Negotiating Identities in CARICOM: How CARICOM Nationals Experience Intra-Regional Migration and Regionalism

A Thesis Submitted to the College of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Sociology University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon, Canada

By Oral Robinson

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Abstract

As the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) deepens its economic and political integration, the development of the CARICOM identity is seen as both a natural outgrowth, and as paramount to its success. This is because a regional identity can promote social cohesion and shape political objects, including social policies. Regional identities are also shaped by politics, social relations and personal attributes. Using data from a cross-national survey and semi-structured interviews, this thesis examines the nuances of identity formation in CARICOM. It specifically asks three questions: a) how do intra-regional CARICOM migrants negotiate their identities and self-identify? b) How do intra-regional CARICOM migrants construct their lived-experiences in other CARICOM countries? And c) how do intra-regional migrants rationalize the impact of CARICOM regionalism on their identities? These data are analyzed statistically, and through the interpretations of migrants’ discourses and experiences.

The study identifies six factors that determine attachments to CARICOM: education level, citizenship region, the meaningfulness of CARICOM, benefits of CARICOM, belonging in member countries, and the nature of migratory experiences. All these variables moderately impact attachment to CARICOM except perceived benefits, which is strongly associated with identification with CARICOM. Perceptions of benefits also impact how migrants rationalized regionalism and their experiences. Overall, support for regional integration and a regional identity are strong, but the CARICOM identity is weak and non-salient primarily because expectations of benefits do not match lived realities. The deepening of the CARICOM identity are therefore contingent on: people experiencing CARICOM’s expected benefits; the development of policies that address perceived failures; CARICOM rebranding itself and being more engaged with its constituents; and on collaborative actions being taken to embed the regional identity into national ones.
Acknowledgements

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I want to thank the participants for availing themselves for the research and for sharing their experiences honestly with me. Without their participation, this research would not have been possible. I also want to thank my friends, who helped with the recruitment by circulating the recruitment flyer and posting details about the research on their social networking pages. I also want to thank the migrant associations, students’ associations and the University of the West Indies (UWI) Alumni Association for promoting the study to their members. Thanks also to the Social Sciences Research Laboratory (SSRL) at the University of Saskatchewan for hosting and collecting data from the online survey. In particular, I want to thank the Experimental Research Manager and Specialist, Jesse Langstaff for the helping me with the layout of the survey, which
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Association of Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community or Caribbean Community and Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIFTA</td>
<td>Caribbean Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSME</td>
<td>Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Office of Migration</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organization of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALISES</td>
<td>Sir Arthur Lewis Institute for Social and Economic Studies</td>
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<td>SICA</td>
<td>Central American Integration System</td>
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<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small Island Developing States</td>
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<td>SSRL</td>
<td>Social Sciences Research Laboratories (University of Saskatchewan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Unión de Naciones Suramericanas/ Union of South American Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNECLAC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Fund for Population Activities</td>
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<td>UWI</td>
<td>University of the West Indies</td>
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background

The premise that “West Indians [are] basically one people with a common history, common identity and a single destiny” (Demas, 1976: xviii) has been the driving force behind regional integration\(^1\) initiatives of the British Commonwealth, both during the colonial and post-independence eras. For the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)\(^2\), which comprises a third of the countries recognized by the United Nations as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), regional integration is an important strategy to overcome their unique vulnerabilities, which includes:

- Small size, geographic dispersion (and, in many cases, remoteness);
- Their vulnerability to natural disasters;
- The fragility of their ecosystems;
- Their isolation from markets and their limited internal markets;
- Migration (particularly of highly skilled citizens);
- Their limited commodities and consequent dependence on imports;
- And their limited ability to reap the benefits of economies of scale (UWI Centre for Environment & Development, 2002: 1).

CARICOM’s response to overcoming its vulnerabilities is not unique. Regional integration and the formation of trade blocs\(^3\) have become common following the successes of the European Economic Community, which was formed in the 1950s (now the European Union). Regional integration became a reflexive outgrowth of the Second World War (Boxill, 1997), which

---

1 It should be noted that within the Caribbean, this notion of “regionalism” refers to supranational integration of a number of countries into a “region”. This is contrary to other contexts, wherein, regionalism refers to subnational regions, as in the case of separatist movements or smaller regions that make up a nation, such as provinces or states\(^1\).

2 A supranational organisation of 15 member states in the Caribbean, namely: Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago.

3 See for example SICA (Central American Integration System); UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) and SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation)
propelled neoliberalism and globalization as the dominant means through which international affairs are organized (Boxill, 1993). As a result, integration through regional blocs are now seen as an effective way for countries to overcome their unique vulnerabilities, and sustain economic and political viability. Regional integration also allows countries to increase their global political influence, benefit from economies of scale and promote social cohesion between diverse countries. Given the small size of most Caribbean countries, many scholars agree that regional integration is a practical way for them to mitigate their vulnerabilities and remain viable in the global sphere (Downes, 2008; Hall, 2012; Rosewarne, 2010; Strachan & Vigilance, 2011; UWI Centre for Environment & Development, 2002).

In accordance with its risk reduction goals, the Caribbean Heads of Government have been progressively taking steps to create a single market and economic space (called “the Caribbean Single Market and Economy” or “CSME”) with the signing of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1989 (hereinafter called “the treaty”). CARICOM’s main objectives include averting the threats of globalization by promoting economic integration and cooperation among its members; ensuring that the benefits of integration are equitably shared; enhancing functional cooperation; and the coordination of foreign policy and the strengthening of a regional identity (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001). Since its inception, CARICOM has reached an advanced stage of integration, with policies and institutions governing most aspects of Caribbean life (see Appendix C for list of institutions). Through its institutions and policy, the influence of CARICOM on people can be said to be pervasive or comprehensive (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006).

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4 The CSME aims to create a single economic space among member countries. Just like in the EU where Britain opted not use the Euro currency, CARICOM member countries can choose to opt out of the CSME. Three full member countries are not part of the CSME: the Bahamas voluntarily opted out; Montserrat is still a UK dependent country and has not expressed a desire to join the CSME; Haiti is the most recent CARICOM member country and is required to make certain economic and social improvements before they are admitted to the CSME.
Integration not only provides economic and security benefits, but supranational identities are often common outcomes inasmuch as they drive integration processes. As a prototype for regional cooperation (Boxill, 1993; Revauger, 2008), the European Union is also perceived as a model for understanding the formation of supranational identities (Bruter, 2005; Marks, 1999). So important is a regional identity to regional integration in the Caribbean that it is embodied in CARICOM’s motto: “One community, One market, One people” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). Likewise, free movement of people is very important in CARICOM because as the CARICOM Secretariat (2005: para. 5), states: “from the outset, free movement is an important pillar of... the CSME [In addition] Article 45 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas requires that member states commit themselves to the goal of free movement of their nationals within the community”. In fact, the West Indian Commission Report, Time for Action, which recommended the formation of the CSME assumes regionalism as the natural outgrowth of a regional identity:

Caribbean regionalism is the outgrowth of more than 300 years of West Indian kinship –the vagaries of the socioeconomic and political history of transplanted people from which is evolving a Caribbean identity. Without that element of West Indian identity a community of Caribbean would be mere markings on a parchment –a community without a soul. Without a vision, without a shared destiny (Time for Action, 1992: xxiii).

This unquestioned assumption of a regional identity is further reflected in the view that “CARICOM is not something apart; it is all of us” (Time for Action, 1992: xxiv). Accordingly, one of the mandates of the CSME is the facilitation of free movement of factors of production (labor, capital, entrepreneurship etc.); to strengthen the shared identity and to propel integration (Hall, 2012). Free movements of labour, under the treaty, entail “the right to seek employment in
any member state and the elimination of the need for work permits of stay” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011b). Free movement of people is expected to realize the “one community, one people” element of CARICOM’s motto. The CARICOM Secretariat (2011) affirms that the future of the community rests in the development of a common identity through free movement of CARICOM nationals:

It is important to note from the outset that free movement is an important pillar of any genuine single market and economy, thus also the CSME. Article 45 of the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas therefore states that: ‘Member States commit themselves to the goal of free movement of their nationals within the community’. Furthermore, in Article II, Respect for Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, of the Charter of Civil Society, the following is included as one of the fundamental human rights and freedoms: Freedom of movement within the Caribbean Community, subject to such exceptions and qualifications as may be authorized by national law and which are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society. (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011).

As the above quote from the CARICOM secretariat shows, the free movement of CARICOM nationals is not just a by-product of economic integration of the region, but is integral to its realization. In this regard, the free movement of people can be conceived as a goal in itself, inasmuch as it is a tool for promoting a common identity, social cohesion and economic development.

1.01 The Current State of Free Movement of Labour in CARICOM

Although the free movement of people is one of the pillars of the CSME, most member states have been hesitant to open their borders to regional migrants. Currently, only five
categories of CARICOM nationals are eligible for free movements within the region: university graduates, media persons, artists, musicians and sportspersons, who must obtain a skills certificate both from their home and receiving countries (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011). This, in spite of the fact that “chapter III of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas provides for the free movement of non-wage earners, either as service providers and/or to establish businesses, including managerial, supervisory and technical staff, and their spouses and immediate family members” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011, para. 17). However, this has been put off for implementation on a phased basis without deadlines (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011). This means that the goals of free movement and the possibility of creating a regional identity are being undermined by the non-implementation of policies, and practices at the national levels. Goddard (2012:550), for example, points out that in addition to there being only 5 categories of people who can move freely within CARICOM, these people are not at liberty to migrate to all countries. This is because only 12 of the 15 member states are part of the free movement initiative (Goddard, 2012:550). The other three CARICOM states\(^5\) have not instituted free movements at all. Goddard further rejects the notion of free movement of people within CARICOM because as of 2012, “no member state [had] enacted the necessary legislation and effected the administrative arrangements” to give effect to the free movement to other categories of workers such as entrepreneurs, technical, managerial and supervisory staff, spouses and immediate family members (Goddard, 2012:550-551). The goal of identity building through intra-regional migration is therefore being subverted under the existing framework, where only a limited category of persons can move freely, and within only some CARICOM countries.

\(^5\) Bahamas, Haiti and Montserrat
In addition to the lack of firm policies to guide free movement of people, social relations within CARICOM countries also impact the development of a regional identity. Unlike the principals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas who assumed that there is a pre-existing regional identity (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005), many writers define the Caribbean in terms of ethnic diversity, cultural pluralism, multiple identities and socioeconomic differences between countries (Garcia, 2008; Elbow, 1999; Premdas, 1996). Furthermore, previous research has shown that neither integration nor identity formation presuppose each other (Bruter, 2005; Cinnirella, 1997; Smith, 1992). In some cases, integration can threaten national identity through competition and conflicts between countries, but at other times, it complements the development of national identity. In either case, many social scientists now assert that the formation/maintenance of collective identities is usually a negotiated process (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006; Giddens, 1997; Gabriel & Lang, 1995; Hall, 2001; Seale, 2004; Swann, 2005). Intra-regional movements, social relationships, individual attributes and everyday experiences are channels through which identities can be negotiated (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006).

1.02 Negotiating a CARICOM Identity

According to Swann (2005:69) identity negotiation refers to “the process through which the perceiver and the target come to an understanding of what identity the target will assume in the [process of] interaction”. This means that identities are usually the outcome of interaction, and are affected by situational and structural factors. While it is individuals who are engaged in the interaction, structures often determine the condition under which interaction occurs as well as the outcome. In a regional context, migration is regarded an important site for the negotiation of identities (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006), and can also affect regional integration. Within regional blocs, migration is often managed by supranational institutions and through policies outside of
individual or national control. For example, the controversy surrounding European migration to Britain demonstrates how individuals can mobilize to influence political decisions (Gross, 2014). In the case of Britain, emotional responses to European migration to the UK led to political backlash, driving calls for a referendum to decide on whether to exit the European Union (Gross, 2014). Gross (2014) points out that many people in Britain are complaining that immigration is changing the face of Britain to the point where it is losing its cultural and ethnic identity.

Migration and experiences of regional integration can thus be conceived of as sites (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006) that can trigger political mobilization on identity issues, or influence the formation, maintenance or negotiation of identities.

The process of identity negotiation involves interaction, engagement and interpretations of: laws, people, cultures, countries, institutions and social processes. Swann (2005) notes that this often occurs with little conscious thought, but it is self-awareness that allows individuals to have a sense of who they are in relation to society and culture. Furthermore, it is by reflexively adjusting one's perception of self in reaction to society that people construct their individual identity. Swann (2005) warns that not all social interactions result in the formation of identities. Some interactions are just routine and bear little impact on identities; however, others might be more significant. For example, when two parties engage in social interaction, there can be a battle of wills, with each party vying to convince others to adopt their point of view. These battles are typically resolved when each party develops a greater sense of congruence, which is achieved through further interaction. At the end of these interactions, an individual might modify his/her viewpoint, adopt a new viewpoint, hold firmly to pre-existing views or develop a stronger sense of opposition to alternate positions, which can impact their identities. Intra-regional migration and regionalism have become significant avenues through which Caribbean nationals
negotiate their identities. The negotiation of identities means that identity formation is a continuous process, which must be contextually understood (Seale, 2004). It also means that identities are malleable (Swann, 2005), so intra-regional migration can modify, create, shift or maintain identities, depending on the individuals, their interactions with others and the social system (Giddens, 1991).

1.03 Rationale

With globalization, supranational and regional identities have gained currency in international and economic relations due to their value in propelling economic development. Identities, more than ever before, are used to regulate access across geopolitical boundaries (Alexander, Kaur & St. Louis, 2012). For example, passports, visas and other forms of identity tools are increasingly required to access countries, particularly after 9/11. This study into CARICOM’s regionalism and identity formation, therefore has both practical and policy implications, especially as migrants are increasingly living their lives outside of national borders. Full recognition of a CARICOM identity could determine whether migrants are allowed or denied entry, not only within member states, but even externally, as CARICOM deepens its relationship with the external world. It could also impact how migrants see themselves; how they relate to fellow CARICOM nationals; and their relationship with the institutions of CARICOM (see Appendix C for a list of institution). In addition, identities have significant impacts on migration trends, which have lasting impacts on the landscapes of destination countries as well as on how the region is integrated in the global economy.

In addition, identities are important to regional integration because they can exert significant influence over policies through collective action (Paasi, 2009; Terada, 2003). As such, supranational movements require regional consciousness because it provides social capital, social
cohesion as well as economic development through cooperation among diverse people (Paasi, 2009:138). The cooperation that a regional consciousness produces can also reduce competitiveness (Terada, 2003) and allow countries overcome the problems of isolation. Conversely, without social cohesion, identities can be mobilized to derail integration through identity politics and unproductive competition. Integration thus supports regional identities inasmuch as it depends on it to be successful (Risse, 2005; Terada, 2003).

Migration also has ramifications on social relationships within and between host and origin countries. More crucially, intra-regional movement can also be a source of conflict if immigrants are not integrated in host societies, and identities can be a source of impediment or a facilitator to integration (Lesser, Fernandez-Alfaró, Cowie & Bruni, 2006). In fact, the literature makes a direct connection between identity construction/formation and modes of incorporation among migrants (Valtonen, 1996). This research therefore goes beyond theorizing Caribbean identities and intra-regional movements, and examines the phenomenon empirically. The study is also relevant to fill the gap in scholarly work on identities and intra-regional movements in the Caribbean, which is severely under-researched (IOM, 2012). In fact the International Office of Migration [IOM] (2012) reports that the management of migration processes in the Caribbean continues to be hampered by the lack of timely, objective and reliable data, and recommends greater research into Caribbean migration. It further states: “lack of concrete data has also constrained the ability of [CARICOM] member countries to overcome deep-seated fears on further opening of intra-regional labour mobility” (IOM, 2012:1). Fernandez (2006:10) makes a similar point, insisting that the lack of research on the causes and effects of intra-regional migration is a problem for policy making and policy makers. This study answers the calls for more information that can help policy makers in “the management of intra-Caribbean migration
with a view not only to preventing violent conflict” but also on how attempts at deepening regional integration can be pursued harmoniously (Fernandez, 2006:10).

1.04 Research Questions

Sociologists have pondered the effects of modern nation states and supranational processes on identity formation. On the one hand, the modern national state is seen to produce full attachment through primordial forces, rituals, and symbols (Appadurai, 1998). On the other, sociologists such as Habermas (1979) and Giddens (1994) argue that supranational processes, such as the integration of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), have steadily eroded the stronghold of nation-states on identity formation. Drawing on the framework that identities are not always automatically determined or fixed, but rather individuals rationalize social processes, this study seeks to understand the processes through which people within supranational boundaries construct their identities. In particular, I seek to understand what contribution regionalism and intra-regional migration make toward the construction/development of identities within the CARICOM region. Accordingly, the research is guided by three specific questions:

1. How do intra-regional CARICOM migrants negotiate their identities and self-identify?

2. How do intra-regional CARICOM migrants construct their lived experiences in other CARICOM countries?

3. How do intra-regional migrants rationalize the impact of CARICOM regionalism on their identities?

The answers to these questions demonstrate the complexities of identity formation. They demonstrate that identity formation is not necessarily routine but that complex processes involving social structure, personal motivation and social interactions are key to understanding it. Accordingly, national and supranational authorities must be cognizant of these processes as they
develop policies that affect people and regions. I approach the research questions through the empirical study of CARICOM intra-regional migration and self-identifications. It also examines migrants’ discourses and perceptions of regionalism. In order to examine supranational identities as a process of negotiation through individual and collective courses, the study utilizes a multi-methods approach. In the first phase, a cross-national online survey is created to capture the perspectives of intra-regional migrants from all 15 CARICOM countries. The second phase includes semi-structured interviewing of intra-regional migrants from four CARICOM countries representing the different sub-groups in CARICOM. The sequencing of the data collection was strategically used to identify potential participants for the interviews, and did not have any known impact on the results. Data were collected over a five month period from January 2014 to May 2014. Qualitative and quantitative analyses were employed to capture unique and collective self-identification of migrants, and to understand the meanings, rationales, and influences of their personal experiences and perceptions of regionalism on the development of their identities.

1.05 Context & Objectives

The lack of empirical research into the existence of a CARICOM identity means that little is known about how Caribbean identities are constructed; what the constitutive elements are; how intra-regional migrants negotiate their identities and derive a sense of self from the multiple possibilities. In addition, little is known about whether intra-regional migration and regional integration impact the formation of a supranational identity. Within this context, the objective of this thesis is to discuss the experiences of intra-regional migrants in the Caribbean in order to ascertain whether a sense of community and common identity are being created by freer movement in the region. It fulfills this by examining: (1) the processes through which intra-regional migrants navigate new experiences, and multiple identities and how they define
themselves; (2) how intra-regional CARICOM migrants construct their lived experiences in other CARICOM countries and how individuals use these experiences to develop their identities; and (3) how intra-regional CARICOM migrants rationalize the role of regional integration in the construction of their identities.

1.06 Outline of Dissertation

The next two chapters provide detailed theoretical discussions on identities, integration and migration. Specifically, chapter 2 provides a sociological discussion on identities, and outlines the how the concept is operationalized in this project. It begins by explaining the different categories of identities deemed relevant to this study: personal, social, national, imagined, supranational, and concentric. It also explains the identity construction process wherein individuals rationalize their identity choices based on their life experiences, social interactions and structural influences including social policies. In so doing, the chapter draws on social identity theory, social constructivism and Giddens’ structuration theory to explain how identities can be negotiated within intra-regional migratory experiences.

Chapter three takes a deeper look at the historical controversies and debates surrounding the existence of a Caribbean identity. It contemplates how existing attachments could translate into a CARICOM identity. It also discusses intra-regional migratory trends within CARICOM countries and their impact on the debate around the supranational identity. An important aspect of this chapter is a review of the three traditional theoretical frameworks used to describe the Caribbean societies: plural, plantation and creole models. It concludes with a discussion on how these frameworks might explain the potential for a regional identity, current migratory trends and context for CARICOM’s free movement policies.
Chapter four discusses the methodological framework which guided the research. In tangent with the assertion that identities are multiple and must be negotiated, the chapter discusses the rationale for a multi-method framework. It also discusses the analytical framework, specifically how themes are developed and how the findings are presented in the thesis. The chapter ends with an examination of the methodological limitations and ethical dilemmas that are considered relevant to this study.

The next five chapters outline and explain the results of the research. Chapters five and six address the first research question: how do intra-regional migrants negotiate, self-identify and rationalize their identities. The main findings of chapter 5 concern the determinants of attachments to CARICOM. It finds that social relationships in member countries and perceived benefits of regionalism significantly influenced attachments to CARICOM. These were also based on respondents lived experiences and impact their attitudes towards regionalism. As such, I argue that the existence of a regional identity cannot be taken for granted, but is dynamic and is heavily influenced by regional governance and social relationships with people in member countries.

Chapter 6 undertakes a deeper investigation into how respondents rationalize the CARICOM identity, specifically looking at what it means to them personally. It then considers factors that can facilitate or hinder the formation of a CARICOM identity, and how respondents negotiate these. In particular, it examines national identity salience, and how pragmatic interests can propel individuals towards a collective identity. The chapter underscores the importance of considering citizens’ wellbeing as a driver towards a regional identity. Respondents identified freer movement between member countries, harmonization or policies and better
communications through CARICOM as important considerations to improve how people experience regional integration.

Chapter 7 specifically addresses the impact of migration as a process on identity outcomes. It considers the impact of origin and destination countries on respondents’ attachments to CARICOM and their rationales for the stability or shifts in their identities. In addition, it sheds light on how, through contact, attachments to CARICOM may increase, without it becoming more salient. The issue of benefits of CARICOM is also examined in relations to identity choices. As such, the chapter underscores the importance of harmony between social structure and social relations in driving people’s identity decisions.

Chapter 8 addresses the second research question: how do intra-regional migrants construct their experiences within CARICOM. It considers the nature of intra-regional migrants’ experiences and how they affect attachments to CARICOM. In particular, it addresses how social relationships shape experiences, including how respondents rationalize ‘belonging’ and discrimination in member countries. It finds that most respondents feel like outsiders in member countries and this adversely affects attachments to CARICOM. It therefore recommends that national and regional governments take steps to better interconnect national and regional identities in order to reduce conflicts and advance regional integration.

The final findings chapter builds on the link between migration and regional identity by exploring the question of how regionalism contributes to the identities of CARICOM citizens. It pulls on the statistical findings to gauge experiences, attitudes and perceptions about regionalism. It also explores how individuals rationalize using the interview transcripts to ascertain the meanings that respondents assign to their experiences. It also draws on theoretical models of CARICOM society to explain experiences of regionalism as well as structural factors to explain
identity formation. It finds that most respondents have unmet expectations regarding the outcomes of regional integration, which hinder their willingness to be more closely attached to CARICOM. Accordingly, it finds that further deepening of the regional identity is contingent on definitive policy actions that will produce meaningful benefits to people.

Chapter 10 emphasizes the main findings from the study and synthesizes them with existing literatures. It emphasizes the determinants of attachments of CARICOM, and points in particular to the importance of meaningful benefits in motivating a regional identity. However, it underscores the weakness identified by respondents with regards to regional policy making, unmet expectations and frustrations with integration. As a result, I caution that without greater efforts to integrate people, regional integration will stall. In particular, I advocate for a person-centered approach to social policy that will address concerns of people and produce the desired benefits. In addition, I argue that concerted efforts need to be made to ameliorate social relations of CARICOM nationals to build a sense of community across member states. Finally, I reflect on the limitations of this research and suggest how they could be addressed in future research.
CHAPTER II – THEORIES OF IDENTITIES AND INTEGRATION

2.0 Overview

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section covers theories of identities and considers how they might apply to studies of intraregional migration in the Caribbean. It evaluates the overlaps among sociological theories drawing specifically from social identity theories, Giddens’ structuration theory, and social construction approaches to tease out a framework for researching how identities are negotiated in migratory contexts. The second area surveys how integration provides a framework for supranational identity formation. The literature reveals that regional integration, through policies, exert considerable influence on the formation of identities, which are usually negotiated alongside social relationships among individuals.

2.01 Identities: A Conceptual Overview

According to Bhugra (2004:135), the concept of identity refers to “the totality of one’s self – formed by how one construes oneself in the present, how one construed oneself in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future”. In other words, identities are influenced by time and bears the imprints of one’s past and present as well as expectations about the future. Gecas and Burke (1995: 42) add that identity is relational, and is affected by external influences as well:

Identity refers to who or what one is, to the various meanings attached to oneself by self and others. In sociology, the concept of identity refers both to self-characterizations individuals make in terms of the structural features of group memberships, such as various social roles, memberships, and categories....and to
the various character traits an individual displays and others attribute to an actor on the basis of his/her conduct.

Both definitions present identities as not simply fixed or pre-existing but are affected by time, and are capable of being influenced by external factors such as other people (interactions) as well as the wider social structure. Before, I discuss the sociological theories of identities, I will discuss categories of identities and explain how they relate to this study.

One of the most common identity distinctions is between personal and social identity. According to Hewitt (1997:93), personal identity is “a sense of self built up over time as the person embarks on and pursues projects or goals that are not thought of as those of a community, but as the personal property of the person. Personal identity, thus emphasizes a sense of individual autonomy rather than of communal involvement”. This is akin to the agency in Giddens’ (1991) structuration theory, which describes the self as a “reflexive project”. This means that the identity of an individual presumes reflexive awareness, which means that people take responsibility for deciding and building their own identities. People are thus capable of making identity choices, which are the outcome of negotiations from among a “diversity of options” (Giddens, 1991:5). For example, an individual may or may not choose to frame his/her identity as a CARICOM national based on perceptions, experiences or information obtained, and his/her actions may reflect such identity choice.

Compared to personal identity, an individual’s social identity is that part of his/her self-concept, which is derived from group membership and placement in a system of categorization. In other words, Social Identity Theory stipulates that a person’s social identity stems primarily from group identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, national identities can be conceived as social identities because people develop them by identifying with the people of
their own country. Tajfel (1982) stipulates that social identity represents the individual's awareness of being a member of a social group, together with the affect associated with that knowledge. Tajfel (1982) also asserts that categorization into in-group and out-group(s) involves an accentuation of differences between groups and similarities within groups leading to the formation of identities. Thus a person described as Bahamian will look for and replicate features/qualities normally associated with being Bahamian. Turner (1987) likewise sees categorization as the fuel which ignites the formation of behaviours and identities. For Turner (1987), self-categorization builds community when it causes us to perceive ourselves as another member of a particular category, and it generates behaviours, which are stereotypical of that group. Many researchers measure identity through individuals' self-categorization (Boxill, 1997; Bruter, 2005; Valtonen, 1996), which involves asking respondents to identify which group they feel they belong to.

Turner (1987) and other proponents of the social identity theory tend to assume that a strong social identity will be associated with perceptions of similarity between in-group members. Drawing on the idea that social identities involve identification with groups, Bruter (2005) describes political identities as social. Tajfel et al (1979) point to the fact that our earliest images of nations are almost totally determined by the "propaganda environment" (Johnson, Middleton & Tajfel, 1970:238), which is created by the mass media, parents and peer groups. These propagation environments can furnish migrants with preconceived ideas, which influence the levels and kinds of association they develop with other groups as well as ideologies and perspectives. Giddens (1991) sees the propaganda environment and the forces that direct group membership as constitutive of what he calls structure. He defines structures as the "rules and resources" embedded in agents' memory traces, of which they are knowledgeable about and call
upon to perform social actions (Giddens, 1994). Examples of structure include the media, school, family, religions, political institutions, and laws, which are instrumental in shaping identities. CARICOM media, for example, have played an important role in shaping the discourse surrounding regionalism, intra-regional migration, and travel experiences (Campbell, 2013; Henry 2013). Exposure to these opinions alongside peer groups influences, personal attributes and experiences, influences how individuals categorize themselves, and by extension, their political and social identities. Negative media propaganda can create tensions between the different CARICOM countries and hinder the development of a supranational identity. In other words, they might affect the extent to which intra-regional migrants adopt a CARICOM identity.

Another way of understanding social and personal identities is through individuals’ internal and external identifications. Ricche and Nebe (2003) describe the acceptance by others to a group as external identities while the cognitive, internalized sense of belonging to that group, they call internal identity. Internal identity can be measured by individuals’ self-categorizations. However, Ricche and Nebe (2003) state that while more difficult to measure, external identity can be measured through a process of “double hermeneutics” (Giddens, 1994), which involves using respondents’ “self–reported statements regarding the level of acceptance by the receiving society made by the migrants themselves” (Ricche & Nebe, 2003:12). In other words, it captures to how individuals perceive how others view them.

Social identities can also be viewed as collective identities, which is a form of group identity derived from shared self–definitions arising from collective effort, such as in social movements. Giddens (1987:303), for example, sees collective identities as embedded in social relations, which involve “differentiations of identity and practices between individual agents, as well as among and between diverse groups”. The concept of collective identities resembles the
social assets in the form of a shared sense of identity on which the CSME is built (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). Some identities are also anchored in individual values and value systems, which give meanings, purpose and directions to life. A regional ideology might also be an important part of a collective value system. For Giddens (1987), social relations involve interactions between the self and with institutions, therefore individuals must negotiate each source separately and collectively to develop a regional identity on a collective level.

National identity is a variation of collective identity in which a person’s sense of belonging is linked to a particular nation or state. It is often characterized by common history, memories, shared culture and a sense of belonging to a collective entity. National identity is also social (Jenkins, 2000), however, Woodward (1997:18) notes that it is not “possible to know all those who share our national identity, one must have a shared idea of what it constitutes”. In important ways, national identities are imagined (Anderson, 2006). This is discussed below. Like national identity, cultural identity is social, and is a way of differentiating between groups based on cultures. For Hall (2003), cultural identity assumes a shared history and cultures and similarities that create a sense of belonging. Cultural, social and national identities are seen as collective because they extend beyond the individual and encompass some real or perceived element of sharing something in common.

Collective, social and personal identities overlap in complex ways. According to Gamson (1991), collective identities and personal identities are interconnected in the sense that a collective identity rests on an individual’s embracing that collective as a salient aspect of his/her personal sense of being. Snow (2001:4) suggests that collective identities are not always empirically manifested except for when that shared sense of “we-ness” associated with real or imagined attributed positions a group as different from others. Snow stipulates that collective
identities are expressed through a process called “identity work”, which encompasses the range of activities people engage in, both individually and collectively, to signify and express who they are and what they stand for in relation or contrast to some set of others” (2001:5). Identities are expressed in speech (including narratives, storytelling), gestures, music, dress etc.

Snow (2001) further argues that the individuals who make up a collective must not be conflated with the collective itself, as they are different entities. He uses the term “identity correspondence” to explain the alignment or linkage between personal and collective identities” (Snow, 2001:8). This identity correspondence occurs through two processes: identity convergence and identity construction. Identity convergence refers to the “union of personal and collective identities when both are congruent” (Snow, 2001:8) such as if a Belizean citizen sees Belize or himself as inseparable and fully congruent with CARICOM, then his/her personal identity can be said to converge with the CARICOM one. However, as section 2.08 shows, identities are primarily forged through active construction by individuals.

2.02 Identities as Imagined

According to Anderson (2006), members of a society often assert common identities, even when there is no direct, tangible “face-to-face” interaction between them. This constitutes imagined communities, which is epitomized by the “nation”. Anderson (2006) further stipulates that the notion of the nation as an objective geographic location within which there is sovereign control over citizens is incomplete. For him, the definition and properties of ‘nation’ are so pliable that they can be adopted in a myriad of social, political and ideological situations. He further notes, “members, of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion…all communities, larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and
perhaps even these) are imagined” (2006:6). This suggests that identities can develop from internalized knowledge systems, even without interaction with most others who share that identity. As such, social identities such as the nation are “imagined political communit[ies] –and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (2006:6). Thus, national identity is not based on everyday interaction between all members within a society, but members have mental images of affinity, which binds them to their nations.

Following this logic, the CARICOM identity can be conceived as an imagined community. Premdas (1996) provides an example of an imagined collective identity among Caribbean people. He uses the term “trans-Caribbean identity” to describe people of Caribbean origin living overseas. In Premdas’ configuration, the “trans-Caribbean” identity does not traverse daily lives between nations, as a transnational identity does. Instead, it fulfils the instrumental purpose of giving migrants a ready frame of reference to the Caribbean region. Like a supranational identity, the trans-Caribbean identity unifies Caribbean nationals outside of the region regardless of their individual nationality by giving them a sense of community, and in this regards, it is also largely imagined. It should be noted that this “trans-Caribbean” identity is different from a transnational identity, which Schiller (1995:48) defines as involving “immigrants whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation state” (Schiller, 1995:48). Thus, unlike the transnational identity, which involved frequent social relations, the trans-Caribbean identity involves an internalized sense of belonging without much social engagement.

An imagined identity develops when a person aligns him/herself to expectations or preconceived ideas about a place or idea (Smith, 1997; Thapar, 1989) and is therefore very
relevant to understanding migratory experiences. Migrants in particular are likely to hold an imaginary construction of ‘home’, which is largely a reflection of their anticipations and desires (Woodward, 2000). According to Premdas (2006), the trans-Caribbean identity is largely imaginary because it gives Caribbean nationals a common place of reference when they are away from their home countries.

2.03 Supranational identities: The Case for a CARICOM Identity

Another form of collective identity that has gained currency since the mid-20th century is supranational identity, which develops when members of a common grouping of nations or international body acquire a sense of belonging to that group/body, without necessarily forsaking the attachment that they have to their own nation state. Hall (1999) describes it as membership/allegiance to a regional bloc or community, which is broader than (but includes) the nation state. The European Union is often viewed as the epitome of a supranational body, but with only varying success in producing a supranational identity (Bruter, 2005; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). The drive for countries to integrate along supranational lines is partly driven by promises of greater political stability, economic development, and a common sense of peoplehood among residents of the countries involved (Boxill, 1993; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Supranational identities allow individuals and nations to overcome the insularity of national identity, which subsumes difference (and sometimes, opposition) from other nations (Cerutti, 1992). It provides a broader term of reference and also an extra sense of security and wellbeing (Cerutti, 1992:151). In this context, supranational institutions such as CARICOM and the EU can avert security fears as well as economic and political threats, and can thus pave the way for supranational identities. Nonetheless, while supranational identities do not assume homogeneity of identity concepts such
as culture and language they expose all members to similar risks and fears, which force them to cooperate (Cerutti, 1992:154).

Because supranational and national identities are not mutually exclusive, they often coexist just as in a concentric model (Bruter, 2005). Cerutti (1992) believes that globalization will make supranational identities more prominent as more countries collaborate on economic social and political levels. In fact, Cerutti (1992) states that supranational identities will become so pervasive that they will challenge the dominance of the nation as the basis for political identities. This is because national identity and nationalism as the basis of statehood are based on markers such as ethnicity, culture and history, which do not provide “univocal criterion defining common nationhood” (Cerutti, 1992:149). This formulation supports the view that nations are imagined communities6 (Anderson, 2006) or artefacts, which are capable of being adopted, dismissed or substituted (Cerutti, 1992). In fact, several theorists proclaim that supranational identity goes beyond individual subjectivity and is a form of “group identity, expressing sameness to a group and the way we define ourselves” (Bruter, 2005; Cerutti, 1992:148).

Burgess (2002) suggests that supranational organizations by their formation assume the existence of a common identity. He suggests, for example, that the institutions and the founding legal framework for the EU is “encoded with a European identity… which surpasses individual actors and unites them in one general interest” (Burgess, 2002:11). He notes that:

The objective of the Marshall Plan was a certain level of European unity, the restoration of some kind of identity that is presumed obliterated – along with its material basis – by the horrors of war… the concrete aims of the EU were only meaningful against the backdrop of a European collectivity, an implicit understanding of the need to cultivate a

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6 See Pg. 23. For a more detailed discussion on imagined communities and identities.
European identity in the name of European harmony. Europe’s catastrophe was not only economic. It was cultural and social (Burgess, 2002:11).

Furthermore, Burgess (2002) stipulates that the subsequent integrative frameworks, including The European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome, The Maastricht Treaty all include the assumption of common identity. He states that The Maastricht Treaty and the 1972 Declaration on European Identity define European identity based on three pillars\(^7\): common heritage, interests and special obligations within the community; the ‘dynamic nature’ of European unification; and the extent to which the members are ‘already acting together in relation to the rest of the world’ (EC, in Burgess, 2002). All three are based on internal unity and commonality, heritage, and internal coherence with regard to the rest of the world (Burgess, 2002: 14). Because supranational institutions influence political structures and critical socializing agents such as the media and education systems, support for supranationalism often leads to the development of supranational identities as well (Bruter, 2005; Burgess, 2002).

Bruter (2005:26) further argues that supranational institutions can influence the emergence and modification of political identities, including the development of new attachments. They do this because they are often imbued with the power to “grant citizens’ rights and duties that define selves, and perceptions of relative closeness to fellow citizens and non-citizens, regardless of what constitute their ‘shared’ heritage baggage, or values, respectively” (Bruter, 2005: 31).

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\(^7\) One drawback of viewing the formation of the European Union as a de-politicised institution based on shared heritage and common social values is that such an approach undermines the influence of economics and geopolitics on the formation of the European Union. The Marshall Plan is partly the outcome of the US political agenda of limiting the influence of the USSR and the ideology of socialism (for greater detail see Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*. Cambridge University Press, 1989)
While national or other local institutions may work against or at least not reinforce supranational identity, supranational institutions, by their, existence, and by the level of interaction citizens have with them, generally influence the formation of supranational identity (Bruter, 2005). As Appendix C shows, CARICOM’s institutional presence in the region is vast, which makes it possible for it to influence the formation of a supranational identity. Numerous European studies have shown that political identities are influenced by a number of factors such as symbols of European integration; the media; and institutions (European Commission, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Bruter, 2005). Bruter (2005) for example, argues that identity formation often proceeds from the identification of individuals in the images they form of the given social and political communities, including physical representation of their symbols, letters, names, or institutions that citizens use (2005: 27). Official symbols of a community often channel and influence the images that citizens form of the communities, which influence their likeliness of identifying with it. Accordingly, studies such as the Eurobarometers have used EU symbols to index European identity. Likewise, CARICOM has made tremendous efforts in creating symbols to reflect Caribbean unity. These include the CARICOM passport, a CARICOM flag, a CARICOM Day (which celebrates the signing of the treaty of Chaguaramas), a CARICOM emblem used on official documents of CARICOM organizations, and a CARICOM logo. However, as Patterson (2007) notes, there is a lack of political will to increase the visibility and celebrate CARICOM symbols among member states. He points out, for example, that Guyana is the only CARICOM country that chooses to recognize and celebrate CARICOM Day (Patterson, 2007). Further, he points out that regional institutions often do not use the CARICOM flag or promote its other symbols in their day to day activity. He also notes that CARICOM is rarely debated in national parliaments, which contributes to the lack of its visibility (Patterson, 2007).
As Appendix C shows, CARICOM, through its regional institutions is able to assert significant influence on the daily lives of CARICOM nationals. Its institutions also have the ability to grant rights and responsibilities to citizens, for example, the treaty of Chaguaramas grants free movement within the region for certain categories of people, and all citizens of the 15 member countries now carry a common travel document called the CARICOM passport.

CARICOM can therefore be considered a socio-political/institutional site with the ability to influence how citizens construct their identities. The ability to travel freely intra-regionally exposes migrants to new sites of identity construction, including new social relationships, labour markets and daily experiences (Cornell and Hartmann, 2006). In fact, the very act of granting rights and responsibilities is powerful, and can elicit attachments by citizens, especially if its power is visible, well-understood and is meaningful in the lives of people. The ability of CARICOM to influence identities can be seen in the region’s educational policy. Due to functional cooperation in education, there is a common regional curriculum designed to provide “West Indian content… driven by cultural identity concerns” (Thomas, 2012:468)). Thus, through the curriculum, a sense of community and belonging can be reinforced. In addition, CARICOM symbols are increasingly being used in school curriculums across the region, at ports of entry, on travel documents and in the media.

While CARICOM has the tools to build a sense of identity, it is important to note that identities are not only ascribed but are negotiated. In addition, negotiation means that some identities can be more influential, meaningful and pervasive than others. Accordingly, the success of a regional identity is largely dependent on how CARICOM is able to engage people and the opportunities it creates for people from member states to develop social relationships.
The development of a regional identity is also dependent on the policies that it implements and the meaningfulness that CARICOM nationals attribute to these policies.

2.04 Migration & Identities

Because people often view themselves in terms of their physical locations or in terms of their nationalities, migration plays a very important role in shaping how people construct identities. Migration has informed much of the discourse on ‘identity politics’ and the notion of ‘identity crises’ (Erikson, 1994; King, 2002), as activists and scholars try to understand the migrants’ experiences. Migration is thus an important consideration when understanding identity development because it impacts sites of identity construction such as labour markets, residential location, daily activities and group membership (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006). In addition, studies have shown that migrants often experience a sense of dislocation, unfamiliarity and emotional disruptions as they move from one place to the next (Woodward, 2000, Thomas-Hope, 2006). However, skilled intra-regional CARICOM migrants (CSME Certificate holders), are less likely to be subjected to factors such as residential zoning or disadvantages in the job market due to their credentials and, social and cultural capitals. Unskilled and illegal migrants on the other hand might be subjected to some of these disadvantages that Cornell and Hartman (2006) identify. For both sets of intraregional migrants, it is possible to have identity shifts, as they negotiate day-to-day experiences in their new destinations and reflect on “home”.

The above discussion presents migrants as empowered with the ability to negotiate their identities as they travel to different countries. This is a departure from earlier understandings of the connections between migration and identities. Earlier approaches view the relationship

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8 Identity politics relates to political activities and social theorizing that address injustices experienced by certain groups, for example, racism or female oppression which migrants might experience.
between migration and the development of identities in host destinations as a linear function of
time. This means that migrants inevitably assimilate in their host destination, forsaking previous
identities and taking on those of their new countries (Alba & Nee, 1999; Gans, 1988; Parks,
1928). Today, there is an increasing body of knowledge, which suggests that migration and
identities are “profoundly interconnected” in non-linear ways (Benmayor & Skotnes, 1994:8).
Portes and Basch (1995: 10) for example, propose that migration itself “can be conceptualized as
a process of network building”, indicating the power of social relations in migrants’ daily lives
and in the construction of their identities. This view also challenges the notions that identities
form a linear, one-directional and permanent path, indicating instead that identities are fluid with
transient and instrumental characteristics. Accordingly, Benmayor and Skotnes (1994:8) argue
that migration “is a lifelong process of negotiating identity, difference, and the right to fully
flourish in a new context”. Hall (1996) concurs that changes in migrants’ settlement and
participation are influenced both by processes of the world, policies of the nation-states and also
by individuals. As a result, migrants are faced with a myriad of local and post national
influences, which they must process as they negotiate their identities.

Sometimes, identities are strategic and temporary. Kahani- Hopkins and Hopkins (2002),
for example, find that some Islamic activists invoke and deploy their religious identities for
practical augmentations, such as the promotion of their religious values. They argue that the
deployment of such identities is highly contingent upon the strategic concerns at hand (Kahani-
Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002). Similarly, Lacy (2004) finds that many Black middle-class
Americans use their black identities in strategic contexts. Such middle class Blacks would deploy
their Black identities for socializing purposes with other Blacks, yet live permanently in White
neighbourhoods. Lacy (2004) views this as strategic assimilation because these individuals did
not view themselves as permanently constrained to “Black spaces”. Both studies demonstrate that identities can be deployed subjectively and strategically as means to particular ends. Nonetheless, Benmayor and Skotnes (1994) find that in long-term contexts, migrants’ identities often become permanent because:

Being a ‘migrant’ is often a negative identity imposed by the dominant culture on generations of [migrant] descendants. Thus…the experience and effects of migrations are long-term and critical in shaping and reshaping both collective and individual identities…contemporary global migration has disrupted static conceptions of identity, challenging notions of cultural homogeneity, essentialism and stereotype (Benmayor and Skotnes, 1994:8).

In concert with postmodernist theorists, Benmayor and Skotnes (1994) view identities as undergoing rapid change in contemporary societies. Despite this, migration-related identities are constantly being negotiated, that is, refined, redefined, and transformed, which creates the potential for multicultural syncretism (Benmayor & Skotnes, 1994; Faist, 2000). Migrants’ need to negotiate complex identities can make the identity construction process a strategic endeavour (Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002; Lacy, 2004) especially as migrants attempt to negotiate racial, religious, economic or cultural barriers. This strategic commissioning of particular identities essentially represents attempts to gain membership, belonging or in-group status with the particular groups. This implies that the development of a CARICOM identity might be dependent on its strategic usefulness, such as the benefits that it might offer.

2.05 Migration, Belonging & Identities

Belonging is an important characteristic of social identity (Jenkins, 1996). According to Massey (1994), it is the quality of social relations, and the understandings between migrants and
host societies that either binds or alienates them from host societies. This is because the high levels of mobility and instability associated with migration often involve: “… an endless search for belonging to the constantly changing other, as well as having to cope with constantly shifting legal and bureaucratic requirements for social acceptance and divergent parameters for recognition” (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2007:97). In fact, many migrants tend to not feel a sense of belonging in their new societies if the cultures are very different from their home countries’, or if they lack a network of persons to help in their transition. An important aspect of belonging is the idea of “home”, which is very stable as an identity marker (Mason, 2007). Through migration, identities are often reconstructed to reflect new “homes” within destination countries. As a result, without a sense of belonging, migrants might find it difficult to identify with their new destinations.

Even in the context of CARICOM, where there are similarities between most of the countries in terms of culture, language, and customs, intra-regional migrants might still lack a sense of belonging. This is because bureaucratic structures and other day-to-day experiences impact the politics of identity construction (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006). Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2007) note that the process of belonging entails three levels: in the first instance it involves tentative and random attachments; in the second instance, it involves ‘a range of ‘feelings’ of belonging’; finally it may involve ‘legal forms of membership’ such as citizenship. This appears to be a rather linear process, reminiscent of assimilation theory. Nonetheless, it underscores the importance of belonging as a key component of forming new identities. Bhugra (2004), for example, concurs that changes in migrants’ identities largely depend on how they are received and whether they develop a sense of belonging in their new locale.
However, Lawson (1999) notes that belonging is highly subjective and goes far beyond tangible manifestations. She argues that belonging is an iterative process that simultaneously shapes and impacts migrants’ reception in host societies, especially in the labour market. In other words, there are subjective and external aspects of belonging that often reinforce each other. Thus, the reception of migrants by local citizens, and the perception of fair opportunities also impact whether migrants develop a sense of place in their new ‘homes’. With regards to intra-regional CARICOM migrants’, the discriminant selection of people (the five categories allowed free movement within CARICOM) alongside the demand-supply factors might make it easier for these travelers to be incorporated into labour markets. However, personal and social acceptance might be constrained by differences in culture, race or class. For example, despite integration in the labor market, it might still remain difficult to develop close friendships, which can alter a sense of belonging. Thus, weak social relationships impact the formation of collective identities, even if a person is otherwise integrated in the society.

2.06 Deterritorialization: Fragmented, Hybrid & Multiple Identities

Supranational identities challenge the conceptualization of collective identities as insular, stand-alone and independent. Along with globalization and migration, supranational regionalism changes the forms and manifestations of identities. According to Appadurai (in Basch, Schiller & Szanton-Blanc, 1994:52) globalization and migration are ushering in a deterritorialized world in which “groups are no longer tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally homogeneous”. In fact, countries with dispersed populations are increasingly constructing themselves as “detrerritorialized nation-states” (Basch, Schiller & Szanton-Blanc, 1994:50), which implies that national identities are increasingly losing their firm grips on their citizens’ identities as they acquire new ones from transnational engagement. Basch
(2001) notes that in the case of West Indian migrants, these multiple identities are supported by political leaders in home countries, who benefit from the maintenance of these ties in many ways, including through economic and technical assistance. Thus, identities are no longer viewed solely as a national construct, but as something borderless. Heislern agrees, noting that:

The ability to change countries of residence with relative ease and the possibility of reversing the move can mitigate the need to make lasting identity commitments. Identities can thus be partial, intermittent, and reversible in the modern Western democratic state. Order no longer depends on unalloyed loyalty stemming from immutable national identity – identity for which there is no plausible or legitimate alternative. Countries’ borders are not seen as coextensive with a comprehensive political community (Heislern in Vertovec, 2004:27).

Thus, migration has created multiple attachments to nation states, legitimizing post-national identities. However, the proliferation of deterritorialized and fragmented identities are not only the products of globalization and migration. According to Satzewich and Wong (2006:11), the presence of ethnic communities can also endow contemporary migrants with “dual or multiple identities characterized by hybridity”. For example, migrant communities provide linkages with source countries (though collective memories, language, cross-border economic activities etc.), and yet cater to their members’ day to day needs in destination countries. As a result, individuals often develop identities that are associated with both countries. In fact, Vertovec (2001:578) stipulates that migrants often have multiple identities because their experiences expose them to a myriad of

… Histories and stereotypes of local belonging and exclusion, geographies of cultural difference and class/ethnic segregation, racialized socioeconomic
hierarchies, degree and type of collective mobilization, access to and nature of resources, and perceptions and regulations surrounding rights and duties.

For Vertovec (2001), migration provides exposure to these different histories, experiences and culture and ways of life that often result in the formation of new identities. Similarly, Plaza (2006) in a study of second generation migrants of Caribbean origin in Canada found that the experience of migration has enamoured respondents with hybrid identities comprising a hybridity of culture, environment, and community. Nonetheless, he notes that hybrid identities are constantly evolving as individuals interact with others and social institutions (Plaza, 2006).

In addition to hybrid identities, Smith (1998) stipulates that contemporary migration has also fragmented the identities. He states that identities are often severely transformed as the self becomes “fragmented and in contention as it is dispersed over a variety of dominant and peripheral discursive practices rather than existing as a homogeneous, centered steering mechanism” (Smith, in Vertovec, 2004). Smith (1998) further argues that migrants’ selfhood, characters and identity are affected as they traverse through alternative structures. Cross-border activities among migrants therefore result in identities that are ‘fluctuating and contingent…[Just] as the contexts through which people move in time-space change” (Smith in Vertovec, 2004:24). Thus migration challenges the stability of identities, making them difficult to predict, or to neatly categorize. Instead, as section 2.07 below shows, individuals have multiple identities that can be categorized in a concentric circle based on salience or depth. This also suggests that as intra-regional CARICOM migrants move through different countries, they might develop temporary identities, or identities that reflect fragments of the different countries that they visit.
2.07 Concentric Identities

Another way in which intra-regional CARICOM migrants might conceive their identities is through the image of a concentric circle. Because individuals categorize and classify themselves in relation to other social categories and classifications (Stets et al, 2000:225), several identities can coexist (Hogg, Terry & White, 1995). In recognition of the coexisting nature of identities, Bruter (2005) stipulates that identities are often additive and are based on territorial proximity. In other words the coexistence of identities can be conceptualized as a form of concentric model (Bruter, 2005). The concentric model supposes that a person will ‘naturally’ feel closer to people from his/her own city than to people who are from other cities, regions, countries, etc. Identities progressively get weaker as we move from the individual level through the local, regional, national and supranational level such as ‘Caribbean identity’. Premdas (1996) for example, identifies four levels of Caribbean identities (sub-state, national, regional and trans-Caribbean) in a concentric-like model (see chapter 3 for details). The level of identity with a community is the inverse of the distance between the individual and the corresponding circle. Premdas (1996) thus stipulates that the sub-state ethno-cultural identity is strongest while the trans-Caribbean identity engenders the least attachment. However, because communities are included in one another, identity feelings are additive (Bruter, 2005:16).

