋朝, 960-1279), originally was used to demarcate women from elite families with women from commoner family ---- women who came from elite families needed to practice footbinding (Barlow, 2004). Later, footbinding became a signifier to increase the chance in the marriage market (Yun, 2013). According to Ko (2005), footbinding was a practice done by women, and women desired to look beautiful by binding their feet as men admired feet of perfect size. Ko (1997) points out that footbinding was performed as a sign of civilization in the Ming dynasty. Such a practice existed in China until the end of the Qing dynasty (清朝, 1644-1912), and Han Chinese women resisted unbinding their feet as footbinding was a way to keep Han Chinese traditions (Ko, 1997). However, Johnson (1983) specifics that footbinding, stemming from Confucian tradition, was overt oppression of women, which was cruel and vicious and underscored women’s values as “goods for exchange” (p.16). Ancient Chinese society’s social norms and rituals were shaped by Confucianism, although some of those norms and rituals changed in different dynasties. Elite family and aristocracy created codes for social norms and rituals. In this sense, footbinding is a social norm and tradition from Confucian society.

In sum, women in ancient society had a very low status without the right to education and work, and had to sacrifice for the family. Whether a woman was virtuous was assessed by her relations with her family and men. However, based on Seven Reasons for Expelling One’s Wife, women were almost responsible for all marital problems.

3.3.1.4 Confucianism and May Fourth Movement

Women’s inferior status was kept and reinforced by traditional Confucianism and feudalism for thousands of years (Leung, 2003). This began to change with the May Fourth Movement (1915-1921), which was a movement that supported the change to the Modern Chinese State, combined with a new culture movement (Sakamoto, 2004). As the new culture
movement in the early twentieth century, it had two significant features as compared with traditional culture. First, the new culture movement proposed a new social identity for individuals in modern society, which contained independent personalities, free thought and citizen status; second, the new culture movement sought to construct a new morality, new ideas, new language and new literature, and those constructions helped China to claim its place in the modern world (Lianfen, 2012). In this sense, the new culture movement reconstructed the identity of individuals for modern China, but modern China also needed a new cultural identity.

Since the May Fourth Movement was to seek a new culture in which emancipation of women was considered as an important feature of civilization and equality (Wang, 1999; Lianfen, 2012), the May Fourth Movement was also regarded as the first women’s movement in China (Leung, 2003). “Gender equality” and “equal rights” entered mainstream public discourse (Changli, 2010). Many new culturalists criticized traditional gender hierarchies and polygamy. The early feminist, He-Yin Zhen, claimed that gender inequality was deeply rooted in Confucianism (He-Yin, 1907). For instance, in ancient China, a man could have more than one wife, and widows were prohibited from remarrying, while He-Yin (1907) argued that by executing such norms, men could keep polygyny persistent. Prohibiting widows from remarrying was criticized by Hu Shi as well. In his article *Chastity Issue* (Zhencao Wenti; 贞操问题), he was against that prohibition and argued that being chaste should offer an equal chance for both man and woman to choose and people cannot compel women to be chaste (Hu, 1918). Lu Xun’s article *About Women’s Emancipation* (Guanyu Funv Jiefang; 关于妇女解放) criticized Confucianism and supported gender equality, although he said he seldom focused on women’s issues. He pointed out that after the May Fourth Movement, although many women left home to work in factories and restaurants, those women still suffered discrimination and exploitation (Lu, 1934). Such criticism implies
that women’s positions need to be improved in both the public sphere and in family and marriage roles.

Wang (1999) identified several ways that revealed Confucianism’s inhumaness towards women, including “Footbinding, concubinage, arranged marriage, female chastity, sexual segregation….” (p.12). The first step to emancipate women from the patriarchal family and subservient status was the equal right to enter school and universities. For instance, in the spring of 1920, Peking University decided to abandon the ban forbidding girls to enter school and accepted female students (Lianfen, 2012). At that time, sending daughters to schools was considered a patriotic gesture that symbolized a desirable social status (Wang, 1999). Such a change challenged Confucianism’s principles in which “men should be in the outside world and women should be at home” (nanzhuai nvzhun; 男主外女主内).

With the movement towards equal school entry, free love started to become the focus of the emancipation of women (Lianfen, 2012). A popular idea is that men and women should have free choice of mates and families should form with boundless love (J. Chen, 2012). In traditional society, marriage was arranged by the household, and women did not have the right to choose the people they married. What a woman did was to obey the decision of the family. When people got married, they did not know each other, not to mention developing ties of romance and love. During the May Fourth Movement, marriages or cohabitation based on love were considered as moral, while such relations were considered as immoral without love (Lianfen, 2012). At that time, The Ladies Journal (Funv zazhi; 妇女杂志), which focused on women’s emancipation and women’s issues, was the most influential women’s magazine (Wang, 1999). Zhang Xichen (1922), the chief editor for The Ladies Journal from 1921-1925, identified free love as the essential solution for reforming old morality, old laws and old family systems. Along with these changes, the right to divorce became a topic of public attention as women did not have the right to claim divorce in ancient China. Although
the right to claim divorce was written in the Draft Civil Code, there were practical problems in exercising this right (Lianfen, 2012). For instance, some men decided to claim divorce from their wives, but most women did not have any education and did not have economic independence, so they could not lead a life without marriage. Some of them still lived with the husband’s family and took care of parents, such as Zhu An (Lu Xun’s rural wife). On the other hand, some women seemed to blur the boundaries of marriage by cohabiting with married men.

The May Fourth Movement promoted the founding of many women’s associations with the aim to gain equal rights with men in dealing with family property. One of these associations, the League of Feminist Movement (Nvquan yundong tongmenghui; 女权运动同盟会), announced women should gain equal rights in the family, including control over family property (Huang, n.d.). Such a request was supported in the late 1920s, as the Civil Law acknowledged that the wife had shared possessions with the husband during the marriage (Changli, 2010).

However, the May Fourth Movement mainly happened in urban areas, whereas such regulations were not implemented in rural areas while the gap between social classes limited the implementation of women’s rights (Changli, 2010).

Through this movement, women gained rights of school entry and “free choice of marriage and divorce and an end to polygamy” (Leung, 2003, p. 363), and also gained rights to family property. Although women’s emancipation was a main target for the May Fourth Movement, this movement did not emancipate all women (Lei, 2011). What is more, the May Fourth Movement was launched by students and intellectuals, so most of its influence was in urban areas.

In sum, women in ancient society had an inferior status in both indoor and outdoor activities; however, such traditional rules and norms were not removed thoroughly by the
May Fourth Movement which was supposed to bring shifts in culture with the result that many features of traditional culture had been maintained in the 20th century. Although women’s issues were not resolved completely, during this period, people enjoyed true freedom of speech for a brief few years in the early 1920s. There were many magazines devoted to gender equality, such as The Ladies’ Journal and the Eastern Journal (Dongfang zazhi; 东方杂志). Meanwhile, besides feminism, the influence of anarchism, liberalism and socialism also grew during the early years of the Republic of China. Ironically, the media system in China had never experienced the freedom of speech since the foundation of PRC, and the CCP started to control the media system before the foundation of PRC.

3.3.2 Media System

As news about corruption is based on types of media fully controlled by the government, it is necessary to examine the nature of China’s media system. China has not had free media since 1949; as Chen and Zhong (1998, p.32) emphasize, “Free media is neither allowed by the government nor advocated by the political culture. According to Confucianism, still prevalent in China's sociopolitical life, the ‘wise and able’ government ought to ‘govern every aspect of social life’ including the media.”

3.3.2.1 Media in Maoist and Cultural Revolution Periods

China’s contemporary media system has been strongly influenced by political events. Based on Chairman Mao’s Talks At The Yenan Forum On Literature And Art (Zai Yan’an wenyi zuotanhui shang de jianghua; 在延安问题座谈会上的讲话), there were two fronts during struggles for liberating people, one is the cultural front, and another is the military front (Mao, 1942). Although the military force is the most important thing during war-time, controlling literature and art has been given the same importance as controlling military force. Mao (1942) pointed out that literary and art workers should stand for the party and advocate the party’s spirit and party policy. In 1942, in order to launch the “Rectification
Movement (Zhengfeng yundong; 整风运动) in Yan’an, Mao reformed the CCP’s party organ, Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao; 解放日报) (Dan, 2011). After the reform, Liberation Daily had become the “mouthpiece of the party” and the only publication in Yan’an, as other newspapers and magazines ceased publication. Through his reform, called the “Yan’an Model,” the press was party-owned and obligated to cater to the party’s interests in both the editorial policy and the content (Dan, 2008, 2011). Such a model was soon used for other media. Dan (2011, p. 108) observes that, “In this way, the media were made homogeneous through the institutional force of the party.” After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, the CCP used the media system of Soviet Russia as a model. The media system was completely state-owned. Yang (2012) points out that a multi-level media system: nationally, the People’s Daily is the mouthpiece of the central government; provincially, there is a central party press (Dangbao; 党报); in addition, there is a central party press in every city and counties in certain areas; and the party media provides guidelines which other publications should not be against them.

Generally, the media system is monitored by the public. However, China’s media system did not follow that way. In fact, the party controlled the media system to keep it in line with the party’s interests, decisions and policies. In 1950, the Central Committee of CCP launched a campaign named “Resolution to Start Self-criticism and Criticism in the Press (Guanyu zai baozhi kanwu shang kaizhan piping he ziwo piping de jueding; 关于在报纸刊物上开展批评和自我批评的决定).” However, according to Dan (2011), this campaign only showed that the party has the right to use newspapers for criticism, and this campaign did not solve the freedom of the press. Here, the “criticism and self-criticism” was different from the “watchdog.” In any democratic society, watchdog means media is an independent force to check political power for the public, while the criticism and self-criticism “is a kind of
strategic empowerment under the monopoly leadership of the CCP” (Dan 2011, p. 108).

From 1950 to 1976, there were a lot of political movements such as the anti-rightist campaign culminating in the Cultural Revolution, in order to clean up what Mao called capitalist elements in the society (Sun, Chang, & Yu, 2001). At that time, even though China had a great number of news outlets, such outlets had nothing to do with journalism. In sum, the biggest problem with China’s media system is that it was not independent, and such a media system provides conditions for propaganda to be circulated and media censorship to be executed.

### 3.3.2.2 Media Reform

With the implementation of the Opening and Reform policy, media systems started to reform in 1978 (Shao, Lu, & Hao, 2016). The reform, recognized “as ‘public causes in nature, but profit-making enterprises in management’ popularized the notion that media are both super-structure and part of the information industry” (Dan, 2011, p.108). Such a reform was oriented to financial reform - to address the financial burden for the government - and it did not touch the core part of the media system, including the political or corporate bias (Pan, 2000; Zhao, 2008, Shao et al., 2016). Such a capitalist reform contributed to a situation in which all types of mass media came to focus on profits. Although this reform did not touch the core dynamics, it did reduce the political control to some degree. Compared with the Maoist and Cultural Revolution eras, there were several changes. First, many print media, such as afternoon and evening publications, news digests, and culture and lifestyle papers, were not required to carry ostensible political propaganda (Sun et al., 2001; C. C. Lee, 1994). Second, many news forms of mass media emerged, such as entertainment and leisure programs, which did not focus on political affairs (Sun et al., 2001; P. S. Lee, 1994). Within this period, although there were no private-owned mass media, many Chinese media started to make profits from advertisements and catering to audiences (Yang, 2012).
One of the achievements within the period of the market reform was the expansion of media systems. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1982), there were 180 newspapers and fewer than 400 radio and television stations in China before the reform (Shao et al., 2016). Since the media reform, China had 1,918 newspapers, 9,876 magazines, and 2,579 radio and television stations at the end of 2012 (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2012; as cited in Shao et al., 2016).

Still, the biggest problem remains that the media system is not independent. According to Dan (2011), the associate Minister of China’s Publicity Ministry, Xu Guangchun (1997), claimed that newspapers should be political in nature. Notably, the media reform “ensures unchanged the media’s primary role as the mouthpiece of the party; the rule of the party over media and the politically correct orientation of public opinions” (Xu, 2002; as cited in Dan, 2011).

Under the Opening and Reform policy, part of the media system had to be commercialized. This market transition enabled more women to participate in the job market, in the process challenging the traditional arrangements of care. According to Abrahamson (2016), under longstanding traditions, Chinese women who were married needed to take care of frail elderly, children, and the disabled. However, the reform contributed to circumstances which meant that women had to make a balance between work and domestic labour. Such a conflict was depicted in images of women in some public discourses. By selecting 202 articles from three Chinese mainstream magazines between 1995 and 2012, Sun and Chen (2015) found that women’s images were complex in this period. On the one hand, the media were undergoing commercialization and started to care about individuals and the working environment of individuals. On the other hand, women’s images reflect traditional divisions of labour, as articles proposed women “returning home.” With respect to their findings, Sun and Chen conclude that they “provide empirical evidence of an increase in the media’s use of
individualistic framing to favour traditionalistic gender ideology” (2015, p.1104). Although part of the media system had been reformed to be commercialized and to focus on individuals’ lives, media discourses on women are still based on traditional gender relations.

In summary, the media system in China changed from completely state-owned and highly politicalized to both state-owned and private-owned and commercialization since 1978. However, even though the reform changed many parts of the media, it is still controlled by the party and still needs to cater to the party’s interests. Party reforms did not really emancipate women after 1949, and women’s images in public discourses reflected and reinforced working and domestic roles.

3.3.3 Political System

After the foundation of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power and began to change Chinese society. In the Maoist era (1949-1976), there were a series of political campaigns, starvation caused by the Great Leap Forward (1958) and so-called “the three-year natural disaster” (1959-1961), “and a decade-long upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s, with the cumulative number of casualties still defying calculation” (Lampton, 2015, p.3). The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was considered as a dark and disastrous time in contemporary China (Wei, 2011). In the early 1960s, some leaders, including Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), Zhou Enlai (周恩来) and Chen Yun (陈云), came to play important roles in the central government. Their actions made Chairman Mao frustrated and dissatisfied with them (Bachman, 2006). He began to emphasize “class struggle” in the political agenda. However, Mao did not realize his goals and eventually launched the cultural revolution in order to reinforce his power while eliminating political rivals in the party (Bachman, 2006). In 1978, China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, decided to transform a centralized socialist economy to a market-oriented economy. Deng decided the government should maintain political stability while reforming the economic system (Zhao, 2001). Deng
Xiaoping used the formula “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to deal with the conflict between socialism and market economy, in contrast to the prior period from 1958 to 1976 in which China had abandoned the market economy because it was supposed to be one of essential parts of capitalism (Boer & Li, 2015). By implementing an open door-policy, China has become the second-largest economy in the world (Boer & Li, 2015).

Because of the rapid growth in the economy, more and more private companies emerged in the 1990s, many of which were founded by elites. While elites became rich, workers in some state-owned factories, especially in the northeastern rustbelt, which were left behind in this reform period, were laid off and had to find jobs in other places (Zhao, 2001). Some workers who could not find a job became very poor. Many social problems began to emerge to the extent that they may cause problems for the Chinese regime in the future. First, the banking system was chaotic, and many non-profit state-owned industries continued to lose money (Zhao, 2001). Second, many workers were laid off, and many youths were waiting to enter the labour market. Third, ideologically, the government still advocated for a communist ideology, which many Chinese did not believe in it (Zhao, 2001).

Recently, many scholars have examined China’s problems, including over-investment in the housing market, capital outflows, increasing income disparities, and abuse of law; in all of these cases, there is potential for “official corruption and lack of checks and balances of government power through legal, public opinion and electoral channels” (Zhao, 2001, p.442). If these problems continue to mount, they could ultimately influence China’s regime, especially if reform does not include effective reform of the political system. Inside the political system, there are some problems. The first will be the issue of succession of the top leadership, as President Xi changed it to the president for life. If this problem is not addressed adequately, it may contribute to political instability. The second problem is the CCP’s capacity to maintain discipline. Corruption can undermine the political system by reducing
people’s loyalty (Lieberthal, 1991). Third, while at the early stage of the Opening and Reform period, the mainstream ideology blended Marxism with nationalism (Shlapentokh, 2002), China currently lacks a legitimizing ideology or value system (Lieberthal, 1991).

Although Chinese society has experienced a period of market Opening and Reform, such reforms did not touch the core part of its political system. To some degree, the media system has been commercialized and has accepted foreign media capital. However, the media system is still controlled by the government. “This fusion of Party state and market power has created a media system that serves the interests of the country’s political and economic elite, while suppressing and marginalizing opposing and alternative voices” (Zhao, 2004, p. 179). In the central government, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) represents the interest of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and oversees the media system to make sure nothing conflicts with official propaganda. The CPD controls nationwide media via setting rules about what kind of news can be covered and the manner of coverage, and CPD can put national issues over all other issues (Qinglian, 2004; Brady, 2006; Jingrong, 2010). For instance, during the Beijing Olympic Games, CPD prohibited negative news reports (Jingrong, 2010).

In sum, China’s political system is totalitarian rather than democratic, as it is moral-based, and the top leadership does not have time limits for the term. The government still controls the media system tightly. Despite the many social problems related to official corruption, neither official nor media responses to the issue are adequate.
CHAPTER 4

METHODODOLOGY

In conjunction with Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge, which I use to understand women’s images in news and comments on corruption, I employ the related research tool of critical discourse analysis, which aims to explore power relations in macro social contexts behind languages. Specifically, I use Content Analysis (CA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to explore gender images. In this section, I will 1) state the research questions and how these methods are suitable to solve these questions; 2) explain each method in terms of definition; and 3) introduce the data sources and procedures of data collections.

4.1 Research Questions

Previous research, though limited, suggests that images about females represented in corruption news are related to affairs in terms of depictions such as mistresses or causes of corruption. The thesis seeks to provide a more thorough understanding of these issues, focusing especially on the following questions:

1) How are women, overall, described in news reports and news articles about corruption in China?

2) Is there any difference between the ways in which women and men are depicted in news reports and articles about corruption? If so, what is the difference?

3) What do any observed differences reveal about the nature of power and gender relations in contemporary China?

In order to answer these research questions, I use content analysis and critical discourse analysis. In common with many other studies that focus on gender representation in news media, the content analysis provides statistical perspectives on gender representations by creating the bivariate analysis. This study follows this method to study gender representation with specific reference to corruption news. Also, I would like to move one step
further. To explore how gender images are formed in corruption news, and how these images are imparted through certain media platforms, I will also use critical discourse analysis.

4.2 Content Analysis

Content Analysis (CA) is an old research method, but it grew very fast in quantitative research. Generally, CA has been applied to many areas, including human interaction and conversations, character portrayals in TV commercials, films, and novels, word usage in news releases and political speeches, and so on (Neuendorf, 2002). However, CA has been defined in varying ways. According to Kolbe and Burnett (1991), CA is “an observational research method that is used to systematically evaluate the symbolic content of all forms of recorded communications” (pp. 134). Similarly, CA can be defined simply as analyzing characteristics of the message in a systematic, objective, and quantitative way (Berelson, 1952; Neuendorf, 2002). In the second case, unlike the first, CA is considered as a quantitative research method, with a focus on objectivity in which codes among texts should follow explicit rules. In this research, I use CA in this quantitative way.

There are several steps for using CA, as Content Analysis (CA) can provide insights and understanding of gender images in news about corruption via counting word frequencies in order to create categories in an objective way. As qualitative methods are criticized as subjective understandings of the text, quantitative Content Analysis can increase the objectivity of research. Quantitative Content Analysis is a useful tool in defining gender representations in media forms, and Chi-square tests and regression models were used by previous studies to determine the significance of gender differences. However, as the number of corrupt female cadres is significantly lower (41:1173) than the number of corrupt male cadres, using Chi-square tests or regression models may produce biased results, so CA is used to summarize gender representations and provide bivariate analysis in corruption news. I conduct content analysis to analyze news reports from the website of The Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which will be introduced in the following section. News reports are analyzed with respect to ten variables: year; cadre levels; gender; regions; occupation; economic problem; job-related crimes; political problem; personal life issues; and other problems. Then, I generalize the way women were represented in corruption news reports. There are two numerical representations here: the number of female cadres and the number of cases that women were involved in. This analysis also provides frequencies about corruption cases and about whether the number of female cadres related to cadre levels, certain years and crimes.

4.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis, as both a theory and method, aims to examine discourse and social life (Rogers et al., 2016). Discourse analysis is not only the study of language, but a way of looking at the language that focuses on how people use it in real life to do things such as joke and argue and persuade, and to show that they are certain kinds of people or belong to certain groups (Jones, 2012). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been employed widely in recent years as a particular type of discourse analysis (Liu & Guo, 2016). Critical discourse analysis refers to an even wider sphere that includes all of the social practices, individuals, and institutions that make it possible or legitimate to understand phenomena in a particular way and to make certain statements about what is “true” (Holsti, 1969). Critical discourse analysis is compatible with a Foucauldian analysis of discourse because it is particularly concerned with power and is rooted in “constructivism”. Liu, & Guo observe that, “Through the surface level of language form, CDA aims to reveal the influence of ideology on discourse, the counteractive influence of discourse on the ideology, and how the two elements derive from and serve social structure and power relations” (2016, p. 1076).

According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and Jahedi, Abdullah, and Mukundan (2014), several principles apply for Critical Discourse Analysis. First, CDA deals with social
problems, and its aim is interpretative and explanatory. Second, it reveals how “power relations are discursive” (Jahedi et al., 2014, p. 29). Third, there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and society and culture. Fourth, discourse is related to ideology, which can be interpreted in relation to specific contexts. Fifth, discourse is “a form of social action” (Jahedi et al., 2014, p. 29). Sixth, text and society are mediated by order of discourse. For example, a university consists of a set of interrelated textual practices, such as papers and essays’ discourses and administrative text (Simpson & Mayr, 2010).

The application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is based on several considerations. First, in the book *Media Discourse*, Fairclough (1995) claims that media language should be analyzed as discourse and CDA should include linguistic analysis of media discourse. In this sense, attention needs to be given to the language and texture of texts while analyzing media discourse. Second, besides the linguistic analysis, CDA focuses on media’s relationships with institutional and wider social and cultural context, “including relations of power and ideologies” (Fairclough, 1995, p.33). It is necessary to analyse how media represents an ideology, as ideology representations are implicit in texts and always look like taken-for-granted or commonsense for reporters and audiences. In sum, Critical Discourse Analysis can focus on language, but also explores the social context in order to find out reasons that may influence certain discourses. Using CDA, one can explore gender representations in news articles and investigate the reasons behind them.

In this study, I explore how the structures/systems support particular kinds of news and gender images in written media coverage of women in relation to corruption, and how these news reports and gender images circulate in Chinese society. Specifically, the analysis of media discourse contains five steps. First, I focus on textual representation, that is, how words and phrases function to describe women and men in corruption news. In order to analyze the news articles through CDA, I develop themes and codes based on the language
that employed to describe the key characters spoken about in relation to the corruption in each news article, and then I calculate frequencies for each code. Second, I assess discourses which include those keywords and phrases.

Generally, the process of analysing discourses requires the analysis of the genre, the type of discourse and the intertextuality. In terms of the genre, attention will be given to the narration associated with the representation of corruption and how the author organized the story or the description either by presenting a clear event-line or framing the story through particular orientations. The function of orientations is to focus the audience’s attention on selected aspects of the character’s experience in ways that may trigger emotional responses to the character (Fairclough, 1995). For instance, the audience may feel empathy for the character by reading this sentence, “not only has she tried to top herself and got herself taken to hospital but now as she’s recovering from that she’s had the biggest blow or one of the biggest blows you can have” (Fairclough, 1995, p.92). Next, I categorize the discourse into different types, including gender discourse, political discourse, regulatory discourse, colloquial discourse, ancient discourse, confession discourse, and evaluation discourse, based on the nature of the content and how it is presented. Identifying the type of discourse is necessary in order to indicate the construction of “social practice from a particular perspective” (Fairclough, 1995, p.94). Gender discourse describes gender relations between characters, and political discourse contains information related to political slogans and the political party. While regulatory discourse refers to descriptions of violations, regulations or punishments that characters received, colloquial discourse employs metaphors, irony, and mockery which are common in daily life conversations. Ancient discourse refers to text that cites or refers to ancient proverbs, poems and sayings. Confession discourse reports the author’s confession. Evaluation discourse involves editorial comments or opinions stated by the authors of the news reports or those reported from investigators of corruption cases. Once
the particular forms of discourse have been identified, according to Fairclough (1995), intertextual analysis of media discourse is necessary in order to compare and evaluate representations, in terms of what is included, what is excluded, what kinds of messages may be conveyed through the use of ironic or metaphorical language in the discourse, and what is presupposed.

Intertextuality is very important, as it provides insight into the way discourse may be connected to the broad social context, culture norms and ideologies, as illustrated in the following example. In one case of corruption that received news covered that is addressed in my analysis, that of Qian Zenghong, his wife was described as a “greedy wife,” while he was depicted as making wrong friends and “not having a good wife.” To strengthen the perception that the corruption was his wife’s fault and excuse the actual corrupt cadre, the author quoted ancient idiomatic expressions: “a good wife will help cadre to keep honest and upright and live in poverty (Jia you xianqi, ze shi neng anpinshouzheng; 家有贤妻，则士能安贫守正).” This idiomatic expression has several functions here: 1) it presupposes that readers are familiar with ancient idioms and wife should be good wife who helps their husbands; 2) it includes wife is the reason for a cadre’s honesty and uprightness but excludes other reasons that may cause a cadre to crash; 3) it is a congruent application.

Third, I focus on the texture and the intertextuality of news articles. The specific analysis process will be the same as the analysis of discourse. Fourth, I explore identities and relationships between each category in the texts, such as women, men, the local government and the central government, as any language use should contain social identities and social relations (Fairclough, 1995); and I explore who is given predominance and who is marginalized. Last but not least, the study compares news articles related to this news coverage from different websites.
4.4 Data

In this study, I collect data from several websites. These websites are the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), Sina Net, Sohu Net, Fenghuang Net, and Wangyi Net, which are introduced below.

From the website of CCDI, I collected news reports and news stories about officials accused or convicted of corruption. The Central Commission of Discipline Inspection of Chinese Party Communist is supposed to address issues related to party discipline and to monitor abuses, so party members who are “suspected of corruption, bad management or breaking with the party line are liable to be hauled before discipline inspection commissions” (“How China is ruled: Discipline Commission,” 2012). The website of CCDI publicizes policies of CPC, releases information of CCDI, collects complaints about cadres and reports cadres who are being inspected or disciplined. In addition, it reports the decisions about corrupt cadres as well as comments of dishonest cadres. I selected this website for data collection because this department represents the government and provides a standard draft (Tonggao; 通稿) for other non-state-owned news media. I collected news articles about corrupt cadres from the channel of Repent and Warning (Chanhui yu jingshi; 忏悔与警示).

For news reports, I explored articles from the channel Examine and Investigate (Shencha diaocha; 审查调查), which divides cadres into three categories: high-profile, middle level, and provincial management level cadres.

In addition to data from the website of CCDI, representing state-owned media, I also collected data from commercial websites. One of these websites is Sina.com. As China’s leading online media company (Sina Corporation, n.d.), Sina was founded in 1998. According to Alexa (n.d.), Sina ranked No. 6 in Chinese websites and ranked No. 3 among media websites. As a company, Sina has Sina.com, Sina Mobile, and Weibo.com. But this
study will focus on news stories from Sina.com, because it “built a broad content network with thousands of professional media partners and accumulated a large mainstream user base, including well-educated, white-collar professionals” (Sina Corporation, n.d). Sina News is one part of Sina.com and includes reports from news providers including “CCTV, Beijing TV Station (“BTV”), China News, Agence France-Presse (“AFP”), Associated Press, Reuters, Getty Images, Nanfang Daily Group, Beijing News, Xinhua Net and Xinhua News Agency” (Sina Corporation, n.d). Selecting news stories from Sina.com is based on several reasons. First, although subject to media censorship, this so-called commercial website reports news comments on corrupt officials, so I am able to verify whether their news stories about corrupt officials tally with those by state-owned media. Second, Sina.com is popular in China, so choosing news stories from Sina.com makes it possible to understand news media’s potential influence on Chinese people.

Similar to Sina.com, Sohu.com is another leading online media company in China. According to Alexa (n.d.), Sohu.com ranked No. 5 on Chinese websites. Also founded in 1998, Sohu.com has provided services for more than 0.7 billion netizens in China (Sohu, Inc., n.d.). The main reason for selecting Sohu.com is for comparison, first, between Sohu.com and CCDI’s website in terms of news articles and, second, with other commercial websites in terms of news articles.

Ifeng.com (Fenghuang Net) is a part of Phoenix Television, which was founded in 1996 and “was the first privately-owned foreign satellite TV broadcaster granted landing rights in the People’s Republic of China” (Richet-Cooper, 2011). The objective of Phoenix TV is to “connect the world to China and reduce distances between Chinese communities scattered overseas” and to broadcast “via satellite in more than 150 countries on the five continents” (Richet-cooper, 2011). In this sense, Ifeng.com provides services for global
Chinese people. Selecting Ifeng.com is to know whether it reports corruption news in a more objective way or tally with state-owned media.

163.com (Wangyi Net or NetEase), founded in 1997, is famous in China. It has provided services to more than 0.9 billion users (NetEase, Inc., n.d.). I selected this website because it is one of the most popular websites in China, and it is privately-owned, enabling me to explore whether, in terms of media comments related to corruption news, such a website should tally with state-owned media.

4.5 Search Procedure

My search for news reports began with one of the channels of CCDI, “Examine and Investigate” (Shencha diaocha). Several steps were used to collect news articles. First, I collected news articles from the CCDI’s channel, Repent and Warning (Chanhui yu jingshi). Although I would have liked to compare news articles on both channels (Examine and Investigate and Repent and Warning), they often covered different corruption cases so the number of cases on both channels is different. Second, I collected news articles from the four privately-owned online media. Because these did not have certain channels to report corrupt cadres, I had to search for news articles by using Google Search Engine. The list of cadres is based on the news items reported by CCDI. I searched the cadre’s name and entered the website that I want to search for, such as Sina. In the search results, I only focused on the first page, and only focused on news articles which were posted on main channels rather than local channels or mobile apps. Also, I did not focus on short news reports announcing the cadre was being investigated, being arrested or being sentenced. For each cadre identified in the reports, I created a WORD document in order to copy the comments and detailed news reports in preparation for data analysis.
4.6 Coding Procedure for Content Analysis (CA)

I used Content Analysis (CA) to analyze the news reports downloaded from the website of CCDI. The website started to report in 2013. As this study focuses on the most recent five years, I downloaded news reports from 2013 to 2017. For cadres in the high-profile level, there are 39 news reports, but these reports were reported from 2014, so reports from 2014 to 2017 were collected. In the middle level, 153 news reports were collected from 2013 to 2017. For the low level, there are 733 news reports. In total, 926 items or news reports were coded.

As some news contain references to more than one cadre, 1,214 cadres are represented in the dataset. Only two news reports were excluded from the dataset. One of them, in the 2015 low-level file, duplicated another piece of news while another, in the 2014 low-level file, just stated that 409 cadres were penalized without any details.

The first column of coding was used for case number, and ten other columns in my tabulations were used for variables. These variables are the year the news was released, cadre level, the gender of cadres, the occupation of the cadre, the region of the cadre, problems that are related to economy, problems that are related to authority abuse, crimes that are related to politics, personal life issues, and other problems. Two processes were included in the coding procedure. First, I used open coding to involve all possible codes in the news reports. For instance, for the variable of cadres’ occupations, I created codes based on the occupation, such as government, electricity department, bank, and company. Second, codes were developed to identify items combined based on their nature. For example, I combined the government and electricity department into government, and combined banks and companies into the company. The following table identifies the variable definitions and attributes.
Table 4.1 Variables, definitions, and attributes of news reports for content analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Operational definitions of variables</th>
<th>Attributes of Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>The year that the news was released</td>
<td>1) 2013; 2) 2014; 3) 2015; 4) 2016; 5) 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Levels of cadres</td>
<td>1) high profile cadres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2) middle level cadres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3) provincial management level cadres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Sex of each cadre</td>
<td>1) male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2) female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>The previous occupation of the cadre</td>
<td>1) government, including central government,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>provincial government, and local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2) state-owned business, involving bank, state-owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3) others, entities that do not belong to the first two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>attributes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>The province that the cadre worked in</td>
<td>Generally, China has 22 provinces, five autonomous regions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>four direct-controlled municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chongqing, and Shanghai), and special administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>regions of HongKong and Macau. According to National Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of Statistics of China (2011), mainland China was divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>into 4 regions: 1) Eastern (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Guangdong and Hainan); 2) Middle part (Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan); 3) Western (Inter-Mongolio, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang); 4) Northeastern (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang). In addition, one cadre in Hong Kong was involved, so 5) Hong Kong.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6</th>
<th>Economic Problem</th>
<th>Problems that are related to the economy or money, including bribery, embezzlement of public funds, illegal reimbursement of personal expenses, acceptance of monetary gifts and illegal profit-making activities.</th>
<th>0) no such problems</th>
<th>1) have such problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Job-related crimes</td>
<td>Problems that are not related to money, including abuse of authority, seeking benefits for relatives, illegal use of government vehicles and goods, and failing to fulfill their duties.</td>
<td>0) no such problems</td>
<td>1) have such problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Cadres’ political problems,</td>
<td>0) no such problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Problems involving obstructing investigation (including such behaviours as: fabricating lies, agreeing with others not to give each other away, colluding with others to devise a consistent story, transferring ill-gotten wealth, and so on), forming factions and cliques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9</th>
<th>Personal Life Issues</th>
<th>Personal life issues, including having mistresses, committing adultery, trading one’s power for sex, improper sexual relationship with a number of women, living in a corrupt lifestyle, and gambling.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Other Problems</td>
<td>Problems that are not related to money, employment, politics, and personal life. These include failure to report personal matters, such as true income, assets, children and marriages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
frequent visits to private clubs or expensive resorts, engaging in superstitious activities, and acceptance of gifts. If the news reports do not include the problems that the cadres have, this will be categorized as not stated.

During the coding procedure, two things should be noted. First, for cadres who have more than one occupation, I coded the first occupation identified in the news report. For cadres who were accused of committing corruption in their previous occupations, I coded the previous occupation. Second, to ensure accuracy of coding, I used two methods. The first method consisted of checking the accuracy of codes by referring to other variables. For example, if the cadre’s problems were not stated in the news report, I would code this as 1-not stated - in the variable of other crimes. In this sense, other variables related to problems or crimes were entered as a code of 0 (no such problem). The second method was to randomly select cases and compare the attributes with specific news reports in order to ensure the accuracy of the coding.

4.7 Analyzing Procedure for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

I used Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyze comments related to news on the above-mentioned websites. In this section, I describe the analysis procedure for these two stages.
For the news stories from CCDI for the years 2013 to 2017, the number of cases is 297. The software that I used to explore news stories is NVivo. After all, articles were imported into NVivo, and the analysis involved several steps. First, I applied open coding to explore the text by marking certain words and discourses. These codes are related to gender representations, such as “mistress (qingfu; 情妇)” and “wife (laopo, or qizi; 老婆或妻子).”

Then, based on these codes, I identified two themes ---- descriptions of women and descriptions of men. Next, based on two themes, I collapsed some codes. For instance, both codes of mistress and of wife can be categorized in the descriptions of women. Then, I computed the frequencies of codes and themes. Fifth, I analyzed the whole text to illustrate how women and men were described in the comments and patterns that the authors used.

Sixth, I focused on the public comments from the four websites and explored whether discourses and comments were different based on whether a woman was identified as a mistress as opposed to a wife. Table 4.2 shows the themes and codes in the analysis.

**Table 4.2 Themes and codes of news articles for critical discourse analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Descriptions of Women</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mistress and Sexual Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptions of Men</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Official/ Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphors of Corrupt Cadres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for Corruption</td>
<td>Sayings signifying reasons of misconduct and illegal behaviours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 identifies three themes and eight codes employed to classify the news articles for CCDI. The reason for including reasons for corruption is to identify relationships
between women, men, and the government, and results will be shown with the analysis of intertextuality. Each code is related to certain words and phrases. For instance, the code “wife” does not refer to the word “wife,” but refers to the phrases: “the wife helps the husband to commit corruption” (Fuzufutan; 妇助夫贪) or the “greedy wife” (Tanneizhu; 贪内助).

In the second stage of CDA, I utilized NVivo to analyze news articles from four websites - Fenghuang Net, Sina, Sohu, and Wangyi Net. Such news articles were searched by Google.com based on the list of cases from the news reports released by CCDI. As readers will see in the findings, the total number of cadres was 1,214, and there were 185 cadres about whom comments were cited on these four websites. Some cadres, who had the same name as celebrities, such as Wang Gang, cannot be found in any news articles. Other cadres, whose names were too common in China, such as Li Li, cannot be found in any news articles. Generally, the lower the cadre’s level, the fewer news articles were found about him. Because codes were discovered in the first stage, the analyzing procedure for the second stage was simple. I used these codes to do query search in the text via NVivo, then categorized codes into four themes - Descriptions of women, descriptions of men, family, and cadres’ misconduct and illegal behaviours (not related to women) – before following the analytical steps mentioned above to explore the main elements of discourse presented in each of the articles that I analyzed.
CHAPTER 5

CONTENT ANALYSIS FINDINGS

In accordance with the procedures identified in the previous chapter, this chapter shows results from Content Analysis (CA). There are several sections in this chapter: (a) frequencies distribution of each variable for decoding news reports from CCDI; (b) a general description of gender images in news reports; and (c) discussions.

5.1 Frequency Distributions of Each Variable for News Reports

This section discusses the results from the analysis of news reports from the channel of Examine and Investigate (Shencha diaocha; 审查调查) on the website of CCDI. There are ten variables, summarized in the following tables.

