

THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF NORTHERN SASKATCHEWAN, 1972-1977

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in the
Department of Economics and Political Science
University of Saskatchewan

by

Robert S. Hauck

La Ronge, Saskatchewan

c. 1981 Robert S. Hauck

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep appreciation to Dr. Jeffrey S. Steeves for his patient guidance and advice over the past three years. The thoughtful comments of Dr. Richard Nordahl and Dr. Hans Michelmann on matters of substance and style have proven very valuable, and are also greatly appreciated.

These acknowledgements would not be complete without mentioning the dedicated civil servants who generously gave their assistance in researching the diverse aspects of northern policy making. Many northern residents must also be thanked for allowing another white, southern academic pester them with questions.

Finally, my deepest thanks to Debby Senger, who has provided unfailing support, wise advice and, most of all, motivation when it has been most needed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
 Chapter	
I. THE EVOLUTION OF A STRATEGY FOR NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT	13
1. A Historical View of Northern Development	13
2. The Emergence and Adoption of the Single Agency Concept	16
3. Goals for and Comprehensive Constraints on the Single Agency's Policy Process	21
A. Innovative Policy Making and the Role of Planning	22
B. Policy Co-ordination and Organizational Evolution of the Department	28
C. Public Participation in Northern Develop- ment: The Northern Municipal Council and the Department's Relationship with Northern Native Groups	34
4. Conclusion	46
II. COMPETING POLICY APPROACHES IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT . .	55
1. Introduction	55
2. The Development of Resource Management Fisheries Policies: An Incremental Policy Approach	56

TABLE OF CONTENTS continued

Page

3.	The Fisheries Development Program: An Innovative Policy System	61
4.	The Implications of Competing Management Approaches	64
5.	Public Participation in Policy Formulation . . .	71
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY:		
	COMMUNITY COLLEGES IN THE NORTH	87
1.	Introduction	87
2.	Community Colleges and Northern Priorities . . .	88
3.	The Initial Northern College and Organizational Duplication	93
4.	The Full Scale Establishment of Northern Community Colleges	101
5.	Interest Group Involvement in Policy Decision Making	108
6.	Conclusion	111
IV. POLICY FORMULATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND		
	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND	121
1.	Introduction	121
2.	Economic Development Strategy and Local Participation	122

TABLE OF CONTENTS continued	Page
3. Administering the Loan Fund: Problems in Economic Development Branch and Their Implications	130
4. The Role of the Northern Municipal Council in Policy Formulation and Administration . . .	139
5. Conclusion	146
V. POLICY CO-ORDINATION	158
1. Introduction	158
2. Program Linkages Between Human, Economic and Resource Development	
A. The Evolution of the Training Oppor- tunity Program	160
B. Alternate Economic and Human Develop- ment Mechanisms	169
C. Commercial Fishermen's Loans	174
3. Conclusion	179
CONCLUSION	190
BIBLIOGRAPHY	200
APPENDIX A: ORGANIZATION CHARTS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN SASKATCHEWAN 1972-73 to 1976-77 . . .	219
APPENDIX B: MAP OF THE NORTHERN ADMINISTRATION DISTRICT, INCLUDING ELECTORAL DIVISIONS FOR THE NORTHERN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL	226
APPENDIX C: NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS	228

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between hinterland and metropolis has become a predominant focus for analysis in contemporary Canadian studies. Canada's "dilemma" has been analyzed in terms of its hinterland status vis-a-vis the American metropolis, and the hinterland-metropolis formula has become a standard explanation for social and economic disparities between Canadian regions.¹ Even within provinces the hinterland-metropolis thesis can be applied,² and the recent focus on northern Canada has given scholars and researchers ample opportunity to witness the dynamics between hinterland and metropolis on a smaller, though not less intense scale.

In Saskatchewan, the establishment of a northern hinterland began with the expansion of the fur trade to the North-West in the second half of the eighteenth century. After the Hudson's Bay Company consolidated its control of the North-West in 1821, the culture and economy of Cree and Chipewyan Indians began being undermined and progressively underdeveloped. The Company organized its relations with Indians to promote social stability so that profits from the fur trade could be ensured.³ Though the Company formally ceded control of the area to Canada in 1869, it continued to share a dominant role with the churches in northern settlements while the North became relatively insignificant to national development.⁴ By the late nineteenth century, the essential features of northern underdevelopment⁵ were clearly established. Traditional economic activities no longer were capable of generating self-sufficiency

and native people became subservient to the white power structure in northern settlements.

Underdevelopment continued in the twentieth century through resource extraction industries such as mining and forestry; northern resources were depleted without producing substantial benefits for native residents.⁶ Only since the Second World War have northern native communities begun to benefit from the statutory services such as health, education and welfare ordinarily available to all provincial residents. However, these services have been of inferior quality. The result has been appalling in statistical terms, let alone in human terms. In 1971, major diseases such as tuberculosis and typhoid plagued the northern populace at rates from two to thirty-five times greater than provincial norms. More than sixty percent of northern children dropped out of school before grade five. Of eleven thousand persons of labour force age, fewer than half were employed and less than one-quarter of those employed earned over two thousand dollars annually.⁷

Clearly, the problem for government has been to determine and implement ways of reversing previous patterns of underdevelopment in northern Saskatchewan. As in most Third World countries, it was apparent that underdevelopment could not be altered or reversed through a few isolated changes in policy. An integrated long-term framework for development was required so that the provision of services, both physical and social, could be co-ordinated with economic, human and resource development.

It was equally apparent to government that a single administrative instrument was required to implement a long-term, integrated development strategy. Many problems of previous northern policy stemmed from the failure to co-ordinate the northern activities of various agencies. Therefore a single agency was established in 1972 to develop and implement northern policy that would directly benefit northern residents, with their active involvement in the process of policy making.

The policy initiative of establishing a single agency reflected a clear appreciation of the link between substantive policy and the policy-making process. Without a fundamentally different process for formulating and implementing northern policy, the substantive objectives established by government for northern policy could not be realized. Hence, this thesis will be concerned with the policy-making process per se, rather than substantive policy. Substantive policy, however, must be described and analyzed to explain northern policy-making processes.

Theorists in political science and public administration have not always agreed about how the policy process can be defined, though for the purposes of this thesis, there is sufficient agreement to derive a workable definition. Two components are involved--policy and process. Policy is generally defined as a statement of government objectives which are manifested in programs and activities intended to achieve those objectives. However, programs and activities may not clearly and logically relate to policy objectives or policy objectives may be so vague as to be meaningless. In these cases, general policy

objectives must be inferred from programs and activities. Thus policy must be considered both as it is formulated, and as it is implemented and affects the public. Process, on the other hand, implies procedure or the production of some definable good or entity through a repeated pattern. Thus, the definition of policy process which will be adopted for this study is: the pattern or patterns by which policy is formulated, decided upon and implemented.⁸

The single agency's failure to develop or implement an innovative strategy for northern development can be largely attributed to difficulties in the Department's policy-making process. Exposition of the relationship between weaknesses in the Department's policy process and failure to achieve innovative northern development is the central task undertaken by this thesis. Three particular weaknesses in the Department's policy-making processes can be singled out.

Contrary to original intentions, departmental policy making has been incremental in nature rather than innovative.⁹ Policy co-ordination and integration, essential features of a single agency, have been lacking in several of the programs most essential for northern residents to reverse previous patterns of underdevelopment. As well, the department has been unable to involve northern residents in formulating or implementing policy in any effective fashion, thus losing the support and mobilization of northern residents necessary for any development program to succeed.

By creating a single agency, government clearly demonstrated that innovative policy and policy-making approaches were intended to emerge.

New approaches taking unique northern considerations into account were required for both the provision of basic services and facilities long available in the south, and for establishing economic, human and resource development programs appropriate for the north. However, an incremental policy-making approach has prevailed over innovative policy making for various reasons.

The capacity of the fledging agency to plan and implement innovative policy was severely compromised by the magnitude of administrative effort required to establish the agency and establish programs without much delay. As a result of the perceived need to quickly deliver programs never before present in the north, personnel from the south with administrative backgrounds were immediately recruited to the Department. In many cases, these personnel have actively resisted attempts to implement innovative policy.

The original nucleus of innovative policy development in the single agency was its Policy and Planning Branch. Within two years of establishing the single agency, branch employees became so frustrated with the Department's direction that they published a document calling for the resignation of several senior managers as well as the Minister, Deputy Minister and Assistant Deputy Minister. As a result, the Branch was disbanded. Since then there has never been a planning branch or process sufficiently strong to develop innovative policy. Hence, the Department's policy-making process has been incremental.

A second central weakness in northern policy making has resulted from a failure to integrate policy and program objectives, and the

difficulties encountered in co-ordinating day-to-day activities between or even within branches. Two basic reasons for establishing a single agency were to provide a focus for channelling resources toward northern development and to co-ordinate and integrate northern policy making. By immediately implementing programs, it became necessary to establish many different administrative units. These units have tended to become compartmentalized; that is, they have developed separate identities and strived toward bureaucratic goals of self-preservation and status enhancement.¹⁰ Co-ordinating their day-to-day activities has proved difficult, particularly because the single agency's structure has not taken the need for such co-ordination into account in an effective fashion. Integrating the objectives of programs to ensure consistency with overall policy and to avoid overlapping and duplicated effort has been difficult for a variety of reasons. Responsibility for closely related programs has been diffused to various branches. Because the branches are compartmentalized, related programs have operated in isolation from each other resulting in much duplication of effort. A further consequence of such inefficiency is that valuable dollars and personnel are tied to existing programs and cannot be made available to support new or innovative program efforts.

A third essential component of the single agency's development strategy was to involve northern residents in determining how development would occur. While the Department has continuously professed to be striving toward development for the benefit of northern residents, there is little evidence that northern residents have had a significant voice

in formulating and implementing policies and programs. Because so much effort has been devoted to establishing a higher level of services quickly, only rarely has the necessary lead time been allotted to involve northern residents effectively in policy development or implementation.

There are no adequate comparisons to the Department of Northern Saskatchewan; as a single agency, it is and has been unique, though somewhat similar agencies exist elsewhere. The Department's policy process has been examined in light of government policy statements and on the basis of a detailed case analysis of policy making in three branches which were administratively grouped together because of the close relationship between them. Department of Northern Saskatchewan officials in these three branches, among others, generously donated their documents and time for interviews.

Interviews were conducted with a wide variety of Department officials ranging from the Minister, Deputy Minister and Assistant Deputy Minister of Economic and Resource Development, down to civil servants involved in the day-to-day administration of policy. Field staff in three branches, as well as northern residents in remote communities, were interviewed to obtain as accurate a cross-section of opinion as possible regarding northern development and the Department's activities.

The granting of access to government documents was essential to the research. Though the extent of access was dependent upon the predispositions of particular officials, most were very helpful. Thus a large mass of documents pertaining to each policy area has been

analyzed, giving insight to the perceptions of a wide range of officials regarding department policies and policy making. It must be emphasized that these documents are confidential, and access to them was granted with the understanding that they not be widely circulated. The combination of detailed documentary analyses and personal interviews with participants directly involved in the policy-making process has made it possible to determine the critical factors shaping policy in Northern Saskatchewan.

These features of the study make it clearly relevant to the study of policy making in Canada, which has been described by Simeon as "shrouded in ignorance if not mystery."¹¹ Moreover, northern development as a policy area for government is of increasing concern in Canada. Academic interest in both northern development and policy research generally has also been high, reflecting a realization that research and analysis must keep pace with the dynamics of policy making. This study itself is a unique contribution to the literature, since there have been no major studies of policy making in Saskatchewan's north and no similar studies of policy making with respect to other areas of Canada's north. Thus the thesis substantially contributes to the study of Canadian policy making by revealing central forces which determine policy making in a unique government agency.

The organization of the thesis is straightforward. It is designed to help the reader develop a broad understanding of the context within which the Department has evolved, before delving into detailed analysis of particular policy areas. Chapter I places the Department's

creation in a historical perspective and illustrates how goals relative to policy and policy making were established. Salient historical events which have encouraged incremental policy making, complicated policy coordination, and frustrated northern involvement in policy making are outlined to provide a general understanding of the single agency.

Subsequent chapters analyze particular cases of policy making in detail. Chapter II examines fishery resource management policy, demonstrating that program diffusion led to the evolution of competing management strategies within one branch. As a result, incremental policy and policy making have prevailed over a rational comprehensive policy approach. Chapter III analyzes how northern community colleges were implemented and demonstrates that program diffusion through a variety of organizations has hampered college development and made it difficult to utilize community colleges for an adequate range of northern human development programs. Ministerial discretion has frustrated northern involvement in supervising the operation of northern colleges. This chapter also explores interest group involvement in policy decision making. Chapter IV considers policy making surrounding the Department's primary vehicle for promoting economic development, the economic development loan fund. It is established that economic development efforts have proceeded without meaningful local or northern involvement. As well, the branch responsible for economic development has been unable to avoid an incremental approach to development because of severe administrative difficulties with the loan fund. In Chapter V, a broader consideration is given to the difficulties encountered in

co-ordinating activities among the three branches studied. These branches have become compartmentalized; closely-related policy responsibilities have been diffused among them. As a result, programming gaps in critical developmental areas have emerged, and resources have not been effectively directed toward achieving northern policy goals. The Conclusion integrates and addresses the central argument of the thesis: the innovative northern development strategy perceived as the central rationale for the creation of this unique agency has not materialized because of fundamental weaknesses in the single agency's policy-making processes.

Notes to Introduction

¹Harold A. Innis and Donald Creighton are generally considered the fathers of the metropolis-hinterland thesis within the Canadian context. Innis's The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964) is particularly relevant to this study in historical terms. Many Canadian writers have taken up the hinterland-metropolis theme. Articles surveying the development of this theme include: J.M.S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History," Canadian Historical Review, Volume XXXVI (1954), pp. 1-21; Arthur K. Davis, "Canadian Society and History as Hinterland Versus Metropolis" in R.J. Ossenbegg (ed.), Canadian Society: Pluralism, Change and Conflict (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1971), pp. 6-32; J.W. Warnock, "Metropolis-Hinterland, The Lost Theme in Canadian Letters," Canadian Dimensions, Volume 10, November 2 (June, 1974), pp. 42-46. As well, reference should be made to the volume of articles edited by W.T. Easterbrook and Mel Watkins, Approaches to Canadian History (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1978), particularly Parts One and Four, pp. 1-98, 183-258.

²Two case studies of the hinterland-metropolis analysis on an intra-provincial level are Peter Douglas Elias, Metropolis and Hinterland in Northern Manitoba (Winnipeg: The Manitoba Museum of Man and Nature, 1975); and G.R. Weller, "Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario," in the Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume X, Number 4 (December, 1977), pp. 727-774. See also the A.K. Davis article referred to in the preceding note for occasional references to northern Saskatchewan as a hinterland.

³See, for example, Gustavus Myers, A History of Canadian Wealth (Toronto: James Lewis Samuel Limited, 1972), particularly chapters III, IV, VIII, IX.

⁴The process of underdevelopment became even more pronounced after the Hudson's Bay Company ceded control of Rupert's Land, Manitoba and the Northwest Territory to the Dominion of Canada in 1869. See Aski Puko (The Land Alone), a report on the expected effects of the proposed hydro-electric installation at Wintego Rapids upon the Cree of the Peter Ballantyne and Lac la Ronge Bands, prepared by the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians and members of the Peter Ballantyne and Lac la Ronge Bands (September, 1976), Chapter II, pp. 17-50 and Chapter IV, pp. 84-137. See H.A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada, *op. cit.*, chapters 5, 7, 10 and 11 for a detailed analysis of Hudson's Bay Company economic activities in the interior. In Chapter 11, Innis demonstrates how the fur trade declined in the interior even before the company lost its monopoly.

⁵For a good outline of underdevelopment theory, see Colin Leys, "Underdevelopment and Neo-colonialism," Chapter One, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism 1964-71 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 1-27. See also, John Loxley, "The Process of Underdevelopment in Manitoba." Paper prepared by John Loxley, Secretary to the Rural Economic Development Sub-committee of Cabinet (September, 1976).

⁶See Chapters Four and Five, Aski Puko, op. cit.

⁷G.R. Bowerman, "Principles for Northern Development." Paper presented to Cabinet (September 30, 1971), pp. 1-2. Please refer to Appendix C for a more thorough statement of socio-economic conditions in northern Saskatchewan.

⁸This definition is a synthesis derived from the rather substantial literature on policy making. For references specific to incremental and innovative approaches to making policy, see the relevant sections in Chapter I. General references to the policy-making process are R.A. Bauer and K.J. Gergen, The Study of Policy Formulation; Randall B. Ripley (ed.), Public Policies and Their Politics (New York: W.W. Norton Company, Inc., 1966); Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968); and Theodore Lowi, "Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote for Technocracy," Public Administration Review (May/June, 1970).

For some consideration of the policy process in Canadian politics, see Richard Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science and G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin (eds.), The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971), especially the Introduction and Chapter One.

⁹Definitions for the terms "incremental" and "innovative" may be found in Chapter I.

¹⁰"Compartmentalization" is more fully discussed in Chapter V. For a discussion of "bureau territoriality," which focuses on the same problem as compartmentalization, see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1967), Chapter XVII, pp. 211-222.

¹¹Richard Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science, op. cit.

Chapter I

THE EVOLUTION OF A STRATEGY FOR NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

The administrative history of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan is a fascinating subject in its own right. As well, a brief sketch of some fundamental aspects of the agency's creation and evolution is essential. Problems and difficulties encountered very early in the Department's history led to fundamental weaknesses in its policy-making process which have resulted since in failure to implement an innovative northern development strategy. The task in this chapter is twofold: first, to set the historical background leading to the Department's creation, and second, to illustrate how general problems which formed early in the agency's history have complicated the development and implementation of innovative northern development strategy.

1. A Historical View of Northern Development¹

Saskatchewan's north has been a focus for government activity only since the rise to power of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 1944. One of the primary emphases of the new government was to develop theretofore largely untapped natural resources, many of them in the north, to provide a more diversified economic base for the province.

The main vehicle for government attention in the north was the Department of Natural Resources, which in the late 1940s and early 1950s

expanded its northern activities. However, through the ensuing decade and a half, it became apparent that northern development could not be achieved simply by regulating and administering resource extraction. First of all, it was necessary to provide such prerequisites for development as an elementary transportation and communications network. Further, it readily became obvious that the province's activities were rapidly changing political, social, cultural and economic realities for the vast majority of northern residents.

The traditional lifestyle of northern native people had already been undermined by over a century and a half of contact with white society through the churches and the Hudson's Bay Company. Government activities in the early 1950s were decisive in making the traditional lifestyle virtually obsolete. Government policies were designed to provide northern residents with services southern civilization had long since taken for granted. These policies tied native people to settlements from which they could not efficiently pursue traditional activities of hunting, fishing and trapping, and in which no alternate economic base existed.² To illustrate how profound this impact was, the consequences flowing from the provision of health services need only be considered. The mortality rate in general and the infant mortality rate in particular dropped so sharply that the native population began to increase dramatically. Some estimates from isolated areas place the natural rate of increase as high as 60 per 1,000 and at a minimum, the rate remained 35 per 1,000 for more than two decades.³ The increase in population rendered traditional economic activities inadequate to maintain an independent subsistence existence in remote northern communities.

— In the first two decades of government interest in northern affairs, policy formulation and implementation was handled in a diffuse, complicated fashion. Policy was primarily implemented by the Northern Administration Branch of the Department of Natural Resources. The most pressing administrative difficulties encountered by the Branch resulted from the extremely broad range of responsibilities it assumed because of the disinterest of most departments in northern affairs. Not only did it assume the expected duties of regulating and managing resource use, but it also tackled such tasks as distributing social welfare, organizing and assisting local governments, providing municipal capital facilities, organizing co-operatives, as well as general responsibility for community development work. Attempts to provide such services were hindered by the fact that they were undertaken by conservation officers stationed throughout the north, whose training was appropriate only for resource development and management tasks.⁴

Policy making was diffused into a number of line departments; although the Department of Natural Resources administered almost all policy affecting the north, other departments retained authority to formulate policy on a province-wide basis. Not surprisingly, programs were developed to meet the needs of southern Saskatchewan where the vast majority of people reside. This often put Northern Administration Branch officials at odds with those in other departments.⁵

2. The Emergence and Adoption of the Single Agency Concept

Attempts were made in the early 1950s to compensate for deficiencies inherent in the northern administrative structure by establishing inter-agency co-ordination committees. These were all unsuccessful, however. Therefore, in January, 1959, Treasury Board directed its Secretary to discuss with relevant deputy ministers the question of effecting unified direction of government affairs in northern Saskatchewan.⁶ This signalled the beginning of official discussion of the single agency concept. In November of that year, Treasury Board recommended, and Cabinet approved in principle, the establishment of a single agency for all northern programming. Further study on the matter was undertaken by the Director of the Northern Administration Branch with assistance from the Budget Bureau. The Budget Bureau's report, completed in March, 1961, presented various proposals which reflected differing degrees of emphasis the government might wish to place on northern-oriented administration.⁷

These proposals were rendered temporarily irrelevant by opposition to the proposed single agency from other program agencies and the difficulties were compounded by Cabinet rivalry. Departments other than Natural Resources began taking an increasing interest in northern affairs toward the end of the 1950s. Thus, when the single agency concept was reviewed by Cabinet, several departments attempted to halt discussion on it, while Natural Resources officials viewed the single agency as a means of consolidating responsibility they already perceived as de facto theirs.⁸ As a result of the Cabinet disagreement,

the single agency concept was quietly dropped, though official Cabinet approval in principle was never rescinded.⁹

The Budget Bureau report of 1961 was interesting in other respects as well. Its authors perceived an

. . . evolution in government thinking from emphasis on resource development in the late 1940s and early 1950s to a special approach . . . which will facilitate accelerated development, community development programmes, co-operative development, etc., . . . to promote the establishment of political, economic and social institutions which would enable people in the north to maximize the utilization of resources available to them.¹⁰

A concomitant requirement of this special approach was the development of much stronger local government institutions to facilitate greater citizen participation. As the Budget Bureau report noted:

. . . local government institutions are limited to such groups as ratepayers' associations, trappers' councils, and various co-operative bodies. In most cases, even these institutions are only advisory and require considerable nursing. . . . Local government institutions, as they are known in the south, are virtually non-existent.¹¹

Local participation in government programs and a decentralized approach to providing community services were recognized as essential elements for northern development. There was an implicit appreciation that northern communities were worth supporting and that human development as well as resource development was required for these communities to realize their potential. In this, the report echoed the language characteristic of Department of Natural Resources annual reports during these years. Co-operative development and community development in combination with local participation through local decision-making

structures were perceived as priorities, though the monetary commitment required to make this "developmental" emphasis real was meagre.¹²

After the Liberals gained power in April, 1964, tendencies counter to a single agency structure began taking effect. In agriculture and social welfare, administrative responsibilities were shifted back to parent departments from the Northern Affairs Branch. The Liberal government also created the Indian and Metis Department in 1965, which assumed responsibility for much of the community development work in the Northern Administration District. These administrative changes were justified as an attempt to make the work of conservation officers more manageable.¹³ Such incremental, administrative changes, however, did not address the basic problems of northern underdevelopment.

During the 1950s and 1960s, symptoms of northern underdevelopment had become quite acute. The population growth rate remained one of the world's highest, while traditional economic activities became progressively less capable of supporting the expanding population. As a result, half the population was dependent on income transfers from various levels of government. Only in the three incorporated centres were incomes comparable to provincial norms. Indeed, three-quarters of the total earned income in the Northern Administration District accrued to La Ronge, Creighton and Uranium City, primarily because of mining activity. The forty other northern settlements, populated by a roughly equal proportion of Metis and Treaty Indians, were almost totally without basic physical and social services. Educational facilities were inadequate, and more than fifty per cent of northern children dropped out before grade six.

Poverty-related diseases afflicted between two and ten times as many northerners as other provincial residents, while insufficient medical services existed to deal with such problems. Many medical problems resulted from unsafe water supplies; again only residents of the incorporated centres had safe water supplies and adequate sanitation facilities. Housing conditions were grossly sub-standard; one- and two-room log shacks housing upwards of ten people were common. Local governments existed in only eight of the forty or so remote communities, and even they had virtually no authority over local affairs because of legislative limitations, the absence of a local tax base, and the lack of individuals knowledgeable in local government processes.¹⁴

Recognition of these symptoms and their underlying roots made it apparent that the application of government policies designed for the south would not result in development different from that which had already produced such appalling conditions in the north. It commonly came to be perceived that if northern residents were to take an active part in northern development and benefit from it, community-based economic, social and political development which incorporated elements of northern culture would have to be promoted. To achieve such development and provide a single focus for government resources, it became similarly apparent that an innovative administrative instrument was necessary.

Within the New Democratic Party, the single agency concept proposed in 1961 had re-emerged in the 1971 New Deal for People election platform.¹⁵ Little else was proposed specifically. The lack of specific development proposals which could have been addressed and criticized led

to the confusion and general misunderstanding which became prevalent after the new department was established.

The initiation of a single agency was not assured by an election campaign promise. Familiar problems were encountered after a four-man Cabinet Committee was established to study the agency's introduction in detail.¹⁶ As in 1959, officials of some departments demonstrated reluctance to transfer responsibilities from their departments to the newly proposed one. The strongest opposition came from the Department of Natural Resources because that Department possessed the largest degree of responsibility for northern programming through its Northern Affairs Branch. Indeed, there are indications that the department's minister, Eiling Kramer, boycotted the Cabinet Committee meetings. Kramer had apparently been under the impression that the new agency would be part of Natural Resources. When it became apparent that this would not occur, he and his staff "dug in."¹⁷

The final solution was drastic, but probably inevitable. Some three weeks after the act establishing the new department was given assent in the legislature, a cabinet shuffle was announced which moved Kramer to the Highways portfolio while G.R. (Ted) Bowerman received the new Northern Saskatchewan portfolio and the Department of Natural Resources.¹⁸

3. Goals for and Comprehensive Constraints on the Single Agency's Policy Process

The act of establishing a unique administrative instrument to develop and implement northern policy demonstrated a clear recognition of the link between policy results and the process of making policy. Government realized that previous attempts to deal with northern policy problems had failed because the process of making policy had lacked a northern focus and was diffused between various agencies. The general commitment to northern development consistent with the New Democratic Party's principles and election platform, together with the choice of a single agency to develop and implement northern policy, implied three particular goals for the Department's policy process. Policy and policy making was to be innovative in nature because the policy problem being addressed obviously was insoluble through an incremental approach to policy and policy making. Second, the lack of co-ordination and diffusion of policy responsibilities characteristic of previous northern administration was to be solved by bringing all government services under the aegis of one agency. Finally, northern residents were to be involved directly in formulating and implementing northern policy, thereby mobilizing their support and active effort toward northern development. The balance of this chapter will identify how general constraints have emerged to hinder the realization of each policy process ideal.

A. Innovative Policy Making and the Role of Planning

The foremost reason for initiating a single agency responsible for most aspects of northern administration was to address the critical problem of northern underdevelopment through an innovative approach to policy. It was well understood that a fundamental break from past policy was required to reverse the pattern of northern underdevelopment. New approaches to human and economic development were considered necessary in order for northern residents to benefit from further development.

The creation of a unique administrative tool as a response to appalling northern social and economic conditions also implied that an innovative approach would be taken to making policy. In theory, an innovative policy process would include the following steps.¹⁹ First, government's view of societal well-being and the primary problems hindering the achievement of societal well-being leads to government defining the values it wishes to achieve through policy. These values are clarified and ranked according to their importance as perceived by policy makers. Then alternative policies are generated and their consequences evaluated. In the final stage, a policy alternative is chosen on the basis of its connection to policy goals and its perceived consequences.

The relevance of such a model to the problem of underdevelopment is at once apparent. By identifying the values required to break from underdevelopment and designing policy to meet values, it is possible to marshal scarce resources to fit unique needs in an integrated, effective fashion.

The innovative, rational-comprehensive model of policy making has been subjected to some criticism from political theorists and administrators. It has been argued quite correctly that most government policy making is incremental in nature. Policy makers experience great difficulty in defining problems, clarifying objectives, and in reconciling objectives when they conflict. They also operate in an environment of insufficient information, and alternatives are perceived as extremely limited. Policy making therefore tends to be incremental: that is, it is made by choosing from only marginally different policies without any direct relation to clearly expressed policy objectives. "Agreement on policy thus becomes the only practicable test of a policy's correctness."²⁰ While incremental policy making may describe reality for most government administrations, it is not suitable as a model for an administration created specifically to foster social and economic change on a broad scale. When innovative, tradition-breaking policy is required, incremental policy making is not adequate.

Quite clearly, an innovative approach to making policy was envisaged by creating the Department of Northern Saskatchewan. As the Premier noted in 1972:

We look to the new Department to provide a new focus for building government services in the north, with the involvement of the people living in northern communities. This means involvement but not only in an advisory capacity--but also in a developing capacity of self-government and local decision making . . . it will require readiness . . . to abandon the safe, standardized approaches to the delivery of government services.²¹

The Department's broad policy objectives were first outlined in a Cabinet-approved document authored by the Minister-to-be entitled "Principles for Northern Development." The broad policy goals outlined there were:

- Recognize Northern Saskatchewan as an area of special and urgent concern to the government.
- Recognize that the differences in culture, social developmental patterns, economics, environment and the current levels of human development require a different approach by government than that of the south.
- Prepare to legislate new administrative approaches, vital economic development programs and socio-economic research.
- Develop northern resources in the best interest of Saskatchewan, principally by and with those who make our northland their home.²²

In describing the single agency's role in northern development, the policy paper stated:

There is little realization and less real appreciation of the fact that problems of the north are different from those of the southerly developed sectors of the province. To try and administer them in the same way is an impugny on our ability to cope outside the established and traditional structures.²³

The document went on to describe a broad range of possible policy initiatives and recommended the establishment of Northern Research and Development Authority with representation from northern areas. The Development Authority was to advise the previously mentioned Cabinet Committee and to

. . . provide the ongoing review and recommendations, involvement, research and programming development for establishing the new agency, department or commission of northern affairs.²⁴

Thus it was thought originally that development of the new agency would take some time, and that planning of new policies and programs would take precedence over actually implementing programs, at least in the short term. The central feature of such an approach was that it allowed time to involve northern residents in planning northern development programs.

As it turned out, the recommendation to establish a Development Authority was disregarded almost immediately. Instead, a full-fledged department was created quickly, with the responsibility to plan and implement programs simultaneously. It may be surmised that Cabinet perceived a need to make its presence in the north felt quickly, thereby demonstrating government's sincerity regarding northern development.²⁵

This decision imposed immediate constraints on the single agency's structure and functions, and on how northern development could proceed. First of all, it became necessary to hire senior personnel with strong administrative backgrounds to supervise the transfer of government programs from southern departments and their implementation in the north. Second, a strong research and planning component was required to modify existing programs in accordance with northern conditions and to devise new and innovative programs to deal with unique problems of northern development. These two conditions were the genesis of a profound and spectacular dispute within the Department which focused on the Policy and Planning Branch.

As its Director noted, Policy and Planning Branch's responsibilities included:

. . . the evaluation of existing programs and the development of new ones, and for seeing that departmental programs are appropriate to the Department of Northern Saskatchewan objectives. It has the responsibility for long and short range planning with respect to all departmental programs, and it is expected to plan for as much integration of programs as is possible, so that the department does not continue to carry out independently the responsibilities of the nine line departments whose legislative jurisdiction it inherited.²⁶

The activities of the Branch represented an innovative approach toward policy and policy making. Branch proposals in the areas of fishery and forest utilization, health services, adult education, staff development and public participation all represented significant departures from previous government policy. In all cases, policy was clearly related to government's stated objectives for northern development.²⁷

By late 1973, while the Department was still becoming operational, it became obvious that Policy and Planning Branch and the operations branches were working at cross-purposes. This can be partly attributed to the lack of any line relationship between the planning and operations components. Consequently, Policy and Planning was isolated from those who had responsibility for implementing programs and policy.²⁸ More fundamentally, the poor relationship between these groups can be traced to personality conflicts based on ideology and career background. The individuals recruited in Policy and Planning had strong academic backgrounds with relatively little experience in government and interpreted government's philosophical commitment to northern development quite strictly. The operations personnel, for the most part, were career civil servants more concerned about establishing administrative systems

with which they felt comfortable and which they perceived as priorities based on their government experience.²⁹

The conflict was made most obvious in the animosity between planning staff and the Director of Operations as well as his immediate superior, the Assistant Deputy Minister. For example, one member of the Policy and Planning Branch discovered that the Director of Operations had initiated several planning studies without Policy and Planning Branch knowledge or approval. The Acting Director of the Branch complained that:

. . . this present situation is the result of the Director of Operations:

- (i) presumptuously attempting to impose study design and consultants upon the Northern Municipal Council;
- (ii) proceeding without budgetary approval;
- (iii) planning without any consultation with Policy and Planning or requests to employ the resources of the Branch.³⁰

This memo, in tone and in substance, indicates a strained relationship between members of Policy and Planning and many of those charged with implementing programs.

The ongoing conflict climaxed in mid-May, 1974, when Policy and Planning Branch employees published "A Statement to the Public" in response to plans for disbanding their branch. In the document, they charged that department officials has misused public funds, operated outside the intent of various acts and regulations and had abrogated the department's objectives. The resignations of the Minister, Deputy Minister, Assistant Deputy Minister and two branch directors were called for, and it was recommended

. . . that the department itself be disbanded so that the people in the north need no longer be controlled by a single agency.³¹

Understandably, the employees were given the choice of resigning or having their contracts terminated.

The departure of these employees and their branch from the Department marked the end of the best opportunity the Department has ever had to establish innovative policy making as its modus operandi. No planning component has subsequently been given the mandate or resources accorded Policy and Planning Branch. A Central Planning Unit exists at present with limited staff operating as a research arm for the Deputy Minister, while the planners are assigned to each of three Assistant Deputy Ministers to meet their short-term planning needs. Long-term planning has become impossible under these circumstances and even short or medium-term planning is complicated by the dispersion of planners into administratively separate components.³² Thus the development of innovative policy has been severely constrained by the lack of effective resources allocated to planning. Incremental policy-making has prevailed in the Department virtually by default.

B. Policy Co-ordination and Organizational Evolution of the Department

The most obvious reason for establishing a single agency was to integrate and co-ordinate northern policy. This policy process goal had implications for policy formulation and administration. In formulating policy, it was understood that policies and programs would be integrated, meaning that programs in separate areas would be explicitly

linked to ensure maximum utilization of resources and policy impact. Adult education policies and programs, for example, would have to be designed to complement economic and resource development programs. In policy administration, the intent was to co-ordinate particular activities in a detailed way. Personnel from different though related branches, for example, would not arrive in the same community to explain related programs to community residents on different days. Such co-ordination and integration has generally not been achieved. The evolution of the Department's structure provides key insights into why policy integration and co-ordination has often been absent in northern policy.

The Department's original organization was not at all conducive to co-ordination. It can be most accurately described as a simplified, scaled-down replicate of the provincial government as a whole, albeit with a number of omissions. Under the Deputy Minister was an Assistant Deputy Minister in charge of operations. He was responsible for all ten branches offering services directly to northerners, while only four internally-oriented support branches remained separate.³³ Inevitably, an impossibly large span of control resulted. In an attempt to introduce co-ordination into this diffuse, unwieldy structure, three mechanisms were established. These were task-oriented committees, branch heads' meetings and area co-ordinators.