It is important to note that the salience of one particular identity does not restrict the possibility of developing another. In their study of the connection between identity and integration in the EU, Hooghe and Marks (2009) find that citizens who attest to a strong national identity are more, not less, likely to identify with Europe. Other studies in Europe also discover that not only do individuals have multiple social identities, they also identify with several territorial communities simultaneously (Burgess, 2002; Citrin & Sides, 2003; Diez Medrano
In fact, they confirm that national identities do not weaken supranational ones (Diez Medrano 2003; Marks 1999). Increasingly, it is being found that within a supranational context, multiple identities add up in a cumulative pattern, much like a multi-layered cake (Risse, 2005). Citrin and Sides (2003) thus conclude that regardless of citizens’ perceptions of integration, they can and have developed multiple identities, including a supranational one.

Despite these assertions, Hooghe and Marks (2004) caution that national and supranational can either reinforce or undermine each other. This is because many factors, including history, social relationships, politics and economic considerations affect identities (Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Hooghe and Marks (2004) therefore suggest that to understand how identities are constructed, one has to probe how identity is socialized, constructed and mobilized.

### 2.08.a A Theoretical Review of Identities

Sociologists have long pondered the question of identities, although there is hardly any theoretical consensus on its nature, formation, characteristics, or proper measurement. The above section described different types of identities, explaining how they are negotiated and socially constructed. The next section advances theoretical discussions, which support my understandings of identities as fluid, multiple, negotiated and socially constructed. Specifically, I rely on interpretive sociology, aspects of critical theory and Giddens’ structuration theory to develop my understanding of identity formation.

### 2.08.b Interpretive Sociology

Social and collective identities are often criticized for emphasizing groups at the expense of the individual. In this way, they are often perceived to be fixed and essentialist rather than dynamic and changing. Symbolic interactionists overcome this shortfall by defining identities as
fluid. They argue that social reality is constantly being created by humans as they attach symbols such as names, labels and meanings to things during interaction. Identities are thus created and modified through these ongoing interactions. Inspired by G. H. Mead, they propose that in analyzing identities, we should look at interaction at three levels: the mind (personality), the self (interaction) and society (social structure). Traditionally, interpretive researchers rely on in-depth ethnographic studies in order to understand processes of interaction. For example, Goffman is well known for his classic study on the management of personal identity in everyday social interactions through impression management. However, the Iowa School of Symbolic interaction used quantitative methodologies and realist assumptions to study identity formation. They pioneered the Twenty Statements Tests also called the “Who am I Test”, which asks respondents to provide twenty statements in response to the question “who am I” in order to ascertain salient aspects of social and personal identities, and how these changed over time (Cote & Levine, 2002:34). Cote and Levin stipulate that this might be a useful tool to monitor late modern or postmodern trends in identity formation (2002:34). In fact, this idea of changing identities has been particularly useful for understanding the impact of globalization and postmodernity. Wood and Zurcher (1988) argue that the “mutable self” is becoming more salient in post-modern society, which is characterized by “highly flexible and autonomous capacity to modify and control self-concepts and to experience various components of self in varying social contexts” (Cote & Levine, 2002:34). Wood and Zurcher (1988) also believe that individual agency to change their identities is a highly effective strategy in periods of rapid social change and in studying migration and identities. In my research, I use quantitative questions to uncover how respondents self-identify and how their identities shift as a result of migration. This was done
using retrospective questions, and by comparing current self-identities with pre-migration identities.

Another important contribution of interpretive sociology is the idea that identities can be understood as socially constructed (Burger & Luckmann, 1966). Social Constructivists believe that cultural and historical circumstances are the root of human construction, which is vital to their survival and well-being. They insist that constructions are higher than the individual because they take existences of their own through “objectivation”. As a result, identities are composed of a subjective and an objective element. Identities are derived from social constructions, which also enable us to negotiate identities. Constructivists tend to view identities as “products of human action and speech [which]… can and do change over time” (Fearon & Laitin, 2000:848). Cornell and Hartmann (2006:39), for example, stipulate that collective identities and experiences are not given, but are constructed historically, culturally, and politically, and are captured in concepts such as of ethnicity, race and nationality. As such, identities are capable of varying across space and changing across time (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006; Fearon et al, 2000). Thus, the dynamics of group identities are the product of social change and circumstances. Identities are therefore neither natural nor static, but are varied, diverse and contingent (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006:169). Constructivists also claim that identities vary by thickness/thinness (extent to which they organize social life) and can be assigned (ascribed by outsiders or circumstances) or asserted (claimed by the particular group) (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006:86). Migrant groups are thus “actively involved in the construction and reconstruction of their identities, negotiating boundaries, asserting meanings, interpreting their own pasts, resisting the impositions of the present, and claiming the future” (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006:106).
Cornell and Hartmann (2006) also suggest that in order to understand how identities are formed, it is imperative to look at the context/social relations within which migrant groups exist. They identify six ‘sites’ that are significant in the making of social identities: politics, labour markets, residential space, culture, daily experience and social institutions. The political site includes government regulations, laws and rules that can either favour or discriminate against a group. This site is significant in the context of the Caribbean, as the CARICOM Secretariat (2005) identified its legal framework as one of the pillars on which the CSME is built. These rules/regulations/laws play a large role in identity formation because they can divide individuals into groups such as minorities and majorities (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006). They also endow people with certain rights such as voting, immigration and education rights, which can discriminate against particular groupings. Government classification systems have great power in deciding who and when certain groups are given access to resources. This contributes to the construction of identities, because it assigns people to either “us” or “them” categories (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006:178). Political systems can also have discriminatory impacts on people through boundary maintenance and government classifications, which affect the way individual migrants negotiate and construct their identities.

Similarly, the labour market, which is divided into groups based on status or class, impacts migrants categorizations and identities. Locals in a particular labour market often have substantially more labour opportunities than immigrants. In addition, labour markets often organize categories of workers, and each categorization includes rewards and associated status. Workers often identify with these categories and roles, which results in the construction of group identities (Cornel & Hartmann, 2006). Research has shown that intra-regional migrants in the Caribbean are often segregated in the labour market (Ferguson, 2003; Marshall, 1979; Valtonen,
1996) especially if they are poor, unskilled and not well education (Ferguson, 2003). These migrants are more likely to resent regionalism and less likely to adopt a regional identity.

Residential space refers to the geographical area in which a person lives. Low paying jobs might force certain immigrants to live with family members or in lower status neighbourhoods, which can lead to ethnic concentration in these areas and thus stronger identity ties with people in that area. Social institutions refer to the social activities that migrants participate in, such as schools, churches etc. These institutions allow individuals to interact with other members and feel a sense of belonging. If people are denied access to certain social institutions, they can lose a sense of self-worth, social solidarity and identity. They are also more likely to choose to retain their national identities than adopt the dominant ones of the host society. Culture allows people to practice every day beliefs, rituals and values, which are a huge part of who they are. However, people can “come to an understanding of who they are based on how others perceive them to be” (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006:191). Ferguson (2003) notes that:

In the Caribbean, negative perceptions of cultural or ethnic difference seem to occur under conditions of social stress such as real or imagined competition for jobs and services. Racism is also a factor, even in societies where the majority of people are black, but race normally interacts with poverty as grounds for discrimination…black racial characteristics and poverty creates xenophobia (Ferguson, 2003:8).

The plantation and plural models of Caribbean society provide insights on how racism is enacted in the region (see chapter 3). Proponents of these models argue that the post-colonial Caribbean is replete with the division and distrust among different social classes and ethnic groups. These divisions are seen as arising from colonialism, which shaped each country
differently (see table 3.02 for a summary of the demographic make-up of CARICOM countries). This creates a climate for racist expressions (some countries more than others). Premdas (1996:40) summarizes the situation well in asserting that racism takes a cultural form in the Caribbean wherein it is “Blacks against Brown…Africans against Indians… [via the tools of] prejudice, customs, cliqueism, clientist networks and kin connections”. Today, it is also reflected in how Haitian immigrants are treated in the Bahamas; how Indo-Guyanese immigrants are treated in relation to the (majority Black) Eastern Caribbean islands and in the perennial ethnic tensions between Blacks and Indians in Guyana and Trinidad. In Guyana and Trinidad for example, political parties are built around racial groups, thus, cultural and ethnic tensions are also fueled by government policies and social institutions, which often propagate anti-immigrant feelings among certain ethnicities (Ferguson, 2003).

Finally, daily experiences impact the way identities are signified and reinforced through daily informal interactions with others. Woodward (2000) asserts that the pressures and opportunities provided by social environment are very influential in constructing identities. This is because social, material and physical constraints can prevent one from presenting him/herself in their desired identity positions. In the case of migrants, identities are usually constrained by the policies and other dimensions of the local environment in the country of settlement. Cornell and Hartmann (2006) recognized this in their assertion that “ethnic and racial identities and the groups that carry them change over time as the forces that impinge on them change, and as the claims made by both group members and others change as well.” Social constructivism thus asserts that migrants’ identities are influenced by the circumstances that surround them in their host country, which may include government policies and the attitude of the host population among others. Consequently, during the process of constructing their identities, individuals often
have to resist negative representations imposed on them (Woodward, 2000). Social
constructivists therefore assert that researchers are tasked with the role of identifying and
understanding these contexts (sites) that affect the construction of identities. In this study, I look
at how intra-regional migration and regional integration provide contexts (sites) where identities
can be constructed, negotiated or transformed.

2.08.c Critical Theory & Reflexive Identities.

Like interpretive/social constructivists who view identities as fluid and arising from the
interplay of individual subjectivities, social interactions and societal structures, critical theorists,
particularly, Habermas (1979) sees social identity as evolving from the primitive, kinship
foundations to contemporary rational and communicative relationships. Habermas (1979) argues
that identities are forged in the relationship between individual and societal development through
three interacting levels: a) interactive-communicative, b) the cognitive-affective and c) the
social-structural level. Similar to symbolic interactionists, Habermas (1979) believes that
identities develop through speech acts at the level of communicative action, which foster the
autonomous realization of self through dependency on interaction with others. In fact, identities
can be seen as embedded in social experience, symbolic communication and as a reflection of
institutional processes, although it can be potentially under “agentic control by the individual”
(Cote & Levine, 2002:39). Thus, rather than being the product of either agents or structure,
Habermas (1979) sees identities as emanating from the interaction between the two.

While modernist theories focus on the relationship between modern institutions and self
and the resultant tensions, identity confusion, fragmentation, alienation and loss of sense of self,
postmodernists explore how newer versions of selves and identities develop in the post-modern
era. They believe that in postmodern society, external influences dismantle any sense that there is
an authentic identity. Emphasis on images and illusions, for example, distorts the real from the imagined, making identities easier to transform (Cote & Levine, 2002). In fact, many late modernists agree that the late 20th century has seen radical social change, such as increasing interdependence of nations, resulting in some national and social structures becoming more obscure and fragmented. Fragmentation in social structures can also result in identity-uncertainty or more fluid identities.

One of the most prominent late modernists, Giddens (1991) argues that “late modernity” or “high modernity”, which comprises today’s highly developed globalized societies, has made it difficult for most people to keep their identities intact due to the intensification of global capitalism. He argues that these conditions have affected even personal experiences, and transformed habits and customs. For him, industrialization has also made it difficult for individuals to truly understand themselves because it de-structures social context, with increased industrialization, geographic mobility and uncertainties of everyday life.

Like the interpretive approach and Habermas (1979) who view identities as the product of three processes, Giddens (1991) believes that identities can be studied through three dimensions: the self, social relations and structures. Informed by his structuration theory in which agents and structure exist in a dual relationship like two sides of the same coin, he stipulates that social structure is organized by human actions and interactions with the social world. He stipulates that people construct their identities through interaction with each other, with collective groups and institutions, and through internal reflections. However, he believes that in high modernity, globalization has destabilized institutions and how individuals relate to them. In addition, he notes that the state is starting to lose its importance with the rise of transnational forces in the
face of cultural and economic globalization, resulting in the crumpling of fixed categories such as national identity.

Giddens (1994) further stipulates that as the state’s loses its grip on identities, the onus has been thrust on individuals to construct their own narrative, leading to a strong imperative for individualization. As a result, individuals must adapt to the rapid changes of globalization by choosing, interpreting and acting based on their personal assessments of situations. Communal ties are thus no longer the means through which people identify themselves; rather, individual choices are now the main driver of identities. Individuals have intentional qualities, which make them capable of resisting and adapting to these changes. Giddens (1991, 1994) therefore stresses the importance of individuals developing agentic capabilities so that they can construct reality and fit into societies. He also stipulates that the self requires reflexive grounding (an external reference point), which is key to understanding personal and social identities. This means that self-identity is “the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of his or her biography” (Giddens, 1991:53). Accordingly, identity formation involves a person negotiating life experiences, reflecting on them and defining his/herself through them. In essence, identity becomes a meaning making process and a mode of adaptations to the vagaries that is characteristic of modern life.

2.09 Identity Construction: Processes and Outcomes

Snow and McAdam (2000) provide a practical way of understanding the outcomes of identity construction: amplification, consolidation, extension and transformation. Identity amplification occurs when there is a reshuffling in identity salience, such as when a less salient identity becomes more salient. An example of this could be if a regional identity is secondary to national identity before intra-regional migration, and later becomes more salient, then that
regional identity can be said to have amplified. Identity consolidation occurs when an individual adopts an identity that is a blend of two different identities; identity extension is the expansion of the importance of an individual’s personal identity to the point of equating it to a collective identity. An example of an expanded identity is if a CARICOM national begins to feel as if he or she represents CARICOM. Finally identities can transform whereby an individual begins to see him/herself in completely different ways than before, for example, if someone initially saw him or herself as a CARICOM national, but totally rejects that identity for another, say a Central American identity.

Snow and McAdam (2000) note that these outcomes are achieved through either the framing process or through actual engagement with a collective group. Framing occurs when an individual adjusts his/her identity in the course of interaction with others, such as embracing, rejecting, renouncing, accepting, modifying or reframing their identity (Snow, 2001). An example of this could be intra-regional migrants modifying their pre-existing identities after interacting with the institutions of CARICOM and citizens of member countries. Engagement involves direct observation or experience that leads to a situationally-specific collective identity, which amplifies a pre-existing identity (Snow, 2001:9). An example, could be a CARICOM citizen with a salient national identity and a less salient CARICOM identity, who might be forced to defend CARICOM from verbal attacks from an outsider. Individuals can also experience identity change through a combination of framing and engagement. While intra-regional migrants are expected to construct their identities primarily through the framing process, it is also possible that it will be through a combination of framing and engagement.
2.10 Summary & Research Implications

The chapter explored a range of ways in which the CARICOM identity can develop using a range of theoretical approaches/concepts including: social identity theory, migration and belonging, supranational identities, and Anderson’s conception of identities as imagined. It adopted the perspective that identities are fluid, multiple, constructed and negotiated, and hence relied on interpretive frameworks and those of Giddens (1991, 1994) and Habermas (1979). It made the point that identities is a lifelong process of negotiation, revealing that globalizing processes and the growth in migration have increased both the depth and kinds of identities that people develop. All the theoretical models explored in the chapter contribute to the overall conception of identities as negotiated, and explain different aspect of the identity construction process or the outcomes. Giddens (1991:201) pointed out, for example, that globalization causes individuals to be confronted with several “dilemmas of the self”, including powerlessness and uncertainty. Institutions and the nature of social relationships also contribute to this powerlessness. It is therefore imperative to view identities as the products of the interaction between between agency (human action), structures and social relations (Giddens, 1991; Hall, 1990; Gabriel & Lang, 1995). In other words, identities are the product of individual contemplations of their personal experiences and how they interrelate with society and other individuals.

Social structure in particular has been demonstrated to greatly influence identity construction. Changes in national discourses or public policies, especially as they relate to migration impact how migrants adjust to their new environments, but also how they rationalize/negotiate identities. Jenkins (1996) described this multiple foci as the ‘internal-external dialectic of identification’ because he believes that self-identity, which is embedded in
social practices must be validated by social interaction. This means that the process of self-identification requires constant negotiation of meanings and experiences that might be derived from structure or through interactions (Jenkins, 1996; Elliot & Wattanasuwan, 1998). It is therefore important to assess the CARICOM identity through this internal-external dialectic (Jenkins, 1996). Within CARICOM, opposition to a regional identity could lead to a lack of social cohesion, which could threaten integration or ultimately the abandonment of integration. The study therefore examines the meanings that structure and social relations provide for intra-regional migrants and the benefits that they derive from them in order to uncover the motivations for identity choices. The assumption is that the propensity to identify with CARICOM is greater the more meaning and benefits that people can derive from such decisions. In this way, in accordance with the theoretical guidance, a regional identity is a product of the interrelations between structure, social relations and processes of identity work. The multi-methods approach to the research reflect the multiple dimensions to identity construction, including subjective and structural influences.
CHAPTER III – THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: HISTORY, INTRA-REGIONAL MIGRATION AND IDENTITIES

3.0 Overview

Throughout this thesis, identity is analyzed through three layers: personal decisions, social relations and structure. This chapter zooms in on social structure, including the institution of CARICOM and its policies and history. It also considers how these structures, through intra-regional migration policies, can influence social relations and personal decisions regarding the construction of identities. It is divided into two sections: the first part provides a historical review of the CARICOM and the second part looks at how globalization has impacted regional integration and the identity discourses in the Caribbean. The historical review begins with a discussion on whether a “Caribbean identity” exists. Following this, it engages in a review of the three traditional theoretical models of the Caribbean, critically exploring the notion of “Caribbean identity” in the context of each model and within CARICOM’s integration history. It then explores the different levels on which a CARICOM identity can be said to exist, and the factors that (may) inhibit the development of a CARICOM identity.

The second section considers globalization and the integration of CARICOM around the notion of a common identity and free movement of people. It looks at the difficulty in implementing free movements, reactions to these difficulties and provides some data on intra-regional migratory movements in CARICOM. The chapter ends with a review of important empirical research that studies the impact of intra-regional migration, integration and identity change in CARICOM, and explains how this research fills gaps identified in current knowledge on this issue. This discussion demonstrates that current integration efforts and the drive towards developing a CARICOM identity must be understood in historical and political contexts, which
continue to constrain how intra-regional migrants experience, rationalize and develop their identities.

3.01 The CARICOM Identity Debate

The difficulty in defining the Caribbean is perhaps best summarized by Nicholas McLaughlin (in Knews, 2008) who writes:

Is “Caribbean” a geographical region defined by proximity to a body of water, by insularity (in the literal sense), by lines of latitude? Is it a group of nations and proto-nations defined by a common history or culture, or by political links? Is it an aspiration, an attitude, an illusion? Is its meaning determined by presence or absence? Has it an antonym? (McLaughlin, 2008, para. 2-3).

As the above demonstrates, the Caribbean can be conceived in many ways. Stuart Hall (2001) observes that neither politicians, artists, Caribbean writers nor others have been able to grasp the meaning of the concept. This is reflected in the perennial disputes and controversies that belie the concept. On the one hand is the view that “Caribbean identity” is non-existent and on the other is the position that it is “the conditio sine qua non⁹ of West Indian nation-building” (Müllerleile, 1995:135). As Figure 1 shows, CARICOM countries (represented in white in Figure 1) represent just a small part of what could be considered the Caribbean. Adding to the difficulty in defining the region are the variations in the names used to refer to the same geographic area. These include: British Caribbean, the West Indies, CARICOM, Commonwealth Caribbean and Caribbean. People from the former British colonies in the Caribbean tend to use these terms exclusively to refer to themselves, although the Caribbean encompasses more than just the English Speaking countries (Garcia, 2008). As a result, few Caribbean writers use the term

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⁹ “conditio sine qua non” means indispensable or essential ingredient or condition
‘CARICOM identity’, even when speaking about CARICOM, preferring instead to use the colonial terms “West Indian” or “Caribbean” identity. The Guyanese daily newspaper Knews (2014) writes that these terms present the views of outsiders looking in, as they are all colonial creations. In this thesis, the terms are all understood to mean members of the CARICOM community. The controversy surrounding the existence of a CARICOM identity can be understood through the lens of the three models that have historically been used to explain relations in Caribbean societies.

![Map of CARICOM and the greater Caribbean](http://www.heritage.org/multimedia/infographic/2012/10/caricom-map)

**Figure 3.01.** Showing Map of CARICOM and the greater Caribbean

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3.02 Three Theoretical Models of Caribbean Society

Caribbean societies have traditionally been explained theoretically by three models: the Plantation Society Model; Plural Society and Creole Society Model. According to Beckford (2000), Caribbean societies can be understood as a microcosm of plantations, which defined the region during the period of colonialism. He contends that in modern society, social, economic and political structures all mirror the organization of the plantation. The plantation society model is often likened to Goffman’s concept of “total institutions”, which strips people of their existing identities and imposes new identities on them. Doumerc describes the plantation society as follows:

It is based on the idea that the institution of the plantation and the experience of slavery are central to Caribbean social life. The plantation is seen as a microcosm of the whole society and its characteristics includes: a rigid system of social stratification with a high correlation between racial and class hierarchies, an economy based on a single crop, weak community structure and a dual occupational framework with peasants working on the plantations and as subsistence farmers (Doumerc, 2003:65).

Accordingly, the plantation society model stresses the continuity of divisions along racial and class lines in contemporary Caribbean society, reminiscent of the slavery period. It prohibits the integration of members within individual societies, much more uniform integration across the Caribbean. This is further exacerbated by the fact that each Caribbean country, though similar, has its own unique history and plantation systems. This means the development of the
CARICOM identity requires, individual and collective negotiation of the region’s historical past as well as the insularity of the member states.

Unlike the Plantation Society Model, which emphasizes race and class as the primary means of stratifying Caribbean society, the Plural Society Model emphasizes cultural division as the primary feature of the Plantation Society Model. The Plural Society Model proffers that on the surface, Caribbean societies appear homogenized and harmonious, but this is just a veneer over deep seated tensions and differences. Borrowing from Furnivall’s concept of plural societies, M. G. Smith (1960:763) affirms that social life in the Caribbean is organized in such a way that people of different ethnic groups might come together, but they do not combine as “each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways, different sections of the community living side by side, but separately within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labour”. The theory supposes heterogeneity to the point of incompatibility between various sections and hence no cultural unity. Lewis (1968:4) summed it up that “the sweep of historical forces…has naturally been different in each island society, since the region’s anomalous decentralization has worked to isolate island from island, island group from island-group. That explains, still the absence of any real pan-Caribbean consciousness and the continuing balkanization of the area”. From this perspective, the plurality in structure makes it difficult to forge a regional identity.

Although the plural society model is still a popular framework used to analyze Caribbean society, it is important to note that Caribbean societies have changed significantly since Smith and Lewis wrote about them in the 1960’s. For example, Caribbean societies have integrated into

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11 Supranational identity refers to membership/allegiance to regional bloc or community broader than a nation state (Hall, 1999) while Pan-ethnic identity refers to the “expansion of an ethnic group or region (Pan-Caribbean) to include different national or ethnic groups that share a common language, culture or a common regional origin into an encompassing identity” (Itzigsohn & Dore-Cabral, 2000:225)
CARICOM, and have taken tangible steps towards creating a common identity. CARICOM has also introduced a community passport to replace the national passports of member countries in order to facilitate intra-Caribbean movement as a tool to foster a sense of common identity (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). This means that in order to understand the CARICOM identity, it is essential to examine the recent initiatives alongside the plurality of the member states.

The final theoretical model of the Caribbean society is the “Creole Society” provided by Kamau Brathwaite. Using Jamaica as a prototype, Brathwaite (1971) rejects both the plural and plantation society models, and suggests instead that contemporary Caribbean societies have become an inseparable mix of cultures and practices of different sets of people. He stipulates that Caribbean societies are “fixed within the dehumanizing institution of slavery [where there] were two cultures of people, having to adapt themselves to a new environment and to each other; the friction created by this confrontation was cruel, but it was also creative” (Brathwaite, 1971: 307). Europeans and Africans, both contributed to the development of a distinctive society and culture that is neither European nor African, but Creole. He describes creolization as a result of: a) acculturation, which is the absorption of one culture by another; and b) ‘interculturation’, which is the reciprocal, spontaneous process of mixture. Thus, despite the diversity, the Caribbean is seen as a unit with the mutual interpenetration of cultures and ethnicities, all co-abiding in harmony. From this viewpoint, the Caribbean enjoys a multicultural, harmonious existence of many different ethnic groups and cultures (see Table 3.02). This is the view that informs integration in the Caribbean and the notion that there is Caribbean “person” or identity (Williams, 1973; Demas, 1975).

While the three models provide different theoretical standpoints from which to conceive regional integration and a common identity, the idea of a unified CARICOM with a supranational
identity aligns with the creolization model where differences are minimized and are absorbed into a harmonious whole. However, the plural or plantation models would support the idea that CARICOM lacks a regional identity and would stress that identities within CARICOM are multiple and marked by differences. This would mean that a supranational identity is only possible through the negotiation of deeply-rooted historical structures and social relations.

3.03 Levels of Identities in the Caribbean

The above three frameworks focus on CARICOM identities from the structural or macro level. Garcia (2008) likewise views Caribbean identities from a macro perspective, but distinguishes three different levels based on a view that the Caribbean is wider than CARICOM, and includes all counties within the Caribbean basin. For her, the three levels of Caribbean identities are distinguishable by political, economic and cultural similarities/differences. Politically, Garcia (2008) distinguishes between countries that are organized as independent (for example Barbados), overseas territories (for example Montserrat), republics (for example Trinidad & Tobago), and Westminster style democracies (for example Jamaica) or as single party socialist states (Cuba). Economically, the Caribbean can be distinguished as separate oil producing countries (Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela); industrialized economies (Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic); international service centers focused around tourism and offshore banking (The Bahamas, Cayman Islands). Culturally, there are differences in language, religion, and ethnicities. These categories overlap and make it difficult to attach a single identity to any country, group of person or individuals. This also means that some CARICOM countries might have more similarities with non-CARICOM countries than CARICOM ones, for example, Trinidad is the only oil-producing CARICOM country, but regionally, Venezuela also produces oil.
Elbow (1999) also claims that the Caribbean is endowed with several identities that can be distinguished at three levels: the micro, meso and macro identity. The micro identity relates to nationalistic or insular identities (similar to Premdas’ insular identities, see below). The meso identity is characterized by affiliation with sub areas in the Caribbean comprised of groupings of small political units, generally with a shared colonial heritage, such as the Lesser Antilles and the British Caribbean. This is similar to what Premdas (1996) calls the ‘regional identity’ (see below). The macro-Caribbean comprises larger agglomerations such as “the greater Caribbean”. Elbow (1999) asserts that while the Caribbean is physically, politically, and culturally fragmented (compounded by strong association of individuals with their island of origin), there is more unity within the region than is generally recognized. He argues that CARICOM is a symbol of Anglo-Caribbean identity, which preserves the British Caribbean legacy. In fact, he credits CARICOM for conferring a sense of political identity to its members in the international scene. Accordingly, he posits that free movement of people can help with the transition from micro to macro scale identity within CARICOM (Elbow, 1999).

Premdas (1996) takes a similar approach in conceptualizing identities in the Caribbean. For analytical purposes, he identifies four levels into which Caribbean identity can be conceived: a) the trans-Caribbean b) the regional c) the insular and d) the sub-state ethno-nationalist. The trans-Caribbean identity relates to forms of collective consciousness about geographic and cultural origins that persons of Caribbean heritage living overseas tend to have. It can be found in regional and international institutions such as the University of the West Indies and CARICOM institutions where diverse Caribbean people work. This can be likened to the cultural identity that Garcia (2008) refers to. Premdas (1996:10) describes the trans-Caribbean identity as mostly imaginary, ambivalent, shallow and is often held as a defense mechanism when Caribbean
nationals are in alien lands. In fact, he argues that it is easily compromised by other identity claims. This identity can be best described as developing from engagement as opposed to framing. Identities developed through engagements are salient only in specific encounters, but do not reside as a permanent aspect of one’s life (Snow, 2001). The insular identity refers to the individual national/territorial identities while the regional identity is “language-delineated boundaries, incorporating clusters of islands” (Premdas, 1996:11), for example English speaking versus French speaking Caribbean. The final level of identity, according to Premdas (1996) is the sub-state ethno-nationalist identity, and it offers a more meaningful attachment to a sub-state locality or a cultural community and results in deep cultural divisions. Premdas (1996) argues that it is at the insular and sub-state ethno-nationalist levels that Caribbean people tend to express the greatest sense of belonging. In addition, Premdas (1996) stipulates that because Caribbean people define themselves using multiple markers such as homeland, language, religion, race, and customs, any identity assumed is geared toward meeting instrumental and expressive needs. The implication is that while Caribbean people might subscribe to that supranational identity, it is never salient. Consequently, Premdas (1996:2) concludes that any conception of the Caribbean as a unified region that confers a sense of common citizenship and community is incomplete. Premdas’ (1996) model shows that Caribbean nationals are permanently engaged in situations where multiple identities abound, and are constantly negotiating which identity more closely aligns to particular needs.

3.04 Features of a Caribbean identity

Many of the observers who extol the existence of a shared Caribbean identity tend to borrow from the Creole society model, which holds that within diversity is unity. Fernandez-Alfaro and Pascua (2006:71) adopt this multicultural perspective when describing the Caribbean:
The Caribbean region encompasses a mixture of cultures, ethnicities, languages, cuisines, and idiosyncrasies. That uniqueness translates, nevertheless, into a common identity that transcends the traditional geographic limits..... Caribbean Sea—whether insular or continental—share a sense of cultural affinity. In that context, population flows have played a key role in Caribbean life and in the creation of Caribbean nations.

This notion of a shared identity based on linguistic, geographic, cultural and historical similarities is today, popularized in Caribbean literature (Edmondson, 2009; Paul, 2007) and is at the crucible of integration attempts in the Caribbean. Even early Caribbean leaders such as Arthur Lewis and Eric Williams in the 1940s and the 1950s stress a “strong sentiment of West Indian oneness” as the rationale toward federalism (Boxill, 1993: xviii). Unsurprisingly, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) of today is seen as an outgrowth of this ‘harmonious’ existence (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001). The Time for Action Report, which recommended the formation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy for example, states:

… Caribbean regionalism is the outgrowth of the more than 300 years of West Indian Kinship… Without that element of West Indian identity a Community of Caribbean would be mere markings on parchment—a community without a soul, without a vision, without a shared destiny… (In Time for Action 1992:468).

This sentiment assumes that CARICOM countries are bound by virtue of a common history, and has informed many writings on Caribbean identities. The prominent Caribbean scholar, Rex Nettleford (1987), for example, proffers that the peoples of the Caribbean are united by a common sense of resilience to slavery and colonialism. He stipulates that “much of this has been achieved by cultural resistance filtered through the sense and sensibility of the majority of
transplanted souls who had to come to terms with their new environments” (Nettleford, 1987:4). This resistance led to the development of new and unique subcultures, which, according to the Barbadian historian, Kamau Brathwaite:

… Swept under the Caribbean Sea influencing, coercing, [and] teasing the ethos into something definitely “Caribbean”. The language, religious expression, kinship patterns, artistic expressions –even the indigenous modes of production, distribution and exchange –as well as the native organization of action groups with recognized leaders, all had their own intrinsic logic often forcing the Establishment to either resist or appropriate than” (Brathwaite in Müllerleile, 1996: 134).

In a similar breath, noted Caribbean scholar, Antonio Benitez likens Caribbean identity and culture to a rhizome, which is a root like stem that spreads horizontally in various directions, but makes up a single plant (Benitez Rojo in Garcia, 2008: 56). Accordingly, these shared regional customs, practices and beliefs in the Caribbean are all characterized by "analogous differences" (Benitez, 2008).

Similarly Garcia (2008) posits that shared linguistic and cultural experiences are arguably bases of a Caribbean identity, but this is just one of many identities that residents assume. Others include: Antilles, West Indies, Antilleans, and West Indians. Garcia (2008) thus stipulates that claims of a unified Caribbean identity are mostly ideological or are based on perceived cultural and anthropological affinities such as food, music and social institutions (family, kinship), and cultural bonds anchored in perceived common historic similarities. However, she stipulates that the region lacks a shared political and cultural identity, which is derailing integration efforts.

Overall the creole model of Caribbean society suggests that rather than tearing CARICOM countries apart, differences unify them into a unique identity. As such, it proposes
that the Caribbean identity can be found in harmonious co-existences of people with differences, which in this research includes nationalities, cultures, demographic backgrounds, migratory experiences and attitudes about integration. This would also mean that regional governments are capable of working together to formulate policies that enhance the region. In addition, it also implies that in spite of differences, intra-regional migrants are able to coexist harmoniously. From this standpoint, regionalism, migration and social relations should promote the strengthening of the CARICOM identity.

3.05 Inhibitors to a CARICOM Identity

While proponents of the creole model see differences within CARICOM as capable of coalescing into building blocks for a common identity, proponents of the plural and plantation models see such divisions as antithetical to a common identity. Premdas (1996) for example assumes that people are more likely to have strong ties to their racial/ethnic background than a macro/trans-Caribbean identity. In a similar vein, other Caribbean observers contend that the Caribbean identity as historically conceived is an ideal, not a reality (Müllerleile, 1996; Premdas, 1996). Eric Williams (1973), the first Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago, and proponent of a federal style government for the Commonwealth Caribbean, notes that despite similar populations and historical development, Caribbean countries:

Have basically one thing in common: they have been nurtured in a climate of isolation one from the other and the jealousies resulting therefrom. Britain did little or nothing to encourage inter-island co-operation... [And hence we have developed a] historical tradition to fragmentation rather than to integration (Williams, 1973:51).

Müllerleile (1996) extends this argument, noting that the shared history, geography, social and climate have developed a Caribbean personality and ‘Caribbean’ ways of living and behaving,
which is inhibitive to development and integration. This view has inspired a whole gamut of
debate on the impact of insularity on negating Caribbean unity. For example, the early Caribbean
integration theorist William Demas (1975) contends that the geographic insularity between the
islands have produced a competitive, individualistic mentality in the people of the region. These
divisions have served to prevent the formation of a Caribbean identity (Lewis, 1968; Parker &
Scott, 2006; Smith, 1968). Instead of forging a unified identity, what has emerged is a
multiplicity of identities within the Caribbean (Müllerleile, 1996; Premdas, 1996; Garcia, 2008).

Another argument supporting the absence of a common Caribbean identity is that
Caribbean expressions are not indigenous but are products of external influences, particularly
colonial imprints. In other words, they are imposed from the outside. Lewis (1968:350) arguing
from the Plural society model of the Caribbean, notes that “regional identity… was frequently
not so much an indigenous phenomenon on native grounds as it was the effort of the outsider
groups… to impose an abstract ideal upon an intractable insularity”. Similarly, Müllerleile,
(1996: 137) opines that “people, culture and language were all imported”. This sentiment is
shared by the prominent Caribbean novelist, Naipaul, who stipulates that the Caribbean consists
of “manufactured societies, labour camps, creations of the empire; and for a long time they were
dependent on the empire for law, language, institutions, culture, even officials. Nothing was
generated locally” (in Mullerleile, 1996:136). The supposed lack of authenticity in Caribbean
society is perceived as creating reticence among CARICOM nationals regarding a common
identity. Müllerleile (1996:136) summarizes the argument, noting that what Caribbean people
possess is “an ‘identity of inferiority’ to colonial influences, out of which grows ‘complicity at
the expense of co-operation’. Accordingly, the Nobel Prize laureate, Sir Arthur Lewis, (1983)
affirms that a specific West Indian personality and a particular West Indian social system are not
possible or desirable due to colonial outgrowths, which include deep structural discordances such as racial division and inequalities.

The above arguments and the three models of Caribbean societies point to the structural conditions that constrain the development of a CARICOM identity. However, these structural make-up of CARICOM societies also affect social relations and individuals’ identity choices. Borrowing from Beckford’s Plantation Society Model and Lewis’ Plural Society model, many regional writers also blame racial and ethnic divisions for disunity not only within and between Caribbean countries, but also within and between people (Mullerleile, 1996; Premdas, 1996; Smith, 1984). According to Stone, “the idea of an individual West Indian identity is predicated on the assumption that, in the Caribbean, people of different races have together formed a West Indian society in which the question of race does not play a role, but where, instead, social norms are set by income, class and education” (in Mullerleile, 1996:164). Smith (1984) describes stratification as a source of tension in the Caribbean based on unequal distribution of power among ethnic groups and social class. The stratification and differences are embodied in the tensions and xenophobia that is said to be experienced by some CARICOM migrants (Kendall, 2008; Ferguson, 2003). They can also lead to a situation in which people mix, but do not combine (Lewis, 1983). In Trinidad, Guyana and Belize, racial tensions are known to be prevalent, and it is pluralism rather than assimilation that are the status quo in those countries (Smith, 1984; Lewis, 1983:10).

Premdas (1996) agrees that it is membership in ethnic communities, not territorial, cultural or historical affiliation, which determines how Caribbean people derive their sense of belonging. He notes that in spite of shared history, colonial powers have left different imprints, and identities on each island, which precedes an “enormous range and variation in present day
Caribbean societies” (Premdas, 1996:2). This, alongside the multi-racial, multi-lingual, stratified, and multi-cultural composition, makes the concept of a Caribbean identity nebulous (Premdas, 1996).

Borrowing on Anderson’s (2006) concept of the imagined community, Premdas (1996) suggests that a sense of regional identity can exist without much social relationship among Caribbean nationals. He contends that “it is easy to assert a Caribbean identity if that person does not have to meet his/her compatriots and have no hope of this ever happening” (Premdas, 1996:6). Furthermore, he argues that an imaginary region empowers persons with something much bigger than a relatively small island (Premdas, 1996) and so it might be desirable to have this larger sense of being that a regional identity permits. At the same time, he notes “Caribbean” is an abstraction suffused with an assortment of ethnic tensions that demonstrate the dangers of making indiscriminate ethnic identity claims (Premdas, 1996:8).

In addition to lacking a tangible base, Robert Cuthbert (1986) argues that a ‘Caribbean identity’ is something that is not accepted by many people of the region. He stipulates that for many residents, it is much more important to be designated a national of their native country than to be a Caribbean person or a West Indian. In fact, Cuthbert (1986) also holds that in spite of links between family members in the various islands, and large intra-regional migration, this has not led to a regional identity.

The above suggests that even if it exists, the CARICOM identity is non-salient. They also indicate that it is weakened by social relations where people privilege personal characteristics such as race and class over a regional identity. Thus, the formation of a CARICOM identity requires the negotiation of race and class as well as other structural differences that define the countries in CARICOM. Applying the concentric models of identities to the discussion above,
national and ethnic identities appear much closer to the individual than Caribbean identity. As Boxill (1997) points out, notwithstanding intra-regional relations developed through migration and integration, the Caribbean historical legacy has divided the region to the point where its members possess stronger identification with countries outside of the region than with those inside. The key argument by these scholars is that despite similar social structures and forms of social organization, the Anglophone Caribbean is far from unified into a common identity let alone non-Anglo Caribbean nations (such as Suriname and Haiti). They therefore cast doubt on the possibilities of integration and of creating a regional identity. In fact, they imply that intra-regional travels would not lead to the strengthening of a regional identity because social relations would be hindered by personal differences, which would loosen the sense of a unified region.

3.06 Globalization & the History of Integration in the Caribbean

The previous section explored how the structure of Caribbean society and internal social relations can impact identity formation. However, the arguments largely predate the integration of CARICOM through the single market and economy and the impacts of globalization. Globalization and the economic system of neo-liberalism are accused of driving the transition to a universal culture of interdependence and interchangeability between nations (Tomlinson, 1999). Many observers claim that it has resulted in nations forming closer alliances at the political, social and economic levels with the consequence that cultures and identities are increasingly permeable (Plaza, 2006; Smith, 1998). Globalization is identified as driving ‘deterriorialized’ identities to the point of diminishing the significance of local cultural experiences and identities (Appadurai in Basch et al, 1994; Bloemraad, 2004; Featherstone, 1990; Tomlinson, 1999). This has not always been the case; Castles (1997) for example views identities as the most powerful source of resistance to globalization. He argues that cultural
identities are not fragile, but are at the very base of institutional (and national) identities (Castles, 1997). However, studies of the connection between globalization and supranational identities tend to indicate that regional institutions play a significant role in identity formation, whether it is in conferring, legitimizing or creating boundaries (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006; Marks, 1999).

The EU is regarded as a sterling model of how supranational organizations/institutions can foster a supranational identity (Marks, 1999). Boxill (1997) notes that it has inspired supranational integration across the globe, including South America, Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Mullerleile (1996), however, observes that while CARICOM has taken EU integration as its prototype, historically there has been a high propensity for integration within the English-speaking Caribbean. Bishop and Payne (2010) stipulate that the supranational context of Caribbean integration is clearly manifested in the four historically distinct phases of the Commonwealth Caribbean. The first phase, Decolonization and Federation, occurred in the 1950s. During this time, the British colonial government attempted to establish a single federated state to govern the region. The British intended to relinquish control of the Commonwealth Caribbean to this government. This government, the West Indies Federation, only lasted for four years (1958-1962) due to in-fighting, British ambivalence, and the desire for national independence in some territories (Boxill, 1993; Bishop and Payne 2010).

Bishop and Payne (2011) explain that the second integrative wave ushered in the formation of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), which lasted from 1965 to 1973. The primary objective of CARIFTA was to facilitate free trade and economic advancement in the region. The desire to facilitate greater cooperation on political and social issues led to the third phase: the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). CARICOM replaced

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12 Supranational institutions- organizations or establishments devoted to the promotion of the objectives of multinational organizations e.g. CARICOM
CARIFTA in 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. According to Boxill (1993), CARICOM is a stronger form of integration with three ‘pillars’ of economic integration (a common market in goods), functional cooperation (education, health and several other areas), and foreign policy coordination. However, CARICOM at this time was seen as being ineffective in promoting trade as intra-regional trade languished substantially in the 1980’s. As a result, CARICOM was seen to have failed to develop into a fully functioning customs union.

In an effort to make integration more meaningful, regional leaders signed The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1989, which paved the way for the formation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). The CSME aimed to harmonize economic policies across the region and create a single economic space. The CSME came into legal effect and was officially inaugurated in 2006. The Single Economy is scheduled for completion in 2015. One of the two key features of CSME is the Right of Establishment, which allows for the establishment of CARICOM owned businesses in any Member State without restrictions. The other is the Free movement of labour, through measures such as removing all obstacles to intra-regional movement of skills, labour and travel, harmonizing social services (education, health, etc.), providing for the transfer of social security benefits and establishing common standards and measures for accreditation and equivalency” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001). Under article 45 of the Treaty, unhindered travel (article 45) is facilitated by a common travel document (CARICOM Passport), common landing documents and national treatment at CARICOM ports of entry. The free movement of skilled labour is provided for in various sections of the Revised Treaty (Articles, 32, 34d, 36 and 37), and have been implemented to various degrees in all territories. The architects of the CSME envisioned that it would foster greater intra-regional movement, greater exchange of cultures and would solidify a common sense of belonging
(Arthur, 2012; Hall, 2012; Patterson 2007). Thus, the goal of creating a regional identity is a policy project. However, as the next section shows, CARICOM’s policies do not necessarily translate into the envisioned regional identity. The success of regional integration and the strengthening of a regional identity is mediated by the willingness of administrators to implement the policies that enamour people and promote social cohesion.

3.07 “Implementation Deficit” and Disillusionment with Integration

Long before regional heads of governments agreed on the CSME in 1989 and began implementing it in 2005, they have been the subject of criticisms around their political will and achievements on integration issues. These criticisms continue to overshadow the implementation of the single market and economy and the rhetoric of a regional identity. Regional leaders continue to be criticized for approaching regional integration in a half-hearted way and for lacking the will to implement plans agreed on at the regional level. For many observers, this has affected the credibility of the movement and is manifested in not only limited success with integration but also failing to gain real buy-in by the common citizenry (Bishop & Payne, 2001; Boxill, 1993; Mullerleile, 1996). According to Mullerleile (1996), while the idea of (economic) integration has always been favoured by the political elite in the Caribbean, very little consideration is given to how it affects culture and people at the grassroots level. Boxill (1993:i) concurs that there is “the persistent failure to consolidate a strong Caribbean Community as envisioned by Treaty of Chaguaramas”, which he attributes to the failure of regional governments to implement decisions taken at the CARICOM level. This “implementation gap” has become a major source of disappointment and frustration for many CARICOM nationals and has contributed to widespread cynicism amongst the public of the region (Boxill, 1993).
Bishop (2011) agrees that ‘implementation deficit’ continues to be the Achilles heels of regional integration. He points to the fact that the revised treaty was signed in 1989, yet the single market is not expected to be completed until 2015 as evidence that there is a real ‘implementation deficit’ in CARICOM (Bishop, 2011). Caribbean media are also critical about the slow pace of implementing free movements of all categories of people as well as the negative experiences reported by intra-regional migrants (Campbell, 2013; Henry, 2013). In addition, the media has questioned the relevance, purposes and achievements of CARICOM, often spewing headlines such as “CARICOM giving ‘migration’ a bad name: Major ‘deficits’ mocking ‘progress’” (Singh, 2011); “CARICOM: A Failure of Effective Leadership” (2012, Starbroek News, Guyana); “CARICOM is Dead” (2013, Caribareana, Antigua) and “CARICOM continues to fail the people of the Caribbean” (2007, Barbados Word Press). In addition, reports of discriminations against some nationals are so rampant that both the ‘Heads of Governments’ in the region and the Caribbean Court of Justice prioritized intra-regional travel as an issue to address in future meetings (CARICOM Secretariat, 2014).

Currently, the plans of CARICOM to “resemble the Schengen in Europe… and allow for a generally more agile movement of people within [the region]” are far from reality (Fernandez-Alfaro, 2006:76). Nationalistic concerns are currently putting such plans on hold (Fernandez-Alfaro, 2006) creating an “implementation deficit” (Boxill, 1997). These concerns include worries that free movement of people will affect nations’ abilities to “efficiently manage all the different migration flows given limited resources and weak or otherwise resource-poor state structures… [And] Perhaps as a direct result of this skepticism, some of the wealthier countries within CARICOM, such as The Bahamas fear receiving lesser-skilled migrants due to this agreement, [and] have shown reluctance in fully supporting the CSME” (Fernandez-Alfaro &
Fernandez-Alfaro & Pascua (2006:76) therefore surmise that the strategy appears to be geared solely at “boost[ing] academic exchange, cultural ties, and business relations” among the elites rather than to genuinely afford free movement of all categories of CARICOM peoples. According to this view, only a select group are exposed to this deepened sense of “CARICOM identity” and so at the institutional level, CARICOM has not created a system that would enable equal opportunity for regional identity building across all its citizens.

The transition from policy to action is seen as the major weakness of CARICOM in effecting free movement of people, and possibly developing a regional identity. Goddard (2012:550) observes that the inability of the majority of CARICOM nationals to travel freely between member states “remains one of the most irksome of the integration process” (Goddard: 2012:550). In fact, even persons in specialized categories are not at liberty to move as they wish because “these persons can only exercise their right to free movement in pursuit of economic activities, not for residential purposes” (Cholewinski, Redpath, Nonnenmacher & Packer, 2006: 38). In this regard, the current arrangements cater only to economic migrants, to the exclusion of broader civic goals. Accordingly, CARICOM is increasingly seen exclusively as an economic bloc rather than an institution promoting socio-cultural development. The exclusion of some people from integration might impact the strength of the regional identity, and could create a loss of diversity in any resultant identity. In addition, unfavourable perception about CARICOM might also cause indifference instead of strengthening social relations and a regional identity.

The nature of relations between intra-regional migrants and citizens of host countries also affects the construction of a regional identity. Kendall (2006:5) explains that social relations between countries and between CARICOM nationals are affected by “fear of economic competition, xenophobia and the consequential political constraints thereby imposed”. The
former Barbadian Prime Minister, Owen Arthur (2004) also acknowledges that “in the Caribbean, the impulse to restrict free movement of our people has become so institutionalized because of its appeal to the more brutal aspects of our supposed national sovereignty and independence” (Arthur, 2004:33). For Arthur (2004), this idea that intra-regional migration is encroaching on national sovereignty and identity is unfounded, yet is widespread in the region. Valdez, Turk, Mc Kinkey & Gayle (2006) concur that intra-regional migration can pose issues concerning national security, as well as social and demographic challenges but they argue that these can be dealt with through effective policies. They point out that:

Intra-regional migration has also created social and economic pressures, which have the potential to evolve into tensions within and between states, thereby affecting regional stability and development…. And so far, policy-oriented thinking has rarely focused specifically on intra-regional migration with a view to providing for comprehensive long-term decision making and collaboration, directed towards preventing violent conflict by better management of migration flows (Valdez & Turk, 2006: xv).

As Valdez and Turk (2006), point out in the quote above, policies need to strengthen social relations between people in order to prevent conflicts that can prevent the formation of a regional identity. In the same breath, regional policies should consider relations between countries because, as Cholewinski et al (2006:43) note, nationalistic tendencies and uneven development between CARICOM countries are derailing integration:

There is the fear from the strongest economies that the new policy will attract workers from other states and negatively affect the unemployment rate; this is also used as a justification for maintaining restrictions on unskilled labor….. On the
other hand, less developed countries that have a small professional labor force and lack a university campus find limited advantages in a regional open market for the highly skilled, and argue that one way to level the playing field is to immediately introduce the free movement of unskilled labor (Cholewinski et al, 2006:43).

The unevenness in institutional presence in some CARICOM member countries can send negative messages about the importance of particular countries in the regional integration process (see Table 5.15 for the geographic distribution of CARICOM institutions). This, alongside restrictive migration policies can affect opportunities for establishing social relationships and social cohesiveness among member countries. This weakens the possibility of forging a regional identity. The Guyanese Ambassador in Barbados therefore warns that “if an understanding is not reached quickly on the free movement of people within the region, it can breed some ‘national’ bitterness, which can result in an entire population being blamed for snafus caused by a particular government,” (Caribbean360, 2013:1).

In addition to diverging interests, inequalities and social tensions among countries, many Caribbean scholars claim that historically, and currently there is just a lack of political will to move forward (Boxill, 1993; Cholewinski et al, 2006). For example, the delays, missed deadlines and constant rescheduling of full implementation of the freedom of movement provisions are understood strictly as a lack of political will by CARICOM government (Boxill, 2010; Cholewinski et al, 2006). Boxill (1993) explains that the implementation deficit might be due to the fact that CARICOM does not have an ideology to guide it. In his study among CARICOM elites, he finds that CARICOM means different things to different people, and that there is a lack of consensus about whether a common identity exists. He thus concludes that CARICOM is “weak and unstable (Boxill, 1993:109). In addition, Boxill (1993) notes that integration within
CARICOM is too focused on the economic realm, with relatively little consideration for non-materialistic factors such as people and culture.

As the above shows, political wrangling impacts migrants’ entry into other CARICOM countries, and for those already living in other countries, the political climate can impact how they are incorporated into those societies. While lukewarm integration politics can breed isolation (Fernandez-Alfaro & Pascua, 2006), increasing movement and “mixing of people [can] produced positive outcomes, including transfers of technology and skills” (Valdez et al, 2006: xv). As a result, social policy and the nature of social relations have serious implications for how intra-regional migrants develop a regional identity.

