

Reshaping Global Governance Norms through Public-Private Partnerships:  
The Role Private Actors Play in Promoting African Food Security in the G8's New Alliance

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## **ABSTRACT**

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become an integral part of global architecture, and efforts to bring public and private actors together to solve policy issues are reshaping global norms. The purpose of this exploratory research is to investigate the extent to which PPPs entrench private sector involvement in global governance, setting a universal norm wherein private entities are at the forefront of global policymaking—specifically in reference to one issue, that of promoting food security. The constructivist approach taken here focuses on the creation and legitimization of new global policymaking norms by examining identities and interests related to the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, with a particular focus on Ghana and its private sector partners. To demonstrate how the PPP concept is becoming a global norm, the analysis reviews the notion through a process of knowledge development that includes three steps—normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation. Examples from around the world detailing PPP institutionalization are given to show how PPPs have been normalized and fragmented on the global scale. Then, Ghanaian-focused documents along with relevant examples from Ethiopia and Tanzania are analyzed to explore how the PPP concept is being assimilated under the G8’s New Alliance.

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Context and Significance of the Thesis

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become an integral part of global architecture, and efforts to bring public and private actors together to solve policy issues are reshaping global norms. This is evident by actions taken by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which, in 2000, passed Resolution 55/2, better known as the *United Nations Millennium Declaration*. In this resolution, the UNGA created eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) towards which the world should aim. These goals included eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving high primary education rates, promoting gender equality, reducing child mortality rates, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for development.<sup>1</sup> The MDGs were to be achieved after fifteen years, and were to expire in 2015. However, not all the MDGs were met within this timeframe, though much progress was made, especially in the areas of lowering poverty, increasing primary school enrollment, combating HIV/AIDS, decreasing maternal and child mortality, and improving water quality and access.<sup>2</sup>

Following the expiration of the MDGs, the UNGA met in New York on 25 September 2015 and “adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to end poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and tackle climate change by 2030.”<sup>3</sup> Unlike the MDGs, which had some quantifiable measures (e.g., reducing the proportion of people suffering from hunger by 50 percent between 1990 and 2015),<sup>4</sup> the SDGs are vague and seem to be far reaching in their aspirations. For example, the second

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 55/2, *United Nations Millennium Declaration*,

<sup>2</sup> “Millennium Development Goals,” United Nations Development Program, accessed October 10, 2015, [http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/mdg\\_goals/](http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/mdg_goals/).

<sup>3</sup> “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),” United Nations Development Program, accessed October 10, 2015, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/>.

<sup>4</sup> “Goals, targets and indicators,” UN Millennium Project, accessed October 10, 2015, <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm#goal5>.

goal listed aims to eradicate all forms of hunger by 2030.<sup>5</sup> Comprehensive goals such as these can be useful for rallying support, but are difficult or impossible to achieve. As Gavin Yamey, a professor at Duke Global Health Institute who spoke on the specific SDG calling for “Good health and well-being,” stated: “How do you even define well-being, let alone measure it?”<sup>6</sup> As it turns out, similar to the MDGs, the SDGs look to achieve their aims by creating partnerships between private and public organizations.

These PPPs are essential according the UNGA. Their importance is demonstrated by the fact that both the MDGs and the SDGs have, as one of their goals, a commitment to establishing such partnership, and, not surprisingly, these agreements are becoming increasingly frequent.<sup>7</sup> However, the increase witnessed globally in the use of PPPs as a strategy for addressing poverty and other ills of underdevelopment warrants additional studies because, arguably, these partnerships have an underlying bias. That is, they are grounded in a neoliberal ideology and are geared towards promoting market-oriented development. As a result, these accord to the private sector partners, especially mammoth global corporations such as Monsanto, a powerful role in development policies. Given that the role of the firm is profit maximization, it is quite likely that a strategy reliant on PPPs runs counter to promoting basic UN aims of reducing inequalities between peoples and upholding equal rights for everyone.

It has been noted by some scholars that these partnerships lack transparency, compared to other UN projects, and that there is not much knowledge of their contribution to the sustainability of the above-mentioned goals.<sup>8</sup> There has also been a question as to whether or not a conflict of interest exists regarding public funding of the private sector when some of these

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<sup>5</sup> “Goal 2: Zero hunger” United Nations Development Program, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/goal-2.html>.

<sup>6</sup> Marc Silver, “What, Really, Does ‘Sustainable’ Mean?” *NPR*, September 23, 2015, accessed October 10, 2015, <http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/09/23/442580821/what-really-does-sustainable-mean>.

<sup>7</sup> “Goal 17: Partnerships for the goals,” United Nations Development Program, accessed October 12, 2015, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/goal-17.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Peter Utting and Ann Zammit, “United Nations-Business Partnerships: Good Intentions and Contradictory Agendas,” *Journal of Business Ethics* 90 (2009): 39.

partnerships have a corporate presence on the boards making financial decisions.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, other scholars have concluded that PPPs too heavily reliant on the private sector to create change may not be the best way to spur innovation.<sup>10</sup> Together, these concerns provide justification for further exploring PPPs, which will be done in the particular area of food security in this analysis. It is against this background that the present study is undertaken. Food security was selected as the area of focus since it, along with maternal care, is an MDG area in which numerous partnerships have been formed

## **1.2 The Research Statement and its Rationale**

The purpose of this exploratory research is to investigate the extent to which PPPs entrench private sector involvement in global governance, setting a universal norm wherein private entities are at the forefront of global policymaking—specifically in reference to one issue, that of promoting food security. This means the emphasis here is on the creation and legitimization of new global policymaking norms, measured by the degree to which private sector participation has increased in public policymaking. To demonstrate this claim and show why private companies are motivated to enter PPPs, it will be useful to examine the benefits reaped by the private sector by engaging in such arrangements. The analysis, focused on norm creation, will draw upon discursive evidence related to the international system and food security to show the entrenchment of private entities in global policymaking.

There are two counter-arguments that this study might encounter. First, the claim may be made that it does not matter if private interests are furthered in fields such as food security, so long as the eradication of hunger is achieved. The study shall not contest that “the proportion of undernourished people in the developing regions dropped by almost half since 1990.”<sup>11</sup> Rather, it aims to uncover if global norms, identities, and interests are changing due to PPPs, and, if so, to highlight the changes. If such alterations are happening, it is vital to understand where, how, and why this contextual reshaping of world politics is occurring, especially if it involves non-state

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<sup>9</sup> Allyn L. Taylor, “Public-Private Partnerships for Health: The United Nations Global Fund on Aids and Health,” *The John Marshall Law Review* 35, no. 3 (2002): 404.

<sup>10</sup> John Kirton, Julia Kulik, and Caroline Bracht, “The political process in global health and nutrition governance: the G8’s 2010 Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Child, and Newborn Health,” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* no. 1331 (2014): 186-200.

<sup>11</sup> “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015,” United Nations Development Program, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/the-millennium-development-goals-report-2015.html>.

actors gaining greater policy influence. Such changes have repercussions not only on international relations, but also for individuals.

The second counter claim is that the investigator will be searching for evidence that makes the story believable. Though the complete removal of bias cannot be guaranteed, acknowledging it upfront can help mitigate this concern. Furthermore, a sense of positionality can be offered by saying the author has no affiliations with any corporation or entity that would benefit from this research. It is for purely academic purposes. Lastly, by using an inductive method such as discourse analysis, there is a set of assumptions upon which the findings will be built. These include understanding that meaning of language exists in a context that the author, reader, and the researcher construct. Data will provide the emergent categories or themes to be studied; such categories should reflect patterns in reality, and the analyst should consider their role in creating these patterns and meaning. Understanding these assumptions should help create, in the future, a better defense of the findings from the analysis.

This study shall continue in the following manner. Chapter 2 reviews the methodology informing this study. It justifies using a thematic case study that draws upon relevant documents and utilizes discourse analysis to uncover how discursive content shapes the reality and power relations that form norms. Chapter 3 looks at the literature focused on the formation of norms and PPPs. From a constructivist viewpoint, a theoretical framework to explore the emergence of PPPs and the norms to which they are giving rise is detailed. The chapter also discusses how norms influence actors' choices, explores the construction of PPPs and how they are billed as win-win affairs, questions if corporations should be able to set their own normative standards under the guise of corporate social responsibly, and critiques neo-liberalization and the emerging market-state paradigm. Chapter 4 is the case study itself, and is broken into subsections. It examines food security and food regimes, defines the relevant actors involved in the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, with a particular focus on Ghana and its private sector partners, and demonstrates norm creation through the three steps of knowledge development—normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation. To show how PPPs have already been normalized and fragmented on the global scale, examples from around the world detailing PPP institutionalization will be given. Then, to explore how the PPP concept is being assimilated under the G8's New Alliance, Ghanaian-focused documents along with relevant examples from

Ethiopia and Tanzania are analyzed. Finally, Chapter 5 offers an alternative model to the current food regime, and some concluding thoughts about the study.

## CHAPTER 2

### METHODOLOGY

Concerns about increased private sector involvement in global policymaking justify further exploration of PPPs, and one method that allows for this examination is a thematic case study. In this case study, the partnerships behind the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition are examined, providing insight into the roles public and private actors play in promoting African food security. Fieldwork was not conducted here, as the analysis draws upon relevant documents to provide a way to analyze such PPPs and the norms they create in relation to global policymaking and food security.

Within the case study, discourse analysis is the primary methodology used to explore the norms created by PPPs. Discourse analysis was selected because it can be used to uncover how discursive content shapes reality and power relations.<sup>12</sup> This is because discourse, as understood here, can be seen as an institutionally consolidated flow of knowledge, “which determines individual and collective doing and/or formative action that shapes society, thus exercising power.”<sup>13</sup> French philosopher Michel Foucault elaborates on how discourse informs systems and the rules residing in such structures:

These systems of formation must not be taken as blocks of immobility, static forms that are imposed on discourse from the outside, and that define once and for all its characteristics and possibilities. They are not constraints whose origin is to be found in the thoughts of men, or in the play of their representations; but nor are they determinations which, formed at the level of institutions, or social or economic relations, transcribe themselves by force on the surface of discourses. These systems - I repeat - reside in discourse itself; or rather (since we are concerned not with its interiority and what it may contain, but with its specific existence and with its conditions) on its frontier, at that limit at which the specific rules that enable it to exist as such are defined. By system of formation, then, I mean a complex group of relations that function as a rule: it lays down what must be related, in a particular discursive practice, for such and such an enunciation to be made, for such and such a concept to be used, for such and such a strategy to be organized. To define a system of formation in its specific individuality is therefore to characterize a discourse or a group of statements by the regularity of a practice.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Siegfried Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis,” in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 33.

<sup>13</sup> Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 34.

<sup>14</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse of Language*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 73-74.

Defining discourse in such a manner inevitably means that one form of discourse, or representation, will eventually dominate other representations of reality, and that discourses in general are evolved, historically-grounded constructs of knowledge that affect individuals with or without their knowing.<sup>15</sup> The task at hand, therefore, is to identify various representations and analyze the relationship(s) between the established discourses.<sup>16</sup>

It is possible that only one representation dominates a field, making the discourse closed. A historical analysis would show, however, this scenario is not apolitical because it takes much maneuvering for one representation to close out another. In cases where two or more representations exist, the field is said to be open and analyses should not necessarily focus on control but on the flow of information that creates and solidifies power.<sup>17</sup> The dominating discourse in either case can be criticized by examining the means by which power was/is consolidated and reinforced.<sup>18</sup>

One method employed within this methodology to detail the flow of power is institutional ethnography. As a way to map out social relations between the United Nations and private sector groups, institutional ethnography reveals how operating procedures and norms are formed by the organizing power of texts.<sup>19</sup> For example, the analysis looks at strategic plans and policy documents, such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations' "Guidelines on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Community"<sup>20</sup>, to demonstrate such claims. Performing such a task requires a close examination of the discourse utilized in the documents with a focus on semantics and context. This is when discourse analysis as a method comes into play, specifically in the form of critical discourse analysis.

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<sup>15</sup> Jäger, "Discourse and knowledge," p. 36.

<sup>16</sup> Iver B. Neumann, "Discourse Analysis," in *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 70.

<sup>17</sup> Neumann, "Discourse Analysis," p. 70-71.

<sup>18</sup> Jäger, "Discourse and knowledge," p. 34.

<sup>19</sup> Marjorie L. Devault, "Introduction: What is Institutional Ethnography?" *Social Problems* 53, no. 3 (2006): 294-298.

<sup>20</sup> Secretary-General of the United Nations, "Guidelines on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Community," July 17, 2000, accessed on November 1, 2015, <http://www.un.org/partners/business/otherpages/guide.htm>.

Using critical discourse analysis to describe the creation of norms requires the researcher to examine both micro- and macro-level data.<sup>21</sup> As mentioned above, the analysis examines UN documents that regulate relationships with the private sector. The case study starts with systemic level documents because discourse strands have various discourse fragments that exist across discourse planes.<sup>22</sup> To better illustrate these various discourse notions, one can imagine a large network. Numerous texts exist within a network, and these are the fragments. Some texts will contain a common, unifying topic that connects them to each other, thus starting a discourse strand. Such strands may exist across multiple planes or communities (i.e., the political, business, or scientific realms), and through the connected discourse strand some fragments may influence the thinking within other planes. Following this understanding, the case study identifies the UN and other international organizations as one discursive plane part of a larger network, which influences the discourse strand by starting the normalization process in knowledge development. Ultimately, as the case study will show through documenting how norms become established through this process, this allows for the construction of canals that ensure power flows in a certain direction. Data showcasing the nature of these relationships and how they have changed over time are vital for understanding the effects of increased use of PPPs to combat global food security problems on global governance.

To further reiterate the importance of discourse, it should be noted that discourses can “be regarded as societal means of production...[that] produce societal realities.”<sup>23</sup> This means that discourse analysis aims not only to understand what already exists, but also to decipher how reality and the norms inherent in such reality are produced. In essence, discourse analysis allows for individuals to interpret the existing norms in the social world by making transparent the elements and forces that construct reality, and “by demonstrating that things were not always the way they appear now.”<sup>24</sup> This assumes discourse strands exist in the present, past, and the future, and justifies exploring the entrenchment of certain discourses.<sup>25</sup> For the purposes of this study,

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<sup>21</sup> Brian David Hodges, Ayelet Kuper, and Scott Reeves, “Qualitative Research: Discourse Analysis,” *British Medical Journal* 337, no. 7669 (2008): 570-572.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20510756>

<sup>22</sup> Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 47-49.

<sup>23</sup> Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 36.

<sup>24</sup> Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” p. 76.

<sup>25</sup> Jäger, “Discourse and knowledge,” p. 51.

acknowledging the power and longevity of discourse is vital to demonstrating how norms change over time, eventually altering the global governance architecture.