![Simple Line Count of year of the news was released](image)

Figure 5.1 Numbers of news reports on corruption on the website of CCDI by year

Figure 5.1 shows that the number of reported cases climbed steadily between 2013 and 2015, after which they levelled off. The total number of valid cases is 1,214. The observed patterns are not a coincidence. At the beginning of 2015, while talking about the anti-corruption campaign at the 5th Full Assembly of the 18th CCDI, the President Xi Jinping
said that the fight against corruption remains grave and complicated, acknowledging that
government had not obtained a sweeping victory in terms of ensuring cadres dare not, cannot
and will not be corrupt (Xinhua News Agency, 2015). Xi’s speech encouraged CCDI to
detect more corrupt cadres, which helps to explain why the number of corrupt cadres reached
its peak in 2015. In 2016, President Xi Jinping observed at the 6th Full Assembly of the 18th
CCDI that the fight against corruption was in the process of gathering unstoppable
momentum (Xinhua News Agency, 2016).

**Table 5.1 Frequency distributions for each variable of content analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Levels of Cadres</td>
<td>high profile level cadres</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>middle level cadres</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial management level cadres</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupations</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>institutions or state-owned companies</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions</td>
<td>Eastern Part</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Part</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Part</td>
<td>367</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern Part</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems that are related to economy or result in money</th>
<th>related to economic</th>
<th>1081</th>
<th>89.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not related to economic</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems that are related to occupational authorities and did not result in money</th>
<th>are related to occupational authorities and did not result in money</th>
<th>501</th>
<th>41.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No such problems</td>
<td></td>
<td>713</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems that are related to counter-investigation or forming factions and cliques</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>312</th>
<th>25.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Problems related to personal life | having mistresses, committing adultery, 328 | 27.0 |
trading one’s power for sex.

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both 2 and 3 problems</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Problems</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no stated</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other crimes</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 describes frequencies in the distribution for each variable. Some of the cases are connected with traditions in Chinese officialdom and others with the current social context in Chinese society.

For the variable of levels of cadres, only four percent of corrupt cadres were in high profile level positions, while provincial management level cadres were the group most frequently reported on the website of CCDI. This comparison has two implications. First, from a Maoist perspective, very few high-profile cadres are likely to be accused of corruption or other problems, reflecting an unspoken rule embedded Confucianist norms. According to the Book of Rites, nobles should not be subject to punishment (Xingbushangdafu; 刑不上大夫). Traditional nobles are equivalent in today’s society equal to ministers in the central government who are classified as high-profile level cadres in this study. Although this rule cannot be found in any laws or regulations, the speech of former Prime Minister Zhou Rongji verified the existence of this unspoken rule. In the book Zhu Rongji On the Record: The
Shanghai Years (Zhu, 2013), Zhu observed public dissatisfaction with the arrangement that, with the CCP as the ruling party, state laws and regulations fail to make party members as equal as the masses in terms of adherence to the laws, therefore, exempting party members from punishments. Second, the number of high-profile level cadres is fewer than provincial management level cadres. Nonetheless, President Xi said that the anti-corruption campaign would investigate both the tiger and the fly. Here, the word “tigers” refers to high-profile cadres and the word “fly” refers to provincial management level cadres. In China, being promoted to a high position, to some degree, means a cadre has fewer chances to be investigated by the CCDI.

Of the 1,214 cases reported in the table, 41(3.4%) are females. This figure reflects gender inequality in government-related jobs rather than an indication that female cadres are more honest than male cadres. According to Sohu News (2012), the rate of female cadres who are high profile cadres is 11%, while the proportion of those in leading roles in cities or equivalent (provincial management level) is 13.7% and among those in leading roles in divisions or equivalent (provincial management level), it is 16.6%. Female cadres also tend to hold deputy positions rather than principal positions, and relatively few female cadres work in core departments, such as land, energy and petroleum, in which cadres have decision-making power in which they may be more likely to get bribes or abuse power during decision-making processes. Most female cadres work in education, technology, culture, health and family planning departments (Sina News, 2012). The Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee released a document, Opinions on Further Training and Selecting Female Cadres and Developing Female Party Members, in 2001, which clearly stated that female cadres should be considered first in those non-core departments. Although the number of female cadres convicted of corruption has increased, it still far fewer than male cadres.
For the variable of occupations, 947 (78%) cadres work for the government and 267 cadres cited for corruption work for institutions or state-owned companies. Such a small number of corrupt cases in corporate settings may be due to the enhanced public governance under President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign (Zhang, 2018a).

In terms of regions of corrupt cadres, 474 (39 percent) are clustered in eastern provinces while in western provinces, 367 (30.2 percent) cadres were investigated. Regional differences in the distribution of corruption are likely related to policy issues and economic opportunities associated with particular industries. In 1978, China executed the Opening and Reforming policy to boost economic development, initially in eastern coastal areas such as Guangdong province and Fujian province. Specifically, the Chinese government established a number of coastal open cities, including Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shanghai, Zhanjiang, Ningbo, and others. To stimulate economic development, those local governments were given more authority in decision-making and policy favours in terms of taxation, licences, project approvals and budget allocations (Chen & Xie, 2009; Yi, Gao & Zhang, 2018). The policy favours, combined with lack of oversight in decision-making processes, have provided opportunities for cadres to abuse their power and get bribes. More recently, in 1999, the central government launched the Western Development Program which is similar to eastern coastal area development program with a major difference that the central government allocated about 500 billion Chinese yuan (about 80 billion dollars) for infrastructure construction in western areas (Chen & Xie, 2009). Although economic development in the eastern areas has been faster than in the western areas, cadres in western areas have more chances to be corrupt in terms of the allocation of budgets. In both cases, policy favours and lack of transparency in decision-making influence the number of corrupt cadres.

Among problems and issues which are reported in the corruption news, the top three problems are: 1) economic problems; 2) non-money issues related to occupational authority;
and 3) sex-related problems such as having a mistress, committing adultery, or trading one’s power for sex. Personal life issues are more important and complicated than economic problems and problems related to power abuse. Except gambling, personal life issues in Chinese refer to lifestyle problems (shenghuo zuofeng wenti; 生活作风问题). Descriptively, besides lifestyle problems, there are several phrases to express personal life issues, including “seriously morally corrupt” (yanzhong daode baihuai; 严重道德败坏); “morally corrupt” (daode baihua; 道德败坏); “leading a dissipated lifestyle” (shenghuo milan; 生活糜烂) and “leading a corrupt lifestyle” (shenghuo fuhua; 生活腐化). Although those phrases do not include any words related to sex, marital issues or women, all of them are related to extramarital issues. Leading a corrupt lifestyle means the cadre has fewer than three mistresses, while morally corrupt and leading a dissipated lifestyle means the cadre has more than three mistresses (Wangyi News, n.d.). Extramarital issues have become a characteristic of corrupt cadres - more than 95% of corrupt cadres have mistresses or “bao ernai” (Wangyi News, n.d.).

China has a long history of identifying extramarital issues as immoral. In traditional Confucian society, being moral is the first priority for a man (junzi; 君子), so a man should “first improve himself, then manage his family, then govern the state; this the only way to bring justice and virtue to the world” (xiushen qijia zhiguo ping tianxia; 修身齐家治国平天下) (Book of Rites; 2017). Being moral is the way to improve oneself. Even though men can have concubines in ancient China, cadres cannot have more than one wife, that is, one wife and some concubines; what is more, the number of concubines depended on the level of the cadre. For instance, during the Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE), the second-rank officials (similar to the vice president today) could have eight concubines, and they would be recognized as immoral if they had more than eight concubines or kept mistresses (Li, 2017). Nowadays,
being moral and not having extramarital issues are also requirements for cadres. In 2001, the sixth plenary session of the 15th CPC Central Committee included lifestyle issues as a problem of cadres. In 2007, the CCDI treated lifestyle issues like corruption. Cadres who have lifestyle issues were supposed to have violated social morality and regulations and would be punished accordingly. For instance, Yi Junqing, the former deputy director of Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, was removed from the position because of improper sexual relationships with a woman. Lifestyle issues do not include women, but such issues stigmatized women by connecting women with improper relationships and immoral behaviour. In order to further assess the gender representation in news reports, the relationship between women and other variables will be shown via bivariate analysis.

5.2 Bivariate Analysis for Gender Representations of News Reports

In order to determine gender images in news reports from CCDI, this section shows relationships between gender and other factors, such as regions, levels of cadres, and crimes, via contingency tables.

Table 5.2 Frequency distributions for news reports on corruption by male and female cadres by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year the news was released</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 2013</td>
<td>46 (3.9% of all males)</td>
<td>1 (2.4% of all females)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2014</td>
<td>245 (20.9%)</td>
<td>12 (29.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2015</td>
<td>331 (28.2%)</td>
<td>11 (26.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2016</td>
<td>268 (22.8%)</td>
<td>6 (14.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2017</td>
<td>283 (24.1%)</td>
<td>11 (26.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2 demonstrates the number of cases released each year by gender (reported in the media in binary terms of male and female). The number of male cadres reported on in corruption news was the highest in 2015, with 331 cases (28.2% of all male cadres), while for females, it was highest in 2014, with 12 cases (29.3% of total female cases). Similar to figure 5.1, the number of male cases peaked in 2015. However, the number of female cases (which was very low in all years) peaked in 2014.

**Table 5.3 Frequency distributions by levels of cadres and sex**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Levels of Cadres</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High profile level cadres</td>
<td>45 (3.8%)</td>
<td>3 (7.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle level cadres</td>
<td>152 (13.0%)</td>
<td>1 (2.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial management level cadres</td>
<td>976 (83.2%)</td>
<td>37 (90.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1173 (100%)</td>
<td>41 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in Table 5.3 show that most corruption news reports are related to provincial management level cadres, no matter whether the reports are about corruption by female or male cadres. The percentage of female provincial management level cadres is slightly higher than that of males, corresponding in part with gender differences in representation in various key positions. According to Sohu News (2012), female cadres are more likely to be in low-level positions compared with male cadres.
Table 5.4 Frequency distributions for job-related crimes by sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Job-related crimes</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Job-related crimes</td>
<td>691 (58.9%)</td>
<td>22 (57.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crimes not related to the job</td>
<td>482 (41.1%)</td>
<td>19 (46.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1173 (100%)</td>
<td>41 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4 shows that for both males and females, more than half of the reported crimes are associated with jobs (abuse of authority). The rate of job-related crimes of female cadres is lower than the rate of male cadres. However, the rate of job-related crimes of female cadres attracts more attention from news media, as many news reports and stories claim that the rate has increased year by year (Ai & Li, 2011; Hu, 2013; Sina News, 2004), and more than half of the female cadres who committed job-related crimes are mistresses of male cadres (Radio Free Asia, 2013).

Table 5.5 Frequency distributions for corrupt cadres’ original occupations by sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>916 (78.1%)</td>
<td>31 (75.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions and state-owned companies</td>
<td>257 (21.9%)</td>
<td>10 (24.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1173 (100%)</td>
<td>41 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.5 shows the occupational distribution based on gender. About three-fourths of the people worked for the government before being investigated. Although the target of the anti-corruption campaign is cadres from all levels and all departments (BBC News, 2017b), most of the reported corrupt cadres are from the government.

Table 5.6 Frequency distributions for news reports focused on economic crimes of corrupt cadres by sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems related to economic crimes</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Related to economic crimes</td>
<td>1046 (89.2%)</td>
<td>35 (85.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not related to economic crimes</td>
<td>127 (10.8%)</td>
<td>6 (14.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1173 (100%)</td>
<td>41 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.6 reveals that the kinds of corruption reported on for most cadres are related to economic crimes, no matter whether male or female.

Table 5.7 Frequency distributions for news reports focused on political crimes by sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems related to political crimes</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Related to political crimes</td>
<td>305 (26.0%)</td>
<td>7 (17.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not related to political</td>
<td>868 (74%)</td>
<td>34 (14.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.7 shows the frequency distribution of reported problems related to political crimes by male and female cadres, representing 26% of male cadres and 17.1% of female cadres appearing in reports on corruption.

**Table 5.8 Frequency distributions for news reports focused on personal life problems of male and female cadres**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems related to personal life</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Related to personal life</td>
<td>326 (27.8%)</td>
<td>2 (4.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not related to personal life</td>
<td>829 (70.7%)</td>
<td>39 (95.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1173 (100%)</td>
<td>41 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 5.8 shows, 326 male cadres have problems related to personal life, while only two female cadres have this problem. However, many of the male cadres’ problems are attributed to women. As reported in Table 4.1, personal life issues are associated with having mistresses, committing adultery, trading one’s power for sex, improper sexual relationship with a number of women, living a corrupt lifestyle, or gambling. The news reports do not describe personal life in detail. For instance, a news report about Yang Xiaobo, the former mayor of Gaoping, Shanxi Province, indicated simply that she “took advantage of her
position to obtain a huge amount of illegal money and gifts, and committed adultery”
(Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), 2014, November 26).

Table 5.9 Frequency distributions by regions and sex of cadres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Part</td>
<td>460 (39.2%)</td>
<td>14 (34.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Part</td>
<td>250 (21.3%)</td>
<td>10 (24.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Part</td>
<td>354 (30.2%)</td>
<td>13 (30.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern Part</td>
<td>109 (9.2%)</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>1 (0.1%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1173 (100%)</td>
<td>41 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9 reveals that more than one-third of cadres reported on, both male and female, are in the eastern part. These patterns confirm that cadres (male and female) in the eastern part have more chances to commit corruption due to the interaction of policy favours and lack of supervision.

In summary, the fact that women are underrepresented in news reports about corruption reveals both gender inequality in government and state-owned companies and gender-based differences in the representation of lifestyle issues. Relatively few CCDI news reports focus on women’s lifestyle issues or their presence as the main subject of corruption news. However, they are represented more frequently as sexed subjects of male corruption cases.
5.3 Chapter Conclusions and Discussions

In an attempt to answer the research question on what gender differences can be found in corruption news, this chapter has provided an overview of general gender images in news reports on corruption from CCDI. The data reveals that while women are underrepresented in corruption news reports, this is more likely accounted for by differences in their positions. In fact, female cadres tend to be stuck in low-level positions in China (Sohu News, 2012). Gender differences are also found in reporting on problems related to personal life issues, as only two corrupt female cadres have this problem, compared with 326 males. Women are more likely to be depicted in accounts focusing on male corruption. Without clearly mentioning women, lifestyle issues successfully connect women with improper sexual relationships with male cadres. Women appear in many of the reports as accessories or just part of the corrupt cadre cases and part of men’s values. These results lead me to consider the definition of gender equality. Based on the Constitution, women and men have equal rights in various aspects, including political, economic, cultural, social and family spheres, and so on (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). Although the Chinese government continues to express its commitment to gender equality in regulatory discourses, women’s voices have been relatively limited in recent years. For instance, on March 6, 2015, five feminists - Li Maize, Wu Rongrong, Wei Tingting, Zheng Churan and Wang Man – seeking to hand out stickers about sexual harassment were arrested by Chinese police for organizing subversive activities (Fincher, 2018). That was also the year in which the biggest number of corrupt cadres appeared in official media reports (shown in figure 1) and the year that President Xi Jinping co-hosted a summit at the UN to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Beijing World Conference on Women. That is to say, while the Chinese government proclaims its commitment to promote gender equality, the CCP has actually muted women’s voices and treated women as sexed subjects in corruption news. Gender equality remains an empty
discourse. However, in order to fully understand gender inequality in corruption news, it is necessary to know how women were depicted in an unequal way. Considering that news reports are relatively short and content analysis cannot provide details about how women are depicted, news articles and critical discourses analysis are needed.
CHAPTER 6
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS FINDINGS ONE: THE OFFICIAL MEDIA

This chapter addresses the research question about gender differences between women’s images and men’s images by examining discourses represented in the news articles of CCDI, focusing on the main themes of text representations, discourses, and intertextuality. This chapter and the one that follows, which analyzes parallel discourses on commercial news sites, begins with an overview of the main codes and categories employed in the news articles, followed by more detailed examination of several cases selected from the reports to illustrate how these discourses are framed in the reporting on different types of corruption.

6.1 Text Representations of CCDI Corruption News Articles

In this part, I present how women and men are represented in the CCDI news articles. This section identifies definitions and related words and phrases to illustrate the themes and codes introduced in chapter 4. After summarizing frequencies for those codes, I will explain how certain words and phrases can be connected with traditional gender discourses and the contemporary social context.

Table 6.1 Codes, definitions and frequencies of themes related to descriptions of women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes of Women</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>This code refers to “women” (nüxing: 女性).</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>This code refers to words and sentences that include the word wife and three phrases: “wife helps husband to commit corruption”</td>
<td>310</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This code refers to words and sentences that include the following words and phrases:

“mistress (qingfu; 情妇);” “improper sexual relations (buzhengdang xingguanxi; 不正当性关系);” “improper relationships between men and women (buzhengdang nannü guanxi; 不正当男女关系);” “trading one’s power for sex (quansejiaoyi; 权色交易);” “living a corrupt lifestyle (shenghuo fuhua; 生活腐化);” “adultery (tongjian; 通奸);” “love (aiqing; 愛情);” “moral corruption (daode baihuai; 道德敗坏).”

Total 128

Note: the total number of news articles is 276.
Table 6.1 shows the definitions and frequencies of each code. Although women generally were not the main subject of the corruption cases, they were still mentioned in the news articles. The table reports that the code “wife” was mentioned 310 times in relation to several meaningful phrases. One such phrase, “fuzhufutan (the wife helps the husband to commit corruption),” is ironic, based on a proverb “fuchangfusui (夫唱婦隨)” which originally means that the wife should obey her husband (fuchangfusui, 2019). It represents a metaphor for harmony between the husband and the wife. The phrase “fuzhufutan (the wife helps the husband to commit corruption)” presupposes readers are familiar with the proverb “fuchangfusui (the wife should obey her husband)” by using similar words. “Fuzhufutan (the wife helps the husband to commit corruption)” recalls traditional gender discourses in which the wife must obey her husband through elements of “husband,” “wife,” “help,” and “corruption,” which confirms women’s position in corruption case as a helper. What is excluded is other factors that influence corruption. The phrase “tanneizhu (greedy wife)” is an antonym of “xianneizhu (good wife).” “Good wife (xianneizhu)” is an ancient phrase which came from the Warring States (475-221BC) periods. Yan Zi (晏子), who was the Prime Minister (zaixiang; 宰相) of Qi state (齐国), was talented (xianliang; 贤良) but not very tall, while his groomer was tall. One day, the groomer’s wife saw Yan Zi and the groomer passing the house (Cai, 2018). The groomer’s wife told her husband that although Yan Zi was the Prime Minister, and everyone knew that he was talented, he was still modest; although she said her husband was tall, he was not modest and had no desire to make progress; she told him she felt ashamed of him and wanted to leave. Finally, the groomer reflected on his wife’s words and turned modest (Cai, 2018). The groomer’s wife later was called the “good wife (xianneizhu),” as she knew what was wrong with her husband and how to make her husband progress (Cai, 2018). Later, the phrase “good wife (xianneizhu)” was used to praise women who were virtuous and promoted their husband’s study, career and social status. “Xian
“(virtuous)” is a very important quality for women. According to the Lessons for Women (Niüe; 女诫), if a wife is not virtuous, she cannot respect and serve her husband (fu bu xian, ze wuyi shi fu; 妇不贤，则无以事夫). Besides the three obediences (sancong; 三从), virtuous also refers to the four virtues (side; 四德) of fidelity, physical charm, propriety in speech, and efficiency in needlework. In this sense, to be the “good wife (xianneizhu)”, women should put the husband and the family at the center of their lives and sacrifice themselves. A wife’s duties have also become a heated topic in the Republican period. Some people advocated the liberation of women from the role of dutiful wives and loving mothers, while many people proposed domestic duties for wives, such as financial independence and child-raising, however, while saying little about women’s public roles, (J. Chen, 2012). The debate did not radically change women’s roles in the family, which partially explains why traditional gender discourses are still used today. Here, “tanneizhu” is an ironic phrase that wives do not follow their responsibility to help their husbands. Using the “good wife (xianneizhu)” and the “greedy wife (tanneizhu)” reminds readers that women should be good wives to help their husbands in their careers and to improve or maintain their social status.

Terms related to mistresses and sexual relationships appear 106 times in relation to eight phrases. The meaning of mistress and love is straightforward, and the meaning of “shenghuo fuhua (leading a corrupt lifestyle)” and “daode baihuai (morally corrupt)” had been mentioned in chapter 5, so the focus here is on the other four phrases. “Quansejiaoyi” means sexual bribes to cadres, while “bu zhengdang xingxingwei” and “bu zhengdang nannv guanxi” means sexual relationships outside marriage. Probably the harshest phrase is “tongjian”, which refers to adultery. “Tongjian (adultery)” was a serious crime in ancient China for which both women and men would receive punishment, even being sentenced to death. For “Tongjian (adultery)”, women who got involved with other men were recognized as not fulfilling women’s responsibilities (i.e., three obediences), and men who were involved
with other people’s wives were identified as immoral men (opposite to moral men —— junzi). Ancient China was a hierarchical society with strict gender norms and rituals, so “tongjian (adultery)” was supposed to violate those norms. Women who committed “tongjian” were called “adulteress (yinfu; 淫妇)” and men who committed “tongjian” were call “adulterer (jianfu; 奸夫).” Both “yinfu” and “jianfu” in the Chinese context are insults. In sum, these eight phrases stigmatize women as sexed subjects and remind readers that women should be moral. To be moral, women should remember traditional gender discourse - to be a good wife and accompany their husbands.

Table 6.2 Codes, definitions and frequencies of themes related to descriptions of men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>this code refers to words and sentences which include “men” (nanren; 男人).</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>This code contains the words and sentences which contain “husband” (zhangfu,丈夫; fu; 夫)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptions of Men</td>
<td>This code contains the words and sentences which include “officials” (guanyuan; 官员) and “leaders” (lingdao; 领导)</td>
<td>1,338</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials/Leaders</td>
<td>Metaphors of corrupt cadres: The code refers to metaphors to describe corrupt cadres, including the related words and phases: “grassroot officials embezzled</td>
<td>169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
huge government funds (xiaoguan ju tan, 小官巨贪, or xiaoguan ju fu, 小官巨腐),” “big rat (it means corrupt officials, shuoshu,硕鼠),”
“a lot of flies (it means a lot of corrupt grassroot officials, qun ying,群蝇),” “fly (it means corrupt grassroot officials, cangying,苍蝇),” “ant (it means grassroot officials, mayi, 蚂蚁),” “tiger (it means high profile officials, laohu,老虎).”

| Total | 1,735 |

Note: the total number of news articles is 276.

Table 6.2 reveals that men in news articles about corruption are most frequently depicted as “officials and leaders,” followed by terms referring to “the husband,” “metaphors,” and “men”. Compared to descriptions of women, men are not depicted as greedy husbands or good husbands, but their roles are conveyed through many metaphors. From past to present, being an official or cadre is a very good career plan for Chinese, as the Analects of Confucius (lunyu; 论语) says a scholar should be an official (xue er you ze shi; 学而优则仕). In ancient society, Confucianism was the foundation of Chinese learning; the purpose for entering school and learning was to attend the imperial examinations (kejukaoshi; 科举考试); and the purpose for the imperial examinations was to select officials for the
government from all levels. Nowadays, many Chinese who have bachelor’s degrees or above are keen to attend the Civil Service Exam, as more than 1.33 million people registered in the 2018 National Civil Service Exam to compete for only 14,500 positions (Xinhua News Agency, 2018, November 1). However, the reason why being officials is so attractive to Chinese is not because of the high salary, but because of the authority held by cadres and the off-the-books income they can amass (huishoushou; 灰色收入). In China, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China earned 11 thousand yuan (about 2000 dollars now) a month in 2011 (Shu, 2014). In the analysis, men were connected with officials and leaders, which continue to reinforce the worship of being officials and leaders and traditional gender stereotypes (women cannot enter school in ancient society).

There are seven metaphors reported in Table 6.2, divided into three categories. First, xiaoguan ju tan and xiaoguan ju fu are used to refer to low-level cadres who have embezzled a huge amount of money. For instance, Hao Pengjun, the former Party Branch Secretary of the Coal Bureau, Pu county, Shanxi Province, had embezzled about .3 billion yuan and spent more than .1 billion yuan on buying 38 houses in many places, including Beijing and Hainan Province (Tencent, 2011). However, he was only section chief rank official (keji; 科级). Those phrases were meant to attract the readers’ attention, as “xiao (small or low-level)” and “ju (huge)” are opposite in Chinese. Second, “shuoshu (big rats)” were used to describe corrupt cadres more than 2000 years ago. Based on the Book of Songs (shijing; 诗经) which collected songs from Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BCE), a song described corrupt cadres: “big rat big rat, do not steal my food” (shuoshu shuoshu, wu shi wo shu; 颛鼠硕鼠，无食我黍) (haoshici.com, n.d.). A Mouse or a rat was supposed to be greedy and ugly and likely to steal food, so a mouse or a rat are metaphors for corrupt cadres. What is more, there is a saying which expresses people’s hate towards a mouse or a rat, that is, when a mouse or a rat runs across the street, everybody cries, “kill it!” (laoshu guo jie, renren han da; 老鼠过街，人人喊
This phrase presupposed people are familiar with the metaphor and the saying. The metaphor may remind people’s hate towards corrupt cadres, similar to the hate towards mouse or rat. What is excluded are institutional reasons for corruption. Third, “laohu (tiger)” and “cangying (flies)” are related to the President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption slogan: “cracking down on both tigers and flies (laohu cangming yiqi da; 虎、苍蝇一起打).” Mention of these two phrases can show the party’s determination to eliminate corruption and make readers feel confident towards the ruling party.

6.2 Discourses of CCDI Corruption News Articles

6.2.1 Descriptions of Women: Women’s Fault

This section focuses on discourses about women, analyzing how they function to make connections between women and corruption. Although, in the previous analysis, very few corrupt female cadres are reported, and most women are mentioned in relation to male cadre’s corruption issues, women are found to be responsible for corruption in the discourses below.

The first type of female representation in discourses concerning cases of corruption is simple mention of “women,” as in the three examples below.

Case 1

(Yici ourang de jihui, Yi Mou zhongyu ‘ruyuanyichang’: ta zhangwo le quezao de zhengju, zhengming Cheng Haibo yu mou nianqing nxing you guo buzengdang xingwei.)

Yi Mou made his “dream” come true all by chance; that is, he had specific evidence that proved that Cheng Haibo had improper sexual relationships with a young woman. (Central Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), 2013, August 20)

Case 1 is a narrative discourse in which the reporter explains a corruption case to readers, and the case involves two men (Yi Mou, Cheng Haibo) and an anonymous woman.
The “woman,” described as being engaged in “improper sexual relationships,” is treated as a sexed subject who is an accessory in the corruption of the male cadre. The reporter emphasizes it is not easy to collect evidence by using the phrase “‘dream’ come true (ruyuanyichang)” with quotation marks. The phrase “all by chance (Yici ourang de jihui)” is consistent with the phrase “‘dream’ come true (ruyuanyichang).” The discourse indicates both men are engaged in a conflict, and women and improper sexual relationships are tools to beat the enemy.

**Case 2**

*(Duan Peixiang bujin zai qian wu shang ai zhan pianyi, hai daode baihuai, yanzhong weifan shenghuo jilv. Shencha faxian, ta zai danren Dehongzhou guangbo dianshiju dangzu shuji, juzhang he Zhouzhengfu fumishuzhang, bangongshi zhuren qijian, yu duoming nvxing fasheng he baochi buzhengdang guanxi)*

*Duan Peixiang did not only take advantage of money and wealth but displayed moral corruption as well. An investigation revealed that he had improper sexual relations with a lot of women when he was Party Secretary of Dehongzhou television station.* (CCDI, November 16, 2017)

Similar to case 1, case 2 is a narration. In this case, the word “women” is associated with illegal behaviour and misconduct (moral corruption, improper sexual relations). The discourse only contains the voice of the reporter, who is employing narration to describe the corruption scandal reinforces women as sexed subjects who, like the corrupt cadre, are willing to engage in “improper” sexual relations. The word “investigation (shencha)” indicates the reporter’s effort to establish the authority of the government. The report mentions the corrupt cadre and the results of the investigation, while the reasons for improper sexual relations are excluded.
Case 3

(Zai ‘mixin xintai’ de yinling xia, Luan Qingwei dizhi gezhong youhuo de nengli jijuxiang. Ta chen qizi, erzi zai guowai qijian, zai guonei yu liangming nvxing changqi baochi buzhengdang guanxi, bing yu you yi nv. Weile manzu zhe liangming nvxing dui jinqian de xuyao, ta liyong shouzhong quanli fengkuang liancai, gei tamen maifang maiche, gong qi dasi huihuo.)

Under the “superstitious mentality,” Luan Qingwei’s ability to resist various temptations reduced quickly. While his wife and son were abroad, he had improper sexual relationships with two women, and one of them gave birth to a girl. In order to fulfill these two women’s needs on money, he utilized his authorities to get money crazily, bought houses and cars for them and provided them with a lot of money. (CCDI, February 4, 2017)

Case 3 describes a corruption case with reference to a “superstitious mentality” (described with quotation marks), emphasizing that corruption is the individual’s fault. The word “women” appears in the discourse twice. First, women are represented in relation to improper sexual relationships,” and second, the word “women” is associated with their need for “money” and a set of desires (houses and cars). “Improper sexual relationships” remind readers that those women may trade sex for money, while “money” and a set of desires (houses and cars) indicate what the corrupt cadre did is to meet women’s needs, and such a discourse reinforces an impression that women who are greedy put pressures on men. The discourse appears as narrative, but actually belittles women and labels women as materialist girls which, in Chinese, is a negative phrase which means young women value everything by their monetary value and do everything for their financial interests. This phrase has been known by Chinese people since the showing of a blind dating television program in 2008. Ma Nuo, one of the participants, said that she preferred to cry in a BMW car rather than smile on
a bike (ningyuan zuozai baoma li ku, ye buyuan zuozai zixingche shang xiao; 宁愿坐在宝马里哭，也不愿坐在自行车上笑), that is, she preferred to lead a luxurious lifestyle even if she may not necessarily be happy. The public criticized Ma as a materialist girl. By examining the entire discourse, there is a paradox: the first sentence claims that Luan’s failure to resist temptations was the cause of his corrupt behaviour, but the last sentence stigmatizes women as the cause of corruption. The discourse tries to send a warning: individuals should be responsible for corruption scandals. Ironically, corruption news is released by the official media, which means that the government has the power to define the cause of corruption.

Intertextuality can be established in the above three examples around the theme of “improper sexual relationships,” which means unmarried sexual relationships (Wang & Zhang, 2015). According to Fairclough (1995), narrative discourses that prevail among news reports are sometimes organized to show stories without a clear event-line. It is important, then, to examine the main elements that appear in the stories and the ideological function of the discourse. The ideological focus of the above discourses is corruption, to draw attention to the kinds of activities that state media describe as corruption and who causes corruption. This gives news reports a Corruption + Cause structure, where Corruption involves the process of committing corruption and the Cause involves how corruption can happen. In these narrative discourses, the conjunctions are mainly temporal (when, while), the processes are actional (i.e., take, fulfill, bought, get) or mental (superstitious mentality), and the characters in the discourse are subjects (specific individual, woman). These narrative discourses are trying to establish a connection between corrupt cadres and women; that is, corrupt cadres’ relationships with women could be based on improper sexual relationships, which are illegal, while fulfilling those women’s desires could cause corruption.
On the other hand, those three examples further reflect traditional gender norms according to which sexual purity is the only measure of women’s values (Barlow, 2004). Although in modern society, no regulations and laws clearly state that women should conserve their sexual purity, an emphasis on improper sexual relationships in media discourses is an indirect attempt by which state media may seek to regulate women’s sexuality.

The next kind of “woman” present in these media discourses is the “wife”. Because the wife is an essential concept in traditional culture, examining this word makes it possible to explore the influence of patriarchal power and whether conventional gender relations still persist in contemporary society.

**Case 4**

(“Qinqing huibao,” fuzhufutan)

“Repaying one for his or her kindness,” the wife helped the husband to commit corruption (CCDI, August 16, 2013).

In case 4, “repaying one for his or her kindness (qinqing huibao)”, is a metaphorical phrase - the wife’s aid in abetting her husband’s corruption in the same way that a wife repays the husband’s kindness. This phrase stems from an old saying. In China’s moral system, it was virtuous to repay people’s kindness, reflected in the expression that a drop of water given in need shall be returned with a burst of spring (*dishui zhi en, dang yongquan xiang bao*; *滴水之恩，当涌泉相报*), which means even if others just provide a little help, one should return the favour with all one can when others are in need (360doc.com, n.d.).

The phrase “the wife helped the husband to commit corruption (fuzhufutan)” is also a metaphorical phrase, which came from the proverb “the wife should obey the husband (fuchangfusui).”

The use of phrases “repaying one for his or her kindness (qinqing huibao)” and “the wife helped the husband to commit corruption (fuzhufutan)” in the news report presupposes
that readers are familiar with the traditional moral system, including this old saying, and understand the use of irony to express the opposite meaning. The author warns that a wife should not be the helper for their husband in terms of corruption.

**Case 5**

(Qizi Jinmou, zai Zhu Weiping tanfu duolu de guocheng zhong, fahui le ‘tanweizhu’de zuoyong. Shen wei dangdi mou yinhang zhihang hangzhang de ta, yu Zhu Weiping ‘zhi xianghe’ gong tu moul, gongtong tanzou qi ‘laoqian’de xiezouq. Jinmou bu manzu yu yijing yongyou de youyu shenghuo, zhengtian xiang de jiushi zenyang qian sheng qian, li gun li, wei Zhujia caichan gunxueqiu shi de zengzhang, zuochu le henda ‘gongxian’.)

Coverage of Zhu Weiping’s corruption highlighted the role that his wife, Ms. Jin, played the role of a “greedy wife.” As the president of a sub-branch of a bank, she accepted bribery with her husband. She was not satisfied with gracious living but thought about how to make more money by misconduct or illegal activities. She “made contributions” to the family wealth. (CCDI, November 4, 2014)

In Case 5, the corruption discourse “greedy wife (tanweizhu)” is used to highlight the contrast with its opposite phrase of the “good wife (xiangeizhu).” Quotation marks indicate “greedy wife (tanweizhu)” is an ironic application of the discourse of corruption in representations of the wife’s behaviour in corruption scandals. In the last sentence, the phrase “made contributions (gongxian),” introduced with quotation marks, is another ironic application, emphasizing Ms. Jin’s important role in corruption. Ironic applications reinforce the image of the wife as rapacious. These two applications, together with the statement that she was not satisfied with gracious living, attribute the cause of the male cadre’s corrupt behaviour to the so-called behaviour of the greedy wife.
In these cases, the wife’s role in corruption is configured by the juxtaposition of a gender discourse (Coverage of Zhu Weiping’s corruption highlighted the role that his wife, Ms. Jin, played the role of a “greedy wife.”) with narrative discourses (i.e., As the president of a sub-branch of a bank, she accepted bribery with her husband.). The reference to the corruption process is also a legal discourse, as Ms. Jin’s behaviours are referred to here as “illegal”. The focus on the greediness of both spouses obscures other pertinent reasons, such as lack of supervision, that make corruption possible, which are entirely excluded from these narratives of corruption.

Case 6

(Li Mou bujin ziji’shanchang’quanqianjiaoyi, hai bu wang zuo hao Yu Shaodong de ‘xianneizhu’. Yiwei mengkuang laoban wei biaoshi ganxie, youyi songgei Yu Shaodong yitao Chongqing zhu cheng de fangzi. Li Mou dezhi hou, quancheng yitong kanfang, xuanfang bing wancheng banli goufang shouxu. Zhihou, ta you ‘qinzi’ shouqu duifang 12 wanyuan de fangwu zhuangxiufei, jiashang goufang feiyong zongji 68 wan yu yuan.)

Ms. Li not only traded power for money but also played the role of the “good wife.” A boss who owned a manganese ore company wanted to give Yu Shaodong a house in Chongqing as a gift. Ms. Li heard this news and selected the house. She accepted 120,000 Chinese yuan for house decoration. This money plus the house purchase fund equalled more than 680,000 Chinese yuan as total. (CCDI, May 20, 2016)

In this case, the wife is initially described as a “good wife (xianneizhu).” However, quotation marks indicate that this is an ironic use of the phrase good wife to suggest that the wife is actually a “greedy wife (tanneizhu).” The cadre Yu had committed misconduct, and the boss wanted to bribe Yu to thank for his help. But in employing three verbs “heard” “selected” and “accepted” to describe Ms. Li’s involvement in obtaining the bribe, the
narrative discourse makes it look like Ms. Li is the only active participant in corruption, while the passivity with which Yu, the male cadre, is portrayed here suggests that he is an innocent bystander, devoid of agency.

The discourses surrounding the role of the wife show that she is judged in relation to whether she helps the husband in getting bribes. If those wives help their husbands in corruption, they are recognized as greedy wives. As has been discussed previously, both discourses of the good wife and the greedy wife are connected with wifely duties in traditional society. Those discourses not only reinforce expectations about women’s traditional roles but, more importantly, represent the exercise of power. According to Foucault’s *History of Sexuality*, biopower represses sex by limiting the topic on certain occasions while certain groups of people, such as children, cannot talk about it. Similarly, the patriarchal power represses women by posing a set of restrictive norms and rituals and stigmatizing women for sexual wrongdoings. In modern society, power is exercised in various forms to suppress women. By infusing traditional meanings to the conception of wife, the discourses reinforce patriarchal norms and behaviours for women.

These expectations are also represented in the last kind of discourse about women which involves mistresses who are infamous subjects in corruption news.