3.08 Intra-Regional Migration & Integration in CARICOM

Despite the pessimism about CARICOM and its record, Valdez et al (2006: xv) insist that globalization and regional integration are “transforming the nature and scope of international movement and migration within the Greater Caribbean both in and of itself and as a pathway to the North”. Thomas-Hope (2006:1) concurs that Caribbean nationals have a propensity to migrate so migration will always impact regional identities (see Table 3.01 for migration rates of CARICOM countries). Schmid (2006) estimates that over the past 50 years, more than 13.5 per cent of the Caribbean’s population migrated overseas. The main destination countries include the USA (80 per cent of all migrants); the United Kingdom (10 percent); and Canada, which accounts for just over 3 per cent of all Caribbean migrants (Nurse, 2006; Thomas-Hope 2006). Table 3.03 shows that among tertiary level graduates in the Caribbean, emigration rates are especially high (Pienkos, 2006) and it appears that with the specialized categories allowed free movements within the CSME, CARICOM is set to exploit these movements, albeit within the region. This could stem the brain drain from the region as a whole, even if it does not stem it
from all CARICOM nations. The free movement of university graduates under the CSME can potentially arrest this brain drain if graduates can be motivated to travel within the region. It can also act as a catalyst for the construction of a regional identity.

In addition, many people in the Caribbean use intra-regional migration as a tool for accessing better lives in more familiar territories before branching further overseas (Basch, 1982; UNECLAC, 2006). It is estimated that close to half a million persons migrated between Caribbean islands during the last half of the 20th century, representing 10 per cent of all Caribbean migration over the same period\(^\text{13}\) (Guengant, 1993). Intra-Caribbean migration in CARICOM countries declined significantly in the 1970’s and 1980’s as most countries began to enforce strict border controls as a result of a decline in the agricultural sector and the fact that almost all Caribbean countries had gained independence during that time. Independence meant that instead of assuming allegiance to Colonial powers, the people of the region assumed their own legal institution, sovereignty and unique national identities, which helped to empower them to enforce restrictive border controls.

\(^{13}\) “Caribbean” is used here in the broader sense. It is likely that most of this migration occurred between the Spanish speaking islands and not the current countries comprising CARICOM.
Table 3.01. Populations and Net Migration Rates in CARICOM Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARICOM Countries</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Net Migration Rate (2010 ~ as a Proportion of total population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>88,710</td>
<td>+2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>342,877</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>273,331</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>307,000</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>67,757</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>104,487</td>
<td>-16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>754,493</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>9,151,000</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2,741,052</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>5,934</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>174,267</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>52,402</td>
<td>+1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>109,333</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>524,636</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>1,341,465</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.02
Demographic Characteristics of CARICOM Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARICOM COUNTRIES</th>
<th>Official Language</th>
<th>Main Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Main Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Black (91%)</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Black (85%)</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Black (93%)</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Multiple*</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Black (90%)</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Black (82%)</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>East Indians (50%)</td>
<td>Christians (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Black (26%)</td>
<td>Hindu 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Black (95%)</td>
<td>Christianity***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Black (91%)</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Multiple**</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Black (91%)</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Black (90%)</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Black (66%)</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>See note 14</td>
<td>See note 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>East Indians (35%)</td>
<td>Christianity (56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Black (34%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Belize is comprised of 34% mixed Maya/European; 25% Kriols and 15% Spanish
**Montserrat is comprised of 20% Blacks; 20% Whites and 40% mixed
***Haiti also 50% Voodoo

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14 Suriname: 41% Christians; 20% Hindu; 14% Muslims. The main ethnic groups are as follow: East Indians 37%; Creole (Black/White) 31%; Maroons 10% and Javanese 15.
Table 3.03
*Per cent of Tertiary level graduates emigrating in and out of CARICOM*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Emigration rates for each individual country, which could include migration to other CARICOM country.*

While the above data on intra-regional migration in the Caribbean are dated, they provide a basis for understanding current trends. The latest publicly available analysis of the data from the ILO shows that intra-regional migrants made up a small fraction of the total population in most CARICOM countries, except for Antigua (see Table 3.04). Migrant stock in the Caribbean
ranges from a high of 24.5 per cent in Antigua in 2000 to a low of 0.2 per cent in Guyana. Despite the apparently low rates of intra-regional migration, most of the work permits issued by CARICOM countries were to CARICOM nationals (see Table 3.04). However, these figures are prior to the implementation of the CSME, which allows for free movements for select categories of people. Using the same 1990/1991 census data in the Caribbean, Cholewinski et al (2007) posit that the number of intra-CARICOM migrants stood at 105,000, which is equivalent to 2 percent of the total CARICOM population excluding Haiti. Nonetheless, many academics and CARICOM observers have declared that since the mid-1990’s intra-regional migration within CARICOM has been increasing steadily (Lesser et al, 2006; Mills, 1997; Boxill, 2010; UNECLAC, 2006) although the precise figure is uncertain.

The mass migration between pre-independent Caribbean countries and the subsequent mass movement outside the region (Guengant, 1993), means that migration is not just a ‘site’ for identity construction (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006), but is also seen as a part of the Caribbean identity itself (Thomas-Hope, 2006). According to Thomas-Hope (2006:1) migration is “deeply embedded in the psyche of Caribbean peoples over the past century and a half”. In fact, migration within the Caribbean Community is not a new phenomenon as 'freedmen' from the smaller islands of Barbados, Antigua and Grenada are known to have migrated to the larger territories such as Trinidad and Jamaica (as early as the late 1830s) in search of higher wages, greater opportunities to acquire land and seek alternatives to plantation life (Mahabir, 2007; Valtonen, 1996). Boxill stipulates that “Caribbean migrants are constantly constructing and reconstructing their identity. The experience of leaving home and living in another country so transforms the individual that he or she is no longer the same on return home” (Boxill, 2010:4).
This would suggest that the experience migrating within CARICOM is an expression of regional identity in itself.

Table 3.04.

*Migrant Stock and Intra-Regional Migration in CARICOM countries*¹⁵

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Migrant stock as % of Population 1990</th>
<th>CARICOM Nationals as % of 1990 Population</th>
<th>WPCN* 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>19.18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; The Grenadines</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*WPCN: Per cent of Work permits issued to CARICOM Nationals in 1998*


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¹⁵ ***The census excluded Haiti, which was not a member of CARICOM in 1990. Montserrat excluded possibly because of the volcanic activity which caused massive migration, shrinking the population from 13,000 to less than 5,000.

*No data available for spaces left blank*
The free movement of people in the region has historically been viewed as a tool towards developing a regional identity. The former Trinidad and Tobago prime minister, Eric Williams (1973:251) notes that despite the fact that within the Commonwealth Caribbean there is a historical tradition to fragment rather than to integrate, any form of political integration would be a step in the direction of the development of a Caribbean personality (Williams, 1973:256). He argues that through the sharing of its resources, the region is able to improve the quality of life and keep its talented (Williams, 1973:256). Patterson thus argues that CARICOM is tasked with:

The nurturing of a sense of collective identity of Caribbean peoples… [Because] the shared collective identity of [its] citizens, whether resident in the region or dispersed in the diaspora, increases in psychic importance…. Each individual Caribbean national identity, overlaid and reinforced by the regional dimension of identity, is provided with an extra sense of resilience by this collective sense of belonging (Patterson, 2007: 482-483).

Even though Patterson (2007) presupposes the existence of a regional identity, he laments that intra-regional movement alone might not be enough to deepen a sense of Caribbean identity. He argues that although a “basic underlying sense of regional identity persists in CARICOM member states [there is] a troubling lack of salience of the CARICOM idea and CARICOM policy issues” in national politics and consciousness of most countries (Patterson, 2007:500). For example, he notes that most member states have abandoned the observance of CARICOM day and the CARICOM flag is not used alongside national flags. In addition, he observes that there is an absence of debates on CARICOM issues in national parliaments (Patterson, 2007). This supports the argument that CARICOM is more of an elitist and institutional ideology, which is far removed from the day to day experiences of citizens (Bishop, 2011; Boxill, 1997).
generally different from how citizens experience integration in the EU, where its symbols (such as the common Euro currency for most member countries), are more pervasive in the lives of citizens. Nonetheless, as the literature suggests, migration exposes individuals to sites that shape their identities and in this regard, it is important to understand their experiences, with CARICOM institutions and with destination countries.

Migrants’ experiences often relate to their positions in destination countries, which many Caribbean researchers mostly theorize is structurally determined (e.g. Basch, 1982; Johnson, 1973). These structural factors include inequalities in wages and job opportunities between the islands (Basch, 1987; Valtonen, 1996). However, Basch (1982) observes that intra-regional migrants within the Caribbean often face a number of problems, including very low entry level into the labour market and substandard dwelling conditions. These experiences translate into low levels of integration. In fact, Basch’s (1982) research among the West Indian diaspora in the US reveals that while Caribbean nationals develop multiple identities after migration, national identity is rarely affected. This implies that intra-Caribbean migrants are likely to expand their identities, but not lose pre-existing ones. At the same time, it is important to note that in reference to existing identities, the development of a regional identity is not a zero sum game because many identities can coexist. Overall, the above section shows that the formation of a supranational identity in CARICOM is constrained by many structural factors that affect the interactions, experiences and identity choices of migrants.

3.09 Empirical Research on Intra-regional Migration & Caribbean Identities

Despite the plethora of literature on Caribbean migration, not many empirical studies have focused on intra-regional migration or explored possible connections between identity formation and Caribbean integration. Most of the work on Caribbean migration continues to be
done with the diaspora in places such as England, the US and Canada (Basch, 2001; Foner, 2001; Thomas-Hope, 2006). An important exception is an early study by Marshall (1979), which explored Haitian migration to the Bahamas (two outlying CARICOM countries, see chapter 4 for an explanation). The research, conducted between 1969 and 1971 involved 250 respondents, and used surveys to study motivations for migration and the levels of ties maintained between home and destination countries. Drawing on economic determinants, in particular the Push-Pull theory, the study found that most Haitian migrants retained strong ties to their home country. Haitian migrants engaged in frequent correspondences, visits, and investments in property and commerce back home. These activities provided a sense of attachment to Haiti, but also made it easy for them to resettle in their temporary homes. While the study did not specifically address the process of identity construction, it suggests that intra-regional migrants do not simply assimilate into that of the local culture. Their active involvement in their homeland suggests that their national identities remained strong. At the same time, as this research covered only two CARICOM countries, the results must be viewed as specific to those countries. Nonetheless, it points towards the resilience of national identity, which could potentially be an obstacle to regional identity formation.

Among the more recent studies is Boxill’s (1997) Ideology & Caribbean Integration, which surveyed the attitudes towards integration among cultural, economic and political elites in St. Lucia and Jamaica. Using a cross sectional survey, the study interviewed 100 Jamaicans and 82 St. Lucians who were predetermined as elites based on their relative influence in business, education and politics in both countries. The study asked respondents to identify the characteristics of a Caribbean identity and to assess whether they possessed these characteristics.

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16 Politicians, educators, business persons, technocrats, trade union leaders etc.
It found that there were no common perceptions of the region, or a regional identity; neither was there consensus on the impact of integration movement or the action required to strengthen/consolidate regionalism. Boxill (1997) concluded that there is a need for a regional ideology, including a pan-national identity. He also suggested that there needs to be a consensus on the main issues affecting the region. This study must be viewed with caution as well because it was based on opinions of only ‘researcher-appointed’ elites in two countries from a possible fifteen. In addition, the survey was based on attitudes and opinions rather than actual experiences of either migration or integration.

Another study that considered intra-regional migrants’ lives is Kathleen Valtonen’s (1996) “Bread and tea: A study of the integration of low-income immigrants from other Caribbean territories into Trinidad”. The study questioned twenty two (22) low income intra-regional immigrants to understand their integration experiences in Trinidad. The study utilized in-depth interviews with migrants to understand their adaptation to Trinidadian’s culture, daily life and labour market, and how these experiences affect self-identities and adaptation to the host society. Using the framework of international circulation, Valtonen (1996) discovered that most immigrants maintained their distinct national identities whilst in Trinidad. However, they managed to successfully integrate into Trinidad’s way of life based on ethno-cultural similarities (for example religion, race and food) with the local population. The study also found that while migrants often engaged in social conflicts with local citizens, the majority reported overall satisfactory relationships with locals and other immigrants alike. Valtonen (1996) concluded that successful integration into a host country only required the incorporation of cultural ‘baggage’ on a need-only basis in daily life. This demonstrates that a strong sense of national identity might not necessarily impede integration in destination countries once there are other shared similarities
that are valued by both migrants and host nationals. Thus, there is a potential for the harmonious coexistence of Caribbean nationals within member states, which could lead to an expansion of their repertoire of identities. However, these results must be viewed with caution as they relate to only one country, using a small sample. In addition, the study focuses on adaptation and not integration\textsuperscript{17} or on identity formation.

Both Valtonen (1996) and Boxill (1997) bemoaned the absence of cross-cultural research on integration and migration more generally in the Caribbean. While both research are important in providing context, neither provide any detail as to the forms of identities in the Caribbean or about how they are constructed. In fact, both studies were conducted before free movement of people legislations were enacted across CARICOM. This research fills these gaps by providing important answers to how intra-regional migrants construct their experiences, how they perceive of regionalism and how they negotiate their identities.

3.10 Summary & Conclusion

The chapter demonstrates that the impact of migration is largely mediated by structural determinants, which influence social relationships and identity choices. The three theoretical models of Caribbean societies suggest that structures and social relations affect daily lives and can significantly impact social cohesion and identity construction. While the similarities among CARICOM countries are undisputed, existing research on the integration process and intra-regional migration in CARICOM suggests that the plural model might be the most useful explain the formation of a regional identity. The literature points to class, race and structural differences

\textsuperscript{17} Adaptation refers to the getting acquainted with a new environment for example getting to know the language, culture, and location of a new country. Integration refers to when a migrant acquires the traits of the host society and is accepted as a part of it. Assimilation on the other hand occurs when all differences between migrants and host societies have been virtually eliminated.
between the CARICOM countries including differences in economic power, the legacy of colonial division, and sub-state differences as some of the factors that constrain the development of a regional identity. In addition, the lack of political will and deficiencies in policy making, which are symptomatic of the plural nature of CARICOM societies were identified as two of the main deterrents to social cohesion and identity formation. In spite of the history towards integration, and numerous treaty revisions, the implementation of policy objectives and the lack of will to facilitate the movement of people continue to constrain the identity construction process. Accordingly, scepticisms about the possibilities of a regional identity are not unwarranted, especially without commitment to free movement which would bolster social relationships, solidarity and the regional identity construction process. This also indicates that it is important to have effective leadership (from both CARICOM and national governments) in setting and implementing agreed on policies, so that people can see and experience the benefits of regionalism. Effective and meaningful policies might have a positive effect on social relations, and might encourage closer attachments to CARICOM. Overall, the chapter demonstrates that given the plural nature of CARICOM societies, the construction of a regional identity therefore requires: a) the promotion of enabling factors such as common cultures and intrinsic vulnerabilities, which necessitates integration; whilst b) mitigating against inhibitive characteristics of plural societies. This would allow intra-regional migrants to realize the purported benefits of integration, which would better inform their identity choices.
CHAPTER IV – METHODOLOGY

4.0 Overview

The previous chapters explained the need for an empirical study on intra-regional migration and CARICOM identities to examine the assumptions about the nature of Caribbean societies, social relations and identity formation in the region. They described the various theoretical models used to study identities and integration, and provided the rationale for viewing identities as the products of negotiation. To explain how a CARICOM identity can be constructed, this research seeks to uncover how intra-regional migrants self-identify and how they rationalize their identities, migratory experiences and regional integration. This chapter describes the methodology and empirical strategies used to answer the research questions. It begins with a methodological overview followed by a discussion on the rationale for the multiple methods approach used in collecting and analyzing the results. It also discusses the recruitment of respondents and the choice of analytical strategies employed. The chapter ends with some reflexive comments about how I situate myself in the research and how it impacts the outcome.

4.01 Multiple Methods Design

In order to overcome the contentious issues of truth and reality, which have dogged ontological and epistemological discussions in social research, this research takes a pragmatic approach in which I assume that there are “singular and multiple realities that are open to empirical inquiry” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011: 42). A pragmatic approach to social research frees the researcher of mental and practical constraints imposed by the “forced choice dichotomy between post-positivism and constructivism” and allows the researcher to value both objective and subjective knowledge (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011: 43-44). Accordingly, researchers are
not imprisoned by commitments to particular methods or techniques, but are more concerned with practically addressing research questions (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Robson, 1993).

To this end, I adopt a multiple methods design to more accurately reflect the plural nature of structures, events and subjectivities. A multi-method design involves the use of both qualitative and quantitative data, which are each treated as separate sets for the purpose of analyses (Hunter & Brewer, 2003). Mingers (2001:243) argues that multi-method approaches to research overcome the shortcoming of focusing on only specific aspects of the world, and consequently provide a broader and richer perspective on social phenomena. In addition, Mingers (2001) stipulates that research is a process that proceeds through different phases, which pose different tasks and problems for the researcher. In this regard, a multi-method strategy is capable of adapting to the different tasks that might come up during the research process. Identities in particular are dynamic and constantly evolving (Smith, 1998; Vertovec, 2004), and multiple methods enhance our understandings of them. In addition, they are often contingent on institutions and social constraints, which are constantly evolving themselves. As this research takes the view that identities are simultaneously subjective, social, situational, contingent, and yet products of structural processes, an approach that allows for a plurality of methods is suitable for this study. In addition, given the infiniteness and the complexity of the world, a multi-method approach is a pragmatic way of aligning research strategy with the research aims or objectives.

The specific multi-method design that this project takes is the sequential approach. The first phase involved the collection of quantitative data, which was followed by interviews to probe qualitative dimensions of responses and thus get a better understanding of the results (Greene, 2008). Quantitative data, obtained through an online survey, was used to identify participants for the qualitative interviews as well as to provide context for qualitative
instruments. The survey allowed me to determine the categories in which people self-identify and understand their attitudes on identity features as well as the significance of proclaimed identities. The use of these surveys is well established (see for example in the Eurobaromter, the International Social Survey Program, and The World Values Survey), and is often used by many academic researchers (Bruter, 2005; Boxill 1993). Boxill (1993:7) stipulates, surveys are useful for studying attitudes because “attitudes reflect, in a substantial way, the character of people’s ideologies…. [And] it is one of the most effective social scientific tools for capturing and categorizing people’s attitudes”. My survey instrument drew on more established research to probe supranational identity, migration and regionalism. Many of my survey questions around identity, symbols and integration were similar to Bruter’s (2005) and those on the Eurobarometer to ensure measurement consistency. For example, the Eurobarometer allowed respondents to self-identity and used attachment to measure identity. I also borrowed Bruter’s (2005) measure of concentric identities to discover the relationship between place, proximity and identity salience. By replicating these tools, I was able to enhance the comparability and reliability of the study.

The survey enabled the exploration of pertinent identity issues and established a baseline for the study. Following the survey, in-depth interviews were conducted with volunteers from the pool of respondents in the online survey or as referred by survey participants.

**4.02 Recruitment of Participants**

The study utilized purposive sampling to ensure that the participants fully met the desired criteria of the study. As such, it targeted information-rich cases (Patton 2002) by selecting respondents who met the following mandatory criteria: Respondents must

- Be a citizen of a CARICOM member country
- Be over the age of 18 years
• Have lived in a CARICOM member country for a period of at least two months (Bruter, 2005).

The recruitment of participants for this study was done through three main ways: a) personal network b) online social networking and c) contact with students’ and intra-regional migrants’ associations in the Caribbean. A total of nineteen associations were contacted and seven (or 37 per cent) responded favorably. They assisted by circulating the research flier to members, advertising the study at meetings and/or posting it on their web pages (see Appendix D). As a graduate of the University of West Indies, which is one of the most visible symbols of regional integration (Girvan, 2012), I tapped into my personal network of fellow graduates and other contacts from other CARICOM islands as well as other Jamaicans who studied in the campuses in Trinidad and Barbados. I also relied on personal contacts of persons that I met while living in Barbados. After briefing them about the study and providing the link for the survey, I asked recruits to pass on the information to eligible persons within their own networks.

The second way in which I recruited participants was through social networking. Social networking presents many opportunities for participant recruitment, including effectively reaching a target group in a relatively short period of time. I advertised the study on my Facebook page and used my personal page to post updates, links and to appeal to eligible people in my social network to take the survey. Participants were also asked to inform their colleagues and other eligible persons to participate. I went through my contacts and sent out just over 40 messages to eligible participants from my own network. Many of my friends also copied my advertisements and updates about the survey on their social networking pages as well. This was an effective way of reaching a rather homogeneous group; respondents tend to have persons who are similar to themselves, (demographically and similarity in migratory experiences) within their
networks. The study utilized two methods to collect data: an online survey and in-depth interviews. These are discussed next.

4.03.a The Online Survey

The first phase of the research utilized an online survey, which was hosted by the University of Saskatchewan’s Social Science Research Laboratory (SSRL). The SSRL provided a web link, which was advertised to the target audience. Interested individuals could easily click on or type in the link in their browsers where they were directed to the consent form. If they agreed to the consent information, they were allowed to take the survey. If not, a thank you message was produced and the survey closed. The first three questions in the survey were used to screen respondents to make sure that they were eligible to participate. If individuals were at least 18 years, held citizenship from a CARICOM country and had lived in at least one other CARICOM country, excluding country of citizenship, they were allowed to complete the survey. Again, if respondents did not meet all three criteria, the survey would be terminated and they were directed to a thank you page.

I chose an online survey for this research largely due to the pragmatic and practical benefits that it offers (Schonlau, Fricker & Elliot, 2001). The online survey afforded the best chance of reaching respondents from all 15 CARICOM countries in a short time. The online design also overcame the barrier of distance between the researcher and respondents (Gruber, Szmigin, Reppel & Vosse, 2008; Salmons, 2009; Volle, 2005) especially in a setting where respondents are in different insular countries. Among the advantages that the online method offered me were low costs, and the availability of a ready audience 24 hours a day, allowing respondents to participate at their convenience (Hogg et al, 1995). Estimates of internet penetration in CARICOM as a percent of its total population is approximately 56 per cent and
Facebook penetration is almost 46 per cent (Internet World Stats, 2013). This is generally consistent across the different islands. As such, a fairly large sample was easy to obtain.

Another advantage of online surveys in this research is the flexibility, speed and timeliness it afforded me. For example, this survey was accessible via a simple web link, which greatly minimized the time it takes to go into the field and collect data. As Kannan, Chang and Whinston, (1998) concluded, the speed and global reach of the internet allow real-time access for interactions with geographically diverse respondent groups and information servers.

Despite the advantages, I recognize that online surveys have several drawbacks. One is a strong perception by potential respondents that the web-link is junk mail/spam. In this research, this was mitigated by the fact that invitations to participate were done through: a) personal contacts and b) social organizations and snowballing. Another drawback of internet research is the fact that the internet usage is said to be skewed by factors such as gender and social class. This is coupled with the fact that sample selection is seen as a “volunteer” sample. However, internet usage in CARICOM is high (Internet World Stats, 2013) and intra-regional migrants are likely to have a high representation among internet users due to better socioeconomic statuses (Fernandez-Alfarro & Pascua, 2006). In addition, the objective of the survey was not to draw generalizations about the entire Caribbean population, but to reach a target audience, which the method effectively facilitated.

In addition, online surveys are criticized for taking away human contact, so the ability of the researcher to probe in-depth is reduced (Scholl, Mulders & Drent, 2002). On the flip-side, online surveys eliminate interviewer effect. In any case, in depth interviews were conducted subsequent to the survey data collection, which allowed for probing of responses. Privacy and security issues are also often cited as concerns for online data collection, but these issues are
mitigated by the fact that the study was submitted for ethical review and consideration at the University of Saskatchewan. In terms of the security of transmissions, the survey was hosted by the Social Sciences Research Laboratory (SSRL) at the University of Saskatchewan, which meets the University’s Ethics Board standard for transmission and storage.

The online survey also overcame the problem of respondents answering more than once. The survey was monitored against multiple responses from the same IP address. We checked the data to identify and delete duplicate records if this occurred, but it was not a problem with this study. Finally, the online format allowed for ease of data entry and analysis because the results were directly imported into SPSS and were available for analysis immediately upon the closure of the survey.

4.03.b Pre-testing & Launch of Survey.

In the month of December 2013, links to the online survey were sent to five colleagues for pretesting, including 2 graduate students who were CARICOM intra-regional migrants and 3 colleagues from different CARICOM countries. They suggested minor changes, including adding new questions and changing the structures of some others. All confirmed that the survey was ready for general distribution. Once the changes were completed, the survey was made available to the general public for two months: January 2014 to the end of February 2014. The SSRL provided weekly updates on the number of hits and completed responses. This ensured that I was able to target particular nationalities and their associations for more advertising if the response level was low in those countries.
4.03.c Analysis of the Survey Data.

At the close of the survey, a total of 501 individuals attempted the survey. However, only 283 met all three eligibility criteria and were allowed to complete the survey. The survey was completed by at least 1 citizen from each of the 15 CARICOM countries. During collection, the data from the online survey were stored in the secured server of the University of Saskatchewan before it was entered into SPSS for statistical analysis. Apart from the filter questions at the beginning of the survey, respondents were able to skip questions. These cases were treated as missing and were excluded from the analysis. The data were placed in frequency tables to show aggregates on issues such as how respondents self-identify, levels of attachments etc. In addition, comparative charts and bivariate tables were used to show relationships between variables such as migration history and levels of attachments. The interaction between variables was also tested for statistical significance to determine meaningful relationships. This was useful in answering questions such as: What factors are important in determining CARICOM identity? And what factors influence CARICOM identity? In order to determine statistical significance, the p value was used to evaluate whether the assumed (null) hypothesis is true. The null hypothesis for all statistical tests was that there is no significant association between the independent and dependent variables. A p-value of less than 0.05 indicates that there are significant differences between independent and dependent variables. For the chi-square test, I used Cramer’s V to test the strength of relationships between variables. Cramer’s V of between 0.00 and 0.10 was interpreted to mean that association between the variables was weak; if it is between 0.11 and 0.30, a moderate association is assumed, and if it is greater than 0.30, the relationship between the variables is assumed to be strong (Healey, 2009:316).
One of the main drawbacks of the statistical analysis in this study arises from the fact that CARICOM comprises fifteen (15) countries. This made it difficult to perform bivariate analysis using citizenship/country variables. The difficulty is twofold: a) any resulting table would be too large and difficult to read/interpret; and b) a large table does not lend itself well to statistical analyses because it would result in small numbers of cases per group. For example, Chi-square tests require counts of at least five per cell in order to provide meaningful and reliable results. In addition, with fifteen (15) countries, outputs could have upward of 50 cells, which would be an ineffective way of interpreting the data. As a result, in this and the subsequent chapters, bivariate and multi-variate analyses with CARICOM country variables were recoded into three distinct and mutually exclusive groups: a) OECS Countries: Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis and St. Vincent & the Grenadines (OECS Secretariat, 2014); b) Outlying member states: the Bahamas, Suriname, Belize and Haiti (SALISES, 2013); and c) the “big four” Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago (Andriamananjara & Schiff, 2001; Corkran, 1971).

The concept of “outlying member states” is borrowed from the SALISES (2013:2), which used it to refer to the Bahamas, Suriname, Belize and Haiti. These are deemed outlying for different reasons: the Bahamas because even though it is a full member of CARICOM, it does not participate in the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). As a result, the Bahamas is under no obligation to facilitate free movement of CARICOM nationals; b) Haiti is described as an outlying country because of language: it is the only French Speaking country in CARICOM. Like the Bahamas, Haiti is also not a full member of the CSME; and c) both Suriname and the Belize were classified as outlying because they are part of the South American and Central American mainland respectively. In addition, unlike the rest of CARICOM (except
Haiti, which has French heritage), Suriname is the only CARICOM member with non-British heritage, having Dutch heritage instead (the only Dutch speaking member of CARICOM). Belize is also an outlying state because it has full membership in the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) as well as CARICOM. It is the only country to have membership in all three bodies.

Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados and Trinidad are the original four members of CARICOM (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011), and are usually referred to as the “big four” (Andriamananjara & Schiff, 2001; Corkran, 1971; Caribbean Journal, 2011). In addition, these four countries are seen to have the greatest influence on the organization, and are considered the most developed in the regional body (Griffith, 2002:103). They also wield economic power with Trinidad, Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana ranking 1st, 2nd, 5th and 6th in terms of economic size among CARICOM countries (CIA Fact Book, 2014).

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), is a unique CARICOM subgroup among nine-member states (eight of whom are part of CARICOM). The OECS acts as an intergovernmental organization dedicated to economic harmonization and integration, protection of human and legal rights, and the encouragement of good governance between countries and dependencies in the Eastern Caribbean (OECS, 2014). They operate a common currency and in some ways are at a very advanced stage of economic harmonization. For our analysis, all variables which listed CARICOM countries were recoded into these three mutually exclusive groups.
Table 4.01

*Citizenship of Survey Respondents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big Four</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlying</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.04.a The Interviews

The qualitative aspect of the study was based on semi-structured interviews to unearth how intra-regional migrants rationalized their experiences and the processes by which they constructed their identities using Bruter’s (2005) top-down/bottom-up model. Bruter (2005) stipulates that there are two ways for studying identities: a) top-down and b) bottom-up perspective. The top down approach focuses on questions such as: Who should be considered a member of the Caribbean? And what unites people? What are the components of a CARICOM identity? These questions were addressed in the survey (see appendix A) and were subjected to deeper probing in the interviews. This ‘objective’ perspective involves trying to understand what unifies people in terms of culture, heritage and values. It also helps us to determine the unique characteristics of the CARICOM identity.

The bottom up perspective relies on citizens’ own perceptions of their individual identities and implies a need to answer further questions such as the link between CARICOM and other identities (Bruter, 2005). It asks questions such as: Who identifies with CARICOM? Why do some identify as Caribbean whereas others do not? What are the meanings of the CARICOM identity? The basic issue here is to define conceptually a CARICOM identity. The interviews provide the opportunity to garner citizens’ subjective perspectives through the bottom up approach.
I used a semi-structured format to guide the interviews because it allowed me to utilize open ended questions and whilst giving sufficient latitude to probe questions, it allowed me to address core themes and issues that are relevant to the research. The interview guide was formulated around the themes of identity, experience of intra-regional travel, and perception of integration. The semi-structured format also allowed me to explore perspective, opinions and ideas in greater depth, exposing individuals’ values, which are not directly observable, or which cannot be gleaned from questionnaires (Rapley, 2004).

4.04.4 Recruitment of Interview Subjects.

Most of the interviewees were recruited from the survey. At the end of the online survey, respondents were asked to indicate if they wished to participate in the interview, and to provide their contact details if they so desired. A total of 85 individuals elected to participate in the interviews. However, a case study format was utilized to capture respondents from the three mutual exclusive CARICOM groups discussed earlier: the big four, outlying and OECS countries. To represent the big four member countries, I selected Jamaica due to the fact that a large number of interested subjects were from Jamaica. From the OECS, I selected St. Lucia also due to the high level of interest from that country. To represent an outlying country, I selected Belize because indications from the survey were that I would be able to get sufficient responses from that country. I also decided to select a non-English speaking country to ensure that I captured all the different groups in CARICOM. I initially selected Haiti but found that many respondents, whilst reasonably proficient in written English, were uncomfortable with spoken English. My inability to find sufficient English-proficient respondents from Haiti led me to recruit respondents from Suriname, where I was able to find more English-proficient speakers.
I decided to interview four individuals from Jamaica, Belize, Suriname and St. Lucia in order to develop sufficient, but in-depth cases from each country. This also enabled me to make comparisons between the countries and the different sub-groups in CARICOM. This approach also ensured that all the interviewees were not from the same country and allowed for some form of representation among the different groups in CARICOM.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonyms</th>
<th>Countries Lived In</th>
<th>Country Most Attached to</th>
<th>Occupation/Field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>University student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Government/Public Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>University student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1</td>
<td>Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, Dominica</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2</td>
<td>Barbados, St. Kitts</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3</td>
<td>Guyana, Trinidad</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L4</td>
<td>Trinidad Barbados, St. Kitts</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J1</td>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Business/Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3</td>
<td>Barbados, Trinidad</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J4</td>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Business/Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>Government/Public Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**4.04.c The Interview Process.**

Interview participants were e-mailed the consent form ahead of the interviews. At the beginning of each interview, I spent time building rapport by asking general questions such as location of subjects and sharing general information about my position as a researcher and why I was conducting the research. I then proceeded to review the consent form with participants, giving them the opportunity to ask questions. Informed consent was tape recorded before we proceeded to the interview. Most of the interviews lasted between 45 minutes to 1 hour. All interviews were conducted via either Google voice calls or Skype. The video feature on Skype was only utilized if respondents’ chose to use it; most opted to use only the voice feature. I did not utilize the video feature for any of the Google calls. This option gave anonymity and allowed respondents to feel more at ease. The interview method was also convenient for most persons, allowing them to schedule the interview at times that were most convenient to them. Although the video option would have allowed me to observe body language, I do not feel this drawback compromised the results.

The topic guide was based on the themes inherent in the research questions, and emanated from the review of the literature. The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed respondents to provide insights on topics not anticipated. In addition to the interview guide, new questions were raised during the interview to suit the particular contexts of the interviewee and to make the process more fluid. The full interview protocol is provided in Appendix B.

Following each interview, I allotted some time to reflect on the data collection process, to focus on issues arising from the interview as well as to capture any pieces of information that might have been previously overlooked. This included making notes of how respondents interpreted particular questions and how they preferred to respond to particular questions. For example, during the first two interviews, I asked respondents “how close to you feel to
CARICOM?” On both occasions, the interviewee asked me “what do you mean, do you mean like on a scale of 1-10”? I then realized that that was an easier way to ask the question. I also found that phrasing the question like that gave me a pillar on which to base probing questions, and context for other questions.

4.04.d Analysis of the Interviews.

The interviews served to probe issues identified from the survey data. All the interviews were tape recorded with the interviewees’ permission. Research notes were also taken during the interviews to record possible themes; these were incorporated in the analysis of the results. The interviews were listened to at least once before transcription to get a general sense of the findings as well as to research certain terms that might not be readily understandable, especially from speakers from Belize and Suriname who might use terms that are unfamiliar to me. I personally transcribed all the interviews to immerse myself in the data.

The transcripts were read several times over before I began manual coding for emerging themes, concepts and categories that relate to identity formation, experiences, regionalism and migration among intra-regional migrants. I used the interviews as a resource (Lee & Roth, 2004) by analyzing what interviewees said about their experiences, perceptions and identities. In this way, I treated the transcripts as reports with responses to my research questions. I utilized qualitative content analysis because it allows “research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the restraints imposed by structured methodologies” (Thomas, 2006:40). Unlike discourse analysis, which is concerned with the structure of text, including the rules and patterns of speech, qualitative content analysis is an analytical tool focusing on the meanings in the text, both what is explicitly stated and what can be interpolated (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). In coding the data, I tried to understand the
meaning behind what respondents were saying rather than just merely coding for particular words, phrases or synonyms. This way I was able to capture the essence of respondents’ narratives, voices and situate them in the appropriate contexts. In defining categories, I looked for themes related to my research questions and the literature review, then arranged verbatim quotes according to these themes and sub-themes. These themes related to the research questions and the main issues coming out of the literature. Many themes were based on the research questions, including self-identities, experiences, and impact of migration. However, some themes were nascent and required an intimate relationship with the data to unearth, such as outlying status, ambivalence of the CARICOM identity and rationality. Significant statements relating to the major themes of identity, integration and migrant experiences were coded to allow easy reference when writing the findings and discussion. In this way, I had separate and detailed transcripts of each major theme or issues, which were addressed in the discussion/findings. To give the authentic voice of respondents, I used their direct quotes in the analysis. In addition, I ensured anonymity by giving each respondent an alphanumeric pseudonym such as J1 or S4. In the write-up, all respondents are referred to using such pseudonyms.

4.05 Ethical Considerations

The study obtained ethics clearance from the University of Saskatchewan’s Research Ethics Board. All participants in the study were informed of my ethical obligations, including use of data and the measures taken to preserve confidentiality and anonymity. The online survey included an information page at the beginning to provide respondents with a brief explanation of the aims and objectives of the study and how the participant had been chosen to participate. This was also done before the commencement of the interviews, and informed consent. In addition, participants were required to sign an informed consent form before participating in the
interviews. All respondents were given the option of withdrawing from the study at any point up to the final analysis and of having their data deleted. After this, all data collected were included for use in the general database.

4.06 Reflexivity

In order to understand the process of identity negotiation and formation among intra-regional migrants, I focused on the contexts: home and host destinations of migrants and their experiences in these different contexts. During the construction of the research instruments, and during field work, I utilized my personal experiences of being an intra-regional migrant to connect with participants, and to make sure that the pertinent questions were being asked. As anticipated, I shared many common characteristics with all of the participants in this study, being an intra-regional migrant within CARICOM. I worked with a regional institution and was relocated from the Jamaican office to the Barbadian one, where I spent three and a half years. My migration was under the university graduate category for which I was required to go through the process of applying for, and receiving a CARICOM skilled certificate. This meant that to some extent I was ‘an insider’ to the research and ‘who I am’ was an important tool in the knowledge production process. Actually, my interest in this study was greatly influenced by both my personal and intellectual biographies. On the one hand, my intellectual history as a social researcher made me aware of the importance of understanding my personal migration experiences as well as the wider issues of the CARICOM identity and the struggles of intra-regional migrants to positioning themselves in the wider movement. On the other hand, my personal experiences as an intra-regional migrant within CARICOM alerted me to many of the issues. In this sense, I have spent several years in contact with CARICOM nationals, both at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica and as a CARICOM skilled national living in Barbados.
In some ways, I was able to empathize with the challenges respondents faced and celebrate the joys of being a part of the community. Interviewing the subjects also reminded me of my own experiences and in many cases pulled me closer to CARICOM as the interviews created an atmosphere of community. This was particularly true in the sense that all respondents wanted further integration. My position as an insider allowed me to understand and analyze certain issues relevant to intra-regional migrants from an insider perspective.

Given, my insider status, I took a reflective approach throughout the study, often asking myself why I asked particular questions, or how I would answer the questions if I were the interviewee. My insider status was very useful in interpreting the results and deepening rapport with respondents. For example, participants often used jargons and colloquial language, to which only an insider would be privy. This is demonstrated when one respondent began to talk about taking a ‘ZR’, which is a term Barbadians use to refer to non-government owned passenger buses. I was only able to relate to these terms because of my experience living in Barbados. Respondents also felt comfortable in the knowledge that I was an intra-regional migrant and would often say “as you know, right”, which affirmed my insider status and made it easier for them to explain certain situations.

I was also an outsider in many respects, because for example, I knew very little about the non-island CARICOM countries such as Belize, Suriname and Haiti. I had to either ask for clarity or research some of the topics that respondents spoke about. Berry (1999) asserts, the mixture of an insider and an outsider view in research allows us to deepen our understanding of important issues in cultural matters. Both positions as insiders and outsiders also have disadvantages. For example, being an insider presents taking for granted aspects of reality, which might have useful insights. On the other hand, being as an outsider presents the challenge of
lacking sufficient shared experience to notice or understand the subtleties and variances that might be at stake. This meant that I had to be conscious of how my research identity may affect the research process and outcomes. I also endeavored to keep an open mind to discover new insights as related to both the familiar and unfamiliar, by questioning my own interpretations and my role in the process. Weber (1978) proposed that we can obtain a sociological understanding of phenomena through reflective interpretations and by understanding the subjective meanings that they attach to their feelings, stories, experiences and life histories. In this sense, I concur that human agents can make sense of the world and their experiences and are capable of negotiating their identities. Accordingly, I place great emphasis on the empirical findings, the feelings of respondents, and relations with social institutions, groups and individuals. I also believe that it is important to be reflexive at all stages of the research in order to understand and document how my own interpretations, and experiences influence the process. In order to simultaneously capture a broad understanding, as well as deep-intimate accounts of the process of identity formation and negotiation among intra-regional migrants in CARICOM, a multi-method data collection design was implemented.

4.07 Conclusion

The preceding sections demonstrated the usefulness of employing a multi-method design to understand the nuances of identity constructions in CARICOM. In particular, the online survey format was very advantageous for reaching participants across 15 countries, proving to be convenient, time-efficient and cheap. The inductive qualitative content analysis allowed me to extract emerging themes as well as those inherent in the literature and research questions without the burdens of methodological constraints. The methodology allowed me to draw fruitful conclusions about the status of intra-regional migrants’ identities in CARICOM. The next
chapter goes into detail about the key finding to the research question: “How do intra-regional CARICOM migrants identify themselves and give meanings to their identities”. The analysis is based on both the survey data as well as the interviews. The simultaneous analysis of qualitative and quantitative data allowed for the explanation of themes as they develop, and for connections to be made between both types of data.
CHAPTER V – INTRA-REGIONAL MIGRANTS’ IDENTITIES

5.0 Overview

This chapter answers the first research question: how do intra-regional CARICOM migrants negotiate their identities and how do they self-identify? The data sources that inform this chapter are: a) the aggregated results of the online survey, and b) quotes and analyses of interview transcripts with participants from Suriname, Belize, St. Lucia and Jamaica. The analyses of the survey data are presented in univariate and bivariate forms. Chi-square tests are used to test the significance of relationships between nominal variables. Qualitative data from the interviews are used to help explain the findings from the survey analyses.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a demographic breakdown of respondents in the study and describes how respondents identify themselves. The second section describes the determinants of attachments to CARICOM, while the third section examines how attachments to CARICOM differ by citizenship. These findings are supplemented with historical, experiential and cultural explanations drawn from the literature. The fourth section focuses on self-identifications of respondents from the outlying states, considering the paradox of their strong attachment to CARICOM and the marginalizations that they experience in member countries. In particular, it discusses the themes of ‘knowledge deficit’ and ‘ineffective communications’, and examines their effects on outlying migrants’ experiences, including how they construct their identities. Finally, the chapter explores how CARICOM nationals strategically shift their identities to counteract marginalization in member countries. The chapter concludes that benefits and meaningfulness are important drivers of attachment to CARICOM, however knowledge deficits and ineffective communications weaken the regional identity. Nonetheless, even for individuals with weak attachments to CARICOM, the regional identity can serve strategic functions, and thus can be beneficial.
5.01.a Representativeness of the Survey Data.

Figure 5.01 shows that 177 (60 per cent) of respondents lived in only one CARICOM member country, excluding their country of birth. Conversely, 106 respondents (40 per cent) lived in multiple CARICOM countries: 69 respondents (20 per cent) lived in 2 other CARICOM countries for more than 2 months, 19 respondents (10 per cent) lived in three countries and the remaining 18 respondents (10 per cent) lived in at least four other CARICOM countries, excluding their birth country.

![Figure 5.01. The Number of CARICOM Countries Respondents lived in for at least two months. N= 283.](image)

In terms of reasons for intra-regional migration, Table 5.01 shows that almost a third of respondents were motivated to migrate by employment opportunities (75 respondents or 30.3 per cent), while 51 respondents (or 27.1 per cent) migrated for educational purposes. The joint third most popular reasons for intra-regional migration were leisure/tourism and the possession of citizenship in the other country (22 respondents each or 11.7 per cent each). Interestingly, only
7.4 per cent of respondents intended to stay long-term in other CARICOM countries. This suggests that intra-regional migration primarily serves mainly pragmatic goals.

Table 5.01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Migrating to the most Recent CARICOM country.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leisure/tourism</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term migration</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have citizenship there too</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Refuse to answer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the respondents who stated their gender, there was an even distribution between male and females: 50 per cent of the sample was male and 50 per cent female. There was also a fairly balanced representation of age-groups in the study: approximately 25 per cent of respondents were between ages 18 to 25 years. Another 38.5 per cent were in the age group 26-40 and 37 per cent of participants were 41 years or older (see Figure 5.02).
Figure 5.02. Age group of Respondents. N= 151.

Figure 5.03 shows the ethnic breakdown of respondents: 55.6 per cent of participants in the survey identified their ethnicity as Black, 6 per cent of the sample self-identified as White and Indian each, while 27.2 per cent claimed mixed heritage, N=151. Mullerleile (1996) estimates that Commonwealth Caribbean is composed of approximately 76 per cent black
(including mixed); 18 per cent Indian and 6 per cent Caucasian/Chinese. The ethnic composition of survey respondents is not significantly different from Mullerleile’s (1996) characterization (see Table 3.02 in chapter 3). The seeming difference is primarily due to the categorizations used. For example, this study used a separate category for mixed race respondents, while Mullerleile (1996) grouped some mixed raced individuals as Black.

Table 5.02

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ Highest Level of Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary/Secondary</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical/Community College</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the respondents in the study possessed some form of post-secondary education, which is not necessarily representative of CARICOM as a whole. While elementary and secondary education is compulsory in all CARICOM countries, Martin and Bray (2009) found that gross enrollment in tertiary institutions in the Caribbean ranged between 10 and 15 percent, and can be as low as 3 per cent in Belize to as high as 53 per cent in Barbados. Among respondents in this study, 73.2 per cent (109 respondents) had at least some university education, 12.5 per cent (19 respondents) were educated up to the technical or community college level while 14 per cent (21 respondents) were only educated to the elementary/secondary level. Nonetheless, Martin and Bray (2009:8) described Caribbean citizens with post-secondary education as comprising an “elite access” group. Likewise, Boxill (1997) in his study, *Ideology and Integration* in the Caribbean, described his highly educated respondents as an “elite” sample.
My sample was over-represented by highly educated respondents due to the fact that the target population was highly educated, which is non-representative of the general population.

5.01.b Identity Salience

Table 5.03 shows respondents’ responses to the question: “How close do you feel to CARICOM?” It reveals that only 15.2 per cent of respondents were not at all close to CARICOM at all. In other words, approximately 80 per cent of respondents felt some degree of attachment to CARICOM, ranging from ‘not very attached’ (34.6 per cent), quite attached (32.3 per cent) or a greatly attached (13.8 per cent). Thus, even though CARICOM was not among the most salient aspects of identity among intra-regional migrants, most identified with it on some level. This is confirmed by Table 5.07, which shows that 75 per cent of respondents would feel personally criticized if they heard someone talking negatively about CARICOM.

In order to ascertain the relative importance of CARICOM vis-à-vis other aspects of identity, I compared attachments to CARICOM against attachment to respondents’ other socio-demographic attributes (Simkus, 2004). I also utilized the concentric model (Bruter, 2005) to determine attachments to CARICOM relative to other geographic regions. Figures 5.04 and 5.05 show what respondents considered to be the most important and the second most important aspects of their identities respectively. The comparison of supranational identity with other identity attributes was adopted from the South East European Social Survey Project (Simkus, 2004). Both Tables 5.04 and 5.05 indicate that respondents overwhelmingly viewed ‘citizenship’ as the most salient aspect of their identities. According to Figure 5.04, almost a third of respondents in this study identified citizenship/nationality as the most important aspect of their identities (58 respondents 30.7 per cent). Race and gender were the joint second most popular aspects of identity accounting for 10 per cent each. When asked what was the second most
important aspect of identity, again nearly a quarter of respondents chose citizenship/nationality (24.6 per cent); 15.4 per cent chose family background and race/ethnicity while another 9.2 per cent selected gender (Figure 5.05). Added together, 55.3 per cent of respondents selected nationality as either the most or second most important aspect of their identity. Overall, family background was chosen by 28.6 per cent of respondents; race was chosen by 26.8 per cent and gender was the fourth most popular aspect of identity, chosen by 19.2 per cent of respondents (Table 5.04).

In contrast, only 11 per cent of respondents chose CARICOM as either the most important or second most important aspect of their identities. It is necessary to point out that this does not mean that CARICOM is not an important aspect of respondents’ identities. It is only possible to infer that CARICOM is just not among the two most important personal identifiers. Stated another way, citizenship, race and gender are more salient than CARICOM in respondents’ lives.

Table 5.03. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How close respondents feel to CARICOM?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very attached</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all attached</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to Answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.04. The most important aspects of Respondents’ identities. N =198.

Figure 5.05. The second most important aspects of respondents’ identities. N=223.
Table 5.04.

*Summary of the two most important aspects of respondents’ identities*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects</th>
<th>Most Important (Percent)</th>
<th>Second Most Important (Percent)</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My citizenship/nationality</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My family background</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My race/ethnic background</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My gender</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My religion</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My social class</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My age group</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to answer</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total_________________________100                                100

N=228

*Total is percentage of respondents who selected each aspect as either the most important or second most important*
Table 5.05
Concentric Attachments: how close respondents feel to CARICOM, their Countries of origin, CARICOM sub-regions, other CARICOM countries, the Wider Caribbean and the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CARICOM</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Sub-region of CARICOM</th>
<th>Non-Home CARICOM Country</th>
<th>Wider Caribbean</th>
<th>The World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Attached</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Attached</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know or Refused to Answer</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=217

Table 5.05 confirms that most respondents felt closer to their country of origin compared to other places in the Caribbean and the world. Interestingly, other non-home CARICOM countries were the second most popular places that respondents identified with. In other words, next to their home countries, intra-regional migrants were most attached to the destination countries where they lived in CARICOM. Nonetheless, respondents were generally more attached to CARICOM than to the wider Caribbean or the world. So, comparatively, respondents were closest to their home countries, followed by other CARICOM countries, then to CARICOM, followed by the World and were least attached to the Wider Caribbean. In summary, the table shows that 58 per cent of respondents rated their attachment to another CARICOM country as strong compared to only 46 per cent who were strongly attached to CARICOM and 42.8 per cent who were strongly attached to the wider world respectively.
Despite the above, it should be noted that generally, attachment to CARICOM is weak: 49.8 per cent of respondents were either not very attached or not at all attached to CARICOM. In contrast, almost 60 per cent of respondents had a strong sense of attachment to another CARICOM country and only 8 per cent were not at all attached to another CARICOM country. This suggests that although respondents were generally attached to CARICOM host countries, it did not translate into attachments to CARICOM. This was supported by the fact that 65.9 per cent of respondents felt closer to fellow CARICOM nationals than to non-CARICOM nationals (see Table 5.06). Overall, the data suggest that respondents had stronger attachments to the components of CARICOM (such as other countries, and people from these other countries) than to CARICOM itself. The attachment to member countries can be related to migrants’ experiences in these countries. In fact, section 8.01 will show that the majority of respondents rated their overall experiences in CARICOM countries as positive. Thus, respondents were opposed to the institution of CARICOM and not its component parts.

Furthermore, Table 5.05 shows clear differences between attachment to CARICOM and attachments to respondents’ origin countries. Whereas only 46.1 per cent of the sample indicated significant\(^{18}\) attachments to CARICOM, 85.3 per cent were significantly attached to their country of origin. Chapter 6 provides detailed explanations for what drives national and regional identities. Nonetheless, the data overall appear to support the concentric identity model, which suggests that individuals are more attached to places closer in proximity to their localities (Bruter, 2005). As expected, national identity appeared at the centre of the circle, followed by other CARICOM countries, then CARICOM, and then the World in the fourth rung. In addition, the findings also match Premdas’ (1996) levels of identities, which propose that identities are

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\(^{18}\) Significant attachments means either “strongly attached” or “quite attached”. In contrast, it excluded those who were “a little” or “not at all” attached.
strongest at the ethnic-sub-state level, followed by the national, regional and then the transnational levels. What is important to glean from the findings is that the identities of intra-regional CARICOM nationals are not mutually exclusive, but are multiple and co-existing (Garcia, 2008; Elbow, 1999; Premdas, 2006; Basch et al, 1994).