While discourse analysis and the methods discussed above can be useful in producing an exploratory or descriptive study of PPPs that sheds light on how the world is constructed and governed, they do have their limitations. For instance, weaknesses associated with these methods include their inability to verify causation, their limitation to recorded discourse, and the subjectivity inherent in breaking down language.<sup>26</sup> Additionally, it is possible the original knowledge and meaning behind an object have significantly changed since the object's conception; such readjustments may occur because of changes in power structures over an extended period of time (e.g., the role of churches).<sup>27</sup> Yet, limitations such as these can be acknowledged upfront to mitigate concerns. And as long as caution is exercised and grandiose statements about the research are not made, such concerns regarding the extent of the study should be minimal.

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<sup>26</sup> Bruce L. Berg, *Qualitative Research for the Social Sciences* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 259. [https://mthoyibi.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/qualitative-research-methods-for-the-social-sciences\\_\\_bruce-l-berg-2001.pdf](https://mthoyibi.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/qualitative-research-methods-for-the-social-sciences__bruce-l-berg-2001.pdf) (accessed on 2 November 2015).

<sup>27</sup> Jäger, "Discourse and knowledge," p. 60.

## CHAPTER 3

### REREGULATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF NORMS

The literature informing this study is derived from critical theories that recognize the ability of factors such as norms and identities to explain actors' actions.<sup>28</sup> Norms have real effects on people around the globe, and are shaped by a variety of international actors, such as those in PPPs. To show how international norms formed by PPPs affect food security, a constructivist lens will be used to examine the legitimation of norms, the various types and benefits of PPPs, and the role corporations play in partnerships. Then, a critique of neoliberalism and the emerging market-state paradigm to come out of neo-liberalization efforts will take place. Before reviewing the literature, norms, constructivism, and a framework outlining how concepts, such as PPPs, become norms will be defined and discussed.

Norms are essentially principles adhered to by actors within a system that constrain and shape behavior.<sup>29</sup> They are derived from inter-subjective understandings and build over time. Once embedded into a social system, norms carry a sense of “ought,” which is what shapes the way states and non-state actors behave.<sup>30</sup> Douglass North, who labels norms as informal institutional constraints that define and limit the choices of individuals, points out further that organizations—including political, social, economic, and educational bodies—come to exist and evolve according to such institutional constraints because norms determine the opportunities such actors can exploit.<sup>31</sup> However, norms must be seen as legitimate if this behavioral claim is to be seen as true; actors seemingly comply with norms, which are not enforced *per se*, because of this reason.

One way in which these ideas become legitimate and normalized is through continuous interactions among actors, ultimately forming identities and interests. Through these collective meanings, actors form identities, such as a sovereign state or private enterprise, which in turn forms interests.<sup>32</sup> At times, such as when actors are constantly interacting with each other and

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<sup>28</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

<sup>29</sup> Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40, (1996): 364.

<sup>30</sup> Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” p. 364.

<sup>31</sup> Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4-7.

<sup>32</sup> Wendt, “Anarchy,” p. 397-398.

they are dissatisfied with existing conditions, they can collaborate in order to create new norms.<sup>33</sup> Traditionally, this has been done on the international level through either the custom or treaty law-making processes, which establish informal and formal institutions (e.g., *jus cogens* and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, respectively).<sup>34</sup> More recently though, PPPs provide an example of when two actors, states and private entities, meet such conditions and have attempted to revamp the international system through their collaboration.

The study of such collaboration and the resulting identities and interests falls under constructivist theory. According to Alexander Wendt, a leading constructivist scholar in international relations, “Constructivists are interested in how knowledgeable practices constitute subjects, which is not far from the strong liberal interest in how institutions transform identity.”<sup>35</sup> To be clear, identity is defined in constructivism as an understanding of the actor’s self within the context of collective meaning that stems from the organizing structures surrounding the actor.<sup>36</sup> Similar to liberal ideology, constructivism is an advocate of the power of institutions, such as international cooperation formed by international arrangements like PPPs, to make interactions between actors less complicated by providing a forum to discuss problems, set regular meetings, and normalize rules and procedures.<sup>37</sup> Understanding that these effects are the product of institutional constraints requires recognizing that systems are reflexive, self-reinforcing operations crafted by the decisions and policies of those involved in creating and maintaining such systems.<sup>38</sup>

In other words, constructivists are guided by a logic of appropriateness, which operates under the notion that “rational actions are a function of legitimacy, defined by shared values and norms within institutions or other social structures rather than purely individual interests...in this

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<sup>33</sup> Wendt, “Anarchy,” p. 414.

<sup>34</sup> Antonio Cassese, *International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 198-202.

<sup>35</sup> Wendt, “Anarchy,” p. 394.

<sup>36</sup> Wendt, “Anarchy,” p. 397.

<sup>37</sup> Jennifer Sterling-Folkner, “Neoliberalism,” in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 121-125.

<sup>38</sup> Steven L. Spiegel et al., *World Politics in a New Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 49.

respect, norms not only constrain behavior; they also constitute the identities of actors.”<sup>39</sup> This is in contrast to the individualist logic of consequences, followed by liberals and realists, where “a rational act is one that will produce an outcome that maximizes the interest of the individual unit.”<sup>40</sup> In the developmental context, this means that constructivists will argue that development policies and processes are driven by values shared between policymakers that are established by social relationships and normative structures.<sup>41</sup>

In examining PPPs and the norms they have helped bring about and solidify, there are two underlying assumptions a constructivist analysis must make. First, is that concepts, despite what their supporters claim, “are not politically or ideologically neutral.”<sup>42</sup> In looking at PPPs, this means there are political agendas behind such relationships. Second, is that concepts change due to different social interpretations that happen as they are employed in different contexts.<sup>43</sup> Following these assumptions, a concept becomes a norm and changes the political landscape after it has gone through a cognitive process of knowledge development that includes three steps: normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation.<sup>44</sup>

Normalization is a “process by which international organizations help to transform a rough concept, initially developed in restricted circles of knowledge, into a widely accepted transnational norm based on expert knowledge.”<sup>45</sup> During this step, one would see organizations increasingly issue statements and procedures that acknowledge the concept. For example, the MDGs and SDGs are a way for the United Nations to normalize PPPs. Furthermore, one would witness the dissemination of the idea to various actors, which leads to the second step of knowledge development.

Fragmentation is a “process by which the concept, once it has gained transnational prominence, is subjected to a variety of local interpretations, as it undergoes multiple uses and

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<sup>39</sup> Karin Marie Fierke, “Constructivism,” in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 190.

<sup>40</sup> Fierke, “Constructivism,” p. 190.

<sup>41</sup> Spiegel et al., *World Politics*, p. 380.

<sup>42</sup> Olivier Nay, “International Organizations and the Production of Hegemonic Knowledge: how the World Bank and the OECD helped invent the Fragile State Concept,” *Third World Quarterly* 35 no. 2 (2014): 211.

<sup>43</sup> Nay, “International Organizations,” p. 212.

<sup>44</sup> Nay, “International Organizations,” p. 212.

<sup>45</sup> Nay, “International Organizations,” p. 215.

acclimatizes in diverse ways across time and space.”<sup>46</sup> Here is where one would see the idea of PPPs applied to several different sectors—maternal health, food security, private security, and more. Additionally, there might be groups, such as certain private companies or governments, which elect not to participate in such partnerships. This form of dissent is a way for these actors to show that they do not accept the validity of the notion. Once several manifestations of the concept have spread, the final stage of knowledge development occurs.

Assimilation is the third and last stage of turning a concept into a norm. It is a “process by which international organizations gradually revise, enrich and perpetuate hegemonic concepts through the steady incorporation of additional insights and critical perspectives into the prevailing paradigm.”<sup>47</sup> Essentially, it is where all the ideas that materialize during fragmentation get either integrated into or rejected from the concept as a whole. This requires organizations to build networks of specialized individuals—such as scholars, experts, diplomats, etc.—to assimilate the knowledge. After this process is finished, the concept is not a solidified idea. Rather, it has become a refined concept that will continue to undergo constant adjustments to fit the agenda of whomever it benefits most.

### **3.1 Understanding PPPs and How They Establish Corporate Norms**

#### **3.1.1 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)**

Evident by the MDGs and SDGs, the issues PPPs address are complex, cross-border challenges. As such, these partnerships encompass a diverse range of interests and expertise. Examining cooperation between the public and private sectors must take into account actors’ expectations. The emergence of a partnership is a sign that the formative parties share a mutual interest in handling the issue underpinning their collaboration.<sup>48</sup> An issue such as food security demands high levels of competency and knowledge in a number of areas, and PPPs allow for the collaboration and cooperation of partners that include state bureaucrats and private sector

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<sup>46</sup> Nay, “International Organizations,” p. 215.

<sup>47</sup> Nay, “International Organizations,” p. 215.

<sup>48</sup> Mark Considine and Sylvain Giguère, “The Partnership Agenda Going Forward: Challenges and Opportunities,” in *The Theory and Practice of Local Governance and Economic Development*, ed. Mark Considine and Sylvain Giguère (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 255-260.

experts. Success, however, is dependent on stakeholders'—including citizens—equal participation,<sup>49</sup> which is easier said than accomplished.

In an attempt to foster success, different types of PPPs have emerged. One way in which PPPs have been categorized is as either “active” or “dependent” partnerships.<sup>50</sup> Active partnerships are built on discursive procedures including continuous negotiation, openness to change roles when appropriate, and learning from informational exchange.<sup>51</sup> Dependent partnerships, especially in the aid-development context, come together under specific terms, rigid roles, and for the purposes of furthering one partner's interests such as gaining access to resources.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, scholars have also debated whether or not partnerships are genuine relationships or simply rhetorical innovations.<sup>53</sup> The former is defined by partners sharing power equally and mutually respecting each other, while the latter classifies partnerships as instrumental in re-branding policies that reinforce colonial power dynamics.<sup>54</sup>

While PPPs may or may not just be rhetorical innovations, their focus on furthering partners' interests is where the constructivist idea of reflexivity becomes apparent in the discussion on creating norms, identities, and interests. Once actors have solidified their identities they start pursuing their newfound interests, which are shaped by their identity. Underpinned by a mutual belief that both parties will benefit and reap advantages such as “resource availability, effectiveness and efficiency, and legitimacy,”<sup>55</sup> partners' actions start to align with their interests that stem from identifying as part of a partnership. Nora McKeon, food systems researcher and former Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) employee, expands on the assumed mutual benefit:

PPP's are billed as win-win affairs since, in theory, they make it possible to profit from the capacities and resources of private entities and shift some of the risk of service provision to them while anchoring accountability solidly in the public sector. In reality,

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<sup>49</sup> Considine and Giguère, “The Partnership Agenda,” p. 255.

<sup>50</sup> David Lewis, “Building ‘active’ partnerships in aid-recipient countries,” in *Public Private Partnerships: Theory and practice in international perspective*, ed. Stephen P. Osborne (London: Routledge, 2000), 252-264.

<sup>51</sup> Lewis, “Building,” p. 260.

<sup>52</sup> Lewis, “Building,” p. 260.

<sup>53</sup> Rita Abrahamsen, “The Power of Partnerships in Global Governance,” *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 8 (2004), 1453-1467.

<sup>54</sup> Abrahamsen, “The Power of Partnerships,” p. 1455-1457.

<sup>55</sup> Ronald W. McQuaid, “The theory of partnership,” in *Public Private Partnerships: Theory and practice in international perspective*, ed. Stephen P. Osborne (London: Routledge, 2000), 14-19.

accountability tends to drop out of the picture altogether while corporations manage to maximize their profits and evade the bulk of the risks involved in investment by pushing governments to twist rules and regulations to their advantage. In the field of agriculture and food security PPPs like those envisaged in the G8's New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition pit the interests of powerful corporations against those of peasant farmers, with governments too often rooting for the former.<sup>56</sup>

This assumed mutual benefit framework—that connects various sectors and organizations together to form new, larger market mechanisms adept at reducing risk while transforming institutions' identities to reflect their relationship with these new markets<sup>57</sup>—has been adopted by the World Bank to address poverty concerns. After redefining poverty as a less static concept, the Bank in its 2000-01 *World Development Report* labeled PPPs as a way to manage poverty and reduce risk by connecting and utilizing the positive aspects of public and private actors.<sup>58</sup>

When it comes to minimalizing risk, PPPs are billed as being able to do so by reducing barriers to trade and lowering transaction costs through increased relations between partners. However, PPPs that decrease barriers tend to do so because international commercial producers stand to benefit much more than small domestic producers from trade liberalization. The latter group may not be able to sustain their livelihoods because of the new well-funded competition, and are forced to focus their limited resources towards whatever export crop multinational corporations (MNCs) are investing in—possibly leading to small producers being further marginalized in terms of land and resource acquisition.<sup>59</sup> There are some that argue MNCs can solve this problem through contract farming, which, in theory, helps small farmers access the market by establishing a formal relationship wherein buyers are obligated to purchase products from such farmers.<sup>60</sup> This model, however, generally creates a state of dependency for the farmers that can obtain one of the limited number of contracts, while other producers, primarily women, are left out of the scheme thus intensifying gender and economic inequalities.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 200.

<sup>57</sup> Jacqueline Best, "The World Bank and International Development," in *International Political Economy*, ed. Greg Anderson and Christopher J. Kukucha (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 160-162.

<sup>58</sup> Best, "The World Bank," p. 160-162.

<sup>59</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 47.

<sup>60</sup> "Contract Farming Resource Centre," Food and Agriculture Organization, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/contract-farming/faq/en/>.

<sup>61</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 49-50.

One of the benefits most attractive to private businesses entering into PPPs is the legitimacy given to the cause and the partnership due to state involvement. This legitimacy comes from the idea of constitutive recognition, where an actor—whether it is a state or non-state actor—“would not possess legal personality if not recognized.”<sup>62</sup> Essentially, such recognition matters for two related reasons, which allow for private firms to expand into new markets unquestioned. First, is the political importance of recognition. If states or organizations such as the UN sanction the actions of firms by partnering with them, then such partnerships gain legitimacy. The second reason recognition matters is that legally it “proves that the recognizing states [or other actors] consider that in their view the new entity fulfills all the factual conditions considered necessary for becoming an international subject.”<sup>63</sup> In other words, such recognition solidifies and legitimizes the role of private actors in global governance. It should be noted, however, that in forming legitimacy partners may have to compromise on certain perceptions, such as how businesses handle human rights in order to gain government trust, which in turn, as these new perceptions are put into operation, form new international norms.<sup>64</sup> One norm to come out of this process, which emerged in response to criticisms faced by the private sector, is corporate social responsibility.

### 3.1.2 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

The full examination of CSR is not in the scope of this study, but it is worth briefly discussing because it has played a role in shaping PPPs—especially partnerships formed with large corporations to deal with development matters (i.e., Monsanto in providing food security). Ramon Mullerat, former president of the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of Europe, defines CSR as:

A concept whereby companies voluntarily decide to respect and protect the interest of a broad range of stakeholders and to contribute to a cleaner environment and a better society through active interaction with all. CSR is the voluntary commitment by business to manage its role in society in a responsible way. CSR is the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable development working with employees, their families, [and] the

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<sup>62</sup> Cassese, *International Law*, p. 74.

