PROLEGOMENON TO
INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
INVOLVING THE ADMINISTRATION
OF EDUCATION

A Dissertation
Submitted to the College of Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Educational Administration
University of Saskatchewan
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by
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ABSTRACT

Human history is marked by progressive stages of dominant human interrelation patterns. Marx examined these patterns and believed that history could be understood as a variation on a Fichtian science of material dialectics where a thesis would meet its antithesis, and a new synthesis would emerge from the violent struggle found at their intersection. This dissertation takes a slightly different perspective, concentrating on the contemporary stage of dominant human interrelation patterns, their origin, and consequences from an educational organisation perspective.

This is an emerging discussion of the foundational and philosophical structures of interorganisational relationships involving educational administration. Beginning with a discussion of the origins and development of contemporary relational structures writ large—in terms of social, political, and economic antecedents—I show how their convergence around a dual falsehood has produced a self-perpetuating dominance in the modern era. The dual falsehood is manifest in the conflation of science and technology, and social Darwinist assumptions of human nature. Misunderstanding the nature of this dual falsehood, proponents of post-modernity are exposed as providing an anaemic or counterproductive response to the problems of modernity.

I explore the particular problems of modernity faced by education as a general area of study and practice, and educational administration more specifically. The root of these problems is demonstrated in a misalignment of (a) dominant relational
structures falsely self-declaring their basis in science, and (b) education as a genuine scientific pursuit (as defined herein). I further explore psychopathologies of relationships when negotiated in terms of such false self-declared and contextually dominant beliefs. The implications of psychopathological relationship negotiations are discussed for educational administration and strategies are explored for educational leadership and advocacy.

Two stages of correction for the dominant issues described herein are posited on behalf of educational organisations. Stage one advocates the construction of a singular definition of pedagogy for public consumption. Stage two articulates areas of responsibility for various *intra*organisational elements within education. The purpose of stage two is to disseminate widespread propaganda based upon Habermas’ (1970) communicative competence to eradicate dysfunctional communication that perpetuates the dominance of modern and post-modern relational structures. Furthermore, stage two advocates the adoption of Mouffe’s *agonistic* position for interorganisational relations between education and non-education entities. Stages are to be evaluated in terms of an adaptation upon Giddens’ (1979) analysis of sedimented practices of educational administration within the context of the Mouffian (2005) *political*.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is with humility and respect that I acknowledge the guidance and wisdom of my doctoral supervisor, Dr. Lawrence Sackney. A project such as this involves much risk; for his trust in, and advocacy for, my ability to see it through I am forever grateful. I must also distinguish the support of two colleagues. First, Dr. Patrick Renihan, whose foresight regarding the importance of a year in New Brunswick is deeply appreciated. Dr. Renihan’s encouragement and support from my first day as a graduate student will remain as an exemplar of mentorship in my academic life. Second, Dr. Philip Peterson, who opened my eyes to the depth of my ignorance and challenged me to a Critique.

I would also like to thank the many other members of my candidacy and dissertation committees over the past five years. Drs. Billinton, Carr-Stewart, Chinnery, Noonan, Stapleton, Walker, Wickett, and Woodhouse—your encouragement and support is greatly appreciated.

Finally, I am eternally indebted to my wife Jennifer. Her unwavering love and support have meant more to me than I can express in words. My energy, perseverance and endurance continue because of your love. To our son Liam, thank you for your hugs, kisses, and laughter. They are a reminder of what is important.
DEDICATION

Jennifer and Liam 1, Monkey 0
Portions of Chapters One, Eight, and Nine, as well as portions of the Postscript, have been accepted for publication prior to the completion of this dissertation.
PREFACE

I expect the pages that follow to present an odd dissertation within the field of Educational Administration. Perhaps this is because, as van Manen (1997) and others (Morf, 1998; Palys, 1997; Schwandt, 1994, 2000; von Glasersfeld, 1991, 1998) implied, the researcher can be nothing but an integral component of his or her own work. My interests are broad, and such breadth will be demonstrable throughout. I intend to employ literature from fields including physiology, psychology, sociology, linguistics, psycholinguistics, psychohistory, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, evolutionary biology, sociobiology, political science, organisational theory, communication theory, educational psychology, research in curriculum studies and learning, educational foundations, history of education and, of course, educational administration.

While necessity may constitute sufficient justification for such an inclusive corpus, the challenge that persists is one of depth. Proof of my argumentative dexterity herein will indeed be judged on the basis of a balanced measure of depth of understanding within the context of my presented breadth of interest. The balance of these two seemingly disparate notions provides an ample test for those who maintain a wide interest—as, it can be said, depth with little breadth one calls specialization, but breadth with little depth one calls illusionary- or perhaps unfounded insight.

My larger intent in writing this dissertation appears (superficially) simple;
I seek to find proof of the obvious. In attempting so, however, I have come to appreciate Plato’s report of Socrates’ self-reflection in both the *Apology* (c. 360 BCE/1966a) and the *Symposium* (c. 360 BCE/1925) that his search for wisdom in fact yielded the extent of his ignorance. It is through a similar and personal encounter with my own faculties of thought that I have come to learn the true mass of my conceptual ignorance—but also the true, original meaning of philosophy [φιλοσοφία / filosofía]: the love and pursuit of understanding. To this end, I have learned that what appears to be an obvious conclusion is, in truth, always a point of departure.
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Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will be no need for any further enquiry.

Plato
*Phaedo*, §107b.
PART I

INTRODUCTION, METHOD, AND PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION

A. Introduction to the First Phase of the Project

When I first went to university, it was to study politics. I was fascinated by power relationships among individuals and groups and since that time my fascination has not waned, it has merely become more specific. Early in my undergraduate studies, I was mentored by my introductory political science professor—we both shared an interest in international relations, and specifically those embedded historically under the auspice of Soviet hegemony. I studied Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought and centred my research papers on contemporary issues faced by post-1991 (post-Soviet) influenced governance in East-Central Europe.

In the summer bridging my first and second year of study, I was awarded a scholarship to attend a class in Post-Soviet Societies in Transition at the State University of Chernivtsi, Ukraine. Questions that confronted students such as myself at that time related to political behaviour in contexts of change, the merits of foreign investment in emerging capitalist economies, and generational differences in political and economic behaviour in new democracies. In the senior year of my
honours degree, I wrote major papers examining predictions of likely reunification scenarios for the Korean peninsula—assuming analogies to be drawn with East and West Germany, and the imminent collapse of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north (based in part upon my own self-initiated study tour of North Korea in 1996).

Following convocation, I was one of a few to gain meaningful experience in my chosen field of study, taking a posting with the United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service in Geneva, funded by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and organised by the United Nations Association in Canada. Over the next few years I travelled in Europe and Asia, returning to Canada as the millennium changed. In the time between convocation and returning home, I had gained some experience working broadly with non-governmental organisations engaged in intra- and inter-organisational relationships.

Striking among the relationships I encountered were what appeared to be significant contextual challenges to organisational mandates and success, not the least of which included the problem of embedded assumptions about the relative power or weight afforded to partners. I had witnessed similar embedded assumptions, theoretically, in political science textbooks, but also practically in various communities during my travels. At the time, this intrigue was neglected, because I had more pressing issues to engage—specifically, finding work in Canada.

I was somewhat disappointed with the disinterest that government agencies
showed toward my applications for analyst positions. While contemplating the default position for most of my undergraduate colleagues, entering law school, I decided to point my attention in another direction—toward secondary education. Faced with what seemed to be insurmountable technocratic walls around my application to the college (political science was not, according to the College of Education, a social science), I decided to make an application for graduate studies in Educational Administration. To my surprise, my application was received and I was now left with the task of measuring the identity crisis I had just made for myself. Would I be political scientist first and educator second, or educator first and political scientist second? Was I really an educator, at all? Would there be a place for a non-teacher within the walls of a college of education and exactly what was educational administration, anyway? I thought it may be a specialized political science.

As weeks progressed into my graduate program, I came to better understand my foray into the field. Educational Administration was potentially a focused political science; and I endeavoured to construct it as such in my own mind, even if members of my cohort did not appear to view its place beyond the walls of schools or perhaps the surrounding community. For this reason, my initial topic of research interest may have appeared anomalous—a study of high school students’ experiences within catastrophic social, economic, and political change. It was obvious to me that the field was broad, after all, I had just written a thesis that did not mention the principalship, school improvement, or school-based learning communities. Even
this work was mundane in comparison to where I next focused my sights.

While in writing my master’s thesis I sought to combine school-based micro-experience with my academic history in political relationships, it became clear to me that I would next examine macro-experiences of political relationships involving school systems. At this time, I returned to my interest in partnerships involving non-governmental organisations, focusing these partnerships within education, and specifically international post-conflict delivery. Little did I realize that early attempts at writing a literature review would thrust me into a major area of research—a project for which my dissertation work might only represent the initial phase.

Two examples of serendipity would open doors of academic pursuit. The first of these emerged as I began to notice growing evidence of minimal discussion in the literature surrounding interorganisational partnerships (what I would come to more accurately employ as interorganisational relationships). Within this body of literature, I could find little meaningful discussion of the antecedents of partnered educational delivery—all of the discussion seemed to rest upon weak or assumed foundations. “Interorganisational relationships must not simply rely upon existing organisational theory: such relationships are clearly different,” I silently reaffirmed to myself. But this presumed difference was based upon nothing more solid than my feelings, not rigorous peer review.

The second example of serendipity was a reinvigoration of study in philosophy as a result of doctoral course expectations. I had studied political philosophy in
some depth during my undergraduate course work, but the philosophy under-girding a specialized political arena like education was different. It seemed to provide often indirect and sporadic pieces of support for my presumptions surrounding interorganisational relationships. Embryonic, at the time, as my theories were, I decided that something currently absent needed to be said. Precisely what or how, I did not know.

Some time for distillation elapsed. Midway through my doctoral studies, my wife and I bought a new car, packed it full of our most needful things and drove across Canada for a year of school in the Maritimes. I attended classes in educational philosophy and social science methodology toward a baccalaureate in education. At the conclusion of a year, two things happened. First, a portion of my earlier identified identity crisis evaporated—I was now an educator, and had the papers to prove it. Second, time had permitted me important reflection and I now more fully understood my program of research, doctoral and otherwise. I returned to doctoral work in great earnest.

My project of research is focused on interorganisational relationships. I continue to struggle with qualifiers—specialising adjectival phrases—such as in education, among educational entities, or between educational and noneducational entities. These addenda are helpful when depicting the differences found in relationships among contrasting organisational Forms. The first phase of my project, however, as described within the core chapters of this document, has emerged in more broad strokes than those refining its analysis into what may still
seem to many educators to be a recalcitrant and overly liberal view of the field of educational administration. This first phase seeks to describe the milieu in which contemporary interorganisational relationships operate and the disadvantaged locale from which educational organisations enter such relationships. The second phase of my project relates to the application to research methodology of the descriptive account I present in phase one. The third phase will be to test these theoretical pronouncements in real contexts—directly in international post-conflict delivery. Phases two and three are not widely discussed in this dissertation; I plan to pursue them in years to come.

1. Introduction to the Problem

1.1. Organisations, educational administration, and collaboration.

Organisations exist because humans are social beings with purpose (Hall, 1991; Hall & Tolbert, 2005). Humans find their goals more easily achieved through the collective activity of a group than on their own (Plato, c. 400 BCE/1945). The goals and purposes to which the individual subscribes provide a rationale for the organisations into which one enters. At times, these shared organisational goals and purposes complement those of other similarly constituted organisations; at other times they do not (Dewey, 1927/1963; Handy, 1988; Mulgan, 1998).²

Every organisation has engaged, or will engage, in some sort of relationship with another organisation at some point within its life (Aldrich, 1971, 1974, 1979).³ The nature of these relationships is frequently directed toward collaborative ventures
where an integration of resources is perceived as beneficial to one party, the other or both, other parties, or humanity in general (Hall & Tolbert, 2005).

Increasingly, the role of educational administration is being linked with collaborative efforts between individuals, private and public organisations, and governmental agencies (Davis & Sumara, 2001; Farmakopoulou, 2002). As a result, western governance models employed in education systems have begun a shift from a representation—organisational meta-policy or organisational ontological position—of democratic hyperrationalization (Wise, 1977) to a more individual needs-centred appreciation of existential complexity, which is no less democratically based.

Contemporary observations of this relationship are growing ever more contextual and, as a result, ever more relative (Peterson, 2002). For example, in the area of educational change, a key point of caution that appears ubiquitous is that change is unpredictable. That is to say, owing to the multiplicity of social antecedents that impact, demand or result in change, change itself never occurs in the same (nor is interpreted the same) way twice. To this end, it has been argued that a complete and singular understanding of change is neither possible, nor perhaps desirable (Böröcz, 1997; Burgess, 2003; Fullan, 2000; Moore, 1963).

A further observation of relativism in relationships arises within the area of educational leadership. The recent popularity of servant-leadership has concentrated educational leadership studies on the pleasantries of the social experience among those being led, rather than the adherence of a leader to a guiding principle or
ethic. In Spears’ (1998) collection of articles on servant-leadership, Batten (1998), for example, seemed to suggest through his *power tools for passionate living* that *asking, listening, hearing and making love visible* are of greater importance for leaders than being capable of explaining the rationale behind a vision and why that vision is appropriate—foundational notions that generally receive little or no attention within the broader work. Along a similar vein, Badaracco (2002) argued that successful leaders do what is right for those around them, seeing leadership as interested in and managing a *kaleidoscopic world* rather than perusing a *fixed target*—a largely reactionary design.

Alternatively, and from the perspective that schools are microcosms of social change, Hopkins’ (2001) research on the stereotypical models of leadership, transactional and transformational retained the underlying notion that the dynamic complexity of contemporary school-based social environments requires a transformational model. For, as Leithwood, Jantzi and Steinbeck (1999) suggested, *times change*. The transformational model for which Hopkins advocated, however, focuses the school’s orientation within change upon school improvement while maintaining foundational principles of pedagogy—student wellbeing and development. The transformational model is, in this way, broadly analogous to Etzioni’s (1967; 1986; 1989) mixed-scanning model in decision-making. In Etzioni’s model, reactionary (or precautionary) decision-making within a context of social or other change is guided by two fundamental questions that force the organisation’s foundational principles both into the open and into focus: “(1) What
is the basic mission of the organisation? and (2) What incremental decisions will move the organisation in that direction" (W. K. Hoy & Tarter, 2004, p. 49)?

The importance of such a focus will be made apparent within the larger project of my research, of which this dissertation represents early and foundational reflections. Central to my ever-developing view of interorganisational relationships remains a singular construct: educational administration and leadership must define, articulate, and advocate a unified and universal focus as the central determinant for interorganisational relations in education. I define interorganisational relations in this context, broadly, as the social relationships of educational organisations with government, business, justice, health services, among others, and how their relationships are manifested within a societal context. Yet, it is not sufficient for an organisation practitioner, especially an educational professional and administrator, to merely assume that a determination of focus, as discussed above, is instantaneously accessible to decision-makers during times of interorganisational social interaction. Rather, such an assumption is wholly irresponsible. Specifically, its presupposition that decision-makers, principals, educational leaders, teachers and students are, within an interorganisational context, are either able to (a) instantaneously and coherently articulate such focus, and (b) capably and lucidly justify or defend those articulations they have spontaneously generated. This assumption is tantamount to an infinite loop error within Etzioni’s (1967; 1986; 1989) model. In effect, by avoiding meaningful discussion of the underlying nature of a focus and irresponsibly assuming its presence, the mixed-scanning model—and similarly transformational
leadership—is, in its precise application, ill-focused. At best, such an inherent lack of focus on the foundational aspects of an organisation leads to floundering (Peterson, 2002) among the organisational participants, and, a fortiori, the organisation itself.

Further examples of this assumption of what I call the spontaneous generation of and aptitude for the justification of the organisational Form appear to greater and lesser extents within other contemporary and similarly concerned educational works (Dimmock & Walker, 2005; Shapiro & Stefkovich, 2005; Starratt, 2004; Watkins, 2005). Nevertheless, Etzioni’s and the transformational models, while assuming and therefore problematic, do represent an improved vision of decision-making and leadership when juxtaposed against more ad hoc or classical models (W. K. Hoy & Tarter, 2004)—for they recognize the importance of a fully understood point toward which organisational behaviour must be focused.

Collaborative models of service delivery characterize a growing area of interest for educational administration (Walker, 1996); this is especially true as the burden of educational opportunities for students with specific needs develops. Such models provide a third example of relativity in relationships for the purposes of the broader discussion. Much of the present literature in this area is clear in its contention that systems of service-delivery marred by duplication, stagnant institutionalism, and independent goals are not currently demonstrating a high degree of success when a client-centred principle is used as a point of reference (Chaskin & Richman, 1992; Chaudry, Polivka, & Kennedy, 2000; Clarke, Coombs, & Walton, 2003; Polivka, Dresbach, Heimlich, & Elliott, 2001; Robson & Beattie, 2004). This contention is
especially true when examined in the context of service delivery for children with exceptionalities (Robson & Beattie, 2004). Unable to step away and conceptualize the proverbial forest for the trees, services appear hidden, to the general public, from view (Chaskin & Richman, 1992), plagued by insurmountable bureaucracy (Chaskin & Richman, 1992; Robson & Beattie, 2004), and consequently abundant in general mistrust (Atkins, Graczyk, Frazier, & Adil, 2003).