Task-oriented committees were initiated in fall, 1973, to develop policy proposals on a wide variety of topics. In forming these committees, an attempt was made to include individuals with widely varying interests so that any particular policy proposal would

have input from individuals with experience in different policy areas. Thus it was hoped that policy developed by the committees would not require inordinate modification by senior management.³⁴ It is difficult to assess the impact of these committees on policy formulation. Their function was limited to preparing one policy paper each. Upon each paper's completion, the committee in question was dissolved. By January 7, 1974, three of the committees had been dissolved and by August that year, all mention of them ceased.³⁵

More significant as structures for policy co-ordination were the branch heads' meetings. Their purpose was

. . . to promote the co-ordination of all those activities that bridge two or more branches; to provide an arena for discussion, communication and decision-making relating between or across [sic] branch boundaries; to provide a medium of exchange and communication between branches or from within branches to the management team.³⁶

The first of these meetings was in late 1973, and thereafter they were held on a monthly basis. Branch heads' meetings suffered from serious shortcomings as mechanisms to achieve inter-branch co-ordination. The meetings included relatively large numbers of individuals, were too infrequent, and an excessive amount of time was devoted to information dissemination.³⁷ These factors contributed to their ineffectiveness as vehicles for dealing with major policy issues and playing a role in determining the general thrust of departmental programming. Branch head meetings are now held very infrequently, and the Department has yet to determine the purpose for such meetings.³⁸

The final ad hoc co-ordinating mechanism was the area co-ordinator program. Among draft proposals for the single agency's structure explored in early Budget Bureau documents, frequent mention was made of an area administration approach to promote co-ordination in policy implementation. Such co-ordination was to be achieved by placing a senior administrator in four or five regions to whom all staff in the respective area would be responsible.³⁹

Within little more than a year of its inception, the Department had appointed five area co-ordinators who were responsible to the Field Services Branch for the following functions:

. . . to involve northern residents in determining programs and policies affecting them, to create a unified administrative structure of all government services in the north, to facilitate employment of northerners in the public and private sectors of the economy and to co-ordinate governmental programs at all levels.⁴⁰

Such an extremely broad "job description" clearly was intended only as a general statement of the responsibilities area co-ordinators could assume. However, the clauses indicating a co-ordinating function for these individuals certainly did not reflect their actual relationship with other employees. Area co-ordinators possessed no line authority over other employees,⁴¹ and consequently could neither "create a unified administrative structure" nor "co-ordinate government programs at all levels."

The day-to-day aspects of this problem were made clear by the area co-ordinators. At a Field Services Branch workshop held at Lac La Plonge, they complained that

. . . constantly area co-ordinators identify problems to field staff and request or recommend action, but their requests go unrecognized, mainly because certain Branch Heads are too concerned with keeping their own disciplines as major objectives rather than an integrated delivery system.⁴²

In practice, the degree of co-ordination achieved by the co-ordinators was primarily dependent on force of personality. Individuals with a strong personality accomplished some of their objectives, though often at the expense of alienating those they were attempting to influence. Of the five area co-ordinators, only one was generally effective.⁴³

The area co-ordinator program was allowed to die through attrition beginning late in 1975 after two of the co-ordinators accepted alternate employment.⁴⁴ Though the need for policy co-ordination at the field level has not disappeared, the Department has been without any formal mechanism for achieving this for nearly four years.⁴⁵

The inability of early ad hoc co-ordinating mechanisms to achieve their goals, the fairly serious challenge posed by Policy and Planning Branch's dissolution, and the considerable confusion which was plainly evident throughout the Department by early 1974 provided the impetus for major organizational changes. By May, 1974, a new structure was being drafted containing the concept of related branches in sections under three or four Assistant Deputy Ministers. Also included was the idea of forming a management committee consisting of these Assistant Deputy Ministers and the Deputy Minister to create a senior management team in the Department that would represent various perspectives and be more workable and effective than branch head meetings.⁴⁶

The appointment of a new Deputy Minister in October, 1974, led to immediate changes. He organized the lines of communication immediately so that more of the branches became directly responsible to him while the Assistant Deputy Minister's burden was reduced.⁴⁷ Almost simultaneously it was announced that an Executive Committee was to be formed, though this body was not established for approximately six months pending final decisions on the reorganization and staffing of newly created senior positions.⁴⁸

The resulting structure has gone largely unmodified since, and may account for the relative organizational stability in recent years. There are now three sectors: Social Development, Economic and Resource Development, and Project Management and Municipal Services, each with their own Assistant Deputy Minister, and a support sector which reports directly to the Deputy Minister.⁴⁹ The senior policy-making body within the Department, the Executive Committee, now consists of the Deputy Minister, the Assistant Deputy Ministers and the Chief Planning Officer of the Department, who is also the Director for Central Planning.

This administrative structure has evolved directly in a response to the need for policy co-ordination among branches which in the south are represented by entire departments. For southern departments, programs are formally co-ordinated through such mechanisms as Cabinet, Executive Council and Treasury Board. Given the longevity of the majority of government programs and basic administrative structures in the south, co-ordination has been institutionalized and is more widely understood

by all concerned. None of these conditions exist in the north. The administrative structures are new, the personnel are usually new to the area, and the many programs are adjusted to fit the particular requirements of northern administration. Hence, the need for more attention to co-ordinating these programs is reflected to a degree in the organizational structure.

However, the structure still has two apparent weaknesses. There is no process or structure for co-ordinating field level activities. The second weakness is that co-ordination between branches not under the same sector is dependent largely upon the predispositions of individuals concerned. In fact, it will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters that even within one sector, policy co-ordination has been lacking.

C. Public Participation in Northern Development: The Northern Municipal Council and the Department's Relationship with Northern Native Groups

The scope of government effort proposed for the north in 1971 was very extensive; it called for a reversal of previous development patterns which explicitly involved major social, economic and political changes. When governments initiate such rapid, large scale change, it is essential that those most concerned with or affected by it are involved in determining what policy will be, and how it will be implemented. Otherwise, government policy will likely provoke hostility and hence be ineffective.

Innovative or rational-comprehensive policy making generally involves extensive public participation, particularly when the outcome of such a process is likely to represent a substantial departure from previous policy. Incremental policy making, on the other hand, generally does not require public participation, because policy changes are so small that public acceptance and active support for change is not perceived as necessary by policy makers. Thus to support the Department's goal of innovative policy making, it was clear that public involvement in determining policy was essential.

The Director of Policy and Planning Branch expressed this point quite effectively.

It is essential to the success of the program of Government in the North that northern people come to see most of the programs, policies, laws, regulations, etc. which affect their lives as being relevant to their concerns. This is not a selling job, but a job of changing our institution up here so the northern objectives are met. If this is to be done, northerners must participate more fully in all phases of any development strategy implemented in northern Saskatchewan. They must help us plan, prioritize, authorize and implement programs. To do otherwise is merely to continue the pattern of Government doing things for northern people50

The Department's inclination to involve northern residents in program formulation and implementation has been lessened severely as a result of its general experience with northern native groups.

The Northern Municipal Council has been the most visible northern native organization. The Department's relationship with it illustrates how contentious an issue public participation has become, and why senior policy makers have been unwilling to commit the

Department effectively to public participation as a policy process objective.

Provision for the establishment of the Northern Municipal Council was made on May 4, 1973, by an amendment to The Northern Administration Act, after the government had experienced considerable pressure from northern interest groups. The Council was to be composed of five members elected from geographical areas in the north, with a provision for two appointed members, one each from the Metis Society of Saskatchewan and the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians. The powers and duties conferred upon the Northern Municipal Council reflected the government's intentions to establish municipal government in the north. Excluding the three incorporated centres of La Ronge, Creighton and Uranium City, the Council was directed to:

. . . exercise the powers and . . . perform the duties that are conferred or imposed on the Council of a rural municipality with respect to the rural municipality.⁵¹

These powers were not to restrict in any manner the Minister's authority, nor did they interfere with the rights of already existing local governments to pass by-laws or to alter their municipal structure where they had such authority.⁵²

By conferring upon the Council powers enumerated in The Rural Municipalities Act, a highly confusing situation was created. Though rural municipalities have considerable powers, Council members have never appreciated these, and in fact have generally resented the application of legislation intended for rural, southern Saskatchewan with its references to insect and rodent control, railways, and other matters

irrelevant to the north.⁵³ In fact, since the 1971 provincial election campaign, the issues of northern municipal government and public participation have been extremely confusing for the Department and northern residents.

In 1971, "The New Deal for People" election platform promised that a New Democratic government would establish northern regional councils, with regional representatives selected from these councils to form a larger northern territorial council.⁵⁴ The specific nature of such a "territorial council" was never precisely defined. Consequently, the election promise and subsequent public statements of various government officials have encouraged somewhat differing interpretations of the duties and powers appropriate for any unique form of northern municipal government. Department officials have generally agreed that the department intended "to introduce a full measure of municipal self-government to the north."⁵⁵ However, there were government employees and influential political actors outside the department who interpreted the 1971 campaign promise literally.

Foremost among these actors was the Metis Society of Saskatchewan, an interest group representing all non-status Indians and Metis in the province. Metis comprise the largest population group in the North, though until recently, they have not exerted a commensurate political influence, particularly on local government bodies. As a Metis Society brief to the government explained, the old colonial order needed dismantling.

Since our native people make up a very large majority of the northern population, we believe that this means northern development by and for the native people as opposed to development by a small minority of whites for their own benefit or for the benefit of others who live outside the area and in many cases outside the country as has been the case in the past.⁵⁶

The Metis Society brief also suggested a local government structure in which native people "would be assured majority control of local government."⁵⁷ Local government representatives were to sit on regional councils, which in turn were to have representation on a northern council with control over department staffing and a crucial role in determining departmental policies and programming.⁵⁸

After the legislation establishing the Northern Municipal Council was passed, the Department was criticized for not consulting northern residents fully before creating the Council. At a meeting of Metis Society representatives from most northern communities,

. . . a watchdog committee was established to explain the new act and formulate initial plans and preparations so that the new council, when elected will understand and be able to perform its duties.⁵⁹

Resolutions passed at this meeting affirmed the desire of northern residents for local self-government and control of northern development. The most explicit stated:

We feel there should be only one council--the Northern Municipal Council. This would be the governing body of the north and take the place of the Deputy Minister.⁶⁰

The attitude of this watchdog committee was indicative of the Northern Municipal Councillors' perception of the powers appropriate for their Council.

The Council's perceptions were influenced as well by the Department's public pronouncements regarding northern involvement in policy making. Early policy statements in departmental literature indicated a strong commitment to public involvement in decision making. A document distributed to staff included two points:

[the] community [was] to gradually take over the major decision-making functions, including budgeting, hiring of local personnel [teachers, welfare officers, health personnel, etc.] and delivery of services on a decentralized basis. Government [was] to provide back-up services, acting on the advice of the three levels of councils, and under the direction of the Minister.⁶²

By creating the Northern Municipal Council, the Department assumed it had established an entity which would take on municipal functions beyond the ability of existing local governments to deliver and which would promote development of the same local governments. Moreover, the regional body was to assist the Department in deciding priorities in the areas of economic development and public housing.⁶² This suggested functions somewhat more extensive than those of municipal government.

Even after the first Council had been created and Councillors elected,⁶³ the Department was unable to define its version of the Council's role. As the Assistant Deputy Minister pointed out:

Our recent crash effort to establish an operational set of powers and duties of the Northern Municipal Council for the near future and an appropriate funding formula has been unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. . . . The relationship among D.N.S., N.M.C. and the L.C.A. is very unclear The legislation setting up the N.M.C. does not rescind the N.A.D. legislation and hence the legal relationships are very unclear.⁶⁴

Within the Department there were divergent views about the Council's functions. The Policy and Planning Branch employees in their public statement argued that:

One must assume that it was intended that the Northern Municipal Council would take over the responsibilities of the Minister progressively as the council developed its staff and expertise and that the Minister would vacate the responsibilities as they were taken over, until the Minister's duties were assumed by the Council.⁶⁵

Almost all government policy statements regarding the Council's mandate since have restricted it to a municipal role. However, the Department's actions have continued to provide credibility to extra-municipal interpretations of the Council's role. Within the first few months of its election Department officials began taking major policy proposals to the Council for its perusal, though proceeding with these proposals was never made conditional on Council's assent.⁶⁶ The Deputy Minister from August, 1974, to September, 1975, D.F. McArthur, allowed the Council some say over hiring senior staff and encouraged his staff to communicate regularly with it over major policy or program decisions.⁶⁷ Although the present Deputy Minister has taken the view that his senior staff need only consult the Council when they feel so inclined,⁶⁸ the Department is still occasionally willing to transfer program responsibilities of an extra-municipal nature to the Council.⁶⁹

In general, however, the Department's position has become more narrowly defined over time in an attempt to limit the Council to purely municipal functions. Even these have been paradoxical in nature for the Council. It was in an intermediary position between the Province

and local governments. The Council had dual responsibility for providing municipal services which existing local governments could not deliver and for encouraging development of the same local governments. As northern local governments assumed responsibilities and duties, it was therefore expected that the Council would literally "work itself out of a job." However, the Council has never assumed these municipal powers and duties because, as legislated, these powers have always seemed inappropriate to Council members and staff.

Local government development has therefore been neglected by a Council which fears that if local governments develop significantly, an erosion of its authority would occur. In fact, this is what has happened. The Department became impatient with Council reluctance to engage in municipal affairs, and altered the local government funding formula so local governments were encouraged to by-pass the Northern Municipal Council for all municipal services. Six of eight local governments granted this option have exercised it and removed themselves from the Council's administrative umbrella, against the Council's advice.⁷⁰ It is clear that the Council's credibility and influence has been severely weakened, perhaps beyond the point of no return.

The continuing confusion and conflict between the Council and the Department reflects the underlying conflict between the Department's position on public participation and the position taken by various northern native groups. Native leaders in northern Saskatchewan have perceived control of northern development as the primary issue. They

—have not objected to the single agency concept, but have demanded that control of the agency and development in general be in the hands of native northerners. The Northern Municipal Council is the only elected, exclusively northern body. Native spokesmen originally perceived it as the vehicle through which northern development could be controlled when they insisted that it take the place of the Department's Deputy Minister. Similarly, at the Northern Municipal Council's local government convention in June, 1977, the Council's Chairman stated that it had been government's original intent to

. . . set up a northern development authority, in this case the Northern Municipal Council, to oversee, plan and develop the north; including control over all industrial and other development.⁷²

The creation of the Northern Municipal Council without clear and appropriate responsibilities in a political arena so full of contentious issues has resulted inevitably in it insisting on having functions far more extensive than purely municipal affairs. Moreover, the Department's tendency from early 1974 until early 1976 to take major policy proposals to the Council for its perusal resulted in Council members perceiving two roles for themselves: one municipal, and one as a consultative or advisory body on all northern development issues. The Department has not recognized the latter role formally since D.F. McArthur left as Deputy Minister. In large part, this is because Department officials have judged the Council as not sufficiently representative of northern public opinion. Consequently, the Department has attempted to establish other avenues for public involvement in determining general northern policy. These alternate mechanisms have

been ineffective for the most part, either because of direct opposition by the Northern Municipal Council, or because native leaders have thought that participation on them was inconsequential.

The Northern Development Advisory Council was established in May, 1974, as a partial attempt by the Department in fulfilment of a New Democratic Party 1971 election promise to achieve northern direction of northern affairs. Composed of all five Northern Municipal Councillors and representatives from northern interest groups, the Advisory Council was to advise the Minister on a broad range of northern issues.⁷² However, the Council met only once before effectively being disbanded because the Northern Municipal Council boycotted it. The Councillors maintained that the Advisory Council constituted an erosion of their authority

. . . to function alone in the capacity of reviewing D.N.S. policy and program as rightfully their duty as elected representatives of northern people. Further, that local governing bodies play a major role in reviewing such policies and programs rather than simply advisory boards set up by the government.⁷³

After the Northern Municipal Council's credibility had begun to deteriorate seriously, the Minister again initiated a mechanism to achieve public consultation on general issues. A Consulting Committee to the Minister was established in June, 1977, with representation almost identical to the Northern Development Advisory Council.⁷⁴ The Northern Municipal Council participated in the Consulting Committee because its influence had diminished. Since only one Council member sits on the Consulting Committee, a boycott would not have had any appreciable effect on it. The Council is no longer generally perceived as a body

been ineffective for the most part, either because of direct opposition by the Northern Municipal Council, or because native leaders have thought that participation on them was inconsequential.

The Northern Development Advisory Council was established in May, 1974, as a partial attempt by the Department in fulfilment of a New Democratic Party 1971 election promise to achieve northern direction of northern affairs. Composed of all five Northern Municipal Councillors and representatives from northern interest groups, the Advisory Council was to advise the Minister on a broad range of northern issues.⁷² However, the Council met only once before effectively being disbanded because the Northern Municipal Council boycotted it. The Councillors maintained that the Advisory Council constituted an erosion of their authority

. . . to function alone in the capacity of reviewing D.N.S. policy and program as rightfully their duty as elected representatives of northern people. Further, that local governing bodies play a major role in reviewing such policies and programs rather than simply advisory boards set up by the government.⁷³

After the Northern Municipal Council's credibility had begun to deteriorate seriously, the Minister again initiated a mechanism to achieve public consultation on general issues. A Consulting Committee to the Minister was established in June, 1977, with representation almost identical to the Northern Development Advisory Council.⁷⁴ The Northern Municipal Council participated in the Consulting Committee because its influence had diminished. Since only one Council member sits on the Consulting Committee, a boycott would not have had any appreciable effect on it. The Council is no longer generally perceived as a body

representing northern residents outside of the three incorporated centres and its influence has rapidly declined.

One of the most visible instruments of northern development was and remains the Western Northlands Agreement. Signed between the western provinces and the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion, the Western Northlands Agreement is a cost-sharing arrangement worked out separately between the three western provinces and the federal department. The terms of the arrangement indicated that some process of public discussion and involvement in allocating the dollars available from the agreement had to take place prior to finalizing the Agreement. In Saskatchewan, the participatory mechanism adopted was the Northlands Advisory Committee, established in February, 1976,

. . . to examine and make recommendations on objectives, policy and procedure for the implementation of projects; to review the progress of projects; to evaluate the effectiveness of projects.⁷⁵

The Committee, which was to include representatives from the Metis Society, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, the three incorporated centres, and the federal and provincial governments, was never particularly effective. The Association of Metis and Non-Status Indians of Saskatchewan did not attend the Committee's first eight meetings. The Metis association viewed the committee's activities as a "rubber stamp" for provincial development proposals in which northern residents had no meaningful involvement.⁷⁶ The Committee was disbanded finally in May, 1977, when it became apparent it was serving no useful purpose.⁷⁷

In fact, the Northlands Agreement is a poor focal point for public participation. Though it appears impressive on paper, the agreement is a retro-active cost-sharing arrangement. The Department must still budget for all its expenditures, and reimbursed federal dollars are transferred directly into General Consolidated Revenue rather than into any program department budgets. Northern natives' concerns about the Agreement result because they perceive it as a significant component of provincial northern development strategy. In fact, because the Department has not prepared or publicized an overall development strategy or engaged northerners meaningfully in its planning activities, the Northlands Agreement appears by default to be the only integrated set of proposals for northern development.

The difficulties in departmental relationships with the Northern Municipal Council, the Northern Development Advisory Council and the Northlands Advisory Committee indicate failure to achieve effective public participation in northern policy making. The Department appears to have taken the position that public participation is necessary primarily to legitimize its own activities. While this is a valid concern, one of greater importance is that northern residents begin exercising more control over their own destiny. For three decades, northern residents have had practically no voice in government developments which have radically altered their existence. The large scale developments taking place in northern Saskatchewan will have a profound impact on its residents' future. If northerners are not assured an adequate voice in how these developments proceed, development will not

likely be appropriate for northerners, and the Department will have failed to direct development so that northern residents benefit from it.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated how government chose a single agency as an instrument through which innovative northern development might proceed, and how achieving an innovative, co-ordinated policy process which incorporated effective northern participation has been hindered by events occurring early in the Department's history.

The development of innovative policy has been frustrated by the low priority accorded planning ever since the Department's Policy and Planning Branch was disbanded. As well, incremental policy making was made almost inevitable by the speed of implementing programs, which resulted in hiring southern administrators and limiting northern participation in program planning and implementation. Not enough time has been arranged to involve northern residents in policy making as clients, or to hire and train northern residents to administer government policy themselves.

Policy integration and co-ordination as well has been affected by the speed of administrative development. Insufficient consideration was given to relating diverse programs to each other. Moreover, the Department's original structure made policy co-ordination dependent on ad hoc co-ordinating mechanisms which were never really effective. Only after three years was the Department formally organized in a

manner conducive to some degree of policy co-ordination. Weaknesses still remain in the structure, particularly at the field level.

Now that some background has been given on the original, underlying factors which have frustrated an innovative, co-ordinated and participatory approach to northern policy, detailed case studies of policy making can be considered. Separate chapters will be devoted to: resource management of northern fisheries, adult education through northern community colleges, the northern economic development loan fund and various attempts to establish integrated human, economic and resource development projects.

Notes to Chapter I

¹This study cannot begin to consider all aspects of northern development from a historical perspective. To do so would entail a description of Cree and Chipewyan civilization prior to the eighteenth century and some analysis of Hudson's Bay Company and various church activities after 1750.

²For a more detailed analysis of how government policy changed the lifestyle of northern natives, particularly with respect to the fur industry, see V.F. Valentine, "Some Problems of the Metis of Northern Saskatchewan," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. XX, No. 1 (February, 1954).

³See Valentine, ibid., p. 93 and Fact Sheet on Saskatchewan Natives, Planning and Research, Executive Council (August 20, 1976), pp. 3-4.

⁴See as an example of the duties of Conservation Officers and the broad range of responsibilities of the Northern Administration Branch, The Report on the Organization for the Provision of Government Services for Northern Saskatchewan, Appendix A, The Budget Bureau (March 1961).

⁵One example of this occurred when Natural Resources officials objected to an increase in Social Assistance rates proposed by Social Services officials to apply across the Province. The Natural Resources officials wanted the funds to be spent on community public works activities which could employ people gainfully. From H. Buckley, J.E.M. Kew, J.B. Hawley, The Indian and Metis of Northern Saskatchewan (Saskatoon, 1963), p. 36.

⁶The Report on the Organization for the Provision of Government Services for Northern Saskatchewan, op. cit., p. 2.

⁷Ibid., pp. 2-10.

⁸For one interpretation of this, see Richard Adrian and John Ridsdell, "D.N.S.--Reoccupying the Colony," Next Year Country, pp. 24-26.

⁹Vernon C. Serl, "Action and Reaction" in Arthur K. Davis (ed.), A Northern Dilemma (Bellingham: Western Washington State College, 1967), p. 64.

¹⁰Report on Government Services, op. cit., p. 5.

¹¹Ibid., p. 4.

¹²See Buckley, Kew, Hawley, op. cit., p. 24.

¹³ Annual Report (1976), p. 37.

¹⁴ See D.N.S. Data Base, Northern Saskatchewan, Consolidated Data, Volume I, Summary. (La Ronge: D.N.S., 1973).

¹⁵ New Deal for People, "NDP Northern Development Program . . . 1971 . . ." (Service Printing Co., 1971).

¹⁶ The Committee included the Minister of Indian and Metis Affairs, G.R. Bowerman, the Minister of Natural Resources, E. Kramer, the Minister of Education and the Premier ex-officio. Cabinet Minute No. 1310 (October 12, 1971), p. 1.

¹⁷ This information comes from three separate personal interviews: Jerry Hammersmith, ex-DNS employee (May 16, 1977); A.C. Towill, Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister (June 10, 1977); and G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan (July 13, 1977).

¹⁸ "Three More Added to Saskatchewan Cabinet," Regina Leader Post (May 12, 1971), p. 2.

¹⁹ Such an ideal view has been described as the rational-comprehensive approach to policy making. Herbert Simon may be considered the father of rational decision making. See his Administrative Behaviour, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1957). Rational-comprehensive policy making has also been described by Amitai Etzioni in The Active Society (New York: Free Press, 1968), see Chapter II, pp. 249-282 and "Mixed Scanning: A Third Approach to Decision Making," Public Administration Review, Volume XXVII (December, 1967). For a prescription of rational-comprehensive elements to produce better policy making, see Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy Making Re-examined (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), see Part IV, "An Optimal Model of Public Policy Making," pp. 129-216, and pp. 271-272. See also Fremont J. Lyden, George A. Shipman and Morton Kroll (eds.), Policies, Decisions, and Organizations (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1969), pp. 1-3; Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), pp. 26-30; James E. Anderson, Public Policy Making (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 10-11; and Peter Self, Administrative Theories and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 19-54.

²⁰ The most outstanding proponent of such an approach to policy is Charles E. Lindblom. See particularly, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, Volume XIX, (Number 2, Spring 1959), pp. 79-88. See also, David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1963), chapters 4, 5 and 10; Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment (New York: The Free Press, 1965); and The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968).

²¹Statement by Premier A.E. Blakeney to Department of Northern Saskatchewan Staff Conference, Prince Albert, mimeo. (Prince Albert: D.N.S., December 12, 1972).

²²G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Indian and Metis Affairs, "Principles for Northern Development," Memorandum to Cabinet (September 30, 1971), p. 3.

²³Ibid., p. 4.

²⁴Ibid., p. 7.

²⁵Personal interview with G.R. Bowerman, op. cit. It should be noted that there was strong opposition from Bowerman's advisors in La Ronge, A.C. Towill and B.R. Hill, to this decision. Interviews with Towill and Hammersmith, op. cit.

²⁶Memo from B.R. Hill, Director, Policy and Planning Branch, to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister, re: Briefing Material on Policy and Planning Staff (April 16, 1973), p. 2.

²⁷One example of how Policy and Planning Branch was proposing innovative policy was with respect to staff development. The concept of "shadow positions" was proposed, whereby one native northerner would have been hired for each planner in the Policy and Planning Branch. The particular knowledge of native northerners about the north was deemed equal in value to the knowledge gained through a university education. By including native northerners at that level in the Department, "public" participation would have been facilitated and native northerners could have been involved in an intensive development process to groom them later for middle and upper management level positions. See proposal by Gary Wouters, Program Consultant, "Shadow Positions." Covering memo on paper by P.D. Elias, "Does Charlie Dysart Know What He's Talking About?" (La Ronge: D.N.S., 1973).

²⁸See organization charts 1 and 2, Appendix I.

²⁹Personal interviews with Hammersmith, Towill, op. cit., and W.D. Worster, Acting Director of Planning and Research Secretariat (September 30, 1976). See also a memo from Shakir Alwarid, Planning and Research Secretariat to W. Worster, Acting Director, Planning and Research Secretariat, re: Planning and Research Secretariat Organization (March 23, 1976), p. 1.

³⁰Memo from Peter Brook, Acting Director, Policy and Planning Branch to D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister, re: Evaluation and Research Activity Associated within the Northern Municipal Council (May 10, 1974), p. 2.

³¹Policy and Planning Branch employees, "A Statement to the Public" (May, 1974), p. 2.

³²Personal knowledge of author while in the employ of the Department in the Central Planning Unit.

³³See Appendix I for detailed organization charts covering the years 1972-77.

³⁴Attachment appended to Branch Heads Meeting Minutes (January 7, 1974). These committees appear to be outcomes of Branch Heads Meetings. It is difficult to trace the development of them precisely, but since Task-Oriented Committee 5 was struck to consider the question of housing just prior to the November 13, 1973, Branch Heads Meeting, it seems reasonable to surmise that they did not begin much before then. The topics they covered included agriculture, public participation, area staff meetings, the role of area co-ordinators, air ambulance service, housing, fisheries, a management information system, recreation and metric conversion.

³⁵Minutes of Branch Heads Meeting, Item 3, Committee Reports and Recommendations (January 7, 1974), p. 2 and Minutes of Branch Directors Meeting (August 27-28, 1974), pp. 1-3.

³⁶Memo from J. Millar, Director of Operations, to D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister re: Suggested Outline for Regulations Covering the Operation of Branch Directors Meetings, pp. 2-3 (January 24, 1974).

³⁷Typically, fifteen individuals were present at a Branch Directors Meeting. As an example of how information dissemination could impede consideration of more important matters, one Branch Directors Meeting reviewed only two items from previous meetings and one new item before tabling the balance of the agenda for a future meeting and adjourning Minutes from Branch Heads Meetings, November 13, 1973-November 1, 1976, and Minutes of Branch Heads Meeting, March 9, 1974, pp. 1-4.

³⁸In the past two years only two Branch Heads Meetings have been held. As one of the participants in these remarked: "The use of Branch Heads' Meetings as a mechanism for information dissemination is time consuming and somewhat dull for the participants. Experience in using the branch head format as a decision-making form shows that function to be of little value." Memo from Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister, to M.O. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister, re: Branch Heads Meeting, November 15, 1977.

³⁹The Organization for Government Services in the North, The Budget Bureau (October, 1963), p. 2.

⁴⁰1973-74 Annual Report of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan, p. 15.

⁴¹See Appendix I. Area Co-ordinators reported to the Field Services Branch, which reported to the Director of Operations, along with program delivery branches.

⁴²A discussion paper prepared for the Deputy Minister of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan (La Plonge, Saskatchewan, October 7, 1974), p. 3.

⁴³Personal interview with A.C. Towill, op. cit.

⁴⁴See Brian Cousins, proposal for organizing "Extension Services" Branch (February 10, 1976), pp. 14-15. Branch responsibilities were shuffled as the Department expanded its responsibilities and programs for municipal affairs.

⁴⁵The only exception to this is the Athabasca Area Co-ordinating Committee established in the far northern region in March, 1976. Initiated voluntarily by Uranium City staff, Executive Committee's attempt to encourage staff in other areas to institute these has been unsuccessful. See Executive Committee Minutes (January 25, 1977), p. 2.

⁴⁶Memo from W.R. Merryweather to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister, Draft Proposal to Re-organize the Department of Northern Saskatchewan (May 8-June 5, 1974).

⁴⁷Branch Directors Meeting Minutes (October 15, 1974).

⁴⁸Memo from D.F. McArthur to D. Schweitzer, J. Perry, M. Gurstein, A. Towill and J. Stobbs, re: D.N.S. Executive Committee Meetings (April 22, 1975).

⁴⁹See Appendix I.

⁵⁰Memo from B.R. Hill, Director of Policy and Planning, to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister, Department of Northern Saskatchewan, re: Western Northlands and D.R.E.E. (July 24, 1973), p. 3.

⁵¹Statutes of Saskatchewan, 21 Elizabeth II (1973), c. 70.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³The powers and duties of rural municipalities are enumerated exhaustively in The Rural Municipalities Act, Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan. Briefly, they give rural municipalities certain powers of taxation and assessment, borrowing, business licensing and regulating, roads and streets maintenance, and providing public services and municipal undertakings. The legislative context is rural, and therefore contains many references to agricultural matters. See the statement

by Ron Cherkewich, Legal Counsel for the Northern Municipal Council made to the Northern Saskatchewan Local Government Convention, 1977, a report prepared by Research and Planning, Northern Municipal Council (July 28, 1977), p. 23.

⁵⁴New Deal for People, op. cit.

⁵⁵Department of Northern Saskatchewan Objectives. Mimeo attached to Statement by Premier A.E. Blakeney to Prince Albert Staff Conference (December 12, 1972).

⁵⁶Metis Society of Saskatchewan, Presentation to Government of Saskatchewan in Regards to Statement of Northern Administration and Legislation (January 9, 1973), p. 3.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 7.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 6-16.

⁵⁹Memo from Jerry Hammersmith, Program Consultant, to A.C. Towill, Assistant Deputy Minister, and B.R. Hill, Director of Policy and Planning, re: Resolutions and Motions--Northern Municipal Council Meeting (May 11, 1973), p. 1.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 3.

⁶¹Summary: Northern Development Considerations, attachment to memo from G.R. Bowerman, Minister-in-Charge to all Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Assistant Deputy Ministers (January 13, 1972), p. 7.

⁶²"The Northern Municipal Council," pamphlet published under the authority of G.R. Bowerman, Minister, Department of Northern Saskatchewan (La Ronge: Northern News Services Branch, 1973), p. 3. It should be noted that this pamphlet estimated the Council's budget at \$2,800,000 with ten positions to be transferred to the Council from the Department. The immediate difficulties between the two bodies resulted in department budget restrictions that have impaired Northern Municipal Council's capacity to deliver the services expected of it by senior government and northern residents.

⁶³The first Council election on October 5, 1973, underscored its close relationship with the Metis Society. In four of the five electoral areas, Metis Society candidates were elected.

⁶⁴Memo from D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister, to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister, re: Northern Municipal Council (November 22, 1973), p. 1.

- ⁶⁵"A Statement to the Public," op. cit., Appendix VI.
- ⁶⁶See Northern Municipal Council Minutes, January, 1974, until January, 1975.
- ⁶⁷Memo from D.F. McArthur to D.H. Schweitzer and all Branch Directors re: Consultations with Northern Municipal Council (January 20, 1975).
- ⁶⁸Personal interview with Marcel L'Heureux, Deputy Minister, Department of Northern Saskatchewan (June 13, 1977).
- ⁶⁹The most recent illustration of this is the Department's attempt to establish a co-ordinated placement service through a contractual arrangement with Canada Manpower and Northern Municipal Council, the Council to be the delivery agency. S. Alwarid, Executive Committee Minutes (March 14, 1978), p. 2.
- ⁷⁰See Robert Hauck, Six Years Later: An Overview of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan's Programs and Accomplishments, A paper prepared for the Central Planning Unit, Department of Northern Saskatchewan (June 8, 1978), p. 38.
- ⁷¹Lawrence Yew, Welcoming Address to Northern Municipal Council Local Government Convention, June 27, 1977, in Ken Gran, The Northern Saskatchewan Local Government Convention 1977: A Report, Research and Planning, Northern Municipal Council (La Ronge, June 28, 1977), p. 11.
- ⁷²Saskatchewan Regulation 142/74 under The Department of Northern Saskatchewan Act, 1972, in the Saskatchewan Gazette (May 16, 1974).
- ⁷³Northern Municipal Council Minutes (November 27, 1974), p. 6.
- ⁷⁴Memo from Marcel L'Heureux, Deputy Minister to Honourable Ted Bowerman, Minister, re: Successor to Northern Development Advisory Council (February 22, 1977), pp. 1-4.
- ⁷⁵Justice E.D. Bayda, Dr. A.J. Groome and Dr. K.J. McCallum, The Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry Final Report, Volume II (May 29, 1978), pp. 527-540.
- ⁷⁶Memo from M.O. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister to Ted Bowerman, Minister, re: Northlands Advisory Committee (May 31, 1977), pp. 1-3.
- ⁷⁷"The Northlands Agreement," New Breed (Regina: Association of Metis and Non-Status Indians of Saskatchewan, July, 1977), p. 21.
- ⁷⁸The organizations represented on Northlands Advisory Committee were given limited funding to develop their own proposals for the Northlands Agreement.

Chapter II

COMPETING POLICY APPROACHES IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

1. Introduction

The fisheries policy area provides an excellent example of the difficulties encountered by the Department in attempting to implement innovative policy. In remote northern communities, the commercial fishing industry in 1971 was the largest employer, although the average annual income of a commercial fisherman was below \$1,500.¹ The single agency's objective to support the development of remote northern communities and their residents appeared most relevant to this industry.

However, in dealing with fisheries policy, the Department has been caught in a web of conflicting organizations and operational philosophies. Fisheries resource management was one of the most active program areas of the Department of Natural Resources while it administered northern affairs. When the Department of Northern Saskatchewan was established, parent agency responsibilities, staff and resources were transferred directly to the single agency. It immediately began operating the same programs in the same manner as the Department of Natural Resources had previously. Parallel with this transitional process, the Department has attempted to implement innovative northern fisheries policies. Competing management approaches to the northern fishery operating within the same departmental branch have resulted,

making it extremely difficult for the Department to articulate a single fisheries policy.

