THE
CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNMENT
IN SASKATCHEWAN,
1929-1934:
RESPONSE TO THE DEPRESSION

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this thesis is "The Co-operative Government in Saskatchewan, 1929-1934: Response to the Depression". It is composed of a brief introduction, five chapters and a conclusion.

The first chapter provides a background to Saskatchewan politics in the 1920s: the decline of the Progressive party in the face of the ruling Liberal party and the Conservative revival under Dr. J.T.M. Anderson. The overestimation of the Ku Klux Klan's impact in the 1929 general election and the formation of the Conservative-Progressive coalition is corrected by giving consideration to other factors, particularly the movement for civil service reform.

The second chapter outlines the personalities of the Co-operative Government cabinet and its policies prior to the depression. The government removed sectarianism and instructional French from the public schools. A Cancer Commission which provided free diagnosis and treatment, a strong Public Service Commission, labor legislation and the ambitious highway program of 1930-1931 were soon overshadowed by the economic and social crisis of the 1930s.

The third and major chapter discusses government responses to the depression's impact on Saskatchewan. After attempting to meet wide-spread destitution by the traditional policy of assisting municipal relief programs, the Co-operative Government established the Saskatchewan Relief Commission to co-ordinate and sustain all provincial projects. The
government also underwrote the Wheat Pool and the Co-op Creamery to enable them to survive. Although the cabinet initially attempted to use deficit financing to maintain social services, dwindling revenues and the financial orthodoxy of the business community and Ottawa, forced it into a policy of retrenchment. Declining incomes -- a product of drought and low grain prices -- disproportionately increased the burden of debt on farmers and merchants. After initial attempts to provide a mediation procedure between creditors and debtors, the government required all creditors to put their case to a Debt Adjustment Board which attempted to ensure that the debt was "reasonable" and the debtor was able to pay. Similarly the tax consolidation bills of 1933 and 1934 deferred payment of tax arrears, providing a long term schedule for repayment. Both debt adjustment and tax consolidation deferred present obligations to allow the property owner to retain possession.

The Co-operative Government's experiments in economic regulation were not successful. The Grain Marketing Act, which attempted to establish a compulsory Wheat Pool in Saskatchewan was vetoed by the courts as contravening the British North America Act. The Gasoline Sales Discrimination Bill failed to even pass, as both government and opposition were divided on it. With the exception of the latter bill, the government did everything constitutionally possible for a provincial authority to meet the depression.
The fourth chapter deals with the internal politics of the coalition. The formal groups of the Co-operative Government -- Conservatives, Progressives and Independents -- were not so much divided as were the radical sections of each group, which together formed a "government left wing". At the other end of the political spectrum, a faction within the Conservative party, calling itself the "true blues", attempted first to challenge Premier Anderson's leadership and then to undermine his entire government. Anderson's attempt to expand the coalition by adding Liberal Charles McIntosh to his cabinet failed with the defeat of that member in the 1933 Kinistino by-election. In spite of many tensions, however, the Co-operative Government had cohesive legislative support throughout its five year term.

The fifth chapter describes the 1934 general election. The government's defensive campaign, weakened by attacks from Conservative renegades, was beaten by the Liberal opposition's aggressive, partisan campaign. The rising Farmer-Labor Group, a democratic socialist party, replaced the Co-operative coalition as the chief opposition to the Liberals.

The conclusion assesses the place of the Co-operative Government in Saskatchewan's history. The removal of sectarianism and instructional French from the public school was the culmination of a long term trend
which encompassed Liberals, Conservatives and Progressives. Within the limits of the social matrix and the Canadian constitution the government did what it could in responding to the depression. The similarity between the social and public service policies of the Co-operative and C.C.F. governments can be explained in terms of the ideological affinities between conservatism and socialism. In breaking the Liberal hegemony in Saskatchewan and struggling to maintain and expand social services in the face of depression, the Co-operative Government represented a major turning point in Saskatchewan's political history.
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Responsibility for all errors and omissions is mine.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .............................................................. 1

Chapter 1
Accession to Power .................................................... 2

Chapter 2
The Coalition in Power ................................................. 27

Chapter 3
Depression and Response .............................................. 46

Chapter 4
The Stresses of Power .................................................. 87

Chapter 5
The 1934 Election ....................................................... 105

Conclusion ............................................................... 120

Appendices ............................................................... 128

Bibliography ............................................................. 149
The Co-operative Government, formed on the very eve of the Great Depression, had to cope with the impact of that unprecedented social and economic disaster on the people of Saskatchewan. In the brief period before the scope of the catastrophe became fully apparent, the government developed and attempted to carry out policies towards education, highways, the civil service, health and labor which deserve comment in their own right. Throughout its period of office, the government of Dr. J.T.M. Anderson had to respond to a series of pressures -- social, economic and political. The nature of its responses -- and the limits on those responses -- to a large extent determined the quality of its governance.
CHAPTER I

ACCESSION TO POWER
By 1929, the Liberal party had been in power in Saskatchewan for twenty-four years. In the early 1920s it had met and defeated the Progressive Party. This defeat was due in part to the ability of Premier C.A. Dunning to undercut the Progressives by appealing to the farm vote and in part to the Liberal organization. In 1926, Dunning moved into federal politics and James G. Gardiner, formerly Minister of Highways, and acknowledged head of the Liberal election organization, became premier.

The later 1920s were marked by a revival of the Conservative party in Saskatchewan. In the provincial elections of 1917 and 1921 the Conservative party had almost ceased to exist; in 1921 it received less than three percent of the popular vote. At the party convention of 1924, Dr. J.T.M. Anderson, former Director of Education for New Canadians, was elected leader. Under his vigorous leadership, the Conservatives won three seats and 15.1% of the popular vote in 1925. By 1928, politics in Saskatchewan consisted of a declining Progressive movement, a rising Conservative

challenge and a Liberal government solidly in power.

The 1929 election was an upset. Saskatchewan is a relatively stable political community: in sixty-five years it has changed government only four times. The late 1920s were prosperous for the province; the Liberal government seemed quite secure; the new premier had passed a number of progressive measures, demonstrating that the Liberals were not stagnant. To most observers, then and since, the defeat of the Liberal party in 1929 was a surprising phenomenon that demanded an extraordinary explanation.

The accepted accounting for the 1929 election, which has the support of both popular belief and scholarly opinion, is that

... in arousing the electorate over questions of race and religion, [The Ku Klux Klan] prepared it for the type of campaign which was to be waged by the Conservatives and the major issues upon which they would appeal for support -- the necessity of preventing sectarianism in public schools, and the importance of a scientific and selective scheme of immigration. ... The Conservative campaign was one of emotion, growing out of and drawing upon the racial and religious antagonism within the province.

The Ku Klux Klan, an exotic importation from the United States which built its appeal in Saskatchewan on anti-Catholic and anti-non-Anglo-Saxon immigrant bigotry, has been credited with

3 The social welfare program of 1927-1929 included a Workmen's Compensation Act, mothers' allowances and public ownership of power utilities.
5 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
the overthrow of the Liberal Party. In contrast to the Conservatives and Progressives, who, it is said, associated with and benefited from the Klan's agitation, the Liberals have been viewed as the apostles of religious and racial tolerance. Thus the 1929 election has been seen as a noble defeat for the Liberal party.

The two key premises of this explanation of the 1929 election are the existence of a Conservative-Klan link (and perhaps a Progressive-Klan link) and the Liberal adherence to a position of tolerance. The evidence given for the Conservative-Klan connection is their interlocking membership, the pro-Klan bias of the 1928 Conservative platform and the voting support for the Conservatives in 1929 from predominantly Anglo-Saxon districts. On the other hand, official declarations in favour of tolerance were made by prominent Liberals. These premises and the evidence for them need to be closely examined.

There is substantial evidence to indicate that the Klan and Conservative memberships overlapped. The most available way of checking this is to look for notables of each on the other's membership list. Four of the Conservative M.L.A's elected in 1929 appear to have been Klan members. Dr. W.D. Cowan, former Conservative M.P., was the

6 Ibid., p. 72.
7 *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, May 30, 1929, p. 5; Regina *Morning Leader*, October 13, 1928, p. 2.
Klan's provincial treasurer. Two of the Klan organizers, Pat Emmons and J.A. Puckering, signed affidavits saying that the Conservative leader, Anderson, had sought Klan assistance. (These were in some doubt, as Puckering later signed another affidavit repudiating the first.) Is Mr. Calderwood correct in concluding that "... the very fact that the Klan membership records contain the names of prominent Conservatives, suggests, though does not prove conclusively, a direct link with the Conservative party"? The answer to this question must be found in comparing the degree of Liberal and Progressive involvement with the Klan to that of the Conservatives. Unfortunately, Mr. Calderwood is less helpful on this point. "Records of Klan membership ... contain the names of some prominent Liberals, including the name of at least one Liberal M.L.A." This M.L.A. might have been J.A. Wilson from Rosetown or D.J. Sikes from Swift Current. The latter had risen in the legislature to defend J.J. Maloney, an anti-Catholic lecturer closely associated with the Klan, from a violent attack by the Attorney-General, Hon. T.C. Davis. However there are

9 Ibid., p. 214, 222n.
10 Ibid., p. 215.
11 Ibid., p. 211.
other, more general, indications of Liberal membership in
the Klan. A Liberal wrote to Premier Gardiner in the spring
of 1928, "... I am trying to keep out of [the Klan] here on
account of my position. It would do no good, but it is
difficult. And about all I can do is to keep Liberals from
wavering and we may as well admit there are quite a number." 14
Also, comparable to the statements by Emmons and Puckering
about Conservative involvement, Dr. J.H. Hawkins, a Klan
organizer, claimed that the Klan was predominately Liberal. 15
Between the Liberals and the Conservatives there does not
seem to be any great difference in terms of Klan ties: each
had some individuals who were attracted to the Invisible
Empire.

The great difference in links between a political
party and the Ku Klux Klan, occurs with the Progressives.
Where the Liberals had perhaps two organizational links and
the Conservatives, five, the Progressives, even with a far
smaller organization and fewer elected members, had seven. 16
While Calderwood finds strength in the connection between the
Klan and the Progressives surprising, American studies have
shown a strong tendency to nativism in the progressive
tradition. 17

14 E.B. Hutcherson to J.G. Gardiner, June 20, 1928, Gardiner
15 Calderwood, "Ku Klux Klan", pp. 210-211.
16 Ibid., pp. 223-224.
17 Ibid., p. 235; G.B. Tindall (ed.), A Populist Reader,
New York, Harper and Row Ltd., 1966, p. 95. For a
revisionist view see M.P. Rogen, The Intellectuals and
McCarthy: The Radical Spectre, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge,
1967, pp. 178-182.
In weighing the evidence for an interlocking Conservative-Klan membership, one must keep in mind the relative degree of interlock with the other two political parties. If having the names of a number of its prominent men on the Klan membership rolls is sufficient to establish a definite link between the Conservative party and the Ku Klux Klan, is similar evidence also sufficient to tie both the Liberal and the Progressive parties to the Klan? Or, to re-word the question in terms of the persons involved, if Dr. Cowan's involvement in the Klan is enough to link Dr. Anderson, is J.A. Wilson's membership enough to tie in James G. Gardiner, or Progressive M.L.A. E.S. Whatley's membership enough to tie in such a prominent Progressive as M.J. Coldwell? If the answer to the second two parts is no, then the answer to the first must also be no. The existence of some membership overlap is not sufficient evidence to tie the Conservative party to the Ku Klux Klan.

The case against the Conservative party does not rest solely on fragmentary evidence of interlocking membership. A more substantial charge was that the Conservative party shaped its platform and election appeal to use the dis-sension raised by the Invisible Empire. In assessing this accusation, one must first examine the Conservative platform of 1928; then compare it to the positions taken by the Klan, the Progressives and the Liberals.

18 Kyba, "Saskatchewan General Election", pp. 31-32.
The Conservative platform as passed by the Saskatoon convention, March 15, 1928 was composed of twenty-six points. Of these, two were alleged to be Klan inspired -- the statements on education and immigration. The conventional view has been that the Conservatives sought to pander to the religious and racial hatred stirred up by the Klan by writing into their platform planks promising to remove all sectarian (i.e. Roman Catholic) influence from the schools and to restrict the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons to ensure a majority of British stock in Saskatchewan. But is that what the platform actually said? Item three of the Conservative platform, dealing with education, said, "Thorough revision of the educational system of the province." This was taken directly from the party's 1924 program. Dr. Anderson, as a former Director of Education for New Canadians, took a particular interest in this and often spoke of it in the legislature. He was chiefly concerned with revision of the curriculum, increased inspection and improved teacher training facilities. But in all of the twenty-six points, there is no mention of non-sectarian schools. Dr. Anderson did commit himself and his party to the principle of removing sectarian influences from public schools; however, this was never part of the Conservative party platform.

Similarly, the immigration plank (item two) was pictured as barring non-Anglo-Saxons. The plank promised

19 Ibid., pp. 31-32; Calderwood, "Ku Klux Klan", p. 110.
20 Appendix A
21 Western Producer, February 2, 1928, p. 2.
an "Aggressive immigration policy based on the selective principle". According to Mr. Kyba the word "selective" meant the exclusion of Roman Catholics, East Europeans and immigrants in general. However this ignores two evident facts. First, the word "aggressive" in the resolution: the Conservatives are in favour of increased immigration. Second, Anderson explained what the party was aiming at with the word "selective". In the past, Liberal governments had encouraged immigration without making adequate provisions for the employment of the New Canadians. The result, according to Anderson, was "a crime against humanity". Immigrants finding themselves destitute in the new land were returning home or, in some cases, committing suicide from despair. Anderson's concern was for the immigrant: he wanted a selective policy to protect the immigrant from unemployment. This had nothing to do with the rabid anti-foreigner propaganda associated with the Ku Klux Klan. While he was still a School Inspector, before becoming Director of Education for New Canadians, Anderson had written a book in which he advocated increased immigration to fully develop Canada's resources and more careful attention to the education of these New Canadians. Reflecting on the "anti-foreigner" bias,

22 Appendix A.
24 Ibid., p. 55.
that had arisen during the Great War, he wrote,

We are in danger, perhaps of being unduly influenced by sentiments of national egotism and a spirit of disdain for all that bears upon it the stamp "foreign". This is the mistake Germany made. Imbued with a spirit of intense racial self-consciousness, she lost sight of those broader considerations pertaining to the welfare of humanity.27

However, there were elements in the Conservative party which did pander to the anti-immigrant element of Saskatchewan's electorate. In particular, J.F. Bryant, later Minister of Public Works, and certain individuals associated with the Conservative Regina Daily Star, attacked the immigration policy of the Liberal party as destructive to the "British character" of Canada. These statements were largely restricted to the Arm River by-election, although the Daily Star, in the 1929 election continued to flaunt its bias by referring to the Hon. J.M. Uhrich as "the papal knight of the Gardiner cabinet".29 During the general election, the Conservative party strove to disassociate itself from the ethnic smears. The Daily Star printed a list of non-British Conservative candidates, praising their people's contribution to Saskatchewan. Recoiling from Liberal attacks, the party's headquarters issued the following statement:

Certain unscrupulous members of the Saskatchewan

27 Ibid., pp. 240-241.
28 Regina Daily Star, October 19, 1928, p. 4; October 24, 1928, p. 16.
29 Regina Daily Star, May 20, 1929, p. 4; May 22, 1929, p. 4; June 4, 1929, p. 4.
30 Regina Daily Star, June 4, 1929, p. 4.
government are making use, in remote districts of the province, of statements made by certain eastern Conservatives and certain irresponsible individuals reflecting on our non-English electors, and are endeavoring thereby to incite hatred against the Conservative Party.

These parties do not represent the Conservative party or the Conservative attitude towards our immigrants of non-English extraction and we deplore the use of such language and hereby repudiate it. 31

In spite of strong statements such as this, the presence of men like J.F. Bryant in the Conservative ranks, made it difficult for Anderson to counter Liberal charges of "Tory bigotry". It is a standard tactic of political warfare to discredit a political party by identifying it with the extremists among its membership.

During the 1928 session of the Saskatchewan Legislature, Anderson moved an amendment to the School Act that would have prohibited the use of religious garb or emblems in public schools during school hours. Many viewed this motion as a bid for Klan support. In considering this charge we should look at the Klan's official position and also the position of the Liberal government. The second and third resolutions passed at the "Second Annual Klavnokation of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan" which dealt with the "schools question" demanded: (1) that separate schools be abolished, (2) that French no longer be taught, and (3) that all schools be completely non-sectarian. 32 The Conservatives did not agree with any of these points. They accepted separate (i.e. Roman Catholic) schools as part of the educat-

31 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, May 24, 1929, p. 5.
32 Appendix B.
ional system in Saskatchewan. Also, Anderson had defended the teaching of the French language in public schools and welcomed its extension. He had argued only that the public schools be non-sectarian; religious teaching in a separate school was accepted.

It is instructive to compare the Conservative position to that of the Liberals. At the United Church conference of June 4-6, 1928 in Saskatoon a resolution was presented to condemn the government for allowing sectarian influences in public schools. Premier Gardiner, who was present as an official of the Church, explained the Government's policy.

The Government follows the same practice in regard to nuns teaching in the public schools as it did with the use of the crucifix. When any complaint is received from school districts, the Department /of Education/ suggests to the board of trustees that it should avoid discussion of that kind by engaging an ordinary teacher. In the great majority of cases the advice of the Department had been carried out. In several school districts in the Southwest part of the Province the Department had been successful in having crucifixes removed from schools.

In the related matter of unauthorized use of languages other than English, the Deputy Minister of Education, A.H. Ball, enunciated an "English only" policy when questioned at the Saskatchewan School Trustees Association Convention in February, 1929. The Premier and his Deputy Minister were supported by the Liberal _Saskatoon Star-Phoenix._

33 _Saskatoon Star-Phoenix_, May 13, 1929, p. 5.
34 _Western Producer_, February 2, 1928, pp. 1-2.
36 _Saskatoon Star-Phoenix_, February 23, 1929, p. 7.
At their convention at Regina last week the school trustees passed a resolution asking that English be the sole language of instruction in the public schools of the province. The motion was carried amid demonstrations of enthusiasm, showing that many of the delegates hold strong views on the question.

Very few citizens of Saskatchewan will disagree with the trustees in the stand they have taken. The language clause in the School Act expresses accurately the sentiment of the province and should be carried out to the letter. No one wants a polyglot Saskatchewan. 37

Both the Conservatives and the Liberals were in favour of non-sectarian, English speaking public schools.

The Progressive platform underwent a considerable change from 1927 to 1928. The standard themes of progressivism -- group government, political reforms, civil service reform and social services -- dominated the 1927 program. 38 However, the 1928 platform, while repeating demands for civil service reform, the return of Saskatchewan's natural resources and political reforms, had new strains: "Freedom of our public schools from sectarian influences ... An immigration policy which will ensure the permanency of British institutions and Ideals." 39 If any party was demonstrably after the Klan vote in 1928-1929, it was the Progressive. Certainly they leaned more to the Klan than did the Conservatives. 40

To some analysts, the clinching evidence for proving a Klan-Conservative tie, is the fact that the Conservatives drew their support from the predominantly Anglo-Saxon

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37 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, February 25, 1929, p. 4.
38 Appendix C.
39 Appendix D.
or Scandinavian areas, which were supposed to be more susceptible to the Klan's appeal. However, this pattern, which may have held for many rural areas, was not true for the large urban centers. The Conservatives and their allies carried every major city except Prince Albert. Yet if the opposition parties were playing an anti-New Canadian line, how did they carry cities such as Saskatoon, Regina and Yorkton which had large New Canadian elements? The vote by poll indicates that Conservatives did as well or better than the Liberals in the "ethnic" districts of Saskatoon's "west side" and Regina's "east end". Gardiner, himself, was aware that the Liberal party had not held the "immigrant vote". The evidence is by no means conclusive that the Conservatives, Progressives and Independents found support only, or even largely, among the Anglo-Saxon part of the electorate.

Many people in Saskatchewan believed and still believe, that the Conservative party was in alliance with the Ku Klux Klan to overthrow the Liberal party in 1929. Yet, as we have seen, the evidence for this is fragmentary and inconclusive at best. There is about as much membership interlock (at least among notables) for the Liberals and

41 Ibid., p. 270; Kyba, "Saskatchewan General Election", pp. 96-97.
42 Kyba, "Saskatchewan General Election", p. 96n.
43 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, June 7, 1929, p. 1; Regina Leader Post, June 7, 1929, p. 1.
Progressives as for the Conservatives. The Conservative leader's stand in favour of non-sectarian public schools in 1928 was virtually identical to the Liberal position. The Conservatives drew voting support from both "old" and "new" Canadians. What, then, is the origin of the account that the Invisible Empire had allied with the Conservative party?

The Conservatives insisted that it was Gardiner who had introduced the Klan to politics, as a club to beat the Conservative opposition. However, in the Premier's earliest mentions of the Klan, he attempted to link it with the Progressives not the Conservatives. Only after the Conservative-Progressive alliance in the spring of 1928, did Gardiner and the Liberal party begin to attack the Conservatives as the overt political agents of the Klan.

In one of his earliest public announcements on the Ku Klux Klan, Gardiner likened it to the Progressive party, whose Regina convention had just collapsed. Mr. Calderwood described the reference as "innuendo", used "unwisely and somewhat cheaply". The Premier repeated it in his full-scale attack on the Klan at the opening of the 1928 session of the legislature. The Western Producer, while it disapproved of the Klan, had this to say about Gardiner's

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45 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, May 29, 1929, p. 5; Kyba, "Saskatchewan General Election", p. 28.
47 Calderwood, "Ku Klux Klan", p. 228.
speech:

So far as can be learned the Klan has done nothing in Saskatchewan of an illegal or immoral nature, and until it does, attacks upon it must be based upon what it might do. Such attacks as those made by the premier might serve to attract attention to it and to enhance its popularity in some quarters. If the criticism is launched for the purpose of making it appear that all opposition to the provincial government was headed by or centered in the Klan, and that was the object of the speech, its delivery can hardly be commended. It would not be good for Saskatchewan if the Klan became a political issue. The chances of the Klan becoming such an issue were very remote until Mr. Gardiner spoke. Now those chances may be increased.49

During the spring of 1928, Premier Gardiner shifted his guns away from the Progressives to the Conservatives. During June he made a province-wide tour, using Anderson's proposed School Act amendment and the resolutions of the Conservatives' March Convention to damn the Tories as the political carriers of the Klan's brand of religious and racial hatred.50 Some Liberals were unhappy about this campaign.