Perhaps justifiably, such duplication of service has been severely criticized in recent years as competition for government funding of service programs becomes ever more desperate in neo-liberal budgeting practices (Nelson, Prilleltensky, & MacGillivary, 2001). This trend, known within public administration as the hollowing of the state, is characterized by a growing relentless reduction of active government participation in the delivery of public services (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; Bardach & Lesser, 1996). Services are hired out through contract, agencies are told to do more with less, and thus a major impetus for alternative delivery methods appears (Bazzoli et al., 1997; Certo & Pumpian, 1997; Levy & Shepardson, 1992; McCallin, 2001; Myrtle & Wilber, 1994).

An interesting by-product of the hollow state phenomenon is its obfuscation of accountability. Within the hollow state—stemming from its economic roots—accountability is seen in economic terms: based upon fiscal responsibility and the quantitative hyperrationalization (Wise, 1977) of facts and figures (Bardach & Lesser, 1996). As such, critics (Habermas, 1984, 1987) charge that such points of departure are detrimental to human services contexts when the complexity of
human systems is overlooked, or worse yet, observed exclusively through the banality of statistician’s tables. For the requisite alternative delivery methods, exemplified most predominantly in the field of human services through interagency or interorganisational collaborative relationships and initiatives, success is thus measured under the guise of distorted indicators of accountability.

Bardach and Lesser (1996) explained the situation by arguing that the outgrowth of interorganisational initiatives that is a result of the hollow state phenomenon is positive for two fundamentally important reasons. First, within interorganisational initiatives, decisions are more likely to be made by those individuals closest (or at the very least closer) to the clientele affected by the decisions (also supported by Foster-Fishman, Salem, N. E. Allen, & Fahrbach, 1999). Second, the micro-management of funding of service delivery is de-legitimised. Yet, the authors warned, offices of government that hold financial control are not quick to relinquish their control over the administrative actions of service providers and have moved to equate general accountability with financial accountability (the nouveau facade of political authority).

Questions rooted in the culture of accountability are therefore of great importance because interorganisational initiatives are contemporaneously viewed in terms of their relation to the complex realities of schools, communities, and the needs of both students with exceptionalities and their families. Indeed, much literature appears to link the complexity of contemporary environments—such as those in inclusive schools and communities—with the flexibility of interorganisational
partnerships (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; D. Allen, Lyne, & Griffiths, 2002). Yet, there are some who point out the irony of this contention, suggesting that interorganisational initiatives are themselves complex ventures, often burdened by competing goals (Atwal & Caldwell, 2002; White & Wehlage, 1995). To wit, others suggest that a multiplicity of competing goals within any organisation represents a predicate for diminished quality of service delivery (Appleton et al., 1997). Bardach and Lesser (1996) explained that, notwithstanding the distorted reality, accountability within interorganisational initiatives should be focused on that which can be made accountable to one’s partners in the initiative, because this will foster interorganisational trust of one another.

Such advice regarding accountability draws upon a similar assumption to that rooted in the critique of Etzioni’s (1967; 1986; 1989) decision-making model and transformational leadership. It assumes that partners to the relationship have a deep, accessible, clear, and accountable understanding of their organisational purpose. To complicate matters further, in an interorganisational context, this understanding is not only required for the participants’ own organisation, anything less would be seriously disingenuous and represent a pathological communicative act (Habermas, 1990/2001a). The participants must trust that their partners have a similar understanding before any form of meaningful intersubjective trust may be possible. In essence, trust is potentially obstructed by a dualistic and interlocked reliance on the earlier discussed assumption of spontaneous generation of and aptitude for the justification of the organisational Form. If this assumption remains
substantive as praxis, trust is possible. Alternatively, and—foreshadowing the case I shall argue in chapters to follow—more likely, if such a constitution of praxis is erroneous, malformed, or based upon deeply embedded fallacy, trust and ethical behaviour, despite the participants’ best intentions, will be (in a Habermasian sense) distorted and developmentally dysfunctional. In the latter case, distorted trust and distorted ethical behaviour are clearly non-examples of the hopeful end sought in Bardach and Lesser (1996).

In the study of interorganisational relations, change represents an analytic \textit{a priori} assumption—a manifest-given by virtue of the implied dynamism of relationships in space and time (Kant, 1783/1950, 1784/1982). Social interplay is similarly understood and therefore interorganisational relationships in general have a prerequisite social nature. In this regard, considerable literature since the late 1960s in the study of business- and commerce-based decision-making generally, and marketing ethics in particular, has arrived at the same conclusion (Pelton, Chowdhury, & Vitell, 1999). Peculiar, however, is the apparent reliance of this body of literature on a \textit{behavioural} description of ethics, that is codes of ethics and normative models of ethical behaviour (Pelton, Chowdhury, & Vitell, 1999).\textsuperscript{10} Such a behavioural definition I do not share; further, I intend to argue that for the very reason that relationships exist in a dynamic social theatre, such a definition merely obfuscates the central ontological and epistemic issues of importance within the assumption of \textit{spontaneous generation of and aptitude for the justification of the organisational Form}: What is the organisational (or shared interorganisational)
Form (in its Platonic sense) and how do we as organisational participants know it?

Nowhere within this document will one find an argument against the contention that the contemporary educational environment is dynamic, complex, or at times chaotic—indeed, it may be ever-more so as time progresses (Burgess, 2003; Fullan, 1991, 1993, 2000, 2001; Lieberman & Miller, 2004). Yet, despite, and perhaps because of, the complexity of the milieu in which education exists, this dissertation will show that it is necessary for an institution of public significance to be guided by a singular and salient end—an end around which the diversity of anomalous circumstances remains fast. Though the end to which I refer may seem a flight of fancy, as my arguments unfold in chapters to follow, the necessity of this end for the justification and maintenance of a practice claiming professionalism outweighs any argument that may stifle or make to be folly its pursuit.

While the intent of the previous paragraphs has been to introduce a number of issues around which my broader project of research will find its place, the sections that follow introduce the reader first to the space this dissertation occupies within the field of interorganisational relationships, and second to a contextual position. Although most statements of context provide an informative background to a piece of writing, I present in section 3. a statement describing the framework at which I intend to arrive.
2. A Place within the Knowledge Base

The literature on interorganisational relationships is vast, and several attempts have been made to provide meta-analyses (see for example, Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich & Whetten, 1981; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Guetzkow, 1966; Oliver, 1990; Van de Ven, 1976). I do not endeavour to recreate an additional concatenation at this time—for past attempts have been plagued by particular issues, including a vast and fractured knowledge base, and the absence of comparative analyses (Ebers, 1997; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Ritter & Gemünden, 2003). Rather, I here explore linkages between my own work and an important and widely cited framework that has been employed since the 1980s to garner contemporary understanding within, and bring order to, the field.

A most prominent meta-analysis of the field is found in Galaskiewicz (1985). Galaskiewicz categorized the field in three broad areas of interest he dubbed arenas: (a) resource procurement and allocation through interorganisational relationships for the purposes of organisational survival; (b) political advocacy through interorganisational relationships intended to bolster one’s own position relative to the contemporary social, political and economic milieu; and (c) organisational legitimacy through relationships with more influential organizations as a means of garnering favourable public opinion, funding opportunities, and licensing for activities. Primary in his analysis (and in the work upon which he drew his conclusions) was the question, why does one organisation engage in relationships with other organisations? These questions are tangential to my work in this area,
but they do offer insight as to motivations that may inform strategies embedded in the nature of decisions made under the guise of interorganisational relationships.

Galaskiewicz’ (1985) framework is therefore helpful, but provides an incomplete picture of the more foundational aspects of interorganisational relationships addressed in my study. It is interesting to note that several meta-analyses conducted over the body of knowledge in this field reflect exclusively on Galaskiewicz’ question of engagement. On this point, Ebers (1997) explained that “[a]lthough it is important to know what motivates organizational decision-makers to forge inter-organizational relationships, motives alone provide only a weak guide when trying to explain the emergence of inter-organizational networking relationships or their organizational form” (p. 7). Additionally, most relationships are observed by researchers as necessary reactions to economic conditions and therefore are conditionally constructed so long as economic need persists (Ritter & Gemünden, 2003). It is perhaps for this reason that Ebers highlighted the virtual lacuna in understanding related to the processes of relationship hardening (variously referred to as building and development phases) within interorganisational relationships and their dissolution. From the work of Ritter and Gemünden, one might conclude that two very different classes of relationships have been conflated into one designation: interorganisational relationships referring equally to instances where two organisations interact briefly (which they designated as interorganisational interactions), and those where organisations interact over longer periods of time and where relationships develop beyond reactions to superficial economic stimuli.
(which they designate as interorganisational *relationships*).

Notwithstanding the issues addressed above, Galaskiewicz’ (1985) framework remains instructive in its treatment of key notions discussed in later chapters of this dissertation. In terms of the arena of resource procurement and allocation, these include (a) dependency and power differentials among parties to a relationship, (b) the conceptualizing of such dependency and power differentials among parties to a relationship in terms of organisational representation, and (c) the managing of constraints (see Zeitz, 1980) and uncertainty (or, in terms outlined in Chapter Seven, managing *irrationality*). In his discussion of political advocacy, I draw attention to Galaskiewicz’ critique of research in this arena. In particular I explore his commentary on monopolizing control over divisible resources for political gain. Furthermore, in terms of the arena of organisational legitimacy, resource monopolies are distilled into both structures of dominance and structures of legitimacy. I will highlight these issues in turn.

In the first of Galaskiewicz’ (1985) arenas, research has principally observed power differentials among parties to interorganisational relationships in economic terms. The outcome has been to attribute power issues in neoliberal terms, dismissing them as artefacts of the free market—simply manifestations of imperfections of the market. As such, researchers focused upon the resource procurement and allocation arena sought only to “describe the patterns of dependency or exchange relations among structural positions within a field of organizations rather than to test for effects of dependency/dominance on organizations’ strategy, structure, or
reputation” (p. 285). In this dissertation, however, I argue contrary to the neoliberal usurped modern position, and in so doing explore the very effects of dependency and dominance upon interorganisational strategy and structure that Galaskiewicz portrayed as absent. Specifically, I attempt to bridge the gap in analysis by theorizing the effects of exchange patterns and what guide them (guidance that I ultimately attribute to organisational representation).

Closely related to Galaskiewicz’ (1985) critique of descriptive economic accounts of power artefacts rests his commentary on the absence of meaningful discussions around environmental constraints as factors in organisational strategic choice in decision-making. While Galaskiewicz appeared to be traditional in his description of available environmental resources (including natural, labour and investment resources), in Chapters Seven and Eight of this dissertation I refocus the notion of environmental constraint to explore organisational representations in terms of environmental dominance and weakness. Doing so, I expose how environmentally dominant representations constrain (through psychopathologies of communication) the decision-making activities of non-dominant organisations party to relationships.

Political advocacy and legitimacy are established as additional arenas in which research on interorganisational relationships has been conducted. In this arena, Galaskiewicz (1985) made clear his assessment of relationships engaged as a result of the political environment. “[W]e have seen no evidence to date showing that prestige or good fellowship play any role in organizations joining political
coalitions” (p. 295). To this end, questions must be raised around the consistency of educational organisations under such conditions. I am unable to comment on this point as a result of this study. However, Galaskiewicz went on to explore political advocacy as a means of environmental change for organisations party to relationships. He suggested that “[a]t the same time they are bringing about changes in the institutional environment, collective actors may have to monopolize control over some divisible resource in order to provide selective incentives to their membership. At this point, resource dependency theory once again becomes important” (p. 295). In Chapters Eight and Nine, I entertain a similar point. I suggest that the divisible resource in question is the definition of education itself—to this end I contend the monopoly of educational administration over this definition, grounded by work in educational foundations, is a precursor to agonistic political advocacy.

While the bulk of my analysis in this dissertation clearly rests within the domain of the field of interorganisational relationships as defined by Galaskiewicz and others, the particular route I have elected to follow does not. It is my contention, however, that in addressing many of the critiques and shortcomings Galaskiewicz highlights within the various arenas of interorganisational relationships, I am compelled to circumvent past means employed by researchers. In circumventing past practices, I hope to articulate what they have not. I hope to bring alternate views forward for meaningful debate—especially in terms of interorganisational relationships involving education.
3. *The Inspirational and Culminating Position*

In this document, I develop a theoretical conceptualisation of interorganisational relationships in education systems. I seek to provide an analysis of contemporary issues regarding the relationships among partners in the delivery of education programs. Although I focus primarily on the philosophical antecedents of relationships among schools, governments, ministries of education, and non-governmental organisations in their most broad and abstract form, other conceptual partners including the public *at-large* are discussed. I employ, as its many theoretical and conceptual frames, literature drawn from physiology, psychology, sociology, linguistics, psycholinguistics, psychohistory, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, evolutionary biology, sociobiology, political science, organisational theory, communication theory, educational psychology, research in curriculum studies and learning, educational foundations, history of education and educational administration, and I culminate the discussion in terms of a pedagogic-inspired political account of a project concerning acts of communication among actors situated in social collectives.

It is not my purpose in this section of the dissertation to examine the nature of this study in detail. However, a brief exploration of the culminating and, in a sense, inspirational conceptualisation of this dissertation provides a context in which the various arguments I employ may be placed.

While not specifically cast in terms of the relationships among schools and their partners, Howe (2000), Held (1980), and McCarthy (1978) have noted
that Jürgen Habermas is himself similarly interested in social and collaborative relationships, the ideologies that direct them, and their shifting nature. The sentiments of Howe, Held and McCarthy are supported by a growing body of work that has found utility in the use of Habermas’ philosophical perspective to evaluate the nature of organisational representations in educational administration (Bates, 1982; Evers & Lakomski, 1996, 2000, 2001; Foster, 1986; Kochan, 2002).

As a critical theorist, Habermas has established a post-Marxist analysis of social relations and ideology that has evolved beyond, and contributed greatly to, his philosophical and sociological foundation in the Frankfurt School (Bates, 1982). To understand Habermas’ evolution in thought, one must first understand the nature of critical theory.

### 3.1. Critical theory and Habermasian understanding-directed behaviour.

Critical theory has been described by Burrell and Morgan (1979) as one of two evolutionary paths resulting from a modern interpretation of Marxist thought: “emphasising the ‘subjective’ aspects of Marxism (Lukács and the Frankfurt School, for example) [as opposed to one] advocating more ‘objective’ approaches, such as that associated with [French post-Marxist] Althusserian structuralism” (p. 22). Burrell and Morgan described a subjective post-Marxist philosophy as favouring change over regulation and therefore, according to their paradigmatic frameset, described this philosophy as radical humanist in nature. Foster (1986) expanded upon this definition, noting that
critical theory locates human relationships in structural variables, particularly those of class and power, without, however, compromising the possibility for change. Thus, a critical theory examines sources of social domination and repression, but with the caveat that since we ultimately make our worlds, we can ultimately change them. Finally, a critical theory is committed to values; its critique is largely oriented toward how created social structures impede the attainment of such values as democracy and freedom. (p. 72)

For Habermas, a Marxist discussion of a dialectic progression of history is important, though incomplete because of its narrow and exclusive belief that the antecedents of all progress and change are economic (Habermas, 1975, 1987). In “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,” Habermas (1990/2001a) argued that change in the human condition is far more social in nature than Marx had described. Rather, change and progress are based on key components of ontological and social understanding: community, communication, and reflection—or perhaps more accurately, change occurs through the breakdown and reconstitution of these elements. It is therefore a goal of Habermasian critical theory to enrich the nature of social understandings of community, communication, and reflection in ways that will ultimately lead to a more democratic ethos of social relationships.

Habermas’ (1984; 1987; 1990/2001a) discourse ethics and communicative action theory provided an intriguing assessment of the historical progression of
social collectives that hold the nature of communication as a key to unlocking
the relationships among individuals and, by extension, among organisational
entities—be they organisations proper, or groups and sub-groups within or betwixt
organisations.

Figure 1.1 depicts in basic terms Habermas’ (1987) exploration of the
temporal progression of human communication—and, by extension, the history of
social collectives. In this diagram, the temporal path of progression is shown by the
solid line (A) depicting the path that leads from its origin in the \textit{life-world} (or the stage
of personal consciousness). The line continues through the stages of \textit{organisation}
or \textit{public sphere} (Habermas, 1962/2001)—described originally by Tönnies
(1887/1957) as \textit{Gemeinschaft} or \textit{community}—and finally \textit{system—Gesellschaft} or
\textit{society}\textsuperscript{12}—visible in their arrangement as columns. These columns are canopied
by two supra-headings: \textit{pre-/post-hyperrationalization} and \textit{hyperrationalization}
that denote Habermas’ distinction between community interests and interests of
competitive advantage respectively. The longer-dashed line (B) continues the path
of line A, but returns to the organisation stage. This line represents my own addition
to Habermas’ thought by linking the shift in popular educational administrative
thought since the work of Callahan (1970) in the mid-twentieth century. Although,
a basis for my addition is found in the earlier commentary of Dewey (1937),
Montessori (1966) and Neill (1960).

In Figure 1.2, I have added my own conceptualisation onto the theory
presented in Figure 1.1. This second diagram depicts both the placement of three
Figure 1.1  Shifting Position of School over Time
Figure 1.2 Stakeholders and Educational Administration
stakeholders that I believe are important to the study (governments, non-governmental organisations, and educational administration and schools) and the communicative interaction among them; Figure 1.1 is therefore a behaviour diagram and Figure 1.2 is a state diagram. It is my suspicion that this conceptualisation of communicative interaction modes (of the system or the community lifeworld) among stakeholders provides a reasonable explanation for problems of their communicative action—and the place of educational administration as a professional field.

I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding. In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect the negotiation of definitions of the situation is an essential element of the interpretive accomplishments required for communicative action.