**Case 7**

de gefen wuchang zhuanrang gei Wang Guoyan de qingfu Yang Mou).

According to investigators, Wang Guoyan had improper sexual relations with many women, and most of the money earned from corruption was spent on his mistresses. For instance, in October 2008, Wang Guoyan rejected 1 million Chinese yuan, which Mr. Wan wanted to pay him as a bribe. Then, this money was kept by intermediary until August 2011, when Wang Guoyan accepted the money because he thought his mistress --- Ms. Zhu ---- needed to use the money to open a hotel. In the second half of 2005, Wang Guoyan agreed that Mr. Chen transferred his shares of a coffee shop to his mistress ---- Ms. Yang and the shares worth 0.38 million Chinese yuan. (CCDI, September 23, 2013)

The discourse stigmatizes women as the focus of “improper sexual relations,” then emphasizes how women who are mistresses cause corruption in three ways. First, the discourse states that most of the bribes the male cadre got were spent on mistresses. Second, the male cadre first rejected the bribe but accepted it when his mistress needed money. Third, by mentioning “hotel” and “coffee shop,” the author implies the commodification of sexual relations by connecting mistresses with monetary values. The investigators’ storytelling while introducing details of the corrupt behaviours, makes the discourse intelligible and credible.

Case 8

(2000 nian, danren yunxi gufen gongsi fuzong de Lei Yi dao Beijing chuchai, zai jiuba renshi le Hou Moumou bing yu qi fasheng liangxing guanxi, bujiuhou baoyang le Hou Moumou bing rang qi dao Kunming juzhu. Danren yunxi jituan dangwei shuji, dongshizhang zhihou, Lei Yi gengshi bianbenjiali, xianhou baoyang le Li Moumou, Wang Moumou deng duoming nvxing, bing jingchang yizhiqianjin, chuzi wei tamen zai Kunming, Chengdu, Shenzhen deng di goumai che, fang, qi tanwu suode de ju’e huilukuan you 1000 yu wan yun renminbi
In 2000, Lei Yi, who was the vice manager of Yunxi Company at that time, was on a business trip to Beijing. He met Ms. Hou in a pub, and they had sexual relations. Later, he kept Ms. Hou (as his mistress) and let her stay in Kunming. After becoming CEO and Party Secretary of Yunxi Company, Lei Yi had many mistresses, such as Ms. Li and Ms. Wang, and so on. Lei Yi used the money made from corruption to buy houses and cars for his mistresses in Shenzhen, Kunming, and Chengdu, and so on. He had spent about 10 million Chinese yuan on his mistresses. Besides, with the help of some bosses, Lei Yi had sexual relations with some celebrities and models. In order to maintain this corrupt lifestyle, Lei Yi made huge money from misconduct and illegal activities. (CCDI, August 15, 2014)

Similar to the previous discourse, this discourse continues to remind readers that mistresses are often causes of corruption. One of the differences between the two discourses is that Lei Yi did not reject the bribe at first, so he did not look as innocent as Wang Guoyan. Another difference is that Lei has sexual relationships with more than one woman, and he has a higher social status than those women do, which reflects traditional gender relations. McMahon (2010) claimed that in ancient China, an elite man could have many women via polygyny and via paying for sex in the brothel. At the end of the discourse, the author summarized the case by attributing Lei’s corruption to his desire to maintain his promiscuous lifestyle, which reinforces the statement that corruption is the fault of the cadre and the mistresses. Although no cadres’ words or mistress’ words were quoted in the discourse, the narrative makes it look realistic. What is excluded here are institutional reasons for corruption. These discourses emphasize that many corrupt cadres bought houses, cars, and
luxury goods for their mistresses, making it appear that the relationships between mistresses and cadres are about the commodification of intimacy rather than about more formal aspects of the cadre’s institutional position and role.

In China, purchases of luxury goods increase every year, with the Chinese spending about $43 billion on luxury brands in 2011 (Rabkin, 2012). Generally, luxury items can be connected to corruption in three ways. First, buying luxury items is a popular way to bribe cadres, as those items can be expensive “gifts”. For instance, before the “two sessions” (the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), many local cadres would buy luxury items (Hong, 2012) which would be sent to other cadres as “gifts” during the “two sessions” period. Second, luxury-item stores are places for getting bribes. For instance, business people can go to certain stores owned by the cadre’s relatives and buy things without picking them up, so the bribe turns into revenue. Third, mistresses like to purchase luxury items. Mistresses’ purchases are described as the driving force of some luxury brands (Rabkin, 2012). On the one hand, some mistresses accompany cadres or business people to attend important occasions, so luxury goods could make them look beautiful and showcase their financial status; on the other hand, buying luxury goods is a form of conspicuous consumption to make people think they have refined taste (Rabkin, 2012). This often causes resentment among the masses who have modest incomes. However, if the general public hates luxury items because of its connection with corruption (Hong, 2012), people may resent mistresses, who are not only tainted by corruption but also have a negative effect on marriages. In China, the mistress is often seen as the responsible party for destroying her lover’s family, as expressed in an old saying about the importance of family or marriage - one would damage ten temples rather than destroy a marriage (ning chai shizuo miao, bu hui yizhuanghun; 宁拆十座庙，不毁一桩婚). Mistresses are described with adjectives such as greedy or materialistic, and portrayed as destroyers of families. As more
and more cadres and business people have mistresses, a new kind of company has emerged – the mistress dispelling company, which serves to help the wife to dispel mistresses by hiring lawyers and psychologists who first befriend the mistress and then convince her to give up on her affair. The discourses that associate mistresses with houses, cars, and goods cater to the readers’ interest in this heated topic but they are also a way to arouse hatred against mistresses. Caught into the lascivious details of such salacious discourses, readers may focus on the mistresses as the problem rather than other factors, including the political system itself.

Both case 7 and case 8 are narrative discourses. As both cases do not have a clear event-line, one of the elements of discourse, orientation, was utilized. According to Faiclough (1995), orientation guides the audience’s perception of the characters. In case 7 and case 8, orientations (i.e., accepted, agreed, buy, spent … on, open a hotel, a coffee shop, houses and cars) help to generate emotion (negative perception) towards the character (mistresses).

**Case 9**

('li lian qianxian guo yu jia, cheng you qinjian bai you she.'  
Shenhui fazhan de lishi Jincheng gaosu women: shemi langfei,  
huihuo wudu biran daoshi guojia miewang, zhengquandianfu;  
yige lingdaoqhe jiaoshe yinyi, shenghuo fuhua biran zangsong  
quantu, shenbaiminglie. Bo Liangen, Wu Zhizhong, Jin Zhao  
jiushi cong rezhong yu chihewanle, chenni yu dinghongjiulv;  
zhubu tuihua bianzhi de.)

“The historical progress of social development tells us: extravagance and waste must lead to the perdition of the state; a leader who is extravagant and leads a corrupt lifestyle must ruin his future and lose all standing and reputation. Examples are Bo Liangen, Wu Zhizhong and Jin Zhao. (CCDI, July 15, 2014)
The discourse employed in case 9 tries to connect a leader’s corrupt behaviour to a country’s survival by using the ancient proverb “to visit the worthiest country and home, into a thrifty defeat by extravagance.” This old saying, written by Li Shangyin, a famous poet in the Tang dynasty (618-907) (Li, n.d.), has three implications. First, the saying attributes the causes of the downfall of the dynasty to the extravagance of the royal family and aristocracy. To maintain their indulgence, the emperor imposed exploitative levels of taxation on peasants, in response to which peasant uprisings contributed to the weakening of the dynasty. For instance, the Empress Dowager Cixi used 30 million taels of silver to celebrate her 60th birthday and commanded the Beiyang Fleet to end the First Sino-Japanese War without any further military support (Hu, 2011). Without support, the Beiyang Fleet was beaten by the Japanese Fleet, and the Qing government had to sign unequal treaties. Because such behaviours accelerated the end of the Qing dynasty, the proverb reminds people of many similar stories about extravagance and the end of a dynasty. Second, the proverb contains hidden propaganda by making a direct connection between individual interests and national interests. The CCP regularly employs such propaganda which advocates for individuals to sacrifice themselves for national interests. For instance, the story of Lai Ning, a student who sacrificed himself at the age of 15 in putting out a forest fire, was widely distributed in the 1990s, when I was in elementary school. In this sense, the proverb tallies with propaganda that people perceive from their own everyday life experiences, serving to reinforce the exercise of political power. Third, ancient Chinese literature is highly generalized, has rhythm, and is straightforward for people to learn and to repeat in the form of proverbs, idioms, and poetry. In the case of the ancient saying employed in this discourse, the relationship between extravagance and the country is clearly conveyed in only fourteen words. In depicting a corrupt lifestyle that includes mistresses and improper sexual relations, the discourse stigmatizes women for their roles in ruining a cadre’s life. Mistresses’
subjectivity is repressed by political and patriarchal power because of the unidimensional way they are presented to the readers.

In the discourse, the mention of “corrupt lifestyles (the cadre keeps several mistresses)” can arouse people’s hatred for mistresses, reinforced by reference to some historical literary quotations which attribute the end of a dynasty to women. For instance, the story of “Setting Beacon Fire to make fun of Dukes” (fenghuo xi zhuhou; 烽火戏诸侯) describes a king who set a beacon fire to please the queen. However, the purpose of setting a beacon fire is to inform dukes to save the king from trouble, so after the beacon fire had been lit for fun so many times, no dukes came to save the king when the king was really in trouble.

Case 9 is a regulatory discourse that is congruently applied (i.e., extravagance and waste must lead to the perdition of the state). The configuration of a traditional discourse with regulatory discourses conveys tensions between “individual corrupt lifestyles” (i.e., keeping mistresses) and a state’s prosperity. The author establishes the truth of the cause of corruption scandals, “a leader who is extravagant and leads a corrupt lifestyle must ruin his future and lose all standing and reputation.” However, while the male is the focus of corruption, the mistress is portrayed as the cause of his troubles.

Some cadres bought houses for their mistresses, which many discourses presuppose is a form of bribery. In China, the house is very important and has many implications. First, the house is related to important forms of social welfare and resources. Since the 1960s, the Chinese government used the household registration system Hukou to restrict migration. That is, people who were born in rural places cannot live in cities because they have agricultural Hukou, while people who were born in cities have urban Hukou (Fincher, 2016). However, many public services, such as medical resources and educational resources, are distributed unevenly between cities and suburban areas and between capital cities and other cities. In this sense, cities have more hospitals, experts, and high-quality schools, and capital cities, like
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, have even better hospitals and schools. In 1998, China started the housing system reform, which enables people to buy and sell houses. Before 1998, people’s houses in cities were assigned by the working unit. To stimulate people to purchase a house, many city governments started to give people the chance to change their Hukou if they bought a house in the city. People began to buy houses not only to get a new Hukou but to have access to better public services. However, many rural residents come to the cities illegally without obtaining an urban Hukou to work as migrant labourers. Most of them are working in heavy labour industries or service industries in jobs that do not require employees to have a higher education background or high skills. It is very hard to get Hukou for rural residents who work in those jobs, while buying a house is too expensive. Second, traditionally, the house is family property which is associated with important social values. For instance, Mencius proposed that people who have property would benefit social stability (you hengchang zhe you hengxin; 有恒产者有恒心). Third, currently, the house is a signifier of wealth, which is ever more important in China’s consumerist culture. From 2000 to 2010, housing prices increased, on average, 10% every year (Wangyi News, 2018). In Beijing, for example, in 2001, the average house price was 4,716 yuan per square metre, while by 2019, it had risen to 42,941 yuan per square metre (Wangyi News, 2018; Xinhua News Agency, 2019). Owning a house in a city signifies that people have property and are wealthier than people who do not own a house. Fourth, accepting a house as a bribe can be convenient for corrupt cadres, as the house can be registered under the name of the cadre’s family members, siblings, parents, or friends. In relation to four aspects noted here, there is a proverb to express the association between a house and mistress which says “settle one’s lover in a golden house (jinwu cang jiao; 金屋藏娇),” which people sometimes cite in conversations about those who buy houses for mistresses.
In summary, women are commonly depicted in news articles on corruption with reference to a series of negative words, including “illegal sexual relations,” “greedy wife,” and “mistresses.” Married women are expected to perform their roles as a traditional good wife who is responsible for their husband’s upright behaviour; as mistresses or women involved in sexual relationships outside of marriage, by contrast, women are sexualized in adverse ways and held accountable for male cadre’s corruption. These results confirm that women do not receive the same treatment as men in the media. Women’s media images are, in part, a reflection of government policies rather than independent and indiscriminate descriptions of women. In contemporary society, patriarchal power is exercised on women in indirect ways by arousing people’s memory of traditional values and connecting gender norms with everyday life. News media contribute to reproducing traditional gender discourses in various forms, including metaphors, use of irony, traditional proverbs, discourses representing officials’ crimes, and traditional storytelling. The next section discusses men’s images in CCDI news articles on corruption.

6.2.2 Descriptions of Men: Men’s Fault

As observed in Table 6.2, four keywords related to men’s descriptions are present in corruption news. Unlike descriptions of women, discourses about men emphasize men’s power at home and in the workplace.

In discourses associated with the representation of “men (nanren; 男人),” several traditional expectations towards men can be found, such as being morally superior (junzi).

Case 10

(Zuo yige shenmeyang de zhangfu, zuo yige shenmeyang de fuqin, zuo yige shenmeyang de erzi, zenme zuohao, shi bixu yao kaolv de. Wo pingshi bu zhuzhong peiyang zhengque de shenghuo qinggu, tantu xiangshou, tanfu anyi, keguang shang jiada le ziji dui jinqian de tanlan he zhiqiu. Zai yewu
I should have considered how to be a good husband, a good father, and a good son. I did not have a healthy interest in life, and I am kind of a hedonist ---- objectively, this made me greedy and made me want to get more money. I failed to resist the temptation of money during business associations. I am sorry for my wife, as she will have to take care of the family all by herself in the future. I am sorry for my son, as he is a good middle school student, and I may see him again when he is a high school student or when he graduates from university, and I do not know how to face him. I am sorry for my parents, as they raised me until I graduated from university, but I left them while they needed me to take care of them, and maybe I will not have a chance to see them after being released from prison.

Life is like a river, not too long not too short, but having healthy interests in life, and a healthy family should be essential tasks for a man. (CCDI, July 2, 2014)

The above discourse stems from a cadre’s confession. What is impressive is that the cadre repented for his actions because of his relationships with his family members, and he felt sorry for all of them. The discourse arouses readers’ empathy that men should be correct persons and take care of their families as fathers, sons and husbands while keeping away
from criminal activity. However, the discourse has three implications. First, the cadre owed his corruption to unhealthy interests in life; his mention of responsibilities for a man and the cultivation of healthy interests and responsibilities reflect Confucianist morality. As observed previously, Confucianism put an individual’s morality together with the survival of a country, emphasizing the importance of a leader’s morality in governing a country. Also, Confucianism advocates that filial piety comes first among hundreds of behaviours (bai xing xiao wei xian; 百行孝为先), so it is moral and normal for a man to take care of parents and the family. Here very striking is the lost opportunity to show filial piety which this cadre failed to abide by because he got himself imprisoned for corruption and thus endangered his responsibilities to take care of his elderly parents.

Second, in quoting the statement of confession, the article validates the perception that corruption is the fault of the individual cadre and not of the political system. While analysing the scaffold in the 18th century, Foucualt (1979) claimed that written forms of criminal procedures, including confessions, served to establish the truth and the exclusive power of the sovereign. The best way to exert the power of truth is to let criminals accept and sign for it (Foucualt, 1979). Similarly, in quoting confessions here, the authorities are trying to create the truth by demonstrating that the CCP is empowered to establish and enforce the truth. Third, the culture of confession (jianbao wenhua; 检讨文化), marked by self-criticism, ensures that party cadres show submission and admit their errors for not supporting the mandates of the party leadership (Liu, 2018).

Since the 1950s, just after the PRC was founded, the CCP launched an ideological reform campaign (sixiang gaizao yundong; 思想改造运动) to force intellectuals (zhishi fenzi; 知识分子) to shift their thoughts and ideas to CCP’s socialist ideologies. Intellectuals had to
write confessions to reflect on their “faults” and to show they had changed their thoughts and
ideas. Writing confessions reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution, but the practice
has been kept until now. Although writing a confession appears to be an individual behaviour
it is actually a forced behaviour under duress, as people have to write confessions to get less
punishment, often having to revise confessions many times until the authorities are satisfied
(Shang, 2013; Liang, 2013; Sha, 2005). Political power is exerted in the confessional
discourse through three operations: 1) certain elements should be included in the confession,
such as admitting one’s errors to Chairman Mao during the Maoist period; 2) the purpose of
writing a confession is to avoid further punishment; and 3) the strategy behind the confession
is to incorporate propaganda into individuals’ lives.

During President Xi Jinping’s first five-year term, there have been many confessions
by both party leaders and commoners, suggesting a possible resurgence of Maoism and tight
ideological controls (Liu, 2018). By analyzing the televised confession made by Gui Minhai,
a Hong Kong bookseller, who was arrested on mainland China, Liu (2018) proposed two key
elements in his confession: criminality and the lack of filial piety. Although the official
mainstream media indicates that he was arrested after fleeing the scene of a traffic accident
he caused, it was widely speculated that he was arrested due to published books which
describe negative images of CCP’s leaders. Compared with confessions in the Maoist era, the
necessary element of confession in the contemporary age has shifted to focus on traditional
family values. The discourse in case 10 combines traditional norms with the culture of
confession to hide the institutional factors associated with corruption.

Case 11

(an fa hou, Xu Weilin shexiang guo henduo ruguo: ruguo bu
dangshang yibashou, ruguo shouzhong meiyou laobanmen
kewang de xiangmu, ruguo dangshi zai jianding yidian …… Xu
Weilin jingchang huishou zai jiceng tashi gan shi shi de
qingjing, bu fuyu danshi tashi, huidaojia man shi huanxiao. Nashi, tashi gujia de haonanren, shi ge zhengzhi de haofuqin. Nashi, ta henshao churu yule xiuxian changsuo, chule biyao de yingchou, ta zong hui diyishijian huiji, xiangshou jia de wenxi. Ran’er, zhe yiqie dou bei ta de tanlan he xiangshou huidiao le.)

After being investigated, Xu Weilin thought of many ifs: if he did not get the position, if bosses did not want programs that he managed, if he can say no …… Xu Weilin always recalled when he was a local cadre, he was happy although he was not rich. At that time, he was a good man who always took care of the family, and he was an upright father. At that time, he seldom went to entertainment and leisure venues, unless he must attend those activities. He always went back home early. However, all of these were destroyed by greed. (CCDI, August 12, 2014)

Case 11 is also a confessional discourse, as signified through reference to a series of “ifs” that Xu Weilin considered. Similar to case 10, the discourse further confirms Confucianism’s gender norms through statements about “a good man who takes care of the family” and “an upright father.” Also, the discourse confirms political norms by combining an individual’s personality with the ability to be a leader (i.e., “all of these were destroyed by greed”). The discourse presupposed that readers understand the importance of family and the importance of morality. Although the CCP claimed that China had entered a new era after the foundation of the PRC, discourses of this nature reveal that traditional gender norms and culture did not change totally and still prevail in China.

Case 12
(zai jiating fangmian, Cui Lianhai hai suan de shang shi yige gujia de nanren. Zuowei zhangfu, ta dui airen henhao, airen youbing zhuyuan shi doushi ta zai yiyuan peiban zhaogu, ye cong mei tingshuo ta zai waimian nianhuarecao; zuowei fuqin,
Case 12, like the previous two cases, mention men’s responsibility to the family, but this example further details the role of man as an economic supporter of a family. In the discourse, the phrase “took care of” has two levels of meanings. First, it means responsibility for a man to take care of the family physically while his wife was in the hospital. Second, it means to take care of the family by providing financial support.

In China, men are always associated with financial status. Historically, women did not have the right to accept education and work outside the household, so men were the only economic supporters for the family. In contemporary society, although women have the right to enter school and find a job, they have limited chances for career development. Women’s ability to give birth to children is believed to increase the cost to employers, so many
occupations favour men. Gender discrimination in the hiring process and the working place reinforce the idea that men are supporters of the family. One outcome of this phenomenon is that a man’s financial status plays a significant role in the marriage market. In urban areas, if a man wants to marry, he needs to buy a house to show his financial ability (Budden, 2017); in rural areas, if a man wants to marry, he needs to provide a betrothal gift (caili) to the bride’s family (Chen, 2016). Generally, buying a house in China’s cities takes, at least, 100,000 dollars, while betrothal gifts require at least, 20,000 dollars. However, the marriage market is highly competitive for men, as the One-Child Policy caused imbalanced gender ratios, leading to a surplus of 40 million men. On the other hand, if a family loses the husband, this family is recognized as having “lost the economic supporter” and may live in poverty. All these facts suggest China is a male-dominated society. Gender inequality is inscribed in this discourse which continues to remind readers that the man is still the breadwinner, embedded in related discourses that emphasize men’s power in the family and downgrade women’s power. Such discourses are applied to the representation of corruption but reveal more generally the hidden exercise of power to configure women’s roles. There is also a gendered double standard here in the representation of corrupt men who are portrayed as having engaged in corruption for altruistic reasons such as supporting their families, while women are vilified for leading men to perdition through their sexuality.

Case 10 and case 11 are confession discourses (I am sorry …, If …) presented with a subjunctive mood (i.e., I should have …). The ideological focus of the confession is on the cause of corruption: a confession typically includes statements about how individuals’ behaviour causes corruption and how individuals should behave. The discourse about men (i.e., At that time, he was a good man.) illustrates what a man should do by specifying a set of filial duties (take care of parents), family duties (take care of the family) and personality traits (upright, greedy). Case 12 is an evaluative discourse (i.e., As a husband, he treated his wife
very good and took care of his wife when she was sick and in the hospital.), but it is consistent with the confession discourse in terms of content.

Traditionally, masculinity in China was related to taking care of the family rather than being an independent man. Discourses conveyed through news about corruption confirm the traditional expectations for men. These include expectations about the role of the “husband” in serving the family well, illustrated in the three examples that follow.

**Case 13**


First, strengthen the institutional constraints on power. The anti-corruption campaign is a systematic project, and it needs a composition of forces from many aspects, such as the education system, the political system, monitoring, reform, punishment, and so on. In my opinion, those aspects have different functions during anti-corruption campaigns, and the essential factor in stopping corruption is to improve the
political system. From Tang Shaobo’s case, he knew the risks of committing corruption, so he was very careful in getting bribes; from Tang Shaobo’s case, we did not find the situation that the wife helps the husband to get bribes. Tang’s wife is a good wife and always warned her husband not to get bribes. However, all of these cannot stop Tang’s desire for money.

Hence, improving the political system can essentially stop corruption. (CCDI, August 10, 2013)

Case 13 articulates a regulatory discourse outlining how to eliminate corruption. The discourse contains various factors (education system, the political system), corruption scandals (i.e., he knew the risks of committing corruption, so he was very careful in getting bribes) and characters implicated in the story (Tang Shaobo, Tang’s wife). Specifically, this case can be understood from several perspectives. First, the discourse recognizes the wife as a good wife, which highlights the family’s role in preventing corruption. The wife did not help the husband to commit corruption but kept warning him of the dangers of corruption. Second, after mentioning the wife-husband relation in terms of corruption, the discourse blamed the person who disengages with family values to engage in corrupt behaviour. Third, although the author proposed the way to prevent corruption was to strengthen the authority structure and the political system, no details were provided about strategies to achieve these goals. Thus, any political dimensions within this discourse remain vague.

According to Foucault’s perspectives on the Panopticon, criminals in prison know that they are being watched, but they do not know who watches them. To avoid punishment, criminals need to engage in certain behaviours to cater to expectations (Foucault, 1979). In China, the main surveillance system for cadres’ behaviour is the Commission for Discipline Inspection. Given that the anti-corruption campaign is the most severe one since the foundation of PRC, why do cadres still commit corruption even if they know they are being watched and that many colleagues have been investigated? Three factors may account for this
situation. First, the Commission for Discipline Inspection is an institution that is led by the CCP, and most of the cadres are CCP members, so the regulatory power is weak. Second, the official media in China is the mouthpiece of the CCP, which seriously limits its power to monitor cadres and the government. Third, as numerous cadres were apprehended and part of the anti-corruption campaign was supposed to clean up Xi Jinping’s rivals, it is reasonable to suggest that many cadres engaged in misconduct did not receive punishment, so there were few fears among them about the consequences of corruption. Many cadres assumed that the risk of committing corruption would be less than the benefits they could get from corruption. Even in the discourse, it was observed that the prevention of corruption would not make cadres fearful of being corrupt; rather, the function of the discourse appears to be to show on a superficial basis the official determinations to eliminate corruption as a way to mitigate the pressure of the ruling party for not effectively restricting officials’ corruption.

Case 14

(Zhangfu rezhongyu quanqian jiaoyi, qizi ze poyou jingji tounao.)
The husband liked to trade power for money, while the wife was “economic-minded.” (CCDI, August 23, 2013)

The two clauses in case 14 are linked, with the word “husband” paralleled with the word “wife,” and the words “trade power for money” paralleled with the words “economic minded.” The word “like” in Chinese, “rezhongyu”) signifies something that is good, but to trade power for money is not a good thing and the phrase economic-minded in Chinese, “jingji tounao (economic minded)” refers to people who are smart in using money, which has a positive meaning whereas their application here is ironic. This discourse is meant to mock the phenomenon that the husband and wife jointly commit corruption. The purpose of the discourse is to remind readers that a family is an important unit in committing or preventing corruption.
Case 15

(2010 nian di, fangdichan laoban Huang Moumou weile
ganxie Zhu Fulin zai qi banli fangchan xiangmu tudizheng
fangmian de bangmang, xiang tongguo chaofang huoqu chajia
de xingshi songqian gei Zhu Fulin. Yushi, Zhu Fulin jiao qizi yi
yuemu de mingyi zhifule dingjin, yi diyu shichangjie 100 yu
wan yuan dinggou le yitao fangwu. Lianggeyue hou, Huang
Moumou shou keyi jiang fangzi zhuanshou huoqu chajia, Zhu
Fulin you jiao qizi zhifule quan'e fangkuan. Fangzi zhuanshou
hou, huoli 100 yu wan yuan. Youyu shijian jiange taiduan, Zhu
Fulin you ying zhangfu yaoqiu, zhidao bannian hou cai lingqu
le zhe 100 wan yu yuan.)

At the end of 2010, the boss of a real estate company, Mr.
Huang, wanted to thank Zhu Fulin’s help in getting Land Use
Certificate, so he wanted to give money to Zhu via price
difference in the real estate market. So, Zhu asked his wife to
order a house and use the name of the mother-in-law to
register the house. The price of the house was 1 million yuan
lower than the market price. After two months, Mr. Huang said
it was time to sell the house to get the price difference, so Zhu
asked his wife to pay the full price. So, Zhu got 1 million yuan
after selling the house. However, the 1 million yuan was still in
Mr. Huang’s company, as Zhu thought it was not right to get
the money back too soon. After six months, Zhu’s wife got the
money back by following her husband’s request. (CCDI, June
15, 2015)

Case 15 contains narrative discourses which combine corruption discourses and
husband-wife discourses. Husband-wife discourses contain action verbs (asked, order, use),
nouns (house) and characters (Mr. Huang, Zhu Fulin, Zhu’s wife), indicating traditional
gender ideologies. The word “wife” is mentioned three times, and each time the wife is
portrayed as just following what her husband said. The discourse does not attribute
corruption to the wife but emphasizes the husband as the head of the family. This case
indicates a paradox in the news about corruption in which women are identified as the cause of corruption, while male cadres have the power to commit corruption. Such a paradox echoes traditional gender norms in which the three obediences required women to follow men while political storytelling owed a dynasty’s downfall to women. Those paradoxes further confirm women’s marginalization in contrast to men, who have the right to define women’s behaviours.

These three examples highlight the essential role of family members in relation to corruption, which they can either prevent or aid and abet. The relation between the family and corruption is also a feature of CCP propaganda. President Xi Jinping has emphasized family values (jiafeng; 家风) since he took power in 2012. At the end of 2012, the Xinhua News Agency released a special article introducing Xi’s family life, conveying his warning to his family members, relatives, and friends, not to do any business activities in the places he had worked before and not to use his name to do anything (CCTV.com, 2018). Xi has connected family values with anti-corruption by proposing to “be honest and keep a family in order” (lianjie qijia; 廉洁齐家) which requires party members to be honest and have good family values as part of their obligation to the paternalistic nation. However, such a slogan transfers the responsibility for anti-corruption to women, who Xi said have “special functions” in building and keeping good family values (Zhang, 2018b), echoing notions of women as “mothers of the nation” within Republican China. Such special functions refer to women’s personality, as well as maternal qualities such as the ability to give birth and the ability to breast-feed (funv teyou de shenxin tedian, shengyu he buru gongneng; 妇女特有的身心特点，生育和哺乳功能) (Zhang, 2018b). The slogan has been exerted by many institutions across many activities. Every year since 2014, the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) has promoted its initiative to “Build the honest atmosphere; Family helps to be honest and upright (shu qinglian jiafeng, jiating zhulian; 树清廉家风，家庭助廉)” (Xinhua
Net, 2016). This initiative requires women to educate their family to be honest and to maintain an honest family atmosphere, and cadres are required to build up the family as the bottom line of anti-corruption (Xinhua Net, 2016). While this campaign employs the concept of the “good woman” as a strategy to stop corruption, it also reinforces the traditional idea that a woman’s primary goal should be a good mother and a good wife, serving to reproduce this dominant discourse in daily life. As political discourses had incorporated traditional gender discourses, women have to suffer the exercise of both political and patriarchal power.

Family’s importance in keeping away corruption has been widespread, with the word “family” included even in discourses related to descriptions of the “leader/official.”

Case 16

(‘buzuo kuiben maimai.’ Shi meige shagnren de jiben xintiao, renhe yige shangren zai gei guanyuan songli shi, kanzhong de doushi guanyuan shouzhong de quanli. Zhexie daoli, Du Min bushi buzhidao, dan yiran lecibupi, he laoban hunzaiyiqi, shenzhi quanjia shangzhen ---- qizi jingshang, xiongdi bangchen, lian erzi ye canyu qizhong)

“Businessmen do not do business without making a profit.” this is the principle of businessmen. When sending gifts to officials, every businessman targets an official’s power. Du Min knew this principle and the businessman’s purpose, but he did not stop committing corruption. He liked to make friends with bosses, and even family members wanted to take advantage of his power ---- his wife did business, his brothers did business, and even his son did business. (CCDI, May 4, 2017)

Case 16 combines a corruption discourse that highlights economic norms related to sayings (Businessmen do not do business without making a profit), narrative discourse (He liked to make friends with bosses, and even family members wanted to take advantage of his power …) and evaluation discourse (Du Min knew this principle and the businessman’s
purpose). In this case, three keywords – “official,” “businessmen,” and “family members” – are employed in relation to corrupt behaviour. By observing that the cadre knew corruption was illegal but could not stop, the discourse seems to emphasize the fault of the cadre. In Chinese, there is a phrase that refers to collusion between officials and business people – “guan shang goujie (官商勾结), which describes a common way to commit corruption. Since China has moved towards a market economy, government officials have the power to decide which company can undertake infrastructure construction and other programs, creating possibilities for business people to bribe government officials in order to obtain government contracts.

In this case, the discourse mentions the participation of the cadre’s family members in corruption, which implies the importance of keeping the family in order. It presupposes the family could constrain the cadre’s career. Family, from past to present, is recognized as a basic social unit. After the foundation of the PRC, marriage has become a public issue or even a political issue. During the Maoist era, if a young man did not marry, the working unit would find a woman to marry him. Before 2003, to marry, people needed to get approval from the working unit, which would check the political backgrounds of the person people wanted to marry. To divorce, people needed to get approval from the working unit as well, but generally, the leader in the working unit would persuade them not to divorce, as “divorce won’t be a good influence”, especially for middle and low-level leaders and officials. Sometimes, however, divorce could be a way to show loyalty to the CCP. In 1953, a document named the Central Government’s Decisions on Dividing Class Components (Zhongyang zhengfu guanyu huafen jieji chengfen de jueding; 中央政府关于划分阶级成分的决定) advocated people to get divorced from partners who did not have good political backgrounds (landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionists, bad people, right political spectrum) (Wangyi News, 2019). With this exercise of political power on marriage
discourses, the idea that family members could constrain the cadres’ career is not alien to
Chinese people.

**Case 17**

*(san shi jiating shishou. Jiaotongting xilie fubaian, zaici
shagnyan le ‘fiqi, fuzi, funv, xiongmei’ tongtang shoushen de
huamian. Zhexie tanfu anjian, xaduo douyou jiating chengyuan
gongton gfubai de qingjie, zhexie guanyuan mei neng shouzhu
jiating de lianjie fangxian, youde shi bei jiating guoxia, youde
shi bei qinqing suo lei, zuizhong bujile ziji, ye duansongle
jiating he qinren de xingfu)*

**Third, the family falls.** From a series of corruption cases
related to the Department of Communications, many of them
had husband and wife, father and son, father and daughter,
brother and sister stand trial together. Among corruption
cases, many officials’ family members committed corruption
together with officials, and such officials cannot keep the
bottom line of not being corrupt. Some of these officials were
*coerced* by family or relatives to commit corruption.

*Corruption ruined their life, their family and their relatives.*

*(CCDI, November 18, 2014)*

Case 17 employs a regulatory discourse which consists of reference to family-related
corruption (i.e., From a series of corruption cases related to the Department of
Communications,...) and an evaluation discourse of the cause of corruption (i.e., such
officials cannot keep the bottom line of not being corrupt). The family appears as a catalyst
for corruption, and the official finds himself “coerced” by different family members to
engage in corrupt behaviour. The word “coerced” reminds readers that men should have
family members listen to him and not the other way around. Traditionally, men were
supposed to manage the family. Success in managing the family was seen as the first step to
govern the country (*dazhangfu yiwu bu sao, he yi sao tianxia*; 大丈夫一屋不扫，何以扫天下). Although men are the head of the family, family members are blamed for corruption, and
wives who participate in corruption are labelled as greedy wives. In this case, a desire for material goods by other family members is suggested as a reason for cadres to commit corruption. Such a relationship looks circumspect in the modern world, but it looks reasonable from a traditional perspective. Traditional Chinese culture is well known for discouraging personal desires, especially material desires. For instance, during the Song dynasty, a Confucian scholar, Zhu Xi (朱熹), proposed that people should have feudal ethics and extinguish desires (cun tianli, mie ren yu; 存天理,灭人欲) (ifeng.com, 2010). Family members’ desires, as described in this report, can violate traditional morality and contribute to corruption. On the other hand, the discourse also faults cadres for failing to keep the bottom line of not being corrupt, suggested that their moral training was not sufficient. Morality, an important ideal of Confucianism, continues to be significant through views that cadres should be morally advanced and able to guide people with morals (dao zhi yi de; 道之以德) (Xinhua News, 2017). In sum, the news discourse, in focusing on families as an impetus for corruption, upholds the party’s approach to addressing corruption in part by focusing on collective ideals and moral values.

Case 18

(chuxian keyan jingfei fubai, shouxian shi keyan zhidu guoyu xingzhenghua zaocheng de. Woguo de keyan zhidu wangwang shi yi keti xiangmuzhide xingshi zai yunxing, keti xiangmu de shenbao wangwang shi you danwei lingdao, zishen jiaoshou, xueke daitouren danren zuizhang, keti zuzhang dui keti de ren, cai, wu juyou gaodu de zhipeiquan, erzhe guoyu jizhong de quanli shi zisheng fubai de wenchuang)

The first reason for research funding corruption is the over administration of the research system. In China, the operation of the research system relies on research projects, and research projects should be approved by leaders, experienced professors, and academic leaders. These people are always the
group leader of research projects and have the right to allocate human resources, research materials and the research funding. The concentration of power produces corruption. (CCDI, November 27, 2013)

Case 18 draws attention to officials’ power as a reason for corruption. This case illustrates a regulatory discourse of corruption that employs explanatory discourse (i.e., These people are always the group leader of research projects and have the right to allocate human resources, research materials and the research funding).

In China’s universities, the power of political-administrative officials is stronger than academic power (Xinhua News, 2016). In terms of applying for research funding, if the applicant is the department head as well as a professor, the application has a high likelihood of success (Xinhua News, 2016). Interestingly, people who examine the research funding applications are leaders, not professors, as a result of a process of university administration -administration interferes with academic independence (Xinhua News, 2016). Many research projects are led by people who are not themselves researchers. Moreover, because universities do not have independent supervisory oversight, people who get research funding can allocate it by themselves. Thus, corruption related to research funding has become an issue in Chinese society; Sohu News (2014) estimated that more than 500 billion yuan had been lost due to corruption. While the case reported here draws attention to problems associated with the concentration of power, this is an empty discourse because it does not mention how to prevent this phenomenon. What is more, to make a clean break with corrupt cadres and avoid being blamed for corruption scandals, the CCP uses metaphors to describe corrupt cadres. The following are three examples of metaphors.