<sup>63</sup> Cassese, *International Law*, p. 74.

<sup>64</sup> McQuaid, “The theory of partnership,” p. 21.

local communities in societies at large to improve their quality of life. CSR is cooperation between government, civil society and business.<sup>65</sup>

Originally hailed as a way for corporations to be more socially responsibly, especially in the field of human rights, CSR quickly incurred many criticisms. Detractors have called CSR a deliberate way to appease regulators,<sup>66</sup> a distraction from a company's dubious activities,<sup>67</sup> and a way for firms to dissociate themselves from the negative aspects of their business.<sup>68</sup> These comments are grounded in the fact that CSR initiatives are voluntary, have no enforcement mechanisms, and seem to be nothing more than an exercise in public relations.<sup>69</sup>

Critics of CSR initiatives have called for a new norm in the role of private enterprises working with governments in the form of corporate accountability. Those advocating for corporate accountability claim it deals with two of the biggest problems with CSR: the democratic deficit and inefficient regulation of business.<sup>70</sup> Democratic deficit here refers to the lack of involvement of ordinary citizens in decisions made by corporations that affect them. In a way, this idea returns back to the active partner notion mentioned earlier; continuous, open discourse would benefit everyone involved with PPPs. The second idea, inefficient regulation, shows the dissatisfaction with businesses being able to regulate themselves. This leads to self-beneficial policies, which is evident in the food sector.

One form of CSR in the food industry is setting standards for companies to meet. Governments generally do not create these standards, but rather they come from collective agreements from food companies.<sup>71</sup> Businesses willingly submit themselves to such standards

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<sup>65</sup> Ramon Mullerat, "The Global Responsibility of Business," in *Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate Governance of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, ed. Ramon Mullerat (The Hague: Kluwer Law International and International Bar Association, 2010), 4.

<sup>66</sup> David Cronin, *Corporate Europe: How Big Business Sets Policies on Food, Climate and War* (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 9.

<sup>67</sup> Colin Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 79-141.

<sup>68</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 206.

<sup>69</sup> Paddy Ireland and Renginee G. Pillay, "Corporate Social Responsibility in a Neoliberal Age," in *Corporate Social Responsibility and Regulatory Governance: Towards Inclusive Development?*, ed. Peter Utting and José Carlos Marques (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 94-95.

<sup>70</sup> Ireland and Pillay, "Corporate," p. 95.

<sup>71</sup> Doris Fuchs and Agni Kalfagianni, "Private Food Governance: Implications for Social Sustainability and Democratic Legitimacy," in *Corporate Social Responsibility and Regulatory*

because they had input into its content, and, once in effect, these voluntary regulations can strengthen their [the private sector's] structural power. For example, the retailers who created and embrace standards such as the British Retail Consortium (BRC), the Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice (Global-Gap), and the International Food Standard (IFS) can control and constrain market forces through such standards, and coerce suppliers to meet the demands required by the criterion.<sup>72</sup> Some argue standards such as these formal certifications benefit farmers because it gives them greater access to markets along with confident buyers; in reality, however, the opportunities for suppliers to gain access to such retailers is fairly limited and benefits only exist for a select few.<sup>73</sup>

The reason for allowing corporations to develop such normative frameworks is further advanced by two other arguments. First, corporations offer positive contributions such as capital, technology, and expert knowledge that will make achieving food security much easier. Second, by including corporations in the process of developing new norms, such firms are more likely to follow the rules. These positions are refutable, however, because “corporations are far more likely to respect norms when they are legally obligated to do so than when they are invited to comply voluntarily.”<sup>74</sup> Nevertheless, once governments embrace standards such as these, societal norms form and the process of creating new identities and interests based on these norms starts again. Now that norms, constructivism, and PPPs have been defined, the discussion shall turn to the influence of neoliberalism and corporations on PPPs and their role in global policymaking.

### **3.2 The Role of Neoliberalism and Corporations in Global Policymaking**

#### 3.2.1 Neo-liberalization

The liberalization of the worldwide agriculture and food industry has brought about new structural power for MNCs, giving them the ability to shape international norms on social and sustainability policies.<sup>75</sup> The approach taken here is to examine structural power behind partnerships formed by MNCs and governments that seek to provide food security in the Global South. The shaping of such norms falls under a process known as neo-liberalization. This process

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*Governance: Towards Inclusive Development?*, ed. Peter Utting and José Carlos Marques (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 225-247.

<sup>72</sup> Fuchs and Kalfagianni, “Private Food Governance,” p. 230.

<sup>73</sup> Fuchs and Kalfagianni, “Private Food Governance,” p. 235.

<sup>74</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 203.

<sup>75</sup> Fuchs and Kalfagianni, “Private Food Governance,” p. 225.

is one that is focused on change—especially concerning systems such as those found in international politics.<sup>76</sup> In other words, it can be categorized as the construction and consolidation of neoliberal ideas— notions that stress deregulation, privatization, trickle-down economics, personal responsibility, and the competition state<sup>77</sup>—in the forms of governance and new regulations.<sup>78</sup>

Before neoliberal ideas consolidated into governance norms, however, policies stemming from state-organized capitalism dominated by Keynesian ideology and characterized as the welfare state had to be dismantled. In the 1980s, this was done through programs that were guided by neoliberal notions, and the process bore the name of its leading advocates— Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganomics in the United States. Under Reagan and Thatcher’s leadership, the welfare state was abandoned in favor of a new model known as New Public Management (NPM).<sup>79</sup> NPM sought to attract private capital and practices to completely run public services. When it was determined that this plan was not politically possible, PPPs formed as a compromise wherein the government would provide services through its employees, but the equipment and property was privately owned.<sup>80</sup>

As neoliberalism’s sole focus on rolling back regulations constraining businesses faded, the concept became “increasingly associated with the political foregrounding of new modes of ‘social’ and penal policymaking, concerned specifically with the aggressive reregulation, disciplining, and containment of those marginalized or disposed by the neo-liberalization of the 1980s.”<sup>81</sup> In other words, after neoliberalism scrapped any regulations seen as hindering the accumulation of wealth, a process of reregulation that advocated for governments to be vassals of corporations tasked with ensuring the protection of private property rights began.<sup>82</sup> Under this paradigm, it is important to note the reregulation process favors privatization over marketization,

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<sup>76</sup> Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” *Antipode* (2002): 380-404.

<sup>77</sup> Nancy Fraser, “Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History,” *New Left Review* 56 (2009): 107.

<sup>78</sup> Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” p. 384.

<sup>79</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 16.

<sup>80</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 16-21.

<sup>81</sup> Peck and Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” p. 389.

<sup>82</sup> Cronin, *Corporate Europe*, p. 3-13.

which is to say the concern of neoliberalism in this new phase is the acquisition of public assets and interests by private enterprise.<sup>83</sup>

As mentioned above, the initial phase of neo-liberalization focused on policies that removed regulations and furthered privatization. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) enacted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s had the explicit goal of removing state regulations from interfering with market policies. SAPs promoted reform in the agricultural sector aimed at reducing public sector involvement by removing grain reserves and eliminating subsidies for seeds and fertilizer. In Africa, this resulted in farmers buying cheaper, lower-yielding seeds, leading to a decline in total crop yields.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, neoliberal policies coerced countries to specialize in their so-called comparative advantage, which happened to be export-oriented crops.<sup>85</sup>

While comparative advantage may work well in theory, in reality there are non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as import quotas, local regulations, production and export subsidies, and several other factors that distort prices making a pure comparative advantage impossible.<sup>86</sup> The WTO is set up to remove some of these barriers, such as quotas and regulations, but goes too far in targeting government institutions in the Global South when the larger problem is MNCs in the Global North benefiting from export subsidies disguised as export credits. This is not to say that all subsidies are bad, considering that no “developed” country would be where it is today without some sort of agricultural subsidy.<sup>87</sup> Rather, this fact demonstrates the importance of government support in the agricultural industry, and gives credence to the belief that policies aimed at dismantling public funding in the Global South are not beneficial for domestic farmers. The World Bank and the IMF see world trade as a level playing field, but their counsel to African governments to exploit their comparative advantage in raw commodities “transformed African countries from net food exporters to net food importers in the space of decade.”<sup>88</sup> One reason

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<sup>83</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 79-80.

<sup>84</sup> Anuradha Mittal, “The Blame Game: Understanding Structural Causes of the Food Crisis,” in *The Global Food Crisis: Governance Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Jennifer Clapp and Marc J. Cohen, (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2009), 20-21.

<sup>85</sup> Peter Rosset, *Food Is Different: Why We Must Get the WTO Out of Agriculture* (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2006), 130.

<sup>86</sup> Rosset, *Food is Different*, p. 17-18.

<sup>87</sup> Rosset, *Food is Different*, p. 76-77.

<sup>88</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 23.

why this has happened is that the U.S. and the EU have maintained their agricultural subsidies, via agreements like the Blair House Accord, to maintain their market dominance rather than submit to the effects of liberalization.<sup>89</sup>

In the African agricultural sector, however, the departure of the state was met with the opposite of neoliberal predictions: private businesses saw higher risk in projects without state backing and did not invest capital.<sup>90</sup> Consequently, the few firms that did invest in countries under SAPs gave poor farmers unfavorable contractual conditions and were characterized as “rent-seeking monopolists.”<sup>91</sup> Due to these failures, which the World Bank categorized as such in 2008,<sup>92</sup> the neoliberal project now understands the importance of the state in helping grow the private sector. The former provides vital infrastructure and assistance programs that give farmers access to land, credit, insurance, and links to other helpful organizations.

### 3.2.2 The Market-State

Recognizing the state as a central player for development, neoliberals now argue over where the positive role of the state ends.<sup>93</sup> In turn, this has led some scholars to assert that the nation-state as a concept is dead, and is being superseded by an emerging market-state characterized by factors such as dependency on international markets and MNCs, less representative institutions, incentive structures rather than impartial rules and regulations, and a considerable accumulation of wealth.<sup>94</sup> This model holds that states are beholden to international capital, as corporations are needed for jobs and economic activity; and corporations need the state for tax breaks, subsidies, and infrastructure.<sup>95</sup> Hence, after the failure of SAPs, it makes sense to see the emergence of PPPs as a new neoliberal tool where states and corporations can work together to achieve corresponding agendas.

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<sup>89</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 45.

<sup>90</sup> Walden Bello, *The Food Wars* (London: Verdo, 2009), 74.

<sup>91</sup> Bello, *The Food Wars*, p. 74

<sup>92</sup> Bello, *The Food Wars*, p. 81-82.

<sup>93</sup> Jamie Peck, *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason* (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011), 20.

<sup>94</sup> Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 229-233.

<sup>95</sup> Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, p. 221.

Neoliberalism, according to Jamie Peck, does not exist in a pure form, but rather hybrid variations such as PPPs advance ideological principles and constitute institutional reinvention.<sup>96</sup> Not only have such partnerships contributed to the creation of new metrics for global politics to follow by architecturally reshaping norms for international security and stability, but they are also establishing rigidity in their respective sectors. For example, because PPPs are more about firms than markets “there is not necessarily any element of market choice for the ultimate consumer or service user.”<sup>97</sup> In relation to food sovereignty, this means that farmers in Ghana are left with fewer options when purchasing seeds.<sup>98</sup>

Essentially, neoliberal policies have given corporations a new role in the polity where they have been able to consistently frame political debates around the ‘state versus market’ idea,<sup>99</sup> while politicians and parties continue to be further removed from the electorate and financed by corporations and the extremely wealthy.<sup>100</sup> In the United States, this paradigm is epitomized by the *Citizens United* Supreme Court case<sup>101</sup>, which represents the victory of corporate politics in democracy. On the other side of the Atlantic, Brussels, home of the EU parliament, has the second highest concentration of lobbyists outside of Washington D.C. There is no official data, but estimates place the number of lobbyists anywhere from 15,000 to 30,000.<sup>102</sup> Furthermore, about two-thirds of the lobbyists represent private interests who have more money and considerably larger influence than advocacy groups such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace.

This has led to a norm where members of the European Parliament (MEPs) rely on corporate and advocacy firms to craft legislation and amendments. In theory, this is not necessarily bad as groups that focus their resources and time on studying a specific topic might

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<sup>96</sup> Peck, *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason*, p. 6-7.

<sup>97</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 87.

<sup>98</sup> Chris Walker, “The Corporate Takeover of Africa’s Food is on Shaky Grounds – It’s Time for Action,” *Common Dreams*, June 3, 2015, accessed on February 25, 2016, <http://www.commondreams.org/views/2015/06/03/corporate-takeover-africas-food-shaky-grounds-its-time-action>.

<sup>99</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 94.

<sup>100</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 164.

<sup>101</sup> *Citizen United v. FEC*, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). *Citizens United* is a U.S. Supreme Court case centered on campaign finance, and the verdict forbids the federal government from restricting independent political expenditures by corporations and other associations.

<sup>102</sup> Cronin, *Corporate Europe*, p. 2.

better understand the issue at hand, therefore offering the best solution. In reality, however, groups are competing to have their voices and interests heard, and the entity with the most money can accomplish this task easier. For example, during 2011, ExxonMobil, the world's wealthiest corporation, spent at least €5 million on lobbying efforts in Brussels. Whereas the Oxfam office for handling EU-affairs had an annual budget of €500,000 that same year.<sup>103</sup> Thus, comparing such firms and saying they have equal influence in a system that requires groups to pay-to-play is not only erroneous, but it also demonstrates how the neoliberal paradigm has reshaped government into a vassal for corporate interest by allowing lobbyists, who are paid to find ways to further the interest (profits) of their employers, to influence legislation.

To illustrate how conflicts of interest can arise from this situation, one can turn their attention to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)—the government arm of the EU responsible for examining risks within the region's food supply. As one can imagine, the EFSA is tasked with assessing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to ensure they are safe for human consumption. In 2009, the EFSA received an application by Monsanto for the approval of a soybean with the codename MON 87701 x MON 89788. After a few years and small number of inquires requesting further information about tests conducted by Monsanto on the product, the EFSA, via its scientific panel on GMOs, deemed the soybean safe.<sup>104</sup> This leads one to question what scientific panel does the EFSA contract out its GMOs inquires to that approves products for public consumption solely based on tests done by a corporation wishing to sell a product?

The panel that approved Monsanto's soybean happens to be the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), "whose mission is to provide science that improves human health and well-being and safeguard the environment."<sup>105</sup> As a PPP, it is important to examine ILSI's membership and funding. To no surprise, Monsanto sits on ILSI's Board of Trustees, and the organization receives more than 50 percent of its budget—\$12.6 million out of \$21.9 million—from its corporate sponsors.<sup>106</sup> This is just one of many examples where products that have only gone through trails paid for and conducted by corporations are being approved by government

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<sup>103</sup> Cronin, *Corporate Europe*, p. 4.