(Habermas, 1984, pp. 285-286, emphasis in original)

It is therefore the nature of this first phase of my project to explore these communicative relationships in an attempt to better understand the issues that result in Habermasian “understanding”-directed behaviour, as well as their contraries and corollaries. In addition to this, however, is a critical evaluation of the historically constituted roles assumed by organisations and the political theatres in which organisational relationships are balanced.
B. Statement of Purpose

This is a conceptual and emergent study of foundational structures embedded in contemporary relationships among educational and non-educational organisations. In writing this dissertation, I seek to more clearly construct an hypothesis of interorganisational relationships involving educational administration. To achieve this end, I examine those conditions under which educational administrators engage educational organisations in relationships with other (both complementary and incompatible) organisations.

C. The Primary Problem and Secondary Areas of Focus

In addressing the statement of purpose, the question of this study is as follows:

- What are the dominant foundational and philosophical structures of contemporary interorganisational relationships involving educational administration?

The following are secondary areas of focus for this study:

1. The historical development of selected contemporary political (relational) positions.
2. The foundations of contemporary political (relational) positions.
3. The impact of and responses to contemporary positions within political (relational) discourse.
4. The impact of contemporary positions on organisational
representations.

5. The impact of and responses to contemporary positions on interorganisational relationships.

6. The impact of contemporary interorganisational relationships on education and the role to be played by its administration to ensure educational interests are served.

D. Limitations and Delimitations

This study is limited by the knowledge, skill, parsimony, and critical thought of its author. The study is delimited to include only those topics that provide, what I, as its author, in conjunction with my doctoral supervisor and committee, believe to be necessary in order that a thorough and logical argument be presented to the reader. The final analysis, its content, and the point at which I chose to render it complete must be satisfactory to my doctoral defence committee.

E. Significance

The significance of this study is found in its reflection upon and organisation of basic tenets of education that give rise to a need for educational administration. Furthermore, in this dissertation I advocate the focus of educational administration on those tenets that impart a distinction from other forms of administration—thus calling into question the relevance for educational administration of those bodies of literature that are alternatively focused. In doing so, I seek to present an Archimedean point, against which such questions may be called, and against which all positions,
theories, and practices of educational administrators, and all literature held by the 
corps administratif, may be evaluated.

My aim is to show that educational administration is itself multidisciplinary in nature despite its educative focus. Furthermore, an important revelation of this study is the centrality of educational administration’s philosophical antecedents—including, in their contemporary manifestations, the linguistic foundation of philosophical accounts in the social sciences.

F. Limitations and Assumptions of the Writer

As I wrote this dissertation I contemplated my role within it. That I was a part of the result seems clear. I have pondered such questions as: Who am I beyond a part of the product? How is it that I am here writing these words?

Research in psychology and psychiatry has suggested that all individuals go through phases in life (Flach, 1988; Richardson, 2002; Richardson, Neiger, Jensen, & Kumpfer, 1990; Rutter, 1985, 1993, 1999). While these phases are commonly interrupted by changes, if surroundings and background provide support, one’s ability to develop through change is assured (Burgess, 2003; Rutter, 1985, 1993, 1999). To this end, Socrates, as Plato (c. 360 BCE/1966b) recorded of his final hours, suggested that the true philosopher is wonting of such interruptions and change—in Socrates’ case, his forced death—for only in the self-reflective rebirth that accompanies change does one come to understand one’s self.

Mine has been a supported life, and perhaps support explains to some
degree the diversity of my interests and experience. While I might at times take the “resilient” state in which I live for granted, I am by nature one to frequently reflect upon these supports, ever-mindful of how I might learn from them—how I might better understand myself and my role.

Principally, I have come to recognize three social factors to which I owe my place: I am male, I am Caucasian, and I am Canadian. These three elements of my social history characterize a certain lot in life that has provided both privilege and support, and offered me the opportunity to be seated as a doctoral student of philosophy and educational administration in a western university. I have further inherited a body of literature in my studies that is perhaps similarly privileged. Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Descartes, Rousseau, Kant, Dewey, Piaget, Habermas, et al.—the work of each is among that body that I employed. So, I felt that I was confronted by a challenge that extended beyond ontological or epistemic persuasion; a challenge to which I have dedicated much time and thought. How could I separate what some see as the elitist, misogynistic, and otherwise contemptuous historically manifest ideas and opinions of many of these individuals from those ideas and opinions that I would maintain to be equitable, enlightened, and eminently valuable? Though I cannot fault these men for the fact that they were unable to separate themselves from the time in which they lived, was I able to separate them from the time in which they lived? Does a promotion of their ideas within a dissertation such as this similarly promote or maintain the privileged position from which they and from which I wrote? The answer at which I have arrived is no—but this response
requires some explanation.

I maintain the belief that an individual’s ideas may be selectively removed from their time so long as both the time in which they were written, and the current impact of their ideas, if taken beyond their face value, are understood and where appropriate steadfastly avoided. In essence, I suggest that it is wrong to refuse to accept the entirety of Rousseau’s work, for example, on the grounds that he was unable to see male (Émile) and female (Sophie) children in the same light. His ideas retain contemporary positive value only if we critically examine those ideas that we deem misogynist or contemptuous—and then hypothesize their negative value as potential traps against which one should be on guard. Our best defence against such traps, needless to say, is found in the depth of our critical examination. In this way, my privilege has been accounted for in my critical vigilance as thinking writer. Thus, in my role as author of this dissertation, I was thinker first and writer second. To be anything else was to deny the importance of critique, and risk an account that was contrary to an academic ethic (Sears & Parsons, 1991).

G. Acknowledgements

I have elsewhere stated that the thinker can be nothing but an integral component of his or her own work. However, it is only fitting that as I embark upon self-examination of mind I come clean (Dimitriadis, 2001), so to speak, regarding three particular influences. Dr. Larry Sackney, as teacher and advisor in the writing of this dissertation, provided both an inspirational introduction to philosophy, and
more specifically to the work of Jürgen Habermas. Dr. Adam Scharf is a process philosopher, a Whiteheadian and Hegelian, whose patience surrounding my many (what must have seemed) pedantic questions during the advent of my examination of the subject is very much appreciated. And finally, Dr. Philip Peterson is a scholar and teacher of epistemology, history of education, and developmental philosophy whose insights, questions and encouragement advanced within me the faculties of mind to write such a work as this. It is through our many conversations (especially regarding the works of Rousseau, Kant and Piaget) that my present understanding and interpretation of mind and its relationship with the world has come into being.

H. Terminology

To clarify six particular notions, connotations and elements of language used within this dissertation, the following definitions of terms were used:

1. Organisational Representation

At the heart of this dissertation is a notion that I have struggled with for a number of years. The notion arose from the question: Do organisations have beliefs? And specifically, what are the relationships between these beliefs and what Rousseau (1762) called the general will?

Much has been written on organisational culture—I need not detail this issue here—but I was particularly inspired after reading Mitroff’s (1983) unorthodox take on the subject titled Stakeholders of the Organisational Mind, especially when I placed this work within the debates engaging cognitive science—Searle (to whose
argument I most readily subscribe) and the Churchlands (from whom Evers and Lakomski, in our own field, draw insight). Simply put, Mitroff suggested that organisations (in their problem-solving, management, actions, etc.) are ruled by the interests of stakeholders; but not just the run-of-the-mill stakeholders embroiled within a particular issue, which is for Mitroff too constrictive a picture. Rather, organisations are ruled by psyche-based stakeholders (of which he identifies three: cognitive styles, ego types, and archetypes) within each stakeholder. From these psyche-based stakeholders, Mitroff surmised an organisational soul.

For my own purposes, the third of Mitroff’s (1983) stakeholders, archetypes, seem to be most closely related to the issues embedded within my questions regarding organisational belief. In this dissertation I examine these questions and employ as an assumption something akin to these archetypes. For reasons that I discuss in Chapters Five through Nine, I see these archetypes as collectively held, rather than specific to a particular stakeholder. Since they are not, therefore, identical to Mitroff’s archetypes, I struggled with a name that captures the meaning I was attempting to reify. Originally I named this as “organisational ontology.” More recently, I have come to accept the name “organisational representation,” and removed any contention that these “representations” were only indirectly linked to the nature of organisational being qua being.
2. Science

In various locations within the present text, the term “science” was distinguished from both “technology” and “neo-science” (or technology qua science). Some writers (Burke, 2007) more loosely equate the two. I, however, echo McClellan and Dorn (1999) and do not equate them due to differences exposed through historical review. I herein defined “science” in Kuhnian paradigmatic and evolutionary terms, viz. a method (or collection of methods) for discovery based upon historically accumulated insight and critical evaluation. As such, I made no particular claim to universality of method (both temporally or disciplinarily) beyond basic and fundamental appeals to reason and an ethic of critique (Starratt, 2003).

Rapoport (1989) argued that there are two ways of defining science. The first way, which he attributed to Lundberg (1939) and other neopositivists (as Lundberg was monikered by Furfey, 1948), is as “organized body of instrumental knowledge”; that is, “knowledge of how to get from here to there, what to expect under given observed conditions, what to deduce from given premises” (Rapoport, 1989, p. 158, emphasis in original). Lundberg believed that science could be understood as a series of if/then statements: if you have condition x, then you can expect y to happen. Further, as Rapoport summarized, this notion also applies to goals; “[g]oals are given; it is the scientist’s job to find the means to attain them” (p. 158). I link Lundberg’s definition with technology, below.

Alternatively, science can be understood as “enlightened way of thinking,” where science is seen as an activity of emancipation; “[i]t provides means of
breaking the strangle-hold of conventional wisdom, of hand-me-down prejudices, of veneration of authority backed by power” (Rapoport, 1989, p. 159). Ideas emerge, then, from long and hard thought, invention, discussion, improvement, and acceptance or refutation. In this way, science is educative. But it is also a moral-enterprise, for even if our emergent ideas turn out to be wrong, as Plato (c. 380 BCE/1967) wrote in the *Meno*, “we will be better men, braver and less idle if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know” (§ 86b).

3. Technology

“Technology” was distinguished within this document as the tangible product of science. In this manner, technology is more closely linked to Burke’s (2007) notion of *economies of planned obsolescence and novelty* than his particular definition of technology, for mine was similarly linked to economic expansion through historical example. The neopositivist definition of science provided by Lundberg (1939), was, for my purposes, technology.

4. Evolutionary Change (Behavioural versus Cultural)

In this dissertation, I discuss ideas around evolution, specifically, ideas stemming from the evolution of the mind and certain behaviours. I am careful not to mix and match behaviour with culture. One of the authors from whom I draw insight in Chapter Four is the biologist Dawkins. Dawkins is known for the notion of *memes*. A meme is an analogy that Dawkins drew in his (1976/2006) book *The Selfish Gene* to describe how replication can explain the spread of ideas, as well as
genetic material.

The notion of a meme is illustrative, and tempting to employ as an analogy for cultural influence, but it was not intended to represent how social evolution progresses. If it were to, memes would imply that social changes occur \textit{via} the replication of minor errors (\textit{mutations}) in thought. But random substitutions or \textit{typos} do not make change. Cultural changes are directed and invented. In this light, a meme is an \textit{epidemiological} notion rather than a \textit{genetic} one. Memes explain how ideas become popular, but not from where they come. Pinker’s (1998) insight on the matter is helpful.

The geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky famously wrote that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. We can add that nothing in culture makes sense except in the light of psychology. Evolution created psychology, and that is how it explains culture. (p. 210)

Pinker’s view defines cultural evolution within this dissertation.

5. Micro/Macro Educational Administration

In Chapter Eight, I focus my more general discussions upon the context of macro educational administration; one of two subdivisions I ascribe. I draw a distinction within this dissertation between (a) the administration of education when focused upon the management of schools and education systems, and (b) when educational administration is focused upon leadership and advocacy for schools and education systems within social, economic, and political contexts.
When discussing $a$ I employ the phrase micro educational administration. When discussing $b$, I employ the phrase macro educational administration.

6. Post-Modernity

In this dissertation, post-modernity is generally defined as a reaction to modernity represented by three related elements: (a) relativism, (b) social construction, and (c) the absence of a grand narrative. I understand relativism and social construction in terms presented by Gillet (1998), and I understand the post-modern rejection of grand narratives through Lyotard (1979).

Under Gillet’s (1998) regime, two forms of epistemological relativism and social constructivism exist. The first he dubbed noncontroversial. Noncontroversial constructivist relativism suggests that belief about the nature of reality is a product of the mind of the individual under certain historical, cultural, and subjective conditions. This form of constructivist relativism is inconsequential. It is generally accepted as reasonable, but is argumentatively unsatisfactory. This form does not define post-modernity in this dissertation. Alternatively, controversial constructivist relativism implies that truth is a product of the subjective experience of the individual. It is this form of constructivist relativism that post-modernity implies.

A logical consequence of Gillet’s (1998) controversial constructivist relativism is that because truth can have no arbiter, knowledge can not be held within a singular project—as was believed during the Enlightenment. Thus Lyotard’s (1979) rejection of grand narratives.
Post-modernity and post-modernism have been defined in terms of organisational theory in educational administration by a variety of authors (see for example, Furman, 1998; Sackney & Mitchell, 2002; Scheurich, 1994). The definitions these authors provided tended to employ the noncontroversial form of constructivist relativism. Due to their acceptance of the need for some form of arbiter, I classify their work as a derivative of critical theory. I therefore do not rely upon this body of literature when I define post-modernity.

I. Organisation of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into three principal parts: (I) Introduction, Method, and Perspective; (II) A Conceptualisation of Interorganisational Relationships; and (III) A Response to the Conceptualisation. In the first part, encompassing the first three chapters, I introduce the topic and the researcher. While the first chapter may bear some resemblance to the model for theses and dissertations employed by many of my contemporaries, the nature of this particular study precludes any such consistency in chapters that follow. Since the majority of this dissertation involved the study and concatenation of hundreds of ostensibly disparate written works and arguments, a single chapter dedicated to a comprehensive review of the literature represented an impractical—and perhaps somewhat disingenuous—account.

With this in mind, in Chapters Two and Three I explore four concerns that required some analysis prior to my entry into the body of the dissertation. These were: (a) a brief overview of the conceptualisation of the notion of methodology
employed within the present phase and to be employed within future phases of this project and (b) the method of argument development explored in Chapter Two, and (c) my ontological and (d) epistemological positions as the writer found in Chapter Three. My ordering of these topics may appear reversed. Indeed, one may argue that ontology and epistemology are natural antecedents of methodology and method (an argument against which I hold no general opposition). I can only submit that the most accountable construction of my ontological and epistemic positions is performed through the use of the method of argumentation I intended to employ throughout this document’s entirety.

In Chapters Four through Eight, I followed the order and foci of those secondary areas of study listed above. These chapters represent the main discussion explored in the dissertation. I present them as Part II.

Finally, in Chapter Nine I provide a summary and draw a conclusion to the arguments made around the primary problem—herein, I construct an hypothesis of foundational structures of interorganisational relationships, and the responsibility of educational administration. Chapter Nine and the Postscript represent Part III.

A synopsis of the structure of the argument is as follows. As described above, in the first three chapters of the dissertation, I outline (a) the context of the problem, (b) the method through which I engage the problem, and (c) the ontological and epistemic assumptions I bring to the problem. In the fourth chapter, I establish the underlying political, social, and economic context for modernity. This context provides a background for contemporary interorganisational relationships and I
here claim that modernity’s present manifestation is corrupted by two principal flaws: modern ideology is rooted in a fallacious conception of (a) human nature, and (b) science. I argue in Chapter Five that post-modern reactions to these flaws are at best anaemic in their responses to these flaws, and at worst perpetuate the longevity of the modern position. In the sixth chapter, I show how present discussions in the organisational theory of educational administration that focus on coherentist decision-making through the use of game theory are also based on the above mentioned flaws of modernity. In the seventh chapter, I show how these flaws, as revealed in game theory, demonstrate psychopathological reasons for modernity’s persistence, and influence on educational organisations that engage in interorganisational relationships. The political consequences of these modern psychopathologies for education are discussed in Chapter Eight. In Chapter Nine, I propose a plan of action for educators and educationalists that mitigates the contemporary psychopathologies of interorganisational relationships involving the administration of education.

Finally, a comment on the style employed within this dissertation. As my intent is to construct a conceptual piece, the broad style in which the dissertation was written is intended to methodically reveal arguments. I concatenate from disparate ideas a final conclusion. The piece, therefore, cannot be held to certain strictures of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association. Similarly, for the sake of clarity and to grant myself the ability to easily refer to past arguments in a reasonably effective manner, I have chosen to slightly modify APA’s requirements
with regard to section headings. As is demonstrated within this and other chapters, I have taken the liberty of adding an organisational numbering scheme to all sections and their subordinates.
CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HERMENEUTIC METHOD

I here present a conceptual study of foundational structures embedded in contemporary relationships among educational and non-educational organisations. This study employed a conceptualisation method based upon a hermeneutic system of philosophic discursive illustration—conceived and defended in the sections within the present chapter. I call my method diagrammatic hermeneutics.

A. The Methodology and Method of the Study

The pages that follow serve several purposes, and I have organised them to represent the arguments I have prepared as justification for the method I employed as I engaged in the philosophical analysis, interpretation, and treatment of this study. In Section 1., I present an examination of the methodological foundations of the method that are employed and described in Section 2. Both sections were summarized within the final paragraphs of the chapter. I define terms throughout and sections and subsections were numbered to simplify their reference within the text.
1. Methodology

1.1. Introduction

In the current and the following section, I have separated the concepts of methodology and method. I provide a distinction between (a) who I am and what I bring to the table as a thinker (my methodology), and the process of thinking that I followed on the other (my method). It is in Chapter Three, where a precise and detailed exploration of my ontological and epistemic positions proceeds by employing the very method I create in Section 2. of this chapter. It is for this reason that although I view (a) ontology and epistemology as preconditions for (b) methodology and method, their respective orders have been reversed. That is, I will use \( b \) throughout my description of \( a \)—since accounting for \( a \) is an act of thinking.

