Post-World War Governance in Okinawa: Normalizing U.S. Military Exceptionalism

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Abstract

This study aims to investigate how the U.S. military presence has become possible and why the U.S. military bases have concentrated in Okinawa. Since 1945, the U.S. military and the Japanese government have maintained U.S. military bases in Okinawa. U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes have been serious problems in Okinawa. Moreover, Okinawans have not been protected from military violence by adequate judicial measures for over a half century. I employ the analytical insights of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben to analyze archival and secondary documents and investigate historical and current U.S. military problems in Okinawa. Foucault’s insight allows me to analyze American rationalizing discourses and power relations that have contributed to the U.S. military presence and concentration on the Okinawa islands. The analytical insight of Giorgio Agamben is a useful reference to investigate juridical contradictions of U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I argue that the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to make the American military presence in Okinawa legitimate through multiple tactics of governance. Given Okinawans’ persistent resistance against the U.S. military and the Japanese government, the U.S. military base presence does not seem wholly accepted in Okinawa. Nevertheless, the military burden has been imposed on Okinawans who are represented and treated by the U.S. military and the Japanese government as the insignificant “Other.” I argue that the analytical approaches that I develop in this study can be applicable to grasp patterns of modern domination in other cases of governance wherein political elites realize their interests by suspending the juridical rights of minority groups.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.0 Introduction
This thesis investigates the continuing U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The Japanese prefecture of Okinawa, or the Okinawa Islands (shoto), were placed under American administration between 1945 and 1972, and continue to be a site on which U.S. military bases operate. Despite resistance by Okinawans to the U.S. military presence on their islands (Kyan 1964; McCormack and Norimatsu 2012; Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Oota 2000), the U.S. military and the Japanese government have sustained and imposed a heavy military and social burden on Okinawans. I will examine governing techniques through which the U.S. military and the Japanese government have managed the concentrated U.S. military bases in Okinawa since 1945.

Before I visited and eventually settled for over two years in Okinawa, I knew little about Okinawa. I had seen Japanese travel agencies and media promoting Okinawa’s image as healing islands. Scenes of sunny beaches, beautiful skies and a slow lifestyle in the semi-tropical islands are often printed, transmitted and uploaded (China 2011; Magazine House Mook 2001). There were also occasional reports of U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes by Japanese newspapers and TV news. News about military accidents and soldiers’ crimes seemed incommensurable with the image of an Okinawa paradise. I became interested in the strangely mixed representations of peace and violence and turned my sociological attention to the islands. This thesis is a result of my interest and subsequent research in Okinawa. I engaged in a total of four months of research in Okinawa between September and November in 2007 and between March and May in 2008 and returned there again in 2010. While researching and writing continued between 2010 and 2012, I lived and worked on the Okinawa main island (hontou).

I noticed that the beautiful ocean, cuisine, music, dance, language, and people’s ways of life in general were different from what I had seen in other regions of Japan. Moreover, the tense coexistence of peace and violence which I witnessed made me sense a remarkable everyday incongruity about the islands. I experienced that the sound of warning sirens could suddenly interrupt my quiet afternoon in a seemingly perfect day on the semi-
In January 2011, I witnessed a few Japanese Self-Defense Forces personnel get off an automobile that is designated for bomb disposal, pile unexploded bombs on the ground, and defuse them at a construction site. Bombs have remained on the island since 1945 when Japanese soldiers and American soldiers fought in the Battle of Okinawa in the Pacific War. Another time, before daybreak, the roaring sound of a U.S. fighter aircraft pried my sleepy eyes open. Past midnight, I saw drunk and disorderly American soldiers shouting and hanging out in a red-light district.

My observations draw attention to the insight by Arasaki et al. (2001), that while Okinawa is a great sightseeing spot, it also has another aspect: war and U.S. military presence. Since 1945, Okinawans have been victims of the Pacific War, U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes (Fukuchi 1995; Maedomari 2011). I have wondered why and how people who traditionally lived in a peaceful culture have been exposed to unexpected and unwelcome American violence.

Critical bodies of literature (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Senaga 1971) indicate that the U.S. military established the U.S. military bases in Okinawa by force. Today, forty-two U.S. military facilities including bases, camps and training sites continue to occupy 24,526 hectares in Okinawa that represent over 10 percent of the prefectural area (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; also see maps contained in the Appendix). These critical bodies of literature provide information about the U.S. military problems, but the processes, mechanisms and reasons of governance through which the U.S. military bases have been stationed and concentrated in Okinawa are not well examined. I employ theoretical approaches, drawing especially on concepts developed by Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, to examine how and why the U.S. military and the Japanese government have maintained the concentrated U.S. military bases in Okinawa. I argue that the military burden has been imposed on Okinawans who have been represented and treated as the insignificant “Other” by the U.S. military and the Japanese government.

In the first chapter, I introduce general information about U.S. military problems in Okinawa as well as an overview of theories and methods I employ in this study. I also present the central theme and focus of this study along with the research questions that the
thesis addresses, which are as follows:

(1) What factors have made possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa?
(2) What is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa?

1.1 Okinawa and U.S. Military Issues
Located southwest of Japan proper, Okinawa prefecture consists of 49 settled and 111 unsettled islands. The total area of Okinawa prefecture is approximately 2,276 square kilometers, and about 1.4 million people reside on the islands (Okinawa Prefecture 2013). The population in Okinawa represents 4.4% of the overall population in Japan, and the prefecture covers 0.6% of the gross state area (Okinawa Industrial Site Promotion Division 2013). The semi-tropical climate and island environment have shaped distinctive ecology, scenery and culture in Okinawa. Unique species, beautiful beaches, Okinawan cuisine and traditional music make the area a popular resort destination, and Okinawa is commonly represented as the healing (iyashi) islands (Nozato 2007). Over five million mainland Japanese people annually visit Okinawa, with tourism contributing about 15-20% of the gross income in Okinawa.

In contrast to the images of Okinawa as a popular tourist destination, it is not hard for visitors to notice the U.S. military presence. The bases currently occupy about 18% of Okinawa hontou. More than 70% of overall U.S. military bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). While the U.S. military bases contribute to employment and business opportunities for those local people who work at U.S. military facilities or who are engaged in shops, restaurants and taxi businesses around U.S. military bases, concentration of the U.S. military bases has impeded sound economic and industrial development in Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Some bases are located in urban areas, and proper city planning is still impracticable (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). For example, in Yomitan Village, 3,517 hectares (46.9% of the total area) are occupied by U.S. military facilities (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). In Ginowan City, 33.2% of the total 1,937
hectares are allocated for U.S. military facilities (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). In both cases, roads have to bypass the U.S. military facilities, and lack of efficient arterial roads causes traffic congestion and contributes to economic loss in Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003).

U.S. military facilities also cause environmental problems in Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). For example, in 1996 and 2002, PCB (polychlorinated biphenyl) contaminated sludge and water were found in sewage treatment plants (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). The sewage treatment plants were located at former U.S. military facility sites which had been recently restored (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). In 2001 and 2002, 215 buried metal drums which contained tarry substance were found also at a former U.S. military facility site (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). In other cases, it is difficult to detect pollutants which issue from or exist at active U.S. military sites since information about U.S. military activities is controlled by the U.S. military and the Japanese government. For instance, between 1995 and 1996, the U.S. marine corps mistakenly used a depleted uranium bomb during their maneuvers in Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003). The U.S. government kept the information for about one year, and the Japanese government kept it for about another month until the Okinawa prefecture was informed (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003).

U.S. military activities pose considerable physical risks to residents of Okinawa. Between 1972 and 2010, there were 1,545 reported cases of U.S. military accidents (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2010). Among these, 506 cases involved U.S. military aircraft accidents, including crashes and forced landing in resident areas (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2010). There were 543 forest fires caused by maneuvers between 1972 and 2013 (Okinawa Prefecture 2013). In total, about 3.646 hectares were burnt by maneuvers (Okinawa Prefecture 2013). Although no death among Okinawans due to U.S. military maneuvers has been reported since 1972, frequent military accidents have contributed to anti-U.S. military sentiments among Okinawans (McCormack and Norimatsu 2012; Oota 1984).
Car accidents and crimes by American soldiers while they are off-duty also pose risks to people in Okinawa. Statistical data related to car accidents by military personnel and their family members are available since 1981. Between 1981 and 2010, there were 2,588 car accidents reported (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2010). Between 1972 and 2011, the number of U.S. military personnel and their family members arrested in Okinawa was 5,654 (Okinawa Prefecture Police 2014). About 10% of those arrested persons committed vicious crimes such as murder, robbery, arson and sexual assault (Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2010).

These incidents related to the U.S. military suggest that Okinawans have undergone considerable military problems contributing to an increased risk of physical harm on their islands. U.S. military activities have caused environmental problems and accidents in Okinawa. American soldiers have committed crimes and caused traffic accidents. Despite these military related problems, the U.S. military presence and concentration in Okinawa have continued since 1945. In this study, I examine mechanisms of governance that have sustained the concentrated U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I present two research questions and objectives of this study in the next section.

1.2 Research Questions and Objectives
Having learned about the U.S. military problems in Okinawa, I aim to answer the following two research questions through analysis of archival and secondary sources. (1) What factors have made possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa? (2) What is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa? This first question is concerned with techniques of governance that have contributed to the continuous U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The second question is concerned with identity politics wherein a heavy U.S. military burden has been imposed on Okinawans who have been constituted as a marginalized population by the U.S. military and the Japanese government. Okinawans have resisted the heavy military burden in Okinawa. I draw their counter-narratives primarily from secondary sources and not from primary voices in this study.

The process, mechanisms and reasons through which the U.S. military bases have
been constructed, maintained and concentrated in Okinawa are very complex. I do not pretend or intend to provide exhaustive and perfect answers to the research questions, but aim to provide a focused explanation that is guided by an analytical framework that draws attention to underlying issues of governance and regulation. In addressing these specific research questions, I draw attention to the wider sociological understanding of contemporary problems of governance. I will provide an overview of analytical approaches to governance in this chapter and elaborate them in chapter 3.

While literature which addresses issues of U.S. military bases in Okinawa initially helped me develop my knowledge about and interests in the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, reference to those existing bodies of literature posed some limitations in advancing my study. I found that while many studies of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa exist, most of these remain collections of historical facts that are not discussed through analytical insights (Okinawa Prefecture 1996) or emotional testimonies (Senaga 1971). By employing sociological insights to this research, I aim to address the research questions in ways that can contribute to advancement in understanding of U.S. military problems in Okinawa. In particular, I intend to contribute to the development of an analytical foundation for the historical understanding of the unwelcome and forcible presence of the U.S. bases in Okinawa.

Alternately, by looking at administrative, judicial and legislative practices in Okinawa by the U.S. military and Japan as concrete examples, I aim to contribute to analytical development in a broader study field of governance. In the theoretical and abstracted sense, governance can be understood as a system of institutional control (Guzzini 2012). Given that a variety of factors can contribute to the formation and management of governance in practice, each empirical case of governance may contain unique features. Therefore, multiple analytical avenues that can correspond to empirical diversity need to be made and refined. I propose that some of these analytical avenues can be consolidated based on relative stability in patterns of governing practices, contributing to overall theoretical development in the study of governance. I argue that a better understanding of historical processes through which the U.S. military bases have been
sustained and concentrated in Okinawa helps to make sense of the relatively stable patterns of American and Japanese governance of Okinawa that can be linked to structures of governance in other cases.

As I discussed in this section, existing literature has provided me with relevant information that offer a useful foundation for analyzing in greater detail issues of U.S. military presence in Okinawa. In the next section, I introduce some secondary sources which I found particularly relevant for understanding and organizing the subsequent chapters.

1.3 Preceding Studies
The archival sources – referred to in chapters 5 and 6 – are helpful to discover what has not yet been widely encompassed and discussed by scholars, but it is difficult to organize the structured discussion solely based on the fragmented archival data. Therefore, I needed to collect additional information to make a coherent and structured discussion in this thesis. Along with the collection and reading of archival data, I searched and read books related to U.S. military issues in Okinawa. Reviewing selected bodies of literature can help guide and structure the discussion in this thesis. In this section, I introduce bodies of literature which helped me understand issues of U.S. military bases and identity politics in Okinawa.

Secondary sources provide relevant information such as historical incidents and recent issues as well as personal and scholarly accounts of such incidents and issues. Reading of secondary sources helped me grasp what has been taking place and discussed about the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. While most officials, both American and Japanese, support the U.S. military presence in Okinawa for security reasons, critical studies emphasize juridical contradiction and Okinawans’ hardships regarding the U.S. military bases. I assumed that the continuing and concentrated U.S. military presence in Okinawa was a product of constant power struggles between the U.S. military and the Japanese government, representing the dominant side that supports the military presence and those who are resistant, respectively. I will introduce bodies of literature written in Japanese and illustrate dominant and counter narratives in the following chapters.
Dominant narratives that are produced by the U.S. military in archival documents will be analyzed in depth in chapter 5.

In both dominant and counter narratives, Okinawa is represented as a unique region within the boundary of the Japanese state. For example, the Okinawa Development Basic Policy (*shinkou kihon houshin*), illustrating official views, mentions various special circumstances for Okinawa that include recognition of its island environment and semi-tropical climate and defines Okinawa as one of the frontiers of Japan (Cabinet Office, Japan 2012). Nakachi, who is critical of the history of Japanese nation state building, also argues that Okinawa is politically, culturally and geographically a frontier (2005, 55). As I will present in the next chapter as part of historical information, Okinawa became a field of battle during the Pacific War and was administered by the U.S. military between 1945 and 1972. The dominant and counter narratives share the view that Okinawa has been disadvantaged due to its historical relation with the war and the U.S. military, that is, the battle on Okinawa and subsequent U.S. military administration (Cabinet Office, Japan 2012; Maeda 2005; Okinawa Development Bureau 1980). In general, Okinawa is represented as unique islands that are characterized by geographical remoteness, unique customs and historical hardships within the Japanese state.

The dominant and counter narratives differ in regard to the portrayal of fundamental issues arising from the Battle of Okinawa and post-war experiences on Okinawa. While the government reports concerns over economic stagnation, critical scholars and testimonies of Okinawans focus on violent consequences of military presence and actions in Okinawa. The former often acknowledges that Okinawans became victims of the war and military, but essential problems in Okinawa remain largely economic. For example, the Okinawa Development Bureau (*kaihatsu chou*) states that, in order to address an economic gap between Okinawa and *hondo* (Japan proper) stemming from the battle and U.S. administration in Okinawa, the onus lies with Okinawa itself to try to improve its position in the Japanese economy (Okinawa Development Bureau 1980). Similarly, the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (*bouei shisetsu chou*) sees U.S. military facilities as obstacles to Okinawa economic development projects (2007).
The counter narratives emphasize numerous hardships that Okinawans have experienced because of the war and military presence. For example, Fukuchi (1971a; 1971b; 1973) and Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA 1970) document military base pollution; Fukuchi (1995) also has compiled extensive studies on American soldiers’ crimes in Okinawa. The process of foreign base construction and persistent military exploitation on Okinawa are also common themes in the critical analysis of Okinawa. The dominant and counter narratives share the view that Okinawans have been marginalized in their relation to the War and U.S. military, but these narratives emphasize different concerns with regard to the current issues that Okinawans have. While the former emphasizes economic stagnation in Okinawa as the primary concern, the latter identifies the U.S. military presence itself as the problem that has resulted in continuous hardships among Okinawans.

In regard to critical analysis of post-war governance of Okinawa, Oota (1972) and Miyazato (1975) have produced pioneering scholarly works. Their works also represent Okinawa as a politically and economically marginalized region. Oota, who was trained as an educator and a social researcher and became an Okinawa governor, is critical of structural political inequality between the Japanese government and Okinawa (1972) and of American occupation of Okinawa (1984). Meanwhile, Oota argues that Okinawa’s economic subordination to Japan has impeded autonomous development of Okinawa (1972). Oota (2000) acknowledges the importance of economic development, but still regards the U.S. military presence as a factor that has caused other hardships, including economic stagnation, U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes within Okinawa. His autobiography (Oota 2000) is also a rich source of information about Okinawa history. It includes his early experiences in the Battle of Okinawa as well as his role in political decision making processes as a governor. Miyazato (2000; 1981; 1975) analyzes American policy towards Okinawa with archival references. He presents critical perspectives on American strategy and policies in the Pacific and the post-war Japan – U.S. relationship (Miyazato 1975). His studies serve not only as thorough historical accounts of Okinawa, but also as references for archival data.
Critical studies of dominant historical narratives elaborate issues of sovereignty and constitutional matters in relation to the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. While the dominant narrative emphasizes that, because Okinawa belongs to Japan, Okinawans need to cooperate with Japan and the U.S. for security matters, the counter narrative tells us that Okinawans are not protected equally under the Japanese constitution. The fundamental issue that divides the two perspectives is the Japan – U.S. Security Treaty. Substantive information and issues regarding the Security Treaty will be presented in the next chapter as part of historical background of governance in Okinawa. As for understanding of the subsequent comparison between official accounts and critical views on this topic in this section, it is helpful to provide brief information about the Security Treaty with regard to U.S. military presence in Okinawa. Japanese policy makers, or members of conservative parties, have made international decisions largely in compliance with American political and security requirements. Ratification of the Security Treaty in 1952 and renewal in 1960 illustrate this form of diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Under the terms of the Security Treaty, the U.S. military is responsible to ensure Japan’s security in the event of foreign military invasion into Japan. In return, the Japanese government supports the U.S. military presence in the Far East and cooperates with U.S. security operations. Currently, U.S. military bases are located in Okinawa and other prefectures of Japan in accordance with Japan’s commitment in the security cooperation with the U.S. military.

The 2012 Annual Defense White Paper (bouei hakusho) illustrates official views and emphasizes the importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to assure peace and stability around Japan as well as the strategic importance of Okinawa in the region (Ministry of Defense 2012). The Defense Facilities Administration Agency (2007) recognizes that the U.S. military facilities that occupy significant land areas of Okinawa constrain Okinawa development, but still regards the Security Treaty as a more prevalent concern. While the agency proposes that it is necessary to reduce the burden posed by a military base on a hosting region, it emphasizes the defence capabilities made possible by the Security Treaty (Defense Facilities Administration Agency 2007). The agency also argues that this security policy has legitimacy (taigi), but it has not been possible to
establish efficient defence capabilities without the sympathy and trust of Japanese citizens (Defense Facilities Administration Agency 2007). In practice, the problems posed by the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa have not been resolved since 1945, suggesting that the Japanese government has not seriously tried to mitigate the military burden in Okinawa, and therefore has not gained the sympathy and trust of Okinawans (Sawachi 2012; Yamada 2012).

On the other hand, the counter narrative points out juridical contradictions in relation to the presence of and practices associated with American military bases (Ibata 2010). Considerable attention has been paid to ways in which the Security Treaty has contributed to conditions that violate human rights and suspend constitutional provisions. Ibata (2010) and Arakaki (2010) point out that two contradictory legal mechanisms exist in Japan. One mechanism is organized under the constitution, the other under the Security Treaty. The latter has infringed on the former mechanism and allowed sovereign immunity for the U.S. military in Japan (Arakaki 2010). Similarly, in the 1960s, a Japanese jurist, Masayasu Hasegawa, suggested that dual legal systems exist in Japan (Wada 2012). One system is based on the constitution, and the other is defined by the Security Treaty (Wada 2012). Gabe (2000) and Ikemiyagi (2008) argue that the Security Treaty privileges the U.S. military in Japan, so that Japanese sovereignty is compromised. Several contradictions regarding the constitution and sovereignty are manifested in Okinawa where the U.S. military bases are concentrated. Yoshida (2008) argues that Okinawa, insofar as the Japanese constitution and laws do not apply to U.S. military matters, is a U.S. military colony.

Another theme in the literature explores cases of military accidents and soldiers’ crimes with reference to human rights, sovereignty and the constitution. During the U.S. military occupation of Okinawa, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) has introduced cases of military base pollution and soldiers’ crime during the American occupation (1970). The Federation recognized significant human rights violations caused by American military activities in Okinawa and argued that these contradict not only democratic principles, but also the UN Charter and international laws (JFBA 1970).
Yoshida et al. (1971) argued that the U.S. did not have legal or constitutional legitimacy to administer Okinawa. The Japan – U.S. Peace Treaty allowed the U.S. to administer Okinawa, and Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa was greatly compromised (Yoshida et al. 1971). In 1975, the JFBA (1975) compiled a report called the Okinawa White Paper (hakusho) in which it argued that Okinawa was treated unfairly under the same (Japanese) constitution, and Okinawans’ basic human rights were still violated by the U.S military. The report was compiled three years after Okinawa fukki (reversion or return), that is, transfer of administrative rights over Okinawa from the U.S. military to Japan. The JFBA points out that as the administrative rights of Okinawa were returned to Japan, co-management of the U.S. military bases – maintained by Japan and operated by the U.S. – began in accordance with the terms of the Security Treaty (JFBA 1982).

Critique of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and the Security Treaty is also directed against dominant geopolitical discourse. The Japanese government has attempted to provide a rationale for the U.S. military presence in Okinawa by emphasizing the geopolitical importance of Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Yara 2009). Yamada (2012) argues that Okinawans who became victims of the Battle of Okinawa as a result of Japanese military presence do not believe in the deterrence of the U.S. military presence. Moreover, Yara (2009) argues that the U.S. military personnel do not cling to Okinawa as an essential site for a military base, so that the Japanese government’s claim that the U.S. military is necessary in Okinawa for geopolitical reasons is doubtful.

In this section, I present selected bodies of literature in order to provide a foundation for understanding Okinawa identity and U.S. military issues in Okinawa, which are concerned with the proposed research questions. I have shown how debates and alternative discourses have been framed around such issues as military security, legal and juridical matters, and geopolitical factors. The purpose of this section is not to provide readers with comprehensive information about Okinawa identity and U.S. military issues, but to introduce prevalent views and competing interpretations on the given topics. These existing studies helped me organize and guide my discussions in chapter 5, 6, and 7. In turn, bodies of literature presented above are important in identifying themes that emerge in
more detail in subsequent discussions. In the next section, I will outline analytical approaches that I employ in this study. The analytical approaches served as another element on which I organized my discussions in this study.

1.4 Theory and Method
Hook and Siddle (2002) argue that Okinawans occasionally have subverted structural constraints posed by the U.S. military and the Japanese government. For example, the Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military administration contributed to the reversion in 1972 (Senaga 1976). The Okinawans’ anti-war movements in the post-reversion era influenced political decision-making by the Japanese government. Nevertheless, the U.S. military and the Japanese government have managed to maintain a continuing U.S. military presence in Okinawa since 1945. In response to the two research questions, I analyze patterns or structures of governance through which the U.S. military and the Japanese government have addressed the Okinawans’ resistance and maintained the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. To this end, I integrate diverse theoretical and methodological elements. In this section, I provide an overview of these analytical approaches and elaborate on these in chapters 3 and 4. The purpose of this section is to present an analytical link between theories and methods applied in this study with reference to Foucault’s insights in discourses and structures.

The analytical approaches developed by Foucault (1991a; 1978; 1977; 1975) and Agamben (2005; 1995) are useful reference points for the analysis of how unequal allocation of authority among people within a national setting or one regime is sustained. The theory of state of exception developed by Agamben (2005) is applied in this study to examine the U.S. military administration in Okinawa between 1945 and 1972. State of exception means the suspension of law and centralization of power on the pretext of emergency such as internal and external wars (Agamben 2005). Political executives who monopolize sovereignty are able to create states of exception in which legal rights of certain groups are suspended and violence is deployed as a means of control (Agamben 2005). Agamben introduces several cases of state of exception such as the Japanese
American internment during the Second World War and the Guantanamo Bay detention camp in which violence is exercised on certain groups without juridical protection. In a state of exception, certain forms of knowledge that are produced by executives become privileged, while other forms of knowledge shared among those who are oppressed remain unheard (Agamben 2005). Agamben argues that “[i]n every case, the state of exception marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an enunciation without any real reference” (2005, 40). He further contends that a state of exception becomes a rule, which means that juridical contradictions such as suspension of our juridical rights can become a deeply entrenched norm (Agamben 2005).

Foucault defined a wide range of institutional techniques of modern governance as governmentality (1991a). Foucault (1991a; 1977) analyzed how a modern government exercises its power and disciplines its citizens through institutions. What characterizes modern governance is the exercise of power in the form of knowledge/discourse which has replaced the exercise of sovereign violence in the pre-modern era (Foucault 1977). In his studies of modern institutions such as clinics and prisons, Foucault (1977; 1975) demonstrates how professional knowledge and discourses are deployed to construct a division between the normal “Self” and the abnormal “Other” and then to discipline and normalize the abnormal “Other.” Professionals employ the representational division in order to justify their intervention in practices seeking to regulate or modify the abnormal “Other.” In this sense, the professional discourses function as means to provide a rationale or justification for institutional control and regulation. In this study, I analyze production and deployment of discourses through which the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to provide a rationale and justification in their control and regulation of Okinawans. Reference to Foucault’s theoretical concept of governmentality and knowledge/discourse is relevant to grasp ideas and practices of U.S. military and Japanese governing institutions. In the chapters that follow, I refer to production and deployment of discourse as a tactic of “rationalization” that provides authorities with a means to claim a rationale and justification of governance. I use the concept of
“rationalization” in conjunction with my preceding study (Yamaguchi 2012) and with respect to Foucault’s attention to a role of discourses in institutional practices. He argues that “rationalization” includes not only an “ensemble of rules, procedures, means to an end,” but also “a production of true discourses” in institutional practices (Foucault 1991, 79). In other words, his definition of “rationalization” is different from that which is commonly used in the discipline of sociology focusing on development in modern bureaucratic and industrial systems in relation to traditional systems.

Said (1978) explores on a much broader scale the impact of the representational division between the superior Occidental “Self” and the inferior Oriental “Other” on colonial domination. He argues that intellectuals played a significant role in helping to disseminate ideas of European superiority over the Orient and legitimize colonial domination (Said 1978). By referring to the concept of hegemony, he explained how the cultural influence promoted by the intellectuals through colonial discourse contributed to the durability of colonial regimes (Said 1978). Harvey (2003) and Chomsky (2003) also used the concept of hegemony to explain the durability of American imperial domination after World War II. Hegemony is a form of governance wherein a ruling class or state manipulates values and maintains its influence without the constant exercise of military power (Chomsky 2003; Gramsci 1971; Harvey 2003; Said 1978).