I feel that the Premier out there has been too rigid and too fierce and that he made a real mistake when he went out into the field against the Klan. A religious fight is not to be battled out in the open, but quietly, through some single personal talks. . . . His going out publicly has aroused the Protestant sentiment in the province, which is exceedingly strong, as you know.51

49 Western Producer, February 7, 1928, p. 4.
51 Andrew Haydon to W.L.M. King, December 7, 1928, King Papers, as cited in Unger, "James G. Gardiner," p. 108.
In the 1929 election the Liberal press and advertisements made the supposed Klan link a major theme.52

Boiled down, what does Dr. Anderson's criticism of the government's educational policy amount to? First, Dr. Anderson criticises the separation of children on the school playgrounds of the province in so far as that is brought about by reason of the fact that out of 4,826 school districts there are 31 separate school districts. . . .

Dr. Anderson also criticises the provision in the school act which permits one-half hour of religious instruction prior to school closing in the afternoon, provided the board of trustees so decides. . . .

Dr. Anderson has recently declared his opposition to the presence of any religious emblems in the schools, and would prohibit the wearing of any religious garb by teachers - declarations which smack very much of Soviet Russia.

Thus, in his own words, and in direct violation of both the letter and the spirit of the constitution of this Christian province, Dr. Anderson declares in favour of absolutely Godless schools.53

Dr. Anderson has capitulated to the worst element in his party. He, as leader, has accepted leadership from the extremists and recalcitrant element of his following. He has thrown the finer element overboard.54

Dr. Anderson may be personally free of bitterness and bias but he is supported by people whose minds are warped by sectarian bigotry and the brand of patriotism which is the last refuge of a scoundrel. Elected to a position of power, he would be subject to pressure from these quarters with possible disastrous results.55

52 Appendix E.
53 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, May 22, 1929, p. 5.
54 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, May 30, 1929, p. 5.
55 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, May 23, 1929, p. 4.
By direct assault, by smear, by innuendo, the Liberals tried to portray the Conservatives as anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant bigots. While the electorat of 1929 apparently rejected the accusation, both popular and scholarly opinion have since accepted it as true and accurate.

II

"If Progressives, like Conservatives, found elements of 'Klancraft' appealing, then Klan propaganda did much to bring these opposition parties together."56 If they didn't, what did bring the two opposition parties together? Most analysts, preoccupied with the role of the Klan, have paid little heed to other factors which drew the Progressives and the Conservatives into alliance. Yet there were a number of factors at work in the late 1920s to create a common opposition front. Premier Gardiner's personality, the cry of "Break the Machine", (or civil service reform) and the group government concept in the Progressive ideology all tended to draw the two opposition parties together.

"Jimmy" Gardiner was a fiercely partisan Liberal. Under C.A. Dunning, he had been identified, correctly, as the head of "the machine", as the Liberal organization was called. In this position he had been the Progressives'  

56 Calderwood, "Ku Klux Klan", p. 236.
most visible and most outspoken enemy. While Dunning made effective appeals to the farm vote and drew it away from the Progressives, Gardiner attacked them directly, with both the party "machine" and vituperative speeches. T.A. Crerar, former national leader of the Progressive party, estimated that 75% of the Progressive vote was really Liberal, but that, "Gardiner's tactics in his efforts to annihilate them lost thousands of these people who are nominally Liberals and are sore and angry." As long as Dunning was present to undercut the farm strength of the Progressives, the Liberals had no serious opposition.

Traditionally, the Progressives had tended to lean towards the Liberal party, but when J.G. Gardiner became Premier of Saskatchewan on February 26, 1926, the Progressives were completely alienated -- an important factor in making the party more open to other associations.

The personality of Premier Gardiner sharpened and brought to the fore the cry of "Break the Machine", also called by a nobler name, civil service reform. Not unnaturally, Conservatives and Progressives preferred to attribute their repeated defeats to the "machine" rather than to any lack of popularity on their own part. With the election of Gardiner as premier, the head of "the machine",

58 T.A. Crerar to A.K. Cameron, June 11, 1929, Cameron Papers, as cited in Unger, "James G. Gardiner", p. 128.
the evil eminence of the Liberal party, had come into the open.

The operations of the Saskatchewan Liberal party's "machine" are no longer much of a secret. A number of studies have examined its method of operation. 60

Many of the chief provincial organizers were concurrently employees of the government. Highway supervisors were preferred for field men; their necessary travels brought them into contact with the entire province. District employees, such as road superintendents and liquor store managers, fitted well into constituency organizations. The appointment of political workers to minor positions in the civil service was also widespread. 61

This was made possible by the absence of a civil service commission, the lack of any merit system and the weakness of the civil service commissioner.

Gardiner never made apologies for the "machine". To him patronage was essential for the existence of the party system. 62 After the 1929 election he conceded that, "although the organization was a perfectly proper one, it was possibly a little overdone and people began to think that their views were being made for them." 63 Although the Premier always insisted that there was nothing strictly illegal about the "machine", the open existence of patronage encouraged the belief in many people's minds that Saskatchewan's Liberal government was corrupt.

61 Unger, "James G. Gardiner", p. 78.
62 Ibid.
"Break the Machine" provided a powerful rallying point for the opposition parties. One of the constant themes in the Progressive platforms of 1927 and 1928 was, "Rigid supervision of public finances, a Civil Service Commission free from political patronage . . . " 64 Paralleling these statements, five of the twenty-six points in the Conservative platform were oblique attacks on the "machine". 65 During the election both parties attacked the government as corrupt and both insisted that the solution was a strong, independent, civil service commission, public tender for contracts and a strict accounting procedure. After the defeat of the Liberal government, the three opposition groups met in Regina to find a common basis for action in power. The three principal points that were agreed upon provide a valuable insight into the reasons for co-operation: (1) reform of the civil service; (2) retention of the identity of the groups; and (3) freedom in the matter of federal politics. 66 Thus, the number one item in the coalition statement was "Break the Machine", under its other name.

The other two points in the common statement require some elucidation. Part of the Progressive ideology

64 Appendix C, parts two and seven; Appendix D, parts three and six.
65 Appendix A, points six, thirteen, eighteen, nineteen and twenty-two.
66 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, June 12, 1929, p. 1.
had always been the concept of "group government" as opposed to party government. Each economic sector (farmers, workers, shop-keepers) should elect its own representatives, who would work in co-operation with the other groups with which it shared a common interest.

We believe in government representative of and responsible to the electorate by the application of the principle of co-operation based on economic interests, as opposed to the system of party rule. . . . Saskatchewan (needs) . . . a more independent and non-partisan treatment than it can receive under existing political conditions.

The emphasis on co-operation between various groups made the Progressives open to Conservative overtures for coalition against the government. From the Progressive's perspective of group government, a co-operative coalition between autonomous groups was a natural development. Also natural was the insistence on the maintenance of distinct groups. While the federal Progressives had rejected this reading of the "group government" theory because the existing political parties were not economic groups, their Saskatchewan provincial counterparts were more flexible. The president of the Progressive Association, C.E. (Charlie) Little, sent greetings to the March, 1928 Conservative Convention and by June of 1928 he was openly touting the possibility of a Conserv-

68 Appendix C, points one and six; Appendix D, point 2b.
69 Appendix A, point twenty-one.
ative-Progressive coalition.70

The Co-operative Government of 1929 was a coalition of three groups, Conservatives, Progressives and Independents. The latter were a controversial phenomena. Most Liberals viewed them as merely Conservatives under another name.71 Their belief grew from the fact that Conservatives in the past had run as anti-government independents when their party was weak and in disrepute.72 However, the 1929 Independents were a different breed. J.F. Bryant, writing to R.B. Bennett, the National Conservative leader, outlined the nature of the Conservative-Progressive coalition and the role of the Independents in it:

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\text{We... would run a } \text{Conservative in certain constituencies (about fifty per cent) and have the Progressives run a candidate in each of the other constituencies where the Progressives were the strongest. If in any constituency neither the Progressives nor Conservatives would accept any suggestions from the Central Committee, then an open convention would be called of all opposing the Government and the strongest man get[sic] the nomination.73}
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While it is not possible to trace all of the co-operative candidates, a brief look at the most notable of them can give some idea who the Independents were.

A.C. Stewart, mayor of Yorkton, was nominated and elected as an Independent for that city. He had been a member and an officer of the Progressive Party.74 As Minister

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70 Regina Daily Post, June 13, 1928, p. 10.
73 J.F. Bryant to R.B. Bennett, March 5, 1928, Bennett Papers, p. 24916.
74 Western Producer, July 21, 1927, p.1; Appendix G, note two.
of Highways, he was the ranking Independent-Progressive in the cabinet. Later he was elected as a "Unity" candidate (C.C.F.-Social Credit-Conservative) to the provincial legislature. Finally, he won Yorkton for the federal Liberal party in 1949. J.V. Patterson transferred from Independent to Conservative to C.C.F. although he never won under subsequent banners. In general an Independent was a respected man in his district, an asset sought by all parties.

III

The 1929 election was, perhaps, a greater surprise to contemporaries than it should have been. Even in the heyday of the Liberal party, opposition candidates never received less than forty per cent of the popular vote. 75 The political impact of the pre-election coalition was evident in the pattern of nominations. The number of Progressive candidates declined from forty to sixteen, reducing the number of three-cornered contests to twelve out of sixty-three. 76 With the forces of opposition behind one man, the Liberals were in trouble.

The results of the election showed a major Conservative breakthrough, with a strong showing by the Independents. 77

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75 Kyba, "Saskatchewan General Election", p. 12.
76 Ibid., pp. 104n, 106.
Five days after the election, at the Hotel Saskatchewan in Regina, the three opposition groups agreed to form a Co-operative Government. Anderson was accepted by all three as joint leader. His first concern was to gain the formal reins of power.

With thirty-six members publicly committed to him, Anderson demanded that Premier Gardiner resign immediately. When Lieutenant Governor Newlands refused to acknowledge the informal demand, the three groups sent identical petitions to him demanding Gardiner's resignation. Premier Gardiner refused to resign on the ground that he had a constitutional right to meet the legislature. Newlands agreed. Was he wrong? The Conservative-Progressive-Independent demand for power was unconstitutional. The tradition throughout the British parliamentary world has favoured letting Premier meet the legislature after an election if he desires. The Co-operatice demand for power was based on the theory that the people rule; but in British North America it is Parliament which rules. The verdict of the people is the verdict of Parliament.

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Wednesday, September 4, 1929 the first session of the Seventh Legislature met. The cabinet, anxious to avoid defeat on a minor issue, did not formally nominate a candidate for Speaker, but left the task to a backbencher. J.F. Bryant, a Conservative, was nominated by Anderson and seconded by E.S. Whatley, a Progressive. On a straight government-opposition vote, Bryant was elected. Following the Speech from the Throne, Anderson moved an amendment of no confidence in the government, seconded by J.V. Patterson, an Independent. In the major debate on Anderson's motion, all of the Liberal notables had their say -- J.G. Gardiner, T.C. Davis, J.R. Uhrich, W.J. Patterson. From the opposition only Stewart and Reginald Stipe spoke, each briefly outlining the position of his respective group, the Independents and the Progressives. On the evening of September 5, 1929 the last Liberal speaker resumed his place, and the vote was taken. 28-35, the Liberal government was defeated after twenty-four years in office.

79 Regina Morning Leader, September 4, 1929, p. 1.
CHAPTER II

THE COALITION IN POWER
On the whole, it looks like a cabinet of able citizens, with rather more political experience than one might expect in the leaders of a party which has never been in power. Dr. Anderson appears to have selected the pick of his following in the House. He is starting out well.

With this charitable introduction, a Liberal newspaper welcomed the new cabinet of the Co-operative Government. Newspaper speculation beforehand as to its members had generally been accurate: there were few surprises. Observers were quick to notice three salient features of the new cabinet: it was large, urban- and business-oriented. The size -- ten privy councillors, two without portfolio -- was unfavourably compared to previous Liberal cabinets which had usually had seven members. The first murmurs of "extravagance" were already audible.

More important to most was the urban dominance, closely linked with a business rather than farming orientation. Seven of the ten came from cities. George Thorn, the secretary of the Saskatchewan Progressive Association

15 \textit{Saskatoon Star-Phoenix}, September 10, 1929, p. 4.
2 Appendix G.
3 \textit{Saskatoon Star-Phoenix}, September 7, 1929, pp. 1, 5, 17; \textit{Western Producer}, September 5, 1929, p. 1; September 12, 1929, p. 6.
4 \textit{Saskatoon Star-Phoenix}, September 10, 1929, p. 4.
commented on the occupational make-up:

The most striking feature of Dr. Anderson's cabinet is the absence of representation of the agricultural industry, in which 70 percent of our people are engaged. Four lawyers, two doctors, a real estate agent, an implement dealer, a telegraphist, together with Dr. Anderson complete the ministry.

The government was sensitive to these criticisms of city and business dominance. Hon. A.C. Stewart devoted a considerable part of his maiden speech answering them. "When the honourable member for Redberry uses the term 'arm chair farmer' let me remind him that Dr. Saunders, one of the greatest benefactors the farming community has known, was not a farmer." 6

The other surprising characteristic of the new cabinet, alluded to by the Liberal newspaper, was its relative experience. Five of the incoming ministers had previous experience in local government; three had been chief executives -- H. McConnell, A.C. Stewart and W.C. Buckle. Anderson himself had been a ranking official in the civil service for a number of years, as Director of Education for New Canadians. While the Conservatives and Progressives had never formed a government in Saskatchewan, they were able to organize a cabinet with considerable experience in government.

5 Western Producer, September 12, 1929, p. 3. W.C. Buckle, the "implement dealer", was also a farmer. He was Minister of Agriculture.
6 Sessional Papers, (hereafter S.P.), 1930, Regina, R.S. Garrent, King's Printer, volume XXVIII, p. 270.
One essential feature of Anderson's cabinet was that it was a coalition. Eight ministers were drawn from the Conservative ranks, one was a Progressive, Dr. R. Stipe, and one was an Independent-cum-Progressive, A.C. Stewart. The Speaker was Rev. R. Leslie, a Progressive. From the very beginning, the relations between the cabinet and the Progressive organizations were delicate. Before the cabinet was formed, E.S. Whatley, Progressive house leader, declared that he was opposed to Progressive representation in the cabinet.\(^7\) When the new cabinet was announced, George Thorn remarked that "the recent Progressive Convention did not give its approval to the acceptance of cabinet representation".\(^8\) However when the executive of the Saskatchewan Progressive Association met, it announced support for the new government on the terms of the June 11 agreement, but any Progressive who accepted a position in the cabinet did so on his own, not as a representative of his party.\(^9\) The Progressives were keeping their association with the new government to a minimum.

The personnel of the Anderson cabinet deserve some individual attention since, although usually considered as a group, they were in fact ten diverse characters. While each member was bound up in the policies of the government, three

\(^7\) Western Producer, September 5, 1929, p. 1.
\(^8\) Western Producer, September 12, 1929, p. 3.
ministers in particular developed programs which, for a
time at least, operated apart from the depression. Thus,
some time will be devoted to highways, labor and health policy
when describing Hon. A.C. Stewart, Hon. J.A. Merkley and Hon.
F.D. Munroe.

In its first years the Co-operative Government was
dominated by a trio of able lawyers -- M.A. MacPherson,
Attorney General; J.F. Bryant, Minister of Public Works; and
Howard McConnell, Provincial Treasurer and Minister of Munici-
pal Affairs. MacPherson, the youngest at 38, was born in
Nova Scotia, and had been elected for Regina in 1925. Bryant
and McConnell were both born in Ontario. All three had come
west seeking to establish a legal practice on the expanding
frontier. McConnell who had served as alderman, then as
mayor for Saskatoon, brought considerable experience in
public finance to his new office. Elected in a 1927 by-
election, McConnell also had some legislative experience.
Bryant, elected in 1929 for Lumsden, and MacPherson had both
been active in the Liberal-Conservative Association. The
former in particular maintained close relations with R.B.
Bennett and other federal Conservatives.

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When the province took control of its own natural resources
in 1930, Premier Anderson became the first Minister of
Natural Resources, as well as Minister of Education. The
crisis in public finance allowed little chance for develop-
ment during the Co-operative Government's tenure. However,
a Research Council was established to explore means of
profiting by the newly acquired resources. S.S., 1930,
ch. 88.
Walter Clutterbuck Buckle, born in England, had emigrated to Canada and settled in the Tisdale district. There he farmed and held a farm implement dealership. From 1921 to 1925 he was mayor of Tisdale. In 1925 he was elected to the provincial Legislature and became the agriculture critic of the Conservative opposition. Although other rural members had been suggested for the cabinet, only Buckle was appointed. 11

The two ministers without portfolio were W.W. Smith and Dr. R. Stipe. Born in Ontario, a war veteran who had practiced medicine in Hanley for a number of years, Dr. Stipe had been the agriculture critic for the Progressive group. Although disavowed by the Progressive Association, he served as a visible reminder of the Progressive element in the coalition. The presence of W.W. Smith is more difficult to explain. An English immigrant, a real estate agent in the Swift Current district, he was seldom mentioned in the speculative reports prior to the announcement of the cabinet. Three possible considerations are that he would represent small business men, Klan influence, or the western part of the province. However, the real reason remains hidden.

One of the pledges in both the Conservative and

11: Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, September 7, 1929, p. 5. George Bennett and Jacob Benson were mentioned for the Departments of Telephones and Highways, respectively.
Progressive campaigns had been an expansion and improvement of the provincial highways system, without political favour­itism. Prior to 1929 the provincial highways had consisted of 3,051 miles of graded surface and 603 miles of gravel surface. In the last Liberal fiscal year (1929-1930), 236 miles of grade and 237 miles of gravel had been budgeted. When Stewart brought in his first Highways budget (1930-1931), he projected 914 miles of grade and 826 miles of gravel, for a cost of $6,850,000. The Liberal attack on the "prodigality" of the new highways program, led to the following exchange between Hon. George Spence, former Minister of Highways and Stewart. 

Spence: My opinion is that the earth road is the most economic road in the world. My opinion is that the earth road is the easiest riding and everything else from the standpoint of economy that there is in the world.

Stewart: I would like to refer my honourable friend from Maple Creek to Professor T.I. Agg of Minnesota University. Professor Agg figures costs in depreciation (to motor vehicles) from an earth road greater than gravel by 1.7 cents a mile. 

However the ambitious highways program had little chance in face of the depression. Even in the 1930 legislative session there was mention of using the road construction program as work relief in dried out areas. By 1931 this policy was explicit and official. As the depression worsened the highways budget shrank and even its limited funds were diverted

12 S.P., 1930, volume XXVIII, pp. 349-351.
to provide relief work in hard hit areas. In spite of Stewart's vigorous leadership, the roads of the province deteriorated, like most other capital goods in the depression.

John Merkley, Minister of Labor and Industry, was a C.P.R. employee who had worked as a telegrapher and train dispatcher. In 1927 he had been elected to the city council of Moose Jaw. Himself a member of a trade union he was representative of the non-ideological, compromising style that V.I. Lenin, the Russian Premier, had denounced as "bread and butter unionism". Through the five legislative sessions, Merkley built up a considerable record of labor legislation. The One Days Rest in Seven Act (1930) and the Weekly Half-Day Holiday Act (1931) provided statutory time off for town and city workers. Following the 1931 Estevan strike and Judge Wylie's Commission to investigate the conditions in the coal mines in that district, Merkley brought down a completely revised Mines Act in 1932. It provided that all

16 From September 7 to October 8, 1931 about 600 coal miners in the Estevan district were on strike. The employers' association refused to recognize the miners' union on the grounds that it had subversive connections. Judge E.R. Wylie was appointed as a one man royal commission by both Regina and Ottawa to investigate mining conditions. The strike came to a close after a riot, September 29, in Estevan during which three miners were killed and six policemen and five miners were seriously injured. Both owners and miners agreed to wait for Judge Wylie's report. Regina Leader Post, September 8, 1931, pp. 1,20; September 29, 1931, pp. 1,12; October 2, 1931, pp. 1,15; October 3, 1931, pp. 1,12,16; October 6, 1931, pp. 1,16.
workers would be paid twice a month, that mine-owners would provide adequate ventilation and that no miner would work more than eight hours below ground. The Workmen's Compensation Act was expanded by three amendments that extended coverage to clerical workers, included the full amount of medical aid under the benefits and increased the application period to make claims easier. Two major amendments to the Minimum Wage Act required an employer to keep an open register of all employees, wages and hours, and extended the jurisdiction of the Minimum Wage Board to towns of over 1,500 people. Most of these acts were the product of a regular consultative meeting prior to each legislative session between the Saskatchewan Trades and Labor Council (T.L.C.) and a committee of the cabinet. While many of the T.L.C.'s requests were not accepted, some were. Nothing in Merkley's labor program was radical or socialist. It was a gradual expansion of the government's power to protect workingmen from the rigours of their employ.

Dr. F.D. Munroe had practiced medicine for twenty-two years in Welwyn, a small town of about three hundred people, a few miles from the Manitoba border. As Minister of Health, he was responsible for two major initiatives in public health. The first was the establishment of a permanent Cancer Commission which was to do research on the in-

17 Regina Leader Post, February 11, 1932, pp. 1,8.
cidence of cancer; conduct a public information campaign; set up clinics for treatment; purchase radium and supervise its use to ensure maximum effectiveness. The provincial government provided the central direction and the funds necessary for a full-scale attack on cancer. The funds for the acquisition of radium were particularly important because, as Dr. Munroe pointed out, "... it is prohibitive in cost for the individual physician or institution to obtain in proper amount for general use in all forms of cancer".  

In spite of the depression, the Cancer Commission was able to provide extensive diagnostic services and radium treatment for 1,165 cancer patients.