Case 19
(Xian jiwéi cong zheqi anjian rushou shenwaxicha, yijú chachule 28 qi gongcheng jianshe lìngyú de wèibiao chuanbiao anjian, bujín jiekaile gongcheng jianshe zhaobiao shichang)
In this article, corrupt cadres who were investigated by the Commission for Discipline Inspection are portrayed as “big rats.” The report articulates corruption in official terms (i.e., The County Commission for Discipline Inspection investigated 28 cases) in conjunction with the metaphorical imagery of “big rats.” Through this application, the last sentence of the discourse seeks to arouse the public’s hatred of corrupt actions while impressing the audience with the effectiveness of efforts to stop corruption. Currently, illegal bidding related to construction has attracted much attention; it is estimated that at least 800 billion yuan are advanced for bribery or corruption every year (Yan, 2014). The essential problem behind corruption in bidding is lack of supervision. For instance, Zheng Daofang, who was the Deputy Director of the Department of Communications in Sichuan Province, was responsible for supervising bidding activities; he was also a bidder in his role as the CEO of a construction company. In addition, he was the Director of the Bid Evaluation Committee, who was responsible for evaluating the criteria for bidding (People’s Daily, 2005). So, the bidding process in which one individual had exclusive power in supervising, bidding, and evaluation is problematic and provides chances for the cadre to commit corruption. Recently, President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has contributed to some reduction in the number of corruption scandals (Xinhua News, 2015). However, the anti-corruption campaign does not mean that a highly effective supervision system is completed, and it does not remove the
exclusive power from cadres, meaning that corruption related to bidding has not been solved completely.

Case 20

(Jinnian yilai, Jiangxisheng Lepingshi jiwei, jianchaju jianchi ‘laohu’, ‘cangying’ yiqida, yansu chachu qianhai quanzhong liyi de weijiweifa anjian. Tongguo yanchan pianqu guojia zaolin xiangmu zijin weiji weifa anjian, yiju chachu le gaishi linye xitong fubai wo an, qude le lianghao de zhengzhi, shehui he faji xiaoguo.)

Since this year, the Leping Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Leping Supervisory Bureau keep fighting for “tiger” and “flies,” that is, they investigated illegal and cases that violate public interest and regulation. By investigating illegal cases related to defrauding national reforestation project funding, the corruption of municipal forestry was shut down. Such anti-corruption activities got good political, social and law results. (CCDI, November 11, 2013)

Case 20 involves forestry corruption. In China, the department of forestry is meant to protect the environment, to plant and manage forests and trees, which used to receiving less allocation from the central government; therefore, forestry is supposed to be less corrupt (Landscape.cn, 2014). In recent years, the central government has allocated more and more money to the forestry. From 1949 to 1999, the forestry department received 24.3 billion yuan from the central government, while in 2002, the central government provided a total of 33.9 billion yuan to the forestry department (Landscape.cn, 2014). The accumulating allocation from the government exceeds 1 trillion yuan. In the absence of an independent force to supervise allocations, the forestry department has many corruption cases. For instance, Guo Qinghe, the former Party Secretary of Guangzhou Forestry and Landscape Bureau, was accused of illegally getting more than 2 million yuan as bribes (Landscape.cn, 2014). In case 20, the discourse is a regulatory discourse (i.e., Since this year, the Leping Commission for
Discipline Inspection and the Leping Supervisory Bureau keep fighting for “tiger” and “flies”), with “tiger” and “flies” serving as metaphorical representations of corrupt cadres, which are consistent with President Xi Jinping’s slogan for the anti-corruption campaign. The report employs the phrase “public interest” in relation to a focus on investigation and good results to remind readers that the party and the government are upright, standing for the public against corruption, which is not their fault.

**Case 21**


“We need to keep the strategy proposed by the Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, that is, punch the ‘tiger,’ ‘flies’ together. We not only investigate illegal behaviours and behaviours that violate regulations related to officials and leaders but investigate corruptions that happen around the public.” This statement was made by Yin Jinhua, the Standing Committee of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and the Secretary of Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission. He said we need to use the results of the anti-corruption campaign to make people trust us, and such a campaign can promote the rise of central plains. (CCDI, October 9, 2013)

Case 21 quotes the leader’s words to strengthen the determination to eliminate corruption, employing metaphorical applications (tigers, flies), to remind readers of the central government’s anti-corruption campaign and reassure the public that action is being taken to address the problem. However, by presenting the focus of the discourse in a vague
manner, the report ignores institutional issues while implying support for consolidating the leader’s power.

In sum, in descriptions of men that appear in news reports on corruption, the family is an important element, depicted in a manner which reinforces men’s roles as householders while emphasizing joint family and wife responsibility even for corruption perpetrated by men. On the other hand, the CCP also uses metaphors and empty discourses to address corruption cases. There is a chain of relations between participants in the discourses: corrupt cadres take responsibility for being greedy and for not keeping the family away from corruption; women take responsibility for not building good family values; and the CCP attributes responsibility for corruption to any sources other than itself. From the perspective of power/knowledge, women are oppressed by both patriarchal and political power.

### 6.3 Intertextuality Analysis of CCDI Corruption News Articles

This section displays an analysis of intertextuality by taking into consideration four articles. The first two articles are related to male cadres who had personal issues (no cases related to female cadre’s personal issues were found). The third article refers to male cadres who do not have personal issues, and the fourth article concerns a female cadre who does not have personal issues.

#### 6.3.1 Examples of Male Cadres Whose Corruption was Related to Personal Issues

The first article introduces the corruption case of Liu Jiakun, the former deputy director of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the Fuyang and former secretary of CPC County Committee in Taihe County. A characteristic of this article is that women are directly depicted as the source of trouble. The title is *The Way to Bribe Me is to Bribe My Mistress*, which clearly states that the mistress plays an important role in corruption. The title employs a sexualized discourse to attract readers.

The article begins with an extract from Liu’s confessions:
(“wo shouhui shi, qingfu shi gongju zaiti, shi caopanshou, shi cangku. Wo shouhui de suoyou qianwu jihu quanbu shi tongguo qingfu shixian de, conger xingcheng le qingfu shou qianwu, wo liyong quanli wei xinghuiren banshi mouqu liyi de jumian ……”

(“danren xianwei shuji shijian yi chang, wo zhuian fangsong le dui ziji de yaoqiu, kaishi xiangwang denghongjiulv de shenghuo, dingbuzhu shehua shenghuo de youhuo ……”

“When I got bribes, the mistress is the tool of getting money, she is the person who controlled this, and she is responsible for storing the money. Nearly all of the bribes I get were accepted by her first. So, she got money and gifts, and I was responsible for doing things for bribes by taking advantage of power…” (CCDI, October 16, 2013)

“I had been the secretary of CCP County Committee of Taihe for a long time, so I reduced restrictions to myself. I began to desire a luxurious life…” (CCDI, October 16, 2013)

Liu’s confession used the words “tool,” “controlled,” and “storing” to indicate the role of his mistress, who appears as an enabler and complicit in the corruption. Then, he admitted his fault by mentioning “reduced restrictions.” Gender discourses and confessional discourses make it look reasonable to owe the corruption to the mistress and the cadre, although the confession could be a forced confession.

Following the extract, the news article turns to use regulatory discourse to introduce the sentences given to Liu and his mistress Zhao Xiaoli by the Intermediate Court of Suzhou Municipality, noting briefly the amount of bribery money they got (29 million Chinese yuan) from project contracting, land expropriation, payment for project, re-organized enterprise, and so on. Then, the article summarizes Liu’s career, in which he was reported to have worked hard until age 47, at which point his career was ruined by a woman:

(47 sui shi de ta zemne ye buhui xiangdao, ziji houlai hui yinewei yige nvren, weile suowei de “aiqing” er zoushang tanfu zhi lu, shangyan le yichang ziji nong quan, qingfu shouqian de tanfu ju).

However, he would never think that he would commit corruption for a woman and for so-called “love.” This scandal can be generalized as Liu’s abuse of power and his mistress accepted money. (CCDI, October 16, 2013)
The above discourse reinforces the statement that the mistress is the cause of corruption. The discourse is informal, using the third person - “zenme ye buhui xiangdao (never think),” and “suowei de aijing (so-called “love”).” Using colloquial discourse is to make the statement closer to the general public daily life. The quotation marks applied to the word “love” are meant to satirize the relationship between the cadre and the mistress and imply that it is not true love. The article shows their relationship is based on material goods and money, which cater to stereotypes about mistresses. Such stereotypes are associated with traditional society gender hierarchy and the relationship between luxury items and the mistress. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many girls in ancient society were sold to rich families as concubines, which made it possible for some of them to have access to material goods and money. These associations continue today in the view that mistresses are one driving force for the purchase of luxury goods through relationships perceived as the intimacy of commodification.

The article proceeds with a sub-section to introduce how Liu became a leader by working hard. For instance, when he was the secretary of Fuyang Environmental Protection Agency, he and his colleague solved environmental problems which the public paid close attention to, and made the discharge of wastewater, dust, and waste meet the standard. Such activities were praised by the municipal government and the State Environmental Protection Administration. Liu accepted many awards and gave presentations in many organizations and places. The article described Liu’s characteristics at that time by quoting an official from Anhui Provinicial Commission for Discipline Inspection. The official used “plain clothes and cloth shoes (yi zhuo pusu, chuan zhe buxie; 衣着朴素，穿着布鞋)” to describe Liu’s appearance. He also used “enthusiasm (reqing; 热情)” to describe Liu’s performance while introducing the Land Policy, and used “honest and upright (yishenzhengqi; 一身正气)” to describe the impression Liu gave him.
Those words, mentioned by the official, cater to expectations for cadres in both traditional and contemporary society. A proverb, be contented in poverty and devoted to things spiritual \((\text{安贫乐道}; \text{安贫乐道})\), means even in poverty, people should insist on moral principles. Although ancient cadres’ salaries were low, and cadres were expected to be morally advanced. During the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), however, it was very hard for an official to support the family by only relying on his salary, so almost every official committed corruption. The easiest and the most common way for officials to increase their income is called “linjiantihu (淋尖踢斛),” that is, when farmers used the container to measure the grain they handed in, the official just kicked the container, and the grain that fell off the container would belong to the official (Dangnian mingyue, 2011). By contrast, regulatory discourses were reinforced by stories such as that of Hai Rui (海瑞), who did not have linjiantihu during his lifetime, was very poor, and his wife and his concubine did not even have new clothes. When he was dead, his family did not have enough money to bury him (Dangnian mingyue, 2011). In contemporary society, a cadre has a relatively lower salary but has more power, so if a cadre has luxury goods, the public may suspect this cadre is involved in corruption. For instance, Yang Dacai, the former head of the Shaanxi Province work safety administration \((\text{ Shaanxi sheng anquan shengchan jiandu guanliju}; \text{ 陕西省安全生产监督管理局})\), was wearing an expensive watch while inspecting a car accident. He was soon reported by people, and later, was investigated by the Commission for Discipline Inspection (Sohu Media, 2013). In Liu’s case, the official’s words were incorporated into colloquial discourse, which is acceptable for the audience, the general public.
Then, this official mentioned that the second time he met with Liu he felt like Liu was not as upright as the first time they had met. The article attributed this change to his mistress:

(er dao zhe zhong zhuan bian de zui zhong yao yinsu jiushi ta tong Zhao Xiaoli chansheng le hun wai qing, bing wei zhe suo wei de “ai qing” yin fa du min zuo gai shi de tan fu xing wei.)

The main factor that led to these changes was the affair with Zhao Xiaoli, and the so-called “love” had triggered corruption behaviours just like Dominoes. (CCDI, October 16, 2013)

The article described how Liu and his mistress got bribes in a section with the sub-title “Errors in seeking love: mistress had become Liu’s weakness” (cuo tan huan: qing fu cheng wei ta de “ruan le i”; 错贪欢：情妇成为他的“软肋”). Again, the title reminds readers that Liu’s fault was to seek love with a mistress who would become the person that caused his corrupt behaviour. The article indicated that Liu’s corruption was exacerbated by the birth of his son:

(ruguo shuo, Liu Jiakun fang zong ziji, chen nian yu he Zhao Xiaoli de gan qing rang qi cheng wei ziji “ruan le i” de hua, name Zhao Xiaoli sheng xia de nage nan hai zai houlai jiu cheng wei jikui ta lianjie cong zheng fang xian de “zhong bang zhadan”)

Zhao became the weakness of Liu; then, the baby boy would be the “bomb,” which made him turn away from being honest and upright. (CCDI, October 16, 2013)

Again and again, the mistress and the baby boy are blamed for Liu’s corruption. Here, the word “bomb” is a common metaphor in Chinese news articles. It symbolizes events which may be of great importance. In this discourse, the “bomb” means the baby boy had a significant influence on Liu’s career, highlighting a progressive relationship between the influence of Zhao and the influence of the baby boy. However, the baby boy was borne by the mistress, so the discourse actually confirms that Zhao caused corruption.

The article described the pattern of Liu’s corruption, revealed by the subtitle as greed: the mistress accepted money, and he did the work (tan yu qi: qing fu shou qian ta banshi; 贪欲
起：情妇收钱他办事). This part began with the importance of Liu’s power in obtaining projects in Taihe County. Liu banned his wife and his son from contacting real estate developers, from getting money or gifts, and from arranging an appointment for relatives for the sake of his job. However, such restrictions did not work for his mistress, Zhao Xiaoli. Then, the article revealed how Zhao accepted Kang’s money and gifts. The reason that Zhao used to persuade Liu to accept money and gifts was:

(Zhao Xiaoli yi gai zhiqian de wenshun xingxiang, kunao qilai: “he ni hao de zhexienian wo mei yao guo ni yifenqian, haizi chusheng hou, wo meishijian dali shengyi, nandao yao zuochishankong ma? Haizi manman zhangda, zai fuyang shenghuo chizao yao baolu, women dao waidi maifang, shenghuo, haizi shangxue, bu dou xuyao qian ma?”)

She cried and screamed: “I have not asked you for money since I had been together with you. I had no time to do my business after giving birth to the baby. How can I earn money? The baby is growing, and people here will sooner or later know my son and me so we have to move to other places. In order to live in other places, we will have living expenses, we need to buy a house, and the kid needs to go to school, all of these need money, right?” (CCDI, October 16, 2013)

The above discourse quoted Zhao’s words in a colloquial discourse close to people’s conversation in daily life. Indeed, the words “cried” and “screamed” are associated with a popular saying in Chinese society ---- first try crying, then try screaming, last try to kill oneself (yi ku er nao san shangdiao). This saying means women generally have three methods to be shrewish: crying, screaming, and suicide. It is a cynical saying which stigmatizes women as unreasonable and insane people. The saying initially stemmed from ancient society but is prevalent in modern society due to its frequent transmission through TV programs. The discourse highlights both the mistress and her behaviour, which is not upright and reasonable, as causes of the cadre’s problems.

The discourse implies the financial pressure to keep a mistress, which helps to generate empathy for the cadre. However, the discourse confirmed the previous discourse that the relationship was not for love; the mistress had ulterior motives rather than felt
genuine love for the cadre, which pressured Liu to get bribes. The article then cited another example of Mr. Han to illustrate the corruption pattern of Liu and Zhao; that is, Zhao accepted money and gifts, while Liu helped secure bribes to get projects. The article detailed how the corruption pattern worked in various ways before concluding with comments by the investigator, who briefly summarized the reasons for Liu’s corruption:

(Liu Jiakun yin tanfu luoma, shi yinxiang de shiluo, liyi de youhuo, renxing de ruodian zai qiefa jiandu de quanli mianqian de quan baolu).

Liu Jiakun was brought down by corruption, and this is because of his loss of faith, the temptation of money, the weakness of humanity, and lack of supervision. (CCDI, October 16, 2013)

The above discourse focused on three aspects of the problem: cadre, mistress, and supervision. The cadre’s problem is the “loss of faith,” which confirmed the expectation that the cadre should be moral; the mistress was recognized as “temptation,” and the authorities are criticized through the phrase “lack of supervision.” However, among those reasons for corruption, three are related to personality, which is emphasized as the cause of corruption, while there is only limited mention of the role of government in contributing to lapse supervision.

The article warned readers, in particular, to avoid improper sexual relations:

(Liu Jiakun de shenbaiminglie guigendaodi shi ta zishen xiuyang chule wenti, raner qi qingfu Zhao Xiaoli zai qizhong suoqi de “cuihua” zuoyong yeshi xianeryijian. Weile rang Zhao Xiaoli muzi guoshang anyi naizhi shehua de shenghuo shi Liu Jiakun shoushou ju’e huilu de zhuyao qudongli. Zai Zhao Xiaoli de tianyanmiyu he kunao xia, Liu Jiakun de lianjie congzheng fangxian dongyao, bengta, zuizhong buzeshouduan, yishenshifa, nanyizi ba di zhuiru tanfu shenyuan.)

The main reason for Liu’s corruption was his personal reason, but his mistress, who served as a catalyst, also caused Liu’s corrupt behaviour. Keeping the mistress and her son living in a luxury life motivated Liu to accept bribery. Mistress’ love words and crying changed Liu’s mind to be an honest and upright cadre, and he could not stop committing corruption. (CCDI, October 16, 2013)
Thus, in an article describing Liu’s corrupt behaviour, primary attention is given to the mistress Zhao Xiaoli, who knew how to persuade Liu by “love words and crying.” This is reinforced in the report, which used an ancient saying to caution against the problem of improper sexual relations:

(guren yue:“shengse zhe, baide zhi ju”.)

The ancients said that if a man indulges in sexual relations, this man will not be moral. (CCDI, October 16, 2013)

Finally, another ancient saying is quoted: “close the case and thought, troubles came from sex and luxurious life” (yanjuan shensi, huo shengyu yinyi, huan shiyu shengse;掩卷深思，祸生于淫逸，患始于声色) (CCDI, October 16, 2013). In case readers missed the message that mistresses were dangerous, the article also quoted comments from an unknown resource, observing about Liu’s case that:“to be honest, Liu’s corruption was from his relations with mistress Zhao” (Liu Jiakun de tuibian, shishiqushi di shuo, shi cong yu Zhao Xiaoli fazhan chengwei hun wai lianqing guanxi kaishi de;刘家坤的蜕变，实事求是地说，是从与赵晓莉发展成为婚外恋情关系开始的) (CCDI, October 16, 2013). The article described the corruption in narrative terms, indicating that the mistress did participate in corruption; she was identified in nine different places as being the main reason for corruption. In short, the article, from its title through to its closing quotations, makes clear that women, by inducing men to engage in illicit sexual activity, are a major cause of corruption.

The article illustrates how the CCDI reports mix gender discourse, regulatory discourse, confessional discourse, and colloquial discourse to form a structure or a relationship between participants: the mistress is the cause and motivation of corruption, the cadre is misled by the mistress, and the CCP’s role is minimized in two sentences that refer to “lack of supervision.” Ironically, the article does not quote confessions from the mistress even though she is confirmed as the cause of corruption! This article reveals a means by
which, according to Foucault (1990), society or culture can perpetuate its ideology via dominant discourse, shaping what people perceive as “truth” as an instrument of power. In this sense, the article guides people to a conclusion that the corruption scandal is caused by individuals rather than a phenomenon that the CCP should not be responsible for. These discourses reflect an exercise in biopower, in this case seeking to regulate behaviours of women and cadres.

Another article analyses the corruption case of Li Zehua, who was quoted as saying he wanted to make money by abuse of power but made a cage (prison) for himself. The article drew on regulatory discourses to summarize penalties imposed on him by the government. The first sub-section describes how Li Zehua was committing corruption with his secretary, Li Zewei, acquiring money by selling land illegally without giving the buyer a receipt. In China, without a receipt, the seller will not pay tax. The second sub-section describes how Li used illegal money for his mistress, Ms. Li. Entitled “Spend a lot of money for his mistress” (wei qingfu yizhiqianjin; 为情妇一掷千金), this section cites an example to illustrate how Li Zehua committed corruption and how his mistress Ms. Li was involved in corruption. While Wang Mou brought money to buy the land, the mistress Ms. Li was described as greedy:

(Li Mou kanjian Wang Mou dailai de yiluo chaopiao, qingbuzijin fachu gankai: “zhe me duo qian a, ruguo shi wode jiu hao le.”)

Ms. Li saw the money that was brought by Mr. Wang, and she said: “what a lot of money. If I had this money, that would be great.” (CCDI, September 7, 2016)

Quoting Ms. Li’s words in the colloquial discourse, the author depicts the mistress as actively and willingly seeking to participate in corrupt behaviour. When the cadre understood what his mistress meant, he gave her 100,000 yuan, for the purposes, as described in the article, “to make the mistress happy”( wei boqu qingfu huanxin; 为博取情妇欢心). To
illustrate the sub-title’s emphasis on the money that the cadre spent on the mistress, the article continues to introduce the involvement of the mistress:

(2014 nian chu, Li Zehua dezhi mou dichanshang zhunbei goumai yikuai tudi, bian shixian jiang zhekua1di dijia chushou gei qi qingfu Li Mou ji haoyou Liu Mou. Zhihou, ta zai tongzhi dai dichanshang cong qi qingfu Li Mou shouzhong goumai gai di kuai. Li Mou he Liu Mou jiang di maichu hou qingsong zhuangu tudi daomai chajia, huoli 12 wan yuan. Li Zehua cong zhezhuang jiaoyi zhong huode haochufei 2 wan yuan.)

At the beginning of 2014, Li Zehua knew that a famous real estate developer wanted to buy land, so he sold the land to his mistress and one of his friends, Mr. Liu. Later, Li Zehua asked the real estate developer to buy the land from his mistress. Ms. Li and Mr. Liu got 0.12 million Chinese yuan for selling the land. Li Zehua got another 20,000 Chinese yuan as benefits. (CCDI, September 7, 2016)

This description reveals that the cadre was the person who had the power to obtain the information that someone would buy the land and asked his mistress to buy the land, but the discourse fails to support the statement that committing corruption was to sustain the luxurious life of the mistress. The next section of the article, titled “get everything from nothing” (‘jieishengdan’ wan “kongshoudao”; “借鸡生蛋”玩“空手道”), describes how Li Zehua got illegal money from giving nothing away. Similar to the former example, Li Zehua got illegal money by selling land to the buyer at a higher price (higher than the original price) in order to make a profit. The article concluded with reference to regulatory discourse to introduce how the government dealt with Li Zehua and other leaders’ problems, with eight people, including Li Zehua, sent to judicial organs, and more than 30 officials investigated. The article ended with a warning to people not to commit corruption.

By referring to “judicial organs,” this discourse reinforces the official message that corrupt cadres would receive punishment and be sent to prison as a result of government oversight to monitor corrupt cadres and prevent corrupt behaviour that violates laws and regulations. Li Zehua experienced a diminishment of his own power as a result of his corrupt activities, losing the capacity he had, before being investigated, Li to speculate and obtain ill-
gotten gains. This power, based on his job and position, belongs to sovereign power and was relinquished by Li when he was sent to prison.

It should be noticed that the pattern of corruption revealed in the case of Li Zehua (i.e., selling land to real estate developers) has become common in China. The behaviour of Li and his mistress, called speculation, emerged prior to the transformation to the market economy in China. At that time, because of the planned economy, the government would allocate all material goods in relation to its population. Because of the egalitarian nature of the planned economy, some people could not get more goods even if they wanted. However, corruption ensued because some state-owned companies had extra goods after allocation which could be sold at a very high price, making it possible for people who sold them to get a lot of money. However, speculation was also practiced by many cadres and business people after China transformed from a planned economy to a market economy. The cases described so far illustrate two ways to engage in speculation, by reselling the house or reselling land for profit. Both of these are covert means to get bribes.

The articles discussed in this section show how women may be involved in the process of corruption, even if they are not identified as the person who motivated the male cadre to commit corruption. The mistress is portrayed as a person whom the male cadre spends a lot of money on as someone who seeks money from the male cadre. Although the cadre does the power-rent seeking, it is the mistresses were are labelled as greedy. Using criminal discourse, colloquial discourse and gender discourse, the authors introduce readers to a number of well-known, well-defined, and stable codes, in the process simplifying corruption scandals to a criminal and personal issue. In both cases, the mistress is represented as someone who would mask corruption and accept money for the cadre. Overall, women, in this genre of news reporting, are represented as tools to get bribes - as greedy women lusting for ill-gotten money.
6.3.2 The Example of Male Cadres Whose Corruption was not Related to Personal Issues

An article entitled “Cut the Hand which Embezzles State-owned Assets” (CCDI, February 25, 2015) describes the case of a male cadre involved in corruption related to a state-owned company. The colloquial nature of the title is meant to show to members of the public the state’s determination to solve corruption related to embezzling state-owned assets. For cadres, the title is meant as a warning not to engage in corruption. In China, politicians’ talk and speeches suggest changes in the future or attitudes towards specific issues. For instance, in the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Wang Qishan, the head of the CCDI, said that even under “high-handed posture” (gaoya tai shi; 高压态势), some party members and cadres did not stop corruption. Here, the phrase “high-handed posture” (gaoya tai shi; 高压态势) signals that the anti-corruption campaign is still in progress, and no corrupt behaviour will be tolerated. In other words, Wang Qishan suggested that any party members and cadres (his talk did not specify who) who commit corruption will be investigated (Wang, 2014). As Table 5.2 has revealed, this message was reinforced through the high number of cases reported to be investigated in 2015.

The article on corruption in state-owned enterprises started with an editor’s note which suggested that issues such as “weak consciousness in understanding party discipline and not implementing subject responsibilities” (dang de guannian danbo, zhuti zeren bu luoshi, shi chansheng wenti de zong binggen: 党的观念淡薄，主体责任不落实，是产生问题的总病根) (CCDI, February 25, 2015) could sometimes contribute to corruption. The word “consciousness” reduces the corruption scandal to an individual’s personal flaw while the phrase “subject responsibilities” refers to the Commission for Discipline Inspection which is responsible for investigating and reporting corrupt cadres. By reporting that these were not
implemented in some cases, the article implies that the supervision organizations may have failed to detect corruption.

The article highlights official perspectives by describing a mobilization meeting of central inspections before the Spring Festival, where Wang Qishan talked about the problems of state-owned enterprises and the main reasons behind these problems. It also mentioned some of these problems reported by the third round of central special inspection before introducing four cases to illustrate problems state-own companies were facing.

The first case, which is related to how family members can treat state-owned companies like an ATM to profit by taking advantage of cadres’ positions, is analyzed here. The cadre, in this case, was Chen Ruizhai, former chief manager and secretary of the Party Committee for the Shangdong Stationery and Sporting Goods Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. He got bribes by borrowing public funds intended for other organizations illegally and embezzled 1,424,100 yuan of state-owned assets. Like many other corrupt officials, Chen used his son’s name to have some shares in those organizations and companies.

Similar to other news articles, the article uses regulatory discourse to depict the way Chen was penalized by the government and sent to judicial organs. This case also included an analysis to convey the apparent reasons for Chen’s corruption. The first reason given was that Chen was avaricious:

(“bujin size chuli guoyou zichan, nuoyong gongkuan, jiu lian Shandongsheng caizhengting xiang sheng wenti gongsi fafang bufen kunnan zhigong jiuzhujin zhezhong “jiumingqian”, jingran yeyou 20 duo wan yuan bei Chen fangru xiaojinku hou sifen. Kejian, Chen de tanlan he xiaozhang yijing daole hezhong chengdu.”)

He was too greedy ---- he not only embezzled state-owned assets but also embezzled funds (also called “life-saving money”), which Shandong Department of Finance allocated to workers who lived in poverty in Shangdong Stationery And Sporting Goods Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. (CCDI, February 25, 2015)
To illustrate Chen’s greediness, the author of the article recounts how Chen embezzled poor workers’ “life-saving money (jiumingqian).” In China, there is a superstition that if a person embezzles life-saving money to do other things, it would be inauspicious. The use of the phrase “life-saving money” in this case arouses readers’ empathy for poor people and causes them to disdain the cadre. Such a colloquial discourse makes readers think that corruption occurs because of avarice rather than pointing to other factors like flaws in the political system.

The second reason, described below, conveys a discourse which suggests that Chen engaged in corruption because of his distorted thoughts and ideas:

(jiuqi genben yuanin, shi Chen de sixiang chu le wenti. Chen jinguan xueshi shuiping bijiao gao, waimao yewu nengli bijiao qiang, dan jinnianlai mingxian fangsong le dui ziji de sixiang gaizao, jingchang jiekou yewu fanmang, henshao canjia zhengzhi xuezi he jieshou lianjie congye jiaoyu, henshao zhudong jiaqiang dangxing xiuyang he dangxing duanlian, shijieguan, renshengguan, jiazhiguan zhege “zongkaiguan”chu le wenti, quanliguan, liyiguan zhuxian fasheng le niuqu cuowei, wangji le zuzhi de zhongtuo he qunzhong de qidai.)

The essential reason for his behaviour was his thoughts and ideas. Although he was better educated and had a strong working ability, he did not promote himself via accepting anti-corruption education, so his ideas and thoughts became tortured, and he totally forgot the party and the public. (CCDI, February 25, 2015)

By presupposing that if Chen had accepted anti-corruption education, he would not have had corruption issues, the discourse successfully shifts the content of corruption from its usual emphasis on criminality and its impact as a political scandal to an individual moral issue. Currently, China has more than 300 laws and regulations to limit corrupt behaviours. The Criminal Law clearly states that an individual who embezzled not less than 50,000 yuan but less than 100,000 yuan should be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than five years (Zhu, 2013). Given its legal punishment, corruption is clearly a criminal issue. Moreover, corruption should be a severe political issue (Ouyang, 2013), as it is related to the ill-
management of the ruling party. However, in the state media discourses, corruption is euphemistically represented as just a moral issue or an individual failing that can be fixed by education. The CCP represents itself as very honourable because the party continues to offer various chances for its cadres to learn how to be upright and honest. The discourse mentions responsibilities to “the public” in order to remind readers that the CCP protects and represents the interests of the public. In this summary, corruption downgraded to an individual problem. Although the last paragraph mentioned that lack of supervision also influenced corruption patterns, this statement is too general to have much of an impact in compensating for personal or individual issues. What is interesting here is that for much of its ideology, CCP is not at all interested in the human rights of the individual and favors the rights of the collectivity and Chinese society as a whole. But when it comes to assuming blame or responsibility, regulatory discourse approved by the CCP tends to blame corruption on individual failings rather than systemic problems in the party.

This article continued to introduce another three cases and ended up with quotations of several articles from the Regulation of the Communist Party of China on Disciplinary Actions (Zhongguo Gongchandang jilv chufen tiaoli; 《中国共产党纪律处分条例》) and The Regulation on the Punishment of Civil Servants of Administrative Organs (Xingzheng jiguan gongwuyuan chufen tiaoli; 《行政机关公务员处分条例》) (CCDI, February 25, 2015). Such party discourse shows readers that the CCP takes the moral high ground and does not tolerate corruption. In sum, a mixture of regulatory discourse, colloquial discourse, and party discourse has simplified the reasons behind this corruption scandal, while allowing the party to exercise its power on corrupt cadres and come out with a clean image from a potentially controversial situation.

The corruption issues of state-owned companies are different in some ways from corruption issues that arise for government officials. In China, in order to control important
areas, such as banking, telecom, resources, the government controls many state-owned companies. Compared to private companies, state-owned companies have better working-benefits and preferential policies and have easier access to bank loans. The government has set up party branches and assigns managers or leaders in those companies. All managers and leaders have the same administrative level as government officials. Without a clear line between the functions of the government and those of state-owned enterprises (zheng qi bu fen; 政企不分) and effective supervision from the government, corruption can proliferate in state-owned enterprises (Ifeng.com, 2014). So, the CCP’s goal in reforming state-owned enterprises is to separate government functions from enterprise management (zheng qi fen kai; 政企分开). However, such a goal has not yet been achieved. President Xi Jinping has strengthened the government’s control of state-owned enterprises by requiring all of them to follow the party’s leadership (Feng, 2016), because other interests are at play, and the state wants to retain its influence. However, corruption cannot be eliminated even if government functions are separated from enterprise management. Should the government sever its ties to those enterprises, then they, in turn, can bribe government officials, just like other private companies. The essential problem is the one-party political system, and the government’s authority cannot be supervised adequately by civil society or democratic elections. So, the separation between the government and enterprises may reduce corruption but cannot solve the problem totally. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, where the transition from the socialist market economy was made in the early 1990s, corruption also arose in the process of privatizing state-owned enterprises when officials got bribes to sell them under market value. This problem could arise in China as well. China has, in fact, been watching the transition to capitalism in Eastern Europe because it feared its own imminent political collapse after the fall of the Eastern socialist block in 89-early 1990s. Consequently, China drew its own lessons about how to transition to the market economy on its own terms.
In sum, discourse about corruption in state-owned companies, like other corruption-related discourse, tends to emphasize the flaws or greediness of individual characters. In the case which follows, another common feature, loss of morality, is the focus of an article describing corruption related to a female cadre.

6.3.3 The Example of Female Cadres Whose Corruption was not Related to Personal Issues

Among 297 articles, only 11 articles depict corrupt female cadres. Such a low number does not mean that females are more honest and more trustable, but rather reflects the reality that there were very few female cadres in positions of power. Many of these 11 articles do not depict female cadres as the main characters. Considering it is necessary to focus on how female cadres are depicted in corruption-related news articles, an article that depicts a female cadre as the main character is shown here.

The article’s title contains a pair of Chinese antonyms - “mei (beautiful)” and “chou (ugly)”- to satirize and expose as shameful the cadre use of bribes to become beautiful by using luxury items. The article first summarized Zhu Fangyun’s case - the total amount of illegal money she got was 0.32 million Chinese yuan, and she was in possession of a lot of luxury items, including Chanel furs, and a lot of expensive cosmetics – and described how she became corrupt by abuse of power. The Environmental Protection Agency decided to buy the Automatic Air Monitoring System and ICP emission spectrometer via bidding invitation. Zhu, who was the judge for this bidding, accepted 40,000 yuan and let Changsha Chunlei Equipment Co., Ltd. win the bid. After being investigated, she said she was afraid of getting illegal money the first time, but after she found nobody recognized this, her concerns decreased.

The second part of the article focused on the process of getting bribes. Zhu thought it was easy to profit from her position, even when she was a low-level cadre (vice section
chief), which she used to buy more luxury items. After helping the Chunlei company to win the bid in 2012, Zhu got 50,000 Chinese yuan as bribes. However, 90,000 yuan was not enough for Zhu, and she still wanted more money. In 2014, Zhu helped Chunlei company to win the bid again. In order to thank Zhu, the boss, Mr. Wang, gave her 230,000 yuan as bribes.

The last part commented on Zhu’s corruption under the title of “She eats her own bitter fruit and regrets committing corruption” (zishi ku guo, ta aohuibuyi; 自食苦果，她懊悔不已) (CCDI, October 20, 2016). The title blames the cadre for the corruption, while the article observes that Zhu was sentenced to three years and got a fine of 200,000 yuan. Then, Zhu’s reflection of her behaviour was quoted. (“xianzai xiagnxiang, ji gandao houhui,you hen houpa. Ziji zai rizi bijiao jianku de shihou shangqie neng dizhi gezhong youhuo, zuodao jie shen zi ai, rujin rizi bianhao le, que bu dongde yueshu, zizunziai, cai niangcheng le wufa wanhui de houguo.” Zhu Fangyun aohui bu die.)

“Now, I feel regret and am in fear of doing this. During times of hardship, I resisted various temptations, but I lost myself when my life became better. This is why I got these results.” (CCDI, October 20, 2016)

Zhu’s confession uses a phrase, jie shen zi ai (which came from a proverb jie shen zi hao, which means exercise self-control so as to protect oneself from immorality), to summarize her problems. Jie shen zi ai reminds readers to be morally upright, indicating that the problem of the cadre was her lack of morality. As morality is one of the essential qualities for being an official in ancient society, the phrase jie shen zi ai helps to formulate corruption as individual issues. The author also attributes Zhu’s behaviour to distorted values about consumption. By employing colloquial discourse, regulatory discourse, and confessional discourse, the article shapes corruption as the result of the individual fault.

Zhu Fangyun’s case is different from other cases, as it suggests a change to consumerism and the prosperity of the luxury market in China might have implications...
related to motivations personal corruption. As Hanser and Li (2015, p.111) observe, “The expansion of a market economy has thrust consumers... into a highly competitive consumer marketplace which seeks to satisfy every consumer desire.” Consumption has become a way to satisfy one’s needs for prestige (zunrong), face (mianzi), and as members of a certain class (middle class) (Hanser & Li, 2015; Zhang, 2012). Here face, a concept that is very prevalent in Chinese society, refers to maintaining appearances and status, whereas to lose face is to lose status and feel ashamed. To some degree, luxury goods are a good fit for these needs, and women are more likely to buy luxury items. Based on the Wealth Report Asia (The Julius Baer Group, 2018), Asian women have become the highest consumers of luxury goods globally. The report has coined the word “womenomics” to describe such a situation.

According to Bar (2018), Chinese women’s purchases of luxury goods have accounted for about one-third of luxury-good purchases worldwide. The report owes this growth to the increasing social status of Chinese women, as more women are found in management positions and are financially savvy. On the other hand, the prosperity of the luxury market could result from the weakened momentum of the anti-corruption campaign (Kottasova, 2018). Also, many young Chinese buyers are financially secure, as they were born after most families were limited to have one child (Kottasova, 2018). Besides the influence of social status, political influence and financial influence, three other factors also influence the growth of luxury market: Chinese women see luxury products as an identity; Chinese women worship foreign brands as it makes them appear cosmopolitan; and Chinese women are influenced by social media, as many people pose photos of luxury products on their Chinese social media accounts (Zheng, 2018). Many labels describe the relationship between women and luxury items in terms like the “materialist girl.” Reference to “luxury items” makes for popular headlines in Chinese society and the Chinese press. Stories about corrupt female cadres and luxury goods attract readers, who can be distracted with such consumerist
preoccupations rather than focus on other issues such as problems with the political system. In this case, the author appeals to readers by employing a colloquial narrative to describe Zhu’s story, highlighting how the female cadre had lost all sense of self-restriction and displayed distorted values of consumption.

By utilizing the intertextual analysis to analyse news reports on corruption, I have two main findings. First, these articles employ a mix of different discourses to shape corruption scandals as individual criminal behaviour, although in some paragraphs, corruption is described as a moral issue. Twenty-two different numbers of words and phrases are used to describe misconduct and illegal behaviours, and these words and phrases appear 4,968 times in a total of 297 articles; therefore, on average, corrupt cadres’ misconduct and illegal behaviour are referred to 15 times per article. This repetition in news articles keeps reinforcing to readers the ways in which corrupt behaviour violates laws and regulations.

