AMERICANIZATION: ANALYSIS OF A CONCEPT

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines a recurrent phenomenon within Canadian society and politics: the fear as well as the claim that the country is becoming "Americanized". Although recent indications of a concurrent value shift among advanced industrial nations call the validity of Americanization claims into question, they continue to the present day. This thesis posits that Americanization claims express underlying issues that contribute to their longevity. Its purpose is to excavate these underlying issues in order to derive an essential meaning for the term.

The study applies the method of conceptual analysis to a variety of materials from the mid-1960s to the 1980s. In the present study this consists of, first seeking out the logic contained in the arguments emanating from two traditional perspectives: continentalist and nationalist. Second, the identification of similarities and dissimilarities across these perspectives assists in excavating underlying issues and common themes from which to derive meaning.

It is posited that the phenomenon of Americanization is best viewed in two dimensions: the appearance or nature of the phenomenon and the meaning attached to it. On the first measure, Americanization appears diffuse. It is incoherent and often ambiguous. This complicates the task of determining meaning but does not preclude it. Similar themes and concepts found in the debate - sovereignty, independence, homogenization - indicate significant agreement on the importance of difference as an essential component in the debate.

The value of difference or diversity has traditionally been recognized in Canada. Despite the established fact that value differences between advanced industrial states appear to be diminishing, local variations remain important to this populace. It may appear in the different ordering of similarly held values, nevertheless it is there and it retains importance to Canadians. Americanization serves as a reminder of that value.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Blair Fraser once wrote that "without at least a touch of anti-Americanism, Canada would have no reason to exist."¹ Although the absolute nature of his claim is questionable, the statement nonetheless acknowledges the reality of anti-American sentiment to the Canadian experience. That sentiment is especially evident when the perceived threat of Americanization occurs, a prospect which repeatedly has arisen in Canada's history. Frank Underhill has called the determination of Canadians not to become Americans "the oldest and most tenacious tradition in our communal memory,"² while Seymour Martin Lipset, an American scholar who has written extensively on Canada, has referred to Canadians as "the world's oldest and most continuing un-Americans."³

At the core of this resistance to Americanization Lipset claims to see a fundamental value difference, one he attributes to the contrasting origins of the two countries. "Thus, the United States," he says,"remained throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries the extreme example of a classically liberal or Lockean society . . . reject[ing] the assumptions of the alliance of throne and altar, of ascriptive elitism, of mercantilism, of noblesseoblige, of communitarianism." By way of contrast, Canada tended to be "more class aware, elitist, law-abiding, statist, collectivity-oriented, and

¹Blair Fraser, The Search for Identity: Canada 1945-67 (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1967), 301.
particularistic (group oriented) . . . than the United States."⁴ While neither country embodied these values in pure form, the variations nonetheless were reflected in their original institutional structures. In Lipset's view, emphasis on "individualism" and "achievement" were "motivating forces in the launching of the American Revolution."⁵ Subsequently, the political and legal institutions of the United States as well as its socioeconomic structures reflected and fostered these liberal values within a republican construct. Canada's "counter-revolutionary" tendencies, in turn, were reflected and fostered through the choice of responsible parliamentary government within the framework of constitutional monarchy.

According to this view, the two societies continued their development side by side but along disparate lines. Canada remained a more statist, collectivity-oriented, particularistic, hierarchical, and deferential society while the United States followed a more anti-statist, meritocratic, individualistic and achievement oriented paradigm. Throughout their history, Canadians expressed the concern that the values and practices of the United States, transmitted through the market, media, and presence of its corporations and people in Canada, were transforming their country into a region of the United States. Recent research calls this interpretation into question. Available evidence points to a concurrent shift in advanced industrial societies toward a similar set of values.⁶ In this context, politicians and scholars alike insist that the concept of Americanization is no longer salient.

⁴Ibid., 8.

⁵Ibid. This view is shared by some Canadian authors as well. See Philip Resnick, Parliament vs. People: An Essay on Democracy and Canadian Political Culture (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1984), 10-17; Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism, 12.

Nevertheless, as recently as January 1998, Michael Valpy referred to "the next door elephant [who] could swamp us with its dumped pop culture". The same year *The Globe and Mail* carried an article entitled "Flood of U.S. Content Feared in Texts," in which Jack Stoddart, president of the Association of Canadian Publishers, warned that "Canadian content 'will disappear from the curriculum and we'll become like another state.'" These are but two examples of the occasional claims of Americanization that continue to surface. Most have to do with cultural, social and political concerns, although some references to economics, especially in regard to the North American Free Trade Agreement, still appear. The persistence of Americanization claims indicates that it is still a concern of Canadians and, for that reason, an essential concept to explore and analyze.

The nature of the phenomenon complicates this task. Because it has stood at the centre of Canadian thinking for so long, the concept of Americanization has grown imprecise. Canadians typically argue about whether or not Canada has been Americanized and, if so, to what degree; they seldom stop to consider the meaning of the term. The problem is not that Americanization has lost meaning for Canadians; rather it has many meanings. It can refer to anything from a penchant for Coca-Cola, to the presence of American-owned corporations in Canada, to the number of American faculty in its universities. At different times, for example, Canada's economy and culture, its military and universities have been said to be Americanized. Because the label is used so indiscriminately, the substance of the charge lacks coherence. This thesis posits that, notwithstanding the apparent incoherence, claims of Americanization contain underlying issues that lend salience to the phenomenon. It is, therefore, the task of this thesis to excavate these issues and in the process derive a cogent meaning for Americanization.

Although other analyses have addressed each sphere of activity separately, the

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present study proposes to look at Americanization as a phenomenon in itself, one that at different times and for distinct reasons may elevate cultural or economic or other concerns. Materials that refer to Americanization will be subjected to a conceptual analysis. Strictly speaking, conceptual analysis is not content analysis. Although some allusion will be made to repetition of phrases and themes in the material, the study does not count specific terms and phrases. As a result, the thesis is best described as a qualitative study, where claims about Americanization must be scrutinized both individually and as a whole to discover the underlying logic of the concept. In the present thesis this will involve, first, seeking out patterns of logic, and second, focusing on similarities and dissimilarities contained in the literature that argues that Canada is becoming Americanized.

One caveat should be noted. It is English-speaking Canada’s experience with anti-American sentiments that will serve as the focus for examination. French Canadians have traditionally been perceived as less vulnerable to American influence by virtue of the shield of their different language, culture and religion. Whether or not this observation is valid, French-speaking Canadians have generally responded differently concerning the matter of anti-American sentiments. A complete analysis of the differential experiences of the two language groups is beyond the scope of this thesis. The reader will also notice that little attention is paid to regional difference in this analysis. Certainly different regional outlooks existed, but these tended to be territorially specific and impermanent. The emphasis here, on pan-Canadian arguments, is not intended to slight regional variations but rather to reflect the dominance of Canada’s nation-building efforts in response to the perceived threat of Americanization.

The interconnectedness of anti-American sentiment and claims of Americanization leads to the proposition that periods of heightened anti-American sentiment are more apt to reveal fears of Americanization. Based on this premise, the following examination will utilize the framework provided by Canadian historian William Baker. Baker provides a chronology within which to view the development of anti-
American sentiment in Canada. He delineates four stages. The first, from the conclusion of the War of 1812-14 to the Treaty of Washington in 1871, was based on fear of military invasion by the United States. The second stage, from 1871 to the First World War, marked a period in which Canadian fears of armed aggression gave way to a lesser but nevertheless substantial fear of American annexation. Anti-American sentiments dissipated significantly during the third stage after the First World War and until the mid-1960s. The fourth stage, beginning in the mid-1960s, was characterized by a resurgence of anti-American sentiments stimulated by economic and cultural factors. Writing in 1973, Baker did not provide a date for the conclusion of the fourth stage, although it is argued here, by virtue of hindsight, that Baker's fourth stage concluded in the late 1980s or early 1990s after the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States. In addition, this thesis posits that the last decade of this century has witnessed a fifth, relatively quiescent, stage of anti-American sentiment. It is the period from the mid-1960s and up to the mid-1980s that provides the focus for the present work, since those two decades of anti-Americanism are framed by periods of quiescence and thus offer an excellent period in which to study the phenomenon.

Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s a plethora of Americanization claims were heard in Canada. Royal Commissions - on Canada's Economic Prospects (Gordon) 1955, on Publications (O'Leary) 1961, on Broadcasting (Fowler) 1965, along with a Task Force on Foreign Ownership (Watkins) 1968 - and the Commission on Canadian Studies (Symons) 1976 were established to investigate economic, cultural and educational concerns arising as a result of these claims. At each end of the political spectrum controversy grew. Conservative George Grant's Lament for a Nation, written in 1965, provided one basis for debate, but so, too, did A Choice for Canada, written

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10Although the debate surrounding this agreement revived many economic arguments, a discussion of this period would constitute a separate study on its own and is beyond the scope of the present thesis.
by Liberal finance minister Walter Gordon in 1966. Other writers, among them socialists Kari Levitt, Ian Lumsden, and Melville Watkins, built upon the observations of these two authors. These works, plus a variety of newspaper and journal articles, provide the ideological lenses - conservative, socialist and liberal - through which to study the arguments that surround the concept of Americanization.

Notwithstanding the ideological leanings of those individuals involved, the works in question debate the fundamental issues of nation-state sovereignty and national interest from two distinct approaches, commonly labelled continentalist and nationalist. Generally, continentalists are associated with the argument that closer ties with the United States will assist in the development of Canada and so serve the national interest. Nationalists, often labelled cultural or economic protectionists by their opponents, retort that continentalism will lead to the Americanization of Canada. As a consequence, they say protectionist measures are required to reverse the process. Neither position is as clear as this brief synopsis would indicate. A variety of perspectives exists within each category. Continentalists range from those who argue for Canada's political annexation to the United States to those who perceive potential costs in closer alliance but insist that the benefits outweigh the costs. It is worth noting that annexationists, pure and simple, have played no part in the debate within this century at least. Extreme nationalists urge that Canada must dissociate itself from all economic, cultural and military ties to the United States, an objective that they think can only be accomplished through a socialist

11Intriguingly, however, the annexationist movement rose up briefly again in 1977 in the form of a U.S. movement called the expansionist party. Founder L. Craig Schoonmaker's proposal for a United States of Canada was based on a Maclean's survey in 1964 that showed at least 68 per cent of Canadians supported economic union with the United States. Schoonmaker's party did not attract significant support in either country. See John Picton "New U.S. Party Seeking to Annex Canada," The Globe and Mail, August 23, 1977, 1; "U.S. Splinter Party Says Union with us only 20 Years Away," Toronto Star, August 23, 1977, A3; P.C. Newman, "Who's for Canada - and Who's for the U.S.A.?," public opinion survey, Maclean's, June 6, 1964, 12-16, 33. Please note that citations for Maclean's throughout this thesis vary in form, according to the magazine's practice sometimes of giving a complete date including day and at other times the month and year alone.
revolution. Moderates accept that a degree of interdependence between the two countries is to be expected but believe it must be accompanied by measures to protect Canada's economy and culture.