Table 5.06
Do respondents feel closer to CARICOM nationals than non-CARICOM nationals?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, strongly</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, not really</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, not at all</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.07
Would respondents feel personally criticized if they heard someone who is not from CARICOM or their country speak negatively about CARICOM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CARICOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Much/Somewhat</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(83.2%)</td>
<td>(74.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.2%)</td>
<td>(4.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.4%)</td>
<td>(13.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.7%)</td>
<td>(6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/refuse to answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5%)</td>
<td>(1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the disparity between attachment to CARICOM and to countries of origin, Table 5.07 shows a much narrower gap between the number of respondents who would feel personally criticized if someone spoke negatively about their country of origin (158 respondents or 83 per cent) compared to those who would feel personally criticized by the same statements regarding CARICOM (142 respondents or 75 per cent). This confirms that most respondents had some emotional attachments to CARICOM. Tajfel (1982) explains that social identity has an affective as well as a collective aspect. To understand how this is related to the results, it is important to reiterate Tajfel’s (1982:292) definition of social identity, which is “that part of an individual’s self-concept, which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” [emphasis added]. The affinity expressed by respondents appears to be related to their knowledge of membership to CARICOM, which was not a salient part of their personal identity. In other words, their knowledge of membership in CARICOM was not matched by ‘affect’ (emotional attachment) towards CARICOM.

Another useful way of understanding the disparity is by applying Snow’s (2001) concepts of framing and engagement. According to Snow (2001), in the identity construction process, framing relates to the proclamation of how respondents generally see themselves in everyday interaction while engagement relates to direct observation or experience driving a specific collective identity. Thus, asking respondents about their attachment requires them to construct their identities using the framing process, which is a more general way of how they see themselves. In this case, respondents generally see themselves in terms of their national identity in everyday interaction, rather than as CARICOM nationals. However, asking respondents about a specific instance, requires them to construct their identities through the engagement process,
which is situationally specific. In other words, respondents’ framings are more stable, whereas their engagements are often more temporary. Everyday framings of identities tend to be through nationalities, but intra-regional migrants are sometimes exposed to experiences, such as discrimination, which will evoke the less salient, CARICOM identity (see chapter 7).

5.02.a Determinants of the CARICOM Identity

Table 5.08 considers the determinants of attachments to CARICOM. Of the twelve variables considered only six variables were found to impact the degree to which a person was attached to CARICOM: education level, citizenship region; the meaningfulness of CARICOM to respondents; perceived benefits that CARICOM provides; feeling of belonging in other CARICOM countries; and the nature of his/her lived experiences in member countries (see Table 5.08 for a comparison of the impact of these variables on attachments to CARICOM).

Respondents with only elementary-level education were almost four times more likely to have no attachments to CARICOM than those with university education (see Table 5.11). Regarding citizenship, respondents from the outlying countries were the most attached to CARICOM while those from the big four were least attached (see Table 5.12). In addition, respondents who felt a sense of belonging, and who had positive experiences in member countries were more attached to CARICOM than those who did not feel like they belonged and those who had negative experiences in member countries (see Tables 8.04 and 7.03 respectively). Finally, respondents who described CARICOM as personally meaningful to their lives and those who saw CARICOM as being beneficial to their countries identified more strongly with CARICOM than those who did not (see Tables 6.02 and 9.09).

Table 5.08 also presents the Cramer’s Vs to indicate the strength of the association between these independent variables and attachments to CARICOM. It reveals that the strength
of all these bivariate relationships were moderate, except for perceptions of benefits to home country, which was strongly related to identification with CARICOM (Cramer’s $V = .326$). As the next chapter will show, respondents’ narratives about identification with CARICOM were overwhelmingly influenced by their pragmatic interests, including the benefits to be derived from integration. In addition, the narratives revealed that much of the indifference towards CARICOM arose from unmet expectations and frustrations about the state of integration and perceived failure to benefits from integration. These attitudes adversely affected respondents’ attachments to CARICOM.

Table 5.08

| Summary of Chi Square test results between independent variables and Attachment to CARICOM |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Independent Variable | $\chi^2$ | df | Cramer’s $V$ |
| Gender | 2.84 | 4 |  |
| Age group | 2.74 | 4 |  |
| Education Level** | 23.12 | 4 | .279 |
| Citizenship Region** | 13.97 | 4 | .192 |
| The Meaning attributed to CARICOM** | 18.87 | 4 | .246 |
| Degree of attachment to Nationality | 4.43 | 4 |  |
| Perceptions of benefits of CARICOM** | 30.40 | 6 | .326 |
| CARICOM Region migrated to | 1.480 | 4 |  |
| Degree of interaction with CARICOM Nationals | 6.65 | 4 |  |
| Number of CARICOM countries lived in | 1.544 | 6 |  |
| Feeling of belonging to CARICOM countries** | 10.28 | 4 | .172 |
| Nature of Lived Experience in CARICOM Countries** | 12.87 | 4 | .194 |

**$p < .05$. 
The six significant determinants of attachment to CARICOM represent a mix of the three interrelated factors identified in the literature as influencing identity construction: personal attributes, social relations and structural influences (Giddens, 1991/1994; Habermas, 1979). While none of CARICOM identity’s six determinants can be said to be exclusively personal, social or structural factors, each associated more closely to one or the other. For example, education level and personal meaning given to CARICOM can be thought of as individual attributes. Citizenship and benefits accruing to home country (perceived) might be thought of as structural factors, while feeling of belonging and the nature of one’s personal experiences can be thought of as being influenced by social relations. Again, all these determinants of the CARICOM identity cross-cut the personal, social and structural divide. For example, a person’s perception of the benefit of CARICOM to his/her country might be influenced by his/her education level (which can be deemed a personal attribute). At the same time, one’s education level might be influenced by the policies in a country (a structural concern).

As the Cramer’s Vs indicate, benefits are strongly associated with attachment to CARICOM. The next chapter shows perceptions of benefits from CARICOM and its policies feature strongly in intra-regional migrants’ discourses regarding attachments to CARICOM. They also exert strong influences in respondents’ experiences, social relations and identity choices. Chapter 6 also discusses the interrelations of benefits and personal meaning driving attachments to CARICOM. Chapter 9 discusses the lived experiences of intra-regional migrants and considers how the feeling of belonging and the nature of respondents’ lived experiences affect attachment to CARICOM. However, the next section of this chapter more closely examines the impact of demographic factors, including education and citizenship region as well as other socio-demographic factors on attachment to CARICOM.
5.02.b Gender & Attachment to CARICOM.

In terms of gender, Table 5.09 shows that 50.7 per cent of males had a strong attachment to CARICOM compared to 45.9 per cent of females. On the other hand, females were twice as likely to have no attachment to CARICOM as males: 18.9 per cent of female respondents were not at all attached to CARICOM compared to only 9 per cent of males. While this might suggest that males were more likely to be attached to CARICOM than females, the chi-square test revealed that these differences were not statistically significant, $\chi^2 (4, 149) =2.835, p = .242$. In other words, attachment to CARICOM is not affected by gender.

Table 5.09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quite/Greatly Attached</td>
<td>38 (50.7%)</td>
<td>34 (45.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Much</td>
<td>30 (40.0%)</td>
<td>26 (35.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>7 (9.3%)</td>
<td>14 (18.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 149

Note $\chi^2 =2.835, p = .242, df= 2$. The Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

5.02.c Age Group & Attachment to CARICOM.

Table 5.10 shows the cross tabulation between age group and attachment to CARICOM. It reveals that only 16.1 per cent of respondents between the ages of 18-30 were not at all attached to CARICOM. Within the age group 41 years and older, 16.7 per cent of respondents were not at all attached to CARICOM compared to just about 10 per cent of respondents ages 31-40. Stated differently, there was a similar level of attachment to CARICOM among all age-groups. In fact, 41.9 per cent of respondents 18-30 were greatly attached to CARICOM, 56 per cent of respondents between ages 31-40 were greatly attached to CARICOM and 50 per cent of
respondents 41 years and over felt the same way. A chi square test of independence was performed to examine the relations between age group and attachment to CARICOM. The relation between these variables was not significant, $\chi^2 (4, N = 149) = 2.739, p = .602$. Age group did not significantly affect attachment to CARICOM. As shown in Table 5.08, with the exception of education level, attachments to CARICOM were determined by mostly social and institutional factors. While some studies indicate that younger people are more likely to develop a supranational identity (Recchi & Nebe, 2003), this research, like the 2012 Eurobarometer (European Union, 2012b), found that attachments vary little by age.

Table 5.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>AGE GROUP OF RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 to 30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite/Greatly Attached</td>
<td>26 (41.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Attached</td>
<td>26 (41.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>10 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 149

Note $\chi^2 = 2.739, p = .602$, d.f. = 4. The numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

5.02.d Education & Attachment to CARICOM.

Table 5.11 shows the relationship between education levels and attachment to CARICOM. It reveals that whereas 68.4 per cent of respondents educated to the technical/community college level were greatly attached to CARICOM, only 47.6 per cent of respondents educated to the elementary/secondary school level and 44.4 per cent of respondents with university level education had strong attachments to CARICOM. Interestingly, 42.9 per cent of the respondents whose highest level of education was at the elementary/secondary level were
not at all attached to CARICOM compared to only 5.3 per cent of technical/community college graduates and 10.2 per cent of respondents with university education. Thus, technical/college level respondents were the most attached to CARICOM, while respondents with only elementary/secondary level education were the least attached. The results must be interpreted with some caution because the sample is skewed towards university level respondents: 73.2 per cent of respondents are university-educated compared to 12.8 (technical/community college) and 14.1 per cent (elementary/secondary) (see table 5.02). A chi-square test of independence was conducted to examine the relation between education level and attachment to CARICOM. The relation was determined to be significant, Note $\chi^2 (4, N = 148) = 23.123^*, p <.05$. Respondents with post-secondary education were more attached to CARICOM than those with elementary/secondary level education. The strength of this relationship was determined to be moderate, Cramer’s $V = .279$.

The above results are not surprising. In a study of Asian identity, Sinnott (2008) found that supranational attachments were stronger among educational elites. He stipulated that education has “no influence on the strength of national identity, [but it] does have an effect on supranational identity –more highly educated individuals are more likely to espouse a supranational identity” (Sinnott, 2008:143). The results from this study, which suggest that respondents with the lowest level of education were least attached to CARICOM are expected. Respondents without post-secondary education have fewer opportunities to legally migrate to other CARICOM countries than those with post-secondary education. This is because university graduates are one of the categories of citizens who can move freely within CARICOM. In addition, some of the other categories such as media personnel or artistes usually require post-secondary education to qualify in these positions. Thus, the lower levels of attachment to
CARICOM by persons without post-secondary education might reflect their exclusion from among the five categories of people who have free movement.

These findings are in line with existing research, which show that educational elites and intra-regional migrants are generally more attached to supranational organizations than the general population (PIONEUR, 2007:6). Speaking of the EU, the PIONEUR reports noted that:

Intra-EU migrants have a much more positive image of the EU, feel far more attached to the EU and perceive themselves as more knowledgeable about European institutions and policies than people who have not left their countries of origin. This finding may be due to the greater ‘use’ movers make of European provisions than stayers (free movement across borders, access to labour markets and welfare rights in other EU countries, making friends abroad, etc. (PIONEUR, 2007:6).

In the case of CARICOM, intra-regional migrants are generally highly educated and are presumably more knowledgeable about CARICOM and its policies than those with lower levels of education. If like the EU, intra-regional migrants in CARIOM are more attached than the general population, then this is worrisome for CARICOM. This is because, intra-regional CARICOM migrants complained that they are neither sufficiently informed nor knowledgeable about CARICOM (see sections 5.05a and 5.05b). If this elite group suffers from knowledge deficit, then the general population can be considered even less knowledgeable about CARICOM and its policies. In addition, if only 46 per cent of respondents were significantly attached to CARICOM and all viewed CARICOM in terms of disappointments and failures (see section 9.02), then one might presume that the general population identified even less with CARICOM. This would mean that, as a matter of urgency, CARICOM needs to communicate better so citizens can be more knowledgeable about the affairs of the region and feel more included.
CARICOM would also be better served by spreading its institutions across the region rather than primarily in Barbados and Trinidad (see Table 5.15). This would improve its visibility, improve knowledge and provide incentives for the general population to develop the regional identity in greater measure. A more equal distribution of CARICOM organizations across member countries could also help in educating the public about CARICOM and its institutions. The next section of this chapter examines how citizenship affects attachments to CARICOM.

Table 5.11
Chi Square Results and Descriptive Statistics of education status by attachments to CARICOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>Highest Level of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elementary/Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite/Greatly Attached</td>
<td>10 (47.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Much</td>
<td>2 (9.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>9 (42.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 148

Note $\chi^2 = 23.123^*$, df = 4. Cramer’s $V = .279^*$. The numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

*p<.05

5.03.a Citizenship & Attachment to CARICOM

Table 5.12 shows the relationship between attachment to CARICOM and citizenship of respondents. It reveals that 75 per cent of respondents from Outlying countries were strongly attached to CARICOM, whereas only 38.4 per cent of respondents from the big four countries and 43.9 per cent of OECS were equally strongly attached. At the same time, almost a quarter of respondents from the big four countries (24.2 per cent) were not at all attached to CARICOM. On the flip side, only 7.1 per cent of respondents from outlying countries and 14.5 per cent of OECS respondents were not at all attached to CARICOM. Overall, the crosstab demonstrates that
respondents from outlying countries were most attached to CARICOM and the big four countries were least attached. The chi-square test reveals that the differences are statistically significant, $\chi^2 (4 = 189) = 13.974$, $p = 0.007$. However, the relationship is a moderate one, Cramer’s $V = .192$.

Table 5.12
Chi Square Results and Descriptive Statistics of Between Citizenship (regions) by Attachment to CARICOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>The Big Four</th>
<th>Outlying</th>
<th>OCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quite/Greatly Attached</td>
<td>38 (38.4%)</td>
<td>21 (75.0%)</td>
<td>27 (44.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Much</td>
<td>37 (37.4%)</td>
<td>5 (17.9%)</td>
<td>26 (41.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>24 (24.2%)</td>
<td>2 (7.1%)</td>
<td>9 (14.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$N = 189$

Note $\chi^2 =13.974^*$, df=4. Cramer’s $V = .192^*$. The numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

* $p<.05$

5.03.b Explaining the OECS’ Attachment to CARICOM.

The study found that intra-regional migrants from the OECS were more attached to CARICOM than those from the big four countries (see Tables 5.12 and 5.1319). This is interesting because not only is the OECS, except for Anguilla, a subgroup of CARICOM, but it is also an economic union that is far more advanced than CARICOM (Boxill, 1997). To understand this finding, it is important to provide some context to the OECS, and compare it with the integration possibilities for the outlying states. The OECS shares the same colonial heritage with the big four countries, and has always enjoyed close and harmonious relations with them. The OECS also has similar demographic characteristics as the big four countries, including ethnic and religious compositions (see Table 3.02). The situation in the outlying countries are somewhat

19 Comparing St. Lucian (OECS) and Jamaican (big four) interviewee’s attachments to CARICOM.
different, particularly Belize and Suriname, who are also members of integration movements in Central and South America. In South America, Suriname’s unification does not stop with CARICOM, it is also being courted by UNASUR, and in Central America, Belize is already a member of the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). These other integrative frameworks compete with CARICOM in global affairs, including agricultural trade and tourism. The OECS as a subgroup shares similar objectives with CARICOM, and therefore does not present any competing interests with CARICOM.

The interviews confirmed that respondents from the OECS and outlying countries were more attached to CARICOM than those from the big four. Interviewees from St. Lucia were generally favourable towards the CARICOM identity, because for them, the regional identity is more powerful, and would allow them to multiply the benefits that they were currently getting from the OECS. They reckoned that CARICOM, being larger and more powerful, would endow even more benefits than those already being realized in the OECS. According to Lewis (2003:326), small island states like those of the OECS, approach globalization with despair because they fear it will close previous opportunities opened to them. They were therefore generally more favourable towards integration as a means of mitigating the risks from small size. Respondent L2, a finance professional discussed the benefits that can be derived from integration as follows:

You might go there [in other CARICOM countries] and want to live there, start a business...especially for me the wave of small businesses, people trying to find something else to do when the 9 to 5 [job] doesn’t work, and they have no choice but to look for a way to improve your skills and make money from it. Knowing
that there is more than just your island, and that there are opportunities in the other islands… I think it would be a pleasure to have CARICOM versus just the islands inside us (L2).

L2’s statement indicates that CARICOM is a source of security for her country, and a means of mitigating the insularities and vulnerabilities that are characteristic of SIDS (Downes, 2008; Hall, 2012; Rosewarne, 2010; Strachan & Vigilance, 2011; UWI Centre for Environment & Development, 2002). For her, CARICOM also means more economic and personal opportunities. Her rationale can be understood as tied to the benefits of integration, which as Table 5.08 shows, are strongly related to attachment to CARICOM (see also section 6.06). For L2, the security derived from a post-national identity, and its potential benefits serve as incentives for the development of a regional identity. It is important to note that she was not satisfied with her current attachment to CARICOM. She stated “it would be a pleasure” to be more attached. Yet within the statement, there was optimism that integration would cause this ‘pleasure’ to be realized. She viewed integration and the realization of its benefits as powerful means of cultivating “CARICOM inside” people.

These potentials appear to generate hope and buy-in from OECS respondents. Some St. Lucian respondents highlighted the need for CARICOM to replicate the successes of the OECS on a greater scale. For example, the following quote from L1 explains some of the successes that CARICOM can emulate from the OECS, which could inspire greater commitment and loyalty in the region:

**L1:** …you know the OECS has done reasonably –really well. You can travel within the OECS on your driver’s license, on your ID card and you can stay, you can stay
up to 6 months or a year or something like that. Travelling within the OECS is great.

Interviewer: so [do] you think that CARICOM can learn from the OECS then?

L1: yes, of course man. Of course, of course. They need to understand.

As the above shows, L1 portrays the OECS as a beacon of success, and as something that CARICOM can emulate, specifically in the area of free movements of people. He sees it as imperative that CARICOM surpasses the OECS in order to guarantee the survival of the entire community. In fact, he sees his identity vested in CARICOM, as the following conversation shows:

Interviewer: Where would your CARICOM identity fall in all of this? How important is that to you?

L1: extremely important. I will tell you why: because if we don’t come together as CARICOM, if we don’t have one voice, [then] the financial situation is going to squeeze us even more.

This demonstrates that for L1, integration and the unity of a common identity evinced through a single voice are the only way to mitigate financial ruin that globalization can potentially heap on CARICOM. Notice that he pictured the entire region as being affected, and not just his country. This demonstrates that he sees himself as a regional citizen, not just a St. Lucian. He envisions a shared destiny for the region, thus a shared identity made sense to him. He therefore recommended that CARICOM earnestly integrate along the lines of the OECS as demonstrated in the transcript below:

This assessment of the importance of integration was not unique. The other OECS respondents were likewise inspired by their sub-region’s success in integration, and projected
this success to CARICOM as a means of deriving greater benefits. CARICOM’s integration and a regional identity are therefore beneficial from their point of view. As the quote below shows, L4 believed that being a part of the OECS has embodied its citizens with the spirit of integration, which could translate into a regional identity:

I think they [St. Lucia] do more [embody the spirit of integration] of that from the OECS standpoint… I think these seven countries [OECS] together, they understand that mind frame more than the others. I can’t say totally that fully St. Lucia would say ‘ok, yes we’re CARICOM, we’re Caribbean people’. We do acknowledge it, but it’s which islands acknowledge it more than the others so compared to Barbados, Trinidad, Jamaica, I would say yes, St. Lucia embodies the CARICOM spirit more than those other countries. More. (L4).

Note that L4 specifically compared the mind frame of the OECS to the big four, definitively identifying Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados as detracting from the potential of CARICOM in building the CARICOM identity. This is an important disclosure because it points to the OECS’ expectations that the big four is crucial to the success of CARICOM. The significance of this is that CARICOM’s predecessor, the West Indies Federation, failed largely because of Jamaica’s exit, which was immediately followed by Trinidad (Demas, 1976; Boxill, 1997). As a result, there is still distrust of the big four countries, even though they are seen as imperative to the success of CARICOM and the development of a regional identity. The distrust of the big four seems to support skepticism about the ability of the West Indies to be united (Ferguson, 2003; Williams, 1973). However, rather than viewing the big four’s apathy as a sign that integration is doomed, L4 was more positive. She saw it as a matter of the OECS being more ready.
The above discussion shows that OECS respondents often highlighted the achievements of their sub-regional group as something that is replicable, if other CARICOM countries commit to it. OECS respondents desired deeper integration, which stemmed from the belief that the achievements of the OECS were still miniscule and could be amplified through CARICOM. Their strong identification with CARICOM therefore rests on the hope that CARICOM can achieve or surpass what the OECS has done. This demonstrates confidence in the ability of regional integration to deliver benefits to the people of the region. Nonetheless, respondents remained mindful of the need for more unity on integration issues, particularly from the big four countries. They viewed the big four as crucial to integration.

5.03.c Explaining the Big Four’s Attachment to CARICOM.

In contrast to respondents from the outlying countries and those from the OECS whose regional identities hinged on the hope that CARICOM will eventually realize its potential and deliver pragmatic benefits, members from the big four countries were less attached to CARICOM. This was because they placed emphasis on failures in regional integration. CARICOM’s perceived failures appeared to cause frustration and apprehension, and raised questions concerning the political will of regional governments. For example, J1 divulged that he was half-hearted towards CARICOM because of the lack of progress in integration. He stated:

I am halfway [attached to CARICOM] because the benefits I see in terms of trading, which I think is very important, because I don’t think you have –because of hidden…. The lack of will from the political leaders. We haven’t completed the transformation to become one common market as yet. We are very far from being a common market. I mean I think we have a long way to go. Consequently, I only am about 50 per cent of the way (J1).
As the above shows, regional politics greatly influenced identity decisions. J1 bemoaned the lack of political will of leaders as one of the reasons he was half-hearted about identifying with the region. His rationale is reminiscent of the discourse of implementation deficit, which many observers identified as an impediment to the integration project (Bishop, 2011; Boxill, 1997; Girvan, 2012; Wickham et al, 2004). Similarly, J3 rationalized that her weak attachment to CARICOM was due to the weak structures and the lack of progress in integration. She explained:

I cannot be a CARICOM national and I mean, you, first of all: CARICOM, there is nothing, I don’t see anything unless it is in the budget that I don’t see right, but I don’t see anything going from no country to a central body to develop CARICOM to develop the concept and to develop, you know this whole idea (J3)

J3 was deeply concerned about the CARICOM’s structure, and how the policies and practices are governed. The effective governance of policy was so important to her that she refused to claim a CARICOM identity unless there are visible progress in that area. This shows that the attitudes of people can be extremely powerful in shaping politics (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). A historical review of regional integration shows that it was Jamaica’s exit in 1962 triggered by a public referendum against the West Indian Federation, which heralded the disintegration of it (Boxill, 1997; Demas, 1976). Consequently, it is important to effectively manage public perceptions, and the public image of CARICOM. In the case of J3, the perception that CARICOM lacks a central body and is disorganized negatively impact her subscription to the shared regional identity.

Whilst acknowledging the implementation deficit in CARICOM, Boxill (2007) also noted that Jamaicans have an elitist mentality concerning the other CARICOM countries, which he attributed to their larger size and development status. In addition, he noted that historically, Jamaicans maintained little contact with the OECS. For him, these factors helped weaken their
attachment to CARICOM. However, within this research, Jamaican respondents suggested differently. They claimed to be the victims of ill-treatment in CARICOM member states. Consider the following statement from J4, a Jamaican medical professional living in the Bahamas:

When it comes to Jamaicans here, they have to establish in terms of being…. If you are a professional, in terms of if you are contributing to their society, they can treat you better because the way…. The way the immigration process is here, it’s just ridiculous [laughs] (J4).

In the above statement, J4 expressed dissatisfaction with the treatment she sees meted out to Jamaicans. In addition, she positioned herself as an outsider, and blamed the immigration process for helping to create differences. For her, the treatment of Jamaicans in the Bahamas is systematic, which suggests that it merits national attention. J4 was not alone in feeling that her nationality is targeted for ill treatment in CARICOM member countries. There are widespread reports in the Caribbean media that certain nationalities, particularly Guyanese nationals and Jamaicans are systematically subjected to abuse in member countries (Campbell, 2013; Henry, 2013). In fact, Rolfe (2007: 110) quoted the Guyanese President Jagdeo as saying "it is not an easy task to sell CARICOM to Guyanese as an integrated community with benefits to be derived when they are treated better outside of CARICOM than at regional ports of entry". Respondents from these countries appeared to use these experiences and the dominant representations of intra-regional migrants’ social relations to strengthen national solidarity and drive indifference towards CARICOM.

In addition, scholars identify a range of internal issues in the big four, which make it difficult for them to favour integration. Rolfe (2007:109) noted that whereas the “smaller
countries need to make themselves bigger through integration” and can assimilate easily into the region, the larger ones have more internal divisions, which make it more difficult for them to integrate. He argued that among the larger countries, there is no shared cultural identity due to ethnic divisions, which make it difficult for them to accept a shared regional identity. He noted that currently, identity is a divisive issue within CARICOM, and pointed to the example that the Trinidadian opposition rejected integration with the Eastern Caribbean (OECS), which comprises mostly Blacks, in favour of integration with Suriname or Guyanese, which has similar ethnic make-up, with a large Indian population\(^ {20} \) (Rolfe, 2007). Within this study, the demographic composition of the countries rarely featured in respondents’ narratives about the CARICOM identity. This was perhaps because Jamaica was used to represent the big four, and it is generally accepted that while Guyana or Trinidad is stratified along racial lines, Jamaica is primarily stratified around social class (Braithwaite, 1971). In fact, as will become more evident in the next chapter, Jamaicans’ weak attachment to CARICOM was primarily explained by their disappointments with CARICOM, particularly with regards to unrealized benefits (see section 6.07 for detailed analysis). The next section provides some explanations for why respondents from the outlying countries identified strongly with CARICOM.

**5.03.d Explaining Outlying Countries’ Strong identification with CARICOM.**

Table 5.13 documents interviewees’ attachments to CARICOM by citizenship region, using a scale of “1” (lowest) to “10” (highest). It shows that the interviewees from Belize and Suriname (outlying countries) were more attached to CARICOM than those from Jamaica (the big four) but just as attached as those from St. Lucia (OECS). This supports the findings from Table 5.12, which shows that respondents from the big four countries were least attached to

\(^ {20} \) See table 3.02 for demographic and ethnic make-up of CARICOM countries
CARICOM compared to those from the Outlying countries and the OECS. This is not a surprising result when one compares the realities of newcomers in the European Union with outlying member states (which were the last to join CARICOM) in CARICOM. Both exhibit similar trends in supranational attachment when compared with original members. The Eurobarometer 2012 reported, for example, that the NMS12 –the twelve new member states that joined the EU at the time of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements –were more attached to the EU than the original EU15 (15 original EU members) (European Commission, 2012a). The report also noted that “respondents in the NMS12 countries are more likely than EU15 respondents to say that they have benefitted from EU achievements” (European Commission, 2012a:18). In a similar vein, this study found that respondents from outlying countries had stronger attachments to CARICOM than respondents from the big four countries. However, as Table 5.14 shows, unlike in the EU where NMS12 respondents said that they benefitted more, the chi square test of independence between CARICOM citizenship region and perception of benefits gained reveal no significant differences, $\chi^2(3 N = 123) = 3.855, p = .278$. Thus, perceptions on the benefits gained from CARICOM did not differ by citizenship. This was due to the fact that overall, 91.1 per cent of respondents see at least some benefits from CARICOM regardless of country of citizenship.

Table 5.13

*How Interviewees rate their level of attachment to CARICOM on a Scale of 1 to 10 (lowest to highest)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Average Level of Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>Citizenship Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>OECS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Big Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Outlying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Outlying</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.14
Chi Square Results and Descriptive Statistics of Respondents’ Perceptions of Benefits Gained by Citizenship Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BENEFITS</th>
<th>CITIZENSHIP REGION</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAINED</td>
<td>Outlying Countries</td>
<td>Non-Outlying (OCES &amp; Big Four)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot of benefits</td>
<td>3 (14.3%)</td>
<td>26 (25.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a few Benefits</td>
<td>6 (28.6%)</td>
<td>13 (12.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Benefits</td>
<td>10 (46.7%)</td>
<td>54 (52.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Benefits</td>
<td>2 (9.5%)</td>
<td>9 (8.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 123

Note $\chi^2 = 3.855$, p = .278, df = 3. Number in parentheses indicate column percentages.

One possible reason that respondents from outlying countries were more attached to CARICOM than non-outlying members could be due to historical differences. While the big four countries and the OECS were part of the West Indies Federation, which broke up after only four years, none of the outlying countries were part of the historic break-up. The fall-out from the West Indies Federation continues to linger in the psyche of many CARICOM nationals, reminding them of the fragility of integration (Boxill, 1997). As a result, it is likely that the big four member and OECS countries, which were a part of the Federation, carry mistrust that lingers into CARICOM. Conversely, respondents from the outlying countries tend to approach integration and the prospect of a regional identity by looking mainly at the possibilities and benefits. One such benefit is the increased global representation that integration in CARICOM provides. S1, a journalist from Suriname explained this benefit:

**S1**: Before the CARICOM became known in the world, it seems that my native passport from Suriname was a little unknown in the rest of the world. For example, when I went for the first time to the United States of America, I handed over my
passport to the customs [official], I told him I’m from Suriname and he asked me where is that country and I said “do you know South America?” and he said ‘yes’. I said ‘it’s part of South America’. He said that he has never heard about that country…. You imagine how I felt for Suriname not being known? And now when I go there and I tell them Suriname, they know it. They know right away where my country is. That’s good.

**Interviewer:** ok, so you find that the CARICOM passport has given you more recognition?

**S1:** sure, not only recognition but I am better known in the world as being part of the CARICOM maybe or being part of South America. People from overseas, they know…which countries we have in the CARICOM (S1).

This quote demonstrates that CARICOM also serves pragmatic purposes for countries that are not well known globally. S1 explained that because of CARICOM, Suriname is now recognized in the global community. Thus, rather than stripping him of his national identity, CARICOM has emboldened his national identity, giving both himself and his country a geographic frame of reference. CARICOM has also removed the indignity of him having to account for the existence of his country. This endowment of status helps explain his strong attachment to CARICOM, and supports the idea that supranational identities can improve if respondents believe in the benefits of integration (European Commission, 2012a; Hooghe, 2004; Marks, 1999).

Another benefit that CARICOM presents to outlying countries is the opportunity for leadership. S4, a Surinamese lawyer, explained that as the largest country in CARICOM, Suriname is able to project a louder voice, and be more influential than if they integrated with their much larger South American neighbours:
Interviewer: So in your opinion, do you think that Suriname is better suited within CARICOM than South America or the rest of the Dutch-Caribbean?

S4: I’m thinking… I’m thinking. It depends. Is it economically? Is it demographically, I don’t know because if you say CARICOM, you have the….we are in the middle, we are in the category middle I think, you know, you [Suriname] are one of the big ones, so you can lead an organization to –you know –prosperity, but in the South…the South American organization, I think we are the smallest and then that’s the problem. The problem: how can you voice your opinion and you know I don’t know…. I don’t know…. Within the CARICOM, we would be better off. For now, I don’t see it in the…I don’t see it in UNASUR (S4).

This narrative illustrates that integration in CARICOM’s integration represents an attractive alternative to integrating in South America (UNASUR), because of the potential influence that Suriname can exert in CARICOM. Within CARICOM, Suriname can potentially use its superior size to exert influence and take a leadership role. Within UNASUR, Suriname loses its size advantage and is less visible, and hence has less influence. As such CARICOM represents a better alternative for Suriname if it is to take on a leadership role. This is another example of how attachment to CARICOM can be driven by the pragmatic benefits both to individuals and to countries (Hogg et al, 1995; Marks, 1999).

Unlike the big four or the OECS countries, which are solely committed to the English-Speaking Caribbean region, Suriname and Belize are sandwiched between CARICOM and South/Central America, with rather uncertain futures. These uncertainties do not necessarily weaken citizens’ identity commitments to CARICOM: social identity studies have shown that
competition, fear and threats can increase in-group commitment (see Altran & Henrich, 2010; Livengood & Reger, 2010; Ren et al, 2012). It is therefore likely that respondents from Belize and Suriname, reacted with strong attachments to CARICOM in order to assert their membership/acceptance in CARICOM. Conversely, the absence of this threat could make citizens from the OECS and big four countries passive about the shared regional identity. Whereas OECS and the big four countries’ respondents have fewer competing interests, and accept CARICOM as given (Ramphalt, 2011), Belizeans and Surinamese were more conscious about their identity decisions. When respondents made their own decision, the CARICOM identity became deeper than when the identity is imposed or taken for granted (Sueda, 2014), which might be the case particularly for the big four member countries. In addition, Suriname and Belize\textsuperscript{21} do not fit much easier into South and Central America either. Respondent B2, explained why CARICOM might be a better fit for Belize:

I think because, one of the things that I have seen in growing up from a child as I have said, we have a very very strong Caribbean identity and Caribbean roots. And you wanting to…a lot of that, or that push, even from a national level, and and, it’s because….I guess it’s in the changing situation as it relates to cultures in Belize, where mestizos are now a larger part of the population than the creoles, and just strategically, the country for certain things sees itself better aligned among with the Latin American Region. I think that somewhere along the line, the push that was there to maintaining our Caribbean identity was lost…we have not embraced a lot of the tools that that allows us to truly integrate ourselves as CARICOM. So me becoming more CARICOM would have a lot to do with the

\textsuperscript{21} In addition to size, both Suriname and Belize are also outliers in South and Central America due to language and to a large degree colonial legacies.
country moving towards becoming more CARICOM. I think at this point its walking a fine line as it relates to whether or not we’re with Central American or CARICOM. And you don’t see that push as I remember as a child in improving our Caribbean identity (B2).

B2’s narrative indicates that her affinity towards CARICOM is not only self-directed. She divulged that she was brought up at a time when Belize was strongly affiliated with CARICOM, which made the CARICOM identity automatic for her. As the country experienced demographic shifts and integrated more closely within the Central America community, B2 had to make the decision whether to modify her identity to match that of her country’s strategic direction. Thus, for her, a supranational identity hinges on the demographic and political direction of her country.

Much has been written about Belize’s demographic and political changes (Le Page, 1986; Premdas, 2003; Wilk, 1999). B2 disclosed that these changes impact how she constructs her identity. She disclosed that as a child, the Caribbean identity was instilled in the Belizean psyche through the media and school, but this was no longer the case in Belize. As a result, she feared that people are feeling less attached to CARICOM. In addition, she feared that the demographic transition that Belize is going through will also cause the CARICOM identity to decrease in importance in her country. She asserted that the Black population is usually more aligned with CARICOM, while the Mestizos are more aligned to Central America. She also alleged that as the Mestizos become numerically and politically stronger, Belize as a country has shifted away from CARICOM towards Central America. If this is true, the strong attachments that Belizeans in this research exhibit, might just be temporary. B2, stated that her personal attachment to CARICOM is contingent upon the strategic direction that Belize takes. Her disclosure suggests a need for the alignment of personal, national and post-national identities. Nonetheless, B2 clearly favoured a
CARICOM identity as noted by the fact that she complained that the “push to maintain our Caribbean identity” has been lost. The desire to hold on to her traditional identity despite the change in Belize’s strategic alignment is partly due to her early socialization into a CARICOM. This early adoption of the CARICOM identity appeared to make it deep (Meyers et al, 2006) and somewhat resilient to current changes. As the only former British territory in Central America, Belize has historically been tied to the Anglophone Caribbean, and this enthusiasm represents a longing to truly gain acceptance in CARICOM (Medina, 1997). Medina (1997:768) pointed out that Belize has historically viewed itself as “a Caribbean country in Central America” and this is emphasized in educational resources. This helps explain why B2, in the quote above, lamented the fact that her country was in some ways alienated by CARICOM, which she felt should be reaching out more to Belize. In addition, she saw the political change that Belize has undergone as being partially responsible for the marginality that she feels. Overall, her narrative suggests that integration within CARICOM, and acceptance of the regional identity represent the most pragmatic way for Belize to rekindle its historical ties with the Anglophone region. However, as Medina (1997) pointed out, the Spanish influence of Central America is making identities uncertain in Belize. The next section explains in detail the seeming contradiction uncovered in this research whereby outlying respondents felt excluded in CARICOM but were the most attached group to it.

5.04.a Lessons from Outlying Countries: Forging a CARICOM Identity as Outsiders

The fact that outlying respondents were the most attached group to CARICOM was somewhat surprising; most respondents from these countries experienced marginalization in their interactions with nationals from non-outlying countries. These respondents believed that CARICOM marginalized outlying countries by not setting up institutions in their countries and in
the way that non-outlying respondents are educated about them. Most outlying respondents also considered their geographic location to be a source of marginality. The following sub-section discuss these marginalizations, and explain how respondents negotiate them in the framing of the CARICOM identity. How respondents negotiate these challenges might be instructive in helping us understand how a regional identity might be strengthened in adverse conditions.

5.04.b Anonymity, Exclusion & Optimism in Identity Framings.

Despite the fact that the interviewees from outlying countries (Belize & Suriname) were more significantly attached to CARICOM than the other regions, they all disclosed feelings of being “othered” whilst living in CARICOM member countries. It was this dual state of being closely attached yet being ‘othered’ that defined their incorporation into CARICOM. While many saw pragmatic benefits in regional integration, and even took pride in the regional identity, many of these respondents described feeling invisible in CARICOM. They reported that other CARICOM nationals did not know who they were, or even that their countries were a part of the community. S4, a Surinamese lawyer, explained the negative effects of this knowledge deficit:

… Especially to the Eastern Caribbean… the small islands in the eastern part because maybe because they don’t know Suriname, they don’t [know] us, they don’t see people from Suriname…. or hear about Suriname unless on the formal forums… in the conferences of CARICOM, [With increased intra-regional migration] then maybe they would be… then the affection can you know, grow, you know, and they could understand Surinamese people or Guyanese people because we are on the other side of the region (S4).

The above shows S4’s lamenting her country’s unknown status in CARICOM nationals. This lack of knowledge serves to exclude genuine members from CARICOM, and functions as an
impediment to the development of a shared identity. In fact, S4 viewed the knowledge deficit as a deterrent to the growth of affection between peoples of the region. In other words, it blights the opportunity for a shared identity to develop. Within her narrative is a sense of optimism that regional integration and a shared identity can develop by simply overcoming distances between the different countries through easier intra-regional travel opportunities. This would reduce the knowledge deficit, and as stipulated by the contact hypothesis, facilitate increased contact between people (Hewstone & Swart, 2011), and perhaps a shared identity.

Another tool that is used to differentiate outlying citizens from the rest of CARICOM is language. Intra-regional migrants from outlying countries reported being automatically dismissed as non-CARICOM nationals once it became known that their primary language was not English. As the following quote from S2 (a Surinamese business owner who lived in Jamaica) demonstrates, language difference leads to assumptions about who is and who is not a member of CARICOM:

…Talking to people and telling them about “yes, we’re [Suriname] part of the CARICOM and we are CARICOM nationals”, they’d be like “oh really?” you know and you explain to them that Suriname is not actually in Africa, but is in South America and it has been part of the CARICOM for a long time so yeah….I think the language…makes it a little bit difficult or…yea so it’s hard [for them to] understand it’s part of an English-speaking community or things like that (S2).

This demonstrates that citizens of the English speaking countries, tend to view CARICOM like its predecessor – the West Indies Federation, as an Anglophone body. While S2 did not feel that the questions she faced were ill-intentioned, such misinformation leads to social exclusion and non-acceptance. It creates a picture of a self-fragmenting body, lacking a common knowledge,
common agenda, common purposes and unity. A stable knowledge base is important to the building of a shared identity, and the fragmented knowledge makes the CARICOM identity unstable and weak. This points to the need for a stronger knowledge base, so that misconception are corrected, and the shared identity that develops is complete, accurate and stable.

The exclusion of members from a group based on perceived differences directly impacts social identity construction. Tajfel (1982) explained that in addition to internal identification with a group, members must be accepted as belonging to that group. The fact that respondents from outlying countries felt anonymous, suggests an incongruence between their internalized sense of being CARICOM nationals and the external identities imposed on them. Nonetheless, respondents often resorted to filling the knowledge gap by educating their counterparts of their CARICOM status. Thus, while the institutional structures (including the media, governments or the schooling systems) might be ineffective in disseminating knowledge, respondents from the outlying states often took the personal responsibility to educate others. As a result, knowledge deficits and the marginalization they produce do not totally impede the development of a regional identity.

5.04.c Structural Marginalization.

Not only did respondents from Suriname and Belize feel personally marginalized, but they also felt like victims of structural marginalization. They pointed out that institutionally and symbolically, their countries are often overlooked in CARICOM. For example, they pointed to the fact that CARICOM institutions are rarely set up in either Belize or Suriname. As a result, there are not many visible symbols of these countries being a part of this community. Table 5.15 shows that 80 per cent of CARICOM’s institutions are headquartered in the big four countries (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago,), primarily within Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago. Conversely, Belize and Suriname each has only 1 CARICOM institution
headquartered in their countries, while St. Lucia and Grenada have a total of three, which includes the Secretariat of the OECS headquartered in St. Lucia. It is interesting that Barbados is home to eight (8) CARICOM institutions while Belize and Suriname each has only one (1) considering that both have populations greater than that of Barbados. This seems to support respondents from Belize and Suriname who point out that there are few visible symbols of CARICOM in their countries.

Table 5.15
Headquarter Locations of CARICOM Institutions and Institutions Recognized in the Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>2007 Population*22 ('000)</th>
<th># of CARICOM Headquarters Institutions</th>
<th>CARICOM Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Big Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Big Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OECS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Outlying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Outlying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OECS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The idea of symbolic representation was an important theme arising from the interviews, particularly among members from outlying countries. Respondents believed that inadequate

institutional presence signified marginalization, which inhibits the development of a regional identity. As Tables 5.12 and 5.13 indicate, Belizeans and Surinamese (outlying countries respondents were more attached to CARICOM than respondents from the other regions. The absence of symbolic integration in these countries (in terms the presence of CARICOM institutions) was a cause for concern for Belizean and Surinamese respondents. For example, B3, who is a Belizean student studying in Barbados presumed that the presence of more CARICOM institutions in Belize would legitimize it as a bona fide member of CARICOM. She explained:

You know that we would be placed, um to be better known, um, as well, um, I think that it would be a good idea for a university to be built within Belize as well so that we could have integration going over into Belize instead of coming out (B3).

The above quote illustrates the importance of institutional representation to respondents. B3 saw institutional representation across member states as important to regional integration. For her, regional institutions could foster the development of a shared identity by creating spaces for people across the different CARICOM countries to interact and learn about each other.

Institutions also serve as avenues through which the visibility, goals and knowledge about CARICOM can be disseminated to local populations. B3 thus professed that the absence of CARICOM institutions in her country hindered both integration and a shared identity by averting social interaction. Similarly, S4, now a lawyer who pursued her studies in Guyana, explained that the lack of institutional diversity, negatively impact the ability of her home country – Suriname, and its people from having a voice in CARICOM. She stated:

And a way [for Suriname] to get involved is also facilitating the CARICOM institutions. That [those institutions] has to come, you know, and if you don’t
facilitate, participate actively…. I am proposing this, be there, fully be there, voice, give your voice. When you are there, you know give the people or tell the people…..voice or what the people of Suriname thinks about an issue so that means you have to do the brainstorming at home before you go there: this is what Suriname is thinking about that issue. We can’t do it or we will do it in this way or that way. So I think we have to manifest ourselves more in the regional institutions if we can’t facilitate them at home (S4).

This quote underscores the perception that regional institutions are symbols of integration and inclusion. While it would have been interesting to examine the correlation between national involvement (at the country level) and attachment to CARICOM, it was outside the scope of this research. Nevertheless, individual perceptions of their county’s involvement/representation shed light on how individual marginalization and exclusion are rationalized. For S4, regional institutions are symbols of membership and identification with CARICOM. Even more interesting, S4 conceived CARICOM institutions as voices through which the positions of different countries can be broadcast to the other community members. In other words, they represent avenues through which the diversity of the community can be expressed. The absence of these institutions from her home country, thus signified a loss of voice, membership and belonging. Importantly, while S4 suggested that this loss of voice affected Suriname’s representation in CARICOM, she did not personalize concerning her attachment to CARICOM. Given their strong attachment to CARICOM, it appears that respondents from the outlying states were able to detach their feelings of exclusion from their commitment to the regional identity. As the two respondents above (B3 and B4) suggested, better institutional representation can both improve attachments to CARICOM and social relations between people. Smith (1992) stipulated
that symbols convey meanings to people, and transmit particular understanding about the institutions and the people they represent. In addition, they have the power to bind people together towards a common goal, ideal, aspiration or sentiment (Smith 1992). Thus, the lack of symbolic representation, though regional institutions robs outlying citizens of integration opportunities.

Examining Anderson’s (2006) concept of the imagined community, the importance of symbols in identity construction becomes clear. He stipulated because “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet or hear them” (2006:6), they must develop communities around friends, families and other symbols of association with the nation. In the absence of direct contact, individual depend on symbols to maintain that sense of shared belonging. The institutions of CARICOM are perhaps the most important supranational symbols of belonging, as they represent integration, process, unity and the character of the region. They also are powerful because they regulate and provide stewardship over all aspects of CARICOM such as health, education, economy, security, disaster management, etc. In essence, they contribute to the deepening of regional identities.

Even though the unequal distribution of regional institutions in the outlying countries did not directly impact their citizens’ attachments to CARICOM, it raises questions about the integration of these countries and their citizens as CARICOM members. It also means that they have little influence in the governance of the community. In addition, because CARICOM negotiate internationally for the community on policies that affect all member countries, unequal representation in the institutions could mean the loss of a voice in affairs that affect these countries.
To illustrate the importance of regional institutions, consider the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC), which is headquartered in Barbados. It exerts power over the region by being the sole organization responsible for the curriculum design, educational assessment and the issuance of certification to citizens up to the end of secondary school for countries in the region\textsuperscript{23}. Barbados, through the CXC therefore has considerable influence over the educational outcomes of citizens throughout the region. Thus, the scarcity of CARICOM institutions in Belize and Suriname represents a symbolic loss of regional power and influence. Furthermore, as B3 hinted, institutions are sites for integration, thus, the shortage of institutions in Belize means that integration is always “going out”, in other words, integration is a privilege that only those who are able to travel outside of Belize can afford. This adds to the paradox in that respondents from these outlying countries were so strongly attached to CARICOM, despite their exclusion. However, it appears that outlying respondents’ attachments to CARICOM are unaffected by their displeasure with the ‘institutional marginalization’ that they believe disadvantage their countries. In other words, their beliefs in the benefits of regional integration outweigh the difficulties they encounter integrating.

5.04.d Geographic Insularity.

In addition to structural and information marginalization within CARICOM, respondents from Suriname and Belize also felt that the geographic positioning\textsuperscript{24} of their countries also made it difficult for them to integrate with the rest of the CARICOM islands. Being located within Central and South America, Belizean and Surinamese share more ethnic and cultural similarities with Central and South America countries than they share with the CARICOM islands. Table

\textsuperscript{23} Except the Bahamas, Suriname and Haiti

\textsuperscript{24} Suriname is located in South America and Belize is located in Central America compared to the other CARICOM countries, which are located within the Caribbean Sea.
3.02 shows that Belize and Suriname are more diverse ethnically, religiously and linguistically than the other CARICOM countries. In addition to East Indian, African and British influences, both of these countries enjoy Amerindian and Spanish influences, which make their cultures more plural than the other CARICOM countries. In addition, Belize and Suriname are influenced by their Central/South American neighbours economically (being simultaneous members of economic unions with their neighbours) and socially through migratory movements with their neighbours (Pessar, 1998). As a result, unlike the big four countries and the OECS countries25, which are solely committed to CARICOM, Belize and Suriname have split integration commitments with their mainland neighbours, and are thus likely to have multiple supranational identities. Some Belizean and Surinamese respondents explained that to assume a full CARICOM identity would be to deny important aspects of their geographic, cultural and mainland heritage. Respondent B2 explained the difficulty of fully identifying exclusively with CARICOM, stating: “we cannot deny still our mainland status and being a part of the land there…. Which is in Central America….and so so we tend to….whether we resist it….we have a lot of influence from that side”. As B2 suggested, Belizeans have to incorporate the influences of their mainland neighbours in their identity construction process, which suggests that any supranational identity that they develop would be a melting pot of the different influences or a hybridity26 of CARICOM, national and South/Central American influences. This is especially the case for Belize, which in addition to being a member of CARICOM, is also a member of SICA and CELAC. Belize has essentially committed to integrating with all three. B2 explained that this

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25 Unlike UNASUR, SICA and CELAC (supranational organizations in South and Central America), the OECS is a subset of CARICOM. Thus rather than competing with CARICOM, the OECS complements it.

26 None of the respondents expressed their identities in hybrid terms. This is likely due to the salience of national identity, which is the primary way in which respondents identified themselves. Perhaps secondary identities might be expressed in hybrid terms, but such consideration was outside the scope of the current research.
triad commitment means that they are simultaneously part of three supranational bodies with full acceptance by none:

...from time to time as a Belizean, I feel that we are force-fit into a situation and sometimes you feel like the red-headed step child, where (laughs) we have to be there because technically we are CARICOM (laughs) but if it, if we don’t (laughs), if we are not there, it’s no big loss kind of a thing. Cause its very very difficult to treat us and I guess it’s the problem that CARICOM has with not only Belize but with other land-based countries. Um, in that we understand that the Caribbean countries aren’t necessarily homogenous but you have countries like Belize that fall so far outside (laughs) that that while we have similar issues in terms of our development patterns and things to that effect. We also have things that we are so [much] more [different in]… (B2).

It is interesting that B2 compared Belize’s status in CARICOM to being a red-headed stepchild, which is a colloquial term to describe a child who is adopted, and who is not the birthright of her/his parents. Such a child is normally treated worse than other children in the family. Being a red-headed stepchild is marked by difference, and B2 described Belize’s status in CARICOM as such. She stated “countries like Belize fall so far outside” of the CARICOM family (in the quote above). Later in the interview, she stated that even in terms of economic development, Belize is different from other CARICOM countries, stating that “…the big difference has always been if you compare Belize to the larger Caribbean islands, we are slightly behind as it relates to the developmental stages of the country…because the majority of these CARICOM nations had moved far beyond what we are as a country”. This deficiency in economic development is considered symptomatic of being a red-headed step child or an outcast. Table 3.02 also shows
socio-cultural differences as well. B2 recognized that Belize is more culturally diverse than the insular CARICOM islands, which has contributed to their outside status in many regards. She stated:

We [Belize] tend to be separated as cultures and not necessarily segregated as it is in Jamaica where the segregation is more of financial or economic or class structure. So in Belize we pride ourselves in belonging to our cultures or holding on to our cultural identity: I am creole, the other person is mestizo, the other person is Garifuna (B2).