The first kind of description is related to abuse of power for money, as described in phrases like “trading power for money(quan qian jiaoyi, 权钱交易 or yi quan mou li, 以权谋利 or yi quan mou qian, 以权谋钱);” “abuse of power for personal interests(yiquanmousi; 以权谋私);” “act in the public service for one’s own ends (jiagongjisi; 假公济私);” “power rent-seeking (quanli xun zu; 权力寻租);” “bribery (shouhui or huilu 受贿 or 贿赂);” and “collusion between and government officials and business owners (guanshang goujie; 官商勾 结).” Among these words and phrases, “jiagongjisi (act in the public service for one's own ends),” “shouhui (bribery)” and “huilu (bribery)” are ancient proverbs or ancient words. “Quanli xun zu” is the translation of the economic term referring to power rent-seeking, which has been employed in popular discourse for about a decade. Others are similar phrases
to express the relationship between money and power. All of these words and phrases are well-defined and well-known in Chinese society.

The second kind of descriptions is related to the abuse of authorities and may not be related to money: “know the law but break it (zhifafanfa; 知法犯法)” “play into the hands of something (yan guo ba mao; 雁过拔毛)” “grasp at authority by oneself (dulan daquan, 独揽大权)” “fraud (nongxu zuojia, 弄虚作假)” and “misuse of authority (lanyong zhiquan; 滥用职权).” For instance, Wu Rijing, the former CEO, general manager and Party Secretary of the Guangdong XinGuang International Group, was accused of grasping at authority by himself, as he occupied the three most important positions in a state-owned company (Ifeng.com, 2011).

The third kind is general words and phrases to describe corruption: “accumulate wealth by unfair means (liancai; 敛财)” “corruption (fu; 腐)” and “greedy (tan; 贪).” Those words and phrases can refer to embezzlement, bribery, selling positions, and so on.

The fourth kind of description is even more general: “not make a clear distinction between public and private interests (gongsi bu fen; 公私不分).” It should be noted that this phrase can be used in various contexts. For instance, this phrase can refer to how the boss treats one worker better in the work place, because the boss and the worker are friends outside the work place. In news articles about corruption, “gongsi bu fen” is not necessarily related to money.

Next is “selling or buying government positions (maiguanyujue; 卖官鬻爵),” which is an ancient proverb which implies unfair competition for government positions. In addition, other phrases are sometimes used, including “gambling (dubo; 赌博),” which violates both the law and the CCP’s regulations) and “offensive and defensive alliance (gongshou tongmeng; 攻守同盟)” which is a strategy used to mask criminal behaviours.
The second main finding is that the causes of corruption scandals are simplified in the state news reports to individuals’ personality and family issues. Eleven words and phrases, other than those that refer to problems associated with women, are related to the cause of corruption. Only two phrases are associated with supervision, that is, “supervise (jiandu, 监督 or jianguan, 监管).” One phrase blames corruption on cadre’s friends, that is, “making wrong friends (jiaoyou bu shen; 交友不慎).” Other phrases are associated with individual desires: “be blinded by the lust for money (lilingzhihun; 利令智昏),” “put profit above conscience (liyuxunxin; 利欲熏心),” “lose control (shikong; 失控),” “psychologically unbalanced (xintai shiheng, 心态失衡 or xinli shiheng, 心理失衡),” “greed is like a valley that can never be filled (yuhenantian; 欲壑难填),” “full with selfish desire (siyu zuosui, 私欲作祟 or siyu pengzhang, 私欲膨胀).” Both “lilingzhihun (be blinded by the lust for money)” and “liyuxunxin (put profit above conscience)” are ancient proverbs, and their meanings are similar - greed makes people crazy or lose intelligence. According to the Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji, 史记), the expression “lilingzhihun (be blinded by lust for money)” was used to describe Zhao Sheng, who was the chancellor of Zhao country in the Warring States Period (Sima, n.d.). Upon defeat, the Han country had to concede territory, Shangdang, to Qin country. However, the garrison general of Shangdang did not agree with it (Sima, n.d.). The garrison general wanted to use Zhao country’s army to confront Qin’s army, so he promised that Shangdang would affiliate with Zhao if Zhao won (Sima, n.d.). Zhao Sheng wanted Shangdang and agreed to confront Qin’s army. However, Zhao’s army was defeated by Qin’s army, and 400,000 of Zhao’s soldiers lost their lives. So, the Records of the Grand Historian commented on Zhao Sheng as “lilingzhihun (be blinded by lust for money),” because Qin country was the strongest country, and Zhao Sheng should not have agreed to confront Qin in order to get Shangdang (Sima, n.d.). “Xinli shiheng” and “xintai shiheng”
(psychologically unbalanced) refer to mentality, which caters to the party’s propaganda. The CCP requires members to strengthen the party spirit through training (jiaqiang dang xing xiuyang; 加强党性修养), and good mentality is an important part of it. Those eleven words and phrases, which appear a total of 1,257 times in the news articles, stress the importance of personality in corruption cases. A common characteristic for all the above words and phrases is that they are well-defined and stable codes. Such a characteristic ensures readers’ understanding and reinforces the party’s power to shape discourse and ideologies about proper behaviour in daily life.

6.4 Chapter Conclusions and Discussions

By using critical discourse analysis to explore divergent discourses about men and women’s involvement in corruption, I have shown the impact of gender differences in news coverage of corruption. In the official media, the most frequently mentioned code for women is the “wife,” which is the core role of women in traditional Chinese culture. Ironically, during the Maoist period, women’s roles in private spheres were considered as obstacles for women to achieve emancipation, and women were mobilized to play roles in the public sphere (Ji, 2015; Sun & Chen, 2015), such as doing heavy industry labour (Yihong et al., 2006). The emphasis on the “wife” may reflect the resurgence of Confucianism in contemporary society. However, being a traditional good wife contrasts with greater choice associated with neoliberalism that has accompanied the market economy. On the one hand, women have more choices in finding a job and choosing a lifestyle; on the other hand, traditional wifehood encourages women to be caretakers; thus, women have to suffer a double burden through their labour in the workplace and the family (Leung, 2003; Summerfield, 1994). In this sense, most women have not truly attained gender equality, even if it is possible to improve their economic status.
In news about corruption, men are more likely to appear as “leaders” or “officials,” which shows that China’s officialdom is still male-dominated. Mass labour participation has not opened the door to higher job positions for most women, who are largely engaged in low-paying jobs (Ji & Yeung, 2014). In fact, during the state-owned companies’ transitions in the 1990s, many female workers were laid-off and later got part-time jobs (Cook & Dong, 2011). While women are gaining higher levels of education, gender stereotypes and discrimination in the workplace limits their opportunities to get promotions (Rai, 1994). Indeed, by 2009, only 11% of cadres at the national level were female cadres (Sina News, 2012).

Gender differences are also prominent in the ways in which men and women are represented in the new reports about corruption. In general, three kinds of women are mentioned in the news articles: the wife, the mistress and women who have improper sexual relations with cadres. Both mistresses and women who have extramarital affairs with cadres are blamed as the cause of corruption, while the wife is blamed if she fails to monitor the husband’s behaviour. Women’s images suggest that wifehood, and being a good wife, are the only criteria for judging women. The media reports feature ancient precepts, stories, words and phrases to confirm women’s leading roles in corruption scandals even when women are not the corrupt cadres. By analyzing Confucian thoughts, Mencius's thoughts and yin-yang harmony, Clark and Wang (2004) claim that Confucianism originally supported gender equality and harmonious relationships between men and women. Jiang (2009) points out that Confucian values for a harmonious society may not harm women, but they do urge women to fulfill their duties. In addition, Confucianism does not provide any specific rules or norms that protect women's rights and prevent abuse towards women (Yun, 2013). In the present study, however, the media reports quote Confucian rules and norms as a way to blame women rather than protect women.
Mistress-blaming reconfirms the traditional social hierarchy and social inequalities. Modern mistresses have a similar status as concubines (Mann, 1997). In ancient society, abuse of concubines reflected the concubines’ lower social status as well as their lower status in a polygamous marriage. In the news articles, mistresses do not receive respect from authors, but rather, are condemned by authors as sources of trouble. In China, there is also a storytelling style which criticizes beautiful women for causing the collision of dynasties. However, Chen (2017) points out that this storytelling style now serves as a template for corruption news framing. Mistresses in corruption news suffer verbal discrimination and abuse. What is more, many news articles neglect female mistresses’ voice, emphasizing mistresses’ greediness in committing corruption and obtaining money. In sum, corruption news articles depict a hierarchy between women centred on concerns of sexual ethics.

In news articles on corruption, men are depicted as family supporters, immoral cadres and animals who are identified by the traditional culture as avaricious. Nevertheless, in their confessions, some corrupt cadres evaluate their roles as men in accordance with traditional conceptions of manhood, while some of them define masculinity as a reflection of wealth and power. The male cadres’ goal appears to be to present themselves as a moral man, as increasing morality can minimize men’s greediness and reduce corruption. This reflects Confucian moral norms in which corruption is caused by individual immoral men. Significantly, the reason that Confucianism remained the dominant ideology over the past 2000 years was that it met the needs of, rather than criticized, the ruling class. In the same way, using Confucianism meets the needs of the ruling CCP; that is, corruption is an individual issue, not the ruling party’s issue.

From my examination of men’s and women’s images in news about corruption, it becomes apparent that the Chinese government is still using Confucian rules and norms to
govern society. However, Confucian leadership style is based on virtues, as kings and leaders were supposed to have a high level of virtuousness maintained by self-discipline (Clark & Wang, 2004). With the development of the market economy, Chinese cadres have more sovereign powers in administration, so self-discipline and morality are not enough to limit powers. Overall, China does not have an anti-corruption culture (Kubat, 2018). In this sense, traditional ideologies can not stop corruption and provide practical solutions for social issues.

From the intertextual analysis, a paradox related to gender relations emerges: traditionally, men are superior, and women are inferior; however, in reports about corruption, women appear to have more power in marital and sexual relations, as they are attributed as having responsibility for corruption while men are more likely shown as following women’s decisions. On the other hand, men’s responsibilities for corruption are associated with circumstances in which they do not follow the party’s regulations. In sum, news articles consistently highlight corruption as the fault of individual women and men. By doing so, the news draws attention from more systemic problems related to the political system, seldom discussing the CCP’s failure to monitor cadres or to change procedures that make corruption possible. News framing is a political strategy for the CCP. By repeatedly emphasizing individual faults, the CCP is mitigating political pressure, as corruption scandals are serious in democratic countries and may trigger the crackdown of the ruling party. Although some journalists are aware of gender issues while writing news reports, such consciousness is not enough to change the ways in which news is framed given domination by the state (Chen, 2009). Women are oppressed by patriarchal and political power, which is reinforced by the ways in which discourses about women appear in news and public images.

The news articles about corruption analyzed in this study frequently included quotations from leaders’ speeches, including slogans and speeches employed in support of President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. While many of those quotations are not
directly associated with women, they reinforce expectations about women's family roles by stressing the importance of good family values to prevent corruption. Inserting Xi Jinping's slogans in news articles provides a way to demonstrate an official determination to eliminate corruption and to build a positive image for CCP even if these do not represent what is really happening. In addition to speaking to women’s family roles, Xi also uses metaphors to describe corrupt cadres as tigers and flies in order to demarcate the boundary between upright cadres and corrupt cadres. More importantly, those slogans also provide important reminders about China's policy process. Contrary to democratic countries, policy-making in China is a top-down process from which the general public is excluded (Han & Ye, 2017). The CCP has exclusive decision-making power, and governments just follow the leadership’s guidelines to make or execute policies (Han & Ye, 2017).

According to Foucault (1980), political power “traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (p.119). In this sense, political discourses make policies, trigger social changes and new social controls (Lu, 1999). This is certainly true in the case of China. For instance, in 1947, after Chairman Mao Zedong had launched land reform in liberated areas, he wrote more than 40 instructions to guide the reform (Rittenberg, 2013). Similarly, Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign started from the instruction laid out in the Central Government's Eight-Point Regulation (Zhongyang baxiang guiding), which was used to limit corruption by reducing the cost of government, such as meals and trips (Lee, 2018; J. Shi, 2013). Some scholars suspected that the Eight-Point regulations might just be a political farce, as the Eight-Point regulations did not address a core issue related to corruption - disclosing personal assets of cadres and limiting the power of the ruling party (Jacobs, 2013). However, temporary changes brought by the Regulations did prove that in China, politicians, slogans, and speeches are policies which could cause
social change. Thus, citing President Xi Jinping's words represents correct political behaviour.

Nevertheless, party cadres who do not follow those instructions, slogans and speeches, would be disciplined. In the new version of Regulations on Disciplinary Actions by the Chinese Communist Party (zongguo gongchandang jilv chufen tiaoli), cadres who "discuss central government's policies based on their interpretations which are different from the central government (wangyi zhongyang)" will be given a warning or serious warning; if the circumstances are serious, cadres will be removed from the party position, placed in the probation within the party, or expelled from the party (www.12371.cn, 2018). In 2016, Lv Xiwen, the former Deputy Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee of Beijing, was removed from the position and expelled by the party for various reasons, one of which was discussing policies from a perspective different from the central government (BBC News, 2016). In this sense, disciplinary power ensures that political discourses and policies are definitely correct and not to be understood from different perspectives.
CHAPTER 7
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS FINDINGS TWO: MAINSTREAM COMMERCIAL MEDIA

This chapter explores gender relations in the news coverage about corruption by mainstream commercial websites, answering the research question about gender differences between women’s images and men’s images. Similar to Chapter 6, the analysis focuses on the main themes of text representations, discourses, and intertextuality.

7.1 Text Representations of Four Websites - Fenghuang Net, Sina, Sohu, and Wangyi Net

Table 7.1 summarizes the frequencies of keywords from the four commercial websites. As all of these words have been explained in previous sections, the table only reports the frequencies of each code. The total number of cadres in the list is 1,214, but I only found news articles for 131 cadres.

Table 7.1 Frequency distributions for themes and codes related to male and female cadres, reported by commercial websites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Codes</th>
<th>Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Descriptions of Women</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mistress and sexual relationship</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptions of Men</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official/leader</td>
<td>2068</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors for Corrupt Cadres</td>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,524</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cadres’ misconducts and illegal behaviours (not related to women)</td>
<td>3495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons of misconduct and illegal behaviours</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4019</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: the total number of news articles is 313.*

Comparing frequencies of codes from commercial websites with those from the CCDI website, several interesting findings emerge. First, in news articles of CCDI, the code “wife” is the most frequent code, while the code “mistress and sexual relationships” is the most frequent among codes related to commercial websites’ descriptions of women. Such a finding suggests that reporting corruption cases with regards to mistresses and sexual relationships may be intended to attract more readers, as click volume and visitor volume are important for commercial websites to make a profit.

In recent years, descriptions of mistresses (*xiaosan; ernai; qingfu*) have become critical words for articles related to corruption. In China, if the cadre is not under investigation, people will not know if they have mistresses from news media; however, after the cadre has been investigated, news media starts to report on their personal life. So, news reports about mistresses or sexual relationships can be commercially attractive. Another aspect is the recent trend that some mistresses report their lovers’ illegal behaviour and misconduct to the Commission of Discipline Inspection, which is called “ernai anti-
corruption campaign (ernai fanfu),” “xiaosan anti-corruption campaign (xiaosan fanfu),” or “qingfu anti-corruption campaign (qingfu fanfu).” For instance, Liu Tienan, the former director of the National Energy Administration, was reported by his mistress, Ms. Xu, to have engaged in corruption (Sohu News, 2013). At first, Liu Tienan committed corruption together with Xu. However, later, they had conflicts of interest, and Xu received death threats from Liu. So, out of fear or retaliation Xu reported Liu’s corruption (Sohu News, 2013). This kind of case is interesting for readers, as mistresses are supposed to be in the same boat with cadres and not usually report their lovers.

Another reason for the popularity of mistresses as a topic within news articles is that so many cadres have mistresses. Mistresses are often described in commercial news reports with reference to “ernai” even though, as noted in chapter 2, this term is discouraged for its discriminatory connotations. In 2017, China Women’s News (Zhongguo funv bao; 中国妇女报), which was established by the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), published a set of gender discriminatory words, including “ernai” and “xiaosan” that could not be used by official channels like the Xinhua News Agency, but private sources like Sohu did not have the power to ban those words in news articles. Because of this, even in 2019, Xinhua News Agency has used “ernai” in its articles. The use of such disparaging words to describe women in news about corruption is an overt way in which both state-owned media and commercial websites continue to discriminate against women, further revealing that gender equality is a hollow discourse.

Second, in terms of descriptions of men, the most frequent code is “official/leader,” which is the same as for the CCDI news articles. On the one hand, commercial websites follow the official news agency in reporting news about corruption; on the other hand, being an official/leader is still a heated topic, as shown in the previous analysis.
Third, reasons related to misconduct and illegal behaviour are cited less frequently in commercial sites than in the CCDI website, which implies that articles in commercial websites are more likely to describe corruption behaviours to attract readers.

Generally, for corruption news, the four commercial websites and the CCDI follow the same guidelines. For commercial news websites and news agencies, if the content of news articles conflicts with government propaganda, they may be subject to heavier censorship. For instance, Southern Weekend (nanfang zhoutuo; 南方周末) is a newspaper which is well-known for its objectivity in reporting social issues that may be ignored by the government. In its New Year Greetings of 2013, the newspaper mentioned political reform and free press and free speech, which were recognized as sensitive issues by the government (Tang, 2013). The Propaganda Department of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee forced the newspaper to revise its New Year Greetings. However, the staff refused to revise it and threatened to stop the newspaper. Finally, under duress, the New Year Greetings was revised, and the newspaper continues to publish (Tang, 2013). But the government tightened its censorship of this newspaper, which caused the newspaper to be marginalized in the media market. This case could be identified as an exercise of regulatory power by the CCP. However, because it occurred without legislation, this is a hidden power exercise.

7.2 Discourses of Fenghuang Net, Sina, Sohu, and Wangyi Net

7.2.1 Women’s Descriptions

Compared to CCDI, discourses related to women on commercial websites are closer to the conversation on commoners’ life, such as the word “tough girl (nv hanzi; 女汉子).” These discourses are more likely to stigmatize, discriminate, and tease women, although both CCDI and commercial websites engage in frequent criticism of women.

The first kind of discourse is related to “women.”
Case 22

(Ni Mou jingran qude le Zhao Minghua she xian weiji de yixilie shipin ziliao, qizhong baokuo pinfan gao dang xiaofe, zuo yong duotao fang chan, yu qizi yi wai de nyxing cunzai bu zhengdang jiaowang dengdeng.)

Mr. Ni had a lot of videos that are related to Zhao Minghua’s misconduct, including having top-grade consumption items, having many houses, and having improper sexual relationships with women other than his wife, and so on. (Shi, August 8, 2013)

Case 22 is a narrative discourse presented in the reporter’s voice. Without an event-line, the orientation which guides readers’ perceptions of women is framed through relationships with the corrupt cadres (improper sexual relationships). In the discourse, “women,” together with “consumption” and “houses,” are evidence of committing corruption. Women are commodified and are viewed as sexed objects.

The discourse presents a paradox: the evidence, including some videos related to improper sexual relationships, was collected by an individual rather than by the Commission for Discipline Inspection, but it does not speak to who recorded those videos. By not suggesting that the videos were taken by the mistress, it leaves open the question of whether Ni was the person who recorded them. Because it is illegal for people to use the pinhole camera to record other people, to some degree, the discourse confirms the ineffective supervision of the Commission for Discipline Inspection and hides a potential problem: can people get evidence of misconduct illegally?

Case 23

(Guan zhi zhengtingji, zai di shi zhong yi shu jiao jiaozhe, duiyu yiming cong jiceng yibubu zoushanglai de nyxing er yan, Ding Fengyun geng shi bei henduo ren shi wei “ren zhong feng”. Yin qi pola nenggan de “nv hanzi” xingxiang he leilifengxing de zuoshi fengge, Ding Fengyun bei ren cheng wei

168
“pinming san niang”, zhe yi chengwei ye bing fei xuming. Keshe, zai jinqian yu youhuo mianqian, ta you biaoxian chu renxing tanlan de zhiming ruodian, yanyi zhe “shuangmian rensheng”.) For a woman, who was a departmental level cadre and had been promoted from a low position, Ding Fengyun was outstanding in the city. Because she was working hard and was exceptionally vigorous at work, she was called “an eager beaver.” However, she had a weakness in front of temptations and money. (Ifeng.net, June 16, 2016)

This discourse describes a corrupt female cadre. This represents a case in which discourse that evaluates corrupt cadre is congruently applied (i.e., For a woman, who was a departmental level cadre and had been promoted from a low position, Ding Fengyun was outstanding in the city). The first sentence emphasizes that it is not easy for a female cadre to be a “departmental level cadre,” which appears as praise for Ding Fengyun. The sentence implies that very few women can be promoted to a high position, suggesting that Ding is an exception, as emphasized in the use of the phrase “ren zhong feng.” In Chinese, “feng” means phoenix, “ren” means people, “zhong” means among, so the phrase “ren zhong feng” means “phoenix among people.” In ancient society, the dragon was the sacred symbol of the emperor, and the phoenix was the sacred symbol of the queen. As very few people can be the emperor and the queen, dragon and phoenix are used to describe outstanding people. There is a well-known proverb “long feng cheng xiang (龙凤呈祥);” that is, dragon and phoenix bring prosperity. So, using the proverb “ren zhong feng” ensures readers understand that the corrupt cadre is outstanding among commoners.

The second sentence uses “nv hanzi” (which translates as the tough girl) to describe Ding Fengyun’s appearance and behaviour. In Chinese, “nv” means women, “hanzi” means men; “nv hanzi” is used to describe women who behave like men - unrestrained, direct and indifferent to trivial matters. Many women use this word to describe themselves to show
gender performativity that is closer to masculinity. However, such a word can also be employed in relation to gender stereotypes; that is, men are strong, direct and indifferent to trivial matters; women, on the other hand, are weak, indirect and care for trivial things. Using this word reinforces gender stereotypes and exercises normative power on women’s behaviour.

To portray Ding as hard-working, the author uses the phrase “pinming san niang” in the discourse. This word came from another phrase “pinming san lang” which originally was employed to describe people who are brave or who work hard; nowadays, “pinming” means working hard, “san” means three, and “lang” means men (360chengyu.com, n.d.). The difference between “pingming san niang” and “pinming san lang” is “niang” means women. “Pinming san niang” implies that women should be working as hard as men. The above four words praise Ding’s work before she became corrupt, while settling boundaries to regulate women’s behaviour and encouraging women to behave in a genderless manner. The discourse describes the female cadre as an outstanding woman that had fallen into financial temptation due to her own weakness. The discourse focuses on the individual while, as with other discourses in state media reports, there is no mention of problems with the political system that may have contributed to corruption.

Case 24

(Zhou Yongkang bei tongbao wei “yu duo ming nvxing tongjian bing jinxing quanse, quanqian jiaoyi”, Ling Jihua shi “yu duo ming nvxing tongjian, jinxing quanse jiaoyi”, Sun Zhengcai shi “yanzhong weifan shenghuo jilv, fuhuaduoluo, gao quanse jiaoyi”.)
Zhou Yongkang was reported as “committed adultery and traded power with many women.” Ling Jihua was reported to have “committed adultery and traded power with many women.” Sun Zhengcai was reported to have “seriously
violated life discipline, led a corrupt life and traded power for sex.” (Sina.com, January 11, 2018)

Case 24 is a regulatory discourse focusing on specific characters (Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, Sun Zhengcai) and specific issues (i.e., “committed adultery and traded power with many women”). Here, women are stigmatized through trading sex for power and money from a corrupt cadre. Zhou Yongkang, the former secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Zhengfa wei) and the former member of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), was supposed to be President Xi Jinping’s political enemy. His crackdown had broken the unspoken rule that corruption investigations should not be conducted into PSC members. As a high-profile politician, Zhou Yongkang was called a “tiger” in the media discourse. Ling Jihua was the former chief of the General Office of the Communist Party of China. His corruption was revealed after he tried to cover up his son’s death. His son, Ling Gu, died in a car accident, and the car was luxurious---- a Ferrari. Ling Jihua did not want this scandal to influence his career, but finally, he was investigated. Sun Zhengcai was the former Communist Party Secretary of Chongqing, and later, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Here, the reference to “women” appears only as part of the evidence that proved Zhou, Ling, and Sun’s misconduct. This discourse illustrates how political power controls the right to define political scandals and gender relations in those scandals.

The above three examples reinforce the stereotyping of women into a narrow range of roles confined to being mistresses of cadres or as less competitive in the working place. However, in their roles as wives, women are expected to prevent corruption, as illustrated by the following three examples.

Case 25
(Zhe xie anli ye tixing renmen: yao zhuzhong jiating jiaoyu, xingcheng lianjie jiafeng, qianghua qinqing zhu lian cuoshi, rang jiaren danghao guanyuan de “shoumenyuan”. Fouze, xianneizhu biancheng le “tanneirzhu”, buchu menti cai guai.)
Such cases warn us that we should pay more attention to the family education, form an honest and upright family atmosphere, and strengthen measures that relatives help cadres to be honest and upright. In this sense, family members and relatives are gatekeepers of cadres. Otherwise, a **good wife** will become a **greedy wife**, and it will become normal for a cadre to commit corruption. (Sina.com, February 20, 2017)

In case 25, regulatory discourses are articulated in the form of a summary application (Such cases warn us that…), an evaluation application (In this sense, family members and relatives are gatekeepers of cadres) and a cause-effect application (family members and relatives are gatekeepers of cadres. Otherwise, a good wife will become a greedy wife, and it will become normal for a cadre to commit corruption). The first sentence advocates President Xi Jinping’s prescription to build good family values to help cadres keep honest and upright. The second sentence mentions that the transformation from a good wife to a greedy wife will cause trouble, directly attributing the responsibility for corruption issues to wives. By employing reference to the word “warn,” the author reinforces the official directive for family members to be gatekeepers of the cadre, shifting the responsibility for keeping cadres upright and honest away from the official himself. Considering that this article was published by a commercial media company, sina.com, it illustrates how a private company can reproduce state propaganda circulated to a larger population. This case illustrates Foucault’s analysis, in *History of Sexuality* (1990), of how institutions can help to reproduce discourses related to sex across the population.

**Case 26**

(`er zuowei xianwei shuji niangzi, danghao “xianneizhu”, “xiangfujiaozi”, zuohao houqin gongzuo shi fenfei zhishi, ying shishichuchu tixing dang lingdao de zhangfu baochi qingxing de tounao, weihu danggui dangji. Er Liu Mou de qizi Jiang Mou, ba zhangfu de gangwei dangzuo “yaoqianshu”, zai 5 nian jian ti zhangfu shou le 42 ming dangdi guanyuan caiwu`)
As the wife of the deputy director of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the County, Ms. Jiang should be a good wife, assisting her husband to keep honest and upright in his work and bringing up their children. However, Jiang treated her husband, Mr. Liu, as a ready source of money, and she accepted more than 7.39 million yuan and gifts in five years from 42 local officials. In the county, everybody knew that “if you wanted to get promoted, find Ms. Jiang.” Jiang’s behaviour is likely “pulling her husband into the pit.” (Du, February 28, 2016)

Case 26 represents a corruption discourse configured as an evaluation discourse (Ms. Jiang should be a good wife) and narrative discourse (i.e., she accepted more than 7.39 million yuan and gifts in five years from 42 local officials). The first sentence describes the expected duties for a cadre’s wife, containing two keywords “xianneizhu (good wife)” and “xiangfujiaozi,” an ancient proverb which means that wives should assist their husbands and educate children. If the husband is a cadre, the wife should help the husband keep upright and honest. “Xiangfujiaozi,” as a criterion for wives’ morality in ancient society, was used for praising good wives. In this sense, “xiangfujiaozi (wives should assist their husbands and educate children)” has a similar meaning as “xianneizhu (good wife),” in both cases to emphasize women’s virtue. Being virtuous is an important criterion for judging women (Barlow, 2004). According to Ban Zhao’s Lessons for Women (Nv Jie), women were recognized as yin (阴), identified as weak, while men were recognized as yang (阳), identified as strong. In other words, women should be inferior and subordinate, while men should be superior and dominant. The harmony between “yin” and “yang” is the most important element of morality and justice, so the wife and the husband should be virtuous.
Instructing Stories to Enlighten the Word (yu shi ming yan; 喻世明言), which consisted of numerous stories and was written by Feng Menglong during the Ming dynasty, claims that if the wife is virtuous, the husband can avoid many troubles (qi xian ze fu huo shao; 妻贤则夫祸少) (Feng, n.d.). The discourse continues by depicting how a greedy wife can ruin the husband’s career. “Yaoqianshu” came from fairy tales, which means a magic tree can produce money if people shake it. Nowadays, “yaoqianshu” means something or somebody can produce money for a family or a company, so the description of the husband as a “yaoqianshu” refers to his capacity to produce money for his wife. “If you wanted to get promoted, find Ms. Jiang” and “pulling her husband into the pit” are colloquial discourses employed to illustrate the selfish wife’s negative influence on the husband contrary to CCP requests that the wife maintain family discipline inspection and be loyal to the party. Case 26, then, blames the cadres’s corruption on the wife who does not fulfill wifely duties.

The next case describes how a good wife became a greedy wife.

Case 27
(zai wairen kanlai, Sun Lanyu youyige xingfu de jiating, suiran ta yin gongzuo changnian buzaijia, dan zuowei “xianneizhu” de qizi neng ba jia dali de jingjingyoutiao, erzi he Sun Lanyu de lao muqin dou neng dedao henhao de zhaogu. Chuyu dui qizi de kuiqian, zai Sun Lanyu kanlai, ta zhineng yi gengduo jinqian lai huibao ta. Yushi “zhangfu banshi, qizi shouqian”, renmen ye bu bihui di qianwang Sun jia songqu qian wu, buzhibuju Zheng, qizi chengwei zhangfu liancai de “dailiren”, qizi meiyou dang hao “lianneizhu”, rang Sun Lanyu zai nitan zhong yuxianyueshen.)
Sun Lanyu had a happy family, although he was seldom at home because of work, his wife is a good wife ---- takes care of the house, son, and Sun’s mother. Sun thought he owed his wife, so he wanted to give her more money in return. So, they were the type of couple where the “wife accepts money, and the
husband does the deed.” People directly went to their house to give money and gifts, and the wife became the agent of Sun. Apparently, Sun’s wife is not an honest wife and made Sun fall more and more deeply into the pit of corruption. (Sina.com, May 5, 2017)

Case 27 is a narrative discourse that does not indicate an event-line. The orientations that guide readers’ perception of the wife are framed through discussion of the reason offered by the corrupt cadre to give money to his wife (Sun thought he owed his wife, so he wanted to give her more money in return), the corruption process (wife accepts money, and the husband does the deed; People directly went to their house to give money and gifts, and the wife became the agent of Sun) and the evaluation of the wife (Sun’s wife is not an honest wife, and made Sun fall more and more deeply into the pit of corruption). The wife is initially represented as the “xiannizhu (good wife)” at first, reinforcing traditional gender norms in which wifehood and motherhood were the core of womanhood; actually, motherhood was an aspect of wifehood (Evans, 2002). As a wife, a woman should obey her husband, give birth to children, and serve the husband’s family to show filial respect (Ko et al., 2003). In the Book of Changes, one of the five ancient Chinese books of Confucianism, women were supposed to play an essential role in keeping the harmony of “yin-yang” binary (Yun, 2012). In this sense, women should be responsible for the crackdown of the family. The dangers of failing to fulfill these obligations are highlighted in the reporting on this case, which highlights that, although the husband was responsible for the corrupt behaviour it was the fault of the wife because she was not a good wife who prevented corruption.

While this discourse refers to the role of the wife in maintaining family responsibilities to prevent corruption, the following examples depict how other women, in the form of mistresses and improper sexual relationships, can also cause trouble for cadres.
Case 28

(Jinnianlai, tanguan houyuan qihuo de shiqing pinpin chuanchu, zhuru zao qianqi jubao de Hefeishi shushanqu weishengju juzhang Hao Mou, baoyang qingfu zuizhong bei tingzhi; zao qianqi he erzi shimingjubao de Anhuisheng dangshanxian fangchanju juzhang Liu Jianghui, tanwu shouhui piaochang, zuizhong bei pan 19nian ling liugeyue; Guangdong zhanjiangshi majiangqu gongwanju juzhang Huang Yongchun youyu zhizi shimingjubao, bei la xia le xia ...... qizi, qianqi, erzi, zhizi chengle dangjin shehui riyi zhuangda de fanfu dajin lu de xinchengyuan.)

Recently, more and more corrupt cadres were reported by their family members. The secretary of Health Bureau in Shushan District, Hefei, Hao, who was reported by his wife, because of keeping a mistress; finally, he was suspended. The secretary of Real Estate Board, Liu Jianghui, was reported by his former wife and son, for accepting bribery and soliciting a prostitute; finally, Liu Jianghui was sentenced for 19 years and six months. The deputy chief, Mazhang Branch of Zhanjiang Municipal Bureau of Public Security, Huang Yongchun, was reported by his nephew, and finally, he was out of business ...... wife, former wife, son and nephew now became members of the anti-corruption army. (Sohu.com, September 12, 2014)

Case 28 employs a narrative discourse, using examples to illustrate the ideological focus on the family associated with surveillance related to corruption (i.e. Hao, who was reported by his wife, because of keeping a mistress). The article contains the word “mistress” while also citing an “example” for wives to follow in reporting on the husband’s misconduct and illegal behaviour. The discourse also reminds readers that keeping a mistress is misconduct for cadres. The case illustrates how CCP utilizes domestic issues as part of its anti-corruption tools. China has a long history of encouraging family members to report each
other’s misconduct. There is a proverb “dayimieqin”, which means to punish one’s own relatives or friends or family members in the cause of justice. Nowadays, the proverb is extended to praise people who report family members. During the Cultural Revolution, if people were identified as “anti-revolutionary” (fan geming; 反革命) or “persons in power within the party taking the capitalist road” (zou zi pai; 走资派), even their children had to report their parents’ problems (Kan, 2015). However, the family-report system also produced many wrongful convictions (yuanjiacuoan; 冤假错案). For the anti-corruption campaign, the family-report system reveals limits to the CCP’s capacity to supervise its cadres effectively, but it also demonstrates the extension of party surveillance and disciplinary measures into the household.

Whereas case 28 focuses on the illegality of keeping a mistress, the next case provides details about how a mistress can cause trouble for the cadre.

**Case 29**


Meanwhile, Wang Zhizhong lived in a corrupt lifestyle, indulging himself in debauchery and keeping a mistress. In 2007, when Wang Zhizhong met Ms. An, he asked her to quit the job and rented a house for her, in order to make dating more convenient. Later, Wang Zhizhong paid for Ms. An’s living expenses, and bought a house and a car for her, and so on. From 2007 to September 2014, he spent 3.4 million Chinese yuan on Ms. An, while keeping improper sexual relations with her. (Wangyi.net, August 5, 2016)
In case 29, narrative discourse is articulated in representations of corruption with reference to specific characters (Wang Zhizhong, Ms.An) and action verbs (quit, rented, make, paid, bought). The article tries to establish as a “truth,” in Foucault’s sense, that corruption is connected with women. By highlighting a large amount of money the cadre spent on the house, car and living expenses for the mistress, the article clearly signals that mistresses can tempt cadres into corruption by entering into a relationship in which the woman benefits from cash and luxuries. Despite the label, such a mistress-cadre relationship may also reveal some structural inequalities that have left women in vulnerable positions. Since the market transition in the 1980s, many state enterprises started to privatize. In order to increase productivity during this process, many state enterprises and factories laid-off workers, especially female employees (Chen, 2017). Many of these women lacked education and skills due to the Cultural Revolution, so earning a living became difficult for them. The gender gap in earning power has exacerbated this situation (Shu & Bian, 2003). Becoming a mistress has provided options for women who lack other choices due to the intersection of gender and class (Chen, 2017). Viewed from this perspective, which understands women as victims of social inequalities, there is a parallel with concubines who always came from poor families in traditional society. However, as represented in the media report, the discourse seems to reinforce the “tradition of male selection that prioritizes the economic and social status of the male” (Chen, 2017, p. 80).

The next case illustrates how other types of sexual relationships between cadres are represented in news about corruption.

**Case 30**

(11 yue 26 ri, Shanxi liangge nv guanyuan bei zhongjiwei xuanbu “shuangkai” qie “yu taren tongjian”. Qizhong, Jinzhong shiwei yuan fushuji Zhang Xiuping bei cheng yu liangren jiwei shuji de jingli “duo you jiaoji”. Gongkai ziliao xianshi, Zhang Xiuping ceng ren shanxi jiwei jianwei fu

On November 26, two female cadres of Shanxi Province were announced to be dismissed from public office and expelled from the party and committed adultery. One of the cadres is Zhang Xiuping, who was the former Deputy Communist Party Secretary of Jinzhong, and she had “relationships” with the two former Secretaries of the Shanxi Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection. Based on public information, Zhang Xiuping had been Deputy Secretary of Supervisory Commission of the Shanxi Provincial Commission for Discipline, a member of the Standing Committee of Shanxi Provincial Commission for Discipline, and the Director of General Supervisory Office of Shanxi Supervisory Commission. It is said that she has a “close relation” to Jin Daoming, the former Secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Jin Yinhuan. When Jin Yinhuan was the Secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, she was her secretary; when Jin Daoming was the Secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, they worked together for almost seven years. (Wangyi.net, December 11, 2014)

Case 30 is a regulatory discourse focusing on specific characters (Zhang Xiuping, Jin Yinhuan, Jin Daoming), a suggestive sentence (she had “relationships” with the two former Secretaries) and the violation (adultery). This discourse stigmatizes women for their role in “committing adultery.” In ancient society, to commit adultery was supposed to violate moral principles (as a threat to the fundamental element in society- the family) and would be seriously punished. For instance, during the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC), people could kill a
husband who committed adultery without bearing legal responsibility (Sohu History, 2014). During the Tang dynasty (618-907) both men and women would be sentenced to prison for committing adultery (Sohu History, 2014). It should be noted that adultery in ancient society was a crime, but today it violates the regulations of the party. The immoral nature of the women’s actions is reinforced in the use of other suggestive words in this report. Enclosed with quotation marks, the words “relationships” and “close relation” suggest that Zhang had abnormal relationships with Jin Yinhuan and Jin Daoming. As the first sentence tells readers that Zhang committed adultery, abnormal relationships could be adultery but, because no convincing evidence is presented, the author adds suggestive words in the discourse. The interesting thing is Jin Yinhuan was a female cadre. Obviously, the author did not notice this.