With reference to these analytical approaches, I examine the particular forms of governing practices in Okinawa since 1945 and the shifting dynamics among them. The U.S. military employed exceptional measures in its governance in Okinawa. For example, it used military forces to appropriate land for its base construction, and Okinawans’ rights to access their land were compromised. I argue that the U.S. military and the Japanese government have deployed multiple tactics through institutional channels in their governing practices in Okinawa in order to sustain and normalize U.S. military exceptionalism in Okinawa. Through multiple tactics, the U.S. military and the Japanese government have dealt with Okinawans’ resistance and critique of the U.S. military burden. I will introduce three tactics of governance which I characterize as “rationalization” of governing practices, “concealment” of inconvenient information, and “provisionality” of exceptional measures
in chapter 3. In the subsequent analysis, I look at representational and empirical dimensions of these tactics which have contributed to durability and stability of governing practices by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in Okinawa.

As I will elaborate on in Chapter 4, my study is based on an analysis of archival and textual documents in accordance with two research methods developed by Foucault in his archival research. Foucault (1972) employed an approach he identified as an “archaeology of knowledge” to discover relatively stable patterns of discourse/knowledge produced by medical professionals and shared among the multitude in medical practices. Foucault (1977) developed another method, genealogy of power, to link discourses to power relations surrounding penal systems in *Discipline and Punish*. His analysis of power challenges a common understanding that power is an instrument of coercion wielded by agents (Foucault 1977). He also rejected the idea that power is embedded in a structure apart from agents’ will and acts (Foucault 1977). Instead of the conventional Ontological dilemma, or binary oppositions between agency and structure, Foucault’s understanding of power suggests the interplay of various forms of agency and structures (1978). Because the exercise and contestation of power is diffused through particular discourses, there is relative stability in the prevailing structures of ideas and practices (Foucault 1977). In this study, I intend to grasp the relatively stable structures of governance produced in the course of actions and regulations imposed by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in efforts to control Okinawans’ resistance and normalize the heavy U.S. military burden on Okinawa. I examine archival documents, bodies of literature, and Japanese government reports that reveal relatively stable patterns of thought employed by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in the governance of Okinawa.

I pay attention to the gap between empirical reality and representational reality in order to explain non-hegemonic yet durable governing practices over Okinawa by the U.S. military and the Japanese government. I argue that empirical reality of governance in Okinawa since 1945 has not always been consistent with the discourses of governance produced by the U.S. military and the Japanese government. As Hook and Siddle (2002) argue, Okinawans occasionally have resisted constraints posed on them by the U.S. military
and the Japanese government. In that sense, there appear to be limits to the success achieved by the deployment of discourses by the U.S. military and the Japanese government to assert full control over Okinawa. In other words, patterns of subjective accounts shared among U.S. and Japanese executives and institutional practices do not necessarily have hegemonic influence over Okinawans. I suggest in this study that the larger the gap between dominant discourses and practices, the less hegemonic influence of the U.S. military and the Japanese government over Okinawans is exercised.

Analysis of the gap between empirical and representational realities of governance in Okinawa requires analytical elaboration. Disparity between representational and empirical realities implies that modern forms of governance in practice are discursive and dynamic. I suggest in this study that the analytical approaches developed by Foucault and Agamben are relevant to analyze different parts of the discursive and dynamic structures of modern governance. Agamben’s approach to state of exception is relevant to analyze threshold of governance wherein the production and deployment of discourse are premature and therefore the disciplinary powers of institutions are limited. I refer to Agamben’s theory to begin my analysis of U.S. military administration immediately after World War II which illustrates apparent suspension of Okinawans’ sovereignty and political rights. Foucault’s approach to modern governance is relevant to analyze relatively stable governance wherein institutional discipline has great influence to manipulate ideas and practices of the population. Institutional practices, such as the production and deployment of discourses, also help political executives create stability in their governance. I will refer to Foucault’s approach to analyze how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to control Okinawans through institutional means to create stability in their governances of Okinawa. In conjunction with the analytical insights of Foucault and Agamben, I also examine several tactics of governance employed by the U.S. military and the Japanese government that contributed to their relatively enduring capacity to exercise control over Okinawa.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented two research questions that seek to understand the presence and concentration of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. The chapter serves as a foundation to provide a general understanding of the more detailed discussion presented in the following chapters. In this study, I aim to examine, drawing from the insights of Foucault and Agamben, how U.S. military exceptionalism has been sustained in Okinawa. Among many cases of state of exception (Agamben 2005), this study is concerned with relations of governance represented in the particular case of Okinawa between 1945 and the present. Nevertheless, understanding of juridical contradictions and people’s hardships in Okinawa through the analytical framework can contribute to the broader study of governance. With reference to the two analytical approaches, I will demonstrate how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have tried to sustain the heavy U.S. military burden on Okinawans through relatively stable patterns of governance. I argue that, despite the unique circumstances associated with the case of Okinawa, the analytical frameworks which I employ in this study may be useful in considering other cases of governance as well. In the next chapter, I describe the historical background of the current U.S. military problems as well as identity politics in Okinawa which are relevant to understand themes that are the focus of substantive discussion in this study.
Chapter 2: Historical Background

2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, I will present a general background of governance in Okinawa and Okinawans' identity politics. In addressing the two research questions, this study focuses on issues of governance and identity politics in Okinawa from 1945 up to the present. This period represents a small but significant period within a much longer history of Okinawans’ encounter with foreign oppressors which began in the 17th century. Okinawans’ hardships were escalated by their inclusion in the modern Japanese state in the 19th century and involvement in the Pacific War in the mid 1940s. Okinawans’ identity as an “Other” ethnic group initially was constructed in relation to the Japanese people. As Hook and Siddle (2002) point out, Okinawans occasionally resisted structural constraints posed by the Japanese government and the U.S. military, and their identity was negotiated and constructed in the course of power struggles with the Japanese people and the American people. The ways in which the identity of Okinawans as a unique ethnic group has been constituted are important factors for understanding the nature of their resistance to the U.S. military presence which is central to the substantive discussion of this study.

2.1 History of Governance: Okinawa, Japan and the U.S.

Okinawans encountered Japanese feudal invasion in the 17th century. Since then, their autonomous decision-making has been impeded by Japanese and American political intervention in Okinawa Islands. What I address in this study, U.S. military governance and Japanese governance in Okinawa since 1945, can be situated in longer historical contexts of foreign control over Okinawa. In this section, I provide an overview of Japanese and U.S. military control over Okinawa, focusing on how Japanese and American geopolitical interests and interventions in Okinawa have contributed to historical and current hardships of Okinawans.

Between 1429 and 1879, kings of Ryukyu governed the Okinawa region. The Ryukyu Kingdom brought tributes to Chinese kingdoms, and it functioned as a tally trade. The Ryukyu Kingdom prospered as a tributary trading hub since few countries were
permitted to trade directly with China. In 1609, a troop of Satsuma-han (domain) invaded Ryukyu and took practical control over the Kingdom. The Ryukyu Kingdom was annexed to, and became a tributary domain of, the Edo Shogunate (feudal government). European and American colonial expansion into Asia in the 19th century altered political structures and international relations among Asian countries. In 1853, the arrival of American fleet vessels led by Commodore Matthew Perry to Japan tore apart feudal Japan’s sakoku (closed country) policy that had lasted for over two centuries (Dower 1999). The opening of Japan to the world (kaikoku) and subsequent unequal treaties with European states and the U.S. resulted in weakening of political and economic systems in the Edo feudal government. In 1868, the Edo Shogunate was overthrown, the Japanese Emperor was restored, and the modern Meiji Government was established (Okinawa Prefecture 1996).

The Meiji government was in haste to modernize Japan in order to strengthen the country and survive in an international environment in which imperial influence of the Western powers was predominant (Weiner 1997c). As part of Japan’s modernizing projects, the Meiji government promoted industrialization, adopted modern military technology, and introduced a nation state system. Hokkaido, which lies northeast of Japan proper, was an important area for Japan due to economic and strategic reasons. Hokkaido not only provided the Meiji government with abundant natural resources for industrialization such as timber and coal, but also served as a northern gate of the Empire of Japan against Russian pressure (Oguma 1998). The Meiji government colonized Hokkaido and expropriated land from indigenous people, the Ainu (Oguma 1998; Siddle 1997; Yamaguchi 2004). By contrast, the Meiji Government was less certain about whether the Ryukyu domain should be incorporated into the modern Japanese state boundary since Okinawa was not economically promising (Oguma 1998). Nevertheless, Okinawa was a geopolitically important site for the modern Japanese state since it could serve as a defence against European powers and a base for marine traffic (Oguma 1998). The Japanese government began negotiation with the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1872 and sent troops to Okinawa in 1879 for forceful annexation. The process of annexation, called Ryukyu shobun (disposition), terminated the Ryukyu regime that had lasted for over 400 years (Okinawa Prefecture
Imperial expansion of the Japanese Empire continued throughout three reigns of Japanese emperors: Meiji, Taishou and Shouwa. The Japanese Empire colonized Taiwan, Korea, and other regions in East and Southeast Asia until its defeat in 1945 against the Allied Forces in the Pacific War. While Japan lost its military supremacy over most regions in East and Southeast Asia, Hokkaido remained to be a prefecture of Japan after the World War II. Meanwhile, Japan maintained its residual sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands, but the Okinawa Islands were administered by the U.S. military between 1945 and 1972.

After the Japanese surrender to the Allied Forces in 1945, the U.S. took the initiative in administering Japanese people and reforming the Japanese political system. For over six years after the end of World War II, Japan was placed under U.S occupation and did not have diplomatic relations with other states (Dower 1999). The Supreme Commander for the Allied Power (SCAP), General MacArthur, monopolized occupation rules over Japan and promoted democratization programs (Dower 1999). Dower (1999) argues that SCAP promoted top-down democracy, liberation, civilization and enlightenment in its occupation of post-war Japan. During the U.S. occupation of Japan, Japanese sovereignty was greatly compromised. General MacArthur held lawmaking authority and administrative authority which were exercised through Japanese state institutions. General MacArthur issued directives, and Japanese bureaucracy carried them out (Dower 1999). Moreover, extraterritoriality was applied to Americans who were in Japan. Japanese jurisdiction was not exercised over Americans in Japan, and “Americans accused of crimes against Japanese were tried by their own government” (Dower 1999, 211). In addition to the institutional control, SCAP also “created a web of programs designated to reach every man, woman, and child” in Japan (Dower 1999, 206). For example, while SCAP promoted its democratization agendas through the education system and media in Japan, “any criticism of the alien overlords whatsoever was forbidden” (Dower 1999, 211).

Initially, “the response of huge numbers of Japanese was that the supreme commander was great, and so was democracy” (Dower 1999, 205). Japanese people, regardless of their ideological positions, saw the “American occupation force as an army of liberation” (Dower 1999, 69). Japanese people also accepted SCAP’s demilitarization
policy as well as Article 9 of the new Constitution of Japan, which committed the nation to
the renunciation of war. Towards the end of the 1940s, as ideological tension between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. intensified, the U.S. began to expect Japan to take a new role in
security in the Far East (Gabe 2002). The U.S. demanded the reluctant Japanese
government to reestablish military power and take responsibility for security against
communist powers (Dower 1999).

The relationship between Okinawans and mainland Japanese people was altered by
Japan’s defeat against the Allied Powers and participation of the U.S. in the post-war
governance of both Japan proper and Okinawa. Hook and Siddle argue that since 1945,
Okinawa has been situated within a dual political relationship “with the other two angles
being made up by the US and Japan” (2002, 3). While the mainland of Japan was gradually
recovering from the lost war, Okinawa was struggling under strict U.S. military control.
The Okinawa Islands were a place where American “harsh strategic considerations held
sway” (Dower 1999, 26). On the 1st of April, 1945, the U.S. military advanced to the
Okinawa main island and began to appropriate the islands for forward airborne and staging
bases from which they could strike major cities in Japan proper. The American presence on
the Okinawa Islands was initially intended to use the islands “as a steppingstone to Japan”
(Fisch 1988, 3). The U.S. troops brought the northern half of the Okinawa main island
under their control during April, and collective action by Japanese soldiers in the island’s
southern half ended by mid June. Japan surrendered within about two months after
American ascendancy over Okinawa. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, in March 1945, the
U.S. Forces made Proclamation No. 1 (Nimitz Proclamation) signed by Chester W. Nimitz,
who was Fleet Admiral as well as Military Governor of the Islands of Nansei Shoto and
adjacent waters which had been hitherto occupied by Japan. Under the terms of the
Proclamation, all powers of the Japanese government were suspended, and final
administrative responsibility of these areas was vested in Nimitz. For 27 years since this
point, Okinawans were governed under the U.S. military rules without any clear decision
on their sovereign rights. As one of the conditions in the 1952 Peace Treaty between Japan
and the U.S., Okinawa was officially separated from Japan for an indefinite period.
Okinawans suffered from frequent incidents of U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes during the period of U.S. military administration. According to a “noticeable” incident list (Okinawa Mondai Henshuu Inkkai 1996), more than 150 Okinawans were killed and more than 200 were injured as a result of U.S. military accidents between 1948 and 1972. Reported cases of crimes numbered 205 in 1947 and 220 in 1948 (Fukuchi 1995). Fukuchi (1995) argues that Okinawans had a sense of inferiority to American troops who were the victors of World War II, so it required courage for them to demand compensation for the U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes. Therefore, the recorded cases are just “the tip of an iceberg” (Fukuchi 1995, 15). Because some cases of accidents and crimes remain unreported, there are no accurate numbers of the U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes that took place during the U.S. military occupation in Okinawa. Indeed, different record sources (Fukuchi 1995; Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2003) provide different estimates of U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes.

Under the U.S. military rules, Okinawans did not have rights to manage their own land (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Moreover, Okinawans were exposed to violence without full legal protection while other Japanese citizens were in principle protected under the new constitution which became effective in 1947. During the 1940s, although Okinawans endured hardship under the U.S. military rules, they did not organize systematic resistance against U.S. military. Few Okinawans requested the U.S. military reversion of Okinawa to Japan, and many Okinawans even considered it taboo to talk about reversion (Kyan 1964). In 1950, as news about the Peace Treaty gathered public attention in Okinawa, Okinawans became anxious about their future situation (Kyan 1964). In September, 1950, the U.S. State Department announced that the U.S. would administer Okinawa under U.N. Trusteeship, and the Japanese government would comply with this under the terms of the Peace Treaty between Japan and the U.S. (Kyan 1964).

In 1972, administrative rights over Okinawa were returned to Japan, but this transfer did not resolve the military issues in Okinawa. The U.S. military bases have remained in Okinawa, military accidents have been prevalent, and Okinawans’ legal rights
have been largely compromised against U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ violence. Japanese Prime Minister Sato made concessions to the U.S. in the reversion agreements, many of which he concealed from public scrutiny by Okinawans and the Japanese population as a whole. From the beginning of negotiations with the U.S. government for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control, he secretly acted with few supportive members in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) including its chief secretary, Fukuda (Nishiyama 2007). Sato’s weak position on Okinawans’ sovereignty not only allowed continued U.S. military presence, but also strengthened the U.S.’s superiority in military matters in Okinawa and Japan proper. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. also maintained its political superiority over Japan. During the Cold War, Japan became an important ally of liberal states. Sato and other political elites misread the American situation and believed that the U.S. government could not spoil the Japan-U.S. relationship simply as a result of problems in Okinawa. As a result, the U.S. continues to exercise its superiority over Japan by maintaining a military presence in Okinawa. The Japanese government has economically compensated Okinawans for the military burden, but has not taken fundamental measures to resolve recurrent military problems in Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996).

As I discuss in chapter 7, the Japanese government seems more concerned with U.S. security demands than Okinawans’ demands to reduce the military burden in Okinawa. For the Japanese government and decision makers in the post World War II era, meeting American security demands has been a challenge. Right after World War II, the Japanese Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, expected that the United Nations would be an international apparatus that could maintain post-war international security in the near future (Gabe 2002). Meanwhile, in order to conclude pacification and achieve independence for Japan, he negotiated with the U.S. government, proposing to maintain U.S. military presence for Japanese security (Gabe 2002). In response to Yoshida’s proposal, John Foster Dulles, a special envoy to Japan who negotiated a peace treaty with Yoshida, demanded Japan’s cooperation with U.S. military action and contribution to the Free World (Gabe 2002). The Japanese government responded to the U.S. demand with the establishment of a

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan has played a central role in decision making by the Japanese government since 1955. The LDP was established in 1955 based on conservative political parties in Japan and continued to be a ruling party for over fifty years. The LDP has contributed to the maintenance and renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Shinsuke Kishi, who served as a Prime Minister of Japan and a president of the LDP between 1957 and 1960, negotiated with the U.S. government for renewal of the Security Treaty (Utsunomiya 1996). Utsunomiya (1996) argues that Kishi tried to resolve Japanese dependence on U.S. military power and sought mutual military cooperation between the two countries. Kishi was confronted with a nation-wide student movement against the Security Treaty. In 1960, he managed to renew the Security Treaty, but had to resign to take responsibility for the student movement (Utsunomiya 1996). As I elaborate on in chapter 7, under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Japanese provisional rules, the U.S. military bases have been maintained, and Okinawans’ legal rights are still compromised. As a result, Okinawans still suffer from military accidents and soldiers’ crimes in the course of their everyday lives (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). For the Japanese government, Okinawa is a convenient site that it can exploit for the purpose of national security (Sawachi 2012).

2.2 Identity and Resistance of Okinawans

In addressing the second research question, I examine how the identity of Okinawans has been a contributing factor to the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. As I discussed in the previous section, the modern Japanese government and the U.S. military
governed Okinawa in order to meet their geopolitical interests. Okinawans were represented and treated as the “Other” ethnic group by the Japanese people as well as the U.S. military personnel and did not acquire equal national membership within the Japanese nation or the American nation. In this section, I introduce how Okinawans’ identity has been constructed since their inclusion in the Japanese state boundary in the 19th century.

Oguma (1998) argues that the national boundary of the mainland Japanese people was not fixed, but negotiated among political executives in the Meiji government. The Meiji government’s policy towards Okinawa was characterized by the inclusion of Okinawa islands in the modern Japanese state boundary while Okinawans were excluded from equal Japanese national membership (Oguma 1998). Okinawa was included in the Japanese modern state, but Okinawans were not respected or treated equally within the Japanese nation (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Okinawans’ customs were seen as backward practices (Oguma 1998). Therefore, their traditional practices were regulated and altered by the Japanese central government. For example, \textit{utaki} (sacred sites) were converted into Japanese style shrines, and the use of Okinawa dialects was discouraged and penalized. In the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, to be part of the Japanese nation meant to become children of the Emperor within the imperial project. Oguma (1998) argues that alteration of Okinawans’ customs was not simple assimilation, but was aimed at nurturing the “Japanese” who were loyal to the Empire of Japan. While Japanization of Okinawans was implemented through official institutions, assimilation within the Japanese nation was a means for Okinawans to mitigate discrimination. Some influential Okinawan scholars such as Fuyuu Iha assented to the assimilation policy and proposed common ancestry of Okinawans with the Japanese people (Oguma 1998). The Japanese policy has not resulted in complete assimilation of Okinawans, thereby contributing to the construction of an ambivalent identity in which Okinawans are accorded simultaneously characteristics of both sameness and otherness (Oguma 1998).

Weiner (1997b) illustrates the ambivalent identity of Okinawans. In his analysis of Okinawans’ anti-U.S. military actions, Weiner argues that “most resistance simultaneously employs ideas of Okinawa’s historical difference from Japan” (1997b, 189). Alternately,
Weiner points out Okinawans’ sense of belonging to the Japanese nation in their resistance to the U.S. military presence;

although there are powerful anti-war and anti-American messages employed in the protests, there is little sense of a need for independence from Japan. Rather, protesters demand first that the Japanese state act politically on Okinawans’ behalf, and second that further economic support from Tokyo should be forthcoming, as compensation for the bases, the accidents, and the environmental devastation that has taken place since 1945. Such rhetoric illustrates the ambivalence of identity in contemporary Okinawa (1997b, 189).

While Oguma (1998) analyzes Okinawans’ ambivalent identity as a product of Japanization and “othering” practices by the Japanese government, Weiner (1997b) contends that Okinawans also act in accordance with the ambivalent identity.

The Okinawans’ ambivalent identity has been politically exploited by the Japanese government on many occasions. For example, during the Pacific War, Okinawa became a battle field, and Okinawans were involved in the battle as civilian workers and student corps in support of Japanese soldiers (Ooshiro 1983). The islands and people were used in order to postpone Japanese surrender and draw better surrender terms (Arasaki et al. 2001). Okinawans were forced to cooperate with the Japanese military as the Japanese people, but they were sacrificed as an insignificant group within the Japanese nation (Arasaki et al. 2001; Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Ooshiro (1983) argues that although many civilians in Okinawa cooperated with Japanese military plans, there was a rumor spread among Japanese soldiers that Okinawans were spies for the U.S. military. As I discuss in chapter 7, the Okinawans’ ambivalent identity is also flexibly exploited in varying ways by the Japanese government with regard to contemporary U.S. military issues within the Japanese state boundary.

During the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, the U.S. military began to administer Okinawa, and the U.S. military administration continued until 1972. The relationship between U.S. military personnel and Okinawans was different from that between the Japanese people and Okinawans. The U.S. military personnel regarded and treated Okinawans as a fundamentally “Other” ethnic group, so that Okinawans’ identity for the
U.S. military personnel was not ambivalent, but foreign. The relationship between the U.S. military personnel and Okinawans parallels that between the U.S. military personnel and the Japanese people after World War II. Dower (1999) argues that the SCAP’s democratization activities involved American neocolonial attitudes and authoritarian rules. American planners and executives of the democratization programs regarded Japanese people as “the obedient herd … of Orientals” who were incapable of self-governance (Dower 1999, 218). The U.S. top-down democratization agenda in Japan “rested on the assumption that … Western culture and its value were superior to those of ‘the Orient’” (Dower 1999, 211). As I discuss in more detail in chapter 5, U.S. military personnel also represented Okinawans as docile people who are not capable of self-governance. Therefore, U.S. military policy did not reflect Okinawans’ demands. Meanwhile, American military problems in Okinawa, such as military accidents, soldiers’ crimes and land appropriation, resulted in anti-U.S. military governance sentiments in Okinawa.

In 1951, leftist political parties in Okinawa, shadai tou (Social Mass Party) and jinmin tou (People’s Party), organized a bipartisan alliance for reversion (fukki kiseikai) (Kyan 1964). The alliance conducted an island-wide signature-collecting campaign for Okinawa reversion to Japan and collected signatures from about 80% of the whole Okinawan electorate (Kyan 1964). The two parties continued to be influential leftist parties during the U.S. military occupation, but the bipartisan alliance in the early 1950s ended due to internal political conflicts (Kyan 1964).

During the 1950s, different organizations such as the Okinawa Teachers’ Association and Land Owners’ Association (tochiren) acted on their own agendas to petition the U.S. military, the U.S. government and the Japanese government for reversion (Kyan 1964). For example, the Okinawa Teachers’ Association started organized actions for reversion such as regular conventions and petitions to the Japanese government in 1952 (Kyan 1964). In 1953, the U.S. military began forceful land appropriation (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). Moreover, in 1954, U.S. President Eisenhower announced occupation of Okinawa for an unlimited duration (Kyan 1964). Accordingly, the U.S. military in Okinawa proposed military use of appropriated land for an unlimited duration in exchange for a
lump-sum payment to land owners. In 1956, in response to the land problem, Okinawans started *shimagurumi* (island-wide) *tousou* (struggle or strife) (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). About 300,000 Okinawans participated in conventions that took place at all Okinawa municipalities in June 1956 (Okinawa Prefecture 1996).

In 1960, a council for reversion (*sokoku fukki kyougikai*) was established with participation of 54 organizations such as the Teachers’ Association, labour unions, and leftist political parties in Okinawa (Kyan 1964). They called Japan their *sokoku* (homeland) and emphasized Okinawa’s belonging to Japan. In the late 1960s, Okinawans’ demand for reversion with supports from leftists in Japan proper was echoed within an agenda advanced by Prime Minister Sato to achieve his personal political ambitions (Sawachi 2012). It is still uncertain why Sato proposed the reversion as a priority, but he was in haste to realize the reversion during his term as Prime Minister.

Reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa from the U.S. to Japan was achieved in 1972, but several survey results show that the reversion did not satisfy Okinawans. According to a survey conducted in 1982, about 57% of Okinawans had positive attitudes towards the reversion (Oota 1984). Oota (1984) argues that this number is significantly low given that 88.4% of Okinawans wished for reversion to Japan in another survey conducted in 1966. In 1982, only about 30% agreed that the Japanese policy towards Okinawa reflected Okinawans’ sentiments (Oota 1984). In the same survey, over 80% answered that the U.S. military facilities in Okinawa should be removed or reduced (Oota 1984). Along with economic stagnation in Okinawa, U.S. military issues have impeded harmonious integration of Okinawans into the Japanese nation (Oota 1984).

Okinawans emphasized their sense of belonging to the Japanese nation state during their movements to promote reversion (Kyan 1964; Senaga 1971). They defined reversion movements as a struggle through which Japanese people including Okinawans would be able to protect Japanese land from the U.S. (Oguma 1998). Surveys conducted after the reversion revealed among Okinawans an intensified *iwakan*, or feeling that something was wrong with their belonging to Japan (Oota 1984). According to two surveys by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation in 1978 and 1982, about 70% of Okinawans thought that the
ways of thinking between Okinawans and mainland Japanese people were different (Oota 1984). Another survey by the Prime Minister’s Office in 1975 indicated that about two thirds of Okinawans felt that they were not integrated with the rest of Japanese people (Oota 1984). In contrast, results from two surveys conducted by Tokyo University and Okinawa Times showed that numbers of Okinawans who had aichaku, a sense of attachment, to Okinawa increased from 60% in 1966 to 81% in 1977. Recent surveys conducted by Chuan-Tiong Lim, a political scientist who specializes in identity issues in East Asia, between 2005 and 2007 also indicated Okinawans’ iwakan about their belonging to the Japanese nation (Lim 2009). About 30% to 40% of research participants answered that they were Okinawans; about 20% to 30% were Japanese; and about 30% to 40% were both Okinawans and Japanese (Lim 2009). These research results support Oota’s claim (1984) that Okinawans’ dissatisfaction arising from the U.S. military problems in Okinawa has created a chasm between Okinawans and other Japanese people since the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

Yamada (2012) argues that it is the collective opinion of Okinawans that the heavy military burden in Okinawa represents discrimination by the Japanese people against Okinawans. He argues, further, that Japanese citizens must share the U.S. military burden if a U.S. military presence is necessary in Japan. Throughout the post-reversion era, Okinawans continued to resist U.S. military presence in Okinawa. For example, in 1971, about 3,000 Okinawans whose lands had been appropriated by the U.S. military during the U.S. military occupation organized hansen jinushi kai (anti-war landowners’ association) and continued to resist U.S military presence in Okinawa (Arasaki 1995). In 1982, about 800 leftists in Okinawa and Japan proper established an anti-war landowners’ association, hito tsubo Hansen jinushi kai, (Arasaki 1995). Each member bought one tsubo (approximately 3.3 square meters) of land appropriated for U.S. military bases and joined anti-U.S. military movements in Okinawa as a land owner (Arasaki 1995).