<sup>104</sup> Cronin, *Corporate Europe*, p. 74.

<sup>105</sup> "Mission," International Life Sciences Institute, accessed April 21, 2016, <http://www.ilsa.org/Pages/Mission.aspx>.

<sup>106</sup> International Life Sciences Institute, 2015 Annual Report, p. 20, accessed April 21, 2016, [http://www.ilsa.org/Documents/ILSI\\_AnnualReport\\_2015\\_web2.pdf](http://www.ilsa.org/Documents/ILSI_AnnualReport_2015_web2.pdf).

commissions; the situation is only further being dominated by corporations as “tripartite meetings” take place between private industry groups, EU officials, and government agencies.<sup>107</sup>

As demonstrated above, large corporations have the ability to influence bureaucracies located in the Global North, and turn organizations into vassals for achieving firms’ aims. As such, when corporations want to invest in countries in the Global South, they can employ governmental agencies associated with organizations such as the EU. For example, European officials frequently strong-arm governments in the Global South to accept free trade deals that better position European firms to expand into new markets. One instance showcases how Peter Mandelson, a European Union commissioner, had his staff write complex trade pacts, better known as economic partnership agreements (EPAs), for countries in the Caribbean and Africa. The EPAs contain clauses that do not benefit the domestic economies of the Global South. For example, one clause bans the taxation of raw material exports—a mechanism used to encourage domestic processing; another, typically known as a ‘most favored nation’ clause, stipulates that any trade deal given to a state that represents more than 1 percent of world trade must also be granted to the EU.<sup>108</sup> Actions like these help substantiate the claim that an asymmetrical relationship exists between corporations and governments in the Global South. In other words, the former has more resources, better access to knowledge, and clear procedures, whereas the latter has fewer capabilities to formulate and execute coordinated, coherent policies.<sup>109</sup>

Networks such as the ones detailed above have put PPPs at the forefront of policymaking, while power is increasingly being concentrated into fewer corporate hands. In effect, PPPs and the private firms supporting them have been able to carve out their own unregulated political space since “no international body mandated to monitor global corporate activity has existed since the UN Center for Transnational Corporations was closed down in 1992,”<sup>110</sup> which is problematic considering the profit margins of many MNCs exceeds the annual GDP of the countries they operate in. Considering PPPs secure markets in their respective sectors for the involved organizations and wrap up government funding through contracts that may last twenty or thirty years, such partnerships create an inflexible monopoly within certain industries.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Cronin, *Corporate Europe*, p. 75-84.

<sup>108</sup> Cronin, *Corporate Europe*, p. 147.

<sup>109</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 133.

<sup>110</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 103.

<sup>111</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 86-87.

Fundamentally, this means a close relationship must exist between governments and firms, which, in the view of neoliberals, is only acceptable if firms have influence over states.<sup>112</sup>

Timothy Wise and Sophie Murphy describe this change in governance perfectly:

A paradigm shift is underway, caused by the deepening integration of agricultural, energy, and financial markets in a resource-constrained world made more vulnerable by climate change. Powerful multinational firms dominate these markets. Many benefit from current policies and practices, and some are directly involved in new agricultural development programs, either through public-private partnerships or in programs such as Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa. Their interests heavily influence national and global policies, slowing, diverting, or halting needed action. This leaves international institutions promoting market friendly reforms but resistant to imposing needed regulations on those food and agricultural markets.<sup>113</sup>

In other words, the continued importance placed on such partnerships, evident by the numerous collaborations to stem from the MDGs and SDGs, shows the significance PPPs play in perpetuating the interests of those who stand to benefit from the expansion of neoliberal policies: corporations and international organizations associated with them.

In this section, the neoliberal framework in which PPPs have been able to carve out their own unregulated political space has been discussed. As a tool where states and corporations can work together to achieve corresponding agendas, PPPs have worked to normalize the presence of the private sector in global governance. By breaking down knowledge development through the three-step process of normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation, this study can adequately show how the PPP concept and its associated neoliberal principles are becoming global norms. With the theoretical framework and literature informing this study now outlined, the next section will present the case study.

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<sup>112</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 95.

<sup>113</sup> Timothy A. Wise and Sophie Murphy, *Resolving the Food Crisis: Assessing Global Policy Reforms Since 2007* (Medford: Global Development and Environmental Institute and Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2012), 34.

## CHAPTER 4

### TURNING THE PPP CONCEPT INTO A NORM

The case study in this paper seeks to investigate the extent to which PPPs entrench private sector involvement in global governance, setting a universal norm wherein private entities are at the forefront of global policymaking. Specifically, this is done in reference to food security. In exploring this question, the analysis will focus on the role of private corporations in Ghana's legislative process via the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (hereafter, G8NA). However, it will also draw on examples from other African contexts where doing so helps to elaborate on the claims made. The norm creating process is examined in three different subsections in this chapter, each focused on one part of the knowledge creation model—normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation—outlined in Chapter Three. Before attempting to connect these various nodes as part of a larger network focused on reshaping global norms, the term food security as it is understood here will be defined and descriptive dossiers about the key players in the PPP arrangement will be given. These include the Republic of Ghana; the G8NA; and corporate sponsors Finatrade, SABMiller, and the World Cocoa Foundation. While some UN documents will be examined, it is assumed that readers are familiar with the top international organization.

#### **4.1 The Terms and Actors Involved in the Analysis**

##### 4.1.1 Food Security

Before undertaking the analysis, it is first necessary to define the concept of food security given its centrality in this analysis, and to provide some background information on the context, that is Ghana and Africa, in which it is examined here. To begin, it should be noted that the definition of food security has changed over time. Originally, post-WWII, the main objective of the concept was to achieve freedom from hunger,<sup>114</sup> which meant increasing production and yields— notions exemplified in the strategies of the Green Revolution. In 1974, the United Nations expanded upon the freedom from hunger idea and defined food security as the “availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic food-stuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in productions and prices.”<sup>115</sup> By the

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<sup>114</sup> D. John Shaw, *World Food Security: A History since 1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 3-4.

<sup>115</sup> Cited in McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 74.

late 1990s, a new definition of food security was advanced. Influenced by numerous factors, including Amartya Sen's *Poverty and Famine* and the rise of peasant organizations like Via Campesina, the FAO called for a World Food Summit (WFS) held in 1996. Those at the WFS agreed to a new definition of food security, which is used to this day: "Food security exists when all people, at all times have physical, [social], and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life."<sup>116</sup>

The term "social" was added in 2001 by the FAO, which essentially allows for four dimensions of food security to emerge: availability, access, utilization, and stability.<sup>117</sup> The first dimension, availability, hinges on the term "sufficient" from the WFS definition. This leads one to believe that if food production can be increased, the availability of food commodities, and therefore food security, would also increase.<sup>118</sup>

This is when the second dimension, access, becomes vital. When the WFS definition states, "all people, at all times have physical, social, and economic access..." there are three underlying concerns with access. First, is the physical or logistical side of having access to food; commodities must be close to consumers. Second, consumers must have the economic ability to purchase food, which means adequate amounts of food must be affordable. Finally, the social aspect acknowledges that socio-cultural barriers, such as food-related issues tied to HIV/AIDS, exist.<sup>119</sup> These concerns, especially the social one, demonstrate how the food security paradigm has changed in response to alternative models such as food sovereignty (more on this later).

The third dimension of food security, utilization, recognizes that food security involves providing safe, quality food. The WFS definition embodies this notion when it reads: "safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life." While the definition emphasizes the importance of food safety in the pursuit of ensuring food security, it also highlights the importance of taking into consideration people's dietary habits

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<sup>116</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization, "World Food Summit Plan of Action," November 13-17, 1996, accessed May 9, 2016, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.HTM>.

<sup>117</sup> George-André Simon, "Food Security: Definition, Four Dimensions, History," Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, March 2012, accessed May 9, 2016, <http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ERP/uni/F4D.pdf>.

<sup>118</sup> Simon, "Food Security," p. 5.

<sup>119</sup> Simon, "Food Security," p. 6-7.

when selecting commodities and nutrients for societies.<sup>120</sup> If such notions are not considered, then a situation where incorrect or under-utilization of food may occur, therefore preventing food security from being achieved.

Stability, the last dimension of food security, is tied to the proper utilization of food. It focuses on making sure food security is recognized as a situation that exists when all the criteria of the other dimensions are met continually. The “at all times” part of the WFS definition is where this notion is embedded, and inherently acknowledges that food security provides a stable basis for continuously fighting off food insecurity.<sup>121</sup> In the fight against food insecurity, these four dimensions—availability, access, utilization, and stability—have existed around globe, in both the past and present, in various food regimes.

#### 4.1.2 The Geographical Context: Africa and Ghana

As the paper will draw primarily from developments in food security in Ghana, it is necessary to provide some background information on the country and the African continent. In 2009, the number of family farms in Africa was estimated to be around 33 million, which is 80 percent of all farms on the continent.<sup>122</sup> In some countries these producers account for 90 percent of agricultural production, and meet around 80 percent of food demand mostly through invisible markets regulated by local customs and values.<sup>123</sup> Peasant and small farmers serve as the backbone of this food supply chain and lack facilities to market their own produce, therefore making it harder for them to compete with imports and vulnerable to international pressures.<sup>124</sup>

Located in West Africa, Ghana is a former British colony that gained independence in 1957, and was ruled by several unstable military dictatorships from 1964-1992.<sup>125</sup> After going through a decade-long constitutional reform process, a multi-party democracy with a parliament and a directly elected president was established. According to the website Freedom House, Ghana’s elections, both for the executive and the legislature, take place every four years. Elections have been deemed free and fair by international standards, and there have been successive peaceful transitions of power between the New Democratic Congress (NDC) and the

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<sup>120</sup> Simon, “Food Security, p. 7.

<sup>121</sup> Simon, “Food Security, p. 8.

<sup>122</sup> Bello, *The Food Wars*, p. 15-16.

<sup>123</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 55.

<sup>124</sup> Cronin, *Corporate Europe*, p. 131.

<sup>125</sup> “Ghana Country Profile,” *BBC*, accessed May 17, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13433790>.

New Patriotic Party (NPP). While Ghanaians enjoy many civil liberties such as freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and open political participation, corruption still exists. For example, bureaucratic agents are known for taking bribes, and the police have a history of using excessive force, illegally detaining civilians, and setting up illegal checkpoints to demand money for passage. Additionally, women are underrepresented in politics—only securing 30 of 275 parliamentary seats in 2012—and in some rural areas subjected to female genital mutilation.<sup>126</sup>

As one of the more free states in Africa, Ghana has been a flagship country for world economic reform on the continent.<sup>127</sup> Today, the country is well known for its cocoa and gold industries, and for being the birthplace of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.<sup>128</sup> According to the website for Ghana’s Embassy in Washington D.C., Ghana currently has a population estimated above 25 million people representing about seventy-five ethnic groups, with a plurality belonging to the Akan group (47.5%). Christians make up the majority (71.2%) of the population; other parts of the populace identify as practicing Islam (17.6%), traditional faiths (5.2%), none (5.2%), and other (0.8%). Additionally, the literacy rate of the total population is 71.5 percent, with males (78.3%) having a higher rate than females (65.3%).<sup>129</sup>

Within Ghana’s relatively diverse population, issues of malnutrition cut across demographics with as many as 1.2 million Ghanaians considered food insecure.<sup>130</sup> And while Ghana has made progress reducing its poverty rate from 52 percent to 28 percent since the inception of the MDGs, problems that stem from nutritional deficiencies, a condition correlated with poverty, still exist.<sup>131</sup> For example, in 2011 the prevalence of anemia in children was 57 percent, 23 percent of children 0-59 months of age experienced stunted growth, and 13 percent of children in the same age group were underweight.<sup>132</sup> In order to progress nutritionally, Ghana has joined several food-related international programs: the Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement, the African-led Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP),

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<sup>126</sup> “Ghana,” Freedom House, accessed May 18, 2016, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/ghana>.

<sup>127</sup> Rachel Naylor, *Ghana* (Oxford: Oxfam, 2000), 8.

<sup>128</sup> Naylor, *Ghana*, p. 6.

<sup>129</sup> “Population,” Ghana Embassy, Washington D.C., accessed May 17, 2016, <http://www.ghanaembassy.org/index.php?page=population>.

<sup>130</sup> USAID, “Ghana: Nutrition Profile,” p. 1, accessed August 16, 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1864/USAID-Ghana-Profile.pdf>.

<sup>131</sup> USAID, “Ghana,” p. 1.

<sup>132</sup> USAID, “Ghana,” p. 2.

the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), and, the initiative analyzed in this case study, the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition.<sup>133</sup>

#### 4.1.3 Food Regimes and the G8NA

The drive to ensure food security has resulted in a variety of food governance regimes at the global level. The food regime concept refers to “the political structuring of world capitalism, and its organization of agricultures to provision labor and/or consumers in such a way as to reduce wage costs and enhance commercial profits.”<sup>134</sup> In the past 150 years, three food regimes have been identified. The first existed from the 1870s-1930s, when Great Britain linked its industrial zones to cheap food zones associated with British colonial rule.<sup>135</sup> Settler states, areas Britain had formally colonized and had strong ties to, such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States, provided cheap imports of wheat and meat.<sup>136</sup> While Britain’s colonial ties in Asia and Africa allowed for these areas to specialize in tropical export crops that seemingly gave them a comparative advantage.<sup>137</sup> These two agricultural zones supported British industrialization and allowed for Britain to maintain hegemony in the world market, and simultaneously expanded farming and crop production in the settler and colonial states.

The second regime—which like the first was state dominated, except by the United States instead of Great Britain—prevailed during the 1940s-1970s, and focused on empowering the agro-industrial model.<sup>138</sup> Known as the Green Revolution, the focus shifted to producing higher crop yields with the help of science and technology. As U.S. President Harry Truman stated in 1949: “Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.”<sup>139</sup> The abundance of food produced through the application of such knowledge allowed for U.S.

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<sup>133</sup> USAID, “Ghana,” p. 2-3.

<sup>134</sup> Philip McMichael, *Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions* (Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2013), 8.

<sup>135</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 12.

<sup>136</sup> Henry Bernstein, “Land grabbing, conflict and agrarian-environmental transformations: perspectives from East and Southeast Asia” (paper presented at an international academic conference, Chiang Mai University, 5-6 June 2015), [http://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Research\\_and\\_projects/Research\\_networks/LDPI/CMC\\_P\\_1-\\_Bernstein.pdf](http://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Research_and_projects/Research_networks/LDPI/CMC_P_1-_Bernstein.pdf).

<sup>137</sup> Bernstein, “Land grabbing,” p. 4.

<sup>138</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 14.

<sup>139</sup> Cited in McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 14.

exports, such as wheat and soy, to dominate international markets and weaken domestic producers in countries that imported cheap American crops—making some states in the Global South dependent on food imports.<sup>140</sup> This second regime paved the way for the final and current food regime.