In addition to variations within each category, there is some overlap between the continentalist and nationalist positions. Both continentalists and nationalists see themselves as acting in the national interest. Either may hold themselves out as the true Canadian nationalists. Where they differ is on competing conceptions of nationalism. S. D. Clark has offered one explanation for the co-existence of these competing nationalisms - Canada's early imperial connection to Britain. The original Canadian patriot was not a nationalist with primary ties to the country where he or she lived but rather to the Empire. The nationalist perspective therefore developed as an anti-imperialist sentiment which, in his words, "came close to being pro-American." Put another way, the original Canadian nationalist was a continentalist. Later, as ties with Great Britain weakened, the need to stress nation over empire eased and Canadian nationalism took a different form. Clark writes that "Canadian nationalism ceased to represent a protest against the imperialist connection and the closed economic-political-ecclesiastical system secured by that connection. It became rather the chief support of this closed system. In doing so, it aligned itself closely with the cause of anti-Americanism."12

These two versions of Canadian nationalism continue to influence Canada's relations with the United States. Their co-existence precludes a clear division between continentalist and nationalist positions. For purposes of argument, this study will define continentalists as those who advocate a strengthening of continental ties and nationalists as those who resist this trend. It must be remembered, however, that the division between the two is an artificial construct. In reality, both may argue for protectionist measures and both may accept what they consider a realistic level of interdependence. The distinction between the two positions is often a matter of degree rather than of kind.

12S. D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community (2d. ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 228.
Following analysis of the general debate, the study will focus on the political realm for it is here that the most dire predictions of Americanization were made. The area of politics is also significant because governmental systems are held by some, including Lipset, to comprise the most essential difference between the two countries. According to Lipset

the most obvious difference between the countries is in their governments: a parliamentary system with an executive (cabinet) that can have its way with the House of Commons, and a presidential, divided-powers system in which the executive does not control and must negotiate with both houses of Congress.\(^{13}\)

Arguments that propose this difference is being eroded will be examined. This part of the exploration will expand the framework of Baker’s fourth stage of anti-American sentiments to include a presentation made by Peter Aucoin in 1997.\(^{14}\) Although Aucoin’s presentation does not fit into the time period under study in the rest of this thesis, it is valuable for its expansion of earlier themes. Foremost among these is the claim by Denis Smith that the office of prime minister in Canada has become presidentialized.\(^{15}\) Although Smith’s observations have been the subject of much contention, his argument finds recent support in Aucoin’s work regarding republican incursions into these institutions. The aim of this exercise is twofold: to search for the meaning of Americanization claims in the political realm and to relate this meaning to that developed in the preceding chapters for the Americanization phenomenon as a whole.

\(^{13}\) Lipset, Continental Divide, 50.

\(^{14}\) Peter Aucoin, “Accountability: The Key to Restoring Public Confidence in Government,” (The Timlin Lecture: University of Saskatchewan, November 6, 1997).

Chapter Two: The Debate - Coherence

In the nationalist interpretation Americanization transcends issue areas in the form of a causal chain. For the nationalist, Americanization fears are rooted in economics. It was Walter Gordon who said that "all economic policies have political and social consequences." Philip Resnick echoed the concern, only from the perspective of defence issues: "The acceptance by Canada's political and military elites of American direction . . . [is] linked intimately to the economic development of Canada along liberal capitalist lines." In the realm of culture, Gail Dexter predicted that "as long as the Canadian economy is dominated by the United States, Canadian culture will be submerged."

Canada's economic relationship with the United States, especially in the search for a reciprocity agreement, is a matter that predates Confederation. In the 1960s, and in the temporary absence of that episodic debate, economic concerns nevertheless reappeared. This time the focus of the debate was foreign investment as an obstacle to Canada's long-term viability. Canadians had long welcomed foreign investment, but by the early 1950s had become concerned at the volume of investment issuing from a single country, the United States, and at its concentration in key sectors of the Canadian economy. "By 1954, foreign investors controlled nearly three quarters of the oil industry,

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3Gail Dexter, "Yes, Cultural Imperialism Too!," Close the 49th Parallel, 161.
one half of the mining and about two fifths of the manufacturing." Over four-fifths of these businesses had American parent companies. A decade later it was estimated that "foreign investors held 60 per cent of Canadian manufacturing industries, 59 per cent of mining and smelting, and 74 per cent of petroleum and natural gas."

According to some critics, the origins of the problem lay in the National Policy of Sir John A. Macdonald. Introduced as a way of protecting Canadian trade, it had, intentionally or not, attracted foreign capital to Canada. Americans who found the tariffs of the National Policy a deterrent to trade moved their industries inside Canada's borders. Canadians wanted American investment. Branch plants then, as now, were perceived by many as the most effective means by which to induce growth in the economy. In an almost feverish pitch, Canadians opened their country to foreign investors: "The practice of granting bonuses to industries in the form of free sites, free utilities, tax concessions, loans and outright cash grants was universal and persistent . . . [and] was responsible for the attraction of countless American branch plants to specific cities." In fact, reciprocity became a contentious issue in the election campaigns of 1891 and 1911 because it was feared that it would cause branch plants to move out of Canada. With reciprocity's defeat, subsidiaries in Canada mushroomed; by 1978 Canada had "more than four times as much foreign ownership as Switzerland, the country with the next highest level on a per capita basis." Approximately 80 per cent of this foreign ownership was held in the United States.

4Michel Brunet, "Continentalism and Quebec Nationalism: A Double Challenge to Canada," Queen's Quarterly, 76, no. 3 (autumn, 1969), 521. Data in this paragraph are from Brunet.

5Michael Bliss, "Canadianizing American Business," Close the 49th Parallel, 32. Bliss argues that, although most historians ignore it, "economists have long recognized . . . [that] the roots of the branch-plant economic structure in North America must clearly be traced to the operations of the National Policy of tariff protection." Also see C. W. Gonick, "Foreign Ownership and Political Decay" Close the 49th Parallel, 61-62.

6Ibid., 33.

In 1955 a Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (Gordon) and, a decade later in 1968, a Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry (Watkins) were established to investigate Canada's economic concerns. In general the tone of the Gordon Report was optimistic. Significantly, however, it expressed growing concern that the extent and nature of foreign investment in Canada could create future economic problems. The 1968 Task Force, appointed at Gordon's insistence, was asked to assess the costs of foreign direct investment to the Canadian economy. Task Force members identified the concentration of this investment in key sectors of Canadian industry as a substantial concern. Coupled with the practice of extraterritoriality, which they defined as "the subjection of residents of one country to the laws and policies of another country," foreign ownership translated into foreign control of the Canadian economy. Some industries had been repatriated but more needed to be done to reconcile the goal of independence with the desire for a high standard of living. A new National Policy was recommended which would include the creation of a special agency to co-ordinate policies regarding multinational corporations.

In 1971, the federal government completed its "third major government study of foreign ownership." The resulting Gray Report (Foreign Direct Investment in Canada) provided a detailed analysis of the effects of foreign ownership on Canada's economy, politics, and culture. One of the major recommendations issuing from the report concerned the establishment of a screening agency to regulate the behaviour of Canadian and foreign controlled firms in Canada as well as the level of foreign ownership, even blocking foreign direct investment in some cases. Although the Trudeau government delayed in publishing the report, an agency similar to the one described in the Gray Report - the Foreign Investment Review Agency - was established in 1974.

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10Ibid., 153-156.
The primary concern among nationalist writers was the extent of foreign ownership and its effect - foreign control of the Canadian economy. According to George Grant, for instance, a triad of Canadian business interests, liberal political elites and American corporations worked together to ensure the economic and, eventually, the political subjugation of Canada. Socialist thinker Kari Levitt posited that American foreign direct investment was a facet of a larger process, a new form of mercantilism centred in the United States. Like the older European variety, it cut across geographical boundaries in order to maximize profits for the centre or "metropolis". Multinational corporations exported capital and ownership in order to create new markets. In exchange for its raw resources the hinterland received manufactured goods from the centre. As before, this new form of mercantilism benefited from "a variety of privileges granted by the state." Levitt stated that multinational corporations "use their economic power and their political influence, and indeed, the military strength of their metropolitan governments, to protect their investments against disruptions in the market for their supplies and their sales."  

Mercantilism has had negative economic consequences for Canada. First, its branch-plant status placed the country in a "perpetually backward technological state." Research and development is controlled and organized by the parent company so that, as Jeff Logan wrote, "plants in Canada often simply assemble parts made elsewhere by their parent company; ... [they] seldom do much research and development." Second, entrepreneurship withers as "local firms are bought out and potential local entrepreneurs become the salaried employees of the multinational corporation." Third, contrary to the benefits claimed by proponents of direct foreign investment, any jobs that


12Ibid., 3.


14Levitt, Silent Surrender, 104.
may be created are impermanent. Logan pointed out that "because of the characteristics of these branch plants, jobs for Canadians are not being generated; ... [rather] in times of economic slowdown subsidiary plants are often the first to be shutdown[sic]."15 Trade figures may look good but on closer inspection Levitt noted that, at the same time as multinational corporations increased in Canada, the "share of crudely processed materials in exports ha[d] not diminished significantly" while "imports of manufactured goods as a percentage of domestic production ... increased."16 Furthermore, "many companies established in Canada are not encouraged to export to other countries. In fact, they are often prohibited from doing so because the parent firm wants to supply those markets itself."17

Worse, according to both Logan and Levitt, was the fact that Canadian savings were being used to finance the continuance of foreign ownership. Levitt noted that "the structure of ownership and control is such that there are barriers to the flow of Canadian savings to finance new Canadian enterprise."18 Profits and savings from the Canadian branch plants return to the parent company in the United States. Logan quoted American studies to show that "less than ten per cent of the huge increase of foreign ownership in the past 15 years has been made with American money. The rest was made through retained earnings or funds raised in Canada"19

Continentalist interpretations of the Canadian economic situation followed one of two lines. The first argued that any economic difficulties Canada was experiencing were the result of a small-scale market compounded by inefficiencies of Canadian industrial practices. The answer, it was said, lay in gaining access to the larger American market

16Levitt, Silent Surrender, 119.
18Levitt, Silent Surrender, 119.
through some form of free trading bloc. The second held that the nationalist camp was advancing a non-issue - foreign investment had and would continue to benefit Canadians. Following the first line of continentalist thought, Canadian economist John A. Weir asserted that the problem with the Canadian economy was tariffs: Canadian tariffs encouraged the development of a branch-plant economy, while U.S. tariffs blocked Canada's access to the larger market it needed to prosper. Removal of the North American tariffs would improve Canada's economy by increasing trade between the two countries.

George Hees, a former minister of Trade and Commerce in the Diefenbaker Government, was among those who argued that the Canadian economy was "in a very healthy state indeed." Moreover, he asserted: "To maintain it, and to keep it steadily increasing in the years ahead, we will need all the capital investment we can lay our hands on, both from inside Canada and from abroad." Walter Gordon, then minister of finance in the Pearson cabinet, concurred that Canada had "benefited greatly from the investment of foreign capital" and that more would be needed. However, he disagreed with Hees's diagnosis. Canada's economy was not flourishing. In A Choice for Canada

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(1966), he pinpointed a problem with Canada's balance-of-payments deficit. In its trade relations Canada had incurred "heavy deficits" with the United States but surpluses with all other countries. The reason for the difference was due to Canadian reliance on American foreign direct investment. Unlike loans which can eventually be repaid, equity from direct foreign investment continues to grow indefinitely as well as exponentially. 24 Reliance on this form of investment condemned Canada to a perpetual state of indebtedness which would hinder future growth and development.