1.2. Methodological Development

I begin my discussion by returning to the first statement made in Section 1.1. I claimed that there exists a distinction between methodology and method, and that the division of methodology from method was not diametrical, but rather more tenuous in nature. It is my contention that the methods thinkers employ can have much of their own perspective found within,\(^{13}\) a notion that is complementary to my reflections on methodology. It is important that I, as a thinker, select from the cannon of research methods a method that both recognizes the intent of my purpose, is complementary to my own methodology, and yet still complements the
way I think. I see this final criterion to be of colossal importance, and believe that it requires some further clarification.

The more I read of Habermas’ philosophical project, the more I became intrigued by both its nature and the manner in which it has come to be. I have been fortunate to become involved in research, of both the qualitative and quantitative varieties, that has highlighted not only the findings, but the nature of the research process itself. From these experiences, I have drawn most pleasure from the academic challenge positioned in the analysis of findings. It is the love of the challenge of analysis that I link with the manner in which philosophical projects, such as Habermas’, exist and grow—and I take as substance for such a claim philosophy’s Greek etymology: *the love of wisdom* (Bogomolov, 1985; Diogenes Laërtius, c. 230/1991; Fuller, 1945)—indeed the analysis of findings is the challenge of drawing wisdom from findings. The Rt. Hon. Lord Quinton (1995a) has suggested that perhaps the simplest definition of philosophy is best, and the least problematic in its lacklustre attempt at profundity—“philosophy is thinking about thinking” (p. 666). Lord Quinton’s aphorism implies the second-order nature of philosophical thinking; in terms of the discussion above, findings constitute a first-order concept, the analysis of findings provides the second-order while espousing no particular methodological lens through which the analysis should proceed.

At the heart of the matter, therefore, rests the unique methodological lens provided by the individual performing the analysis, and furthermore the technique they employ within the analysis process. Or perhaps more simply: What has
influenced a philosopher’s thinking? and How do philosophers go about it? From the words of Lord Quinton (1995a) I am left to contemplate the technique I personally employ as I academically analyse the findings, objects, events, relationships, and ideas that inundate my psyche. In my own case, I analyse diagrammatically.

A general purpose of education is to recognize the analytic potential of the student and engage his or her thought processes through techniques, strategies, or models that better enable the student to achieve higher order analysis. In modern educational philosophic interpretations (Dewey, 1927/1963, 1937; Gallagher, 1992; Montessori, 1966), education draws-out from the student’s own mind those techniques, strategies, or models that best suit the student’s thought processes.14 Having not yet found a technique, strategy, model, or method from within existing literature (Baggini & Fosl, 2003; Garrison, 1997; Newell, 1967; Plato, c. 360 BCE/1966b; Whitehead, 1933/1969; Wittgenstein, 1958/1984, among others) that best suited my personal processes of analysis, I constructed my own. I call my philosophic method-project *diagrammatic hermeneutics*.

### 1.2.a. *Diagrammatic hermeneutics*

The method that I propose is a concatenation of two thought processes. The first is the well-established philosophical and qualitative research method of hermeneutics. The second is a recently emergent branch of semiotics called pictorial semiotics, and is further influenced by areas of study including philosophical analogy, heuristics, educational mnemonics and educational multimodal literacy.
I shall briefly outline the literary foundations of each of these constituent thought processes of diagrammatic hermeneutics.

1.2.a.i. Hermeneutics and the hermeneutic circle

The root of hermeneutics is Greek, both etymologically and philosophically (Gallagher, 1992). Plato (c. 380 BCE/1925) described the conversation between Socrates and Ion wherein the argument is constructed that interpretation [ἐρμηνεία / hermēneía] is the work of poets.

Socrates. … For the god, as it seems to me, intended him to be a sign to us that we should not waver or doubt that these fine poems are not human or the work of men, but divine and the work of gods; and that the poets are merely the interpreters of the gods, according as each is possessed by one of the heavenly powers. To show this forth, the god of set purpose sang the finest of songs through the meanest of poets: or do you not think my statement true, Ion?

Ion. Yes, upon my word, I do: for you somehow touch my soul with your words, Socrates, and I believe it is by divine dispensation that good poets interpret to us these utterances of the gods.

Socrates. And you rhapsodes, for your part, interpret the utterances of the poets?

Ion. Again your words are true.

Socrates. And so you act as interpreters of interpreters? [ἐρμηνέων ἐρμηνῆς
Plato’s record does more than simply recall the conversation of his teacher and make claims as to the divine inspiration of poetry, it demonstrates the early held philosophical belief that interpretation is multi-perspectived, -levelled and transcendental (in Kant’s [1784/1982] sense: ever-developing understanding of one’s understanding)—each of which inform the modern discipline.

The path of modern hermeneutics is drawn through fields of philosophy, theology, law, literacy and social sciences. Attempts at its definition are as diverse as these disciplines (Gallagher, 1992) but retain the ancient notions of interpretation and understanding as unifiers. Schleiermacher (1819/1977) explained that hermeneutics is “the art of understanding” (p. 96) among individuals and the way through which understanding is achieved. Kosman’s (2003) discussion of Plato’s (c. 380 BCE/1996) Euthyphro highlighted the ancient notion that understanding was embodied in interpretation and dialogue among individuals. Kosman argued that, according to the ancient view, the transcendental act of interpretation literally is understanding.

Ricœur (1970) provided a bridge between hermeneutics and semiotics. He described hermeneutics as “the theory of the rules that preside over an exegesis … the interpretation of a particular text, or a group of signs that may be viewed as a text” (p. 8). Heidegger (1967), and Gadamer (as cited in Gallagher, 1992) following Heidegger’s ontological purpose for it, sought to employ hermeneutics
in the pursuit of understanding the existential individual through phenomenological
enquiry around Being (Sein) and existence (Dasein) (Heidegger, 1967; Inwood,
1995). Heidegger (1997) maintained, however, the link between hermeneutics and
language when he wrote, “Language is the house of Being. In its home the human
dwells” (p. 193). Heidegger here solidified the context of human understanding as
linguistic. Habermas (1971/1990) provided his own definition when he noted that

[h]ermeneutics refers to an “ability” we acquire to the extent to which we
learn to “master” a natural language: the art of understanding linguistically
communicable meaning and to render it comprehensible in cases of distorted
communication. The understanding of meaning is directed at the semantic
content of speech as well as the meaning-content of written forms or even
of non-linguistic symbolic systems, in so far as meaning-content can, in
principle, be expressed in words. (p. 245)

Habermas thus provided an important point to which I return later: that meaning
and hermeneutic interpretation are not exclusively found within language as we
know it, but extend beyond language into symbolic depictions of knowledge—so
long as that knowledge adheres to discursively reconcilable validity claims, as
required in his principles of communicative action and discourse ethics (Habermas,
1990/2001a). Meanings must therefore be justified and the hermeneutic process
provides the link between meaning and justification.

Habermas’ communicative link to hermeneutics was further demonstrated
in the work of Stewart (1995) and articulated in Heidegger’s existentialism—
“[t]o be human is to be an understander, which is to engage in processes of coherence building or sense making [sic] processes that occur communicatively and that enable humans to constitute, maintain, and develop the worlds we inhabit” (p. 115). Furthermore, Stewart cited Madison (1990) to under-gird his definition: “language is the way in which, as humans, we experience what we call reality, that is, the way in which reality exists for us” (Madison, 1990, p. 165, cited in Stewart, 1995, p. 137, emphasis in original).

This broad collection of definitions en masse articulates the multiplicity encountered in the classical Greek context of hermēneía. Modern hermeneutics does not find its significance in the study of language proper, but in studying the individual’s interpretation or understanding drawn from and through language and “non-linguistic symbol systems,” however one constitutes or defines them. “Hermeneutics examines human understanding in general. All understanding is linguistic, and nothing that involves knowledge or seeking after knowledge escapes the domain of hermeneutics” (Gallagher, 1992, p. 7). Modern hermeneutics embodies a reinforcement of the hermēneía (interpretations of interpretations) tradition.

The hermeneutic circle is found in all forms of interpretation (Gallagher, 1992; Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000; Schwandt, 1994, 2000). It is the interpretation of the hermeneutic circle’s very nature that marks a major schism within modern hermeneutics (Gallagher, 1992; D. C. Hoy, 1978), a schism found between the normative and philosophical varieties. The former, more classical variety, seeks to define a hermeneutic method, a process, a protocol, or a cannon. This normative
method provides a guide to follow in the hermeneutic practice. The latter, defined by Gadamer, does not seek to provide a method of understanding. Rather, philosophical hermeneutics seeks to clarify the conditions under which understanding takes place, including constraints and possibilities inherent within interpretation (Gallagher, 1992).

Normative or philosophical, the purpose of the hermeneutic circle remains basically the same: to provide an awareness that ideas, concepts, and thoughts are not representative of a whole unto themselves, but are depictions of a part of a whole. Furthermore, the hermeneutic circle establishes an awareness that the parts must be understood in terms of the whole, and the whole in terms of its parts—the unknown is found within the known, through recognition of the circularity of the expansion of knowledge (Gallagher, 1992; Habermas, 1971/1990; Heidegger, 1967; D. C. Hoy, 1978; Schleiermacher, 1819/1977). The debate among normative and philosophic hermeneutics emerges, in terms of the circle, between the Schleiermacherian/normative principle that the circle, at a certain point, provides the answer to any question entertained through its loop, and the Gadamerian/philosophical doubt that such completeness is possible (Gallagher, 1992).

My own view is that hermeneutics seemed a combination of the two varieties. I agree with the normative point that a loose process outlining a method of knowledge expansion is valuable as a tool, both for expansion and for recursively auditing expansion (or discursively reconciling validity claims in Habermasian terms). Yet, I also agree with the philosophic critique that the circle provides no
end—a contention that ideas exist within more complex and developing theatres than are knowable by any one individual. I therefore construct a method for hermeneutic interpretation and reinterpretation that makes no general claim to an eventual end. Having said this, certain constraints under which I wrote these pages precluded me from engaging in ceaseless circumnavigations. Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation, I found an arbitrary but appropriate point at which I concluded; a point at which I believed my research question had been answered sufficiently.

1.2.a.ii. Pictographic depiction in philosophical symbolism and analogy, psychology, heuristics, mnemonics and education

Charles Sanders Peirce (1894/1992) explained that pictures alone,—pure likenesses,—can never convey the slightest information. … The same thing is true of general language and of all symbols. No combination of words (excluding proper nouns, and in the absence of gestures or other indicative concomitants of speech) can ever convey the slightest information. (p. 7)

Peirce’s point seemed paradoxical, for words, symbols, and signs are indeed meant to convey information—from the advent of Sumerian cuniform (c. 3000 BCE) onward, humans have thousands of years of contra-examples. Peirce’s suggestion was somewhat more foundational, however. His was an exploration of the nature of signs (pictures, likenesses, diagrams) through a juxtaposition of linguistic concepts. It is not the sign that transmits information in and of itself, but it is the preexistent meaning that the sign reflects in its viewer.
The result of Peirce’s work was an articulation of the inherent differences between symbols unto themselves and referential language—which provides a link to the mantra of the hermeneutic circle: the parts must be understood in terms of the whole, and the whole in terms of its parts.

A symbol, as we have seen, cannot indicate any particular thing; it denotes a kind of thing. Not only that, but it is itself a kind and not a single thing. You can write down the word “star”; but that does not make you the creator of the word, nor if you erase it have you destroyed the word. The word lives in the minds of those who use it. Even if they are all asleep, it exists in their memory. So we may admit, if there be reason to do so, that generals are mere words without at all saying, as Ockham supposed, that they are really individuals.

Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of likenesses and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo. A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples [sic]. In use and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, bear for us very different meanings from those they bore to our barbarous ancestors. (Peirce, 1894/1992, pp. 9-10, emphasis in original)
Peirce’s discourse may be understood to imply that language provides a discursive means of articulating and amalgamating minor concepts into larger one’s, while symbolizing, alternatively, provides a non-discursive means of articulating amalgamated or minor concepts in a broader context.

An important caution is provided by Searle (1979; 1984; 1992) and one to which I return in greater detail in Chapters Three and Nine. In light of the direction toward which the current discussion is progressing, the concept of language must be deconstructed into two important antecedents: (a) syntax, and (b) semantics. Chomsky (2000) articulated definitions of these two components of language. Where syntax relates to the “organisation of … symbolic elements” of language (written letters, characters or symbols), semantics describes “a purported [mental] relation between symbols and things of the non-mental world to which they ‘refer’” (p. 46). The distinction is important because it exposes the multi-levelled nature of language, and (when referred back to Peirce [1894/1992] and others to be discussed hereafter) symbolic representations and diagrammatic or schematic elements.

Consistent with Chomsky’s account, a symbol is of no value to human cognition unless it holds some preestablished or reasonably inferred meaning. That is to say, unless the symbol refers to something known, assumed or deduced through reference to another preestablished something or somethings. Returning to Searle (2004), lines and circles potentially appear in nature, but it takes human knowledge of their meaning to interpret them as one’s and zeros—one’s and zeros are therefore observer-dependent, while objects of nature are observer independent. Therefore,
I distinguish my discussion of symbols from that explored by Evers and Lakomski (2000) and advocated by Vera and Simon (1993) on the subject of physical symbol system processing in the field of cognitive science. To foreshadow the extension of these notions into the ultimate conclusions of the present discussion in Section 1.2.b., it is important to see that while individual elements of a singular diagram may carry no particular meaning (on account of their pure syntactic nature), a *hermeneutic diagram* assists the apperception of meaning by the observer.

In 1946, Price noted that “[o]ur whole civilization … is probably the most symbol-ridden civilization there has ever been” (p. 2). He continued by explaining his perception of the mental-distance and difference between an instance of language and the image it depicts.

When we think by means of words, there are, as it were, two layers of symbols, or two stages of symbolization: let us call them primary and secondary. The word does not directly stand for the absent object …. What it directly stands for is an idea—a concept or an image—and this is itself something intra-mental. And then the concept or image in turn symbolizes the absent object, the extra-mental reality about which we are thinking. It is the concept of, or the image of, that extra-mental object. Thus, on this theory, words are secondary symbols, and apart from their relation to ideas they would not mean at all. (Price, 1946/1975, p. 4, emphasis in original)

Habermas (2001) supported this contention when he wrote, “[r]epresented objects can only come into existence within the horizon opened by the primordial creative
power of symbolic representation. Outside of the symbolically grounded relation between a linguistic expression and what it affirms, such an attribution of existence is strictly meaningless” (p. 17). Perhaps Wittgenstein (1949/1968) provided an analogy in his commentary regarding the complete capacity of language when he challenged:

ask yourself whether our language is complete;—whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language [Vorstädte unserer Sprache]. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) (p. 8e)

At the root of the relationship between language and mental image is a concept known in psychology as mapping. Mapping provides linkages between conceptual domains by applying the terminology employed by one domain within another. Fauconnier (1997) explained, as an example of psychological mapping, that English speakers employ spatial terminology within the domain of time.

We use structure from our everyday conception of space and motion to organize our everyday conception of time, as when we say: Christmas is approaching; The weeks go by; Summer is around the corner; The long day stretched out with no end in sight. (p. 9, emphasis in original)

Furthermore, mapping of this type has been extended into the fields of computer, computational and neural sciences through cognitive simulations and analogy (Forbus, 2001; Holyoak & Hummel, 2001; Wilson, Halford, Gray, & Phillips, 2001).
Yet mapping, as a concept, is used in very different ways within heuristics, mnemonics and education—in ways more similar to Lewin’s (1936; 1951) mathematical and topological representation, and ultimately field theory and Gestalt (Mayer, 1991) in psychology, than to the ways employed by Fauconnier (1997). Although these fields of study have each implanted their own purpose within mapping, what binds their grouping as unit is their translation of the mental image employed in Fauconnier’s psychological mapping and analogy on the written page.

Klix (1983), writing in the field of heuristics, noted that “[f]or reasons that are connected with our prehistory in archaic thinking, thinking … can take place both in image-like pictorial and in a logic-conceitional or symbolic form of representation” (p. 33). Klix’ notion of symbolic representation is a form of mapping where ideas that would be eminently difficult to articulate linguistically are more easily depicted spatially or graphically.

Along an arguably complementary line of thought, Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason (1784/1890), argued that the spatial representation of objects was an a priori sensibility—a faculty of our mind’s innate and natural capacity to receive representations of material objects.

Space then is a necessary representation à priori, which serves for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of phænomena, and by no
means as a determination dependent on them, and is a representation à priori, which necessarily supplies the basis for external phænomena. …

Space is nothing else than the form of all phænomena of the external sense, that is, the subjective condition of the sensibility, under which alone external intuition is possible. (Kant, 1784/1890, pp. 24-26; [A 24/B 38-A 26/B 42])

We are, according to Kant, naturally designed to understand objects of our experience and imagination spatially.¹⁸ I revisit this point and its implications in the chapter to follow.