After four years of trying to co-ordinate and sustain a patchwork quilt of private clinics, union hospitals and municipal hospitals in the depths of a severe depression, the Co-operative Government embarked on a different course of action. The 1934 "Amendment to the Public Health Act" established a Health Services Board to be responsible for all medical, dental and hospital relief, to do research on health needs in Saskatchewan and to "consider methods for an equitable distribution of the costs of illness". While the Leader Post attacked the latter as "state medicine", the

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19 Regina Leader Post, February 14, 1934, p. 1. This figure covers the period 1930-1934.
20 Statutes of Saskatchewan (hereafter S.S.), 1934, ch. 44, section 99(d).
Legislature passed the bill on second reading by a unanimous recorded vote. The early initiative in medicare came to nothing. The Co-operative Government was defeated before it could take action on the new Board. The Liberals later converted it into a regulating agency for municipal doctor plans.

The main challenge to public health administration during the depression was to sustain the level of services. While highways, public works and administrative expenditures were cut back, hospital grants were maintained without reduction. In addition special grants were made to drought areas to pay for the care of indigent patients. Like Stewart, Dr. Munroe found his ambitious projects blocked by the depression. Instead of leading an extension of health care, he was reduced to struggling to keep up normal service.

Anderson's cabinet contained many active, knowledgeable men. A number came to office with high hopes for improving and expanding their departments' services. The onset of the depression dashed most of these hopes, forcing the ministers to expend their energies in maintaining the essential services of government, within a dwindling budget.

21 Regina Leader Post, March 7, 1934, p. 4.
22 S.S., 1936, ch. 100.
23 Regina Leader Post, February 15, 1934, p. 2.
Those who view the Liberal defeat of 1929 as the work of the Ku Klux Klan, see the amendments made to the School Act in 1930 and 1931 by Anderson as proof positive of the Klan's influence. Yet if one is to say that the Co-operative Government was strongly sympathetic to, if not controlled by, the Klan, then the Klan's own program with regard to schools should be compared to that of the government.

Two amendments to the School Act roused the French and Catholic populations. The first, passed in 1930, read, in its essence:

No emblem of any religious faith, denomination, order, sect, society or association, shall be displayed in or on any public school premises during school hours, nor shall any person teach or be permitted to teach in any public school while wearing the garb of any such religious faith, denomination, order, sect, society or association.

The second, which came in 1931, following a report on the knowledge of English where French was the language of instruction in grade one, removed the legislative sanction for using instructional French. Preceding the 1931 amendment, in 1929 Premier Anderson had sought a legal opinion as to whether languages other than English could legally be used to give the one half hour of religious instruction. When the

24 S.S., 1930, ch. 45, section 1(1).
Attorney-General's Department replied that they could not, the Department of Education asked the teachers to comply. The two amendments and the regulation, taken together, meant the end of sectarian public schools and the use of languages other than English (principally French) for instruction.

But, was this the Klan's platform? The Invisible Empire had called for an absolute end to the use of languages other than English in schools and the abolition of separate schools. Although the government would not permit languages other than English to be used in instruction, French (the Klan's particular concern) remained on the curriculum as a subject. While the government insisted that public schools be strictly non-sectarian, it made no move against the separate schools. Anderson described his policy in these words:

I take the stand, and the Government takes the stand that, in a province such as ours with its great cosmopolitan population consisting of representatives of many races and many religious beliefs, it is very essential [sic] that there should be some common meeting place, some common training ground in that institution known as the Public School.

Now there is nothing in this Act affecting minority or separate schools under Sections 39 and 44 of the School Act. So this amendment to the School Act does not affect religious instructions as allowed under the present law: it does not affect separate or minority schools and does not affect existing regulations as regards language. 25

When the debate came on the 1931 School Act Amendment, to make English the sole language of instruction, it is

interesting to note that the Liberal speakers, J.G. Gardiner, W.J. Patterson and J.M. Uhrich did not argue over the principal of the bill. Indeed, they said that the proposed law was superfluous, since the Liberals had already made English the only legal instructional language. According to Gardiner the amendment would limit the use of the "direct method" of teaching French. Not one speaker mentioned the bill's impact on French-Canadians or their schools. 26

When the Klan congratulated the Premier at its last "Klonvokation" in 1930, for his actions 27, it was performing an exercise of self-delusion. Between the Klan position and the government position on schools there was a gap, which the Klan would not recognize. With the onset of the depression and the removal of sectarian strife from the public schools, the Ku Klux Klan fell into a state of permanent decline. The Leader Post tried to keep it at least within the realm of the public consciousness by putting out an occasional alarum. Just after the 1932 Conservative Convention, it printed a more or less openly solicited letter from J.W. Rossborough, who maintained the title of Imperial Wizard, obliquely linking the defeat of Dr. D.S. Johnstone, the party's president, to the continuing strength of the Klan. 28 Again in the 1934 General Election, the Post gave prominence to a Klan questionnaire allegedly sent to all candidates, demanding a pledge

26 Regina Leader Post, March 7, 1931, p. 3.
27 Appendix F.
28 Regina Leader Post, June 4, 1932, p. 2.
to abolish separate schools. However, the Klan itself was finished. There still remained pockets of anti-Catholic, and anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the province, but these never again obtained the notoriety that they had under the Invisible Empire.

III

"Break the Machine" had been the Opposition cry before and during the election. Civil service reform had been the promised remedy. In power, the Co-operative Government moved to prove its charges of corruption and maladministration, in particular against the Saskatchewan Provincial Police (S.P.P.) and the Farm Loans Board (F.L.B.), as a politically necessary prelude to its own civil service reform program.

In February, 1930 the Legislature echoed with charges by Howard McConnell, James Bryant and W.C. Buckle, and counter-charges and denials from the former Liberal cabinet members. The cabinet had called in Walter Weston, C.A., to audit the Farm Loan Board's accounts. His report confirmed Conservative and Progressive charges of political interference, maladministration of funds, huge losses and gross inefficiency. The report, along with a number of

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29 Regina Leader Post, June 2, 1934, p. 1.
charges of financial maladministration made by Howard McConnell, was referred to the standing Public Accounts Committee, composed of Conservatives, Progressives and Liberals, with a Co-operative majority. After extensive investigation the Committee produced an innocuous statement which in effect dismissed the charges made.31 Liberals rejoiced that the government had been unable to back up its charges of corruption. They were premature.

Another series of charges by the Minister of Public Works, concerning the maladministration of justice by the S.P.P. (disbanded in 1928), were referred to a royal commission of three prominent justices.32 The investigations of the "Bryant Charges Commission" uncovered a shocking record of corruption and political favouritism. Experienced, competent police officers had been dismissed because they balked at such tasks as framing opponents of the Liberal party to keep them in jail on polling day, or dropping charges against Liberal party workers, regardless of the evidence. Party workers were put on the S.P.P. payroll during campaigns and openly submitted their election expenses to their superior officers for payment.33 The commissioners summarized their

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31 Ibid., pp. 135, 139-140.
32 The commissioners were the Hon. James McKay and the Hon. Philip Edward MacKenzie of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan, and the Hon. J.F.L. Embury of the King's Bench for Saskatchewan.
findings in these words:

The evidence of Commissioner Mahony and of Assistant Commissioner Tracey, and of Mr. Duckworth, and of Mr. Taylor, is conclusive that there was constant, and in our view, improper interference by the Attorney-General's Department with the administration of the police. That is, it affected the whole spirit of the force, and was a detrimental influence.\[34\]

The Conservatives and Progressives had capitalized on the popular antipathy toward the evident political corruption. Some of their charges fell wide of the mark. Many did not. The "Bryant Charges Commission" demonstrated the depth of political influence in one department; by association it convicted others. In the heated Legislative Session of 1930, all of the charges, founded and unfounded, served to justify the government's policy of civil service reform by blackening the existing civil service structure.

Within a month of taking office the Co-operative Government established the Public Service Inquiry Commission under M.J. Coldwell (a member of the Progressive Association executive) to make recommendations for revisions in the provincial Civil Service Act. Basically unaltered since 1913, the Act gave maximum discretionary power to the cabinet and the individual cabinet minister: the Executive Council made all appointments to the service, and all regulations; a cabinet minister could fire, hire or hold back salary for any member of his department without giving reason.\[35\]

\[34\] Ibid., p. 137.
civil service commissioner under the Act had no power, except to make recommendations concerning regulations. From the testimony of the commissioner, it appears that procedure closely followed the letter of the law. Ministerial discretion was unhampered by any classification system for either salaries or positions.

The Public Service Act, adopted by the government from the Coldwell Commission recommendations, established a strong Public Service Commission. The cabinet retained the power to appoint only deputy ministers and members of boards or commissions. The Commission was responsible for firing, transfers and making regulations for the operation of the civil service. Appointment to the service was made by the Commission, following a satisfactory performance in competitive examinations set by it. A complete system of classification for positions and salaries was to be established through the Commission. Ministerial discretion was almost eliminated. It survived only for "special cases" which the minister had to justify to the Commission. The creation of a powerful Public Service Commission was intended to end patronage politics in Saskatchewan.

But did it? Liberal speakers repeatedly laid

36 Selected Documents from the Records of the Public Service Inquiry Commission, 1929-1930, (Archives of Saskatchewan), microfilm roll 245, letter of the civil service commissioner to the Commission's acting secretary, November 12, 1929, pp. 4, 6.

37 S.S., 1930, ch. 7, sections 12(1), 30, 31, 37(1) and 40(1).
charges that the new Commission was a sham, a cover-up for Tory corruption. In particular they pointed to the Saskatchewan Relief Commission and the Farm Loan Board. With respect to the latter, J.G. Gardiner claimed that "the present government has succeeded in creating the greatest machine in the history of Saskatchewan politics". Such statements must be weighed against those of Conservatives, such as H.A. Lilly, James Grassick, J.F. Bryant and Dr. D.S. Johnstone, that the new structure was denying reliable Conservative workers the jobs they deserved. Looking toward the upcoming provincial election, Grassick said, "I believe that one of the greatest mistakes the government made at the start was the setting up of the civil service board", as it deprived the party of a reliable core of paid workers.

To these assertions can be added those of more detached observers. Both the Relief Commission and the Farm Loans Board have been given clean bills of health. Concluding his study of the Saskatchewan Relief Commission, Dr. H. Blair Neatby wrote,

"... In spite of the magnitude of the enter-

38 Regina Leader Post, February 19, 1932, pp. 1, 2; February 9, 1932, pp. 1, 5. The first reference is to Charles McIntosh, the second to J.G. Gardiner.
39 Regina Leader Post, February 21, 1931, p. 2.
40 Regina Leader Post, February 23, 1932, p. 2; June 4, 1932, p. 9; J.F. Bryant to R.B. Bennett, June 22, 1934, Bennett Papers, p. 475984.
42 Green, "Farm Loan Board", p. 148.
prise, there was never the slightest indication of political influence, profiteering or partiality. When we consider the blunders and the corruption that are possible in the administering of a large relief program, this constitutes an enviable record. 43

Civil service reform had provided the unifying force for the Opposition parties and a common platform for their coalition government. Although both the Public Service Commission and the Relief Commission were dismantled as soon as the Liberals regained power, each left a noble record of honesty in serving the public. It is ironic that when the Liberals were defeated in 1944, one of the priorities of the new Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) Government was to re-establish a non-partisan civil service under a powerful, independent commission. 44

44 S.S., 1947, ch. 4.
CHAPTER III

DEPRESSION AND RESPONSE
Of all Canada, Saskatchewan was hardest hit by the depression. Average per capita income fell seventy-two per cent from 1928 to 1933, by far the largest drop for any province.¹ This sharp decline was reinforced by the unevenness of deflation. Export-oriented farm products, particularly wheat, suffered a disastrous fall; but tariff-protected manufactures, while experiencing a slump in production and a reduction in price, did not have nearly the same decline.² The result of these two factors was to reduce the farmers' purchasing power from 1928 to 1933 by 63.8%.³ The reduction in farm income was reflected in the non-farm sectors of the provincial economy. Towns and cities in Saskatchewan were almost exclusively service centers for the district farmers. There was no "urban economy", since nearly every town was directly dependent on the fortunes of agriculture.⁴

The aggregate statistics give some idea of the relative severity of the depression in Saskatchewan. To understand the variations of hardship with the province we

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² Ibid., pp. 143,150.
⁴ Alma Lawton, "Urban Relief in Saskatchewan During the Years of Depression, 1930-1939", (hereafter, "Urban Relief"), unpublished master's thesis, 1969, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, p. 5.
must remember that falling prices and shrinking markets -- that affected all farmers -- were accompanied by drought.

In the south of the province, within a triangle with its base along the American border from Frontier to Torquay and its apex at Watrous, lay ninety-five municipalities. This area, designated "zone A" by the Saskatchewan Relief Commission (S.R.C.), experienced the longest drought, beginning in 1929, and the most severe. On the borders of the triangle were another seventy-seven municipalities where the drought began later, in 1930 and 1931, and was not as rigorous. North of this "zone B", was "zone C" comprising sixty-eight municipal districts, where the drought came in 1932. The variations in the incidence of drought were important. When the south and south west began to dry up in 1929-1931, many people thought it was merely "a couple of dry years" similar to the drought of the early 1920s. Not until 1931-1933 were drought conditions general in the province. Like the S.R.C., each public agency had to formulate policies to deal with the unequal occurrence of hardship.

The Co-operative Government attempted to meet the unprecedented economic and social disaster with the traditional responses of relief and retrenchment. As the depth and length of the depression became more evident, the government tried other policies. We shall attempt to determine the government's goals, the effectiveness of the program in attaining those goals and what limits existed within the
government's policies that restricted its response to the depression.

II

"No one will starve," declared Premier Anderson in a speech at Yorkton, September, 1931. That statement marked the Co-operative Government's recognition that the depression and its effects were to be the government's principal challenge. Drought and low prices forced many farmers into bankruptcy, and many town dwellers into unemployment. Both sought government assistance to avoid destitution. Such aid came as either "direct relief" or "work relief", employment on public works projects.

Relieving poverty had traditionally been primarily a municipal duty. Provinces were expected to come to the aid of junior governments only in dire distress. The federal government had a long standing policy that relief was strictly provincial, although in 1920 it had given some assistance as an "emergency only" measure. Under the Unemployment Relief Act (1930), later succeeded by a series of Unemployment and Farm Relief Acts, the federal government again took a "temporary" role in sharing relief costs. From September, 1930 to July, 1934, the federal, provincial and municipal governments

6 Lawton, "Urban Relief", p. 27.
were each to pay one-third of the costs for direct relief. The first year (1930-1931) the federal and provincial governments each put up a quarter of the costs and the municipality was to supply the remaining one half for public work relief. As the municipalities were unable to carry their share, the next year the federal government undertook one half the costs, the province and the municipality, one quarter each. However, in May 1932, the federal government stopped all payment for work relief, in favour of direct relief which was more economical for the public treasury. Within this constantly "temporary" framework, the Co-operative Government dealt with the cost and administration of relief.

During the first two years of its tenure, the Co-operative Government handled the growing problem of relief in the traditional way -- by assisting hard-pressed municipalities with special grants. In the face of the massive problems of destitution, this hit-and-miss non-system was clearly inadequate. In August, 1931 by order-in-council the government established the Saskatchewan Relief Commission (S.R.C.), a single provincial agency responsible for supervising all rural relief and administering provincial relief programs. As set up by the 1932 Legislature, the Commission supplied food, clothing, heating fuel, feed, fodder, seed grain, medical and dental aid, fuel for schools, relief payments to enable teachers to

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7 Ibid., p. 31.
8 The federal relief acts were renewed each year, with no guarantee of consistency or even continuity.
9 Regina Morning Leader, January 9, 1931, p. 1.
continue teaching and money for machinery repairs. The S.R.C. used its mass buying power to force down prices in purchasing provisions. It managed its limited resources, including what it received from various volunteer charity groups, ably.

From a contemporary point of view, one of the unseemly aspects of the S.R.C. was its practice of requiring pledges to repay relief money. The thought behind this was to remove the stigma of "accepting charity", and at the same time to deter unnecessary applications. Economy had to be one of the major concerns of the S.R.C.: faced by tremendous need and a limited budget, the administrators wanted to ensure the best use of every penny. Yet, the repayment requirement was and remained pro forma. Inability to repay did not weigh on the consideration of relief applications. As to the actual repayment,

The Commission . . . seems to have been a lenient creditor. . . . The leniency, made necessary by the very unfavourable crop conditions, meant that many liens were still in effect /i.e. unpaid/ until their cancellation /by the Legislature/ in 1937.

The S.R.C.'s programs of direct relief were complemented by the work relief projects of the Departments of Highways and Public Works. After 1932, the federal withdrawal

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11 Ibid., p. 53.
12 Lawton, "Urban Relief", p. 53.
13 Neatby, "S.R.C.", pp. 43-44.
14 Ibid., p. 50.
from work relief compelled termination of almost all municipal relief work projects. Within their shrinking budgets Public Works and Highways continued to try to provide employment for destitute farmers and laborers.

Another agency which provided some financial assistance was the Farm Loan Board. In the depression of the early 1920s the Board had consciously adopted a policy of restricting loans, to coincide with the overall government policy of retrenchment. Its policy in the 1930s can be traced in the bare statistics of its operations.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Applications</th>
<th>Loans made</th>
<th>Total loaned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>$947,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>$1,839,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>$1,470,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3,846</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>$2,633,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$14,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$14,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$34,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Until 1932, the Board was expanding its loan program to meet the need. After 1932, its funds were sharply curtailed. The Board, like the government which directed it, was caught in the money squeeze. With provincial credit exhausted, the Co-operative Government had no alternative but to fall into line with Ottawa's policy of retrenchment.  

Unlike most other governments in North America, Premier Anderson's cabinet did not introduce a special policy of retrenchment when the depression began. Certainly some

15 Green, "Farm Loan Board", p. 110.
16 Lawton, "Urban Relief", p. 36.
departments' projects. Highways in particular, were cut back, but the overall policy was to expand services to meet the new needs of farmers and townspeople without increased taxes. The pattern of debt financing can be seen in the record of the Farm Loan Board and the Saskatchewan Relief Commission. R.L. Hanbidge, the government's chief whip, explicitly defended the policy of deficit budgeting:

... Money should be spent freely on public works [in time of depression]. The time for a government to retrench, is when prosperity [has] returned, for then private interests will once more be in a position to embark on large expenditures.\(^{17}\)

At first there appeared to be some unity between opposition and government in rejecting a policy of thoroughgoing retrenchment. When a Conservative backbencher introduced a motion calling for reductions in civil service salaries and personnel, both sides of the house voted it down.\(^{18}\) A Liberal daily, devoted an editorial defending the civil service from retrenchment.\(^{19}\) However the spirit of unity did not last long. Before the session was out, W.J. Patterson, Liberal finance critic was saying,

Such extraordinary and unprecedented expenditure is unwise and unwarranted under existing conditions. ... the provincial secretary was going to spend his way to prosperity.\(^{20}\)

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17 Legislative Debates Scrapbooks, (Archives of Saskatchewan), (hereafter, L.D.S.), from Regina Leader Post, January 21, 1931, p. 19.  
18 Ibid., January 15, 1931, p. 8; February 25, 1931, p. 137.  
19 Ibid., January 16, 1931, p. 12.  
20 Regina Leader Post, February 12, 1931, p. 1.
The Co-operative Government's policy of increasing public expenditures to meet public needs and financing the deficit by loans, came to an end in 1932.

The economic orthodoxy of the federal government and the financial community, and declining provincial revenues forced the government into a policy of retrenchment. As the depression hit public revenues the government found itself more and more dependent on loans. 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Land titles fees</th>
<th>Motor licence fees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929-1930</td>
<td>$478,510</td>
<td>$2,017,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1931</td>
<td>$398,208</td>
<td>$1,884,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1932</td>
<td>$277,984</td>
<td>$1,026,820</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gas tax</th>
<th>Provincial deficit</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929-1930</td>
<td>$ 981,907</td>
<td>$ 518,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1931</td>
<td>$1,918,833*</td>
<td>$3,856,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1932</td>
<td>$1,210,537</td>
<td>$5,820,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*In 1930 this tax was increased from 3¢ to 5¢ per gallon.

The necessity in deficit financing is to find someone who will lend the money. Faced by large losses in private business, the financial community was in no mood to support a provincial government that would not adhere to the conventional view of public finance. The federal government mirrored this orthodoxy, insisting that Saskatchewan cut expenditures and raise taxes according to the classic formula. Dependent on extra credit, the Co-operative Government fell into line.

The 1932 Legislative Session was the "retrenchment session". Taxes were increased on corporations, in-

21 L.D.S., from Regina Leader Post, February 2, 1933, pp. 395-396.
cluding banks and finance companies, and new taxes were levied: a gross revenue tax and a per unit tax on oil storage tanks.22 The Gasoline Tax, which had been increased from 3 cents to 5 cents a gallon in 1930 to cover the increased program of construction, was raised to 6 cents per gallon, just to maintain revenues.23 Finally, the Co-operative Government imposed the province's first income tax. Corporations and Joint Stock Companies paid 4% tax on all income over $1,000.24 In structure the middle and higher levels of the income tax on personal income were not progressive. However, in the given economic conditions, only the lower level (below $5,000) was operative, which meant the tax was more progressive in operation than it was in design.

At the same time, government expenditures in several areas were cut. The civil service, so sacred a year before, took a collective pay reduction of $228,878, at rates of from 9% to 14%.25 The next year it received a further cut of 7%-15%.26 The Farm Loan Board received no advances from the provincial treasury for 1932 or 1933. It continued its operations only by re-lending its revenues. The Highways budget provided for no construction in 1932.27 Even with these

22 S.S., 1932, ch. 4, sections 4, 5 and 17. Compare with Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1930, (hereafter, R.S.S.), ch. 38, sections 4, 6, 12, 13 and 16.
24 S.S., 1932, ch. 9, section 7(1,3), schedule one. Regina Leader Post, February 25, 1932, p. 3.
25 L.D.S., from Regina Leader Post, February 4, 1933, p. 396.
26 Ibid., February 7, 1933, p. 391.
27 Regina Leader Post, February 16, 1932, pp. 1, 10.
and similar reductions in other departments, the estimated deficit was still $1,000,000. 28 But as most other governments were discovering in the 1930s, the promise of retrenchment -- the balanced budget -- was a mirage. The new taxes did not produce; expenditures, especially the costs of relief, continued to rise. 29

It is difficult to say retrenchment was either a success or a failure. Retrenchment was not so much a wrong policy as an inevitable one. The government avoided cut backs and higher taxes as long as possible. Limited by the narrow provincial tax base, faced by the financial orthodoxy of both the federal government and the business community, the Anderson government was forced to undertake retrenchment.