B2 raised a valuable point about the divisions within her country. However, these divisions might unwittingly help Belizeans to be integrated and form meaningful social relations within CARICOM member countries. The cultural fragmentation in her home country might allow some Belizeans to more readily develop a sense of home in CARICOM member countries. Furthermore, as a creole individual, B2 explained that she shares significant ethnic and cultural similarities with citizens from most of the other CARICOM islands, possibly more so than she would have with Mestizos and Garifuna people in her own country. Accordingly, the challenges of isolation within CARICOM is not an unsurmountable problem from B2’s perspective. Being from a plural society where different groups mix but do not necessarily combine (Lewis, 1968), might have equipped Belizean respondents such as B2 to cope with social marginalization faced within CARICOM. As B2 pointed out, ethno-cultural identities are most salient within her country, a completely different situation than in countries like Jamaica where ethnic divisions are replaced by class divisions. Her narrative indicates that Belizeans might find it easy to develop a regional identity once they can locate the similarities with other CARICOM countries and overcome possible ethnic divisions. Nonetheless, given the economic disadvantages and the
multiplicities of cultures in Belize, B2 described the relationship between CARICOM as somewhat unnatural; one that is “forced” by the technicality in which Belize is the only former British colony in Central America. She also believed that being a mainland country is a source of marginalization by both CARICOM and her Central American neighbours:

…And again it comes to the complexity of being a mainland state and strategic alignment of your state. We share a lot of our issues with our Central American neighbours. I happen to think that we possibly share more issues with our Central American neighbours than we do with our remote Caribbean islands. And so for some time now, I’m ah, as it relates to the movement of the country, there has been a steady movement in, as it relates to strategic alignment. Unfortunately we have not yet mastered any because Latin America treats us as Caribbean and the Caribbean treats us as Latin America. I’m so sorry, but as I have said before, sometimes you do come off as being the red-headed step child that does not really have a place (B2).

B2 implied that she could never become a full CARICOM national because in addition to being from CARICOM, she is also from Latin America. To her, acquiring a full CARICOM identity would mean denying the Latin American part of her. As indicated earlier, this means that Belizeans are forced to march on with a plethora of identities ranging from ethno-cultural (for example, creole, mestizos etc.), national (Belize) and post national (CARICOM, Latin American) and they shift between these. At the post-national level, B2 believed that ethno-culturally, she can be described as Latin American, but linguistically and historically, she belonged to CARICOM. This dual post-national affinity is marked by simultaneous inclusion and exclusion due to the impossibility of uniquely fitting into one. Rolfe (2007) summed up the plurality of
cultures and attachments in the region, noting that paradoxically, the same sea that unites the Caribbean is the same sea that divides it.

5.05.a Ineffective Communications, Knowledge Deficits & Outlying Countries

Ineffective communications and knowledge deficit was identified as one of the main problems respondents had with CARICOM. In particular, respondents from the outlying countries felt that it marginalized them from the rest of CARICOM. As such, this emerged as one of the major themes in the study, and it was also interpreted in the wider context of the failures of CARICOM (discussed extensively in section 9.02). Primarily for respondents from outlying countries, the lack of knowledge about CARICOM presented affected the broadening of their participation and attachment to CARICOM. This was exacerbated by feeling of being anonymous and excluded. Almost all respondents complained that they did not know enough about CARICOM and/or that the people they encountered in CARICOM did not know enough about it either. In particular, as discussed earlier, outlying respondents decried the “poor education” of the mainstream CARICOM population about Surinamese’ and Belizeans’ membership into the community. They perceived that knowledge deficits, specifically about Suriname and Belize caused migrants from these countries to be treated as “out-groups”. Even Belize (formerly British Honduras), an English-speaking and former British colony, was often unrecognized as a member of CARICOM. For example, B1 noted that there is a knowledge deficit among people from the non-outlying countries. While he accepted that Belize is not geographically located among mainstream Caribbean islands, he found it difficult to understand why the governments in the mainstream CARICOM countries do not educate their people about other CARICOM countries as he claimed is done in Belize. He stated:
B1: Sometimes you ask people about Belize and they don’t even know; they are asking questions like: "oh, you speak Spanish?"

Interviewer: so [do] you find that a lot of CARICOM people don’t understand much about Belize?

B1: Yeah, they don’t….I understand why they do since we're technically that um, we are not considered a part of the Caribbean geographically so I understand why they feel as if though we are not. And I mean their educational system is failing because if we could know about Jamaica and Trinidad and all those places, I don’t see why they can’t learn about us also (B1).

B1 thus found it both inexplicable and insulting that he knew about the mainstream islands yet his country was unknown among them. For him, the deficiency in their knowledge was outside of their control; he saw it as the failure of their respective governments to provide the requisite education. This excusing of laypeople helped explain why in spite of exclusionary experiences, Belizeans and Surinamese remained strongly attached to CARICOM. For them, the issue was not so much about the people they encountered, but was about CARICOM improving its communications system to facilitate knowledge exchange. This was illustrated by S3, a Surinamese national who attended university in Trinidad. She disclosed that after explaining Suriname to non-outlying citizens, they developed better understandings about CARICOM:

Very often I had to explain to people where Suriname was, where Suriname is. A lot of persons, I was studying in UWI and a lot of students like nearly 90 per cent of the students in my first year, they had no idea where Suriname was. No idea and I had to say this was in 2003 so this was some time ago. I used to get the question like if Suriname is in Africa or but of course after you explain it, then
you say you know Suriname is right here, then people would know so the next
time they see you they would know. But a lot of people wouldn’t know who on
first sight ok this is where Suriname is, No (S3).

The above shows that mainstream CARICOM citizens are not averse to learning, but that are not
presented with sufficient learning opportunities. This was demonstrated further by B4, a Belizean
who lived in Guyana. She claimed that Guyanese nationals were woefully deficient in their
knowledge about Belize. She disclosed: “they [Guyanese] knew Belize had existed, but to say, no. Actually, um, you could have told them anything and they believe. That was the sad part”. B4
expressed pity that citizens from non-outlying countries were so badly misinformed that they
were gullible. The statement exposes the inherent weakness in CARICOM willingness to
facilitate knowledge exchange.

Regarding facilitating knowledge, it is interesting to note that all CARICOM countries,
except the Bahamas, Suriname and Haiti (outlying countries), follow the same curriculum up to
high school. This explained why respondents such as B1 saw it as an injustice that Belizeans
knew about other member states but was unknown to other CARICOM nationals. While
mainstream CARICOM nationals’ poor knowledge about Belize or Suriname did not directly
result in prejudice or discrimination, it created exclusion. For example, the non-recognition of
these nationalities casts them as outsiders. In essence, internal and external identities did not
match. In some respect, the CARICOM identity existed in fragments among these respondents.
Peter and De Vreese (2003) in their study of the impact of national identities and European
identification, found that information is an important factor in building cross-national
consciousness. Thus, being informed about CARICOM and other member states is important
because it fosters shared understandings. Without consensus on who is a CARICOM national,
citizens might find that they count as part of the in-group in some situations whilst being relegated to the out-group in others, depending on who they are interacting with and their knowledge about CARICOM. As a result, CARICOM nationals might be required to shift their identities depending on the interaction as the next section demonstrates.

5.05.b Outlying Migrants: Shifting Identities and Information Deficiency.

Many respondents viewed the information deficiency in the region as so pervasive that even public servants often lacked sufficient knowledge about CARICOM. Wickham et al (2004) recognized that some countries lack the resources to administer and enforce policies agreed on at the CARICOM levels. However, when public officials appear uninformed, respondents worry about the extent to which regional integration is a serious project for political leaders, and whether a shared identity is desirable. Consider the anecdotes from B1 and S4 below, which reveal that CARICOM knowledge-deficit is so pervasive within mainstream countries that even immigration officials are not sufficiently knowledgeable about outlying member states:

When I was going to St. Lucia, this lady at the airport, who was checking me in and stuff, she was like, do you need a visa to go to St. Lucia? I was shocked, so um, so somebody intervened and said well –I mean, obviously she didn’t see the CARICOM in front of the passport (B1).

[At UWI] I would introduce myself as a Caribbean national because we were from different countries: Guyana was here and I think some from Jamaica and Trinidad were in the group and I told them I am a Caribbean national but when I’m in Trinidad –when I’m at Immigration, they don’t view me as a Caribbean national (S4).
The above anecdotes indicate that lack of knowledge has the effect of shifting respondents’ identities. The exclusion that both B1 and S4 faced resulted in them being cast in the ‘out-group’, that is, they encountered an external shift (imposed) in their identities. Both B1 and S4 experiences were such that their CARICOM identities were stripped from them in their interaction with immigration officials. However, the above shows that respondents actively shifted their own identities for strategic use as well. This includes emphasizing the CARICOM identity to assert rights and privileges. While S4 primarily defined herself as Surinamese, when she was at regional institutions like UWI, she shifted her identity to being a Caribbean national. This allowed her to fit in with other CARICOM nationals. Similarly, B1 identified himself primarily as Belizean but when dealing with the official in St. Lucia, pointed to the CARICOM emblem on his passport. These strategic shifting of identities appeared to create a sense of belongingness and inclusion in these engagement processes (Snow, 2001). In addition, by identifying themselves as CARICOM nationals in these specific situations, they were attempting to find common ground and establish a sense of community with other actors. Because neither respondent primarily identified as a CARICOM national, they were actively involved in this shifting of their identities. In these instances, they strategically utilized the CARICOM identity to gain acceptance and benefit from group membership.

On the other hand, the identity shift that respondents reported could be interpreted in terms of a loss of agency. This was evident in both B1 and S4’s interactions with airport/immigration officials in St. Lucia and Trinidad respectively. Both respondents were rejected as CARICOM nationals, representing an external identity shift. These presentations of identities seem to support the postmodern approach, which views identities as fluid, multiple and often contradictory. Hall (1992:280), for example, stipulated that identities should be understood
as being “formed through one’s membership of a national culture—and how the process of dislocating change, encapsulated by the concept of ‘globalization,’ are affecting it”. In the case of S4, the dislocation of her identity occurred through her interaction with immigration officials in Trinidad, even though she felt a sense of belonging to CARICOM.

As chapter 6 explains, this feeling of exclusion in member countries is one reason why the regional identity is underdeveloped. This made it easy for national identity to be the most salient. Furthermore, Table 5.04 demonstrates that respondents consistently rated their national identity as either the most or second most important means of describing who they are (see also Figures 5.04 and 5.05). The argument here is not that it is surprising that national identities are more salient than the CARICOM. Generally, national identities are more salient than post-national ones (Bruter, 2005). However, given the history of integration in CARICOM, the knowledge deficit and the apathy towards the shared identity are surprising.

Furthermore, it is important to note national and regional identities operate at two different levels. Respondents’ belonging to their nations were unquestioned whereas their CARICOM identity was constantly under surveillance (by other CARICOM nationals and immigration officials). This supervision of the regional identity appeared to take away these respondents’ sense of ownership and belonging to the community. For example, majority of respondents surveyed indicated that they were primarily attached to their countries of citizenship (see Table 5.05) and rationalized their CARICOM identity as something imposed or external to them (see section 6.05). In addition, Chapter 9 discusses how these feelings lead to disappointments and the perception that CARICOM is a failure. These significantly impact attachment to CARICOM. The key point remains that while respondents from the outlying countries encountered the most difficulties in gaining acceptance and being included, they were
most likely to affirm the CARICOM aspects of their identities. In other words, they used their optimism and the possibilities of CARICOM to negotiate the challenges of integration. Accordingly, they were less apprehensive in proclaiming their attachments to CARICOM.

5.06 Conclusion

The chapter explained respondents’ level of attachments to CARICOM and the determinants of the CARICOM identity. It found that while the majority of respondents were somewhat attached to CARICOM, this attachment was latent and weak. In other words, the CARICOM identity was neither pervasive nor salient, but there is potential for it to deepen, especially with better dissemination of information and distribution of regional symbols. In addition, the chapter revealed that attachments to CARICOM are determined by six factors: education level, citizenships, the meaningfulness of CARICOM, the nature of lived experiences, the extent to which respondents feel a sense of belonging in member countries and their perceptions of the benefits of CARICOM. All these relationships were moderate, except perceptions around the benefits gained from CARICOM, which was found to be strongly associated with attachments to CARICOM. I made the argument that the other five significant variables can ultimately be conceived as either producing benefits or represented actual benefits from CARICOM.

While the realization of benefits was identified as perhaps the most important determinant of attachments to CARICOM, social inclusion was found to also strongly impact the strengthening of a CARICOM identity. Firstly, respondents from the outlying countries encountered difficulties in publicly identifying themselves as CARICOM nationals because citizens from the non-outlying countries questioned/rejected these claims. This was due to the fact that CARICOM citizens are poorly informed as to who is and who is not a CARICOM
national. Social inclusion therefore impacts external identification with CARICOM, which must be addressed through public education.

The second issue around inclusion relates to the fact that the outlying countries in this study, Belize and Suriname, are undergoing socio-political changes, which might result in their departure from CARICOM and the loss of the CARICOM identity among their people. In the case of Belize, racial change towards greater number of mestizos is resulting in the country aligning closer to Central America and away from CARICOM. Similarly, respondents in Suriname – the only Dutch-speaking CARICOM country – felt alienated by language differences. Like Belize, they too must negotiate the political pull from South America and decide if their futures lie in CARICOM. These socio-political changes will greatly impact individuals’ identity decision, and must be considered determinants of attachment to CARICOM. Thus, the importance of regional identity must be addressed from the top. CARICOM must be proactive in asserting itself in all member countries. If leaders are serious, they should make greater efforts to include the outlying countries and formulate strategies to win their loyalties.

Overall, these findings suggest that the major impediments to the development of a CARICOM identity are structural. Most of the benefits that respondents desired were also policy-oriented. For example, both Belize and Suriname faced structural marginalization, with very weak CARICOM institutional presence in these countries. Policies towards more equal distributions of regional institutions among member states and building the capacities of the weaker countries to host these institutions would benefit the region. The lack of regional institutions do not directly weaken attachments to CARICOM, but it removes frames of reference and symbolic integration from citizens. In essence it breeds feelings of exclusion rather than promotes social cohesion. This means that CARICOM needs to commit to the intensification and
implementation of integration policies, and develop strategies to better disseminate information. These would result in the realization of more benefits and increase confidence in regional governance, which would deepen the regional identity.
CHAPTER VI: MEANING AND DRIVERS OF THE CARICOM IDENTITY

6.0 Overview

This chapter continues to address the research question of how intra-regional migrants negotiate their identities. The previous chapter revealed that personal meanings and benefits were two of the main determinants of CARICOM identity. This chapter examines these factors in detail, and is divided into two sections. The first section takes an in-depth look into what CARICOM means to respondents. It also examines what respondents believe the components of a CARICOM identity are, and the value of these components to them. The second section considers how pragmatic interests (benefits) drive the framing of CARICOM identities among intra-regional migrants. It concludes that the meaningfulness of CARICOM to respondents is associated with benefits they perceive, which also drive attachment to CARICOM.

6.01 Meaning of CARICOM

According to Stet and Burke (2000:225), the core of an identity is the categorization of the self and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and expectations associated with that identity. In other words, social identities carry meanings for individuals who proclaim them, and drive behaviours and expectations associated with such identities. Figure 6.01 summarizes the percentages of respondents who found CARICOM to be meaningful in specific areas. In accordance with the previous chapter, which found that most respondents had some attachment to CARICOM, albeit latently, figure 6.01 reveals that CARICOM is also meaningful to most intra-regional migrants. For example, 84 per cent of respondents agreed that it meant they have the right to travel to other CARICOM countries; 77 per cent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that CARICOM provided a sense of membership in the Caribbean family; 72.6 per cent felt that it has provided increased access to regional institutions and 60 per cent felt that
it provided greater representation in the wider world. However, 28 per cent of respondents felt like CARICOM meant nothing to them personally. This might appear contradictory, but as respondents explained in the interviews (chapter 7), potential benefits and actual benefits of CARICOM are different. In other words, a benefit like the right to travel represents a potential benefit, but in reality is not available to all CARICOM nationals. Thus, even though CARICOM represents free travel, some respondents did not feel like they were personally benefitting from it; thus this potential benefit became meaningless.

Figure 6.01. Personal Meanings of CARICOM to intra-regional migrants.

Specifically, two findings from Figure 6.01 require further contemplation: a) 77 per cent of respondents said that a CARICOM identity meant being a part of the Caribbean family; and b) 60 per cent of respondents said that it gave them greater representation in the world. Both findings represent features of a CARICOM identity through membership, which is a key component of social identities (Tajfel, 1982). This seems to support the finding that most intra-regional migrants were somewhat attached to CARICOM although such attachment was weak.

27 Per cent of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed
Table 5.03 shows that only 46.1 per cent of respondents had any significant attachment to CARICOM). This raises the question of what accounts for the dissonance between acknowledging a CARICOM identity and actually displaying features of it. Snow’s (2001) two conceptual distinctions help to clarify the apparent discord. Snow (2001) explained that personal identities are self-designations and self-attributions, which are personally distinctive whereas social identities refer to an individual’s awareness of group membership and the affect associated with this knowledge. The fact that most respondents believed that CARICOM is meaningful, especially in creating membership in a Caribbean family suggests social identification with CARICOM. However, as section 5.01 demonstrates, the CARICOM identity is non-salient (see also Table 5.04).

6.02 Meanings & Attachments to CARICOM

Table 6.01 shows the cross tabulations of attachment to CARICOM by the respondents’ perceptions of the meaningfulness of CARICOM. It reveals that only a third of respondents (32.6 per cent) who claimed that CARICOM meant nothing to them personally were strongly attached to CARICOM, whereas 63.9 percent who felt that CARICOM meant something to them personally were strongly attached to CARICOM. However, 53 per cent of respondents who were unsure/neutral about the meaning of CARICOM were likewise not very attached to CARICOM while the other 20 per cent were not attached to CARICOM at all. On the flip side, 46.5 per cent respondents who felt that CARICOM meant nothing to them personally were not very attached to CARICOM. Interestingly, 7.2 per cent of respondents who felt that CARICOM was personally meaningful were not at all attached to CARICOM. Overall, these results indicate that attachment to CARICOM is dependent on the extent to which persons feel that the organization is personally meaningful to them. A chi square test of independence was conducted on the attachment
variables and meanings of CARICOM to respondents; the relations were found to be significant, 

\[ \chi^2 (4, N = 123) = 18.868, p = .000. \]  

The strength of this relationship was confirmed to be moderate, with a Cramer’s V of 0.246. In other words, the more meaningful CARICOM was to respondents, the more attached they were to CARICOM.

Table 6.01
*Chi-Square Test and Descriptive Statistics for Attachment to CARICOM by Meanings of CARICOM to Respondents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>CARICOM Means Nothing Personally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite/Greatly Attached</td>
<td>14 (32.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Attached</td>
<td>20 (46.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all Attached</td>
<td>9 (20.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 123

Notes: \( \chi^2 = 18.868^*, \) df = 4, Cramer’s V = .246*. The numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

*\( p < .05 \)

6.03 Components of CARICOM Identity

Figure 6.02 summarizes what respondents felt are important components of the CARICOM identity. It reveals that respondents selected ‘respect for regional political institutions’ most often as what it takes to be a CARICOM national. This was selected by 78 per cent of the survey participants. The next two most popular components of CARICOM identity from the list were ‘ability to speak English’ (76.9 per cent) and ‘to have citizenship of a CARICOM member country’ (72.7 per cent). Interestingly, the ability to speak English ranked higher (76.9 per cent) than the ability to speak a dialect of a member country (64.9 per cent) in terms of having a CARICOM identity. This may reflect the fact that the English language is the
official and primary mode of communication in CARICOM level. In addition, 13 of the 15 countries use English as their official language. It also supports the idea that CARICOM is essentially an “English-speaking club” (Revauger, 2008:857), despite the fact that it has admitted Haiti (French) and Suriname (Dutch-Speaking) islands as its newest members. The population of Haiti alone, for example exceeds all of the 13 English-speaking members combined. The importance placed on the ability to speak English as a component of the CARICOM identity reinforces outside/outlying status attributed to Haiti and Suriname. This finding might also be due to the fact that Haitians and Surinamese were under-represented in the sample, accounting for 2 per cent and 4 per cent of the total number of respondents, respectively (in other words the first language of 94 per cent of the sample is English).

Figure 6.02. What makes someone a CARICOM National? Percentages of respondents who identified with selected attribute.

The above demonstrates that respondents had definitive ideas about who is a CARICOM national even though many did not outwardly frame their identities as CARICOM nationals. The shared understanding among migrants about what qualifies someone to become a CARICOM
national points to an ‘imagined’ identity (Anderson, 2006). The regional identity can be said to be imagined because respondents did acknowledge their county’s (and their personal) membership in CARICOM, and the existence of similar heritage, cultures and way of life. B2, for example, described an intangible bond between CARICOM people based on cultural similarities. She stated that: “… at the end of the day, you also find it very easy to fit within these [other CARICOM countries’] cultures because it strikes a chord with something that… with who you are as a Caribbean national”. It is interesting that B2 used the word “chord” to describe the connections between CARICOM nationals. For her, there is a shared emotional connection, which binds CARICOM nationals. It is this emotional bond, from her perspective, which enables intra-regional migrants to be able to fit easily other CARICOM countries. J2 likewise expressed a sense of shared awareness with other CARICOM nationals to express the meaning of his CARICOM identity. He stated: “most Caribbean countries are the same. I mean, we are island nations, you know similar sort of geography”. The use of the pronoun “we” attests to this shared identity. For L1, this sense of awareness is demonstrated by the fact that there are “no cultural differences. To me, we are all the same people, we might sound a little different, we are all the same we like the same music…” This suggests that the CARICOM identity is also anchored in a shared awareness of the similarities between both CARICOM countries and its people.

Similarly, L4’s image of a CARICOM national was informed by similarities in way of life, temperament and social engagement. She stated:

A CARICOM person is someone who loves to party, I think that is what the whole world believe who Caribbean people are…..They are friendly compared to other countries in the world. They are more expressive compared to other persons from different countries of the world…. That is one commonality that we all share. We
know how to have a good time, we know how to be friendly, I guess that’s a part of our tourism background… (L4).

Despite the fact that L4’s image of a CARICOM person was embedded in images of unity and hospitality, her lived experience did not live up to this image. Speaking of her experience in Trinidad, she stated: “people believe that Trinidadians are very homely because of carnival and they are very explorant [adventurous] but when it comes down to the actual nitty gritty of hospitality and care, I did not feel that”. This demonstrates that her image of hospitality and care did not match up to her actual experience, and helps to explain the dissonance expressed between respondents’ internal identities and how they framed them in everyday interactions. In the case of L4, her internal CARICOM identity centers on harmony, but her engagement with CARICOM nationals produced the opposite experience. This dissonance between imagination and experience can also explain the differences in how respondents frame and engage their identities.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that even when realities do not conform to internal imageries, respondents still maintain that CARICOM nationals have something that makes them unique.

6.04 The CARICOM Identity as a threat to National Identity

The above shows that most respondents viewed the CARICOM identity as being composed of distinct and tangible elements. However, as Table 5.03 shows, less than half of the sample had strong attachments to CARICOM. One reason for this appeared to be the salience of national identity among respondents. Some respondents were fearful of losing the individual uniqueness that a national identity provides should they accept a regional one. Such opinions were more frequently wrapped up in discourses of crisis, as respondents’ conceived that adopting the regional identity would also mean losing an essential element of their selfhood. This following conversation with B2 illustrates:
Interviewer:… are you ready to let go of your Belizean identity and assume a CARICOM one?

B2: As much as I would like to say yes to that, I also know…. Because…. I also know the implications of a true CARICOM union. Um ah, as Belizens, to a certain degree, we have been spoilt, and I think it’s what shaped us, and I think it’s the same position that many of the larger islands probably have, that Jamaica would have, the way you have pride in your individual identity, and a Barbados would have and things that and there is a fear of losing your individuality as you move towards a CARICOM union per say, and so as I have said, while you would like to say yes, I think I have the same reservations as many of my Caribbean counterparts will have where you lose your…I am, I am Caribbean yes, but I am essentially Belizean. And it is the context of that that shapes primarily who I am (B2).

In the above conversation, B2 explained that she would never let go of her Belizean identity because of the inherent pride she has in her country. She presumed that her unique national identity would get lost if it is folded in a CARICOM identity. This reveals a fear that a CARICOM identity might absorb the unique Belizean components of her identity and that she would not be able to express her Belizean uniqueness within a CARICOM identity. This would suggest that in spite of the similarities between CARICOM countries, respondents might perceive national identities to be incompatible with a regional identity in some circumstances. B2 described herself, for example, as “essentially Belizean”, which embodies cultural, ethnic and religious idiosyncrasies that separates Belize from other CARICOM countries. She justified her fears by explaining that the other CARICOM nationals would be unwilling to lose their national difference as well. At the same time, she acknowledged that she is Caribbean as well, but with
essentially Belizean characteristics. This points to a recognition of her multiple identities, but the Belizean aspect is thicker, more pervasive and more salient (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006). This is not surprising as the concentric model suggests (Brute, 2005). It also supports the idea that identities are often not mutually exclusive, but coexist with varying levels of salience. Overall, her account was somewhat reminiscent of the plural model of Caribbean societies, which stipulates that the differences between the different societies make them incompatible for integration purposes.

L2, a St. Lucian, who has lived in at least 3 CARICOM countries and has visited all the others at least once explained that her national identity is salient because it is embedded in her entire sense of self:

I think I feel most attached to St. Lucia because I spent my formative years there so I went to primary school and high school and I did my A Levels there so my whole persona and personality as constituted during those years so I consider myself St. Lucian (L4).

Both L4 and B2 acknowledged the CARICOM aspect of their identities, which they are happy to have play a subordinate role to their national identity. For both respondents, the coexistence of the national and regional identities are desirable as long as the CARICOM identity remained subordinated to their national identities. Because their national identities are essentially who they are, any shifting of its salience would create a loss of their individual sense of being. L4 for example, framed her identity in her life experiences and biographical history. She was born and brought up in St. Lucia. As a result, she stated that St. Lucia will always be special for her. She associated her country with her most significant life moments, including the sitting of her A Level exams, which marked her transition into adulthood. These intimate memories and
experiences made her national identity salient and irreplaceable. Any perceived threat to that aspect of her individuality would trigger fear, and strengthen the stronghold of national identity. It is important to note that a constant theme in this study is a utilitarian motivation for identity formation. The issue of fear of the loss of personhood can also be related to a utilitarian cost-benefit motive: respondents viewed a salient CARICOM identity as a cost, which would result in the loss of their intrinsic selves. National identities are beneficial on the other hand, because they connected respondents with their biographies and invaluable life histories. The issue of pragmatic benefits is discussed in detail later in the chapter.

6.05 CARICOM: Lacking a Definitive Meaning

Another reason that respondents expressed apprehension about a CARICOM identity is the lack of clarity in its meaning. Respondents were able to definitively express the meaning of their national identities, but had difficulties doing the same for CARICOM. This might be due to insufficient information about CARICOM and other member countries. Information greatly influence the formation of social identities, especially in supranational context (Peter & De Vreese, 2003). With information, people are able to rationalize their identity choices, while the lack of information can cause uncertainties or even fear. In the context, where sufficient information was not forthcoming from CARICOM, some respondents viewed the regional identity as a loss, in the sense that it means shifting their definitive national identity for an uncertain CARICOM one. Consider L3’s statement below explains:

From a regional perspective, I would say I’m a… I would like to identify myself as a CARICOM national right, but the reality of the situation is, right, legally, I’m a St. Lucian citizen but I am a Guyanese by birth, so until the region is able to, to bind itself together with one fabric right, you would not want to, as much as you
would want to say I’m from CARICOM, I’m from the Caribbean, they will ask you specially, what part of the Caribbean because when you tell somebody you are from the Caribbean, the first thing they ask is where in the Caribbean are you from? Because regional integration, although there is talk of it, has not occurred on the ground as yet (L3).

One of the central themes arising from L3’s quote is the meaninglessness of the CARICOM identity in a space where regional integration is largely unaccomplished. She felt like unlike her national identity, which can stand alone, a CARICOM identity cannot exist independently. For her, it requires explanation, which would inherently lead back to her national identity. This also points to the perception that the region has not sufficiently asserted itself to the outside world and so it is unknown. L3 suggested that for a CARICOM identity to be meaningful, regional integration needs to be realized. She expressed a longing to be able to label herself a CARICOM person, but says that based on the current state of things, she cannot do so. The CARICOM identity can therefore be described as contingent on the success of integration, and the success of CARICOM being better known and having a more definitive meaning.

It is also interesting that even though L3 has dual citizenship within CARICOM, she was still resistant to a CARICOM identity. For her, both of her two citizenship identities are specific, and are understood to have distinct flavors. On the other hand, a CARICOM identity lacks external value because people outside the region would not know that it means. In other words, a CARICOM identity would be too general, and one would be forced to constantly revert to a national identity. In addition, she saw no value in a CARICOM identity without true regional unity, which for her has not occurred as yet. In her viewpoint, for a CARICOM identity to make sense, it would have to incorporate elements of the 15 member states. Her analogy of a
CARICOM identity being woven into a single fabric is similar to the creole model of Caribbean society, but for her, this is currently only an ideal. Accordingly, she saw the current status of the CARICOM identity as merely symbolic, immaterial and contingent on further integration.

Perhaps the ambiguity of CARICOM identity was best summarized by B3 who described it as lacking specificity. She said:

By me saying that ‘I am a CARICOM national’, like what is behind it though? I know that if I say that I am Belizean, I could talk about my culture and what’s not [etcetera] and all of that and all of my experiences from back home, but saying that I’m a CARICOM national, you know, what benefits do I, do I get? (B3).

Like L3 earlier, B3 was also concerned about how she would be perceived if she identified as a CARICOM national. For her, identifying as a CARICOM national is ambiguous and would raise questions about the meaning of such an identity. B3 clearly does not believe that CARICOM has substantive characteristics, hence she asked “what is behind that though”. She opined that personally, there were no “benefits” to be had by identifying as a CARICOM national. This again can be seen through a utilitarian lens, but not necessarily economically. For both L3 and B3, their national identities served instrumental purposes such as a sense of pride when talking about their culture, whereas CARICOM does not have such substance. CARICOM is not perceived as producing these benefits, hence the lukewarm reaction to it.

The above demonstrates that respondents’ resistances to framing their identities through CARICOM partly arose from the fear that it would erode essential elements of themselves, which they derived from their countries of citizenship. In addition, they reasoned that the unique elements of their countries could get lost in a supranational identity. Furthermore, respondents
generally saw the CARICOM identity as a work in progress, contingent on further regional integration. This contingency status rendered it weak in its current state for respondents.

Based on the above findings, a salient CARICOM identity is not something that many respondents desired, even though they acquiesced to sharing a bond with other peoples in the region. Snow (2001) described the process of attributing an identity in everyday interaction as framing; thus while most CARICOM nationals were cognizant of their membership in CARICOM, they did not frame their identities as such. This was because other identities are more salient than the CARICOM identity (Table 5.04 shows that most respondents framed their identities in terms of their citizenship and their race). In addition, the CARICOM identity was seen as weak and unable to stand alone. Another factor that might account for the muting of the CARICOM identity might be respondents’ perception that CARICOM was failing and an unwillingness to associate themselves with failure (see chapter 8). In addition, Chapter 9 explains that social relations experiences such as discrimination and marginalization by other CARICOM nationals also impacted respondents’ willingness to align their identities with CARICOM.

The chapter so far has examined the meanings of CARICOM to respondents. It revealed that most respondents saw CARICOM as having distinct characteristics. However, in reality, many did not find it personally meaningful. Consequently, attachment to CARICOM was mediated by national identity, which was more meaningful for respondents. Attachment to CARICOM was also hampered by ambiguities associated with CARICOM. Thus, even though CARICOM has a defining character, this did not translate in the regional identity. Overall, respondents for whom CARICOM was personally meaningful were more attached to CARICOM than those who did not find it personally meaningful. These findings indicate that CARICOM as an organization needs to enhance its image so that people in the region better understand it, and
the nuances of a shared identity. The findings also demonstrate that in spite of shared beliefs and common awareness (see section 6.03), many respondents believed that a supranational identity should provide benefits. The next section examines the impact of pragmatic interests on identity formation, not only from an individual standpoint but also from national perspectives.

6.06 Pragmatic Interests & Attachment to CARICOM

Many respondents based their identity preferences on benefits that they believed such identities would provide. This meant that economic, national and personal self-interest were often the drivers towards deepening attachments to CARICOM. Table 6.02 examines the impact of perceptions of benefits on attachments to CARICOM. The table shows that 72.7 per cent of respondents who believed that their home country had benefited a lot from CARICOM were strongly attached to CARICOM. Likewise, 75 per cent of respondents who believed their home country had gained quite a few benefits were strongly attached to CARICOM compared to only 43 per cent who just saw “some benefits”. On the flip side, 71.4 per cent of respondents who believed that their home country had not benefited at all from CARICOM were only slightly attached to CARICOM, and 28.6 per cent were not attached to CARICOM at all. None of the respondents who believed that their country of origin did not benefit from CARICOM were strongly attached to CARICOM. The cross tabulation indicates that attachment to CARICOM was strongly related to perception of whether their home country had benefited from the organization/region. The chi square test revealed that this relationship is significant, \( \chi^2 (6, N = 141) = 30.401, (p=0.000) \). This was a strong relationship, Cramer’s V = .328. Respondents who viewed CARICOM as being beneficial to their countries of origins were more attached to CARICOM than those who did not. These results imply that if attachments to CARICOM are to
be increased across the region, more persons need to feel that their country is reaping benefits from regional integration.

Table 6.02
Chi Square Results and Descriptive Statistics of Attachment to CARICOM and Respondents Perceptions of Benefits gained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>Perception of Benefits Gained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A lot of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite/Greatly Attached</td>
<td>24 (72.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Attached</td>
<td>4 (12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all Attached</td>
<td>5 (15.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 141

Notes: $\chi^2 = 30.401^*$, df = 6, Cramer’s V = .328*. The numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

*p < .05

6.07 Benefits & Unrealized Benefits of CARICOM.

The interviews likewise confirmed that most respondents took into account the economic consequences of having a CARICOM identity in making their identity choices. Rather than pinning the CARICOM identity solely on emotions, feelings of belonging, and loyalties, most respondents viewed integration, and any resulting CARICOM identity as something that should confer benefits to their countries and to themselves personally. Personal benefits for respondents included the right to travel and work in member countries without visa/work permit. Respondents also referred to the harmonization of economic and foreign policies as important national benefits. This would also assure the economic and geo-political security for the region. In fact, for most respondents, CARICOM does not have a choice but to pursue integration that would confer these benefits, otherwise, the region would fail. The following statement from L1 illustrates:
Whether or not the Caribbean wants it, we should have to be integrated. We have to get together with one voice to actually make a difference to our small selves. We are dots, we are dots…if God forbids a tsunami happen to pass over St. Lucia and half the population gets wiped out, the only reason why that would be on the BBC is if English tourists die, and that wouldn’t make the news for more than two days. This is how insignificant we are and but if we come together, if Usain Bolt is not from Jamaica but from CARICOM, if something happens to Usain Bolt’s country and Usain Bolt speaks in front of the UN, then everybody would listen, you understand?....I will tell you why, because of the so called economic situation that most of the islands find themselves in. I don’t want to sound rude but the majority of, in my opinion, individuals without sufficient understanding believe that the only way to get out of this is if we keep everybody else out. So jobs are for St. Lucians…. In St. Lucia, we have a, we have a problem and that problem is ignorance…. [but] if we don’t come together as CARICOM, if we don’t have one voice, the financial situation is just going to squeeze us even more (L1).

L1’s quote above highlights several reasons why CARICOM unity and by extension, a CARICOM identity is pragmatically beneficial. According to him, regional integration provides a sense of security, both economically and geo-politically. He pointed out that as individuals and as individual countries, the region is insignificant in global affairs. In fact, he perceived the current disunity as indicative of a crisis, and expressed fears that economic conditions in CARICOM countries will worsen without further integration. While his discourse appears to focus on regional integration, it is important to note that he did not distinguish between CARICOM
integration and CARICOM identity. For example, he longed for a time when Usain Bolt would not just be seen as Jamaican but as a CARICOM national. Integration, for him, can be interpreted as going hand-in-hand with a common identity. Practically, he positioned regional integration as a panacea to the economic situations that CARICOM countries have to contend with. These perceptions are in line with the goals of CARICOM, which involves averting the threats of vulnerability and globalization (Downes, 2008; Rosewarne, 2010; Strachan & Vigilance, 2011; UWI Centre for Environment & Development, 2002).

Nonetheless, some respondents were dubious about whether CARICOM conferred any real benefits to the region due to unmet expectations concerning regional integration. They assumed that the benefits would trickle down from nations to individuals. As a result, glitches in regional integration were viewed as a loss of potential benefits, which impeded their willingness to identify with CARICOM. L4, for example, lamented that:

So I don’t think there is enough marketing and promotion of the CARICOM region, the CARICOM body at the heads of government –internationally and that’s the kind of thing that could help in terms of increasing tourism, um increasing our, increasing economic growth in the region because if we were to go out there and advertise the Caribbean region as one as opposed to advertising Barbados or Jamaica or so on, the benefits would be greater because we would have economies of scale so we’re not promoting ourselves out there from a holistic perspective (L4).

In the above, L4 described the region using the pronouns “our” and “we”. These indicate a sense of ownership and identification with CARICOM. However, she pointed out that due to failures, potential economic growth are not being realized from integration. She contended that the failure
to realize the benefits of integration equates to a failure to promote “ourselves from a holistic perspective”. Again, her statement indicates a sense of ownership with the region and the personification of the benefits. The emphasis placed on the regional identity points to the belief that its benefits exceed those that national identities can confer. CARICOM’s integration thus represents the fulfillment of the potentials in the individual countries and their peoples. However, L4 lamented that more work needs to be done to promote the region because currently, the benefits of a common region with a common identity are not being realized. This is again a case where respondents were drawn to potential benefits, even though they were not actualized.

The interviews also revealed that a key aspect of realizing the potentials that respondents envisioned involved educating people about the benefits of a regional identity. This is because, CARICOM nationals esteemed benefits as imperative in forming supranational attachments. Consider L2 for example, who has visited all the CARICOM countries, but had to stop during the interview to check the cover of her passport to verify if it was a CARICOM passport. She exclaimed: “I didn’t even realise that it was a CARICOM passport, ah I don’t even know what the benefits are….now I have to go and research the benefits…” Apart from the fact that L2’s quote demonstrates that people were not aware of CARICOM’s symbols, it also reveals the importance of benefits for respondents in their engagement with CARICOM and its symbols. This is illustrated in the fact that immediately upon realizing that she had a CARICOM passport, rather than expressing a feeling of membership, loyalty, community or emotional commitment, her reaction was to research the benefits. Her actions reflect a utilitarian motive for integration. Given her lack of knowledge about the CARICOM passport, she suggested that a CARICOM identity would be enhanced if people understood its benefits. She opined:
[Broadening CARICOM Identity] would have to be a case where people understand the benefits… so I think it comes to a point where especially in the economic climate they can be clearly communicated to people like this is how you are going to benefit from us working together… but there is so much more that we can benefit from if we just kind of open up our mindsets, and embrace the different nations that are like so close to us (L2).

In line with the findings from chapter 5, which showed that the lack of information was a deterrent against regional identity formation, L2 pointed out how important informing people about the economic consequences is towards building this regional identity. For her, building a broad-based CARICOM identity hinges on communicating the benefits to people. She felt that once the benefits are made known, people would commit to the community by opening up their mindsets and by embracing the different nations.

The point must therefore be reiterated that respondents can be motivated to choose a CARICOM identity if they perceive that CARICOM’s benefits are meaningful to them and their country. Although all respondents viewed national identities as permanently more salient than a CARICOM identity, most admitted that if CARICOM can successfully reach its potential in terms of integration and providing meaningful benefits, then affinities towards CARICOM would deepen. In other words, they believed that integration will deliver benefits that their home countries were unable to deliver. However, some respondents still see the need for a closer alignment of the CARICOM identity with national ones. The following interview with J2, a Jamaican banking professional, explains the struggle of adopting a new identity in addition to his nationality:
Interviewer: Do you think that CARICOM is important to who you are?

J2: No, in the sense that I am a Jamaican and that is what is important in terms of who I am as a person. No in that sense. But yes in the sense that I did benefit… I benefited from the elements of CARICOM such as the free movements and the ability to go and work in Barbados. So in that aspect yes because I mean working in Barbados played an important role in terms of my personal, professional development and I think I still have my CARICOM skilled certificate. I still have my CARICOM residency so if I want to go back to Barbados to live, then I can go back there and live. So I am a Jamaican citizen, I think I have Barbadian residence so in that aspect kind of but you know, I don’t know (J2).

This narrative delineates the importance of benefits to the framing of identities. J2 explained that CARICOM was not important to who he is because his national identity sufficiently described him. However, he found that CARICOM was important to him based on the benefits that he received from it, which included the ability to live and work in another CARICOM country without a visa (this was previously not possible before CARICOM). As a result, it would appear that even when national identities are salient, if intra-regional migrants feel that CARICOM provides benefits, then their attachment to the region will grow. This was a very popular sentiment among respondents. Another respondent, J3, for example explained that she values the benefits that CARICOM confers:

Interviewer: Do you think it means anything though to be a CARICOM national?

J3: ahhhh, if it means anything?…ahhhhh, well, I guess people tend to add value to something, which, to attach value to something from what they can get from it
so from the sense that you know I’m able to go and work in any other CARICOM country without the hassle of work permit, yes it means something, yes! If I am a CARICOM national, I have an advantage over for example, a Canadian or an American that wants to go and work in Barbados because I don’t have to get a work permit. They [Canadians or Americans] have to get a work permit. And I’m almost treated as if I’m a Bajan so yes, it does. It means something to be a CARICOM national. Yeah, yeah. It has its benefits (J3).

The quote above shows that it is difficult to separate benefits from attachment to CARICOM. J3 explained that the benefits were what she found meaningful in CARICOM. As a result, CARICOM was as meaningful to her inasmuch as it was beneficial. Like J2, J3 derived meaning from the free movement possibilities of CARICOM. However, it is important to note that only an elitist five categories of people are afforded this free movement. In addition, given their educational and social status, elites would have fewer incentives to move to other countries for the long term than other segments of the population. As a result, this benefit must be interpreted as being available/utilized to only a small section of the CARICOM population, who often used it for short-term stratégic use. Despite this, people in the elite category still placed high value on the benefits that can be derived, and expressed disappointments that more benefits were not available or being materialized. This was most aptly explained by L3, a Guyanese/St. Lucian national:

**Interviewer:** Do you care about CARICOM?

**L3:** well, yess, I did or I do. I think the whole idea of, you know, having a unified region makes sense, ah, you know because there are some benefits to be derived I guess, ah, from that perspective, I think you know based on where we
are located, based on our backgrounds, based on history, having CARICOM makes sense for us… But I don’t think the full benefits are derived as yet and I don’t think that it is fully developed. The concept is there, but it is not fully developed (L3).

As indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the majority of respondents are at least marginally attached to CARICOM, but this identity was inconsequential to their lives. As a result, respondents did not engage with the CARICOM identity with much emotional attachment or care. However, L3 above indicated that she cares about CARICOM because it makes sense, and because of its potential. Her statement indicates that the development of a shared identity is not simply a matter of self-proclamation, emotions or recognition of the similarities between CARICOM countries. Rather, integration and the shared identity must provide benefits, and for L3, these benefits will not be manifested until integration is fully developed. But like most respondents, she was disappointed that the benefits were not fully developed.

Another respondent who lamented the unrealized benefits from integration was J3, who disclosed that when the potentials are not developed, the strengthening of a regional identity becomes problematic. J3 specifically spoke about jobs, education and healthcare as some of the benefits that were theoretically possible, but were not being realized. She passionately explained the difficulty in adopting a CARICOM identity when the benefits of integration are not being materialized as follows:

My understanding is that CARICOM will…. CARICOM will help the region, right? CARICOM will help the region in more than one way…I mean we look at skills, and we look at the economy concept but we have not focused a lot on education or healthcare, yeah? Or other things that really are integral to the
country, right? These things are very important to the whole concept of CARICOM, we haven’t heard about that. What about health care? Are there benefits to be derived for countries or individuals in another country who you may not have that facility in your country but another country has it?... if you gonna talk about CARICOM, I mean you know, it’s just, to be –you can’t just surface and talk about three things are say we’re supposed to be. We must identify with the other regions because we can move labour and you know it has to be greater than that. I cannot be a CARICOM national and I mean, you, first of all: CARICOM, there is nothing (J3).

For J3 like the other respondents quoted in this section, the deepening of her supranational CARICOM is contingent on her witnessing and feeling the potential of CARICOM being achieved. After lamenting the areas that CARICOM has failed in, J3 explained how this ties in with her identity. She said, she could not be a CARICOM national because the potentials were not being realized. This relationship between unrealized benefits and supranational attachment is not unusual. The drive for countries to integrate along supranational lines is partly driven by promises of greater political stability, economic development, and a common sense of peoplehood among residents of the countries involved (Boxill, 1993; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). As a result, citizens’ affections and attachments are often tied to these benefits, and dissatisfaction can negatively impact attachments (see sections 9.02 for more detailed analyses of how respondents engaged with the disappointments and frustrations).

6.08 Costs.

In assessing the potentials of a CARICOM identity, some respondents felt that it would disadvantage their home countries. While respondents who personally felt this way were in the
minority, most encountered other CARICOM nationals who emphasized these costs. The costs that respondents highlighted include: impaired economic viability (e.g. higher unemployment in receiving countries); issues of sovereignty, and the rise of social problems such as crimes. The following quotes provide a synopsis of respondents’ encounter with anti-regionalism/immigration sentiment:

I think all of them [St. Lucians] are positive about CARICOM integration but they are worried about um the economic effects because St. Lucians are worried that they gonna have an overcrowding of Guyanese that is gonna make their unemployment level increase… (L3)

I know in Antigua as I have said, there is this feeling that Jamaicans have come there to take their jobs and their women. Barbados, it’s the same thing. I know that there is an issue there (J1)

I didn’t [speak about CARICOM with Bajans] because there was a….I got the feeling that Bajans you know, they are of the opinion that um, people were coming to Barbados to take their jobs. To take Bajan jobs and that’s the kind of discussions that I didn’t want to participate in. No no, I don’t have that discussion with them about CARICOM (J2)

As the above shows, anti-immigration utterances were a part of many respondents’ experience, but these sentiments did not appear to be driven by fear of cultural loss or structural changes to receiving countries. Instead, the sentiments seemed to be driven by fear that the receiving country’s residents would lose jobs or their women. All three respondents above experienced backlash against intra-regional migration, where citizens in destination countries
lamented that it would result in increased unemployment in their countries. In other words, CARICOM’s main push to increase intra-regional migration was seen to be costly. As J2 explained, such encounters also impacted how he related to locals in destination countries. For him, he did not engage in discussions about CARICOM for fear of inciting anti-immigration sentiments. This suggests that there are latent tensions among CARICOM nationals, which unless addressed could escalate and impede the development of the regional identity.

Anti-immigration sentiment was also driven by fears that intra-regional migrants might cause an increase in social problems in destination countries. This view was expressed by S1, a Surinamese media personnel who worked in various countries in the region:

I could say that I want the movement of people among the countries to be easy but on the other side, on the other hand, for example, I know Guyana, if you have too many people travelling freely between the countries, I know that a lot of criminals from Guyana will come to Suriname to rob over here (S1).

The above quotes reveal that social problems are an important consideration when assessing the cost-benefit of building a regional community. S1, quoted above, was worried about the rise of crime in his native Suriname if CARICOM integration facilitates the indiscriminate opening up of the borders between member countries. These concerns suggest that unless people are comfortable with the implications of a shared identity, which might include increased migratory flows, then attachments to CARICOM might not deepen.

In addition to the economic and social cost, some respondents questioned the cost to their sovereignty. J3, a Jamaican financial executive, explained that her country gives up too much fighting for the sustenance of CARICOM:
Some people benefit from CARICOM more than others….I don’t think that we [Jamaicans] benefit from it you know, apart from being patriotic….I think my country [Jamaica] fights for CARICOM more than any other country… I think they do but there are some other countries that may be further ahead, right? Because I think that one of the underlying problems of CARICOM is that the countries that are maybe a little bit further ahead believes that the other countries will pull them back (J3).

As a Jamaican, J3 acknowledged that her country is one of the weaker countries economically, but claimed that CARICOM offered it few benefits. She surmised that the more wealthy CARICOM countries perceived that less economically stable countries would burden their economies, and are thus averse to meaningful integration. In addition, she felt that her country fights too much to be in CARICOM, which she feared might result in a loss of sovereignty. In addition, she affirmed that the only impact that CARICOM has had on her was increased patriotism to her country, hence “I cannot sit and say that I am CARICOM when the affairs of my country, right the affairs of my country is handled differently. My country is an independent country” (J3). Thus, J3 reasoned that her assuming a CARICOM identity is contingent on the political path that her country pursues. This implies that if CARICOM takes a pivotal role in the running of her country, and that there is more unity among member state, she would be willing to acquiesce to the regional identity. Overall, this section demonstrated that respondents did not unconditionally identify with CARICOM. Instead, they predicated their attachment to CARICOM on it becoming more meaningful to their lives through benefits at the regional, national and personal levels.
6.09 Conclusion

The chapter revealed that the majority of respondents in the study found CARICOM to be meaningful, but only in some areas. These areas include providing a sense of a CARICOM family; fostering intra-regional migration; providing representation of the global levels; and providing economic and geopolitical security. Only a small portion of the sample opined that CARICOM meant nothing to them personally. This corroborates the conclusions from the previous chapter that there is a shared identity among CARICOM nationals. However, the meanings that respondents associate with CARICOM were determined to be merely potentials; the majority of respondents countered that the goals of CARICOM are not being realized. Thus, in many ways, a CARICOM identity is also meaningless. Conversely, national identities were seen as more meaningful, concrete and certain compared to CARICOM, which was seen as undeveloped and ambiguous.

Nonetheless, the one thing that maintained the stability of the CARICOM identity was potential pragmatic benefits from integration. The chapter revealed that respondents who believed that either they or their countries have benefited from CARICOM tended to have stronger attachments to CARICOM. This supports the thesis that economic rationality and pragmatic interests generally increases supranational attachments (Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Since attachment to CARICOM was found to be significantly related to perceived benefits, CARICOM can foster the deepening of the regional identity by putting in policies that address the primary concerns that respondents have. These include expansions of free movements of people, and better coordination of economic policies. The realization of benefits would also make CARICOM more meaningful to respondents and would strengthen the regional identity.
CHAPTER VII: MIGRATION & ATTACHMENTS TO CARICOM

7.0 Context

One of the few things that sociologists agree on is that migration has far reaching effects on the construction of identities, identity politics and citizenship. In fact, as Cornell and Hartmann (2006) put it, migration affects, and is affected by politics, labour markets, residential space, culture, daily experience and social institutions, which are all sites through which people construct identities. The architects of CARICOM integration argued that the social assets component, which includes a sense of shared identity and free movement of people (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005:6) is a key pillar of CARICOM and the CSME. This chapter builds on the previous two chapters, which address intra-regional migrants’ self-identities, by explaining how migration affects the identity construction process. The chapter is divided in two sections: the first section examines the effects of migrants’ experiences on the formation of the CARICOM identity and the second section examines migrants’ rationalizations for transformations in their identities.

7.01.a Effects of Migration on the CARICOM Identity

This section considers how migration impacts personal identities. In particular, it looks at how attachments to CARICOM, country of origin and CARICOM member countries change as a result of migration. It then discusses how respondents rationalized their identity outcomes and their migratory experiences.
# 7.01.b Effects of Migration on Personal Identities.