Yamada (2012) argues that some Okinawans who support the LDP withstand the U.S. military burden on the basis that they have been compensated in part by Okinawa development projects implemented by the Japanese government. The Okinawa
development projects provide the Okinawa prefectural government with subsidies and local people with employment and business opportunities. Nevertheless, these projects did not eliminate Okinawans’ anti-U.S. military sentiments. In September, 1995, Okinawans’ frustration over the U.S. military burden in Okinawa was heightened after three U.S. servicemen abducted and assaulted a 12-year-old Okinawan girl (Okinawa Mondai Henshuu Iinkai 1995). In response to this incident, Okinawans organized a prefectural rally (kenmin taikai) and criticized both the U.S. military presence and inequality between Okinawa and Japan proper under the Security Treaty.

Since 1995, Okinawans’ prefectural rallies have taken place periodically following other incidents related to the U.S. military presence. For example, Okinawans’ kenmin taikai took place against a military aircraft crash in 2004, another assault incident in 2008, and deployment of a V-22 Osprey in 2012 (Kurosawa 2005; McCormack and Norimatsu 2012). In 2013, Prime Minister Abe proposed that the government would hold an annual ceremony for the Restoration of Sovereignty Day on April 28th. Okinawans regard the same date as Humiliation Day. They expressed discomfort with the Prime Minister’s proposal and held the prefectural rally so as to publicize their discomfort. The date marks the day in 1952 that the Treaty of Peace with Japan came into effect. The Treaty officially ended the post-war occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces while its Article 3 entitled the U.S. to administrative rights of Okinawa. Okinawans continue to feel this as humiliating (McCormak and Norimatsu 2012) because the treaty not only separated Okinawa from Japan without consideration of their will, but also imposed the subsequent military burden on Okinawa.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined the historical background of U.S. military problems and discussed identity politics in Okinawa. Okinawans have resisted the U.S. military presence in Okinawa since the period of U.S. military administration, but political and security interests of the U.S. and Japan have impeded a withdrawal of U.S. military bases from Okinawa. I argue that what underlies the U.S. military problems in Okinawa is the
Okinawans’ marginalized position in relation both to the U.S. and within the Japanese nation-state. In response to the two research questions, I will analyze a mechanism of administrative practices by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in greater depth in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In the next chapter, I will introduce theoretical approaches to governance and identity which are relevant to analyze governance and identity politics in Okinawa.
Chapter 3: Literature Review and Analytical Orientation

3.0 Introduction
In this chapter, I introduce several analytical approaches that are relevant to address the two research questions that are the focus of this thesis, that is, “what factors have made possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa?” and “what is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa?” The first research question is concerned with the processes and techniques through which the U.S. military and the Japanese government have governed Okinawa and made the U.S. military presence possible in Okinawa. The second research question is concerned with reasons why a heavier U.S. military burden has been imposed on Okinawans as compared to other Japanese citizens. The analytical approaches that I introduce in this chapter are related to a system of control and institutional practices that can be defined as governance (Guzzini 2012; Reus-Smit 1998) as well as identity politics. In this study, I examine a particular case of administrative, judicial and legislative practices in Okinawa by the U.S. military and the Japanese government, focusing on how the U.S. military bases have been maintained and concentrated in Okinawa with reference to analytical foundations provided in this chapter.

Reference to analytical approaches to international governance introduced in the first section is intended to offer a relevant foundation on which I analyze the case of U.S. military presence and concentration in Okinawa and situate it in a larger context of governance. In the second section, I introduce analytical approaches developed by Foucault and Agamben in depth. As I discussed in the first chapter, the two approaches can be linked in order to examine dynamics and diversity of modern governance. In the third section, I discuss identity politics and tactics of governance that enable hegemonic control over those who are represented and treated as the “Other.”

3.1 Governance, Sovereignty and Inequality
Modern institutions of governance were established in the 18th century within European nation-states, replacing “the absolutist system of sovereign states” (Reus-Smit 1998). These institutions include structures of accumulation that assure economic development and
wealth of a nation, organization of coercion through which a state assures national security, and frameworks of ideas that “constitute[s] institutional design and action (Reus-Smit 1998, 10). Reus-Smit (1998, 3) argues that questions of governance are concerned with how “human beings organize their social relations to enhance individual and collective security and physical well-being and to enable the pursuit of common goals and the management of common problems.” In the principle of popular sovereignty, each modern nation-state acts in accordance with the will of its citizens and facilitates security and wealth of its nation through a centralized system of administrative, legal and legislative institutions. Sassen (2006, 6) argues that in the state centric view, “the national sovereign gains exclusive authority over a given territory.” Moreover, in the principle of “the formal equality of states” (Broude and Shany 2008), each modern state is supposed to be independently responsible for its domestic governance, but in practice, governance of one state is influenced by various factors that include political and economic interests of each state in the international context.

Anghie (2005) argues that Spanish colonialism gave rise to what he calls the sovereignty doctrine. He defines a sovereign doctrine as “the complex of rules deciding what entities are sovereign, and the powers and limits of sovereignty” (Anghie 2005, 16). For Spain, religious authority of Christianity was a foundation of governance and sovereignty (Anghie 2005). While the colonized “heathen Indians” were excluded from the realm of Spanish sovereignty, war was waged against “Indians” in the name of sovereign’s rights in order to occupy the territory and to dominate “Indians” (Anghie 2005). The colonial era continued, as influence of colonial states such as England, France and Holland spread to non-European regions. In the 19th century, sovereignty of the colonized people was still suspended, and colonized populations were exposed to colonial violence. Anghie (2005) argues that positivism, in conjunction with rational legal principles, helped colonial states to legitimize their colonial violence as civilizing missions and also created a foundation of international law.

The late nineteenth century was … the period in which positivism decisively replaced naturalism as the principal jurisprudential technique of
the discipline of international law. The sovereign is the foundation of positivist jurisprudence, and nineteenth-century jurists sought to reconstruct the entire system of international law as a creation of sovereign will. Positivism was the new analytic apparatus used by the jurists of the time to account for the events which resulted in this dramatic development, the universalization of international law and the formulation of a body of principles which was understood to apply globally as a result of the annexation of ‘unoccupied’ territories… (Anghie 2005, 33)

After the First World War, the League of Nations was established. Anghie argues that this was the time when “the international institution emerged as a new actor in the international system, providing international law with a new range of ambitions and techniques for the management of international relations” (2005, 115). The aim of the Mandate System by the League of Nations was to govern formerly colonized peoples by colonial states which had been defeated in the First World War. Anghie (2005) discusses how the structure of international governance has been developed based on the Mandate System. In principle, the Mandate System promotes self-governance, independent sovereignty and equal participation in the international system (Anghie 2005). What underlay the Mandate System was the idea that the formerly colonized people were backward and incapable of self-governance (Anghie 2005). Anghie argues that international governance by the Mandate System promoted desirable behaviours of formerly colonized people “not through physical punishment but through persuasion” (2005, 186). Since the end of the Second World War, many formerly colonized countries in Asia, Africa and South America have been de-colonized. The United Nations (UN) has acted as an influential international institution that supervises governance of the de-colonized states. The trusteeship system of the UN is supposed to facilitate self-governance and sovereignty of the de-colonizing and de-colonized states, but the UN inherits colonial legacies such as “the persistence of the structure of the civilizing mission” (Anghie 2005, 199). Consequently, despite the formal independence of formally colonized states, these states are still subjected to political and economic interventions by international organizations and other states (Anghie 2005).

The studies of international governance which I introduced above point to
inequalities among sovereign states in the field of international politics. Recent studies of globalization help understand how national sovereignty is compromised and inequality among sovereign states is produced within recent international political economy. Studies of globalization (Broude and Shany 2008; Cooley 2003; Guzzini 2012; Hardt and Negri 2000; Nickel 2002; Reus-Smit 1998; Sassen 2006) examine recent transitions within national and international governing bodies and the arrangements among them. For example, Hardt and Negri (2000) and Kollmeyer (2003) point out that economic globalization, such as trans-national capital flows and the establishment of global production networks, weakened state sovereignty and provided international organizations with greater authority. According to Broude and Shany (2008, 5), questions regarding the supremacy of international institutions over national sovereignty are “who decides what? and how to settle normative and jurisdictional conflicts, which the present unsatisfactory delineation of authority encourages.” Broude and Shany (2008, 5) suggest that “the resolution of such conflicts may well depend on the allocation of power between the competing parties to the political or legal interaction.”

Sassen (2006) looks at parallel structures between domestic and international institutions. She argues that institutions of global governance are developed based on those of nation-state governance. The interaction of domestic governance and international governance has contributed to inequality among citizens within a state as well as among sovereign states (Sassen 2006). At the domestic level, “legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal membership rights because these rights are often conditioned by the position of different groups within a nation-state” (Sassen 2006, 292). Power is unequally distributed among citizens and institutions in a nation-state. The advancement of globalization has resulted in “a significant shift of power to the executive, loss of lawmaking capacities and political participation” by the legislature in developed nations like the U.S. (Sassen 2006, 145). Aalberts (2012) explores the issue of inequality among sovereign states and dynamic process of global governance in relation to power and knowledge. Aalberts (2012, 239) suggests that it is necessary “to analyze sovereignty as a governmental project, as part of a manifold regime of power/knowledge that is constitutive
of the international order and its (various) subjects.” As I elaborate in the next section, Foucault argues that a modern government employs techniques of governance, which he defines as governmentality, in order to control its population. According to Aalberts (2012), global governance can be analyzed through Foucault’s analytical approach to governmentality.

The studies of global governance from colonialism to globalization demonstrate that sovereign authorities are unequally distributed among nation-states. Cooley and Spruyt (2009, 4) argue that “sovereignty consists of a bundle of rights and obligations that are dynamically exchanged and transferred between states.” They further (2009) point out that recent bilateral and international agreements avoid clear and longer-term contracts, leaving a space for future negotiation, reapportion and transfer of sovereignty. All cases “of sovereign transfer – including imperialism, supranationalism, decolonization, and agreements to locate military bases overseas – involve the reapportioning of sovereign, rights, functions, and territories from one actor to another” (Cooley and Spruyt 2009, 8). Cooley and Spruyt (2009, 4) propose that their analytical approach to temporary aspects of bilateral and international contracts, which they define as incomplete contracting theory, “can clarify how and why states choose to bundle and unbundle their sovereignty.”

The analyses of international relations and governance which I introduced in this section show how sovereign authorities have been constructed and negotiated within international politics. Sassen’s (2006) work demonstrates that national and international frameworks of governance are intertwined and share similar structures in which the rights of certain groups in a national context or sovereign authorities of certain states in an international context can often be compromised. Within a nation-state, some executives or institutions are given greater authority while those who have special identities – for example, identities related to race, ethnicity, religion and gender – may be excluded from legal entitlement (Sassen 2006). In international politics, some states hold greater authority than others.
3.2 Governmentality and the State of Exception
In this section, I introduce Foucault’s concept of governmentality and Agamben’s theory of state of exception to help explain a case in which the sovereignty of members of a particular nation is compromised by interests from outside that nation or territory. Foucault’s analysis of deployment of discourses through means that are fundamentally non-violent, is a relevant approach to examine efficient control over a population by a government. Meanwhile, Agamben’s analysis of state of exception in which the rights of certain individuals are suspended provides a useful framework through which to examine the exercise of a violent means in governance. Agamben’s analytical approach is also relevant to examine the U.S. primacy that allowed it to be exempted “from the general norms” (Guzzini 2012, 12) in its initial military occupation of Okinawa. I propose that the analytical approaches of Foucault and Agamben make it possible to examine differences in and dynamics of governance as they are expressed in the case of Okinawa.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977) examines transformations of techniques of control, from the pre-modern domination levying on sovereign violence to modern governance implemented through disciplinary institutions, a theme that he also carries into much of his other work. In the pre-modern era, sovereign power had “the right to decide life and death” (Foucault 1978, 135) or capacity to “take life and let live” (141), and presentation of sovereign violence functioned as a means of domination. Such sovereign violence as a technique of control was replaced by modern governance through formal and legal institutions.

Foucault’s attention in *Discipline and Punish* (1977) is directed to a role of disciplinary power or micro-physics of power, as well as a discourse through which modern institutions promote self-control of individuals. He argues that disciplinary power is exercised through production and deployment of discourses (1978; 1977). Discourses, or representational realities, construct order and hierarchy among things or people (Foucault 1977; 1970). Modern institutions such as prisons and clinics not only promote representational division between the normal “Self” and the abnormal “Other,” but also problematize and intervene in actions of the “Other” (1977; 1975). Referring to an
architectural model of the Panopticon, Foucault argues that prisoners who are exposed to constant possibility of surveillance internalize discipline and regulate and “normalize” their behaviours according to the discipline (1977). Institutional discipline not only within prisons but also in factories, schools, hospitals, or military regiments creates “docile bodies” that comply with norms of the industrialized society. In this sense, production and deployment of discourses by modern institutions do not signify exclusion so much as “subtle methods of normalization” (Oliwniak 2011, 53).

Foucault (1977) suggests that the influence of discipline and normalization does not remain within institutions, but extends to modern society at large. A network which consists of various institutions such as prisons, schools and hospitals contributes to the formation of a panoptic society wherein its members are observed and disciplined in accordance with discourses produced by scientific authorities. Foucault (1978) also argues that juridical institutions and laws take part in the discipline and normalization of citizens. He (1978, 144) argues that “the law operates more and more as a norm, and … the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory.”

Foucault examines biopower, that is, another form of power which influences the population (1978). Unlike sovereign power which is characterized by its capacity to take life, biopower promotes life (Ojakangas 2010). Foucault argues that “disciplines of the body and the regulation of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed” (1978, 139). On the one hand, disciplinary power “sought to turn individuals into docile bodies that worked in favor of the new conditions of an industrialized society” (Erlenbusch 2013, 45). On the other hand, biopower “is concerned with the population on the level of aleatory yet predictable events that can be observed by statistics and managed by security mechanisms” (Erlenbusch 2013). The introduction of calculated governance – for example, the use of statistics – along with the discipline of individuals through institutional practices enabled modern governments to control individual life while regulating total populations at the same time.

The concept of “governmentality” extends Foucault’s “previous analyses under the
rubric of bio-politics and biopower” (Ojakangas 2010, 7) and links Foucault’s disciplinary power “to forms of political rule and economic exploitation” (Lemke 2000, 4). Governmentality, which Foucault calls the art of government is a wide range of governing techniques to control each individual and the population (1991a). With regard to governmentality, Foucault (1991a) attributes to laws additional meaning. That is, laws are tactics employed by government to achieve multiple aims. He contends that:

With government it is a question not of imposing law on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved (1991a, 95).

Agamben’s understanding of sovereignty, power and laws is different from Foucault's. Referring to Carl Schmitt’s concept of “state of exception,” Agamben (2005) examines historical and current examples of governance in which power is monopolized by certain political executives. In times of emergency, such as internal and external wars, political executives claim a state of exception, increase their spheres of authority, and suspend political rights of citizens (2005). Referring to some examples, such as American responses to the 9/11 incidents, Agamben argues that “the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency … has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states” (Agamben 2005, 2). He states that those political executives who claim exception hold sovereign power. In other words, unlike Foucault, Agamben does not assume that the sovereign as an absolute figure disappeared in the modern era, but finds that sovereign rule has been represented in recent political developments in which political executives can decide on exception. Agamben’s analysis of sovereignty exercised by executives is somewhat akin to Sassen's (2006) observation concerning the extension of executive power. Agamben argues that “the state of exception appears as a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism” (Agamben 2005, 3). For Agamben, “the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order” (1995, 15). The sovereign is able to transcend the boundary of legality and illegality where necessary, and therefore avoid sanction or constitute new rules. In this sense, Agamben’s (2005)
understanding of sovereignty can be a relevant approach to examine recent governing practices in which the population is controlled by executive decisions rather than institutional discipline.

In the state of exception, certain individuals are deprived of their legal rights, and indeterminate periods of detention and degrees of sanction are decided by the sovereign authority (1995). Agamben (1995) argues that archaic Roman law initially created those individuals whose political rights are suspended. Those who committed certain crimes were deprived of their political rights and defined as homo sacer (sacred life) in Roman law (Agamben 1995). Homo sacer, or what Agamben calls bare life, is “included in the juridical order … solely in the form of its exclusion” (1995, 8). Bare life is “subjected to sovereign violence” (Erlenbusch 2013, 45) and “a sort of un-dead life that has no other form of content than being exposed to death” (Ojakangas 2010, 104). Agamben argues that “inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original - if concealed - nucleus of sovereign power” (1995, 6). In recent politics, the relationship between sovereign power and bare life is “hidden in normal times and brought to light in exceptional circumstances” (Erlenbusch 2013, 48).

Agamben (2005) argues that the field of Western law contains two tendencies; on the one hand, a normative tendency in the strict sense, which aims at crystallizing itself in a rigid system of norms whose connection to life is, however, problematic if not impossible (the perfect state of law, in which everything is regulated by norms); and, on the other hand, an anomic tendency that leads to the state of exception or the idea of the sovereign as living law, in which a force-of-law that is without norm acts as the pure inclusion of life (2005, 73).

While Agamben acknowledges normative elements of law, he suggests that current juridical systems contain possibilities for political executives to claim a state of exception and suspend normal enforcement of law. He (2005, 7) argues that an essential characteristic of the state of exception is a lasting practice of “the provisional abolition of the distinction among legislative, executive, and judicial powers.” Moreover, “the gradual erosion of the legislative powers of parliament” has been a common practice since the First World War (Agamben 2005, 7). In such practice, normative regulation is not plausible, so that he
rejects an idea that norms are applied in law making and application. He continues “[w]hat the ‘ark’ of power contains at its center is the state of exception – but this is essentially an empty space, in which a human action with no relation to law stands before a norm with no relation to life” (Agamben 2005, 86).

As I discussed above, Foucault and Agamben provide different insights into techniques of governance with regard to power, subject and law. While Foucault argues that sovereign power was replaced by disciplinary power and biopower in modern societies, Agamben argues that sovereign power is still exercised in recent political contexts. In conjunction with disciplinary power and biopower, Foucault analyzed how modern subjects and the population as a whole are regulated through institutional practices. In contrast, Agamben argues that sovereign violence can be exercised towards certain individuals, or bare life, without juridical protection. Moreover, Foucault and Agamben address laws in different manners. For Foucault, laws are norms or tactics through which a government achieves its aims. Agamben acknowledges normative roles that laws play, but also contends that sovereign power surpasses influence of laws in the time of emergency.

I argue that differences between the analytical approaches proposed by Foucault and Agamben do not necessarily contradict one another in their application to the analysis of modern forms of governance. Given the dynamic and discursive nature of modern politics and society, one cannot expect a single paradigmatic element or abstract concept to be applicable to all empirical cases of governance. Any concept or theory is limited to explaining only part of diversified realities that reflect geographical and temporal differences. Alternately, multiple concepts and theories can be employed to analyze one case of governance that contains various aspects as a result of contradictory practices and dynamic transitions in political and social structures. In the following analysis of Okinawa, I analyze the time period from 1945 to the present. During this period, Okinawa has not been a static society, but has experienced radical transition. For analyzing the political and social transition, I refer to analytical approaches developed by Foucault and Agamben in ways that together constitute main elements in an analytical framework in this study.

I regard Agamben’s model as referring to a threshold in the capacity of nation-
states to make rules and Foucault’s model as one that focuses on a process in which rules are normalized and accepted by the populations. A modern society does not contain a paradigmatic essence, but is defined by various elements in contrast to the greater cohesion often attributed to a traditional society. Since the collapse of traditional regimes, what is broadly defined as modern society has been characterized by not only diversity but accelerated transitions. Concepts of post-modern or late-modern society, for example, seek to grasp such transitions. Scholars such as Spohn (2003) emphasize the need to acknowledge pragmatic differences among many cases of modernity (Spohn 2003). This thesis seeks to understand the particular features of governance of Okinawa within the broader dynamics in which relations among and within nation-states have been changing since the mid-twentieth century.

The analytical approaches developed by Foucault and Agamben make it possible to understand how Okinawa has been governed as a unique case within contemporary Japan. Agamben’s theory of state of exception is relevant to analyze how rules are made by those who monopolize sovereignty. In the case of U.S. military governance in Okinawa, U.S. military personnel could decide on rules with which Okinawans should comply. Foucault’s insight into the production and deployment of discourses is relevant to analyze how normative control becomes possible through institutional practices. I argue that rules themselves do not necessarily contain normative essence, but through institutional practices, political executives discipline citizens to accept certain rules. In this study, with reference to Foucault, I examine how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have tried to make Okinawans accept imposition of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I do not argue that Okinawans have accepted the U.S. military presence as a rule that they have to obey. Instead, I look at ongoing institutional practices through which the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to sustain the presence of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa regardless of whether or not they are acceptable to Okinawans. In addition to Foucault’s analysis of institutional practices, reference to the concept of hegemony and tactics of governance, which I present in the next section, are relevant for better understanding of mechanisms of governance through which the U.S. military and the
Japanese government have controlled Okinawans and maintained U.S. military bases in Okinawa.

3.3 Hegemony and Representation of the “Other”
Hegemony is a relevant concept to understand enduring mechanisms of inequality between two groups. What Gramsci (1971) calls cultural hegemony refers to manipulation of values through which one group is able to sustain its stable and durable domination over the other group. Harvey (2003), in regard to hegemony of the U.S. in post-World War II international politics, argues that it is not only by military superiority, but also its relative success in receiving consent from and satisfying the general interest of other powerful states that the U.S. has been able to maintain a dominant position in international politics. Ongoing resistance by Okinawans to the U.S. military presence in their territories under the governance of both the U.S. military and Japanese state illustrates that dominant positions held by the U.S. military and the Japanese government over Okinawans are not fully accepted by Okinawans (Hook and Siddle 2002). I argue that although practices of hegemonic domination can contain stability and durability, it does not mean that they are never unchallenged. One group has to deal with challenges and resistance through multiple techniques in order to maintain its hegemonic influence over the other group. The U.S. military and the Japanese government also employed multiple means to deal with Okinawans’ resistance to existing forms of governance. While the U.S. military occasionally exercised military force to control Okinawans, the U.S. military and the Japanese government at large have relied on non-coercive institutional techniques of governance to sustain authority over Okinawans. Whether or not the U.S. military and the Japanese government have been aware of a recipe for hegemonic domination and successfully applied it in their governances of Okinawa, reference to the concept of hegemony makes it possible to understand more fully how mechanisms of U.S. military and Japanese governance have contributed to the long-term U.S. military presence in Okinawa. In this section, I introduce studies of hegemony and identity politics as well as techniques of governance that serve as relevant reference point in the analysis of means of governance.
by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in Okinawa.

In recent years, in many parts of the world, the U.S. has been a powerful actor in international politics. Harvey (2003) and Chomsky (2003) referred to the concept of hegemony to explain the long-term U.S. primacy in the post-World War II international politics. By contrast, Silver and Arrighi (2011) point out that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 indicates the decline of the U.S. hegemony. Recent signs of decline in the U.S. primacy indicate that hegemony is not a static form of domination, but can lose its influence. Reus-Smit (1998) argues that globalization has spread Western cultural values to non-European regions, but some of the former colonized states have rejected Western cultural hegemony. Effective hegemonic governance needs to include “a vision of order which is to some extent consensual, or at least rational insofar as countries do not see any better alternative … and therefore share an interest in its continuation” (Reus-Smit 1998, 12).

Edward Said (1978) applied Foucauldian discourse analysis to examine how colonized people were represented as the Oriental “Other” in relation to the Western “Self,” but representation by a powerful group does not guarantee its cultural hegemony over the “Other.” Said argues that, “[i]t is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism the durability and the strength” (1978, 8). According to Gramsci (1971) and Said (1978), intellectuals play a great role to disseminate certain knowledge and make it widely accepted and believed. In the colonial period, European superiority over the “Oriental Other” was not merely representational reality, but became established as consent or cultural norms which made colonization a durable project (Said 1978). The application of scientific knowledge and logics by specialists, embedded in forms such as Social Darwinism in the colonial era and Neo-Malthusian theories in the context of international development, helped a dominant group legitimate its intervention into the activities of another group.

Harvey argues that the U.S. has acquired its hegemonic power “through an ever-shifting balance between coercion and consensus” (2003, 38). Unlike colonial regimes, coercion as a means of control toward the “Other” does not easily create wide and durable
consent both in a homeland and a targeted community in recent years. Therefore, I argue that dominant groups employ multiple tactics of control to sustain their domination over another group or other groups. For example, as Vine (2009) examines in the case of U.S. military bases in Diego Garcia, the U.S. military concealed that fact that it expelled inhabitants from the island and appropriated the island for its military base construction. In this study, I define such practices of domination that conceal unfavourable information for a dominant group as a tactic of “concealment.” While a mighty group attempts to justify its domination over the “Other” by a tactic of “rationalization,” it conceals unfavourable practices or information for which it cannot easily provide a rationale.

In this study, I also pay attention to “provisionality” of institutional practices. Cooley and Spruyt (2009) argue that unequal bilateral relationships between two sovereign states is sustained and negotiated in a flexible or shifting manner by incomplete contracts. They argue that recent bilateral treaties avoid or defer specific terms so that the states “can adapt to changing circumstances” (2009, 5). Furthermore, deferral of specific terms makes “the distribution and allocation of sovereign rights a matter of on-going negotiation” (Cooley and Spruyt 2009, 5). In other words, dominant states obscure and cover their exercise of power over other states with provisional terms in bilateral treaties. I look at provisional aspects of U.S. military and Japanese governances to analyze Okinawa sovereignty which has been contested since its suspension in 1945 among the U.S. military, the Japanese government and Okinawans.