III

The Co-operative Government used traditional means to satisfy traditional ends. Retrenchment was the established method for a government to maintain public solvency (i.e. the balanced budget). Relief, although on an unprecedented scale, was the traditional method of relieving destitution. But Saskatchewan in the 1930s had another problem, second only in importance to relief -- debt. Falling prices and drought

28 L.D.S., from Regina Leader Post, February 4, 1933, p. 396.
29 The new income tax, expected to yield $775,000, produced less than one half of that, $375,736.90. L.D.S., from Regina Leader Post, February 21, 1933, p. 361.
meant that a farmer could not support himself for the present; a tax sale or mortgage foreclosure meant he would not be able to support himself in the future.

Saskatchewan had been a debtor community from the days of settlement. Farmers borrowed to buy land and machinery, depending on next year's crop to pay the bill. Merchants borrowed to build their shops and stock them, depending on the farmers' anticipated income. Credit was Saskatchewan's backbone. The depression broke that backbone.

Obligations which often proved difficult to support with good yields when wheat sold at $1.25 per bushel quickly became impossible to meet in terms of 40 cent wheat and lower yields. To have paid the interest alone on the farm debt of the province would have taken nearly two-thirds of the wheat available for sale in every year since 1930 and taxes would have absorbed most of the remainder.30

The debt load had two basic components: contracted debt and tax arrears. The latter, although comprising a lesser part of the total debt was doubly important.31 First, it applied principally to land (i.e. the farm, the shop, the home) which was essential to have even the prospect of a livelihood. Second, it was debt held by government: could a public authority allow citizens to not pay private contracted debts, then insist on payment to itself? The difficulty in legislating on tax arrears was that they were owed mainly to municipal governments, while the provincial government was the

authority which could legislate a deferral. The Co-operative Government when it attempted to legislate was attacked for invasion of local autonomy by both Conservatives and Liberals.  

Two measures were passed in 1933 which aimed at preventing forced sales and providing for an orderly means of paying off the arrears. The first act, which was an extension of a 1931 act, postponed all tax sales until after June 30, 1934. The second established a schedule by which debtors could apply to the municipality to be allowed to pay their consolidated arrears as of September 1, 1933. Starting with a 10% payment in 1933, the debtor would eliminate the arrears by 1938, at five per cent interest. The plan applied automatically to all rural municipalities, although they had the alternative of voting themselves out of the plan. J.J. McGurran, representing the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (S.A.R.M.) said that sixty per cent of his group were in favour of the bill, as long as they were given the same deal as the urban centers; each local government unit would vote into the plan if it chose. However, the provincial government put the bill through over this objection.  

At the next Legislative Session, the government

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32 Regina Leader Post, March 16, 1934, pp. 1, 2; April 3, 1934, p. 4.
33 S.S., 1931, ch. 50; S.S., 1933, ch. 35 and ch. 36.
introduced a much more radical consolidation bill which ex-
tended the period for payment of the arrears and made the
offer of consolidation universal. Not only could everyone
who was two years behind in his taxes apply, but the municipal-
ity could only deny him on stated grounds. Both the S.A.R.M.
and the urban municipalities opposed the measure. The prov-
incial government was telling local property owners that they
could defer payment of their tax arrears, which left the
municipalities with one less source of revenue at a time when
their budgets were already hard-pressed. At least one banker
had already put the debt-ridden local government units on
notice that credit could dry up if Regina restricted their
revenues. However the Co-operative Government passed the
bill in spite of Liberal protests that it would destroy the
fiscal autonomy of local government.

Tax consolidation was a limited solution. It de-
layed the immediate payment of tax arrears, in effect, shifting
the debt load forward in time. Predicated on the quick return
of prosperity, this policy could not provide a permanent
solution to the non-payment of taxes due to the depression.
However, it did succeed in the short term goal of keeping
producers in possession of their means of livelihood.

36 Regina Leader Post, March 23, 1934, pp. 1,18.
37 Regina Leader Post, March 9, 1934, p. 2; March 16, 1934,
pp. 1,2.
38 A statement by the Regina supervisor of the Royal Bank of
Canada. L.D.S., from Regina Daily Star, March 18, 1933,
p. 67.
39 Regina Leader Post, April 3, 1934, p. 4.
A larger problem for many people, particularly farmers, was contracted debt -- mortgages, agreements, for sale and bank loans. At first the government attempted to meet the problem in its 1931 Act to facilitate the Adjustment of Agricultural Debts. The act offered a voluntary conciliation procedure through a Debt Commissioner by which farmers' current payments would be postponed to a future time. Like tax consolidation, this act was a stop-gap measure which implicitly relied on the return of prosperity. From the experience of the Commissioner, and a study done by a committee of the Legislature came a second debt adjustment act in 1932, which extended coverage to urban areas and tried to limit the claims of the creditor as a supplement to the conciliation procedure. The restraints on the creditor's claims were designed to make the debt "reasonable", by ruling out extreme provisions in private contracts. Perhaps the most startling feature was that which empowered the Debt Commissioner to declare an individual moratorium -- quite a club for a "conciliation" mediator. The trend of the 1932 Act was clearly away from simple mediation to a coercive settlement of debts in favour of the debtor.

The 1933 Debt Adjustment Bill and the Bill for the Limitation of Civil Rights completed the shift towards government regulation, as opposed to simple mediation of debt

40 S.S., 1931, ch. 59.
41 S.S., 1932, ch. 51.
adjustment. A.C. Stewart, in introducing the bill, explained the government's change in policy.

The policy of our government has been to keep all bona-fide farmers on the land, prevent foreclosures, and costs being incurred . . . until a) voluntary adjustments were made by the debt adjustment commissioner, or b) if the conditions continued, further legislative action would be taken.

Every effort was made by our government . . . to persuade the loan and trust companies to deal generally and generously with the situation this last year. . . . Surely they do not expect the government of this province to act as a buffer between them and the fair demands of the debtors who form 90% of our farming population. . . . We feel that it is fundamental and in the interests of the creditor that he take his share of the loss now; write off debts that should be written off and shed daylight to the farmers who need it shown.42

All debts had to be reviewed by the newly established Debt Adjustment Board, prior to any legal proceeding by the creditor, in order that the Board could attempt conciliation and pass judgment on the "reasonableness" of the debt. It also had the power to arbitrate a settlement if conciliation failed. Among its powers was that of re-writing the contracted debt to reduce the interest or principal. The new bill gave the cabinet power to declare interest moratoria for any individual case, any part, or the whole of the province. The draft bill limiting civil rights further restricted the creditors' claims on their debtors.43 As soon as the texts became public a furious debate erupted.

42 L.D.S., from Regina Daily Star, March 10, 1933, p. 47.
43 S.S., 1933, ch. 82 and ch. 83.
When the two debt adjustment bills were moved to committee, over twenty individuals from all over the province, and as far away as Toronto, came to present briefs. The boards of trade from Regina, Moose Jaw, Swift Current, Weyburn, Estevan, Yorkton, Saskatoon, North Battleford and Prince Albert sent representatives. The Saskatchewan Bar Association, the Land Mortgage Association, Robert Simpson Western Ltd., Beatty Washing Machine Co., International Harvester Company, and the National Trust Company made representations. All were opposed to the bills. R.H. Milliken appeared on behalf of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool's 80,000 members to support the bills. M.J. Coldwell, leader of the Farmer-Labor Party, urged farm and trade union groups to lobby for the measure. A number of individual farmers argued for the bills, although one was against them. In the main, arguments against the proposed legislation centered on the sanctity of contract in law and the necessity of preserving this sanctity to maintain confidence and good credit rating.

From time immemorial, it has been a basic principle of British law that contractual rights, acquired for valuable consideration in accordance with the law existing at the time the contract is entered into will not be taken away by the Legislature. Confidence in the stability of the law with the reference to which contracts are made is the foundation of business and commerce.

44 L.D.S., from Regina Daily Star, March 10, 1933, p. 49; March 14, 1933, pp. 55-56; March 15, 1933, pp. 59-60; March 20, 1933, p. 68.
and any impairment of this confidence cannot fail to have very serious and far-reaching effects. . . . We feel that conditions are about to improve and we feel very strongly that any legislation which has the effect of undermining confidence can only have a retarding influence.\textsuperscript{45}

Those who appeared on behalf of the bills pleaded the necessity of easing the debtors' load in the extreme conditions of depression. Some of the bills' "supporters", while backing the legislation, were less than enthusiastic.\textsuperscript{46} As the Western Producer later put it, "This 'generous gesture' must be interpreted as an agreement to refrain from trying to extract blood from a stone . . . ."\textsuperscript{47} In general, as was to be expected, creditors opposed the legislation, debtors supported it.

The province's two leading partisan newspapers, the Conservative Regina Daily Star and the Liberal Regina Leader Post, reacted to the debt adjustment bills with surprising unity. The Liberal paper, of course, condemned the bills. The Regina Daily Star took a more complex position. At first, it seemed inclined to side with the government, its nominal ally, with cautious acceptance of the proposed legislation.\textsuperscript{49} Later, however, the Star ridiculed R.H. Milliken's support of

\textsuperscript{46} M.J. Coldwell had reservations, although he supported the government bills. L.D.S., Regina Daily Star, March 10, 1933, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{47} This comment applied to all the Debt Adjustment Acts, including Hon. W.J. Patterson's, Western Producer, October 8, 1936, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{48} L.D.S., from Regina Leader Post, March 9, 1933, p. 324; March 10, 1933, p. 315.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., from Regina Daily Star, March 9, 1933, p. 46; March 10, 1933, p. 48.
the bills, in an oblique attack on the government's policy.

If the ordinary debtor is to be allowed to break his solemn agreement with a second party, why could not the Pool (whom Milliken represented) also escape its financial obligations to the provincial government by dishonouring its own signature? 58

As the business community mounted its vigorous attack on the proposed debt adjustment legislation, the Star eagerly printed speculation that various parts of the bills would be dropped. In effect, it tried to provide an honourable line of retreat.

Members of the government are not backing down as a result of the rather savage series of attacks on the Debt Adjustment Bill, but rather are beginning to believe that part of the bill is unnecessary . . . 51

The Star wanted nothing more than an extension of the 1931 mediation procedure. It opposed those aspects of the bill which empowered the Board to cancel or re-write contracts.

On March 14, Stewart announced that the government would withdraw section 5 and 6(1) of the Civil Rights Bill and sections 22 and 23 of the Debt Adjustment Bill. The former was the controversial "personal covenant" clause which would have barred the vendor or mortgagee from suing the debtor on the basis of his promise to pay (i.e. "covenant"). The latter sections would have empowered the Board to cancel or re-write a debt on its own judgment, before any court decision. 52 While the Star welcomed this move in an editorial

50 Ibid., March 17, 1933, p. 65.
51 Ibid., March 14, 1933, p. 55.
52 Ibid., March 9, 1933, p. 45; March 10, 1933, p. 48; March 14, 1933, p. 55.
entitled, "Taking a Wise Step", business opposition continued unabated.

The reasons for the changes are difficult to establish. If the government thought to conciliate its opponents by deleting the most objectionable features, it misjudged the vehemence of the business community. Moreover the concessions were not a full retreat from government regulation of debt adjustment, but only a tactical maneuver. While section 22 of the Debt Adjustment Bill was withdrawn, other sections remained, which gave the Board power to defer payment and re-write certain features of a contract. The government found the modified stand was still acceptable to farm representatives. However in the Legislature, it had to resist attacks by its own backbenchers to give debtors more protection from legal action by creditors. The announcement of March 14 probably failed to win the government any new supporters and likely irritated those it had.

When the final draft of the Debt Adjustment Bill was presented on third reading, the opposition adopted a strange, ambivalent attitude: the Liberals accepted it unanimously on a recorded vote; yet J.G. Gardiner announced that "he and many other Liberals disagreed with the bill, although they wished it well." Apparently the Liberals in-

53 Ibid., March 14, 1933, p. 58.
54 Ibid., March 20, 1933, p. 68.
55 Ibid., March 28, 1933, p. 82.
56 Ibid., March 28, 1933, p. 81.
tended to see how the Act worked out before they took definite position.

The 1934 amendment to the Debt Adjustment Act strengthened the Debt Adjustment Board, more than the original draft of the act a year earlier. The Board was empowered to re-write the actual terms of the contract (i.e. the amount of interest and principal) and if the creditor refused to accept the new contract the Board was required to declare a moratorium for the debtor involved. The Leader Post attacked the amendment strongly.

If a Debt Adjustment Board in Saskatchewan has power to declare all contracts null and void, and to remake them according to its own decision as to what they should be, it would appear as if the basis for contracts has disappeared. Under this new situation all basis for credit, for selling goods on time, for engaging to carry out conditions disappears.

The government's stand at the close of the 1934 session was substantially the same as at the opening of the 1933 session. No creditor was allowed to sue for any kind of contracted debt without first securing permission from the central board; such permission was granted only if the members of the board were satisfied the debt was reasonable and the debtor was able to pay.

What was the impact of the government's debt adjustment program? In some ways, like tax consolidation it was a

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57 Regina Leader Post, April 3, 1934, pp. 1,2; April 9, 1934, pp. 1,9.
58 Regina Leader Post, April 15, 1934, p. 4.
short term measure.

... All these measures have had the effect of deferring collection of debts and have been accompanied by a rapid accumulation of arrears of interest rather than by any real scaling down of the burden.\(^5\)

Much of the program's impact depended on the actions of the Board. In general it was reluctant to re-write contracts, while it gave many farmers relief from immediate demands by creditors.\(^6\)

Number of farmer-owners (1931 census) 90,695
Debt Adjustment Board (1933-1934)
(1) Applications for mortgage foreclosure or cancellation of agreement of sale 1,683
(2) Applications granted 956
(3) Applications granted without debtor's consent 749
(4) Applications for repossession 2,512
(5) Applications granted 1,218*
*(Of these, "many" were with the debtor's consent, according to Stewart.)

Perhaps the best expression of both the aims and the achievements of the province's debt adjustment program, was the introductory statement made by Stewart.

While this act won't cure the patient Saskatchewan, which like every other state and province and country is suffering from an economic illness that will take a radical international operation to cure, still the act will provide the necessary blood transfusion to keep the patient alive until the radical operation is performed, and in the main, those supplying that transfusion are themselves in a healthy state and able to stand the loss, though perhaps not willing.\(^6\)

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60 Regina Leader Post, April 5, 1934, p. 2.
61 L.D.S., from Regina Daily Star, March 10, 1933, p. 47.
When the Co-operative Government took office, the liberal ideal of limited government was already weakening. In 1928 the Liberal government had initiated a policy of public ownership of power utilities. The Conservatives had endorsed this move, and at their March, 1928 convention passed a resolution in favour of the "development of the power resources of the province as publicly owned and operated utilities." The depression compelled further government intervention in the economy for two reasons. The weight of the depression, but for the government's support, would have struck down many enterprises essential for the public welfare. The necessity of maintaining basic economic structures was the rationale for the debt adjustment laws, and the provincial government's backing of the Wheat Pool and the Co-op Creamery. By generating dissatisfaction, economic hardship tended to increase the popularity of radical politics and policies. With a government as polyglot as that under Anderson, many of these radical ideas were given a hearing. For example, S.N. Horner introduced a motion calling for federal bounties to successful exporters of wheat. Two radical initiatives which became government policy, at least for a time, were the compulsory Wheat Pool and the regulation of gasoline competition.

63 Appendix A, point 10.
64 L.D.S., from Regina Leader Post, February 20, 1931, p. 123; February 27, 1931, p. 147.
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, established in 1923, had done a good job of marketing its members' grain at fair prices for five years. In 1928-1930, however, it was caught by falling prices and declining markets. By December, 1929 the Pool had accumulated a debt of $15,493,752. Provincial Premiers Bracken of Manitoba, Brownlee of Alberta and Anderson of Saskatchewan met in Regina with officials for the three provincial Wheat Pools to consider methods of keeping the Pools solvent. When it was decided that each government would guarantee its own provincial Pool's bond issue to cover the indebtedness, the premiers thought they had done their part. Not so said the bankers, who were expected to accept the bonds. They wanted and got provincial bonds to cover the indebtedness, while the three governments accepted the Pool bonds. While this arrangement saved the Wheat Pools from the 1929 disaster, it exhausted their credit and left them dependent on the provincial government's credit. However, with the depression making its impact on public revenues and increasing relief expenditures, the prairie provinces could not finance another huge deficit (over half to Saskatchewan). After numerous trips to the east, the three premiers and the Pool directors convinced the federal government that it must guarantee the operation of the Wheat Pools in Western Canada.

The provincial aid in 1929 had kept the Pool from bankruptcy in the initial shock of the "crash"; provincial lobbying at Ottawa had helped to obtain the federal guarantee that enabled the Pools to survive the long, lean years of the 1930s.

The depression also brought trouble for another, smaller co-operative, the Saskatchewan Co-op Creamery. Formed in 1917 from a large number of small creameries in the province, it merged with its largest rival, Joseph Caulder's Caulder Creameries Ltd., in 1927. Prior to that date, the Co-op Creamery had been dependent on government loans to carry deficits. Under the impact of the depression, the deficits again mounted with two results -- the Co-op Creamery needed more loans and Caulder wanted out. An attempt by the company's largest shareholder to dump his shares would destroy the Co-op Creamery's credit rating. The directors appealed to the government to buy out Caulder. This the government agreed to do, over the objections of at least one of its members. For its expenditure of $54,892, the government gained a controlling interest in an unorthodox "co-operative" that had run up a $500,000 loss even in the prosperous 1920s.

The government, with the controlling interest, chose Mr. S.C. Burton as the Co-op Creamery's general manager. To everyone's surprise, Mr. Burton put the enterprise on its feet. In 1932, the Creamery showed a $28,000 profit in its operating

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68 Dr. R.H. Smith of Moose Jaw City. Regina Leader Post, March 5, 1932, p. 2.
69 Regina Leader Post, February 5, 1931, pp. 1,10.
budget. The Regina Leader Post, unaccustomed to complimenting the Co-operative Government, wrote,

While Mr. Burton was not able to meet interest charges to the government or to the bondholders, he managed to get the concern to a point where it was not losing money in actual operation. This is encouraging. While there is faint hope that the concern will earn enough to make good the money lost in the past it is satisfactory that it does not have to make further demands on provincial credit to keep going. 70

In supporting the Wheat Pool and the Co-op Creamery during their time of travail, the Co-operative Government gave an ironic fulfillment to the pledge of the Conservative platform to give "approval and encouragement (to) co-operative enterprises". 71

The government's actions toward the Wheat Pool and the Co-op Creameries were in the nature of a salvage operation. The same is not true of another initiative of the Co-operative Government -- the attempt to establish a provincial, producer controlled wheat board. This had its origins in the Wheat Pool movement that had grown up in Saskatchewan during the 1920s. The basic idea of the Pool was a producers' monopoly: if the farmers' organization could control the entire crop, it could have some voice in the conditions of sale. When a voluntary organization could not gain complete control, a compulsory one, enforced by legislative enactment, was proposed. 72 The campaign for a "100% Pool" or "compulsory Pool"

70 Regina Leader Post, February 25, 1933, p. 4.
71 Appendix C, point 12; Appendix D, point 4c.
was a logical outgrowth of the voluntary Wheat Pool movement.

The sentiment for government intervention, however, was by no means unanimous. A.J. MacPhail, Wheat Pool President, was still arguing against the 100% Pool two years after the provincial convention had accepted the idea. Friction between the United Farmers' of Canada, Saskatchewan Section (U.F.C.) and the Pool on the issue delayed a referendum of Pool contract holders for two and a half years. While its members voted for a compulsory organization by 71%, with a 58% turn out, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool was the only one of the prairie pools to endorse government intervention. There were plenty of critics of the 100% Pool, both within the Pool movement and outside it.

With the success of the Pool's June, 1930 referendum, the directors and their solicitor, R.H. Milliken, began to press their demand for legislation on the government. At the same time, those farmers who opposed the compulsory pool were organizing to lobby by the formation of the "Association Opposing a Compulsory Pool". Composed of both Pool and non-pool members, the Association was divided by a chronic ambivalence: at times the whole idea of pooling grain was attacked; at others only the compulsory aspect of legislation.

73 Western Producer, October 31, 1929, p. 1.
75 Nesbitt, Wheat Pool Story, p. 190.
76 Regina Leader Post, January 27, 1931, p. 1. For a full expression of the businessmen's case against the compulsory pool, see Hon. Frank Oliver's article, "Saskatchewan Faced With Momentous Decision", Saturday Night, February 7, 1931, pp. 19, 27.
Through the Regina newspapers, the Association carried on a running battle with the proponents of the 100% Pool. The officials of the Pool, R.J. Moffat, its managing director and George W. Robertson its secretary, replied to all attacks. On February 19, 1931, the Pool organized a demonstration near the Legislative Buildings of 1,500 farmers in support of the 100% Pool. In addition to the overt manifestations of support, both sides used more private methods of lobbying.

The result of this agitation was a resolution in favour of a provincial grain marketing agency, introduced by a private member on the government side. Premier Anderson, in announcing this procedure, was careful to explain that the Co-operative Government was neutral on the matter. The reason for this curious method was not long hidden. Two days later, Dr. D.S. Johnstone, President of the Saskatchewan Liberal-Conservative Association, attacked the government for allowing any compulsory marketing legislation.

I do not believe that any government would be justified in submitting or passing legislation which would have the effect of creating a monopoly, to deprive the individual producer of the right to dispose of his product or transacting his private business as he is now entitled to do.

77 Regina Leader Post, January 28, 1931, pp. 1, 8; January 30, 1931, p. 8; February 3, 1931, p. 2.
79 J.V. Patterson told of the numerous letters, petitions and representations both for and against the 100% Pool, that he had received from his riding, L.D.S., from Regina Daily Star, March 4, 1931, p. 304.
The Conservative Regina Daily Star also disapproved of the government's tacit acceptance of the 100% Pool idea, although its dissent was less strident than Johnstone's. When the final vote was taken on the resolution, only five members voted against it, with forty-eight in favour. Three of the five were Conservatives.

The proposed legislation took the form of two bills. The first, the Referendum (Grain Marketing) Bill, called for a referendum among all persons over twenty-one years of age who owned or occupied at least forty acres on which some grain was grown, who was the wife or husband of such a person, or who was the vendor or mortgager of such land. If two thirds of those eligible to vote and voting answered "yes" to the question, "Are you in favour of a 100% Compulsory Grain Pool as provided in the Grain Marketing Act, 1931?", then that act would incorporate the "Saskatchewan Grain Co-operative", run like the Wheat Pool, with a monopoly on the purchase of grain in Saskatchewan.