This chapter will explore how policy co-ordination, a central goal for the single agency, has been absent even within one branch. The competing operational philosophies which have arisen within this branch will be analyzed, particularly in their approaches to local participation in resource management and public participation in policy formulation. Finally, it will be demonstrated that the effect of intra-organizational conflict has been to defeat innovative policy making in favour of a continued incremental approach.

2. The Development of Resource Management Fisheries Policies:

An Incremental Policy Approach

The creation of the Department in 1972 without a comprehensive plan of operations meant that for some agencies the administrative machinery already in existence was simply transferred relatively intact to the new Department. This was true of the Department of Natural Resources and its Northern Affairs Branch. In fact, in its first year of operations, the new Resources Branch² of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan maintained responsibility for such varied tasks as supervising the construction of houses, conducting an industrial assistance program, and assisting northern co-operatives, all in addition to its regular, strictly resource-oriented duties.³ When these extraneous activities were transferred to other branches, Resources Branch was left with administration of programs and policies essentially identical

to those of the Department of Natural Resources. The new Resources Branch headquarters of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan even remained in Prince Albert where the old Northern Affairs Branch had previously been stationed, rather than being transferred to La Ronge along with most of the new Department. There was also almost complete continuity between Northern Affairs Branch employees and those employed by the Resources Branch.⁴ With programs, personnel and operational philosophy largely intact, the Resources Branch was merely a reorganized version of the old Northern Affairs Branch, albeit with a narrower, more manageable scope of operations.

The foundation for Resources Branch policy and operational philosophy with respect to the fishery resource emerged gradually between 1950 and 1969. Its "multi-use" policy has been designed for two purposes: to reduce conflict between the commercial fishing industry and the tourist outfitting industry, and to conserve the resource by ensuring a balanced harvest of both game fish and non-game fish species. The multi-use fisheries management strategy developed during this period used "tolerances" as a central management tool. A "tolerance" is a quota restricting the poundage of game fish commercial fishermen may take from a lake as a proportion of the total catch of those fishermen. The proportion may vary from nil to twenty-five percent and is applied where there is a conflict in resource use between commercial fishermen and tourist outfitters. Tolerances were initiated in 1959, although they were not formally established by regulation until 1969.⁵ The practice was reaffirmed by a Resources

Branch policy directive in 1974:

Where it is established the sport fishery is making efficient use of the game fish population, commercial operations will be restricted to that portion of the resource not taken by the angler.⁶

Tolerances might not be so negatively received were it not that game fish are usually more lucrative than whitefish, the mainstay of the commercial fishery.

The implementation of tolerances and other resource management policies and practices at the field level has drawn criticism from commercial fishermen, their organized representatives and personnel within the Department. In a number of instances, lakes have been arbitrarily zoned so commercial fishing operations and tourist outfitting operations do not come in contact with each other. The general complaint, particularly on the part of some department employees, has been that Conservation Officers through their ad hoc interpretations and judgments in field situations, have a "high potential for biased paternalism"⁷ which has often been translated into discrimination against commercial fishermen. As an independent study of the Northern Saskatchewan fishery noted in 1974:

It has apparently been longstanding practice for the Department [DNS and previously DNR] to informally regulate certain aspects of fishery activity. In particular, the Department has required commercial fishermen to fish only in certain areas of specific waters and to move their nets if they were catching what was deemed to be an excessive amount of game fish. Such practices should not be continued without legislative authority.⁸

The primary reason advanced for the maintenance of the multiple use policy system by Resources Branch employees is to conserve healthy

fish stocks by maintaining a balance in fish populations between game and non-game fish species. The underlying principle of resource conservation certainly has merit, especially given the relatively recent and rapid increase of pressure on a fishery resource base which, contrary to popular opinion, is not a "vast and abundant wealth." Increased accessibility to the north by road has led to an influx of tourists, who can be particularly dangerous to the resource because little control can be exercised over self-sufficient tourists compared to outfitters or commercial fishermen. Increasing pressure on the fishery resource has reinforced the beliefs of Resources Branch employees that only continued vigorous enforcement of existing policies will protect and maintain the resource. Despite continuous criticism and proposed alternatives to the multiple-use management approach, Resources Branch employees remain firmly committed to it.⁹

This policy approach is fundamentally incremental in nature. The basic multiple-use policy approach, which has existed for twenty years, guides field officers and senior management. Policy adjustment is based on isolated, ad hoc decisions dependent on personal judgments about particular situations.¹⁰

Recent attempts to implement an innovative fisheries management system have been directed primarily at problems with the commercial fishing industry. Its most fundamental difficulty has been the rapidly inflating cost of production in the face of relatively stable returns from fish products. From 1970 to 1975, prices received by fishermen rose approximately eight percent, while nets and other supplies

— increased in price by more than fifty percent. Air transportation costs increased by approximately forty percent and fuel costs have risen dramatically.¹¹ The result of this cost-price squeeze and other associated difficulties was noted by an inter-agency task force on the freshwater fisheries which, in 1975, reported that:

. . . many fisheries . . . particularly remote northern fisheries are economically non-viable. The problem is becoming so critical that the termination of fishing operations in certain regions is regarded as a certainty.¹²

The significance of commercial fishing for the northern economy should not be underestimated. At least a thousand individuals still participate in the industry, and for them, fifty-six percent of aggregate earned income is derived directly from fishing.¹³ Yet, one study in 1975 estimated that even if the number of fishermen on some lakes were reduced by sixty percent, the average annual income of the remainder could be increased from only approximately \$300 to \$1,000.¹⁴

The difficult and unfortunate circumstances of this industry indicate that the days have passed when commercial fishing could be considered a traditional economic activity. However, it is still a crucial economic activity in remote northern communities, and most of those involved do wish to continue commercial fishing.¹⁵ Recognition that the industry is still prominent in the north and that the traditional multiple-use management policy has worked against commercial fishermen led the Department to support the development of an alternative fishery resource management strategy.

3. The Fisheries Development Program: An Innovative Policy System

An alternate fisheries management strategy was an important component of Policy and Planning Branch's attempt to develop integrated and innovative northern development policy. By 1973, some of its employees were beginning to formulate plans for "rational resource utilization and management" within the fishery.¹⁶ The "understood objectives of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan" regarding fishery resource utilization were outlined at a workshop attended by various Government officials as follows:

- (1) To maximize economic returns, with due attention to preserving the quality of the environment;
- (2) To aim development programs specifically at people already living in the north; [and]
- (3) To maximize participation by northerners in decisions which affect their way of life.¹⁷

The first step in actually realizing these objectives was the contracting of the Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries Study to a Winnipeg consulting firm "to formulate a comprehensive plan for the continuing rational development of the fisheries resource." As the study noted:

The fundamental premise of the proposed study is that resources should be managed as means to social and economic ends and not as ends in themselves.¹⁸

The study was clearly intended to identify a development strategy for the northern fishery. Thus it broke radically from past government efforts which focused on simply maintaining the resource and permitted ad hoc policy implementation to affect commercial fishing adversely.

As the Resource Management Consultant for Policy and Planning asserted:

. . . the [proposed Management] System would put the Department in a position to continually assess all fishery resource uses, and all factors affecting these uses. All fishery management, planning and development activities would be integrated through an active allocation process specifically designed to incorporate public participation.¹⁹

The planning and management system being proposed was innovative in nature; it can be described as a rational process for formulating and administering policy.²⁰ Government's overall objectives for northern policy were identified and applied to the fishery resource, so that fisheries policy was to maximize benefits for those who made northern Saskatchewan their home. The management system was to assess all fishing resource uses in totality, to inform resource users about the policy alternatives which could be implemented, and to allow them a critical say regarding specific resource allocations.

It was recognized that to establish such a comprehensive proposal as the Fisheries Management System, a high degree of intra-departmental co-operation was necessary. Thus a Branch Heads Fisheries Planning Committee was established in November, 1973, to aid implementation of the Fisheries Management System. A fairly critical decision approved by the Committee was

. . . that the Fisheries Management System and Development Strategy be developed and implemented as an integrated unit without fragmentation within the Department.²¹

The decision to establish the Fisheries Management System in an integrated, non-fragmented manner had significant implications for several branches, but primarily for the Resources Branch which was responsible for ongoing operations, and supported the incremental, multiple-use policy system.

The requirement to orient these employees into the new system was duly noted by the Branch Heads Fisheries Planning Committee.²² Nevertheless, the failure to incorporate Resources Branch employees into the new Fisheries Management System became a critical factor precluding its implementation.

As the first step in attempting to establish rational fisheries policy, the Minister in February, 1974, introduced a \$500,000 Fisheries Development Program with the triple objectives of creating greater returns to people in the fishing industry, creating greater employment in the industry, and providing better protection of the fishery resource.²³ The importance of this program to the Department was underlined by the Minister's remarks to the annual meeting of Co-operative Fisheries Limited:

. . . this program will represent the most significant development opportunity ever initiated in the Canadian inland fisheries outside of the Great Lakes Frankly, I know of no other government which has dedicated itself to such a degree to furthering fisheries development and to promoting an open rapport with meaningful participation by all those involved in the industry.²⁴

Gordon Koshinsky, the Resource Management Consultant in Policy and Planning Branch, became head of the Fisheries Development Unit in the Resources Branch which was charged with implementing the new fisheries development program. The existing fisheries management system was maintained. While the new fisheries program could and did undertake several "immediate action" initiatives,²⁵ it had not yet developed to the point where the existing system could be replaced

in its entirety.²⁶ The existence of these two management systems has provided a focus for intra-branch conflict.

4. The Implications of Competing Management Approaches

One of the primary causes of intra-branch conflict was the ambiguous definition of specific program responsibilities between the existing management system and the Fisheries Development Unit. The Resource Services component of Resources Branch maintained responsibility for:

. . . fishery policy interpretation and implementation, the provision and the maintenance of fisheries statistical records, the carrying out of an adequate liaison with departmental field staff, fishermen and fishery agencies and undertaking several special projects pertinent to fishery program [sic].²⁷

At the same time, the Fisheries Development Program was supposed "to provide an ongoing administrative and planning capacity for fisheries program development and management."²⁸ For the first while, it seemed clear that Resource Services was to continue its management system while the Fisheries Development Unit was to work out the operating details and gradually implement an alternate management system. However, two separate administrative units existed, responsible for the same policy area. There was little or nothing to demarcate their specific areas of functional authority or to serve as guideposts for a transitional implementation process to the new management system.

This situation could not continue indefinitely. As the Fisheries Development Program began delivering services to the same

clientele as the traditional resource management unit was administering conflicts arose and began to make it impossible for the Department to articulate a single fisheries policy. As an internal evaluation of the Fisheries Development Program noted:

. . . most of the functions of the Management Group are either being or will be carried out by the Development Group. This overlapping of mandates and work is leading to confusion and frustrations on the part of both groups. The lack of communications, especially regarding allocations at the community level, is producing conflict and harm to the functioning of both programs and is creating a bad image for the Department in the communities.²⁹

Thus the continued duplication of policy responsibilities has formed the backdrop against which most of the specific disagreements over substantive policy have occurred. The existence of an unworkable administrative structure, with no clear understanding of when, how or even if the organizational components were to be merged meant that each group came to perceive very clearly that its survival as an administrative unit was at stake. The struggle for organizational survival has focused on resource use issues, primarily on the question of local participation in resource management.

The operational philosophy of Resources Management Division held that only through vigorous enforcement of existing regulations could conflict between various fishery resource users be managed and resource conservation ensured.³⁰ This emphasis on resource conservation has implied a limited role for resource users, since their activities are only significant insofar as resource conservation is concerned. On the other hand, the Fisheries Development group has insisted that

northern residents engaged in the fishing industry be able to determine resource allocation among themselves at the community level. Such an allocation mechanism had been recommended by the 1974 Fisheries Study as an essential component of any rational resource management system. Thus the Fisheries Development group established community resource allocation committees on a pilot project basis during the first years of their program's operation.

It was over the existence and potential functions of community resource allocation committees that the Management and Development Divisions revealed their strongest differences. In theory, these committees were to represent all potential resource users in a given location. These people or their representatives were to determine who could fish by having authority over the issuing of fishing licenses. It was proposed that local allocations committees would have access to information regarding species populations by year and class, thus facilitating rational decisions regarding optimum resource use.³¹

However, continual fears have been raised by Fisheries Management employees that powers of this nature delegated to the local level would result in discrimination by commercial fishermen against outfitting operators. Since commercial fishing interests are more often numerically predominant at the local level, it has been asserted that skewed resource utilization would prevail, and fish populations would be adversely affected.³² These arguments, however, are quite academic because the allocation committees have not yet been able to function as was originally intended. Advocates of resource allocation committees have

countered Fisheries Management arguments by saying that given adequate information about general lake limitations, local resource users will allocate local resources to ensure future viability.

The Department has not been able to specify and support the role of community resource allocation committees largely because of conflict between the Management and Development divisions. While the Fisheries Development group operated several of its employees were actively engaged in field work. This extension program involved travelling into communities, establishing liaison with local fishermen, and encouraging them to play a more active role in allocating local resources. In a number of cases, decisions reached by local fishermen with the aid and support of Development group employees were subsequently altered or ignored by Conservation Officers responding to the wishes of senior Management Division employees.³³ These incidents have exposed the fundamental philosophical differences between the competing administrative units about the most appropriate role for local participation in resource use decisions.

One reason these philosophical differences became so significant in the intra-branch dispute is the equivocal nature of senior management policy statements. When the Minister announced the development program on February 28, 1974, he said:

The second stated development policy is to promote and encourage to the fullest extent possible, community participation in fishery resource allocation, in fishery development and in resolution of local problems.³⁴

The Development Group employees perceived that in light of the Department's mandate to decentralize decision making to the local level, people in the

communities had the right to control access to the resource. They viewed the actions of some Conservation Officers as undermining the authority of local committees and defeating the Department's mandate. The management division, on the other hand, accused employees in Fisheries Development of actively encouraging people in the communities to believe they actually owned the resource. Moreover, management group employees interpreted the community resource allocation program in general as a violation in some sense of the principle that the Province owns natural resources.³⁵

The Minister himself reinforced Resource Management employees' fears that these committees would discriminate against tourist outfitters. At a meeting between the Minister and the Co-operative Fisheries Limited, the co-operative body presented a brief calling for an end to departmental policies that discriminated in favour of tourist outfitting operations. The Minister responded by interpreting these remarks as meaning that commercial fishermen ultimately wished to shut tourist camps down, in spite of vigorous protests by commercial fishermen there against that interpretation.³⁶

The disagreement over the role of local participation in determining resource use demonstrated the continuing polarization of attitudes and beliefs on the part of employees in both administrative units. The lack of a clearly defined jurisdiction between the two units made conflicts at the field level inevitable, and each incident in turn served to reinforce the beliefs of all concerned. These beliefs were intensified because all of the individuals in Development and Management

groups remained essentially the same from 1974 until 1977. Senior employees in Fisheries Management were all transferred from the Department of Natural Resources, while all Fisheries Development employees were new recruits unattached to northern administration prior to the Department of Northern Saskatchewan's creation.³⁷ These new employees tended to regard Fisheries Management personnel and Conservation Officers as part of the "neocolonial" administration which existed before 1972.³⁸ In turn, Fisheries Development employees were viewed as "shit disturbers." This animosity hampered all activities carried out by employees in both programs. In a situation where close co-operation between units was an obvious requirement, the policies administered by these groups were doomed to failure. As the recent internal evaluation of the fisheries program noted:

Given the confusion which exists now regarding our resource allocation procedures and policy (even within the Department) and the lack of commitment/ understanding for the role of these Local Allocation Committees, the program is useless and/or frustrating to both staff, fishermen and outfitters.³⁹

Since this situation went unresolved, it was natural that staff turnover should finally "solve" it. In a submission to the Executive Committee in November, 1976, the Department was requested by the Fisheries Development leader to approve complete implementation of the Fisheries Management System with all its policy and organizational implications.⁴⁰ The Executive Committee was unable to decide, and instead requested further information from Resources Branch. The matter has not been formally raised since. However, the Fisheries Development Program leader left the Department for two years beginning

in the summer of 1977. Over the course of the following year, many of the remaining Fisheries Development personnel left. As of early 1978, the program is under the direction of a senior Fisheries Management employee who formerly resisted it vigorously. This change in personnel means that for the foreseeable future, no attempt will be made to implement the Fisheries Management System. The staff now responsible for the Fisheries Development Program are not committed to its concepts. Without consciously trying, the Department finally "integrated" the two management systems by failing to implement the Management System conclusively. A number of original Fisheries Development programs are still operational, but these are peripheral to the central concepts of the resource use system originated by Policy and Planning Branch in 1973.

It is apparent from this analysis that all levels of the fisheries policy process have been seriously harmed. The duplication of policy responsibilities within Resources Branch meant that the separate administrative units established were allowed to go their own way, making eventual integration impossible. As each group became more entrenched in its position, it became progressively more difficult for the Department to make decisions about substantive fisheries policy, let alone the organizational structure required to administer such policy. Finally, the implementation of fisheries policy at the community level has been confused and incoherent; separate components of the same branch of the same Department have attempted to administer contradictory programs for their clients and to rationalize these to more senior officials in the Department.

This illustrates a central point about the policy process in the Department of Northern Saskatchewan. In policy areas where previous agencies have had a significant impact on the north, their incremental policy "systems" and processes have prevailed over innovative policy initiatives proposed and developed within the Department. In the process of transition, the Department incorporated some of these agencies as a first step in its creation. These agencies and their personnel have had the first and predominant influence in their respective policy areas, and have imposed serious constraints on the single agency's ability to implement innovative policy.

5. Public Participation in Policy Formulation

Two relatively well-established interest groups have been involved in northern fisheries-related issues: the Northern Saskatchewan Outfitters Association representing the outfitting industry, and Co-operative Fisheries Limited representing commercial fishermen. The Outfitters Association is composed of outfitters operating in northern areas, though residency in the area is not a prerequisite for membership. Co-operative Fisheries Limited, established in 1959, is a producers' co-operative. Once involved in marketing and processing member fishermen's produce, the co-operative has recently curtailed its processing and ceased marketing as a result of the Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation's establishment.⁴¹

The extent and significance of these two interest groups' attempts to influence government policy in their favour cannot be

estimated with a high degree of certainty. However, for the most part they have only attempted to affect government policy incrementally.⁴² The most obvious opportunity to encourage policy adjustment has occurred at annual meetings of the Outfitters Association and Co-op Fisheries. Resolutions considered at these meetings have generally dealt with fairly specific, locally oriented issues such as allowances established on a particular lake, or problems encountered with a local agent of Co-op Fisheries. Two exceptions to this general pattern have been outfitters' complaints that government policies favour commercial fishermen and very broad issues not particularly resolvable solely within the provincial context. Two examples in the latter category include the concern expressed over the general impact of pollution and industrial development on natural resources and the preoccupation of commercial fishermen with the Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation, particularly since 1974.⁴³

Government officials from a number of federal and provincial departments are always present at such conventions. The resolutions are noted and usually draw comment by memo from an appropriate government official. During the remainder of the year, personnel in the respective organizations and the relevant government agencies keep in touch. The only definite indication of these organizations' impact is that the Outfitters Association is regarded quite favourably in the Prince Albert Resource Management office.⁴⁴

It is difficult to say whether the generally incremental approach of the interest groups toward policy is a result of the incremental

policy approach of the Resources Branch, or is a result simply of their members' predispositions. Certainly Resources Branch's incremental policy-making approach has led relevant interest groups to concentrate on incremental policy adjustments. However, the predominance of very localized policy adjustment requests leads to the conclusion that members of such interest groups are interested in specific, individual economic problems, and perceive their organization's annual conventions as a means of communicating policy adjustment requests to government officials. In any case, Co-operative Fisheries Limited and the Outfitters Association as organizations have not become heavily involved in formulating the innovative proposals initiated from the Fisheries Development Program.

The concern of the Policy and Planning Branch for extensive public participation in policy formulation has been reflected in many aspects of the Fisheries Development Program. In the early stages of developing an innovative fisheries management strategy, affected resource users were closely involved. For example, in conducting the 1974 Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries Study, Gordon Koshinsky established a steering committee with client representatives. As he noted in a letter to one of the prospective committee members:

The driving motive for the study is the particular plight and opportunities of the commercial fishing industry, with particular concern for the primary producers. To ensure that the study is conducted along lines acceptable to the people actually producing and handling the fish, it is my intention that we establish, as soon as possible, a steering committee.⁴⁵

The Committee was composed of three members, one nominated by Co-operative

Fisheries Limited, another from the Northern Saskatchewan Outfitters Association, and a third from a privately owned Buffalo Narrows processing plant.⁴⁶ The Committee met on four occasions to review work of the consulting firm on the proposed Management Study.

It is difficult to assess the impact committee members may have had on the study's final recommendations. However, the central function of the committee was to keep committee members and the resource users they were representing informed of the study's status. In this manner, new fisheries policy and the programs subsequently developed were sanctioned by the people most directly affected by such policy. Clearly, when proposals with far-reaching implications are considered by government, those immediately affected must be convinced that the proposals will be of benefit to themselves. The advisory committee was a significant step toward this end. All committee members gave their approval to the study and appear to have been fairly effective in registering their specific concerns regarding fishery resource use with the consultants.⁴⁷

The concern for systematic public participation did not end with the advisory committee. One of the first activities conducted under the Fisheries Development Program was the creation of two development committees, one representing the outfitting industry and the other representing the commercial fishery industry. The manner in which these committees have functioned and their relationship with both government and established interest groups representing these industries affords an interesting example of one form of public participation available to government.

The Tourist Sport Fisheries Development Committee met for the first time on March 27, 1974. From the beginning, it was clear that most of the people on the committee were there to represent the Northern Saskatchewan Outfitters Association. This close relationship was illustrated in the following decision taken at the first meeting.

. . . if consensus could not be reached among the outfitters representing the Association, the item would be referred to the Association Executive for decision.⁴⁸

The relatively low profile of the Development Committee was largely a result of the relationship between Committee members and the Association. Because Committee members were acting simply as spokesmen for the Outfitters Association, little room for independent judgment or initiative existed. More fundamentally, the Tourist Development Committee was being asked for comment on a Management System and Development Strategy which, though applicable to all resource users, dealt in practice primarily with commercial fishermen.

In addition, the focus of the Development Committee on comprehensive questions regarding innovative policy apparently has not been sufficiently specific or immediate to engage the attention of the Outfitters Association. The Fisheries Development Program leader in fact had to prod the tourist committee into meeting more often to keep up with the Commercial Fishery Development Committee's success in making recommendations to Government on policy questions.⁴⁹ His efforts did not meet with spectacular success. Although the Committee did begin meeting more regularly for a time, outfitters on the Committee have remained preoccupied with the problems of their own industry and have

not been willing to consider implementing a management system for all aspects of resource administration. Established outfitters have even protested that specific study proposals would threaten their livelihood if implemented. Thus they have spent time reacting against aspects of the management system rather than contributing to the system's implementation in a manner favourable to them.⁵⁰

By contrast, the Commercial Fisheries Development Committee was much more effective than its counterpart for the tourist outfitting industry. Both committees met approximately ten times. However, recommendations to the Minister have followed from eight of ten Commercial Fisheries Development Committee meetings, whereas only two of nine Tourist Sport Fisheries Development Committee meetings resulted in such recommendations.⁵¹

Commercial fishermen have been involved in determining the mechanics of implementing several Government initiatives in the commercial fishing industry, most notably among these the transportation subsidy program established in 1975.⁵² The committee's effectiveness was a result of two factors. First, it was obvious for several years prior to initiating the Fisheries Development Program that the commercial fishing industry was in need of assistance. Thus commercial fishermen have been receptive to official attempts to develop innovative policies applicable to their industry. Moreover, the greater attention paid to commercial fishing by staff of the Fisheries Development Program undoubtedly contributed to the Committee's effectiveness.

It is also interesting to note that Co-operative Fisheries Limited has been more receptive to the implementation of the Fisheries Management System and the development committee than the Northern Saskatchewan Outfitters Association. Committee members regularly reported developments to the Co-op Fisheries Board of Directors and Annual Meetings, and Co-op Fisheries has always expressed confidence in those members delegated by it to the Committee.⁵³ These members have been free to speak on behalf of the industry as they have seen fit. The lack of concern by Co-op Fisheries for specific Development Committee deliberations can, in part, be attributed to the rather close liaison established between the Fisheries Development employees, the consultant for the Study and Co-op Fisheries members and staff. The government representatives and technical personnel regularly attended Co-op Fisheries Board meetings and communicated Committee deliberations in an informal manner to the interest group.

The activities of both development committees stand in sharp contrast to public participation in policy formulation prevalent prior to the Fisheries Development Program. The innovative nature of the policy proposals originating from the Fisheries Development group required extensive client knowledge and acceptance to be successful. Moreover, the objectives of the innovative fisheries policy approach implied a view of public participation which was in sharp contrast to the incremental resource management approach. If one agrees, as the Fisheries Development Program personnel did, that the resource must be managed with social and economic ends in mind, then clearly the

resource users become fairly critical components in resource management policy formulation. The Resource Management employees' beliefs that the primary goal of resource management is preservation of the resource has led to a situation where social and economic values have not been consciously included in policy formulation. Their concern for resource management and conservation as pre-eminent goals implies that resource users have only a limited role to play in formulating policy.

It is also clear that where established interest groups are concerned primarily with incremental policy, it is sound strategy for an innovative agency to break from the existing incremental policy process framework while maintaining contact with the relevant interest groups in some manner. The environment of "development committees" in this case ensured that proposals were dealt with directly, in relative isolation from potentially distracting issues or inter-organizational disputes. Representatives of relevant interests were encouraged to provide candid reactions to proposals, to give the agency some sense of confidence in its activities, and to give the proposals credibility before client groups were affected.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has explored a policy area that has caused Department of Northern Saskatchewan officials considerable grief. The Department's difficulties began when fisheries' responsibilities were transferred from the Department of Natural Resources to the new single agency. Since Natural Resources' programs and operating personnel remained largely

intact, the Department of Northern Saskatchewan encountered severe difficulties in introducing innovative policies throughout the field of natural resource utilization. The Resources Branch employees have demonstrated reluctance and even active opposition to concepts that are perceived as threatening to their "modus operandi." The failure to demarcate administrative responsibilities clearly between the two units with jurisdiction for northern fisheries meant that the established unit became progressively more entrenched. At the same time, the innovative group created in 1974 attempted to fulfill its mandate by expanding into the former unit's administrative territory. The result was a duplication of policy responsibility which complicated the northern fisheries policy process to the point of absurdity.

This has been demonstrated most vividly in the philosophical differences over resource use, particularly regarding resource allocation at the local level. The established unit continued to administer local allocation through Conservation Officers stationed throughout the North. Traditionally, the actions of these officers have resulted in a resource use bias in favour of tourist outfitters as opposed to commercial fishermen. The Fisheries Development unit was committed to managing the resource for more equitable social and economic ends, as well as for environmental goals. It has asserted that local resource use decisions are most appropriately made by people residing in northern communities. The inability to reconcile these contrasting approaches resulted in a process of policy administration largely unintelligible to those being served by the Department. Recently the situation has

been "solved" by the Department refusing to commit itself exclusively to the policies of the innovative unit, which sparked sufficient staff turnover to halt intra-branch rivalry.

While such rivalry existed, there was also a substantial difference between the units' approaches to policy formulation. The established unit, operating within an incremental framework, utilized an incremental approach to policy formulation that relied heavily on specific, largely locally oriented inputs toward policy adjustment from the two major interest groups concerned with the northern fishery. This incremental framework helped preclude consideration of innovative policy changes. The new administrative group was established with the intent of implementing substantial policy changes. Its approach was comprehensive and innovative; all factors affecting fishery use were to be assessed by their proposed management strategy. Since public participation was an integral part of the proposed management strategy, its design and implementation were considered by committees designed expressly for achieving public participation. Although the relevant "interests" were represented in these committees, the interest groups per se were only minimally involved, as much because of their own relative lack of interest as the Development Group's need to utilize non-incrementally oriented avenues for public participation.

The diffuse fisheries policy process paralyzed decision making for sometime, and finally an incremental policy-making approach prevailed over innovative policy and policy making. This is of great interest, because the rational policy process for fisheries management originated

by the Policy and Planning Branch stands as the clearest example of innovative policy formulation in the Department. Thus, its final demise clearly establishes the incremental nature of the Department's approach to policy formulation.

Notes to Chapter II

¹See Gordon Koshinsky, "Policy and Related Implications for Proposed Management System for Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries." Paper prepared for Cabinet Planning Committee (November 12, 1973), p. 2. The paper noted that commercial fishing accounted for 28% of earned income outside the government sector in 1971 in the North, though the value per fisherman of fish caught was \$1,234.

²Although something of a misnomer, the Branch was originally called the Resource Development Branch; it will be referred to throughout by its present name, the Resources Branch.

³Annual Report of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan, 1972-73, pp. 8-9.

⁴When the new Department was established, 80 former employees of the Department of Natural Resources became some of the first Department of Northern Saskatchewan employees, all of them in the Resource Branch.

⁵Although no more tolerances have been applied since 1974 because of protests by commercial fishermen, there are still some 70 lakes in the north with tolerances. "Game Fish Tolerances," undated statement from Resources Branch files, pp. 1-2; and G.E. Couldwell, Director of Fisheries, Department of Natural Resources, "Policy Statement: Sport plus Commercial Fisheries" (circa. 1972).

⁶Policy Directive from Department of Northern Saskatchewan Policy and Procedure Manual re: Fishery Resource Utilization prepared by Resource Development Branch (May 1, 1974), p. 1.

⁷Gordon Koshinsky, Fisheries Development Program leader, "Executive Committee Item: Fisheries Allocation" (December 17, 1976), p. 2.

⁸R.R. Andrews and R.E. England, RPC Ltd., Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries Study, A Report Prepared for the Department of Northern Saskatchewan and the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (Winnipeg, May, 1974), pp. 7-9.

⁹Resources Branch employees who were formerly Department of Natural Resources employees all expressed very similar views toward resource management, regardless of their place in the Resource Branch hierarchy. Personal interviews with Jim Clouthier, Resource Management Division Director (February 17, 1977); Pete Edwards and Doug Walton, employees of the Fisheries Management group, Resource Management Division (February 18, 1977); Stan Shannon, Buffalo Narrows Regional

Director, Resource Management Division (June 14, 1977); and Norm Hook, Creighton Regional Director, Resource Management Division (March 2, 1977).

¹⁰Policy adjustments made within the multi-use policy framework have been very minor. A memo from P.H. Edwards, Resource Administrator II to J.W. Clouthier, Director of Resource Development re: "Fisheries Policy and Legislation" (October 24, 1973) listed six proposed policy changes for the northern fishery. Of the six "changes," two had been implemented already for a year, two others were "minor changes from DNR policy, while the other two related to fur-farm fishing and fish farming. These latter two changes were well within the existing policy framework.

¹¹Accurate and comprehensive statistics are not readily available to demonstrate this point, though all concerned concur on the extent and seriousness of the problem. The statistics here are from a letter written by L.A. Hunter, General Manager, Co-operative Fisheries Limited to J. Twardy, Chief Assessment Officer, Workman's Compensation Board (March 26, 1975).

¹²Federal-Provincial Task Force on the Commercial Fishing Industry in the Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation's Area of Operations, p. 14.

¹³Shakir Alwarid, Chief Planning Officer, DNS, "Evaluation of the Fisheries Program" (February 16, 1977), p. 1.

¹⁴"Too Many Fishermen--Not Enough Fish," The Northerner (La Ronge, January 23, 1975), p. 3.

¹⁵Shakir Alwarid, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁶See Peter Brook and Gordon Koshinsky, "Draft Summary of a Workshop on Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries held at La Ronge" (July 3-6, 1973), pp. 1-6.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 1-2.

¹⁸R.R. Andrews and R.E. England, op. cit., p. 8.1.

¹⁹G.D. Koshinsky, "A Proposed Management System and Development Strategy for Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries," A summary proposal prepared for Branch Heads Meeting (December 10, 1973), p. 1.

²⁰Rational policy making has been described by analysts such as Lindblom, Etzioni, Lowi and Anderson. Please refer to the lengthy discussion in Chapter I.

²¹Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Branch Heads Fisheries Planning Committee (January 30, 1974), p. 6.

²²Minutes of Fisheries Planning Committee Meeting Number Three (February 18, 1974), p. 4.

²³Press Release: "Fisheries Development Program Announced," Saskatchewan Government Information Services (Regina, February 28, 1974), p. 1.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 1-3.

²⁵These immediate-action activities were designed to improve commercial fishermen's income by developing fishermen's managerial skill, reducing cullage and improving quality, developing a more sensitive quota system, and controlling the use of small gillnet meshes. Minutes of Meeting Number 2, Advisory Committee to the Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries Study (Buffalo Narrows, October 3, 1973), p. 2.

²⁶Gordon Koshinsky has estimated that the objective of developing "The Department of Northern Saskatchewan management capability (Management System) such that the significance of all factors affecting returns to the client groups can be appraised, and an optimum mix of developmental activities can be identified and programmed, "would be achieved by 1977." G.D. Koshinsky, "Summary of a Proposed Management System and Development Strategy . . ." (November 30, 1973), p. 5.

²⁷Resources Branch Budget, 1975-76, XX, Fisheries, 5. Purpose.

²⁸Ibid., XXIII, Fisheries Development Program, 5. Purpose.

²⁹Shakir Alwarid, op. cit., p. 22.

³⁰This has been confirmed by interviews with Jim Clouthier, Director, Resource Management Division (February 17, 1977); Doug Walton and Pete Edwards, employees of the Resource Management Division (February 18, 1977).

³¹See R.R. Andrews and R.E. England, "A Proposed Management System and Development Strategy for Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries (September 1973), pp. 3-8.

³²Interviews with Clouthier, Walton and Edwards, op. cit.

³³Ibid., and from interviews with John Piper, former Fisheries Development employee (June 8, 1977), and Gordon Koshinsky, Fisheries Development Program leader (March 10, 1977).

³⁴ Press release, op. cit., p. 2.

³⁵ Interviews, op. cit.

³⁶ Speech by G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan to Co-operative Fisheries Limited Annual Meeting, Prince Albert (March 23, 1977).

³⁷ Department of Northern Saskatchewan Budget, 1974-75, Staff Establishment Summary.

³⁸ Interviews with Koshinsky and Piper, op. cit.

³⁹ Shakir Alwarid, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴⁰ Executive Committee Decision Sheet, Item 54.5, "Fisheries Allocation" (November 27, 1976), p. 3.

⁴¹ The Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation is a federal crown corporation established in 1969 to provide for the orderly marketing of inland commercial fishermen's produce. Its activities have been highly criticized to the extent that the Saskatchewan Government has considered becoming independent of the Corporation.

⁴² This judgment comes as a result of scanning Northern Saskatchewan Outfitters' Minutes of Annual Meetings, 1974-77, and Co-operative Fisheries Limited's Minutes of Annual Meetings, 1972-76.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Interview with Jim Clouthier, op. cit.

⁴⁵ Letter from Gordon D. Koshinsky, Resource Management Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch to Mr. Richard Waite, Buffalo Narrows (June 15, 1973).

⁴⁶ Memo from G.D. Koshinsky, Resource Management Consultant to B.R. Hill, Director, Policy and Planning re: Meeting Number One, Advisory Committee, Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries Study (July 13, 1973).

⁴⁷ Based on memos from Koshinsky to Hill re: Advisory Committee, Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries Study (July 17, October 3, December 7, 1973; January 22, 1974).

⁴⁸ Minutes of Meeting Number One, Tourist Sport Fisheries Development Committee (March 27-28, 1974), p. 1.