I do not argue that U.S. military and Japanese forms of governance in Okinawa contain necessary components that can be defined as hegemony or are as durable and stable as other examples of hegemony. The purpose of this section is to examine institutional practices that provide one regime with a capacity to create and sustain dominance or control over marginalized populations. Examination of preceding cases of hegemony is helpful to derive hints for analysis of U.S. military and Japanese governances. I suggest that a tactic of “rationalization” supported and disseminated by experts help a dominant group extend its cultural influence over marginalized populations as means of domination. Given that hegemony is not a static and permanent form of domination, a hegemonic group needs to
adopt several institutional techniques in order to maintain its primacy. I suggest that “concealment” and “provisionality” are tactics of governance that help a dominant group avoid immediate critiques and prolong its authority. I will look into U.S. military and Japanese governances of Okinawa and see if these tactics help them sustain their influence and control over Okinawans.

3.4 Conclusion
Studies of international and global governance which I presented in this chapter allow me to situate the case of the U.S. military and Japanese government in a broader issue of governance. I employ Foucault’s (1991a) concept of governmentality and Agamben’s (2005) theory of state of exception in this study as principal analytical approaches in order to examine how the U.S. military bases have been maintained and why they are concentrated in Okinawa. The theory of state of exception is relevant to examine how the U.S. military could construct and maintain its bases in Okinawa by monopoly of sovereignty. Foucault’s analytical approach to modern institutions is relevant to examine how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have tried to normalize U.S. military exception in Okinawa by deployment of power/knowledge through their institutional practices. In the analysis that follows, I refer to Foucault’s insight into the production and deployment of discourses in terms of a tactic of “rationalization” that makes it possible to examine how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to justify their practices of governance in Okinawa. In addition to the tactic of “rationalization,” I also refer to tactics of “concealment” and “provisionality” to examine complementary forms of institutional practice that have sustained the U.S. military presence in Okinawa.

Foucault’s study also has contributed to methodological development in analysis of modern institutional governance. I employ Foucault’s discourse analysis in this study as a main methodological approach. In the next chapter, I introduce how I analyze archival data as well as how I collected those archival data collected at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives.
Chapter 4: Methodology

4.0 Introduction
In this chapter, I outline how I collected and organized archival data which are referred to in chapters 5 and 6. I also introduce the analytical approaches and research methods which I employ in this study. My points of departure were the research questions that I developed while I stayed in Okinawa; I explored existing literature in order to understand what factors have made possible, and what are the major implications of, the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. My experiences in Okinawa sensitized me, in particular, to recognizing with respect to the second research question that the U.S. military presence has been imposed on Okinawans as people who are represented and treated as an “Other” group by both the U.S. military and the Japanese government. Therefore, I introduce analytical approaches that are concerned with identity construction. Research methods for this study were influenced by Foucault’s approaches to investigate archaeology of knowledge and genealogy of power. I also discuss how I incorporated Agamben’s analytical insights in the research methods.

4.1 Archival Research
Kawulich (2004, 96) argues that data analysis in qualitative research “involves immersing oneself in the data to become familiar with it, then looking for patterns and themes, searching for various relationships between data that help the researchers to understand what they have.” This section describes my archival data sources and the themes that emerged during the course of my archival research. In the first research phase, I began to search for archival documents that corresponded to broad themes such as U.S. military bases and governance in Okinawa. In reading these archival documents, I learned that the U.S. military presence in Okinawa was resisted by Okinawans and contested within U.S. internal, bilateral and international politics. Therefore, I searched for archival sources that are relevant to investigate Okinawans’ resistance and politics surrounding the U.S. military governance in Okinawa. I organized these archival data into the ten categories in order to investigate patterns of thought that were shared within each concerned group and related them to practices of U.S. military governance and presence in Okinawa. Then in the
following section, I will present methodological approaches which I employed to analyze these patterns of thought with regard to the two research questions of this study.

I conducted the first phase of archival research between mid September and mid November in 2007, and the second phase between mid March and mid May in 2008 at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives (OPA) in Japan. During my time in the archives, I focused my efforts on retrieving documentary records that illustrate characteristics of U.S. military governance in Okinawa between 1945 and 1972. I collected most archival data during this total period of four months; however, between March 2010 and November 2012, I occasionally visited the OPA when complementary information was necessary. I used a search engine at the OPA and conducted a keyword search to find archival documents, but descriptions in the OPA database did not provide sufficient information to know the detailed contents of the documents. Therefore, I needed to request files that seemed relevant, based on my focus in gathering data about U.S. military governance in Okinawa in order to find out whether they contained relevant information or not. During the original four months of data collection, I requested and copied as many relevant documents as possible at the OPA. In this section, I outline how I searched, collected and organized archival data.

The archival collection of the Okinawa Prefectural Archives (OPA) is divided into four categories: Okinawa Government’s official documents, Ryukyu Government’s official documents, U.S. Government’s documents, and Okinawa regional materials. In addition to these primary sources, secondary sources related to Okinawa’s history and region are also available in a reading room. Archival and secondary sources in the OPA are published either in Japanese or English. All archival sources which I used as references in this study were English documents, but I referred to and cited some secondary sources originally written in Japanese. I interpreted and translated these Japanese documents for this study and indicated at reference sections Japanese titles of the referred and cited sources along with translated English titles.

At the OPA, archival data are entered in a database, and a file and document search can be conducted at local computers or on the OPA website. Most English documents
related to American governance of Okinawa are selected and copied from an archival collection at the United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) by OPA archivists, and the USCAR documents alone at the OPA count 3.5 million pages. It was not possible to read through the entire archival collection at the OPA, so I consulted with archivists at the OPA about my research at the beginning of my data collection in 2007. One archivist suggested I look into the United States Civil Administration of Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) files. Another archivist at the reading room showed me how to search archival files by keywords and narrow down a search result by selecting a category in the flow sheet on the OPA database.

I narrowed down my search by “U.S. Data Collection” in the flow sheet and began a keyword search. I entered keywords related to U.S. military bases such as military, base and land. A brief description is attached to each archival file such as a file title, a compiler, a time period, and a number of pages on the database, and a keyword search corresponds to the brief description. In the first week, I requested as many files as possible that were found through the first keyword search and read as many documents as possible. The number of documents contained in each file varies from a couple of pages to a few thousand pages. I spent the first two days scanning through a microfiche that contained about 1200 pages of USCAR documents in several files. The microfiche contained documents not only about land and U.S military bases, but also various issues in Okinawa such as the status of Okinawans, communists, economy, crime, immigration, prohibition of parades, and farming experiments. I copied 344 pages out of the microfiche related to USCAR policies and administrations in Okinawa. From these documents, I learned that the U.S. military established the USCAR in order to maintain U.S. military bases in Okinawa. I also learned that the USCAR established the Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI) and issued directives to control the Okinawa islands.

During the second week, I searched documents related to land appropriation for U.S. military bases and also began to search documents related to U.S. security interests in Okinawa since the Pacific War. U.S. top secret records that contain documents about the General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were useful sources to learn U.S. military interests in Okinawa and negotiations between the U.S. State Department and the U.S. military. During the third week, I continued to search, read and copy archival documents related to land, U.S. military bases, and U.S. military interests in Okinawa. Beginning in mid October, I began to search files compiled by the GRI, communist activities, and private collections by Okinawans. These documents helped me learn about Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military as well as petitions to the U.S. government and the Japanese government. In late October, I began to search archival documents related to reversion of U.S. administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. Due to time constraints, I did not have enough time during this first data collection phase to read through many of reversion documents, and as a result these were examined during the second data collection phase.

In the second data collection phase, I continued to search and read archival documents related to U.S. military governance in Okinawa. I paid attention to how the U.S. military had prolonged its governance in Okinawa despite juridical problems its governance had contained. My search was directed especially to documents that included key words or terms like directives, legislation, sovereignty and laws.

Meanwhile, I searched archival documents related to reversion negotiations between the U.S. government and the Japanese government, the U.S. military government between 1945 and 1950, and local newspapers issued during the U.S. military governance in Okinawa. I searched reversion negotiation documents by keyword “reversion” and requested files that were compiled by the U.S. State Department. Archival documents about Okinawa reversion negotiations have been gradually declassified at the NARA. Before I conducted the archival research, I was not sure if I could access the newly declassified archival documents at OPA. I found about 20 copied files in the OPA collection that contained documents that referred to or contained details about the reversion negotiations. I could acquire a fair amount of archival sources which were recently declassified. These archival sources provide relevant information to illustrate important dimensions in the process of transition from U.S. military governance to Japanese governance in Okinawa. Therefore, I decided to write an independent chapter on reversion negotiation issues.
Through the reversion negotiation documents, I learned that the U.S. State Department had regarded the U.S. military governance and Okinawans’ resistance in Okinawa as undesirable political factors in international politics and bilateral relations with Japan and sought for ways in which it could maintain its military presence without direct administrative responsibility in Okinawa.

The OPA has about 300 files related to the U.S. military government between 1945 and 1950. I requested about 50 files and copied 9 files that were related to U.S. military bases and directives. In the OPA collection, I found two kinds of local newspapers – *Uruma Shinpou* (1945 - 1951) and its renamed issue *Ryukyu Shinpou* (1951 onwards) – issued during the U.S. military governance. *Uruma Shinpou* initially was issued as a bulletin by the U.S. military and supervised by U.S. military personnel (Arasaki 1999; Yoshioka 2012). Therefore, *Uruma Shinpou* did not carry articles which explicitly criticized the U.S. military governance in Okinawa. In 1947, the *Uruma Shinpou* Office became an independent publishing company, and in 1951, *Uruma Shinpou* was renamed to *Ryukyu Shinpou* in conjunction with the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between the U.S. and Japan. In the mid 1950s, as Okinawans’ land struggle against the U.S. military took place, *Ryukyu Shinpou* began to take a stance that was critical of the U.S. military governance in Okinawa (Yoshioka 2012). At the OPA, I had access to *Uruma Shinpou* published in three volumes and *Ryukyu Shinpou* in microfiche. I scanned through and copied newspaper articles dating from 1945 up to 1972 that were related to U.S. military accidents and crimes in Okinawa. Current issues of *Ryukyu Shinpou* and another local newspaper, *Okinawa Times*, dating from 1972 up to the present are also available at the OPA. The two local newspapers are critical of U.S. military problems and often carry articles that report or discuss U.S. military accidents, soldiers’ crimes and Okinawans’ protests against U.S. military presence in Okinawa (Yoshioka 2012). I scanned through *Ryukyu Shinpou* and *Okinawa Times* and copied relevant articles related to U.S. military issues in Okinawa.

In the process of data collection, I copied in total 11,510 pages of archival documents from 240 files and took notes based on the archival documents as well as selected local newspaper articles. I took digital copies of the collected data and converted
them into a PDF format. I underlined and left comments on the PDF documents. I organized the archival files into ten categories: U.S. State Department, U.S. Military Government in Okinawa, USCAR, U.S. Army Department, Ryukyu Government, Ryukyu Civil Society, Communist activity, Reversion Negotiation, Okinawa Prefectural, and Private Collection. Notes from archival sources are organized under the same categories in the spreadsheet.

The first four categories – U.S. State Department, U.S. military government in Okinawa, USCAR, and the U.S. Army Department – are relevant to my investigation of U.S. internal, bilateral and international negotiations and interests regarding the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The next three categories – Ryukyu Government, Ryukyu Civil Society, and Communist Activity – contain useful references that make possible the analysis of Okinawans’ counter discourses and movements against the U.S. military in Okinawa. The documents under these six categories are referred to mainly in chapter 4. Most of those in the category of Reversion Negotiations are recently disclosed documents regarding Japan-U.S. bilateral negotiations of Okinawa reversion that are the focus of analysis in chapter 5. Of the files in the Okinawa Prefectural category, all but two documents are directly referred to in this thesis. The last category, Private Collection, contains various documents such as newspaper scraps and testimonies of American and Japanese officials that are not relevant for the analysis in the thesis.

4.2 Methods and Analysis
I employed Foucauldian discourse analysis, or constructivist approaches in a broader sense (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002) to analyze the archival and secondary data. In this section, I introduce Foucault’s methodological approaches that allowed a focused analysis of discourses in archival and secondary sources. In order to investigate historical processes related to how and reasons why the U.S. military bases have been concentrated in Okinawa, I paid attention to discourses that represent American and Japanese geopolitical interests in Okinawa. Discourses that show American and Japanese security interests in Okinawa as a keystone of the Pacific are apparent in U.S. archival documents as well as Japanese official
reports and books. Moreover, with reference to Foucault’s insight and postcolonial studies that analyze representational between the “Self” and the “Other,” I examined statements by American and Japanese authorities to identify discourses that attempt to legitimize the security interests by creating divisions between the American and Japanese “Selves” who rhetorically promise good governance in Okinawa and the Okinawan “Other” whose incapability to engage in effective self governance is emphasized. In this section, I introduce how I analyzed the American and Japanese discourses through my archival research in Okinawa. Additionally, I outline how I elaborated the Foucauldian discourse analysis in order to measure relative failure and success in American and Japanese govenrances in Okinawa.

Kawulich (2004, 96) argues that “there is no prescribed way” for analyzing data in qualitative research. Instead, qualitative researchers analyze data in accordance with “the research questions being asked …[and]… the theoretical foundation of the study” (Kawulich 2004, 96). In this study, in response to the two research questions, I refer to concepts and theories developed by Foucault and Agamben to investigate techniques of governance and identity politics that contributed to prolonged and concentrated U.S. military base presence in Okinawa. The methodological framework which I employ in this study to analyze the data from archival and secondary sources also reflects insights of Foucault and Agamben. The framework is founded on two methods of discourse analysis which Foucault developed in his archival work, that is, archaeology of knowledge and genealogy of power and elaborated with reference to Agemben’s theory of state of exception.

Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) argue that “[i]n almost all discourse analytical approaches, Foucault has become a figure to quote, relate to, comment on modify and criticize.” Criticisms of Foucault’s discourse analysis are directed to his limited attention to material reality in contrast to his heavy emphasis on discourse (Young 2001) or his one-sided attention to repressive aspects of modern rationality (Best and Kellner 2002). Nevertheless, Foucault’s insights in discourse can provide researchers with “tactics, strategies and approaches” for their investigations (Nicholls 2008). Foucault (1972)
developed and applied archaeology of knowledge in his earlier works in order to grasp a system of knowledge and rules that governs discourse in a given time. In particular, Foucault was interested in the discourses ‘that seek to rationalize or systematize themselves in relation to particular ways of ‘saying the true’” (Dean 1994 in Ritzer 2000). Jorgensen and Phillips (2002, 13) point out that most “contemporary discourse analytical approaches follow Foucault’s conception of discourses as relatively rule-bound sets of statements … and build on his ideas about truth being something which is … created discursively.”

In his archaeological method, Foucault tended to “identify only one knowledge regime in each historical period” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 13). In other words, in his earlier works prior to Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault did not take into account a “conflictual picture in which different discourses exist side by side or struggle for the right to define truth” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 13). In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) adopts genealogy of power and explores relations between knowledge and power that are mediated and expressed in a form of discourse. He argues that power is unequally distributed among individuals, but not possessed by them (Foucault 1977). Power is exercised and contested among individuals within power relations (Foucault 1977). In one geographical space and historical moment, as a result of power relations and struggle, certain knowledge becomes accepted as the truth. Discourse analysis then allows a researcher to trace relatively stable rules that underlie discourse as well as power relations and struggles that define what is true in the given space and period.

In my analysis, I employ thematic discourse analysis to demonstrate the nature and forms of discourse employed by American military or government and Japanese government authorities. The discourses that are the focus of my analysis are those produced by American and Japanese government authorities, represented in official documents and statements presented by authorities in the course of administering or making decisions about Okinawa during the time frame covered by my study. These can be considered representative of official discourses because multiple documents illustrate similar patterns of thought employed by U.S. military personnel and Japanese officials in their governing practices in Okinawa since 1945. In order to grasp these patterns, I organized words and
phrases which are repeatedly used in archival documents under several codes which are concerned with themes of governance in response to the two research questions.

As a first step to thematic discourse analysis, I familiarized myself with archival data during and after my archival research in 2007 and 2008. The archival files which I collected were organized into ten categories. I scanned through archival documents in all ten categories and sought for words and phrases which deemed relevant to respond to the two research questions of this study. Each file contained fragmented information, so that I did not target all documents exhaustively, but selected and took notes of paragraphs and sections in each file that were relevant to investigate the research questions.

In response to the first research question - what factors have made possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa? - I paid attention to words and phrases that illustrate intention and reason of U.S. military governance in Okinawa. I noticed that some words and phrases were repeatedly used by the U.S. military personnel. These words and phrases include liberty, peace, freedom, well-being, justice and civilizing mission which are related to U.S. military rhetoric of good governance in Okinawa. Words and phrases which are related to U.S. military interests in and concern about security matters in Asia, such as defense, communists, communist China, threat and security demand, were also recognizable. I coded the former as “democracy” and the latter as “security” and took detailed notes from 63 archival files which illustrated the two codes. In response to the second research question - what is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa? - I noticed that the U.S. military personnel often differentiated Okinawans from themselves. I coded the words and phrases which illustrate U.S. military representation of Okinawans, such as Orientals, Oriental mind and Asian, as “identity.” 36 archival files which I collected contained relevant words and phrases, so that I took detailed notes from these files. The three codes were analyzed in relation to governing practices by the U.S. military as well as events that took place in Okinawa. I also examined secondary sources whether similar discourses are employed and deployed in the case of Japanese governance in Okinawa.

Discourse analysis has been applied in many fields of social research, such as
psychology (Tarabochia 2013), medicine (Rose 2006), criminology (Tator and Henry 2006), education (Popkewitz and Brennan ed 1998) and interdisciplinary studies (Blain 2012). Said (1978) examined how representation of the Oriental “Other” has been disseminated by professionals as true knowledge and employed to legitimate political intervention of one group to another. Escobar (1995) also applied Foucauldian discourse analysis to examine representational division between industrialized nations and former colonized nations that legitimized practices of international development. While many examinations and critiques of such representation and practices have been made, it is not clearly discussed how representation and practices lose their legitimacy and at the same time one regime declines. Foucault (1972) suggests discontinuity of discourse in archaeology of knowledge and refines the idea of discontinuity in terms of contingency that has a great impact on power relations and knowledge formation. Alternately, the contingency causes a shift in a historical course and condition of a society. Moreover, a project of control by one militarily strong group can fail if it does not meet with a contingent condition in a particular moment and location. In the failed project, the discourse loses its legitimacy as the true or does not produce consensus about the true. Therefore, I propose that there is disparity or contradiction that can be observed between a discourse and outcomes in one failed project of control.

As Agamben (2005) argues, exception is demonstrated in many recent political circumstances. Some cases of exception, such as American military campaigns in the Middle East after the 9/11 events, have created civil and intellectual resistance. Between American claims of ‘war on terror’ or ‘justice’ and resistance to these, we can observe disparity and contradiction. I incorporate this aspect – the gap between rationalizing discourse and resistance – into the analytical framework which is founded on Foucault’s methods.

I trace the genealogy of power by exploring the statements and actions or forms of governance employed to assert and maintain rule over Okinawa or Okinawans at different stages. In conjunction with this analysis, I conduct an archaeology of knowledge by examining the relationships among these ruling practices as well as the factors that have
enabled or limited the translation of these practices into effective control over Okinawa and its population. Firstly, I present a link between discourse and deployment of discourse in practice. For example, I examine how the U.S. and Japanese policies in Okinawa are concerned with discourses of security. As I will elaborate in chapter 5, the U.S. military deployed the security discourse in order to justify its presence and administration in Okinawa. Secondly, I examine whether the deployment of discourses is accepted by Okinawans by observing how they respond to the American and Japanese practices. The two attempts by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in normalizing the U.S. military presence may entail observable difference. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, I will refer to this difference in order to measure relative success and failure in the normalization of American state of exception in Okinawa by the U.S. military and the Japanese government.

4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I outlined my archival research in Okinawa and introduced research methods that were used in order to investigate what factors have made possible the continued U.S. military presence in Okinawa and what is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. The analytical framework that I developed provides an analytical focus. Through this framework, I analyze how the U.S. military and the Japanese governments have attempted to normalize the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge and genealogy of power are the main methods that I employ in this analysis. I analyze discourses of governance that are employed by the U.S. personnel and the Japanese officials in archival and secondary sources and link them to the problem of long-term presence and concentration of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. In the following chapter, I analyze what kinds of rationalizing and othering discourses the American military personnel produced, how the discourses along with tactics of control are deployed in maintaining the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, and how the representational and material realities are shaped within the dynamic international, national and local power relations.
Chapter 5: American State of Exception

5.0 Introduction
In response to the research questions, I examine the reason why the U.S. military decided to garrison in Okinawa and the techniques through which the U.S. administrators managed the military presence. The U.S. military began to build military bases in 1945 and eventually governed Okinawa for 27 years. During and immediately after World War II, the U.S. military and State Department did not have a consensual plan about Okinawa governance. Governance throughout this twenty-seven year period was a product of complex American strategy and negotiation within dynamic national and international political contexts.

Several studies (Miyazato 1986; Oguma 1998) point out that while the U.S. State Department acknowledged that Okinawa belonged to Japan, the U.S. Defense Department became interested in the Okinawa Islands as a strategic site in the Far East as early as 1942. This internal politics – intertwined with post-war American diplomacy with Japan and the Allied Forces – caused indecision that made it possible to suspend key aspects of sovereignty and human rights on the islands during its governance. As the ideological rivalry became apparent in the Far East, the U.S. began to regard the Okinawa Islands as a vital and convenient site on which it could maintain a military presence.

In this chapter, I analyze exceptional practices of U.S. governance of Okinawa and resulting contradictions on the islands. I focus especially on tactics of governance that made it possible for Okinawa to be governed in accordance with what Agamben refers to as a state of exception. I argue that institutional governance by using a local political body – which the U.S. initially planned – was unsuccessful, but the U.S. managed to govern the islands for over a quarter century by making Okinawa a zone of exception where regular political functions and human rights were suspended, and a mechanism of control was created and maintained. As a result, unlawful and forceful establishment, presence and maintenance of military bases became possible. Nevertheless, the local institutions in Okinawa did not function in such a way as to establish hegemonic control over the islands by the U.S. military. Most American administrators and soldiers represented and treated Okinawans as the incommensurable “Other” (Steeves 1956a) and did not seek assimilation
of this foreign ethnic group into the American political system (Senaga 1971). Meanwhile, the U.S. administrators imposed American form of rationality, such as security and geopolitical importance of the Okinawa Islands in the Far East, on Okinawans. American adherence to principles associated with democracy and security were often contradictory and too foreign for those Okinawans who did not share American values (Senaga 1971). Therefore, resistance by Okinawans emerged and persisted after the initial and provisional phase of the American occupation. In the face of resistance, the U.S. military employed multiple tactics in order to sustain its presence. The tactics were not fully functional, but allowed the U.S. military to prolong its administration.

The first section deals with the period of early U.S. military governance of Okinawa between 1945 and 1950. It refers especially to two conflicting discourses, of democracy and (military) geopolitics, found in archival documents. The discussion also draws from secondary sources that offer helpful references to guide and structure this analysis. The second section deals with the period after 1950 when the U.S. quasi-civil administration began to contract the exceptional regime on the islands. The conflicting discourses were still prevalent, but newly emerging political difficulties posed by the appearance of communist states in the Far East led the U.S. to enter into a long term strategic planning phase in Okinawa. It was also during this period that the U.S. began to seek an ideological alliance with Japan and laid a stronger emphasis on liberal democratic principles. The liberal democratic principles were narrated in relation to communist ideology and distorted within the anti-communist atmosphere. In Okinawa, American democracy in practice meant a longer term U.S. military domination over the islands. In the third section, I analyze the two conflicting discourses in reference to techniques of American governance of Okinawa. Moreover, I introduce discourses that represent Okinawans as the “Other” in relation to the discourses of democracy and security as well as some cases of resistance on the islands.

5.1 Making Exception in Uncertainty
As observed previously, Miyazato (1986) argues that the U.S. State Department had
consistently acknowledged since the early 1940s that the Okinawa Islands belonged to the Japanese state. As the Pacific War progressed towards the mid 1940s, the U.S. military authorities, such as Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and U.S. Navy Department, began to regard the Okinawa Islands as a strategically important site in their post-war base planning. In other words, the U.S. government did not have consent among these departments for its post-war plan to occupy and govern Okinawa. The U.S. military began its military administration of the Okinawa Islands in such uncertainty. Despite the uncertainty and resulting ad hoc policies, the initial U.S. military administration during these five years represented the most stable period of its total 27 year governance in Okinawa. I argue that the unintentional “provisionality” in its initial governance by the U.S. military in Okinawa contributed to the stability. The U.S. encountered relatively few problems within Okinawa and from Japan with respect to its military control in this provisional phase. Therefore, the U.S. could initially monopolize control over the islands without any complex bilateral consideration and negotiation with Japan as it established its military bases. Nevertheless, in the initial five years, the U.S. had to deal with three major obstacles to the military government on Okinawa. Firstly, the U.S. military occupation of Okinawa posed a financial burden on the U.S. government. Secondly, the U.S. had to resolve ongoing debates within the American government about Okinawa sovereignty. Despite the geopolitical significance of the Okinawa Islands, many American decision makers were hesitant to formally colonize the islands since an explicit colonial action was contradictory to American democratic principles. Lastly, because the U.S. had to deal with other state members among the Allied nations, it could not take action on Okinawa that was explicitly illegitimate.

5.1.1 Keystone of the Pacific
American military personnel often use the term “keystone” to express the geopolitical advantages the Okinawa Islands offered for locating U.S. military bases in the Pacific area. During the American administration of Okinawa, a symbolic phrase “Keystone of the Pacific” was embossed on American-owned automobile license plates in Okinawa. Instead of the initial representation of the islands as a steppingstone in the Pacific War, the U.S.
began to emphasize publicly Okinawa’s geopolitical importance in the Pacific from the outset of the American military administration. The discourse of keystone was not consistent with a discourse of democracy which the U.S. had repeatedly emphasized as one of its core principles. In general, the former was supported by the American military personnel, and the latter by civilian officers. For example, Miyazato (1986) and Oguma (1998) point out that in 1942, the Subcommittee on Security Problems insisted that the U.S. should be a lone administrator of Okinawa. On the other hand, the Subcommittee of Political Problems, which was supervised by the State Department, acknowledged that the Okinawa Islands belonged to Japan and was reluctant to occupy the islands. The interdepartmental politics continued without definite reason or legitimacy for American occupation of Okinawa for 27 years.