Generally, women in the news articles about corruption news do not receive equal treatment to that of men, no matter whether the reports are presented by the state-owned news agency or a commercial news agency. News reports about corruption news are exempt from gender equality, demonstrating the widespread exercise of patriarchal power.

7.2.2 Men’s Descriptions

This section focuses on discourses related to corrupt male cadres. Unlike the CCDI, the discourses in the commercial website make reference to the understanding of male-dominated society from the perspective of corrupt female cadres, revealing how authors on non-state websites may express different ideas about corruption scandals.

The following are examples related to the use of the code “men.”

Case 31

(Hunan diyi nv taguan Jiang Yanping youji jingdian
mingyan: ”zai nanren dangquan de shehui, zhiyou dongde
chongfen kaifa liyong nanren jiazhi de nvren, caineng suanshi
zhenzheng gaoming de nvren.” Weici, Jiang Yanping chongfen
liyong sexiang youshi, “kaifa” chu xuduo ziyuan gong ziji
shiyong, xianhou nu 40 duo ming tingji lingdao ganbu fasheng

180
xingguanxi, yici huande guanzhi, quanli he qiancai, cong yige cangku baoguanyuan yaoshenyibian chengwei futingji lingdao ganbu. Jiang Yanping de xingwei buzhi shibushi “tongjian”, gujie ba zhezhong jiliang jiao “wanshang”).

The No.1 corrupt female cadre in Hunan Province, Jiang Yanping, had a famous sentence: “in the male-dominated society, if a woman wants to be a smart woman, she should know how to take advantage of the value of a man.” Hence, Jiang Yanping fully utilized her body to “develop sources for use” - she had sexual relations with more than 40 department level cadres in order to get promoted and to obtain money. She advanced to a deputy department director from a storage staff.

I don’t know if Jiang Yanping’s behaviour constitutes adultery, but we can call this behaviour as “play with superiors.” (Sohu.com, November 28, 2014)

Case 31 makes reference to Jiang Yanping’s famous sentence, which admits that Chinese society is a male-dominated society in which women have to be innovative in order to be able to compensate for the denial of women’s efforts to advance in conventional ways. This statement expresses how Jiang was proud of her behaviour rather than ashamed. She utilized sexual power to get money and power in officialdom. To convey the case as a retrogression of gender equality, this article describes corruption through interrelated discourses of narration, evaluation, colloquialism. The narrative discourse (Jiang Yanping, had a famous sentence: “in the male-dominated society, if a woman wants to be a smart woman, she should know how to take advantage of the value of a man.”) is presented quotation marks to indicate by means of direct speech the relationships between a woman and success (take advantage of the value of a man). The evaluation discourse (Jiang Yanping fully utilized her body to “develop sources for use”) confirms the statement, with the phrase “Develop sources for use” placed in quotation marks to indicates an ironic application of this discourse as an element in representing Jiang’s misconduct negatively, to emphasize that she
should not take advantage of her body to get promotions. The colloquial discourse (i.e., we can call this behaviour as “play with superiors.”) also contains an ironic application, with the author teasing Jiang’s behaviour as a form of “play.” The case presents to readers a woman who used promiscuity to advance herself but does not make reference to any other dimensions of corruption. As in many of the other cases, the danger appears to lie in a woman’s sexuality and lack of moral virtue.

While case 31 makes reference to “men” as a tool for a woman to get promoted, the word “man” in case 32 is related to criteria for success.

**Case 32**

(*Dan ta xinfeng de na tao “chenggongxue” biaozhun, que rangren jing’e: ju qi “jinzhu”, shenmumei laoban Gao Zhilin fushu, Wang Dengji ceng shuo:’shanbei nanren zenme cai suan chenggong? Dangguan yao dang dao shengbuji, zhuquan yao duo shi ge yi, wo li fushengji jiu cha yibuzhiyao le.”*)

Gao Zhilin, the boss of a coal mine said, “(Wang Dengji told him) for a man from Northern Shaanxi Province, to achieve success, this man must be the provincial level cadre, earn more than 1 billion, so I have only one step left to be vice-ministerial level cadre.” (Sohu.com, December 6, 2016)

This narrative discourse employs direct speech (“for a man from Northern Shaanxi Province...”), quoting Wang Dengji’s criteria for the success of men - power and money. Such criteria have two-fold meanings. First, Wang’s definition of success reveals popular masculine ideals in post-Mao China that associate a successful man with social status, power, and wealth (Liu, 2019). This ideal implies social changes and social issues in contemporary China. After the market reform and the development of consumerism, individuals need to pay for their own welfare, so money is important to buy services which were previously publicly funded, such as childcare. However, as China is a non-democratic country and social
inequalities widely exist, power is essential to access better services. This ideal also reflects the persistent gender inequalities in the job market; that is, man is the breadwinner.

Second, unlike the CCDI which describes good men by traditional criteria, the discourse of the successful man alludes to popular criteria in contemporary society, especially in relation to the marriage market. According to a survey conducted by China Youth Daily, a man who is tall, handsome, and rich is more likely to find a wife (China Daily, 2012). Another survey, conducted by Southwest Securities (Xinan zhengquan), claimed that about 25% of single women required their future boyfriend or husband to have at least 15,000 yuan (Southwest Securities, 2017). Although those two surveys were conducted by different sources in different years, there is one commonality: a rich man will be more popular in the marriage market. Since China has shifted to a market economy, houses, health care and education have become goods, so leading a better life requires money. For commercial websites, such a discourse caters to social trends and may attract more readers.

The above discourse is about “a successful man,” while the “man” in the following example is not recognized as successful.

**Case 33**

*(Shijie shang hanyou miaoling meinv hui zhenxin milian yige qingchunyishi, shenghuo yayi, xingge chenmen de lao nanren, ershi dingshang ni shouzhong de quanli).*

*Worldwide, it is almost impossible for a beautiful young woman to love a boring old man. This woman must want to trade sex for the old man’s authority.* (Shi, May 20, 2014)

In case 33, the reporter articulates a judgment or evaluative discourse which contains negative comments (i.e., *it is almost impossible for a beautiful young woman to love a boring old man*) on the relationship (love) between characters (*a woman, a man*). The case mocks the “love” between women and older corrupt male cadres. Young beautiful women are stereotyped as covetous, depicted for their desire to benefit from the cadres’ power. While
women are portrayed as materialistic, old men are stereotyped as stupid and condemned by the author. The age difference underscores the naivety of the older cadre as to the intention of the young woman in question. The article draws on colloquial discourses in which people tease young women and corrupt cadres, enabling the construction of labels through which to frame mistress-cadre relationships while seeking to raise people’s interest in reading the article.

All three cases show that men in positions of authority are attractive to women. As mentioned earlier, officials do not have a very high salary, but many people apply to be officials because of the authority associated with the positions. This fact, on the other hand, reflects problems that frequently arise in the political system with respect to the supervision of authority.

While discourses of men demonstrate popular beliefs related to masculinity in post-reform China, discourses related to “husband” express traditional marital relations. The next case refers to men who were described as “husband.”

**Case 34**

(Zhi suoyi chxian zheyang de qingkuang, shouxian shi xianzai de ganbu xuanba jizhi bugou wanshan. Henduo shihou, ganbu xunba kan guanxi, jiang jiaoqing, shenzhi shezhi xingbie bilei, daozihi yixie you nengli you caihua de nxing wufa tongguo zhengchang tujing huode tishen. Zenme? Zheshi, ta rao meiyou yige hao baba, hao zhuangfu, kongpa jiu zhineng yikao youge hao qingren le ba.)

The first reason for this situation is related to problems in the system of selecting cadres. Sometimes, selecting cadres relies on relations, friendships and the gender of the candidate. Such problems encumber women to get promotions in normal ways. What can they do? Without a good father (a father who has power or relation to help kids get promoted), good husband, women may only think of a good lover. (Chen, June 17, 2014)
Case 34 combines regulatory discourses (i.e., The first reason for this situation is related to problems in the system of selecting cadres) and colloquial discourses (i.e., What can they do?) while drawing attention to gender inequalities in government-related jobs. In such a system, women need to have relations or friendships with male cadres to get promoted. These relations could be a father-daughter relationship, husband-wife relationship, or mistress-cadre relationship. The last sentence is a colloquial discourse presented as if it were a daily conversation reflecting gender inequalities that are obvious in China. On the one hand, this discourse indicates Chinese society is male-dominated, and men have more power. Many previous studies confirm a resurgence of patriarchal norms in China, as many gender inequalities have deteriorated in the post-socialism period (Fincher, 2018; Ji, 2015; Ji & Yeung, 2014; Leung, 2013; Li & Jiang, 2019).

Case 35

(“yuefu kaochi tiba nvxu, zhangfu tiba laopo”, you meiti ruci miaoshu Wei Shumin, Wang Yongjin, Wei Wu zhe sanren de shitu lianxi.)

“The father-in-law inspects and promotes his son-in-law, while the husband promotes his wife,” some newspapers use this sentence to describe the relationships between Shumin Wei, Yongjin Wang, and Wu Wei. (Ifeng.com, June 12, 2017)

Case 35, a narrative discourse, directly quotes an ironic statement from newspapers to make light of a pattern of corruption represented in nepotism. By emphasizing family relationships between corrupt cadres, the author’s discourse helps to normalize the slogan “building good family values to prevent corruption.” In China, nepotism is closely related to corruption. As Pei (2014) observes, corrupt cadres and their cronies have formed a self-reinforcing web of relations. Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has greatly increased investments in infrastructure, providing opportunities for cadres and their cronies to get illegal money (Pei, 2014).
In sum, both case 34 and case 35 describe “husband” in relation to nepotism, while husband-wife relations and marital power are the focus of the next case.

**Case 36**

(“zheng de qian bi zhangfu duo, hunyin bian duoyifen baozhang.” Zheshi Cao Yanfang de jingdian yulu. Hou Fucai tanwu 2000 wan yuan, Cao Yanfang que liyong zhangfu de zhiquan tanwu 3000 wan yuan. Cao Yanfang renwei, zhiyao zheng de qian bi zhangfu duo, jiu bupa zai jiali shuohua meiyou fenliang.)

“Making more money than one’s husband means making the marriage more secure,” this is Cao Yanfang’s famous sentence. The husband, Hou Fucai, got 20 million yuan illegal money, while Cao utilized Hou’s authority to get 30 million yuan illegal money. Cao thought that if she made more money than her husband, her words would carry weight at home.

(Ifeng.com, April 20, 2015)

Case 36 indicates narrative discourses in representations of the husband (Hou Fucai), beginning with a quotation offering a perspective on the importance of a wife’s earning potential to a stable marriage. However, the report reveals how this has been distorted through the illegal acquisition of money (Cao thought that if she made more money than her husband, her words would carry weight at home). In China, during the Maoist period, gender equality is largely demonstrated by women’s rights in labour participation (Sun & Chen, 2015). Obviously, Cao has simplified gender equality to economic equality. However, economic equality cannot bring equal rights to women automatically. Cao’s thoughts displayed a low level of confidence towards gender relations and reflected on the famous propaganda - the economic base determines the superstructure - which Chinese students learn from their middle school politics course. Originally, the propaganda was to promote Marxism, but nowadays, the reference to the superstructure has been extended to gender relations in the family, and the economic base is extended as the economic status of an
individual. The interesting thing in the discourse is that Cao’s corruption is based on her husband’s authority, which does not reflect gender equality.

The above three examples reflect the fact that Chinese women continue to face gender inequalities in the workplace and household. In China, the logic behind gender inequalities in processes related to hiring and getting promotions is the consideration of women’s domestic roles - the idea that giving birth to children, doing housework, taking care of the kids and elderly makes them less productive (Robinson, 1985; Chen, 2012). As observed in chapter two, employers seek to avoid extra costs associated with maternity leave, so they ask women if they are married and if they have kids during the hiring process (CCTV.com, 2019). What is more, a provincial hospital even said to a woman that “we could hire you, but your job needs you to carry machines, so you cannot have a baby for five years” (CCTV.com, 2019). The execution of the two-child policy could reinforce the gender discriminations in the workplace, as employers may need to give women two maternity leaves. On February 21, the Notice of Regulating Hiring Process to Promote Women’s Labour Participation (guanyu jinyibu guifa zhaopin xingwei cujin funv jiuye de tongzhi; 关于进一步规范招聘行为促进妇女就业的通知) was released by nine bodies, including the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of Education, the All-China Women’s Federation, and the Supreme People’s Court, prohibiting companies from asking those discriminatory questions (CCTV.com, 2019; Pingzhang, 2019). However, some people still worry that such a notice cannot stop gender discrimination in the hiring process, as employers could still reject young women who just graduated from universities since employers may think young women who do not yet have kids will want to have them in the near future (Pingzhang, 2019). Gender inequalities in the hiring process have two levels: they favour male applicants over female applicants, and they also favour mothers in comparison with single women. As mentioned in chapter 5, very few women in the government are promoted to leading positions in core
departments. What is more, in terms of companies, very few women are CEOs, and most women in high management positions are in human resources or accounting departments (Sohu News, 2012). The media discourses related to corruption cases reinforce dominant perceptions of gender inequalities while distracting readers from focusing on the economic and political systems that contribute to such unequal relations.

The third kind of men are related to “official /leader.”

**Case 37**

*(Zuowei daxing guoyouqiye yibashou, Yin Liang jishi zuzhi renming de zhengtiji ganbu, yeshi zuoyong jibaiyiyuan zichan de guoqi laozong, zhezhong zhanju zhongyao jingji he zhengzhi ziyuan de tiaojian, rang ta zai yu shangren, guanyuan deng gefang zhouxuan zhong yourenyouyu, ta you le ziji de quanzi, jinexingcheng le liyi gongtongti, zhiyou ta quanzi li ren caingyou xiandao tiba, huoqu gezhong liyi. “quanzi wenhua” bei ta yanyi de “chushenruhua”*.)

As the director of a state-owned enterprise, Yin Liang was not only the departmental level cadre but operated a property worth more than 10 billion. Such identities made him easy to make friends with businessmen and various levels officials, so he had a community of interests. Many circles were involved in this community, including his circle of friends, his circle of trusted followers, and his circle of Mahjong. Only people he thought were promising entered his circles, only people who were insiders could get promoted first. *(Ifeng.com, May 18, 2018)*

Case 37 presents a narrative discourse in the representation of the corruption case illustrated with reference to the word “officials.” This discourse emphasizes a pattern of corruption involving “circles” between cadres: Yin Liang only got bribes from close friends, relatives, and close colleagues. This corruption is covert, as cadres want to avoid investigation and punishment. Such “circles” stemmed from “guanxi” (also translated as
connections or relations), which is traditionally seen as a characteristic of Chinese society (Lee, 2018). According to Confucianism, an individual is living in a system which is full of interdependent relationships, and everyone has a place in the hierarchy of social relationships (Yeung & Tung, 1996). To some degree, Confucian doctrines are based on five types of relationships: ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, brother-brother, and friend-friend (Yeung & Tung, 1996). Good “guanxi (connections or relations)” means “xinren (trust)” and “ganqing (sentiment),” and cultivate and maintaining “guanxi” is associated with an asymmetrical exchange of favours, which could be material or non-material (Barbalet, 2018; Zhao & Timothy, 2015).

“Guanxi (connections or relations)” is everywhere in Chinese society. Guanxi can be cultivated based on familial ties, friendship, kinship (tong zong), “native place (tong xiang), education background (tong xue), working place (tong shi) and political party (tong zhi)” (Lee, 2018, p. 351). For companies, “guanxi (connections or relations)” with the authorities can influence the success of the business. As China’s business law is ambiguous and policies are open to interactions by those who are in positions of power, guanxi with high-ranking officials helps the success of the business (Yeung & Tung, 1996). For instance, Li Jiacheng, the Hong Kong billionaire, was supposed to have “guanxi” with the former President Jiang Zemin when Li started to invest in real estate in Beijing in 1993 (Suofei, 2014). Politicians often form groups based on the network of “guanxi (connections or relations),” and the mutually beneficial nature of “guanxi” provides opportunities for cadres to commit corruption (Lee, 2018). For instance, Wang (2016) claims that the practice of “guanxi,” including gift-giving, could distort the promotion system in the army. Corruption could be conducted under the mask of good “guanxi,” and all people in the network of “guanxi” are in the same boat. The description of corruption in Case 37 reinforces the significance of Chinese
“guanxi” culture but also warns of the dangers of abusing it within existing political and institutional systems.

Case 38

(Sanwen: song qingfu zhihou, qingfu yu Zhu Xuqing haiyou laiwang ma? Ruguo qingfu sixintadi genzhu Wu Sha, Zhu Xuqing huibuhui shebude huoze chicu? Ruguo qingfu zai Wu Sha he Zhu Xuqing zhijian laiwaiwangwang, zuowei shangji de Wu Sha hui he xiaji Zhu Xuqing gongxiang qingfu ma? Meiti baodao guo guanyuan gongxiang qingfu de shiqing ---- Jieyang shiwei shuji Chen Hongping yu Guangzhou shiwei shuji Wan Qingliang gongxiang qingfu “Xu Xiaowan”, nandao Wu Sha he Zhu Xuqing shi xiang Chen Gongping he Wan Qingliang xuexi? Guangzhou, Jieyang tongshu Guangdong, Guangdong weisha zhuangmen chu zhezhogn gongxiang qingfu de shiqing?)

The third question: after sending out the mistress, did the mistress contact Zhu Xuqing? If the mistress lives with Wu Sha, was Zhu jealous? If the mistress lives with Wu but still contacted Zhu, did Zhu and Wu share a mistress? Some media reports were about shared mistresses among officials. For instance, the former Party Secretary of Yang Jie, Chen Hongping, and the former Party Secretary of Guangzhou, Wan Qingliang, shared the mistress Xu Xiaowan. Don’t Wu and Zhu want to learn from Chen and Wan? Both Guangzhou and Jieyang belong to Guangdong, why do officials in Guangdong always want to share mistresses? (Mao, January 30, 2016)

Case 38 employs colloquial discourses, highlighting the phrase “gongxiang qingfu (shared mistress)” which stems from another phrase, “gongxiang danche (bicycle-sharing system),” referring to the popularity of bicycle-sharing in China. In the Chinese context, “gongxiang qingfu (shared mistress)” is sometimes understood as an ironic statement that refers to mistresses and corrupt cadres. However, “gongxiang qingfu” and the word “song (send)” as employed in this discourse indicate a lack of respect for both women and men,
presenting the women as materialized as commodities while men are disparaged as emasculated and reproached for not valuing womanhood. In ancient China, sending women as gifts was a normal practice. As discussed in previous chapters, women in ancient society did not have status and belonged to the family, making it possible for families to sell or send off some women (for some women, once married, they entered the husband’s family).

Concubines, prostitutes and slaves had a relatively lower status than the wife and most of them were purchased by the family and could be sent to anybody if the head of the family or the husband or the wife wanted. In some rare situations, even the wife could be sent to other people. For instance, during the Warring States Period, in order to cultivate “guanxi” (connections or relations) with the king of Qin country, Lv Buwei sent his wife, Zhao Ji, to the king as the wife. Later, Lv Buwei became the prime minister (chengxiang) of Qin country. In ancient society, except for the wife, other women had very low status, were not treated as human and could be abused by the men, by the family, by the owner (i.e., the boss of a brothel), and by the wife. In today’s China, people still discriminate against those identified as xiaosan, qingfu and ernai (translated as second wife and mistress). Once women are labeled as xiaosan, qingfu, and ernai, many people show no respect for them, referring to them in terms such as “gongxiang qingfu (shared mistress).” In recent years, harsher titles that insulted women as mistresses have emerged in news media, including the CCP’s mouthpiece. For instance, on December 1, 2007, Renmin Net posted a news article which suggested that Zhang Yufen “Use the Bolo Knife to Cut the Head of Ernai” (Zhang Yufen “dadao xiang enai toushang kanqu”) (Liu, 2007). This article was not meant to promote gender equality but to “promote” conflicts among women. Similar to the abuse of concubines in ancient society, news reports related to beating mistresses on the street (dangjie da xiaosan) have also emerged. The discourse in case 38 reminds people to hate those mistresses and corrupt cadres.
Case 39
(Zai jinnian guanguo lianghui shang, quanguo zhengxie weiyuan, shenjishu fu shenjizhang Dong Dasheng toulu, qunian dui 6 ge sheng de kuangchanziyuan shenji faxian, gai lingyu fubai yanzhong, bushao lingdao ganbu zhijie chashou ganyu kuangyequan churang, daozi guoyou zichan liushi. Jinnian, shenjishu jiang kuangchan ziyuan zuowei shenji de zhongdian zhiyi.)

In this year’s National People’s Congress (NPC) and National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the member of CPPCC National Committee and the deputy director of National Audit Office of the PRC said that they found mineral resources from 6 provinces that had corruption issues via auditing, and many leaders intervened in the sale of mining rights, and such behaviour led to the loss of state-owned properties. This year, the audit office put mineral resources as one of the main focuses. (Wangyi.net, April 17, 2014)

Case 39 uses a metaphorical application in the article title, employing the word “mouse” to refer to corrupt cadre as a means to arouse people’s hatred towards corruption.

The case consists of regulatory discourses (i.e., they found mineral resources from 6 provinces), describing corruption in state-owned enterprises made possible due to lack of effective supervision and concerns about cost and profit. Many types of state firms suffer from corruption related to such activities as the purchase of raw materials, property transfer (i.e., selling mining rights), and fund management. After state firms started to execute The Go Out Strategy (Zouchuqu zhanlue) in 2000, many state firms have invested in programs overseas. Compared to domestic operations of state-owned enterprises, state firms’ overseas investments and other activities have relatively less supervision -Xinhua News has reported that 4 trillion yuan of assets were not audited by the government (Reuters, 2017) - increasing possibilities for corruption. In one high profile example, Bo Qiliang, the former PetroChina’s
overseas operations chief, was accused of committing corruption after letting his brother purchase raw material. His brother hired agents to operate a company to purchase raw material for PetroChina’s overseas programs resulting in supposed earnings of 20 billion yuan a year (Sohu Business, 2014).

Although the word “official” is often embedded directly in the descriptions of corruption processes and corrupt lifestyles, as illustrated in the three cases just considered, descriptions that employ metaphors to depict corrupt cadres are more interesting. The following are three examples of how media discourses use such metaphors to represent corrupt cadres:

Case 40

*(Jiaotu you le sanku, hai neng yu maiyin de nvzi chuang lai chuang qu. Zhe yijing bushi tuzi, shi laohu.)*

A *rabbit* has three burrows and still has sexual relationships with prostitutes. *This is not a rabbit but a tiger.* (Liu, August 7, 2013)

Case 40 is a traditional discourse that is hard to understand when translated into English. In Chinese, “*jiaotusanku*” is a proverb which states that a cunning rabbit has three burrows to hide in compared to a normal rabbit who has only one. The proverb refers to people who have more places to hide or can think of many solutions. The discourse at first appears to apply the proverb incorrectly, but the meaning of the metaphor is not hard to understand. Although the judges are supposed to be cleverer than normal people, their misconduct, in visiting whores, reveals them to be tigers which, as mentioned in relation to a previous discourse, is a metaphor to represent high-level corrupt cadres.

Dhont et al. (2019) observe that people’s perceptions of animals are always influenced by the social-culture environment. For instance, in western cultures, people value companion animals, such as cats and dogs, while devaluing other animals or treating them as commodities to satisfy people’s interests and desires (Dhont et al., 2019). On the other hand,
the Chinese language contains a lot of proverbs that involve animals. In traditional culture, the tiger was also used to describe strong enemies or bad people, and many proverbs are related to the tiger. For instance, the proverb “weihuzuochang” (translated as to be the aid of the tiger), means help, bad people or enemy, to do bad things or illegal things. In China, animal proverbs are based on ancient people’s perceptions of animals and are related to the social environment (Zhang, 2013). In ancient society, tigers were very dangerous for people, and people and some animals could be eaten by tigers. Thus, the tiger is the king of animals, represented as strong, fierce and sacred (chinanews.com, 2010), so many phrases and proverbs make comparisons to tigers in a positive sense, such as hutouhunao, which means boys look strong. However, some animals are characterized in relation at can to their negative influences on human - flies, for example, transmit disease and rats steal food, and should be killed. In this sense, many negative proverbs refer to flies and rats to describe bad people. According to Nigert (2002), animals are exploited or oppressed via social and cultural processes that often involve speciesism, signifying “an ideology, a belief system that legitimates and inspires prejudice and discrimination.” In the case of these Chinese proverbs, a hierarchy between animals is employed to convey norms related to human social traits and hierarchies. For cadres who commit corruption, their portrayal as people who are not moral is represented in descriptions as tigers, flies and rats, depending on their levels.

Given that proverbs and metaphors are common in daily life, media reports often employ colloquial discourse to attract readers. There is an additional message embedded in the title of the article described in Case 40 which is also interesting, as it uses guns to describe the discipline inspection department and the person who revealed the misconduct of the judges. By describing those guns as being fired on the judges, the title reinforces the legitimacy and strength of the discipline inspection department and the law.
Case 41

(ruguo shike xiangdao women de qunli shi renmin fuyu de, dui quanli you jingwei zhi xin, shike laoji zeren, yange yueshu ziji, qingbai wei guan, gongzheng yong quan, dui quanli “si zhizu yi ziji”, dui qiancai “si zhizu yi jiejie,” bu zhuang hongdeng, buyue leichi, name Niu Qizhong jiubuhui “xinli shiheng”, you “laoniu” biancheng “laohu”de.)

If we think the authorities were empowered by people, respect authorities, always remember our responsibilities, restrict ourselves, do not commit corruption, use authority properly, be satisfied with our current occupation positions and income, and do not cross the bottom line, Niu Qizhong will not be psychologically unbalanced and change to tiger from cow.

(Wangyi.net, March 23, 2016)

Case 41 presents a regulatory discourse which employs several discursive techniques. First, in Chinese, Niu has the same pronunciation as the cow, so metaphorically, Niu Qizhong is the cow. In this sense, the “cow (niu)” is a metaphorical application of the regulatory discourse in the representation of the character (Niu Qizhong). Also, because the cow in Chinese culture represents people who are loyal, perseverant, and hardworking without complaint, the metaphorical application refers not only to the cadre’s name but also to expectations for cadres. Similar to previous examples, the tiger is another metaphorical application to represent the corrupt cadre. Second, “hongdeng” means red light, and “leichi” is the name of a lake; both of them signify the boundaries of corruption in the discourse. “Hongdeng” and “leichi” are also metaphors to warn against committing corruption - do not run the red light and do not cross. Third, “si zhizu yi zi jie,” an old saying which means to be satisfied with what you have and restrict yourself, reminds people to be self-disciplined. As morality is an important quality in ancient society, to be moral, people need to be self-disciplined. Fourth, while the reminder that cadres should maintain self-discipline is associated with the statement that “authorities were empowered by people,” a discourse that
might otherwise inspire people remains empty with the provision of any practical suggestions.

**Case 42**

(you dao le xiawu 6 dian zhege “laoshijian”, yijing jiu wei you “laohu” luoma xiaoxi chuanlai de zhongjiwei fangliao, guojia zongjiaoju dangzu chengyuan, fu juzhang Zhang Lebin shexian yanzhogn weiji jieshou diaocha.)

Again, it was 6 p.m. - the so-called “old-time.” But the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China had not released any tigers’ crackdown for a long time. This time, it announced that Zhang Lebin, the deputy director of State Administration for Religious Affairs, was under investigation for suspected serious violation of discipline. (Sohu.com, September 23, 2015)

Case 42 employs a colloquial discourse beginning with the author’s speculative use of “old-time” to suggest that the CCDI typically releases news about corruption at 6 p.m. In fact, the CCDI releases such news reports all day, but this portrayal adds a sense of interest to the news article. The metaphor of the “tiger” describes Zhang’s position as a high-level official in the central government, drawing upon a concept that is frequently employed in news about corruption. As with many representations associated with men, the image conveys a sense of power that tends not to be employed when women are the focus of the media’s attention.

Overall, the analysis of discourses related to men in commercial media coverage of corruption cases reveals that, compared to the official media platform, the language is more colloquial, with frequent reliance on irony, metaphors, proverbs, and ancient sayings. In the next part, I will focus on the intertextual analysis of the news articles on corruption that appear on commercial websites, discussing coverage associated with major types of corruption issues.
7.3 Intertextuality Analysis of Commercial Websites’ Corruption News Articles

7.3.1 Examples of Male Cadres Whose Corruption was Related to Personal Issues

I focus first on a lengthy article that presents the case of the former director of the Guizhou Communications Department, Cheng Mengren, and his mistress, He Wen, written by a correspondent for Sohu.com, Luo Lizhi. The title is revealing—“Luo Lizhi: Being the Mistress of the Deputy Mayor, Female Journalist was ‘Harmed’ (Luo Lizhi: nv jizhe zuo fushizhang qingfu queshi shi “shouhai” le).” By introducing the word “harmed” in quotation marks, the author employs irony to suggest disbelief in the mistress’s position that she was the victim. The title reflects the widely-shared public stereotype that mistresses are materialistic, choosing to become a mistress because they want to lead a life of luxury views.

The article begins with the court verdict of Cheng and He Wen, then refers to He Wen’s interview for other news media: He Wen said she was together with Cheng because of love, but she was also the victim of Cheng’s corruption. The author questioned this love because Cheng passed the buck to He Wen, who passed the buck to Cheng when both of them were at court. Describing He Wen as a journalist from Zunyi TV station, Guizhou Province, the article proceeds to outline the process of how He Wen knew Cheng and became his mistress. He Wen said that she never thought of marriage with Cheng, and said that she moved to Beijing after divorcing her husband in order to avoid seeing Cheng. The author does not believe what He Wen said, analyzing in ironic tones He Wen’s claims about how she became the victim of Cheng’s case:

(cong shagnmian de wenzhang kanlai, yaoshuo He Wen zhen mei “shouhai”, shi nanyizhixin de. He Wen yinwei piaoliang, dedaole fushizhang de qinglai, congci jiu baizing le ziji de xingfu rensheng. Meiyoule ziji de zunyan renge, meiyou le zhengzheng de aiqing, yu qianfu lihun, zheshi cuoai dailai de kuguo. Qianfu pobudeyi fenshou, shijishang shi dui He Wen de paoqi. Beijinglixiang daizhe haizi shang Beijing, guozhe bing bu guangcai bing bu ruyi de shenghuo, neng shuo bushi shouhai ma?)
From the above articles, it is unbelievable to say that He Wen was not the victim. The deputy mayor liked He Wen because she was beautiful; from then on, He Wen buried her happy life, lost her dignity, lost the chance to obtain true love, and divorced her husband. These were the results of wrong love. He Wen’s husband had to divorce He, but she was abandoned by her husband actually. So, He Wen had to leave her hometown and live in Beijing with her kid, and her life in Beijing was not glorious; hence, Wen He was the victim, wasn’t she? (Luo, September 27, 2015)

The author repeatedly reveals his disagreement with He Wen’s statement to the court that she was the victim of Chen Mengren’s corruption by employing words like “beautiful,” “happiness,” “dignity,” “true love,” and “divorce” which convey deep significance. First, the assertion that He Wen can obtain true love only in marriage reminds readers of the traditional values for women, that is, to be virtuous and belong to the family. Second, in describing how being a mistress brings unhappiness and has no dignity, and in speculating that He Wen’s subsequent life was “not glorious,” the author reveals his disdain for women who are mistresses. In stating that her husband “had to” to divorce He Wen, the author makes it look like He Wen’s husband did not have any other option or responsibility. Throughout this discourse, the author caters to the general public’s preconceived ideas about mistresses.

The article continues by referring to an ancient phrase in China that “a beautiful woman always has an unfortunate life (Hongyan boming; 红颜薄命).” In referring to a mayor and his mistress who were tried in the court of law, the article presents He Wen’s situation as a warning to women about how to be good women.

(He Wen gei fushizhang zuole 18 nian qingren, cong 30 sui zuodao 48 sui, zheshi rensheng de huangjin jieduan. Ruguo shuo zhenxi ziji de aiqing shenghuo, re’ai ziji de jiating, dui zhangju duoyidian zhongxin, jingdeqi lingdao quanli yinyou de chanrao, hui you jintina de laoyu zhi zai ma? Laoyu gaizao, queshi shi rensehngzhihai! Zaozhijinri, hebidangchu.)

He Wen had been the mistress of the deputy mayor for 18 years, from age 30 to age 48, which was the golden period of her life. If she had cherished her love with her husband, if she had cherished her family, if she had been more loyal towards her husband, if she could
resist the temptation of a leader’s power, she wouldn’t have today’s result. Today’s result was that she had to spend life in prison, and prison harmed her life. If she had known it would come to this, she wouldn’t have done it! (Luo, September 27, 2015)

In employing language to persuade women not to betray their husbands, the discourse also reproduces and reinforces patriarchal norms. Words “cherished,” “loyal,” and “temptation” are associated with obligations for women’s fault in marriage, while in this case, the husband (who is not described) appears very innocent. There is a paradox here: the author claims that when He Wen betrayed marriage, she was betraying love, but surmises (without substantiation) that the husband is He Wen’s true love.

In China, divorce has been recognized as immoral for a long time. Before the 1990s, it was almost impossible for Chinese to divorce. To divorce, people needed permissions from their working unit and before giving people permission, leaders of the working unit would try to persuade people not to divorce. Even if people filed divorce petitions to the court, judges would mediate or pressure spouses to reach reconciliation (He & Ng, 2013). In the 1990s, after “broken emotional relationship (ganqing polie)” was allowed to be one of the reasons for divorce, the rate of divorce climbed. Since 2000, with rapid economic development and social changes, people’s ideas on divorce have become more liberal, and the rate of divorce has increased year by year. Although people’s ideas on divorce may have changed, mistresses still suffer discrimination from the public. These public attitudes conveyed in the author’s attribution of blame to He Wen for being a mistress and breaking up her family. Replicate the traditional gender hierarchy in which mistresses hold low social status (He-Yin, 1907).

The article further belittles women by focusing on women’s beauty, warning women to keep away from corrupt cadres:

(Nvren liandan re ren ai, tebie shi you lingdao xiai, qishi shi weihai de mogui lai qiaomen le. Gei lingdao dang qingren, qing bu you ji, ming bu you ren. Zhiyou you yidian wenhua hui sikao wenti de ren, jiu hui bunan dedao qingxing de renshi, littong meise qu bajie tanguanwuli, yuanyi yishenxiangxu, mudi zhiyou yige, mouqu sili.)
People, especially leaders, love beautiful women’s faces; in fact, this is the signal of a ghost. Some women had to be mistresses of leaders. However, even women who have little education can think of this issue for a bit and will have a clear understanding of mistresses. So, women who utilized beauty to cater to corrupt cadres only had one purpose -- get the money and benefits. (Luo, September 27, 2015)

The use of the words “beautiful,” “love,” and “ghost” discriminate against beautiful women, suggesting that improper relations between women and cadres are women’s fault. As in many media reports analyzed previously, beautiful women are further blamed for developing “guanxi (connections or relations)” with cadres purposely- beautiful women are materialistic, wanting to be close to cadres for money. As in the other articles, there is no discussion of other issues, including mention of a political system which provides opportunities for cadres and mistresses to commit corruption. As in the accounts in the CCDI news reports, corruption, even when committed by male cadres, is presented as the women’s fault.

This discourse problematizes women’s beauty as an essential feature in the mistress-cadre relationship, as beauty can be utilized to get money and benefits. While posed as an individual issue, beauty has been commodified in contemporary China and serves as a driving force in the consumer market. According to Meng and Huang (2017), beauty products represented the highest sales category in the 2015 Double Eleven shopping festival, organized by the biggest e-commerce company Alibaba, for which total sales in 2015 reached 91.2 billion in one day (Hu, 2018)! Media discourse on gender and corruption reinforces a powerful paradox in which patriarchal gender hierarchies intersect with the market economy and consumerism.

These issues are extended as the article continues by commenting more generally on relationships between mistresses and corrupt cadres:

(zhongsuozhuzhi, qingfu bei panxing, yijing chengwei “gongli”, laobaixing feichang yonghu! Shige tanguan, jiuge shi qingfu xiangsui. Shangban zuozhe chezi zhuang, zhongwu
As we all know, the public advocates the principle ---- mistress should be sentenced to prison. For every ten corrupt cadres, nine of them had mistresses. Such cadres go to work by car, have meals by sitting around tables, and live with mistresses at night. Such corrupt cadres betray the party propaganda, and cruelly oppress and exploit the public. Such corrupt cadres’ downfall was because of mistresses, and such corrupt cadres are Cheng Kejie, Hu Changqing, and Chen Liangyu, and so on. (Luo, September 27, 2015)

In the above paragraph, the words “mistress,” “principle,” and “advocate” invoke people’s hatred towards mistresses and reinforce discrimination, both of which stem from the ancient society. The sentence “wanshang raozhe qunzi zhuan” (translated as live with mistresses at night) expresses disrespect toward women, employing metaphorical terms “qunzi” (in English dress) for mistress and “zhuan” (in English around) while denouncing corrupt cadres who are around the mistress at night. The author later describes three corruption cases to further demonstrate how women take a leading role in cadres’ corruption. The discourse is paradoxical: it describes how women can lead male breadwinners into corruption The article repeats lessons about patriarchal power that appears frequently in other news articles on corruption - women oppression by patriarchal power is concealed as women are represented as causes of corruption; women are subordinate to men’s power yet treated as scapegoats for the party.