The two bills were introduced by Jacob Benson and M.A. MacPherson. The fiction of government neutrality was wearing thin. But if the cabinet was staying as far from the measure as it could, it had good reason. Much of the attack on the 100% Pool came from Conservatives. Besides Johnstone,

82 Regina Daily Star, January 14, 1931, p. 1; February 4, 1931, p. 4.
83 George Bennett, James Grassick and H.A. Lilly. The Liberals supplied the other two dissenters -- Anton Huck and Jules Marion. S.P., 1931, p. 89.
84 S.S., 1931, ch. 87, sections 3 and 4; ch. 88, section 2.
the Conservative Association President, M.L.A.'s H.N. Warren and James Gobban questioned both the effectiveness and the honesty of the voluntary Wheat Pool. Dr. R.H. Smith attempted to amend the Referendum Bill to give the franchise to all persons who could vote in a provincial election, rather than just the farming population. This change, favoured by the opponents of the bill was defeated. By disavowing any responsibility for the bills, the Co-operative Government was able to avoid any direct clash with those of its supporters who opposed compulsory pool legislation. Most Liberals were lying low. Only T.C. Davis, A. Loptson and R.J. Gordon ventured any criticism of the compulsory pool or pooling in general. The opposition had no intention of forcefully taking sides on an obviously controversial issue.

One obstacle in the way of the proposed provincial wheat board was the British North America Act, which grants legislative power over "trade and commerce" to the Dominion. A provincial marketing act passed by the British Columbia Legislature, much along the same lines as the 100% Pool, had been challenged in the courts. The same week that the Saskatchewan Legislature passed its marketing resolution, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled the British Columbia act ultra vires.

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86 Regina Leader Post, March 11, 1931, p. 11; Regina Daily Star, January 14, 1931, p. 4.
87 Regina Leader Post, March 3, 1931, p. 8.
88 30-31 Victoria, ch. 3, section 91(2).
The Regina Leader Post commented:

Applied to the proposed 100 per cent wheat pool, the judgment would prevent any prairie legislature from enforcing an act by which farmers were compelled to sell their wheat through a central pool or agency. 89

Responding to the ruling, MacPherson announced that the legislation would be proceeded with, but that the referendum would be delayed until its legality under the British North America Act was certain. In case the legislation did prove ultra vires, it was considered probable that the Co-operative Government would request federal enabling legislation. 90 Such was to be the case.

The Grain Marketing Act and its partner, the Referendum (Grain Marketing) Act received vice-regal assent in March, 1931. As promised MacPherson's Attorney General's Department took them to Saskatchewan's Court of Appeal. As expected the judges followed the case of Lawson vs. Interior Tree Fruit and Vegetable Committee of Direction which had declared the British Columbia Produce Marketing Act to be unconstitutional, and declared the Grain Marketing Act ultra vires. 91 The Co-operative Government was prepared to appeal the decision, hoping for a reversal, but the farmers' organizations which had pressed for the bill were no longer interested. 92

89 Regina Leader Post, February 16, 1931, p. 1.
It is difficult to estimate the impact of Saskatchewan's Grain Marketing Act on the later Dominion statutes, the Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934 and the Wheat Board Act, 1935. The Co-operative Government made representations to Ottawa in 1931 and 1932 for a marketing act. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool used the same tactics in its 1932-1933 drive for a national marketing act as it had for the provincial 100% Pool: petitions from local organizations, letters and telegrams. But in the period 1931-1933, Ottawa felt it had its hands full with Mr. J.I. MacFarland's price stabilization program. Moreover the other two wheat pools were not pressing for government intervention. However when the Dominion Government did decide to intervene, the fate of Saskatchewan's Grain Marketing Act demonstrated the need for federal action in marketing legislation.

The Bill to Prohibit Discrimination in Sales of Gasoline (the "Gas Bill") had a checkered and instructive career. It aimed at establishing a uniform price structure for petroleum products throughout the province in order to protect small independent sellers from ruinous local price wars by the Imperial Oil Company and its allies. Although never passed, the Gas Bill provides an interesting contrast to its contemporary, debt adjustment legislation in terms of measuring government determination against business lobbying pressure. While the Grain Marketing Act and the Debt Adjust-

94 Norris, "The Natural Products Marketing Act", pp. 470-475.
ment Act show the extent to which the Co-operative Government was willing to intervene in the economy to meet the pressures of the depression, the Gas Bill demonstrates the limits of that intervention.

The bill was first introduced by A.C. Stewart in 1931, but was withdrawn by him on second reading. In the 1933 debates, he explained that the government had been pressured by certain boards of trade and threats of a gasoline price increase from the Imperial Oil Company. The business community, headed by Imperial Oil, had succeeded in defeating the first Gas Bill.\textsuperscript{95}

The next year the Legislature established a committee "to enquire into the costs and sale of gasoline, oil and lubricating oils and correlated questions, and to report to this Assembly during the present session".\textsuperscript{96} The committee's conclusions offered a number of recommendations about methods of retailing gasoline, the need for quality control and lower freight rates. But its most significant finding was the existence of a gasoline combine.

While there is evidence of very keen competition in the matter of local distribution and retail sale of gasoline, there does not appear to be, in Saskatchewan, any real competition in the manufacture or sale in the larger quantities. Practically all gasoline retailed in Saskatchewan, and sold by companies other than the Imperial Oil Company,

\textsuperscript{95} Regina Leader Post, March 11, 1933, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{96} S.P.,\textsuperscript{2} 1932, p. 39.
irrespective of who sells it, is refined by that company, and that company fixes the prices and, in effect, determines the price which the consumers will pay, without any outside competition whatever.97

In view of the committee's report, Stewart's Gas Bill was sure to receive attention at the next Legislative session. Events of the spring and summer of 1932 lent further weight to his Bill. In March, the Hi-Way Refinery Company opened a small refinery a few miles north of Regina. A short time later, the same company constructed another at Saskatoon. The impact of the new company was to force the price of gasoline down four to five cents per gallon in the centers where its product was marketed -- Regina, Saskatoon, Moose Jaw, and Yorkton.

Into this tense atmosphere, Stewart reintroduced his Gas Bill. His speech on the bill in second reading reviewed the history of the 1931 Gas Bill, the events of 1932 and the aims of the present bill.

If independent refineries are given protection under this bill so that the Imperial Oil Company, for instance, cannot undersell them and put them out of business, then I believe the price of gasoline will come down.

Certain farm co-operative societies interested in the selling of gasoline have in various manners intimated that if given the protection of this act before the legislature they will establish a refinery for the purpose of serving the people of the western side of the province.99

Using the Hi-Way refinery as an example, he argued that com-

97 Regina Leader Post, April 13, 1932, p. 10.
98 Regina Leader Post, March 11, 1933, p. 5.
99 Ibid.
petition would bring the price down to at least four cents per gallon, for a saving of about $3,000,000 for the people of Saskatchewan. Considering the reduction in kerosene, tractor and heating fuel costs, altogether more than $5,000,000 could be gained. At the same time he denied that the Gas Bill was solely for the protection of a single company. Its aim was to increase competition in the sale of petroleum products in order to reduce their cost to consumers. 100

The Gas Bill immediately aroused the adamant opposition of both the province's major newspapers. The Conservative Regina Daily Star wrote:

If a large concern, say such as the Imperial Oil Company, is to be forced to make a province-wide reduction, it involves the Government interfering with trade which as The Star has so frequently contended, is no function of government. 101

The Liberal Regina Leader Post, backed away from its earlier assertion that gasoline had become a public utility, and attacked the Bill as "legislation . . . to help out one set of companies against another set of companies". 102 The newspapers reflected the energetic opposition of the business community as a whole and the Imperial Oil group of companies in particular.

The day before the Select Standing Committee on Law Amendments began its hearings on the Gas Bill, H.L. Magee, the

100 Ibid.
101 Regina Daily Star, March 14, 1933, p. 4.
102 Regina Leader Post, June 24, 1932, p. 4; March 15, 1933, p. 4.
manager of Imperial Oil in Regina announced that if the bill passed, the company would be forced to close its refinery in Regina. B.A. Oil Company announced that it would not build the projected oil refinery at Saskatoon if the bill were allowed to pass. Among the long list of those appearing to condemn the bill were E.C. Leslie (Imperial Oil), W.S. Kirkpatrick (Puritan Oil), A.D. Kennedy (Patron Oil), P.H. Gordon (B.A. Oil), J.T. Warner (Imperial Oil workers), J.L. Waterson (Saskatchewan Motor Club) and surprisingly, R.: McKay (Saskatchewan Wholesale Co-operative) and John Wilson (Davidson Co-operative). The only two individuals who appeared to argue in favour were R.W. Ferguson, of the Riceton Co-operative Society and D.F. Bolster, a Hi-Way shareholder.

The death blow to the Gas Bill was not dealt by its enemies but by C.B. Keenleyside, the solicitor for Hi-Way. After arguing that his company had been pressured by Imperial Oil and its allies, he read the following statement,

In view of this threatened action of the Imperial Oil Company (to close their refinery), therefore, it is the desire of Hi-Way to make known to this committee that in its opinion the public has been made so aware of the imminent danger to small industries and it, the public, is so emphatically behind the spirit and intent of the bill that its purpose has been largely accomplished and no company will now dare to institute a ruinous price war for the purpose of destroying the business of a competitor — bill or no bill.

104 Regina Leader Post, March 16, 1933, p. 12.
105 L.D.S., from Regina Daily Star, March 20, 1933, p. 70.
The retreat by Hi-Way was apparently not unanimous. Mr. Bolster said quite frankly that he did not believe the promises of the big companies. However, the committee accepted Mr. Keenleyside's statement and a majority voted to kill the Gasoline Sales Discrimination Bill.

But the Gas Bill was not quite dead. When the committee brought its report to the Legislature, a storm of protests arose. Eventually James Hogan and R.J. Gordon put a motion to oblige the committee to reconsider its report. It carried without a standing vote, T.C. Davis expressing the only dissenting voice. The next day, the committee submitted exactly the same report -- that the bill not be proceeded with. This time the opponents of the Gas Bill were ready to force a standing vote. The result produced a curious division. Thirteen Liberals, including the entire front bench and twelve Conservatives, including the premier and four of his cabinet, voted against the bill (i.e. in favour of the committee report). They were beaten by a combination of ten Liberals, ten Conservatives, five Independents and three Progressives. The result of this victory for the pro-bill forces was to move the Gasoline Sales Discrimination Bill to Committee of the Whole.

March 30, the second day that the Committee of the Whole spent on the Gas Bill, James Grassick moved that the Committee rise and report, a motion that would have the effect
of defeating the bill. When an M.L.A. tried to debate the motion, the Deputy Speaker informed him that discussion was not in order. On a standing vote, the chairman ruled the motion carried. Under the pressure of protests from James Hogan and Sam Whatley, he called for a recount, just as some members were entering the chamber. The chairman again ruled the motion carried, 26 to 19. Again members rose to protest the manner in which the vote was taken. But the ruling stood.

The Gas Bill was, to a large extent, a backbenchers' bill: no one on the Liberal frontbench supported it; only two cabinet ministers, Stewart and John Merkley, supported it. It was also, to a considerable degree, a Liberal bill. The men who pressed the 1932 enquiry and the 1933 bill -- B.F. McGregor, D.N. Strath, James Hogan, R.J. Gordon, H.M. Therres -- were Liberals. Yet in the crucial March 30 vote the opposition voted practically solidly to defeat the measure, with only two voting for continuing the bill. The lack of frontbench support can be accounted for by the oil companies' tactics. In the hearings before the Select Standing Committee on Law Amendments the solicitors for Imperial, B.A. and related concerns concentrated their attention on the prominent members of the Legislature -- J.F. Bryant, M.A. MacPherson, J.M. Uhrich, and T.C. Davis. It is more difficult to explain the reversal of the Liberal backbenchers. In the key vote to

110 Ibid.
111 Regina Leader Post, March 16, 1933, p. 12.
reject the committee report, ten of the twenty-eight opposed had been Liberals. On March 30, only two opposition members stood up for the Gas Bill. Part of this decline might be attributed to absenteeism, as it was the last day of the session and there were eight fewer M.L.A.'s in the House. But why would members go home when they knew their bill was in danger? It may be that between the bill's unexpected twenty-eight to twenty-five success on March 21 and the final vote on March 30, the oil lobby turned its persuasive attentions on to those Liberal backbenchers who had supported the Gas Bill.

It would not be fair to leave an impression that the Legislature was the facile tool of the commercial lobby. The Grain Marketing Act and the debt adjustment legislation were put through over strong objections from the business community. But the Gas Bill was not. Part of the reason for this may be the fact that the two bills on debt adjustment were being discussed at the same time. The Co-operative Government cabinet contained a good many individuals who were involved in business, who were open to demands for some concessions. Certainly the Regina Daily Star eagerly reported any rumors of partial concessions by the government.112 Committed to the debt adjustment legislation, the cabinet may have been willing to let the Gas Bill die, rather than further increase the hostility towards it among the business community.

112 Regina Daily Star, March 14, 1933, p. 4; March 18, 1933, p. 1.
"My government is taking the necessary steps to do all that is humanly possible to meet the current crisis..."

Accepting this statement, taken from the 1934 Speech from the Throne, as a self-declared standard, how does the Co-operative Government measure up? Did its policies -- retrenchment, relief, tax consolidation, debt adjustment and the experiments in regulation -- do "all that is humanly possible" for a provincial government to do in responding to a depression?

Retrenchment was a policy designed to meet the crisis in public finance, rather than the crisis of the whole community. Yet it was one imposed on the government after two years of resistance. When the financial community's economic orthodoxy, accepted by Ottawa, did force the Co-operative Government into line, the cabinet raised the taxes on a generally progressive basis and refused to make major cutbacks in social services -- health, relief or education, preferring to reduce government administration and Highways budgets. In undertaking retrenchment, the government tried to make the best of a bad situation.

113 Although the statement strictly applies only to the provision of grasshopper poison, it characterizes the tone of the Speech from the Throne. Regina Leader Post, February 14, 1934, p. 2.
115 Premier Anderson stated that he was prepared to increase the public debt if that was necessary to maintain relief services. Regina Leader Post, May 28, 1934, p. 4.
The relief policy fulfilled the Premier's pledge that "No one will starve". In co-operation with the urban municipalities and voluntary agencies, the S.R.C. provided food, clothing, fuel and health care for those made destitute by the depression. The use of relief advances, often criticized as harsh, was softened in practice by the administrators. While much of the provincial relief program was dependent on "temporary" Dominion assistance, the Co-operative Government was responsible for the able handling of relief.

Tax consolidation and debt adjustment were both basically policies designed to defer present financial obligations in order to preserve ownership. Many criticized this approach, specifically to debt adjustment, as inadequate since it left the burden of debt unreduced. While there were some provisions in the 1933 Debt Adjustment Act for the reduction of debt, these only applied to unusual cases. But what would a general reduction of debts by legislative enactment have achieved? As long as a farmer or merchant kept title to his property and had upcoming payments on his debts reduced to a level he could pay, which might be nil for many, the permanent writing down of debts would not be any additional assistance. The call for debt reduction was popular, but it had little to do with meeting the crisis of the depression.

The government's financial assistance to the Wheat Pool and the Co-op Creamery enabled these institutions to operate through the 1930s. In a similar way the S.R.C.'s aid to hard pressed school and hospital boards enabled the...
continuation of education and health care even in the poorest areas. The government, besides supporting existing social and economic structures, tried to create new ones although both its major efforts failed.

The Grain Marketing Act, 1931, attempted to establish a provincial wheat board on the basis of the 100% Pool idea. The failure of the act in the courts contributed indirectly to the development of the federal Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934 and the Wheat Board Act, 1935. The 1933 Gasoline Sales Discrimination Bill marked a split in the government, with most of cabinet abandoning the measure under pressure from the "oil lobby". Yet it is too much to say that a commercial lobby ran the government: the Grain Marketing Act and the Debt Adjustment Act were passed over strenuous objections from the business community.

A provincial government does not have the constitutional power to do "all that is humanly possible" in responding to a depression. Within the limits of the British North America Act, the Co-operative Government tried to cope with the effects of the drought and trade depression on the people of Saskatchewan. With the exception of the Gasoline Sales Discrimination Bill, the government did everything constitutionally possible for a provincial authority.
CHAPTER IV

THE STRESSES OF POWER
Anderson's government depended on the Legislative support of three groups -- the Conservatives, the Progressives, and the Independents. The tensions between the Tories and the Progressive-Independents, and the tensions within the Tory party were always in the background when the events of the last two chapters were being played out. With the onset of the depression and the example of all-party government in Manitoba the question arose of expanding the coalition to include all or part of the Liberal opposition. These political matters took up considerable time and a great deal of energy, at times affecting the course of government policy.

When the Co-operative Government was formed in the fall of 1929, many observers thought that it could not last. Liberals in particular found it incredible that high-tariff Conservatives could work with low-tariff Progressives.¹ Although the Progressives had agreed both before and after the election to combine with the Conservatives against Gardiner, it was not certain that they would consistently support a Conservative or predominantly Conservative cabinet.² The

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¹ Regina Leader Post, June 8, 1929, p. 4.
² C.E. Little, President of the Progressive Association, said Conservative-Progressive co-operation against the government was possible, Regina Daily Post, June 13, 1928, p. 10; Kyba, "Saskatchewan General Election", p. 77.
federal Progressives had become notorious for their indecision in 1925-1926 when they switched their support from Mackenzie King's Liberal government to Arthur Meighen's Conservative opposition, and then back again. When the three groups met at the Hotel Saskatchewan in Regina after the election, they agreed to operate as a bloc on a limited platform -- civil service reform.⁢ Although Rev. R. Leslie, a Progressive M.L.A., was Speaker of the House from 1930 to 1934, and Dr. Reginald Stipe was appointed to the cabinet, the Progressive Association made it quite clear that these were individual actions and not sanctioned or encouraged by the Association.⁴ In the first years of the Co-operative Government the Progressive's support seemed tenuous.

The most precise method of measuring the consistency of support for the Co-operative Government is to examine the voting lists to determine the number of splits from government ranks on motions of confidence (i.e. direct non-confidence motions, the motion for supply, the Speech from the Throne), government bills and motions, and resolutions generally supported by government members. A study of these votes from 1930 to 1934 shows that of the four Progressives -- Jacob Benson, Sam Whatley, S.N. Horner and R. Stipe -- only the former two demonstrated more deviation than the more independent minded Conservatives such as Sam Whittaker,

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³ Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, June 12, 1929, p. 1.
⁴ Western Producer, September 12, 1929, p. 3; September 21, 1929, p. 1.
Dr. S.W. Arthur, or H.A. Lilly. The radical Progressives, Jacob Benson and Sam Whatley, changed their party designation to Farmer-Labor in the 1933 session, after the formation of that group. The behaviour of these two members towards the coalition is instructive. First, they still sat on the government side of the House. Second, their support of the government did not change in pattern from that of 1929-1932. Of the Independent members only J.V. Patterson and J.B. Taylor showed any tendency to vote against government motions. In spite of the apparent tenuousness of the coalition, its record in the Legislature demonstrates a high degree of cohesion among the supporters of the government.

There was a group within the Co-operative Government caucus which often took an independent line from the cabinet. This "ginger group", which the Regina Leader Post dubbed "the government's left wing", usually included Whittaker, Dr. Arthur, Horner, Whatley, Benson, and at times, J.V. Patterson and A.C. Stewart. In 1931 and 1932 this group pressed for further retrenchment of the civil service, a fairer re-distribution bill and licencing for osteopaths. In 1933 it supported the Gasoline Sales Discrimination Bill and pressed for a stronger Debt Adjustment Act. The ginger group also sponsored many resolutions of

5 Appendix G.
6 Regina Leader Post, April 12, 1932, p. 1.
7 S.P., 1931, pp. 100-101,123; 1932, pp. 126,137-138; Regina Leader Post, April 12, 1932, p. 1.
8 S.P., 1933, p. 95; L.D.S. from Regina Daily Star, March 28, 1933, p. 82.
its own -- in favour of the single transferable ballot, in favour of lower tariffs, and against continuing the office of Lieutenant Governor. Most of these differences with the majority of the government members were of degree, rather than substance.

The cohesion of the coalition can be traced to two major influences. First, there was the presence of Stewart and Stipe in the cabinet. As Minister of Highways, Stewart was the ranking non-Conservative in the cabinet. By 1932 many people were calling the Co-operative Government, the "Anderson-Stewart Government". Not only was he the holder of a prominent portfolio, but he also introduced some of the government's major legislation which had little to do with his department, for example, the Debt Adjustment Bill. With one of their number ascendant in the cabinet, both the non-Conservative M.L.A.'s and the members of the ginger group could feel that they were influential in the Co-operative Government.

The second factor which tended to draw all government members together was their general agreement on policy. Although the cabinet might not always move fast enough for the members of the ginger group, it was, for them, moving in the right direction. On all the major policies -- civil service reform, retrenchment, relief, grain marketing, debt

10 Regina Leader Post, March 29, 1932, p. 1; June 15, 1934, p. 4.
adjustment -- there was substantial unity. The Co-operative Government was held together by the relative harmony of personalities in the cabinet and by support for a common set of policies. After three and one half years of Anderson's government, the Daily Star summarized its view of the coalition's experience.

The Progressives and the Independents have been loyal to his leadership. At times they have shown an independent spirit which is the essence of such an administration and of such an admixture of political views. But they have never failed him and the other ministers in their support whenever a question of major importance such as relief and debt adjustment, has called for a decision.

II

As the depression deepened, people began to call for a truce in the partisan struggle, and an all-party coalition to meet the depression. This movement was a re-emergence of the old Non-Partisan-Progressive belief that political parties were, if not the origin of evil, at least one of its principal carriers. The formation of such a government in Manitoba under John Bracken spurred the non-partisan advocates in Saskatchewan.