De Groot (1965), whose work is widely cited as seminal by heuristicsicians, argued that players of chess require no linguistic interaction in order to learn or play the game—“chess thinking is typically non-verbal” (p. 335, emphasis in original). All manœuvres in chess, De Groot argued, are “objects of perception, imagination, and thought, without any dependence on verbal formulations and concepts. … Thus chess thinking is nonverbal thinking and especially thinking in terms of spatial relationships and possibilities for movement” (p. 335, emphasis in original). The linkage of De Groot’s work into the field of heuristics is found in its use of an image (whether drawn, imagined or depicted on a chess board resting before the player) that is constantly malleable and plastic, and where such malleability may be depicted within the image itself, or through a series of images used as tools for evaluation within real or hypothetical scenarios.

In the entry titled Figures within his “Short Dictionary of Heuristic,” Pólya
(1957), whose work is similarly cited as seminal, explained the importance of drawing out ideas as pictographs.

On certain occasions, it might be desirable to imagine the figure without drawing it; but if we have to examine various details, one detail after the other, it is desirable to draw a figure. If there are many details, we cannot imagine all of them simultaneously, but they are all together on the paper. A detail pictured in our imagination may be forgotten; but the detail traced on paper remains, and, when we come back to it, it reminds us of our previous remarks, it saves us some of the trouble we have in recollecting our previous consideration. (pp. 103-104)

A connection may be drawn between the notion of drawing figures for the purpose of memory and discussions of mnemonics in the field of educational psychology (Anderson & Bower, 1980; Laird & Laird, 1960; Svantesson, 2004). A further exploration of drawing pictographs to aid in education comes by way of teaching methods that include thinking technology (McKenzie, 1997)—of which constructing mental pictures and non-linguistic representations, graphical representations and organisers, semantic webbing and mapping, drawing pictographs and diagrams, multidimensional problem analysis, and concept and story maps provide examples.19 Jewitt and Kress (2003) have recently proposed the theory that the figures individuals draw to assist in their thought processes are an extension, if not a branch unto their own, of the concept of literacy. However, their work in multimodal literacy does not focus on pictographic depictions to the exclusion of all other multimodal thinking,
including film, hypertext, and music.

It is clear that representations of ideas in the form of pictures exists as a legitimate strategy for engaging thought processes in students. The act of creation stimulates and challenges the thinking subject. The artefacts that remain, if examined in accordance with the analytic system outlined in the following subsection, can be a useful record of thought processes and important in the justification of the concepts that emerge.

1.2.a.iii. Pictorial semiotics

Pictorial semiotics, a branch of general semiotics and the second component of my method of analysis, studies “in which way the resources put at our disposal by

[Diagram: A Generic Pictograph]
picture-making are different from those, for instance, of verbal language” (Sonesson, 2004, p. 26). An example may provide some insight. Consider Figure 2.1, a diagram that depicts a generic pictograph—its component dotted lines, arrows, “Area,” “A,” “B,” and “C” hold *no specific meanings*; the content is purely demonstrative and is not as important as the overall idea it depicts. From the perspective of pictorial semiotics, such a pictogram is interpreted much differently than it might be within other fields, heuristics, or mnemonics for example. As a heuristic, the pictograph exists as a tool through which a problem may be solved or through which the solution to a problem may be explained. As a mnemonic, the pictograph exists as a tool through which a possibly complex idea may be alternatively committed to memory. Interpreted through pictorial semiotics, however, Figure 2.1 is seen as containing both understood and yet to be understood ideas, as well as a multiplicity of relationships that may or may not be currently visible to the viewer. “[T]he picture immediately seems to give access to more than it literally contains, … the scene which we perceive directly is placed within the framework of a temporal sequences [sic] of typical happenings in the world” (Sonesson, 2004, p. 11).

Sonesson suggested that what separates pictorial semiotics from heuristics, mnemonics, and even art history, is its treatment of a pictograph as an idea in space and time. In other words, pictographs—among paintings, drawings, and other visual artistic forms—have interpretive meanings that make them ideal for thought processing. The thinker can see what they literally contain (what is shown in Figure 2.1) and anticipate or imagine what might come next, what might have existed as a
predicate, alternative routes that may have been followed in coming to the depiction as it stands and alternative routes that may be followed as the idea progresses—what Sonesson (1988) described as the *narrative model*. I use Figure 2.2 to demonstrate this temporal (narrative) nature of depicting ideas and thoughts pictographically.

Pictographs are also understood as *schematic* in the sense that each of their elements may be *made up of* (or *clothing*) other elements beneath that are literally
visible to the viewer. For example, and speaking generally rather than in regard to a particular figure, if an element $A$ depicted an individual, pictorial semiotics would see both the articles of clothing the individual wears as represented by a scheme and the organs, bones, and tissues within $A$ as another scheme. Furthermore, the element $A$ may be understood to be a scheme element of $B$, $A$, and $B$ may share the same scheme, or they may in fact depict the same element—although unknown to the viewer and thinker at the time. Alternatively, $A$ may depict only $B$’s schemes. The idea here is that a particular element within a pictograph is understood as possibly both containing and clothed in a variety of other elements not necessarily visible
In other words, pictorial semiotics is by nature conscious of the hermeneutic principle of whole and parts. Through successive iterations of similar or slightly modified pictographs, more information may be gleaned.

In Figure 2.3 I depict the area around the pictograph—an area that exists, according to pictorial semiotics, beyond the end of the pictorial surface. These outer regions are understood as extending indefinitely and underscore the hermeneutic presumption that the pictograph “forms part of a greater whole” (Sonesson, 2004, p. 11). In fact, one may revisit Figure 2.2 and see it as depicting not only the temporal nature of the pictograph, but also the depth of the pictograph in terms similar to the outer region shown in Figure 2.3. Sonesson (2004), describing Diego Velázquez’ 1656 painting titled “Las Meninas”, explained this pictographic depth:

the canvas [depicted within the painting] erected at the left-hand limits of the scene, for instance, is not perceived to be cut off where the depicted scene ends. If so, we could hardly have identified it as a canvas. Nor do we doubt the presence within the same fictional space of those pictures hanging on the wall in the background which [sic] are partly covered by the canvas or the bodies of the depicted persons. We also take for granted that the door in the background leads on to further rooms, and that the window opens up onto the outside world. What is more, we never doubt that fictional space continues in front of the pictorial scene, beyond the limits of the depicted space. Most probably, there are other walls there, other doors and windows, and perhaps other paintings on the walls. (p. 12, emphasis in original)
I have admittedly oversimplified the principles of pictorial semiotics yet have provided a basic understanding necessary to comprehend the relationships that exist among pictographic sketches I submit as a component of the method I intend to employ. Furthermore, I have shown how pictorial semiotic analysis differs from other fields that utilize pictographs or extol their virtues—a difference I continue to explore. While pictorial semiotics describes a method of visual content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004) and interpreting existing depictions in various artistic forms, in the section that follows I explore the ways in which its concepts and principles are employed in philosophic knowledge extension.

1.2.b. The hermeneutic diagram

In Section 1.2.a.i., I concluded with the claim that my personal belief surrounding the nature of the hermeneutic circle was one straddling the Schleiermacherian/normative contention that principles governing the structure of the circle were both valid and useful and the Gadamerian/philosophical suggestion that the circle has no end. Pictorial semiotics, demonstrated in the previous section, is similarly inclined: loosely structured without a strictly demarcated boundary or state of completion. In Sections 1.2.a.ii. and 1.2.a.iii., I underscored the general acceptance of a hermeneutic circular search for the parts within the whole and the whole within the parts as understood and justified by philosophical symbolism and analogy, heuristics in general, and pictorial semiotics in particular. Of primary concern within this subsection is the distillation of the reciprocal use for pictorial
semiotic principles in the creation of pictographs for the purpose of exploring ideas.

In the previous subsection, a basic overview of the interpretive cannon employed by pictorial semioticians was explored—and the ideas explored remain vitally important as the interpretive structure within the adaptation of the hermeneutic circle I propose below. Furthermore, as was the contention of Wittgenstein (1949/1968) that supports the circular evaluation of pictographs, “[i]f you search in a figure (1) for another figure (2), and then find it, you see (1) in a new way. Not only can you give a new kind of description of it, but noticing the second figure was a new visual experience” (p. 199e).

Linking the three concepts explored in Sections 1.2.a.ii. and 1.2.a.iii.—(a) the hermeneutic circle (both as a method and as a condition of a transcendental cogitation), (b) the relationship between pictographs as syntax and their observer-dependent semantics, and (c) the pictorial semiotic account of image in space and time—reveals an exciting result: an ever-developing or transcendental mode of ante and post hoc cogitation and expression of meaning through the illustration of ideas as extending bodies. To clarify this result, I deconstruct its content beginning with the referents of concepts b and c, and then conclude with concept a.

Discussed in Section 1.2.a.ii., Searle’s (1984) caution suggests a division between the existence of a syntactic element (a symbol, sign or diagram) and its observer-dependent semantic element (meaning). An implication of this caution for the present discussion is that a diagram has no inherent or innate meaning unto
itself. Rather, for a syntactic element to represent something, it must either (a) be employed by an observer beholden of a preformulated semantic element that requires a syntactic referent, or (b) be observed by an observer and understood to represent a preestablished semantic referent. In the case of $a$, the process is ante hoc cogitation and expression of a meaning for the thinker, whereas in the case of $b$, the process is post hoc cogitation and expression of a meaning for the reader.  

In Section 1.2.a.iii., attention was drawn to Sonneson’s (2004) articulation that, in Searle’s (1984) terms, syntactic elements contain the potential for both previously understood and yet to be understood semantic referents. The discussion was further developed to highlight the important conceptualisation of syntactic elements as potentially existing simultaneously at any point in both the dimensions of time (sequence) and space (extension). I submit that the reciprocal notion is also acceptable. It is reasonable to consider the same potential for the semantic referents of such syntactic elements—that they may likewise potentially exist simultaneously at any point in both the dimensions of sequence (time) and extension (space). I argue that any procedural constraint upon one’s system of cogitation is released: freeing one’s method of thinking into the realm of speculation.

In this way, thoughts, ideas, or contemplations regarding a particular something are both possible and instantly relational in a dimensional audit: a new diagram is simply created that is easily understood as an adaptation, deconstruction, reconstruction, assimilation, integration, or micro- or macro-examination of a particular syntactical element (and by extension its referent semantic element) within
the diagrammatic whole. I further submit that a sequential depiction of the steps in one’s process of cogitation is limited by the distance between these steps, where a reasonable individual might lose track of the semantic elements about which an argument might be focused. It is not necessary for every detail in one’s audit to be strictly accounted for in diagrammatic form. Rather, only those key frames wherein reasonable symmetry between ante and post hoc cogitations may falter must be illustrated. Put another way, sequential diagrams illustrate only manageable leaps in logic within a particular argument.

Stated as such, the entire process is finally transcendental and hermeneutic. The process is a developmental method for cogitation (fulfilling the Schleiermacherian/normative contention) and a statement of the conditions under which understanding takes place (the root of the Gadamerian/philosophical project). The locus of both the normative hermeneutic and philosophic hermeneutic is therefore the apperception (Kant, 1784/1982)—a contention that is entitled much greater elaboration, and to which I return frequently throughout the remainder of this dissertation.

The hermeneutic diagram, therefore, differs from any purely descriptive, mnemonic or heuristic diagram in its assumptions. From the perspective of the thinker, the hermeneutic diagram is a perpetually developmental, but accountable, tool of speculative cogitation. From the perspective of the reader, the hermeneutic diagram is but one audit of a philosophical position on a particular matter under discussion. It is, from this perspective, a tool of understanding the development of a speculative position.
A question remains: How do I, as thinker, intend to practically employ the hermeneutic diagram within the remainder of this dissertation? I explore this question in the section that follows.

2. Method

A hermeneutic diagram is understood as eternally developing in both space and time, but captured temporally and spatially in an auditable ordering. In Chapter Three I explore the ontological and epistemic considerations that precede my methodological conception and use of the hermeneutic diagram. My purpose for this second section is to examine how I intend to bring the hermeneutic diagram into a useful practice. Consistent with the methodological position set out earlier, here I limit my discussion to the practical ante hoc character of the hermeneutic diagram. Its philosophical post hoc character is more appropriately discussed in Chapter Three on account of its epistemic nature.

Park (2005) suggested that in process writing theory, ideas do not hesitate. Rather, they exist within us, bursting with potential and ripe with cognitive energies. While such contentions may appear apocryphal, one’s ability to cogitate upon any topic practically requires a point of departure. Park’s explanation suggests that ideas are in some important way manifestly one’s own—for it is from somewhere deep within one’s minds that one was initially intrigued, curious, and interested. It is from deep within that one begins to think. Whatever the genesis of one’s thought, an account of its developmental path is revealing, instructive, and inspirational,
both for the thinker in his or her own working through of various difficult problems, and for the reader as he or she comes to understand the thinker’s position.

My ideas seem to emerge as malleable images—yet I hesitate to categorize myself within Gardner’s (1999) popular nomenclature of intelligences or as a “visual learner” (Dunn, Beaudry, & Klavas, 1989, among others). The hermeneutic diagram provides a tool of speculative thinking in the absence of another such tool that might meet my particular and personal process of philosophic cogitation. It is not simply a device for Gardnerian visual/spacial learners.

**Figure 2.4** A Multi-Step Hermeneutic Process
2.1. Procedure

I employ the hermeneutic diagram in accordance with a multistep hermeneutic process. Figure 2.4 provides a basic syntactic representation of this process, and is elaborated in the paragraphs that follow. Numbers below refer to numbers presented within Figure 2.4.

(1) The process begins with the arrival of an idea. The specific origin of this idea is of less importance than the implication of its arrival within the domain of the understanding: it becomes the intentional object.

(2) An initial sketch is made of the idea in (1) (hereafter idea′). The depth of the idea′ limits this sketch—it is here accepted that an idea begins as a rough and perhaps superficial articulation of an acceptable, justifiable or valid idea. The depth of the idea′ is sketched to the extent it is possible at that time.

(3) A mental evaluation of the sketch in (2) (hereafter sketch′) is made. The earlier discussed tenets of pictorial semiotics provide the theoretical basis for understanding the idea′ in its context. Principles of pictorial semiotics remind the thinker that the sketch′ must be considered both temporally and spatially. In this way, the evaluating thinker examines or contemplates a manipulation, tangential zone, particular implication, result, fallacy, redundancy or constellation of the sketch′.

(4) At this point an emergent idea may develop as a result of the evaluation in (3) (hereafter evaluation′). As is consistent with a general
hermeneutic circle model, the emergent idea (hereafter idea”’) becomes the new intentional object and is, in (5) and (6), sketched (producing the sketch”’) and evaluated (producing the evaluation”’) as would be the case in (2) and (3) respectively.

(7) At this point a potential further emergent idea may develop as a result of the evaluation”’. This further emergent idea (hereafter idea’”’) becomes the new intentional object and is, in (8) and (9), sketched (producing the sketch’”’) and evaluated (producing the evaluation’”’) as would be the case in (2) and (3) respectively. Idea”’ is considered potential in that its sub-process—referring collectively to (7), (8) and (9)—may or may not be of particular use, and may or may not be repeated (presumably no farther than ad infinitum less 1 since, if the process is to be of some practical utility, at some point before the end of time it should succumb to points [10] and [11]).

(10) A meta-evaluation of those ideas’”(n), sketches’”(n) and evaluations’’(n) is drawn en masse and a summary (11) of the larger process—referring collectively to (1) through (10)—is written. In this way, the syntactical elements of the hermeneutic diagram are provided to the reader through those sketches’”(n) that reflect substantial points in the larger argument under consideration. Furthermore, the summary (11), when encountered in conjunction with sketches’”(n), provides the thinker’s semantic content for the purpose of assisting the reader in the development of their own, vis-à-vis the
thinker’s position on the subject.

The repeating process of sequentially illustrating ideas and evaluating or reflecting upon insights that rest beyond, above or behind the content within their frames stimulates alternative ways of viewing a particular notion. In the following subsection, I explore a philosophical justification for the method outlined in Figure 2.4, and describe the means by which an audit trail of an argument’s progression is constructed. The audit trail that results is helpful in both the process of writing out the logical path of an argument’s development, as well as in the process of discursive justification for the argument’s validity.

**Figure 2.5** The Paths of Norm Construction and Discursive Validity
2.2. The Path of Norm Construction and the Path of Discursive Validity

The numeric order shown in Figure 2.4 denotes, in Habermasian terms, a directional *path of norm construction* (Habermas, 1990/2001a). As a thinker follows the path through its completion (at point [11]), a newly created, but merely potential, *norm* is presented to the reader. When the norm is accepted, it can be said that symmetry between the *ante* and *post hoc* characters of the hermeneutic diagram is achieved. If the norm were rejected, the reader has one of two options: (a) the reader may retrace the argument’s steps through the presented sketches‘(n) and summary (11), or summaries; or (b), if option a reveals no satisfactory justification of the potential norm, may discuss the matter with the thinker—who must provide a satisfactory justification for the argument to continue. Arguably, option b does present a recognized limitation of this method in cases where a relationship between the thinker and reader does not, or cannot, exist. Notwithstanding this limitation, and since Habermas names these potential norms *validity claims* and requires those who voice such claims to discursively justify them, the thinker following this diagrammatic hermeneutic method provides for a systematic discursiveness within his or her argument. The *path of discursive validity* is therefore achieved by following the *path of norm construction* in reverse. These are shown in Figure 2.5.
B. Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to establish the methodological underpinnings and method of the research/philosophic/thinking design I employed in this study. I described a methodological project, which I have named diagrammatic hermeneutics, and I created a mental construct—the hermeneutic diagram—that is accountable to both the Schleiermacherian/normative and Gadamerian/philosophical accounts of hermeneutics. To engender the hermeneutic diagram with utility, I determined a multistep process that provides both consistency with the inspirational and culminating position (described in the previous chapter) of this dissertation, and requires a functionally auditable practice of argumentation. In Chapter Three, I use this system to deconstruct questions of ontology and epistemology.
CHAPTER THREE

ONTOMETRY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND RECONCILIATION

In this chapter, I examine the questions of ontology and epistemology. I furthermore seek to reconcile issues found among my personal methodology and the method established in Section 3. of the previous chapter.