⁴⁹Minutes of Meeting Number Four, Tourist Sport Fisheries Development Committee (November 1, 1974), p. 1.

⁵⁰Minutes of Meeting Number Seven, Tourist Sport Fisheries Development Committee (January 16-17, 1975), pp. 1-6 demonstrate this effectively.

⁵¹Minutes of Meetings of Tourist Sport Fisheries Committee and Northern Saskatchewan Commercial Fisheries Development Committee.

⁵²Minutes of Meeting Number Five, Northern Saskatchewan Commercial Fisheries Development Committee (January 14, 1975), pp. 1-2; and Minutes of Meeting Number Eight, Commercial Fisheries Development Committee (June 19, 1975), pp. 2-4.

⁵³See Minutes from Co-operative Fisheries Limited Board of Directors' Meetings, July 30, 1974 to October, 1976.

Chapter III

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY: COMMUNITY COLLEGES IN THE NORTH

1. Introduction

An integral component of the Province's northern development program is to improve the education and skills of northern adults so they may participate in development opportunities. Adult education is closely linked to almost all aspects of northern development. For example, the capacity of most northern local governments to assume levels of responsibility equivalent to similarly sized local governments in southern Saskatchewan is constrained by the lack of formal skills possessed by their elected members, employees, and constituents. This, in turn, has a profound impact on the inclination of the Department to promote local decision making and on the eagerness of local residents to assume such responsibilities. Economic development opportunities, when made available to northern residents, are often failures partly because northern entrepreneurs do not possess adequate management expertise.

The Department has made educational and training programs a high priority; the total budget for educational expenditures during the past three years has been slightly less than one-third of the total ordinary departmental expenditures.¹ These expenditures, of course, may not produce higher educational levels for a generation or more, and such improvement depends highly on the existence of

employment that is related to the education being provided. This is even more true of adult education than of academic education. Approximately half of the Northern School Board's students drop out before grade six;² hence, adult education programs must be linked directly to the creation of employment opportunities.

Community colleges were established in northern Saskatchewan as a means through which northerners' level of education and skill attainment could be increased. However, this chapter will demonstrate that northern colleges have not provided adequate education for northern adults. Because northern community colleges have not taken unique northern needs into account, they have become incapable of being comprehensive and innovative institutions through which northerners can obtain the skills they need to participate fully in northern development. Moreover, the Department of Northern Saskatchewan developed a duplicate adult education delivery system, resulting in considerable confusion and wasted efforts. The chapter will also illustrate how the exercise of Ministerial discretion has frustrated local decision making in college affairs and how northern interest groups have affected policy decision making.

2. Community Colleges and Northern Priorities

The Saskatchewan system of community colleges was planned by the Department of Continuing Education shortly after the New Democratic Party electoral victory in 1971. Community colleges were designed to help "reinforce a sense of community" by providing educational services

to people in communities as they requested them, thus "breaking from the usual pattern of bringing people to centres of education services."³

A decentralized, locally controlled system of adult education was the intended end result. Courses were to be provided to individuals in their own communities according to their educational requirements as they perceived them, utilizing whatever educational facilities existed and utilizing local people as instructors for those courses whenever possible. When technical, vocational or university courses were requested, these were to be arranged through contracts between the community college and technical schools or universities, thereby maintaining the community base of such programs.⁴ Local control was to be achieved by appointing persons residing in the region serviced by the college to community college boards which were to:

. . . formulate general policies for the college concerning the organization, administration, operation and courses of instruction of the college; authorize and make provision for the various programs of instruction and other educational activities of the college; be responsible for expenditures made by it for the operation of the college from the funds provided, and account for these expenditures⁵

These boards were to be appointed and hold office at the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, meaning in effect the Minister of Continuing Education.⁶

In addition to decentralizing control of adult education, the community colleges were to aid in community development by hiring community development workers. All aspects of adult education would be co-ordinated by colleges at the community level. Particularly in

rural areas, colleges were to "serve as a mechanism for the maintenance and development of a viable way of life" through "strengthening and preserving . . . provincial and community values."⁷

Community colleges were developed primarily with southern and rural needs in mind. However, the emphasis on a decentralized approach to education, community development, and local control appeared especially relevant to northern Saskatchewan. As the program consultant responsible for education in Policy and Planning Branch noted:

The Community College for the north could be, in my opinion, the first step to "deschooling" the centralized and institutionalized concept of community education. More specifically, the Community Colleges for Northern Saskatchewan can provide a unique learning and service opportunities [sic] The special problems and unique features of the north, as distinct from the southern region of the province, can be met through a differential approach in curriculum and field instruction.⁸

Community development and local control of college affairs were also stressed strongly by the first principal of the La Ronge Region Community College. In a policy statement prepared for the College, he described a system of Local Management Committees elected in each community served by the College. These committees were to be responsible for almost all components of adult education in their communities: determining programs, preparing and submitting community adult education budgets, assisting in the selection of staff and building or acquiring educational facilities.⁹

However, community colleges and their potentially unique educational emphasis have not been utilized to meet northern educational needs. To appreciate this, the contrast between educational needs in northern

and southern Saskatchewan must be understood. In early 1973, the Director of Policy and Planning Branch noted that Mr. MacMurphy, the Minister of Continuing Education:

. . . seems to be moving toward putting a very heavy reliance on the Community Colleges Program at the expense of operating large technical and vocational institutes. He seems to be moving towards having Community Colleges become responsible for all training programs in their communities.¹⁰

While this position could be taken in the south where community colleges have ready access to technical and vocational training facilities,¹¹ such an emphasis in the North was less feasible because of the poor access to technical training institutes.

A primary concern in northern Saskatchewan has been and continues to be for the creation of employment opportunities in which northerners can participate. Viewed from this perspective, considerable emphasis must be placed on education and training directly related to employment. This, in turn, implies two major types of training experiences appropriate for the north: training on the job, and technical or vocational education to develop a skilled labour force. While in theory on-the-job training could be administered through community colleges, the administrative and budgetary restraints imposed on colleges by the departments of Continuing Education and Northern Saskatchewan through the Community Colleges Act have served as a severe impediment to training on-the-job projects. In the south, community colleges were never intended to deliver extensive and direct employment-related training themselves. A Colleges Branch official reporting on the community college concept to the Deputy Minister, commented:

The concept of the community college does not extend to this level and should not, or it will lose the unique perspective Saskatchewan has developed. The implications of employment-oriented training are in direct contrast to the philosophical recommendations for the community college.¹²

The question of whether northern community colleges should become more extensively involved in creating skills for wage employment has been central in the continuing debate over expansion of La Ronge Regional Community College into a technical institute. College principals and boards have long advocated college expansion while the Department has vigorously resisted such expansion. Department officials have been concerned that a technical institute located in La Ronge might not be any more acceptable and accessible to northern residents than existing facilities in centres around the Saskatchewan northland's perimeter such as Meadow Lake, Fort MacMurray, Yellowknife and Flin Flon. Although the debate over a northern technical institute has gone on for more than three years and the Department has recently undertaken feasibility studies for a northern technical institute, a final decision has not been made on whether such an institute should be established, and what its scope and role should be.¹²

Thus, community colleges in the north are something of a paradox. On one hand, the concept is conducive in theory to promoting community development and on-the-job training projects which can become economically viable once community residents develop the skills to work in and manage local enterprises. This, however, runs contrary to community college development in the rest of the province. Although both northern community colleges are delivering more "skill training" than their southern

counterparts, this training is limited by the lack of facilities; the southern model never took trades training into account because it was already being handled quite adequately by existing institutions.¹⁵ Moreover, the provision for community development by colleges has never materialized. Rather, it was quickly dropped from the conceptual framework of community colleges because of the difficulty in making community development operational in the absence of a more significant and specific emphasis on community development. Community colleges have therefore not made the impact on northern adult education their original proponents intended. The Department has attempted to fulfill its mandate by providing a level of services in the north comparable to the south; in so doing it has implemented a program drawn from the south which has not been successfully adapted to fit the northern context.

The development of northern community colleges has met with limited success for other reasons as well.¹⁷ There is a division and duplication of adult education delivery responsibilities between the colleges and the Department, with the result that adult education and skill training activities have suffered. These difficulties become apparent by examining relations between La Ronge Regional Community College and the Department's Colleges/Northern Continuing Education Branch.

3. The Initial Northern College and Organizational Duplication

The first northern community college was not set up by the Department of Northern Saskatchewan, but by the Department of

Continuing Education operating from Regina. The La Ronge area, along with three other areas, was used as a pilot project preceding establishment of colleges throughout the province. By May, 1973, the La Ronge Regional Community College Board had been appointed. Within a few months a principal and staff had been hired so the college could begin operating in the fall of 1973 under the jurisdiction of the Department of Continuing Education. Except for the community college program, all Department of Continuing Education responsibilities in the Northern Administration District were transferred to the Department of Northern Saskatchewan as of April 1, 1973.¹⁸

The subsequent lengthy delay in transferring responsibility for community colleges north resulted from initiatives taken by the Department of Northern Saskatchewan's Director of Colleges Branch. Created in April, 1973, the branch was charged with providing all manner of "continuing" education responsibilities and with developing a northern job placement system. To do this, it created a system of regional offices which coincided with the same natural regions suggested later as the basis for community college expansion. Programs the director planned and began implementing before La Ronge Community College was fully operational included precisely the types of programs community colleges were best able to deliver, that is, adult basic education programs and special interest programs. Members of La Ronge Community College Board were particularly irked by the Director's plan, without College Board approval, to provide the same courses the college was attempting to provide within La Ronge College's boundary of operations.¹⁹

The situation was exacerbated by a personality clash between the principal of La Ronge Community College and the Director of Colleges Branch which severely undermined the co-operation and co-ordination necessary between them.²⁰ The College principal was a strong advocate of community development, along much the same lines as employees in Policy and Planning Branch. The animosity of these individuals to the Colleges Branch director was considerable. Policy and Planning Branch employees subsequently indicated that the Colleges Branch director opposed the concept of community colleges and was responsible for delaying the transfer of the colleges to the Department of Northern Saskatchewan.²¹

Given the relatively autonomous position of the La Ronge College with respect to the Department of Continuing Education and the reservations of College Board members regarding the Colleges Branch, an agreement signed by all three parties was required prior to formal transfer of the community college program to Colleges Branch. The agreement's wording echoed fears raised earlier by College Board members.

However, it is a matter of concern to the Board, recognized and agreed to by the two departments, that it be clear that the Board will continue to exercise the prerogatives it enjoyed for the period during which the Department of Continuing Education administered the Act in northern Saskatchewan. This implies that the Board be recognized as the operative continuing education authority within the defined borders of the college region.²²

The agreement allowed the Department to offer courses within the College's borders, but clearly stated that "whenever possible

courses should be negotiated between the Department and the college and offered by the college."²³ Such an agreement required that a "maximum of open communication and co-operation"²⁴ would exist between the Department and the College. This was true with the Department of Continuing Education as well, since it was to continue providing expertise gained from supervising the community college program south of the Northern Administration District line. However, fulfilling the agreement's terms remained unlikely as long as the Director of Colleges Branch, Policy and Planning employees and the College principal remained in their respective positions. Within eight months after formal transfer of program authority, the entire Policy and Planning Branch and the Director of Colleges Branch had either resigned or been transferred.²⁵

The creation of the first northern community college has established a precedent for further college development. The first principal of the college clearly supported and worked towards the college taking an active role in community development.²⁶ However, because the La Ronge pilot project was administered in a way consistent with southern colleges, the potential for northern colleges to provide meaningful, community-centred adult education has never materialized. The essential link between adult education and community development was never seriously attempted with the first northern college, and policy development for community colleges since then has not taken this link into consideration.

The most serious consequence of two agencies each establishing separate adult education delivery agencies is that these organizations have continued to exist separately. Both the Colleges/Northern Continuing Education Branch and northern community colleges offer similar training programs, though now these operate in different areas. The existence of separate organizations performing similar operations has naturally led to a certain degree of conflict. Departmental officials have been concerned with "integrating" college operations with their own to reduce or eliminate inefficiencies. Government supervision of the colleges has been interpreted by college staff and board members as infringing on the legislatively decreed autonomy of colleges and thus has been the source of tension between the Branch and the La Ronge College. To explore this question more thoroughly, The Community Colleges Act must be examined.

The primary issue has been balancing the autonomy to be exercised through college boards with the supervision of college operations required by the department responsible for administering The Community Colleges Act. The publicly stated objectives for the colleges program certainly gave every indication that colleges were to function in a relatively independent manner, subject only to routine scrutiny from the Department of Continuing Education. Such a point of view, however, depends on a particular interpretation of The Community Colleges Act. General clauses grant the Minister authority to "make regulations governing the conduct and operation of community colleges" and authority to review and approve college budgets. In addition, the

Act also makes departmental approval a condition for all college acquisitions of real or personal property, and for the appointment of all employees, along with establishing their salaries, duties and conditions of employment.²⁷ These departmental prerogatives, including ministerial discretion over appointment and tenure of board members, meant that college autonomy was entirely dependent upon departmental practices and ministerial discretion.

The ambiguous legislative framework combined with the duplication of adult education mechanisms complicated the College-Branch relationship. A Branch re-organization was required to accommodate and integrate the College operations with those of the Branch. The re-organization was:

. . . premised on the basis of providing effective professional services to the colleges, while retaining some direct program involvement. It has been designed to achieve maximum use of the relatively small manpower establishment in an integrated system of operations.²⁸

More than a year later, when again re-organizing the Branch in response to severe Budget Bureau cuts, the Northern Continuing Education Branch Director stated that:

Community Colleges (existing and proposed) present something of an enigma in this situation. We are attempting to establish a relationship which brings them into the system as far as possible while respecting their autonomy as granted in the Community Colleges Act.²⁹

This confused situation has had a number of repercussions. As far as Branch personnel have been concerned, programs relating to the needs of the entire north and to training for employment were to be the responsibility of Colleges Branch. Community colleges were to concern themselves primarily with pre-employment training and special

interest programming.³⁰ The college's proposals to expand its facilities and programming to provide employment-related training denote its disagreement with this arrangement, regardless of the force of economic logic, parent agency practice and original conceptual framework used to justify the present arrangement.

The Branch has also become more concerned with college administration and expenditures in recent years as the Provincial Government has become more concerned with controlling public sector expenditures. Between 1974 and 1976, the college was faced with both managerial and financial difficulties which encouraged the Branch to become involved directly in college activities. For example, the Branch assumed the college's duties in curriculum development and with the agreement of the College Board, required the college to submit quarterly financial statements. It also instituted Branch-College meetings to facilitate coordination between the organizations.³¹

The assumption of responsibilities for curriculum development by the Branch appears contrary to the intentions of The Community Colleges Act, and was resisted for awhile by the College Board and principal.³² Eventually the Branch was successful in having one of its staff members attend College Board meetings, in spite of College Board members' protests. Quoting from the speech made by the Minister of Continuing Education when introducing The Community Colleges Act, the Board Chairman interpreted "consultative review services" for the College by the Department:

. . . to mean that the Department's resources would be available if expertise or advice in any form was

required; however it would be up to the college to initiate Department involvement. This has become confused and although it has been maintained in the south we would like to see it again become the basis of operations here. We do not support the position of Field Representatives as has been introduced in other colleges, neither are we in favour of a Department person attending Board meetings unless there is a particular reason for doing so.³³

Nevertheless, the Branch Director has maintained that

. . . except within the N.A.D., it is worth considering that the Department of Continuing Education has seen the relationships between the Department and the community colleges in something of a less loose and flexible manner than is the practice here.³⁴

The explanation given for integration between the Branch and the College has often centered on ensuring that sufficient economy is exercised in College operations. The Branch Director noted in the previously cited letter:

This department tries to maintain as low a profile as possible in regards to community colleges. There are occasions however, when we feel we have a responsibility to ensure that tax dollars are expended by the college in an approved and responsible manner. I don't view this as unnecessary interference with your activities.³⁵

These difficulties in delineating responsibilities between the colleges and the Branch have continued unsolved. Parallel programs are still offered by community colleges and the Branch, while critical areas such as skill training for employment remain unaddressed in any substantive way. Thus, an unintegrated and uneconomical approach to educating and training adult northerners for northern development opportunities has resulted.

4. The Full Scale Establishment of Northern Community Colleges

Despite the apparent difficulties with community colleges as comprehensive delivery agents for northern adult education, the Department took the initiative of establishing community colleges throughout the North in 1975. The catalyst in expanding community colleges throughout the North was Douglas McArthur, the Deputy Minister appointed in September, 1974, to get the Department back on its feet after its many problems during the first year and a half of operation. He took a very active interest in community colleges, reiterating to a large extent concerns raised originally by Policy and Planning Branch employees.³⁶ For example, in a letter to the Chairman of the Northern Municipal Council, he indicated that:

. . . it is now the intention of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan to place the highest priority on the establishment of a regionally based college system throughout the north . . . [which] will provide the means to ensure that this much needed aspect of education is provided under the direction and control of northern people.³⁷

Mr. McArthur proposed the development of three new colleges in the north. Their development was to be supervised by a Community College Development Committee which included representatives from the Department, the Northern School Board, the Department of Continuing Education, the La Ronge Regional Community College, the Northern Municipal Council, the Metis Society of Saskatchewan, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, and from the East Side of the Northern Administrative District.³⁸ Accepting a suggestion from the Deputy Minister, who sat in on the first

meeting, the Committee decided to get these colleges into operation by September of 1975 even though representatives from the Metis Society and the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians had not yet been selected for the Development Committee.³⁹

The first step in making these colleges operational was to recruit community college developers. The developers were to inform people in northern communities of Government's intentions, assist them in assessing and identifying their educational needs, encourage them to make recommendations for potential college board members and to consider locations for college headquarters.⁴⁰ By encouraging community residents to make recommendations for board members and college locations, the college developers were attempting to fulfill expectations that the colleges would be locally controlled. These expectations were held by the Deputy Minister, the College Development Committee, and by the college developers themselves, who were all northern residents.

As a result, all the East Side communities and many on the West Side indicated they would each select a Board member and decide among themselves the eventual location of regional college headquarters.⁴² On the East Side in particular, the seven communities involved insisted they each had the right to select a member of the College Board,⁴² thus fortuitously arriving at precisely the maximum number of Board members permitted by legislation. On the West Side most of the communities wanted to elect their Board member, although more emphasis was placed on the notion of having two colleges service the West Side rather

than just one. The communities in Area Three surrounding Beauval were quite specific on the matter of locating college headquarters; through their local governments letters were written and a petition gathered requesting that Beauval be the administrative centre for a community college operating in Area Three.⁴³

Uncertainty surrounded all these questions. The developers had been working in the communities from the middle of July and received most community suggestions by the middle of October. However, as late as mid-November they felt compelled to write a letter to the Minister requesting clarification regarding the number of colleges to be established, the area boundaries for colleges, the locations of college headquarters, the transfer of physical facilities from the Department to the Colleges and the method of selecting board members.⁴⁴ The uncertainty of the developers on these basic concerns is a profound comment on the lack of effective communications within the Department and the absence of policy guidelines concerning the implementation process for community colleges.

The college development process left community residents with the impression they could select a representative to the Board and expect to gain Ministerial concurrence. However, the Community Colleges Act clearly makes the appointment of College Board members a matter of Ministerial discretion. The process adopted by the Minister of Northern Saskatchewan for appointing board members has kept control firmly in his hands. Board members have been appointed without regard for the advice of college developers, community

residents and senior civil servants. Mr. Bowerman's reply to the college developers' concerns noted earlier established a precedent for later decisions:

While I am a strong proponent of the development of local government and of local determination in general, I feel that at this stage in the development of the Community College concept, I must exercise my prerogative and appoint Board members who have demonstrated a genuine interest and ability in educational programming.⁴⁵

The issue of selecting board members was raised with respect to the La Ronge Community College, which at the same time was experiencing internal disagreements between the principal and the College Board and staff. The first principal resigned in June, 1975, and an open rift developed between the new principal and many of the college staff. Apparently the basis for this disagreement was the new principal's rigid approach to administration, which contrasted with his predecessor's more relaxed style. The conflict over internal operating procedures was taken to the College Board where most Board members supported the position taken by the staff. When the principal subsequently submitted his resignation, Board members accepted after a lengthy delay.⁴⁶

In the interim, the Minister decided that the La Ronge College Board required "rejuvenating." He instructed his Legislative Secretary, Norman MacAuley, the Member of the Legislative Assembly for the Cumberland constituency, to approach individuals the latter thought suitable as College Board members. Mr. MacAuley was then a member of the Board, and his antipathy towards those who supported the staff was fairly well recognized.⁴⁷ Initially his recommendations were accepted and on

November 20 a memo was sent from the Minister's office requesting that the three Board members who had been the most ardent supporters of the staff be replaced.⁴⁸ None of this was done with the knowledge of the Board members, although a December 1st letter from the Chairperson of the College Board to the Director of Northern Continuing Education Branch requested that appointments to the Board be rotated periodically, in accordance with the method adopted by community colleges in the south.⁴⁹ This would have meant that every year, two of the members would be replaced with new appointees who were to have three-year terms of office.

The Director's reply gave no indication that the Minister had already made a decision regarding new appointments. However, it did indicate the Department would engage in a process of consultation with communities in the area to provide the Minister with a list of nominees. To this end, one of the college developers was assigned to approach and evaluate various individuals as potential Board members. His recommendations, with which the Northern Continuing Education Director concurred, ran almost directly counter to the Minister's suggestions.⁵⁰ The Branch Director's communications with the College Board reiterated the Minister's position that Board appointments were subject to annual review at the Minister's discretion. Nevertheless, in a December 24th letter to the Minister, the Director asked the Minister not to make a final decision on the matter until a public meeting scheduled for January 5, 1976, was held.⁵¹

At this meeting, two resolutions were given nearly unanimous approval: the first requested that in order to maintain board continuity, no more of the Board members than necessary be removed; the second requested election of the Board members instead of ministerial appointment.⁵² This was all to no avail. The Minister by Order-in-Council on January 27, 1976, terminated the appointments of five out of six Board members, including those he had wanted to replace originally.⁵³ Moreover, of the seven appointees suggested by the college developer and the Branch Director, only three were approved by the Minister. He also made two appointments on clearly dubious grounds. One member had requested before the appointment that his name be withdrawn from the list, and another had served previously on the Board but because of her work, was unavoidably absent from many Board meetings.⁵⁴

The exercise of ministerial prerogative has been one of the most interesting features of supervising community college affairs. In the case of board member nominations, the Minister could have chosen to approve the decisions of community leaders. The Minister's reasons for maintaining his prerogative and using it contrary to community wishes is not entirely clear, but he has implied that there are some criteria of preparedness which northern communities must achieve before such decision-making powers are transferred. For example, when Mr. Bowerman indicated that the final selection of college board members would be his, he also noted that:

I would sincerely hope that at some point in the future, when Northern Community Colleges have gained some experience in the delivery of programs, and the northern public is more aware of the implications of serving on such a board, that an electoral process can be established similar to that employed by the Northern School Board.⁵⁵

The criterion which the Minister has used thus far to justify the selection of Board members is that they must "have demonstrated a genuine interest and ability in educational programming."⁵⁶

Though the Minister thinks northern communities are presently less able than he to judge the merits of potential Board members, the evidence indicates that his selections have been seriously deficient. For example, both the La Ronge and West Side Community College Boards have had members who had changed their minds about sitting on the college boards after being initially approached but were appointed anyway. The La Ronge College Board in the past few years has suffered rapid and large turnovers in its membership, thus reducing its effectiveness as a mechanism for supervising College activities.⁵⁷

Another intriguing feature of these ministerial decisions is that they were made against the recommendations of senior Department employees.⁵⁸ They thus indicate a significant difference in perspective between the La Ronge based employees and the Minister, much like the difference already noted between Resources Branch employees in La Ronge and Prince Albert.

5. Interest Group Involvement in Policy Decision Making

The initiative to establish community colleges throughout the North has never been completely fulfilled. This has occurred largely because of the establishment of the Saskatchewan Indian Cultural College as a community college, thereby adding another adult education delivery agent in the North. As a result, the population to be served by Department-sponsored colleges was reduced and the justification for four such colleges was questioned. The remainder of this chapter will examine the impact this additional delivery agent has had on northern college development and decision making by the Department.

The reason for the delay and eventual rationalization of the community college program was a successful bid by the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians to have the Saskatchewan Indian Cultural College recognized as a community college under The Community Colleges Act. The Federation has also been an advocate of the single agency concept, meaning that all services to Treaty Indians be provided by the Federal Government through the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development rather than through any provincial agencies or other federal agencies.⁵⁹ On September 16, 1975, the Federation decided that "it is imperative that no delivery of training programs be undertaken by the Province to the Reserves."⁶⁰ The implications for potential northern community colleges were substantial, particularly on the East Side and in the Athabasca region, where status Indians comprise a large proportion of the population. Departmental officials were primarily concerned with

the reduction in college "user populations," which made the expense involved in establishing three new community colleges seem unwarranted.

The Minister immediately suspended further college development until the implications of the Saskatchewan Indian Cultural College's attaining community college status could be ascertained more precisely. This halt to all college development activity was opposed by the college developers and the Director of Northern Continuing Education Branch. They recommended that the Department proceed with college development on the West Side, where the Treaty Indian population was too insignificant to have any serious effect on the "user population."⁶¹ Approval to proceed with the West Side Community College at Beauval was merely delayed for a few months. However, the possibility of establishing separate community colleges in either the northern or eastern districts to reduce departmental training efforts in those regions was indefinitely postponed. Instead, it has been proposed for several years now that existing College boundaries will be extended to cover the East Side and the Athabasca area.⁶²

One interesting factor in the decision to halt northern college development is the very considerable influence demonstrated by the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians. In explaining his decision to suspend college development activity, the Minister noted that:

I hope that our College Development staff will recognize that this is an understandable request on behalf of their people living on reserves. It is important that our staff should not, in any way, attempt to discourage or react adversely to the expressed will of the F.S.I. at this time.⁶³

The seriousness with which the Department has treated the relatively

few instances where the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians has pursued northern policy matters contrasts vividly with the Department's reaction to other organizations, particularly the Metis Society. The most recent agreement which has been reached between the Department and the Saskatchewan Indian Cultural College concerning the jurisdiction of each college system further illustrates the Department's respect for the Federation. This agreement makes the Indian Cultural College responsible for adult training programs in each community where the Treaty Indian population is a majority; in those communities where the Treaty Indian population is a minority, Northern Continuing Education Branch or the applicable community college assumes responsibility for the programming. To arrive at this agreement, lengthy negotiations have been required. Although the Branch Director expressed his doubts concerning the Indian Cultural College's capacity to deliver training programs to communities in the following year, the climate of the negotiations and the spirit of the agreement have been cordial and co-operative.⁶⁴ Such relative amicability contrasts starkly with the tense atmosphere of confrontation which pervades departmental relations with the Metis Society.

Since the 1969 Federal Government White Paper on Treaty Indians, Treaty Indians have consistently feared and opposed Federal attempts to transfer Indian responsibilities to Provincial Governments. Treaty Indian organizations for the most part have vigorously insisted that services to them be funded and provided by the Federal Government. This position has been respected by the Saskatchewan Government, partly because it relieves the Province of responsibility for serving reserve

communities. More importantly, Provincial officials generally perceive that Treaty Indians do have a just claim to special status with the Federal Government, and that those claims would be weakened by provincial assumption of services to Treaty Indians. Compared with the Metis Society, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians has not had many dealings with the Province and thus has not been placed in a confrontational relationship with the Provincial Government.

There is yet another reason for the Federation's impact on the Provincial Government. It is quite a sophisticated organization when compared to the Metis Society. The former organization appears to be much more institutionalized than the latter.⁶⁵ The Federation has an extensive staff, a guaranteed source of income and it has become very involved in administering government-sponsored programs as well as undertaking extensive research into and development of detailed policy proposals for government and public consideration. This organizational sophistication gives the Federation leaders substantial impact when they choose to approach the Province.

6. Conclusion

Clearly some of the difficulties encountered in establishing northern community colleges can be attributed to the limitations of colleges within the northern context. The supervising Branch of the Department has, in effect, chosen to pursue a non-innovative approach to northern adult education. Rather than actively encouraging and supporting the colleges to become innovative mechanisms for promoting

adult education, the Department has approached college development cautiously and defensively, with southern policies serving as rough guidelines.

Part of the explanation for the incremental approach to college development is the proliferation of organizations designed to deliver adult education. In the first instance, duplication came about because two government departments established separate northern adult education delivery agents. The colleges and the Colleges/Northern Continuing Education Branch have regularly been at odds since. In fact, the manner in which integration between college and departmental activities was to occur was never made explicit in The Community Colleges Act or regulations made under it. The degree of College autonomy and the extent of the sponsoring Department's authority to supervise college activities have been subject to different interpretations by officials in each agency. Thus, structuring an integrated approach to northern adult education has been complicated and remains an unresolved problem.

The participatory process in establishing college boards has been compromised by the exercise of Ministerial discretion. Civil servants from La Ronge and in the field, acting in response to the Deputy Minister's intentions, communicated the concept of locally controlled community colleges to northern residents. After northern residents had expressed their wishes to the Minister regarding the selection of college headquarters' locations and College Board members, the Minister exercised his discretion and made other choices. His decisions on these matters have reflected an insensitivity to community

aspirations and have often been ill-considered, judging by objective standards. Such a pattern of choices indicates the Department's failure to achieve its northern political objectives: strengthening local governments and promoting northern decision making.

Clearly, northern community colleges have not been innovative mechanisms for achieving adult education related directly to employment in northern communities. Community colleges have not been successfully adapted to fit the northern context; hence, Government has had to examine other means for meeting the northern requirements for skill training related directly to employment. The partial establishment of colleges in the north and the presence of several organizations delivering adult education reinforces the Department's incremental approach toward the adult education policy area. Integrating adult education effectively with the creation of employment opportunities in northern Saskatchewan hence has become more difficult as the Department has matured.

Notes to Chapter III

¹Department of Northern Saskatchewan Annual Reports, 1973-4, p. 29; 1974-5, p. 74; 1976-7, p. 40.

²The statistics are from the Northern Saskatchewan Small Scale Forestry Study: Baseline Report (Winnipeg: Intergroup Consultants Ltd., March, 1976), p. 158; and R. Hauck, Six Years Later: An Overview of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan's Programs and Accomplishments, prepared for Central Planning Unit (La Ronge: June 8, 1978), p. 35.

³From a Department of Continuing Education pamphlet, "Saskatchewan Community Colleges" in Northern Continuing Education Branch file, "Community College Development Committee," circa 1971, p. 4.

⁴Ibid., pp. 4-9.

⁵Statutes of Saskatchewan, 21 Elizabeth II (1973), c. 15, s. 13.

⁶Ibid., s. 8.

⁷From previously cited pamphlet, pp. 5, 8. Also, in a Department of Continuing Education pamphlet "Community Colleges in Saskatchewan" published as a message from Grodon MacMurchy, the Minister of Continuing Education noted that:

Saskatchewan's community colleges are unique in Canada, making use of the community development approach in education. This means they attempt to serve not just individuals, but communities in total. We are breaking new ground in delivering the kind of education people want, where they need it.

In another pamphlet circulated by Jake Kutarna, the Community College Developer for the La Ronge Region (circa, 1973), it was stated that:

Built into the Community College as outlined by the bill recently passed in Saskatchewan's legislature, is an important principle: that of local control This principle is put into practice through the Community College Board The board will not be advisory; it will be a decision-making board.

The same pamphlet made some comments on the community development aspect of colleges:

As Mr. MacMurchy, Minister of Continuing Education has said himself, "If the community development

aspect is not as successful as we hope--and make no mistake about it--the idea is far from a sure bet--if it is less successful, the simple availability of informal education to interested persons where they live will be of substantial benefit in itself."

⁸ Memo from Garry Wouters, Program Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch to Ed Breese, Director of Colleges Branch, re: Philosophy of the Community College for the North (January 4, 1973).

⁹ See John Stobbe, Principal of La Ronge Region Community College, "Organizing the Community College at the Community Level" (July 27, 1973), pp. 1-2. Although this policy statement was ratified by the College Board, there is no evidence that Local Management Committees were ever established, at least not with the effective mandate outlined in the policy statement.

¹⁰ Memo from B.R. Hill, Director, Policy and Planning Branch, to A.C. Towill, Assistant Deputy Minister, re: Community Colleges (March 20, 1973).

¹¹ As the Minister's Advisory Committee on Community Colleges stated:

Adult Education Services are already available from many government departments, institutions and agencies, Colleges will be effective to the extent that they can simplify access to these resources. The aim would be that present agencies, maintaining their own identity, would serve people more effectively because of the information received as a result of college need assessment processes.

Report of the Minister's Advisory Committee on Community Colleges (August, 1972), p. 23.

¹² D.J. Parsons, Colleges Branch, "Department of Northern Saskatchewan Colleges Branch and the Community Colleges Concept." Submission to D.F. McArthur, Deputy Minister (January 2, 1975), p. 3.

¹³ See submission by Eric Hamm, Principal, La Ronge Region Community College, "Rational for Proposed Regional Training Centre in La Ronge, Saskatchewan." A submission to M.O. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister (November 3, 1976); and memo from Brian Shelly, Co-ordinator of Colleges, Northern Continuing Education Branch to Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister re: La Ronge Community College--Capital Construction Proposal (April 13, 1977).

¹⁴The connection between adult education and community development is obvious and well-established. Community organizing and development is essentially the process of community residents educating themselves about their ability to shape their collective environment in the community, with the help of individuals more experienced in such endeavours. As an excellent example of this, see, Frank Adams, "Highlander Folk School: Getting Information, Going Back and Teaching It," Harvard Educational Review, Volume XLII, Number Four (November, 1972), pp. 497-520.

¹⁵Although precise statistics are not available, the La Ronge College in 1977-8 offered some \$20,000 worth of social demand courses, whereas it spent approximately \$400,000 on basic upgrading and other "skill-training" courses. The number of social demand courses far outstrips upgrading and skill-training courses, but both the cost and the number of students taking these is far greater than for social demand courses. It should be noted that southern community colleges have recently begun requesting more employment-related training and have asked for more permanent, "fixed" facilities such as those the La Ronge College has been requesting for some years. There are some indications that these requests are being regarded favourably by Department of Continuing Education officials, thus implying the possibility of a major policy shift for community colleges. Interview with Eric Hamm, Principal, La Ronge Community College (May 17, 1978).

¹⁶Interview with John Stobbe, former Principal, La Ronge Regional Community College (June 2, 1977) and with J.J. Bell, Director, Northern Continuing Education Branch (June 7, 1977).

¹⁷As well, the Colleges/Northern Continuing Education Branch's administrative record has been poor, thus limiting its ability to establish and supervise community colleges. Re-organization has been endemic to the Branch. It was re-organized for two consecutive fiscal years, 1975-6 and 1976-7; the former because of the community college initiative in part, and the latter because of extensive budget cuts at Budget Bureau. Submission from Parsons to McArthur, op. cit., and Minutes of D.N.S. Executive Committee meeting, December 16, 1975. A memo from R. Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister to J.J. Bell, Director Northern Continuing Education commented:

Colleges Branch, along with many other Branches of the Department, has a record of poor administration and control. Over the years since D.N.S. was established, most of the branches have improved their systems and to a great extent, overcome their reputation for mis-administration. For various reasons, Northern Continuing Education Branch has not been able to achieve that happy state.

Memo re: Branch Administration (July 5, 1976).

¹⁸Annual Report, 1973-74, p. 27.

¹⁹Letter from Norman A. McAuley, Chairman, La Ronge Region Community College, to Hon. Gordon MacMurchy, Minister of Continuing Education (June 30, 1973) and reply (July 17, 1973).