Documents produced by the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1945a) indicate that in the mid 1940s, the American military executives and planners sought sites for military bases at strategically crucial areas all over the world and targeted the Okinawa Islands as one of those sites. During and right after World War II, the U.S. military planners were eager to assure they had access to a world-wide military network in times of emergency. For example, the post-war air base plan\(^1\) of the JCS states that “it is essential that command and operational control of these bases be exercised at all times by the military authorities of the United States in order that freedom of military action may be assured in time of emergency” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945a). The U.S. military interests and requirements shifted according to their geopolitical situations. In the Joint Staff Planners’ report, Okinawa was ranked at a level of secondary base area out of four ranks of primary, secondary, subsidiary, and minor base areas (Joint Chiefs of Staff Planners 1945). Although the military importance of the secondary base areas is stressed, their expected role was “the protection and for access to primary bases” (Joint Chiefs of Staff Planners 1945). At this stage, in September 1945, the report states that “diplomatic negotiations are required” to assure the military base sites (Joint Chiefs of Staff Planners 1945). In the same series of

\(^1\) As potential sites for the American military bases, Brazil, Ecuador, Cuba, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, and United Kingdom are discussed in this document.
reports dated October, 1945, it states “the Ryukyus … be transferred from the secondary to the primary base area category” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945b). The primary base was assumed to “be under United States sovereignty or exclusively under United States strategic control” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945b). The mission to establish the military network was incompatible with overall post-war international policies of the Department of State. The department of State was determined at one point to establish an international system that included the United Nations in order to avoid a future war (Miyazato 1986, 17). Furthermore, the military plans at this stage to keep Okinawa under exclusive U.S. control already were contradictory to an American rhetoric of democracy and free nations.

The Office of Territory document dated 1946 says that Okinawa was “the only island large enough to support the 26 projected airfields for the bombing of Japan proper with land-based planes … the ultimate invasion of Japan” (Goodhew 1946). The same file contains the memorandum which planned the permanent base construction project on the Okinawa Islands (Hashbourns 1946). During and right after the war, American administrators assumed it was necessary to keep Okinawa in order to maintain military bases against Japan because the latter was potentially dangerous for the U.S. Meanwhile, the documents reveal that U.S. personnel expressed anxiety regarding their long term U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The establishment and maintenance of military bases on foreign territories were not easy tasks due to economic and political constraints. Both U.S. military personnel and some civil officers acknowledged the strategic importance of the Okinawa Islands, but the economic and political constraints became a site of struggle among American elites. Firstly, economic constraints were a significant challenge that the U.S. had to consider since American administrators had to work within a limited budget. For example, the U.S. State Department points out that “control of the Ryukyus by the United States would in all probability require a considerable financial outlay” (Reid et al. 1946). Similarly, JCS documents indicate American anxiety regarding expenditure and publicity of their military bases at the foreign territories. JCS concerned “not only additional expenditure of manpower and money but also … the disposal value of such installations or equipment” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945c). Secondly, as a newly emerging
leader of democratic states, in their overall political stance, the U.S. had to act in compliance with democratic principles. A memorandum that contains views of the U.S. State Department and the U.S. military indicates the U.S. aimed towards “liberalization and democratization of government” in its reconstruction plan in Japan (Ara 1995a). For example, the same memorandum proposes that after demilitarization of Japan, the U.S. would “permit freedom of speech, press and religion and (eventually) freedom of assembly” in Japan (Ara 1995a).

5.1.2 American “Democracy”

However the U.S. policy makers and military personnel defined or understood ideas and practices of democracy, it is important to note that the U.S. began to use discourses associated with principles of American democracy such as liberalization and democratization since the Cold War in a distinctive way. While the discourse of democracy was mainly employed in the context of political reconstruction programs in the mid 1940s, the U.S. officials and military personnel began to use the same term in contrast to communism as communist influence increased towards the end of 1940s in the Far East (Ara 1995a; Steeves 1956a). The American discourse of democracy has been associated with a discourse of security since 1945 (Ara 1995a; Steeves 1956a). The discourse of security also changed its meaning in the late 1940s. The discourse of security during the Cold War was mostly used in anti-communism contexts (Steeves 1956a).

In the mid 1940s, the U.S. government implemented its security policies very carefully in compliance with international agreements. For example, the JCS document indicates that the U.S. monitored its military activities; “raising political difficulties in England, France and elsewhere” regarding military and commercial rights to use the airfields (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945c). At the Atlantic Charter in 1941, the American President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed not to seek territorial aggrandizement in the course and consequence of the Second World War (Nanpou Douhou Engokai 1972). The Cairo Declaration (1944) also states that the Allies “covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion” (Reid 1946).
There were conflicting themes within the US: anti-expansionist agenda on one hand and military interests on the other hand. However, their overall international policy was to comply with international laws and not explicitly violate rules among rival European nations. Therefore, the U.S. tried “[t]o retain control by the United States, in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, of those strategic points in the Pacific which are necessary for the security of the United States” (Ara 1995a, 44). The proposed aim was “to maintain international peace and security, and to lay solid foundation upon which a better world may be built” (Ara 1995a, 44). It was emphasized that the U.S. was willing to respect the principles of sovereignty, justice and international laws to realize freedom, democracy, self-governance, and peace among nations (Ara 1995a, 45).

Harvey argues:

coercion and liquidation of enemy is only a partial, and sometimes counterproductive, basis for US power. Consent and cooperation are just as important. If these could not be mobilized internationally and if leadership could not be exercised in such a way as to generate collective benefits, then the US would long ago have ceased to be hegemonic. The US must at least act in the general interest plausible to others even when, as most people suspect, it is acting out of narrow self-interest. This is what exercising leadership through consent is all about (Harvey, 2003, p. 39)

In other words, compliance with the international norms – yet without compromising their minimum requirement of political and military influence – was a general trend within U.S. post-war international governance.

In the case of U.S. military occupation of Okinawa, the U.S. employed tricky strategies regarding Okinawans’ sovereignty to realize their military will to gain consent from most European states. The Potsdam Declaration indicates that Japan proper includes “[t]he four main islands of Japan – Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku and about 1,000 smaller adjacent islands, including Tsushima” (Ara 1995a, 6). In 1946, General Headquarters declared the separation of Japan and Nansei Shoto (southern islands off Kyushu including the Okinawa Islands) (Kyan 1964). There is no clear indication of Okinawans’ sovereignty in the two declarations. The location of Okinawans’ sovereignty
was an issue within the U.S. The ideas of democracy and security again led the course of discussion about Okinawans’ sovereignty. As a meeting ground of two contradictory ideas, UN trusteeship eventually became a focus of negotiation within the U.S.

The study prepared by State members (Reid et al. 1946) shows the American intention to implement the reconstruction project of Japan and Okinawa without territorial ambition. The study was to be signed by the President and to be undertaken in consultation with the governments of other interested states at appropriate times regarding the terms of trusteeship for the Japanese Mandated Islands and other Japanese islands which are to remain under United States administration” (Reid et al. 1946). For example, it reads “[i]n areas where strategic considerations are not overruling and especially where large numbers of indigenous inhabitants are involved, the trust territories should be non-strategic in character” (Reid et al. 1946). In contradiction to their subsequent action in Okinawa, the 1946 document also proposed that “[t]he Ryukyu Islands should be regarded as minor islands to be retained by Japan and demilitarized” (Reid et al. 1946). Given the nature of this study, which was submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, it was likely that the state members did not present purely “democratic” rhetoric which could have provoked the military authority.

The same study reveals America’s ambitious stance with regard to post-war international politics. For example, it states “[t]he United States should be designated as sole administering authority in all of the trusteeship agreements … [and] … [t]he terms of trusteeship in all cases should be such as to safeguard the defense of the United States” (Reid et al. 1946). Moreover, the study contains the stance which became the common ground which settled the political negotiation between Washington and military; “[t]he terms of trusteeship in all cases should be such as to give the United States exclusive authority in all matters affecting the security of United States in the trust territory” (Reid et al. 1946).

American politics with regard to Okinawans’ sovereignty was unresolved at the time that the Treaty of San Francisco was signed in 1951 (effective as of 1952). Eventually, the option of trusteeship was included in the Treaty, which under Article 3 states, “Japan
will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 deg. North latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands).”

As a consequence of indecision regarding sovereignty of Okinawa, the U.S. military could not implement stable governance. It temporarily established three local administrative channels between 1945 and 1950 for indirect control of Okinawa. The three local institutions were not granted independent decision-making authority, but were only allowed to implement American military rules and orders to local people. A military directive allowed American administrators to “suspend the operation of any laws, ordinances or regulations which interfere with the furtherance of your objective” (Headquarters of the Commander in Chief 1945). While the U.S. military appropriated lands for military camps and bases, Okinawans were detained in concentration camps during the Battle of Okinawa, and movement from the camps was restricted (Headquarters U.S. Naval Military Government Okinawa 1945). The general attitude of the U.S. Military Government is stated in a military directive: “[i]n your treatment of the local population, the degree of severity to be exercised will be determined by the conduct and the attitude of the people and their willingness to cooperate with the military authorities” (Headquarters of the Commander in Chief 1945).

During the period of U.S. military governance, many Okinawans sensed that it was taboo to talk about reversion to Japan (Kyan 1964). Few individual requests for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan were made to American administrators in concentration camps. However, in 1946, a former mayor of Shuri-city, Yoshimitsu Nakayoshi, went to Tokyo to petition General MacArthur for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan (Kyan 1964). In 1947, three political parties were organized, and political movements for Okinawa reversion to Japan grew. Nevertheless, because the Okinawa Civilian Administration did not have a legislative function but operated by means of military proclamations, ordinances and directives (Kyan

2 Okinawa Advisory Council in 1945, Okinawa Civilian Administration in 1946, and Gunto (archipelago) Governments in 1950

3 Jinmin Doumei (Democratic Alliance), Jinmin Tou (People’s Party), and Shakai Tou (Socialist Party)
1964), their political actions were limited to petitions. Although local political movements were not reflected in policy making, there was a dawning of political resistance in Okinawa.

5.2 Contracting Exception

As I introduced in chapter 2, when the Treaty of Peace was signed in 1951, another signature for the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was conducted. The bilateral security treaty was renamed and renewed, but it has not changed its fundamental character. The security treaty enabled the U.S. military to be stationed in the Japanese territory and obligated Japan to support the U.S. military in Japan. The two treaties reflected American security interests in the context of Cold War politics, revealing the intention of the U.S. to use the archipelago in the Far East for fulfilling these interests. Archival documents (Ara 1995c) dated the beginning of the Cold War indicate a transition and dilemmas associated with American policy making regarding the Far East. At the time of the early occupation of Japan, the U.S. aimed to realize its democratic policy in Japan. I do not intend to evaluate American democratization of Japan, but a basic structure of liberal democracy such as sovereignty of the people, an election and parliamentary system, and freedom of expression was established in the immediate post-war years in Japan. On the other hand, the U.S. maintained provisional military governance in Okinawa between 1945 and 1950. As the ideological tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. grew, the U.S. sought permanent military base sites. Under the peace treaty, the U.S. military was able to govern Okinawa without bilateral intervention. Meanwhile, the U.S. needed to implement military governance in accordance with democratic principles in order to comply with the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration that prohibit territorial expansion of the concerned states. Therefore, multiple tactics were required to maintain the American state of exception in Okinawa. In this section, I examine how American claims of democracy as a tactic of “rationalization” was contested in the Cold War international politics and compromised in its application to Okinawa.
5.2.1 Communism and Security Treaty

Growing communist influence altered the course of U.S. international policies in the Far East towards the late 1940s. On September 1945, a report for the Office of the United States Political Advisor (Ara 1995a) indicates the U.S. intention to cooperate with the U.S.S.R. although influence of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East should be observed. The report also indicates that the U.S. intended to avoid action that could cause colonial rivalry and conflicts in the Far East. In 1946, ideological rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. became overt. In March, the U.S. – U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Korea was met. A report of the Commission from the United States Army Forces in Korea refers to the U.S.S.R. political stance that non-communist political belief is undemocratic and fascist (Ara 1995b). At the same time, a report by the U.S. Secretary of War shows difficulties with the U.S.S.R. in Europe and describes attitudes by U.S.S.R soldiers witnessed by U.S. troops in Europe as arrogant and hostile (Ara 1995b). In this context, up to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the Korean War in 1950, the U.S. began to see Japan as a partner in security cooperation and Okinawa as a keystone of the Pacific.

Decisions regarding American military policies in Japan were made in this dynamic international context. An initial American post-war reconstruction plan for Japan was to de-militarize and establish a liberal government (Ara 1995a). It also aimed to promote “liberalization and democratization” of the local government (Ara 1995a, 34). As a consequence of the growing ideological rivalry with the U.S.S.R., military interests began to surpass American democratic principles. A JCS report in 1950 proposed an amendment to the pacifist constitution and militarization of Japan, so that the U.S. would be able to use Japan as military bases for the Korean War (Ishihara and Uemura 2000b). At the same time, under General MacArthur’s order, the Police Reserve Forces were established in Japan (Niihara 1990). In 1952, the U.S.-Japan Administrative Agreement in the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan entitled the U.S. to use military bases in Japan for security in the Far East (Gabe 2002). Nevertheless, the U.S. needed to avoid explicit military action in Japan proper because of the risk that it could provoke the rival states as well as the Japanese. The American dilemma between democratic principles and security
interests required a tricky solution. Okinawa became a convenient site for the U.S. where it could conceal its military ambition and assure a military presence by suspending any clear decision on sovereignty and rights of local people. While the inter-departmental debate between the State and Army regarding trusteeship was in succession (Allison 1953), American governance of Okinawa continued to be marked by indecision over long-term objectives.

5.2.2 USCAR and GRI
In 1950, the U.S. established the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) replacing the Military Government. The post-war emergency phase ended, and the U.S. began to seek a long term military staging site as the communist influence grew. Despite its title, the USCAR’s fundamental objective was not to improve civil affairs, but to sustain American military presence on Okinawa. As a local political body that would support this objective, they established the Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI). The establishment of the GRI for the USCAR was to ensure indirect control over Okinawa as well as to put a quasi-democratic varnish on the military domination. The GRI was given a pro forma legislative function, and legislative members were elected by popular vote. Most of the time, governors were not elected, but nominated by the USCAR. Moreover, the USCAR had superior authority to suspend any legislative decision that could threaten American military presence and objectives. The USCAR made ad hoc decisions on multiple problems in Okinawa. In that sense, the USCAR governance was indecisive in its political character, but the provisional measures were dysfunctional as the U.S. military began to aim for a long term presence in Okinawa.

The USCAR’s indecisive policy impeded Okinawa’s post-war recovery, and Okinawans were anxious about the long term military presence (Kyan 1964). The American personnel who were in charge of Okinawa governance regarded and treated Okinawans as a fundamentally foreign ethnic group (Steeves 1956a). Therefore, the USCAR did not seriously consider policies that sought to improve Okinawans’ living standards and political rights. Appropriate measures for post-war development were not implemented, and the gap
in living standards between Okinawa and Japan proper enlarged. A USCAR mission states that, “Improvement in the standard of living above that existing prior to the war will be accomplished through the efforts of the Ryukyuans themselves, without the assistance of United States appropriated funds” (The Administrative Office 1954). On the islands without abundant arable area, land was a critical element for food supply. While the U.S. military was aware that over 70% of households on Okinawa were farmers before the war (Taylor 1946), it appropriated land for construction of military bases. Along with the Okinawans’ dissatisfaction with their living standard under the USCAR governance, the land appropriation gave rise to serious resistance by people on Okinawa. In the next section, I analyze American discourses of democracy, military interests, and the Okinawan “Other” which are significant indicators to understand American misreading and mishandling of Okinawa.

5.3 Unnormalized Exception and Resistance

The U.S. military seized the Okinawa Islands, constructed military bases by force, and maintained its administration for 27 years, but Okinawans did not accept the USCAR governance as an enduring rule. In the previous section, I discussed how the American military governance of Okinawa began to depart from a focus on provisional elements as the ideological tension and military interests grew. As it became apparent that the U.S. military was re-oriented towards a long term presence, Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military governance grew. In other words, the U.S. military succeeded in making an exception, but failed to normalize it. In addition to the tactical failure regarding “provisionality,” the U.S. military also failed to provide an effective rationale for its presence and governance in Okinawa. The “rationalization” of the U.S. military governance of Okinawa was consistent with the two American agendas of democracy and keystone held up by the Department of State and the Department of Army in its predominant approach to international politics. Okinawans were not privy to decisions framed within American politics and did not give importance to the American agendas so far as compliance with the USCAR governance did not ameliorate their living conditions. In that sense, the tactic of
“rationalization” by discourses of democracy and keystone did not seem reasonable agendas for Okinawans that could assure stable governance by the U.S. military in Okinawa. In this section, I analyze further what factors contributed to mishandling of Okinawans by the U.S. military personnel.

5.3.1 Okinawan “Other”
In addition to the discourses that highlighted themes of democracy and keystone, I noticed in several archival documents that there were patterns of thought that differentiated the American “Self” from the Okinawan “Other.” Some of the archival documents (Steeves 1956a; Department of the Army 1957) reveal the belief by American military personnel in their superiority over Okinawans. Based on this belief, they shared optimism and confidence that Okinawans would be obedient and guided by American orders (Steeves 1956a). Okinawans began to resist American military practices that did not accord with Okinawans’ post-war recovery needs. These discourses were not mere ideas, but set the course for American military governance in Okinawa. The U.S. military made unilateral decisions on Okinawans in accordance with U.S. military agendas in conjunction with discourse of the American “Self” and the Okinawan “Other.” In practice, deployment of American democratic principles was greatly compromised in relation to the U.S. military agendas and its treatment of Okinawans, contributing to dysfunctional and contradictory discourses that impeded the capacity for America to rationalize and normalize its exception in Okinawa.

Through analysis of archival documents, I found a binary characteristic of American discourses in relation to Okinawans. Americans represented themselves as superior people who could teach and lead the Okinawan “Other.” Okinawans are represented as those who are dissimilar to Americans who need to be guided and taught. For example, John Steeves who investigated the USCAR governance contends that Okinawans “are teachable and have demonstrated their ability to acquire technical skills and learning” while “the United States has sought to display the benefits of the type of world order we stand for” (Steeves 1956a). The American representation of Okinawans was
consistent with the paternalistic way in which American leaders regarded Asians in the immediate post-war era. General MacArthur argued that Asian people have “the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership” in the context that the U.S. had to assure its leadership in the Western Pacific (Ishihara and Uemura 2000a, 67).

The Americans' belief in their superiority underlay how the USCAR governed Okinawa. The U.S. military attempted to rationalize the U.S. military presence by the self-righteous agendas of democracy and security. A directive of the Department of Army states that the mission of the USCAR is to contribute to “the peace and security of the free world” (Department of the Army 1957). Meanwhile, the directive proposes that if Okinawans cooperate with the USCAR, they enjoy “a free and democratic society in which political and financial stability prevail” (Department of the Army 1957). The directive was issued in 1957 when the Okinawans’ reversion movement was prevalent. Moreover, as I introduced in the previous section, the USCAR demanded that Okinawans should be responsible to improve their own living standard without American assistance while they were deprived of land – which had been a means of industry in Okinawa – due to the military base construction. The persistence of resistance by Okinawans demonstrates that the USCAR could not adequately rationalize and normalize its exceptional state of governance. The gap between American military rhetoric in its governance and Okinawans’ resistance indicate not only American failure in asserting hegemonic control over Okinawa, but also a contradiction between American democratic principles and military interests when both were applied in the U.S. military control over Okinawans who were represented and treated as inferior people by the U.S. military personnel.

5.3.2 Failed Showcase

In this subsection, I examine the case of American military land appropriation and Okinawans’ resistance. The case manifests the American exceptionalism and the USCAR’s tactical failure in Okinawa governance after the provisional phase of U.S. military occupation. As I introduced in chapter 2, various types of resistance by Okinawans were
drawn together and eventually took the form of an island-wide movement that demanded Okinawa reversion to Japan. Sarantakes (2000) argues that Americans could not understand Okinawans’ desire to be part of Japan given severe oppression that marked much of the history of Okinawa in relation to Japanese feudal and modern regimes. As I introduced in chapter 2, Okinawans had been exploited under Japanese control until the end of World War II. Nevertheless, I argue that the U.S. military mismanaged Okinawa to the extent that Okinawans began to demand reversion to Japan.

In “Okinawa – American Showcase in the Western Pacific” (Steeves 1956a), a document prepared for political investigation in Okinawa and sent to the U.S. Department of State, John Steeves expressed his belief in American privilege regarding “ideas, techniques and a great amount of wealth” to be invested in the underprivileged Asian counterparts. Steeves was an expert in Asian affairs and served as a consul general and political advisor in Okinawa between 1955 and 1956. He was not satisfied with approaches by the USCAR administration that caused Okinawans’ resistance, but still believed in the potential for democracy to be applied to the U.S. governance of Okinawa. Meanwhile, in the same report, he also presented his understanding that American security and defence objectives took priority in Okinawa. By promoting further democratic principles, he believed that Okinawa could be a showcase of American democracy and realize “the development of all aspects of civil affairs” (Steeves 1956a). The idea of Showcase of American democracy was narrated in the context that communist influence was growing and “well-meaning programs sponsored by the United States” in Asia were unsuccessful (Steeves 1956a). Steeves (1956a) believed that if the U.S. could turn the Okinawa “pilot plant” or “experimental station” into a successful showcase, the American model and idea of democracy would be adopted and reproduced in other Asian countries.

The Steeves report not only contains the American belief in its own superiority over Asians, but also shows a distorted view of democracy. Steeves stated that some American sponsored programs failed when they had to deal with sovereign governments wherein American motives were “often the subject of suspicion and understanding cooperation on the part of local authorities” was lacking (1956a). On the other hand,
Okinawa served as a unique opportunity that should not be missed because the U.S. was “in control of most of the factors” (Steeves 1956a). In other words, Okinawa was a perfect experimental site for the U.S. because Okinawans’ sovereign rights were suspended, and the U.S. military could monopolize all decisions in its governance. What Steeves proposed for the experimental program was a technical resolution for the land problems that the USCAR caused in Okinawa. Steeves suggested that, “[i]t would be appropriate to the psychology of the moment in Okinawa to demonstrate what modern techniques, machinery, ingenuity and capital, can do” (Steeves 1956a).

The pro forma democracy wherein the USCAR monopolized ultimate decisions was not accepted by Okinawans. Okinawans began to recognize that acquisition of full political rights was the fundamental condition in order to improve their living circumstances. A dilemma that the U.S. military had was that Okinawans did not share the security and defence agendas with them, so that the military presence would have been more difficult if Okinawans had acquired full political rights and made their own decisions for the islands. Democracy was compromised and distorted in practice for the sake of the American military interests in Okinawa.

In the early 1950s, the American forces began further land appropriation for military base construction. They used bayonets to repress Okinawans and bulldozers to destroy buildings (Wohl 1954). The forceful land appropriation resulted in serious Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military governance (Kyan 1964; Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Senaga 1971). In 1953, the American Consular Unit on Okinawa sent a report entitled “Procedures Established for Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Ryukyus (Murfin 1953) to the State Department regarding the land issue. It reveals that “a large number of Military Police stood by to prevent any attempts at resistance and the families of the farmers hastily endeavored to salvage their crops” (Murfin 1953). The report also includes issues of legality of the land appropriation and indicates that the USCAR attempted to issue an ordinance as “a legal basis for acquisition of land”\(^4\) (Murfin 1953). In March, 1953, the

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\(^4\) 1. Prevention of U.S. Permanent Land Use by a Lump Sum Payment, 2. Proper Compensation for the
ordinance\textsuperscript{5} was issued. Moreover, in 1954, the USCAR announced a policy of permanent land use for military bases by a lump-sum payment.

The ordinance was hardly persuasive for Okinawans who had a strong attachment to their land. The resistance grew, and in 1954, the GRI legislative assembly adopted ‘Four Principles to Protect Land’ against the ordinance. In 1955, in order to settle the land problem, the House Committee on Armed Services sent a group of inspectors led by Congressman Melvin Price to Okinawa. The resulting Price Report released in 1956 recommended a lump-sum payment formula and further land appropriation for military use. In response to the USCAR treatment of Okinawans for the land issue, a telegram from American Consul in Naha to the Secretary of State indicates that the “military operates Okinawa as though there were no Okinawans on the Island” (Steeves 1956b).

As a consequence of the Price recommendation, Okinawans’ resistance against the presence of American military bases grew further. In 1956, the collective resistance “shimagurumi tousou (All-Island Struggle)” took place. However, the USCAR characterized the political upheaval on Okinawa as a mere communist action and tried to suppress political activities of certain individuals (Department of the Army 1957; Steeves 1956b). In the late 1950s, as the USCAR’s mishandling of Okinawa became apparent, the State Department began to realize the limitations of military governance (MacArthur II 1958). In the early 1960s, Okinawans’ movement became more systematic, but the USCAR reaction was still suppressive. The third High Commissioner of the USCAR, lieutenant general Paul Caraway, strengthened military control over Okinawa's politics and economy. The political and economic control had wide repercussions for Okinawa. As a result, the American President, Kennedy, dismissed Caraway.

After the mid 1960s, Okinawa became a staging site for the Vietnam War.

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\textsuperscript{5} Ordinance 109 “Land Acquisition Procedure” states “Whereas the United States has certain requirements concerning the use and possession of land in the Ryukyu Islands and whereas there are no provisions of Ryukyuan law whereby such requirements may be satisfied, it is deemed appropriate and necessary to establish procedures for the acquisition of and just compensation for such interests in land as the United States must have for the carrying out of its responsibility in the Ryukyu Islands.”
American soldiers stationed in Okinawa before dispatch to Vietnam committed serious crimes on Okinawa, and several military related accidents took place. In 1970, several thousand Okinawans engaged in a violent protest against the military presence. In such a difficult atmosphere, the U.S. started negotiations for reversion of Okinawa with the Japanese government. The American military project of making and normalizing a state of exception on Okinawa failed, but the Japanese government eventually contracted with the U.S. to continue the project. I will continue my analysis of U.S. military governance of Okinawa and Okinawans’ resistance in relation to another tactic, that of “concealment,” and Okinawa reversion negotiations between the U.S. and Japan in the next chapter. I argue that Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military governance in Okinawa and U.S. military failure in deployment of “concealment” contributed to reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan.