I have organised the following pages to represent a personal and primary account of questions related to existence and knowledge, and peripherally, to questions of value and purpose. My response to these questions provides the reader with an account of foundational conceptualisations affecting the philosophical analysis, interpretation, and treatment of this study. In Section 1., I examine my ontology through the question: What is? In Section 2., I respond to the question: How can I know it? and in so doing, present my epistemological position. Both sections are summarized within the final paragraphs of the chapter.

A. A Relationship among Ontology and Epistemology

Questions of ontology are questions of the accessibility of existence. The position from which I begin this dissertation implies that while an apprehension of what is is developmentally and universally accessible through natural epistemic
growth, such accessibility remains contemporarily, if not *ad infinitum*, within the realm of the potential. The separation of the knowable from the knower is maintained by the limits of our faculties of understanding, and this dissertation reflects a Kantian (1784/1982) perspective. The cognitively malleable nature of that separation, I argue, provides a key to certain developmentally or socially constructed limits on accessibility, and redress. By extension, this separation implies an epistemological framework that guides discussions to follow in *Section 2.* of this chapter.

1. **Ontology: What is?**

   *What is?* A formidable question, indeed, and perhaps one of the earliest and most formidable questions in the history of philosophy (Robinson, 1995; Seyffert, 1896/1956). I herein detail my own point of view on the subject.

   Copleston (1962a) identified the importance of providing one’s own point of view when he wrote that no one “can write without some point of view, some standpoint, if for no other reason than that he must have a principle of selection, guiding his intelligent choice and arrangement of facts” (p. 9). On the alternative, idealist, point, and rooted in the phenomenalism of Hegel *via* Hume, volumes of literature (in the area of the contemporary study of a social construction of reality and phenomenology) argue less for Copleston’s limitations as the impetus for a standpoint. The phenomenalist alternative advances the account that writer and object are subjectively linked (van Manen, 1997). On this view, the reader needs to understand the standpoint of the writer in order to interpret the writer’s description
of the object of interest. If not to fully separate the two, then to provide contextual basis for accepting or rejecting claims.

1.1. Dualism and Monism

Searle (1984, 2004) suggested that an appropriate point from which a modern account may take root is found, historically, in 1637. It was in this year that Descartes (1637/1969) published *A Discourse on Method*, wherein he provided justification for the now infamous *cogito ergo sum* [I think, therefore I exist]. From this work, modern philosophy of mind takes its shape. The world is divided into two substances (in accordance with Aristotelian [c. 350 BCE/1989] science): mental substances or *minds* (the primary essence of which is thinking and the nature of which is indivisible), and physical substances or *bodies* (the primary essence of which is extension and the nature of which is infinitely divisible).²⁵

The separation of the world into the two categories, known as Cartesian dualism and depicted in Figure 3.1, appeared consistent with folk wisdom in this regard. After all, the separation of human thoughts from human physical bodies does seem intuitively accurate to the *man on the street* (Paley, 2002; Searle, 1984, 2004).²⁶ The natural question stemming from a Cartesian point of view is, however, to ask how the two elements relate to one another. This question seems to be an appropriate place from which to begin the present dissection of my own ontological position. If there is no relation, then what I can know is clearly limited by the nature of my mind. If a relation exists, then to what degree can I, as a thinking subject,
know the physical world?

According to the meaning of the *Cogito*, the only thing for which Descartes (1637/1969) argued he could be certain was the content of his own mind, and so long as God was not deceiving him, he could extrapolate his own existence. Furthermore, Descartes argued that mental substances were limited to humans. This claim in itself is revealing, in terms of the profound statement it makes about
the abandonment of any possible animal sentience—for animals were deemed to be little more than cleverly designed mechanical clockworks (Descartes, 1637/1969), a claim contemporarily disputed (Carruthers, 1989, 1998; Cavalieri & Miller, 1999; Darwin, 1874). The argument is also derived from the certainty of Descartes’ premises, through which the existence of others could be solidly deduced. This is to say, the *Cogito* permitted Descartes to derive at a nonsolipsistic position.

Those who historically followed Descartes, including Hume and Berkeley, objected to a *dualistic* view of the world, preferring a *monistic* view based exclusively on the mind—with the body being epiphenomenal. Berkeley (1710/1998) argued that minds were the only basis of human existence and Hume (1777/1904) argued that one’s experience was limited to phenomena as perceived by the mind. The orthodox exploration of this type of mind-based monism is found in Hegelian idealism (Searle, 1984, 2004). Alternatively, notwithstanding the materialism of the ancient and scientific revolution periods, it was not until the late nineteenth century that body-based monistic orthodoxy arrived in the Huxley-*esque* mechanistic form of *epiphenomenalism* where the mind is an impotent byproduct of the body (Campbell, 2001; Clifford, 1874/1879; Huxley, 1861/1906, 1863/1905, 1874/1904; Romanes, 1895).²⁷ Huxley’s form of mechanicism was akin to a more general suggestion that all animals (including humans) are like Cartesian animals (Chomsky, 1966a). That is to say, even if humans have mental states, they do not directly affect human physical states but are merely *along for the ride*. The relationship among these dualistic and monistic forms is shown in Figure 3.2.
1.2. An Initial Examination of Kant

In the preceding section, I provided background to the point at which the discussion becomes interesting—that is, where Immanuel Kant enters. Searle (1984; 2004) argued that Kant was, according to the scheme developed above, a pure idealist, but it has been elsewhere argued that Kant’s conclusion is distinct from Hegel’s (Copleston, 1962b). The nature of this distinction rests in Hegel’s maintenance of Fichte’s elimination of the *noumenon*—what I would argue is

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**Figure 3.2** Dualistic and Monistic Typology

- **Cartesian Dualism**
  - Mind is epiphenomenal
    - (Huxley, Clifford, Romanes)
  - Body is epiphenomenal
    - (Hume, Berkeley, Hegel)

- **Varieties of Monisms**
a difference among Hegel and Kant. Furthermore, Kant’s view is more closely paralleled with Searle’s (2004) *transcendental argument for direct (naïve)*

*realism* than in name alone. Yet, to fully understand the implications of these differences and similarities, and, more importantly my own position within the larger context, I begin by presenting a picture of my understanding of Kant’s (1784/1982) most famous and important work: the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

It is important to contextually place Kant’s argument in its time. Published in the 1780s, the *Critique* predates many contemporary notions, especially with regard to evolutionary biology and modern—*quantum*—physics. This is principally evident in Kant’s ironic and uncritical acceptance of Newtonian physics as manifestly prior to (*a priori*) one’s ability to understand the world; for Kant believed that Newton’s account was the zenith of all possible explanations for the physical universe. Furthermore, it can be said that while Kant was not necessarily a particularly religious man, he was persecuted for a time based upon the potentially negative implications of his work for certain theological assumptions held by much of Christendom (his work was banned by the Holy See between 1793 and 1939)—although these implications were in no way linked to an evolutionary view. It is also important to understand that Kant’s work was largely directed as a critique of what might be understood as the arrogance of two schools of his predecessors’ thought: the empiricism of individuals like Locke (who believed that the physical world can be empirically accounted for through our sensual perception of objects therein) or Hume (who believed that physical matter exists only as
mental phenomena), and rationalist philosophers like Descartes\(^{30}\) (who believed that beginning with [a] the *Cogito* and [b] the fact that God would not mislead him, one could deduce a complete account of the world). Kant thus disagreed with both the empiricist notion that all knowledge arrives *a posteriori* (after experience) and with the notion that all knowledge could be derived *a priori* (before experience). Rather, his suggestion was that it is a combination of the two: certain faculties of the mind are required *a priori* for an *a posteriori* account of experience to be possible (Copleston, 1960)—and in the physical act of writing the *Critique*, it follows that some sort of *a posteriori* understanding was required to articulate an understanding of the nature of that which was *a priori*.

The point of the *Critique* was that it is our mind that is ultimately responsible for our understanding of the nature of objects within the world rather than the nature of objects within the world as being responsible for the nature of our understanding of those objects. The latter statement represented the essence of both the arguments of the empiricists and the deductive philosophers during Kant’s time.

In an attempt to prove his argument, Kant pulled his reader through an eminently complicated exploration of the nature of the mind—a journey into which Kant permits few definitions of his terms. On this account, Kant (1784/1890) explained

…I very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous problems with which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived that this critical investigation would, even if delivered in the driest *scholastic* manner,
be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to enlarge it still more with examples and explanations, which are necessary only from a popular point of view. I was induced to take this course from the consideration also, that the present work is not intended for popular use[—] … we may say [that] … many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be clear. For explanations and examples, and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole… (pp. xxii ff, emphasis in original; [A xviii])

Yet, it can be argued in Kant’s defence, that articulating one’s thinking about the manner in which one thinks is an undoubtedly complicated task. The existence of the Critique in any form might, on this account, be regarded as a feat of human ingenuity for which presentation is of understandably secondary concern. For my own interpretation of his work, however, I attempt to illustrate those concepts that I believe enlighten the current larger discussion—both in terms of (a) my own answer to the question: What is? (and by extension: What can I know?) and (b) that will be useful as the dissertation progresses beyond the current chapter.

While some accounts (Copleston, 1960; Durrant, 1943; Mahaffy & Bernard, 1889) of the Critique begin with details of Kant’s separation of knowledge into its four subtypes (the permutations of a priori or a posteriori, and analytic or synthetic), I will resist the temptation to do so lest I lose the reader in what I view as insignificant for my purpose. I suggest that for Kant, one’s mind is constructed in such a fashion
as to permit one’s knowledge of the world in a certain way. While the world as it actually is may exist according to certain rules or may maintain a certain nature, we are quite simply unable to account for the world in its actual state. The reason for this account lies within the natural fashioning of our minds. Kant believed that one’s mind limits one’s view of the world. One can only view the world in a certain way, and that way does not permit a view of the world’s actual state.

In Kant’s terms, the world as it actually exists is the *noumenon*: the realm of things-in-themselves. Because of these limits, our view of the noumenon is as *phenomena*; an initial account of this relationship is shown in Figure 3.3. In essence, the nature of our minds does not permit us to view things-in-themselves, we only see and experience phenomena. On this view, which is Kant’s, {α} the noumenon is *radically unknowable*—we can and will never know the noumenon. As foreshadowing of the discussion in *Section 2.*, all possible human knowledge is limited by the noumenon, and all of my current knowledge is limited by those parts of the noumenon that have been revealed to me as phenomena.

While the above account is easily understood, it must be followed by an important caveat. It would be wrong, on Kant’s view, to hold that phenomena are real in any independent sense. Phenomena are only real in terms of one’s mind. Without the employment of one’s mind, phenomena do not really exist. To this end, Figure 3.4 shows a slight alteration of Figure 3.3 wherein the place of phenomena is adjusted and that which fills the former place of phenomena is the *transcendental object*. {β} The transcendental object, therefore, is the expression of
the noumenon prior to experience (and within one’s mind) from which phenomena are represented within one’s mind. So, the transcendental object is the object of one’s imagination that creates phenomena from the things-in-themselves. In this way, the ubiquitousness and omnipotence of the noumenon (even within one’s own mind) is demonstrated. For Kant (1784/1890) explained, in a rather long passage, that,

Transcendental idealism[32] allows that the objects of external intuition—as intuited in space, and all changes in time—as represented by the internal sense, are real. … But time and space, with all phænomena therein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but representations and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind. … The objects of experience then are not things in themselves (Dinge an sich), but are given only in experience, and
have no existence apart from and independently of experience.

... The non-sensuous cause of these representations is completely unknown to us and hence cannot be intuited as an object. For such an object could not be represented either in space or in time; and without these conditions intuition or representation is impossible. We may, at the same time,
term the non-sensuous cause of phænomena the transcendental object—but merely as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered as a receptivity. To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole connection and extent of our possible perceptions, and say that it is given and exists in itself prior to all experience. But the phænomena, corresponding to it, are not given as things in themselves, but in experience alone. (Kant, 1784/1890, pp. 307-309 [A 491/B 520-A494/B 522])

I would here caution that neither Figure 3.4 nor the above passage implies that humans are merely brains in vats. Rather, it reveals how human are all (minds, bodies, perceptions, assumptions, representations) part of nature. But if such a natural and fluid relationship among noumenon, phenomena, and transcendental objects exists, does this not reasonably beg the questions: (a) Are the nature of such relationships determined? and (b) How does the answer to this question affect the nature of the product of their relationship? My view, which I posit as reasonably consistent with Peterson’s (1992) work in this area, is that while the relationship among noumenon, phenomena, and transcendental objects is most certainly determined in nature, the product of their relationships—an eminently epistemological issue—is temporally subject to some form of natural temporal (developmental) mechanism of cogitation, but is itself not determined.
1.3. Direct (Naïve) and Transcendental Object Realisms

At the beginning of Section 1.2. I made the comment that Searle’s (2004) contention that Kant’s transcendental idealism was akin to Hegel’s absolute idealism. The doctrine of perception that Searle posited suggested: (a) “[w]e assume that people actually communicate with each other in a public language about public objects and states of affairs in the world”; (b) “I have to assume that you understand the expression[s of our public language] in the same way that I intend it”; and (c) “that I have to presuppose that you and I are both seeing or otherwise perceiving the same public object” (Searle, 2004, pp. 275ff). On Searle’s view, such an argument provides for a type of realism that is contrary to the sense-data based idealism of the body-as-epiphenomenal monism shown in Figure 3.2.


In Figure 3.5 I present an account of Searle’s (2004) conception of direct ( naïve) realism. In this diagram two individuals A and B see, in Searle’s own terms,
the same public object. On Searle’s account, since they both speak the same public language and see the same public object, they are able to confirm the existence of the same “real” nature of that public object. Alternatively, Figure 3.6 presents an account of a pure idealism (similar to Hegel’s). Again, I present two individuals A and B who ultimately need not see an object, since their perception is basically Idea-referential in that it exists exclusively through the internal dialectic construction of the Idea (Copleston, 1962b; Fuller, 1945)—through the process of abandoning antitheses of self and objects. In this sense, communication supports the construction of the Idea and the absorption of the external world, since communication is itself a potentially reflective process. These accounts (the naïve realist and the pure idealist) are different from one another. My question was: To which idea is my own
interpretation of Kant’s more closely linked?

In Figures 3.7 and 3.8 I have depicted my interpretation of Kant’s basic position. In Figure 3.7 I show that little difference exists between Kant’s position and naïve realism as depicted in Figure 3.5. The difference that is demonstrated, however, must be understood in terms of Figure 3.8. I recall earlier indicated premises \{\beta\} and \{\gamma\}—that the transcendental object is the expression of the noumenon prior to experience (and within our minds) from which phenomena are represented within one’s mind, and that humans are all (minds, bodies, perceptions, assumptions, representations) part of nature—and agree that the “real” nature of the public object is, in neither Searle’s account nor my own, an objectively real public
object. Rather, it is real, but only intersubjectively real. The intersubjective nature of the public object’s reality is neither socially constructed nor Idea-referential, but is naturally as real as the functions of one’s cognition are natural functions, and as real as brains are natural organs in which such functions take place. Searle (1984) stated “[m]ental phenomena, all mental phenomena … are caused by processes going on in the brain. … [But] are just features of the brain (and perhaps the rest of the central

![Figure 3.7 Kantian Transcendental Object (Limited) Realism](image)
These processes (both Searle’s and Kant’s) are natural and intersubjectively real—they are neither mind- nor body-epiphenomenological, nor are they dualistic or monistic.

1.4. A Return to the Problem of Spontaneous Generation of and Aptitude for the Justification of the Organisational Form

I now address an important matter presented in Chapter One. The issue arose in the concern over what was at that time called the assumption of spontaneous generation of and aptitude for the justification of the organisational Form. The context of this assumption focused, at that time, around Etzioni’s (1967; 1986; 1989) model of mixed-scanning as a technique of decision-making, and the
transformational leadership model. These were only two examples of what I argue is a problem of greater depth.

The assumption may be simply described as follows: models of social interaction pre-suppose that individuals have a clear and immediate understanding of what they know to be true, and further pre-suppose that these individuals can explain and justify this knowledge at any instant in which they are called upon to do so. Alternatively, I reconstitute this assumption in terms of the discussion found in the previous section. The assumption is: models of public discourse about reality pre-suppose that individual A has a clear and immediate understanding of nature and is able to explain and justify to individual B through public language the processes and functions of nature—and with the roles of A and B reversed, vice-versa. A resulting question is of key ontological importance: Does one in fact know the nature of a public object, and can one justify his or her knowledge of it? The assumption neglects the question of how it is that this understanding is present within oneself. The simple answer might be that the presence of these understandings is natural—noumenal. Yet this simple answer, as shall be shown in the sections that follow, would be wrong. For one must not, in answering this question, neglect earlier presented arguments—specifically premise δ: that the relationship among noumenon, phenomena, and transcendental objects is determined in nature. The product of their relationships is temporally subject to some form of natural temporal (developmental) mechanism of cogitation, but is itself not determined. Thus, I address epistemology at this stage.
2. Epistemology: How Can I Know It?