Continentalists argued that the current state of indebtedness was not perpetual but temporary and a necessary step in the development of Canada as a mature capitalist state. Development could best be accomplished by Canada availing itself of superior American financial and business acumen. Dependence on foreign capital would eventually enable the country to achieve the high level of prosperity needed in order to realize greater independence. Harry Johnson, a leading Canadian economist (but holding appointments at the University of Chicago and the London School of Economics) explained that "closer economic integration . . . would make [Canadians] better able and more willing to use the political sovereignty of their country to pursue political and social policies appropriate to their own conceptions and requirements." 25 On the contrary, Gordon argued that the preponderance of foreign ownership in Canadian industry "meant the surrender to absentee owners of far too much control over the day-to-day workings of the Canadian economy," 26 and "no country in the world . . . can make any pretense of being independent if it does not control . . . in one way or another, the general nature of the decisions made by those who directs its basic

24Ibid., 65, 70-71.


26Gordon, A Choice for Canada, 69.
Philip Resnick saw the "integration in defence policy..." as a logical counterpart to economic continentalism. Economic development "along liberal capitalist lines [had] turned Canada into a region in the continental and worldwide American economic system." In light of this association, it was natural that the support shown by Canada's political and military elite for "liberal values and free enterprise, combined with their anti-communism, should have led them to define Canadian interests in terms of the American empire." In Resnick's view, the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) irreversibly tied Canada to continental defence under the leadership of the United States. Ottawa's agreement to this arrangement amounted to a recognition "that control over air defence had to all intents and purposes passed to the United States as the major partner in the combined command... Through NORAD... the RCAF had in fact become 'a colonial military instrument serving the nuclear strategy of the United States'."

The Cuban Missile Crisis proved a case in point. When in 1961 the United States officials perceived a threat from Soviet missiles placed in Cuba, they ordered NORAD defences on full alert. Canada's prime minister, who held joint decision-making status with U.S. command, waited forty-eight hours before deciding to place Canada's forces on alert. Nevertheless, in the words of one American official, "Canadian forces went on full alert despite their government." Resnick points out that in this case, the Canadian


28Resnick, "Canadian Defence," 100.

29Ibid., 94.

30Ibid.

31Ibid., 105.

prime minister was "powerless" to prevent the mobilization of Canada's own forces.

Membership in NORAD also committed Canada to accept nuclear weapons deemed necessary for continental protection. The Diefenbaker government had agreed in 1959-60 to acquire from the United States Bomarc missiles and CF101B interceptors designed to carry nuclear warheads. This agreement was in direct contradiction with Canada's stance on non-proliferation of nuclear arms. The final delivery date, late spring 1963, afforded the government time to vacillate over whether it would accept the weapons. Diefenbaker's indecision was utilized by the Liberal opposition led by Lester B. Pearson during the election campaign of 1962 and, to a lesser extent, again in 1963. The controversy was of such proportions that it eventually brought down the Diefenbaker government on a non-confidence motion.

The Pearson Liberals, who had committed themselves to non-proliferation at the 1961 party rally, shifted their position significantly by 1963. Denis Smith described Pearson's position during the 1962 election campaign as follows: "Canada should end its indecision either by negotiating itself out of its nuclear commitments in NORAD or by accepting them without ambiguity." By 1963 Pearson had gone further: "A new Liberal government would put Canada's armed services in the position to discharge fully commitments undertaken for Canada by its predecessor." Although there was some dissension within Liberal ranks because of the shift in position, it was mitigated by the promise of a future review of Canada's commitments, especially NORAD.

According to Resnick, Pearson's position was logical in light of previous agreements:

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34Ibid., 115.


36Lester B. Pearson, Words and Occasions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 204.
"NORAD led irrevocably to nuclear weapons."\(^\text{37}\)

Continentalists insisted that Canada's demographic makeup and its geographical proximity to a powerful yet friendly nation made mutual alliance a pragmatic option. In the Cold War environment, Canada and the United States had common interests as free market countries; they also had a common enemy in the Soviet Union. In 1969, Gordon Fairweather, a former Progressive Conservative member of parliament, wrote that "if the use of our airspace for surveillance is of assistance to America, let us graciously concede the point. We cannot opt out of geography; neither can we turn our backs on the reality of our association."\(^\text{38}\)

Another, less obvious effect of Canada's branch-plant status was said to be the homogenization of national cultures. The economic success of the multinational corporations depended upon their ability to introduce new products into the marketplace at a rapid pace. In turn, that success depended upon educating the public to desire the new products. In these efforts, Levitt declared that "the corporations have mastered the techniques of manipulating our personal and social requirements in the interests of their private imperatives of survival; they can make people buy things they don't really want and produce things nobody else really needs."\(^\text{39}\) According to this view "the cultural imperatives of the metropolis" must prevail. Generally, it is not cost effective to acknowledge particularities of culture: "The corporation thus has a vested interest in the destruction of cultural differences and in a homogenized way of life the world over."\(^\text{40}\) Economist Kenneth Boulding coined the term superculture for this "culture grown in the


\(^{39}\)Levitt, *Silent Surrender*, 29.

\(^{40}\)Ibid., 76.
market instead of the psyche,"^{41} and Pierre Juneau, then Canada's Under Secretary of State, elaborated on its meaning:

Superculture . . . is the product of the corporate world: it is mass consumer culture, products and services developed through trial and error in the marketplace and franchised or exported around the world. It is the formula TV series, shrewdly balancing sex and violence with the exploitation of celebrity talent. It is the carefully guarded recipe of Coca-Cola or the Colonel's chicken batter, internationally marketed . . . ; efficiency and convenience and standardization on the march.^{42}

John Kettle added that although "superculture is not exclusively American . . . the U.S. dominates it as well as manag[es] it."^{43}

In the face of this superculture, cultural protection became an increasingly significant part of the Americanization debate in Canada. Canadian historian, Michael Bliss saw a "major shift in Canadian protectionist effort during the last century . . . [as it moved] from safeguarding the infant national economy to shoring up the infant national culture."^{44} Paradoxically in the matter of culture, foreign had become whatever derived from the United States, the country with which Canada had most in common. Cultural concerns had been addressed in the post war period through the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, commonly known as the Massey Commission. Although the Massey Commission had a broad perspective, encompassing the arts, education and mass culture or communications, it was the last that primarily concerned protectionists in the period under review. In 1961 the Royal Commission on Publications (O'Leary) was "appointed to investigate every aspect of Canadian periodical publishing industry with a view to insuring its place in Canada's way

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^{43}Ibid.

^{44}Michael Bliss, "Cultural Tariffs and Canadian Universities," in *The Star-Spangled Beaver*, 80.
of life."45 Commissioners expressed the concern that "the nature of modern communication is such that its effects carry enormous social and political, as well as economic implications."46 The O'Leary Report, released in 1961, put the matter this way:

The tremendous expansion of communications in the United States has given that nation the world's most penetrating and effective apparatus for the transmission of ideas. Canada, more than any other country, is naked to that force, exposed unceasingly to a vast network of communications which reaches to every corner of our land: American words, images and print - the good, the bad, the indifferent - batter unrelentingly at our eyes and ears.47

Commissioners described the Canadian situation as one in which there was a foreign periodical overflow. Foreign periodicals, especially split-run editions (which sell space for geographically specific advertising), adversely affect Canadian magazine circulation and advertising revenues. They recommended that advertising not be eligible for tax deductions against income when placed in foreign periodicals.

In 1965 the Committee on Broadcasting (Fowler) was set up, as an advisory committee to the Secretary of State, to examine Canada's broadcasting system. Members of the committee began with the premise that good programming should bring news and information that would "reflect Canadian values and judgements" as well as provide a connective function within Canada.48 They determined that "left to operate freely, economic factors would quickly tend to make Canadian private television stations mere extensions of the American networks."49 As a result, they recommended, among other things, the creation of a regulatory body to control broadcasting through the regulation

46Ibid.
47Ibid., 5-6.
49Ibid., 45.
of licensing and conditions of broadcasting. For the first time, it was also recommended that a minimum of 55 percent of television time be devoted to programmes with Canadian content.

In a 1969 article provocatively titled "How to Become an American without Really Trying", Jon Ruddy bemoaned the transference of "American middle-class values" to Canada through television "the most potent purveyor of America's conventional wisdom."50 In 1977 the fact that "three out of four hours of television watched by Canadian children [was] American" was a cause for great concern among some.51 Canada's Secretary of State John Roberts posited that "TV was not just entertainment" but that "it carry[d] a profound impact."52 In the same speech to publishing executives, Roberts expressed concern over the threat posed to Canada's freedom of expression by the "deep penetration of American books, films, records, radio and TV."53 Jeff Logan summed up the matter well when he wrote that "Canadians are overwhelmed by a foreign culture in their own country."54

Continentalists conceded that some measure of cultural infiltration was to be expected. Their critiques took the form of a cost-benefit analysis. Culture was one area in which Canadians might experience some loss but the benefits of a close alliance with the United States far outweighed the cost. Culture could be protected as long as it did not endanger the economic and technological advances that would be realized through closer integration. Promotion of the arts, it was argued, was a more feasible goal than


52 Ibid.


reactive protectionist measures.

Closely connected to the cultural argument was the issue of the Americanization of Canada's universities. The concern took two forms: the proportion of foreign scholars at Canadian universities and perceived lack of Canadian content in course materials. Nationalists saw a causal relationship between the two phenomena: the increasing proportion of non-Canadians in the universities was responsible for a decline in the use of Canadian subject matter. In the early 1970s, James Steele and Robin Matthews noted that "there is evidence for believing that the proportion of Canadians in Canadian universities has diminished by about 25 per cent between 1961 and 1968." The resulting gap, they asserted, was being filled with foreign scholars, the majority of whom were from one country, the United States. In 1968-69, 1,013 positions were filled from the U.S.A., 545 from Great Britain, 722 from elsewhere and the remainder, probably only about 360, were filled by Canadians. The under-representation of Canadian instructors suggested that "too few Canadians are being urged to excellence, are being helped to continue study, or are being hired when qualified personnel are sought for

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55James Steele and Robin Matthews, "The Universities: Takeover of the Mind," Close the 49th Parallel, 171. They based this observation on a 1967 Economic Council of Canada survey of fifteen university calenders together with data from the 1961 Canada census. Surveys conducted, during the 1960s, at various Canadian universities also intimated that the proportion of Canadian faculty was decreasing in relation to that of foreign faculty. Simon Fraser University, for instance conducted a survey in 1967-8 showing that 68 per cent of faculty in professorial ranks were not Canadian citizens.

University of Alberta surveys demonstrate a decrease in Canadian faculty from the 1961-2 figure of 60.8 per cent to 47.2 per cent in 1968-9 and a similar drop was recorded at the University of Waterloo, from 68 per cent in 1964 to 57 per cent in 1968, while in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Waterloo the decrease was more dramatic, from 60 per cent Canadian in 1964-5 to 49 per cent in 1969. See "Analysis of Full-Time Faculty at the University of Alberta - By Country of Birth," in Robin Matthews, Cyril Byrne, and Kenneth McKinnon, "The University of Waterloo: A Special Study," presented to the Minister of University Affairs et al., August 1969, Appendix Item One.