This third regime is centered on free market principles, transnational finance and commodities, and the consolidation of corporate interests.<sup>141</sup> Labeled the corporate food regime by the academics that identified the first two regimes, this arrangement allows for corporations to achieve high levels of profit from food production and control the global food market.<sup>142</sup> Corporations are able to achieve market dominance through measures such as influencing government legislation, which fits under the parameters of neo-liberalization, the market-state paradigm, and David Harvey’s “accumulation by dispossession” notion.<sup>143</sup> In addition to advocating the liberalization of markets and the privatization of public assets, the corporate food regime is ecologically destructive as it relies heavily on fossil fuels, leads to the degradation of soil and destruction of biodiversity, and diminishes the importance of traditional knowledge and practices in favor of specialized industrial farming.<sup>144</sup>

The current architecture of food security governance is fragmented and no real commanding governance structure exists under the corporate food regime. Due to this void, quasi-regulatory entities, such as PPPs, have expanded resulting in corporate-led programs found in initiatives such as the G8NA.<sup>145</sup> Founded in 2012, the G8NA seeks to bring together the resources and abilities of G8 governments, African countries, and private firms to uplift fifty million Africans out of poverty by 2022.<sup>146</sup> The other goals of the initiative, as outlined on the G8NA website, are:

- Reaffirm continued donor commitment to reducing poverty and hunger.
- Accelerate implementation of key components of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme.

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<sup>140</sup> Bernstein, “Land grabbing,” p. 7.

<sup>141</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 16-20.

<sup>142</sup> Bernstein, “Land grabbing,” p. 11-12.

<sup>143</sup> Bernstein, “Land grabbing,” p. 13-14.

<sup>144</sup> Bernstein, “Land grabbing,” p. 14.

<sup>145</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 98-101.

<sup>146</sup> Wolfgang Obenland, “Corporate Influence through the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa,” Working Paper (MISEREOR, 2014), 4.

- Leverage the potential of responsible private investment to support development goals.
- Achieve sustained inclusive, agriculture-led growth in Africa.<sup>147</sup>

To achieve these goals, businesses—or stakeholders as they are referred to on the G8NA website—and individual African countries negotiate what are known as Cooperation Frameworks.<sup>148</sup> Within these agreements, African host countries essentially agree to create investment-friendly environments to attract foreign direct investment, while private firms pledge resources to further food security.<sup>149</sup> To ensure the proper implementation of Cooperation Frameworks and that all sides are upholding their end of the deal, G8 countries serve as interlocutors tasked with providing financial and capacity-building support; the United States is the interlocutor in charge of G8NA affairs in Ghana.<sup>150</sup> The agreement between Ghana and its stakeholders will be examined later in the case study.

For countries like the United States, with large agricultural firms, the G8NA is viewed as a win-win situation that helps small entrepreneurs by giving them access to new technology and seed varieties, and at the same time opens up Africa—the “last frontier”—to global agriculture markets.<sup>151</sup> Since its conception, however, many groups have criticized the G8NA. For instance, as McKeon notes:

Initiatives like the G8’s ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’ and ‘Grow Africa’ program promoted by the World Economic Forum, clothed in language of fighting hunger, aim at privatizing Africa’s natural resources, opening up its agrifood markets to corporations, and institutionalizing an industrial model of agriculture along with value chains that whisk benefits away from rural economies.<sup>152</sup>

Other organizations, such as the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA), the Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance (EAA), and the ONE Campaign, also have concerns about the G8NA that can be condensed into the following risks:

- “Increasing the concentration of land and land grabbing.

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<sup>147</sup> “About,” New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, accessed May 11, 2016, <https://new-alliance.org/about>.

<sup>148</sup> “Commitments,” New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, accessed May 11, 2016, <https://new-alliance.org/commitments>.

<sup>149</sup> Obenland, “Corporate Influence,” p. 4.

<sup>150</sup> Obenland, “Corporate Influence,” p. 5-7.

<sup>151</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 172.

<sup>152</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 181.

- Encouraging the pursuit of large-scale models of production, which are focused on monocultures and pose severe environmental consequences, including soil degradation, amongst other issues.
- Focusing on export-oriented crops or most lucrative markets which could leave farmers at the mercy of volatile international commodity prices.
- Facilitating unpredictable and poorly remunerated seasonal labour through contract farming schemes.
- Encouraging the consolidation of power in input markets.
- Propagating a loss of agro-biodiversity, particularly where seeds are concerned.
- Reducing impetus from States to act on public commitments to food and nutrition security, in that way relegating the task to corporate actors.”<sup>153</sup>

In summary, corporations are leading the way in consolidating and gaining control of the market in Africa, and initiatives like the G8NA are transforming the state and its institutions into vassals for large firms.

#### 4.1.4 Corporate Dossiers

The corporations involved with Ghana via the G8NA include both domestic and multinational firms. Since this case study focuses largely on Ghana’s Plant Breeders Bill, dubbed by some as the “Monsanto Law,”<sup>154</sup> (the reason for the label is explained later), only the businesses connected to the agro-seed industry shall be discussed. This network starts with three firms that have pledged to support G8NA aims in Ghana: Finatrade Group, SABMiller, and the World Cocoa Foundation. The first business, Finatrade, is a Ghanaian company that works with large MNCs—including ABInBev, Beiersdorf, and Coca-Cola—to “bring the world’s products to West African consumers, and West African products to the world.”<sup>155</sup> In other words, Finatrade is focused on obtaining, processing, and distributing commodities. Additionally, it is worth noting that in Ghana’s Cooperation Framework it states Finatrade and its subsidiaries “sourced a combined volume of 660,000 metric tons in 2011 across four agricultural commodities—cocoa, cashew nut, sugar, and rice—and is currently looking to expand into maize

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<sup>153</sup> Obenland, “Corporate Influence,” p. 5.

<sup>154</sup> Chris Walker, “Battling the ‘Monsanto law’ in Ghana,” *New Internationalist* (blog), October 20, 2014, <http://newint.org/blog/2014/10/20/plant-breeders-bill-ghana/>.

<sup>155</sup> “About us,” Finatrade Group, accessed May 13, 2016, <http://finatradegroup.com/about-us/#>.

and soya.”<sup>156</sup> Sourcing volumes in quantities this large is significant because agricultural production in these fields is highly consolidated. For example, as the world’s second largest cocoa producer—Ghana’s estimated 2014 cocoa bean output was 930,000 metric tons—a dozen local companies, Finatrade being one, accounted for 98 percent of bean purchases.<sup>157</sup>

The second company to detail is SABMiller. A top-twenty Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) company, this London-based firm is one of the largest brewers in the world employing around 69,000 individuals across more than eighty countries, and reporting revenue of around \$26 billion for 2015.<sup>158</sup> SABMiller was selected as a corporate sponsor in Ghana for two reasons. First, the company supports local farming in Africa with “estimates that its local sourcing programmes support 89,000 farming jobs in Africa (excluding South Africa).”<sup>159</sup> Second, SABMiller’s subsidiary Accra Brewery Ltd., located in Ghana, seeks to brew more cassava-based lagers and expand cassava growing and processing in the region.<sup>160</sup> Together, these two reasons signify SABMiller’s willingness to be a corporate sponsor, as the benefits from doing so would result in a more regulation-friendly environment in the cassava industry.

Before moving forward, it is worth noting that Finatrade and SABMiller are connected to ABInBev, the world’s largest brewer that reported revenue of around \$43 billion in 2015.<sup>161</sup> As mentioned above, ABInBev is one of Finatrade’s suppliers. The connection between SABMiller and ABInBev, however, is much deeper than just partners. In 2015, it was announced that the two brewers would merge into a new conglomerate valued at £71 billion controlling around 30 percent of the beer market.<sup>162</sup> This has major ramifications for SABMiller’s involvement in Ghana’s Cooperation Framework, especially in relation to the seed industry because of ABInBev’s collaboration with Syngenta—a Swiss biotech company. The beer giant is working

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<sup>156</sup> New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, “G8 Cooperation Framework to Support The ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’ in Ghana,” 2012, p. 8, accessed May 13, 2016, [https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/Ghana\\_web.pdf](https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/Ghana_web.pdf).

<sup>157</sup> Ecobank, “Middle Africa Briefing Note: Cocoa,” p. 1, accessed August 17, 2016, <http://www.ecobank.com/upload/20140723100236691535ay7ctp5kPP.pdf>.

<sup>158</sup> “Who We Are,” SABMiller, accessed May 13, 2016, <http://www.sabmiller.com/about-us/who-we-are>.

<sup>159</sup> New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana,” p. 12.

<sup>160</sup> New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana,” p. 12.

<sup>161</sup> Anheuser-Busch InBev, 2015 Annual Report, p. 49, accessed May 13, 2016, [http://annualreport.ab-inbev.com/docs/2015\\_Annual\\_Report/2015-Annual-Report-ENG.pdf](http://annualreport.ab-inbev.com/docs/2015_Annual_Report/2015-Annual-Report-ENG.pdf).

<sup>162</sup> Anheuser-Busch InBev, 2015 Annual Report, p. 48.

with the Syngenta “to secure the sourcing of high-quality malting barely, the key raw material for the beer industry.”<sup>163</sup> ABInBev’s suppliers account for about one-fifth of the world’s planted malting barley meaning the deal between ABInBev and SABMiller would increase this percentage and create a larger market for Syngenta’s genetically modified barley variations, which are already being used by 160 farmers on 14,000 hectares in Argentina.<sup>164</sup> In theory, this means SABMiller could use its G8 sponsorship to push for the creation of regulations that would allow for the introduction and market domination of Syngenta’s barley seeds in Ghana.

The final corporate partnership to be detailed is with the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF). The WCF styles itself as:

...an international membership organization that promotes sustainability in the cocoa sector by providing cocoa farmers with the support they need to grow more quality cocoa and strengthen their communities. Representing more than 80 percent of the global cocoa market, WCF’s programs benefit farmers in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Americas.<sup>165</sup>

As a large organization, the WCF has both members and partners. Its members include companies such as The Hershey Company, Kellogg’s, Mars Incorporated, Nestlé, Starbucks, and many others.<sup>166</sup> The WCF’s partners, which are seen as vital to optimizing knowledge and maximizing benefits, include a diverse number of entities including the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the European Union, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), The Germany Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the University of Wisconsin, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Walmart Foundation, and the World Bank.<sup>167</sup> Between

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<sup>163</sup> Syngenta, “Syngenta and Anheuser-Busch InBev enter malting barley collaboration,” June 17, 2014, accessed May 13, 2016, <http://www.syngenta.com/global/corporate/en/news-center/news-releases/Pages/140617.aspx>.

<sup>164</sup> Patrick Winters, “Syngenta Seeks to Replicate Seeds Pact with ABInBev,” *Bloomberg*, June 19, 2014, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-18/syngenta-seeks-to-replicate-seeds-pact-with-maker-of-budweiser>.

<sup>165</sup> “Our Approach,” World Cocoa Foundation, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.worldcocoafoundation.org/our-work/our-approach/>.

<sup>166</sup> “Members,” World Cocoa Foundation, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.worldcocoafoundation.org/about-wcf/members/>.

<sup>167</sup> “Partners,” World Cocoa Foundation, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.worldcocoafoundation.org/about-wcf/partners/>.

it and its partners, the WCF pledged \$3.8 million towards the G8NA with the goal of doubling the productivity of the 35,000 cocoa farmers in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, and Nigeria.<sup>168</sup>

It is no surprise that the WCF is partnered with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, a giant in the field of developmental aid. While the Gates Foundation may do impressive humanitarian work, such as leading the effort in micro-saving to help uplift people from the poverty trap,<sup>169</sup> this does not mean the Foundation does not have other than charitable motives. As the largest philanthropic organization in the world, the Gates Foundation has given money to several initiatives including, in 2006, \$150 million to the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA).<sup>170</sup> On the surface this donation may be viewed as helping combat food insecurity, but a deeper analysis of AGRA and why the money was given to the organization leads one to question Gate's motives. While it has been documented that India currently produces more food in the aggregate-sense because of initiatives like AGRA, the measures enacted also pushed farmers into debt,<sup>171</sup> which subsequently was followed by an increase in farmer suicide, further environmental degradation, and a reduced variety of crops in the Punjab region from 250 to just three monocultures of wheat, rice, and cotton.<sup>172</sup>

This type of agriculture reform, one that is focused on increasing monoculture outputs to provide food security, fits within the food security paradigm portrayed by the FAO. It also fits with Bill Gates' personal ideology, which he outlined in his 2009 annual letter: "New seeds and other inputs like fertilizer allow a farmer to increase her farm's output significantly, instead of just growing enough food to subsist. This innovation is just as important as developing and delivering vaccinations. The additional output means her children get better nutrition, which

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<sup>168</sup> New Alliance, "G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana," p. 14.

<sup>169</sup> Abhijit V. Banerjee and Ester Duflo, *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012), 190.

<sup>170</sup> David Hursh, "The Gates Foundation's Interventions into Education, Health, and Food Policies," in *The Gates Foundation and the Future of U.S. "Public" Schools*, ed. Philip E. Kovacs (New York: Routledge, 2011), 43.

<sup>171</sup> Farmers are pushed into accumulating debt because AGRA policies eliminate farm-saved seeds and replace them with corporate seeds with non-renewable traits, thus forcing farmers to repurchase seeds every season. Hursh, "The Gates Foundation's," p. 44.

<sup>172</sup> Hursh, "The Gates Foundation's," p. 43.

improves their health and ability to learn.”<sup>173</sup> While Gates’ optimism about technology and its ability to improve the livelihood of millions of Africans by ensuring they have enough food is based on historical precedents in other parts of the world, it also happens to align with Gate’s financial interests. For example, related to the G8NA in Ghana, the Gates Foundation is known to have donated \$23 million to the WCF in 2009<sup>174</sup> and another \$10 million in 2014.<sup>175</sup> While on the surface this may seem like a philanthropic, altruistic gift, like the \$150 million given to AGRA, there is also a financial motive in it for the Foundation.

Between these donations, in 2010, it was revealed the Gates Foundations’ investment portfolio contained 500,000 shares of Monsanto—an agrochemical and biotechnology behemoth—estimated to be worth around \$23 million, and that the Foundation was teaming up with agribusiness giant Cargill in a \$10 million soybean project in Mozambique.<sup>176</sup> So, if the WCF is successful in its goal of doubling the productivity of cocoa farmers in Ghana by increasing their access to productivity inputs such as new seed varieties and fertilizers, than Gates, and Monsanto and Cargill by association, will have created a whole new market dependent on their products. This, in turn, means more money for the agrochemical industry and its stakeholders. Bear in mind, “six multinationals—Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow, and BASF—control 75 percent of all private sector plant breeding research, 60 percent of the commercial seed market and 76 percent of global agrochemical sales.”<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Bill Gates, “Annual Letter 2009,” Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, January 2009, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/Resources-and-Media/Annual-Letters-List/Annual-Letter-2009>.