I base my epistemology on Kant. The nature of my deviation from an orthodox Kantian position might be understood as an addendum rather than as a significant derivation. In Section 2.1., I resume the discussion that closed the previous section by expanding Kant’s (1784/1982) account of perception. I further expand upon the account (Section 2.2.) as a demonstration of my own conceptualisation, in light of two important contributions to philosophy of mind since Kant’s publication: (a) a developmental and evolutionary description of natural phenomena, and (b) the linguistic turn.

2.1. The Apperceptive System and Its Epistemic Importance

At this time, recall the four premises described in Section 1.2.:

α: The noumenon is radically unknowable.

β: The transcendental object is the expression of the noumenon prior to experience (and within human minds) from which phenomena are represented within human minds.

γ: Humans are all (minds, bodies, perceptions, assumptions, representations) part of nature.

δ: While the relationship among noumenon, phenomena and transcendental objects is determined in nature, the product of their relationships is subject to some form of natural temporal (developmental) mechanism of cogitation, but is itself not
While these premises help to describe the Kantian ontological position regarding the question: What is?, they are as yet insufficient to shed light upon the epistemic question: How can I know it? At best, one might assume that a natural relationship exists between what I can know and how I can know it—an assumption that is grounded in $\gamma$ and solidified in $\delta$. For these ontological premises to be understood as foundations of an epistemological system, one must first understand their location within Kant’s broader argument.

2.1.a. The understanding°

In premise $\beta$ the transcendental object is the expression of the noumenon prior to experience (and within one’s mind) from which phenomena are represented within one’s mind. While this statement appears somewhat idealist and therefore incoherent with the limited realist arguments in previous sections it highlights an important concept of which I have previously made mention but consciously neglected to adequately define until now: the understanding°. I have elected to append the word “understanding” with the ° mark in an attempt to make my meaning clearer in its usage, separate from its commonplace English definition. Kant (1784/1890) described the understanding°, perhaps most succinctly, throughout his account of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements.

We apply the term sensiblity to the receptivity of the mind for impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the other hand, we call the
faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, *understanding*. Our nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects [*Gegenständen*]. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object [*Gegenstand*] of sensuous intuition is the understanding[°]. Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object [*Gegenstand*] would be given to us, and without the understanding[°] no object [*Gegenstand*] would be thought. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind.

(pp. 45ff, emphasis in original; [A 51/B 75])

Kant’s view, denoted as {ε} the understanding° is the faculty of cognition that permits thought to take place. Further, his argument holds that the understanding° exists naturally within humans, and its existence is prior to experience. Brains are naturally constructed in such a way that permits thought to take place when bombarded by sensuous objects [*Gegenstände*].

Kant’s depiction of the understanding° is as the precondition for one’s understanding of the world—a faculty that requires several tools for understanding to take place. Kant names these tools the categories of the understanding°—categories of sub-tools without which human understanding of the world would not be possible. The categories include: (a) quantity, (b) quality, (c) relation and (d) modality.

This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of the synthesis
which [sic] the understanding\[^\circ\] contains à priori, and these conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding\[^\circ\]; inasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, think an object [\(\text{Objekt}\)]—meaning an object of cognition, not a physical or sensible object {\(\text{Gegenstand}\)} of intuition. (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 64; [A 80/B 106])

But the understanding\[^\circ\] and its categories do not, in themselves, provide the epistemic answer to the question: How can I know it? Rather, the understanding\[^\circ\] merely represents the locus of cogitation; the channel through which the transcendental object is the object\[^\circ\] of the understanding\[^\circ\] requires one further apparatus: the transcendental apperception—an account of which I present in Section 2.1.b.

### 2.1.b. The apperception and the transcendental apperception

I found the apperception and the transcendental apperception difficult concepts to grasp in Kant’s (1784/1890) account of the mind. Therefore, I claim the logical sense I have made from my reading of Kant’s account as it relates to questions of epistemology.

#### 2.1.b.i. The apperception

On Kant’s view, for a cogitation to be related to a particular object (an intentional object), an agent of thought is required for this direction to exist. The agent of thought Kant argued is found in our consciousness of self, which he calls apperception.
The consciousness of self (apperception) is the simple representation of the “Ego”; ... If the faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what lies in the mind, it must all act that and can in this way alone produce an intuition of self. (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 41; [B 68])

Yet, regarding the apperception’s apprehension of what lies in the mind, “we may especially remark, that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations” (p. 40; [B 67]). {ζ} The ordering of these relations of the objects° of thought into a single unity for their presentation to the understanding° is the primary concern of the apperception. For without an ability to order the relations of the objects°, the function of the understanding° is not possible—there would be nothing to present to the understanding° and therefore no thought would exist. In this way, the apperception is natural and is a priori of experience.

Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty of Cognitions. These consist in the determined relation of given representation to an object[°]. But an object[°] is that, in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is united. Now all union of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and consequently, the possibility of the existence of the understanding[°] itself. (Kant, 1784/1890, pp. 84ff, emphasis in original; [B 137])

The argument to this point is that one’s mind orders the representations of
objects of one’s experience in such a way that permits the understanding of them. Yet, Kant continued in his account of the apperception to say that only certain conditions of the apperception permit universally and necessarily valid conceptions to exist.

[T]he empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of representations, itself relates to a phenomenal world and is wholly contingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intuition in time, merely as an intuition, which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, and that solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the “I think,” consequently by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding[^], which lies à priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis. The transcendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid; the empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and which is merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions in concreto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects the notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical, is, in relation to that which is given by experience, not necessarily and universally valid. (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 86, emphasis in original; [B 140])

Kant argued that two levels of apperception exist. The first is that which I have above discussed and is required a priori to the understanding[^]. The second is the meta-level apperception—the apperception that orders one’s view of the work
of the first apperception. Thus, the meta-level apperception, which Kant called *transcendental*, is that function of the understanding° that permits one the ability to examine the functioning of one’s understanding°.

From this point, I presuppositionally argue that since the transcendental apperception permits one’s self-reflection upon one’s self-consciousness, it must be *a priori* to the apperception. It is therefore more natural, or of a greater natural purity. The transcendental apperception is more closely akin—or perhaps identical to—an *original* apperception.° The only logical reason for this, I submit as premise \{η\}, is that the apperception is in some way prone to dysfunctions that limit the products of the function of the understanding° to be eternally subjective. This point was, in essence, the impetus for which Kant wrote the *Critique*—to show that what is often thought to be empirical is merely subjective.

### 2.1.b.ii. The transcendental apperception and schema

The *transcendental apperception* is a loose Kantian equivalent in function to the Cartesian *Cogito* (Bermúdez, 1994). It is the statement of reflective self-consciousness—meta-thought is ordered by the transcendental apperception for presentation to the understanding°. It is through the transcendental apperception that one’s understanding of the apperception and its derived nature (*a posteriori*) is possible. Kant (1784/1890) argued that the apperception orders the objects° of cognition for the understanding° following patterns—which he named *schemata*. Kant suggested that
the categories in their pure signification, free from all conditions of sensibility, ought to be valid of things as they are, and not, as the schemata represent them, merely as they appear; and consequently the categories must have a significance far more extended, and wholly independent of all schemata. ...[T]he categories, without schemata are merely functions of the understanding[°] for the production of conceptions, but do not represent any object. This significance they derive from sensibility, which at the same time realizes the understanding[°] and restricts it. (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 113, emphasis in original; [A 147/B 186-B 187])

The importance of this statement is its suggestion that the apperception develops over time. Its schemata are manipulated through experience, from its original nature into something that limits one’s mind’s ability to be objective. Therefore, the development of the apperception increases subjectivity. Thus the earlier premise $\eta$ is explained.

Kant (1784/1890) suggested that the human mind is a tool for and against self-regulation of Being. His contention was that while humans are natural objects, they present themselves to themselves as both phenomena and as objects of their own pure understanding. One is able to mentally treat one’s self as phenomena. One is able to construct one’s understandings of one’s self in the world according to a schemata-developed apperception. The schemata-developed apperception is thus a tool in use against one’s self-regulation of Being. Alternatively, one may employ one’s transcendental apperception to evaluate the current state of one’s schema-
developed apperceptive presentation of one’s self. The transcendental apperception is thus a tool in use for one’s self-regulation of Being. In the former instance, one tends, over time, to drift from our natural Being. In the latter, we are able to see the distance from which we have drifted—and if so inclined make adjustments that correct our drifting tendencies.

Epistemologically, it is through the transcendental apperception that one recognizes the existence of one’s schemata. Furthermore, as premise \( \{ \theta \} \), the schemata are the socially constructed and conservative manner in which one tends to think. I use “conservative” in a biological conservation sense (Musso et al., 1999; Taub, Uswatte & Pidikiti, 1999; Weiller & Rijntjes, 1999) where the conservative behaviour of a muscle, for example, is linked to an adapted preference for movement patterns based upon the experience of commonplace and repetitive movements. These patterns are then used complacently under anomalous circumstances, despite the absence of any biomechanical advantage in doing so.

The transcendental apperception is exemplified through critical thinking, whereas the apperception is a sedentary or complacent manner of cogitation. When ill-aligned, one’s apperception misrepresents the truth of objects to the understanding—a truth that is universally accessible via a transcendentally apperceptive regimentation. I depict these notions in Figure 3.9.

Figure 3.9 presents a transcendental apperceptive articulation of the apperception. It is the transcendental apperception that permits such a figure to be constructed. In the diagram, the understanding (denoted as \( U^o \)) is shown to
accept a transcendental object (the dotted cup) via the schematic construction of the apperceptive system (shown in the central portion). When the transcendental object becomes the intentional object, it is perceived—although the accuracy of one’s perception juxtaposed against the object’s Form is only realized through a transcendental apperceptive account. By way of analogy, one might consider the apperception to be not unlike the muscle described earlier. When exercised in a particular fashion or according to a particular regime, the muscle takes on a particular predilection toward actions consistent with that regime (Hadders-Algra, 2000; Harris, 2004; Jones, Rutherford, & Parker, 1989; Spencer & Thelen, 2000). My contention is that as does the muscle under its regime, so does the apperceptive system when placed under its own regime. I explore the apperceptive system and its regimes in the next section.

2.2. Language° as a Schematizing Agent of Apperception

I define the schematizing agent of apperception, that agent (shown in Figure 3.9) by which deviations among one’s apperception and transcendental apperception may be accounted. I return to an earlier discussion of the nature of the understanding° as expressed in the categories. Kant explained that the understanding°, as a priori of experience, required certain features through which spatial and temporal representations (sensuous experience) are understood. These features Kant called the categories of the understanding°; he included quantity, quality, relation, and modality; and he argued that without these categories experience was not possible.
Yet, while Kant argued that the categories were vital to his Transcendental Philosophy, he was reluctant to provide clear definitions of them beyond his own requirements:

The categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility [space and time], or with one another, afford a great number of deduced *à priori* conceptions; a complete enumeration of which would be a useful and not unpleasant, but in this place a perfectly dispensable, occupation. I purposely omit the

![Figure 3.9](image)

*Figure 3.9* The Apperceptive System of Perception
definitions of the categories in this treatise. (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 66; [A 82/B 108])

I structure my understanding of the categories more broadly in terms employed within the earlier discussion of syntax and semantics in Section 1.2.a.ii. of Chapter Two.

Semantics provides the meaning of any particular element of syntax. Without semantics, a syntactic element has no particular meaning in speech among individuals. Semantics, in Kantian terms, must develop within the understanding as syntactic elements are made into public objects (in writing, drawing, or other vocal linguistic representations) through their interaction with schemata of the apperceptive system. At the heart of the matter is: {t} the need for a medium through which public objects might be publicly contemplated, yet which does not require the presence of a transcendental object. For this medium, all that is required is a syntactic referent of the transcendental object upon which the categories of the understanding might act. The syntactic referent becomes the intentional object. The question of interest, therefore, is: How is the connection between syntax and semantics naturally possible?—or, How is the product of the operation of the categories of the understanding connected to the intentional object?

Until the publication of Chomsky’s (1959) review of the book Verbal Behavior, the predominant view regarding this question was one of behaviourist psychology—most notably found in the work of B. F. Skinner. Skinner had attempted to explain semantic development through operant behaviour in accordance with
his studies of animal-conditioning. As Chomsky (1966b) explained of the mind-epiphenomenalistic position from the 1800s,

[t]he problem of accounting for the acquisition of language, so conceived, disappears. ‘...the acquisition of language by children does not seem to us any mystery at all.’ It is not at all astonishing ‘that a child, after hearing a certain word used some scores or hundreds of times comes to understand what it means, and then, a little later, to pronounce and use it.’ (p. 22)

Chomsky’s own view, out of which his universal grammar emerges, is more Kantian in nature (Williams, 1993).

At the heart of Chomsky’s theory of universal or generative grammar is the underlying recognition that certain elements of language are universally present in humanity — a priori structures that permit the linkage of syntax to semantic content. The contention is not that syntax exists separate from semantics, but that both are required for competent communication (Chomsky, 1993); they are both part of the natural system of thought. If syntax is the stimuli, and semantics the product of the understanding’s function upon it, then the creative nature of language use must be in some way operationally linked to the Kantian categories. The reason for this is found in the contention that imaginative thought—which Kant argued was equivalent to synthesis and required for cognition to take place—is similar to its imaginative representation in language. That I can imagine a situation and describe that situation (its semantic referent) through a linguistic account (its syntactic referent) requires a priori the ability to synthesize two disparate stimuli presented
to the understanding°. My creative account is the product of synthesis, and to this end, synthesis is the operation of the understanding° through the categories.

If Chomsky’s contention is correct that creative language is a universal trait of humanity, then it is only reasonable to conclude that one’s natural ability to produce creative language must be formulated according to particular rules or an ordering of thought, or a particular linguistic or grammatical apperceptive output of the understanding°. Furthermore, if it can be concluded that outbound syntactic structure is articulated via an apperceptive ordering of universal and natural grammatical principles emanating from the categories, and syntactic referents are absent transcendental objects (or experiences of objects), then certainly it is reasonable to conclude that the reverse is also true: syntactic referents are presented to the understanding° via the apperception. Having established earlier through premise θ in Section 2.1.b.ii. that the apperception is deviated from its natural Form through socially constructed schemata, it is further reasonable to conclude that language appears to provide an equally present and accessible master of dysfunctional development within the apperception. This language, however, is not a language specific to any one society or group (it is neither English, nor Magyar, nor Hangul, for example). Rather, it is a universally and naturally present meta-language of cognition and I therefore refer to it as language°. We do not speak this language°, but we visualize (through the transcendental apperception) its affect on the apperception via its construction of schemata. Synthesis is only viable within the understanding° if a language of pure semantics exists. This is the language° and
it is *a priori* to both experience and language.

3. Summary and Reconciliation

What is the point in all of my discussion hitherto and how does the discussion permit me to reach an answer to the questions: What is? and How can I know it?

Through the collected premises $\alpha$ through $\lambda$, six important conclusions may be drawn that answer the questions presented: (a) that my ontological position suggests a natural relation of all objects of experience with processes of the mind—that is, my ontology is neither *mind-* nor *body-epiphenomenal* and is neither *monistic* nor *dualistic*; (b) that my mind is a natural feature of my naturally developing brain—both of which are limited by i) the point in evolution at which I currently exist, and ii) the point in the schematic development of my apperception at which I currently exist; (c) my understanding of the world is limited by these limitations in $b$; (d) the limits of my understanding of the world are transcendently observable *via* the transcendental apperception; (e) understanding the deviational limits of my understanding of the world cause me to seek correction of my apperception through its focus upon a natural construction; (f) a singular, natural and universally accessible apperception is, at least, possible—although to achieve this universal remains only a potential so long as human apperception is complacently schematized.

*What is?* Only that which I am developmentally and evolutionarily capable of knowing.

*How can I know it?* I can know it complacently (apperceptively) or critically
(transcendentally)—but always as an ontological being, *via* the understanding° and language°.
PART II

A CONCEPTUALISATION OF INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE

In this chapter, I begin to establish a critique of modern and post-modern perspectives of contemporary institutional interaction. The roots of the critique that results from this chapter are then more concretely articulated in Chapter Five where I develop an hypothesis of social interactions in general.

Drawing upon a modern view of evolutionary theory, based primarily in the work of Dawkins and his predecessors, Fisher (1930), Hamilton (1964a; 1964b), Williams (1966), and Maynard Smith (1982), work on what has been dubbed the gene's perspective—an alternative to Mayr’s (1942) or Wynne-Edwards’ (1962), and others work on the ecologically centred view—I intend to show how the contemporary social/political/institutional perspectives in which education operates and, furthermore, in which interorganisational relationships exist, is largely inconsistent with certain scientific accounts of humanity. The discussion of the contemporary perspectives will be extended in Chapter Five to encompass a discussion of how inconsistency may ultimately cause the distortion of those institutional environments in which a truer expression of the individual’s and organisation’s teleos may be manifested. Since in doing so I engage in the
task of establishing what appears to be a new hypothesis of social and institutional relationships within the field of educational administration, I am compelled to meet the demands of a standard of explanatory precision. The precision I seek will serve to more methodically construct the argument than simply provide references to previously established texts commonly known among my colleagues. For this reason, in the opening section of the chapter, I pay attention to an area of study that may, under most other circumstances within the field, be relegated to irrelevance. Its relevance, I contend, is found in its strength of stature as an evidence-based hypothesis of foundational antecedents of human interaction. Though there are many hypotheses in both the physical and social sciences, all hypotheses are not of equal weight nor are they equally able to maintain their justification over time.