56Ibid., 170. Also see L. Parai, Immigration and Emigration of Professional and Skilled Manpower During the Post-War Period, Special Study No. 1 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1963), 224.
positions in the universities." Further studies indicated a relation between the proportion of non-Canadians present in the universities and the paucity of Canadian course material offered. Michael Kennedy's 1968-69 survey at the University of Alberta revealed that of seventy-nine Sociology courses offered in the Calendar "only one . . . [was] described . . . as pertaining to Canada," this was in a department consisting of nineteen non-Canadian and four Canadian scholars. Similar situations were discovered at the University of Waterloo, Laurentian University and the University of Winnipeg. As further indication of the relationship, Steele and Matthews cited the example of the only Canadian professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Winnipeg in 1969-70, who was threatened with "disciplinary steps" when he "resolved to use two US and three Canadian texts instead of four out of five US texts for an introductory Political Science course."

Submissions to the Commission on Canadian Studies (Symons) indicated that this experience was far from being atypical. The Commission, appointed in 1972, by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, was mandated to "study, report, and make recommendations upon the state of teaching and research in various fields of study relating to Canada at Canadian universities." In its subsequent report, Dr. Symons related that

57Ibid., 173.

58"Numbers of Canadian Courses and Canadian Teachers in the Departments of Political Science, Sociology, History, and Psychology at the University of Alberta (1968-9)," in Matthews, Byrne, and McKinnon, "The University of Waterloo," Appendix, Items 2a and 2b.


60Steele and Matthews, "The Universities: Takeover of the Mind," 172.

in some departments, the Commission was told, curriculum and planning committees have been dominated by non-Canadians who either were not interested in Canadian literature or made it evident that they regarded it as unworthy of serious study... Other instances were cited where senior Canadian scholars indicated to young teachers that attempts to emphasize Canadian literature in their courses would be detrimental to their advancement. Graduate students cited similar experiences. 62

From the perspective of continentalists the proportion of foreign scholars in Canadian universities was separate from that of Canadian content in courses. They maintained that increasing knowledge of Canada would be a bonus but not if it were done in a narrow parochial manner. Knowledge, said writers of this persuasion, is a universal, and it is discriminatory to suggest that the presence of foreigners lessens opportunities for Canadians and knowledge of Canada. Michael Bliss took issue with the statistics cited by nationalists, although he conceded that "their general proposition about our reliance on academic imports seems established... It is not desirable to have humanities and social science departments in Canadian universities stocked with Americans who pay no attention to Canadian traditions and issues."63 The solution, however, did not consist in protectionist measures but rather in offering more courses on Canadian studies.

Another strain to the nationalist argument contends that it is the attitude of the American market place that has been imported into Canadian universities. According to Winstanley "America is a business culture and it is not, therefore, surprising that most of the universities in the U.S.A. are run according to the values, attitudes, organization and practices of corporate capitalism."64 This attitude manifests itself most readily in the


63Bliss, "Cultural Tariffs," 81,84.

modern managerial style by which most universities operate. Winstanley wrote that "'American liberalism' or simply 'Americanism'... is a curious blend of Calvinistic sadism on the part of the administrators and myopic materialism and self-centred individualism on the part of the faculty... The name of the game is to keep as many faculty untenured i.e., insecure as possible, motivating the faculty by fear of losing their jobs in a market where it is difficult to get another."65

Ellen and Neal Wood, two political theory professors from the United States, argued that while, statistically, the Americanization of Canada's universities was well recognized, the more important issue concerning the universities had to do with "substantive Americanization." By this they meant the adoption of the new social sciences, especially as developed in the United States after the Second World War. Because the imperative of the new social sciences is technique, "quantification, mechanization and standardization" are stressed over content. For Canada, this led to the adoption of models, concepts, and theories that did not recognize its particularities.66 Alan C. Cairns made a similar observation in a submission to the Commission on Canadian Studies:

It requires little imagination to visualize a pessimistic scenario in which students of Canadian politics exhaust themselves trying to apply the latest, ever-changing model, approach, or theory developed by the bulk of the world's political scientists who live in the United States.67

The Symons Commission found that generally, in most academic disciplines, from literature to history, from the social to the natural sciences, insufficient attention was paid to Canadian concerns. Although knowledge can be viewed as a universal, Canada's geography, as well as its societal and political institutions, necessitate study of the particular. In many cases the Canadian emphasis was non-existent. For this reason, the

65Ibid.


67Symons, Abridged, 52.
Commission recommended a "major expansion of Canadian studies in the university curriculum . . . at both the undergraduate and graduate levels."68

Continentalists did not see the causal connection between economics and culture, defence and universities nor did they accept the primacy nationalists gave economics. While nationalists might dismiss continentalists as myopic for failing to see a coherent Americanization, study of the period 1960-80 suggests less coherence than nationalists maintained. For instance, by 1980 the economic argument had begun to disappear. That year Walter Stewart wrote an epitaph for economic nationalism.

In today's climate, it has not produced a murmur. Hurtig has become discouraged. Max Saltsman, chairman of the Committee for an Independent Canada, has other things on his mind . . . . Walter Gordon, while still engaged in the nationalist debate, has dropped out of the CIC and is working instead with the Canadian Institute for Economic Policy.69

Among the reasons for this apparent inactivity is the fact, said Stewart, that "outside control is not, apparently, as damaging as expected . . . . Canadians obviously feel that the contributions of American capital to such areas as electrical manufacturing and oil exploration offset [any] disadvantage."70 Economically, Canadians experienced the benefits of continental ties and in the late 1970s even real growth in relation to the United States. Yet this proved to be the lull before the storm of the free-trade debate. Ironically one of the concerns was that Free Trade would cause many of the branch plants to leave Canada.

The arguments surrounding the defence issue were most marked in the 1960s with the Cuban Missile Crisis and the nuclear arms debate. Once the decision to obtain the nuclear arms was made by the Pearson government it quickly faded into a non-

68Ibid., 88.


70Ibid. Significantly, although Canada experienced some real growth during the 1970s, 1980 witnessed a general economic crisis and therefore a fear of taking new directions also played a role in moderating nationalist expression.

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issue. The Canadian public seemed to accept the Liberals' reasoning that Canada should honour its commitments in this regard. Later testing of cruise missiles and a subsequent review of Canada's role in NORAD did nothing to revive defence as an issue as Canada became more concerned with the state of its military at home.

The cultural argument, heard first before the Massey Commission, continued throughout the period. However, analyses became severed from the other issues. The causal relation espoused by the nationalists was no longer a part of the argument as the continentalist interpretation of costs and benefits became more widely accepted. Legislation to limit American influence through publications and mass media was pursued but with the caveat that Canadians did not wish to appear to be "raving nationalists." The argument about academics was largely confined to the 1970s. After the Commission on Canadian Studies reported its findings, more universities developed Canadian Studies programs and, for a variety of reasons, the number of foreign professors and graduate students dwindled.

For the most part nationalist arguments had either disappeared or merged with continentalist thought. Anthony Westell described the 'new nationalism' of the 1980s in the following manner: "[It] arises from Canadian business people who see vast opportunities in the resource sector and are determined not to let foreigners run away with the lion's share. It reflects confidence rather than fear and is not anti-American." In an attempt to test Westell's theory of a shift to a new type of nationalist this study examined three hundred and forty-one titles taken from the Canadian Periodical Index (1965 - 1984 inclusive) under the heading Canada and sub-headings Economic relations - United States and International Relations - United States. Such words or phrases as "limits" "fears" "domination" "empire" "draw the line" were taken as evidence

71 The title of one 1981 article, by Anthony Westell, expressed this sentiment well "It's not that We're Raving Nationalists - the Problem is that the Americans Think We Are," Canadian Business, 54 no. 7 (July 1981), 31.

72 Ibid.

73 See Appendix A.
of negative sentiments. "Integrating" "affirm" "good friend" "help" "yes to NAFTA" "accord" and "success" were considered positive. It was expected that the shift Westell referred to would manifest itself in the presence of more positive titles toward the end of the time period. As a corollary, the survey sought to establish a connection between specific external events, such as Canadian or American legislation or American activities and the appearance of anti-American sentiment, which would lend coherence to the phenomenon. Of the total number of titles, one hundred and one could not be definitively categorized as either positive or negative and so were labelled neutral. Sixty were considered positive and one hundred and eighty negative.

The results of this title study are inconclusive on two counts. First, the shift to a more continentalist perspective could not be established. Both sides continued to be represented in the materials, as indicated by the relatively stable presence of both negative and positive titles up to the end of the period under review: in 1982 and again in 1984 negative titles out-numbered positive, twenty-two to six and twelve to two. Second, no significant relation to external events could be found. Periods of hostile relations, as in the period following the Kennedy equalization tax (1964), witnessed an increase in negative sentiments. So too did times of closer relations, for instance the signing of the auto pact in 196574 or the first stirring of the free-trade debate (1982-84). Of course, events having both a positive and negative impact for relations might occur simultaneously. Royal commissions often resulted in legislation that would generate a period of strained relations, but not always immediate or lasting. An example was the Report of the (Fowler) Committee on Broadcasting released in 1965, the same year as legislation aimed at protecting the Canadian magazine industry first appeared. In 1965, four journal titles were listed, all designated neutral, but in 1966, of nine titles assessed, six were negative and three neutral, zero positive. The following year saw two negative

74See Appendix A. Although 1965 found only four titles, all neutral, 1966 again witnessed the resurgence of negative titles: six to zero positive with three neutral. Negative and positive titles continued to alternate in predominance for the next two years. After this negative titles overwhelmed positive through most of the period under review.
and two positive titles. Often what would happen is that an external event might engender a debate to which both continentalists and nationalists would contribute. Although more positive titles began to appear near the end of the twenty-year period, the negative continued to outweigh the positive overall. The findings seem to bear out William Baker's observation that "anti-Americanism operated within Canadian nationalism when times were bad . . . [and] when times were good."75

Extending the title study a further twelve years, from 1985 to 199676, produced more satisfactory results. Of a total of two hundred and six titles, eighty-six were considered neutral, sixty-four negative, and fifty-six positive. The ratio of negative to positive was much closer and neutral often predominated. In fact, between 1987 and 1989 positive outweighed negative titles significantly. This would have been during the lead up to the Free Trade Agreement. One must remember, however, that titles were also listed under alternate categories at this time. Still, an exploration of the subjects with which the titles dealt shows that even when the negative increased toward the end of this period, 1994 till 1996, a significant number of titles classified negative were directly related to external events: the Free Trade Agreement (1994- three out of seven negative and 1995 - two out of ten), the Pacific Salmon Wars (1994 - one out of seven negative and 1995 - three out of ten) and the Helms-Burton Act and American sanctions against Canadian subsidiaries dealing with Cuba (1996 - four out of seven). The remainder of the negative articles dealt with older themes such as "Canada, an American nation?" but the general subject matter indicates that perhaps these claims conform more to Westell's theory of the shift toward a continentalist paradigm, the new nationalists who were concerned about their own business. Nevertheless, a perusal of current editions of The Globe and Mail reveals that this shift was incomplete. As recently as 1998 and the early part of 1999 there appears to be a resurgence in negative attitudes on many fronts.


76See Appendix B.
Concerns over the growing level of foreign investment as well as the continuing influence of American mass media, efforts to pass legislation banning advertising in split-run editions of American magazines, as well as descriptions of Canadian economic policies as "Americanizing" fill the pages of Canada's national newspaper. This recurrence of Americanization claims even at the end of the present century demands an attempt to understand the issues that undergird the phenomenon.

Chapter Three: Conceptual Analysis - Meaning

Proceeding on the assumption that claims of Americanization embrace substantive issues, materials that refer to Americanization in the cultural, economic, military, academic and political spheres will be subjected to a conceptual analysis. Paul Diesing describes conceptual analysis as a process by which the investigator analyzes a concept in terms of "how it is used in ordinary conversation . . . [including] seeing what other concepts it combines within a sentence." Recurrent themes, common vocabularies, and underlying similarities and dissimilarities in the material all assist in understanding how participants in the debate on Americanization understood the term.