<sup>174</sup> “Foundation, Partners Pledge \$90 Million to Boost Incomes of Farmers in Africa,” Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation press release, February 19, 2009, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2009/02/Foundation-Partners-Pledge-90-Million-to-Boost-Incomes-of-Small-Farmers-in-Africa>.

<sup>175</sup> “How We Work Grant: World Cocoa Foundation,” Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database/Grants/2014/01/OPP1049181>.

<sup>176</sup> John Vidal, “Why is the Gates Foundation investing million in GM giant Monsanto?” *The Guardian*, September 29, 2010, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2010/sep/29/gates-foundation-gm-monsanto?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>177</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 39.

## 4.2 From Concept to Norm

Now that the actors involved in this case study have been described, the present section will analyze the relevant documents to show the process by which the concept of PPP has become a norm. It will trace its evolution from the normalization phase to that of fragmentation, and finally to assimilation. Following the case study is a chapter offering a look at an alternative to food security, and some concluding thoughts about the information presented here are given.

### 4.2.1 Normalization of PPPs: From the Top-down

The first step of a concept or idea becoming a norm is normalization, which occurs when an idea becomes ubiquitous because of increased use by international organizations. As discussed in the introduction of this paper, Goal 8 of the MDGs was the initial push by the world's largest international organization, the United Nations, to normalize PPPs, which was followed in 2015 by Goal 17 of the SDGs. In 2000, it became clear the UN would need private partners to finance and achieve the MDGs, so the Office of the Secretary-General encouraged UN member states to cooperate with businesses by releasing a document titled "Guidelines on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Community."

In this document, the Secretary-General immediately recognizes the importance of the business community in Point 3: "The relationship with the business community has become more important as the role of business in generating employment and wealth through trade, investment and finance has grown and as UN member states have increasingly stressed the importance of private investment in development."<sup>178</sup> In Point 4, the Secretary-General goes on to mention how UN activities such as "promoting peace and security, providing norms and standards in such diverse areas as trade laws, shipping, aviation, telecommunication, postal services and statistics; addressing issues of vulnerability, poverty, environmental degradation and social conflict," are seen as "helping provide a stable and favourable framework for business and development."<sup>179</sup>

These two points push an agenda centered on private investment in two ways. First, with the line "UN member states have increasingly stressed the importance of private investment in development," the document is putting forth a narrative that development programs can no longer be solely funded by states. In turn, this means that states need to do what they can to

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<sup>178</sup> Secretary-General of the United Nations, "Guidelines."

<sup>179</sup> Secretary-General of the United Nations, "Guidelines."

attract private capital to be invested in their development programs. Second, concerning the discourse from Point 4, if UN activities are seen as “helping provide a stable and favourable framework for business and development,” then the organization and its member states are essentially relegating themselves to being in the service of corporations, rather than the converse. While non-state actors such as large corporations may be helpful in achieving UN aims, the UN is ultimately responsible to its member states, and by association, the citizens of said states. Therefore, it should not be the organization’s concern to establish frameworks that favor MNCs and allow for some citizens’ livelihoods to be decided by private interests.

The Secretary-General’s guidelines address this concern, but only vaguely. Point 14 discusses general requirements that all UN cooperative arrangements should follow. The first subsection states: “The objective [of partnerships] needs to be articulated clearly and must advance UN goals as laid out in the Charter.”<sup>180</sup> Further general principles are laid out in subsequent subsections:

- b) Clear delineation of responsibilities and roles: The arrangement must be based on a clear understanding of respective roles and expectations, with accountability and a clear division of responsibilities.
- c) Maintain integrity and independence: Arrangements should not diminish the UN's integrity, independence and impartiality.<sup>181</sup>

There are inherent problems with these guidelines. The notion that “arrangement[s] must be based on a clear understanding of respective roles and expectations with...a clear division of responsibilities,” creates dependent partnerships characterized by specific terms and rigid roles, rather than active partnerships built on continuous negotiation and the ability to adapt from informational exchange.<sup>182</sup>

Furthermore, the idea that partnerships “should not diminish the UN’s integrity, independence and impartiality,” is nearly impossible. Due to the nature of partnerships, by entering into an arrangement the UN, or any member state, is effectively ceding over some of its autonomy to the other partner, and is endorsing whatever discourse and/or paradigm associated with the partnership. This is certainly the case in regards to partnerships formed to combat food insecurity that rely heavily on technological innovations controlled by corporations, which, in the view of small producers that favor the food sovereignty paradigm, eliminates the impartiality of

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<sup>180</sup> Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Guidelines.”

<sup>181</sup> Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Guidelines.”

<sup>182</sup> Lewis, “Building,” p. 260.

the state(s) and/or international organization(s) partaking in such agreements. Now that the normalization of PPPs has been discussed, specifically its use by international organizations, the case study shall turn its focus to the fragmentation of the concept by examining multiple interpretations of the concept offered by different international actors.

#### 4.2.2 Fragmentation of PPPs: A State Analysis

The second phase of movement from concept to norm involves fragmentation. As discussed earlier in the literature review, PPPs are arrangements billed as win-win affairs that minimize risk, lower transaction costs, and allow for the public and private sectors to share resources and expertise to tackle immense challenges. Formed in various contexts uniquely developed to specific sectors, “PPPs differ significantly from sector to sector and from project to project.”<sup>183</sup> This observation demonstrates how the concept of PPPs is still going through the fragmentation stage of knowledge development, wherein the notion has gained international prominence and is acclimatized in multiple areas of space and time. In order to show how this stage helps to further entrench the private sector as a global governance leader, this section of the case study shall review multiple, diverse cases of PPPs in wider context beyond food security. Examining how the PPP concept has been institutionalized in different states will demonstrate the fragmentation of the concept, which is needed to show the progression from an idea to an established norm. A country-by-country analysis demonstrates fragmentation best as individual states engage the PPP concept differently, while each state’s institutions provide the concept with legitimacy that eventually moves the concept into the assimilation phase of norm creation.

Starting on the country level, the first case to examine is the United States. Concerning infrastructure projects alone—those that deal with railroads, highways, bridges airports, etc.—the United States had 104 PPPs between 1989 and 2011.<sup>184</sup> The majority (56%) of these projects took place in one of five states: California, Colorado, Florida, Texas, and Virginia. In addition, it is worth noting 82 percent of transportation PPPs contracted within this timeframe are located in the United States’ top 100 metropolitan areas, meaning the demand for such services corresponds

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<sup>183</sup> Emilia Istrate and Robert Puentes, “Moving Forward on Public-Private Partnerships: U.S. and International Experience with PPP Units,” Brookings-Rockefeller: Project on State and Metropolitan Innovation, December 2011, accessed May 23, 2016, [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/12/08%20transportation%20istrate%20puentes/1208\\_transportation\\_istrate\\_puentes.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/12/08%20transportation%20istrate%20puentes/1208_transportation_istrate_puentes.pdf).

<sup>184</sup> Istrate and Puentes, “Moving Forward,” p. 3.

to higher demand for transportation services.<sup>185</sup> While data suggest PPPs and their adoption are growing in the U.S., other areas, such as Asia and Europe, have invested heavily in the concept. As the authors of one study note, with little federal direction and various standards between individual states, “there is a lack of institutional capacity and expertise in some cities and states to properly promote the benefits and costs of PPP deals.”<sup>186</sup> It should be pointed out the discourse used by the authors is a critique of the lack of capacity and calls for further implementation of PPPs to achieve certain “benefits,” which follows the ideology behind neo-liberalization and helps to establish the PPP concept as a norm.

It may also be useful to acknowledge that PPPs exist differently in various institutional structures. For example, governments may choose to house their PPP management units in a certain ministry or even formalize the unit as a public corporation, as is the case in the United Kingdom and Canada, respectively. In the United Kingdom, the unit that provides technical advice to and is in charge of domestic PPPs is known as Infrastructure UK (IUK), and is housed in Her Majesty’s Treasury.<sup>187</sup> Formed in 2010, IUK consolidated Partnership UK and the U.K. Treasury’s PPP Policy Team, and now, as of 1 January 2016, IUK has merged with the Major Projects Authority (MPA) to create the new Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA).<sup>188</sup> This means the IPA engages with numerous actors on policies ranging from housing and transportation to information technology and education, and seeks to provide technical expertise and state direction to private entities by helping companies structure competitive bids and design quality assurance systems.<sup>189</sup>

Similarly, the PPP unit in Ghana, the Public Investment Division (PID), is housed in the government’s Ministry of Finance. In recent years, Ghana’s government has recognized PPPs as a way to procure foreign investment to finance and expand public infrastructure, and received \$30 million USD from the World Bank to build up a comprehensive PPP program from 2012-

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<sup>185</sup> Istrate and Puentes, “Moving Forward,” p. 4.

<sup>186</sup> Istrate and Puentes, “Moving Forward,” p. 6.

<sup>187</sup> Istrate and Puentes, “Moving Forward,” p. 8.

<sup>188</sup> “About us,” Infrastructure and Projects Authority, accessed May 23, 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/infrastructure-and-projects-authority/about>.

<sup>189</sup> Istrate and Puentes, “Moving Forward,” p. 8.

2016.<sup>190</sup> To implement such policies, the government developed the National Policy on PPP, which, spearheaded by PID, looks to develop “the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for the PPP Programme.”<sup>191</sup> Since this case study examines Ghana’s Plant Breeders Bill, it is worth highlighting the language used by PID when it comes to regulatory legislation for private investors.

Phase One of the PPP Programme looks at facilitating private sector involvement in Ghana by improving capacities of such organizations through establishing regulatory frameworks through legislative and institutional means.<sup>192</sup> As PID states, legislation regarding PPPs should “provide sufficient protection to lenders, such as step in rights,<sup>193</sup> security over assets, foreign currency transfers, property rights, rights to award concessions, etc.”<sup>194</sup> Furthermore, PID lists two key objectives of the PPP Programme: “Ensure attainment of required and acceptable local and international social and environmental standards, [and] protect the interests of all stakeholders including end users, affected people, Government and the private sector.”<sup>195</sup> The first statement clearly seeks to provide MNCs with property rights and any other rights companies label as “sufficient protection” before investing in Ghana. The second statement, when it says a key objective is attaining “acceptable local and international social and environmental standards,” can also be a way to usher in regulatory frameworks suited to corporations. As discussed earlier in the literature review, many international standards, such as the International Food Standard, allow large companies to control market forces by constraining and coercing suppliers to meet such demands.<sup>196</sup> From the documentation provided by PID, it seems Ghana’s Ministry of Finance is looking to establish PPP-friendly frameworks by giving corporations what they want.

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<sup>190</sup> Public Investment Division, *Ghana Public Private Partnership (PPP) Programme: Partnering the Private Sector for Improved delivery of Public Infrastructure and Services* (Accra: Ministry of Finance, 2014), 3.

<sup>191</sup> Public Investment Division, *Ghana*, p. 3.

<sup>192</sup> Public Investment Division, *Ghana*, p. 6.

<sup>193</sup> Step in rights are contractual powers given to lenders in finance deals that gives the lender the ability to ‘step in’ and ensure key contractual obligations are fulfilled. João Gil Figueira, “Step-in right clauses in financing deals,” International Law Office, October 24, 2012, accessed August 17, 2016, <http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Corporate-FinanceMA/Portugal/Cameira-Law/Step-in-right-clauses-in-financing-deals#>.

<sup>194</sup> Public Investment Division, *Ghana*, p. 5.

<sup>195</sup> Public Investment Division, *Ghana*, p. 7.

<sup>196</sup> Fuchs and Kalfagianni, “Private Food Governance,” p. 230.

Returning back to the fragmentation of the PPP concept, that is, how states adapt and institutionalize PPPs to different contexts, some states, such as Canada, elect to form their PPP unit as a corporation. Compared to housing a PPP unit in a ministry as in the British case, setting one up as a public or crown corporation allows the unit greater political independence, more flexibility when it comes to the PPP market, and makes the unit accountable to the private sector through an independent Board of Directors run by private sector citizens.<sup>197</sup> In 2008, the Canadian government established PPP Canada, a crown corporation, to work with public authorities at every level—provincial, territorial, municipal, and national—and provide competitive funding for public infrastructure projects on a variety of topics including broadband connectivity, culture, energy, security, transportation, and tourism.<sup>198</sup> While PPP Canada cannot impose federal standards for PPP engagement, it does provide technical assistance and education about PPPs to both government agencies and private entities interested in entering such arrangements. Additionally, the crown corporation serves as the first reviewer for projects submitted to the New Building Canada Fund administered by Infrastructure Canada.<sup>199</sup>

Besides being institutionalized differently, PPPs vary across sectors. Partnerships arranged by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) illustrate this point. One reason for this is because the number of private partners working with UNESCO, since the introduction of the MDGs in 2000, “has increased to several hundred, ranging from multinational companies, to small and medium sized enterprises, philanthropic trusts and foundations, economic and business associations and individuals.”<sup>200</sup> To show sectorial fragmentation, brief examples from the different sectors UNESCO works in will be given.

The first example is in the field of education. In the Balkans, UNESCO works with Hewlett-Packard to help alleviate the brain drain experienced in the region by providing better grid computing technology for universities, assisting researchers access international information, and supplying financial assistance for scientific research done by young

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<sup>197</sup> Istrate and Puentes, “Moving Forward,” p. 9-10.

<sup>198</sup> Istrate and Puentes, “Moving Forward,” p. 10.

<sup>199</sup> “P3s and the New Building Canada Fund,” PPP Canada, accessed May 23, 2016, <http://www.p3canada.ca/screening-and-advisory-services/the-building-canada-fund/p3s-and-the-building-canada-fund/>.

<sup>200</sup> United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *UNESCO-Private Sector Partnerships: Making a Difference* (Paris: UNESCO, 2006), 2.

professionals.<sup>201</sup> The second example comes from the natural sciences, and works towards achieving the MDG focused on reducing the gender gap. Working alongside cosmetics giant L'Oréal, UNESCO has developed a tiered program that recognized the work of female scientist around the globe by awarding fellowships up to \$100,000 USD.<sup>202</sup> Finally, concerning culture and the environment, UNESCO's World Heritage Foundation is partnered with the Shell Foundation, an arm of oil company Royal Dutch Shell, to pair Shell Group and World Heritage site managers together to develop and implement better business practices.<sup>203</sup> Each of these partnerships works towards facilitating cooperation and stability in their respective sectors, while also promoting global integration through public and private means.