The article underlines these lessons by telling women how to behave properly:

(cong zhe yigege anli lai kan, bang gaoguan yishenxiangxu de nvzi, queshi shi duo boming! Yao gaibian zhege “boming” zhi yun, genben dafa zaiyu shouzhu daode dixian, yao weihu nvzi de zunyan, yao yuanli gaogian de youhuo, qiemu chengwei tanguanwuli de wanwu, chengwei fubai fenzi de bangxiong, chengwei jiating de pantu.)

From some cases, we can see that women have unfortunate lives if they become mistresses of cadres. In order to get rid of an unfortunate lifestyle, the essential solution is to keep the moral bottom, keep the female dignity and keep away from cadres, and women...
should not be the toys of corrupt cadres, helpers of corrupt cadres, and betrayers of the family. (Luo, September 27, 2015)

The discourse advises women to maintain dignity, to avoid having relations with cadres as represented through words like “the moral bottom,” “toys,” “helpers,” and “betrayers.” Ironically, this language presents women as agents, who are blamed for engaging in improper relations with cadres and corruption scandals. In relation to the cause of corruption, women are suddenly “empowered” by authors to occupy positions of power, at the same time that these discourses reproduce patriarchal norms that women are inferior to men who stand at the head of the family and society.

In blending traditional gender discourse, colloquial discourse, and regulatory discourse, the article represents the exercise of patriarchal power by reinforcing the regulation of women’s behaviour from a male-centred perspective. As with CCDI reporting, the article reduces corruption issues to gender issues and provides cover for the party which has formal responsibility for political scandals.

The next article illustrates another dimension of these issues, highlighting how male cadres can utilize their power or authority to promote their mistresses.

The article focuses on three cases, the first of which is Li Rongting, the former vice-chairman of Baise CPPCC, Guangxi Province. Li was investigated and penalized not for getting bribes, but rather on account of “intervening in the election of cadres and illegally promoting his mistress, and the illegal promotion created a bad influence” (panyu, chashou xiaji gonghui de huanjie xuanjue gongzuo, zhiling tiba qi qingfu, yingxiang elie; 干预、插手下级工会的换届选举工作，指令提拔其情妇，影响恶劣) (Ifeng.com, June 24, 2017). In this case, “having bad influence” means that many people knew about the illegal promotion but did not say anything until the cadre was investigated. Li provided money to the “female confidant” (hongyanzhiji; 红颜知己) but also power (promotion) as well. In referring to the
mistress as “female confidant” - - also known as “hongyanzhiji” in Chinese -the article employs irony, for it elicits a meaning of a male’s good female friend (not girlfriend or mistress). However, the use of quotation marks remind readers that this particular mistress is not “hongyanzhiji”, even though compared to other terms, including “ernai, qingfu, xiaosan (mistress or second wife),” “hongyanzhiji ” is relatively less demeaning.

The second case is that of Ji Jianye, the former mayor of Nanjing, who had promoted several of his mistresses. One mistress was promoted from an office clerical position to the Deputy Director of the Municipal Development and Reform Commission, was promoted from waitress to officer of Shouxihu Management Committee of Yangzhou and the most famous mistress, Jin Qiufen, was sentenced to prison together with Ji, after she was promoted to a position as the director of the Yangzhou Environmental Protection Agency. The article highlighted how these promotions illustrated instances in which officials did not meet requirements for government positions.

The article then introduced the case of Ji’s political enemy, Yang Weize, the former Party Secretary of Nanjing, who also promoted his mistress, Yu Minyan, to the department head of the propaganda department for Xin District in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. The article described Yu with reference to terms like “hongyanzhiji (female confidant),” “beautiful,” “studied arts in university,” and “transferred to the government positions from university positions” to suggest reasons for why Yang promoted her.

In each of these cases, relationships were based on situations in which female and male cadres came together through work roles. The persons who utilized power to promote others were male cadres! What is more, we do not know whether any of the cadres had used his power to threaten a woman to be his mistress. Nonetheless, the article adopts a double standard by suggesting that the corrupt behavior was the fault of women, who are warned to keep away from male cadres. As in other reports, the discourse makes no reference to other
important issues, and in particular conceals problems related to a political system which provides opportunities for illegal promotion and the patriarchal society which provides men with opportunities to abuse power. Besides a lack of supervision, the concentration of power also contributes to the abuse of power. For instance, Ji Jianye was not only the mayor but the Deputy Secretary of the Nanjing Committee of the Communist Party of China as well, so he managed the municipal committee as well as the government. The CCP does not have clear criteria to select cadres for promotion. According to the Regulation on the Selection and Appointment of the Party and Government Leaders (dangzheng lingdao ganwu xuanba renting gongzuotiaoli; 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例), selecting cadres should be based on ability and moral integrity (decaijianbei; 德才兼备). However, the regulation does not explain what kind of ability a cadre needs and what moral integrity is, so the discourse is vague. In other words, anybody can be cadres, as the understanding of the regulation is open to people who are in positions of power.

The article ends not by focusing on issues related to power but by citing regulatory discourse, reinforcing the party’s role to ensure justice, focusing on corrupt individuals, who “should pay the price together (yici fuchu daijia).” (Ifeng.com, June 24, 2017)

In the case of mistress-cadre relationships, there is a clear pattern in media reports to depict mistresses as the cause of problems for seeking to get money or promotions from cadres who are unable to resist mistresses' desires. So mistresses should be responsible or partly responsible for corruption. Another type of corruption, not related to keeping mistresses, is examined in the next section.
7.3.2 The Example of a Male Cadre Whose Corruption was not Related to Personal Issues

One article, discussing corruption scandals in China’s universities, is entitled “Corruption cases of presidents in Universities resulted from lacking of supervision (高校校长落马“问责”监管缺失; gaoxiao xiaozhang luoma “wenze” jianquan queshi) (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013). In contrast to other media reports, the title clearly attributes the cause of corruption to lack of supervision. However, the analysis of corruption within the article remains superficial. The article begins with a question:

(gaoxiao benshi jiaoshu yuren de shensheng suozai, weirenshibiao zhe ben ying xuehaoweishi, weixingshifan, er yixiaozhizhang, yiyanzhizhang jiu geng ying jieshenzhiao, weirenbiaoshuai, zemme ye zai tanfu lushang yilu “chongfeng” ?)

“given that universities are sacred places for educating students and both the president and the head of colleges should be a model of clean living, how can those people, who should impart knowledge, become corrupted?” (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013)

This question reinforces traditional stereotypes of people who are highly educated. In ancient society, people who were highly educated were called intellectuals (dushuren), and they were supposed to resist material, sexual, and other forms of temptation.

“Zuohuaibuluan,” originally referred to a man who does not have improper sexual relationships with any woman (zdic.net, n.d.), is a proverb that describes intellectuals who kept upright and honest all the time. In this sense, faculty in universities should automatically resist any temptations because they are highly educated. In addition to expressing regret about the corruption scandal, the language conveys an image reproduced through colloquial conversation. The article proceeds to answer the question by focusing on the issue of supervision:

(jinguan baoshougoubing de “daxue xingzhenghua” shi qizhong yuoyin zhiyi, dan jianquan queshi, jiandu buli de wenti geng yao yinqi gaodu zhongshi)
“One reason is universities had become subject to administration, but an essential reason should be the lack of supervision.” (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013)

This answer looks paradoxical, as the purported cause of the lack of supervision is the administrationalization (daxue xingzhenghua) of universities, describing a process in which academic institutions come to be increasingly managed by administrative power. In this system, academia becomes subject to state administrative power as university leaders are placed at the same level as government officials and presidents are appointed by the government. In China, the president of a university has the same, or even higher, administrative level as a mayor. For instance, the president of Lanzhou University has a higher administrative level than the mayor of Lanzhou. As with government officials, university presidents have multiple positions. For instance, Lin Haibo, who is the Deputy Secretary of Lanzhou University Party Committee, is the Deputy Secretary of Lanzhou University Discipline Inspection Commission (Lanzhou University, n.d.). The administrationalization of universities contributes to a concentration of power in leaders’ hands and ineffective supervision from the University-level Discipline Inspection Commission (China Business Network, 2013). The discourse employed in the Ifeng.com news report separates the issue of lack of supervision from a focus on the universities’ administrationalization, serving to make the corruption look less serious.

The article proceeds to explain how universities’ cadres now have more chances to commit corruption, unlike previously when universities were considered as “poor” places. First, universities have many projects “in the areas of infrastructure and purchasing” (zai jijian, caigou deng lingyu) due to “university mergers” (gaoxiao hebing) and “the enrollment expansion” (kuozhao), so “universities become a place where power rent-seeking exists” (henrongyi huode quanli xunzu kongjian) (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013). Second, university leaders can get bribes from selling spaces reserved through “some rare enrolment quotas” (xique de zhaosheng ming’e) to parents (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013). Third, because
“universities opened their logistics services market” (ge gaoxiao zhubu kaifang xiaonei houqin fuwu shichang), corruption may exist in bidding processes (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013).

By highlighting four areas in which corruption is possible (“infrastructure, purchase, logistics, and enrolment,” jijian, caigou, houqin he zhaosheng) (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013), the article appears to suggest that universities have become a supervision-free area with leaders who are more powerful than before. However, the discussion is silent on one significant area, related to companies that were initially founded by the university, usually for benign purposes, which also face corruption scandals. Many university corporations, which were originally founded to utilize a university’s research capacity to promote the development of firms, have performed poorly (xiaoyi bu jia) (Xinhua News Agency, 2018, August 15). In some cases, these problems have opened the door to corrupt activities. For instance, the crackdown of Chu Jian, who was the former vice president of Zhejiang University, is related to the illegal transfer of benefits to university corporations (Sohu Education, 2019).

Universities’ corruption is, indeed, associated with faulty supervision, but the article concludes with only superficial reference to ways to improve supervision, by means of “a system of accountability after corruption” (shifa hou yange wenze de zhuijiu zhidu) and various supervision measures, including “third-party auditing bodies, public opinion, …the teachers’ congress and the union, and supervision from teachers and students”(shehui disanfang shenji jigou, yinru gongzhong yulun, tongshi dali fahui xuexiao nei jiaodaihui, gonghui, shisheng yuanguang de jiandu zuoyong). (Ifeng.com, June 14, 2013)

The proposed solutions are vague and do not speak to processes that could guarantee any effective changes, especially as long as the process of administrationalization of universities makes it possible to commit and conceal corruption. There are some discussions
in China about de-administrationalization as a means to solve the problem, but such an idea remains naive. As in the situation of state-owned companies where a separation of government from the company will not help to eliminate corruption, de-administrationalization will not necessarily help to eliminate university leaders’ misconduct and illegal behaviour. With independent supervised institutes, government officials can get bribes from university leaders even in situations where a university has experienced de-administrationalization.

The experiences associated with universities suggest that corruption occurs in a wide range of settings in China, and suggests, further, that under current political and institutional systems, it is difficult to make effective changes to minimize corrupt activity. The next section examines an article which details in more depth why it is hard to eliminate corruption in China from the perspective of officialdom.

7.3.3 The Example of a Female Cadre Whose Corruption was not Related to Personal Issues

Corruption occurs in unlikely places in China. One article reports on a corruption scandal within the Red Cross Society, which in China, as a charity organization, is expected to maintain a clean image (Sina.com, August 21, 2016). The article describes the case of Wen Jiabi, who was the former party secretary of the Society’s Sichuan branch. The title, “Comment: Knowing Wen Jiabi, the former vice president of Sichuan Red Cross Society, is more valuable than knowing Guo Meimei” (the internet celebrity who is related to Sichuan Red Cross Society) (评论: 红十字会文家碧比郭美美更值得深挖), compares Wen’s case to another well-known case. Guo Meimei became famous for showing off a lavish lifestyle on Weibo (Chinese version Twitter) even though she was identified as the General Manager of the Red Cross Commerce. Her lavish lifestyle consisted of the use of numerous luxury goods, luxury cars (i.e., Maserati) and luxury houses. Therefore people questioned if Guo had

208
embezzled donations to the Red Cross Society for her personal use. While the Red Cross Society claimed that Guo was not associated with them, she was arrested in 2014 for illegally gambling on the World Cup. Although the Red Cross Society denied Guo’s identity, the credibility of the Red Cross Society was greatly reduced, as donations decreased every year. Here, the author mentioned Guo Meimei not only to attract readers, as Guo Meimei was a notorious internet celebrity but to emphasize the assertion that Wen Jiabi was a confirmed corrupt cadre in the Red Cross Society.

The article reports that Wen was sentenced to 16 years in prison for embezzling three million Chinese yuan and getting bribes worth five million Chinese yuan, accepting money no matter who gave it to her. She got commissions from almost every problem related to the Red Cross Society, and she even embezzled donations from the public. Although Wen was definitely immoral, the narrative suggests that problems behind her corrupt behaviour maybe even more complex.

(buguo, Wen Jiabi zai tingshen he chanhui zhong de bianjie, que zhanshi le wentsi de fuzaxing. Zai yifeng xiegei sheng lingdao de xin zhong, Wen Jiabi biaoshi, ta taoqu zijiin daduo yin zai, yin zhigong liyi he honghui gongzuo de xietiao, er ta tanwu de daduoshu kuanxiang ye yongzai le zhexie defang. Zai ta de fansi shougao zhong, Wen Jiabi duoci cheng shouhui de yuanyou wei “qu Beijing Chuchai, xietiao guanxi”.)

Wen’s defence and confessions showed the complexity of the problem. In a letter which [she] wrote to provincial management level cadres, Wen said that the money she embezzled was used for coordinating with other departments. In her confessions, she mentioned that the reason for corruption was “business trips to Beijing, to coordinate relations between different departments” many times. (Sina.com, August 21, 2016)

The article observes that Wen’s case implies a more significant problem; that is, cadres cannot do anything without getting bribes and bribing other cadres. Unlike most of the reported corruption cases, this report does not simply criticize the cadre, but draws attention to a more systemic potential problem reflected in Wen’s case in suggesting that Wen may be immoral, but also a victim of a latent principle in officialdom. In Chinese, the latent principle
called “xietiao guanxi” (translated as coordinate relations between different departments), is related to two issues. First, the procedure of getting administrative approvals is quite complex and takes a long time. For instance, without “guanxi” (connections or relations), a real estate program needs more than 30 approvals and 100 seals, and it takes at least 272 working days from obtaining the land to executing the program (Fenghuang News, 2014). Such a complex procedure requires people to xietiao guanxi to shorten the time to get approvals. In Wen’s case, she had helped the establishment of the Meishan Elderly Rehabilitation Centre (Meishan laonian kungfu zhongxin; 眉山老年康复中心). The second issue is that China is very big, but it is not a federal country, so the execution of policy needs people to coordinate relations among different provinces and different departments. Local governments and major state-owned enterprises established Liaison Offices in Beijing (zhujingban), and those offices were supposed to coordinate central government policies with local government’s conditions. However, Beijing Liaison Offices face corruption issues, as officers accept bribes from business to “xietiao guanxi.” (Sohu News, n.d.) Since 2013, many of these offices have been cancelled (Sohu News, n.d.). Generally, there are many ways to “xietiao guanxi,” such as an invitation to a meal (qingke chifan) or sending gifts and money. It is significant that, while “xietiao guanxi” is related to corruption and flaws in the political system, the article uses a neutral term to describe it as an “ecology of officialdom” (guanchang shengtai; 官场生态).

News articles, in general, tend to be more objective if the cadre’s corruption is not related to personal issues, compared with those that focus on cadres who have personal issues. For news articles related to personal issues, gender images differ in regard to the causes of corruption, and females are regularly blamed for male cadres’ corruption. Male cadres who engage in corrupt activity, on the other hand, appear as emasculated and weak, ready to cave into their mistresses’ material desires or to their lack of self-discipline. These
gender discourses prevail in the coverage of corruption cases by both state-owned and private-owned media platforms.

7.4 Chapter Conclusions and Discussions

This chapter has utilized critical discourse analysis to explore gender discourses in news about corruption that appears on commercial websites. Unlike CCDI, the most frequent coded term associated with descriptions of women is “mistresses,” which indicates in part the media outlets’ desires to attract readers as part of commercial media’s focus on maintaining profitability. Otherwise, many findings related to how commercial media represent gender are similar to those for official media. Women are regularly assessed in terms of their ability to fulfill their traditional roles as wives and mothers while men are judged with reference to traditional ideologies related to family, work and patriarchal roles. In terms of corruption, women in both state and commercial news media are repeatedly blamed for causing the corruption of male cadres while men are portrayed as committing corruption to satisfy the desires of women in their lives due to their own personal failings to uphold male standards.

There are some differences within these media discourses. Commercial media companies tend to use more sensational words and salacious sentences to describe women involved in corruption scandals. However, their criticisms of women remain the same as those advanced through state-owned media.

There are three significant features of these findings. First, the media’s economic role has oriented them to cater to mass public tastes and lifestyles. Since the market reform in 1978, the media started to embrace the market economy by means of commercialization and marketization. Media need an audience to make a profit (Yang, 2012; Shao et al., 2016). To attract these audiences, authors use colloquial descriptions to link their content and news articles more closely with people’s daily lives. The news articles on corruption illustrate how media incorporate some well-known ancient proverbs and phrases to increase the audience’s
understanding, in the process also reinforcing traditional views about how gender issues are part of corruption scandals. Second, although parts of the media have been commercialized, Chinese media is still largely controlled by the party-state. While reporting social issues, the media has to avoid criticizing the ruling party (Shao et al., 2016). A useful strategy to do this is self-censorship. According to Hassid (2008), media workers, including journalists, may deliberately omit some aspects of a phenomenon being reported on in news articles to avoid punishment from authorities within the power structure. In this sense, commercial media in China are problematic, as they face pressures from both political and commercial forces (Shao et al., 2016). These characteristics of Chinese political and media structures contribute to the stigmatization of women in news reporting about corruption in both state media and commercial media. Third, discourses about women disseminated by commercial media show that women are not treated the same as men, and are frequently disrespected. Commercial media companies serve as an apparatus that reproduces discriminatory discourses on women transmitted not only through state media but also across other political and institutional systems. China’s media system is far from independent, conveying media discourses that are part of a broader web of power.

The analyses of both official state media and commercial media demonstrate that traditional gender norms play an important role in constructing both women and men’s images in news reports on corruption, revealing that in important ways, contemporary China remains a patriarchal country. Similar to previous studies (Du, 2016; Yun, 2013; Ji, 2015; Summerfield, 1994; Leung, 2003; Sun & Chen, 2015), my findings reveal that Confucianism still has a far-reaching influence on almost all spheres of life, with gender relations that continue to be regulated by traditional gender norms.
CHAPTER 8

STRUCTURAL FACTORS AND THE RELATION BETWEEN TRADITIONAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

News coverage on corruption in China reveals that images of women are strongly influenced by traditional Confucian gender norms, with women frequently being held responsible for male cadres’ corruption scandals. News articles attribute blame to individual women and men in corruption scandals, but they describe the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as upright in its dedication to addressing corruption cases. These results give rise to several questions: how can authors of those articles attribute corruption to women? How do they know so many ancient proverbs, ancient stories, and traditional gender norms? How come the CCP remains so blameless in corruption scandals despite its stated commitment to eradicate corruption? I want to address these questions by focusing on both formal and informal structural factors, focusing especially on how the All-China Women’s Federation, along with family, education, and the media, work to represent traditional culture and political propaganda. Because women in the news reports about corruption are regularly judged by Confucian gender norms, I will also explore the relationship between traditional culture and political ideology, that is, what is the function of traditional culture from the perspective of politics?

8.1 The All-China Women’s Federation

The All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) and the CCP are associated. Before the foundation of the PRC, leaders of feminist movements had worked with the CCP for a long time (Johns, n.d.; Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998). May Fourth Feminism and Marxism had a significant influence on CCP policies concerning women (Zheng, 1997; Gilmartin, 1995; Johns, n.d.). Leading intellectuals in the 20th century, such as Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei, proposed that women’s emancipation would boost China to be a strong nation
Such ideas were absorbed by the May Fourth Movement, and intellectuals frequently criticized traditional family structures for the oppression of women (Li, 2000; Johns, n.d.; Tsui, 1998). The influential Marxist thinker, Engels, explained that women were oppressed because they were excluded from labour market participation (Johns, n.d.; Zheng, 1997). In a sense, for the CCP, women’s roles outside the home were the main focus. Many leaders of May Fourth Feminist activities, such as Deng Yingchao, had become party members and married men within the CCP elite (Johns, n.d.), prior to helping to shape the subsequent development of the ACWF.

Given the connections between the ACWF and the CCP, a question for the ACWF is whether it represents women’s interests and protects women’s rights. Some scholars claim that the ACWF, in general, represents women’s interests, although it is guided by the CCP (Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998; Zheng, 1997). A common feature of this literature is that authors use interviews with the ACWF’s cadres as evidence to prove that the ACWF had significantly improved Chinese women’s status and represent Chinese women as a whole. On the other hand, other scholars argue that the ACWF is a propaganda tool of the CCP (Johns, n.d.; Stacey, 1984). In this part, I will explore the ACWF’s missions, the ACWF’s role in various construction programs during the Maoist period, and ideologies after the market reform to examine whether the ACWF represents women’s rights and interests. This question can help understand why in corruption news, the party is blameless and appears as upright. Using Foucaudian’s disciplinary power and biopower, I would like to know how these power dynamics work together in the ACWF to control the female population.

The ACWF is guided by nine missions which can be divided into three categories: guidance by and support for the policies of the CCP; protection of the rights of women; and representation of women internationally (Tsui, 1998). Among these missions, the political interests are expressed as organizing women to study President Xi Jinping’s “Thought on
Socialism with Chinese Characteristic on a New Era” (Zuzhi yindao funv xuexi guache Xi Jinping xinshidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang); unifying and mobilizing women to make contributions to socialist economy, political, culture, social and ecological constructions (Tuanjie dongyuan funv toushen gaige kaifang he shehui zhuyi jingji jianshe, zhengzhi jianshe, wenhua jianshe, shehui jianshe he shengdai wenming jianshe); educating women to practice the core ideology of socialism (jiaoyu yindao funv shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhiguan); and actively participating in the Belt and Road Initiative (jiji canyu yi dai yi lu) (All-China Women’s Federation, 2013).

Those political missions are up-to-date, as the core ideology of socialism and the Belt and Road Initiative were proposed since President Xi Jinping took power in 2012. The core ideology of socialism is intended to compete with the universal values in western societies (Zhu, 2014), while the Belt and Road Initiative utilizes the ancient silk road to promote economic development (BBC News, 2017a). Contrary to these specific and clear political requirements, the mission of gender equality is vague. Mission No. 4 stated that the ACWF protects women’s and children’s legal interests and listens to women’s issues (weihu funv ertong hefa quanyi, qingting funv yijian) (All-China Women’s Federation, 2013). Such a mission does not define what women’s legal interests are and how they protect women’s rights. In the Foucauldian sense, the ACWF is an apparatus of gender discourses, and those discourses help to guide women’s behaviours. For the CCP, exerting political interests on the ACWF’s missions helps control the female population at a distance. The ACWF’s missions indicate women should behave in supporting the CCP first.

The ACWF plays a significant role in proposing programs to support the discourse of the “liberation of women,” defining women’s identity and promoting CCP’s policies. From 1949 to 1966, the CCP’s policies on women relied on the discourse of the “liberation of women.” Women’s liberation was defined to counteract feudalism, as Mao Zedong stated in
the 1949 Common Program (*gongtong gangling*): “The People’s Republic of China should ban the feudalist system. The feudalist system limited women. Women should have equal rights with men in political, economic, cultural, educational, and social life areas. We should exert free marriage” (Tencent News, 2011). Thus, women were identified as an unutilized labour force who could be freed from the confines of the home so they could make contributions to socialist constructions (Johns, n.d.; Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998). The ACWF echoed this thought, with the Vice-Chairman, Deng Yingchao, emphasizing that the ACWF’s role is to “give expression to their [women’s] aspirations, protect their rights and interests as well as those of their children, and supervise the implementation of the policy and decrees regarding the equality of men and women” (Croll, 1978, p. 258). In this discourse, the role of ACWF is connected with the implementation of CCP’s policy, and the hypothesis is the government could design policies that fit women’s interests, so the ACWF creates direct programs to achieve women’s emancipation (Yee, 2003). Normalization of biopower at the macro level functions by enforcing the ruling party’s policies. Normalization is next implemented through the ACWF’s disciplinary power and is then enforced via literary programs. From 1949 to 1966, the ACWF organized literacy programmes for four times and thousands of lectures to publicize the freedom of marriage. After the literacy programmes, the literacy rate was increased to about 48% (Wu, n.d.). In Shanghai, more than 40,000 women participated in the study of marriage law (Deng, 2012). From the Foucauldian perspective, these programmes launched by the ACWF had normalized women’s liberation as being able to know words and being able to work. Women who were not literary and working would be identified as abnormal, as Deng Yingchao used “feudalism limited women’s rights” to criticize some patriarchal thoughts, such as women can do nothing (Yee, 2003). During the Maoist period, the ACWF’s role was to educate women through political propaganda and make sure that women were not excluded from various campaigns (Tsui,
Because of the ACWF, women’s behaviour was normalized as supporting the nation, and women’s bodies belonged to the country, while women started to follow the CCP’s policies without disagreement.

Since many scholars suggest that the ACWF stopped working during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (Johns, n.d.; Yee, 2003; Tsui, 1998; Zheng, 2010), I focus on the role of ACWF after the market economic reform in 1978. Although the CCP did not launch mass socialist construction projects and movements, the ACWF is still the mouthpiece of the Chinese government (Trui, 1998). As the economic transition opened up many job opportunities for Chinese citizens, the ACWF kept mobilizing women to participate in the production. However, the retreat of the welfare state re-emphasized women’s family roles; consequently, the ACWF also kept promoting women’s family life. Normalization of biopower functions through the ACWF’s disciplinary power in two ways. First, on International Women’s Day each year, the ACWF awards successful women in various industries recognition as “March 8th Red Flag Bearer” (Sanba hongqi shou) (Tsui, 1998). Second, the ACWF selects “Five Good Families” to also highlight women’s contributions to the family. In the 1990s, when many state companies privatized, many women were laid off, so the ACWF launched numerous programs to provide training for these women. Through these programs, women’s behaviour was normalized in a contradictory way, and women experienced a double burden through their responsibilities in the home and in the workplace. In addition, the ACWF failed to address many gender inequalities and gender issues, such as the One-Child Policy and domestic violence. Although Zheng (1997) claimed that many of the ACWF’s leaders were shocked once they heard the One-Child Policy, the ACWF did not resist this policy. In regards to domestic violence, the ACWF treats the issue as a family affair with its main focus to strengthen the family unit. Thus, the ACWF’s function in representing Chinese women is problematic. Chinese women lack an active independent
organization to represent their interests and to protect their rights. The ACWF’s primary focus is CCP policy, and the ACWF frequently ignores gender inequalities that lie outside key policy areas. In China, the definition of gender equality is limited to education rights and labour participation rights. Given the ACWF’s role in following CCP’s policies, unequal treatment in the media image had not been fully aware by the authority.

8.2 The Family

Many news articles examined in this study emphasize contributions of the good wife to a healthy family, with the definition of the good wife being associated with traditional wifehood; that is, a good wife takes care of her parents-in-law, her kids and helps the husband in furthering his career. Given that traditional gender norms reflect uneven gender relations and labour divisions, what does the resurgence of wifehood in news articles signify about family power structures in the contemporary Chinese society?

Unlike the ACWF, the education system and the media system, the family is an informal structural factor. However, the family is actually embedded into the post-socialist system, as family structures are influenced by macro social events and social changes. Besides state-own companies largely laying off female workers in the 1990s, the retained traditional gender ideology and the proposal of women returning home to save more jobs for men, work hand in hand against women and reinforce women’s duties in the family (Ji et al., 2017). Nowadays, President Xi’s political thought of the family makes covert traditional gender ideologies become overt. Women’s positions in the family power structure reflect on marital power.

Marital power in the Chinese family is complicated. Hu and Scott (2016) suggest that China has a deep-rooted patriarchal culture, and men always hold power in making decisions, while older people in an extended family hold power. However, no matter what kind of family, the wife does not have much marital power.
Lui (2018) proposes that the traditional power structure would be strengthened if the wife comes from a rural place and the husband from an urban place. The interesting thing is that each kind of power structure reflects cultural norms and social inequalities. For multi-generational families, elder power is disguised by filial piety, which requires young people to obey senior parents (Whyte & Ikels, 2004). Filial piety is an important aspect of Confucian norms. In contemporary China, as the household registration system (Houku), city residences have more benefits than rural residents, and such resources empower people who come from cities (Lui, 2018). Indeed, socio-economic backgrounds influence marital power, as women who come from low-income families would have lower status in marriage (Mann, 1997). However, even if women participate in the labour force, lower economic contributions would also erode their power in marriage (Chien & Yi, 2014). Power structures also influence labour divisions, as women have to do more housework (Chien & Yi, 2014). On the other hand, some scholars propose that by doing housework, women could also gain power (Shu, Zhu, & Zhang, 2013; Zuo & Bian, 2005). As Shu et al. (2013) observe, by making decisions on mundane affairs and childcare affairs, however, such power is based on housework rather than income, and women are still excluded by making important economic decisions.

Although women have some power in making trivial decisions, men are still the breadwinners in the household. Such an imbalanced family power structure makes women suffer more housework than men. Such family labour division reflects traditional patriarchal norms; that is, women are supposed to manage the household, and men are supposed to support the family. Power in making important decisions and in allocating resources helps men build authority in the family, and such an authority maintains the family. The existence of traditional culture, the gender income gap, social inequalities, social changes, social events and politician’s thoughts reproduce the family power structure. Patriarchal gender culture penetrates everyday life through labour divisions and decision-making patterns in the family.
Thus, these everyday activities influence perceptions of women, especially the way to be a good wife.

Critical discourse analysis demonstrates that many news articles utilize ancient words and precepts to comment on women (e.g., if the wife is virtuous, the husband can avoid many troubles - *qi xian ze fu huo shao*). Those words and precepts are common in Chinese people’s daily life. People’s familiarity with ancient sayings may suggest the prominent status of traditional culture in contemporary society. Traditional culture is connected with positive meanings in family education. In China, many parents like to teach their kids ancient poems and classical readings before school age (Dongping, n.d.). Based on a survey conducted by the Research Centre of the Ministry of Science and Technology of the PRC, 88.7% parents and 96.7% teachers thought repeating ancient poems, and ancient classical works would be good for children’s self-cultivation (*xiuyang*) and personality development (*renge fayu*) (Xu, 2011). Repeating those ancient works was supposed to promote children’s sense of language towards their mother tongue, cultivate children’s sense of beauty, and increase children’s emotional intelligence (Tencent, n.d.). According to Xu (2011), many classical readings were identified as good for children to learn, such as Three-Character Canon (*Sanzijing*), Students’ Rules (*Dizi gui*) and Zhu’s Family Instructions (*Zhu zi jiaxun*). Three-Character Canon dates back to the Song Dynasty, while Students’ Rules came from the Qing Dynasty. Both of them employ three-character sentences, making it easy for children to repeat. Although these works are from different dynasties, they are about traditional cultural norms and Confucian morality, which emphasize filial piety, the husband-wife relationship, and collective interests.

In the Three-Character Canon, two sentences emphasize filial piety:

(Xiangjiuling, nengwenxi, xiaoyuqing, suodangzhi)

**Xiang**, who was nine-year-old, could warm his parents’ bed;

We should show filial piety towards parents forever.

(shouxiaoti, cijianwen, zhimoushu, shimouwen)
People should begin with filial piety and fraternal love, and then see and hear. (tom61.com, n.d.)

The meanings of these two sentences are straightforward; that is, filial piety should be the most important quality for children. Compared to the Three-Character Canon, Students’ Rules propose more behaviours that constitute filial piety. For instance:

(Shouxiaodi, cijinxin) People should first respect parents and then should be trustworthy. (fumu, yingwuhuan) When parents call, they should answer them quickly. (fumuming, xingwulan). When parents give an order, they should do it right now. (fumuxiao, xujingting) When parents teach something, they should listen to them. (fumuze, xuwocheng) When parents blame you, you should obey and accept their blame. (dizigui, n.d.)

These obligations demonstrate parents’ exclusive power over their children. By repeating those sentences, Confucian norms are reproduced invisibly. People accept those norms unconsciously. On the other hand, Zhu’s Family Instructions contain many sentences related to the husband-wife relationship. For instance:

(ting fuyan guai gurou, qishi zhangfu)
A husband should not listen to what the wife says and should not spoil kids.

(xi qiu shunv, wuji houlian)
A wife should be virtuous, and the husband’s family should not ask for a lot of dowry. (guoxuemeng.com, n.d.)

The above sentences state that in regards to the husband-wife relationship, the husband should make decisions independently, and that to listen to tone’s wife was not proper, and women should be virtuous. The Instructions also stigmatized beautiful women, as “maidens should not be beautiful” (nupu wuyong junmei). Guidelines such as these demonstrate the deep-rooted patriarchal culture in China. In the power hierarchy, children are expected to obey their parents; the wife should obey the husband. Those traditional
norms are widely perceived to influence people's behaviour and thoughts in a positive way by means of repeating ancient works as a guide for self-improvement. Parents monitor children to learn and repeat classical readings, thereby reproducing patriarchal norms.

8.3 Ideological-Political Education

News reports about corruption represent the CCP as upright and just in dealing with corruption scandals - investigating and prosecuting corrupt cadres, and subsequent sentencing to prison of all corrupt cadres. However, news coverage related to corruption is not the only place that the CCP represents itself as honourable; CCP has built its image from various aspects. One of the most common ways to indoctrinate people with state propaganda is through ideological-political education.

Changing the discourse textbooks is a method that the CCP uses to portray itself as an honourable ruling party. In 2017, the Ministry of Education released a new version of the textbook for the middle school history class. The new version changed the length of the Second Sino-Japanese War from eight years to fourteen years and increased descriptions of battles organized by the CCP, such as the Battle of Wuhan (1938) (Yang, 2017). Moreover, the new version deleted many details related to CCP activity in launching the Cultural Revolution. For instance, the new version deleted the CCP's roles in the foundation of the Central Group of the Cultural Revolution (Luo, 2018). The new textbook summarized the Cultural Revolution by observing that, “nothing can proceed smoothly without a hitch; everything will be finally advanced although in a tortuous way (renshi jian meiyou yifanfengshun de shiye, shijie lishi zongshi zai diedangqifu de quzhe guocheng zhong qianjin de).” (Luo, 2018) By using ideological rhetoric, the extremism of the Cultural Revolution was downplayed, and the CCP leaders' mistakes in launching the Cultural Revolution were minimized (Schell, n.d.). In the Foucauldian sense, ideological-political education maintains
the positive image of the CCP in emancipating Chinese people and leading Chinese people to a bright future.

Universities are recognized by the CCP as important battlefields for propagating ideologies (Schell, n.d.; Li, Feng & Li, 2013; Lai & Lo, 2011; Tiffert, 2019). Normalization of the honourable ruling party is implemented through the disciplinary power of the university, enforced by introducing ideological-political courses. Before 2006, ideological-political education in universities consisted of two classes - Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three Represents (Schell, n.d.). In 2005, the Publicity Department of the CPC central committee and the Ministry of Education released a policy document, named On Further Strengthening and Improving Ideological-Political Education in Universities and Colleges (guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin gaodeng xuexiao sixiang zhengzhi lilunke de yijian). By implementing this policy, ideological-political education had been reorganized, and undergraduates were required to complete four compulsory ideological-political classes, including Introduction to the Basic Concepts of Marxism, An Outline of Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three Represents, Moral Accomplishment and Law Basics, and Contemporary Chinese History (Sina.com, 2005; Schell, n.d.). Although students had to devote more time to studying and passing these courses, they did not develop affection towards these courses. According to Lai and Lo (2011), students generally felt bored while taking these classes and felt these classes were impractical. While students were not attracted by the ideological-political classes, these classes may have a positive influence on CCP's image among students. As Huang (2015) observes, students may not think that socialism is the best system, but they tend to believe that the CCP is very strong and can solve social issues, so they may not be interested in being a political dissident. From the perspective of Foucault's biopower and disciplinary power, the CCP’s desires for the future generation not to challenge the ruling party and to continue to
support the CCP and the regime are reinforced by naturalizing a sense of stability and appropriateness related to common knowledge and current conditions.

8.4 The Internet

The present study verifies that commercial news websites are not able to release news about corruption based on their own independent investigations. Any reports they present must come from the state media, and their new articles should convey the same message as presented by the state media. This result opens up a question: how does the CCP control the media system? Here it is instructive to consider the role of visible regulations and invisible censorship in relation to social media.