5.4 Conclusion
The U.S. military used excessive force to create a state of exception in Okinawa during the Pacific War. The military forcibly appropriated Okinawans’ land and suspended political rights. At the beginning of the period of U.S. military occupation in Okinawa, the U.S. military policy in Okinawa was provisional since the U.S. government was hesitant to expand its territory with regard to international agreements. As the Cold War progressed, the U.S. security interests in the Okinawa Islands, as a keystone of the Pacific, outweighed American commitment to democratic principles. The U.S. military began to focus on ways to establish a longer term presence in Okinawa. For Okinawans, who were exposed to U.S. military violence, the rationales provided by the American military for its governance in Okinawa, such as democratization and security of the Far East, were not acceptable reasons for the U.S. military presence. Consequently, as I introduced in chapter 2, Okinawans began to undertake organized resistance to the U.S. military in Okinawa. In short, the U.S. military successfully created a state of exception in Okinawa, but its tactics of “provisionality” and “rationalization” began to fail at the beginning of the Cold War. As a result, normalization of its state of exception became a difficult task for the U.S. military in
Okinawa.

Another tactic of “concealment” helped the U.S. military endure its presence in Okinawa, but Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military administration in Okinawa began to reveal what was hidden. As a result, the U.S. military governance in Okinawa became political and economic burdens for the U.S. government. Meanwhile, the Japanese Prime Minister, Sato, was interested in regaining the administrative rights of Okinawa from the U.S. government. He secretly negotiated with the U.S. government and agreed to allow continuous U.S. military presence in Okinawa. In the next chapter, I will examine the U.S. military tactic of “concealment” as one of contributing factors that sustained the U.S. military administration in Okinawa. Moreover, I will present how Sato concealed unfavorable information about Okinawa reversion and attempted to provide a rationale for the policies employed by Japan in governing Okinawa by providing Okinawa with financial subsidies.
Chapter 6: Confidential Exception

6.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I examined how the U.S. military constructed and maintained its military bases in Okinawa. The U.S. military was able to seize the Okinawa Islands and began to implement its practice of exceptional governance with the occasional exercise of physical force. As the ideological tension between the U.S. and communist states intensified, the U.S. military expanded the scale of military bases and claimed its authority for a longer term presence. Within the Cold War international politics in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, U.S. military policy began to lose its provisional elements. Moreover, the democratic ideal was compromised in practice since it was not commensurable with the increasing U.S. security and defence interests. Therefore, for Okinawans, the discourse of democracy was mere rhetoric that did not provide them with a substantive political means to better their living by their own decisions. Consequently, the American discourse of democracy did not contain hegemonic power over Okinawans, and the U.S. military could not legitimate its governance by presenting a democratic agenda to Okinawans. Having two dysfunctional tactics of “provisionality” and “rationalization,” the USCAR could not normalize its state of exception in Okinawa and had to face escalating resistance by Okinawans.

In this chapter, I examine how another tactic, that of “concealment,” prolonged U.S. military governance in Okinawa, but also posed problems in normalizing the American state of exception. The U.S. military concealed information about Okinawans’ resistance to its administration as well as the reality of Okinawans’ hardships under American exception (Monna 1996). Despite these intentional efforts to contain information, military problems, such as military accidents and soldiers’ crimes, began to be leaked by American, Japanese and Okinawan individuals and also reported by media inside and outside Okinawa. As a result, the tactic of “concealment” collapsed, and the maintenance of exceptional administration became a more difficult task for the USCAR. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister of Japan, Eisaku Sato, schemed to accomplish Okinawa reversion to Japan as part of his own personal political agenda. Sato also employed the tactic of
“concealment” not only to realize the reversion, but also to maintain the American exception. He concealed terms contained in the negotiations with the U.S. over reversion of Okinawa that could have been politically troublesome for him and allowed the U.S. military exception to continue in the post reversion era. Moreover, in order to mitigate Okinawans’ distress and immediate resistance to the continued military presence, the Japanese government sidestepped the military issues and implemented a policy to advance economic investment for Okinawan development.

6.1 Failed Concealment
The U.S. military tried to conceal facts about Okinawans’ hardships, struggles and resistance during its administration in Okinawa (Monna 1996). Travels from and to Okinawa were regulated, and reports about Okinawa were carefully monitored by the U.S. military. As a result, military problems in Okinawa were not thoroughly recognized outside Okinawa in the early years of military occupation (Oota 1984). The land struggles in the mid 1950s and anti-military reversion movement in the 1960s made the U.S. government aware of the military mishandling of Okinawa. Meanwhile, American military intervention in the Vietnam War caused further hardships among Okinawans. The Okinawa Islands became a military outpost for the Vietnam War, and many American soldiers were stationed on the islands. Soldiers’ crimes and military accidents contributed to hostility and resistance to the USCAR among Okinawans. In the 1960s, the USCAR tied to control Okinawans through betterment of civil programs that included education, but it could not resolve the Okinawans’ resistance against the U.S. military. Together with the two tactics of “provisionality” and “rationalization,” the American tactic of “concealment” eventually reached its limit. Consequently, the military administration of Okinawa became a significant economic and political burden for the U.S. government. Therefore, the U.S. government had to seek alternative ways to maintain its military presence and save appearances and expenditures at the same time. In this section, I present several examples of “concealment” as a tactic of governance employed by the U.S. military. Eventual U.S. military failure in deployment of this tactic caused further difficulties for U.S. military
governance in Okinawa.

6.1.1 Okinawans’ Resistance

As I introduced in Chapter 5, the GRI had legislative, judicial and administrative structures, but did not function as an autonomous political body. The USCAR had superior authority and kept refusing GRI decisions when the U.S. military objectives were threatened. As the Cold War progressed, military burden on Okinawa as the American Keystone of the Pacific was intensifying. Around the mid-1950s, Okinawans began to be aware that the quasi-democratic functions and limited political authority of GRI were not sufficient to warrant fundamental human rights for Okinawans. Consequently, Okinawans started organizing island-wide resistance and also publicizing the military problems in Okinawa (Kyan 1964). In 1958, the Okinawans’ land struggle that was caused by the forceful land appropriation and the Price Recommendation was settled with the intervention of the American State Department, but problems arising from U.S. military handling of Okinawa remained.

Some studies, such as those by Okudaira (2010), Oguma (1998) and Kyan (1964), suggest that action to resolve problems related to military bases, education and labour were key agendas of the civil movements. These seemingly separate agendas were consolidated into an organized reversion movement (fukki undou). The reversion movement was seeking affiliation of Okinawa with Japan, a nation which had experienced significant social and economic development since the end of the war. In contrast to the post-war Japanese situation, Okinawa suffered from military risks and lower socioeconomic standards in the 1940s and 1950s. In the late 1950s, military accidents and soldiers’ crimes caught Okinawans’ public attention and contributed to demands by Okinawans for reversion to Japan (Kyan 1964). Their struggles with the U.S. military presence were not only for protection of their land rights or development of social welfare, but also for protection of their lives against U.S. military violence. For Okinawans, who are well known for their anti-militaristic positions, the U.S. military presence did not assure security, but caused unusual and unacceptable incidents of deaths and other risks (Fukuchi 1995; Hiyane 2005). Consequently, the movement that campaigned for reversion contained an agenda of
affiliation with the Japanese pacifist constitution in order to end the military related problems (Kyan 1964). Okinawans believed that suspended fundamental political rights, such as those of legislation, judicature, and freedom of speech and travel, would be granted as administrative rights of Okinawa returned to Japan (Kyan 1964). The USCAR could not provide fundamental resolutions for the military problems. In the early 1960s, as a consequence of the American military interventions in the Vietnam War, the military burden on Okinawa increased, and some Okinawans began to rely on more radical means to alter their political situations.

6.1.2 Concealed Exception
The suppression by the U.S. Military Governments and USCAR of unsettling facts about Okinawans’ circumstances and resistance was oriented to avoid critiques and resistance inside and outside Okinawa. In Okinawa, newspaper publication started in 1945. The first post-war newspaper, Uruma Shinpou, was funded and censored by the U.S. Military Government. Since the Uruma Shinpou for the Military Government was a media device to support the smooth implementation of military governance, it could not carry news that was inconvenient for the U.S. military presence (Arasaki 1999). It contained very few articles reporting on American soldiers’ crimes on Okinawa (Arasaki 1999). According to Monna (1996), the U.S. Military Government did not provide a clear standard of censorship. Nevertheless, American executives on Okinawa provided “limitations of freedom of critique” in media through consultation with Okinawan local elites (Monna 1996).

Okinawans were given the message that they had to believe American military personnel were sincerely doing their best for Okinawans, and Americans were willing to correct wrong doings (Monna 1996). For example, Uruma Shinpou (Funabashi 1999) carried an article (6 Feb 1948) that encouraged Okinawans to report American crimes in Okinawa. The reality of American military governance differed from the rhetoric, and the consultation was merely to suppress freedom of speech on Okinawa that could conflict with American military governance (Monna 1996). When media did not comply with the agendas, the U.S. military prohibited or punished the publication (Monna 1996). Two cases
of American suppression of media, for instance, occurred in 1950: *Jinmin Bunka* (People’s Culture) and *Ryukyu Nippou* (Ryukyu Daily). *Jinmin Bunkasha* carried an article written by Kamejirou Senaga that criticized an unclear transaction that occurred within the Okinawa development budget (Monna 1996). The U.S. military suspended the publication license of *Jinmin Bunkasha*, claiming that the magazine had made unfair accusations against certain individuals or groups (Monna 1996). *Ryukyu Nippou* carried correspondence between two contributors regarding U.S. military aid in Okinawa (Monnna 1996). One contributor, Uema, wrote that Okinawans should accept aid from the U.S. military, and the other contributor, Kawahira, replied to Uema that receiving the aid was a beggar’s attitude (Monna 1996). In response, Uema argued that Okinawans should not be shamed out of the aid because the prosperity of the U.S. people in the post-war era was to no small extent founded on the sacrifice of Okinawans (Monna 1996). The U.S. Military Government sent Uema and a *Ryukyu Nippou* editor, Urasaki, to the U.S. military court for their hostility to the U.S. military (Monnna 1996). Uema was sentenced to nine months in prison and suspended for two years, and Urasaki was sentenced to eighteen months in prison and suspended for two years (Monna 1996).

Fukuchi (1995) conducted an interview with people who were victims of or bereaved by military accidents and soldiers’ crimes. Fukuchi (1995) argues that there had been inadequate judgements in assessing these accidents and crimes, so that the victims and bereaved were not provided with proper compensation. For example, in 1948, an accidental detonation of collected unexploded bombs caused 103 deaths and 109 injuries of Okinawans. The U.S. military did not make monetary compensation, but provided each Okinawan sufferer with a ration and a blanket. In 1967, after a long and painstaking petition by Okinawa sufferers to the USCAR and the Japanese government, monetary compensation was eventually made by the USCAR. In the preface, Fukuchi (1995) argues from his own experience that, until the late 1950s, making public any damage or loss of human bodies by Americans was regarded as an anti-American action, so that it took great courage for Okinawans to demand compensation from the U.S. military. After reversion, it was made public that large numbers of victims had not been compensated for accidents and
crimes (Fukuchi 1995). As a result of another petition by Okinawans, it was decided that the Japanese government would subrogate the compensation. Fukuchi’s research illustrates that facts about Okinawans’ hardships caused by the U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes did not receive adequate attentions from the U.S. military and Okinawans did not have means to make these issues widely acknowledged inside and outside Okinawa.

The tactic of “concealment” was also employed to prevent leaks of damaging information about the Okinawans’ situation from reaching beyond Okinawa. As one advantage of the USCAR control over the islands, Steeves stated that Okinawa was “far enough removed from the mainland to provide isolation of the problem area” (Steeves 1956a). He did not explore why the isolation was an advantage for the USCAR in his report. Given his dissatisfaction with the USCAR governance in 1957, it seems that he was not willing to publicize what was not presentable as a showcase. Isolation of Okinawa was not only Steeves’s idea, but a shared practice since the beginning of military occupation. It was only in 1949 that American journalists were allowed to freely observe Okinawa for the first time (Monna 1996). Even after 1949, publication and reports abroad about Okinawa were checked by the U.S. military. For example, in 1956, the U.S. military acquired information about an article in Contemporary Issues, which carries articles on human rights issues (Davis 1956). One man who had been to Okinawa attended a meeting of the Contemporary group and reported it to an American colonel. The Contemporary group was critical of the American military presence on Okinawa. One participant of the meeting said:

it is about time that someone has the guts enough to stand up and give out the facts about the conditions on Okinawa … the Army is purposely keeping under cover and trying to eliminate the reports prepared by the Scientific Board that the Army invited out to the Ryukyus (Davis 1956).

The executive director to the military side suggested:

There are many rotten apples in the Okinawan barrel, and if it gets before the American public, there will be an investigation that will have many heads rolling. This investigation would seriously hurt American prestige throughout the world (Davis 1956)
The report of the meeting was also sent to the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. The executive director wrote to the Office that, “I am happy that I can keep an eye on them” (Davis 1956) and attached a personal letter from the author of the article.

The initial prohibition of journalist activities and related correspondence are examples of how “concealment” of military problems in Okinawa worked as a tactic to maintain stable governance. The capacity to maintain this “concealment” began to break as Okinawans’ resistance grew. In 1956, Kamejiro Senaga was elected to be a mayor of Naha city. He was publicly critical of the Price recommendation as well as the American military presence in general (Senaga 1971). Therefore, Senaga was an unfavorable local political leader for the USCAR. The USCAR tried to make him resign from his post by cutting subsidies and freezing the bank account of Naha city. With Naha citizens’ support, Senaga was able to allow the city to manage self governance. Prior to the election, in 1954, Senaga was accused of sheltering two communist party members (Senaga 1971). The U.S. Civil Administration Courts sentenced him to two years in prison. The High Commissioner of the USCAR, James Edward Moore, amended a Civil Administration ordinance and disenfranchised the eligibility of ex-convicts for election. Senaga was suspended from the post, but his case received Okinawans’ attention and support contributing to island wide resistance to USCAR’s oppression. Afterwards, this incident also drew the attention of the U.S. State Department. The State Department suggested joint governance of the islands with the Army Department to avoid further political difficulty. The Army’s response in 1958 was:

The administration of the Ryukyus is … a responsibility of the Department of the Army which it cannot share with other agencies… we cannot evade our responsibility by instituting a system of joint reporting and joint decision-making… However, following the Senaga incident we have reiterated to the High Commissioner the necessity for advance reporting on important matters (Department of the Army 1957)

The Senaga incident did not ameliorate the USCAR policies or High Commissioners’
attitudes, and the reversion movement continued in the 1960s. Okinawans made organized petitions to American and Japanese governments. It turned out that Okinawans were not the docile “Other” for the USCAR personnel.

6.1.3 Costs of Okinawa Governance
The U.S. had to deal with political and economic costs of its military administration in Okinawa. As the Vietnam War intensified, both kinds of costs imposed a further burden in the mid 1960s. Initially, a major USCAR expense was allocated for military infrastructure, and therefore public welfare and service on Okinawa were not matters of primary concern. For example, in 1950, Chobyo Yara, an Okinawan educator who visited Japan proper was surprised to see the post-war development of Japan and recognized disparities between educational services in Japan and Okinawa (Okudaira 2010). He saw abundant study-aid books and a three-story reinforced-concrete schoolhouse that was, he assumed, something that would not be built on Okinawa (Okudaira 2010). On Okinawa, some classrooms were held under tents without teaching materials or blackboards (Okudaira 2010).

As mentioned earlier, dissatisfaction among Okinawan teachers became one of major driving forces of the reversion movement. In 1952, a meeting of school principals passed a resolution in support of reversion. In the same year, they established the Okinawa kyoushokuinkai (teachers association) and petitioned the GRI Legislature for reversion. Also in the same year, the Okinawa kyoushokuinkai played a central role in re-organizing the Association for Promoting Reversion (fukki kiseikai in Japanese, originally established in 1951). Yara initially believed that the reversion movement was an ethnic matter and should not involve political actions (Kyan 1964). Dissatisfied with the state of political suspension and the USCAR’s suppression, the reversion movement eventually became politicized in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1960, the Council for the Reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland (commonly called fukkikyou in Japanese) was established. The Council was a collaborative body of both political parties and civil society, so that both political and civil affairs were involved in the reversion movement.

In order to maintain the military bases on Okinawa, the USCAR tried to control
the reversion movement by increasing public assistance in the late 1960s. The Department of Army requested a supplementary budget in 1968 for the next fiscal year. The fundamental objective of the public assistance was that:

Our bases on Okinawa are most important to our Far East defense posture, and to our effort in Vietnam. The assistance provided to the civilian population of the Ryukyu Islands helps ensure continued acquiescence of the inhabitants of these islands in our administration, and thus contribute to the free use of our bases there. (Secretary of Defense 1966)

As I discussed in the previous chapter, U.S. military seizure and administration of Okinawa were contradictory to the principle of American democracy. For the U.S. military, Okinawa’s prior role was a keystone of the Pacific, and Okinawans’ political rights were of secondary concern. When “concealment” of the state of suspension became impossible, and resistance by Okinawans escalated in response to military accidents and soldiers’ crimes, the USCAR tried to allay Okinawans’ anti-military and anti-American mood by offering public assistance. Nevertheless, the reversion movement by Okinawans did not calm down. Initial American confidence for governance of Okinawa turned out to be a challenging task, and the U.S. government began to recognize political disadvantage of long term USCAR governance in Okinawa.

6.2 Sato’s Misreading of Okinawan Politics

As the Cold War tension progressed towards the late 1940s, the U.S. began to see Japan as a potential ally of liberal democracy. For the U.S., Japan itself was a key geopolitical site in the Far East with respect to its interest to check ideological rival states such as the U.S.S.R and China. Therefore, the U.S. government carefully negotiated with the Japanese government in order to assure a close bilateral relationship without compromising its security interest in the Far East. The State Department concerned the political situation of Okinawa with respect to the USCAR’s mishandling of Okinawa, since it could threaten the bilateral alliance with Japan. Moreover, the U.S. did not apply the UN trusteeship system
that could risk the alliance even though the potential application was stated in the Peace Treaty. In the mid 1960s, Japanese Prime Minister Sato began to negotiate with the U.S. government for Okinawa reversion, and the U.S. government finally agreed to return the administrative rights of Okinawa to Japan. Nevertheless, he was ignorant about the U.S. government’s anxiety regarding U.S. military issues in Okinawa and failed to resolve the problem of the state of exception that continued on Okinawa. His tactic was to leave sensitive articles as indefinite as possible and to conceal conditions of reversion such as continuous free use of military bases by the U.S. military in Okinawa after reversion that could have fueled protest in Okinawa because Japanese officials betrayed the interests of Okinawans. In this section, I discuss how Sato managed to proceed and conclude the Okinawa reversion agreement by employing a tactic of “concealment.”

Okinawans felt their islands were officially separated from Japan proper under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty in 1952 (Kyan 1964; Senaga 1971). According to the Article, the U.S. could decide whether Okinawa should be under the trusteeship system and the U.S. could be responsible for administration. The U.S. military continued its governance for 27 years, but the trusteeship system was not applied. While the U.S. Army Department wanted to continue occupation, the U.S. State Department hesitated to officially incorporate Okinawa into American territory (Miyazato 1986). As a result, any decision on the sovereignty of Okinawa was prolonged for an indeterminate period. With regard to the sovereignty of Okinawa, Sato stated in the Diet that delegates of the U.S. and U.K. recognized Japanese residual sovereignty at the peace conference in San Francisco (American Embassy, Tokyo 1969). Meanwhile, the U.S. was a sole administrator and had “the rights to exercise all or part of the administrative, legislative and judicial rights over the territory” (American Embassy, Tokyo 1969). In other words, sovereignty over Okinawa was split into Japanese residual sovereignty and American administrative rights. As a result, Okinawa was neither separated from nor fully belonged to Japan for 27 years, and Okinawans were governed under a state of exception.

Japan relied almost solely on the U.S. for the post-war reconstruction project, including matters of security, for which the Japanese government was willing to allocate
space and budgetary resources for the American military presence. Meanwhile, anti-war and anti-American military movements took place in Japan and Okinawa. In particular, negotiation for revised extension of the Security Treaty with the U.S. caused a nation-wide student and leftist protest in the late 1950s. As Okinawans’ hardships and political situation in Okinawa became well publicized, connections among leftist movements in Okinawa and Japan proper were strengthened to an extent that Japanese politicians needed to deal with the Okinawa reversion matter.

In 1965, Sato visited Okinawa and stated that Japan’s post-war reconstruction was incomplete unless Okinawa reversion was realized (Wakaizumi 1994). Sato began to investigate the possibility of Okinawa reversion and negotiate with the American government. He could not recognize that the U.S. government was concerned with the political and economic costs of Okinawa occupation. Kei Wakaizumi, who was Sato’s personal envoy to the U.S., emphasized in his publication the political difficulty of Okinawa reversion since Okinawa was a critical keystone of the U.S. for the Vietnam War (Wakaizumi 1994). With Sato’s visit to the U.S., American and Japanese governments began formal negotiation for Okinawa reversion in 1969. According to a memorandum by the Secretary of State, the U.S. side had assumed that it would be difficult to negotiate continuous use of Okinawa for military bases after reversion. It reads:

The Japanese have gone somewhat further than we originally expected in the public assurances that they will give on our ability to use Okinawa bases, as well as those in Japan proper (Rogers 1969)

For the U.S., the reversion negotiation went far better than they had expected. A prior objective it held for Okinawa occupation was an exclusive use of the islands for American military bases, and the Japanese government agreed with free use of the islands for the U.S. military bases after the reversion. Moreover, in return for the Okinawa reversion, the Japanese government agreed to extend the Security Treat in 1970. The Security Treaty includes SOFA (U.S. – Japan Status of Forces Agreement) that allows the application of American criminal laws to American soldiers’ crimes committed in Japan.
Under the SOFA, Japanese citizens are not protected by the Japanese laws against U.S. military accidents and soldiers crimes, and the Japanese government has to provide the U.S. military with facilities and budgets to maintain the U.S. military presence in Japan (Gabe 2002). Therefore, the negotiation and extension of the treaty in 1970 were sensitive matters. Sato tried to legitimate the U.S. military presence on Okinawa after reversion by emphasizing its security advantage of the U.S. military presence. He answered in the Diet that:

The Government is now exploring means by which the people’s wish for the early reversion of the administrative rights over Okinawa can be realized, in a way which is most in harmony with the national interests of our country, centering on the point of how it can be realized without impairing the important security role which the United States Forces’ bases in Okinawa are playing for our country and the Far East, including our country (American Embassy, Tokyo 1969)

However, the anti-American military and anti-Security Treaty movement continued in both Okinawa and Japan proper. In this sense, Sato failed to provide a rationale for the continuing American military presence. Meanwhile, he continued to make possible a concession to the U.S. for earlier reversion during his term as Prime Minister.

The reversion movement involved multiple agendas including civil affairs, but as the military burden increased on Okinawa due to the Vietnam War, Okinawans began to focus on an anti-war agenda. The slogan of reversion was “anti-war (hansen) reversion (hukki).” According to Nishiyama (2007), the U.S. side recognized that Sato was eager to conclude the reversion negotiation as early as possible for his own political ambition. Taking advantage of Sato’s ambition, the U.S. could lead the negotiation so as to maintain its military presence on Okinawa without being responsible for direct governance of the whole islands. Although Sato publicly stated the three anti-nuclear principles that prohibit possession, manufacture and introduction of nuclear weapons, he agreed that the U.S. could not only maintain a post-reversion military presence and free use of bases, but could also introduce nuclear weapons into Okinawa in times of emergency. In the anti-war atmosphere in Japan and Okinawa, Sato was not able to publicize the agreement, and in fact kept it secret (Nishiyama 2007).
Many confidential documents related to the Okinawa reversion negotiations have been released in the U.S. (Nishiyama 2007), but several agreements Sato made were kept secret in Japan for a long time. Wakaizumi (1994) admitted that Sato signed a secret agreement to allow the U.S. to introduce nuclear weapons to Okinawa. Although evidence of secret agreements has been released in the U.S. through official and unofficial channels (Nishiyama 2007), the Japanese government has not acknowledged existence of written secret documents. Officially, the government admitted that there was a secret agreement regarding introduction of nuclear weapons only in a broad sense. In 1974, Sato was awarded a Nobel peace prize for representing the Japanese will for peace. Nevertheless, as the materials that revealed secret negotiations of reversion were released in the 1990s, his adherence to the three antinuclear principles became known to be myth (Nishiyama 2007).

6.3 Succeeding a State of Exception
Consequences of the secret reversion negotiation included not only the continued presence of U.S. military bases, but also furthered inequalities within the Japanese-American bilateral relationship. In addition to the nuclear weapons deal, Sato secretly agreed with the U.S. that the Japanese government covers some expenses associated with reversion for which the U.S. was supposed to be fully responsible. Furthermore, Japan began to provide the U.S. with additional payments (Omoiyari Yosan⁶) in 1978. The secret negotiation created a path in which the U.S. could continuously rely on Japan to offset much of the financial and political burden associated with its military presence. Additionally, the Japanese government used financial means from the reversion arrangement to fulfill some of the necessary Japanese contributions to Okinawa. In this section, I will summarize some consequences of the reversion for the U.S. and Japan. I argue that the Okinawa reversion did not relieve Okinawans from a state of exception, but the Japanese government succeeded the U.S. military role to normalize the U.S. military exceptionalism.

The reversion of Okinawa to Japan relieved the U.S. from the political and

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⁶ It is also called “Host Nation Support” or “financial support towards welfare benefits and allowance of U.S. forces stationed in Japan.”
economic burden it had borne as an administrator. Sato’s concessions in the reversion negotiation enabled the U.S. not only to run military bases with a much lower financial cost, but also to avoid administrative responsibility. The U.S. military failed to establish a local political institution through which it could indirectly govern the islands during its occupation of Okinawa. Therefore, it was not able to normalize the exceptional regime through modern disciplinary mechanisms. After the reversion, the U.S. indirectly maintained the state of exception on Okinawa through the Japanese government. While the U.S. was relieved from the economic and political costs of administration over Okinawa, the Japanese government needed to find ways in which to meet U.S. military demand and mitigate Okinawans’ resistance at the same time. In the process of negotiations for reversion, it became clear that Japan could not provide the islands with mainland status. The continuing presence of American military bases in post-reversion was for Okinawans an unacceptable condition of reversion (Okinawa Prefecture 1996). As a result, Okinawans began to express their frustration and anger upon recognizing that inequality between Okinawa and Japan proper would continue in the post-reversion era, especially after incidents drew attention to the consequences of these conditions. For example, in 1970, an American soldier’s car accident triggered a violent protest in Okinawa. Several hundred Okinawans burned and destroyed American vehicles and facilities. The incident, Koza boudou (uprising), was a reaction to the long-term and continuous military problems on Okinawa (Takamine 1984).