While discussing UNESCO's partnerships, the discourse concerning the private sector used by former UNESCO Assistant Director General for external Relations and Cooperation Ahmed Sayyad should be analyzed. Mr. Sayyad, when speaking on the difference such partnerships can make, wrote:

UNESCO and the private sector now work together by sharing resources and expertise to develop partnership programmes. These programmes promote advocacy, enhance policy dialogue, *build international rules and norms* [emphasis added], harness markets for development, and carry out projects that contribute directly to tackling global challenges, achieving wide reach and great impact...They also make good long-term business sense by positioning the private sector and, in particular, the business community as key drivers of sustainable development.<sup>204</sup>

Mr. Sayyad's comments speak to two major points of this thesis. First, as emphasized above, he acknowledges the ability of PPPs to reshape and "build international rules and norms." Not only does this recognize the fact that global governance norms are changing, but it also highlights that international organizations understand and help facilitate such structural remodeling. Secondly, Mr. Sayyad's comments about PPPs being "good long-term" investments for the business community fits within the neo-liberalization framework. Through these arrangements, private entities can enter into decades-long government contracts and create new markets in the Global South, thus generating stable long-term profit projections.

This section of the case study has shown how PPPs are institutionalized differently by

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<sup>201</sup> UNESCO, *UNESCO-Private Sector Partnerships*, p. 6.

<sup>202</sup> UNESCO, *UNESCO-Private Sector Partnerships*, p. 9.

<sup>203</sup> UNESCO, *UNESCO-Private Sector Partnerships*, p. 14.

<sup>204</sup> UNESCO, *UNESCO-Private Sector Partnerships*, p. 2.

various states, and utilized across an assortment of sectors. As the concept is fragmented across these diverse situations, it becomes further refined and familiar within the international community. This is vital for the creation of a PPP-norm since this process adds legitimacy to the idea, which is needed if international actors, especially non-state actors such as corporations, are going to subject themselves to the constraints and limitations of the PPP framework. Once several manifestations of the concept have spread, the final stage of knowledge development, known as assimilation, occurs.

#### 4.2.3 Assimilation of PPPs: The G8's New Alliance

Assimilation, the last step of knowledge development, is when a concept is further revised by incorporating additional insights and perspectives into the notion through a specific field or paradigm. This requires the organization(s) undertaking such a task to build networks of specialized individuals—such as scholars, experts, diplomats, private sector citizens, etc.—that comprehend the concept and are willing to work within its established framework. Here, the case study examines the assimilation of the PPP concept and its associated neoliberal principles through the specific paradigm of food security. It does this by examining the parameters of partnerships formed under the G8NA's Cooperation Frameworks in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Ghana, though the primary focus is on Ghana and how the G8 initiative acted as a catalyst for neoliberal aims such as securing favorable manufactures' rights through legislation like Ghana's Plant Breeders Bill. The Cooperation Frameworks in Ethiopia and Tanzania are reviewed and compared alongside Ghana's Cooperation Framework for assimilation purposes due to the fact that large companies such as Monsanto, SABMiller, and Syngenta are all directly or indirectly involved in each agreement.<sup>205</sup>

Ghana's Cooperation Framework opens with a commitment made by the Government of Ghana and G8 member nations. It states that the involved parties:

...commit to the 'New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition' and to working together to generate greater private investment in agricultural development, scale innovation, achieve sustainable food security outcomes, reduce poverty and end hunger...The G8 members intend to provide support within the agricultural sector...*with the overall goal of facilitating increases in private investment and scaling innovation* [emphasis added]. The G8 members intend to engage the relevant agencies of their member governments and also to bring to bear appropriate enabling actions to accelerate progress in the areas

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<sup>205</sup> Obenland, "Corporate Influence," p. 6-7.

of finance and markets, science and technology, and risk management.<sup>206</sup>

The commitments made here by both the Government of Ghana and G8 member states are concerned more with securing capital for agricultural investment than helping small producers increase supply. The above discourse, along with PID's PPP Programme, demonstrates that creating attractive investment environments takes precedence over building up small producers' capacity in two ways. First, when it lists the general commitments made by the involved parties, the first collaborative notion mentioned is "to generate greater private investment in agricultural development." This is listed before commitments to "achieve sustainable food security outcomes, [and] reduce poverty and end hunger," showing the G8NA's preference for creating a business-friendly environment before devoting time and resources to achieving sustainable food policies and frameworks that work towards reducing food insecurity.

Granted, one can argue, if they share Bill Gates' optimism about technology's ability to improve the livelihood of millions of Africans through innovations in seeds and fertilizer, generating and securing private investment in agricultural development is paramount to achieving food security. However, when the commitments section continues by doubling down on the importance of attracting private capital by saying, "G8 members intend to provide support within the agricultural sector...*with the overall goal of facilitating increases in private investment and scaling innovation* [emphasis added]," one is given reason to pause because so much focus is being put on private sector incorporation over domestic, food-related issues. Additionally, this language, word-for-word, is used in the opening commitments of Ethiopia's Cooperation Framework<sup>207</sup> and Tanzania's Cooperation Framework.<sup>208</sup>

Further attention is paid to investing in private agricultural development under the Key Policy Commitments section in all three Cooperation Frameworks. Ghana's agreement states:

The Government of Ghana intends to pursue the policy goals set out below in order to build domestic and international private sector confidence to increase agricultural investment significantly, with the overall goal of reducing poverty and ending hunger.

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<sup>206</sup> New Alliance, "G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana," p. 1.

<sup>207</sup> New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, "G8 Cooperation Framework to Support The 'New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition' in Ethiopia," 2012, p. 1, accessed May 13, 2016, [https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/Ethiopia\\_web.pdf](https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/Ethiopia_web.pdf).

<sup>208</sup> New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, "G8 Cooperation Framework to Support The 'New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition' in Tanzania," 2012, p. 1, accessed May 13, 2016, [https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/Tanzania\\_web.pdf](https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/Tanzania_web.pdf).

The Government of Ghana intends to improve incentives for private sector investment in agriculture, in particular, taking actions to facilitate inclusive access to and productive use of land; developing and *implementing domestic seed regulations that encourage increased private sector involvement in this area* [emphasis added]; and supporting transparent inclusive, evidence-based policy formulation.<sup>209</sup>

Ethiopia and Tanzania's Cooperation Frameworks have the exact same discourse stating their governments' intention to focus on "developing and implementing domestic seed policies that encourage increased private sector involvement in this area."<sup>210</sup> Alone, the attention to this issue across Cooperation Frameworks provides evidence that the PPP concept and its associated neoliberal principles are being assimilated and advanced through the G8NA. The specifics of each country's Key Policy Agreements, however, suggest an entrenchment of the private sector in global governance that follows the market-state paradigm where governments work to advance the interests of corporations.

In Ethiopia's Cooperation Framework, the first objective outlined in the Government of Ethiopia's Key Policy Commitments is to: "Increase private sector participation in seed development, multiplication, and distribution."<sup>211</sup> One of the objectives in Tanzania's Key Policy Commitments reads: "Develop and implement domestic and regional seed and other inputs policies that encourage greater private sector participation in the production, marketing and trade in seeds and other inputs."<sup>212</sup> And Ghana's Cooperation Framework contains one particular objective for the government to: "Establish policy that enables the private sector to develop, commercialize, and use improved inputs to increase smallholder productivity and incomes."<sup>213</sup> One should note how each of these objectives seeks to incentivize private sector involvement in the agriculture sector by emboldening private entities through the establishment of business-friendly regulations.

The G8NA, in an attempt to measure the success of partnership goals the above-mentioned objectives, recommends certain actions be fulfilled by specific dates. For example, in the Ethiopian Framework, one suggested action advocates for establishing regulatory changes

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<sup>209</sup> New Alliance, "G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana," p. 2.

<sup>210</sup> New Alliance, "G8 Cooperation Framework in Ethiopia," p. 2; New Alliance, "G8 Cooperation Framework in Tanzania," p. 2.

<sup>211</sup> New Alliance, "G8 Cooperation Framework in Ethiopia," p. 4.

<sup>212</sup> New Alliance, "G8 Cooperation Framework in Tanzania," p. 4.

<sup>213</sup> New Alliance, "G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana," p. 4.

such as allowing market forces to more freely determine the price and availability of seeds by June 2012.<sup>214</sup> Tanzania’s agreement lists several actions related to the seed industry including one calling for “taxes on seeds and seed packaging [be] reduced or lifted by July 2013.”<sup>215</sup>

Lastly, the policy actions recommended for Ghana call for sweeping reforms:

1. Regulations developed to implement the new seed law [by June 2013], specifically:
  - Seed registry system established.
  - Protocols for variety testing, release and registration, authorization to conduct field inspections, seed sampling, and seed testing developed.
  - Standards for seed classification and certification established.
2. New agricultural input policy for fertilizer and certified seed use developed [by December 2013] that includes:
  - Clearly defined role of government in fertilizer and seed marketing;
  - Clearly defined role of government’s CSIR and Grains & Legumes Board; and
  - Defined role of private sector in breeding.<sup>216</sup>

These actions, in accordance with the commitments previously outlined, aim to improve incentives for private companies, specifically large agriculture and biotech firms, to invest in each country’s agriculture sector. In Ghana, such actions are included in the yet to be passed 2013 Plant Breeders Bill, which, if ever implemented, would constitute the type of institutional reinvention that establishes private sector dominance of governance.

The Plant Breeders Bill, also commonly referred to as the ‘Monsanto Law’ by reporters, provides reason to question and explore the connections to private sector entities that have an economic interest in such market development. It provides such a basis because the language contained within the bill heavily favors private companies over agricultural producers and even the government itself. For example, Section 23 of the Bill reads: “A plant breeder right shall be independent of any measure taken by the Republic to regulate within Ghana the production, certification and marketing of material of a variety or the importation or exportation of the material.” In other words, the Bill is trying to preempt any future government regulations that may restrict the sale of agricultural products. The regulations could be for environmental or health reasons, but if this Bill is passed then the government would not have to authority to “regulate within Ghana the production, certification and marketing of material of a variety or the

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<sup>214</sup> New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Ethiopia,” p. 4.

<sup>215</sup> New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Tanzania,” p. 4.

<sup>216</sup> New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana,” p. 4.

importation or exportation of the material.”

In several other sections, the Bill also provides protections for breeders, defined in Section 61 as “(a) the person who bred, or discovered and developed a variety; (b) the employer of the person referred to in paragraph (a); or (c) the successor in title of the persons referred to in paragraphs (a) or (b).” One protection, found in Section 8.2.b, is an attempt to preempt state regulations on corporate breeders that have applied for and been denied rights on a variety in a foreign country. To illustrate, say the European Union or another African state bans a product, companies will be still be able to register for plant breeder rights in Ghana because Section 8.2.b prevents the Registrar from denying a breeder’s application on such grounds. Not only does this reduce the autonomy of the government, but also it dissuades officials from relying on scientific studies conducted by other states that may be imperative to understanding the varieties in question.

Furthermore, the Bill allows for companies registered as plant breeders to seek civil action against those that commit certain offenses. Outlined in Section 58, such offenses include:

A person who willfully (a) offers for sale, sells or markets the propagating material of a variety protected in Ghana; (b) markets propagating material of a variety protected in Ghana without the registered variety denomination; or (c) uses the registered variety denomination of a variety protected in Ghana for another variety of the same plant species or closely related species likely to cause confusion commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than two thousand penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than two years or to both.

The above offenses are in line with Section 20.1, which lists propagating acts that require authorization from breeders: “(a) production or reproduction; (b) conditioning for the purpose of propagation; (c) an offer for sale; (d) sale or marketing; (e) exportation; (f) importation; and (g) stocking for any of the purposes mentioned in paragraph (a) to (f).” In any case where a plant breeder feels their plant breeder rights have been infringed upon, they have the ability to pursue civil remedies in accordance to Section 57:

(1) Where a person is aggrieved by the infringement of a plant breeder right, that person may bring an action for (a) an order of injunction to prevent the commission or continuation of the commission of the act of infringement or to prohibit the continuation of the infringement; (b) the recovery of damages for the infringement; (c) the forfeiture, seizure or destruction of propagating or harvested material which has been produced contrary to this Act; (d) an order requiring the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority to detain goods imported or ready for export; and (e) any other remedy that the court considers fit.

These sections ensure that large companies, such as Monsanto or Syngenta, can adequately enforce their policies in Ghana regarding their patented products without getting tied up in legal fights such as *Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association, et al., v. Monsanto Company, et al.* in the United States.<sup>217</sup> It makes sense the Bill would provide such protections as it was designed under the recommendations found in Ghana's G8NA Cooperative Framework, which seek to attract capital to Ghana's agriculture sector. If companies are afforded such legal protection not only are their initial and future transaction costs lowered, but also long-term market projections increase; therefore, making investing in Ghana lucrative.

In addition to establishing enforcement mechanisms to safeguard plant breeders' rights, the Bill also establishes an appeal board that can be controlled by private sector experts. Before discussing the powers of this board, it is vital to note that the Bill also creates a register of plant breeder rights, outlined in Section 41, that requires the Registrar-General, a member of the Ministry of Justice, to perform bureaucratic functions such as application processing, document collection, and third party variety testing.<sup>218</sup> If a party feels the decision made by the Registrar is unfair or not correct, then the party may appeal the decision to the appeals board. According to Section 53, the aggrieved party has sixty days after the publication of the Registrar's decision to submit an appeal to the appeal board, and the board "may confirm, set aside or vary any decision of the Registrar." While this seems like a normal judicial hierarchy, the members of the appeal board provide reason to question the neutrality of the board.

The composition of the appeal board is laid out in Section 51. According to 51.2, "The Appeal Board consists of five members including one expert in legal and administrative matters and four experts qualified in agricultural science." Furthermore, as specified by 51.5, "The Appeal Board may co-opt a person to act as an adviser at its meetings but that person shall not vote on a matter for decision at the meeting." The Bill, by using the language "four experts

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<sup>217</sup> Charlie Delacruz, "Supreme Court Denies Appeal from Farmers Seeking 'Preemptive' Protection from Future Patent Infringement Claims," *National Grain and Feed Association*, January 24, 2014, accessed May 31, 2016, <https://www.ngfa.org/newsletter/supreme-court-denies-appeal-from-farmers-seeking-preemptive-protection-from-future-patent-infringement-claims/>. *OSGATA et al. v. Monsanto et al.* is a court case that sought protection for farmers against large companies claiming patent infringement if trace amounts of patented genes were found in farmers' products.

<sup>218</sup> See Sections 11-14 of Plant Breeders Bill.

qualified in agricultural science,” invites private sector “experts” to sit on the appeal board. The only approval a member needs is that of the Minister of Justice, who, under Section 51.3, is given the authority to appoint the members of the board, and more than likely would approve of private sector experts tied to large agricultural companies considering the Minister is part of a government that accepted the terms of the G8NA Cooperation Framework. The adviser, on the other hand, only needs to be approved by the board; meaning anyone the board wants in the position can be placed there.