Prior to the 1932 Legislative Session, Premier Anderson called on the Liberals to unite with him in grappling

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12 Appendix G.
14 Speeches by C.M. Dunn and Jacob Benson, Regina Leader Post, March 9, 1932, p. 10; Western Producer, February 2, 1933, p. 6; April 6, 1933, p. 6.
with the depression. It seems likely there was pressure from within his own caucus from the Progressive members for this move.\textsuperscript{15} The basis of Anderson's offer was a coalition cabinet of four Liberals, four Conservatives and one Independent or Progressive.\textsuperscript{16} In return J.G. Gardiner offered to join an all-party committee of the House to co-operate on the basis of further retrenchment. But he combined this with extensive charges of corruption in the S.R.C.. Gardiner was not interested in a cabinet coalition. The joint committee on retrenchment was as far as he would go.

We are prepared to get down to the real problem, balance the budget but not by taxation. We want to have a say where expenditures can be cut and I suggest we assist in effecting economies.\textsuperscript{17} Anderson's response to this approach was a vigorous defense of government policy and an attack on the Liberals for placing party before province.\textsuperscript{18} Nothing came of the first attempt to expand the coalition.

In November, 1932, Charles McIntosh, Liberal member for Kinistino, announced that he would support the Co-operative Government. One of the more independent minded Liberal backbenchers, McIntosh had broken with his colleagues to vote with the government ginger group for further retrenchment and against a bill to grant pensions for A.P. McNab and Colin Fraser in 1931, and for the single transferable ballot in

\textsuperscript{15} Jacob Benson's speech, Regina Leader Post, March 9, 1932, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{16} Regina Daily Star, May 20, 1933, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{17} Regina Leader Post, February 9, 1932, pp. 1, 5.
\textsuperscript{18} Regina Leader Post, February 11, 1932, p. 2.
1932. This is not to say that he was at all pro-government previous to 1933. In fact his speech during the 1932 Speech from the Throne debate was a vehement attack on the corruption of the Co-operative Government. At the opening of the 1933 Legislature, he crossed the floor after making a brief statement that he intended to fully assist the cabinet in resolving the depression and that he felt this could be done most effectively from the government side of the House.

Put on the spot by one of his own backbenchers, J.G. Gardiner asserted that he too was willing to co-operate with the government to handle the depression. He offered a five man committee, three government and two opposition members, which was to draft programs of debt adjustment and tax arrears consolidation. Each member was to have veto power. However, the government continued to insist on a cabinet coalition, with direct shared responsibility for any programs undertaken.

The Liberal response to the Co-operative offers of coalition and McIntosh's action was hostile. Anderson was accused of not making any definite coalition proposals and of using vague talk of co-operation to gain a political advantage.

19 Colin Fraser and A.P. McNab had served on a number of government boards and commissions during the 1920s, but none of these positions entitled them to a civil service pension. The Anderson government's attempt to provide a special pension for the two men was widely opposed by those who regarded Fraser and McNab as part of the "Grit Machine", S.P., 1931, pp. 100-101,114; 1932, pp. 85-86.
20 Regina Leader Post, February 19, 1932, pp. 1,12.
22 Ibid.
23 Regina Leader Post, February 9, 1933, p. 4.
The *Leader Post* expressed consternation at McIntosh's act of crossing the floor.

"... It is difficult to realize how anyone who has professed Liberalism, can, at this time of all times, get tied up with the apostles of a high tariff."  

During the remainder of the Legislative Session, McIntosh voted for cabinet measures and generally supported resolutions brought forward by other members of the government.

As early as March 15, there were rumours, which the new government member refused to acknowledge, that he would be rewarded with a cabinet post. Yet on May 2, Premier Anderson announced the appointment of the Liberal member as Minister of Natural Resources, according to J.F. Bryant, without consulting the whole cabinet. The by-election necessary for the new minister was set for May 22. The *Daily Star* warmly welcomed the new cabinet member, in an oblique attack on the rest of the Liberal M.L.A.'s.

He has refused to ally himself with the policy of taking advantage of the difficulties of the Government to obtain party benefits, and he gave practical expression to his views last session by crossing the floor in support of the Government.

The *Star* challenged the Liberals to prove their professions of co-operation by letting McIntosh take his seat by acclamation. This sentiment was not restricted to the partisan

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24 *Regina Leader Post*, February 7, 1933, p. 4.  
26 J.F. Bryant to R.B. Bennett, May 25, 1933, Bennett Papers, p. 308137.  
press: the Western Producer had earlier urged that minister-
ial by-elections not be contested. 30 The Liberals refused to
go along, nominating J.R. Taylor who had previously represent-
ed Kinistino.

The government campaign was based almost exclusively on the coalition issue. Anderson, in his appeal to the electors of Kinistino dealt solely with the need for a united political front.

I have strongly urged that all political parties unite in the formation of a coalition or union government in this province. With this end in view, I publicly and by letter and by private conversation with the leader of the Liberal party urged that such action would be taken in the best interests of our province.

Why party warfare when the very life blood of our province is at stake?

Only one Liberal member was prepared to place his province before his party and throw his lot with a government that has for four years been grappling with problems the like of which no previous government in this province ever faced. 31

The Liberals rejected the Conservative platform, as asking for "a death-bed coalition", alleging its principal motive to be the desire "of remaining in office longer than would otherwise be the case". 32 The most active government campaigner in the riding was Stewart, while few other cabinet ministers set foot in the district. 33 This fact lends credence to Bryant's charge that the cabinet as a whole was opposed to the appoint-

30 Western Producer, September 26, 1929, p. 6.
31 Regina Leader Post, May 10, 1933, pp. 1,10; see also Regina Daily Star, May 9, 1933, p. 4; May 16, 1933, p. 4; May 17, 1933, p. 4; May 20, 1933, p. 4.
32 Regina Leader Post, May 8, 1933, p. 4.
33 Regina Leader Post, May 22, 1933, pp. 1,4.
The result of the by-election was a clear Liberal victory: Taylor had a 1,981 vote majority. In general, those areas which had been traditionally Liberal voted for Taylor, while those in which non-Liberal sentiment was strong supported McIntosh. Few Liberals were willing to vote for the new minister or the idea of non-partisan coalition. This should not seem unnatural. The Co-operative Government was, in its origin, as much an anti-Liberal movement as anything else. Combined with the fact that J.G. Gardiner was one of the leading defenders of the party system of government, this anti-Liberal bias meant the Anderson government was not likely to receive much support from the Liberal hierarchy. The Kinistino by-election demonstrated that the rank-and-file Liberal voters were still listening to that party hierarchy.

III

The Co-operative Government's political problems were not limited to the Progressives, the ginger group or the Liberal opposition. Within its largest bloc of supporters a division grew which for a time appeared to threaten the government. The split within the Conservative party over the idea of coalition was evident from the beginning. At the party conventions of 1928 and 1930 voices were raised against

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34 Regina Leader Post, May 23, 1933, p. 1.
co-operation with other political groups. Dr. D.S. Johnstone, who was to become the center of right wing resistance to the Co-operative Government, was elected President of the Liberal-Conservative Association at the 1930 Convention. His opening remarks left little doubt as to where he stood: "So far as Saskatchewan is concerned, there is no room under the Conservative banner except for straight Conservatives." It was not long before he was condemning the policies and personalities of the Co-operative Government.

Johnstone's attack on the 100% Pool has already been discussed. Although Premier Anderson repudiated the attack on the Wheat Pool and the proposed Grain Marketing Bill, he did not make any direct reference to the Conservative Association President. Dr. Johnstone, however, was not above personalities. Within one month he publicly attacked Stewart for failing to dismiss his deputy minister who was, according to Johnstone, a Liberal hack. These assaults, however, appear mild when compared to the one he launched towards the end of the 1932 Session in response to a radio talk by the Premier.

Whatever money is being spent this Anderson-Stewart broadcast no doubt comes from the slush fund of the highways' minister and collected by the minions of the co-operative government -- taken as a toll from all the people of Saskatchewan.

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36 Regina Leader Post, June 13, 1934, pp. 11-14.
37 Regina Leader Post, June 10, 1930, p. 2.
38 Supra, chapter III, p. 72.
40 Regina Leader Post, March 4, 1931, p. 1.
an (in a round about way).
If the prime minister \(\text{Anderson}\) still wishes to stand up and broadcast the doings of this perfectly impossible government, along with one of the Conservative party's most subtle and dangerous enemies, by all means let him do so; all I would ask of him is to keep his politically befouled hands off the Conservative party.\(^{41}\)

Without naming any names, Anderson stated that, "Men who attempt to wreck the Conservative party for their own ends would be better out of the party". The premier indicated that the issue would be definitely settled at the party's biennial convention in June of 1932.\(^{42}\)

Johnstone had intended to open the convention with an address, but because of throat trouble, W.A. Munns read it in his place. Although it began with praise for R.B. Bennett and his policies, as soon as Saskatchewan was mentioned it took a sharp turn to the critical.

Let us demand the services of a public administrator working with the public service itself, rather than submit to the present mockery of a public service commission made up of a court stenographer, a housewife and a worn-out cog in the old Grit Machine.

We must take a strong stand against this tendency for the dole which has gained so much force with the hard times. Someone has to have the courage to call a halt on paternalism just as soon as times approach normal once more.

Has the great Conservative party reached that state of degradation in Saskatchewan where it has to depend on compromise for its existence? To sink to the level of trading principle and discarding policy in the vain hope of gaining a place in the sun?\(^{43}\)

The speech, which was interrupted several times by the protests of the delegates, was referred to the policy committee without

\(^{41}\) Regina Leader Post, March 29, 1932, pp. 1,8.
\(^{42}\) Regina Leader Post, March 31, 1932, pp. 1,16.
\(^{43}\) Regina Daily Star, June 2, 1932, p. 1.
The committee eventually produced a resolution which thanked Johnstone for his hard work on behalf of the Conservative party and which repudiated without qualification the text of his speech.

The key test for Anderson's prestige was the election of officers. Of the four men nominated, three were from the past executive, and two of these had close relations with Johnstone. After two ballots, Dr. E.T. Myers of Rosetown -- regarded as the Anderson candidate -- was elected by a clear majority. Speeches by Premier Anderson, W.C. Buckle and M.A. MacPherson were warmly received. While the Daily Star headlined its story "Anti-Anderson Forces Routed At Convention In Moose Jaw", the Leader Post concluded that,

> It proved the overwhelming popularity of the premier with his party. It had been heralded as a test of his strength. And it witnessed the speedy defeat of the first major counter movement against his leadership since he was chosen leader in 1924.

The nominally Conservative Regina Daily Star had generally ignored the speculations about division within the party before the Moose Jaw Convention. Just as the 900 to 1200 people were assembling, it published an editorial calling for unity. Although the Star had occasionally sided with Johnstone in opposing the government's policies -- the Grain

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44 Regina Leader Post, June 3, 1932, p. 9.
45 Regina Leader Post, June 3, 1932, pp. 1-19.
48 Regina Daily Star, June 1, 1932, p. 4.
Marketing Bill, for example -- it was definitely pro-
Anderson in regard to the convention. Yet at the same
time the Star was mild and even conciliatory in its remarks
about the Johnstone group.

The little groups of discontents are conscientious
Conservatives. They are not a separatist faction.
... To imagine them betraying the province by
handing the government over to the tender mercies
of Mr. J.G. Gardiner, Jim Cameron and the rest of
the "Grit Machine" is inconceivable.

The Moose Jaw Convention did wisely in putting
an end to what might rob the co-operative Govern-
ment of sufficient of its support to weaken it.
No doubt Dr. Johnstone and his friends were well-
intentioned in their desire to promote Conservat-
ive principles and to widen their influence. But
at present Dr. Anderson and his colleagues have a
hard task on their hands and the greater the con-
fidence placed in them the more the Conservative
cause in the province will be strengthened.

In the next two years, as the Johnstone group's attacks be-
came more and more vehement, the Daily Star never once attack-
ed the "discontents". While it appears that there was never
an alliance between the newspaper and the rebels, there was
considerable sympathy.

The Kinistino by-election demonstrated the extent
to which the dissident Conservatives would go. They had
opposed the inclusion of Independents and Progressives in the
government; the idea of a Liberal in the cabinet was equally
repugnant. The group, calling itself the "true blues", held
a meeting in Regina and decided,

... if the present officers of the Liberal

49 Regina Daily Star, January 14, 1932, p. 4.
50 Regina Daily Star, June 4, 1932, p. 4.
Conservative party are not prepared to take a definite stand to divorce the association from this destructive influence [the Co-operative Government], then those of us who believe that our principles must be protected, should undertake the formation of an entirely new organization within the province.\(^5\)

T.C. Davis, who knew a good thing when he saw it, encouraged them.

The Conservative element see that they are being made monkeys of by Hon. A.C. Stewart and Hon. Mr. McIntosh. They are out to organize their own party and their own government in the province. They are using the Tory party as a step ladder, and as soon as they are on the roof, they will kick the step ladder out from under.\(^5\)

According to Stewart, it was the Liberal party which financed the campaign tour which Dr. Johnstone and T.A. Anderson, a former Conservative M.L.A., took through the riding, attacking McIntosh and the Co-operative Government.\(^5\) When J.R. Taylor's victory was announced, Mr. Anderson stated that if a "true blue" Conservative had run, he could have been elected.\(^5\) The inference was that in future elections the rebels would put up their own candidates.

Although there were no "true blue" Conservative candidates in the 1934 General Election, the Johnstone group did work against the Government candidates. The most spectacular sally came from the pen of Dr. Johnstone himself, in the form of an eleven page letter to the Leader Post, which that paper

\(^5\) Regina Leader Post, May 10, 1933, pp. 1,16.
\(^5\) Regina Leader Post, May 2, 1933, p. 11.
\(^5\) Regina Leader Post, May 22, 1933, p. 9; Regina Daily Star, May 25, 1933, p. 4.
\(^5\) Regina Leader Post, May 23, 1933, p. 1.
graciously consented to print in full. One paragraph is sufficient to give an impression of the tone of his remarks.

The Conservative party in this province has become demoralized. Its executive officers, in a majority, have been corrupted by jobs, contracts, whiskey and beer agencies, judgeships, senatorships and huge legal fees. They have consented to allow the Co-operative group to use the party, not for any legitimate purpose, but to help return to power men who have betrayed all their pledges, who have betrayed their friends, their party and finally, they have betrayed the state also.55

Why did Johnstone, T.A. Anderson, Mrs. R. Williams and others revolt against the Co-operative Government and Anderson's leadership? According to their own account, the "true blues" were protesting the subversion and destruction of "Conservative principles". In practice these "Conservative principles" seem to reduce to a demand for further retrenchment by dismantling the civil service, allegedly bloated with Liberals.

The monstrous system of inefficiency and extravagance built up during the twenty-four years of Liberal rule is still here in all its iniquity. No government can even be credited with a start toward economy while that remains.56

Stewart took a different view of the reasons for "the true blue" dissent: "They are not engaging in the controversy as a matter of principle, as they claim, but out of a spirit of revenge against myself because I endeavoured to protect the interests of the general public in the province."57 While at one time Mr. Anderson and Johnstone had been great support-

55 Regina Leader Post, June 13, 1934, pp. 11, 14.
57 Regina Leader Post, May 31, 1933, p. 9.
ers of the Highways Minister, according to Stewart, their affection had grown cold when it failed to yield the anticipated rewards.

Since I refused to allow Mr. Anderson a contract with the government in view of his position on the advisory board of the Conservative party, and because I gave instructions that on no account was Dr. D.S. Johnstone, at that time president of the Conservative Association, to be allowed a contract with my department, the attitude of these two men towards me has entirely changed. No longer do they wish me to be attorney-general. In making this announcement to the press, he offered to show the correspondence on the disputed Barnard road contract which Mr. Anderson had sought to obtain. Given that Johnstone's first assault was made on Stewart's deputy minister, that some of his most scornful remarks were reserved for the public service commission and that his stand on government intervention was not one of consistent principle, it seems reasonable to assume that Johnstone's concern for Conservative principles was not unmixed with a strong concern for Johnstone.

The legislative coalition, on which the Co-operative Government depended, was solid throughout its tenure. The attempt to expand the coalition by taking in all or part of the Liberal opposition failed because of the intransigence of the Liberal leadership, the adherance of the Liberal voters

58 Ibid.
59 Regina Leader Post, May 22, 1933, p. 9.
60 While he opposed the Grain Marketing Act, he was in favour of state medicine, Regina Daily Star, June 2, 1932, p. 1.
to that leadership -- as demonstrated in the Kinistino by-election -- and in part to the anti-Liberal character of the Co-operative Government. The coalition kept its coherence in the face of Progressive shyness, in the early years and the ginger group's impatience. The revolt of the "true blues", whether motivated by idealistic adherence to principle or a thirst for patronage, failed to draw a significant support from the Conservative M.L.A.'s. For a government frequently declared as "impossible", it had a surprisingly tranquil career.
CHAPTER V

THE 1934 ELECTION
When Premier Anderson called Saskatchewan's eighth general election for June 19, 1934, no one was surprised. In the spring of 1932 there had been election rumours. The 1931 harvest had been fairly good and hopes were high for a general recovery. Certainly J.G. Gardiner was looking for an election at that time. Similar rumours were less common in the spring of 1933. The announcement of the Kinistino by-election effectively ended such speculation as there was. By the summer of 1933, the spring of 1934 -- the legal limit of the Seventh Legislature -- was the expected date.

Three main political forces contended for power in the 1934 election. The Co-operative Government endorsed candidates in almost all constituencies. Most were Conservatives, although some were Progressives or Independents. The Liberals nominated a full slate across the province. Surprisingly, the new Farmer-Labor Group nominated in most ridings. A recent political phenomenon, it combined themes which had been present in Saskatchewan politics for many years.

At its February, 1931 Convention, the United Farmers of Canada, Saskatchewan Section (U.F.C.), committed its 27,000 members to political action. Following the direction of the delegates, Frank Eliason, U.F.C. president, met with

1 Regina Leader Post, March 8, 1932, pp. 1, 9; March 9, 1932, pp. 1, 10; March 28, 1932, p. 2.
2 Western Producer, May 11, 1933, p. 6.
M.J. Coldwell who was then leader of the Independent Labor Party, during the summer of 1931. As a result of these negotiations, the Saskatchewan Farmer-Labor Group was formed in July of 1932 at the annual U.F.C. Convention, which admitted representatives from eleven labor organizations. The various elements agreed to co-operate in political action while maintaining individual autonomy. The Farmer-Labor Group was to be a democratic socialist movement.

The Group quickly gained parliamentary representation in the Legislature. At the opening of the 1933 Session, two Progressives, Jacob Benson and E.S. Whatley, declared themselves Farmer-Labor members. The change in party label, however, had little impact on the voting patterns of the two Progressive-Farmer-Labor M.L.A.'s. Nor did the party's spokesmen, "out of doors", seem to be any more at odds with the Co-operative Government's policies than some of its Conservative supporters. M.J. Coldwell welcomed the 1933 debt adjustment legislation as "something akin to the Farmer-Labor Party's land tenure policy". He later spoke in support of the two bills when the business community began its attacks, although pointing out that the bills did not go far enough.

The biggest lobby ever conducted in Saskatchewan is being carried on at the parliament buildings at the present time in opposition to the

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5 Regina Leader Post, February 2, 1933, p. 2.
6 Appendix G.
Debt Adjustment Act in an effort to have the measure repealed or rendered innocuous. However, even if the Debt Adjustment Act is made operative, it would not cure the situation.

The Farmer-Labor Group seldom disagreed with the direction of cabinet policy, playing much the same tune as the ginger group.

In one important respect, the new organization departed sharply from the Co-operative Government. It was socialist. While government speakers, for the most part, waited until the election campaign to discover the evils of socialism, the Leader of the Opposition denounced the enemy as soon as it came to view.

"... We have the formation of a new party known as the Farmer-Labor party. The Liberal party has been and is a Socialistic organization within Canada, but this party is the Socialist party of Canada. There is a distinct difference. When a party is socialistic it tries to bring all organizations in industry, finance, transportation, trade and commerce, labor and primary production as well as public service to work in harmony for the common good. A socialist party of the type we have in Saskatchewan believes in state ownership and operation as a panacea to all our economic ills."

During the election, most of the Farmer-Labor campaign was devoted to explaining how socialism could meet the problems which the depression had caused in Saskatchewan and prevent such disasters from recurring in the future. When-

8 Regina Daily Star, March 14, 1933, p. 1; March 18, 1933, p. 1.
9 Regina Leader Post, February 7, 1933, p. 2.
10 Regina Leader Post, June 9, 1934, p. 19; June 11, 1934, p. 20; June 12, 1934, p. 20; June 13, 1934, p. 20; June 14, 1934, p. 11.
ever the other parties were mentioned, they were usually lumped together for equal treatment.

Behind the Liberal and Conservative parties are marshalled all the vested and financial interests of Canada. They realize that the Farmer-Labor group is determined to place the needs of our people before the greeds of the moneyed interests. They were offering the electors of Saskatchewan a new order. The greatest proportion of their campaign was given to describing how socialist policies would work.

II

At first glance the defeat of the Co-operative Government in 1934 appears to be the most natural thing in the world. Saskatchewan had suffered an unparalleled economic disaster and the voters were taking out their frustration and discontent on the government. The difficulty with this particular piece of conventional wisdom is that other governments survived the depression. John Bracken's coalition in Manitoba was re-elected in 1932 and 1936, with conditions scarcely better than Saskatchewan. W.J. Patterson, Gardiner's successor after 1935, was returned to Regina in 1938 after Saskatchewan's worst years of depression, 1937-1938. Certainly many governments were toppled in the depression years because of the hard times. But defeat was not necessarily a foregone conclusion for the Co-operative Government in 1934.

11 Regina Leader Post, May 26, 1934, p. 11.
The campaign waged by government candidates can be summed up in a sentence from Premier Anderson's election manifesto: "We have stood by you". The predominant theme was defensive. Government speakers and advertisements constantly repeated the line: 'we have done our best to ease the hard times which are not our fault'.

We do not claim to be perfect; we do not claim we have made no mistakes; but we do claim we have done our honest best to deal with extraordinary problems in a most difficult period.

Despite all the obstacles with which it has been confronted, and which were not of its making, the Anderson Government has passed much useful legislation, has maintained the social services at the high pitch of utility, has done big things to sustain public health in the province, and, in fact, has done more for the farmers of Saskatchewan than any former administration.

It is the fate of the Anderson government to have to deal with conditions as they find them. . . . [Gardiner] forgets trends of trade are not the results of the moment but of months and years past.