It is in an examination of this sort that the continentalist-nationalist distinction is most helpful. Admittedly strict adherence to the categories risks ignoring the complexity of the debate; while certain writers easily fit into one perspective or another, more often arguments and attitudes overlap. Despite the difficulties, treating arguments as either continentalist or nationalist assists in identifying similarities and differences which will lend comprehension to the nature of the debate and phenomenon itself.

Excerpts from twenty-three articles and two books were chosen for analysis. The source materials were taken from a pool of sixty-five because they spanned each of the issue areas and, as much as possible, the two perspectives. Ten of the articles fit into the continentalist perspective defined as arguing for close continental ties. Ten articles plus excerpts from two books argued the nationalist position in the sense that they resisted current or new continental ties. Three of the articles could be labelled crossover arguments in that they contained elements of both a continentalist and nationalist

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2See Appendix C for list of sources used.
interpretation.

Close examination of the materials reveals a number of themes favoured by authors of either persuasion. One recurrent topic was the contrast between reality and myth or fiction. Understandably, continentalist and nationalist perceptions of reality were usually polar opposites. Each side repeatedly charged the other with naivety or with manipulation or misinterpretation of "the facts". On the continentalist side, W. Earle McLaughlin, then Chairman and President of the Royal Bank of Canada, charged that nationalists re-write history to fit their "mythical world of unrelieved darkness consistent with their baseless feelings of national inferiority." At the other end of the spectrum, Jeff Logan targeted several "great Canadian myths": the need for foreign investment, the assumption that foreign investment leads to greater development and employment, and the belief that Canadians are not great risk-takers. Working on the premise that foreign capital is necessary for Canada's continued growth and independence, McLaughlin identified the nationalists' spectre of a balance-of-payments deficit as a "false problem." A "real problem," by contrast, involved the practice of extraterritoriality, the application of foreign laws.

Although they disagreed over what was true and what was false, continentalists and nationalists worked with similar themes. The Canadian identity was central to the debate. Both sides accused Canadians of having a sense of "inferiority" or a "colonial mentality". This mentality consisted of the assumption that Americans were more efficient managers, more talented producers of television shows, movies and books, and more knowledgable academics. R.D. Matthews equated continentalism with the "colonial cringe" or the idea that "to develop technologically is to become 'American'.


That suggestion" he argued "accepts tacitly ... the inevitability of U.S. imperial power." Continentalists argued, however, that the colonial mentality was manifest in Canadians' sense of national inferiority and aversion to risk-taking. It was self-imposed rather than the result of American influence.

In an article titled "Can Canadian Identity Survive?", Ross Munro wrote that while "there are very, grave, grave dangers in American intrusions ... in our stubborn Canadian way we seem to absorb them without allowing them so far to eat up the total country." His analysis introduces a new dimension to Canadian identity: the ability to absorb what Canadians consider foreign and make it their own. Canadian actor Jeannie Elias took this further; she noted that the "US influences" should not be rejected since "our identity is very much a part of these influences." According to Elias, Canada's is an adopted culture and recognition of this enables Canadians to embrace what they have inherited and to mould it into something that is uniquely their own. This is a departure from the nationalist analyses which typically argue that the Canadian identity has been submerged under the "overwhelming flood" of American cultural influences.

There is an element of choice inherent in the positions advanced by Munro and Elias, and choice versus inevitability comprises a further theme of the Americanization debate. If, in the continentalist argument, Americanization is perceived to have had little or no effect on Canada, then choice explains past Canadian decisions. However, when difficulties associated with the close alliance arise then it is up to Canadians to deal with them. Keenleyside's analysis of the military alliance between the United States and Canada stressed both Canadian action and choice. Although he used the words "inevitable" and "imperative" to describe the association, Keenleyside also noted that

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7Ross Munro, "Can the Canadian Identity Survive?," Canadian Authors and Bookmakers, 45, no. 1 (autumn 1969) 4.

8Jeannie Elias, "But is it Canadian?," Canada and the World, 43, no. 5 (January 1978), 18.
joint defence began as a result of a Canadian initiative and, throughout the early period, Canada remained an active and full partner in decision-making. Again in the military sphere, Gordon Fairweather argued that alliance between the two countries did not connote subservience on Canada's part. Rather, he maintained, Canada continued to make its position known and was free to do so. Paul Martin added that in the combined defence policy "It was made very clear that Canada would retain control of all defence installations on her own territory."

For nationalists, the past had determined the present. While it was not inevitable that particular decisions had been made, once made, the results were inevitable. Resnick argues that Canadian acceptance of the liberal capitalist ideology made it inevitable that Canada would become a junior partner in joint defence agreements. He maintained that the two facets of dependence, economic and military, act upon each other to entrench Canada's status as a colony of the United States. The solution called for a measure of self-help. Although he saw the condition as inevitable, Resnick hinted that through changing their economic orientation to a socialist one Canadians could secure a hold on their future. Walter Gordon stressed choice when he called on Canadians to regain the ownership of the economic sector. Only if foreign control of the economy was reversed would independence be realized. This was the object of his Canadian Development Corporation.

One could also see inevitability in the continentalist argument that "foreign capital is needed for growth and prosperity" and hence full independence. For economist John A. Weir, it was inevitable that larger countries would be more advanced and


therefore more capable of producing and diffusing technology. Still, as inevitable as this part of the process was, the understanding of the free-market allowed for the development, eventually, of smaller countries into larger countries or markets which in turn produce and diffuse technology. In the order of things, Canada would have its turn.

Gordon's and Weir's analyses also lead into a closely related theme found in the general debate about Americanization: the issue of dependence versus independence. Here was (and is) a great sticking point in the Americanization debate. McLaughlin, in line with recognized economic theory, argued that without foreign investment "we shall not for long be . . . independent,"\footnote{McLaughlin, "Canada's Economic Independence," 29.} whereas Walter Gordon stressed the need to have economic ownership and thus control in Canadian hands. The continentalist equation rests on the three stage debtor-creditor theory; in this theory borrowing allows the indebted country to realize greater prosperity and development which in turn will lead to greater independence as the debtor country moves through stage two and toward stage three where it becomes a creditor country. Nationalist arguments refute this assumption and claim that the theory does not apply to the Canadian situation. According to Gonick and Gordon, Canada is different because of the form of borrowing that has occurred: foreign direct investment. Because, as noted in an earlier chapter, foreign direct investment continues to grow and cannot be paid back, Canada is caught in a vicious cycle and will not escape from stage two in its development until foreign ownership of the economy is lessened.

For Gordon and the nationalists, the issue of dependence/independence was to be understood at a level over and above economics. For the nationalists, economics determined all. As a consequence economic dependency meant an overall loss of independence. By contrast, many continentalists not only saw a separation between spheres but the need to maintain the distinction. For example, it was Martin who wrote that "the policy of the government has been to avoid as far as possible any interference
with the free flow of capital." For nationalists like Levitt there was no separation. She argued that the effect of international corporations would be to "impose on the world an 'internationalism' which would break down all possible cultural, institutional and political barriers to their unlimited expansion." Gordon summed it up by saying that "to a large extent we should equate political independence with economic independence." Because nationalists saw an interconnectedness among issues, protection was more urgent to them than to continentalists. The difference between continentalist and nationalist assertions consisted of the degree of protection that was warranted and the emphasis to be placed on protectionist measures. Some continentalists were totally opposed to protectionist measures. Michael Bliss, for instance, argued that in both the economic and cultural realms, protectionism would "only . . . encourage deeper and more permanent cultural penetration of the country, more dangerous because it would be less conscious." Others, like Munro, argued that some protection was needed: "I'm all for the protection that some areas of our economy have against foreign takeovers, and prejudicially in favour of the legislation that permits only 25 per cent foreign ownership of Canadian newspapers and communications media," but at the same time he wrote that "we must also recognize that without this vast flood of American and other foreign


17Michael Bliss, "Cultural Tariffs and Canadian Universities," in The Star Spangled Beaver, 86. Bliss could be considered one of those confusing authors who straddle the continentalist/nationalist camps. At times he acknowledges the phenomenon of Americanization. For the purposes of this study, however, he is classified as continentalist because he argues in favour of the benefits of closer economic ties and against protectionism.
capital we wouldn't be where we are today.”¹¹⁸ On occasion, both nationalists and continentalists agreed on the need for protection - in the cultural realm and sometimes even in the economic realm if the issue was seen to touch on sovereignty.

Agreement between continentalists and nationalists regarding the need for some protection intimates that there is something to protect and also implies the recognition of some sort of a threat. However, agreement that protection is in order is not the same thing as agreement on the nature of the threat. The identification of this threat is a major area of disagreement between the two camps. Continentalists say that the term Americanization is inappropriate, because they believe that the forces of modernization emanate from more than a single nation. In fact, these forces are tied to no nation. Instead they originate in the large conglomerate multinational corporations which ignore boundaries. Continentalists speak of modernization, internationalism, globalism, and progress as the engines of influence and change. Globalism is just one variation on the theme. Although some today refer to globalism as the spread of knowledge between cultures, globalism as used in most of the material in the debate discussed in this chapter refers directly to the market-place and the spread of corporations over the globe - the global village that is interconnected and interdependent. Its concern is with uniformity not diversity. Advanced industrial nations around the world, including the United States, are equally affected by the growth of multinational, and more recently transnational, corporations. Those effects are both positive and negative. Progress and modernization connote a higher standard of living and increased efficiency. Globalism and internationalism intimate access to a global market with the premise of increased wealth but the potential of homogenized cultures. Continentalists did not perceive this potential threat to local cultures as proceeding from the United States but as part of a worldwide process. The literary critic Northrop Frye expressed this understanding in the following manner:

Because the United States is the most powerful centre of this civilization, we often say, when referring to its uniformity,

¹¹⁸Munro, "Can the Canadian Identity Survive?" 4.
that the world is becoming Americanized. But of course America itself is becoming Americanized in this sense, and the uniformity imposed on New Delhi and Singapore, or on Toronto and Vancouver, is no greater than that imposed on New Orleans or Baltimore.¹⁹

Nationalists did not like the terms modernization, internationalism and globalism, because they saw them as misnomers, even euphemisms, for Americanization. Although many Americans criticized the multinationals, nationalists still maintained that these organizations reflected the policies and ethos of the United States. Kari Levitt stated that "the pioneers of this new mercantilism are undoubtedly the American corporations which have, within the last twenty years, transformed the international economy."²⁰ Cy Gonick echoed that sentiment: "The multinational corporation . . . leads not to a world government . . . but to American rule throughout the world."²¹ Nationalists rejected the argument that the United States was becoming "Americanized" in the same way as other countries: "[The] impact on a foreign society, which did not generate the structure in the first place, may be far greater and less understood."²² R.D. Matthews agreed: "There are differences in purpose, in class conflict, in cultural collision, in spiritual effect, even in mere 'community efficiency' when the USA 'Americanizes' itself, when India or Canada or Singapore 'industrializes' itself, and when the USA 'Americanizes' India, Canada and Singapore."²³

Concepts such as independence, sovereignty, nationalism, globalism, internationalism, and diversity were often combined with statements regarding Americanization. It is important to understand how different writers used these terms


²⁰Levitt, Silent Surrender, 32.