²⁰Interview with J.J. Bell, Director, Northern Continuing Education (June 7, 1977).

²¹"A Statement to the Public," op. cit., Appendix II.

²²Letter from Gordon MacMurchy, Minister of Continuing Education, to G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan (October 6, 1973), p. 2.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 3.

²⁵"Northern Municipal Council's duties unclear," Regina Leader Post (November 30, 1974), p. 1.

²⁶Though the opportunities for pursuing adult education and community development together were limited, community development was a clearly-stated objective of the La Ronge Region Community College. As the principal wrote to an official in the Department of Continuing Education:

There is also the important aspect of allowing decisions to be made at the community level. Whereas previously lip service was paid to this concept, Community College now provides a vehicle whereby this can be done. Local Management Committees have been formed in most communities. The people in the community decide how they will form the committee, whether elected, appointed or volunteered. The committees in all instances have been conscientious.

Letter from John Stobbe, Principal, La Ronge Region Community College to Jake Kutarna, Department of Continuing Education (February 22, 1974), p. 1.

²⁷Statutes of Saskatchewan, 21 Elizabeth II (1973), c. 15, s. 10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22.

²⁸D.J. Parsons' submission to D.F. McArthur, op. cit., p. 12.

²⁹Memo from J.J. Bell, Director of Northern Continuing Education to Executive Committee re: "Northern Continuing Education Branch Re-organization Chart and General Program Objectives" (March 8, 1976), p. 3.

³⁰ See Parsons to McArthur submission, op. cit., p. 4; and memo from J.J. Bell, Director of Northern Continuing Education to John Solomon, Executive Assistant to the Minister, re: Information You Requested (November 17, 1976).

³¹ Memo from J.J. Bell to La Ronge Community College Board members re: Meeting on March 19, 1976, between Northern Continuing Education Branch and La Ronge Community College (March 22, 1976).

³² See for example the letter from Jerry Jenner, Principal, La Ronge Community College to Jack Bell, Director, Northern Continuing Education Branch (December 18, 1975). The letter thoroughly outlines the Principal's perception of the intended relationship between the College and the Department. Curriculum development and the responsibility for establishing budgetary priorities were asserted to be appropriate and legislatively intended functions of the College.

³³ Letter from Gill Gracie, Board Chairman, La Ronge Region Community College to Jack Bell, Director, Northern Continuing Education (January 9, 1976), p. 2.

³⁴ Letter from J.J. Bell, Director, Northern Continuing Education to the Board Members, La Ronge Region Community College (circa. September 20, 1976), p. 2.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Interview with J.J. Bell, op. cit. He indicated in the interview that prior to the beginning of his tenure as Director, the Branch had been without a Director for approximately ten months. During that time both McArthur and the Executive Director had taken a fairly direct involvement in Branch affairs.

³⁷ Letter from D.F. McArthur, Deputy Minister to Lawrence Yew, Chairman, Northern Municipal Council (January 2, 1975).

³⁸ Press release: "Community College Committee Formed," Saskatchewan Government Information Services (May 2, 1975).

³⁹ Minutes from first meeting of Community Colleges Development (February 18, 1975).

⁴⁰ Reports of Community College Developers, general reference (July 16-October 31, 1974).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴²Letter from Roy Fosseneuve, for Cumberland House College Committee to Jack Bell, Director, Northern Continuing Education Branch (October 14, 1975); and letter from D.J. Gibson, Secretary, Creighton Education Committee to G.R. Bowerman, Minister (March 4, 1976).

⁴³Reports of West Side Community College Developers (July 16-October 31, 1975).

⁴⁴Letter from Community College Developers to Minister of Northern Saskatchewan (November 13, 1975).

⁴⁵Letter from G.R. Bowerman to Mrs. Gill Gracie, Chairperson, Community College Development Committee (November 26, 1975). College developers were requested in the same memo to provide a list of nominees from which the Minister could appoint Board members.

⁴⁶From personal interviews with J.J. Bell, op. cit.; Gill Gracie, D.N.S. employee (June 2, 1977); John Stobbe, former principal, La Ronge Region Community College (May 22, 1977); and from Ken Collier, "Village Bizarre," The Northerner (January 8, 1975).

⁴⁷From personal interview with Gracie and Stobbe, op. cit., and "College Controversy Boils as New Board Takes Office," The Northerner (January 28, 1976).

⁴⁸Memo from John Solomon, Executive Assistant to Honourable Ted Bowerman to Marcel L'Heureux, Acting Deputy Minister, n.t. (November 30, 1975).

⁴⁹Letter from Gill Gracie, Chairman of the La Ronge Community College Board to J.J. Bell, Director, Northern Continuing Education Branch (December 1, 1975).

⁵⁰Memo from Ron Fiddler, Community College Developer to J.J. Bell, Director, Northern Continuing Education, n.t. (December 19, 1975).

⁵¹Memo from J.J. Bell, to Honourable G.R. (Ted) Bowerman, re: Rejuvenation of Board--La Ronge Community College (December 24, 1975).

⁵²Letter from Robert Dalby to G.R. Bowerman with resolutions attached (January 6, 1976).

⁵³Order-in-Council 82/76 (January 27, 1976).

⁵⁴Memo from Bell to Bowerman, op. cit. (December 24, 1975).

⁵⁵Letter from Bowerman to Gracie, op. cit. (November 26, 1975).

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷ See the memos from J.J. Bell to G.R. Bowerman, op. cit. (December 24, 1975); from J.J. Bell to G.R. Bowerman re: Treaty Indian Appointments to the Board--La Ronge Community College (July 16, 1976); and a letter from Brian Shelly, Assistant Director, Northern Continuing Education to Mrs. Louise Weins, Chairperson, La Ronge Region Community College (April 15, 1977).

⁵⁸ Letter from Gill Gracie, Chairperson, Community Colleges Development Committee to Hon. G.R. Bowerman with enclosed recommendations from West Side developers (December 22, 1975); and letters from West Side Local Community Authorities attached to college developer's reports (June 15-October 31, 1975).

⁵⁹ See Letter from Dave Ahenakew, Chief, Federation of Saskatchewan Indians to L.A. Reiderer, Director of Community Colleges, Department of Continuing Education (September 16, 1976), pp. 1-2.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 2.

⁶¹ Memo from J.J. Bell to M. L'Heureux, Acting Deputy Minister re: Cultural College-Community College Implications (December 2, 1975); and letter from Gill Gracie, Chairman, Community College Development Committee to G.R. Bowerman, with college developer's recommendations enclosed (December 22, 1975).

⁶² Memo from J.J. Bell to M. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister, re: Update on the Development of Northern Community Colleges (March 29, 1977).

⁶³ Memo from G.R. Bowerman to Marcel L'Heureux, Acting Deputy Minister re: Northern Community Colleges--FSI Cultural College (December 18, 1975).

⁶⁴ Memo from J.J. Bell to M. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister, re: Update on the Development of Northern Community Colleges (March 29, 1977).

⁶⁵ The most appropriate definition of pressure group institutionalization within the Canadian context is in A. Paul Pross (ed.), Pressure Group Behaviour in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975). See especially the introductory chapter by Pross, "Pressure Groups: Adaptive Instruments of Political Communication," where Pross identifies five major characteristics of pressure groups which can be used to measure a given group's level of institutionalization. They are: (1) organizational continuity and cohesion; (2) extensive knowledge of government; (3) a stable membership; (4) concrete, immediate operational objectives; and (5) precedence of organizational objectives. The more entrenched these characteristics in a pressure group, the greater its level of institutionalization.

Chapter IV

POLICY FORMULATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND

1. Introduction

Northern economic development and the creation of employment opportunities in which northerners can fully participate are arguably the Department of Northern Saskatchewan's foremost policy objectives. G.R. Bowerman's "Principles for Northern Development" in 1971 noted that fewer than half of the 11,000 citizens of working age in the north were employed and fewer than a quarter of them earned more than \$2,000 per year.¹ The future magnitude of this problem was estimated in 1973 to be such that:

. . . between now and 1986 . . . around 5,500 man years of employment will be required to eliminate seasonality and raise participation rates of current and new labour force entrants to provincial levels.²

While the expansion of the uranium industry and associated spin-off developments promise to provide some employment opportunities for northerners, the desire and capacity of northerners to take part in mining and mining-related employment is limited. The Department is confronted with the challenge of promoting economic development options in which northern residents wish to participate and which they actively support as elements of community development. The most visible program utilized by the Department to promote economic development is the

economic development loan fund. This chapter will explore the formulation and administration of policy pertaining to the loan fund and will demonstrate how such policy making has constrained the realization of economic development opportunities by northern residents.

The chapter will first examine the Department's economic development strategy in detail and consider its attempts to provide for local participation in economic development. Then it will show how the loan fund and its client group have required so much attention from the Economic Development Branch that it has been unable to formulate or implement alternate tactics for promoting economic development, in spite of the apparent need for such alternate tactics. Policy in the Branch has been directed exclusively toward managing day-to-day problems in the loan fund's operations. An incremental approach to overall economic development policy making thus has prevailed because underlying problems constraining northern economic development have not been addressed. Finally, this chapter will illustrate how limited the Northern Municipal Council's role has been in formulating and administering northern economic development policy.

2. Economic Development Strategy and Local Participation

When the Economic Development Branch was established in June, 1973, its objectives were described as being:

. . . to improve the quality of life for northern residents by encouraging economic development in the area and to foster social development by working for a greater participation by northerners in their own economy.³

This reflected government's desire to direct economic development programs and policies at northern residents where they already lived, rather than allowing development opportunities to occur exclusively in larger northern centres or in the south. As expressed by the Policy and Planning Branch Director:

Our economic development strategy starts with the premise that most northern communities are surrounded by potential economic wealth of some kind or another, and that we can most effectively develop the North by helping northern residents to make use of these resources.⁴

This strategy has been referred to as the "stay option" model, as opposed to the "growth pole" model for economic development. The growth pole model implies concentrated development in a few large centres. Because northern residents have tended not to move toward larger centres in search of employment, and because such migration simply results in a transfer of unemployment from rural areas to urban centres, the Department has adopted the "stay option" model for development. It prescribes that services and developments be directed at small centres and communities. Such communities can thereby be made viable places for people to live, and the social dislocation created by unskilled people moving to urban centres can be minimized.

The stay option model is implicit in almost all the Department's activities; social and health services as well as the provision of physical infrastructure have been directed toward relatively small, remote northern communities. To foster this model in the economic development policy area, the economic development loan fund program was initiated on July 11, 1973.⁵ It has become the most highly visible

of the Department's attempts to promote economic development and has been given most attention as an economic development mechanism.

The concept of a loan fund accessible only to "disadvantaged" persons was not novel. Both the Indian and Metis Department under the old Liberal administration and the Human Resources Development Agency under the New Democratic Party government's direction had developed such loan funds.⁶ In addition, the Metis Society had called vociferously for the establishment of a loan fund in May, 1973.⁷

While it was relatively simple for the Department to announce the loan fund as one of its economic development programs, there does not seem to have been much, if any, serious consideration of alternatives or adjuncts to the loan fund. This is curious since both co-operatives and some state-owned and operated enterprises had existed in the north prior to the Department's creation. State-owned enterprises have subsequently undergone limited expansion through the Department's Economic Development Advance Account, although co-operatives have not been well supported and are generally failing.

Because the Department did not pay sufficient attention to the problems inherent in both these types of enterprises,⁸ the problems which have afflicted enterprises financed through the loan fund were not predicted. Hence no comprehensive strategy to promote economic development was designed before the existing program was implemented.⁹ The many problems which have since affected the program have thus been dealt with in isolation from general consideration of what barriers hinder northern economic development and what alternative tactics might best remove these barriers.

A critical aspect of the "stay option" development model was that it implied that northern communities would become involved in determining proposed developments in their communities. Particularly when proposed activities represent a significant departure from the past, or concern the provision of essential services in a community, local participation and control are essential elements in development. Community-based projects that are not understood, approved of and actively supported by local residents cannot be expected to succeed, and may actually have a detrimental impact on a community. Even when funds are disbursed to individuals to establish a business enterprise, local participation in vetting the loan application is essential. Information necessary to evaluate the enterprise and avoid potential problems can be provided by community residents who have a vested interest in seeing basic services provided in their community. Moreover, the project can be given official sanction at the local level, thereby avoiding the problems which occur when decision making about essentially local affairs is centralized and made inaccessible to those most directly affected by development.

Local and district loans committees are the only mechanisms that have ever been used to achieve such local participation in economic development. Local loans committees, established in almost every northern community,¹⁰ are composed of three members: one Economic Development Branch Loans Officer, and two members chosen from the community, one nominated by the local government body and one selected at the Minister's discretion. The committees have the authority to

reject or approve any loan under \$4,000, and may make recommendations regarding larger loans.

Also, a District Loans Committee has been established with authority to approve or reject loans between \$4,000 and \$25,000. Its membership includes the Director of Economic Development or his designate, a resident of the Northern Administration District selected at the Minister's discretion, and one of the Northern Municipal Councillors. The District Committee may make recommendations on loans larger than \$25,000, but the final decision rests with the Minister. Any loan decision by any committee may be appealed to the Minister, who has discretionary authority to overrule previous decisions.¹¹

The existence, composition and function of local committees have been at issue within the Department from time to time. The original enabling regulations made no provision for local participation in loan fund decisions. They did provide for a committee of three to be established with membership from the Northern Municipal Council, the Northern Development Advisory Council and the Director of the Economic Development Branch.¹² The committee's limited authority to make recommendations regarding loan applications was never put into effect since it was never struck. As late as April, 1974, the Branch Director, by this time the second to hold the position, informed the Northern Municipal Council that the decision-making process for loan applications simply required the Director to screen applications prior to forwarding them to the Minister for a final decision.¹³

Although the regulations clearly did not provide for local committees to have authority regarding the granting of loans to community residents, some within the Department interpreted such to be the intention of Government. For example, a memo from the Director of Field Services to the Assistant Deputy Minister on October 1, 1973, confirming an earlier conversation between them, noted that the local committee was to include the area co-ordinator for the region and two members from the Local Community Authorities in each community.¹⁴

The Economic Development Branch Director, however, perceived the issue quite differently. In a memo to the Assistant Deputy Minister only three days later he expressed the opinion that people on the west side, where there were five Local Community Authorities, might want only one or two committees.¹⁵

His views contrasted sharply with those of the Northern Municipal Council and the Policy and Planning Branch. Employees of Policy and Planning interpreted the July, 1973, regulations as providing for local committees in each community. They interpreted the regulations to mean that local committees were to have the final decision on loans up to \$4,000 and that the District Loans Committee was to decide on loans up to \$25,000.¹⁶ The regulations clearly were not specific about the powers of the District Loans Committee and, as mentioned, there was no provision for the establishment of local committees.

The Northern Municipal Council's proposal for structuring the loan fund committees was identical to and likely formed the basis for the Policy and Planning Branch's interpretation of the July, 1973,

regulations.¹⁷ In most of the discussions regarding the role of public participation in government programs, the Policy and Planning Branch and the Northern Municipal Council were informal allies in a position strongly favouring decentralization of government programs and local decision making. The final outcome was a set of regulations almost identical to those drafted by the Policy and Planning Branch. These regulations were implemented in June, 1974, after the Policy and Planning Branch debacle in May that year, and after the second Economic Development Branch Director within a year had resigned.¹⁸

The effectiveness of local loans committees as mechanisms for vetting loan applications came into question periodically after they were established. On three occasions during the past few years, the Economic Development Branch has evaluated the performance of local loans committees with a view to reducing the frequency of "bad" loans approved by these committees.¹⁹ The Branch's major emphasis in recent years has been to disburse its funds more restrictively. The proportion of loans in arrears in the category under \$4,000 for which local loans committees can be held accountable to some extent, has been higher than for loans larger than \$4,000. However, for loans under \$4,000 the total amount in arrears is far less than for the other categories.²⁰ Regardless of the generally low impact of the small loans on the loan fund in total, the Economic Development Branch Director in 1978 stated that:

. . . if the performance of the Local Loans Committee does not improve within a period of a year, a recommendation to disband that particular Local Loans Committee will be made. (This decision will be made at the discretion of the Director of Economic Development.)²¹

Though the legality and propriety of such action by the Director would probably be challenged within the Department, his attitude toward local loans committees reflects the Branch's general inability to give these committees the support they require to function effectively. The lack of management support given to Branch clients, a point to be discussed later, is reflected also in the inability of Economic Development Branch to provide counselling or training to local residents who sit on loans committees and are expected to make sound judgments about loans.

Thus local participation in the loan fund has not been of major significance in the Department's economic development strategy taken as a whole, in spite of the obvious implications the "stay option" has for such participation. Local committees have only a limited role to play in major expenditures from the loan fund. More significantly, their role has never extended beyond the loan fund to other activities which have an impact on any given community's economy. Local loans committees are not well regarded within the Economic Development Branch, in spite of the fact that they represent a logical focus for introducing some of the expertise northern communities require to participate more fully in development opportunities.

Up to this point, the general framework within which the economic development loan fund operates has been outlined to preface a more detailed consideration of loan fund policy administration and formulation. The loan fund has required all of Economic Development Branch's attention, thereby imposing an incremental policy-making approach to economic development on the Branch and the Department.

3. Administering the Loan Fund: Problems in Economic Development Branch and Their Implications

The ease with which the Department decided to establish the loan fund was not at all paralleled by the process of implementing the loan program. Indeed, the attempt by the Branch to implement the loan fund must rank as one of the best examples of confusion and mismanagement within the Department. One basic reason for confusion was the inadequate enabling legislation and regulations governing the loan fund's operation. The initial legislation limited the program's available funds to just \$500,000. By mid-October, 1973, only three months after the regulations had been filed, the Deputy Minister was reporting to the Minister that "of necessity we are slowing down in the processing of loans because only \$144,864.00 remains in the fund."²² As the loan approval process slowed down, criticism of the loan fund increased from interested northern residents and from Department employees. Their criticism centered primarily on the length of time required to approve loans and limitations on their availability.²³

The initial problems also reflected serious administrative confusion within Economic Development Branch. Some time between April and June of 1974, the first director was replaced by another, who held the position for less than two months before leaving the Department.²⁴ In fact, recruiting employees at all levels within the Branch was difficult during the first year of operations. Ten months after the Branch had been established, there were still no field staff to deal

directly with people in the communities, even though budget approval had been given for such positions.²⁵ Criticism of the Branch was not limited to those outside the Department or in the Policy and Planning Branch. The Minister put a complete freeze on Branch activities early in 1974.

As he said:

I am returning the proposed loans for livestock purchases without approval. The Department does not seem to have developed a policy for economic development, either in agriculture, fishing, trapping or wood harvesting industries. The applications that came forward for my approval were on an Ad Hoc [sic] basis, without any clear determination of whether we should be giving consideration for interest rates or whether there should be partial forgiveness for repayment of loans, and so on.²⁶

The quotation illustrates the difficulties encountered by the Branch and the Department, especially during the first few years of operation. A commitment had been made to promote economic development, without specifying methods by which it would be achieved. This commitment had been carried to the point where an actual program had been established and publicized. However, the essential policy statements necessary to provide specific criteria for Department officials to make discrete decisions or recommendations were absent.

The apparent inability to formulate general economic development policy statements may have been a result of the antagonism existing among various individuals in the Department. For example, the Policy and Planning Branch in April, 1974, prepared a draft of guidelines for administering the loan fund in an attempt to make these more explicit. The Economic Development Branch Director prepared a specific reply to

each of the suggestions made. In many instances, the Director replied "Agreed, but obvious," and his general remark regarding the summary introducing the draft was that it was "so vague as to be almost meaningless."²⁷ These documents make it quite obvious that in spite of the very genuine and serious problems within the Branch, the co-operation between branches which might have helped alleviate these difficulties simply was not present. The reasons for this situation are basically those referred to in Chapter I with respect to the general antagonism between Policy and Planning Branch and the program branches. Conflicts in personality and in approach to the policy area compounded the difficulties created by not clearly specifying the working relationship between planners and administrators in the economic development policy area.²⁸

Some of the early troubles of the Branch and the loan fund program were mitigated as a result of assent being given to The Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act on May 10, 1974, and the filing of regulations in accordance with the Act on June 7, 1974.²⁹ Since then, the basic legislative framework within which the loan fund operates has not been altered significantly. However, the initial problems in administering the loan fund were not all solved as a result of establishing a more appropriate legislative framework. No policy statements or guidelines in specific areas such as forestry and fishing existed and the Branch was still functioning without enough staff. Thus the Branch became a target for considerable pressure and criticism. Many of the other branches were already relatively operational while

Economic Development Branch was still in an embryonic stage, even though development of the northern economy was perceived by all to be critical and basic to northern development.³⁰

The most immediate result of such pressure on the Branch was the flood of loans which were processed after mid-1974.³¹ This output was certainly in large part a result of the new loan regulations, the establishment of loans committees, and the recruitment of an adequate staff complement in the Branch. However, the almost uncontrolled manner in which loans were disbursed can also be partly attributed to staff attitudes. Although never explicitly formulated as a policy statement, Branch employees apparently were given instructions to process as many loan applications as quickly as possible.³² The Department had been severely criticized by outside groups such as the Metis Society, and from groups within the Department such as the Policy and Planning Branch employees, for failing to have a functioning economic development policy. Thus an effort was undertaken to make the loan fund a highly visible program throughout the north and thereby to demonstrate that the Department was taking action to promote economic development.

In purely statistical terms the initial efforts of the Branch, once it was operational, were certainly impressive. But behind the superficial signs of success was a set of problems which soon was to dictate a substantially different emphasis in loan fund operations. The first problem was a familiar one. An internal Task Group established to review the loan fund in May, 1975, reported that the loan

fund had exhausted approximately half its available capital within the first year of full scale branch operations.³³ The report went on to state that:

. . . the single most disconcerting fact is the very high proportion of delinquencies on loan accounts in the first few months of the loan term. A very large number of loan recipients have made nothing more than token payments on their accounts.³⁴

This situation raised questions regarding the capacity of the loan fund to "revolve" and sustain itself through replenishment by loan repayments.

There were several reasons for the high rate of loan delinquency. The most obvious was that the initial pressure on the Department to get the loan fund program into effect had resulted in approving a large number of ill-considered loans. In the first months of the program's full scale operation, Branch employees had been able to collect and process loan applications, but no genuine capacity or effort to evaluate loans existed in the Branch.

The internal report also cited the lack of management support to clients by the Branch as a major reason for many delinquencies. As the report noted:

Because of the lack of consultation between field officer and client, the client either feels no obligation to repay the loan or is experiencing financial difficulties which prohibit repayment. In many cases, the client has no experience in financial management and needs advise [sic] on how to schedule his cash flow.³⁵

This led the report's authors to conclude:

. . . a majority of the loans are being invested into activities, and those activities operated in such a way, that the consequence is a transfer

of capital into income into personal consumption in a most inefficient manner to both the lender as well as the borrower.³⁶

The lack of management support to Branch clients has continued to stand out as a weakness in the loan fund program. A very brief but recent evaluation of the loan fund conducted by the Central Planning Unit noted that:

The need for better quantity and quality in bookkeeping expertise and/or services in respect of all or most business enterprises with which EDB is involved is doubtlessly acute. However, there seemed to be a curious equation of adequate bookkeeping with management skills development--i.e., the philosophy/policy seemed to suggest that the accomplishment of the former (either internally or externally) would be synonymous with or naturally bring about the latter.³⁷

Over five hundred loans have been disbursed through the loan fund program. It is clear that attempting to provide meaningful management support to all or even most of the Branch's clients is a hopeless task given present constraints on increasing Government expenditures and the existing vehicle for promoting economic development.

The impending exhaustion of the loan fund and the large number of delinquent loans brought about rapid changes in the loan fund program by late 1975. Under a new director³⁸ the Branch began focusing its attention on limitations in the Economic Development Advance Account and the necessity of becoming more rigorous in evaluating loan applications. An attempt was made to raise the limit of the Advance Account from \$5 to \$7 million.³⁹ As a more fundamental effort to come to terms with these problems, the director decided to establish an Advisory and Evaluation Team to "assist the District Loans Committee by providing

comprehensive analysis and recommendations for each loan above \$4,000."⁴⁰ He demonstrated the impact of perceived public pressure on the Department by advising one of the members of the Advisory and Evaluation Unit that:

. . . the Branch currently lacks a co-ordinated effort to carry out adequate internal evaluation of projects. As a result, poor projects get approved and an attitude of "anything goes" is generated on the part of the public. Projects which do not receive an adequate evaluation may have an important component not adequately provided for which could have enhanced the viability of the project. Furthermore, the presentation of a thoroughly performed analysis as to why the project would not likely succeed would add to the credibility of the Branch when they are refused and minimize the current view that grants and loans are given on the basis of personal bias or pressure group affiliation.⁴¹

These developments mark the beginning of a new attitude within the Branch to the loan fund. The pressures generated by the initial spurt of activity in the loan fund's first fully functional year of operations were the dominant factor in dictating the shift in administrative attitude from leniency to comparative strictness. These pressures were heightened by public opinion as perceived by civil servants in charge of the program.⁴² A third factor contributing to tightening up the loan approval process has been the recent change in government attitudes toward public spending. Politicians and hence civil servants have become considerably more cautious in disbursing public funds to individuals. With respect to the loan fund in particular, general monitoring bodies such as the Provincial Auditor's office, the Select Standing Committee on Public Accounts and the Budget Bureau

have all levelled criticisms at the Branch for not being more fastidious in granting and collecting loans.⁴³

In fact, the Branch has had considerable success in terms of keeping the loan fund solvent. The increase in the level of the Economic Development Advance Account previously referred to was not granted, and actually was never needed. The loan fund today is "revolving" as intended and appears to be relatively stable.⁴⁴ While the more rigid attitude toward disbursing funds has mollified some criticism of the program, it also has generated its own set of reactions to the loan fund. The most serious instance of this has occurred with commercial fishermen's loan applications, which will be discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter.⁴⁵

Briefly, commercial fishermen have been forced to resort to the loan fund as a source of credit for their operations because traditional credit sources gradually have dried up. Fishermen and their representatives have requested a source of financing separate from the loan fund, but have been informed by the Minister that until and unless the loan fund proves too cumbersome for commercial fishermen's requirements, no alternate financing mechanism will be provided.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, Economic Development Branch has been chastised regularly by both commercial fishermen and employees of the Fisheries Development Program for not providing an acceptable source of credit to commercial fishermen. The Economic Development Branch persisted for some time in being insensitive to the needs of individuals it had assumed were engaged in an essentially non-viable industry.⁴⁷ Only after the Branch was given total

responsibility and staff positions for fishermen's loans did attitudes change so that commercial fishermen were given a more reasonable standard of service.

As the Economic Development Branch continued to draw criticism of its activities, its mandate and scope of activities came into question. The Assistant Deputy Minister for Economic and Resource Development, who had been the fourth director of the Branch, noted that:

Since the inception of D.N.S., the Economic Development Branch has been saddled with an ambiguous and overwhelming mandate--to provide employment for the working force of Northern Saskatchewan, if possible in their home communities, to develop an industrial base in Northern Saskatchewan, and to do so by the development of businesses with northern ownership, funded through a loan and grant fund The Department has also been criticized for allowing development components to emerge in the Resources Branch.⁴⁸

The result of these criticisms was a decision by the Executive Committee to restrict the mandate of the Branch to administration of the loan and grant program, provision of management support to businesses funded by Department loans and grants, and administration of the Department's farms.⁴⁹ This very nearly was carried one step further a year later when the Branch Director and Assistant Deputy Minister met with the Deputy Minister to consider modifying the Branch's title to "the Small Business Development Branch."⁵⁰

The results of formally narrowing the Branch's mandate were actually quite limited. In practice, the Branch had not engaged in developing economic potential in the areas of wildlife, small scale

forest industries and fisheries from which it was excluded by the Executive Committee decision. The real purpose of the Executive Committee decision was to clarify responsibilities and more significantly, to improve morale within the Economic Development Branch by providing its staff with a more realistic set of objectives.⁵¹

It is clear that an incremental approach to making policy has become entrenched in the Economic Development Branch, with serious consequences for the Department as a whole. The Branch has now formally been excluded from activities in those economic sectors which offer most hope for long term renewable resource-based development. Branch policy making is focused on solving the loan fund's immediate problems, and is therefore incremental in nature. Serious problems in the loan fund program and in all northern economic development efforts, such as the paucity of management support and training, are not being dealt with by the Branch. Such problems could be addressed more suitably within the framework of other economic development mechanisms. However, immediate problems in operating the loan fund have kept the Branch fully occupied, and hence active consideration of alternate mechanisms has been beyond the Branch's capacity.

4. The Role of the Northern Municipal Council in Policy

Formulation and Administration

The final section of this chapter deals with the involvement of the Northern Municipal Council in loan fund policy formulation and administration. The Department has included the Council in some of its

discussions on loan fund policy formulation and has structured the Council into the loan fund's administrative process. However, the Council's involvement in policy formulation and administration was never very significant and has declined as the Department has increasingly restricted the Council's jurisdiction to municipal matters.

It was noted in the preceding section that the loan fund did not become fully functional until after the second set of regulations governing it became operational on June 7, 1974. Within two months after the regulations were filed, the Branch Director noted that "several errors and omissions occurred in gazetting the regulations," and he listed ten corrections, some of which constituted changes in policy.⁵² The precise reason for the occurrence of these "errors and omissions" is not clear. However, the deficiencies were judged as being sufficiently serious that it was decided to draft an entirely new set of regulations. This was feasible because the 1974 regulations provided the essential framework within which the loan fund could operate.

The new regulations were drafted by the end of October, 1974, and were presented officially to the Northern Municipal Council for review at its November meeting. There a motion was carried indicating the Council's unwillingness to have the regulations implemented, although the Council approved four specific changes. Briefly, these gave local committees authority to reject loan or grant applications of any size, changed the District Loan Committee's membership slightly,

made residency requirements for loans more specific, and allowed for removal of the Department's ability to guarantee loans. The Council expressed its desire to make removal of loan guarantees conditional on an increase in the Advance Account from \$5 to \$15 million.⁵³ In more general terms, the Councillors noted that:

. . . this action is a temporary measure and that as [the N.M.C.'s] . . . contribution to a more permanent resolution of the inadequate performance of various economic and manpower development attempts in Northern Saskatchewan the Council proposes sponsoring the establishment of an Economic and Manpower Development Task Force.⁵⁴

The Department did not respond favourably to this proposal for an external task force but the specific recommendations regarding the regulations were fairly well received.

However, it took nearly a year before the Department's officials decided to send the new regulations to Cabinet for approval. The delay was, in part, a reflection of the relatively small policy changes which were incorporated in the regulations. Indeed, the Department's submission to Cabinet justified the changes in the regulations on the grounds that they were drafted in a more straightforward manner and therefore would be understood more easily by both branch staff and their clients.⁵⁵ The Department offered another reason for the lengthy delay in bringing the regulations to Cabinet for its approval:

The Northern Municipal Council has been unable to make a decision whether to approve the entire proposed regulations, although they have been before the Council for almost one year. It is recommended that they be dealt with without specific NMC approval.⁵⁶

After the proposed changes gained Cabinet approval, the Branch Director informed the Northern Municipal Council of the Government's intentions and inquired whether the Council wished a final meeting.⁵⁷ At the meeting which followed two further changes were agreed upon: (1) a clause specifying that the third appointee to the District Loans Committee be recommended by the Northern Development Advisory Council was modified such that the recommending body would be the Northern Municipal Council, and (2) another clause was changed so that the authority of the local loans committee to reject loans was limited to amounts less than \$4,000.

These changes, although modest in scope, were modified subsequently by the Minister. In a memo to the Branch Director dated January 21, 1976, he requested a number of specific changes to the regulations. Three of these modifications had some impact on the authority of the Minister vis-a-vis local government. One provided the Minister, rather than the Northern Municipal Council, with the right to waive residency requirements for loan applicants. Another changed authority to appoint individuals to the local loans committee. Where previously the relevant local governing body selected two of the three Committee members, the Minister now assumed authority to select one of these two members, although two of the three members still were to be local residents. The third change involved technical wording of the clause establishing the District Loans Committee. Before, the regulations had stated "the Minister shall appoint"; after, they read "the Minister may appoint."⁵⁷

The net effect of these changes, which were quickly approved by the Director,⁶⁰ was to decrease the potential authority for decision making by northern residents by expanding the potential for Ministerial discretion. There is no evidence that the Northern Municipal Council was informed of these changes, let alone given an opportunity to respond to them. The regulations were filed on February 27, 1976,⁶¹ and have remained in effect to this day. Recently, the Northern Municipal Council has objected to the regulations and to the general operations of Economic Development Branch, but without result.⁶²

A further point of contention has centred on the membership of the District Loans Committee. The first two sets of regulations provided that the membership of this committee include a member from Northern Municipal Council recommended by the Council, a member from the Northern Development Advisory Council, and a member from the Economic Development Branch, in practice usually the Director. Curiously enough, at the same meeting where a motion was passed indicating the Council's intention to boycott all further Advisory Council meetings, the Council also approved an amendment to the regulations providing for the Minister to appoint a member from the Advisory Council to the District Loans Committee.⁶³

Problems arose rather quickly when the duly appointed member of the Advisory Council submitted his resignation from the District Loans Committee, stating that he was "falsely representing a Council that does not exist."⁶⁴ Northern Municipal Council members subsequently

became more consistent in their opposition to the existence of the Advisory Council. Eventually they opposed appointing a member from the Advisory Council to the Loans Committee.⁶⁵ The functioning of the District Loans Committee was not impaired by the boycott since the regulations provided for the committee to function with only two members. Nevertheless, the Department has attempted fairly regularly to find a third member to sit on the committee. When Northern Municipal Council members approved what they thought were final changes to the regulations, they requested that the Branch Director ask the Minister to solicit Council recommendations for a third District Committee member.⁶⁶ The finalized regulations, in keeping with the expansion of potential for Ministerial discretion, retained only the two specific appointees previously agreed upon and left the appointment of any additional members in the Minister's hands.⁶⁷

The debate on this question was not finished. In August, 1976, the Deputy Minister raised some questions regarding the membership of the District Loans Committee. At the Executive Committee meeting which dealt with this issue, the Branch Director's recommendation that a northern business person be appointed to the Committee was approved. The Branch Director was instructed to negotiate with the Northern Municipal Council and to prepare a joint proposal to be forwarded to the Minister.⁶⁸ He subsequently requested a list of possible candidates for the Committee from the Council but as of April, 1977, no response had been received from the Council.⁶⁹ This is not at all surprising, since at the District Committee meeting in January, 1977, the Council

representative apparently

. . . got very excited over previous grant approvals by the Executive Committee. He maintains that Executive Committee has no business making any prior approvals of any grants.⁷⁰

The person in question, Leon McAuley, boycotted a number of Committee meetings, and the Department found a new member to sit on the Committee so that it continued to function. As the Director explained at the Executive Committee meeting which considered the problem:

There has been constant problems in convening the Committee and avoiding conflict due to politicking by the N.M.C.⁷¹

This interpretation may be biased since it seems that one major difficulty is simply that the Branch Director and the Council member have a substantial personality conflict which results in their inability to sit in the same room together.⁷²

This consideration of the Northern Municipal Council's involvement in formulating and implementing loan fund regulations makes evident the failure of all concerned to specify the Council's functions. The Council has always sought an important role in northern economic development. In the early years of the Department this thinking was never challenged seriously. If anything, the constant consultation with the Council on a broad spectrum of policy areas, including the precise nature of the loan fund regulations and the provision for Council representation on District Loans Committee, encouraged the Council to believe it had some jurisdiction over economic development affairs. However, the extent of this jurisdiction has never been spelled out.