Table 7.01

*How intraregional migration affects Attachments to CARICOM, Countries of Origin & Countries of Destination*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Migrant Destination</th>
<th>CARICOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Attached</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unchanged</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Attached</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/Refuse to Answer</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=160 N=151 N=142

Table 7.01 shows respondents’ perceptions of the impact that intra-regional migration had on their attachment to CARICOM, other CARICOM countries and origin country. It shows that intra-regional migration positively impacted attachments to countries of origin and to the most recent CARICOM country that they lived in (48.9 per cent and 45.1 per cent became more attached respectively). Overall, Table 7.01 indicates that respondents either became more attached to their origin and destination countries, or their attachments remained unchanged.

Regarding CARICOM, intra-regional migration appears to be producing benefits in terms of the development of a CARICOM identity. For example, nearly a third of respondents (29.9 per cent) became more attached to CARICOM subsequent to living in another CARICOM country, while 45.7 per cent remained unchanged and only 11 per cent became less attached. Overall, intra-regional migration appears to increase, rather than decrease, attachments to home countries, CARICOM or the countries that intra-regional migrants live in. The simultaneous positive impact of migration on attachment at national and regional levels suggests that identities do not
necessarily compete, but in some ways, complement each other. In other words, identities are multiple and additive rather than mutually exclusive (Burgess, 2002; Citrin & Sides, 2004; Diez Medrano, 2003; Marks, 1999).

Another fact that jumps out of table 7.01 is that respondents were more likely to be attached to other CARICOM countries than to CARICOM itself. This is consistent with earlier findings, and suggests that migration is a vessel through with the regional identity can be developed (Arthur, 2012). In fact, this finding complements Table 8.01 (in chapter 8), which shows that over 75 per cent of respondents rated their overall experiences in other CARICOM countries as positive. Nonetheless Chapters 6 and 7 revealed that interview respondents were generally frustrated with the pace of regional integration, and were more likely to lay the blame on CARICOM rather than individual countries. As such, it is not surprising that respondents were more attached to their migrant destinations than to CARICOM. In addition, if the concentric model (Bruter, 2005) is to be applied, other CARICOM countries are closer to individuals’ personal circles than CARICOM.

While overall attachment to CARICOM is weak (Table 5.04), migration does not decrease attachments to CARICOM. Only 11 per cent of respondents claim to be less attached to CARICOM after intra-regional migration. This supports the idea that there is a regional identity, and even if it is weak (Boxill, 1997), it is also stable. This claim is supported by Table 7.03, which demonstrates that attachment to CARICOM is independent of intraregional migrants’ experiences in other CARICOM countries.

7.01.c Migration Destination & Attachments to CARICOM

In chapter 5, it was revealed that ties to CARICOM differed by citizenship, with respondents from outlying countries having closer ties than respondents from the big four
countries (Tables 5.12). Table 7.02 shows the impacts of migration destination on ties to CARICOM. It reveals that that 48.1 per cent of respondents who migrated to OECS countries were strongly attached to CARICOM. This is not significantly different from the other regions in CARICOM: 52.4 per cent who lived in outlying countries and 45.6 per cent who lived in the big four member countries were also strongly attached to CARICOM. The table also reveals that migration destination did not significantly determine a respondent’s likelihood of being not at all attached to CARICOM: 15.2 per cent of respondents who lived in the OECS were not at all attached to CARICOM compared to 23.8 per cent who lived in outlying countries and 17.6 per cent who lived in the big four countries. A chi-square test of independence was performed between migrant destination ad attachment to CARICOM, and the relationship was determined not to be significant, \( \chi^2 (4, \, N = 200) = 1.480, \, p = 0.830 \). This confirms that where CARICOM nationals migrate to does not significantly impact how attached they become to CARICOM.

Table 7.02
*Chi Square Results and Descriptive Statistics of Attachment to CARICOM and Respondents Migration Destination*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>Migrant Destination (Country Region)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OECS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite/Greatly Attached</td>
<td>26 (48.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Attached</td>
<td>18 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all Attached</td>
<td>5 (15.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( N = 200 \)

Notes: \( \chi^2 = 1.480, \, df=4, \, p = 0.830 \). Number in parentheses indicate column percentages.
7.01.d Effects of Intra-Regional Migratory Experiences on Identities

Table 7.03 compares respondents’ migratory experiences with shifts in attachments to CARICOM. According to the table, 40.4 per cent of respondents who rated their overall migratory experiences as positive became more attached to CARICOM, but 50.5 per cent of respondents’ remained unchanged in regards to their attachments to CARICOM despite the positive experience, while only 9 per cent of respondents became less attached to CARICOM despite having positive experiences. Among respondents who had negative experiences in member countries, the majority, 54.5 per cent did not become more or less attached to CARICOM, while 18.2 per cent actually became more attached and 27.3 per cent became less attached. A chi square test of independence was conducted to examine the relationship between the nature of migratory experiences (positive, neutral or negative) and attachments to CARICOM, and it determined that there is no significant relationship between the variables, $\chi^2 (4, N=140) = 8.636, p= 0.71$. Respondents’ experiences did not significantly impact how their CARICOM identities changed. Thus, even though the CARICOM identity might be weak, it also has permanent and stable features, appearing to be somewhat impervious to respondents’ migratory experiences.
Table 7.03
Chi Square Results and Descriptive Statistics of Changes in attachment to CARICOM by Respondents’ migratory experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes in Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>Respondents’ Migratory Experiences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Attached</td>
<td>44 (40.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unchanged</td>
<td>55 (50.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Attached</td>
<td>10 (9.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 140

Notes: $\chi^2 = 8.636$, d.f. = 4, p = 0.71. Number in parentheses indicate column percentages.

7.02.a Identity Decisions Explained

The interviews revealed that the primary reasons given for increased attachments to CARICOM were the ability to learn other cultures, meet more people and satisfy curiosity about the region. These things contributed to the maintenance of the CARICOM identity to the extent that even negative experiences were unable to weaken ties to CARICOM. After migration, the majority of respondents either became more attached or were just as attached as before to CARICOM. In essence, one can conclude that the effects of migration on the formation of a regional identity has been largely positive. Below, I examine the main factors in detail.

7.02.b Curiosity & Knowledge of Other Cultures.

One of the main ways in which intra-regional migration contributed to the maintenance of the CARICOM identity, even in the face of negative experiences, was by facilitating the spread of knowledge. Most respondents agreed that they learnt a lot about other CARICOM nationals after migration. B2, a Belizean student studying at the University of the West Indies in Barbados, explained that her migratory experiences have driven her to become more curious about other
countries in the region. She also credited her migratory experiences for enhancing her knowledge of the region. She disclosed:

I’ve met people from, well since I’ve been here, I’ve met people from all over. I’ve learnt about Jamaican culture, Trinidadian culture, even people from Martinique, Dominica. I’ve learnt about quite a few and I plan to visit some of the islands soon enough, so I got integrated a lot (B2).

The above quote is evocative of the contact hypothesis, which stipulates that positive inter-group contact can promote better inter-group relations, and reduce prejudice (Hewstone & Swart, 2011). B2 found that her contact with other CARICOM nationals improved her knowledge about other member countries’ cultures and provided a sense of belonging in Barbados. In accordance with the contact hypothesis suggests, B2 found that such contact “integrated” her into Barbados. In other words, she felt like a part of the in-group, which is crucial to the development of any social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the same way, S3 who studied in Trinidad before returning to Suriname, credited her migratory experience for learning about the other countries. She stated:

The thing is that I know some things about CARICOM and that is because I studied in another CARICOM country where… I would say that I am….I think that I was at the height of being CARICOM when I was in Trinidad [at the University of the West Indies]…and there is a reason because when you are in Trinidad, you see so many other students from other islands so you are actively trying to find out what their country is about. While if you are in your own country, I mean the majority of the time you are doing national stuff…. (S3).
Learning about the cultures and other people is important because knowledge creates cognitive and emotional ties. Migration also provides greater awareness and clarifies the meaning of a CARICOM identity. As S3 above explained, she felt most like a CARICOM national when she was a student at the University of the West Indies due to the fact that she was able to interact and learn about the other member countries directly from citizens of those countries.

Apart from learning about other CARICOM nationals, the act of migration itself can be a source of empowerment through the expansion of world views. Consider S2, a Surinamese, who first went to Jamaica to gain working experience as part of her hospitality degree training. From that experience, she was able to secure a permanent job in Jamaica, and got married to a Jamaican. Because of her positive experiences, she disclosed that not only has she become more attached to CARICOM, but she felt even more attached to Jamaica than to Suriname. The following is an excerpt from her interview transcript:

**Interviewer:** so you said you would identify yourself as a CARICOM national?

**S2:** Yes

**Interviewer:** Why?

**S2:** Because I tend, I can take my bags today and move to Jamaica and nobody would tell me ‘oh you have six months here before you [must] leave… I am a CARICOM citizen.

**Interviewer:** ok, have you always felt this way or you think it changed when you went to Jamaica?

**S2:** I think it changed the first time I went to Jamaica because I can also relate cultural-wise to Jamaicans and I felt at home in Jamaica from the beginning so it is
um….yeah. It wasn’t like I’m a stranger here [or] I don’t know what to do, where to go or its uncomfortable. It’s a comfortable feeling (S2).

S2’s positive experiences were instrumental to the shaping her identity for several reasons. First, not having restrictions on her movement to and from Jamaica made her feel like she was a part of CARICOM (a right guaranteed for the select categories of people only after the signing of the revised treaty). Second, unlike other respondents who viewed the achievements of CARICOM as mainly symbolic, she felt like the free movement provision was actually working. She also explained that she would feel comfortable moving to any other CARICOM country based on her experiences in Jamaica. Third, she explained that her cultural knowledge of CARICOM had improved, which made her feel more comfortable fitting in and adjusting in member states. This made her feel like a legitimate member of CARICOM, which was why she identified wholly identify with it.

Cultural exchange was another positive aspect of integration cited by respondents. B1, a Belizean student, pointed out that his musical tastes have been transformed since living in Barbados. He disclosed:

Oh yeah, when I started to [meet] people and stuff …actually I have a greater appreciation for Soca music… I mean greater awareness, I guess we never really….like every day here you probably hear Soca and back home we never used to that. You probably hear it once in a while [but] not all the time…. I guess, when you are here and you meet other people, people from other island you have, actually get more closer to them (B1).

Like the other respondents in this section, the above quote from B1 demonstrates that migration is contributing to building social ties and raising cultural awareness across the CARICOM. B1
confessed that his personal attachment to CARICOM improved as a result of his engagement with the cultures of other CARICOM countries. As soca music is indigenous to the region, his increased appreciation for it demonstrates the embracing of regional cultures. It also suggests an increased sense of affinity to the products of the region. Thus, for B1, learning about and experiencing the cultural diversity of the region boosted to his sense of belonging in, and his sense of identification with the region.

In addition to promoting cultural exchange, many respondents viewed migration as a prerequisite for building a regional identity (see section 7.04). This was the case for, B2, a Belizean who pursued university, got married and lived in Jamaica for several years. She credited intra-regional migration as the CARICOM initiative that has made her most attached to the region. As the quote below shows, B2 explained that migration has created many opportunities for her:

**Interviewer**: …Which CARICOM initiative has made you feel most attached to the region?

**B2**: Maybe the idea of the free trade [movement] of persons and expertise across. Because it has benefitted a lot. Not too many, not as many persons use the mechanism as it should be but it does [provide benefits]. It [Intra-regional migration] is one of those things that does open up or sets you up with things in place so for you to be able to make a life in another Caribbean Island. And so I guess that would probably would be it (B2).

Having benefited from free movement, B2 proposed that more people should [be able to] migrate to other countries. She found it personally useful as a way of sharing knowledge, which as section 5.05a outlines is one of the main barriers to integration that intra-regional migrants face.
It is interesting that B2 used the word “trade”, which implies mutual exchange, for as she said, this would enable people to gain the tools necessary to be able to relocate as they choose. Overall, respondents agreed that migration has been beneficial in broadening their identities, improving awareness, strengthening appreciation of the community and even cultivating a deeper sense of attachment to CARICOM. The next section looks specifically at the impact of migration on attachment to destination countries.

7.02.c Expanded sense of self.

Learning about other cultures and the acquisition of knowledge were identified as important aspects of intra-regional migratory experiences. In addition, knowledge increases membership and strengthen the regional identity. Several respondents, including S4, confessed that migration had enhanced their understandings of CARICOM as it related to a regional identity. In fact, S4 asserted that it enabled her to make personal connections to the regions, and equipped her with a greater sense of who she was as a person. This was beneficial to her because she claimed to be better able to defend being a CARICOM citizen. In other words, her sense as a CARICOM national deepened. She said: “it [my identity] has broadened. It has broadened in the sense that I am…if I’m able to say to people that I’m a Caribbean citizen that means that I have a certain awareness where I’m standing” (S4). In essence, S4 developed a broader sense of herself, realizing that she was not only a Surinamese but a CARICOM national as well. Similarly, J1 a Jamaican entrepreneur who lived and travelled extensively in the OECS countries and the Southern Caribbean (Barbados and Trinidad), reported that he began seeing himself as not only Jamaican, but as part of the region due to his migratory experiences:

“I’ve always been a very nationalistic Jamaican. And I have, even –I started travelling the Caribbean back when I was in my 20’s and at first I must tell you I
never saw myself as being a part of the Caribbean – as just Jamaican but overtime, I as I got more... trading, as trading expanded, you find a lot of Trinidadians would shop and Jamaicans take something down [unclear] and so on and so forth. You know, I saw myself as part of a larger, I saw myself as part of a larger whole but I don’t get myself a 100 percent behind the Caribbean or as a Caribbean person (J1).

For J1, the experience of migration revealed that his identity was not anchored solely to Jamaica, but to a larger community – CARICOM, as well. This sentiment was also shared by L4 who reflected that her strong sense of attachment to CARICOM was strongly related to her extensive migratory experiences in the region. She explained that she spent her childhood in three different CARICOM countries (St. Kitts, St. Lucia and Barbados) and traveled with her family to regional conferences (in the different member states) each summer as a child. For her, being able to meet, and learn about people in the region convinced her that her identity was not just tied to a particular country, but to the entire region. She stated:

In terms of identifying... as [having] a Caribbean identity, what would have really done that for me would have been attendance at those Caribbean conferences of [name of Organization withheld] every summer for over 15 years um because I would have met many Caribbean people and would have experienced different Caribbean cultures. I could know what country anybody is from once they speak because of being exposed to that environment in my formative years (L4).

As this demonstrates, L4’s realization of her Caribbean identity came from the exposure to the different countries, and the knowledge she gained from those exposures. This tied in with the repeated statements from respondents that the lack of information, education and knowledge about CARICOM were key deterrents to the development of a CARICOM identity (see sections
5.05a and 9.02c). It appears that once individuals gained exposure to CARICOM, their knowledge about other member countries improves and they became less resistant to identifying with CARICOM. This rationale was expressed by L2, a St. Lucian citizen living in Barbados at the time of the interview:

I think having been exposed to the different Caribbean islands, whether it’s through family or living in different places, ah, it kind of makes me feel like I’m not part just of an island but different islands, different parts of the countries that I identify with [but] has my identity changed overtime? Yeah, I think so. I think with the more time I spend away from St. Lucia, I wouldn’t say I less identify with St. Lucian but I more identify with the place I’m living in, obviously because that’s the culture I’m in, that’s home, that where I am so, whereas I wouldn’t call myself a Barbadian, I can understand the Bajan dialect, I could understand the way of life, I can understand how things happen more so than I would have if I wasn’t living here. So yeah, I think it has, I think it has changed a bit or a bit more [unclear] different cultures (L2).

This narrative supports the view that intra-regional migration leaves an impression on CARICOM nationals with regards to locating their identity in a broader, post-national, context. Much of the broadening of the identity arose from becoming more knowledgeable about destination countries. Knowledge of destination countries appears to create feelings of belonging and membership, which translate into more attachment to that place and to the region. Migration thus provides a frame of reference and a tangible connection to place and people, making it easier for them to identify with each other and with member countries. This highlights the importance of first-hand exposure and cross border engagement to the building of community and
supranational identities. It also helps to explain why respondents emphasized the importance of free intra-regional movement in CARICOM (see chapter 9) and expressed disappointment about the full realization of it (see section 9.02b).

Another way in which migration has impacted respondents was through the creation of “nested” identities. L4, a St. Lucian national illustrated the existence of nested identities in CARICOM. She explained that St. Lucia and the rest of the OCES (a CARICOM subgroup) take integration more seriously than CARICOM. However, when asked to which region/sub-region she felt more aligned to, she stated:

I think CARICOM because I have been living in Barbados for such a long time. I’ve been here for 7 years, too long, so I think it’s, I think its Barbados. Sorry so I think its CARICOM and I myself like CARICOM. The OECS from an economic standpoint has more benefits through the single currency and the easy movement of people. I see more advancement in that body than CARICOM…. [but I chose CARICOM] because I would have lived in Barbados, I would have lived in Trinidad so it’s more of a bigger, the wider picture as opposed to the smaller picture (L4)

This faith in intra-regional migration as a tool for showcasing the bigger picture of CARICOM is consistent with the emphasis placed on intra-regional movements as one of the major priorities of CARICOM (see section 7.01). L4’s optimism was also echoed by L1 who proffered that migration can enhance the CARICOM spirit:

Yes, yes, yes yes that’s why I really believe if the opportunities are there to move a little bit more freely, I mean if they have more access to inter-island travel that will help a lot with our community feel (L1).
The above suggests that identities in CARICOM are multiple, multi-faceted, and co-existing. While national identities were most salient, they did not appear to detract from the formation of post-national ones. There was some evidence of nested identities, but the CARICOM identity appeared to be mostly cross-cutting (Risse, 2010). However, the key finding from this section related to the fact that respondents who became more attached to CARICOM benefited in some way from it: they became more knowledgeable, developed a greater sense of self, benefited from cultural exchange and exposure to other islands. While most of these benefits were personal and intangible, migrants connected with them, and credited CARICOM for them. As such, it is necessary to reiterate that a stronger regional identity is contingent on CARICOM being meaningful and beneficial to people. Below, I discuss the mixed and negative effects that respondents believe migration had on the development of the CARICOM identity.

7.02.d Identity Outcomes Explained: Mixed Effects of Migration.

In accordance with the fact that survey results showed that migration did not impact the development of the CARICOM identity for almost half of respondents (see Table 7.01), the interviews revealed that many respondents also had mixed feelings about their migratory experiences. These mixed experiences appeared to contribute to the stability of identities despite intra-regional migration. The following quote from J2 (a Jamaican who lived in Barbados) reveals that often times, migratory experiences are not enough to sway identities in either one way or the other:

I think living in Barbados, um, did my CARICOM identity improve? Um, I don’t know maybe. Yes- no because even though I lived in Barbados and liked the place, I really wasn’t in the culture. I didn’t feel as if I was a Bajan per [se]… and so each of the Caribbean countries, so if you go to Jamaica, it’s a Jamaican culture and if I
am Bajans and go to Jamaica, my options are I maintain a Bajan identity or I adjust to the Jamaican culture or the country’s person culture. So there is no quote unquote Caribbean culture per say. Yeah, we have a CARICOM passport but effectively your identity is a Jamaican so I don’t know. I think the closest thing that would work would be the University of the West Indies. That, I think that creates some form of Caribbean one-ness—Caribbean culture, but on a wider scale for people to who are not a member of the University of the West Indies, I don’t know. I don’t know (J2).

For J2 above, the impact of migration can be described as only partial with regards to forging a regional identity. For him, while living in another country exposed him to a new culture, and he liked the place, the cultural difference mitigated against him developing a deeper sense of attachment to the region. His statement suggests that national identity will supersede supranational identity because people will choose their native culture above those in their host countries. Thus, rather than resulting in bi-culturalism or interculturation, which can be antecedents towards a supranational identity (Recchi & Nebe, 2003), migration in these cases, reinforces national culture. This is akin to the plural model of Caribbean, which stipulates that the various cultures mix but do not combine to make a whole. It is important to note, however, that J2 still felt closer to Barbados than to CARICOM, which suggests that while migration might not directly lead to a supranational identity, it leads to closer attachment to host countries. For J2, the main difficulty in developing a CARICOM identity was the absence of a truly-integrated CARICOM community, barring the University of the West Indies. This seems to echo Boxill’s (1997) argument that CARICOM lacks a regional ideology. J2’s narrative also demonstrates that
it would require a collective effort to sway the ordering of his identity attachments. It thus suggests that individual experiences might be insufficient to shift or transform stable identities.

Similarly, B2 pointed out that building the regional identity was difficult due to the tendency of intra-regional migrants to seek out people from their own countries. She lamented that rather than mingling with other people in the region and experiencing their cultures, intra-regional migrants tended to stick with people from their cultures. In other words, intra-regional migration does not necessarily facilitate the mixing of culture. The following conversation illustrates B2’s point:

Interviewer: Do you think that [intra-regional migration] it can foster a sense of CARICOM identity, based on your experiences?

B2: yes and no. yes in that as it does expose the other countries to your countries and who you are and but No because of something you mentioned earlier in the interview. What I….and perhaps it will change as we become a little freer in our exchange of people but what you see happening is normally, when you see migration growth in any country they tend to seek out their own. And so, like in Belize you have this little Jamaican association that meets every now and again for a game of kalooki [board game] and [laughs] other things and so while you do have some interaction in the new place, we tend to feel a little bit more comfortable in our own little niche and with our own. So, as I have said yea and no. yes and no (B2).

In the above quote, B2 expressed mixed feelings about the impact of migration on the development of a regional identity. Based on her experiences, she felt that migration was unlikely to break the stability in national identities, because rather than mixing of cultures, intra-
regional migrants tend to associate with people from their home countries. She lamented this because she felt that it detracts from learning about other cultures and the building of a regional identity. However, as was the case among respondents generally, B2 expressed hope that increased intra-regional migration would lead to more contact and the forging of a regional identity.

Similarly, J1 observed that that intra-regional migration has had limited impact on the formation of a CARICOM identity. He found national identities to be strong, stable, salient and pervasive in the lives of intra-regional migrants in spite of them living outside their counties. He noted that while intra-regional migration has strengthened his CARICOM identity, it has also made him realize that he could never fully be a CARICOM national as the following quote demonstrates:

Well, it has pushed me a little towards CARICOM. It has pushed me a little –having lived there and having left for four years now, it has pushed me a little towards CARICOM because whilst I was there [in St. Vincent] I visited Barbados and Trinidad far more often that I had in the past. So it pushed me towards CARICOM because I realised that in my line of business um, it’s a real possibility that I could be asked to go and work in any one of those countries and I would have been able to if I was asked. I got to know the places a little more, a little better. I got to see how the people live [unclear] so it pushed me a little bit more towards CARICOM but that is it, not less more. But going toward……I think my opinion probably is influenced to the fact that I have actually have been down there and been a part of those countries. I am not sure if I did not have that experience I perhaps would have been more inclined to you know, I don’t know, perhaps I would have been more
inclined but I think absolutely having the experience has made me sure that I am not a CARICOM citizen. I don’t feel that way (J1).

This quote corroborates the point that migratory experiences had mixed impacts on the development of the CARICOM identity. On one hand, it pulled people together and supported the building of a regional identity, on the other it pushed people away. The latter was the case for J1 who disclosed that even though he has learnt more about the region, and can fit in quite easily into member states, he still did not feel like a “CARICOM citizen”. So externally, one could say that he manifested attributes of being a CARICOM national, in terms of his knowledge of the region and the acceptance that he received in member countries. However, based on his feeling that there was no common regional affection between the CARICOM islands, and his doubts about the existence of a CARICOM identity, internally, he did not subscribe to this regional identity. Jenkins (2000:7) describes these ambiguities as ‘internal and external moments in the dialectic of identification”. External identification occurs when the members of the community accept an individual by identifying him/her as part of the group while internal identification occurs when that individual feels a sense of belonging to the group (Recchi & Nebe, 2003). In the case of J1 (quoted above), migration validated his external identification but not his internal identification with CARICOM. It is this dissonance between internal and external identification with CARICOM that appear to stall the building of the regional identity.

Another way of interpreting J1’s narrative is that J1 identified more with CARICOM than he realized or chose to admit. He spoke of being “pushed…more but not less” towards CARICOM, which suggests an internal level of identification. Thus, even though he said he was “not a CARICOM citizen”, this may be an indication that his CARICOM identity is non-salient rather than non-existent. Nonetheless, his narrative and others confirmed that intraregional
migration has limited impact on the development of the CARICOM identity. The survey showed that attachments to CARICOM did not change for almost half of the sample after migration. Thus, the effects of migration on identities are not automatic or linear. In fact, the next section considers how migration can lead to the weakening of the CARICOM identity.

7.02.e Identity Outcomes Explained: Weakened Attachments to CARICOM.

While most respondents either became more attached to CARICOM or were unaffected by migration, a few became less attached (Table 7.01 shows approximately 11 per cent became less attached). J3, a Jamaican banking executive who lived in Trinidad and Barbados, explained that while she became closer to the countries that she lived in, primarily through the broadening of her social network in those countries, she became less attached to CARICOM. The following excerpt illustrates this irony:

**Interviewer:** Now, are you closer to those countries [that you lived in] or are you less close to those countries compared to before…?

**J3:** I would say closer.

**Interviewer:** yeah?

**J3:** yes, I would say closer because you have built relationships, you get to know people so I guess I would say I’m closer…You know it’s not a situation where I’m not receptive to CARICOM you know. I am. I don’t think my experiences ….I don’t know. I don’t think my experiences shaped my beliefs or anything of that nature as it relates to CARICOM. I don’t think it had any impact on it apart from the fact that the whole immigration process and so on, it makes, it may be pushed me away. Yes. It may have pushed me away from it (J3).
This finding is interesting because it corroborates the survey findings summarized in Table 5.05, which show that attachments to CARICOM countries were stronger than attachments to CARICOM. J3’s anecdote illustrates this position. For her, the negative experience with the immigration process, (which she attributed to CARICOM, not to the specific countries where she experienced them) made her less attached to CARICOM. This appears to challenge the idea of nested identities or the concentric model wherein “everyone in a smaller community is also part of a larger community” (Risse, 2010:24) because many respondents did not view their identities as embedded in CARICOM (see Table 5.04). Risse (2010) surmised that the relationship is better classified as “cross-cutting” wherein some, but not all members of one social group, also identify with another social group, from example some St. Lucians may identify as CARICOM nationals, while others might just prefer to identify with their OECS or their home countries.

In addition to being nested and cross-cutting, identities can also weaken over time if they are not sustained. S4, a Surinamese lawyer who pursued her education in Trinidad, explained that when she first migrated, she was filled with excitement. This initial excitement of living in another CARICOM country made her strongly attached to CARICOM. However, reflecting on her experiences now that the excitement has gone, she stated that she would identify less with CARICOM:

S4: …I’m saying that as a student, I was more excited because it was new and you thought everyone was –you know –excited. But then you went to work [and attend CARICOM meetings]…and then you were hearing all those opinions [about CARICOM] and you think by yourself: ‘so, are we a Surinamese only?’…the commitment, [CARICOM] didn’t make the deadline and the things you were hearing…There has a lot to be done –still to be done
**Interviewer:** even before you were a student and before you got all these CARICOM experiences, were you always an 8 [out of 10 in terms of attachment to CARICOM] or were you more or less? Were you always this close to it before you started interacting with other CARICOM countries?

**S4:** ahhhh, let me say more. It was more than an 8 because of the excitement. S4 had two different experiences with CARICOM. The first experience was at university in Trinidad. During this excitement-filled time, her attachment to CARICOM was strong primarily due to interactions she had with other CARICOM nationals. The university provided a space where a community of CARICOM nationals could interact. Her second experience was in the working world, where she had to work with CARICOM institutions, and people from the other countries. She disclosed feeling isolated and frustrated by the failure of CARICOM to meet deadlines and to honor commitments. As a result, while she was strongly attached to CARICOM (rating herself 8 out of a possible 10), she said that she was even more attached to CARICOM when she first embarked on studies. This ties in with section 9.02, which discusses how frustrations and disappointments reduces attachment to CARICOM.

While S4’s attachment to CARICOM fluctuated, B4 was firm in her belief that she was became significantly less attached CARICOM after her experience of living in another CARICOM country. B4 is a Belizean who studied in Guyana. She explained that her personal experiences as well as the stories recited by her colleagues decreased her attachment to CARICOM significantly. She stated:

**B4:** probably it [my attachment to CARICOM] went to a 3 [from a 5]. After all I went through, and the way everything played out, ‘cause when I was going back [returning to Belize] the last time I left Trinidad –it’s a lovely place: the people and
everything. I was in transit there, right? So the last time I transiting through Trinidad, I told the immigration officer that I was just here and I’m going to overnight here at some people’s house that I knew. Oh lord, [the immigration officer asked] ‘why are you going to spend overnight?’ All kind of questions. I said really? One overnight and I have my ticket to leave. I was…they scrutinized everybody again…. If we don’t have movements [of people within CARICOM], then how would it make us, our identity stronger?

Interviewer: um um, oh wow! So you are, based on the experience that you had in the Caribbean, you find that you are identifying less with CARICOM, because of that experience?

B4: I believe so ‘cause it’s not only me. I’m speaking from other people’s experience. I feel like I identify less with CARICOM. I feel like I was a complete stranger. I actually felt like I was travelling in Central America. Hmm (B4)

Travelling through Trinidad, B4 felt hassled and felt like the questioning that she was subjected to goes against the spirit of free movement of people. These greatly affected how she constructed her identity because as she stated, both her experiences and the stories that she heard made her no longer feel a personal sense of belonging to CARICOM. Thus migration, when experienced negatively, can negatively affect the forging of a regional identity.

7.03 Summary & Conclusion

The chapter revealed that migration significantly altered identities. The survey data showed that while most intra-regional migrants’ identities were generally stable, many experienced shifts in their attachment circle, primarily towards host countries. These appeared to emanate from the social relationships and the experience of calling these countries “home”, even
if it was only for a short time. Migration appeared to bring most respondents closer to CARICOM, although identity salience remained unchanged within the concentric circle. Migration was also found to be beneficial to the building of a regional identity, as almost a third of respondents became more attached to CARICOM after living in a member country. Increased attachments to CARICOM was explained largely by the benefits of integration, which include: increased knowledge about other cultures and other people in the region; exposure to a new country and developing an expanded sense of self. In other words, intra-regional migration provided benefits to most respondents, which contributed to increased attachments to CARICOM. Respondents whose identities decreased after CARICOM pointed to the failures of CARICOM to achieve integration and questioned the existence of a CARICOM identity. Many respondents whose identities remained unchanged experienced a mixture of both positive and negative effects of migration but found neither sufficient to have transforming effects on their identities.

For most respondents, migration provided many opportunities for building social relations and for experiencing the structures that govern intra-regional migratory processes. It allowed respondents learn about other cultures, experience a sense of freedom to travel and expand their sense of self, which significantly strengthened the regional identity. However, the structural deficiencies that respondents perceived, such as failures to develop policies that facilitate easier free movement and the perceived absence of a real CARICOM culture either led to decreased or unchanged attachment to CARICOM. As a result, it appears that the strengthening of CARICOM identity would benefit from policies, which make the migratory process less complex and from greater visibility of CARICOM. This could be through public education or through programs geared at highlighting the uniqueness of CARICOM.
CHAPTER VIII –LIVED EXPERIENCES AND ATTACHMENTS TO CARICOM

8.0 Overview

This chapter attempts to answer the second research question: How do intra-regional CARICOM migrants construct their lived experiences in other CARICOM countries. It specifically addresses how social relations affect the construction of a regional identity. It is divided into three sections. The first section provides a broad overview of intra-regional migrants’ experiences based on the survey data. Specifically it focuses on overall experiences, feeling of belonging and intra-regional migrants’ participation in the social, political, and labour market systems in destination countries.

The second section provides statistical analyses of the impacts of intra-regional migrants’ experiences on the development of the CARICOM identity. It examines the relationship between belongingness and identity formation, shedding light on variations in attachment by citizens. The third section draws on the interview transcripts to examine migrants’ experiences and social relationships in member countries and assess how they impact a regional identity.

8.01 Experiences

As the literature points out, lived experiences and social interactions are crucial in forming social identities (Block, 2007; Cornell & Hartmann, 2006; Elliott & Wattanasuwan 1998; Cote & Levine, 2014). In addition, “migrant experiences can lead to different kinds of acculturation to the host country. They may also cause an intensification of nationalistic feelings for home countries” (Favell, 2003:2). In other words, the experiences that migrants have in host countries influence their daily experiences including their emotional responses. For example, negative experiences can intensify the desire to return “home” or might result in enclaves, while positive experiences might lead to identification with the host country. This section outlines
individuals’ experiences in other CARICOM countries and explains how these experiences relate to their identities.

Table 8.01 lists intra-regional migrants’ experiences and perceptions in CARICOM countries and the proportion of the sample who were affected by, or have had those experiences/perceptions. It shows that 75.4 per cent of respondents reported having positive overall experiences in other CARICOM countries. This implies that having positive overall experiences in other CARICOM islands is not sufficient to build a CARICOM identity because Table 5.03 shows that only 46 per cent of the sample felt strongly attached to CARICOM.

Table 8.01.
Summary of Respondents’ Lived Experiences in Migrant Destinations (Per cent of Respondents who agreed to the statements).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Per Cent (Strongly Agree or Agree)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It was a positive overall experience</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I felt like I belonged</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I visited my country of origin often</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was afforded equal opportunities in the workplace</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was very socially involved in that country</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would consider living there permanently</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I invested financially in that country</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I participated in its politics</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 179

Another experience examined in table 8.01 is the feeling of belonging in destination CARICOM countries. The table reveals that only 48.6 per cent of respondents felt a sense of belonging in CARICOM member countries, and even fewer would consider living in those
countries permanently (37.4 per cent). These figures are in line with attachment to CARICOM (46 per cent, see Table 5.03). Belonging is traditionally viewed as an important aspect of social identity because it is closely associated with acceptance, membership and inclusion in a group member (Benmayor & Skotnes, 1994); Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Recchi and Nebe (2003) for example, stipulate that internal identification is when an individual personalizes feelings of belonging. In this regard, feeling of belonging can be considered a proxy for social identification. It is therefore not surprising in this study that 48 per cent of respondents feel a sense of belonging in other CARICOM countries and only 46 per cent would claim any sense of strong CARICOM identity (see Table 5.03, chapter 5). This suggests that there is some correspondence between belonging and identification with CARICOM as will be explored later in this chapter.

In addition to not belonging, Table 8.01 also indicates that most intra-regional migrants were generally not well integrated into their host destination: only 41.9 per cent got involved in the social activities of those countries. Similarly, only 27.4 per cent invested financially in their destination countries and only 45.6 per cent felt like they were afforded equal opportunities in the workplace. Given these facts, it is curious that 75.4 per cent of respondents rated their overall experience as positive. However, belonging and social integration might not completely account for how respondents assessed their overall experiences. Some might consider economic factors, future migrating opportunities (Basch, 1982), educational accomplishment or other value-added possibilities as important to determining their overall experience. Thus, even though migrants might not feel a sense of belonging in their host country, they might still have positive experiences based on networks formed with other migrants or other accomplishments. Some migrants might also develop strong relationships with co-nationals, which might insulate them
against negative experiences in host countries. J3, a Jamaican, noted that his national identitybuffered against the discrimination that he could have faced in Barbados:

   Discrimination in Barbados as a Jamaican? To be honest, I don’t know, no. No I
didn’t….no and even if it was there, I didn’t really….cause I was so comfortable in
my identity that I really didn’t care what other people….you know what their
opinions were of me so I didn’t experience it (J3).

The above demonstrates that J3’s internal identity, which was anchored in a very strong
sense of belonging to Jamaica was powerful enough to negate any imposed or external identities or
experiences that he experienced in Barbados. Thus even though, intra-regional experiences might
not be ideal, the cushion of a strong national identity can, in some cases, overcome the challenges
of daily lives. This is often the case with transnational identities, wherein migrants depend on the
support systems from both their home countries and the relationships they formed in host to
negotiate the challenges of daily life (Schiller, Basch & Blan, 1995).

**8.02 Impact of Experiences on CARICOM Identification**

   This section examines some social dimensions of intra-regional CARICOM migrants’
lived experiences and their effects on attachments to CARICOM. It draws on the social
constructionists’ framework, which proposes that identities are constructed through every day
experiences including social relations, institutions, residence, work place and political
institutions. These sites of identity construction are specifically addressed hereafter.

   Table 8.02 shows that 51.7 per cent of respondents who rated their lived experiences in
other CARICOM countries as positive were strongly attached to CARICOM. In contrast, only
38.5 per cent and 25 per cent of respondents with negative and neutral lived experienced
respectively identified strongly with CARICOM. Stated another way, among respondents whose
lived experiences were positive, only 14.9 per cent were not at all attached to CARICOM compared to 12.5 per cent with neutral experiences and 38.5 per cent whose experience was rated as negative. In order to assess the statistical significance of migrants’ lived experiences on attachments to CARICOM, a chi-square test of independence was performed. The relation between these variables was significant, $\chi^2 (4, N = 171) = 12.87$, $p < .05$ and the strength of this relationship was moderate, Crammer’s $V = .194$. Respondents who had positive experiences in member countries were more attached to CARICOM than those who did not.

Table 8.02
**Chi-Square and Descriptive Statistics for attachment to CARICOM by nature of respondents’ lived experiences in CARICOM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Lived Experiences</th>
<th>CARICOM Attachments</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite/Greatly attached</td>
<td>69 (51.7%)</td>
<td>6 (25.0%)</td>
<td>5 (38.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very attached</td>
<td>45 (33.6%)</td>
<td>15 (62.5%)</td>
<td>3 (23.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all attached</td>
<td>20 (14.9%)</td>
<td>3 (12.5%)</td>
<td>5 (38.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $\chi^2 = 12.871^*$, df = 4, Cramer’s $V = .194^*$. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages. $P < .05$.

8.03 Social Relationships & Attachment to CARICOM

Table 8.01 indicates that only 41.9 per cent of intra-regional migrants got involved in the social activities in their destination countries. Research within the EU has shown that intra-EU migrants sometimes lack the social capital needed to integrate, and this goes beyond linguistic and cultural capitals, but also includes forming social networks (Favell, 2003). Social networks can help migrants to adjust to their new home in such a way that they live within but not
necessarily integrate in the local culture. Favell (2003) further claimed that the co-existence of multiple identities at local and global levels can lead to a sense of disintegration or superficial attachment to particular places and nations. Thus, I hypothesized that the greater involvement (interactions) that intra-regional migrants have with other CARICOM people, the greater their attachments to CARICOM would be. Table 8.03 examines the relationship between social interactions (with people in host countries) with attachment to CARICOM.

Table 8.03
Results for Chi-Square Test and Descriptive Statistics for level of interaction with other CARICOM nationals by attachment to CARICOM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attachment to CARICOM</th>
<th>Very Involved</th>
<th>A little Involved</th>
<th>Not at all Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quite/Greatly Attached</td>
<td>41 (53.2%)</td>
<td>33 (43.4%)</td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Attached</td>
<td>27 (35.1%)</td>
<td>30 (39.5%)</td>
<td>8 (42.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all Attached</td>
<td>9 (11.7%)</td>
<td>13 (17.1%)</td>
<td>6 (31.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 172

Notes: χ² = 6.656, df = 4, p = .155. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.

Table 8.03 examines whether respondents who were more involved in with other CARICOM nationals became more attached to CARICOM than those who were not very involved. It shows that 53.2 per cent of respondents who got very involved with people from other CARICOM regions had strong attachments to CARICOM. On the other hand 43.4 per cent of respondents who were a just little involved and 26.3 per cent of respondents who were not at all involved had strong attachments to CARICOM. The chi square test indicates that the relationship between the variables were not significant, χ² (4, N = 172) = 6.656, (p = 0.155).
Thus, the extent to which intra-regional migrants were involved with other CARICOM nationals did not impact how attached they became to CARICOM.

8.04.a Belonging & Identity

Belonging is an important aspect of social identity (Bhugra, 2004; Jenkins, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1982). Bhugra (2004) asserts that whether changes in migrants’ identities occur, largely depends on how they are received and whether they develop a sense of belonging in their new locale. This feeling of belonging and membership in a group are important in building social identities (Bhugra, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1982). Table 8.04 shows that only 48.6 per cent of the sample felt like they belonged in other CARICOM countries. This was less than a half of the sample, and corresponds with the percentage of respondents who had strong attachments to CARICOM (Table 5.03 shows that just about 46.1 per cent of respondents felt strongly attached to CARICOM). Just over a quarter of the sample remained neutral about whether they felt like they belong (26.3) while 22.4 per cent of disagreed or strongly disagreed that they belonged in CARICOM member countries. In other words, nearly a quarter of the sample did not feel like they belonged in other CARICOM countries.

Table 8.04
Feeling of Belonging in other CARICOM Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree/Strongly Agree</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree/Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/refuse to answer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 179
8.04.b Nationality, Belonging & Identity.

Table 8.05 indicates that respondents from the big four CARICOM countries were least likely to feel a sense of belonging in other CARICOM countries. Only 36.9 per cent of respondents from the big four member countries felt a sense of belonging in other CARICOM member countries compared to 66.7 per cent of respondents from the outlying countries and 58 per cent from the OECS. At the same time, respondents in outlying member countries were the most settled in other Caribbean countries: only 6.7 per cent of respondents did not feeling a sense of belonging in member countries compared to 32 per cent of respondents from the big four member countries and 22 per cent from the OECS. The chi square test indicates that these results are significant, \( \chi^2 (4, N = 164) = 12.720, p = 0.013 \) and the relationship between the variables is moderate, Cramer’s V = .197. Thus, intra-regional migrants from the big four countries were least likely to feel like they belonged in other countries, while migrants from outlying countries were most likely to feel like they belonged in other CARICOM countries.

Table 8.05

*Chi-Square Test and Descriptive Statistics for feeling of belonging by home country of respondents.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feelings</th>
<th>The Big Four</th>
<th>Outlying</th>
<th>OECS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belonged</td>
<td>31 (36.9%)</td>
<td>20 (66.7%)</td>
<td>29 (58.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>26 (31.0%)</td>
<td>8 (26.7%)</td>
<td>10 (20.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not Belong</td>
<td>27 (32.1%)</td>
<td>2 (6.7%)</td>
<td>11 (22.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 164

Notes: P < .05; \( \chi^2 = 12.720, \text{df} = 4, \text{Cramer’s V} .197. \) Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages.
These results are consistent with the findings in chapter 5, which show that respondents from outlying countries were more attached to CARICOM than respondents from the OECS, while those from the big four countries were least attached. Thus, it might be argued that the feeling of belonging in other countries contributed to why members from the outlying counties felt more attached to CARICOM than intra-regional migrants from the other regions. Social identity proponents, such as Beucker (2006: 267), note that identity can be conceived of as belonging to a distinct group or social unit. Conceived of as feelings of belonging, identities can also have integrative functions for people of diverse backgrounds, such as within a supranational region.

8.04.c Belonging & Attachments to CARICOM.

Table 8.06 shows that 58 per cent of respondents who were strongly attached to CARICOM felt like they belonged in member countries compared to only 44.4 per cent of respondents who were neutral about CARICOM and 41.4 per cent of respondents who did not feel any form of attachments to CARICOM. On the other hand, only 12.3 per cent of respondents who were strongly attached to CARICOM did not feel like they belonged compared to 28.6 per cent and 37.9 per cent of neutral and unattached CARICOM nationals respectively. These results suggest that the more attached respondents are to CARICOM, the more they feel like they belonged in other CARICOM countries. A chi-square test of independence was conducted, which revealed a significant relationship between attachment to CARICOM and belonging, $\chi^2 (4, N = 173) = 10.277$. Cramer’s $V .172$ indicates a moderate association between the two variables.
Table 8.06
*Chi-Square Test and Descriptive Statistics for attachment to CARICOM by feeling of belonging.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feelings</th>
<th>Quite/Greatly Attached</th>
<th>Not very Attached</th>
<th>Not at all Attached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belonged</td>
<td>47 (58.1%)</td>
<td>28 (44.4%)</td>
<td>12 (41.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24 (29.6%)</td>
<td>17 (27.0%)</td>
<td>6 (20.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not Belong</td>
<td>10 (12.3%)</td>
<td>18 (28.6%)</td>
<td>4 (37.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $\chi^2 = 10.277^*$, df = 4, Cramer’s $V = .172^*$. Numbers in parentheses indicate column percentages. $P<.05$

8.05.a Explaining Intra-Regional Migrants’ Experiences

The above section demonstrates that belonging and lived experiences were strongly associated with attachment to CARICOM. While 75.4 per cent of respondents rated their overall experiences as positive (Table 8.01), only 48.6 per cent had a sense of belonging in host countries (Table 8.04). At the same time, 46 per cent of respondents were significantly attached to CARICOM (Table 5.03). The following sub-sections describe, in detail, how respondents rationalized their migratory experiences, and will clarify the apparent contradiction between feeling of belonging and positive overall experiences.

8.05.b Being a Foreigner.

Many respondents disclosed feeling like foreigners in CARICOM member states. The experience of being a foreigner in a country can be quite disheartening for intra-regional migrants (Benmayor & Skotnes, 1994). This is because being a foreigner confers an outsider status, and pervades daily life where identities are constructed (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006).
Being an outsider also makes it difficult to build group cohesiveness and social identities. The narrative of J4, a Jamaican who has been living in the Bahamas\textsuperscript{28} for over 7 years, illustrates the impact that a foreign status can have on attachment to host country and to CARICOM. Despite the length of her residence, J4 consistently identified herself as a foreigner in the Bahamas, which the conversation below demonstrates:

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I’ve never felt close…any sense of attachments here. Just a matter that I work here and in terms of my career, I would never like identify myself like towards…even like, I’m going towards my 7th year and if God spares my life and I’m here another three years, you’re not gonna get me to apply for any residence or any stuff like that. I feel a strong sense, more connected to being a Jamaican, a foreigner. Well for me, I wouldn’t say I’m comfortable living here because I keep leaving here…I’m not comfortable because as an, if I go back because as a foreigner here, they don’t…there is not a lot of opportunities for you and in terms of doing business living here, the government doesn’t see you as a [resident], even though you are playing a very vital role in terms of helping their society here but they doesn’t see you as a part of [them]…and there is not a lot of opportunities so you can’t get, so for example, for myself, because I’m here on an annual work permit, I can’t go to the bank and say ok, give me a loan of this. They are gonna say ok you’re on an annual work permit so we can’t give you that loan. So that’s the disadvantage here do for me (J4).
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\textsuperscript{28} The Bahamas is noteworthy as a destination country in this research because even though it is a full CARICOM member country, it has not signed on to the CSME agreement, which grants free movement of CARICOM nationals.
This quote explicitly outlines some of the consequences that being cast as a foreigner in another country can have on everyday life. For J4, being a foreigner meant exclusion from the routine aspects of day-to-day life such as applying for a loan. As such, it has real consequences for economic and social wellbeing. As J4’s narrative shows, it also means that little emotional attachment is forged with migrant destination. This affects attachment to CARICOM because respondents generally held CARICOM responsible for the kind of experiences they encountered in member countries. J4 for example, noted:

CARICOM…have to establish in terms of the Bahamas [if they are] to be a part of it…yes you see they’re on the list so if they are a part of…they have to come and say ‘ok, we’re talking about the single market, why is it that you guys just stand by yourself? (J4).

J4 believed that her lived experiences in the Bahamas contravened what being a CARICOM national meant. She, thus, proposed that CARICOM hold the Bahamas accountable, even for its failure to sign up to the CSME. She suggested that CARICOM takes leadership in ensuring that the Bahamas embodies the spirit of CARICOM. It is noteworthy that while, J4 was upset with the Bahamas for her experiences, she ultimately deflected the blame to CARICOM. This indicates that attachment to CARICOM cannot be treated as independent of lived experiences in member countries.

B4 had a similar experience, wherein she disclosed that she felt like a foreigner while living in Guyana. She described the experience as outright unpleasant, and she credited it for decreasing the extent to which she became attached to CARICOM. The following conversation illustrates:
B4: The experience I had in Guyana was horrible, that’s point blank horrible. When I went to Guyana, I believed that since Guyana was also a part of CARICOM, it would have been easier. But Guyana is a very very hard and difficult place to live. Upon reaching to Guyana, I met some people from Jamaica, and they told me that Guyana is hell… The main problem you have with landlord cause you are a foreigner, they take advantage of you…People in Guyana has this tendency, I don’t know if because other countries are in a better position than them, they’re undermined by students, you get discriminated against cause you are from another country… It was that bad, and that’s one of the problems of my stay in Guyana. I wouldn’t recommend nobody to study in Guyana because if you are a foreigner, nobody cares about you. It’s basically, you are just on your own…

Interviewer: ohhh. So um, you wouldn’t say it was an enjoyable experience in Guyana?

B4: no, from 1-10, I would give it minus 5.

Interviewer: oh wow, so you said that you are about a 5 in terms of having a CARICOM identity. Has that changed overtime?

B4: hmmm, probably it went to a 3… we used to get told off you know. We used to get told off, like why did you come here to take our space? Why didn’t you all just stay in Belize? (B4).

Interestingly, B4 rated her experience living in Guyana as a -5 (negative five) yet her CARICOM identity as +5 (positive five), which she subsequently revised to +3 (positive three) on reflection on her negative experiences. While attachment to her host country was affected more severely than attachment to CARICOM, thinking about her negative experience made her feel less
attached to CARICOM. This again demonstrates that attachment to CARICOM is contingent on lived experiences in member countries. It is also noteworthy, that despite being CARICOM nationals, both B4 and J4 identified themselves as foreigners. This implies the lack of internalization of the CARICOM identity, despite being legislatively defined as CARICOM nationals, and despite using symbols such as the CARICOM passport.

Being a foreigner also meant standing out. S1 a Surinamese journalists explained that based on visible attributes, he was marked as an outsider in Guyana. This, for him, meant that he could have been easily targeted as prey for criminals. He explained it as follows:

Well, after been there [in Guyana], the native people told me only by the way you walk, they can know you are not a Guyanese citizen. The way you walk, the way you talk, they know everything already that he is a stranger that we could rob easily (S1).

In addition to being a target, the above experiences challenge the assumption of one “one people” engraved in CARICOM’s motto, which is also a pillar of the CSME (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). It also demonstrates that the formation of a regional identity through intra-regional migration is not an automatic process. Unless people start seeing themselves and others from member countries as part of the same body, some intra-regional migrants will continue to feel like foreigners and will be less inclined to deepening regional identities. As respondents suggested in chapters 7 and 8, regional governments and the institution of CARICOM might have a greater role to play in informing people about CARICOM, and about their responsibilities and rights. More knowledgeable citizens might be more socially accepting ones.
8.05.c Exclusion.

Not only did some respondents feel like foreigners in member countries; some also claimed to suffer more direct exclusions from social, cultural and political activities in those countries. These experiences made respondents question the meaning of CARICOM, and doubt the value of the regional integration. To illustrate the impact of exclusion, consider J3’s description of her lived experience in Barbados:

To be honest, ok, apart from individuals at work, I don’t think I got a, I don’t think I was really integrated into the Barbados community even though I was there for maybe like a year. I don’t think I was integrated in their community, like in the local community so you know, you really living among real Barbados. I lived among white Bajans [laughs] so they don’t ever come out, um, they’re always in. You know that kind of environment. So, but on the general forefront, I mean people that you interact with at work I didn’t find, I mean, I didn’t have a problem at work, ah, ah…for me personally. I don’t know about anybody else, but none of my Bajan friends invited me to their homes. If I do go to somebody’s home, they were not real Bajans. They were somebody from another country, from another region living in Barbados. Maybe from a St. Lucia, or maybe they’re from a Grenada, you understand? But they weren’t really true Bajans (J3).