²¹C. W. Gonick, "Foreign Ownership and Political Decay," Close the 49th Parallel, 69.

²²Levitt, Silent Surrender, 112.

²³Matthews, "Americanization of the Universities," 56.
and how they related them to the claims of Americanization. The difficulty is that many of these concepts are themselves imprecise; writers rarely defined what they meant by sovereignty or independence for instance. A textbook definition of sovereignty, as the "right [of a state] to exercise complete jurisdiction over its own territory," leads to questions of why it is important that Canada have and maintain this capacity. The justification would rest on what it is about Canada that makes its existence worthwhile and worth protecting. The concept of sovereignty, therefore, is not helpful in understanding why the writers urged that Canada must be protected from Americanization. The same holds for independence. Nationalism, globalism, and internationalism, likewise only achieve their salience in relation to what it is about Canada that makes it worth protecting.

Regardless of the sphere of activity - cultural, military, economic, or universities - similar themes appeared: truth versus fiction, free-will versus predestination, independence versus dependence and globalization or modernization versus Americanization. What could be agreed upon was that some force was at work to effect change and, whether this change was voluntary or not, some aspects of Canadian society required protection. At the core of this agreement stands the concept of difference. Difference repeatedly occurs in arguments made by continentalists and nationalists. How great a difference, or the role that this difference is to play, may be open to question, but that difference exists is assumed. Once, when he was Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin described Canadians as "a different people;" this he attributed to Canada's origins, the French fact and ties to Europe. John G. Diefenbaker saw


25See Peyton V. Lyon, "Problems of Canadian Independence," *International Journal*, 16, no. 3 (summer 1961), 253. Lyon argued that "we are not at all certain that we differ so decisively from our more numerous neighbours [Americans] . . . . that our uniqueness could survive increasing fraternization." Also see Fairweather, "Living with a giant," 75. Fairweather quoted John Conway: "[We are] complementary to each other, but [we] are not identical."
"Canadians [as] . . . different from Americans without having serious differences with Americans." Gordon Fairweather, a former Progressive Conservative MP, put the same sentiment this way: "Canadians are not the same breed of cat as are the people of the United States." At times continentalist arguments told Canadians that their "difference" had protected and would continue to protect them from the American cultural onslaught. Nationalists urged Canadians to remember their difference when confronted by the homogenizing culture of the United States. John Kettle observed that "there are differences between us . . . . They are as trivial as rye whisky, fiddlehead greens, the Mounties' musical ride . . . . They are as important as Parliament, the monarchy, French culture, the Commonwealth connection . . . the CBC, and Stratford." Difference refers to a state of being. One is different from another. It implies a separate existence. Canada was said to be different from the United States not only by virtue of its origin, institutions and attitudes but also its values. Difference itself constitutes one of the core values of Canadian society. A stress on diversity has been traditional within Canada. In the cultural realm Canadians have politically and socially declared their commitment to diversity. Kettle reminded Canadians that we do . . . seem to have understood . . . that while the Americans favour a melting pot approach to culture, we must maintain a mosaic. To have fallen into imitation Americanism in the matter of culture, as we have in the matters of business enterprise, environmentalism, defence, and many other important areas, would have been to cause the collapse of Canada long ago.\footnote{Ibid., 44.}


\footnote{John G. Diefenbaker, "Across the Border," \textit{The Star-Spangled Beaver}, 37.}

\footnote{Fairweather, "Living with a Giant," 76.}

\footnote{John Kettle, "Direction Canada: The U.S. in Our Future," \textit{Executive}, 20, no. 8 (August 1978), 37.}
Nationalists argued that the homogenizing imperative of the market was in direct contradiction to this traditionally espoused value of Canadian society. Kari Levitt wrote that "continentalism extends the American melting pot philosophy into Canada."\(^{31}\)

Placing the specific term, Americanization, aside for a moment, continentalists and nationalists alike recognized a force, whether it was globalism or Americanization, that served to homogenize. Basically what Canadians did not want homogenized was their difference. Homogenization implies the erasure of difference. Americanization claims, therefore, have as their most basic element the protection of difference.

\(^{31}\)Levitt, *Silent Surrender*, 149.
Chapter Four: Political Focus - Connections

The ultimate threat of Americanization lies in the sphere of politics. Some of the authors discussed in earlier chapters claimed that loss of sovereignty in the economic realm would translate into a loss of sovereignty in the political realm. The most obvious manifestation of this threat was in the American practice of extraterritoriality. Stephen Clarkson wrote that "the application . . . of American laws and regulations . . . represents a continual undermining . . . of our formal sovereignty."¹ Others went further seeing the damage to Canada's nationhood extending to its governmental structure. Michael S. Cross predicted that "the destruction of our culture and . . . of our political institutions"² would follow from Canada's branch plant status.

Both continentalists and nationalists conceded that Canada suffered a loss of sovereignty through the extraterritorial application of American law. This aspect of Canada - United States relations was readily apparent in many of the countries' dealings. Whether Canada's institutional structure was also being eroded presented a more difficult claim to analyze but perhaps more important, for it is here that authors such as Lipset identified the greatest difference between the two countries.

In 1969 Denis Smith presented a paper entitled "President and Parliament: The Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada" to the Priorities for Canada Conference organized by the Progressive Conservative Party. He argued that the prime minister's office had assumed presidential proportions and for that reason the Canadian practice of responsible parliamentary government had been transformed. Two basic

sources of prime ministerial authority: "the respect, gratitude and control of patronage he
gains from bringing a party to power in the previous general election [and] . . . the
discomfort he can create among MPs by threatening to call the next general election at a
time of his choosing," had led to an overwhelming power imbalance in favour of the
prime minister as chief executive. These features of the prime minister's office together
with certain acquired features that mirrored the American presidency - an organized
secretariat and direct appeal to the public instead of parliament - brought the Canadian
prime minister more into line with the American presidency, thus creating a disjuncture
between the theory of responsible government and its practice.

That theory, Smith stated, saw the public elect individual members to the House
of Commons and the House, in turn, choose the government; once in place, cabinet
governs and the House holds it responsible. Parliament has the capacity, rarely used, to
remove the governing party through a motion of non-confidence and, more commonly, to serve as a public forum in which to call the government to account in the name of the people. Smith concluded that, because of the growing power of the office of prime
minister, parliament no longer could exercise these powers.

To support his observation that parliament was incapable of removing the prime
minister by constitutional or conventional means, Smith examined two incidents
traditionally cited to support parliamentary supremacy: the King-Byng affair of 1926 and
the collapse of the Diefenbaker government in 1963. These cases, he said, more
accurately portrayed the extent of prime ministerial rather than parliamentary power.
Citing the short life of the Meighen government after King had been denied a dissolution, Smith stated that the lesson to be learned was that when a government accepts office
after a dissolution has been refused to a former prime minister "he [the former prime

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3Denis Smith, "President and Parliament: The Transformation of Parliamentary
Government in Canada," in Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership
in Canada, ed., Thomas A. Hockin (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada Limited,
1971), 232.

4Ibid., 228.
minister] will convince the public that you acted wrongly and you will soon be out of office." Smith concluded that "1926 reinforced the usefulness of the power of dissolution as a weapon in the hands of the prime minister." In short, either the prime minister gets what he (or she) wants from the Crown or he (or she) campaigns against the Crown's refusal to meet the request.

The collapse of the Diefenbaker government in 1963, according to Smith, was more the result of miscalculation than an example of parliamentary supremacy at work. Based on the account of Patrick Nicholson, Smith argued that Social Creditors, whose deciding votes in the non-confidence measure led to Diefenbaker's defeat in the House, had been assured that before Diefenbaker could request a dissolution of parliament, he would be replaced by George Nowlan. With Nowlan in place as leader, the Social Creditors had planned to switch their support back to the government, thus avoiding a dissolution and an election. Unfortunately for them, in the words of John Diefenbaker, "the plan failed to take account of one person: the Prime Minister." Although the government subsequently lost power, in Smith's view, the result was not the work of parliament. Smith thus reasoned that if parliament no longer could remove the prime minister from power, one of the main distinctions between American and Canadian leaders no longer held. The Canadian prime minister was now "as immoveable as an American President during his term of office."

Smith's presidential hypothesis engendered much criticism. Although he saw the degree of executive dominance in Canada as indicative of presidentialization, critics countered that this dominance was, instead, an essential element of parliamentary

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5Ibid., 232.


8Ibid.
systems. In fact, the general understanding is that the president of the United States is in a relatively weaker position when it comes to realizing initiatives. Lipset's comparison between the two systems stresses this understanding in the following phrase: "A parliamentary system with an executive . . . that can have its way with the House of Commons [compared with] a presidential, divided-powers system in which the executive does not control and must negotiate with both houses of Congress." Admittedly, and Smith specifically states this in a later article, Smith's characterization of a strong president was based on the perception of an 'Imperial Presidency'.

Walter Stewart expands upon this perception: "The U.S. president has executive powers that put a prime minister to shame. He can declare any nation in the world to be an 'enemy,' and suspend trading with its citizens; he can sign executive agreements that have all the force of international treaties: he can fight a war . . . And all without the sanction of Congress." Stewart claims that "it is this kind of muscle that Trudeau's opponents claim he is scheming to acquire."

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11 See Denis Smith, "Is the Prime Minister Too Powerful? - Yes," in Crosscurrents: Contemporary Political Issues, eds., Mark Charlton and Paul Barker (2d. ed., Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1994), 155. Smith states that his earlier presentation in 1969 occurred during the "era of the Imperial Presidency, when the American president led a Cold War alliance, fought foreign wars without congressional authority, and commanded substantial secret projects through a variety of information-gathering and dirty-tricks agencies." He also concedes that "the intervening twenty-five years seem to have emphasized even more the limitations on a president's power." However, he claims that the Canadian prime minister's power "has not diminished [and] . . . the contrast between prime ministerial freedom and presidential limitation seems, if anything, more stark." 156.

Presidential power in the United States is constitutionally entrenched as well as delegated by Congress. Domestically, it includes executive power - appointment and supervision of all executive officers and appointment of federal judges; military power "to protect every state 'against invasion . . . and against domestic Violence;" and legislative power "to participate effectively and authoritatively in the legislative process." It is also important to note that under the American Constitution, the president is head of state as well as head of government. It is as head of state that the presidency exhibits the imperial qualities described by Stewart - the president holds the office of Commander in Chief of the military and has the judicial capacity to grant reprieves and pardons, as well as the diplomatic role to "receive Ambassadors [and even] . . . to recognize other countries." Further to this, the president has at his disposal a variety of other power resources classified as formal and informal. The former refers to the powers granted to him by the Constitution and delegated by Congress and includes patronage, appointment of cabinet, and access to the organizational staff of the National Security Council, the White House staff, the Executive Office of the President, the Office of Management and Budget, and the vice-presidency. Informal power resources consist of the power achieved by winning a majority election, the capacity to initiate legislative action, the use of the media, party, groups and mass popularity in support of presidential programmes.

Smith draws heavily from the informal powers of presidents for his comparisons. His examples centre on prime minister Trudeau's disdain for parliament, use of the media and appeal to the public over parliament. Thomas Hockin would agree with Smith that the politics of Prime Minister Trudeau in particular - direct appeal to the public, disdain for parliament, and unilateral initiatives - were indeed presidential, and Hockin asserted

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14Ibid., 137.