By including the Council in economic development policy discussions and administration without allowing it any significant impact, the Council has been frustrated in a policy area it perceives as crucial. This has been particularly true in the past two years as relations between the Council and the Department have deteriorated.

It is clear that the Council's role in this area has been relatively unimportant. It has been involved in negotiating only one of three sets of regulations under which the loan fund has operated, and when it was consulted about one set of regulations, its advice and recommendations went unheeded. As well, the District Loans Committee, on which one member of the Council sits, is not of crucial importance in loan fund operations taken as a whole. The Committee has functioned regularly with only two members, so that a Council boycott of the Committee would be inconsequential.

5. Conclusion

Unquestionably, economic development is the most critical policy issue in Northern Saskatchewan. The Department's primary economic development objective is to make use of northern resources and bring services to northern communities in order that they become relatively self-sufficient and so northern residents can begin enjoying a higher standard of living. Beyond this general objective, very little concentrated consideration has been given to the specific strategy or tactics through which this general objective could be achieved. The loan fund has become the primary mechanism for achieving

development, at first because no other means of achieving northern economic development were considered and then later because it required so much administrative effort that the Economic Development Branch would have been taxed severely to assume more responsibilities.

The Department has given force to its commitment to local participation in economic development by establishing local loans committees to approve local projects and given them legitimacy. This has relieved the Department of political and administrative difficulties which doubtlessly would have ensued from making decisions about local projects without some form of local consideration and approval or disapproval. However, these committees generally are not well regarded by senior members of the Branch and the Branch has ignored the potential role these committees have to play in locally based economic development.

The many problems encountered in operating the loan fund have dominated policy administration and constrained policy formulation. The problem of a high arrears rate has been attacked by evaluating loan applications much more closely and by establishing more rigorous collections procedures. This has meant that the Branch has ignored the more fundamental problem of the paucity of management support and training to loan recipients. The Branch's apparent inability to deal with this problem and others in any meaningful manner raises some serious questions about the appropriateness of the loan fund as the central economic development policy tool.

The administrative problems associated with the loan fund have led to an incremental approach toward economic development policy

formulation by the Branch and the Department. Alternatives to the loan fund have been suggested and are available, but have never been taken very seriously. The preponderance of an incremental approach to problem solving in general makes the consideration of alternatives to the program improbable and difficult. Moreover, the Branch's problems with the loan fund have drawn criticism from inside the Department and from other Government agencies whose responsibility it is to monitor programs. Thus, the Economic Development Branch has had its boundaries formally limited so that in policy areas such as forestry it has very little responsibility and therefore little ability to conceive and implement new programs.

The Northern Municipal Council's jurisdiction in the field of economic development has depended directly on the Department's inclination to allow such involvement. During the first few years of the Department's existence, the Council appeared to be an important actor, particularly when it was requested to consider, review and approve a new set of loan fund regulations. But the Council did not perceive this level of involvement in economic development programming as sufficient, nor did it perceive minor changes in the loan fund as being significant enough to address fundamental northern development issues. Its involvement in policy formulation for the loan fund and for economic development generally was not effective, even when relations between the Council and the Department were relatively amicable. Since the two organizations have become progressively more disenchanted with each other, the Department has been less inclined

to involve the Council in policy formulation. This has extended to policy administration as well, so that the Council's role with respect to the District Loans Committee is now fairly inconsequential.

Notes to Chapter IV

¹G.R. Bowerman, "Principles for Northern Development" (September 30, 1971), p. 2.

²Howard Brown, Employment Outlook for Northern Saskatchewan. Report prepared by the Economic Analysis and Forecasts Branch, Federal Department of Manpower and Immigration (Regina: Department of Manpower and Immigration, January, 1977), p. 2.

³Annual Report of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan, 1973-74, p. 3.

⁴Memo from B.R. Hill, Director, Policy and Planning Branch to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister, Department of Northern Saskatchewan, re: Western Northlands and D.R.E.E. (July 24, 1973), p. 3.

⁵Saskatchewan Regulation 165/73 under The Department of Northern Saskatchewan Act, 1972, in the Saskatchewan Gazette 1973 (July 11, 1973), p. 280.

⁶Described in untitled report by Archie Leslie, Director, Economic Development Branch re: Loans, Grants and Guarantees (February 18, 1974), p. 1.

⁷At the meeting on May 9 and 10, 1973, between the Department and the Metis Society, the Metis Society delegates resolved that "We feel that a minimum of 100 million dollars be set up so that native people may develop an economic base." Noted in a memo from Jerry Hammersmith, Program Consultant to A.C. Towill, Assistant Deputy Minister and B.R. Hill, Director Policy and Planning re: Resolutions and Motions--Northern Municipal Council meeting--May 9th and 10th (May 11, 1973), p. 3.

⁸These problems for northern co-operatives are well illustrated in a report by J.T. Phalen, "Co-operative Organization--A Basic Development Approach--Northern Saskatchewan Experience," A report prepared for the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, 1973, especially pp. 6-30. In particular, the report recommended:

That appropriate educational programs for both northern residents and people commissioned to assist in northern development be part of any development program. Educational programs should be organized on a consistent basis designed to foster maximum development of the people involved as well as meeting the needs of the organizations that are established (pp. 24-25).

⁹In fact, throughout the brief history of the Department, alternative mechanisms have existed or have been created by the Department. Some of these will be considered briefly in the following chapter. It is worth noting, however, that in every instance these mechanisms have not been given sufficient attention by the Department and thus have been discontinued, misused, or simply ignored.

¹⁰Twenty-eight local loans committees have been established out of a total of thirty-three northern communities for which the Province is a program delivery agency; the remaining communities are generally very small and proximate to neighbouring communities whose local loans committee they utilize.

¹¹See Saskatchewan Regulation 40/76 under The Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act, 1974, in the Saskatchewan Gazette (February 27, 1976), p. 110.

¹²Saskatchewan Regulation 165/73, op. cit., p. 282.

¹³Northern Municipal Council Minutes (April 9, 1974), p. 2.

¹⁴Memo from A.C. Towill, Director of Field Services, to Doug Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister, re: Economic Development Loan and Grant Funds (October 1, 1973).

¹⁵Memo from A.G. Leslie, Acting Director of Economic Development, to Doug Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister re: Economic Development Loan and Grant Fund (October 4, 1973).

¹⁶Policy and Planning Branch employees, "Economic Development," Appendix IV in A Statement to the Public (May 20, 1974).

¹⁷See the proposal presented in The Northern Municipal Council Minutes (January 31, 1974), p. 5.

¹⁸As will be explained more thoroughly later in the chapter, the new regulations and the new Act respecting the Economic Development of Northern Saskatchewan were not drafted with the issue of local participation specifically in mind, but most fundamentally represented an attempt to correct the general deficiencies in the legislative framework surrounding this policy area.

¹⁹The identifiable occasions when the evaluation of local loans committees took place were in October, 1975, and January, 1978. See memo from Joe Jeerakathil and Doug McLeod, Research and Evaluation Team to Ross Moxley, Director, Economic Development re: Information on Local Loan Committees, Loans Approved, etc.--1975 (October 23, 1975) and Doug McLeod, Director, Economic Development Branch to Marcel L'Heureux, Deputy Minister re: Analysis--Local Loans Committees (February 9, 1978).

²⁰As of September 1, 1977, of a total amount of loans in arrears equalled \$800,873; \$132,964 or 17% were for loans under \$4,000; \$286,723 or 36% were for loans between \$4,000 and \$25,000 and \$381,176 or 48% were for loans larger than \$25,000. However, the ratio of arrears to total loan amount for loans less than \$4,000 was 29%; for loans between \$4,000 and \$25,000 was 22% and for loans larger than \$25,000 was 11%. Because so many more loans are given out under the \$4,000 level--262 out of a total of 494 loans disbursed for the four-year period from 1973 to September, 1977--the percentage of small loans in arrears is relatively high while the total amount in arrears under \$4,000 is smaller than for the other categories. Tony Bunz, Department of Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Branch Analysis of Loan Fund--Period 1973 to September 1, 1977, A Report Prepared by the Advisory and Evaluation Unit (November 9, 1977), p. 12.

²¹Memo from Doug McLeod, Director, Economic Development Branch, to Marcel L'Heureux, Deputy Minister, re: Analysis--Local Loans Committees (February 9, 1978).

²²Memo from J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister, to Hon. G.R. (Ted) Bowerman, Minister, re: Loan Fund (October 17, 1973).

²³See, for example, Policy and Planning Branch employees, A Statement to the Public, op. cit.

²⁴The available documentation does not make it apparent when A.G. Leslie left the Department. See, for example, the Northern Municipal Council Minutes (April 9, 1974), p. 2, and a memo from D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister, to Ed Breese, Director of Colleges Branch (February 8, 1974). The third Director remained until August, 1975. Personal interview with Vic Ellis, former Director of Economic Development (June 10, 1977).

²⁵Northern Municipal Council Minutes (April 9, 1974), p. 2.

²⁶Memo from G.R. Bowerman, Minister to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister, re: Economic Development Loans and Grants (March 27, 1974).

²⁷A.G. Leslie, Reply to "Guidelines for Administration of Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Fund" (May 3, 1973).

²⁸In fact, a memo from P. Brook, Program Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch to G. Koshinsky, J. Jeerakathil, G. Roberts, and D. Newman, Policy and Planning Branch, re: Guidelines for Administration of Economic Development Funds by Specific Resource Sector (February 19, 1974) indicated that J. Millar, Director of Operations, had requested that Policy and Planning Branch prepare specific guidelines for loan fund administration in the Resources sector. But neither this memo nor any other documentation clearly spells out what the roles of Economic Development and Policy and Planning branches were with respect

to economic development planning. It should be noted though, that for any period prior to the Policy and Planning disbandment, only that Branch would have had the resources to undertake such planning.

²⁹Saskatchewan Regulation 162/74 under The Northern Saskatchewan Development Act, 1974, in Saskatchewan Gazette (June 7, 1974), pp. 403-412.

³⁰All northern interest groups were concerned that meaningful economic development take place, cf. note 7. However, the realization of economic development by northerners is undoubtedly one of the most difficult objectives for the Department to achieve. This was even more true in the first year or so of the Department's existence, when the Economic Development Branch lacked resources and there was very poor co-ordination with other branches. As the new Deputy Minister noted to the press only two months after his appointment:

One area . . . [of] real concern is economic development, and . . . the number of complaints . . . indicated the present programs are not reaching the people they are supposed to serve.

Article by Tom McKegney, "Northern Municipal Council's duties unclear," The Regina Leader-Post (November 30, 1974), p. 1. One Branch staff member in August, 1974, stated that:

. . . the Branch will undoubtedly receive further criticism as to the delay in the processing of applications and deficiencies in the delivery of management support services to clients. The Branch would recommend that a critical review of the present regulations governing the Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Fund.

Memo from T.L. Giesbrecht, Administration Officer, Economic Development Branch to D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister, "Problems in the Branch for Discussion with new Deputy Minister" (August 20, 1974).

³¹An analysis of the loan fund completed in the fall of 1977 indicated that of 494 loans in total during the period from July, 1973, until September, 1978, 35 or 7% were processed during the 1973-74 fiscal year; 135 or 27% were processed during the 1974-75 fiscal year; 137 or 28% were processed during the 1975-76 fiscal year; 72 or 15% were processed during the 1977-78 fiscal year up until September, 1977. The statistics are from Tony Bunz, Economic Development Branch Analysis, op. cit.

³²From personal interviews with Gerry Parsons, Supervisor of West Side Field Officers, Economic Development Branch (June 2, 1977) and

with Ken Shaw, Co-operative Management Advisor, Economic Development Branch (January 18, 1978).

³³ Identification of Problems Currently Facing the Economic Development Branch and Suggested Solutions for the Short-run (1-2 years), a report prepared by an intra-department Economic Development Task Group (circa July, 1975), Item 1 "The Consequences of Past Activities," B., p. 1.

³⁴ Ibid., part I. A., p. 3.

³⁵ Ibid., part II, p. 5.

³⁶ Ibid., part I.A., p. 3.

³⁷ Memo from Suzanne Wise, Central Planning to Shakir Alwarid, Chief Planner, re: Economic Development Branch Scheme (February 23, 1977), p. 1.

³⁸ Vic Ellis was replaced by Ross Moxley as Branch Director as of August, 1975. Memo from D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister, to D.M. Wallace, Director of Budget Bureau, Department of Finance, re: Legislation for 1975-76 Session (August 28, 1975).

³⁹ Memo from Ross Moxley, Director of Economic Development to Doug McLeod, Economic Development Branch, re: Economic Development Loan Fund (September 25, 1975).

⁴⁰ Memo from Ross Moxley, Director, Economic Development Branch, to Northern Municipal Council and District Loans Committee members, re: 1. Establishment of Advisory and Evaluation Team, 2. District Loans Committee meetings, Naming Alternate Members (October 22, 1975), p. 1.

⁴¹ Ross Moxley, Director of Economic Development to Doug McLeod, Economic Development Branch, re: Branch Administration (September 9, 1975), p. 2.

⁴² Initial criticisms of the loan fund came primarily from native groups. However, the large number of small loans given to northern natives, primarily for fishing and trapping activity, resulted by 1975 in considerable criticism from northern whites. They were disgruntled that the loan fund was restricted by virtue of a clause requiring residency in the north of fifteen years or half a client's lifetime, whichever was lesser. This criticism had some impact on some branch staff. Cf. memo from Giesbrecht to Schweitzer (August 20, 1974). The internal Task Group, which included Economic Development Branch staff, also perceived that the public was criticizing them on the grounds that loans were given "on the basis of personal bias or pressure group affiliation." See note 41.

⁴³The most criticism seems to have been generated by the Department of Finance. See memo from Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister to S. Alwarid, Secretary, Executive Committee (November 22, 1976), p. 1, where Moxley stated that:

By trying to cover all fronts, including development, funding; management support and collections, the Branch has been under heavy criticism particularly by the Department of Finance (Budget Bureau, Comptroller's Office, Treasury Board). The criticism is currently being brought to bear by the Budget Bureau in the form of proposed cuts to the Branch's programs. It has been said that no meaningful development has taken place, that the loan fund has been mismanaged and that businesses once established receive inadequate management support.

⁴⁴Three separate factors explain why the Economic Development Advance Account has been "revolving." In the first three years of operation, \$773,362 was transferred into the account, primarily to write-off loans assessed as being uncollectable. Second, the Branch began developing collections procedures and recruited people to encourage repayments, which subsequently have increased. And finally, as noted earlier, the Branch has granted fewer "high risk" loans since 1976. See memo from Doug McLeod, Director, Economic Development Branch, to M.O. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister, Department of Northern Saskatchewan, re: Economic Development Loan Fund (January 21, 1977), p. 3.

⁴⁵The matter of commercial fishermen's economic development loans will be considered more thoroughly in the following chapter on policy co-ordination but must be mentioned here to establish the limitation of the loan fund.

⁴⁶The Minister's position on this question first was enunciated on September 30, 1974, and subsequently has been consistent. See letter from G.R. Bowerman, Minister, to Larry Hunter, Secretary, Commercial Fisheries Development Committee (September 30, 1974), p. 1.

⁴⁷This attitude was illustrated in a memo from the Branch Director where he cited 64% of the loans to commercial fishermen as being in arrears while the amount in arrears represented 76% of the total amount of outstanding loans. The Director then commented "As you can appreciate from the above data, our concerns regarding the viability of fishing in the N.A.D. are well founded." Memo from Doug McLeod, Director, Economic Development Branch to John Piper, Economist, Fisheries Development Program, re: Bert Thompson's Loan Application to Establish a Commercial Fishing Operation (March 2, 1977), p. 2.

⁴⁸ Memo from Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister, to all Branch Heads and all Economic Development staff, n.t. (December 24, 1976), p. 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁵⁰ See memo from Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister, Economic and Resource Development Administration, to Marcel L'Heureux, Deputy Minister, re: Economic Development Branch (January 12, 1978), p. 1.

⁵¹ Personal interview with Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister, Economic and Resource Development Administration (June 10, 1977).

⁵² Memo from V.C. Ellis, Acting Director of Economic Development, to M.B. Derrick, Deputy Minister, re: Amendments to Economic Development Regulations (July 31, 1974), p. 1.

⁵³ Northern Municipal Council Minutes (November 27, 1974), pp. 4-5.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 5. The Council has rarely made its views of economic development explicit and has generally limited its criticism of departmental economic development policies to fairly general statements. However, in the Council's submission to the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry, the Council gave what may be its most explicit statement on economic development:

Social, cultural, and economic development cannot be separated but it must be recognized that the control of economic development has great affect upon both social and cultural development. This factor has been recognized by the North and they have expressed their dissatisfaction with the D.N.S. economic development programming Simply stated: the North refuses any longer to be "dictated to" by the Province It demands the right to equal participation as is enjoyed in the south of this Province.

To this end, the Council proposed that a special Northern Saskatchewan Development Agency be established with representation from a cross-section of northern residents to plan northern economic development from renewable and non-renewable resources. The Submission by the Northern Municipal Council to the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry on the Matter of Uranium Development in Northern Saskatchewan (October 16, 1977), pp. 27-28.

⁵⁵ Fact Sheet accompanying amendments to regulations made under The Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act, 1974 (October 10, 1975), p. 2.

- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ Letter from Ross Moxley, Director, Economic Development Branch to Lawrence Yew, Chairman, Northern Municipal Council (November 4, 1975).
- ⁵⁸ Northern Municipal Council Minutes (November 19, 1976), p. 3.
- ⁵⁹ Memo from Ted Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan to Ross Moxley, Director of Economic Development, re: Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act (January 21, 1976).
- ⁶⁰ Memo from Ross Moxley, Director, Economic Development Branch, to Hon. G.R. (Ted) Bowerman, Minister, re: Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Regulations (February 6, 1976).
- ⁶¹ Saskatchewan Regulation 40/76, op. cit., pp. 106-110.
- ⁶² See memo from Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister, to Lawrence Yew, Chairman of the Northern Municipal Council, n.t. (May 5, 1977).
- ⁶³ N.M.C. Council Minutes, p. 4.
- ⁶⁴ Letter from Phil Chenard, Member of Northern Development Advisory Council, to G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan (May 1, 1976).
- ⁶⁵ Fact Sheet, op. cit., p. 5.
- ⁶⁶ Memo from Ross Moxley, Director, Economic Development Branch, to G.R. Bowerman, Minister, re: District Loans Committee (November 24, 1975).
- ⁶⁷ Saskatchewan Regulation 40/76, op. cit., p. 109.
- ⁶⁸ Executive Committee Minutes (September 9, 1976), p. 1.
- ⁶⁹ Memo from Doug McLeod, Director of Economic Development, to the Northern Municipal Council, re: Third Member to the District Loans Committee (March 28, 1977).
- ⁷⁰ Memo from Doug McLeod, Director of Economic Development, to Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister, re: Leon McAuley--Member of District Loans Committee (January 21, 1977).
- ⁷¹ Executive Committee Minutes (June 28, 1977), p. 2.
- ⁷² Personal interview with Gerry Parsons, op. cit.

Chapter V-

POLICY CO-ORDINATION

1. Introduction

The previous analysis has examined particular policy areas which demonstrate that the Department's policy process has been largely incremental rather than innovative and that public participation has not been found to the extent expected in processes of policy formulation and implementation. Policy co-ordination and integration,¹ the third central objective of the policy process in the Department remains to be discussed more thoroughly. The lack of integration and co-ordination in northern programming from the early 1950s until the Department's inception has quite frequently been given as the primary reason for creating the single agency. Thus, two of the seven most often cited objectives of the Department have been:

A unified administrative structure for all government services in the north The co-ordination of all levels of all government programs as transferred to D.N.S.²

Policy co-ordination was stressed even more strongly in a message from the Deputy Minister to the Assistant Deputy Minister in 1973. Three of the Assistant Deputy's objectives were to:

. . . co-ordinate the activities of the Operations Branches in Prince Albert and La Ronge to ensure a maximum of efficient services to the people of the North; as units are transferred to Department of Northern Saskatchewan from parent Departments, take necessary action to integrate them into a unified

whole with the units already in place; and develop a cohesive, harmonious Department dedicated to working with the people to determine and meet their needs.³

These statements highlight one of the major purposes of the single agency, that is, to achieve an integrated, co-ordinated policy approach in a particular geographical area.

However, the Department has encountered many problems in achieving policy integration and co-ordination. These, in part, may be traced to what can be termed "branch compartmentalization." "Branch compartmentalization" is the tendency of particular branches to become caught up in their own priorities to the exclusion of other branches' priorities or those of the Department in general. A lack of co-ordination has been noted in previous chapters, particularly in Chapter II with respect to fisheries policy. This chapter will describe and analyze in more detail the factors contributing to a lack of policy integration and co-ordination.

To illustrate these problems, the chapter will explore policy areas where there are obvious linkages between human, economic and resource development,⁴ at the level of general policy formulation and in specific policy administration. First, a discussion of the now defunct Training Opportunity Program will demonstrate how a lack of co-ordination seriously weakened the Department's ability to promote projects which integrate critical aspects of human, economic and resource development. Then, alternative development mechanisms available to the Department will be considered to illustrate co-ordination problems the agency continues to experience. Finally, the case of commercial fishermen's

loans from Economic Development Branch will be analyzed as an example of how two branches have disputed the use of the Department's loan fund, to the detriment of the fund's largest client group.

2. Program Linkages Between Human, Economic and Resource Development.

A. The Evolution of the Training Opportunity Program

The Training Opportunity Program was initiated in October, 1972, under the auspices of the Department of Continuing Education in the Meadow Lake Special Area⁵ as an attempt to meet a perceived gap in conventional adult education programming. Previous adult educational programs that had focused on training in direct work-related situations did not include provision for counselling and orientation to the work situation. By contrast, the Training Opportunity Program attempted to achieve:

. . . the simultaneous application of currently used methods, including academic upgrading, skill training, social orientation and intensive counselling, as an integral part of a work-training program involving work in credible work situations.⁶

Where possible, the projects were intended to develop a work force with specific job-related skills so that potential employment generating enterprises in these communities would have a better chance for success. In communities where permanent employment opportunities were not immediately available, public works projects, essentially "make-work" endeavours, were utilized "with emphasis on the development of sound work habits, understanding the demands of the world of work, academic upgrading and vocational skills."⁷

Four separate projects were initiated under the Training Opportunity Program in the Northern Administration District. With the exception of one tourist resort project in Turnor Lake, all the northern projects concentrated on "make-work" endeavours.⁸ This aspect of the program was criticized in a formal evaluation after its first year of operation.

It was felt by those in the projects that recognizable skills should be the result of the project. Training involved in some projects appeared to be isolated with little future extension of it possible. The most successful projects were thought to be those leading to specific job training.⁹

Despite this and other criticisms,¹⁰ the Training Opportunity Program was successful in establishing development projects in communities which sorely needed and desired them. Thus, it was a logical program to transfer to the Department of Northern Saskatchewan.

The Training Opportunity Program was transferred to the Department on January 1, 1974. Its objectives remained quite similar to those formulated for projects sponsored earlier in Meadow Lake Special Area.¹¹ The program was immediately earmarked for expansion. The 1974-75 budget description noted:

The present plan to extend these programs throughout Northern Saskatchewan should reinforce and enhance the success of our total training program.¹²

Within the first year of operation under the Colleges Branch, projects funded under the program included three handicraft producer co-operatives, two wood harvesting and post cutting operations and one boat building, handicraft producing and labour contracting enterprise.

Ideally, the Training Opportunity Program represented an opportunity for the Department to sponsor innovative industrial projects which would process renewable resources already harvested in the north and thereby retain their value-added potential there. Thus the program addressed a critical problem in the northern economy. Northern resources have traditionally been sent south in their primary state, so that dollars, jobs and the potential to develop skills are all similarly exported to the south while the northern economy and northern residents remain underdeveloped. In attempting to develop essential linkages in the northern economy, it was and is inevitable that some enterprises which ordinarily might be considered "uneconomic" must be supported. Furthermore, the training northern residents require to take part in and manage industrial projects is ideally provided as an integral part of the work situation. At least in theory, all of the components essential to northern economic development were addressed in one integrated package, the Training Opportunity Program.

The spurt of projects sponsored by T.O.P. in 1974 points to a fundamental difficulty that plagued the program until its demise. When T.O.P. was transferred to the Department, it was the most convenient means of initiating industrial economic development projects.¹³ In fact, difficulties in the Economic Development Branch then were such that the Training Opportunity Program was virtually the only source of funding for projects employing a few people or more. As a consequence many different types of projects were sponsored under the program, but they were developed without reference to the program's intended uses

and occasionally were simply ill-considered projects. The Department's general inability to promote economic development projects in its first two years led to hurried, incomplete scrutinizing of any projects which were proposed prior to approving them.

These problems were as prevalent in Colleges Branch as in Economic Development Branch. Moreover, staff associated with the Training Opportunity Program developed lax attitudes toward establishing and implementing projects.¹⁴ A good illustration of these problems occurred with a local housing repair project in Cumberland House. There the local Training Opportunity Program counsellor attempted to have program funds used to pay a portion of the wages for individuals training on a house repair project sponsored by the federal Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program. For the project's purposes, T.O.P. was simply viewed as a convenient funding vehicle.¹⁵ As the Co-ordinator of Industry Based Training in Colleges Branch noted:

In our discussion in Prince Albert, it was concluded that we would attempt to create a business enterprise of some type which could get its start and develop its skill through contract work on R.R.A.P. with training assistance from T.O.P. Instead, it appears that T.O.P. has been presented as a program of wage subsidies which will allow R.R.A.P. funds to be extended a bit further I gather that T.O.P. is now committed to paying the salary of an instructor and the minimum wage training allowance to nine trainees Undoubtedly, training is taking place. From all reports the instructional program is progressing very well. Consequently, Colleges Branch will be involved.¹⁶

This situation was fairly typical. Field staff initiated a project which was poorly conceived in terms of the Training Opportunity

Program's objectives. In this situation, the ideal approach identified by the Co-ordinator was to create a business enterprise which would serve as a permanent community focus for developing skills, processing resources and developing a local economy. While housing repair activities and related training did take place, no permanent community enterprise was established. Subsequent construction activities have taken place in the community, but local residents have been unable to maximize benefits from these because of the absence of such a permanent business enterprise.

The reasons for such missed development opportunities are numerous. As noted before, the projects were conceived poorly in general. None of the individuals in Colleges Branch had much expertise in establishing economic development projects, and Economic Development Branch was only operational after most of the Training Opportunity Program projects had been initiated. Besides being established without sufficient attention to technical economic questions, such as the most feasible means of production and marketing, the projects were developed as co-operatives. This made them more difficult to manage than private enterprises. Thus management support and co-operative education were required for each of the projects. The Economic Development Branch was supposed to possess expertise in co-operative development and education, and in providing management support and training to business enterprises. However, in practice the Branch was either unable or unwilling to provide such services.

Criticism from an external agency was required before the problem area of co-operative education and development was tackled. In 1975, the Department attempted to submit Training Opportunity Program projects as part of a more general training package entitled "Options North" to the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion for retroactive cost-sharing.¹⁷ One of the federal Department's Senior Implementation Officers from the federal Department recommended against retroactive cost-sharing for the program partly because of the use of co-operatives for these projects. Describing the most successful ventures, the handicraft operations, he noted:

There is little or no understanding of the co-op principles and philosophy. Very little is being done to improve this situation. I am of the opinion that too much emphasis is placed on co-ops without the proper and continued education in the movement.¹⁸

Responsibility for administering co-operatives rested with Economic Development Branch, but problems there in acquiring an adequate staff complement for co-operative development and education were even greater than in acquiring personnel to administer the loan and grant program.¹⁹ The Training Opportunity Program staff therefore assumed co-operative education responsibilities, without having any specific knowledge of co-operative organization aside from their experience with program projects.²⁰

A similar difficulty was evident in connection with management support. After T.O.P. responsibilities were assumed by the northern agency, there was virtually no mention of management training as an objective. However, by mid-1975, the program's objectives included:

Management support staff to train a team of local managers. Program staff will phase down their involvement over the project life In general, work toward phasing out Department input by encouraging local management and direction, and leave behind a viable, on-going business enterprise.²¹

Again, management support and training was not a responsibility of Colleges Branch, but at the same time was not being provided adequately by the Economic Development Branch.

However, projects were conceived which did not make sense in economic terms and were established as co-operatives. This made them more difficult to manage than private entrepreneurial operations and required much more attention from the Department. With respect to the handicraft co-operatives, for example, neither central staff nor field staff ever managed to develop a clear perspective of what economic potential existed for the industry or of how to achieve such potential. When Economic Development Branch staff suggested that handicrafts had to be centrally marketed and machine-made in large quantities to be economically viable, field staff resisted.²²

This difficulty was compounded by the fact that even central staff could not agree on what approach to take towards particular projects.²³ As different Department employees went into a community, they offered contradictory advice to project staff and community residents. Not surprisingly, such advice given by central staff from any one branch was generally selected on the grounds of its apparent convenience or favourability to local residents, regardless of its relationship to advice given by staff from another branch.²⁴ The controversy generated by the program at the community level became so intense that some field staff perceived a "war"

occurring between Economic Development Branch and the Northern Continuing Education Branch.²⁵

By August, 1975, the branches had initiated a series of formal meetings to resolve problems facing T.O.P. projects and to co-ordinate their efforts. Generally speaking, the first meeting produced agreement that the Colleges Branch would provide management support to the projects and that project officers would be assigned to each project "to ensure the co-ordinated delivery of joint services."²⁶ These changes, however, did not materialize quickly enough to allay criticism of the program emanating from the Budget Bureau.

The overall Colleges Branch budget submitted for the 1976-77 fiscal year may be considered an unqualified disaster. In almost all areas of programming, the Branch encountered severe criticism. Consequently, several programs were either reduced or transferred to other branches. The Training Opportunity Program was a prime target. Budget Bureau's criticism was comprehensive.

It is clear . . . that the Branch is involved in what is intended to be economic development initiatives. Unfortunately, these initiatives have been taken in the past with extremely inadequate preparation and study. Consequently, the Department has bound itself to organizations initiated within constraints which give them no final prospect of viability. Furthermore, the concept of the program has proven to be extremely paternalistic. The Budget Bureau cannot accept the view that ten to fourteen native women require "counselling" for over two years within the framework of a native handicrafts co-operative. This kind of approach does not prepare native people to take responsibility, but can only increase their dependence on outside help.²⁷

The Bureau recommended that the Training Opportunity Program be terminated and that responsibility for existing projects be transferred

to the Economic Development Branch. It was asserted that this Branch could easily handle the managerial assistance required for the handicraft co-operatives, while the wood harvesting ventures could continue with more intensive managerial assistance and financial support.²⁸

Not unexpectedly, the Budget Bureau's recommendations were greeted with animosity by those associated with the Training Opportunity Program. As the Program Manager noted in an extensive rebuttal to the Bureau's criticisms:

The Training Opportunity Program provides social and work adaptation support as well as business and skill training to the Economic Development Program. The Economic Development Branch provides none of these services at the present time, nor do they intend to in the future.²⁹

And further:

T.O.P.'s philosophy of skill training and counselling is imperative to the inauguration of new projects. It has allowed Economic Development to take a hard economic stand and T.O.P. to subsidize those uneconomic attitudes, while training to change them took place.³⁰

The Program Manager's fears that the Economic Development Branch would not be able to support individual projects has been substantiated by subsequent events. The handicraft operations, after an unsuccessful attempt by Economic Development Branch to solve some of their problems by establishing a central marketing agency,³¹ are no longer operating. The wood harvesting operations have closed down, even though transportation subsidies were provided. Instead, the Department has placed greater emphasis on government-owned and operated sawmills to take advantage of forestry-based economic development opportunities.

B. Alternate Economic and Human Development Mechanisms

This overview of the Training Opportunity Program leads naturally to a discussion of alternate mechanisms for promoting locally based economic development. In the previous chapter, the limitations of relying exclusively on the loan fund and individual entrepreneurship for local economic development were discussed. Yet some of the same limitations, most notably the lack of resources to provide adequate support to enterprises of any type, have hampered the utilization and effectiveness of alternate mechanisms. The following discussion will centre on some of the Department's attempts to establish alternate development mechanisms. These include the Training Opportunity Program and the development of Bill 84, meant to enable the Department to engage directly in commercial enterprises.

When it became clear to the Budget Bureau that the Training Opportunity Program was actually providing economic development services as much as it was delivering adult education and training, the program was transferred to a branch supposedly more appropriate. The most immediate result was a gap in programming. After March 31, 1976, no program existed for supporting projects which co-ordinated human, economic and resource development activities.

Even before the Training Opportunity Program was terminated, alternate development mechanisms were being considered by Department employees. Replying to a request for information from the Director of the Budget Bureau, the Economic Development Branch Director identified

a major deficiency in the economic development program as being:

. . . the lack of ability for the Department to be an initiator for development. We have been forced to be a response mechanism, thus having little or no impact into the development of essential services into the community.³²

The Department first considered rectifying this problem by creating a Northern Development Crown Corporation. Such a corporation was to have northern representatives on its Board of Directors. Its mandate was to provide a greater emphasis on tourism, marketing, the provision of community services and developing northern cottage industries while simultaneously taking over the loan fund activities of Economic Development Branch. By November, 1974, the draft arrangements for such an institution had been developed, and active discussions regarding a Crown Corporation continued until mid-1976.³³ But for reasons not entirely clear, the proposal was dropped. One definite difficulty was that drafts prepared by individuals in the Economic Development Branch were criticized by the Planning and Research Secretariat, the low profile successor to the Policy and Planning Branch. The Secretariat did not criticize the concept in general, but found fault with organizational details contained in the proposals. These were sufficiently serious that other mechanisms were pursued,³⁴ although the Crown Corporation concept had been discussed occasionally ever since.

In fact, the tactic finally adopted was a rather simple, incremental one by comparison with the Crown Corporation concept or the Training Opportunity Program. In July, 1976, the Assistant Deputy Minister informed the Director of Economic Development that:

We are presently preparing an amendment to the Act (The Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act, 1974) which will permit the Department to carry on commercial activities. The proposal at this time is to create an advance account in the amount of \$15,000,000.³⁵

This proposal passed through intra-departmental channels quickly. It was never discussed formally at Executive Committee and by November was submitted as a Treasury Board Agenda item. There its purpose was described as:

. . . a method whereby the D.N.S. could initiate, acquire or support business enterprises in the north. The proposed amendment would allow the Department to establish commercially-viable businesses and employ and train local people in their operation. After a period of time, the business could be sold to the employees Marginal operations with growth and employment potential could be purchased or rejuvenated, by an injection of management expertise, then transferred to the "private" or "co-operative" sectors.³⁶

The rationale for proposing these amendments was the need to clarify the status of existing Government-owned, operated or heavily subsidized industries. Included in this category were four Government-operated farms which had been criticized within the Department for inefficient operation; the Prospector's Incentive Plan, a Government-sponsored training and employment program for native prospectors which had been criticized from agencies outside the Department; and two wood harvesting operations originally sponsored by Training Opportunity Program which had such high inventories of fence posts that their solvency was in question. Tourism development was the only new area of Government involvement proposed. In this area, the Department had initiated some discussions regarding the possibility of establishing

a tourist training complex in La Ronge and acquiring some tourist outfitting operations, thereby giving northern residents more opportunity to become involved in that industry.³⁷

The amendment to the Act was routed through the Attorney General's Department, the Legislative Review Committee of Cabinet and Cabinet itself with no more than minor modifications to its content.³⁸ On May 10, 1977, Bill 84, An Act to Amend The Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act, 1974,³⁹ was given assent by the Provincial Legislature. The Bill provoked some controversy because of its provision for Government involvement in the tourist outfitting industry. The Northern Saskatchewan Outfitters' Association objected vociferously to the legislation, largely because the organization perceived it as a mechanism whereby the Department could expropriate existing operations. In response, a letter from the Minister to the Association's Secretary explained that the Bill did not convey powers of expropriation to the Minister. Instead, the letter noted that its intent was to purchase operations being sold and to provide a means for developing a tourist training complex.⁴⁰

The controversy generated by the Bill has not been warranted given its limited use. Apart from rationalizing Government farming operations and the Prospector's Incentive Plan, few developmental activities have been carried out under the Commercial Advance Account. The Department's existing sawmills have undergone expansion and one unique mill and manufactured log cabin enterprise has been initiated.⁴¹ Crucially, important development opportunities have been missed, and

the controversy associated with the Bill has had little to do with such failure to capitalize on opportunities.