J3 described never receiving an invitation into a local person’s home; not even from her local friends. She described living around people with whom she has never had the chance to socialize with because they never made themselves available. She felt that she was not integrated into the community, but found solace with other intra-regional migrants, who likely had the same experience. L2 had a similar experience in Barbados, wherein she described feeling like an
outsider, but was able to have positive overall experiences based strong connections developed with other intra-regional migrants. The following conversation illustrates

L2: I went to school in Barbados…I now live in Barbados…I have a hard time calling Barbados home…I don’t know why that is. I don’t know if it’s a case of not being fully immersed in the culture…

Interviewer: Do you feel a sense of belonging in Barbados?

L2: not really, um, I feel belonging to my friends….in a sense, I think the Barbadian culture is a bit, is less embracing than other cultures that I have experienced so you kind of feel like an outsider for I bit. I cannot explain it but luckily, there is a big population of people who are from other countries so that makes it easier to feel like you can still have fun and still feel comfortable in your own skin but you may not feel like a Bajan.

Both L2 and J3 described feeling like outsiders in CARICOM countries but found refuge in relationships developed with other intra-regional migrants. This might explain the seemingly contradictory finding between feeling of belonging and positive experiences. Note that neither L2 nor J3 felt like they belonged in Barbados, but both developed positive relationships based on connections made with other intra-regional migrants. It therefore appears that the bonding of ‘outsiders’ accounts for the positive experiences. This need not be interpreted as a hindrance to the development of a regional identity; it appears that intra-regional migrants are still able to develop meaningful relationships with each other. Nonetheless, this did not necessarily mean that such relationships were sufficient for the development of a regional identity, because as Table 9.06 demonstrates, respondents who felt like they belonged in their host countries were more attached to CARICOM than those who did not feel like they belonged.
Exclusion from political processes was another factor that accounted for respondents’ negative experiences in member countries. L4 described, with anger, her attempts to vote in Barbados’ general election:

…..the law states that any commonwealth citizen or the commonwealth law states that any citizen of a commonwealth country can vote in another commonwealth country once they have been there for two or more years….so I went to sign up to vote because the government is awful…when I go to vote, I was told I can’t vote because I am a CARICOM skilled national and they are not allowed to vote. So I said ‘that not true, sure I’m paying taxes I can vote and that is discrimination’…so that to me really struck home, it was like ok, my worth is nothing to them because I can’t even say who can run this country that I am paying 20 per cent of my salary to on a monthly basis to make it a better place (L4).

The question of whether L4 was legally entitled to vote in Barbados as a commonwealth citizen is outside the scope of this study. However, it is worth noting that while commonwealth citizens can vote in national elections in Barbados, CARICOM skilled nationals cannot (Edwards, 2012). According to Edwards (2012), the constitution of Barbados Sec. 41A. of CAP. 5, and the Representation of the People’s Act, CAP. 12, Section 7 provides that commonwealth citizens have the right to vote and stand for election in the Parliament of Barbados under proscribed condition. However, CARICOM skilled nationals, though they are Commonwealth citizens, are not proscribed this right. For L4, the exclusion of CARICOM skilled nationals is discriminatory, and it made her feel unappreciated, undervalued, excluded and like an outsider in the country where she works and pays taxes. As it relates to social identity, the experience indicates that the CARICOM identity is meaningless in some aspects of intra-regional migrants’ lived experiences.
The literature suggests, attraction to a group is an important precursor for the development of social identities (Hogg et al, 1995). Thus, if the CARICOM identity is perceived to be powerless in matters that are important to people, it might inspire little attraction and attachment. In addition, rather than building commitments through positive rewards to members, the CARICOM identity might be perceived as ill-functioning, which is injurious to group solidarity (Meyer Becker & Van Dick, 2006). Furthermore, L4’s experience in Barbados was not only about being an outcast, but she framed it as an injustice against non-nationals. In this situation, being a non-national can be synonymized with being an outsider. According to the social identity theory, the categorization of being an outsider in Barbados, a CARICOM member country, can instil feelings of being an outsider in CARICOM as well.

Like L4, L3 spoke about feeling like a second class citizen living in St. Lucia. L3 is Guyanese-born but moved to St. Lucia as a pre-teen, once there, she obtained dual citizenship as well. She considered St. Lucian to be her primary identity, but being Guyanese-born, she still faced problems fitting in:

I have lots of friends in St. Lucia. I fit in perfectly normal but at the end of the day, no matter what you say or do, although you belong to the CSME and CARICOM, when other [indistinct] to another country…they still treat you like, ah, second class citizens in my opinion, which is something that I think personally is etched in the mind of Caribbean people you know you may come from St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad or Grenada or wherever but when you go to one of these islands, as a member state from another country, they still treat you as a second class citizen….the thing is, right, in St. Lucia right, unlike the other islands, St. Lucia has a local dialect that, which is patois, which is particular to their island, right. Once
you, once you, um, cannot speak that patois, then you are never able to actually fit in as a St. Lucian (L3).

For L3, being Guyanese-born is a permanent marker, which in St. Lucia categorizes her as an outsider. She said that the St. Lucian dialect is used to include or exclude people from being “truly” St. Lucian. She disclosed that while she can speak it, she still has a Guyanese accent, which creates difficulty integrating. This shows that acceptance as a group member, transcends official documents, but social acceptance is paramount for group identities. Interestingly, not only was L3 conferred an outsider status in St. Lucia, but she also faced discrimination as a CARICOM national in other countries. The following is her story with a Barbadian airport official:

The fact that I was born in one CARICOM country and chose to live in another one, is one of the biggest stresses in my life. The other day I was checking into a flight at the airport in Barbados to go to Canada, the security agent, you know what she asked me, ‘how did I became a St. Lucian? (L3).

Overall, the above shows that if the CARICOM identity is to deepen, social relations in member countries need to improve for intra-regional migrants. While it appears that intra-regional migrants supported each other, this was not sufficient to deepen the regional identity because only 48 per cent of respondents felt like they belong in host countries. Since feeling of belonging in member countries was found to significantly affect attachment to CARICOM, the social dimensions of migrants’ experiences cannot be ignored. Thus, CARICOM and national governments must commit more to the development of the social asset pillar of the community, if the regional identity is to deepen.
8.05.d Discrimination & Conflict of Nationalities.

Another aspect of many intra-regional migrants’ experience, which affects identity construction is conflicts of nationalities arising from prejudices. B1, a university student in Barbados explained that prejudice against certain nationalities inhibit social relations among CARICOM nationals, often leading to confrontations. He related a story in which a Barbadian citizen on a bus verbally abused him on hearing his accent. The following anecdote relates the story:

…I told the Barbadian lady] ‘I am entitled to ride this bus as anyone else…’ and she is like ‘uh, you are not entitled to anything’, something about you don’t have any rights here and a whole heap of shit. So I was wondering where is this coming from…she said ‘oh, I hope when you go back to Guyana, I hope you find a job’. Automatically she assumed I was from Guyana, and well based on my accent, she probably thought I was from Guyana….like I said, these people are not the nicest so if I had another [University] option, I would have never come here. I guess once they hear your accent, they don’t care, they just get at it, so I…based on being a Belizean, based on being a Belizean I don’t think it’s a personal attack but I guess once they hear an accent, they treat you differently (B1).

B1’s felt that he was singled out for discriminatory treatments in Barbados based on his accent. He disclosed that the discrimination based on accents was not specific to Belizeans, but was pervasive in Barbados. His encounter with the Barbadian on the bus demonstrates this as he was mistaken for a Guyanese. B1’s confrontation was not unique: L2, a St. Lucian, stated that he has

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29 His program of studies is primarily offered at the University of the West Indies campus in Barbados.
heard statements such as “go and leave we country or you come to take drugs or you all come here because you are hungry”. In addition, S1, a Surinamese journalists disclosed that:

Sometimes when I am, sometimes when I’m doing interviews over there in Guyana and I’m passing by certain café or a bar, then you have some of the drunkards screaming “aye, we don’t want any Surinamese over here. Get back to your country” something like that (S1).

The above experiences challenge the picture of a harmonious CARICOM with hassle free migratory movement is a work in progress, and that prejudices among CARICOM nationals are real. The anecdotes also convey outright rejection based on national differences, which also signifies difference or exclusion. Conflict between national identities might not only serve to reinforce national solidary, but might simultaneously weaken commitment to the regional identity.

Another example of differential treatments based on nationality was that of J4, a Jamaican medical professional who has lived in the Bahamas for over seven years. She explained that the enmity against her nationality was structural, and not just present in interactions with local people. She noted that as a Jamaican, she felt like she was targeted for maltreatment both in her profession and with immigration officials. She explained:

When it comes to Jamaicans here, they have to establish in terms of being….if you are a professional, in terms of if you are contributing to their society, they can treat you better because the way….the way the immigration process there it’s just ridiculous (J4).

J4’s experience demonstrates the feelings of exclusion associated with being of a different nationality. In the anecdote, J4 was pained about her experience because she felt that as a
professional, she was making a significant contribution to the Bahamian society. However, she felt that as a Jamaican, she received no recognition or rewards for this contribution. Her story, like the others, corroborates what adherents to the plural model see as divisions etched into the social fabric of Caribbean society preventing unification. One such adherent, Williams (1973:51) stipulated that Caribbean “have basically one thing in common: they have been nurtured in a climate of isolation” resulting in ways that are inhibitive to integration (Mullerleile, 1996). While this study did not test that assumption, or found no evidence to support it, the results indicate that there are tensions between some nationalities, which affect social relations, and possibly the construction of a regional identity. Since groups are important to social identities, exclusions from member countries derail identity construction processes (Hogg et al, 1995). Hence, these negative experiences work against a shared identity.

8.05.e The Benefits of Positive Experiences.

The previous section demonstrates that social exclusion and negative experiences in member countries adversely affected the development of a shared identity. The reverse was true for respondents who felt integrated, and for whom the experience was positive. Consider S2, who migrated to Jamaica. For her, the entire experience was joyful, which drove her to become more attached to CARICOM.

S2: It [Jamaica] was fabulous. I loved it. I worked there, I lived there…yeah, I would do it again in a heartbeat

Interviewer: Was it like a second home for you?

S2: it is, yeah. More like a first. I feel right at home in Jamaica. I love Jamaica.

Interviewer: How were the people, were they receptive? Did they make you feel comfortable?
S2: um, yeah, yeah, you know some of them did, some of them not. But most of us are like that so even in my home country. So most of them were very receptive and you know and I established some very good friendships and um –over there –and um, yeah. I don’t regret anything…

Interviewer: [did] you say that you would identify yourself as a CARICOM national?

S2: yes…because I tend, I can take my bags today and move to Jamaica and nobody would tell me ‘oh, you have six months here [before] you can leave’. I can, I can find a job, and I can go work and live there without any problems…I am a CARICOM citizen

The above shows that positive experiences in one country can lead to positive feelings about the entire Caribbean Community (CARICOM). S2’s perception of CARICOM was almost completely driven by her lived experiences in Jamaica. Her overall positive experience also helped her overlook the negative experiences that she encountered such as when people were always receptive towards her. Positive experiences are often seen as affirmation of belonging and group membership, which reinforce internal identities and commitments (Barreto & Ellemers, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This acceptance was evident when S2 spoke about feeling at “home” and the positive “reception” she received in Jamaica. The experience of being accepted also reinforced her confidence to be able to move to any of the CARICOM countries. In this way, her experiences validated her internal identity. Her experiences also aligned internal and external identification in the sense that her perceptions of CARICOM were validated by experiences. Identities developed in these ways usually become deep-structured because the individual incorporates characteristics of the collective into their personal identities (Meyer, Becker & Van
Dick, 2006). According to Meyer et al (2006: 667) “once developed, deep structure identities tend to be more enduring and less cue dependent”.

Like S2, S3 can be said to have a deep structured CARICOM identity. She rated her attachment to CARICOM at 7 out of a possible 10. Her strong attachments originated from positive migratory experiences, which she described as follow:

I did [get involved] in a lot, um the, well, the thing [is] on campus in Trinidad, you make Trinidadian friends and people from other Caribbean islands so it’s very easy to get immersed in Trinidadian culture…of course you have, you have little things that are different but I didn’t have something like you know [like] I’m really standing out. No I didn’t, if I wouldn’t speak because of course the Surinamese accent is different, then people wouldn’t know that I wasn’t from Trinidad… I think that now that I am working, it would be a bit different but I do have ah, because I’ve lived there and I don’t know if that is one of your questions but I do consider Trinidad to be my second home in the Caribbean so I mean when you get to a place and you know where everything is, you have that kind of familiarity… (S3).

For S3, her positive experiences and ability to integrate easily in Trinidad signified her belonging in CARICOM. In fact, she identified Trinidad as a second home. Her overall attachment to therefore CARICOM aligned with her experiences. Her identity can be described as deep-structured because even after graduating from the University of the West Indies in Trinidad for over a decade, she still resorted to those experiences when explaining her identification with the region.

In addition to being able to integrate, another positive experience that some respondents derived from intra-regional migration was the psychological security in having a second home in
a member state. S3 alluded to that fact in her quote above. S4 similarly divulged that she got
closer to CARICOM as a result of the freedom that being a skilled national has given her. She
praised the ability to move and establish herself in other member countries as a key benefit of the
regional identity. The following quote demonstrates:

I don’t need a visa, you know? You just take your bag and your ticket and you’re flying. Yes, you don’t have to go to an embassy to request a visa. Second [cross talk]…second you’re learning when you’re arriving there, it seems like you’re in your own country and you’re seeing you know…they are resembling so much familiar with you’re in their country but it is another culture….there must be the same things, the same ingredients but they making the food another way, you know and another way etc. etc. but when you….and they don’t view you as visitors.

When I’m walking downtown Trinidad and I’m telling people that I’m walking there, they are looking at me because they don’t view me as a visitor, they think I’m a Trinidadian….(S4).

The above reiterates the importance of belonging and inclusion to forming attachments to CARICOM. S4’s derived a sense of belonging from the fact that she does not require visas to travel to other CSME countries. Prior to the treaty of Chaguaramas, it was not possible to work in member countries without a work permit, and some CARICOM countries had visa restrictions on other countries. However, visa and work-permit restrictions still apply to some CARICOM nationals such as Haitians who still require visas for casual visits to most CARICOM countries, even though they are a full member of CARICOM.\(^{30}\)

\(^{30}\) Haiti is not currently a member of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)
Both S3 and S4 described having a sense of belonging and membership in CARICOM, which supported their strong attachment to CARICOM (both rated their attachment at 7 out of a maximum 10). For S3, the ability to get involved in the day-to-day activities and to participate as she wished provided a sense of group membership. In fact, she likened her experiences in Trinidad to being at home, speaking about not standing out, becoming more knowledgeable about the country. Thus for her, intra-regional migration provided confidence in, and validated her membership in CARICOM. In other words, it reinforced her internal identification with CARICOM. Similarly, S4’s sense of belonging emanated from the fact that she had visa-free entry to other CARICOM countries. The requirements to have a visa may be interpreted as a tool for marking boundaries, to keep outsider out. Thus the fact that S4 has full mobility, without the restrictions of a visa, affirmed an insider status, which strengthened her attachment to CARICOM. In addition, she explained that she was not perceived as a visitor, and thus was accepted as a part of the community.

Even respondents with weak attachment to CARICOM softened their opposition to the regional identity upon reflections on their positive social relations in member countries. Consider, J3 who rated her attachments to CARICOM at 3 out of a maximum 10. Once she started to reflect on her positive experiences in Trinidad, her tone softened. Speaking about the reception she received in Trinidad, she stated:

They were, yes! They [Trinidadians] were very receptive towards me. Um, I didn’t have any problems at all. Um, I never experienced any form of hate, no, they were very warm and welcoming…when I went down Trinidad, my Trini friends invited me over to their house. I stayed over and you know so you got to get a feel of the real Trini life. I’ll never forget that they were so warm to me you know they came
to my place, I went by their place we stayed over for weekends, you know we went
to the mall together, we did stuff, you know, just touring the island together.
Independence, I remember when it was their independence weekend I was there and
another set of friends invited me down to their house and we just celebrated, eat a
lot of food, watch the fireworks, you know….but it was not so in Barbados (J3).

J3 described her experience in Trinidad as pleasant, which drew her close to the host country.
Nonetheless, coupled with her negative experiences in Barbados and her disappointments with
CARICOM, her attachment to the region did not strengthen. Thus, positive experiences were
sometimes overshadowed by negative ones, which weakened attachments to CARICOM. For
example, J1, a Jamaican entrepreneur explained that despite years of positive experiences in St.
Vincent, the negative encounters he had in Antigua, Barbados and Trinidad, made it difficult for
him to develop a strong regional identity. He explained:

The experience was actually good. I mean Vincentians don’t have the….they’re not
so bothered with foreigners coming. Living with Vincentians was, on a social basis
was like home……St. Vincent, I feel more of a sense of belonging you know,
perhaps because their culture is very similar to ours and they do things much more
like we do and so on…I like St. Vincent very much, I mean it’s a place that I could
live again and I wouldn’t have a problem living there. I like most of the Caribbean
countries…I think of the things about St. Vincent and Grenada that really, and in St.
Lucia is that it is so similar in certain respects to Jamaica. Very similar in terms of
ethnography, very similar in terms of how the people, ah, how the people are –how
they are –how accepting they are, how social they are…I certainly don’t feel a sense
of belong in Trinidad or Barbados because their cultures I find are very different
from ours and they do things very different and they are very stupid…I don’t care too much about Trinidad and Antigua and Barbados…In Barbados, the people in Barbados are not really – Barbados and Antigua are not really intimate. So I consider myself as a part of CARICOM as I consider myself a part of the United States. I don’t, I really don’t. There is no advantage personally except probably the free trade… (J1).

J1 anchored his positive experiences in St. Vincent and most of the Eastern Caribbean on his ability to integrate, and the cultural similarities with his home country. He found that people in the smaller, Eastern Caribbean countries were welcoming and were similar to Jamaicans. As a result, he found it easy to fit in, and developed a sense of belonging in those countries. However, he found that in Trinidad, Barbados and Antigua, it was more difficult to gain social acceptance, and it was these negative experiences that determined the extent of his attachment to CARICOM. Thus, positive experiences in one set of countries are not always sufficient to overcome negative experiences in member state or even disappointments with the structural organization of CARICOM. Respondents expect consistency in the treatment meted out to CARICOM nationals across all member states.

8.06 Summary & Conclusion

The chapter revealed that social relations are important aspects of intra-regional migrants’ identity construction process. The findings produced mixed results about the relationship between social contact and integration. On one hand, it contradicted the assumptions of the contact hypothesis, and found that interaction between different groups of people do not necessarily reduce prejudice or discrimination. Less than half of the sample developed a sense of belonging to member countries, and most experienced some form of exclusion, conflicts and
discrimination. Generally, most respondent failed to develop meaningful relationship with nationals of destination country, and statistically, respondents who felt a sense of belonging to destination countries and those for whom the overall experience was positive identified more strongly with CARICOM than those who did not. However, on the other hand, the findings supported of the contact hypothesis: many respondents developed closer attachments to host countries and their citizens to the point where they considered these countries their second homes. Thus the effect of contact on group on social cohesion was partial.

The study also revealed another important contradiction: even though less than half of the sample reported feeling like they belonged to member countries, a strong majority rated the overall experience as positive. This was explained by the sense of solidarity that most intra-regional migrants developed from the social relationships with co-nationals and other intra-regional migrants. In addition, most respondents viewed the right to travel to other countries as an achievement in itself, even though such experiences were often difficult and rife with inconsistencies and negative experiences. This ‘achievement’ appeared to also help explain the positive summation of intra-regional migrants’ experiences on the whole. It is interesting that the component of respondents’ positive experiences were also identified as benefits of integration (see section 6.06). In other words, the realization of CARICOM’s benefits create positive experiences for intra-regional migrants, which also drive attachments to CARICOM.

Overall, the chapter revealed that while weak social relations impeded the development of a regional identity, respondents often overlooked these when there are alternate support. However, they did not easily overlook the role that CARICOM and regional governments play in their negative experiences. CARICOM and regional governments must therefore develop policies to improve social cohesion within and between member countries and their citizens.
9.0 Overview

This chapter answers the third research question: how does regionalism impact the formation of a CARICOM identity? It is divided into two sections: the first section draws on the survey data to report on intra-regional migrants’ wishes, perceptions and attitudes towards regionalism. It reports on how respondents feel about regional integration, and how these perceptions vary by country of citizenship. It also evaluates reactions to integration symbols such as the CARICOM passport, a regional sports team, their country’s membership in CARICOM and reactions to other CARICOM nationals residing in their countries. It then considers how these attitudes and perceptions impact attachment to CARICOM.

The second section draws on the qualitative data to get deeper insights into these perceptions, and how respondents rationalized the meaning of regional integration to their personal lives, to their countries and towards developing a shared identity. The main themes emanating from this section are unmet expectations and disappointments with CARICOM and regional structures. The failures and disappointments of regional integration are centred primarily on the state of free movement and the role of people in the integration process. The chapter closes with a summary of the key findings and explanations. It concludes that regionalism is highly valued among intra-regional migrants but disappointments regarding the materialization of benefits help explain the [weak] outward manifestation of the CARICOM identity.
9.01.a Perceptions & Attitudes towards Regional Integration

Regional integration is now a characteristic feature of late modernity where distinct regions are increasingly shaping national politics and identities (Katzenstein, 1996). Cantori and Spiegel (1970:6-7) explained that it is characterized by geographic proximity, international interaction, common bonds (ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical) and a sense of identity that is sometimes accentuated by the actions and attitudes of states external to the region. The section below outlines CARICOM respondents’ attitudes towards these characteristics. In particular, it assesses respondents’ attitudes towards integration, intra-regional migration, and their citizenship country’s involvement in CARICOM to delineate how regionalism affects the formation of the CARICOM identity.

9.01.b Attitudes towards Integration.

In spite of the low levels of attachment to CARICOM (chapter 5), the majority of respondents viewed regional integration positively and desired for it to deepen. Table 9.01 shows that more than three quarters of respondents (75.5 per cent) wanted to see CARICOM increase integration. Another 3.1 per cent of respondents wanted regional integration to stay where it was, and 3.1 per cent wanted it to slow down. Only 3.6 per cent of the sample were opposed to regional integration (wishing that it would either stop altogether or it be reversed), while the remaining 14.7 per cent were unsure about how they feel about integration.

These results add to the paradoxes of the study. Table 5.02 in chapter 5 indicated that only 46 per cent of respondents felt close to CARICOM. However, like Table 9.01 below, which shows that increased integration was favoured in some measure by at least 85 per cent of the sample, Table 8.01 in chapter 8 also revealed that 75 per cent of respondents claimed their overall migratory experiences in CARICOM were positive. These results suggest that migratory
experiences and desires for integration are not in themselves good predictors of attachment to CARICOM, or regional identity. Nonetheless, it must be noted that unlike migratory experiences, which varied according to the citizenship of intra-regional migrants, support for integration was very strong across all 15 CARICOM countries. Only 6.7 per cent of respondents believed that CARIOM should either slow down, stop or reverse integration.

Table 9.01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration wishes for CARICOM</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration needs to increase at a faster pace</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration needs to increase but only moderately</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM doesn’t need to integrate anymore</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM needs to slow down integration</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM needs to reverse all integration</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM needs to stop integration</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/Refuse to Answer</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, Table 9.02 shows that the majority of respondents had positive views about sharing a common passport with citizens of other CARICOM countries. It reveals that that just over half of the respondents (53.5 per cent) viewed the CARICOM passport as a good idea (this is slightly higher than the 46 per cent of respondents who felt close to CARICOM, Table 5.03). Interestingly while 36.1 per cent of respondents believed that the CARICOM passport made no difference, only 6.5 per cent believed that it was not a good idea. These findings demonstrate that there is very strong support for integration among intra-regional CARICOM migrants, and they
are consistent with the results from Boxill’s (1997) study on *Ideology and Caribbean Integration* in which he noted that there was no shortage of support for integration in Jamaica and St. Lucia. What he found instead was that respondents in both countries differed on the type of integration that they desired. He found that St. Lucians supported centralized forms of integration such as an economic or political union while Jamaican respondents supported more relaxed forms of regionalism such as functional cooperation. In a similar vein, Rolfe (2007:99) explained that support for integration made special “sense for small and less developed states to group together to take advantage of the ‘unlimited development opportunities to be achieved when pursued in partnership and with a sense of common purpose’”, hence respondents from the OECS (and the less developed outlying states) would be more supportive of integration than those from the big four countries.

Table 9.02  
*Respondents’ reaction to the CARICOM Passport*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ attitudes to the CARICOM passport which has the name of individual countries as well as the words “CARICOM COMMUNITY” written on the front cover.</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is a very good idea</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It makes no difference</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not a very good idea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>155</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like Boxill’s (1997) study, which showed that there was varying support for different aspects of integration in the Caribbean, this study also found that support for the various integration measures, varied greatly. For example, while there was good support for the common CARICOM passport (see Table 9.02), support for CARICOM countries competing at
international events as a single team was weak (Table 9.03). Only 38.1 per cent of respondents strongly agreed/agreed that CARICOM countries should compete as a single team at international events such as the Olympics; 53.5 per cent would oppose such a move, likely preferring to retain their national identity. This finding is consistent with those of Table 5.04 (see also Figures 5.04 and 5.05), which demonstrate that national identity/citizenship were the primary way in which most respondents identified themselves (see chapter 5). When grouped by citizenship region (outlying states, OECS, the big four), there were no statistical differences among attitudes towards CARICOM countries forming a single sports team to represent the region at international events. Table 9.04 corroborates this, showing a generally fair balance between those who agreed and those who disagreed on the matter. The notable cross-national exceptions were respondents from Jamaica, Trinidad and Belize who disagreed that there should be a CARICOM team representing the region at international events. It should be noted that Jamaica and Trinidad have had the greatest successes in the traditional sports that CARICOM countries participate in. For example, those are the only CARICOM countries to produce individual Olympic gold medalists, or to have ever qualified for the FIFA World Cup Football. In the case of Jamaica, Boxill (1997) explained that the dominance of the Jamaican identity is reflected in how they viewed themselves in relation to the rest of the region. He noted that “being the largest country 31 in terms of population and possessing an enviable reputation for sports and music internationally, Jamaicans evidently have independent bases for seeing themselves as part of the international system” (Boxill, 1997:77). He further explained that “for the Caribbean countries, success in sports and music have been the most important ways of achieving international recognition in a world where they possess little economic, military or political

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31 With the admission of Haiti in CARICOM, Jamaica is no longer the largest country in the community in terms of population
power” (Boxill, 1997:77). Thus, it is clear that sports is an important part of national identity (Maguire, 1994; Tomlinson, 2006; Ward, 2009), and given the salience of national identities over other aspects of identities, it partly explains why the big four countries might be the least attached to CARICOM. Respondents from Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago might be resistant to a regional identity because it might be perceived as diluting their national sport identity. This is not surprising; studies have found sport to be significantly associated with national identity and the expression of national culture (Maguire, 1994; Tomlinson, 2006; Ward, 2009).

While Trinidadian & Jamaican respondents’ resistances to sport integration are somewhat explained, the reasons for Belizeans’ reticence about competing as a single sport team are unclear, although it must be born in mind that only 10 Belizeans answered this question.

Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the region is represented internationally by one team in the sport of cricket, although the team does not usually include members from the four outlying countries.

Table 9.03  
*Respondents’ reaction to the idea of CARICOM countries competing as a single team at international events*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion about CARICOM countries competing as a single team at international events such as the Olympics</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.04
Opinions about CARICOM countries competing as a single team and citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Country</th>
<th>Strongly Agree or Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree or Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; Grenadines</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>3 (41.0%)</td>
<td>1 (5.2%)</td>
<td>11 (53.7%)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 55 (41.0%) 7 (5.2%) 72 (53.7%) 134 (100%)

Note: Numbers in bracket indicate row percentages

Consistent with the salience of national identity/citizenship among respondents, Table 9.05 shows that only a cumulative 19.6 per cent of respondents would react positively to the replacement of national symbols with CARICOM ones. The majority of respondents (61.4 per cent) said that they would react negatively to such a move. Like sport, national identity symbols appear to be something that most respondents would not want to be submerged under the
CARICOM identity even as integration increased. This is not surprising given that national identity was the most salient aspect of identity found in this study. In addition, as Hall and Chuck-A-Sang (2012) noted, CARICOM symbols are not widely used across the region so many respondents might not even be aware of them. Meier-Pesti and Kirchler (2003:686) argued that citizens’ formation of a supra-national identity derives from membership in that body, but it can also be facilitated by the conversion of national symbols to supranational ones such as currency or travel documents. They argued that sentimental attachment can lead to loyalty to culture, traditions and symbols. Accordingly, one of the contributing reasons for the weak attachment to CARICOM might be the poor visibility of some of its symbols. In addition, it appears that the most visible symbols, such as the CARICOM emblem on passports do not inspire a shared regional sentiment.

Table 9.05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reactions</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Positive</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/Unsure</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Negative</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>153</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While Table 9.05 shows overall strong opposition to the idea of regional symbols replacing national ones, respondents from the three citizenship regions varied significantly in their opinions about this proposition. Table 9.07 reveals that respondents from the big four were
the least receptive to the idea of regional symbols replacing national ones. For example, 74.3 per cent of big four respondents viewed the replacement of national symbols with regional ones negatively compared to 61.9 per cent of respondents from outlying countries and 38.6 per cent of respondents from the OECS. On the flip side, 31.8 per cent of OECS respondents viewed the replacement of national symbols with regional ones positively, compared to only 8.6 per cent of big four respondents and 28.6 per cent of respondents from outlying countries. This suggests that OECS respondents were most favourable towards the replacement of their national symbols with regional ones while respondents from the big four were least receptive towards this idea. Chi square tests revealed that these results are significant, $\chi^2 (4, N = 200) = 17.802, p = 0.001$; that is, respondents from the big four countries were more opposed to CARICOM symbols replacing their national ones while respondents from the outlying countries were the most favourable toward this proposition. Cramer’s $V = 0.257$ indicates that the relationship between citizenship and attitude towards CARICOM symbols is a moderate one. This also corroborates the findings explained in Table 5.12, which show that respondents from the big four were least attached to CARICOM while those from the outlying countries were most attached.

Regarding attitudes towards other intra-regional migration, Table 9.06 shows that respondents were generally positive about other Caribbean nationals moving to their country. More than two thirds (67.9 per cent) of respondents believed that it was a good idea to have other CARICOM nationals living in their countries; only 6.2 per cent believed it to be a bad idea with the remaining 24.1 per cent staying neutral.
Table 9.06
Respondents’ reactions to other CARICOM nationals living in their citizenship countries.

How do you feel about other CARICOM nationals living in your country of citizenship?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reactions</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I think it is a good idea</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t hold any opinions</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t think it’s a good idea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/Refuse to Answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>162</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.07
Chi Square Results and Descriptive Statistics of Attitudes towards CARICOM symbols replacing national symbols by citizenship (regions).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude towards</th>
<th>Citizenship Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only CARICOM Symbols</td>
<td>Big Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>6 (8.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/unsure</td>
<td>12 (17.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>52 (74.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 135

Notes: $\chi^2 = 17.802^*$, df=4, Cramer’s V =.257*. Number in parentheses indicate column percentages. 

* $p<.05$
Table 9.08
Respondents’ opinions about their country of origin’s membership in CARICOM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reactions</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Positive</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Positive</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Positive nor Negative</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Negative</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very negative</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.08 confirms that regionalism sentiments were fairly strong among intra-regional CARICOM migrants. Despite the relatively low level of attachment to CARICOM (see Table 5.03, chapter 5), it reveals that 68.5 per cent of respondents were positive about their country’s membership in CARICOM with 16 per cent being neutral. Only 8 per cent of respondents had negative views of their country’s membership in CARICOM. This is consistent with Table 9.01, which shows that the majority of respondents desired deeper integration of the community. The desire for deepened integration might be associated with the benefits respondents perceived their home countries to be reaping from CARICOM. As Table 9.09 shows, approximately 80 per cent of respondents believed that their country of origin has gained some benefits from CARICOM with only 8.8 per cent seeing no benefits at all. This finding corroborates those in Table 7.20, which shows that attachment to CARICOM was stronger for respondents who perceived that their home countries have benefited from CARICOM compared to those who did not.
Table 9.09
*Respondents’ perceptions of the benefits that their home countries have gained from CARICOM*

How much benefits do you think that your country has gained from CARICOM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot of benefits</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a few benefits</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some benefits</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No benefits</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.10.
*Respondents’ opinions about whether CARICOM has fostered a regional identity and has brought unity among member countries.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fostered Regional Identity</th>
<th>Frequency (Per cent)</th>
<th>Fostered unity among members countries</th>
<th>Frequency (Per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>76 (47.2%)</td>
<td>70 (43.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>67 (41.6%)</td>
<td>70 (43.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>18 (11.2%)</td>
<td>21 (13.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of Table 9.10 above are consistent with table 5.03 (chapter 5, which shows that 46.1 per cent of respondents felt close to CARICOM). Table 9.10 shows that 47.2 per cent of respondents believed that CARICOM had fostered a sense of regional identity, while 41.6 per cent disagreed. Likewise, participants in the survey were equally split (43.5 per cent each) regarding whether CARICOM had unified member states. The fairly modest reception to the idea
that CARICOM had unified the CARICOM might also explain the lackluster attachment to CARICOM. Overall, the study found that respondents were consistent in their views about CARICOM. Just under a half of the sample were: a) significantly attached to CARICOM; b) believed that it had fostered a regional identity; and c) believed that it had unified member states. Thus, respondents who believed that CARICOM had actually unified countries and had fostered a regional identity appeared to identify with it more than those who did not.

In summary, there is evidence to support the view that the affinity towards integration across the region is strong. In fact only 3.6 per cent of the sample wanted integration to be stopped or be reversed (Table 9.01). Most respondents also viewed the common passport positively; most were happy with other CARICOM nationals living in their own countries; and most respondents believed their country had benefited from CARICOM. However, because respondents viewed CARICOM as failing to live up to its potentials, their attitudes towards regionalism did not convert into strong identification with CARICOM. In other words, regionalism is not a significant determinant of attachment to CARICOM.

9.02.a Identity, Attitudes & Perceptions about Regionalism

This section explains, in detail, the attitudes and perceptions that interview respondents had of regional integration. It reveals that respondents generally perceived CARICOM to be failing at integration, and hence they were overwhelmingly disappointed about the state of regionalism. These disappointments appeared to erode respondents’ confidence in CARICOM, manifested in their reticence about a shared regional identity.
9.02.b Regional Disappointments: Unmet Expectations & Frustrations.

The survey data show that support for regional integration was strong across the region despite the fact that respondents claimed that it has neither impacted their personal identities, fostered a common regional one, nor promoted unity among member states. However, interview respondents from all four countries repeatedly expressed frustration with the whole process of integration. Most respondents felt that CARICOM as an institution was not living up to its potential or their expectations, particularly in disseminating information and in proactively pursuing integration. They also blamed the policy mechanism for not sanctioning free movement of all CARICOM nationals and for not making greater progress in creating the single economy. Respondents tended to identify with CARICOM on contingent bases, wherein they withheld their attachment to CARICOM until they perceived that their disappointments and sources of frustration are being addressed.

9.02.c Education/Dissemination of Information from CARICOM.

One primary concern expressed by respondents regarding regionalism was the insufficient information about the future of CARICOM. All of the interviewees bemoaned the inadequacy of the information coming out of CARICOM. For them, information about CARICOM was often scarce, inadequate or incomplete. They also blamed regional governments for failing to educate citizens sufficiently about CARICOM and its impact on local life. As section 5.04 demonstrates, respondents from the outlying countries, in particular, often found that they were victims of the poor knowledge, which resulted in them being viewed as outsiders. The scarcity of information also contributed to the apathy towards CARICOM; created uncertainty about CARICOM and generally weakened attachments to CARICOM. One respondent who resented the poor dissemination of CARICOM information was S3, a Surinamese national who
was working in the public sector at the time of the interview. She explained that despite working on numerous CARICOM projects, her knowledge about CARICOM remained poor. She expressed frustration about this lack of knowledge as the quote below shows:

I….you know why CARICOM was established but you don’t know where CARICOM wants to go. So, um, I mean a common, ah, no borders and one passport…one dollar, so the question is where does CARICOM want to go and how is CARICOM going to inform us about where CARICOM wants to go? Because, because the thing is we have so little insight on what is going on within CARICOM so you always feel like this (S3).

The problem with being uninformed is that it makes CARICOM nationals feel like outsiders. S3 felt frustrated by the exclusion from CARICOM’s vision and the unawareness about its future. Key to social identities are shared knowledge and understandings of one’s position in the group and of the group’s goals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Research in organizations have found that group cohesion improves significantly with efficient knowledge sharing systems (Ellemers et al, 2004; Van de Hoof & De Rider, 2004). Van de Hoof and De Rider (2004), for example, argued that increasing personal communications was associated with stronger identification with groups within organizations. It appears that within CARICOM, a knowledge deficit is hampering attachments to CARICOM. J3, a Jamaican banking professional, expressed this view. She also proposed that a better system of communication from CARICOM would enhance understandings about CARICOM and its effects on daily lives. She stated:

I would like to see the whole CARICOM concept be more, um publicized, be more, um, information out there for people to get. Instead of searching for the information, the information is searching for you….there is nothing out there to
make the whole concept of CARICOM visible to people in the region unless you
are somebody who is involved or interested in that kind of thing…a typical person
don’t know. They don’t understand how it works because we’re not, we’re not
educated about it enough. So if they made the information more – you know –
accessible or they would publicize things more you know, then that - you know –
part will increase the visibility, and I guess the understanding of people (J3).

The point that J3 made is important in the context of building a regional identity. Without
sufficient knowledge about CARICOM including about its goals, and its impacts on regional
economies and daily lives, regional integration might appear purely theoretical to people.
Likewise the notion of a CARICOM identity might seem meaningless to people if it is not
transparent to them. The reservation against identifying with CARICOM can even intensify if
respondents believe that CARICOM is primarily responsible for the lack of transparency. This
was the case for L2, who opined that CARICOM was not making enough effort to communicate
with people. She viewed this as one of the reasons that people in the region are not as attached to
CARICOM as they were to their countries of origin. She stated:

I think because there isn’t sufficient presence or a proper understanding as to what
the CARICOM organization is doing, had done or is working towards…maybe it’s
because, maybe I’m in a box but I don’t feel like I am as aware as I could be
because I don’t read the papers as much as I used to but I feel like maybe there
needs to be more of a stronger presence and efforts to get [more] regional bodies,
say for example in sports…there are lots of things that could be done to make
citizens of different nations feel like a citizen of CARICOM versus a citizen of
separate countries (L2).
As L2 suggested in the above quote, the weaknesses in the dissemination of information about CARICOM is a major deterrent towards the development of a regional identity. For her, without information, people cannot become close to CARICOM, and instead will remain attached to their separate countries. Like J3, L2 was concerned about the lack of CARICOM presence in member countries and the effort that it takes to find information. This suggests that CARICOM nationals do not want to have to be engaged in tedious searches to get information. The fact that respondents felt like they had to embark on these searches to learn more about CARICOM is symptomatic of the distance between citizens and institutions/government. Their unwillingness to search represents an attempt to shift the responsibility of developing a CARICOM identity more towards regional institutions and less on individuals. Thus, it can be suggested that respondents’ apathy towards CARICOM mirrors that of CARICOM’s apathy towards them.

For some respondents, the state of being uninformed was not only an individual problem. For them, government officials are no wiser about what is going on about CARICOM, and this corroborates the notion that CARICOM is not a serious project for regional leaders. Consider B4, who in her encounter with immigration officials at the ports of entries in Guyana and Trinidad, concluded that even these officials were uncertain about CARICOM’s policies concerning free movement of people. Based on the questions she faced, she opined: “I think these people at our entry point are not educated enough. I bet –well in my opinion, I think CARICOM has never thought at various entry point [that they] have to actually educate your people about this CARICOM passport”. B4 was not alone in doubting the administration of policies in the region. According the Caribbean Leadership Project’s (2014:5) report entitled “Caribbean Migration”, the absence of “an overarching political structure, implementation of the relevant political and administrative measures requires action at the local [national] level”. As a result, implementation
is not uniform across the region. Wickham, Wharton, Marshall, and Darlington-Weekes (2004) narrowed down the problem to the lack of resources in some countries. They argued that “the pace at which legislative and administrative arrangements allowing free movement of persons has progressed is symptomatic of the resource problem affecting most Member States” (Wickham et al, 2004:25). The matter of strengthening attachment to CARICOM is therefore tied to the development, implementation and administration of policies uniformly across the region,

One of the important things to note about all the quotes from interviewees is that they came from elite people who possess the means and access to information (see Table 4.02 for occupational statuses). It means that if the elites felt so unaware about CARICOM, it can be expected that non-elites are even more uninformed. As Bishop and Payne (2010:18) asserted, CARICOM is “distant from the ‘man in the street’ and that there is little awareness, let alone buy-in, of ordinary citizens or organisations outside of a limited circle of officials”. This means that the development of a shared identity among ordinary citizens is a monumental task. However, because shared information leads to shared understandings and group commitment (Van de Hoof & De Rider, 2004), the monumental task of building a shared identity can be lessened with a systematic knowledge/dissemination system at national and regional levels.

The lack of information also triggered disappointments about the regionalism project. Interestingly, in all the above quotes, respondents were supportive of deepened integration but were equally frustrated about the actual state of integration. Boxill (1997) referred to the lack of integration as an “implementation deficit”. The interviews supported the survey findings, which showed strong support for integration across all countries but weak attachment to CARICOM. Thence, integration wishes were in themselves not strong predictors of attachment to CARICOM. For most respondents, more tangible manifestations of regional integration were
needed for them having confidence in CARICOM, and ultimately in them developing a deeper
CARICOM identity. In this way, the crisis of implementation impeded the development of a
regional identity (Girvan 2012).

Another reason that the lack of communication inhibits the development of a regional
identity is that it prevents people from seeing the benefits of integration. This was the view
expressed by L1 statement below:

I think it comes to a point where especially in the economic climate they can be
clearly communicated to people like this is how you are going to benefit from us
working together. Then I think it is possible, and again similar, I mean if Europe
can do it, I don’t see a reason why it’s so difficult (L1).

Given the strong relation between benefits and attachment to CARICOM (see Table 6.02),
communication of these benefits could also strengthen the CARICOM identity as L1 pointed out.
In tangent with the power of shared knowledge, effective communication can motivate and build
commitment to the shared identity. Thus, these findings support those in section 6.06, which
indicate that the realization of benefits significantly influenced attachments to CARICOM. The
realization of benefits largely depends on how they are communicated to people. At the same
time, perceptions of failure including ineffective communication or the exclusion of people
inhibit the development of a CARICOM identity.

9.02.d Regionalism & Failures.

As the above section shows, most respondents felt that the dissemination of information
in CARICOM is currently inadequate, which is interpreted as a failure in regionalism. The
discourse of failure was driven by the idea that CARICOM was not doing enough, and that it
should be more proactive in its efforts to deepen integration and to get citizens involved. S2
emphasized the need for CARICOM to be more decisive and proactive on its integration mandate. She stated:

[They should] do more...do more for CARICOM people….do something for the CARICOM, for the CARICOM people. You know to introduce free travelling to CARICOM nationals. You know, wouldn’t that be great?... [They need to] work on scholarships, work on schools, work on opportunities, job opportunities, um yea that is tops for now. And you know, along the way, things will figure themselves out, I think (S2).

The above encapsulates the general perception about CARICOM and the state of regional integration, which is that CARICOM is doing little for people, for the region, for free movement and for creating opportunities for people to improve their lives (such as in education and employment). These disappointments have implications for the construction of a shared identity driven by CARICOM. Perceived as failure, CARICOM appears unattractive to citizens so they have little motivation to associate with it. In addition, as the previous section shows, the lack of information breeds uncertainty. Individuals do not want to associate with either failure or uncertainty. Furthermore, section 6.02 shows that most respondents viewed their national identity as firm, solid and meaningful. Conversely, the uncertainties, failings and information-deficit, make CARICOM undesirable. This reasoning was aptly expressed by J3 who stated that the failure of CARICOM to integrate in a federation or a confederation has decreased the possibility of her adopting the regional identity:

**Interviewer:** Do you think that at any point whatsoever that you would be willing to let go of your Jamaican identity and assume a CARICOM one?
J3: Oh my God! …I don’t think we need to go to that extreme…you know why, you know why I don’t think it’s going to be possible? Unless you’re gonna run the region like a Russia or like a USA where each country is considered a state, right, and you have one head, ok? One president…you get where I’m going with this?....I cannot sit and say I am CARICOM when the affairs of my country, right, the affairs of my country is handled differently. My country is an independent country….Jamaica, Jamaica is a country on its own standing, on its own. And [unless] the affairs of the country is handled by a local ministry unless it’s going to be a situation where we have a single economy, we have a real single economy and each country is considered a state…… that the only way, that the only way it could work. That’s the only way I could lose my Jamaican identity. And even then you not gonna lose it because you gonna have the Jamaican state. So whilst you may be from CARICOM, when people ask you which state are you from, [you will say] ‘Oh I’m from Jamaica’ (J3).

J3’s response was revealing in several ways. First, it revealed that national identity is salient and in many ways permanent for her. While she was distraught by the suggestion of CARICOM replacing her national identity, she gave consideration to the possibility. However, comparing CARICOM to the US or Russia, she noted that the region has failed to truly integrate, and that for her personally, unless the region integrates along such lines, she would be unlikely to be more attached to it. While her position was somewhat extreme, it suggests that the deepening of individual regional identities is tied with the deepening of integration at the national level. In addition, her narrative suggests that the development of a CARICOM identity is contingent on a regionalism that matches citizens’ expectations. The former Secretary General of the Association
of Caribbean States, Norman Girvan (2012) noted that there is a “crisis of CARICOM” wherein people of the region are disinterested in it. The disappointments and unmet expectations expressed by respondents did appear to present a crisis—in effect a gridlock, because for many respondents, the further strengthening of a CARICOM identity will not happen unless their expectations are realized. Having said this, there is evidence to suggest that an embryonic CARICOM identity exists, but rather than being certain, stable or permanent, it is contingent, and malleable to circumstances, respondents’ feelings, and the status of regional integration.

In addition to holding the CARICOM identity as contingent on expectations being met, some respondents blamed CARICOM leaders for the failures. These failures, they claimed, boiled down to the lack of political will, and the unwillingness of different member states to work together toward a common goal. The following two quotes from L1 and J2 illustrate:

So I find essentially the leaders talk about it [integration] but there is nothing, you don’t get the impression that the leaders are actually doing it or is it that you are of a certain [unclear] a certain stature that CARICOM appear to work, yea but if you are not then then, you know, I honestly I mean, look at a simple thing as travelling into the islands, in and around the islands, it takes….it’s ridiculous, ridiculous….the government in my opinion, do not seem, do not seem to be doing enough –from their, from where I sit –to make it look like one Caribbean. It does not, ok? I don’t get the impression that its one Caribbean man and I err, I don’t think I’m the only one (L1).

I think it’s largely still an experiment and I think that if we put our heads together as a Caribbean people, we can get it right. Despite, um, holding on to my Jamaican
identity and all that, I think that if we put our heads together in a Caribbean way then we can get it right, we can get it right (J2).

Consistent with the survey results (Table 9.01), both respondents above expressed a longing for CARICOM to “get it right” and create a shared identity. They were thus optimistic that regionalism is possible and can be meaningful. However, both were clearly frustrated, for example, J2’s repeatedly emphasized that “we can get it right” and L1’s disclosed that “I don’t think I am the only one”. The frustration with the unrealized potentials of CARICOM made some respondents pessimistic. L3, for example, pointed to the historical propensity of CARICOM countries to fail at integration. As a result, she was pessimistic about the current attempts at regional integration:

You see, the problems in the Caribbean is that the politicians are small minded. Everybody wants to keep power to himself. There was the West Indies Federation in the early 1960’s that was dissolved, it took them how many years before they made the Treaty of Chaguaramas. Having done the Treaty of Chaguaramas from then till now if you look at CARICOM and the gains that have been made, it is basically insignificant. The fact is that there are many good things that have come out of it but apart from the single market, right, as a region, as a people we have not integrated at all. Everybody still have their own individual identity and wants to keep it that way because nobody is fostering the relations that needs to be fostered to create a region (L3).

L3’s pessimism was not only anchored in the failures of CARICOM’s predecessors, but she argued that CARICOM credentials amounted only to “insignificant” gains. She noted that the creation of the single market did not translate into a regional identity because “as a people we
have not integrated at all”. This statement is significant because it challenges the long held assumption that CARICOM intrinsically comprises “one people” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). Her statement implies that there are persistent differences between CARICOM people, and that the creation of a shared identity goes beyond economic integration, which is still underdeveloped. As a result, a CARICOM identity must not be taken as given but as something that must be continuously worked on. Her statement also points to the history of failed integration (Boxill, 1997; Demas, 1976; Rolfe, 2007), which appears to continually impact how people view CARICOM and how they develop ties to the region.

Some respondents also personalized the failures of CARICOM. For them, CARICOM’s failures have real impacts on daily experiences. The following quote from L4 describes the impacts of CARICOM’s failures:

Well there is no free movement benefits there, there are no other benefits that affect me directly. If CARICOM were to work as it should, as a free market, um, where travel would be easy, where it would be one currency, where there would be one team from a sport perspective, where there’d be one health care system, where it would just be one, yes it would benefit me immensely, um, from both a financial, economical, personal perspective so I would be able to move freely, there’d be little risks involved in terms of economic downfall and and decrease in currency value, it would be easier for me to work in other places within the Caribbean from a speed standpoint and then also from an acquisition of assets standpoint. There would be less bureaucracy so yes if it worked out as it should there’d be benefits than what presently exists (L4).
The personalization of CARICOM’s failures might explain the frequency of this theme in the study, as well as why the CARICOM identity is remains contingent. For L4, CARICOM represents negative experiences, negative memories and unreached potential. The contingency in adopting a CARICOM identity beyond what is imposed legislatively seems to be partly driven by these ‘failings’. Again it is interesting that L4 identified that free movement of people, administrative issues, employment, health, recreation and educational as the areas in which CARICOM is failing the region. These are the things that respondents viewed as potential benefits. It should be noted that these ‘failures’ go beyond mere hindrance to the formation of a regional identity, they helped portrayed CARICOM as insignificant as the quote below from L2 demonstrates:

…. apart from immigration purposes right, apart from immigration purposes being a CARICOM national in CARICOM serves no purpose unless the region is going to move to proper integration. I mean they talk about it all the time but nothing, nothing is done, it’s just pure talk (L2).