The Japanese government has regularly relied on granting subsidies for the economic development of Okinawa in order to control Okinawans’ dissatisfaction related to reversion. For example, in 1971, the Japanese government started a project to host an international fair aimed at the promotion of industry and technology, Exposition ’75 (Okinawa kokusai kaiyou hakurankai), and subsidized infrastructure in Okinawa. In the post-reversion era, the Japanese government has implemented various and continuous economic development projects through official development boards, but infrastructural projects have contributed more to Japanese corporations than to the local economy (Yamada 2012). Moreover, a major part of maintenance fees for U.S. military bases has
been covered by the Japanese government (Gabe 2002). For Okinawans, the U.S. military bases were significant sources of income during the American occupation. By investing a large budget in the military industry, the Japanese government has fostered Okinawans’ reliance on the military bases, so that some Okinawans assume that the Okinawan economy requires the military presence. This financial assistance provides Okinawa with a temporary economic gain. Moreover, by creating Okinawa’s structural reliance on subsidies and base-related industry, the Japanese government has attempted to justify the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I elaborate on how the Japanese subsidies in Okinawa after the reversion represented as a tactic of “rationalization” in the next chapter.

Military accidents and American soldiers’ crimes are still problems in Okinawa today. For those accidents and crimes, according to the Security Treaty, the U.S. military has superior authority to investigate and judge relative to the Japanese police and courts. In this sense, the state of exception wherein Okinawans’ judicial rights are suspended, continues to exist in the post reversion era. What the reversion changed was not the political suspension itself, but who maintains the exception. Okinawans’ resistance to the U.S. military presence in the post-reversion era indicates that the Japanese government has not succeeded in normalizing the exception and realizing hegemonic control over Okinawans. Despite Okinawans’ dissatisfaction and resistance against the U.S. military presence on their islands, the Japanese government has succeeded in maintaining and concentrating the U.S. military bases in Okinawa through non-violent tactics of governance. Along with the financial means, the Japanese government also has employed tactics of “concealment” and “provisionality” in order to sustain the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. In the next chapter, I examine, in more detail, how the Japanese government has sustained the U.S. military presence – which still causes violent problems in Okinawa – through multiple tactics of governance.

6.4 Conclusion
Despite Okinawans’ concerns about the long-term U.S. military presence and contradictions between American democracy and security interests, the U.S. military managed to sustain
its presence as governing authority for 27 years. The “provisionality” of its governance was lost in the Cold War international politics, and Okinawans did not share the security reasons with the U.S. military, but the American tactic of “concealment” contributed to continuance of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. Towards the late 1950s, Okinawans’ resistance began to be publicized, and it became a significant political concern for the U.S. government. Additionally, betterment of social welfare in Okinawa was an economic burden for the U.S. government. Sato’s proposal for Okinawa reversion was presented to the U.S. government which was facing increasing difficulties with its military governance in Okinawa. Sato’s ignorance and impatience resulted in American advantage in the course of the Japan-U.S. bilateral negotiations for the Okinawa reversion. Consequently, the Japanese government agreed to sustain the U.S. military bases. Sato and his close advisers concealed terms of the Japan-U.S. agreements that represented major concessions made by Japan. As it became clear that the U.S. military bases would continue to remain in Okinawa, Okinawans began to express their dissatisfaction with the conditions of reversion. In order to mitigate the Okinawans’ dissatisfaction, the Japanese government began to provide Okinawa with subsidies.

In the post-reversion era, the Japanese government has continued to employ economic measures in order to justify its approach to governance of Okinawa. While the Japanese government has not been successful in justifying the U.S. military presence in Okinawa by means of a discourse of security, it has been able to control local politics of Okinawa by the economic measures. The Japanese government also has used economic and political provisional measures in sustaining the U.S. military presence. Moreover, the Japanese government decided in secret terms and conditions within the Security Treaty that legalized the U.S. military exception in Okinawa. In the next chapter, I will examine these tactics of “rationalization,” “provisionality” and “concealment” along with analysis of Okinawan identity. I argue that Okinawans’ ambivalent identity – of otherness and sameness – for the majority of Japanese is a key element to understand why the U.S. military burden has been able to be imposed on Okinawans in the post World War II period.
Chapter 7: Governance by Japan

7.0 Introduction
The reversion of Okinawa to Japan did not grant Okinawans full legal rights; exceptional measures in Okinawa continued. The Japanese government succeeded USCAR in its role to administer Okinawa as well as to maintain the U.S. military presence. What Okinawans expected in reversion was not mere transfer of administrative rights (Oota 1984), but an improvement in their political, economic and social circumstances. Referring to the past experiences of hardships resulting from their relationship with Japan, some Okinawans have referred to the unsatisfactory reversion as the third Ryukyu shobun (disposition) (Miyamoto 1979) or argue that Okinawa again became a sacrificial stone for Japan (Fukuchi 1995). The Japanese government had to employ multiple tactics in order to control Okinawans’ resistance and to realize the reversion. The inconvenient terms produced through negotiations were concealed since they could fuel Okinawans’ resistance. Additionally, the Japanese government provided subsidies for Okinawa development and diverted the reversion issues into economic matters. Although Okinawans protested against the U.S. military presence, the Japanese government restored its administrative rights over Okinawa in 1972.

After the reversion, American military accidents and soldiers’ crimes continued to be significant problems in Okinawa. Under the terms of the Security Treaty, Okinawans’ political rights are still compromised. Consequently, the resistance by Okinawans to the U.S. military bases has taken place throughout the post-reversion period. In this sense, the Japanese government has not succeeded in making the state of exception a widely accepted rule for Okinawans. By employing multiple tactics through government channels, the Japanese government has controlled the Okinawans’ resistance and maintained the U.S. military bases for over forty years. In this chapter, I analyze what factors have made possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa” and “what is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa” in the post-reversion era. The analysis elaborates upon Foucault’s insights into governance. I argue that the Japanese government has attempted to make U.S. military exceptionalism in Okinawa an
accepted rule within the Japanese nation by multiple governing tactics that include “rationalization,” “provisionality” and “concealment.”

7.1 Continued Exception

Ibata (2010) points out the illegality of the American occupation of Okinawa. For example, the land appropriation after the Battle of Okinawa violated the Hague Convention that defines the lawful and unlawful acts regarding wars. Moreover, the U.S. proposal for the Trusteeship of Okinawa was supposed to be invalid since the U.S. recognized that Japan had residual sovereignty. I argue that the central issue regarding American occupation of Okinawa was not its illegality, but the supremacy that allowed the U.S. military to decide on exception. That is, given American military supremacy over Okinawa, the U.S. military could exercise its authority regardless of juridical constraint and acted in effect as a practical sovereign over Okinawa. The state of exception existed insofar as the U.S. military could act as a practical sovereign and impose its rules on Okinawans. The reversion movement and Japan-U.S. bilateral politics ended the USCAR regime, but the U.S. military presence and rules remained. In this chapter I examine how this presence has been able to be sustained and explore some of the major consequences it has produced. Firstly, this section introduces some cases and rules of exception. Secondly, I analyze identity of Okinawans within the Japanese nation in relation to the tactic of provisionality that has been employed by the Japanese government. I also examine how Okinawans have responded to the military problems on their islands.

7.1.1 Crimes and Accidents

Several cases of U.S. military accidents and soldiers crimes have not been investigated or punished under Japanese jurisdiction, but the Japanese government has allowed the U.S. to take police and judicial initiative. Japanese jurisdiction does not apply to some serious accidents and crimes committed by American military personnel due to the U.S. – Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) under the Peace Treaty Article VI. The SOFA grants superior authority to the U.S. for custody of American soldiers who commit crimes
As a result, in many cases, American crimes in Okinawa are unpunished, and suspects have managed to escape from Okinawa (Ryukyu Shinpou 1995). Two recent cases - one involving crimes committed by American soldiers and the other a military accident - illustrate some of the factors that emerge within the broader conditions in which many U.S. military accidents and soldiers' crimes are not met with adequately punishment of the offenders or compensation of the victims (Takasaku 2010). While both cases triggered island-wide resistance on the part of Okinawans, underlying these reactions were Okinawans' frustration and anger that had accumulated over time (Nishitani 2012; Okinawa Mondai Henshuu Iinkai 1995).

A sexual assault case in 1995 caused island-wide resistance in Okinawa. A twelve year old girl was assaulted and injured by three American servicemen. The U.S. military initially rejected custody of the suspects as well as a police investigation by Japan. Prefectural and several municipal assemblies of Okinawa lodged resolutions against the U.S. military, and 85,000 people gathered at an island-wide rally (kenmin taikai). The tragic news spread to Japan proper resulting, for the first time since 1945, in the whole Japanese nation being involved in public protests against U.S. military crimes occurring in Okinawa. Rallies organized by various civil society groups, such as political associations, non-governmental organizations, teachers’ associations, and Okinawans’ associations, took place in prefectures throughout Japan (Okinawa Mondai Henshuu Iinkai 1995).

The news also spread to the U.S., and American media reported the news in unusual details over a long period, especially considering it was an incident in Okinawa. Major American newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post carried several articles covering not only the incident, but also the trial of the three accused soldiers and related matters (Associated Press 1995; Graham 1995). For example, the mothers of two of the three defendants demanded “to have the trial moved off Okinawa” since there was “antagonism toward United States bases” that could influence the judges (Associated Press 1995). This reaction from the two mothers was not surprising given that fact that many American soldiers’ crimes were judged by the military court. Moreover, the Washington Post reported a comment by Admiral Macke who was Commander of United
States Pacific Command on the incident, that the servicemen “could have hired a prostitute for the cost of the rental car in which the crime was committed” (Graham 1995). The three servicemen were eventually convicted and sentenced to 6.5-7 years each in prison at the Naha District Court, but the fundamental issues of SOFA and U.S. military presence have remained. In 1996, the Washington Post carried a small article that another case of sexual assault was “being handled through the military justice system” (Sullivan 1996).

In another incident, in 2004, a military helicopter crashed into a university building. The U.S. military blockaded the accident site – part of university campus – for seven days and prohibited entry of Japanese civilians including police detectives and university personnel until the helicopter was removed (Kurosawa 2005). It was witnessed that, after extinguishing the fire, the U.S military personnel in protective clothing and masks sprayed a white chemical and carried away the soil and trees around the crash site (Kurosawa 2005). Leakage of a radioactive substance was suspected, but the U.S. military initially refused to provide the university with a clear explanation. After three weeks, the U.S military eventually admitted that their activities after the crash had something to do with a radioactive substance, that is, Strontium 90, contained in the helicopter safety device, but clear explanations have not been provided (Kurosawa 2005). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, under the Article XXIII of SOFA, the blockade was for protection of U.S. military property (Akahata Web Newspaper 2004). Arakaki (Akahata Web Newspaper 2004) argues that the U.S. police authority was not entitled to exercise its power in this case, and the blockage was an illegal activity even with reference to the SOFA. Kurosawa also argues that it clearly exceeded the prerogatives of American military under the SOFA (Kurosawa 2005). The events related to the helicopter accident represent a juridical contradiction of the SOFA and of American state of exception in Okinawa.

Although the U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes are not secret information, media coverage of these incidents outside Okinawa is generally less enthusiastic and smaller in contrast to that within Okinawa (Ishihara 2006). Gen (2006) argues that Okinawans believed that mainland Japanese people felt sympathy for the Okinawans with regard to the U.S. military issues on the island in 1995 when the sexual assault case received
considerable attention. After a decade, it turned out to be *gensou* (illusion) that mainland Japanese people would share *itami* (pain) with Okinawans for U.S. military issues (Gen 2006). Gen suggests that this illusion masks an image that Okinawa accepted the U.S. military burden in return for development support which had spread during the decade since 1995 (Gen 2006). Consequently, these incidents do not mobilize a nation-wide anti-U.S. military movement. I argue that in the post-reversion era, the Japanese government has not been able to normalize the American exception, but has succeeded in enclosing the military problems within Okinawa through multiple tactics.

### 7.1.2 Special and Provisional Okinawa

“Provisionality” is one of these tactics that the Japanese government employed. The Japanese government used several provisional and special measures in its control and regulation of Okinawans with emphasis on Okinawans’ special status. In Japanese official discourse, Okinawa’s special status is expressed, and many special measures are applied to Okinawa. For example, general provisions of the Special Measure Law for Development of Okinawa (Okinawa Shinkou Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Sochihou Kenkyuukai 1974) state that the special measure for development is provided given Okinawa’s special circumstances. The special circumstances usually include Okinawans’ war experience, U.S. military administration, island environment, concentration of military bases, and fragile economy (Maedomari 2012). Moreover, the Special Measures Law for USFJ (United States Forces, Japan) Land Release (*chuuryuu gunyouchi tokubetu sochi hou* 1952) was applied to Okinawa. The Land Release Law was originally established to provide base sites for the U.S. military as required under the Security Treaty. This law makes it possible for foreign forces to be granted authority to use a given tract of land in Japan in cases when those forces are not able to conclude land rental agreements with an owner (Ministry of Defense 2012). Because most sites provided in Japan proper were nationally-owned land, the terms of the law were applied for only forty-nine sites between 1953 and 1962 (Ministry of Defense 2012). On the other hand, the law has been applied to 75 sites on Okinawa since 1982.
Between 1972 and 1982, the Japanese government employed legislation of specified duration on Okinawa to maintain the U.S. military presence. These laws were *kouyouchi zantei shiyou hou* (Act on Provisional Use of Official Area) and Okinawa *kenno kuikinai niokeru ichikyoukai fumeichiikino kakuhituno tochino ichikyoukaino meikakukanado nikansuru tokubetsu sochihou* (Act on Special Measures concerning Fixing of Boundaries of Each Land Lot in Districts Where Land Boundaries Are Not Clearly Fixed Located in Okinawa Prefecture). During the specified terms, the Japanese government aimed to purchase private real estate allocated for military bases while making continued expropriation of land legally possible. Given Okinawans’ attachment to land, the purchase of land was difficult. The Japanese government eventually applied the Land Release Law to Okinawa in 1982. Meanwhile, the Japanese government had to employ the provisional measures in order to make time for negotiations with the local land owners in Okinawa. The negotiations did not anticipate return of the U.S. military sites to the owners. The Japanese government needed to retain the land in order to maintain the U.S. military bases in compliance with the Security Treaty. Therefore, the provisional measures aimed to postpone immediate demands from many land owners for land return.

The special and provisional measures that have been employed to govern Okinawa are not to achieve for Okinawans political and social equality under the Japanese constitution, but to maintain the state of exception under the Security Treaty. Masahide Oota, in his capacity as an Okinawa governor, tried to resist the provisional measure that sustained the U.S. military burden in Okinawa. The provisional measure for land release required an Okinawa governor’s proxy signature. Oota announced that he would refuse the proxy signature for contract renewals given Okinawans’ increasing dissatisfaction and resistance to the U.S. military after the sexual assault case in 1995. As Oota refused the proxy signature, the Prime Minister instituted a lawsuit against Oota for execution of duty (Okinawa Mondai Henshuu Iinkai 1996). The Naha branch of the Fukuoka High Court supported the plaintiff and ordered Oota to execute the proxy signature (Okinawa Mondai Henshuu Iinkai 1996). Oota’s final appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court in 1996.

Meanwhile, because some provisional contracts had expired during the lawsuit, the
Japanese government revised the Land Release Law and enabled provisional use of the land appropriated for the U.S. military bases on Okinawa. Moreover, the revision allows the Prime Minister to appropriate land under his/her authority.

7.2 Incomplete Governmentality
Agamben (2005) argues that a sovereign is able to create a state of exception which has strong prospects of becoming the rule. However, the process in which a rule is normalized and accepted in a society can be unique, and understanding of the process requires empirical reflection. In this section, I examine the tactics of “rationalization” through which the Japanese government has attempted to normalize the American state of exception in the post reversion era. The first element of the tactic is to create political reasons for the U.S. military presence. Official discourses emphasize the necessity of the U.S. military in the Japanese territory in order to assure security of the Far East and the Pacific. The second element is the use of special and provisional economic measures. The special and provisional measures are employed not only to impose Japanese juridical authority, but to control Okinawa by economic means. During the period of USCAR governance, the U.S. military was a major industry for Okinawans while alternatives to produce a self-sustainable economy were impeded. In 1972, military-related income represented 21.49% of the gross Okinawan income (Oota 1984). In 2007, it represented 5.3% (Ryukyu Shinpou 2007), so that Okinawa’s economic dependence on the military has significantly declined since the time of reversion. The Japanese government has created a new structure for Okinawa’s economic dependency on the U.S. military by providing Okinawa with official funding for Okinawa development in return for the U.S. military presence on the Okinawa islands.

7.2.1 “Rationalizing” U.S. Military Presence
The Japanese government has used discourses of emergency and security as means to justify the U.S. military presence. For example, Yara (2009) points out that the Japanese government argues that Okinawa is important for strategic and geopolitical reasons. In
Okinawa, the Cold War and military requirements in the Pacific were a consistent “reason” for the U.S. to maintain its military presence on Okinawa. In the post Cold War era, the Japanese government still resorts to the same justification by referring to the importance of the Security Treaty. After the 1995 sexual assault case, Oota repeatedly asked the Japanese government to revise the SOFA, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Youhei Kouno, insisted on the importance of the SOFA and the Security Treaty for peace in the Asia-Pacific (Ryukyu Shinpou 1995). Whether Japan is exposed to practical risks of military invasion has been a consistent and unresolved topic of discussion. Nevertheless, the Japanese government has repeatedly emphasized the geopolitical importance of the Okinawa Islands and the advantages that the U.S. military offers as deterrence against foreign military invasion into Japan.

If the Japanese government’s claim to U.S. military deterrence is reasonable, it still has to provide Okinawans with a reason why the U.S bases have to be concentrated in Okinawa. An Okinawan journalist, Tomonori Yara (2009), investigated recent Japanese and American geopolitics regarding Okinawa. In response to Yara’s (2009) question as to whether the U.S. marine corps in Okinawa can be relocated to other areas in Japan, an American commander answered that it does not have to be in Okinawa as long as the Japanese government is prepared to offer fair conditions for the relocation. Meanwhile, a Japanese executive officer of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency could not provide an answer for why the Japanese government could not distribute the U.S. military bases in Okinawa to other areas in Japan (Yara 2009). The security and geopolitical discourses do not provide enough reason that only Okinawans have to make an everyday sacrifice for the U.S. military burden (Yara 2009).

The Japanese policy makers and officials have attempted to justify the post-reversion U.S. military presence in Okinawa by means of the geopolitical discourse and the importance of the Security Treaty. Nevertheless, U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes have reignited Okinawans’ resistance against the U.S. military presence as well as Japanese handling of Okinawa (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Yara 2009). As noted previously, Yamada (2012) argues that Okinawans who became victims of the Pacific War due to the
Japanese military presence in Okinawa do not believe in the deterrence of the U.S. military presence. Despite its failure in legitimizing and disseminating effectively its geopolitical discourse in Okinawa, the Japanese government has successfully confined the military problems to Okinawa. I argue that, along with the geopolitical justification, the Japanese government also has employed other tactics of governance and been able to control Okinawans’ resistance to the level that it does not jeopardize either the Security Treaty or the U.S. military presence in Okinawa.

Japanese official narratives stress economic problems in Okinawa and financial contributions of the Japanese government to Okinawa. For example, the Okinawa Development Bureau (Okinawa Development Bureau 1980, 1, my translation) states that, “it is [the] responsibility of the country to repay Okinawa for its long-term hardships and sacrifice and to provide Okinawa with a desired position within the Japanese economic system.” According to the Okinawa Development Bureau, the Japanese government should financially repay Okinawans for the destruction of lives and soil in Okinawa during the war (Okinawa Development Bureau 1980). The idea that problems in Okinawa could be addressed by economic contributions is also shared by individual Japanese officers. For example, a former Japanese officer of Defense Facilities Administration Agency testified how the Agency had responded to a military accident case in 1978 (Defense Facilities Administration Agency 2007).

On November 1978, a U.S. military carrier dropped a feed pipe by accident and cut off a power cable. It caused a power failure in a large area... We were not sure how much compensation should be paid. One younger officer proposed that “Let’s visit each house and check what has gone bad in a fridge,” (laugh) but it did not sound possible... Among several ideas, we decided to provide consolation payments depending on the length of power failure. I think it was two million yens in total. There was not complaint from the aggrieved party since we made the consolation payments in a speedy manner and with a clear standard (Defense Facilities Administration Agency 2007, 61, my translation).

The officer narrated the incident half in jest and did not problematize the military accident itself that could have caused Okinawans’ deaths. His testimony reveals the official views
that a military accident can be compensated by money, and Okinawans remain calm as long as the damage is compensated.

Takemasa Moriya (2010), who was an administrative vice minister of Defense, explains how the Japanese government dealt with the Okinawa local government for relocation of the Futenma military base from an urban area in Okinawa. In his book, he argues that the Japanese government had already decided that the Futenma military base would be relocated to northern Okinawa main-island offshore, but the governor of Okinawa was not willing to cooperate with the project (Moriya, 2010). While Moriya (2010) worries about the frustration of the American side, he suggests forcible dispersal of Okinawans’ protesters from the construction site. Moriya (2010) expresses his disappointment with the slow progress of the project and the governor’s unwillingness to cooperate with the project. Moriya (2010) also mentions that a great amount of budget for Okinawa northern development project has been allocated in return for the military base relocation from Futenma to the northern region in Okinawa. Moriya shows the Japanese security concern that prevails in the bilateral relationship with the U.S., and also reveals his position that Okinawa is supposed to remain manageable as long as monetary assistance is provided. Therefore, resistance by Okinawans, who receive economic benefit from the Japanese government, is regarded as problematic. In other words, official discourses attempt to justify the U.S. military presence in Okinawa as a price Okinawans should pay in return for the Japanese monetary assistances.

7.2.2 Developing Okinawa Dependency

According to national census data, the population of Okinawa in the early 1970s was around one million. Before the reversion, about 20,000 people were employed in U.S. military bases (Oota 1984), and over 20% of domestic income on Okinawa was military-related in 1972 (Oota 1984). Significant portions of arable land were appropriated for U.S. military bases, so that for most Okinawans whose major industry had been farming, employment in military bases and service industry for American soldiers became major sources of income. In other words, the Okinawa economy had become heavily dependent
on the U.S. military before reversion. The economic dependency of Okinawa on the military industry has gradually declined since the reversion. Despite less and less dependence on military related employment and business after the reversion, a fair amount of Okinawans continue to believe that the Okinawa economy is not sustainable without U.S. military presence.

I argue that the Japanese government has created Okinawa’s structural dependency on U.S. military presence by providing economic support in compensation for hosting military bases in Okinawa. Oota (1984) argues that Okinawa’s prefectural administration is constrained by government funding, so that Okinawans’ demand for resolving military base issues is not well reflected in the policy making of the Okinawa government. Yamada (2012) points out that the conservatives in the Okinawa government assumed it was necessary to tolerate the U.S. military burden in Okinawa in order to receive subsidies from the Japanese government that contributed to Okinawa development. Similarly, Arashiro (2006) argues that while the U.S. military bases impede the possibility of Okinawa’s economic independence, the Japanese government tells its residents that the U.S. military bases economically help Okinawans. By 2009, the Japanese government funded 8.788 trillion yen for Okinawa development projects and provided municipalities that host military bases with additional subsidies (Takasaku 2010). The central government has superior authority to decide the contents of development projects. For example, the Okinawan governor’s proposal for an objective to achieve a development project that would enable “Okinawans’ life without military bases and pollution” was deleted by the Japanese development bureau (Matsuda 1974). Additionally, laws, programs and subsidies for Okinawa development also involve provisional aspects. The Japanese government has funded new projects on a provisional basis in return for the U.S. military presence and can withdraw from Okinawa development anytime.

7.3 Concealment and Unconcern
Okinawans have been disappointed with the Japanese policy that has sustained the U.S. military presence (Okinawa Prefecture 1996; Yamada 2012). As I introduced earlier, the
majority of Okinawans have not demanded independence of Okinawa from the Japanese nation state (Lim 2009). In that sense, the Japanese tactics of governance have seemed more functional than those of the pre-reversion U.S. military governance in Okinawa. In the meantime, Okinawans’ frustration has accumulated (Yamada 2012), and any case involving a U.S. military accident or soldier’s crime, such as the sexual assault case in 1995 and the helicopter crash in 2005, can still give rise to a movement of Okinawans against the U.S. military presence and Japanese governance. I argue that the Japanese government also has employed a tactic of “concealment” in order to make its Okinawa governance less troublesome.

It does not seem possible to conceal the news of American military accidents and soldiers’ crimes today. Therefore, the tactic of concealment is deployed by the Japanese government in another way. The Japanese government has decided on important bilateral security terms with the U.S. behind closed doors and has not provided the Okinawa government with relevant information in advance (Umebayashi 2006). In most cases, when information is eventually released, the Okinawa government has to comply with what is already decided between the Japanese and U.S. governments. The local political leaders are aware that there is an institutional framework in which they eventually must comply with state decisions on the security issues (Umebayashi 2006). For example, Oota eventually had to conduct the proxy signature after the rejection of his appeal at the Supreme Court. The institutional framework, which constrains local political decisions and actions, has been founded on political, judicial and bureaucratic decisions made behind closed doors. The Japanese government has been able to prevent immediate scandals and mitigate counter movements by concealing inconvenient political negotiations and decisions. A recent publication (Moriya 2010) argues not only that the exclusive decisions have been made by the Japanese central government, but also that the Japanese government has given precedence to the security agenda with the U.S. over local circumstances in Japan. Such an argument does not seem to result in a notable movement against the Security Treaty in Japan. I argue that the concealment tactic in conjunction with the Japanese institutional framework has contributed to political apathy among Japanese people in terms of the
security issues. In the following, I present examples of the tactic of “concealment” and the institutional framework that have contributed to maintenance of the Security Treaty and the U.S. military presence in Okinawa.

Umebayashi (2006) argues that local political leaders in Japan feel wrath because the central government conceals important information and does not consult with local political bodies for important political decisions. Above all, agreements and decisions regarding the Security Treaty are carefully concealed by the Japanese government. Article 2 of the SACO ordains that the U.S. – Japan Joint Committee decides terms and conditions of military facilities and areas that are provided for the U.S. military in Japan (Defense Facilities Administration Agency 2007). In principle, terms of agreements are subject to non-disclosure unless both Japanese and American governments agree on disclosure (Defense Facilities Administration Agency 2007).