Rather, more familiar factors are a better explanation for the fact that few development activities were promoted through the Advance Account. Although the Department now has clarified and expanded its capacity to initiate commercial enterprises, the Economic Development Branch still cannot and will not become extensively involved in supporting such enterprises. Apparently worthwhile projects have regularly been stalled by the Branch for spurious reasons.⁴² Moreover, in the capital construction field where the Department has been extremely active, opportunities to develop transferable skills and long-term business enterprises have been completely missed. Instead, the Department itself continues to manage and deliver capital projects such as roads, airstrips, sewer and water projects, houses, government offices and community buildings.⁴³ Had northern entrepreneurs or a northern-controlled corporation been established early in the Department's history, most of the economic benefits from such capital projects would have flowed directly to northern residents.

It is clear that the Department has not been able to identify and utilize a successful range of delivery agents for an integrated program of economic development at the community level. The economic development loan fund has assisted individual entrepreneurs to become established in northern communities, but the Branch's management support consists of providing bookkeeping services rather than training for management. Thus field staff for the Branch have been, and for

the foreseeable future, will continue to be involved in a "maintenance activity" that develops few skills.

Branch staff have been unable to provide adequate support to the Training Opportunity Program and few initiatives have been embarked upon through the Department's Commercial Advance Account. In short, maintaining the loan fund has severely constrained the Branch's capacity to establish or support alternate mechanisms. Nor has integration and co-ordination with the Branch primarily responsible for adult education and training occurred to alleviate these problems. Disputes between Economic Development and Northern Continuing Education over such programs as the Training Opportunity Program have made co-ordination unlikely. It should also be remembered that as a result of the Budget Bureau cuts for 1976-77, Northern Continuing Education Branch has lost much of its effectiveness. In fact, both branches have been prone to poor administration. Economic Development has been regularly reorganized, usually with little reason and less effect. The Assistant Deputy Minister's remarks cited in Chapter III regarding Northern Continuing Education Branch's poor administrative record are pertinent here.⁴⁴ These difficulties have made it more difficult for the branches to effectively marshal the resources required to establish innovative human and economic development programming.

C. Commercial Fishermen's Loans

Activities related to the Resources and Economic Development branches have also suffered from poor co-ordination. An excellent

example of these problems is the attempt to make the economic development loan fund accessible to commercial fishermen.

Before the creation of the Department, northern fishermen were usually extended credit for fishing equipment by Co-operative Fisheries Limited or by other independent fish processing and handling operations. Since the 1970s these organizations, for various reasons, have gradually stopped giving credit to fishermen.⁴⁵ The establishment of a northern economic development loan fund was intended for fishermen as well as other potential entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, both the Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries Study and the Northern Saskatchewan Commercial Fisheries Development Committee recommended that a separate source of funding for northern fishermen be established.⁴⁶ The Minister's reply to these requests was:

We recognize there have been some delays in getting this fund truly functional, but many of the original difficulties now appear to be resolved so that this fund should be of increasing benefit to fishermen. . . . There may be certain shortcomings in our Economic Development Fund as it is currently administered from the viewpoint of commercial fisheries. My staff shall be evaluating this fund in operation, and we shall be exploring possible changes in the direction suggested in your recommendation.⁴⁷

Commercial fishermen and staff in the Fisheries Development Division continued to criticize the loan fund as an inappropriate vehicle for providing credit to commercial fishermen, but senior Department officials did not respond until early 1977.

The primary difficulty fishermen faced was the delay in processing loan applications. Although the Minister assured commercial fishermen that their loan applications should only take a

month to process, in practice loans have often taken up to six months to be approved and disbursed. Loans have even taken over a year to process in some isolated incidents.⁴⁸ Since 1975, the situation has been exacerbated by the more rigorous approach to disbursing loans taken by Economic Development. Fishermen's loans were singled out as particularly poor risks and treated accordingly, in spite of evidence that fishermen's loans have been more regularly repaid than loans for most other economic activities. Furthermore, it is well known that the impact of fishermen's loans on the loan fund is negligible.

Commercial fishermen and personnel in Fisheries Development were extremely frustrated by the rigid approach taken to fishermen's loans. For example, in reply to a memo from an Economic Development loans officer regarding a rejected application, one Fisheries Development employee noted:

The general question that I and the Fisheries Development Program as a whole, have is why does your Branch throw so many obstacles in the way of loan applications (e.g., fallacious economic assessments, pedantic interpretation of regulations).⁵⁰

In order to alleviate these problems the two branches under direction from the sector's Assistant Deputy Minister arranged to have these loans reviewed initially by a staff member of Fisheries Development. This procedure was implemented in the spring of 1977 without formal discussion by Executive Committee.⁵¹ It made processing applications more simple and speedy. Those minor details in loan applications which had previously given rise to rejecting or rerouting of applications were dealt with by an individual familiar with the technical requirements

necessary to obtain loan approval. Since that individual was sympathetic to the needs of commercial fishermen, he could act as an advocate for them when completing the loan application and in discussions with Economic Development Branch when the application was reviewed. Immediately, the number of fishermen's loans rose to a record high.⁵²

This did not impress senior officials in Economic Development Branch; their lack of concern for fishermen's loans was indicated in the previous chapter. They rejected the arrangement with Fisheries Development Division and insisted on re-establishing Economic Development's total responsibility for fishermen's loans. As the Branch Director put it:

I understand your staff have appeared to border our mandate from time to time and this practice can easily create more problems for all concerned. . . . In our meeting, I shall summarize the points we have agreed upon in order to avoid any confusion dealing with fishing loan applications:

- 1) Fisheries staff shall not, under any circumstances, solicit or promote fishing loans.
- 2) Fisheries staff are to return all fishing loan applications in their possession to Economic Development Branch.
- 3) Fisheries staff shall provide appropriate data to Economic Development staff for fishing loan evaluation purposes.
- 4) Fisheries staff shall refer fishermen's concerns to an appropriate Economic Development staff member if they are approached by fishermen.⁵³

The reassertion by Economic Development Branch of complete jurisdiction over commercial fishing loans was made possible by a sudden weakness in

the Fisheries Development program. The strong leader of the Fisheries Development Program left the Department in spring, 1977. He was replaced by a management-oriented person from the Fisheries Management group in Prince Albert who doubts the viability of commercial fishing.⁵⁴ Moreover, two of the Development Program employees most extensively involved with commercial fishermen's loans had left the Department under duress even before the Fisheries program leader resigned. The effect was to leave the Development Program unable to help commercial fishermen in the essential area of financing.

The final step in this saga led to improved service for commercial fishermen. In late summer, 1977, the Economic Development Branch hired a Fisheries Liaison Officer to be involved with all aspects of financing commercial fishermen. In early 1978, the last individual in Fisheries Development who had worked with loans initiated a transfer of his position to the Economic Development Branch. After negotiations presided over by the Assistant Deputy Minister, this position and one other vacant position in the Fisheries Development Program were transferred to Economic Development Branch, although the budgets accompanying these positions remained with Fisheries Development. The Economic Development Branch since then has had both exclusive jurisdiction and the necessary resources to deal effectively with fishermen's loans.⁵⁵

The role reversal by Economic Development was caused primarily by the organizational tendency to protect and expand jurisdiction. It should be recalled here that this branch had its mandate formally

narrowed to "small business development" in November, 1976. When presented with the opportunity to re-establish authority over all facets of the loan fund and the incentive of additional positions, the Economic Development Branch Director was more than willing to ignore his previous criticism that fishermen's loans were "uneconomic." The inescapable conclusion is that asserting branch jurisdiction was a more significant motivation than providing commercial fishermen with some acceptable, workable form of credit to pursue their livelihood.

3. Conclusion

The problems of integrating and co-ordinating policy in the Department are partly a result of branch compartmentalization--the tendency of particular branches to become caught up in their own priorities. Branch compartmentalization, in turn, has been caused by many factors. The speed with which the Department assumed program delivery responsibilities meant that many branches were created rapidly, so that the level of Government services in the north could be raised quickly. This had some severe implications, notably in the Training Opportunity Program. Projects were poorly conceived because Colleges Branch was operational before the Economic Development Branch at a time when the Department desperately needed to provide evidence of its developmental efforts.

Another fundamental problem leading to branch compartmentalization was the difficulty in determining branch responsibilities conclusively and establishing clear, legitimately established objectives

for programs which could not be allocated exclusively to one branch. Although the goals of many branches are superficially integrated, in fact the orientation of any two related branches may be quite divergent. Since responsibilities for a particular program or policy area have often been diffused among a number of branches, under the assumption that all branches "salute the same flag," it was thought that co-ordinating their activities would be relatively simple. However, in the case of Training Opportunity Program, various individuals from the two involved branches would approach individual projects with differing criteria for project evaluation. The Budget Bureau subsequently terminated the program, primarily because the Department was unable to demonstrate an integrated, positive approach to program projects. The same difficulty has hampered commercial fishermen's loans administration: the two branches concerned have often disagreed about the need to support commercial fishermen and about appropriate mechanisms for channelling such support.

The failure to establish integrated policy objectives for diffused programs was largely due to a lack of effective senior leadership to ensure that integrated policy formulation would take place. This lack of leadership can be attributed in part to the speed of administrative development and the original faulty organizational structure. Because program delivery began so quickly, and the organization itself was so spread out, effective leadership would have been difficult in any case. One group which could have provided some leadership pertinent to policy co-ordination was the Policy and

Planning Branch. Since its demise, senior officials in the Department have often been involved in resolving immediate policy problems, a result again of the speed of development and of the Department's broad scope of operations. In the Training Opportunity Program, for example, it was apparent by mid-1975 that many individual projects had such irresolvable problems that it might have been better to shut them down completely and start anew. Senior officials attempted to resolve these problems within the existing framework, but could not before the Budget Bureau intervened arbitrarily. Because of the rapid development of programs and subsequent administrative difficulties, planning and leadership to integrate programs and ensure co-ordination have often been lacking.

The difficulties in co-ordinating policy have contributed to the single agency's inability to promote an integrated, comprehensive approach to development. Where the Department has been able to delegate to one branch the responsibility for providing a service to northern residents, a fair degree of success has been possible. This has not been the case where integrated programs requiring considerable co-operation between branches have been attempted. Such co-operation tends to be more essential for programs which are "developmental" in nature as opposed to being focused on the relatively more simple provision of basic services such as health and welfare. In these more significant and more challenging policy areas, the Department has encountered difficulties. The Training Opportunity Program is perhaps the prime example of this. It was a program with the potential of

coming to terms with all aspects of human, economic and resource development, but the co-operation between branches required for the program's success was absent. Since its inception, the Department has been searching for appropriate development mechanisms, but the vehicles it has chosen have seen only limited use.

Part of the reason for this is that the Department has marshalled very limited resources for such ventures. The two branches most critical to this policy area, Economic Development and Northern Continuing Education, have both had poor administrative records. This severely complicates attempts to provide resources for development projects, because these branches now lack credibility within the Department and with external monitoring agencies such as the Budget Bureau. Thus it is very unlikely that these branches will receive further resources in a time of general fiscal constraint. Nevertheless, the difficulties encountered in integrating the programs of these branches and coordinating their activities are largely responsible for the Department's poor track record in establishing innovative, community-centred development projects.

Notes to Chapter V

¹The distinction between policy integration and program or activity co-ordination has been drawn in the Introduction. Briefly, policy integration refers to ensuring that policy and program objectives in various policy areas do not conflict. Thus such integration must occur in the policy formulation or planning stages of policy making. By contrast, program or activity co-ordination refers to the process whereby day-to-day activities are managed such that related program efforts do not conflict with each other. Hence program co-ordination occurs in the implementation stage of policy making.

²Department of Northern Saskatchewan Objectives, part of paper entitled Organization of Department of Northern Saskatchewan, a paper presented at Staff Orientation and Training Session, Prince Albert, December 12-14, 1972 (December 6, 1972).

³Appended material to memo from J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister, to Mr. A.C. Towill, Assistant Deputy Minister, re: Suggested Objectives (February 12, 1973), p. 1.

⁴Since the terms economic, human, and resource development are so extensively used in this chapter, this is where they will be defined.

Human development may be defined as the process whereby individuals, alone or in groups, acquire skills which make a broader range of choices about careers and personal interests possible.

Economic development may be defined as a rise in the standard of living generalized across all segments of society, and sustained over a prolonged period of time.

Resource development refers to the process of bringing resources into use or increasing the utilization of resources in use.

Within the context of northern Saskatchewan, it is clear that these terms in conjunction refer to a process of development whereby northern residents can make effective decisions about the skills they require to use northern resources and acquire the benefits of these. Hence, such development also includes a process of political development.

⁵The Meadow Lake Special Area was so designated in 1970 under an arrangement with the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion. The area covered 18,000 square miles in the northwestern region of the province, including Meadow Lake in the south and all of the area on the west side up to La Loche and Turnor Lake. See "Background Report of the Development Strategy for the Meadow Lake Special Area," prepared by the Department of Industry and Commerce (January, 1971), p. 1.

⁶From the "Evaluation Report for Training Opportunity Program, Meadow Lake Special Area," a report prepared by the Research and Evaluation Branch, Department of Continuing Education (November, 1973), p. 1.

⁷Ibid., p. 13.

⁸The other three projects were a public works maintenance Project for Buffalo Narrows, construction of a hockey arena in Ile a la Crosse and a project to develop campsites in Beauval. Ibid., pp. 13-18.

⁹Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁰There were numerous administrative and personnel difficulties associated with T.O.P. projects. Many of the counselling and support staff for the projects left part way through them for assorted reasons and both materials and payrolls for the projects were often delayed. Ibid., pp. 5-24.

¹¹See Department of Northern Saskatchewan Budget, 1974-75, Colleges Branch, Training Opportunity Program, 3.0., Background.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Personal interviews with Ray Famega, Manpower Planner, Executive Administration (July 14, 1978); V.C. Ellis, Senior Development Consultant, Executive Administration (July 16, 1978); and J.J. Bell, Director, Northern Continuing Education Branch (June 7, 1977).

¹⁴Interviews with Famega and Ellis, op. cit., and with J.D. Sanderson, former Training Opportunity Program Manager (July 14, 1978); Sanderson indicated that project policies were often made at the project site on an ad hoc basis, thus with little information or technical advice.

¹⁵See memo from Gordon Raymond Wensely, Training Opportunity Program Counsellor, Cumberland House, to John Sanderson, T.O.P. Manager, re: Clarification of T.O.P. Involvement in R.R.A.P. (June 16, 1975).

¹⁶Memo from J.J. Bell, Co-ordinator, Industry Based Training, to I. Brunas, Project Manager, Northern Housing Branch, re: R.R.A.P. Cumberland House, T.O.P. Involvement (July 2, 1975). As well, both Beauval Mutual Wood Products and Methy Co-operative Association were initiated without reference to appropriate Training Opportunity Program uses. Doug McLeod and Joe Jeerakathil, "Management and Organization Structure of Beauval Mutual and Methy Co-op," prepared for Economic Development Branch (March, 1976), pp. 2, 10.

¹⁷ See memo from J. Bell, Co-ordinator, Industry Based Training, to Ross Moxley, Director of Economic Development, re: Carriere's Evaluation (July 24, 1975).

¹⁸ See memo from A.J. Carriere, Senior Implementation Officer, Department of Regional Economic Expansion, to W.B. Herringer, Manager, Program Implementation, Department of Regional Economic Expansion, re: Cost-sharing Retroactive T.O.P. Projects (May 26, 1975) and attachment, p. 2. This memo also indicates that a commitment from Regional Economic Expansion to the Department of Manpower and Immigration was the primary reason for not cost-sharing Training Opportunity Program, though the details of this commitment were not spelled out.

¹⁹ In fact, Economic Development Branch's Co-operative Division was disbanded in 1976 since the work of Co-op Management Advisors could not be distinguished from that of other field staff. In a letter to Department of Co-operation in February, 1977, it was indicated that:

Future plans are not firm or formalized but the responsibility is recognized (for co-op education) and contracts are on-going with Northern Continuing Education Branch of D.N.S. to do the work.

However, there is no evidence that Northern Continuing Education has ever delivered co-op education outside of Training Opportunity Program. Memo from Gerry Parsons, Field Staff Co-ordinator, Economic Development Branch to C.W. Norman, Department of Co-operation, re: D.N.S. Assistance to Co-operatives (February 25, 1977), p. 2.

²⁰ A brief report on the status of co-operative education in the Training Opportunity Program indicated that of five projects, only two had been involved in any of this activity, while the other three were to commence co-operative education in the near future. Memo from J.D. Sanderson, T.O.P. Manager, to J.J. Bell, Director, Colleges Branch, re: Co-op Education (October 27, 1975).

²¹ Procedure for the Initiation and Phase Out of T.O.P. Projects, unidentified Colleges Branch document (circa, 1975), pp. 1-2.

²² Personal interviews with Vic Ellis and J.D. Sanderson, op. cit. Ellis has noted that there is a great potential for the northern handi-craft industry, but only if it competes within the existing marketing framework, thus implying fairly large-scale production utilizing machines or very expensive "speciality" production. Sanderson supports the notion that handicrafts are essentially a hobby; in this case, there is little point to even establishing production co-operatives or any other entrepreneurial vehicle.

²³Personal interviews with Ellis, Famega and Sanderson, op. cit. All of them identify staff disagreement over the correct "philosophical" approach to the projects as central to their failure. Some, for example, argued that all that was required to correct the program's problems was to close the administrative loopholes in it, which were rather large. As one example, in a forest pulp-cutting training project at Besnard Lake, a caterpillar-skidder was somehow procured, even though it was the only one of its kind used in the entire Saskatchewan forest industry. Other staff, particularly in Economic Development, argued that the central question for such projects was their economic viability, or economic "sense," regardless of technical viability, and that this was required to provide a credible training situation. Others, in Colleges Branch primarily, perceived the goal of work exposure for northern residents as sufficient to justify the existence of projects.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., and Ken Gran, Report on the Canoe Lake Mutual Wood Harvesters Co-operative and Training Opportunity Program, report prepared for Colleges Branch (March, 1976).

²⁶J.J. Bell, Minutes of Meeting between Colleges and Economic Development Branch (August 27-28, 1975), pp. 1-4.

²⁷Robert Drislane, Budget Analyst, Budget Bureau evaluation of Colleges Branch 1976-77 Budget, "Training Opportunity Program" (circa, December, 1975).

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹J.D. Sanderson, a response to Budget Bureau's evaluation of Training Opportunity Program (circa, February, 1976), p. 2.

³⁰Ibid., p. 5.

³¹The last of the handicraft operations, in La Ronge, closed early in 1978. Apparently competition from mass-produced imported handicrafts put the northern operations at a severe disadvantage--workers in northern operations did not wish to automate their production and no mechanism existed to capture or develop sufficiently large markets for more expensive handmade products. Personal interviews with Vic Ellis, op. cit.

³²Memo from Vic Ellis, Economic Development Branch Director, to D.M. Wallace, Director, The Budget Bureau, re: Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Advance Account (circa, July 30, 1975).

³³Memo from Ross Moxley, Economic Development Branch Director, to Shakir Alwarid, Economist, Planning and Research Secretariat, re:

Development Corporation (November 17, 1975), pp. 1-4, and Jerry Jenner, "A Proposal for the Establishment of a Northern Saskatchewan Development Corporation," prepared for Economic Development Branch (April 14, 1976).

³⁴ Personal interview with Shakir Alwarid, Chief Planning Officer, Central Planning Unit (November 9, 1977).

³⁵ Memo from Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister to Doug McLeod, Director, Economic Development Branch, re: Economic Development Act (July 23, 1976).

³⁶ Memo from Ted Bowerman, Minister, Department of Northern Saskatchewan, to D.M. Wallace, Secretary, Treasury Board, re: Treasury Board Agenda Item (November 8, 1976), p. 4.

³⁷ Memo from Ross Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister, Economic and Resource Development Administration, to Minister's Consulting Committee, re: Resources Branch, Economic Development Branch and Northern Continuing Education Branch (September 21, 1977), pp. 1-3.

³⁸ Memo from T. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan, to Premier A.E. Blakeney and all Cabinet Ministers, re: Amendments to the Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act--1978 (February 7, 1977), pp. 1-2.

³⁹ Statutes of Saskatchewan 23 and 24 Elizabeth II, c. 52 (1977), An Act to Amend the Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act.

⁴⁰ Letter from Ted Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan, to Gordon Wallace, Secretary, Northern Saskatchewan Outfitters' Association (May 17, 1977), pp. 1-2.

⁴¹ Memo from Ted Bowerman, Minister, Department of Northern Saskatchewan, to G.H. Beatty, Secretary, Treasury Board, re: Treasury Board Agenda Item (June 21, 1976), pp. 1-41.

⁴² In one case, a proposed garment factory for La Loche was stalled by Economic Development Branch officials on the grounds that the proponents were a Seventh Day Adventist group who might have attempted to proselytize the local Roman Catholic population. The project appeared feasible and attractive in all other respects. Another project, a slaughter house in Ile a la Crosse, simply died internally after Executive Committee reviewed it in 1977 in spite of the fact that the Department's training farms on the west side presently have cattle, though not any developed markets, and that mining developments at Cluff Lake and the west side communities could easily support such a venture. In other cases, bureaucratically approved loans have been ignored at higher levels because of political pressure from the northern M.L.A.s. Personal interviews with Vic Ellis and Shakir Alwarid, op. cit.

⁴³The Department's capital construction programs have received more attention than any other program area. Permanent staff in the Project Management sector have increased from 4 in 1973-74 to over 400 in 1979-80 and at peak construction period, over 1600 time-certificate employees are hired in the field. This level of activity is projected to be maintained for at least another seven or eight years. In the meantime, few northern contracting firms have developed and the sheer weight of government involvement in capital construction makes significant decentralization improbable. The above figures were obtained from R. Hauck, *Six Years Later: An Overview of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan's Programs and Accomplishments*, a paper prepared for the Central Planning Unit, Department of Northern Saskatchewan (June 8, 1978), pp. 58-68.

⁴⁴See the remarks by the past Assistant Deputy Minister regarding the Colleges/Northern Continuing Education Branch's poor administrative records, memo from Moxley to Bell, re: Branch Administration (July 5, 1976).

⁴⁵Personal interview with Chuck Feaver, Fisheries Research Officer, Economic Development Branch (March 8, 1978).

⁴⁶Letter from Larry Hunter, Secretary, Northern Saskatchewan Commercial Fisheries Development Committee to Honourable G.R. Bowerman, Minister, Department of Northern Saskatchewan (July 26, 1974).

⁴⁷Letter from G.R. (Ted) Bowerman, Minister of Department of Northern Saskatchewan, to Larry Hunter, Secretary, Commercial Fisheries Development Committee (September 30, 1974).

⁴⁸See John Piper, a submission regarding commercial fishermen's economic development loans (circa, winter, 1976).

⁴⁹See Shakir Alwarid, "Evaluation of the Fisheries Program," a report prepared by Central Planning Unit, Exhibit 7 (February 16, 1977).

⁵⁰Memo from John Piper, Economist, Fisheries Development Program, to Doug McLeod, Director, Economic Development Branch, re: Bert Thompson's Loan Application to Establish a Commercial Fishing Operation (February 2, 1977).

⁵¹Personal interviews with John Piper, former Fisheries Development employee (June 8, 1977), and Chuck Feaver, op. cit.

⁵²Memo from P. Charles Feaver, Research Officer, Fisheries Development Program, to P.H. Edwards, Acting Director, Fisheries Development Program, re: Field Staff and Loan Applications (November 14, 1977), p. 1.

⁵³ Memo from Doug R. McLeod, Director, Economic Development Branch, to Pete Edwards, Director, Fisheries Program, re: Loan Applications for Commercial Fishermen (December 12, 1977).

⁵⁴ Personal interview with Pete Edwards, Director, Resource Management (Fisheries) (February 18, 1977).

⁵⁵ Personal interview with Chuck Feaver, op. cit.

⁵⁶ Certainly in the provision of basic services, such as health, social services programming, grade school education and physical "services" such as housing, electricity, and sewer/water systems, the Department has generated a great deal of program activity. However, this activity has not always been integrated with economic and human development on a policy level. Lack of co-ordination here, too, has resulted in missed development opportunities. See R. Hauck, op. cit.

CONCLUSION

The creation of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan signalled the intention of the Saskatchewan Government to establish an innovative northern development strategy. However, the preceding analysis of innovative policy making, policy co-ordination, public participation and local decision making raises some serious questions regarding the extent to which the single agency has addressed the central problems of northern underdevelopment. The Department's first five years in fact indicate that it has not successfully reversed previous patterns of underdevelopment and is no longer capable of fostering innovative northern development.

Originally, policy making was to conform to Government's broad policy objectives. As well as providing a level of services to northern residents roughly comparable with those provided to southern residents, the strategy represented a general plan to establish unique human, economic and resource development programs allowing northern residents to participate fully in northern development. Through increased local decision making, northern residents would come to exercise some control over the development process. From an administrative perspective, it was foreseen that by combining responsibility for most Government activities under one agency, the problems of poor co-ordination between agencies which had plagued previous northern administration would be eliminated.

The requirement for innovative northern policy was obvious in 1972. However, this goal was compromised by the very decision to establish the Department as a program delivery agency before a detailed development strategy could be planned with the active participation of northern residents. The Department simultaneously became responsible for program administration and policy formulation, and brought in personnel with both incremental and innovative approaches to northern development. Conflict thus became inevitable. For various reasons, the Minister and other senior personnel have never been able to reconcile these differing views. The result has been a conservative approach toward policy. However, some conflict has always remained because the goals originally established for the Department continue to be cited by northern civil servants and the northern public as criteria for evaluating the Department's performance.

In general then, the Department's approach to policy making has become fundamentally similar to southern departments. The embroiled early years of its existence made a deep impression on senior leadership in the Department. The will to develop innovative policy has been severely weakened by the fear of taking risks which might create political controversy, and by the need to establish tighter internal administrative systems. The Department now is a fairly well-institutionalized organization, and incremental policy making is entrenched as a modus operandi in northern policy making.

Closely linked to the question of innovative policy making is the question of policy integration and co-ordination. Co-ordination

was a central component of the Department's raison d'etre. Unquestionably, the Department has served as a channel for funneling resources toward aspects of northern development which previous administrations had ignored almost completely. However, the evidence suggests that policy integration and co-ordination has been absent in key policy areas, and that this absence has hindered innovative policy making.

Given an apparent assumption by senior management that the existence of a single agency per se would solve co-ordination difficulties, and partly because so many different administrative units developed so rapidly, policy responsibilities within the Department have often been diffused. It was assumed different branches would bring their particular expertise to bear on programs and policy problems not strictly within their jurisdiction. However, the tendency of branches to become compartmentalized, or to elevate their own priorities above those of other branches and the Department in general, has militated against policy co-ordination. Branch compartmentalization reflects the Department's inability to develop clear, well-planned policy guidelines for all to follow.

Intra-departmental differences in philosophical orientation have been demonstrated in the fishery resource management field, with the Training Opportunity Program, and over fishermen's loans through the Economic Development Branch. These differing orientations have often focused on major issues; they are not simply differences of opinion regarding the most appropriate means to achieve commonly recognized ends. The most critical results of such basic disagreement

and the failure to integrate and co-ordinate policy are that resources have often been spent on programs with limited effectiveness and that important programming gaps have occurred.

Thus it is questionable whether the single agency has served as anything other than a focus for channelling resources. It is possible, as the first Budget Bureau reports recommending a single agency suggested, that a co-ordinating mechanism having jurisdiction over the northern programming of southern line departments might be as appropriate as the full-blown single agency approach. The need for policy co-ordination would be more obvious and hence might be better addressed than at present. As well, the need for northern involvement in policy formulation would be apparent, and a co-ordinating mechanism might be a convenient and critical structure for including such involvement.

Finally, one of the Department's primary goals is to permit northern residents to take on greater decision-making authority over local matters and to have effective input into Government policy making. In many of the instances where intermediate Department officials have attempted to follow these policy goals, either the Minister or more senior officials have made policy decisions contrary to Government's stated intentions. This was most evident in the case of northern community colleges and their boards, where the exercise of Ministerial discretion has frustrated the wishes of northern residents. Such discretion has also limited northerners' control of the selection process for local loans committees. More significantly, the decision

to stand by traditional resource use-management policy for the northern fishery meant that an important opportunity for northerners to play a much greater and more effective role in determining northern resource use was missed.

These instances raise some interesting questions regarding the Department's commitment to encourage local decision making. Again, the commitment appears clear enough, and is being addressed in some policy areas, but it is not followed with a great deal of consistency. It is understandable that professional administrators perceive lay individuals' abilities to participate in policy formulation as limited. However, too often professional administrators in the Department make decisions about local affairs, thereby demonstrating a failure to adhere to departmental objectives which indicate support of northerners in their efforts to achieve greater political development.

A major dilemma for the Government has been to incorporate public participation in policy formulation and administration. The level of expectations for such participation has always been quite high, and clearly out of reach given a conventional administrative approach. Since programs were established so quickly, there has not been sufficient time to allow northern residents to participate meaningfully in policy formulation. Policy has been formed in rather conventional fashion, with administrators taking the lead in identifying perceived policy problems. By contrast, original goals for the Department consistently refer to northern residents taking a full and active role in policy formulation with the assistance of Government personnel.

Fundamental questions of value underlie the debate surrounding public participation. Native groups and many northern residents have perceived the Department as an institution which has alleviated some of the social costs of continuing large-scale resource developments and has entrenched the hinterland status of northern Saskatchewan, rather than as an institution which has given northerners some control over the development process. This is a critical difference. Northerners have not controlled the development process. Indeed, the Department itself has not had complete control over this process. The most visible and highly politicized northern developments recently have been in the uranium industry. Control of mineral development is largely in the hands of private interests and the Saskatchewan Mineral Development Corporation, a crown corporation. Though the Department of Northern Saskatchewan has recently begun to regulate some aspects of mining activity to ensure that northerners will receive some benefits from mineral development, such regulation does not give northerners any choice about whether individual mining projects proceed and under what conditions they may proceed. Thus the Department has been perceived by some northerners and native organizations as an institution which simply makes a continuing process of northern underdevelopment palatable to northern residents.

The Department has not established effective channels for public participation. Hence, it has inadvertently thrust itself into an intermediary role; in effect, speaking to private developers and southern Government agencies on behalf of northern residents. Clearly, such a role is untenable for a Government agency, no matter how unique.

These conclusions about the Department's policy-making processes lead to several general observations about the role of such an agency in the development process and about the unique features of its policy-making processes. The Department's experience clearly indicates that innovative policy making requires extensive, broadly based participation so innovative policy may gain sanction from those affected by it. By contrast, however, most northern policy making has been incremental, and the need for effective public participation has not been appreciated. Indeed, it appears that incremental policy making is incompatible with public participation on any broad or meaningful basis. Since incremental policy is not designed to produce major changes, it would be self-defeating and possibly politically embarrassing to consult or plan with those who will be affected by any given policy.

The Department has never been able to integrate its policy goals. In part, this lack of policy integration is due to the failure to reconcile the original, innovative intentions for the Department and subsequent incremental policy making. Without a common sense of direction, it is not possible to expect individual officials to act in concert on a day-to-day basis.

The disintegration of a clearly defined set of expectations for the Department, and hence failure over the long-term to achieve innovative policy, can be largely attributed to a lack of political will on the part of southern politicians and senior management in the Department. While the political will to reverse the process of underdevelopment may have existed before the Department was established, its

early difficulties and subsequent failure to resolve critical problems has badly damaged its credibility with key southern agencies. Hence innovative policy making, meaningful public participation in policy development, and integrated policy objectives were all quickly threatened. Of course, it is pertinent to question whether southern politicians and senior civil servants transferred to northern Saskatchewan can escape from the perspective of the metropolitan society sufficiently to address questions of underdevelopment. Clearly, a dilemma is created for policy makers, since ongoing underdevelopment in some form is of undoubted economic benefit to the dominant society.

Closely related is the question of how effectively any government agency can actually come to terms with or reverse patterns of underdevelopment. The Department of Northern Saskatchewan and other like agencies have generally inherited situations where northern underdevelopment was well entrenched as a political, social and economic process. It is not entirely surprising then that such agencies have had difficulty achieving development appropriate from their clients' perspectives.

Government agencies which pursue development objectives naturally have development defined for them primarily by the government which they represent rather than by the clients who they are attempting to serve. However, when it is the clients themselves who are expected to develop, or to be a fulcrum for the development process, then development will only be appropriate and effective once the clients have at least an equal say in what development will occur and what its specific policy content will be. Of course, there is not a government agency in existence which

allows its clients to determine the content of policy or to control the process of deciding policy content. Hence government agencies which pursue northern development must inevitably come to the point where only by transferring their functions to northern-controlled structures may patterns of development actually be reversed. In this process of transferring some measure of control over northern development, government agencies may be either supportive or obstructive. It is this final attitude which indicates the extent to which political will exists in the dominant, metropolitan society to alter northern underdevelopment drastically.

There is a distinct possibility that the north will continue to be a hinterland, economically, culturally and politically, to the south for the foreseeable future. Northern resources such as uranium are abundant, and presently very attractive to exploit. The impetus behind such development is very considerable, and simultaneously, this thesis has demonstrated that the Department's attempts to provide innovative alternatives to such development have generally failed.

Given the preceding analysis, it is reasonable to ask whether the single agency is still the most appropriate structure to co-ordinate government activities in the north, to promote innovative development, and to solicit the involvement of northerners in policy making. Obviously, northerners' desires to control the development process cannot be realized given the Department's present structure and functions. Integrated policy goals and day-to-day policy co-ordination have not been achieved even within the single agency. Most critically, the

failure of the single agency to realize significant, innovative development opportunities implies that in the absence of any major changes in its direction, the Department will be unable to meet the challenges of the next decade.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

A. Federal Government

1. Papers

Government of Canada. Department of Manpower and Immigration.
Howard Brown. Employment Outlook for: Northern Saskatchewan.
Economic Analysis and Forecasts Branch. Regina, January,
1977.

Government of Canada. Department of Regional Economic Expansion.
J.T. Phalen. "Co-operative Organization--A Basic Development
Approach--Northern Saskatchewan Experience." n.p., 1973.

2. Memos

Carriere, A.J. Senior Implementation Officer to W.B. Herringer,
Program Management Officer, Department of Regional Economic
Expansion. "Cost-sharing Retroactive T.O.P. Projects."
Regina, May 26, 1975.

B. Provincial Government--General

1. Statutes, Regulations, and Orders-in-Council

Government of Saskatchewan. Statutes of Saskatchewan. 21
Elizabeth II, c. 15, 1973.

Government of Saskatchewan. Statutes of Saskatchewan. 21
Elizabeth II, c. 70, 1973.

Government of Saskatchewan. Statutes of Saskatchewan. 23 and
24 Elizabeth II, c. 52, 1977.

Government of Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan Regulation 165/73.
Saskatchewan Gazette 1973, July 11, 1973.

Government of Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan Regulation 142/74.
Saskatchewan Gazette 1974, June 7, 1974.