Government speakers seemed to pick a particular aspect of the record and defend it, to the exclusion of any constructive proposals. Premier Anderson defended the growth of the provincial debt, insisting that it was unavoidable if one was to provide the necessary relief and maintain social services.

13 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, May 31, 1934, p. 6.
17 Regina Leader Post, May 29, 1934, p. 11; June 9, 1934, p. 10; Regina Daily Star, June 5, 1934, pp. 1, 2.
Bryant also tried to justify the expanded provincial debt, pointing out that the Co-operative Government had been faithful to its 1929 pledges. MacPherson and Merkley spoke in defense of the government's relief program, as it applied to both urban and rural areas. H.A. Lilly praised the Co-operative health services record. W.W. Smith tried to explain and defend the debt adjustment legislation of 1933 and 1934. The entire government campaign tended to be on long, repetitive apologia for its five year record.

While defense of the past dominated the Co-operative campaign, there were other, lesser themes which were played, One of these was to attack the Liberals and the Farmer-Labor Group. Against J.G. Gardiner, the Bryant charges were revived. The Liberals were depicted as greedy men seeking to regain their hold on patronage. There were also oblique hints that if the Liberals were elected, they would cancel the relief program -- an allegation which the Liberals vigorously denied. At the same time, the Farmer-Labor group was attacked for its "utopian socialism", in Premier Anderson's phrase.

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18 Regina Daily Star, May 21, 1934, p. 2; May 30, 1934, p. 3; June 5, 1934, p. 3.
19 Regina Daily Star, May 29, 1934, p. 4; Regina Leader Post, June 6, 1934, p. 11.
20 Regina Leader Post, May 23, 1934, p. 11.
21 Regina Leader Post, May 25, 1934, p. 11.
22 During the election both the terms, "Farmer-Labor" and "C.C.F." (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation) were used. The former was the correct title for the Saskatchewan candidates.
23 Regina Leader Post, June 12, 1934, p. 20.
24 Regina Daily Star, May 23, 1934, p. 4; June 5, 1934, p. 4; Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, June 7, 1934, p. 9; Regina Leader Post, May 28, 1934, p. 4; June 2, 1934, p. 20; June 11, 1934, p. 20.
25 Regina Leader Post, May 25, 1934, p. 11.
The new party was accused of wanting a rigidly regimented state where private property would be abolished -- including privately held farm land. The Regina Daily Star urged electors to support government candidates as the only acceptable alternative.

The people of the province cannot afford to experiment with theoretical proposals in these days, nor allow themselves to get into the hands of a party which has been weighed in the balance and found wanting.

The government's greatest weakness was its lack of positive programs. Beyond saying that it would continue the past policies, it offered little for the future. The election manifesto issued by Anderson did contain some proposals -- a minimum salary for teachers, a new Schools Grants Act and a system of agricultural representatives. But these were not taken up by many government speakers. His proposals to cur with federal marketing legislation and federal debt policy made the Co-operative Government appear the appendage of R.B. Bennett in Ottawa, lending credence to Liberal attacks on the "Anderson-Bennett" government. However, in a notable speech, J.F. Bryant did propose a long range solution to the problem of drought, by construction of a network of small dams and reservoirs to maintain the water-table, by offering farmers free saplings to build up tree lines which would stop soil

26 Regina Daily Star, May 25, 1934, p. 4; May 28, 1934, p. 4.
29 Regina Leader Post, June 6, 1934, p. 4.
drifting and hold moisture, and by undertaking a soils survey to determine which was unsuitable farm land. Nevertheless, such initiatives were rare in the government's campaign.

As well as defending its record from opposition attacks, the Co-operative Government spent time dealing with Liberal attempts to link it with the Farmer-Labor Groups and R.B. Bennett's federal policies. T.C. Davis apparently began the Socialist coalition rumour by stating that there couldn't be any Anderson-Coldwell debate because they were so much alike. Dr. A.M. Young, former Liberal M.P. for Saskatoon, made the charge publicly, that a secret coalition existed between the government and the Farmer-Labor Group. Others soon picked up the cry. P.M. Anderson, Liberal candidate in Regina, said,

I tell you there is an understanding between Anderson and Stewart and Coldwell and if they find they have to get together to get power they'll do it. Why they're as close together as peas in a pod.

The redoubtable Dr. Johnstone joined the chorus to ask,

Would someone please explain just why there are two such movements side by side as those of Anderson and Coldwell? Their appeal to the electors is identical -- an appeal to ignorance and prejudice -- an appeal to the mob. They were together from 1928 until 1931. How did they come to divide forces? That is the question. It is merely a division until after the election, done because they hoped to get enough seats together to defeat the Grits.

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30 Regina Leader Post, June 5, 1934, p. 11.
31 Regina Leader Post, May 30, 1934, p. 11.
32 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, May 31, 1934, p. 4.
33 Regina Leader Post, June 8, 1934, p. 11.
34 Regina Leader Post, June 13, 1934, p. 11.
As one would expect, the parties charged fell over one another to deny any link between them. Coldwell, Anderson and MacPherson, all made statements to disprove the Liberal claim. Still, it was a clever argument and the Liberals used it skillfully. Five years earlier many people thought a Conservative-Progressive alliance impossible; and when it was formed, immoral. After all, Jacob Benson, now Farmer-Labor candidate in Last Mountain, had supported the Co-operative Government, hadn't he? The Liberals claimed that in Humboldt, where there was no official government candidate, the Co-operative forces were supporting Joe Burton, the Farmer-Labor nominee. When J.V. Patterson, Independent, Milestone, said (in answer to a question) that he would accept a federal C.C.F. nomination, the Liberals seized this as proof positive of a secret alliance. The charge made adept use of the Co-operative Government's polyglot composition to frighten many Conservatives away from voting for government candidates.

The other accusation, of Regina's subservience to Ottawa, also attempted to divide the government forces, by stressing the Conservative presence in the government to the detriment of the Progressive-Independent element. Liberal advertisements and editorials hit at this point repeatedly.

The intelligent elector will recall that the Anderson government (including the premier) did

35 Regina Leader Post, May 30, 1934, p. 11; June 1, 1934, p. 11; June 2, 1934, p. 11.
36 Regina Leader Post, June 8, 1934, p. 11.
37 Regina Leader Post, June 4, 1934, p. 11; June 6, 1934, p. 4.
everything possible to wreck the Canadian farmers' markets by supporting policies, and working for the election of the Bennett government.\footnote{38}

The Liberal view-point is that Bennett-Anderson policies, which have sacrificed agriculture, by subordinating its interests to those of secondary \footnote{manufacturing} interests, must be reversed.\footnote{39}

In other words, a vote against Anderson government candidates in Saskatchewan on June 19 is one means of getting rid of the Bennett administration.\footnote{40}

The government spokesmen, after an initial attempt to defend Bennett's record \textit{\textendash} exactly the sort of mistake for which the Liberals were hoping \textendash{} wisely took the stand that the tariff had nothing to do with a provincial election.\footnote{41} In any event, that particular red herring did not appear to damage the cohesiveness of the coalition. Those members of the Progressive-Independent group who were still politically active campaigned for the government \textendash{} Stewart, Dr. C.E. Tran (Progressive House leader against Premier Dunning), Dr. R. Stipe, S.N. Horner and J.V. Patterson.\footnote{42}

The Liberal campaign itself was marked by a shift of attention from the Co-operative Government, which was the main target in the beginning, to the Farmer-Labor Group in the final days of the election. A number of the first Liberal advertisements were taken from the same text as most of J.G.

\footnotesize{38 Regina Leader Post, June 2, 1934, p. 20.  
39 Regina Leader Post, June 9, 1934, p. 19.  
40 Regina Leader Post, June 6, 1934, p. 4.  
41 Regina Leader Post, May 26, 1934, p. 11; Regina Daily Star, May 21, 1934, p. 4; Regina Leader Post, June 15, 1934, p. 20.  
42 Regina Daily Star, June 7, 1934, p. 16; Regina Leader Post, February 14, 1934, p. 4; June 4, 1934, p. 11; June 13, 1934, p. 8.}
Gardiner's speeches from 1931 on charging the cabinet with extravagance and corruption. Then the emphasis began to change to the theme that the Conservatives and Progressives couldn't win, leaving a straight fight between the Liberals and the Farmer-Labor Group.

The worst thing that can happen to Saskatchewan as a result of the coming election is to find itself with a new Legislature in which no party will have a clear majority. Such a House would lead to log-rolling, back scratching, ineffective government and administration. The Liberals offer by far the best bet for the people of Saskatchewan on June 19.

In British Columbia, the Conservatives saw that their cause was hopeless and that to vote Conservative was to put the C.C.F. in power. They felt that to put the C.C.F. in power would be to take a leap in the dark. The alternative was to vote Liberal, as that party alone had a real chance. Nobody seriously believes the Anderson government will be returned. The fight appears to be between the Liberals and the C.C.F.

Before it concentrated its guns on the Farmer-Labor Group, the Liberal party directed some heavy blows against the Cooperative Government.

The central theme of the early stages of the Liberals' campaign was the wild extravagance of the government. The Liberals denied that the impact of the depression -- in particular, relief -- had forced the rising provincial deficit on the government. Relief, according to the Liberals,

43 Regina Leader Post, May 26, 1934, p. 11; June 2, 1934 p. 20; Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, June 1, 1934, p. 5.
44 Regina Leader Post, June 18, 1934, p. 4.
45 Regina Leader Post, June 16, 1934, p. 20; June 18, 1934, p. 8.
could have been provided at half the cost.\textsuperscript{47}

It would almost seem that Mr. McConnell doesn't realize there is a depression, and that depression is a time when caution, care and judicious control of expenditure is essential. The idea of spending oneself out of depression was abandoned long ago. It seems, too, as though he did not realize that debts and interest charges are responsible for most of the Province's troubles.\textsuperscript{48}

The Liberal newspapers in both Saskatoon and Regina printed extensive "features" on the alarming growth of the provincial debt since 1929, without any direct political comment.\textsuperscript{49} The concept of the "Anderson-Bennett government" was introduced, as has been mentioned, which gave Liberal speakers and writers a chance to work the tariff issue.\textsuperscript{50}

What has Dr. Anderson been doing to try to shake off the depression and to help prevent the recurrence of such things? Now if we could get away from a lot of this high tariff policy, we should have better times and relief wouldn't likely be anything like the problem it is.\textsuperscript{51}

Besides the main theme of the mounting provincial debt and the tariff question, the Liberals, introduced a number of subsidiary issues, which ranged from droll to frenetic. To boost attendance at a Gardiner rally in Regina, "Captain" Bill Cook of the New York Rangers hockey team was brought in to testify to the merits of Liberalism.\textsuperscript{52} The \textit{Leader Post} revived the ancient charge that Anderson drew political

\textsuperscript{47} Regina \textit{Leader Post}, February 25, 1933, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{48} Saskatoon \textit{Star-Phoenix}, June 4, 1934, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{49} Saskatoon \textit{Star-Phoenix}, June 1, 1934, p. 1; Regina \textit{Leader Post}, June 6, 1934, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{50} Regina \textit{Leader Post}, June 2, 1934, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{51} Regina \textit{Leader Post}, May 28, 1934, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{52} Regina \textit{Leader Post}, June 14, 1934, p. 2.
cartoons in his spare time. This had been used by J.G. Gardiner as far back as the Arm River by-election, when the Liberal leader had accused Anderson of "frittering away his time with drawings". On a more serious plane, M.A. MacPherson was accused of being responsible for the shooting of three miners during the Estevan coal strike in 1931. In addition the Liberals tried to link the Conservatives to the rising extremist, right-wing ideologies which were coming to dominate Europe in the 1930s.

The Conservative attitude of mind has found expression in greater strength in the last few years than ever before. It has found expression in trade restriction, contraction of foreign markets in the hope that a few might benefit by a greater share of the domestic market . . . . Of course, if Canadians have tired of democracy, if they believe a plutocratic fascism is desirable, then the only thing to do is to give wholehearted approval to Conservative policies.

It is difficult to estimate what impact such tactics had.

The Farmer-Labor Group waged a straightforward, ideological campaign; the Co-operative Government candidates, for the most part, conducted a defense of their record; the Liberals ran an aggressive partisan campaign. The results showed an overwhelming landslide for the latter---carrying fifty seats. The Farmer-Labor candidates won five constituencies. Not a single government candidate was elected.

53 Regina Leader Post, May 28, 1934, p. 4.
54 Regina Daily Post, October 13, 1928, p. 5.
55 Regina Leader Post, June 12, 1934, p. 11.
The Co-operative Government's defeat was not as sweeping as it appears at first glance. Because of the "first past the post" constituency system, the government candidates gained a sizable portion of the total provincial vote, without winning any representation in the Legislature.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>% of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>202,814</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>114,829</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer-Labor</td>
<td>101,163</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Liberal</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Front</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Liberal victory was not quite as great as it seemed: only fourteen seats were won by clear majorities. Yet there can be little doubt that the Co-operative Government had been rejected by the electors of the province. Even in the four ridings where the government candidates did best (margin of defeat in brackets) -- Bengough (70), Arm River (287), Moosomin (347), and Rosetown (348) -- it was due more to the popularity of the local man, than to his prominence in the Legislature, or his identification with particular policies.

One of the main factors for the government's defeat was the rise of the Farmer-Labor Group. The new party was already beginning to replace the Conservatives as the principal contender for power: in the six constituencies where its candidate

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58 Ibid., pp. 74, 81, 101.
either won or came very close to winning, the Liberal provided the major opposition, while the Conservative trailed a distant third. The other major factors for the defeat were the government's defensive campaign and the skill with which the Liberals used the depression as an issue. Politics is the sphere of the uncertain. As Dr. Anderson stated on assuming the office of Premier,

We may make mistakes, but at the same time we are moved by high and sincere motives, and it is the fortune of politics, as it is of war, that defeat comes at times as well as victory.\(^5^9\)

\(^{59}\) Regina Leader Post, September 7, 1929, p. 1.
CONCLUSION
In studying a history of any government, the character of its governance is a central consideration. The examination of Co-operative Government policies leads to a number of broader questions. Was the government's policy towards schools a triumph of bigotry? What were the limits on the government's response to the depression? What is the significance of the Anderson government in Saskatchewan's history?

Many Liberals and Roman Catholics have viewed the removal of sectarian influence from public schools and the abolition of French as an instructional language as proof that the Co-operative Government was a victory for the intolerance of Protestant extremism, symbolized in the Ku Klux Klan. Neither the Liberal nor the Co-operative governments were in favour of sectarian influences in public schools or the use of languages other than English for instruction. Both were the culmination of a long term trend. Since its establishment in the North West Territories in 1875, official bi-lingualism had been under attack. The Territorial Assembly in 1892 had restricted both the use of French in publicly supported schools and the establishment of separate schools. 1 While

the Saskatchewan Act guaranteed the separate school system, it did not prevent the provincial Liberal government from further restricting the use of French. Although it was quite willing to use Anderson’s School Act amendment to partisan advantage, the Liberal party was caught in the same trend as the Conservatives and Progressives.

In a system of representative responsible government, such as exists in Canada, the majority generally rules. If the majority happens to be intolerant, so much the worse for the object of its intolerance. From our own social matrix -- in the latter part of the 1960s, what has been called the post-Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission era -- the policy of the Liberal and Co-operative governments was wrong. Yet in condemning it, we condemn the entire social matrix which gave rise to that policy. As David Hume wrote, "It seems unreasonable to judge the measures embraced during one period, by the maxims which prevail in another."3

Conservatism, financial orthodoxy and the constitution are the limits usually regarded as those which inhibited the Co-operative Government’s response to the impact of the depression. What is usually meant by "conservatism" is right-wing, business oriented

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2 Ibid., p. 140.
The dominance of lawyers and businessmen in the cabinet lent credence to the view that the government was based on that type of liberalism, often called "small 'c' conservatism". Yet the frequently mobilized commercial lobby had little impact on the direction of government policy. The Gasoline Sales Discrimination Bill was the only clear victory the lobby could claim.

If conservatism means only right-wing liberalism, then it was not a constant limit on the Co-operative Government.

What is a conservative? If we could get away from the usage popularized by some American journalists, and return to the roots of the Canadian Conservative party, we would turn to Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, Thomas Carlyle, Benjamin Disraeli and Lord Hugh Cecil, rather than Herbert Spencer or W.G. Sumner. The ideas of society as a community, rather than a random aggregation of individuals, of government as "a trustee of the interest of the whole community", and of reform as the necessary preservative of all that is best in society's traditions, are central to an understanding of Conservatism.


Disraeli could have been speaking of the 1931 Act to Adjust Agricultural Debts when he said, "The object of the measure of Your Majesty's Government is to take advantage of these tranquil times, get rid of those anomalies and circumstances of apparent injustice . . .". By acting early Saskatchewan, like her neighbours, provided timely relief and hope of further relief to farmers, preventing violent reactions such as occurred in the United States.

The Co-operative Government was conservative -- given the true understanding of the term. But its conservative nature did not so much limit the response to the depression, as guide it in a particular pattern.

One boundary which definitely did restrict the government's reaction was the social matrix of the 1930s. The conventional wisdom of the financial community, accepted with little question by Ottawa, forced retrenchment on a province attempting to use deficit financing to maintain social services. The Relief Commission's policy of requiring a promise to repay money received on relief was also an expression of prevailing social attitudes, although its apparent harshness was softened in practice. Whether the Co-operative Government attempted to resist, as with

7 Appendix H.
retrenchment, or conceded, as with the policy of "relief advances", the social matrix was a definite limit on the government.

The Canadian constitution as it stood in 1929, a collection of traditions centering on the British North America Act, also restricted the Co-operative Government. The province's dependence on external credit, which made it vulnerable to demands for retrenchment from Ottawa and the financial community, was due to the insufficiency of the narrow provincial tax base. The failure of various income and business taxes to achieve anything near a balanced budget graphically demonstrated the province's weakness. The federal government later recognized the need for national income transfers and established National Unemployment Insurance, the Family Allowance and various other measures. During the Anderson period, federal support for provincial and municipal relief programs served as an interim, "temporary" solution. The most obvious exercise of the constitution was the failure of the Grain Marketing Act in the courts. Eventually, Ottawa's Natural Products Marketing Act and Wheat Board Act provided for the orderly marketing of agricultural produce, in part because the provinces had been unable to do so. The constitution and the prevailing social-economic attitudes did form formidable barriers to Saskatchewan's response.
to the crisis of the 1930s.

The Co-operative Government marked the beginning of a long eclipse for the provincial Liberal party. Anderson's victory in 1929 was the end of a twenty-four year Liberal hegemony. The Liberal return to office in 1934 was only an Indian Summer. In the next thirty years, the party won only a single general election. The defeat of 1944 sent it into the political wilderness for twenty years.

While contemporaries interpreted the Co-operative Government as essentially anti-Liberal, a historian must also ask, what was its relation to the C.C.F.? Aside from a fragmentary, ephemeral continuity of personnel, policy and ideology were the two most important dimensions of the relationship.

The powerful Public Service Commission set up by the Co-operative Government to establish a non-partisan civil service, repealed by the Liberals in 1934, was reenacted by the C.C.F. in 1947. Neither the Co-operative nor the C.C.F. governments were completely free from corruption, but both shared a basic commitment to the principle of a non-partisan civil service. Another common characteristic of the two governments was the emphasis on social services and the maintenance of Saskatchewan's

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community life. The Co-operative Government's actions to maintain the Wheat Pool and the Co-op Creamery, as well as the Relief Commission's efforts to hold together families and communities, parallel the C.C.F.'s program of community development. The Cancer Commission and the 1934 Public Health Act were the forerunners of the Hospital Insurance Act of T.C. Douglas and the Medical Care Insurance Act of W.S. Lloyd. To some recent political theorists such a continuity of policy can be explained by examining the basic ideas of conservatism and socialism.

It is often assumed that Conservatism and Socialism are directly opposed. But this is not completely true. Modern Conservatism inherits the traditions of Toryism which are favourable to the activity and authority of the state. A number of Canadian political writers have taken up Lord Cecil's line of thought. Conservative author George Grant has asked,

... What is socialism, if it is not the use of government to restrain greed in the name of social good? In actual practice, socialism has always had to advocate inhibition in this respect. In doing so, was it not appealing to the conservative idea of social order against the liberal idea of freedom?

Socialist Gad Horowitz made this evaluation of the role of ideology in the C.C.F. and the Conservative party:

9 Cecil, Conservatism, p. 169.
10 George Grant, Lament for a Nation, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965, p. 59.
The tory and socialist minds have some crucial assumptions, orientations and values in common, so that from certain angles they may appear not as enemies, but as two different expressions of the same basic ideological outlook.  

In this view the existence of certain ideological affinities between conservatism and socialism made a measure of continuity between the Co-operative and C.C.F. governments a natural development.

It is as difficult to make a final assessment of a particular government, as it is of a particular individual. In reviewing the Co-operative Government, conclusions have been made about what it did. The policy of removing sectarianism and instructional French from public schools, the Relief Commission and the Debt Adjustment Board were attempts to cope with contemporary pressures. The Cancer Commission, the Public Service Commission and the Research Council have been of lasting benefit. The Co-operative Government did the best it could in difficult times and left much that was of value to the people of Saskatchewan.

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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

SASKATCHEWAN CONSERVATIVE PLATFORM - MARCH 15, 1928

1. Immediate return of the natural resources of the province and compensation for lands and resources alienated,
2. Aggressive immigration policy based on the selective principle,
3. Thorough revision of the educational system of the province,
4. Encouragement of diversified agriculture and creation of wider markets for home products,
5. Improvement of conditions of labor generally,
6. Policy of economy and retrenchment,
7. Balanced industrial development,
8. Amalgamation and co-ordination of all public welfare services,
9. Establishment of an individual investigating commission on public health and the creation of free consultive clinics,
10. Development of the power resources of the province as publicly owned and operated utilities,
11. Development of provincial coal deposits,
12. Approval and encouragement of co-operative enterprises,
13. Strict provincial law enforcement,
14. Furtherance of scientific research,
15. Conservation of fur-bearing animals and development of the fur industry,
16. Promotion of a campaign of temperance education through public school text books,
17. Political equality of the sexes,
18. Reorganization of the provincial farm loan board,
19. Public tender for public contracts,
20. Preference for Canadian and British made goods,
21. Co-operation of political groups and individuals opposed to the present administration,
22. Reorganization of the civil service,
23. Free speech in radio broadcasting,
24. Reduction in the automobile license tax,
25. Preference to returned soldiers in civil service positions,

Source: Kyba, "Saskatchewan General Election", p. 111.
APPENDIX B


WHEREAS Section 9 of the School Act reads, "There shall be an educational council appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, consisting of at least 5 persons, two of whom shall be Roman Catholics;"

BE IT RESOLVED, that the words, "two of whom shall be Roman Catholics," should be deleted from the Act. R.S.S. 1920. C.110. Sec. 9.