Recent archival study and publications (Niihara and Fukawa 2013; Wada 2012) explicate how the Japanese government has established the institutional framework that has enabled the concealed practices and sustained the Security Treaty as well as the U.S. state of exception. In 1959, regarding the Sunagawa case trial, the Japanese Supreme Court Chief Justice, Koutaro Tanaka, stated that whether the Security Treaty is unconstitutional or not is highly political, so that it is not within the authority of the judicature to make a judgement on this point (Wada 2012). Prior to the Tanaka decision, in 1955 at the Tokyo district court on the Sunagawa case, it was judged that it was unconstitutional for U.S. forces to be stationed in Japan (Wada 2012). The Sunagawa case was the second case in Japan that skipped a high court and was directly sent to the Supreme Court (Wada 2012). In 2008, Shouji Niihara divulged fourteen telegrams to the Akahata newspaper (Wada 2012). These documents revealed that the American ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur II, suggested the direct appeal of the Sunagawa case to the Supreme Court, and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Aiichirou Fujiyama, fully agreed with the suggestion (Wada 2012). One of the telegrams also indicates a secret meeting between MacArthur II and Tanaka prior to the Supreme Court Trial (Wada 2012). In 2013, Reiko Fukawa made a request to the NARA for disclosure of archival documents related to the Sunagawa case. One of the newly
disclosed documents demonstrates American intervention in the Sunagawa case and Tanaka’s information leakage to the U.S. side (Niihara and Fukawa 2013). Until 2008, information about the American intervention into the Japanese judicature on the security matter was not discovered (Wada 2012). Meanwhile, the Tanaka judgement has become a key judicial precedent for issues concerning the Security Treaty and the U.S. military presence in Japan. In other words, the judicial decisions on the security matters have been greatly influenced by the Tanaka decision which was undermined by the U.S. security interests and the actions taken on their behalf.

The Japanese bureaucratic system also helps ensure the tactic of “concealment” as well as the functioning of the Security Treaty. Moriya (2010) argues that one of the most important duties for public servants is confidentiality. Moriya (2010) outlines how the Japan – U.S. security terms are decided among politicians and high ranking bureaucrats and argues that information leakage is regarded as a significant problem. Japanese bureaucrats also influence political actions behind closed doors. For example, in response to the helicopter crash in the university building, the Japanese Minister of Defense, Ishiba, attempted to remonstrate Rumsfeld, who served as the U.S. Secretary of Defense, on the accident (Moriya 2010). Moriya (2010) persuaded Ishiba not to remonstrate Rumsfeld on this matter. Moriya (2010) assumed that the Japanese side was to be blamed because the Japanese government had not executed the relocation project in a prompt manner. While the U.S. military concealed the information about the helicopter crash, the Japanese bureaucrats secretly acted to side with the U.S. military.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, since Sato’s weak approach to the reversion negotiations, the Japanese government has continued to concede to the U.S. in security matters. Nishiyama (2012) argues that the Japanese government has cooperated with the U.S. global stratagems and accepted various American demands since the reversion. The Japanese government has decided its due roles based on the American conditions which it has unconditionally accepted (Nishiyama 2012). Therefore, the Japanese government also has complied with the U.S. demands to sustain its military presence in Okinawa as well as the Security Treaty. The Japanese central political, judicial and administrative bodies and
personnel have collaborated to assure that they comply with the U.S. demands by concealing what could cause immediate and organized resistance against the Security Treaty. The “concealment” tactic has allowed the Japanese government to prevent critical resistance against the Security Treaty by the majority of Japanese people. It does not mean that the Japanese government has not had to deal with the Japanese resistance against the Security Treaty. In the 1960s, the Japanese government was compelled to suppress forcefully the nation-wide student protest against the renewal of the Security Treaty and the Vietnam War. In that sense, the Japanese policy makers processed the security matters secretly because they were aware that the American demands were not reasonable for the majority of Japanese.

Yamada (2012) points out that apathy regarding the U.S. military presence in Okinawa is spreading among Japanese citizens and some Japanese people avoid worrying about military problems. Meanwhile, Okinawans feel helpless, considering it seems fruitless to protest against U.S. military problems (Yamada 2012). Okinawa’s local media repeatedly report American military accidents and soldiers’ crimes (Takamine 2006). Nagamoto (2006) argues that most Japanese major media treat U.S. military news in Okinawa as secondary coverage. For example, the assault case by the three American servicemen was reported sensationaly, but most major newspapers and TV news had less coverage of the helicopter accident than that of the Athens Olympics and the resignation of a baseball team owner (Ishihara 2006). The Institute of Ryukyu Culture at the Okinawa International University conducted a survey to research media coverage of the helicopter accident. The research results show differences in degrees of interests in the helicopter accident between Okinawan media and other Japanese media (Tamaki 2006). The latter’s lack of interest in the helicopter accident seems to indicate and reflect general disinterest in the military problems in Okinawa among the majority of Japanese people.

Yamada (2012) argues that the concentration of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa represents Japanese discrimination against Okinawans, but Okinawa development projects and resulting economic development in Okinawa have appeased Okinawans’ feelings that they are discriminated against. In 2009, the former Prime Minister Hatoyama in the
Japanese Democratic Party proposed relocation of the Futenma base from Okinawa. Yamada (2012) argues that the Hatoyama’s idealistic approach consolidated Okinawans against the Japanese discrimination that has maintained a high concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. Moreover, the change that Hatoyama brought made it difficult for Okinawans to accept the situation that they receive the deceptive development projects in return for the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. While other prefectures refused relocation of the U.S. military base from Okinawa to their prefectural areas, Okinawans’ frustration grew. In 2011, Ryukyu Shimpo and Asahi newspapers carried articles about U.S. telegrams disclosed by WikiLeaks. The telegrams issued in 2009 indicate Japanese bureaucrats’ suggestion to the U.S. side that the U.S. government should not be flexible in accepting the Futenma relocation proposal by the Japanese Democratic Party (Asahi 2011; Ryukyu Shimpo 2011).

The Japanese government has not been able to offer an adequate rationale for the Security Treaty and the U.S. military presence in Japan, but it has succeeded in concentrating the U.S. military problems in Okinawa. Whether or not the WikiLeaks information is a reliable source, lack of media attention to the military issues in Okinawa and the failure of the Futenma relocation proposal suggest that most Japanese people do not regard the U.S. military problems in Okinawa as immediate problems of their own. In the Japanese official discourses, Okinawans are represented as a special group for which special measures are required. The Okinawan “Other” is not only represented as a special people, but also treated as a convenient people upon whom military risks can be imposed for the sake of Japanese security. For example, the Japanese conservative politicians and bureaucrats have been promoting the Futenma relocation plan within Okinawa since other prefectures do not accept the U.S. military burden (Watanabe 2008; Yamada 2012).

Meanwhile, the Japanese government has implemented special financial measures for Okinawa development in return for the U.S. military burden in Okinawa (Watanabe 2008; Yamada 2012). While Okinawans are required to share the security responsibility as Japanese people, they are imposed the military burden as the special “Other.” The Japanese government has exploited the identity of Okinawans in order to mitigate the military burden.
on the majority of Japanese while the American security demands are still realized within Japanese state boundaries (Yamada 2012). The tactic of “concealment” has prevented sudden sensationalization of U.S. military problems, and Japanese people have been desensitized by the constant resistance by Okinawans. Moreover, under the Japanese institutional framework, critical voices speaking against the Security Treaty have been rejected and ignored. For instance, the Futenma relocation project has been decided upon and processed by policy makers and bureaucrats within the Japanese central government, and Okinawans are excluded from the decision making and implementation of the project (Watanabe 2008; Yamada 2012). The Japanese government also has succeeded in creating political apathy within Japan about the security matters by its exclusive and secret practices (Yamada 2012). In order to eliminate the U.S. military exception, it is necessary that the majority of Japanese sees the U.S. military problems and security issues as concerns that they share with Okinawans.

7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, in response to the two research questions, I introduced how the Japanese government has sustained the highly concentrated U.S. military bases in Okinawa since the Okinawa reversion in 1972. The U.S. military governance ended in 1972, but its continued presence has produced significant problems in Okinawa. Some cases of U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes have not been properly judged under the Japanese jurisdiction. Several critical studies (Gabe 2000; Ibata 2010; Ikemiyagi 2008) point out that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty that has allowed the U.S. juridical supremacy in its military matters in Japan is a cause of these juridical contradictions in Okinawa. With reference to the tactics of governance and Agamben’s theory of state of exception, I aimed to contribute to analytical development of these critical studies. Agamben (2005) presents many cases of state of exception wherein political rights of certain individuals or groups are suspended. I argue that the case of juridical suspension in Okinawa regarding the U.S. military presence can be examined through Agamebn’s (2005) theoretical insight that sovereignty is monopolized by certain elites while political rights of certain people are compromised. I
also addressed three tactics of governance – “rationalization,” “provisionality” and “concealment” – as key elements that have enabled the Japanese government to sustain the exceptional U.S. military presence in Okinawa. Moreover, I elaborated Foucauldian analysis of representational reality and argued that the Okinawans’ ambivalent identity as the “Self” and the “Other” with the Japanese nation is a key factor to understand why the U.S. military burden has been concentrated in Okinawa. In the concluding chapter, I will summarize and analyze main findings of this study as well as contributions, limitations and future directions associated with the research.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.0 Introduction
This study has aimed to answer the two research questions related to the governance of Okinawa after World War II. Firstly, I investigated governing techniques through which the U.S. military and the Japanese government have sustained the U.S. military bases in Okinawa in order to respond to “what factors have made possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa?” Secondly, I investigated identity politics regarding Okinawans to answer “what is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa?” This study contains new findings and analytical elaboration that can contribute to future studies of U.S. military bases as well as to studies of governance at large. The new findings are based on information from archival and secondary references that were analyzed through analytical approaches of Foucault and Agamben as well as my own articulation of particular forms of tactics of governance. I argue that the approaches developed by Foucault and Agamben are useful analytical tools that also may be applied to other cases of governance. Additionally, the three tactics of governance – “rationalization,” “concealment” and “ provisionality” – which I introduced in this study can contribute to examining governing practices through which political executives attempt to turn exceptional measures into rules. In this chapter, I summarize research findings, contributions, limitations and future directions of this study.

8.1 Findings and Analysis
This section summarizes research findings with reference to Foucault’s concept of governmentality and Agamben’s theory of state of exception as well as tactics of governance. By applying analytical insights of Foucault and Agamben, this thesis draws attention to the distinct U.S. and Japanese governing structures that have sustained and concentrated the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. I argue that three tactics of governance have contributed to relatively stable structures of governance through which the U.S. military and the Japanese government have maintained the heavy U.S. military burden in Okinawa. Meanwhile, I suggest that there are also differences in how the U.S. military and
Japanese government have deployed their governing tactics, and these differences are key elements that have caused failures in the U.S military governance and relative success in the Japanese governance in Okinawa.

In the course of my archival research, I intended to search for key elements that sustained the U.S. military governance in Okinawa for 27 years. Initially, with reference to Agamben’s (2005) theory of state of exception and secondary sources (Fukuchi 1995; Senaga 1971), I wondered if I could find in archival documents, patterns of thought or practice that characterize the U.S. military governance in Okinawa. I could not help noticing that the term “democracy” is repeatedly used in many U.S. archival documents. It was an unexpected and surprising discovery that the U.S. military also employed the discourse of democracy in its governance in Okinawa. As I read more documents and referred back to Foucault’s insight about non-violent modern governance, I began to notice that the U.S. military as well as the U.S. State Department did not explicitly acknowledge that they would resort to their military power as a major means of military governance in Okinawa. In contrast to the discourse of democracy, the U.S. military forcibly appropriated Okinawans’ land for the construction of its bases. Moreover, Okinawans were not protected under proper political and juridical institutions. Having discovered these signs of American military exceptionalism in archival documents and secondary sources, I began to reconsider Agamben’s (1995) argument that state of exception becomes a rule. The analysis conducted for this research suggests that the U.S. military attempted to justify its exceptional governance in Okinawa by using a discourse of democracy in order to normalize the U.S. military presence in Okinawa.

The U.S. military also tried to justify its governance in Okinawa by employing a discourse of security (Steeves 1956a). This discourse is shared among U.S. officials and military personnel as a primary objective of their governance in Okinawa. Nevertheless, for Okinawans who were exposed to military violence in their everyday life, the U.S. military presence in Okinawa for security of the Pacific was not a tolerable reality. The Japanese government also employed the discourse of security in order to justify the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The Japanese discourse of security is produced in relation to the
Security Treaty (Yara 2009). The Security Treaty is a legal foundation on which the Japanese government has sustained U.S. military bases within the Japanese state boundary including Okinawa. Analysis of the Security Treaty still does not explain why the U.S. military bases have been unequally distributed and concentrated in Okinawa since its application is not limited to Okinawa, but effective to the entire Japanese territory. In order to investigate the concentration of U.S. military burdens in Okinawa, with reference to Foucault’s insights, I analyzed discourses that the Japanese government employed. The Japanese government emphasized deterrence of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa for the security of Japan. However, this does not offer an adequate explanation as to why these bases remain. As Yara (2009) discovered through his interviews with U.S. military executives, the U.S. military could have been relocated from Okinawa to other regions in Japan insofar as the U.S. military strategy in the Far East is concerned.

For Okinawans who have suffered from U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes, the security discourses do not seem to provide them with convincing reasons why the heavy U.S. military burden has to be imposed on them. Several studies (Yamada 2012; Yoshida 2008) point out that the heavy U.S. military burden in Okinawa constitutes a form of Japanese discrimination against Okinawans or that Okinawa is a military colony of the U.S. and Japan. I suggest that discourse analysis of identity politics in this study helps to inform an understanding of discrimination and military colony that is the focus of these other studies. Both the U.S. military and the Japanese government constructed and treated Okinawans as the “Other” group for whom the superior “Selves” – U.S. military and Japanese executives – can provide support. U.S. officials and military personnel presupposed their superiority and Okinawans’ inferiority regarding respective degrees of political development. The division between the superior American Self and the inferior Okinawan “Other” is explicit when the U.S. military personnel narrate their democratization efforts in Okinawa. Americans are represented as those who democratize Okinawa and teach Okinawans how to improve their life. Okinawans are portrayed as those who must learn ideas and practices of democracy from Americans. In practice, the American democratic principles were largely compromised for their security interests in
Okinawa. The representational division between the American “Self” and the Okinawan “Other” as well as Okinawans’ resistance against the U.S. military presence demonstrate that Americans and Okinawans on the Okinawa islands regarded each other as a foreign group of people.

The Japanese government also represents and treats Okinawans as the “Other” group, but it exploits in a flexible manner ambivalent identities attached to Okinawans. On the one hand, Okinawans are expected to fulfill their security responsibility as part of their citizenship obligations within the Japanese nation. On the other hand, the Japanese government applies special financial measures to Okinawans who are represented as a special group within the Japanese nation. The special financial measures are provided for Okinawa economic development as if the Japanese government sincerely considers it necessary to recognize the historical and current hardship of Okinawans. According to Moriya (2010) and Yamada (2012), the Japanese government has subsidized Okinawa development projects as compensation for the U.S. military burden in Okinawa. The Okinawan conservatives whose local government has heavily relied on the subsidies from the Japanese government are hesitant to dispute explicitly the position taken by national elites regarding the U.S. military burden in Okinawa since it can terminate or curtail subsidies from the central government. Therefore, the Japanese official subsidy functions as a financial trap which constrains resistance by Okinawans and sustains the concentrated U.S. military bases in Okinawa. I argue that most Japanese people do not regard the U.S. military bases in Okinawa as a burden that the whole Japanese nation should be concerned with. The major reason why the concentrated U.S. military bases have been maintained in Okinawa is that the majority of Japanese people accept the Japanese central policies that exploit the Okinawan minority group. While the Japanese government cannot fundamentally justify the heavy U.S. military burden in Okinawa, maintaining the military burden in Okinawa is a reasonable practice for the majority of Japanese people. I argue that the U.S. military treated Okinawans as the incommensurable “Other” and could not make them share the U.S. security agenda. Meanwhile, the Japanese government exploits as it sees fit Okinawa as part of the Japanese nation that needs to share security responsibility,
and treats the Okinawans as the “Other,” a special group that needs official support.

The ongoing U.S. military accidents and soldiers’ crimes have stimulated Okinawans’ resistance against the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. For example, the assault incident by the three American servicemen in 1995 and the helicopter accident in 2004 resulted in island-wide movements against the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The former incident caught media attention not only in Okinawa, but also in the U.S. and Japan proper. The assault case explicates juridical contradiction in Okinawa under the Security Treaty that Okinawans are not properly protected under the Japanese jurisdiction when accidents and crimes are caused due to the U.S. military presence. I noticed that “rationalization” through discourses of democracy, security and Other/Self is not a sufficient governing tactic to normalize the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. In this study, I also analyzed tactics of “provisionality” and “concealment” as elements that mitigate Okinawans’ resistance. The Japanese tactic of “provisionality” is explicit in forms of temporary economic subsidies and provisional laws. I discovered that the Japanese tactic of “provisionality” differs from that which was employed by the U.S. military. While the Japanese government has intentionally employed provisional measures whenever necessary in order to prevent Okinawans’ movements against the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, “provisionality” of U.S. military occupation in Okinawa was an unintended consequence of U.S. national and international politics. The U.S. military employed provisional measures during the first five years following World War II when its future roles in Okinawa were still uncertain. In the USCAR regime, as it became apparent that the U.S. military aimed to station its bases in Okinawa for a longer period, Okinawans’ resistance intensified. Analysis of the tactic of “provisionality” employed by the Japanese government and the U.S. military suggests that this tactic can be employed both intentionally, such as Japanese subsidies in Okinawa, and unintentionally, as in the case of early U.S. military occupation of Okinawa. Moreover, it suggests that these provisional measures can mitigate immediate resistance by marginalized groups.

Both the U.S. military and the Japanese government have intentionally conducted tactics of “concealment,” but the latter employs a more sophisticated institutional form of
“concealment.” Research by Vine (2009) suggests the U.S. military concealed its appropriation of indigenous land in Diego Garcia. As I read archival documents (Davis 1956), I noticed that the U.S. military intentionally concealed other information about its governance in Okinawa. It was not difficult to find secondary sources (Monna 1996) that discuss the control of U.S. military information within Okinawa. The studies by Vine (2009) and Monna (1996) and the archival documents (Davis 1956) made me pay attention to the practice of “concealment” as another tactic of governance that has sustained the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I began to examine whether the Japanese government also has employed the tactic of “concealment” in order to normalize the U.S. military exceptionalism in Okinawa. Moriya’s (2010) testimony demonstrates that the Japanese politicians and bureaucrats have concealed inconvenient factors about the Security Treaty that can cause resistance against the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. I argue that the tactics of “concealment” by the U.S. military were not fully successful as information about problems of its governance in Okinawa began to spread to the U.S. and Japan, but still had effects on maintenance of the U.S. military bases. Meanwhile, the Japanese government created a more sophisticated institutional framework of concealment. A recent archival study (Niihara and Fukawa 2013) revealed that not only the Japanese legislative and bureaucracy, but also the judicature is involved in the institutional framework to conceal inconvenient information about the Security Treaty. The research finding suggests that the U.S. military and the Japanese government have employed the tactic of “concealment” to avoid immediate resistance. Moreover, different results of “concealment” by the U.S. military and the Japanese government suggest that the more sophisticated the form of concealment a governing body employs, the more effectively it can control resistance against it by a group that is not satisfied with its governance.

In this section, I presented my research findings and analysis. My research findings suggest that the U.S. military and the Japanese government share similar patterns of governance, that is, tactics of “rationalization,” “concealment” and “provisionality” in their governance of Okinawa. Deployment of these tactics has not allowed the U.S. military and the Japanese government to make the U.S. military presence an acceptable rule for
Okinawans. In other words, the U.S. military and the Japanese government have not been able to achieve their hegemonic control over Okinawans by employing these tactics of governance. Instead, these tactics of governance have allowed the U.S. military and the Japanese government to confine U.S. military bases in Okinawa since 1945. I regard the deployment of these tactics as part of ongoing processes in which the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to normalize U.S. military exceptionalism in Okinawa. U.S. military failure in its governance in Okinawa in contrast to the Japanese government’s relative success suggests that deployment of these tactics is a contested process that is influenced by discursive factors. Therefore, in this study, I examined multiple factors, such as international politics and Okinawans’ resistance, that have influenced deployment of tactics by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in practice.

8.2 Contributions and Limitations
The objective of this study is to investigate what factors have made possible the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and what is the significance of the concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa. In the process of investigation, I referred to the analytical insights of Foucault and Agamben as well as tactics of governance in order to analyze how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have attempted to normalize the U.S. military presence and maintain the U.S. military burden in Okinawa. This study, which focused on the case of various forms of governance represented by the U.S. military and the Japanese government in Okinawa, can be linked with other cases and situated within the broader study of governance. In this section, I introduce contributions of this study to the broader research on governance. I also present limitations that I faced in this research.

This study employed multiple analytical elements. Agamben’s theory of state of exception (2005; 1995) is a useful analytical approach to analyze how some executives in one regime monopolizes sovereignty to dominate certain groups or individuals whose legal rights are suspended. Meanwhile, Foucault’s (1991; 1977) analytical insights concerning
how governmentality is facilitated by deployment of discourses through institutions are relevant to analyze how ideas and practices of governance are disseminated and become accepted reality. I argue that the two analytical approaches by Agamben and Foucault can be integrated in order to grasp discursive and dynamic structures of modern governance. In this study, I employed Agamben’s insights to examine how the U.S. military employed exceptional measures to establish and prolong its bases. I also employed Foucault’s insights to examine how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have tried to sustain and normalize the U.S. military presence by providing rationale of their governances. The two analytical approaches by Agamben and Foucault can be linked by looking at exceptionalism as a threshold of governance and “rationalization” as a process to make the exceptionalism an enduring practice. The link between analytical approaches of Agamben and Foucault is one contribution of this study.

My analysis has shown, moreover, that it is important to understand that governance often depends on multiple mechanisms, including tactics of “rationalization,” “concealment” and “provisionality.” Agamben (2005) presents several cases of state of exception and also argues that a state of exception becomes rule. I have argued in this study that in addition to “rationalization,” the U.S. military and the Japanese government employed tactics of “concealment” and “provisionality” to normalize the heavy U.S. military burden in Okinawa. The analytical approaches I employed in this study can be applied to other cases of state of exception to analyze how exceptional measures in these cases are normalized. As I discussed in chapter 2, Sassen’s (2006) study suggests structural similarities between national and international forms of governance. Both in national and international settings, power is unequally distributed, and rights of certain groups of people are deprived (Sassen 2006). Analytical approaches that I employed in this study also can be applied to cases of international governance wherein exceptional measures are deployed by international institutions and unequal power relations are maintained. I believe that this study can contribute to analytical development in fields of national and international governance.

Foucault (1972) argues that discourse and institutional practices are discursive;
governance in each setting in a given time may entail unique features. Therefore, I do not argue that the analytical approaches I employed in this study are always and perfectly applicable to any particular case of governance. I suggest instead that they serve as analytical references with which other scholars can investigate structural similarities and differences in other cases of governance wherein inequality among people or nations are sustained.

It is also possible that more complex tactics of governance may have employed even within Okinawa. Within limited research time, I collected and analyzed as many archival documents as possible. I do not argue that I was able to search and read the entire archival collection related to the U.S. military governance in Okinawa, but I was able to read a sufficient amount of archival documents to grasp patterns of thought – such as discourses of the “Other,” democracy and security – shared among the U.S. military personnel.

8.3 Future Directions
In my master’s thesis (2004), I analyzed how the modern Japanese government has destroyed indigenous culture and environment in the northern island (Hokkaido) of Japan. The current study elaborates analytical insights of Foucault and critical approaches to history of the modern Japanese government which I used in the previous study. I would like to continue to investigate social problems that have been caused by the Japanese government in its modernizing projects. Future studies along with this trajectory include investigation of environmental problems in Okinawa. In the course of current research, I learned that the U.S. military bases have caused various environmental problems in Okinawa. I am interested in looking at other archival files and secondary sources to find out how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have dealt with the environmental problems in Okinawa. Moreover, I would like to expand research fields to other countries which were invaded and colonized by the Empire of Japan. Among many countries and regions, I would like to conduct research on the modern history of Taiwan. Okinawa and Taiwan were incorporated in the Japanese state boundary in the late 19th century. To date,
sovereignties of Okinawans and Taiwanese are largely compromised in international politics. I would like to investigate how the Japanese colonization has influenced recent sovereignty issues in both areas.

I am also interested in recent U.S. military situations on islands around the world. For example, the U.S. military is stationed in Hawaii and Guam, both of which are included in distinctive ways as American territories. I would like to investigate why islands of Hawaii and Guam were chosen as military staging sites and whether the U.S. military bases in these islands contain structural similarities to those in Okinawa. Moreover, I would like to know whether nationalities affect peoples’ feeling and reactions to military presence. Guam is a special territory of the U.S. while Hawaii is part of the United States, and I assume they have different sense of national belonging as well as attitudes about the U.S. military presence. Through comparative study of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, Hawaii and Guam wherein people have different senses of nationhood, I may be able to elaborate how identity politics affect the U.S. military planning to make its presence accepted by island peoples.

8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I summarized my discussion and analysis and presented contributions, limitations and future directions of this study. The U.S. military constructed its bases and governed Okinawa between 1945 and 1972. I argue that the U.S. military presence in Okinawa can be analyzed with reference to Agamben’s theory of state of exception. On the other hand, creation of a state of exception by U.S. military forces did not guarantee its ability to sustain stable governance in Okinawa. The U.S. military and the Japanese government have employed multiple tactics to normalize the U.S. military presence. I looked at the tactics of “provisionality” and “concealment” in addition to Foucault’s insights into discourses and power in order to investigate how the U.S. military and the Japanese government have managed to maintain the long-term concentration of U.S. military bases in Okinawa despite the negative consequences for Okinawans. Governing regimes under both the U.S. military and the Japanese government have faced Okinawans’
resistance and do not seem to operate as a functional form of governmentality in the manner that Foucault presented. I argue that modern governance is not always a stable practice, revealing instead varying forms of social control that must be both flexible and discursive, if social control is to be maintained on a long term basis without excessive coercion in a democratic context. I aimed to explicate representative aspects of these complex mechanisms of modern governance by looking at U.S. military exceptionalism in Okinawa. This study contains analytical elements that can contribute to our understanding of the study of governance. It may be a very small step in the process of achieving the capacity to better our societies; I hope that this study can be part of ongoing efforts to create societies in which no group is more advantaged or disadvantaged than others.
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Appendix: Map of U.S. Military Facilities in Okinawa

Map 2. “Map of Training Areas in Okinawa” Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office 2014