Government of Saskatchewan. Order-in-Council 82/76. Saskatchewan Gazette 1976, January 27, 1976.

Government of Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan Regulation 40/76. Saskatchewan Gazette 1976, February 27, 1976.

2. Reports, Circulars and Press Releases

Government of Saskatchewan. The Report on the Organization for the Provision of Government Services for Northern Saskatchewan. Regina: Department of Finance, The Budget Bureau, March, 1961.

Government of Saskatchewan. The Organization for Government Services in the North. Regina: Department of Finance, The Budget Bureau, October, 1963.

Government of Saskatchewan. "Background Report of the Development Strategy for the Meadow Lake Special Area." Regina: Department of Industry and Commerce, January, 1971.

Government of Saskatchewan. G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Indian and Metis Affairs. "Principles for Northern Development." Memorandum to Cabinet. Regina, September 30, 1971.

Government of Saskatchewan. G.R. Bowerman, Minister-in-Charge. "Summary: Northern Development Considerations," Attachment to memo to all Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Assistant Deputy Ministers. Regina, January 13, 1972.

Government of Saskatchewan. Report of the Minister's Advisory Committee on Community Colleges. Regina: Department of Continuing Education. August, 1972.

Government of Saskatchewan. "Cabinet Minute No. 1310." Regina, October 12, 1972.

Government of Saskatchewan. G.E. Couldwell, Director of Fisheries. "Policy Statement: Sport plus Commercial Fisheries." Regina: Department of Natural Resources, 1972.

Government of Saskatchewan. "Community Colleges in Saskatchewan." Regina: Department of Continuing Education, 1973 (mimeographed).

Government of Saskatchewan. "Evaluation Report for Training Opportunity Program, Meadow Lake Special Area." Regina: Department of Continuing Education, Research and Evaluation Branch, November, 1973.

Government of Saskatchewan. "Fisheries Development Program Announced." Regina: Saskatchewan Government Information Services, February 28, 1974.

Government of Saskatchewan. "Community College Committee Formed." Regina: Saskatchewan Government Information Services, May 2, 1975.

Government of Saskatchewan. Robert Drislane. "An Evaluation of Colleges Branch Programming." Regina: Department of Finance, The Budget Bureau, 1975.

Government of Saskatchewan. "Fact Sheet on Saskatchewan Natives." Regina: Executive Council, Planning and Research, August 20, 1976.

C. General Department of Northern Saskatchewan

1. Papers, Reports and Circulars

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. "Department of Northern Saskatchewan Objectives." Circular presented to Staff Orientation and Training Session, December 6, 1972 (mimeographed).

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. Premier A.E. Blakeney. Statement to Department of Northern Saskatchewan at Staff Orientation and Training Session. Prince Albert, December 12, 1972 (mimeographed).

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. "The Northern Municipal Council." La Ronge: Northern News Services Branch, 1973 (mimeographed).

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. W.R. Merryweather. Draft Proposals to Re-organize the Department of Northern Saskatchewan. May 8-June 5, 1974.

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. "A Discussion Paper Prepared for the Deputy Minister of Northern Saskatchewan." La Ronge: Field Services Branch and various employees, October 7, 1974.

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. Brian Cousins. Proposal for Organizing Extension Services Branch. Yellowknife, February 10, 1976.

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan, Speech to Co-operative Fisheries Limited Annual Meeting. Prince Albert, March 23, 1977.

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. Annual Reports. 1972-73--1976-77.

2. Memoranda and Letters

Bowerman, G.R., Minister to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister. "Economic Development Loans and Grants." Regina: D.N.S., March 27, 1974.

Bowerman, G.R., Minister to Larry Hunter, Secretary, Northern Saskatchewan Commercial Fisheries Development Committee. Regina: D.N.S., September 30, 1974.

Bowerman, G.R., Minister to Gill Gracie, Chairperson, Community College Development Committee. Regina: D.N.S., November 26, 1975.

Bowerman, G.R., Minister to M.O. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister. "Northern Community Colleges--FSI Cultural College." Regina: D.N.S., December 18, 1975.

Bowerman, G.R., Minister to R. Moxley, Director of Economic Development. "Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act." La Ronge: D.N.S., January 21, 1976.

Bowerman, G.R., Minister to G.H. Beatty, Secretary, Treasury Board. "Treasury Board Agenda Item." Regina: D.N.S., June 21, 1976.

Bowerman, G.R., Minister to D.M. Wallace, Secretary, Treasury Board. "Treasury Board Agenda Item." Regina: D.N.S., November 8, 1976.

Bowerman, G.R., Minister to Premier A.E. Blakeney and all Cabinet Ministers. "Amendments to the Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act--1978." Regina: D.N.S., February 7, 1977.

Bowerman, G.R., Minister to Gordon Wallace, Secretary, Northern Saskatchewan Outfitters' Association. Regina: D.N.S., May 17, 1977.

Chenard, Phil., Member, Northern Development Advisory Council to G.R. Bowerman, Minister. May 1, 1975.

- Churchman, J.W., Deputy Minister to A.C. Towill, Assistant Deputy Minister. "Suggested Objectives." Regina: D.N.S.; February 12, 1973.
- Churchman, J.W., Deputy Minister to G.R. Bowerman, Minister. "Loan Fund." Regina: D.N.S., October 17, 1973.
- L'Heureux, M.O., Deputy Minister to G.R. Bowerman, Minister. "Successor to Northern Development Advisory Council." La Ronge: D.N.S., February 22, 1977.
- L'Heureux, M.O., Deputy Minister to G.R. Bowerman, Minister. "Northlands Advisory Committee." La Ronge: D.N.S., May 31, 1977.
- MacMurchy, G., Minister of Continuing Education to G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan. Regina: Department of Continuing Education, October 6, 1976.
- McArthur, D.F., Deputy Minister to D.H. Schweitzer and Branch Directors. "Consultations with Northern Municipal Council." La Ronge: D.N.S., January 20, 1975.
- McArthur, D.F., to D.H. Schweitzer, J. Perry, M. Gurstein, A.C. Towill and J. Stobbe. "Executive Committee Meetings." La Ronge: D.N.S., April 22, 1975.
- Millar, J., Director of Operations to D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister. "Suggested Outline for Regulations Covering the Operation of Branch Directors' Meetings." La Ronge: D.N.S., January 24, 1974.
- Moxley, G.R., Director of Economic Development Branch. "Fact Sheet," attachment to regulations made under The Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Act, 1974. La Ronge: D.N.S., October 10, 1975.
- Moxley, R., Assistant Deputy Minister to Lawrence Yew, Chairman, Northern Municipal Council. La Ronge: D.N.S., May 5, 1977.
- Moxley, R., Assistant Deputy Minister to M.O. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister. "Branch Heads' Meeting." La Ronge: D.N.S., November 15, 1977.
- Schweitzer, D.H., Assistant Deputy Minister to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister. "Northern Municipal Council." La Ronge: D.N.S., November 22, 1973.

Schweitzer, D.H., Assistant Deputy Minister to D.M. Wallace, Director, The Budget Bureau, Department of Finance. "Legislation for the 1975-76 Session." La Ronge: D.N.S., August 28, 1975.

Towill, A.C., Director of Field Services to D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister. "Economic Development Loan and Grant Funds." La Ronge: D.N.S., October 1, 1973.

3. Committee Minutes and Budgets

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. Branch Heads Fisheries Planning Committee Minutes of Meetings. December 1973 to February 1974.

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. Branch Heads Meetings. Minutes of Meetings. November 1973 to December 1976.

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. Executive Committee. Minutes of Meetings. May 1975 to July 1978.

Department of Northern Saskatchewan. Budgets 1973-74 to 1976-77.

D. Policy and Planning Branch, Planning and Research Secretariat, Central Planning Unit

1. Reports and Papers

Central Planning Unit. Shakir Alwarid. "Evaluation of the Fisheries Program." A report prepared by Central Planning Unit for Executive Committee. La Ronge: D.N.S., February 16, 1977.

Central Planning Unit. Robert Hauck. Six Years Later: An Overview of the Department of Northern Saskatchewan's Programs and Accomplishments. A paper prepared for the Central Planning Unit. La Ronge: D.N.S., June 8, 1978.

Department of Northern Saskatchewan Data Base, Consolidated Data, Volume One. Prepared for the Policy and Planning Branch. La Ronge: D.N.S., 1973.

Planning and Research Secretariat. Northern Saskatchewan Small Scale Forestry Study: Baseline Report. Winnipeg: Inter-group Consultants Ltd., March 1973.

Policy and Planning Branch. Gary Wouters. "Shadow Positions." Attachment to paper by P.D. Elias. "Does Charlie Dysart Really Know What He's Talking About?" La Ronge: D.N.S., 1973.

Policy and Planning Branch. Gordon Koshinsky and Peter Brook. "Draft Summary of a Workshop on Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries held at La Ronge." La Ronge: D.N.S., circa July 8, 1973.

Policy and Planning Branch. R.R. Andrews and R.E. England. "A Proposed Management System and Development Strategy for Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries." A report prepared for the Department of Northern Saskatchewan and Department of Regional Economic Expansion. Winnipeg: RPC Ltd., September 1973.

Policy and Planning Branch. Gordon Koshinsky. "Policy and Related Implications for Proposed Management System for Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries." Paper prepared for Cabinet Planning Committee. La Ronge: D.N.S., November 12, 1973.

Policy and Planning Branch. Gordon Koshinsky. "Summary of a Proposed Management System and Development Strategy." La Ronge: D.N.S., November 30, 1973.

Policy and Planning Branch. Gordon Koshinsky. "A Proposed Management System and Development Strategy for Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries." A Summary Proposal prepared for Branch Heads Meeting. La Ronge: D.N.S., December 10, 1973.

Policy and Planning Branch. R.R. Andrews and R.E. England. Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries Study. Winnipeg: R.P.C. Ltd., May 1974.

Policy and Planning Branch. Branch employees. "A Statement to the Public." La Ronge: D.N.S., May 1974.

2. Memoranda and Letters

Alwarid, Shakir, Industry and Commerce Consultant, Planning and Research Secretariat to W. Worster, Acting Director of Planning and Research. "Planning and Research Secretariat Organization." La Ronge: D.N.S., March 23, 1976.

Brook, Peter, Program Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch to G. Koshinsky, J. Jeerakathil, G. Roberts, D. Newman, Policy and Planning Branch. "Guidelines for Administration of Economic Development Funds by Specific Resource Sector." La Ronge: D.N.S., February 19, 1974.

Hammersmith, Jerry, Program Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch to A.C. Towill, Assistant Deputy Minister and B.R. Hill, Director of Policy and Planning. "Resolutions and Motions--Northern Municipal Council Meeting--May 9th and 10th." La Ronge: D.N.S., May 11, 1973.

Hill, B.R., Director of Policy and Planning to A.C. Towill, Assistant Deputy Minister. "Community Colleges." La Ronge: D.N.S., March 20, 1973.

Hill, B.R., Director of Policy and Planning to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister. "Briefing Material on Policy and Planning Staff." La Ronge: D.N.S., April 16, 1973.

Hill, B.R., Director of Policy and Planning to J.W. Churchman, Deputy Minister. "Western Northlands and D.R.E.E." La Ronge: D.N.S., July 24, 1973.

Koshinsky, G.D., Resource Management Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch to Richard Waite, Waite Fisheries, Buffalo Narrows. La Ronge: D.N.S., June 15, 1973.

Koshinsky, G.D., Resource Management Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch to B.R. Hill, Director of Policy and Planning. "Meeting Number One, Advisory Committee, Northern Saskatchewan." La Ronge: D.N.S., July 13, 1973.

Koshinsky, G.D., Resource Management Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch to B.R. Hill, Director of Policy and Planning. "Advisory Committee: Northern Saskatchewan Fisheries Study." La Ronge: D.N.S., July 17, October 3, December 7, 1973; January 22, 1974.

Wise, Suzanne, Research Officer, Central Planning Unit to Shakir Alwarid, Chief Planner. "Economic Development Branch Scheme." La Ronge: D.N.S., February 23, 1977.

Wouters, Gary, Program Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch to Ed Breese, Director of Colleges. "Philosophy of the Community College for the North." La Ronge: D.N.S., January 4, 1973.

E. Resource Development/Resources Branch

1. Budget Documents, Policy Procedures and Papers

Resource Development Branch. Department of Northern Saskatchewan Policy and Procedure Manual. "Fishery Resource Utilization." Policy Directive. La Ronge: D.N.S., May 1, 1974.

Resources Branch. 1975-76 Budget. Fisheries and Fisheries Development Programs. La Ronge: D.N.S., 1975.

Resources Branch. Fisheries Development Program. John Piper. A submission regarding commercial fishermen's loans from Economic Development Branch. La Ronge, D.N.S., circa Winter, 1976.

2. Memoranda and Papers

Edwards, P.H., Resource Administrator, Resource Development Branch to J.W. Clouthier, Director of Resource Development. "Fisheries Policy and Legislation." La Ronge: D.N.S., October 24, 1973.

Feaver, P.C., Research Officer, Fisheries Development Program to P.H. Edwards, Acting Director of Fisheries Development Program. "Field Staff and Loan Applications." La Ronge: D.N.S., November 14, 1977.

Piper, J., Economist, Fisheries Development Program to D. McLeod, Director of Economic Development. "Bert Thompson's Loan Application to Establish a Commercial Fishing Operation." La Ronge: D.N.S., February 2, 1977.

F. Colleges/Northern Continuing Education Branch

1. Reports, Circulars and Budgets

Colleges Branch. 1974-75 Budget. Training Opportunity Program. La Ronge: D.N.S., 1974.

Colleges Branch. D.J. Parsons. "Department of Northern Saskatchewan Colleges Branch and the Community Colleges Concept." Submission to D.F. McArthur, Deputy Minister. La Ronge: D.N.S., January 2, 1975.

Colleges Branch. Community College Developers. "Reports."
Various locations: D.N.S., July 16--October 31, 1975.

Colleges Branch. "Procedure for the Initiation and Phase-Out
of T.O.P. Projects." Circular. La Ronge: D.N.S., 1975.

Colleges Branch. J.D. Sanderson. Manager of Training Oppor-
tunity Program. A Response to Budget Bureau's Evaluation
of the Training Opportunity Program. D.N.S., February 1976.

Colleges Branch. Ken Gran. Training Opportunity Program
Counsellor. "Report on the Canoe Lake Mutual Wood
Harvestors Co-operative and Training Opportunity Program."
Buffalo Narrows: D.N.S., March 1976.

2. Memoranda and Letters

Bell, J.J., Co-ordinator of Industry-based Training to I.
Brunas, Manager of Northern Housing Branch. "R.R.A.P.
Cumberland House, T.O.P. Involvement." La Ronge: D.N.S.,
July 2, 1975.

Bell, J.J., Co-ordinator of Industry-based Training to R.
Moxley, Director of Economic Development. "Carriere's
Evaluation." La Ronge: D.N.S., July 24, 1975.

Bell, J.J., Director of Colleges to M. L'Heureux, Acting Deputy
Minister. "Cultural College--Community College Implications."
La Ronge: D.N.S., December 2, 1975.

Bell, J.J., Director of Northern Continuing Education to G.R.
Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan. "Rejuvenation
of Board--La Ronge Community College." La Ronge: D.N.S.,
December 24, 1975.

Bell, J.J., Director of Northern Continuing Education to Executive
Committee. "Northern Continuing Education Branch Re-organ-
ization and General Program Objectives." La Ronge: D.N.S.,
March 8, 1976.

Bell, J.J., Director of Northern Continuing Education to La
Ronge Community College Board Members. "Meeting on March 19,
1976, between Northern Continuing Education Branch and La
Ronge Community College." La Ronge: D.N.S., March 22, 1976.

Bell, J.J., Director of Northern Continuing Education to G.R.
Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan. "Treaty Indian
Appointments to the Board--La Ronge Community College."
La Ronge: D.N.S., July 16, 1976.

- Bell, J.J., Director of Northern Continuing Education to M. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister. "Update on the Development of Northern Community Colleges." La Ronge: D.N.S., March 29, 1977.
- Bowerman, G.R., Minister of Northern Saskatchewan to Gill Gracie, Chairperson, Community College Development Committee. Regina: D.N.S., November 26, 1975.
- Bowerman, G.R., Minister of Northern Saskatchewan to M. L'Heureux, Acting Deputy Minister. "Northern Community Colleges--FSI Cultural College." Regina: D.N.S., December 18, 1975.
- Community College Developers to G.R. Bowerman, Minister, La Ronge: D.N.S., November 13, 1975.
- Fiddler, R., Community College Developer to J.J. Bell, Director of Northern Continuing Education. n.t. D.N.S., December 19, 1975.
- Gracie, G., Chairperson, Community College Development Committee to G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan. La Ronge: December 22, 1975.
- Moxley, R., Assistant Deputy Minister, Economic and Resource Development to J.J. Bell, Director of Northern Continuing Education. "Branch Administration." La Ronge: D.N.S., July 5, 1976.
- Sanderson, J.D., Training Opportunity Program Manager to J.J. Bell, Director of Colleges. "Co-op Education." La Ronge: D.N.S., October 27, 1975.
- Shelly, B., Assistant Director of Northern Continuing Education to Louise Wiens, Chairperson, La Ronge Community College. La Ronge: D.N.S., April 5, 1977.
- Solomon, J., Executive Assistant to the Minister to M. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister. n.t. Regina: D.N.S., November 30, 1975.
- Wensely, G.R., Training Opportunity Program Counsellor to J.D. Sanderson, Training Opportunity Program Manager. "Clarification of T.O.P. Involvement in R.R.A.P." Cumberland House: D.N.S., June 16, 1975.

G. Economic Development Branch

1. Reports

Economic Development Branch. Archie Leslie, Director of Economic Development. Untitled report regarding loans, grants and guarantees. La Ronge: D.N.S., February 18, 1974.

Economic Development Branch. Intra-Departmental Economic Development Task Group. "Identification of Problems Currently Facing the Economic Development Branch and Suggested Solutions for the Short-run." La Ronge: D.N.S., July 1975.

Economic Development Branch. J. Jenner, Industry and Commerce Consultant. "A Proposal for the Establishment of a Northern Saskatchewan Development Corporation." La Ronge: D.N.S., April 14, 1976.

Economic Development Branch. Tony Bunz, "Department of Northern Saskatchewan Analysis of Loan Fund, Period 1973 to September 1, 1977." A report prepared by the Advisory and Evaluation Unit. La Ronge: D.N.S., November 9, 1977.

2. Memoranda and Letters

Ellis, V.C., Acting Director of Economic Development to M.B. Derrick, Deputy Minister. "Amendments to Economic Development Regulations." La Ronge: D.N.S., July 31, 1974.

Ellis, V.C., Director of Economic Development to D.M. Wallace, Director of the Budget Bureau, Department of Finance. "Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Advance Account." La Ronge: D.N.S., July 30, 1975.

Giesbrecht, T.L., Administration Officer, Economic Development Branch to D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister. "Problems in the Branch for Discussion with New Deputy Minister." La Ronge: D.N.S., August 20, 1974.

Jeerakathil, J., and McLeod, D., Research and Evaluation Team to R. Moxley, Director of Economic Development. "Information on Local Loans Committees, Loans Approved, etc.--1975." La Ronge: D.N.S., October 23, 1975.

Leslie, A.G., Director of Economic Development to D.H. Schweitzer, Assistant Deputy Minister. "Economic Development Loan and Grant Funds." La Ronge: D.N.S., October 4, 1973.

Leslie, A.G., Director of Economic Development. A reply to a memo by Peter Brook, Program Consultant, Policy and Planning Branch. "Guidelines for the Administration of Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Funds." La Ronge: D.N.S., May 3, 1974.

McLeod, D., Director of Economic Development to M.O. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister. "Economic Development Loan Fund." La Ronge: D.N.S., January 21, 1977.

McLeod, D., Director of Economic Development to G.R. Moxley, Assistant Deputy Minister. "Leon McAuley--Member of District Loans Committee." La Ronge: D.N.S., January 21, 1977.

McLeod, D., Director of Economic Development to J. Piper, Economist, Fisheries Development Program. "Bert Thompson's Loan Application to Establish a Commercial Fishing Operation." La Ronge: D.N.S., March 2, 1977.

McLeod, D., Director of Economic Development to the Northern Municipal Council. "Third Member to the District Loans Committee." La Ronge: D.N.S., March 28, 1977.

McLeod, D., Director of Economic Development to P. Edwards, Director of Fisheries Program. "Loan Applications for Commercial Fishermen." La Ronge: D.N.S., December 12, 1977.

McLeod, D., Director of Economic Development to M. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister. "Analysis--Local Loans Committees." La Ronge: D.N.S., February 9, 1978.

Moxley, G.R., Director of Economic Development to D. McLeod, Advisory and Evaluation Team. "Branch Administration." La Ronge: D.N.S., September 9, 1975.

Moxley, G.R., Director of Economic Development to D. McLeod, Advisory and Evaluation Team. "Economic Development Loan Fund." La Ronge: D.N.S., September 25, 1975.

Moxley, G.R., Director of Economic Development to the Northern Municipal Council and District Loans Committee Members. "1. Establishment of Advisory and Evaluation Team; 2. District Loans Committee Members, Naming Alternate Members." La Ronge: D.N.S., October 22, 1975.

- Moxley, G.R., Director of Economic Development to Shakir Alwarid, Economist, Planning and Research Secretariat. "Development Corporation." La Ronge: D.N.S., November 17, 1975.
- Moxley, G.R., Director of Economic Development to Lawrence Yew, Chairman of the Northern Municipal Council. La Ronge: D.N.S., November 24, 1975.
- Moxley, G.R., Director of Economic Development to G.R. Bowerman, Minister. "Northern Saskatchewan Economic Development Regulations." La Ronge: D.N.S., February 6, 1976.
- Moxley, G.R., Assistant Deputy Minister to D. McLeod, Director of Economic Development. "Economic Development Act." La Ronge: D.N.S., July 23, 1976.
- Moxley, G.R., Assistant Deputy Minister to Shakir Alwarid, Secretary to Executive Committee. n.t. La Ronge: D.N.S., November 22, 1976.
- Moxley, G.R., Assistant Deputy Minister to all Branch Heads and all Economic Development staff. n.t. La Ronge: D.N.S., December 24, 1976.
- Moxley, G.R., Assistant Deputy Minister to Lawrence Yew, Chairman, Northern Municipal Council. "Economic Development Act." La Ronge: D.N.S., May 5, 1977.
- Moxley, G.R., Assistant Deputy Minister, to the Minister's Consulting Committee. "Resources Branch, Economic Development Branch and Northern Continuing Education Branch." La Ronge: D.N.S., September 21, 1977.
- Moxley, G.R., Assistant Deputy Minister, to M. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister. "Economic Development Branch." La Ronge: D.N.S., January 12, 1978.
- Parsons, G., Field Staff Co-ordinator, Economic Development Branch to C.W. Norman, Department of Co-operatives and Co-operative Development. "D.N.S. Assistance to Co-operatives." La Ronge: D.N.S., February 25, 1977.

H. Non-Government Primary Sources

1. Papers

Canoe Lake Mutual Wood Producers. Peter Brook. A submission on behalf of the Canoe Lake Mutual Wood Producers, to Vic Ellis, Director of Economic Development Branch. n.p., April 30, 1975.

La Ronge Region Community College. John Stobbe, Principal. "Organizing the Community College at the Community Level." A paper presented to the La Ronge Region Community College Board. La Ronge, July 27, 1973.

La Ronge Region Community College. Eric Hamm, Principal. "Rational for Proposed Regional Training Centre in La Ronge, Saskatchewan." Submission to M.O. L'Heureux, Deputy Minister of Northern Saskatchewan. La Ronge, November 3, 1976.

Metis Society of Saskatchewan. Presentation to Government of Saskatchewan in Regards to Statement of Northern Administration and Legislation. January 9, 1973.

Northern Municipal Council. The Submission by the Northern Municipal Council to the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry on the Matter of Uranium Development in Northern Saskatchewan. La Ronge, October 16, 1977.

Northern Municipal Council. The Northern Saskatchewan Local Government Convention, 1977. A report prepared by Planning and Research, Northern Municipal Council. La Ronge, July 28, 1977.

2. Letters

Ahenakew, Dave, Chief of Federation of Saskatchewan Indians to L.A. Reiderer, Director of Community Colleges, Department of Continuing Education. Prince Albert, September 16, 1976.

Dalby, Bob, to G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan. La Ronge, January 6, 1976.

Fosseneuve, Ray, Cumberland House College Committee, to Jack Bell, Director of Northern Continuing Education Branch. Cumberland House, October 14, 1975.

Gibson, D.J., Secretary, Creighton Education Committee to G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan. Creighton, March 4, 1976.

Gracie, Gill, Chairman of the La Ronge Community College Board to J.J. Bell, Director of Northern Continuing Education Branch. La Ronge, December 1, 1975.

Gracie, Gill, Chairman of Community College Development Committee to G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan. La Ronge, January 6, 1976.

Gracie, Gill, Chairman of La Ronge Region Community College to Jack Bell, Director of Northern Continuing Education Branch. La Ronge, January 9, 1976.

Hunter, Larry, Secretary of Northern Saskatchewan Commercial Fisheries Development Committee to G.R. Bowerman, Minister of Northern Saskatchewan. La Ronge, July 26, 1974.

Hunter, Larry, General Manager, Co-operative Fisheries Limited, to J. Twardy, Chief Assessment Officer, Workman's Compensation Board. La Ronge, March 26, 1975.

Jenner, Jerry, Principal, La Ronge Community College to Jack Bell, Director of Northern Continuing Education Branch. La Ronge, December 18, 1975.

MacMurchy, Gordon, Minister of Continuing Education to Norman McAuley, Chairman of La Ronge Region Community College Board. Regina, July 17, 1973.

McAuley, Norman A., Chairman, La Ronge Region Community College Board to Gordon MacMurchy, Minister of Continuing Education. La Ronge, June 30, 1973.

Stobbe, John, Principal of La Ronge Region Community College to Jake Kutarna, Department of Continuing Education. La Ronge, February 22, 1974.

3. Minutes

Co-operative Fisheries Limited. Minutes of Annual Meetings. 1972 to 1976.

Northern Municipal Council. Minutes of Meetings. January, 1974 to January 1977.

II. Secondary Sources

- Adams, Frank. "Highlander Folk School: Getting Information, Going Back and Teaching It," Harvard Educational Review, Volume 42, Number 4, November 1972.
- Adrian, Richard, and Ridsdell, John. "D.N.S.--Reoccupying the Colony," Next Year Country, Volume I, Number 2, December-January 1972-73.
- Anderson, James E. Public Policy Making. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.
- Association of Metis and Non-Status Indians of Saskatchewan. "The Northlands Agreement," New Breed. Regina: The Association of Metis and Non-Status Indians of Saskatchewan, July 1977.
- Bauer, R.A. and Gergen, K.J. (eds.). The Study of Policy Formation. New York: Free Press, 1968.
- Bayda, Justice E.D., Groome, Dr. A.J., and McCallum, Dr. K.J. The Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry Final Report, Volume 2, May 28, 1978.
- Buckley, H., Kew, J.E.M., and Hawley, J.B. The Indian and Metis of Northern Saskatchewan. Saskatoon: The Centre for Community Studies, 1963.
- Careless, J.M.S. "Frontierism, Metropolitanism and Canadian History," Canadian Historical Review, Volume 36, 1954.
- Davis, Arthur K. "Canadian Society and History as Metropolis Versus Hinterland," Canadian Society: Pluralism, Change and Conflict. Edited by R.J. Ossenberg. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1971.
- Doern, G. Bruce, and Aucoin, Peter. The Structures of Policy Making in Canada. Toronto: Macmillan, 1971.
- Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967.
- Dror, Yehezkel. Public Policy Making Re-examined. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968.
- Dye, Thomas R. Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.
- Easterbrook, W.T., and Watkins, Mel (eds.). Approaches to Canadian Economic History. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada Limited, 1978.

- Elias, Peter Douglas. Metropolis and Hinterland in Northern Manitoba. Winnipeg: The Manitoba Museum of Man and Nature, 1975.
- Etzioni, Amitai. "Mixed Scanning: A 'Third' Approach to Decision Making," Public Administration Review, Volume 27, December 1967.
- Etzioni, Amitai. The Active Society. New York: Free Press, 1968.
- Federation of Saskatchewan Indians and Members of the Peter Ballantyne and Lac La Ronge Bands, The. Aski-Puko (The Land Alone). September 1976.
- Innis, Harold A. The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964.
- Leys, Colin. "Underdevelopment and Neo-colonialism," Chapter 2, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism 1964-71. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Lindblom, Charles E. "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" Public Administration Review, Volume 19, Number 2, Spring 1959.
- Lindblom, Charles E. The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment. New York: Free Press, 1965.
- Lindblom, Charles E. The Decision-Making Process. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
- Lindblom, Charles E., and Braybrooke, D. A Strategy of Decision. London: Free Press, 1963.
- Lowi, Theodore. "Distribution, Regulation and Redistribution: The Functions of Government" in Randall B. Ripley (ed.), Public Policies and Their Politics. New York: N.W. Norton Company, Inc., 1966.
- Lowi, Theodore. "Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote for Technocracy," Public Administration Review, Volume 30, May/June 1970.
- Lyden, Fremont J., Shipman, George A., and Kroll, Morton (eds.). Policies, Decisions and Organizations. New York: Meredith Corporation, 1969.
- Myers, Gustavus. A History of Canadian Wealth. Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel Limited, 1972.


- New Democratic Party of Saskatchewan. "NDP Northern Development Program . . . 1971," New Deal for People. Service Printing Co., 1971.
- Pross, A. Paul. Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1975.
- Ranney, Austin (ed.). Political Science and Public Policy. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968.
- Self, Peter. Administrative Theories and Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.
- Serl, Vernon C. "Action and Reaction" in Davis, Arthur K. (ed.). A Northern Dilemma. Bellingham: Western Washington State College, 1967.
- Simeon, Richard. "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 9, December 1976.
- Simon, Herbert. Administrative Behaviour, 2nd edition. New York: Macmillan, 1957.
- Valentine, V.F. "Some Problems of the Indian and Metis of Northern Saskatchewan," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Volume 20, Number 2, February 1954.
- Warnock, J.W. "Metropolis-Hinterland: The Lost Theme in Canadian Letters," Canadian Dimensions, Volume 10, Number 2, June 1974.
- Weller, J.R. "Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 10, Number 4, December 1977.

APPENDIX A


ORGANIZATION CHARTS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN SASKATCHEWAN

1972-73 to 1976-77


ORGANIZATION CHART
Phase I — 1972-73 Fiscal Year



DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN SASKATCHEWAN - 1973-74



*The Director of Operations co-ordinates six branches, providing an integrated departmental delivery system. The six operations branches are: Health and Social Development, Field Services, Economic Development, Academic Education, Colleges and Resource Development.



DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION - 1974-75


In order to increase department efficiency and to ensure a more effective delivery system of department programs to the people of northern Saskatchewan, several organizational changes were implemented during the 1974-75 fiscal year and others were scheduled for implementation during the succeeding year.

A Resources Group was formed combining three branches, Resources, Colleges and Economic Development, under the direct supervision of Jack Perry, executive director. A Social Development Group, consisting of the Academic Education, Health Services and Social Services branches was also formed, but an executive director of the group had not been appointed by the

...anning capabilities to the department and to individual branches, was established under the directorship of Michael Gurstein. ... established late in the fiscal year and did not become fully


**ORGANIZATION CHART
FOR
DEPARTMENT OF
NORTHERN SASKATCHEWAN**

1975-76




ORGANIZATION
 FOR
 DEPARTMENT OF
 NORTHERN SASKATCHEWAN

1976-77




Organization chart for the Department of Northern Saskatchewan

1977-78



APPENDIX B

MAP OF THE NORTHERN ADMINISTRATION DISTRICT, INCLUDING
ELECTORAL DIVISIONS FOR THE NORTHERN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL



Population

Area 1	- 4,350
Area 2	- 3,989
Area 3	- 3,663
Area 4	- 7,077
Area 5	- 5,706

APPENDIX C

NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

Socio-Economic Context1. Progress Indicators(a) Economic Well Being

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1978</u>
Average Annual Wage	\$2,257	\$4,695
SAP Dependency Rate	47%	16%

(b) Physical Well-Being

(i) Housing (new units 1973-80 - 1,121)		
Houses Electrified	43%	81%
(ii) Medical Services		
Population/General Practitioners	2,208	1,733
Population/Public Health Nurse	2,000	1,106.
(iii) Construction and Improve- ment of Public Utilities		
- 8 community water and sewer systems completed and two presently underway		
(iv) Transportation		
People with Road Access	68%	79%
People with Year Round Air Strip Access	60%	72%

(c) Human Development

(i) Education - Northern people with K-12 in their home community	27%	(1973)	52%	(1980)
Students in Div. IV	3%	(1973)	7%	(1980)
Teachers with Degrees	18%		76%	(1980)
Native Teachers	.005%	(1973)	16%	(1980)
(ii) Local Government				
Residents Having Local Government (in Communities)	63%		100%	
(iii) Communications				
Population with Access to T.V.	15%		95%	
Population with Access to Telephones	24%		96%	

(d) Renewable Resource Development

(i) The census value-added of forestry, fishing and trapping industries in Saskatchewan increased from \$10 million in 1971 to \$38 million in-1979.

(ii) Forestry	<u>1972</u>	<u>1979</u>
Total Sawmills in the NAD	8	23
Total Employees in Forest Industry	176	1146
Residents Making Supplement Income from Commercial Fisheries		1600
Tourist Lodge Operators		140
Recreational Use - Persons Annually		65,000
Trapping - Annual Return	596,000	1,805,000
Number of Active Trappers		1,460

2. Key Trends in Northern Demography 1980-1990 (Zero Migration, Constant Birth Rate, Constant Death Rate)

1. The already high rate of natural population increase will accelerate. The NAD reproduction rate in the most recent year for which we have details (1977) is 3.7 compared to 2.1 for all of Saskatchewan. The NAD death rate for that year is 691/100,000.

<u>1980</u>	<u>1990</u>
28,000	36,000

2. The population will continue to be substantially younger than the provincial average.

(i) In 1980, some 42% of the population is 14 years or less in age and 24% of women in the prime child-bearing ages of 17-29.

(ii) The proportion of women ages 17-29 will increase dramatically - there will be a growth of 38% in the percentage of women in this age-group between 1990 and now.

<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1990</u>	women, ages 17-29
24%	29%	33%	

(iii) In 1980, only 3.5% of the population is 65 years of age or more.

(iv) In 1990, the elderly will remain about the same proportion of the total population; the big surge in the numbers of elderly will not start until about the year 2010.

3. The dependency ratio will remain very high.

	<u>NAD</u>	<u>Saskatchewan</u>
Total dependency*	.86	.60
Age dependency	.07	.18
Youth dependency	.79	.42
	12,129/14,007	349,380/602,146
	.86	.60

*Total dependency is the ratio of the population less than 15 or 65 and over, to the population 15-64.

4. The growth rate of the labour force will continue to be high.
- (i) School leavers projected at 500-700 per year to the mid 1980's.
- (ii) The very low female participation rate will change as women move through child-bearing and rearing ages out into the labour market.
5. The component of the population which is Indian in ethnic origin will increase.

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1990</u>
Treaty Indian	35%	36%
Non-Status Indian	38%	40%
Non-Indian	27%	24%

6. The growth in the group of women 17-29 will impact on the prevalence of developmental disability, as northern women give birth at younger ages and as younger women tend to give birth to lower birth-weight, at risk infants and thereby have a greater proportion of health related problems.

	<u>Live Births</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
NAD under 24	538	63%
All Saskatchewan under 24	9,002	54%