15Ibid., 155.
"will probably remain presidential until Parliament or 'the public' convince him otherwise."¹⁶ Hockin would insist, however, that a distinction must be made between government structures and political practices. Using governmental structures as the measure, Smith's presidential hypothesis does not hold. No structural changes had occurred that would cause an inevitable flow of power to the prime minister. Therefore, the Canadian government could not accurately be portrayed as presidential.

The missing element in Smith's presidential argument is serious treatment of the Canadian cabinet. First he quotes from Richard Crossman's *Introduction to Bagehot's The English Constitution* to claim:

In Bagehot's day, collective Cabinet responsibility meant the responsibility of a group of equal colleagues for decisions taken collectively, after full, free and secret discussion in which all could participate. It now means collective obedience by the whole administration, . . . to the will of the man at the apex of power.¹⁷

and concludes that the Canadian prime minister is "further along the road to being a presidential leader than the British."¹⁸ He then swiftly moves into his analysis of parliamentary limitations versus executive power, thus discounting the role of cabinet as a countervailing force to prime ministerial power. In contrast, Joseph Wearing claims that "a successful Canadian Prime Minister . . . must find Cabinet Ministers who can not only run departments, but who can give effective representation to their regions in Ottawa and effective leadership to the party in their home regions." Therefore, he adds that "if he is to attract the paragons that he needs, a Prime Minister cannot override their [Cabinets] views too often. He cannot be a one-man government."¹⁹ Specifically referring to prime minister Trudeau, Wearing remarks "In his relations with the Cabinet,

¹⁶Hockin, "Could Pierre Trudeau Become President of Canada?," 25.

¹⁷Quoted by Smith, "President and Parliament," 230.

¹⁸Ibid., 231.

¹⁹Wearing, "President or Prime Minister," 251.
Mr. Trudeau would appear to be more committed to cabinet government than some of his predecessors. As proof, he points to the extensive cabinet discussion of policy review, and the fuller use of cabinet committees under the Trudeau government.

It is unfortunate that this weakness in Smith's presentation detracted from his larger argument because the second part of his argument regarding structural changes in parliament is crucial. Here, Smith argued that not only was parliament's ability to remove the government from power non-existent but so too was its role as public forum. He attributed this failure to a lack of opportunity for members to influence legislation and to the fact that question period, as well as emergency and general debates, provided little information to the public. Parliamentary governance slipped even further in 1968, when reforms were passed that cut the time allowed for debate of government initiatives. Although the executive and members of parliament agreed on the need for reform, the motivation in each instance was different: the members wanted a perceptible increase in their power, whereas the executive sought increased efficiency to move its policies through Parliament.

The conflicting goals had translated into a hybrid parliamentary/presidential system. On the one hand, Smith argued, Canada's executive was developing into a "presidential system" but without effective limits on its power. On the other hand, increased resources for members of parliament, and the opposition especially, were leading to increased independence and intransigence in the House. Smith concluded that the Government may respond to the situation in one of two ways. The first solution, to apply pressure in private to stem the increasing intransigence of House members does not appear viable because as Smith states "it will have difficulty withdrawing the public machinery of criticism it has now acquiesced in." The second solution Smith notes is "to accept the logic of these parliamentary pressures" and to move to more congressional checks and balances to reflect the de facto separation that had occurred between the

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20 Ibid., 258.

Canadian legislative and executive bodies.

Peter Aucoin picks up on Smith's theme of executive dominance and concedes that "there are features of our institutional arrangements and political practices that have led to what can be considered excessive executive dominance:"\(^{22}\) Although responsible government does "assume" that there will be a strong executive, the Canadian case is special, and for reasons distinctive to Canada: a weak Senate, highly disciplined political parties, inexperienced members of parliament, and insecurity among public servants. Aucoin warns that there is a high price to be paid for executive dominance, and that price consists of "bad constitutional theory" and "bad constitutional practice." The bad constitutional theory, which seeks to curb executive dominance originates, in part, with republican ideas concerning "balanced constitutional arrangements in which checks on authority are achieved by the creation of separate branches of government which share in governmental powers."\(^{23}\)

The problem, as far as applying the theory to Canada, is that "republican ideas concerning the balancing and sharing of power between separate executive and legislative branches cannot be squared with the basic tenets of responsible government."\(^{24}\) Reforms aimed at curbing executive dominance do not understand that the source of this dominance lies in the very operation of responsible government. Under a system of responsible government accountability and confidence are maintained by government being directly responsible to elected representatives on a continuing basis and directly responsible to the citizens at elections. The "primary purpose of Parliament under responsible government is to ensure we have a government which possesses the confidence of the House of Commons."\(^{25}\)

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\(^{22}\)Peter Aucoin, "Accountability: The Key to Restoring Public Confidence in Government," (The Timlin Lecture: University of Saskatchewan, November 6, 1997), 3.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., 4.

\(^{24}\)Ibid., 5-6.

\(^{25}\)Ibid., 7.
According to Aucoin responsible government not only determines "who will form the government . . . [but] also [serves as] a method to oblige those who form the government to account for the exercise of the authority conferred on them."\(^{26}\) One of the major problems Aucoin identifies is the mistaken assumption among newly elected MPs that they were "elected 'to govern'." This causes them to neglect their "most critical function, [which is] to hold the government to account."\(^{27}\) In Aucoin's words, "MPs who are not part of government are not legislators in the American sense . . . . The role of MPs who are not ministers is to debate government bills and then to give consent or to express dissent."\(^{28}\) Admittedly, MPs who are not ministers do not perform their function well because the great proportion are inexperienced and ill prepared to fill the role. Generally speaking, "more than half of Canadian MPs have had fewer than five years in parliament."\(^{29}\) Nor is there incentive for experienced members of parliament to focus on extracting an account from government. Their role is not recognized because the processes and procedures meant to secure accountability are deficient. Question period affords little opportunity except for public posturing and parliamentary committees, where much of the work of the MP is done, seldom attract the ministers and prime ministers.

Aucoin's identification of these deficiencies in parliamentary procedures constitutes an important point of agreement with Smith. In fact, the two authors agree upon a number of common difficulties: executive dominance, deficient parliamentary procedures, faulty reform attempts and resultant hybrid systems. Pinpointing similar problems, however, does not mean they share similar views regarding the appropriate solution. Smith argues that the degree of executive dominance in Canada is indicative of

\(^{26}\)Ibid., 2.

\(^{27}\)Ibid., 7.

\(^{28}\)Ibid.

presidentialization and this presidentialization has caused a transformation of Canada's parliamentary system. Aucoin concedes that Canada suffers from what "can be considered excessive executive dominance." What concerns Aucoin, however, are the attempts to curb this dominance. Smith argues that the reforms of 1968 translated into a hybrid parliamentary/presidential system that gives parliamentarians the expectation of increased power but against an increasingly powerful executive. To correct this impasse, he suggests that further reforms could be aimed at granting members of parliament congressional type powers. Although Aucoin agrees that question period, debates, and parliamentary committees are deficient as vehicles for securing accountability, he would charge that Smith's solution, like many of the reform attempts since 1968, is fuelled by the implicit acceptance of republican ideas. In this reformers have failed to consider the reasons for the existence of responsible government in Canada and have moved the Canadian system toward a hybrid republican/parliamentary model.

One consequence of the implicit acceptance of republican ideas is that the "American model [then becomes the]... benchmark" for evaluation. The resulting tendency to view parliament as a weaker version of congress assumes a separation of institutions that does not exist in Canadian governance. Smith stands accused of this because of his neglect of both cabinet and the crown in his explanation of Canada's executive. His insistence on depicting the prime minister as chief sole executive, in effect, separates the prime minister as executive from the House, including cabinet, Government members and opposition. Discounting these institutions as 'countervailing forces' leads to the proposition that stronger checks and balances are needed. Significantly, the model Smith turns to is the American republican model. The problem is that rather than debating the advantages and disadvantages of either, Smith reasons that since the Canadian system has moved in that direction already, it is logical to move further toward a complete congressional system.


31Ibid., 6.
The relation between theory and practice undergirds both of these analyses. Smith sees a shortfall between the ideal and the practice. He insists that the theory or "mythology" of responsible parliamentary government obscures "many of the real forces at work in Canadian politics."32 Since, in Smith's view, the reality does not fit the theory, the theory should be moulded to fit the practice. Aucoin argues that he is not in favour of letting "the constitution . . . be 'what happens'."33 Although he recognizes the flexibility of Canada's constitution, Aucoin's concern is to discover why practice and theory diverge.

While the analysis of these two arguments does not represent an exhaustive study of Americanization in the political realm, it highlights areas of concern that relate to the larger debate. Several of the themes carry over. Without a doubt, both writers are speaking about a process of Americanization. Smith maintains that the executive has acquired the trappings of an American presidency, while Aucoin argues that republicanism, which fuelled attempts to curb executive dominance, is "almost exclusively a Canadian emulation of American ideas."34 Numerous statements in their articles refer to the "emulation," "imitation," or "adoption" of American practices and ideas. The stress is not on an intentional migration of these ideas and practices of the United States but rather on the unquestioned assumptions Canadians make based on American models and examples. The unquestioned acceptance of social science models developed in and for the United States, once a concern addressed by academics and nationalists, is now evident in the political realm.

The concept of difference is essential to both analyses. Because Canada is a different country with different issues, structures and, perhaps values, American models might be inapplicable. Aucoin makes this point:

The American system is a fundamentally different system of

32Smith, "President and Parliament," 228.


34Ibid., 4.
governance. Whether it is a better system is a separate question. Confusion on this elementary point, nevertheless, has led many would-be reformers of Canadian government to treat the parliamentary system as essentially a weak version of the American system.\textsuperscript{35}

Choice versus inevitability also resurfaces here. There is an element of inevitability in Smith's analysis; since the Canadian executive has acquired the trappings of an American presidency, he suggests the logical solution to the problem would be to move further in the direction that the system has already moved. Aucoin asserts that informed choice must be the uppermost consideration in effecting changes within the Canadian system: "There is . . . a public interest to be advanced by examining the fundamental values that are meant to be served by adherence to the basic principles of responsible government."\textsuperscript{36} Education plays a major role in Aucoin's solution. It is a lack of knowledge of Canada's own parliamentary system that has led to the implicit acceptance of republican ideas. Conversely, if a change toward a more republican form of government were to be considered, it would need to result from considered judgment rather than implicit acceptance.

If Canadian institutions are being eroded or Americanized it is the result of Canadian complacency. If one accepts the coherence of the Americanization argument, this colonial mentality can be attributed to a client state that believes that the Americans are more efficient managers, more accomplished academics and more talented producers of television, movies and books and that "the American Congress is . . . a stronger or more democratic version of the Canadian Parliament."\textsuperscript{37} Here again is Americanization that results from a self-imposed external standard.