In essence, if this Bill and appeal board are ever passed and established, respectively, then the agricultural experts on the board have the real power in approving entities that apply for plant breeder status. In other words, the Registrar’s decision is a rubber stamp that conforms to the views of the appeal board, which, as demonstrated above, could easily be filled by affiliates of organizations such as ABInBev, Cargill, Monsanto, SABMiller, Syngenta, or the World Cocoa Foundation. Granted, in Section 53.10, it is stated that Ghana’s Supreme Court supersedes the appeal board in all matters, but, if the Bill itself is not ruled unconstitutional, then the Court would rule on any case brought to it regarding plant breeder rights under the framework established by the Bill. In such a case, the Court would likely side with the decision of the appeal board considering, as shown above, the broad, sweeping authority given to the board on matters related to plant breeder rights. This means the passage of Ghana’s Plant Breeders Bill will institutionalize the power of “experts qualified in agricultural science,” allow for companies registered as plant breeders to seek civil action against those that commit certain offenses, and preempt any future government regulations that may restrict the sale of agricultural products.

The assimilation and refinement of the PPP concept and its associated neoliberal principles through the specific paradigm of food security is an ongoing process where the G8NA dealings in Ghana are only a small part of a larger phenomenon. As this case study has attempted to demonstrate, PPPs have become a global governance norm through a process of knowledge development that has involved various actors across sectors. The most prominent international organization, the United Nations, spearheaded the normalization of PPPs through the MDGs/SDGs and provided guidelines for member states and other organizations to follow when dealing with the business community. The PPP concept has undergone and is still going through the fragmentation process, in which states have institutionalized PPPs differently, such as formalizing the notion in a public corporation or as part of a ministry, and the concept has been

acclimated to various sectors including cosmetics, electronics, and fossil fuels.

When it comes to PPPs and food security, the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition provides an example where the PPP concept and its associated neoliberal principles are put to work in a specific sector. Cooperation Frameworks, arrangements made under the G8NA and agreed to by participating governments and private organizations, have the exact same discourse focused on attracting private capital across countries. One role for governments in these PPPs is “developing and implementing domestic seed policies that encourage increased private sector involvement in this area.”<sup>219</sup> In Ghana, this manifested as the 2013 Plant Breeders Bill. As demonstrated above, the Bill, if passed, would give private companies unprecedented power by allowing them to control the plant breeder application process, persecute those that violate the rights instilled by companies, and prevent the Ghanaian government from enacting future regulations. The Plant Breeders Bill is the epitome of neo-liberalization, and if passed would without a doubt entrench the private sector as a leader in global governance. Even without its passage, the PPP concept has developed as a norm continuing the erosion of the state and the empowering of private actors on the global front.

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<sup>219</sup> New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Ghana,” p. 2; New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Ethiopia,” p. 2; New Alliance, “G8 Cooperation Framework in Tanzania,” p. 2.

## CHAPTER 5

### AN ALTERNATIVE TO FOOD SECURITY AND CONCLUSION

When addressing world food concerns, the current food security paradigm, operating under the Corporate Food Regime, frequently neglects the fact that small-scale farms produce around 70 percent of food consumed globally.<sup>220</sup> One reason for disregarding this fact goes back to 1980s, when World Bank policies emphasized higher production and yields by offering credit and technical support for purchasing “industrial produced seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides.”<sup>221</sup> Programs such as these are less concerned about food sovereignty, and more concerned with food security and the idea that countries must modernize and develop towards certain Western standards characterized by monoculture, large-scale industrial farming, and biotechnology.<sup>222</sup> Such ideas are still perpetuated by the FAO, with one publication by the organization framing the transformation of the agricultural system in the following manner:

We lay out three different typologies for food systems that correspond roughly with the development process. The first is a traditional food system, characterized by a dominance of traditional, unorganized supply chains and limited market infrastructure. The second is a structured food system, still characterized by traditional actors but with more rules and regulations applied to marketplaces and more market infrastructure...The third type is an industrialized food system, as observed throughout the developed world, with strong perceptions of safety, a high degree of coordination, a large and consolidated processing sector and organized retailers.<sup>223</sup>

Such policies help concentrate capital in the bank accounts of corporations, which is evident by the consolidation of the international grain market where 75 percent is controlled by the five largest grain traders—Cargill, Bunge, Archer Daniels Midland, Gencore, and Dreyfus.<sup>224</sup>

The concept of agriculture, however, is about more than just producing commodities—it is multifaceted. In addition to growing food, agricultural practices can have a multi-functionality that seeks to preserve landscapes, protect traditional knowledge and livelihoods, and ensure food security.<sup>225</sup> Rather than promote private business solutions to produce higher quantities of food, global policy and international organizations should operationalize these multifaceted elements

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<sup>220</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 3.

<sup>221</sup> Bello, *The Food Wars*, p. 29.

<sup>222</sup> Bello, *The Food Wars*, p. 134.

<sup>223</sup> Cited in McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 34.

<sup>224</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 36.

<sup>225</sup> Rosset, *Food is Different*, p. 33.

and recognize food is not a normal commodity. Since food represents notions like people, cultures, and livelihoods, it is important to have a holistic alternative to the current food security paradigm. Movements like Via Campesina, translated as “the peasant way,” and MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, or Landless Workers’ Movement) have embraced such an alternative known as food sovereignty.<sup>226</sup> As one of the founders of the food sovereignty movement and one of its biggest proponents, Via Campesina formally defined the concept at a convention in Mali:

Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local producers. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal - fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just income to all peoples and the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations.<sup>227</sup>

In other words, people have a right to healthy, culturally appropriate food produced in sustainable ways from local production systems free of corporate interests.

Under the current food regime, farmers are limited to a role of harvesting raw materials, and surplus accumulated capital is used to finance corporate interests. The food sovereignty paradigm reimagines farmers’ roles by involving them in material processing, marketing and selling, and policymaking, while surplus accumulated capital would be used to strengthen local farming capacities and improve livelihoods.<sup>228</sup> Other benefits brought about by food sovereignty include bringing consumers and farmers closer together, protecting farmers from dumping, increasing the availability of fresh, healthy food for consumers, locking out unwanted genetically

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<sup>226</sup> Bello, *The Food Wars*, p. 13.

<sup>227</sup> “Declaration of Nyéléni,” Via Campesina, February 27, 2007, accessed June 2, 2016, <http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/food-sovereignty-and-trade-mainmenu-38/262-declaration-of-nyi>.

<sup>228</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 136.

engineered crops, and returning power to local growers over transnational corporations.<sup>229</sup> One of the biggest obstacles in achieving food sovereignty, however, is that issues such as dumping are controlled by corporate monopolies/oligopolies, which are subsidized by governments. As such, the topic of dismantling such power structures has not been on the negotiating table, but, as farmer organizations have made clear, addressing such concerns is vital to overhauling the global food paradigm.<sup>230</sup>

The concerns of ordinary farmers and organizations like Via Campesina received international recognition in 2008. In conjunction with the economic recession hitting the world at that time, food prices soared creating a food epidemic.<sup>231</sup> This prompted the United Nations to investigate the issue, resulting in the 2008 UN Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food. The report concludes with the following:

The current situation creates opportunities. But opportunities should not be mistaken for solutions. While more must be invested in agriculture and rural infrastructure in order to make up for years of neglect, how the investments are targeted, which forms they take, and what their effects are, must be carefully monitored. If a new global partnership for agriculture and food is to emerge from the current crisis, it is crucial to ensure that this partnership does not simply seek to boost supply by promoting technology-driven recipes, but also empowers those who are hungry and malnourished and whose livelihoods may be threatened by precisely this renewed interest in encouraging agricultural production. A human rights framework would contribute to keeping the search for solutions on this track, because it would ensure that the most vulnerable will be given priority, and because it would improve accountability and participation in decision-making. It is therefore regrettable that such a framework has been almost entirely absent from current discussions.<sup>232</sup>

In further suggestions made by Special Rapporteur Olivier De Schutter, he reminds readers of the complications brought about by corporate seed regimes, recommends ensuring the right to adequate food over simply boosting the supply of food, and speaks to the danger of indicators and benchmarks like those found in the G8 Cooperation Frameworks.<sup>233</sup> The foresight of the Special Rapporteur is in line with the food sovereignty paradigm, but as the case study here

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<sup>229</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 51.

<sup>230</sup> Rosset, *Food is Different*, p. 31.

<sup>231</sup> Bello, *The Food Wars*, p. 5.

<sup>232</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, *Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development*, A/HRC/9/23, September 8, 2008, p. 25.

<sup>233</sup> A/HRC/9/23, p. 23-24.

shows, the partnership that formed to combat food insecurity, the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, followed exactly what the Special Rapporteur advised against—further showcasing how the private sector is entrenched in global governance and shapes policies according to its interests.

As the corporate takeover of state institutions under neoliberal reregulation demonstrates, corporations will use any means necessary to further their bottom line, and if successful will completely make government an extension of private interests. Despite their massive amount of wealth and power, corporations are far outnumbered by ordinary people—meaning action by civil society is vital.<sup>234</sup> Civil society consists of actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, religious and charitable organizations, and professional associations.<sup>235</sup> Some civil society actors advocate for governments to exercise the precautionary principle when it comes to genetically engineered organisms, which is to say that there should be reluctance to use such products without knowing the ultimate effects of their use.<sup>236</sup> Via Campesina is an example of such a civil society actor. It has grown to include over 150 organizations residing from fifty-six countries within its network, and has key features that should set the example for other civil society actors.<sup>237</sup>

First, Via Campesina's leaders are farmer-activists meaning the leadership comes from the base and understands the struggles of members from first hand experience. This is different than what is found in other organizations where intellectual outsiders can be directing efforts. Second, the vision of the organization is not region specific allowing for a wide coalition of actors from the Global North and South to come together. In other words, Via Campesina can build large networks that consist of small farmers, indigenous peoples, pastoralists, environmentalists, consumers, environmentalists, human rights advocates, and religious groups.<sup>238</sup> Lastly, the organization has been able to successfully put gender at the forefront of its policy demands. This is important because women make up the majority of Africa's small farmers—which produce 80 percent of the continent's agriculture—and comprise 43 percent of

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<sup>234</sup> Cronin, *Corporate Europe*, p. 156.

<sup>235</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 154.

<sup>236</sup> Rosset, *Food is Different*, p. 76.

<sup>237</sup> Bello, *The Food Wars*, p. 131-133.

<sup>238</sup> Rosset, *Food is Different*, p. 78.

the global agricultural work force.<sup>239</sup> These features help ordinary people campaign against MNCs on a transnational front, while others that are not farmers can utilize their buying power to oppose policies they dislike by supporting small producers that operate under similar policies practiced by Via Campesina and its associates.

Civil society should also act as a watchdog to monitor and be critical of governments and firms. While civil society actors, like NGOs, may receive assistance from governments, these groups need be cautious about accepting funds. In some cases, such as Norwegian NGOs partnering with the Norwegian government to bring about an international treaty to ban landmines, civil society actors may be able to carve out political space and obtain a higher level of agency.<sup>240</sup> It is possible, however, for NGOs to receive funding from states and to be co-opted by governments to follow government agendas rather than their own aims to continue receiving money.<sup>241</sup> Therefore, it is essential for civil society actors to maintain their autonomy in order to remain effective. Otherwise, they may simply become an extension of the state, which under the market-state paradigm is an extension of large corporations.

Ultimately, increasing local people's political clout will achieve food sovereignty. This is done through capacity building, establishing transnational networks with various societies, and empowering bottom-up citizen movements.<sup>242</sup> Doing this, however, requires going against the norms now solidifying in global governance. By examining the creation of norms and certain identities and interests, this study has shown how other motives besides food security, such as the spread of neoliberal policies and corporate interests, inform and shape PPPs and global agricultural development. Whether or not such secondary intentions are the primary drivers of such partnerships, those advocating for the food sovereignty paradigm will certainly have to go against the food security model favored by powerful international organizations, the G8, and corporations.

While PPPs may be effective in promoting food security, they are simultaneously creating global neoliberal norms that consolidate power for few entities by introducing new

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<sup>239</sup> Saquina Mucavele, "The Role of Rural Women in Agriculture," World Farmers' Organization, accessed June 6, 2016, <http://www.wfo-oma.com/women-in-agriculture/articles/the-role-of-rural-women-in-agriculture.html>.

<sup>240</sup> Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann, "Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 no. 3 (2006): 664-668.

<sup>241</sup> Crouch, *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, p. 160.

<sup>242</sup> McKeon, *Food Security Governance*, p. 9.

regulations via a process of neo-liberalization. The importance of these partnerships rests upon the fact that their existence and continued use by policymakers is affecting global norms. Further studies into PPPs are vital to ensure world politics continue to operate in a manner that serves people's interests over corporate ones. This study has presented an initial exploration of PPPs to gain a better understanding of such relationships, and can serve as a launch pad for future qualitative or quantitative studies that further explain PPP practices within specific sectors in extensive detail.

By examining how norms are created through a cognitive process of knowledge development that analyzes the normalization, fragmentation, and assimilation of concepts, this study has contributed to the literature and understanding of PPPs by exploring how such relationships have reshaped global governance by entrenching the private sector at the forefront of the policymaking process—specifically in relation to food security. The private partners behind the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition have embedded their interests in the discourses that form the G8NA Cooperation Frameworks, which have been signed and implemented by several African countries. In Ghana, such discourse favoring biotech and agricultural companies materialized as the 2013 Plant Breeders Bill. Though the Parliament of Ghana has yet to pass the Bill, the language contained in it would allow for private companies such as AbInBev, Cargill, Monsanto, SABMiller, Syngenta, and any other interested firms to create and control markets in the last frontier of agricultural development. Such discourse serves only the interests of private enterprises and their shareholders, not small producers trying to make a living. If people across the world wish to see enhanced autonomy for themselves and governments accountable to their citizens instead of transnational corporate entities, then they should reconsider the power given to the private part of public-private partnerships.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFSA – Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa  
AGRA – Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa  
BMZ – Germany Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development  
BRC – British Retail Consortium  
CAADP - Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program  
CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility  
DANIDA – Danish International Development Agency  
EAA – Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance  
EFSA – European Food Safety Authority  
EPA – Economic Partnership Agreements  
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization  
FTSE – Financial Times Stock Exchange  
G8NA – G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition  
GAIN - Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition  
GIZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit  
GMO – Genetically Modified Organism  
IFS – International Food Standard  
ILSI – International Life Science Institute  
IMF – International Monetary Fund  
IPA – Infrastructure and Projects Authority  
IUK – Infrastructure UK  
MDG – Millennium Development Goals  
MEP – Member of European Parliament  
MNC – Multinational Corporation  
MPA – Major Projects Authority  
MST – Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra  
NDC – New Democratic Congress  
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization  
NPM – New Public Management  
NPP – New Patriotic Party  
NTB – Non-Tariff Barriers  
PID – Public Investment Division  
PPP – Public-Private Partnership  
SAP – Structural Adjustment Program  
SDG – Sustainable Development Goals  
SUN – Scaling-Up Nutrition  
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly  
USAID – U.S. Agency for International Development  
WCF – World Cocoa Foundation  
WFS – World Food Summit

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