WHEREAS Section 30, Clause.2, reads, "Each person nominated for trustees shall be able to read and write;"

BE IT RESOLVED, that the words "in the English language" should be added to said clause.

WHEREAS there is much dissatisfaction with the present School System of Saskatchewan; and

WHEREAS schools are for the education of the young and for the building up of our national unity;

BE IT RESOLVED, that this Klonvocation goes on record as being opposed to the continuation of Separate Schools in a province like Saskatchewan where so many glaring irregularities are becoming more and more evident; and further,

BE IT RESOLVED, that we demand the elimination from the School Act of Section 39 to 44 inclusive, and that all schools be entirely non-sectarian.

That we recommend that Section 5, 'School Grants relating to schools operating according to law or not, be repealed,

That we recommend that the words "if required" be deleted from sub-section 6 of S. 198, reading; "To send monthly to the parents or guardians of each pupil, if required by the board, a report of the pupil's attendance, conduct and progress."

WHEREAS our organization believes in the Constitutional principals of unqualified loyalty to the British Empire and Canada's present status as an integral
part of same, the King as our sovereign, and that all
natural resources belong as of right to the peoples of
such provinces respectively;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that we, the members
of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in
Klonvokation assembled, affirm our stand of maintaining
Canada's present relationship to the Empire under the
British North America Act, loyalty to our Sovereign, the
Union Jack as our only national flag, "God Save The King"
the only national anthem, and the immediate transference,
encumbered of the natural resources to the provinces
respectively for the exclusive control of the people.

WHEREAS knowing that there are attempts being
made to change the flag of this country, which are not to
the best interests of Canada. We do therefore object
most strongly against any change, as the Union Jack has
for centuries signified freedom and liberty; and

WHEREAS we protest to there being any attempt
made to separate Canada from the British Empire, as we
believe that the future of Canada depends upon a solid
connection between Canada and the British Empire;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that we, the members
of the Ku Klux Klan, in Klonvokation assembled, place
ourselves on record as being opposed to any such action.

WHEREAS in view of the presence of so many
different religious denominations in this the Dominion of
Canada, that it is not in the interests of religious
liberty, nor the welfare of the nation as a whole to
specially recognize any ecclesiastical preference;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that this Klonvokation
of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, held in the City of
Saskatoon, January 10th & 11th, 1929, emphatically protest;

1. Against the preference shown by our Federal
Officials on public occasions to the Apostolic
Delegate of the Pope, who is sent out from Rome
every four years and which delegate has never
yet been a British subject.

2. We further protest against this titular representa-
tive of the Church of Rome being toasted at so-called
public gatherings of Canadian citizens prior to the
toast to our Sovereign Lord His Most Gracious Majesty
the King, or his lawful successors.

3. And furthermore we protest against the promiscuous
issuance of railway passes to Roman Catholic priests
and other church officials, which is contrary to
the Railway Act of Canada.

4. And further we protest against the Pope, who is
not a British subject, being permitted to bestow
titles or other secular honors upon citizens in
the Dominion of Canada, more especially as His
Most Gracious Majesty the King, or his successors
are not extended the same privilege.
WHEREAS in view of the statement contained in the self-styled Holiness the Pope's recent encyclical in which he said "What a glorious and magnificent Catholic country is Canada," and the boast of the Roman Catholics that they would make French the official language of Canada, linked with the boast was the statement that our railroad tickets, all Post Office material, currency and coinage would soon be printed in the French language, and in view of the fact that the Government authorities at Ottawa have already made French the principle language on Post Office material and English is the subordinate language thereon, and in view of the fact that recent railroad tickets bear the French language, we feel that the boast of the Roman Catholics is materializing. As further evidence we have the announcement of a meeting held recently in which the Deputy Minister of Agriculture for Saskatchewan, at the request of Hon. Mr. Prefontaine of Manitoba, and other, decided to have the World's Grain Show material printed in French as well as in English;

 THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that we, while not objecting to the private use of the language of the mother tongue of any individual, reaffirm our opposition to the extension of bilingualism in the Dominion of Canada, outside the Province of Quebec; and

 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that we voice our protest against the French language being forced upon us and those people who come to Canada from other lands, and that we use every lawful means to do our part in enforcing the use of the English language and thereby help keep Canada British.

"We believe that the present party system of government in this province is detrimental to the best interests of our people. It has resulted in the division of our citizens along purely artificial lines; has subordinated the welfare of our people to that of party interests, and has developed into what is popularly known as machine politics.

"Not only does this injuriously affect our provincial affairs as controlled at Regina, but it extends to the federal sphere as well. When the Dominion government knows that, right or wrong, it can depend on the co-operation of the Saskatchewan government, the exigencies of party advantage at Ottawa will take precedence over the interests of this province. Just as the introduction of party politics would make for injustice and inefficiency in the affairs of a municipality, so it is that the party alignment which has taken place with federal issues in view, asserts itself in the provincial government where the issues are largely different. When, for example, provincial officials neglect their duties to electioneer for federal candidates, a dangerous situation has developed.

1. We believe that the moral, social and economic problems now confronting us in Saskatchewan are of such a nature as to demand a more independent and non-partisan treatment than it can receive under existing political conditions.

2. We believe in the removal of patronage from the business of government, and the freedom of the civil service from political influence, and in the prohibition of the use of civil servants in election campaigns.

3. We believe in the setting of a fixed term of years for the duration of a legislature and a parliament, except upon a direct vote of want of confidence in the government."
"4. We believe in the setting of a fixed period between the time of a vacancy and the by-election.

"5. We believe that the care of our sick and infirm should be a responsibility of the state.

"6. We believe in government representative of and responsible to the electorate by the application of the principle of co-operation based on economic interests, as opposed to the present system of party rule and that all legislators shall be elected by the people.

"7. We believe in compulsory publication of the sources of the contributions received in the financing of election campaigns.

"8. We believe in adopting an educational policy which will have regard to the special needs of our province.

"9. We believe in the removal of every handicap in the co-operative marketing of produce and the purchasing of supplies.

"10. We believe in utilizing the credit of the nation of the provision of intermediate and long-term loans to the primary industries at cost.

"11. We believe in public ownership and control of public utilities and their operation for the benefit of the people."

APPENDIX D

SASKATCHEWAN PROGRESSIVE PLATFORM - 1928

1. Equal Rights For All, Special Privileges to None,
2. Representative and Responsible Government by:
   a. Democratic selection and election of Candidates
      with Constituency autonomy,
   b. Cooperative [sic] Government,
   c. The setting of a fixed period for elections,
   d. Compulsory publication of all sources of
      campaign funds,
   e. Preferential ballot,
3. Honest and Efficient Administration by:
   a. Rigid supervision of public finances,
   b. A Civil Service Commission free from politi-
      cial partisanship,
   c. Abolition of Government patronage,
   d. Strict economy in Government Administration
      consistent with efficiency,
   e. Government contracts by public tender only,
   f. 1. Gasoline tax for highway construction and
      maintenance,
      2. Motor license, flat rate basis, for re-
         gistration purposes only,
   g. Reduction in number of Judicial Districts,
      Land Registration Districts and Constituencies,
   h. Transferring the work of the Official Guard-
      ian to the Department of the Attorney General,
   i. Removing all election machinery from the sphere
      of political partisanship,
4. Recognition of the importance to Saskatchewan of our
   primary industries by:
   a. Utilization of the credit of the Province to
      develop our primary industries,
   b. Recognition of the Farm Loan Board as a benef-
      it to be set up on a business basis free from
      political influence with sufficient capital to
      cause a general reduction in interest rates
      on farm mortgages,
   c. Encouragement and active assistance for gen-
      eral cooperative effort, [sic]
   d. Drastic reduction in the expenses of attend-
      ing the Saskatchewan Agricultural College,
4. e. Adequate facilities for scientific research,

5. Natural Resources.
a. The immediate return of the Natural Resources of the Province with compensation for land and resources alienated and:
   1. Retention and development of resources returned in the public interest,
   2. Public ownership or control of public utilities and their operation for the benefit of the people,

a. The formation of a Highway Construction Policy freed from the trammels and abuses of partisanship by:
   1. Placing the sole responsibility in the Department of Highways for all the highways comprised in the Provincial Highway system whether improved or not,
   2. Abolition of the road grant system,
   3. Placing the main market roads and feeder system under the control of the Rural Municipalities and providing a source of revenue based on the difficulties of construction and the volume of traffic,

7. Complete educational opportunities for each Saskatchewan boy and girl.
a. Revision of our educational system to meet adequately the social and economic needs of our people,
b. Building up a permanent and efficient teaching profession within the province,
c. Freedom of our public schools from sectarian influence, with increased emphasis on moral training.

Recognizing that the health of our people is essential to the welfare of our province and is therefore the responsibility of the State:
a. Free consultive medical clinics,
b. Early consideration of a State Health Insurance Scheme on a contributory basis,
c. Sterilization of mental defectives,


11. Elimination of private interests in the Manufacture and Sale of intoxicating liquors.
a. Government operation and ownership of all plants engaged in the manufacture of liquor so long as the sale of liquor is approved by the people,
b. The prohibition of all liquor advertisements within the province,
12. An Immigration Policy which will insure the permanency of British Institutions and Ideals.

13. We believe in a scientific scheme of land settlement.

In attempting to discover what each party emphasised in its campaign, one needs a standard index by which to measure the incidence of each issue in each campaign. The Saskatoon Star-Phoenix feature, "Views of the Parties", provides such an index. From May 13 to June 5, 1929, the Star printed statements of a given length on page 5 submitted by the parties. The Liberals and Conservatives furnished a copy for all twenty issues; the Progressives (and their splinter group, the "Co-operative Economic Group") submitted less than a dozen articles. The following table compares the frequency with which the two major parties dealt with a series of issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and civil service</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>reform</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highways</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Anderson's character</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chances of winning</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Sometimes an individual article would deal with more than one issue.)*

The overwhelming emphasis of the Conservative campaign, to which it devoted more than one half its free newspaper space, was on corruption and civil service, reform. 1 This main attack was supplemented by a wide range of other concerns -- natural resources, immigration, highways. Of the two mentions of the secular vs. sectarian schools controversy, one laid out the Conservat-

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1 Compare this with Mr. Kyba's analysis. Kyba, "Saskatchewan General Election", p. 34.
ive position (May 13, 1929) and the other attempted to answer Liberal charges of religious bigotry. (May 29, 1929). The Conservatives combined their presentation of immigration policy with a denial of Liberal charges of racism (May 24, 1929).

The accent in the Liberal campaign (particularly at the outset) was on the government's record of achievement. As election day drew nearer, the Liberals began to concentrate on two other themes: refuting Conservative charges of corruption and attacking the Tory education policy as religious bigotry (May 22, May 27, May 30, May 31, June 4). It would be unfair to say that the Liberal campaign as a whole was defensive.
APPENDIX F


WHEREAS, the Premier of the Province of Saskatchewan in his official capacity as minister of education has issued instructions that religious teaching in the schools shall be in the English language only, and that sectarian influences such as religious garbs and emblems will be removed from the public schools of the province, and that the School Act and all regulations issued by the department will be strictly adhered to.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that this convention go on record as being in hearty accord with same and congratulate the Premier on his stand in this connection; and further that this convention call upon the premier of Saskatchewan as minister of education to see that this province receives, apart from the Natural Resources, full and unrestricted control of our school system, and that the School Lands Endowment Fund be placed under entire provincial law and control.

WHEREAS the French language has no status outside of the House of Parliament, the Supreme Court of Canada and the province of Quebec; and

WHEREAS the Postmaster General, the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, the Minister of National Revenue, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Railways and Canals, are giving the French language equal status with the English language on forms and requirements issued by their respective departments;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that this convention go on record as protesting strenuously against the violation of the British North America Act.

WHEREAS the iniquitous railways agreement has been dumping into Canada for the last three years thousands of Central Europeans, creating an unemployment situation which has no parallel in the history of Canada;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that this convention is of the opinion that the Immigration department of the Dominion government should inaugurate a quota system; and
WHEREAS the government of Canada has apparently made agreement with the railways, according to press reports of January 7th, 1930 to allow a large portion of some 3,000 Mennonites who seek admission to the Dominion, to enter even after the protest made on behalf of the people of Saskatchewan by their representatives on the ground that there is a serious unemployment problem on their hands, and also that relations with members of this groups have not been satisfactory in the past; and because we believe that the Government of Saskatchewan has the right to control immigration into this province;

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that we view with alarm the report that the Dominion government has now officially made these further agreements, [sic] and that we protest in the strongest possible manner to the proper authorities at Ottawa, and that we approve of the stand taken by the Co-operative Government of Saskatchewan on this question.

WHEREAS the song "O Canada" was written specifically for a religious festival of the province of Quebec; and whereas "O Canada" is in many places supplanting our national anthem, "God save the King".

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that this convention go on record as being opposed to such substitution, and that in all meetings of the convention or individual Klans where it is found that a patriotic air is required that "The Maple Leaf Forever" be sung, but in no case shall any patriotic air be substituted for the national anthem, and further, that attention be seriously paid to the versions of "O Canada", one of which is definitely sectarian.

APPENDIX G

THE COHESIVENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORTERS IN THE LEGISLATURE AND MEMBERS OF THE SEVENTH LEGISLATURE

To determine the constancy with which the government members voted as a bloc, the recorded votes of the Legislature must be examined. In particular, votes on motions of non-confidence, on government bills and motions, and on resolutions generally supported by government members serve to indicate which members on the Speaker's right manifested an independent voting pattern. The votes for the 1929 session are not included in the chart since there was no deviant voting by coalition members in that brief sitting.

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<td>(b) Number of votes on government bills &amp; motions</td>
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<td>(c) Resolutions generally government backed</td>
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<th>J.B. Taylor</th>
<th>S.W. Arthur</th>
<th>H.A. Lilly</th>
<th>S. Whittaker</th>
<th>J. Grassick</th>
<th>H.P. Eades</th>
<th>H. Smith</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
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Note: The chart shows the number of votes each member cast in favor of government policies for each year, with the breakdown into different categories.
NOTES:

1. The high level of deviation in 1931 (b) is due entirely to a back bench revolt against a government bill to provide special pensions for A.P. McNab and Colin Fraser.

2. Group labels are not fixed. Dr. Arthur, elected as an Independent, called himself an "Independent Conservative" during his term, and ran as a Conservative in 1934. Mr. Whittaker, elected as a Conservative, called himself an "Independent Conservative", during his term, and ran as a government sponsored Independent in 1934.

3. The source for these figures is Saskatchewan Journals and Sessional Papers, R.S. Garrett, King's Printer, 1930, p. 173-174, 197; 1931, p. 58, 89, 106, 114; 1932, p. 35, 39-41, 70-71, 82-83, 93, 93-94, 97, 100, 102, 108, 111, 115-116, 126, 137-138; 1933, p. 82-83, 102-103; 1934, p. 49.

THE ANDERSON MINISTRY

Premier, President of the Executive Council, Minister of Education
Hon. J.T.M. Anderson, September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934

Attorney-General
Hon. M.A. MacPherson September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934

Provincial Secretary, Minister of Railways, Labor and Industries
Hon. J.A. Merkley September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934

Provincial Treasurer
Hon. Howard McConnell September 9, 1929 - November 2, 1931
Hon. M.A. MacPherson November 2, 1931 - July 19, 1934

Public Works Minister
Hon. J.F. Bryant September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934

Minister of Agriculture
Hon. W.C. Buckle September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934
| Minister of Municipal Affairs | Hon. Howard McConnell  
|                             | September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934 |
| Minister of Highways        | Hon. A.C. Stewart  
|                             | September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934 |
| Minister of Public Health   | Hon. F.D. Munroe  
|                             | September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934 |
| Minister of Natural Resources | Hon. J.T.M. Anderson  
|                              | September 9, 1929 - April 29, 1933 |
|                             | Hon. Charles McIntosh  
|                              | April 29, 1933 - May 31, 1933 |
|                             | Hon. J.T.M. Anderson  
|                              | May 31, 1933 - July 19, 1934 |
| Minister without Portfolio  | Hon. R. Stipe  
|                              | September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934 |
|                             | Hon. W.W. Smith  
|                              | September 9, 1929 - July 19, 1934 |

**MEMBERS ELECTED TO THE SEVENTH LEGISLATURE,**  
**JUNE 6, 1929**

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<td>Rev. R. Leslie</td>
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APPENDIX H

A COMPARISON OF DEBT ADJUSTMENT LEGISLATION:
THE CANADIAN PRAIRIES AND
THE AMERICAN MID-WEST

Agriculture on the Great Plains of North America faced a common problem in the depression of the 1930s: how to cope with the burden of debt in an economic crisis. While there existed many differences in the types of farming carried on, this problem was shared by all. The governments of Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan on the Canadian prairies, and Minnesota, Iowa and Nebraska in the American mid-west, whatever their respective political label -- Farmer, Progressive, Co-operative, Farmer-Labor, Republican or Democrat -- had to struggle with farm bankruptcy and foreclosure.

The approaches to debt adjustment in western Canada followed a similar pattern. In 1931 Manitoba passed a Debt Adjustment Act to establish an optional Debt Commission which offered conciliation procedures for farmer-debtors to adjust (i.e. defer) their payments. The Commission was empowered to issue a certificate to stop foreclosure and a farmer could appeal to a civil court if such a certificate was not granted.1 This Act was similar to one passed in Alberta in 1922.2 However in 1931 the government of Alberta passed a new act to extend coverage to all residents and establish a Debt Board to which creditors could appeal the ruling of the Debt Commissioner.3 In the same year, Saskatchewan's Co-operative Government passed an Act to Adjust Agricultural Debts which offered the optional conciliation procedure of a Debt Commissioner.4 Another Act established a moratorium on tax sales (i.e. foreclosure by a government for non-payment of taxes.)5 The next year, an amendment was passed to empower the Debt Commissioner to declare individual moratoria.6 With the exception of appeal procedure, this brought Saskatchewan's policy into line with that of her neighbours.

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1 Statutes of Manitoba (hereafter, S.M.), 1931, ch. 7.
2 Statutes of Alberta (hereafter, S.A.), 1922, ch. 43.
3 S.A., 1931, ch. 57.
4 S.S., 1931, ch. 59.
5 S.S., 1931, ch. 50.
6 S.S., 1932, ch. 51.
In 1933 both Alberta and Saskatchewan passed amendments to require all creditors to apply for a permit from a Debt Adjustment Board, which would attempt conciliation. The Alberta statute provided for appeals to the Supreme Court and gave the Board no powers of arbitration. The Saskatchewan Board had wide powers of arbitration, including the re-writing of some parts of the contract, and admitted no appeal. That year, Manitoba extended its Debt Commission's responsibility to include tax sales as well as contracted debt. While the Manitoba Commission was never made compulsory, the next year it was given the power of arbitration where its certificate was disputed. Beginning in 1931, the three prairie governments provided a legal procedure to ensure that residents, particularly farmers, would not be forced to give up their property by the arbitrary impact on the economic crisis.

Although the depression struck American farmers with equal severity, events took a different course than in western Canada. In the three years following the 1929 crash, state governments did little or nothing to aid farmers with their debt load: from 1931 to 1933 the rate of farm foreclosures in Nebraska, which was comparatively well-off, more than doubled. In desperation farmers formed their own non-partisan organization, the Farmers' Holiday Association in May, 1932, advocating direct action to withhold produce from the market to force prices up and to forcibly block foreclosure sales. These tactics yielded little but violent disorder.

On August 24/1932/ deputies in an automobile with tear gas cans mounted on the running boards ran a gauntlet of farmers armed with clubs and rocks. When forty-three were arrested, a sullen mob of five hundred, un daunted by machine guns in the hands of amateur deputies, swarmed over the courthouse lawn at Council Bluffs [Iowa] and threatened to storm the jail if the prisoners were not released by dusk.

On the nights of August 30, August 31, and September 1/1932/ there were pitched battles of deputies and farm pickets at the Omaha city limits. On September 1 a thousand

7 S.A., 1933, ch. 13; S.S., 1933, ch. 82.
8 S.M., 1933, ch. 9.
9 S.M., 1933, ch. 9.
11 Ibid., pp. 56-57, 65.
spectors watched as forty deputies were pelted by logs and rocks while they conducted farm trucks through a line of one hundred fifty pickets on Dodge Street.

In the last days of August, strikers and deputies clashed in Woodbury County, Iowa; fourteen pickets at Cherokee were injured by a shotgun blast; at Clinton, across the state, farmers again threatened to storm the county jail.12

Not until this violence had erupted did state governments begin to act.

After three years of inactivity, the legislatures suddenly burst into action. Minnesota's Farmer-Labor Governor declared a temporary moratorium on mortgage sales in February 1933, which was later confirmed and extended by the Legislature.13 Iowa's Republican Legislature passed a two year moratorium on mortgage foreclosures. In Nebraska, Democratic Governor C.W. Bryan appointed a conciliation commission to mediate settlements between debtors and creditors, on January 30, 1933. However, a little over a month later he was outbid by the Legislature which adopted a moratorium similar to that passed earlier in Iowa.14 These measures were largely overshadowed by Congress's creation of the Farm Credit Administration in March 1933, to re-finance farm debts. It provided a long term solution to the debt problem acceptable to both creditors and debtors, at considerable cost to the public treasury.15

Instead of acting at the onset of the depression to ease the debt load, American state governments waited until farmers were driven in desperation to violence, before attempting to provide assistance. When they did act, the states universally adopted a radical blanket solution which ignored individual circumstances. Eventually, the federal government's huge financial resources made the state response immaterial. The prairie provinces' response of acting early to provide a legal, orderly means of preventing farm foreclosure eliminated the injustice of arbitrary eviction and the violence that could have grown from that injustice.

12 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
14 Shaver, "The Farm Holiday Movement", p. 69.
15 Ibid., p. 71.
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