China has many regulations to manage the Internet with respect to content, copyright, IP addresses, Internet forums, and so on. According to the Administration of Internet Information Services (hulianwang xixin fuwu guanli banfa) (China.com.cn, n.d.), which was released on September 25, 2000, Internet content providers cannot provide the following content:

(di shiwu tiao hulianwang xinxi fuwu tigongzhe bude zhizuo, fuzhi, fabu, chuanbo hanyou xialie neirong de xinxi: fandui xianfa suo queding de jiben yuanze de; weihai guojia anquan, xielu guojia mimi, dianfu guojia zhengquan, pohuai guojia tongyi de; sunhai guojia rongyu he liyi de; shandong minzu chouhen, minzu qishi, pohuai minzu tuanjie de; pohuai guojia zongjiao zhengce, xuanyang xiejiao he fengjian mixin de; sanbu yaoyan, raoluan shehui zhixu, pohuai shehui wending de; sanbu yinhui, seqing, dubo, baoli, xiongsha, kongbu huzhe jiaosuo fazui de; wuru huzhe feibang taren, qinhai taren hefa quanyi de; hanyou falv, xingzheng fagui jinzhi de qita neirong de.)

Article 15 Internet content services providers cannot produce, reproduce, disseminate or broadcast content which includes the following parts: oppose to the basic principles of the
Constitution; endanger state security, leak national secrets, subvert the PRC, break the unity of the nation; damage state honours and interests; incite hate and discriminations between ethnic groups, break the unity of ethnic groups; jeopardize religious policy, propagate cult and superstitious ideas; spread rumours, disrupt social order and stability; disseminate obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, murder or fear or instigate crimes; insult or slander others; content prohibited by other laws or regulations.

Article 15 states nine kinds of improper content. In sum, three aspects of content are banned: that which opposes the ruling party, opposes the policies and opposes the law. The regulation does not mention how these behaviours are judged or determined. The same provisions are specified in other regulations, such as Interim Administration Provisions on Internet Culture (hulianwang wenhua guanli zanxing guiding). Although Vuori and Paltemaa (2015) claim that the regulations explain the reason for censorship, the vagueness with respect to monitoring, identifying and prosecuting each provision makes the censorship more complex.

The Chinese government has a long history of controlling Internet content and services, even before the Internet was popular among the public (Taneja & Wu, 2014; Hachigian, 2001). While exerting more ideological control on the Internet, the government has continuously invested in Internet infrastructure in a nation which has the largest population of Internet users (Taneja & Wu, 2014; Harwit & Clark, 2001; Zhang, 2006). Before the popularity of social media, censorship concentrated on website content - whether the content violates social and moral norms or challenges the authority (Taneja & Wu, 2014; Faris & Villeneuve, 2008; Bamman, O'Connor, & Smith, 2012). Websites are restricted by two types of censorship: domestic website content and blockage of access to outside websites (Taneja & Wu, 2014). The system that filters and blocks websites is named as "the Great
Firewall of China." Nowadays, with the popularity of social media, censorship has become omnipotent.

The Chinese government has developed multiple methods to monitor the Internet. The government deployed Internet police (wang jing), "50 cent party members" (wumao dang) and Internet monitors (wang guan ban) to monitor Internet content (King, Pan & Roberts, 2013). It should be noted that “50 cent party members” is a name which was coined by Chinese Internet users. Fifty cent party members, who anonymously comment on social events online and “promote a pro-government discourse” (p.106), represent a soft way for the state to cope with the rise of the Internet while inserting indoctrinating propaganda (Han, 2015). While it turns out that comments written by these 50 cent party members have not changed people's opinions, and those members consistently get exposed (Han, 2015), the CCP has not stopped its controls on the Internet.

For content that does not follow the government guidelines, Internet media companies can be fined or shut down (King et al., 2013). For instance, on June 10, 2019, one of the famous financial sites, Wallstreetcn (huaerjie jianwen), was cracked down on by the authorities due to allegations that the site “violated laws.” (Yu, 2019) Although both Wallstreetcn and the government did not provide details or reasons for this crackdown, it was believed that the crackdown is related to government policies. As US-China relations worsened in 2019 because of trade and technology, Wallstreetcn still reports optimistic news about the US financial market (i.e., the US stock market rose on June 7 due to President Trump announcement not to increase tariffs on Mexico products) (Yu, 2019). The standpoints represented in such reports were not the same as the Chinese authority during the “Trade War” with the US. Wallstreetcn is not the first social media platform to be shut down by the government. In 2018, the Chinese version of Twitter - Weibo - announced that it would “rectify” part of its services, such as most searched hashtags (re sou bang), after it was
blamed by the authority for not censoring its content and spreading wrong social values (Zhuang, 2018). As many celebrities have Weibo accounts, Weibo had become a platform for celebrities to announce key events such as divorce, marriage, or giving birth to children while paparazzi exposed celebrities’ extra-marriage affairs or wrongdoing via Weibo. For the general public, Weibo had become a platform to spread commentary about social issues and social problems, so those topics always appeared among the most searched hashtags. After a one-week rectification, Weibo brought its services back, and it added a top hashtag on the most searched hashtags; the top one was for the government’s policies or news only. All of these actions demonstrate enforcement of a policy that the media should work for the government rather than for the general public.

Given that censorship is everywhere, scholars have explored the most sensitive issues for the CCP. By analysing posts on social media, King et al. (2013) claim that government censorship does not try to eliminate criticism towards the government but rather, seeks to eliminate positions that may trigger collective actions or collective movements. In this sense, the reason to delete all posts about the #METOO movement on Weibo was to minimize the chance to trigger collective mobilization in support of women’s rights in China. On the other hand, by examining sensitive words on Weibo, Vuori and Paltemaa (2015) argue that those words are related more to the ruling party rather than to protests. It is fair to say that China does not have a free Internet, and Chinese people cannot express their ideas freely.

Similar to the Panopticon in which prisoners have to engage in certain behaviours to avoid punishment under surveillance (Foucault, 1979), Internet media companies develop self-censorship in order to survive. For instance, WeChat, which is the most popular social media in China with 1 billion monthly active users, has developed a program to censor the content sent by users (Knockel & Xiong, 2019). The censorship includes group chat, 1-to-1 chat, and moments (pengyou quan). While users send pictures or messages in the group chat,
1-to-1 chat, and moments, the program compares those words and pictures with a blacklist that contains sensitive words and pictures. Any words and pictures found in the blacklist will be filtered from WeChat by the program (Knockel & Xiong, 2019). The interesting thing is that the blacklist is renewing all the time. If users change the words or pictures a little bit and send, the revised words and pictures can be received for the first time, but cannot be received for a second time (Knockel & Xiong, 2019). The blacklist consists of words and pictures which mock political leaders and policies or related to social events, such as the Cultural Revolution, as Knockel and Xiong (2019) observe.

While censorship shapes people's behaviour, some scholars are worried that continuous controls would undermine the exercise of citizenship in China, as censorship reduces the function of media in representing different voices (Yu, 2006). In the Foucauldian sense, regulators are to normalize the media in China to be in line with the CCP requirements and policies, and censorship disciplines media users and content providers to let them know what the government does not like. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1979) referred to the role of the circus in emphasizing how people had to show "correct behaviours" in the Panopticon. Nowadays, the media has become another circus, and the circus is very hard to get rid of.

8.5 Traditional Culture and the Legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

In China, traditional culture has long been a key feature associated with political propaganda. President Xi Jinping continues to refer to Chinese cultural and philosophical heritage to improve CCP governance (Kubat, 2018; Buckley, 2014; Brown, 2015; People's Daily, 2016; Zhang, 2015). Specifically, President Xi quotes ancient stories for the management of cadres and anti-corruption measures (Kubat, 2018; Angle & Zhang, 2013; Anderlini, 2017; Schuman, 2015). Ironically, this represents a reversal of a prior stance in
which the CCP was seriously against traditional culture, calling traditional norms remnants of feudalism.

Marxist ideology eroded in the context of market transition, and the CCP needs new sources to reinforce its legitimacy (Kubat, 2018; Holbig & Gilley, 2010; Laliberte & Lanteigne, 2008; Yang, 1996; Wu, 2015; Zhao, 1998). From the 1990s into the beginning of the 21st century, the CCP used economic growth and improved living standards to get support for the regime (Kubat, 2018; Wright, 2010; Zhao & Yang, 2013; Twohey, 1999; Chen, 1997). However, due to the intersection of slower economic growth, corruption, environmental pollution, and the emergence of numerous social issues, the former ideological concepts were not suitable, and the CCP has turned to traditional culture as a new way to reinforce its governance (Kubat, 2018; Tiffert, 2019; Shi, 2019).

Traditional culture, mainly consisting of Confucianism, is praised as “excellent traditional culture (youxiu chuantong wenhua),” narrowed down as moral norms (Kubat, 2018). In the articles of the Central Party School, the CCP is recognized as the rightful successor of the excellent traditional culture (Kubat, 2018).

Party leaders use ancient words and phrases to propose their thoughts and ideas. For instance, the party proposes “building a well-off society in an all-round way (quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui).” This slogan can be traced back to the Book of Poetry, which contains the saying, “people are working hard so they can enjoy the prosperity now (min yi lao zhi, qi yu xiaokang)” (Kubat, 2018). While former President Jiang Zemin proposed governing the country with morality (yide zhiguo), which can be found in Analects (Zhou, 2001; Xu, 2018), former President Hu Jintao, Jiang's successor, used "building a harmonious society" as the goal of governance (Tang, 2006; Xu, 2018; Wu, 2015).

President Xi Jinping also utilizes traditional cultural norms to manage party cadres and justify solutions to corruption. Xi used the Confucian concept of “clean government
“lianzheng)” as an ideal for the government's performance (Kubat, 2018). Many official documents use moral norms and moral cultivation, such as “Notice about Reinforcing Education of Ideals, Beliefs and Moral Behaviours during the Training of Cadres (Guanyu zai ganbu jiaoyu peixun zhong jiaqiang lixiang xinnian he daode pinxing jiaoyu de tongzhi)” and “Guidelines on Clean, Uncorrupted and Self-Discipline of the Chinese Communist Party (Zhongguo gongchandang lianjie zilv zhunze),” to educate cadres. For the anti-corruption campaign, Xi proposed to “bit the tiger and the fly together (laohu cangying yiqi da),” which means to crack down on corrupt cadres at all levels. In directing cadres to be “clean and uncorrupted (qinglian),” he also cited traditional culture. Since the Han Dynasty, being “uncorrupted” (lian) was always an important criterion for the selection of officials which continues into the present-day evaluation of cadre's performance (www.wenming.cn, 2017). The best solution to corruption continues to be a focus on “building good family values.”

Although Confucianism was a state doctrine in traditional society (Xu, 2018), it can also provide an ideal for political and social order for the contemporary society without having to provide practical suggestions for the CCP to solve up-to-date social issues (Shi, 2019). Confucianism, in ancient society, was also supported by the clan system and imperial examination system; however, scholars worry that Confucianism may not work for today's China in the absence of those institutional supports (Shi, 2019; Wu, 2015; Gan, 2003). Wu (2015) argues that Confucianism simply represents an ideological tool for the CCP to strengthen its power structure. Traditional cultural norms are utilized by the CCP for its legitimacy and governance. In this sense, using traditional cultural norms to evaluate women in news articles about corruption is to follow the political ideology which deems the excellent cultural heritage represented in traditional culture. Patriarchal power is not enough to confirm women’s subordinate status in this corruption news, and political power is employed as a further form of domination in trapping women as the cause of corruption scandals.
8.6 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter has explored the last research question concerning the power structures and power relations behind gender discourses in corruption news. Chapters 5 and 6 have shown that women did not receive equal treatment in news coverage. Gender inequality in China is influenced by multiple aspects: the ACWF’s ignorance of women’s equal rights; the role of male domination within family structures; the influence of ideological-political education on the acceptance of the ruling party; and the limited capacity of media to provide oppositional perspectives on social issues. Thus, political propaganda has become the main voice in daily life, while patriarchal norms still prevail in the domestic sphere.

By analyzing womanhood and its relationship with social control in ancient society, Zhan (1996) claimed that traditional gender norms were not enough to produce gender inequality; the state itself plays an active role in reinforcing the unequal status of women. Similar results can be found in contemporary society, as the family-work conflict is reinforced by the retreat of the welfare state. ACWF, which is intended to represent women’s interests, is an organization that follows the CCP’s guidelines. More generally, due to the fear of social unrest, the feminist voice is muted by the CCP. In this sense, superficially, the exercise of both political power and patriarchal power is everywhere, shaping people’s behaviours and thoughts. Political power limits the ways in which people are able to discuss corruption scandals, as people avoid criticizing the ruling party. If blame is to be found for the cause of corruption, women, whose own roles are subordinated within Chinese society, become an easy target. The existence of traditional gender norms provides a strong reference point in news reports about corruption. Traditional culture provides standards by which to judge women’s behaviours, while in the process also maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP. The party draws on patriarchal norms to govern society as it attempts to explain the serious problem of corruption. The problematic descriptions of women in the news about corruption
news represent part of the CCP’s efforts to sustain domination through ideological mechanisms.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

This study has been concerned to answer questions about unequal gender representations in mainstream media news coverage of corruption in China, despite continuing claims by the government that it is committed to promote gender equality. Very little academic research has addressed this issue in a comprehensive way or provided integrative explanations and suggestions. Prior research has emphasized traditional cultural descriptions of women as the predominant reason accounting for the ways women are represented in the news reporting on corruption. Women who are ernai (the second wife) of the male cadre are depicted as “a source of trouble”. While my findings confirm that many of these cultural factors continue to be important, they also reveal that cultural reasons cannot fully explain the issue. In particular, the focus on cultural factors without any attention to the wider structural context ignores the way cultural descriptions of women became part of the dominant discourse and circulate in society. More in-depth explanations are needed to explore why and how gender images appear in imbalanced and unequal ways in news reporting on corruption in Chinese media.

I have drawn from Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge to address this gender inequality in the discourses represented in news about corruption. In corruption news discourse, biopower works in controlling deviant population ---- people who committed corruption, resulting in stigmatized women and gender stereotypes. On the other hand, power-knowledge provides explanations for how dominant discourses of gender can be circulated around the society from political, societal, cultural and media perspectives.

Specifically, gender differences are found in both state news reports and commercial news articles. Content Analysis which examined gender representation in news reports from Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) reveals very few reports about women
involved directly in corruption scandals, and when these appeared, the women were described in relation to having improper sexual relations with others and committing adultery. Critical Discourse Analysis reveals how these representations are more deeply rooted in wider gender inequalities. My research findings demonstrate that news articles on corruption in both the state and commercial media analysed in my study reinforce gender stereotypes in ways that do not tally with the government’s claims that it widely promotes gender equality. There is extensive coverage of women portrayed as accessories or causes of corruption through their representations as mistresses, bad wives, or greedy women. Some of these representations, such as labelling a wife who commits corruption for the husband as a greedy wife (*tanneizhu*), are associated with traditional cultural images. Mistresses have a status similar to that of the concubine in traditional society, subjecting them to negative stereotypes and insulting words in news reports about corruption, especially in commercial media. In this sense, news reporting helps to sensationalize particular aspects of corruption, while women are stereotyped and judged in accordance with traditional gender ideology.

On the other hand, a notable feature of the news reports on corruption is that in some ways women are empowered in corruption scandals; that is, men act as followers who commit corruption in order to support their wives or their mistresses’ luxury lifestyles. By contrast, the reports question or weaken masculinity when they comment on male cadres who have extramarital affairs. However, these findings demonstrate that media - both state-controlled and in other sectors - reinforce strong expectations about the proper roles for men and women in relation to one another. They suggest that China is still male-dominated, with men holding the power to define corruption. Gender inequalities related to patriarchal power are reinforced by and help to reinforce political power as well.

In accordance with power-knowledge theory, which emphasizes that social context is essential for understanding how power relations and knowledge interact in specific social
contexts, my study has analysed the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), the ideological-political education, the family system and the media system in order to provide macro-level explanations of gender-related discourses in news about corruption.

Finally, I discussed the legitimacy of the CCP to explore the relations between the traditional culture and the ruling party. Results suggest that the exercise of patriarchal and political power in daily life mutually reinforce one another in part through constraints on gender equality. For instance, the ACWF, which is a quasi-governmental organization that follows CCP’s policies and educates women to support rather than represent women’s interests, continues to be guided by traditional culture which the CCP draws on to help sustain its legitimacy. The intersecting dimensions of Chinese social life and structure are reinforced by and reflected in the discourses revealed in my analysis, showing that stereotypical and unequal gender representations are maintained in news reporting about corruption.

Attention to gender equality in China is not a new topic. A hundred years ago, one Chinese feminist, He-Yin Zhen, highlighted four kinds of gender inequalities, in marriage, in the husband-wife relationship, in work and responsibility, and in the system of rituals (He-Yin, 1907). Some progress in addressing these inequalities has been achieved. Women now have the right to choose husbands and jobs, and many traditional rituals have eroded. However, inequalities remain in the husband-wife relationships and other areas of life. The development of technology has introduced a new platform in which gender relations should be examined. Here, I would like to propose that a fifth kind of gender inequality has emerged through gender inequality in media content.

This study has sought to make unique contributions. It has provided an integrated analysis of gender images in news about corruption news in part by applying Foucault’s power-knowledge theory to explain a contemporary social phenomenon in the context of
China. It has also linked the understanding of gender discourses in news about corruption in China with a critical analysis of relationships among traditional culture, political and media systems. Nonetheless, this study has several limitations, some of which open new avenues for future research. First, the scope of the study is restricted by the available data sources, which has made it possible to undertake only limited quantitative content analysis to verify women’s under-representation in news about corruption despite my original intent also to conduct more advanced tests such as regressions. However, because of the limited number of cases involving women, I was not able to explore models that would make it possible to see if high-level women cadres, who have more power than low-level women cadres, are more likely to commit corruption. These issues limit the conclusions that can be made on the basis of content analysis. Second, critical discourse analysis revealed distorted descriptions of women, but because of the need to select particular kinds of cases for analysis in the dissertation, there may be other interesting insights and discourses in the more than five-hundred news articles in my data set that could not be explored in this thesis. Future research may make it possible to study particular features of these discourses, such as the way in which the “good wife” is represented. I believe more insightful conclusions will be drawn from a full presentation. Third, by focusing on the ways in which corruption news coverage constructs narratives about women and men this research has employed Foucault’s theory and critical discourse analysis in order to explore power relations and the exercise of power behind official discourses. While I drew on Foucault’s work in order to analyze major themes and types of discourses focused on gender representation, my research did not focus on other potential themes, such as different discourses related to class or other social distinctions, that would be worth exploring in future research. Fourth, the present study verifies women’s unequal treatment in media discourse, but more empirical evidence is needed, especially related to people’s perceptions about these discourses related to women. For instance, Chen
(2017) claims that some women have protested against the treatment of mistresses as sources of trouble in media reporting on corruption. In this sense, studies that examine people’s perceptions of discourse about women, such as the good wife and the greedy wife, are needed. Fifth, I discuss the family's influence on imparting traditional culture via monitoring their children repeating Confucian classics and poems, but more studies need to be done to examine perceptions of traditional culture by younger generations. Sixth, the ACWF is recognized as an organization that does not represent women's interests. However, as the ACWF plays an essential role in understanding women's living experience, studies that investigate women's images associated with various ACWF prizes and awards are needed. In sum, the dissertation has provided a first step in exploring a topic that contains considerable potential to be further developed in subsequent research while drawing attention to major problems that confront Chinese society.
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former town party secretary mayor of the Qinjiajun Town, Gongzhuling, Jilin
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qinjiajun zhen yuan dangwei shuji, zhenzhang Cui Lianhai fubai an pouxi].
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## APPENDIX: NEWS ARTICLES EXAMINED IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE

### ANALYSIS BY CASE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case/Article</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case 1</td>
<td>2013, August 20</td>
<td>Central Commissio n for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)</td>
<td>Ruin his Career by Indulgence ---- Analysis of the case of former head Cheng Haibo of Department of Agriculture in Hunan Province (在纵中自毁前程 -- 湖南省农业厅原厅长程海波受贿案剖析；zai fangzong zhong zihuiqiancheng----hunansheng nongyeting yuan tingzhang Cheng Haibo shouhui an pouxi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 2</td>
<td>2017, November 16</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Alternative Economics make him lose himself in calculations ---- Analysis of the case of Duan Peixiang, the former office director and deputy secretary of Dehong city, Yunnan Province (“另类经济学”，让他迷失在算计中——云南省德宏州人民政府原副秘书长、办公室主任段培相案件剖析; “linglei jingjixue”, rang ta mishi zai suanji zhong ---- Yunansheng Dehongzhou renmin zhengfu yuan furnishuzhang, bangongshi zhuren Duan Peixiang anjian pouxi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 3</td>
<td>2017, February 4</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>A Scholar Mayor Who Was Indulged In Greediness ---- Warning From Former Mayor Luan Qingwei, Fushun, Liaoning Province. 一个在贪欲中沉沦的“学者市长” ——辽宁省抚顺市原市长栾庆伟案件警示录. (Yige zai tan yu zhong chenlun de ‘xuezhe shizhang’---- Liaoningsheng Fushunshi yuan shizhang Luan Qingwei anjian jingshilu)</td>
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<td>Case 4</td>
<td>2013, August 16</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>District Mayor Qian was Investigated because of Money (In China, Qian is pronounced as money) ---- Analysis of the case of Qian Zenghong, the former district mayor of Hailing District, Taizhou City, Jiangsu Province (因钱落马的“钱区长”——江苏省泰州市海陵区原副区长钱增宏受贿案剖析; yin qian luoma de “Qian quzhang”---- Jiangsusheng Taizhoushi Hailingqu yuan fuquzhang Qian Zenghong shouhui an pouxi)</td>
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<td>Case 5</td>
<td>2014, November 4</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>A Corruption Sample from the Talent ---- Analysis of the case of Zhu Weiping, the Former Secretary of Commission of Binghu area of Wuxi, Jiangsu Province (一个“能人腐败”的标本”——江苏省无锡市滨湖区原书记朱渭平受贿案剖析; Yige “nengren fubai” de “biaoben” ---- Jiangsusheng Wuxishi Binghu quwei yuan shuji Zhu Weiping shouhui an pouxi)</td>
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<td>Case</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2016, May 20</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Family-style corruption ---- warning from the case of Yu Shaodong, the former director and Party secretary of People’s Congress in Chengkou County, Chongqing (一损俱损的“家庭式腐败”——重庆市城口县人大原党组书记、主任于少东案件警示录; Yisunjusun de “jiatingshi fubai” ---- Chongqingshi Chengkouxian renda yuan dangzu shuji, zhuren Yu Shaodong anjian jingshilu)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>2013, September 23</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Getting promoted while committing corruption ---- an investigation of Wang Guoyan, former Secretary of Commission of Nanchang Hangkong University (一路升迁一路腐败——南昌航空大学原党委书记王国炎腐败案调查; yilu shengqian yilu fubai ---- Nanchang hangkong daxue yuan dangwei shuji Wang Guoyan fubai an diaocha)</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>2014, August 15</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Iron Fence made of Greed ---- Analysis of the case of Lei Yi, former CEO and Secretary of Yunnan Tin Co., Ltd. (贪欲编织的“铁篱笆”——云南锡业集团（控股）有限责任公司原党委书记、董事长雷毅贪腐案例剖析; tanyu bianzhi de “teliba” ---- Yunnan xiye jiguan (konggu) youxian gongsi yuan dangwei shuji, dongshizhang Lei Yi tanfu anli pouxi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2014, July 15</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Life Which is Eroded by Greedy and Extravagance -- -- Analysis of the cases of Bo Liangen, Wu Zhizhong and Jin Zhao (被贪婪和奢靡腐蚀的人生——薄连根、武志忠、金昭违纪违法案件剖析; Bei tanlan he shemi fushi de rensheng ---- Bo Liangen, Wu Zhizhong, Jin Zhao weiji weifa anjian pouxi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2014, July 2</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Broken Dream of being Billionaire ---- analysis of the case of Zhang Kaizhou, the former deputy director of Pinghu News Broadcast Station, Zhejiang Province (&quot;顶管&quot;捅破“发财梦”——浙江省平湖市广播电视台原副台长张凯洲等人贪污、受贿案剖析; &quot;dingguan&quot; tongpo “facaimeng” ---- Zhejiangsheng Pinghushi guangbo dianshidai yuan futaizhang Zhang Kaizhou dengren tanwu, shouhui an pouxi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2014, August 12</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>What made him loose his career ---- Analysis of the case of Xu Weilin, former deputy minister of Municipal Propaganda Department of Pinghu, Zhejiang Province (是什么让他输掉人生——浙江省平湖市市委宣传部原副部长徐卫林受贿案剖析; shi shenme rang ta shudiao rensheng ---- Zhejiangsheng Pinghu shiwei xuanchuanbuan yuan fubuzhang Xu Weilin shouhui an pouxi)</td>
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| 12   | 2013, December 9 | CCDI | “Grassroot Official got lots of Bribes” is a Tragedy ---- Analysis of the case of Cui Lianhai, the former town party secretary mayor of the Qinjiatum Town, Gongzhuling, Jilin Province. ("小官大贪"演绎人生悲}
剧——吉林省公主岭市秦家屯镇原党委书记、镇长崔连海腐败案剖析; “xiaoguan da tan” yanyi rensheng beiju——Jilinsheng Gongzhuling shi qinjiatun zhen yuan dangwei shuji, zhenshang Cui Lianhai fubai an pouxi)

Case 13  2013, August 10  CCDI  Falling down from the three barriers ---- Analysis of the case of Tang Shaobo, former secretary of CPC Lishui County Committee, Jiangsu Province (”三道坎”前栽下马——江苏省溧水县委原副书记汤少波受贿案剖析; “sandaokan” qian zai xia ma ---- Jiangsusheng Lishui xianwei yuan fushuji Tang Shaobo shouhui an pouxi)

Case 14  2013, August 23  CCDI  Wrong-planning of Life ---- Analysis of the case of Gu Xiangling, the former secretary of Changsha Building and Construction Authority, Hunan Province (”规划”错了的人生——湖南省长沙市市政建设局原局长顾湘陵腐败案剖析; “guihua” cuole de rensheng ---- Hunansheng Changshashi shizheng jiansheju yuan juzhang Gu Xiangling fubai an pouxi)

Case 15  2015, June 15  CCDI  The Crackdown of an “expert” cadre ---- Warnings from Zhu Fulin, the former deputy Mayor of Jinhuan, Zhejiang Province. (一个“专家型”干部的陨落——浙江省金华市原副市长朱福林案件警示录; yige “zhujuanjiaxing” ganbu de yunluo ---- Zhejiangsheng Jinhua shi yuan fushizhang Zhu Fulin anjian jingshilu)

Case 16  2017, May 4  CCDI  From “proud of the family” to “shame of the family” ---- Analysis of the case of Du Min, the former Party secretary of Yunnan Police Institute (从“家族骄傲”沦为“家族耻辱”——云南警官学院原党委书记杜敏严重违纪问题剖析; cong “jiazu jiaoao” lunwei “jiazu chiru” ---- Yunan jingguan xueyuan yuan dagnwei shuji Du Min yanzhong weiji wenti pouxi)

Case 17  2014, November 18  CCDI  The Family Corruption ---- Analysis of corruption cases from Department of Communications (触目惊心的“塌方式腐败”——湖南省交通运输厅系列腐败案剖析; chimujinxin de “tafang shi fubai” ---- Hunansheng jiaotong jingshi li xilie fubai an pouxi)

Case 18  2013, November 27  CCDI  How can Top Research Talent become Academic “Tiger” (corruption) (顶尖科研人员为什么成了学界 “老虎”; dingjian keyan renyuan weishenme chengle xuejie “laohu”)

Case 19  2013, September 13  CCDI  Cut off the Invisible hands and Smash the unspoken rule ---- Casess of illegal biding in construction area, Yuhuan County, Zhejiang Province. (斩"无形手"砸"潜规则"——浙江省玉环县查处工程建设领域围标串标系列案件纪实; Zhan “wuxingshou” za “qianguize” ---- Zhejiangsheng yuhuanxian chachu
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>2013, November 11</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>“Peck Worms” from forest ---- Corruption cases of Forestry Industry in Leping, Jiangxi Province. (山林&quot;蛀虫&quot;被&quot;啄&quot;记——江西省乐平市严查林业系统腐败窝案纪实; Shanlin “zhuchong” bei “zhuo” ji ---- Jiangxisheng Lepingshi yancha linye xitong fubai woan jishi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2013, October 9</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Punch Corruption ---- record on the work of the inspective and supervisory structure of discipline in Henan Province. (收拢五指 重拳惩腐——河南省纪检监察机关加强案件查办工作纪实; shoulong wuzhi zhongquan cheng fu ---- Henansheng jijian jiancha jiguan jiaqiang anjian chaban gongzuo jishi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2013, October 16</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>The Way to Bribe Me is to Bribe My Mistress ---- the investigation of the case Liu Jiakun, the former deputy director of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the Fuyang and former secretary of CPC County Committee in Taihe County (情妇成了找我办事的“敲门砖”——安徽省阜阳市人大常委会原副主任、太和县原县委书记刘家坤腐败案调查; Qingfu cheng le zhao wo banshi de “qiaomenzhu” ---- Anhuisheng Fuyangshi renda changweihui yuan fuzhuren, taihexian yuan xianweishuji Liu Jiakun fubaian diaocha)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2016, September 7</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>One Wants to Make Money but Made a Cage for himself ---- Analysis of several people’s corruption, including Li Zehua, the former Party branch secretary of Liangjiang Community, Peiyuan sub-district office, Changning, Hunan Province (“坐地生财”换来“作茧自缚”——湖南省常宁市培元街道办事处两江社区党支部原书记李泽华等人违纪问题剖析; “zuodishengcai” huanlai “zuojianzifu” ---- Hunansheng Changningshi Peiyuan jiedao banshichu liangjiang shequ dangzhibu yuan shuji Li Zehua deng ren weiji wenti pouxi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2015, February 25</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Cut the hand which Embezzles State-owned Assests---- analysis of typical corruption cases of state-owned enterprises (斩断伸向国有资产的 “黑手” ——国有企业领导干部腐败问题典型案例剖析; zhanduan shenxiang guoyou zichan de “heishou” ---- guoyou qiy e lingdiao ganbu fubai wenti dianxing anli pouxi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2016, October 20</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Being attracted by luxury, beautiful secretary is not beautiful ---- analysis of the case Zhu Fangyun, the former deputy director of Environmental Protection</td>
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<td>Case</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case 22</td>
<td>2013, August 8</td>
<td>Sina.com</td>
<td>The Loser for the Case of Judge Prostitution (法官“嫖娼门”最大的输家; faguan “piaochagn men” zuida de shuju), authored by Shi Shusi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 23</td>
<td>2016, June 16</td>
<td>Ifeng.net</td>
<td>Working hard but finally enter the Abyss ---- the isolation life of corrupt cadre, Ding Fengyun (“拼命三娘”终坠入深渊——贪官丁凤云的割裂人生; “pinming san niang” zhong zuiru shenyuan ---- tanguan Ding Fengyun de gelie rensheng)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 24</td>
<td>2018, January 11</td>
<td>Sina.com</td>
<td>Corrupt Cadres were Indulged in Trading Power for Money and for Sex, Zhou Yongkang and Sun Zhengcai are Typical Cases 贪官痴迷权色和钱色交易 周永康孙政才成反面典型 (Tanguan chimi quanse he quanqian jiaoyi, Zhou Yongkang Sun Zhengcai cheng fanmian dianxing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 25</td>
<td>2017, February 20</td>
<td>Sina.com</td>
<td>The common characteristics of three corrupt high profile cadres who had been arrested last week (解局: 上周被判刑的 3 位省部级大老虎有何共同点; jieju: shang zhou bei panxing de 3 wei shengbuji dalaohu you he gongtongdian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 26</td>
<td>2016, February 28</td>
<td>Sohu.com</td>
<td>Du Caiyun: warnings of “get promoted by seeking help from your elder sister” (杜才云:“升官找大嫂”警示了谁?; Du Caiyun:”shengguan zhao dasao” jinshi le shei?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 27</td>
<td>2017, May 5</td>
<td>Sina.com</td>
<td>Corrupt cadres got Bribes for 48 times in three years: I did the thing and my wife got money (贪官 3 年受贿 48 次年均百万: 自己办事妻子收钱; tanguan 3 nian shouhui 48 ci nian jun baiwan: ziji banshi qizi shouqian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 28</td>
<td>2014, September 12</td>
<td>Sohu.com</td>
<td>Departmental level cadre was tip-off by relatives, like a knife into corrupt cadre’s heart (正厅级裸贪遭近亲举报 “尖刀”直插贪官心脏; zhengtingji luoguan zhao jianao “jianao” zhi cha tanguan xinzang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 29</td>
<td>2016, August 5</td>
<td>Wangyi.net</td>
<td>Warning from Wang Zhizhong’s case: he is modest at work, but indulged in gambling and lived a corrupt life at home (王志忠案警示录: 人前低调诚恳, 人后嗜赌成瘾腐化堕落; Wang Zhizhong an jinshilu: ren qian didiaoluo gambling, ren hou shi shi shi chu cheng yin fuhua duoluo)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Case 30 | 2014, December 11 | Wangyi.net | Most female cadres who were shut down were leading roles of departments and many of them are related to trade sex for power (落马女官员逾半数为厅级 多人
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case 31</td>
<td>2014, November 28</td>
<td>Sohu.com</td>
<td>Summary of Female Corrupt Cadres: some of them trade power with sex, and some of them got money for beauty (盘点落马女贪官：有的以色谋权 有的为美容; pandian luoma nv tanguan: youde yise mou quan youde wei meirong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 32</td>
<td>2016, December 6</td>
<td>Sohu.com</td>
<td>Corrupt Departmental level cadre’s success science is not success (落马厅长王登记的“成功学”很失败; luoma tingzhang Wang Dengji de “Chengongxue” hen shibai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 33</td>
<td>2014, May 20</td>
<td>Sohu.com</td>
<td>Shi Shusi: the Sexual Scandal of Corrupt Cadres is more Important than the Prostitution of Huang Haibo (石述思: 贪官情色之祸重于黄海波嫖娼; Tanguan qingse zhi huo zhongyu Huang Haibo piaochang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 34</td>
<td>2014, June 17</td>
<td>Ifeng.com</td>
<td>Xiaoe Chen: reflections on female cadres’ trading sex for power (陈小二: “女官员以色谋权”背后的反思; Chen Xiaoer: “nv guanyuan yi se mou quan” beihou de fansi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 35</td>
<td>2017, June 12</td>
<td>Ifeng.com</td>
<td>Outstanding backgrounds, inflated couple (显赫的背景, 膨胀的夫妻; xianhe de beijing, pengzhang de fuqi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 36</td>
<td>2015, April 20</td>
<td>Ifeng.com</td>
<td>When the corrupt couple will be crackdown (腐败 “夫妻档” 何日谢幕; fubai “fuqin dang” heri xiemu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 37</td>
<td>2018, May 18</td>
<td>Ifeng.com</td>
<td>The Results of Overbearing President (霸道董事长的下场; badao dongshizhang de xiachang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 38</td>
<td>2016, January 30</td>
<td>Sohu.com</td>
<td>Mao Kaiyun: what shall we see from sending mistress to the Police Commissioner (毛开云: “给公安局长送情妇” 的看点在哪儿; Mao Kaiyun: “gei gong'an juzhang song qingfu” de kandian zai na'er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 39</td>
<td>2014, April 17</td>
<td>Wangyi.net</td>
<td>A mineral mouse (metaphor of corrupt cadre in mineral industry) and a lot of corrupt cadres (一只“矿老鼠”与一批落马贪官; yizhi “kuang laoshu” yu yiqi luoma tanguan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 40</td>
<td>2013, August 7</td>
<td>Sohu.com</td>
<td>Liu Xuesong: Judges Visit Whores Together, Who fires on Them (刘雪松: 法官集体嫖娼, 该倒在谁的枪下; Liu Xuesong: faguanjiti piaochang, gai dao zai shei de qiang xia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 41</td>
<td>2016, March 23</td>
<td>Wangyi.net</td>
<td>From “old cow” became “tiger” due to the “nutrition of power” (“老牛” 变 “老虎” 凭于 “权力营养丰富” “laoniu” bian “laohu” yuanyu “quanli yingxiang fengfu”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 42</td>
<td>2015, September 23</td>
<td>Sohu.com</td>
<td>Media: The Fallen Deputy Director of the State Administration of Religious Affairs has Close Relation with the Ling family (Ling Jihua’s family) (媒体：落马国家宗教局副局长跟“令”关系密切;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Article 5  
(Examples of male cadres whose corruption was related to personal issues)  
2015, September 27  
Sohu.com  
Luo Lizhi: Being the Mistress of the Deputy Mayor, Female Journalist was “Harmed” (罗立志: 女记者做副市长情人 确实是 “受害” 了; Luo Lizhi: nv jizhe zuo fushizhang qingfu queshi shi “shouhai” le)

Article 6  
(Examples of male cadres whose corruption was related to personal issues)  
2017, June 24  
Ifeng.com  
What kind of positions that corrupt cadres can promote their mistresses? (官员可以将情妇提拔到什么位置; Guanyuan keyi jiang qingfu tiba dao shenme weizhi)

Article 7  
(The example of male cadres whose corruption was not related to personal issues)  
2013, June 14  
Ifeng.com  
Corruption cases of presidents in Universities resulted from lacking of supervision (高校校长落马“问责”监管缺失; gaoxiao xiaozhang luoma “wenze” jianguan queshi)

Article 8  
(The example of female cadres whose corruption was not related to personal issues)  
2016, August 21  
Sina.com  
Comment: Knowing Wen Jiabi, the former vice president of Sichuan Red Cross Society, is more valuable than knowing Guo Meimei (the internet celebrity who is related to Sichuan Red Cross Society) (评论: 红十字会文家碧比郭美美更值得深挖; Pinglun: hongshizihui Wen Jiabi bi Guo Meimei geng zhide shen wa)