\textsuperscript{35}Aucoin, "Accountability," 6.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., 6.
Chapter Five: Conclusion

Recently, Neil Nevitte has defied the traditional understanding of a process of Americanization through which foreign values are transmitted to Canada. Utilizing the World Values Surveys of 1981 and 1990 he examined changes and attitudes toward change in twelve countries around the world including Canada and the United States, according to various measures - deference to authority, disaffection from political structures, the rise of cosmopolitanism and orientations toward change. On each measure, Canadian changes that had occurred during the decade in question were in line with those in the other eleven countries. Intriguingly, although Canadians have often been described as more cautious and deferential to authority than Americans, Nevitte's study revealed the obverse to be true. He states that "In fact, Canadians seem to be more likely than other publics, including Americans, to 'welcome' change, and they are less likely than most to 'worry about the difficulties that changes may cause';"¹ and "Support for greater respect for authority is much higher in the United States than Canada and that the 1981-1990 decrease in Canada was sharper (about 11 per cent) than in the United States (about 8 per cent)."² Nevitte concludes "There is little to indicate that the Canadian changes followed those that took place in the United States or that, in these respects, the United States shows Canada the picture of its own future. More often than not, in fact, the reverse appears true."³

The curious thing surrounding claims about Americanization is that, despite evidence to the contrary, they have not disappeared. In two recent columns in The

¹Neil Nevitte, The Decline of Deference (Toronto: Broadview Press, 1996), 97. Also see 98.
²Ibid., 37.
³Ibid., 70.
Globe and Mail, Jeffrey Simpson advanced familiar arguments. First, in the political context, he referred to "the Charter of Rights and Freedoms" as "the single most Americanizing influence on Canada's political culture." Simpson is not alone in this opinion - many have made similar statements - but he said it in 1998. Simpson next echoed economic arguments of the 1960s when he suggested that "foreign control of Canadian manufacturing might be among the reasons" for Canada's lack of productivity under NAFTA. He added: "Foreign firms are more likely to do major research at home than abroad." In the area of culture, concerns appeared in The Globe and Mail regarding textbooks produced in the United States and mass or "pop" culture emanating from the United States. Michael Valpy referred to "the globalized American mass-media giants," and Jack Stoddart warned that "[Canada will] become like another state." The fundamental question then to be posed is: If fears of Americanization centre on the protection of difference and the majority of western industrialized nations are simultaneously experiencing similar value shifts, then what is the salience of Americanization claims? If there is none, then why do they persist? One possible explanation is that the phenomenon is cyclical rather than linear, that it has its roots deep in Canadian history and continues to intrude on the Canadian consciousness. Frank Underhill once quipped that "one can never tell what will be the next occasion on which we'll gird up our loins and save ourselves once again from the United States. One can only predict with confidence that the occasion will come." In


1980, when Walter Stewart declared economic nationalism dead, he concluded his eulogy with the words "we have either grown up or given up." Soon afterward Anthony Westell described the new nationalist of the 1980s as "arising from Canadian business people who see vast opportunities in the resource sector and are determined not to let foreigners run away with the lion's share. It reflects confidence rather than fear and is not anti-American." And yet, as recently as 1998, a letter to the editor of the Globe and Mail dismissed the fiscal policies of Ontario Premier Mike Harris with the words "he can Americanize us only so far."

Sylvia Bashevkin suggests that resistance to Americanization may be explained by using in-group/out-group theory. According to this theory, unity is created within a group by delineating a common enemy. The United States, because of its geographical proximity and revolutionary beginnings, appears a natural choice when compared to Canada's traditions of conservatism and its loyalty to the former British empire. Viewed in this manner, anti-Americanization remains because of its central role in the formation of Canadian national identity. William Baker incorporated Bashevkin's hypothesis into his analysis of anti-American sentiment. Baker listed four contributory factors: the imperial connection, American action, in-group/out group theory as a component of Canadian nationalism, and elite promotion. Baker's four factors are especially interesting. Although the imperial connection to Britain is largely a feature of the past, its ...


10Anthony Westell, "It's not that We're Raving Nationalists - the Problem is that the Americans Think We Are," Canadian Business, 54 no. 7 (July 1981), 31.


contribution to the development of a Canadian mentality opposed to that of the United States cannot be under-estimated: "Imperial and national patriotism have worked in harmony in Canadian history." American action has also played its role in engendering spurts of anti-American sentiment: expressions of belief in manifest destiny, practices of extraterritoriality, enactment of protectionist legislation, and statements like those of Henry Fowler, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury:

Let us understand that the United States Government has consistently sought, and will continue to seek to expand and extend the role of the multinational corporation as an essential instrument of strong and healthy economic progress throughout the Free World.15

Baker's third factor, in-group/out-group theory is a reasonable consequence of a smaller, less powerful nation such as Canada living next to the extremely powerful, influential United States, especially when one considers that the United States has expressed annexationist ambitions in the past. Add to this the percentage of key industries in Canada owned by the United States and the two countries appear likely candidates for this type of relationship. It is the fourth category, however, in which one observes intriguing shifts: elite promotion based on vested interest. Baker argues that early in Canada's history, the elite consisted of the governing imperialists, then quickly moved to the merchant class. During the period of Baker's fourth stage, the one studied in this thesis, he suggests that Americanization arguments were promoted by an intellectual elite. From time to time, politicians also made Americanization claims, although these were usually in response to perceived public opinion on specific issues. The curious thing about the most recent claims is that they are mostly found in newspapers and media. Rarely do they appear in scholarly journals.16 If Baker's elite factor is true then, it would

14Ibid., 64.


16Mark MacKinnon, journalist with The Globe and Mail, reported on February 1, 1999, however, that Mel Hurtig, founder of the Council of Canadians, is currently working on a book about how Canadians have lost control of the economy since 1985. According to
appear that a new elite has surfaced within the media. This would explain the stress on publications and culture, though not necessarily the economic and political arguments that continue to surface.

It is likely that all of these explanations contribute to the understanding of Canadian resistance to Americanization and yet the concept itself remains amorphous. This thesis posits that, in order to achieve an understanding of what is at issue, a distinction must be made between the appearance or nature of the phenomenon and the meaning attached to it. The question of coherence is central to understanding the appearance. Despite the claims made by nationalists, Americanization claims appear to be incoherent; they arise repeatedly but in different forms and attached to different issues.

Ambiguity comprises a second characteristic of the nature of the Americanization phenomenon. It was extremely difficult to separate arguments and thinkers according to the nationalist/continentalist divide. S.D. Clark's survey of the competing nationalisms explains this in part. As noted earlier, there was often overlap between continentalist and nationalist arguments as well as a variety of positions within each paradigm. The ambiguity is present not only amongst participants involved in the debate but also within each participant. The curious "love-hate" relationship that Canadians have historically expressed continues to infect the debate to this day. For instance Michael Bliss argued in the economic and cultural realms against protectionist measures but in each case he implicitly acknowledged the reality of what he considered to be Americanization. Bliss stated that the result of protectionist measures would only "be to encourage deeper and more permanent cultural penetration of the country, more dangerous because it would be less conscious;"17 yet, as an antidote he urged cultural and economic free trade.

MacKinnon, economic nationalism may experience a resurgence in the near future as a reaction to rising levels of foreign ownership, largely by the United States, of Canadian firms. See "Who Owns Canada?: Foreign Ownership is on the Rise," B2, B7.

Although the nature of the Americanization phenomenon is ambiguous, even at times incoherent, it is not devoid of meaning. In his examination of the Americanization of the universities debate, Alan C. Cairns notes that "while much of the literature on Americanization is deservedly ephemeral, it is premature to conclude that its often polemical nature indicates the absence of any issue."\(^{18}\) Agreeing with Cairns, this thesis has argued that the longevity of Americanization claims indicates the presence of significant underlying issues which must be understood. The continentalist/nationalist divide, as difficult as it has been to work with, is useful for illuminating underlying similarities from which to develop meaning. The debate concerning Americanization encompassed several themes: truth versus fiction; free-will versus pre-destination; independence versus dependence; and globalization versus Americanization. It also combined several concepts, among them sovereignty, independence, nationalism, globalism, internationalism, and difference. Commonalities across spheres of activity and between perspectives reveal agreement on basic issues of protection from a force that threatens Canadian sovereignty. At the root of these concerns, and central to the various themes found in the material, is the insistence on difference.

Yet the question remains: how can Canadians claim to be different when the evidence declares this to be untrue? Seymour Martin Lipset, proponent of the originating values theory, concedes that "Canada and the United States have both followed the general tendencies of most western nations toward greater acceptance of communitarian welfare and egalitarian objectives [and]... a greater role for government."\(^{19}\) Still he maintains that "inspite of the changes in both countries, Canada remains much more group- and collectivity- oriented"\(^{20}\) while "American emphases on individual success and

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\(^{20}\) Ibid., 110.
equality of opportunity, rather than of result . . . have not [been] basically modified."\textsuperscript{21} He concludes that "Canada and the United States share the same values, but in Canada they are held more tentatively . . . the contrast remains one of degree."\textsuperscript{22} Granted, Lipset made these statements in 1990 whereas Nevitte's study was still in progress. One could make the argument that the situation had progressed since the time of Lipset's understanding. Nevertheless, even though societies hold similar values the ordering of these values in individual societies may differ. Democracy constitutes one of those values amenable to different systems of ordering. W.B. Gallie has described democracy as "an essentially contested concept . . . the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users."\textsuperscript{23} Through the institution of responsible parliamentary government, Canada's fathers of Confederation sought to promote political stability while at the same time curbing what they perceived as the excesses of democratic impulses. Democracy was present in this ordering but not in the same form or order of importance as it was in the American republic. Although critics decry Canada's original institutions of government as neither republican nor democratic,\textsuperscript{24} it must be remembered that republicanism and democracy are not synonymous. Whether or not Canadians decide that the original ordering of this value fits within the modern context must be the result of informed decision.

The insistence on difference indicates that difference itself, or diversity, may be more essential to communities and individuals than had previously been supposed. The valuing of difference, in itself, precludes the imposition of uniformity whether the force that seeks to homogenize is American or global. Many Canadians recognize the potential

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21}Ibid., 39.
  \item \textsuperscript{22}Ibid., 4.
\end{itemize}
homogenizing agent as the global economy rather than the United States. The words of John Dewey in the 1920s, once used to describe the "American soul"—standardization, mechanization, quantification— are now applied to globalism. Not all Canadians, however, have transferred this understanding from Americanization to Globalism. One of the reactions to the prospect of globalism has been the rise of localism. Americanization claims have traditionally been the pan-Canadian variant of localism.

Still Americanization, except in the economic sector where market exigencies rule, is no longer viewed by many, including nationalists, as an intentional transmission of standardization and uniformity. Now the greater danger manifests itself in the implicit acceptance and unthinking adoption by Canadians of models or ways of knowing and organizing that relate specifically to the United States. To equate progress with the United States or to consider, for instance, the U.S. Congress as the stronger, perfected version of governance discounts Canada's own needs. In this context, Americanization serves as an important reminder of the value of difference.

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Appendix A  
Measure of anti-American Sentiment Using  
*Canadian Periodical Index*  
1965-84

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*As noted in body of thesis, titles were found under headings and sub-headings: Economic Relations (United States) and Foreign Relations (United States). Criteria for classification also noted in body, chapter 2, page 27.*
Appendix B

Extended Measure of anti-American Sentiment Using
*Canadian Periodical Index*
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*As noted in body of thesis, titles were found under headings and sub-headings: Economic Relations (United States) and Foreign Relations (United States). Criteria for classification also noted in body, chapter 2, page 27.*
Appendix C

Sources Used for Analysis
Chapter 3

Authors of the twenty-three articles (and two books) which comprise the source material for this study are categorized according to the arguments contained in these specific works: either for or against closer continental ties between Canada and the United States. Complete bibliographic detail is given in the attached bibliography. Please note that where more than one article is given in the bibliography for an author listed here, the following were used.

Bliss, Michael. "Cultural Tariffs and Canadian Universities."
Resnick, Philip. "Canadian Defence Policy and the American Empire."
Watkins, Melville. "Cruisin' for a Bruisin'."

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