The above section demonstrated that the goals of CARICOM were often unclear to respondents, who responded with tentative attachments to CARICOM. These perceptions eroded confidence in regional integration and in efforts to deepen the regional identity. Without belief in CARICOM, and without a sense of purpose, CARICOM made little sense to respondents. Tajfel and Turner (1979) stipulated that social identity involves in-group favouritism wherein members give, and expect, preferential treatment to others when they perceive that they are of the same group. The problem with CARICOM nationals not having information and feeling personally disadvantaged from the failures of CARICOM is that it robs them of a sense of membership in that group. As such, CARICOM nationals often do not feel like members, which creates
problems identifying with it. So even though most respondents identified to some degree with CARICOM, such identity is likely to remain non-salient or perhaps dormant until people feel like regionalism is being approached seriously. In addition, the CARICOM identity will likely remain contingent on the realization of meaningful benefits.

9.02.e Regionalism & Free Movements.

The previous section discussed how respondents assessed CARICOM, and how they framed its performance in discourses of failures and disappointments. In particularly, CARICOM was judged heavily on its execution of the “free movement of people” component of the CSME. For most respondents, free movement of people is such an integral part of CARICOM that to fail in that area amounts to the failure of regionalism. On the flip side, success in free movement may pull people closer to CARICOM. Consider B2, a Belizean who lived in Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados. For her, the experience of being able to live in these countries made her more attached to CARICOM:

**Interviewer:** Have any of the initiatives implemented by CARICOM made you feel more attached to the region?

**B2:** hmmm, maybe the idea of the free trade of persons and expertise across. Because it has benefitted a lot, not too many, not as many persons use the mechanism as it should be but it does, it is one of those things that does open up or sets you up with things in place so for you to be able to make a life in another Caribbean Island. And so I guess that would probably would be it (B2).

B2’s narrative shows that the opportunity to live in member countries is a valuable part of being a CARICOM citizen for her, and she viewed advances made in this area as one of the successes of integration. At the same time, she was mindful that not enough people have benefitted from
this, and hence would not experience this benefit CARICOM. Nonetheless, her statement illustrates the importance of tangible benefits such as the liberty to move freely in member countries towards the development of a regional identity.

Apart from free movement being underutilized as B2 suggested, some respondents viewed the provision as of free movement as an unfilled promised. J1, a Jamaican who lived and worked in St. Vincent but also travelled extensively in the OECS, Barbados and Trinidad made this point as the next quote illustrates:

Well one of the, one of the shortcomings is that fact that there is not free movements of individuals between the countries, that’s one…There are non-tariff barriers that is one, between some of the smaller ones and … there is a general feeling of xenophobia throughout some of the, some of the [CARICOM countries]…. particularly directed to…I think Jamaicans, Guyanese, and some of the smaller countries that are not well developed. You get xenophobia from Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago…. Even in living down in St. Vincent down there I have a feeling when going through that any person with a Jamaican passport you know, raise a lot of suspicion among, among [immigration officials]. [This range] from Antigua down to Trinidad you know. I think that doesn’t lend itself well to free movement and that is why you won’t get me going to any of those places… every time I go there [Trinidad], I have to do secondary screening, you know they, they um, the immigration officer would look at my passport and make a call to somebody else and then they get permission to let me through but then that would happen the next week if I go back and the third week…It’s a process to go
through immigration, every time. I’ve had, I’ve had same thing in Antigua….asked comments about Jamaicans coming there….you see what I'm saying (J1).

As the above quote shows, J1 found it difficult to accept that there is free movements of people within CARICOM. Based on his experience, wherein he was hassled by immigration officials in Trinidad and as well as negative stereotypes from locals in some countries, he concluded that the free movement of people is more of an assumption than a reality. The difficulties that respondents faced travelling between the different CARICOM countries were not innocuous. J1 stated that it caused him to not to want to go back: “that is why you won’t get me going to those places”. Ironically, the very system that is supposed to encourage people movement, is administered in such a way that makes people want to limit their movements. J1 viewed immigration procedures in the region as so bad that he referred to it as xenophobia. He explained that there is a hatred for his nationality (Jamaicans), so the moment immigration officials in these countries open his passport, he begins to feel victimized. This amounted, for him, to being treated like an outsider, which helps explain why he rated his attachment to CARICOM at only 50 per cent.

In addition, many respondents found CARICOM’s free movement provision to be ambiguous, and accompanied by difficulties even for the professional categories covered under the CSME. S1, a Surinamese journalists remarked:

If I go for example for an investigation of a special case in Guyana, I might need special documents and I need special permissions….. When I went to get some more time to stay over there, they told me: ‘No, you can’t stay more than three months over here. You have to go back and travel back to Suriname’. It was a little strange to me. We are a CARICOM country. Why can’t you extend my stay in
Guyana, I can’t understand. Yeah, they do state that you can stay up to a maximum three months… [otherwise] you are illegal. Before the three months pass, you have to travel back to your country then you could travel back the next day for another three months (S1).

As a media personnel, S1 believed he should receive hassle-free travel in CARICOM because his profession is one of the five categories covered under the CSME. However, S1 did not apply for a CARICOM Skilled National Certificate in the countries he visited, and so the benefit did not extend to him. Despite this, S1 felt that he should have been afforded at least six months whenever he travelled in the region. He resented the fact that he is unable to extend his stay in member countries without having to return to his home country and re-entering the destination country. For him, this indicates that free movement is not occurring.

Like S1, other skilled nationals complained that they did not get enough time when they visited other CARICOM countries. They explained that length of time permitted to stay in member countries varied considerably. Below, S4 explained that the failure to give her at least six months in Trinidad was indicative that she was not accepted as a CARICOM national. She stated:

You know I was there [Trinidad] last year in June. I have a six months permit to get to stay in the country, right? I didn’t get my six months… Because I think T&T weren’t viewing me as a national – a Caribbean national. They don’t view you as such [yet] when they are coming here [Suriname], they are getting the six months at our airports (S4).

Likewise, S1 described free movement of people in CARICOM to be a failure when compared to the EU. He noted “in comparison to the European Union who is one already if you travel from
Holland for example to say to Germany, you can stay there for six months and nobody bothers you because of the passport” (S1). Comparing the state of intra-EU travel to that of CARICOM, made it even more disappointing for S1. Furthermore, as B4 passionately explained, CARICOM is seriously lagging in implementing free movement. She described immigration procedures in Guyana and Trinidad as extremely difficult as the following quote shows:

[In Guyana] you have to pay for a student visa. And we have the CARICOM passport, and the thing is, that upsets me, CARICOM is located in Guyana. But what has CARICOM done for the students, foreign students from other CARICOM nations? They have done nothing. The scrutiny I face at the airport is, um, well search, I understand search, but a lot of people are not being, a lot of persons who do security checks, it seems that they are not educated enough because I remember when I went through Trinidad…I believe they are not aware of the rules of CARICOM. I believe CARICOM has not done a good job in educating people about what is the purpose of CARICOM because when you to a Caribbean country, there is a reason why we change the passport. The reason we change passport is so we could have a free movement within the Caribbean but if you have a CARICOM passport, they treat you better I think when you come to the United States what when you go in the Caribbean. To me this is unjust and unfair. If we are for fairness, equality with the Caribbean countries, come on, you should not treat people like that… (B4).

B4’s story reveals a discord between the expectations raised by CARICOM and her travelling experiences. She opined that the CARICOM passport is useless because she is still treated as an outsider when using it. In addition, she described immigration officials as being poorly informed,
but more important, she laid the blame for migration difficulties on CARICOM. It is this blaming of CARICOM that makes identifying with it problematic for many respondents. In fact, the association of CARICOM with the failures makes it a liability with regards to the framing of a regional identity. As J3 explained, successful regional integration is a precursor to the development of a personally strong and salient CARICOM identity. However, due to the failures and problems with intra-regional travels, she declared:

I cannot be a CARICOM national and I mean, you, first of all: CARICOM, there is nothing, I don’t see anything unless it is in the budget that I don’t see right but I don’t see anything going from no country to a central body to develop CARICOM to develop the concept and to develop, you know this whole idea. Right, I don’t see anything so how, I don’t I don’t understand, maybe I don’t understand it but to me it’s just somebody who just came up with the idea and they already have certain things in place so they just they say ok let us just……and then they issue some passports because it’s the easiest thing to do and nothing else. Right cause they don’t think of, what about education? Um, how do you deal with that as a CARICOM national? (J3).

J3’s statement made it clear that an unattractive CARICOM directly impacts individuals’ willingness to develop a CARICOM identity. She categorically proclaimed that she would be unwilling to designate herself a CARICOM national unless she sees efforts being made to advance the region through integration. However, she remained dubious about whether integration is being taken seriously by regional leaders. The perceived lack of interest of regional leaders, led J3 to become apathetic towards CARICOM as well. This shows that perceptions about regional leaders and their attitudes impact the behaviours of constituents.
The above demonstrates that even though many respondents complained about insufficient information about CARICOM, their expectations lined up with the promises of the CSME. In fact the CARICOM Secretariat (2011) listed the full use of labour and full exploitation of other factors of production as one of its main objectives. This perhaps explains why some respondents were expectant about free movement, and were disappointed about its current status. The former Secretary General of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), Norman Girvan (2001:1) sympathized with this view, noting that:

To all intents and purposes there has been no progress in implementing the CSME since the Single Market was inaugurated with much fanfare in 2006. What is more, the governments have backed off, or are backing off, commitments that they made with regard to implementation in key areas; such as freedom of movement; and the scheduled completion of the Single Economy.

Both the literature and respondents’ statements confirmed general dissatisfaction with the current pace of integration in CARICOM. Hogg et al (1995) stipulated that attraction to a group usually precede social identity and cohesion within that group. Applying this to CARICOM, it is possible that the perceived failures make CARICOM unattractive, and this serves as a deterrent to identifying with it. According to Girvan (2011), these dissatisfactions can affect not only identities but also the future of regional integration. Girvan (2011:3) saw these as reminiscent of what he calls the “original sins” of regional integration, which caused the dissolution of the West Indies Federation. These original sins include:

The absence of supranationality, or collective sovereignty, in the execution of decisions. This is the underlying source of the implementation deficit of the Community. The second that is of particular relevance to this exercise, is what may
be called a “participation deficit”. I am referring to the absence of effective mechanisms for popular involvement—people involvement—in the taking of decisions, in the implementation of decisions; and indeed in the construction of an authentic Caribbean community (Girvan, 2011:3).

Girvan (2011) saw the same “sins” in today’s integration movement, and cautioned that these things can potentially cause the dissolution of CARICOM just as they did to the West Indies Federation. Interestingly he suggests that the lack of people involvement detracts from the creation of an authentic identity. For Girvan (2011), the inclusion of agency in the supranational identification is crucial, and resonates with Giddens’ (1991) notion of the self in negotiating identities. Similarly, De Vreese (2003) maintained that individual participation is vital to the building of supranational identity. As Table 8.01 shows, the idea of regionalism is very important to respondents yet they persistently described its implementation in terms of failures. In addition, respondents felt as if they are not consulted, informed or included in the forging of regionalism and the regional identity. Furthermore, respondents viewed regional integration as a failure because it was not personally beneficial. For respondents, regional integration is being pursued at the macro level only with no consideration of micro implications and individual experiences (Girvan, 2011). The strengthening of the regional identity is therefore unlikely to be successful unless CARICOM becomes more attractive by delivering on promises and instituting policies that are meaningful to citizens of the region.

9.03 Summary & Conclusion

This chapter revealed that intra-regional migrants’ perceptions and experiences with regionalism significantly impacted how they framed their identities. Respondents generally felt disaffected with CARICOM due to the perception that it is failing and that it has not provided
meaningful benefits. They held CARICOM responsible for the state of integration, which I argued manifested itself in the weak attachments to CARICOM. This is consistent with the findings in the previous chapters, wherein it was found that respondents were not personally opposed to CARICOM or to sharing an identity with other CARICOM nationals, but were primarily dissuaded from CARICOM by its perceived disinterest in matters most pertinent to them. In other words, the realization of a deep-structured regional identity is dependent on how favourable people are in their assessments of regional integration.

The emphasis on structure as the primary weakness in enabling a deep regional identity can be explained by pragmatic interests (individual and macro). In fact, the failure of regionalism to meet individual expectations can be viewed as an affront to their pragmatic expectations. The two main pragmatic areas that evoked disappointments and failing grades were people’s involvement in CARICOM and the state of free movement of people. All interviewees revealed that they had negative experiences with free movement. In addition, respondents also believed that regionalism is being pursued primarily at the macro level and is excluding ordinary people. Respondents’ primary reactions to regional integration were with disappointment and disapproval. These are significant because respondents intuitively were unwilling to anchor their identities in something that they perceive to be failing or a disappointment. The weak CARICOM identity can therefore be seen as an expression of individuals’ frustrations with these weaknesses.

Overall, the chapter revealed that the effective pursuit of regional integration could drive the strengthening of a regional identity. Most intra-regional migrants approved of the regional passport, their country’s membership in CARICOM, their wish for deepened integration and their favourable opinion of citizens from other CARICOM regions living in their countries. However, these positives are being undermined by the perceived failures of regional integration.
This implies that at the individual level, the conditions are favourable for the development of a regional identity, but structurally, CARICOM and regional governments need to do more to effect policies and nurture the kind of social relationships that will engender regional pride and attachment. In other words, CARICOM must be seen as beneficial, and must deliver on the promise of integration to be attractive in the eyes of intra-regional migrants. An attractive CARICOM is one that would generate a deep-seated regional identity.
CHAPTER X – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.0 Overview

In this research, I problematized the notion of a CARICOM identity by studying the lived experiences of intra-regional migrants and their attitudes towards regionalism. The approach and analyses of the results were informed by aspects of social constructionism, critical theory and Giddens’ structuration, which underscored the multi-dimensionality and fluidity of identities. In addition, these frameworks acknowledged the formation of identities through a negotiated process involving personal reflection, social relations and social structures.

10.01 Is there a CARICOM Identity?

This research departed from traditional theorizing about the Caribbean identity, and instead introduced the more specific concept of a Caribbean Community (CARICOM) identity to address the present reality, where CARICOM plays a superordinate role in guiding its 15 member states and their peoples. The question of a CARICOM identity might appear counter intuitive given that all citizens of CARICOM countries are automatically considered CARICOM nationals (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005). In fact, the survey revealed that more than 80 per cent of respondents had some form of attachment to CARICOM, though this attachment was mostly weak. While this may reflect the fact that the CARICOM identity is ascribed, the study focused on understanding how respondents subjectively viewed themselves using their individual agencies. Most respondents agreed that shared regional institutions, language, customs and heritage are key components of this regional identity. These reflections about the CARICOM identity matched the dominant portrayal of the region as being based on a shared identity centered on linguistic (those from the OECS and the big four), geographic, cultural and historical similarities (see Edmondson, 2009; Müllerleile, 1996; Nettleford, 1987; Paul, 2007).
Undoubtedly, there is a CARICOM identity, but it is rather non-pervasive and non-salient, latent and contingent. This was not surprising because most respondents saw it as purely ascribed. In addition, they equated it with disappointments, unmet expectations and unrealized benefits, which prevented it from being deep-structured (Meyer, Becker & Van Dick, 2006). Furthermore, it only nominally organizes daily lives. Meyer et al (2006:667) stipulate that “a deep structure identity involves the alteration of one’s self-concept to incorporate the characteristics of the collective. Once developed, deep structure identities tend to be more enduring and less cue dependent”. CARICOM nationals appeared uncertain about what aspect of the collective to incorporate into their self-concepts. Most would like CARICOM to be more meaningful by effecting changes that would positively affect the region and benefit their personal lives. The absence of these meant that in its current form, the CARICOM identity is embryonic and vulnerable to changes in the social and political environment. For regional leaders, this is positive because it means that people are open to change once the policies and realities better align with their wishes.

Added to the dissonance between the ascribed regional identity and personal framing of identities, the study uncovered contradictions between support for regionalism and identification with the region. It revealed strong support for integration, yet less than half of the survey sample had strong attachments to CARICOM. Snow and McAdam’s (2000) concept of “identity correspondence”, which refers to the alignment or linkage of personal and collective identities provides some useful insight to understand these contractions. For them, identities are aligned through either convergence or construction. Identity convergence is the union of personal and collective identities such that both are congruent, and such that the collective identity provides an outlet for individuals to act in accordance with their personal identity. In the case of CARICOM,
there was a weak alignment between personal and CARICOM identities. Accordingly, the CARICOM identity was neither pervasive nor comprehensive (Cornell & Hartmann, 2006) and played little role in the organization of social lives. Respondents acquiesced to the CARICOM identity, but gave little regard to it.

In addition to the depth and strength of identities, the literature identified a range of possible identity outcomes, including: fragmented, cross-cutting, and hybrid identities. However, the study found that intra-regional migrants identities were mainly multiple and coexisting, with national identities being stronger than the regional one. This is not surprising (see European Commission 2012a/b) and as expected, identities followed a concentric rather than cross-cutting manner, possibly because of the pluralistic nature of CARICOM societies, wherein social groups and countries mix but do not necessarily combine.

10.02 Benefits & the CARICOM Identity

The study found six variables, which significantly impacted a person’s attachment to CARICOM: education level, citizenship region, the personal meaning that one attributes to CARICOM, perceived benefits that CARICOM brings to his/her home country, feeling of belonging in other CARICOM countries and the nature of his/her lived experiences in member countries. Statistically, all these factors were moderately associated with attachments to CARICOM except for perception of benefits gained, which was strongly related to attachments to CARICOM. This was confirmed by the interviews, which revealed that much of the indifference towards CARICOM arose primarily from unmet expectations, frustrations and unrealized benefits from regional integration. I argued that the other five determinants can be understood as benefits or the product of benefits. Accordingly, the key to explaining the construction of the CARICOM identity is an understanding of how benefits are perceived and
transferred to the people of the region. The study found that individuals co-located the regional identity with benefits such as greater acceptance in member countries, freedom to travel within member countries, inclusion and information sharing, more political actions from regional governments to enact a regional identity and improved welfare of the region through integration.

Accordingly, the findings suggest that improvements in macro conditions (at national governments and CARICOM levels) must be prioritized to ensure that benefits are visible and well understood. Nonetheless, as explained throughout this thesis, the identity construction process is an interplay of personal agency and social relations. Without enabling structures and social cohesion, there will be a lack of alignment between external and internal identities, and as shown in this study, the resultant identity will be shallow, and without deep roots. Below, I specifically examine how personal reflections (self), social relations and structure constrained and enabled the construction of the CARICOM identity.

**10.03 Agency & the CARICOM Identity**

According to Giddens, humans have intentional qualities that allow them to construct their realities, form attachments, and resist or adapt to changes (Giddens, 1991). From this viewpoint, humans can choose how they identify themselves, through personal reflections and by rationalizing meanings. Within this study, CARICOM intra-regional migrants often resisted framing their identities with reference to CARICOM. As noted earlier, CARICOM identity choices were primarily driven by reflections on the benefits gained and personal meanings that people derived from CARICOM. The following were what respondents identified to be both meaningful and beneficial: the ability to travel and seize opportunities in member countries, the feeling of being a part of a larger whole, and access to regional institutions. Giddens (1991:54) posits that a person’s identity is formed through the continual integration of “events, which occur
in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing 'story' about the self”. This means that beneficial social relations and structural policies influence how people rationalize their identity choices. This is consistent with studies in the European Union (Hooge & Marks, 2004), which also reveal that individual rationalities were partly influenced by the benefits associated with the supranational identity.

10.04 Social Relations & the CARICOM Identity

Social relationships also greatly influenced the formation of identities in CARICOM. In some regards, the findings from this study support the contact hypothesis, which asserts that intergroup relations can reduce prejudice and create social harmony. Respondents who reported feeling like they belonged in CARICOM member states and those who had positive overall experiences in member countries were more attached to CARICOM than those who did not. While most respondents rated their migratory experiences as positive overall, this appeared to be through social relations formed with others migrants rather than locals. The experience of being an intra-regional migrant appeared to provide bonding benefits; however, it did not translate into seamless integration in host countries, or in significant attachments to CARICOM. Less than half of the survey respondents felt like they belonged, and this significantly affected attachments to CARICOM. Most respondents described feeling like outsiders or excluded while living in CARICOM member states. Migration also facilitated tensions and discriminations among different nationalities, which also negatively affected attachments to CARICOM. These findings therefore contradict the commonly held assumption that by facilitating the free movement of people, regional affection will grow and a CARICOM identity will strengthen (CARICOM Secretariat, 2005; Hall, 2012; Patterson 2007). Instead, they suggest that the building of a regional identity goes beyond providing opportunities for people to interact. There needs to be
more public education to educate people about the benefits of intra-regional migration, so that migrants are better incorporated in their host countries.

10.05 Structure, Regionalism & the CARICOM Identity

Whilst respondents tended to denounce their social experiences, especially the feeling of being outsiders in member countries, they were most vocal about the structural weaknesses in CARICOM. These weaknesses primarily concerned policy mechanism, which led to delays in deepening regional integration, and in making free movements of people easier and more accessible to all regional citizens. In particular, respondents desired common economic policies throughout the region, better communication of information, and clearer understandings of CARICOM’s goals and purposes. Most respondents reacted against the absence of these by withholding their attachments to CARICOM, making it contingent on the delivery of these benefits. The resistance to the CARICOM identity was facilitated by the salience and pervasiveness of national identities, which acted as a cushion to their disappointments and frustrations with CARICOM. The CARICOM identity might therefore be at risk of not deepening or even retracting if individual countries can deliver the desired benefits without integrating; in the case of Belize and Suriname, other integration initiatives such as with neighboring countries might offer better alternatives or provide these benefits.

The emphasis placed on disappointments, frustration and on the realization of benefits from integration as inhibitors to the development of the CARICOM identity can be explained in two ways. First, it signified weak integration, which respondents viewed as costly to the region. In addition, it means that the region is failing to capitalize on the potential benefits. In accordance with the literature that suggests that supranational identities are driven by pragmatic imperatives (Boxill, 1993; Hogg et al, 1995; Marks, 1999), CARICOM nationals often engaged
in cost-benefit analysis as they discussed the state of regionalism. In particular, respondents were
cognizant of the vulnerabilities of CARICOM states, and believed that integration can help the
region overcome the threats of these vulnerabilities. Integration was generally seen as positive,
particularly as a means of giving the region global presence that no individual could achieve on
its own. Second, respondents believed that the region’s resources can be best utilized if they are
pooled together. As chapter 5 demonstrates, respondents saw regional integration and
CARICOM as beneficial, but conceived the benefits as potentials rather than actuals. This is
important because as Haas (1976:23) states, supranationalism is successful when “national actors
perceive that their interests are best served by the delegation of national decision powers to the
new supranational body into one field, it is likely that they will apply the lessons to integration
elements in other fields”. However, CARICOM nationals did not perceive that it is acting in their
best interest, which was reflected in the apathy towards CARICOM.

The connection between integration and identity that this research uncovered contradicts
existing knowledge concerning Caribbean identities. Leading Caribbean scholars such as
Nettleford (1987) and Boxill (1993:29) argued that the development of a sense of identity is a
prerequisite for the achievement of economic or political integration without coercion. The
evidence from this study suggests the reverse. Respondents felt like regionalism needs to develop
more before a common identity can be formed. In fact, as discussed earlier, the CARICOM
identity is latent in part because respondents want to see the real manifestation of integration and
its benefits.

The differences in attachment by citizenship region should also be a cause for concern.
Intra-regional migrants from outlying regions were most likely to feel like they belonged in other
CARICOM regions and were most attached to CARICOM, while those from the big four
countries were least likely to feel like they belonged in other member countries and were least attached. In the same breath, intra-regional migrants who settled in outlying countries were most likely to feel like they belonged while those who settled in big four countries were least likely to feel like they belonged in those countries. This suggests that in order to build a more universal regional identity, CARICOM needs to give special attention to the big four countries to understand their challenges and put the necessary interventions in place to enhance the spirit of regionalism in those countries. Lessons should also be learnt from the outlying and OECS countries in order to replicate their enthusiasm about the regional identity. Without improving migratory experiences in the big four, and the attitudes of their citizens towards a regional identity, it will be difficult for a CARICOM identity to take real root, given the influence these countries wield in the region. In addition, most intra-regional migrants settled in one of the big four countries.

10.06 Migration & the CARICOM Identity

This study also found that attachments to CARICOM remained unchanged post-migration for just over a half of the sample. This is significant because even though most persons were disappointed and frustrated with integration in CARICOM, and indicated that they would increase their attachments to CARICOM if integration improves, it also means that they did not decrease their attachment to CARICOM in spite of its shortcoming. In fact, almost a third of the survey sample became more attached to CARICOM and only 11 per cent became less attached. Hence there is some stability and acceptance of the CARICOM identity in its latent form. The challenge, therefore seemed to be how to move the CARICOM identity from its embryonic form to maturity.
In terms of rationalizing their identity transformation status, respondents whose CARICOM identities improved after migration pointed to the fact that migration helped them to learn about other cultures and other people, and it gave meaning to their identities in a global context. It also equipped them with the tools to successfully integrate in other CARICOM countries. Thus, despite the fact that attachments to CARICOM remained unchanged post-migration for just over a half of the sample it appears that it is still a useful tool to facilitate integration. This suggests that if people feel that integration is being pursued in a purposeful and beneficial way, migration could actually increase the formation of a regional identity.

10.07 Social Policy & the CARICOM Identity

Two of the main findings of this study are that the development of the CARICOM identity is contingent on CARICOM providing meaningful benefits to citizens and engaging with citizens through better dissemination of information. Respondents therefore demanded policy changes on matters such as the deepening of regional integration, communication and the administration of regionalism across member states. The dominant perception of current regional integration was that it was rudimentary, and lacking motivation, drive, purpose and direction. CARICOM was also held responsible for the current state of integration, and for failing to inspire a regional identity. CARICOM therefore serves as a source of disappointment and frustration for respondents; and in these ways, it is a liability for the development of a regional identity. Thus, changing the perceptions about regional integration through definitive policy actions can significantly impact the development of a CARICOM identity. CARICOM can achieve these by creating channels through which citizens and outlying countries can participate, where information is communicated openly and is accessible, where there is true integration, and where there is consistency in the application of regional policies across member countries.
Specifically, CARICOM needs to create an agenda, which documents the status of the agreed on goals, and sets specific deadlines to achieve them. In addition, there needs to be a system of accountability for both CARICOM and member countries. This should include appropriate remedies for failures, which might include sanctions. Wickham et al (2004) note that some countries lack the resources needed to implement and administer agreed-on plans. CARICOM must assess, and make the necessary interventions in each member state to ensure that each is equipped to implement and administer agreed on targets. This would ensure consistency in the administration of policies across the region, which would make intra-regional travels more pleasant. Table 5.15 shows that the majority of CARICOM institutions are located in only a few countries. While it might not be possible to relocate CARICOM institutions, it is important that CARICOM build the capacities of these countries, by giving them more opportunities to host regional meetings or similar affairs. This would also increase CARICOM’s visibility, and contribute to a sense of inclusivity among citizens in these countries.

One of the key frustrations for respondents in this study concerned the status of free movement of people. Respondents recommended making it more accessible for the general population and easier for those who are already making use of existing provisions. While it might not be possible to implement this immediately, CARICOM needs a better communication framework to inform people about the status on key policies such as free movements. People need to be kept informed about why policies are being delayed, what actions are being taken and when they are likely to be resolved. In any case, the broadening of free moments must be done in concert with public education across the region to inform constituents of their rights and responsibilities regarding movement. This would also mean informing people of the benefits of intra-regional travels and encouraging citizens to be more receptive of each other.
Another recommendation is that CARICOM addresses the perception that it has failed at integration. CARICOM needs to listen, and assure people that their voices are being heard. This means acknowledging their concerns, but also publicizing CARICOM’s successes. In addition, there needs to be better communications of the visions and goals of CARICOM. The study found little evidence that intra-regional migrants were totally resistant to a CARICOM identity. Instead, it found that their resistance was in protest against CARICOM’s failures, uncertainties and their exclusion. This would suggest that if CARICOM can address the causes of these resistances, people would be more inclined to be attached to CARICOM. Overall, the findings indicate that in order to fulfill its goal of being a people-centred institution, built on the pillar of the social assets of its people, engagement of people is paramount. CARICOM therefore needs a specialist body to manage communications with people, and it needs to make use of the ways in which people gather information. This would mean greater use of communications technologies, social networking, information booths, media campaigns or other innovative methods of dissemination.

This specialist communications arm should also work on rebranding the image of CARICOM. People will not associate with a body that is perceived as a failure. The literature suggests that supranational institutions play a key role to play in the development of postnational identities (Bruter, 2005; Cerutti, 1992; Hooghe et al, 2004). Herman et al, (2004), for example, note that the EU plays a key role in shaping how states define themselves. They argue that institutions provide information, enhance confidence and help to fill deficits that hinder trust, and are “successful if they generate trust in themselves. [As a result], participants can cooperate because they trust the institutions and not other participants” (Herman et al, 2004:10). Within CARICOM, this public relations could engage with citizens, be a reference point and develop strategies to engender trust.
Finally, CARICOM needs to be careful about how it treats the outlying countries, especially Belize and Suriname, which are being influenced by their Central American and South American neighbours. The exit of these countries would reduce the diversity of the body, and weaken CARICOM’s global presence. CARICOM leaders should therefore heed respondents from outlying countries’ calls for more regional presence in their countries and for better sharing of information so they can be better appreciated in the region. CARICOM must actively promote itself in these countries, and make itself relevant to their geo-political realities. At the same time, the weak attachments of the big four must be addressed. These are the main source and destination countries; they also have the greatest influence on regional integration. It must be remembered that the West Indies Federation broke up with the exit of Jamaica. Weak regional identities in the big four could give rise to identity politics, which could derail CARICOM. CARICOM must therefore develop an action plan to address concerns in these countries and promote the benefits of integration to these countries.

10.08 Limitations & Agenda for Future Research

The primary limitation of the study is that it targeted a specialist group, with a fairly small sample size. While intra-regional migration is more relevant to the elite sample, the issue of CARICOM identity is relevant to all. Furthermore, intra-regional migration and attitude towards integration are just two factors that affect the development of a CARICOM identity. Therefore, future research could use a more representative sample, and explore other factors such as attitude of national government or the media to understand how the CARICOM identity is formed. In addition, a larger sample would allow for the disaggregation of the attachment variable by individual countries, and other socio-demographic characteristics. In this research, the relatively small sample meant that many of the independent variables had to be grouped
together in order to produce meaningful results. A better disaggregated data would help to better target policies to address specific issues identified by people.

Some variables were skewed heavily in particular directions, such as ‘integration wishes’. It is uncertain if this was due to the relative homogeneity of the sample and its small size. A broader and larger sample would clarify the true extent of these attitudes. Furthermore, with 15 countries in CARICOM and a sample size of less than 300 respondents, the data could not be reliably disaggregated by country, especially because some countries just had a handful of participants. This was overcome by grouping countries according to region, but whilst this facilitated macro analyses, it did not readily lend itself to understanding how the CARICOM identity differed at more micro levels. Thus a more representative sample would allow one to delineate such differences, leading to deeper understanding of the CARICOM identity.

Social relations were found to significantly affect the construction of the CARICOM identity; however, it was outside the scope of this study to explore the nature of these relationships in detail. Future research could explore the formation, composition and maintenance of these relationships, and specifically examine how they contribute to intra-regional migrants’ integration and lived experiences in host countries. In addition, future research could study how social relationships and networks (such as migrant organizations) contribute to the construction of the regional identity. Furthermore, researchers are pointing to the importance of transnational relations as a way of maintaining identities; future research could investigate how this is manifested among intra-regional migrants within CARICOM.

The need for specific policy geared towards improving intraregional migratory experiences was recommended as one of the key outputs from this research. However, this study only examined the impact of policies on people; future research could look at the existing
policies themselves to assess whether they are adequate, and to assess what new ones would be
needed as the CARICOM identity and integration process deepens. In addition, the situation of
the outlying states must be investigated further to assess and make recommendations on how best
to identify and address the risks posed by their outlying status, and by their involvement in
multiple supranational bodies.

In addition, as the notion of CARICOM identity gains prominence, areas for future
research could include examining how the CARICOM identity co-exists with the other identities
in the region. For example, the designation “CARICOM national” is fairly recent while
designations such as “Caribbean” or “West Indian” are well entrenched in the region. Future
research could examine the meanings of these designations and assess how people rationalize
them against the “CARICOM identity”. In addition, the study points out that intra-regional
migrants use the CARICOM identity strategically through framing and engagements. Future
studies could explore the use of these strategies, and their outcomes. In addition, it would be
interesting to find out how these framing and engagement processes impact deep-seated
identities.

Overall, the findings validated the theoretical flexibility employed in the study. The plural
nature of the 15 member states within CARICOM meant that it would be difficult for one theory
to completely explain the process of identity construction within the region. Nonetheless, each
theory helped to explain varying elements of the identity construction process. For example, the
strong support for integration and the solidarity expressed with regards to respect for regional
institutions, shared language, customs and heritage indicated an ‘imagined’ sense of
supranational identity (Anderson, 2006). In addition, the imagined identity is a feature of the
supranational model of identity formation, wherein political stability, economic development and
sense of peoplehood were seen to drive post-national identities (Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Furthermore, in accordance with the Giddens, Habermas and social constructivism, the study found that identity construction is mitigated by the interrelations of agency, structure and social relations.

Cornell and Hartmann’s (2006) six ‘sites’ of identity construction was also useful to explaining the formation of the CARICOM identity, particularly, culture, daily experiences, politics and social institutions. However, labour market and residential space were less significant in the shaping intra-regional CARICOM migrants’ identities, probably because the educational status of respondents mitigated the effects of these sites. Nonetheless, this suggests that ‘sites’ of identity construction contribute in varying measures to migrant’s sense of being. Given the importance of benefits and meanings to the constructions of identity, Cornell and Hartmann’s (2006) six sites might be better assessed in terms of the unique benefits/costs that they provide to people in order to determine their relative importance to the process. Existing theories might also be enhanced by incorporating analyses of pragmatic interests and internal meanings.

The discussion so far demonstrates that national and supranational leadership cannot assume the automatic formation of a regional identity merely through the establishment of treaties, legislations or other political actions. The findings help to explain how individuals rationalize their identity choices, and how they can be motivated by actions which they believe confer benefits to them personally, to their individual countries and to the region on a whole. It confirms that the CARICOM identity is fluid, strategic and multiple. As a result, the construction of migrant’ identities might be best conceived as ongoing and created through a process of continuous negotiation. CARICOM and regional government must therefore design policies that
resonate with people as both beneficial and meaningful. In addition, it is important to create environments within CARICOM where people can freely meet, move and interact with each. This could foster meaningful social relationships between different nationals, and increase the attractiveness of a regional identity. Thus, the thesis demonstrate that the formation of a regional identity within a supranational space is not automatic, but depends on the meaningfulness of policies and social relations to people, who ultimately negotiate the factors that determine their personal identities.

In closing, this research found that existing theorizing on identity formation has greatly enhanced our understanding of the complexities of identities, including: ways of describing identities (for example, multiple, fragmented, fluid and deterritorial); sites of formation (see Cornel’s constructivist approach); the characteristics of identities (for example, their composition, negotiated features, and aspects of group membership and belonging); and how multiple identities interrelate (for example in concentric or cross-cutting manner). The study used structuration, constructivism, Anderson’s imagined identities, migration analyses and social identity theory to explain identity formation among intra-regional migrants within CARICOM. Used in this multiple fashion, they provided nuanced descriptions and analyses of the status of supranational identity within CARICOM; however, they do not adequately explain what motivates the formation of identities in a supranational context. In the same breath, the thesis emphasizes the importance of benefits and personal meanings in driving identity decisions. The research therefore has two implications for theorizing supranational identities: first, identity theories and researchers must begin to incorporate the issues that people find meaningful in their lives. In other words, identity theories must address pragmatic issues, including the economics of identity decisions. Second, supranational identity theorizing must contend with issues of
institutional governance and politics, and how they constrain/enable post-national identities. This means that it is not only important to view identities as fluid and negotiated, but their sensitivities to external stimuli such as economics, politics and social conditions warrant that they be studied in more interdisciplinary contexts. As a result, researchers of supranational identity formation might adopt theoretical triangulation in the future to study identities. In so doing, and as this research demonstrates, not only is it possible to push the boundaries of studying identities from single to multiple theoretical frameworks, but it is possible to extend existing analyses to incorporate the impact of pragmatic realities of personal, social and structural existence on the formation of supranational identities.
REFERENCES


UNECLAC. (2006). Migration in the Caribbean-what do we know? Expert group meeting on international migration and development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Port of Spain: UNECLAC.


APPENDIX A – QUESTIONNAIRE

Migration History

Question 1: Apart from your primary country of citizenship, how many CARICOM countries have you ever lived in for more than two months?

a. Zero ☐
   b. One ☐
   c. Two ☐
   d. Three ☐
   e. Four or more ☐

End of Survey

Question 2: Have you ever lived in a non-CARICOM country?

Yes ☐ No ☐

Identity

Question 2: Please identify your country of birth, current residence, home country, country of citizenship and the country that you are most attached to. Please select a response(s) in the appropriate column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>Where is home</th>
<th>Where you currently live</th>
<th>Country of Citizenship (select all that apply)</th>
<th>Country Most Attached to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Birth</td>
<td>Where is home</td>
<td>Where you currently live</td>
<td>Country of Citizenship (select all that apply)</td>
<td>Country Most Attached to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (State)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 3:** In general, which in the following list is most important to describe who you are? And which is the second most important? (Please tick one box in each column)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Important</th>
<th>Second Most Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Your race/ethnic background</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Your gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Your age group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Your religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Your citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Your family background</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Your social class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. CARICOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 4:** How close do you feel to…? (Please tick one box on each line)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A great deal</th>
<th>Quite a lot</th>
<th>Not very much</th>
<th>None at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your country of primary citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-group in CARICOM (e.g. OECS Windward Island or Leeward Island)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wider Caribbean (including non-CARICOM Member countries)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 5: Would you say that you feel closer to fellow CARICOM nationals than non-CARICOM countries for example American, British, or Asian people? (Please, choose ONE ONLY)

a. Yes, strongly
b. Yes, to some extent
c. I don’t know
d. No, not really
e. No, not at all

Question 6: Some people say that the following things are important for being truly (insert nationality). Others say that they are not so important. Personally, how important do you think each of the following is… (Please tick one box on each line)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Fairly Important</th>
<th>Not Very Important</th>
<th>Not Important at all</th>
<th>Can’t choose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. To have been born in [country of citizenship]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. To have [country] citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. To have lived in [country] for most of one’s life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. To be able to speak the local dialect of [country]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. To respect [nationality] political institutions and laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. To feel [country nationality]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. To have [country’s] ancestry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 7: Some people say that the following things are important for being a CARICOM national. Others say that they are not so important. How important for you think each of the following is… (Please tick one box on each line)
a. To have been born in a CARICOM member state
   □ □ □ □ □
b. To have citizenship in a CARICOM member state
   □ □ □ □ □
c. To have lived within a CARICOM member state for most of one’s life
   □ □ □ □ □
d. To be able to speak English fluently
   □ □ □ □ □
e. To be able to speak the dialect of at least one CARICOM country
   □ □ □ □ □
f. To respect CARICOM’s institutions and laws
   □ □ □ □ □
g. To feel like a CARICOM national
   □ □ □ □ □
h. To have some ancestry in CARICOM
   □ □ □ □ □

**Question 8:** If you should hear someone who is not a national of your country speaking negatively of it, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Much</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 9:** If you should hear someone who is not a CARICOM national speaking negatively about it, to what extent do you feel personally criticized?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Much</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Experiences & Activities in other CARICOM Countries

**Question 10:** Regarding the two most recent CARICOM countries that you lived in, what was the primary purpose of your travel?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Most Recent Country</th>
<th>Second Most Recent Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leisure/Tourism</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Term Migration</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have citizenship there as well</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’ve only lived in one</td>
<td></td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 11:** By what means did you obtain settlement in the two most recent CARICOM countries that you lived in?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Most Recent</th>
<th>Second Most Recent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work Permit</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Visa</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Seeker</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSME Skilled National</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored by a Citizen of that country</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entered as a Visitor</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’ve only lived in one</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Question 12:** If you have obtained a CARICOM skilled certification, under what category did you obtain it?

a. I do not have a CARICOM skilled national certificate  ☐

b. University graduate  ☐

c. Artist  ☐

d. Musician  ☐

e. Sport  ☐

f. Media personnel  ☐

**Question 13:** In the most recent CARICOM country that you have lived in (outside of your home country), would you say:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

a. It was very positive experience

b. I felt like I belonged

c. I felt like I was afforded equal opportunity to participate in social life

d. I felt like I was afforded equal opportunity in the work place

e. I would consider living there for good

f. I was greatly involved in the social activities in that country

g. I was very interested in the politics of the country

h. I read that country newspaper daily

i. I watched news in that country daily

j. I invested financially in that country (such as in stocks, property, business ventures)

**Question 14:** While living in the most recent CARICOM country, how often did you…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Often</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

a. Visit your home country  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐

b. Dream of returning to your home country  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐

c. Read newspapers in your home country  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐

d. Participate in activities by your home country association in that society  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐

e. Send money to your home country  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐
f. Participate in civic activities in your home country


g. Engage in business activities in your home country


h. Engage in the politics of your home country


i. Engage regularly in family affairs in your home country


Question 15: In the past 12 months, have you…?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Socialised with people from another CARICOM country
b. Visited another CARICOM country from the one you live in
c. Read newspapers from another CARICOM country
d. Used the internet to purchase products from another CARICOM country

Question 16: Compared to before you first lived in another CARICOM member state, how attached are you now to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>More Attached</th>
<th>Unchanged</th>
<th>Less Attached</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your country of citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The most recent CARICOM state that I lived in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The second most recent CARICOM state that I lived in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM on a whole</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional Integration

Question 17: How much have you heard or read about CARICOM?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. A lot
b. Quite a bit
c. Nothing Much
d. Nothing at all

e. A lot

Question 18: In general, are you in favour or against efforts to bring Caribbean countries closer together?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Very much in favour
b. Somewhat in favour
c. Neutral
d. Somewhat against

e. Very much against

f. Unsure

**Question 19:** Which of the following best corresponds to your wishes for CARICOM?

a. It needs to stop all efforts to integrate

b. It needs to reverse all changes that have been made towards integration

c. It needs to slow down integration activities

d. It does not need to integrate any more

e. It needs to increase the pace of integration but only moderately

f. It needs to increase the pace of integration much faster

**Question 20:** In general, what do you think of your country of citizenship membership in CARICOM?

a. Very positive

b. Somewhat positive

c. Neither positive nor negative

d. Somewhat negative

e. Very negative

**Question 21:** How do you feel about other CARICOM nationals living in your country of citizenship?

a. I think it is a good idea

b. I don’t hold any opinion

c. I don’t think it’s a good idea

**Question 23:** How do you feel about sharing the burden of educating people from other CARICOM country through your home country’s contribution to regional institutions such as the University of the West Indies and the Caribbean Examinations Council?

a. Very much in favour

b. Somewhat in favour

c. Neutral

d. Somewhat against

e. Very much against

f. Unsure
**Question 22:** How knowledgeable are you about your rights to travel within CARICOM member states?

a. I know my rights very well [ ]

b. I know a little about my rights [ ]

c. I am not sure [ ]

d. I don’t know enough about my rights [ ]

**Question 23:** What would you say are the main achievements of CARICOM and which have been personally beneficial to you? (Select all that apply)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achievement</th>
<th>Personally Beneficial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It has made the process of travelling within CARICOM easier</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has made the process of living in other CARICOM states easier</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has unifying the region’s education system</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has fostered a regional identity</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has made it easier to study within the region</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has brought more unity between member countries</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has given the region a global political voice</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has strengthened the region’s economy</td>
<td>[ ] [ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 24:** How much benefit do you think your primary country of citizenship has gained from membership in CARICOM?

a. A great deal [ ]

b. Quite a few benefits [ ]

c. Not many benefits [ ]

d. Not sure [ ]

e. No benefits [ ]

**Question 25:** The Caribbean Community has meant different things to different people. From the list below, please indicate the extent of your agreement with what CARICOM means to you personally? CARICOM means….

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Unsure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing to me personally</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A shared heritage/history with other people in the Caribbean</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater access to regional institutions</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to travel to other CARICOM country</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e. Membership in the Caribbean family
f. Greater representation for me and my country in the wider world
g. Belonging to a more powerful body than only my home country
h. Other (please state)___________

Question 26: Has your knowledge of CARICOM impacted how you would define yourself?

a. A lot □
b. Quite a bit □
c. Nothing Much □
d. Nothing at all □

Integration and Symbols
Question 27: It is argued that despite the numerous differences among countries in CARICOM, they share a common heritage that make them closer to each other than to other countries of the world (for example the United States, the UK etc.) What is your opinion?

a. Strongly disagree □
b. Somewhat disagree □
c. Neither agree nor disagree □
d. Somewhat agree □
e. Strongly agree □

Question 28: It is proposed that CARICOM should compete as a single team at international events such as the Olympics etc. What is your opinion?

a. Strongly disagree □
b. Somewhat disagree □
c. Neither agree nor disagree □
d. Somewhat agree □
e. Strongly agree □

Question 29: Since 2005, citizens from all countries of CARICOM have a common CARICOM passport on which the name of their country and “CARICOM” is written. Do you think that this is a good idea?

a. Yes, it’s a very good idea □
b. It makes no difference □
c. No, it’s not a very good idea □
**Question 30:** In general, what would your reaction be towards plans to replace your country’s national symbols (such as flags) with CARICOM equivalents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral/Unsure</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 34:** To what extent do the following symbols impact how you define yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A great deal</th>
<th>Quite a Lot</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Just a little</th>
<th>none at all</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- a. CARICOM Passport
- b. Caribbean Examinations Council
- c. West Indies Cricket team
- d. University of the West Indies

**General Questions**

**Question 31:** Age Group

18-25 □ 26-30 □ 31-35 □ 36-40 □ 41-45 □ 46-50 □ 51 or over □

**Question 32:** Gender

Are you...

- Male □
- Female □

**Question 33:** Marital Status:

- a. Single □
- b. Divorced □
- c. Separated □
- d. Married □
- e. Widowed □
- f. Living with Partner □

**Question 34:** Did any of your family (e.g. parents, grandparents, cousins, uncles/aunts) come from another CARICOM country?

- a. Yes □
- b. No □

**Question 34a:** If yes to question 37, which family member?
a. A parent(s) □
b. A grandparent (s) □
c. An aunt/uncle (s) □
d. A cousin □
e. Other relative (please state) ______________

**Question 35:** What is your highest level of education you have completed?

Some elementary / secondary / high school □
Completed secondary / high school □
Some technical, community college □
Completed technical, community college □
Some university □
Bachelor’s degree □
Master’s degree □
Professional degree or doctorate □

**Question 36:** What is your current occupation? (Select the one that best apply)

a. Student □ Agricultural/Farmer □
b. Professional/Technical □ Artistic/Crafts □
c. Managerial □ Sales (salesperson, broker, etc.) □
d. Services □ Government/Public Services □
e. Clerical □ Retired □
f. Skilled Trade □ Laborer □
g. Self-employed □ Unemployed □
h. Other (please state) ____________________________________________

**Question 37:** What is your religion?

a. Christian □
b. Muslim □
c. Hindu □
d. Rastafarian □
e. Other □

**Question 38:** What is your ethnicity?

a. Black □
b. Indian □
c. White □
d. Chinese □
e. Mixed □
f. Other □

**Consent To Be Contacted For Further Research**

In order to gather more in depth understandings of your experiences of migration within CARICOM, the researcher will also be conducting semi-structured interviews will be conducted
internet (e.g. skype/yahoo messenger etc.) or via the telephone. Are you willing to be contacted to participate in these interviews?

Yes □ (CONTINUE)
No □ (SKIP TO CONCLUSION)

If yes, Please enter your information:
Name (optional)_________________
E-mail address ____________________
Telephone Number (Optional)___________

CONCLUSION

Thank you very much for participating. Those are all the questions that I have!
APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Where is home? What does home mean to you?

2. How would you describe the process of moving from your home country to another CARICOM state? Who/What motivated your decision?

3. How would you describe your settlement in another CARICOM country? What was the experience like? Did you enjoy it? Why do you think your experience was like this?

4. How do you identify yourself? Have you always felt this way? If not what made you change your view on your identity? How do you express this identity? (Clothes, food, politics, etc.)

5. Do you think that your identity has changed over time, or have you always seen yourself as you are now? (In what ways – give examples)

6. Do you think increased intra-regional migration can foster a greater sense of CARICOM identity? Why? Did it increase your personal sense of Caribbean-ness?

7. If you had to identify two or three factors that have had a particular influence upon your identity what would they be?

8. How do you maintain contact with your home country when you are abroad? How often? With whom? What kind of activities do you engage in?

9. Do you think that CARICOM is important to who you are? Do you feel a personal sense of belonging in the CARICOM?

10. Have any of the initiatives implemented by CARICOM made you felt more attached to the region? Which ones? In what ways?

11. How would you describe your nationality? Has this ever changed?

12. Have you ever felt discriminated in any way while in another CARICOM country?
13. Do you have close friends in another CARICOM Country? Are your friends primarily from your country of origin or the host country or a variety of other countries?
   - Have they ever spoken about CARICOM? If yes, what are their views about integration? Do you share these views?
   - Would you say that they have a positive attitude about people from your country?
14. Do you engage in national events from your home country while in a CARICOM country?
15. Do you participate in your home country’s national activities?
16. Have you ever had any difficulties identifying as a CARICOM national? (Fear of negative reaction? If so, which situations/Why/Why do you think they responded in that way?)
17. Who do you think is or can be a CARICOM national/ your nationality? Why?
18. What do you think being (your nationality/CARICOM national) means/What does it mean to be (your nationality/CARICOM national)?
19. Are there differences between people from your home country and other CARICOM member countries? (use your settlement country as an example) In what ways?
20. Do you think that your opinions about CARICOM differ from most persons in your home country? Explain.
21. Do you think that your opinions about CARICOM differ from most persons in the CARICOM country (ies) that you resided in? In what ways?
22. To which country do you feel closest to and least close to: your home country, your host CARICOM country or the wider CARICOM region? Why?
23. Do you think that your home country is doing enough in CARICOM? Should they increase or decrease their involvement? Are they doing enough for their citizens?

24. Is CARICOM doing enough for citizens of the region? Why or why not? What do they need to work on? Has it been personally beneficial to you?
### APPENDIX C – LIST OF CARICOM INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR HEADQUARTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Location of Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM Secretariat/Headquarters</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Development Fund</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Court of Justice</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Competition Commission</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Meteorological Institute</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Meteorological Organization</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Environmental Health Institute</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians</td>
<td>Rotating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Centre for Development Administration</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Public Health Agency</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Examinations Council</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Aviation Safety &amp; Security Oversight System</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime &amp; Security</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM Agriculture Health &amp; Food Safety Agency</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Knowledge Learning Network Agency</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Telecommunications Union</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM Regional Organization for Standard &amp; Quality</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanisms</td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre</td>
<td>Belize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Organization of Tax Administrators</td>
<td>Rotating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ASSOCIATE INSTITUTIONS (RECOGNIZED IN THE TREATY)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Location of Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Guyana</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the West Indies</td>
<td>Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Law institute</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean States)</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Caribbean Secretariat [www.caricom.org](http://www.caricom.org)
APPENDIX D - PARTICIPATING MIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS

1. Jamaican Association of Barbados
2. Jamaican Association of Belize
3. Guyanese Association of Barbados
4. Jamaican Students Association in Trinidad & Tobago
5. Barbados Student Association in Trinidad & Tobago
6. Trinidad & Tobago Association of Barbados
7. University of the West Indies Alumni Association