A. Dawkins’ “Rhizobium’s Tale”

In 2004, Richard Dawkins published one of the most fascinating books I have ever read. Inspired by the style of Chaucer’s 14th century Canterbury Tales, Dawkins’ Ancestor’s Tale depicts the history of life on Earth as a great journey backward over 900 million years. For Dawkins, Canterbury was represented by the origin of life on the planet and the roles of Chaucer’s adjoining pilgrims are taken by the various species—or more appropriately, ancestral species—that merged with humanity along the way. The stylistic analogue between Chaucer’s and Dawkins’ works extended into the pilgrims’ tales, as well. Yet where Chaucer’s Miller’s, Friar’s, Shipman’s, Manciple’s, et al., tales depicted a variety of human interests
in a variety of social contexts interspersed with a variety of bodily functions, Dawkins’ Bonobo’s, Platypus’, Lungfish’s, Cauliflower’s, et al., tales depicted the remarkable and peculiar adaptations and bodily functions of adjoining species as an accommodation to specific environmental contexts. I highlight these (differing) contexts for an important reason that I shall explore later in Section B, and in Chapter Five. In the meantime and as a vehicle toward a larger end, however, I recount a small portion of one of Dawkins’ character’s tales—that of a microscopic bacterium that inhabits the root nodules of legumes.

I intend to reveal how it is that relevant segments of the tale exemplify a foundational hypothesis that will repeatedly arise within the remainder of this chapter and those that follow. A hypothesis, but one grounded in an account of history that surpasses the rigor of all previous socio-historical philosophical accounts.

The *Rhizobium’s Tale* is the tale of an evolved wheel. It is, I think, reasonable to let one’s mind wander when disengaged by daily routine. On more than one occasion I have contemplated why it is that humans have legs as opposed to some other form of locomotive device—wheels, perhaps. Why is it so likely that no species one has ever seen has developed a “wheel”, axle and all, as locomotive appendage, organ, or other anatomical structure? The reason is surprisingly simple (Dawkins, 2004), although some have suggested that it is demonstrative of *irreducible complexity* (Behe, 1996, 1998)—the mantra of the *intelligent design* movement in the United States, and of some contemporary significance for the practice of educational administration, if not only in the American theatre.46
Berg’s (2003) paper in the Annual Review of Biochemistry, and Macnab’s (2003) paper in the Annual Review of Microbiology are particularly helpful in understanding the nature of the circumstances that Dawkins (2004) highlighted in his *Rhizobium’s Tale*. It is in this tale that one example of an evolved “wheel” is discussed.

Why has one likely never seen such a thing? The reason is found in the requirements of molecular level construction for such an anatomical peculiarity to exist, and rhizobia provide just such an appropriate host. A wheel has found its place exclusively within micro-anatomy because at any other level it is either impractical, assumes a pre-existent and naturally constructed “road”, or both. I discuss each of these in turn, the second case being the more important of the two for the underlying critique proposed in this chapter.

Micro-anatomy (that of viruses, prokaryotes [less complex single-celled organisms], and single-cell eukaryotes [more complex but microscopic organisms]) differs from macro-anatomy (that of multi-eukaryotic-celled organisms) in both degrees of complexity and, *a fortiori*, function. This rubicon (see Figure 4.1) is important because it distinguishes the point at which the strict evolutionary practicality of a wheel ceases, and the point where the existence of such evolutionary constructs are ultimately dependent upon environmental features that assume consciousness and foresight on the part of the species involved.

Rhizobia are nitrogen-fixing bacteria found in the roots of legumes (Skerman, McGowan, & Sneath, 1980; Young & Haukka, 1996). As naturally occurring
bacteria, rhizobia are prokaryotes that fulfil a specialized role within the husbandry of legumes, symbiotically breaking down nitrogen in plant hosts into ammonia (Guillén-Navarro, Encarnación, & Dunn, 2005). The structure of the rhizobium’s cell is similarly intriguing since it includes a bacterial flagellum—ultimately, the evolved wheel to which I am specifically referring.

Flagella in general may be characterized as microscopic filaments the purpose of which are to propel bacteria and other cells (Berg, 2003; Macnab, 2003; Platzer, Sterr, Hausmann, & Schmitt, 1997). Among rhizobia, the rotary movement of their bacterial flagella enable the organism to propel itself; although the locomotion of rhizobia are of less importance here than the mere fact that a free (but controlled) moving filament (read axle) has naturally developed among these microscopic species.

The rotary “motor” (Berg, 2003; Macnab, 2003) of the bacterial flagella is controlled by the flow of chemical and electrical protons through the membrane between the body of the rhizobium and its flagellum. The flow of these protons drives the motor at rates as high as 300 hertz (Berg & Turner, 1993; Lowe, Meister, & Berg, 1987). It is the microscopic size of rhizobia, and by extension their bacterial flagella, that permit this peculiarity of evolution to exist.

Larger organisms, certainly those that we might see in our lifetimes without the aid of microscopes, would be denied such an evolved wheel because any large-scale filament (read appendage or other anatomical structure) would require some mechanism for the supply of nutrients. This requirement presupposes a relatively
large-scale circulatory system, and therefore connective vessels—the fate of which would be entanglement and presumably constrictions upon flow. It is therefore safe to say that any large-scale rotational filament (certainly if it were composed of living tissue) would die of nutrient occlusion. Since evolutionary processes do not tend to favour the maintenance of such impractical manifestations, it is not surprising that one does not find wheels (axles or other long-axis rotational filaments that are physically coherent with wheel systems) common in nature (Dawkins, 2004).

The above discussion dealt with only one of the two earlier mentioned objections to the existence of wheels in large-scale organisms, but represents only part of Dawkins’ *Rhizobium’s Tale*. The second objection, resting upon the large-scale side of the rubicon in Figure 4.1, is more important and somewhat more complex in terms of my argument.

**B. Roads as “Contra”-Evolutionary Artefacts of Social Systems?**

As Dawkins’ (2004) argument in the *Rhizobium’s Tale* wanders away from the details of the microscopic organisms for which the tale is named, he articulated an important characteristic that appears to make humans human. “Whenever humans have a good idea,” Dawkins wrote, “zoologists have grown accustomed to finding it anticipated in the animal kingdom” (p. 545). Dawkins then went on to list those examples that he referred to in other chapters of his book: echo-ranging in bats, electro-location in platypuses, harpoons in cnidarians and jet-propulsion found in use by squid, among others. The invention of these processes by humans
(for specific human purposes), in every case, occurred after the phenomenon was observed in nature.\textsuperscript{48} This is true in all cases mentioned but one: the wheel, likely invented in Mesopotamia (Harrison, 1937) over six thousand years ago (Dawkins, 2004; Littauer & Crouwel, 1996), yet nearly six thousand years before the first observation of the bacterial flagellum (Macnab, 1999). What is so particularly special about the wheel as a human invention?

In one sense, the wheel is special because its invention is an example of a \textit{radically new} idea at its earliest conception, and on more than one level. MacIntyre (1984), to whom I shall return in Chapter Five, highlighted the apropos Popperian discussion of the Stone Age futurist and his friend. As MacIntyre described it, the first individual (the futurist) predicts “that within the next ten years someone will invent the wheel. ‘Wheel?’ [the friend asks]. ‘What is that?’” The first describes the
wheel, “finding words, doubtless with difficulty, for the very first time to say what a rim, spokes, a hub and perhaps an axle will be” (p. 93).

The obvious conclusion of the discussion is that the futurist has himself at that particular point in history done what he predicted would happen—to wit, the prediction of the invention of such a thing can simply not be made. For the act of predictively describing such a radically new phenomenon assumes its contemporaneous invention. In this, MacIntyre separated the conception of that which is simply new from that which is radically new; and while not placed specifically in MacIntyre’s Popperian story line, the point is largely similarly derived through Dawkins’ (2004) tale. Radically new ideas, like the axle-based wheel, appear to us only at a point when we are capable of thought processes beyond the purely experiential. Simply new ideas, like the human mechanization of flight (in MacIntyre’s description of the case) or echo-ranging (and human invention of the others in Dawkins’), are “merely … additive construction[s] from the existing stock of concepts—new, if you like, but not radically new” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 94), and certainly more commonplace.

The point to be taken from the above discussion is that there exists something within our natural development that has permitted us to escape the confines of a new-idea world and possess the capability of defining a radically new-idea world. Indeed the ability of humans to capitalize on both the new and radically new seems eminently distinguishing if contrasted with the majority of contemporary species on the planet, and the vast majority, if not all, of those ancestrally present.49
Similarly distinguishing is the second feature of humanity to be drawn from the *Rhizobium’s Tale*: forethought and altruism as markers of our “contra”-evolutionary development.

Dawkins’ (2004) second answer to the question regarding the absence of an evolved wheel in larger organisms highlighted an interesting point at which the worlds of evolutionary biology and social systems intermingle. The wheel, Dawkins wrote,

> is dependent for maximum efficiency on a prior invention—the road (or other smooth, hard surface). A car’s powerful engine enables it to beat a horse or a dog or a cheetah on a hard, flat road. But run the race over wild country or ploughed fields, perhaps with hedges or ditches in the way, and it is a rout: the horse will leave the car wallowing. (pp. 545-546)

Thus the question must be reframed, “[w]hy haven’t animals developed the road? There is no great technical difficulty” (p. 546). Placing to one side the anticipated objections of civil engineers on this account, the problem is seemingly one of evolutionary proportions: of what evolutionary advantage is a road if one’s labour in constructing it would neglect defending one’s territory or young, finding food, or otherwise engaging in the cause of perpetuating one’s species? For the constructed road, unless somehow omni-presently defended by individuals or some other mechanical means (both of which similarly distract the individual from pure survival), will surely benefit others at one’s expense. Indeed, building a road is an endeavour too “dangerously altruistic” for the selfish evolutionary game (Dawkins,
1976/2006); or as Matt Ridley (1998) stated, organisms “consistently do things that benefit their genes, because they are all inevitably descended from those that did the same. None of your ancestors died celibate” (p. 17). There is, therefore, no benefit in altruism … or is there?

It is at this point that I explore commonplace and considerably old misinterpretations of Darwinian natural selection. Doing so preemptively defends my argument from those who might root their critique under such provisions. Some may take from the statement attributed to the political philosopher Spencer (a reader of Darwin, and a statement all too frequently mistakenly attributed to Darwin) that evolutionary processes are manifest in the “survival of the fittest” (Spencer, 1864/1900, vol. 1, p. 444) but to do so is at best problematic and at worst naïve. Once again, I must return to the anatomical-size rubicon employed earlier in Figure 4.1—and I must return to the work of those more specialized in applicable areas of study.

1. Genetic Foundations and Debates

This time, my examination of the rubicon of size separates conceptualisations found within the present discussion in two ways. Figure 4.2 is similar to Figure 4.1 in that it demonstrates my so-called rubicon, but it differs slightly in the region of the spectrum (to the left) that represents far smaller entities than the viruses, prokaryotes, and single-cell eukaryotes presented earlier. I refer to the “building blocks of life”: DNA, RNA and the bonded pairs of nucleobases of which these
are made. Comparing Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, one will note how I have shifted the rubicon left-ward, this time to demonstrate the demarcation of replication from its hosting. In order to proceed, it is important to understand a few foundational concepts of, and historical debates within, genetics.

Figure 4.2 The Gene’s and Host’s Perspectives and the Rubicon that Divides
1.1. The Host and Its Genes

Before Watson and Crick’s (1953) famous publication of *Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids*, and before the work of Fisher (1930) on population genetics and the modern evolutionary synthesis, evolutionary biologists saw the organism (or host of genes) as the appropriate level to which evolutionary processes might be attributed (Dawkins, 1976/2006). A population of organism with trait \( x \) appears to thrive within the fossil record, whereas another population lacking trait \( x \) does not thrive as well and eventually becomes extinct. From a host perspective the suggestion above leads to the conclusion that the \( x \)-population is more fit to survive, as compared to the \( not \ x \)-population. But this suggestion is broad, and a more concretely constructed example would likely prove helpful.

In or around 1857, Charles Darwin wrote a posthumously published chapter on species that provides an example fitting the current discussion. In his work, Darwin (c.1857/1997) asked his reader to imagine an island on which a canine animal sought after rabbits as its chief source of food. The species upon which Darwin focused was the canine rather than the rodent, and—supposing that since the island is a confined space where a confined population of both canines and rodents would be affected by environment and season—at certain times during the year or more drastically during certain years, the environmental conditions or over-population of canines caused a decrease in the population of rodents. During such times, some canines would go without food and would ultimately perish. Among those who did survive, Darwin reasoned, certain traits would likely be dominant:
better (nocturnal, longevous, hyperopic) eyesight, longer leg length, etc.; traits that ultimately contributed to their fitness for survival over the long run. Those canines without these traits would tend to die off and the replication of their faulty traits (in terms of the island’s environment) would largely cease, except in unexpected and statistically chance occurrences.

Placing statistical anomalies aside and returning now to the origin of this discussion, the question of deconstructing Spencer’s (1864/1900) oft quoted “survival of the fittest,” a host perspective implies that those canines (read x-population) that bare the traits required of an environment survive, while those who do not have the trait do not survive. At this level, Spencer’s quotation has been interpreted in a number of important ways among a number of social scientists. What might be characterized as a variety of what I have dubbed the host perspective, while retrospectively situated within the Enlightenment, is the Fichtian dialectic notion of thesis/antithesis/synthesis. Marxist material dialectics, only predating Darwinian evolutionary theory by a decade but following Spencer’s social and scientific writings by twenty years, followed Fichte’s work via Hegel’s dialectics.

Along a similar vein, although philosophically antithetical to Marxist economic theory, Mill’s free market liberalism and utilitarianism was arguably grounded in a variety of Spencerian social-evolutionary theory (Patterson, 2005). It seems, then, that European philosophy at the time of Darwin’s (1869) publication of *On the Origin of Species* was ripe with theory for which Darwin appeared to provide cutting-edge scientific evidence. So it is no surprise that before and following its
publication, the social, economic, and political theories that evidenced themselves
in varieties of evolutionary theory appeared to dominate social, economic, and
political environments. Indeed, Darwin’s particular brand of evolutionary account
was new, but certainly buttressed by other varieties that informed the sociological
and philosophical writings of many individuals. Even Immanuel Kant employed
evolutionary ideas as conceptual frameworks in many of his papers (for a more
detailed description, see Lovejoy, 1911).

In the fifth edition of his most famous work, Darwin (1869), after reading
at least Spencer’s (1864/1900) *Principles of Biology*, renamed his fourth chapter
from “Natural Selection” to “Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest.”
Interesting is the case, however, that Darwin later rejected the linking of the
two notions in his (1874) second edition of the *Descent of Man and Selection
in Relation to Sex*. Herein, he claimed that natural selection was limited to the
biological realm. While the origin of Spencer’s identification with the meaning
behind the phrase is found in *Social Statics* (1851)—a clearly written use of
evolutionary biology to justify social and economic systems wherein individuality
is seen as the height of progress—Darwin’s usage of Spencer’s terminology was
rather less social Darwinian. Despite the difference in usage, the two notions have
been historically intertwined. From their entanglement a certain dominant view of
social interaction developed, one that derives more from Spencer’s than Darwin’s
usage.

The conflated and erroneous view of Darwinism has been found at the
heart of race and politico-economic competitive social dynamics manifest in technologically advanced societies around the world since the beginning of the modern era. It has similarly and more recently been perpetuated in accounts of the new world order following the collapse of the socialist system in the Soviet Union by political economists, such as Fukuyama (1992), who have declared that the end of history was achieved when the fittest ideology (on his particular view, liberalism) survived the dialectically competitive cold war. Such a statement highlights the pervasive nature of the social Darwinian influence over the contemporary view of social and political relationships. It suggests that despite the great number of principles that are in dispute among right and left, liberal and Marxist, one single and shared ontological perspective drives their causes.

The ontological perspective I refer to is social Darwinism—as derived through Spencer’s usage and employing the representation of social and institutional relationships in terms of the presence of certain traits (perspectives, lexicons, and philosophical and/or economic frameworks or hierarchies) that must, in the end, unquestionably prevail. This notion is logically extended in the political realm to encompass a dualism of us versus them, but has been equally engaged as a hallmark for debates related to social desirability and eugenics. Indeed, as Mouffe (2005) stated, the heavily politicized dualism of us versus them was very recently exploited in the former Yugoslavia, with dire consequences played out daily in the western media. Similarly fashioned humiliations of humanity were a too frequent lament of the twentieth century: e.g., the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, Democratic
Kampuchea, Rwanda, East Timor, and Darfur. Yet, not all questions of difference and desirability have been settled by the machete, bayonet, or bullet. Eugenics movements have been fed by social Darwinism. Interventions visible in the sterilization or outright culling of the most vulnerable in a particular population has had its share of otherwise heroic, culturally and politically powerful advocates, among them Winston Churchill, H. G. Wells, and Bernard Shaw (Lewis, 1952; Spektorowski, 2004; Spektorowski & Mizrachi, 2004). Such interventions hold a place as a Canadian historical artefact found in Alberta’s Sexual Sterilization Act of 1928 (McWhirter & Weijer, 1969).

More generally speaking, social Darwinist constructs are used to justify the place of liberalism (in its laissez-faire economic manifestation) as the epitome of evolved human interactions. The Marxist argues that class-struggle is an historically scientific manifestation of evolving human interactions around the means of production that ends, indisputably for the Marxist, with the individual worker as master of his own means of production. Add to the mixture the contemporary and historical manifestations of theocratic (neo-) conservatism and the ontology described above is equally present. For the theocrat, to which I ascribe the title all political organisations or groups that seek to establish religious supremacy over public institutions and policy—equally the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, segments of the Republican Party in the United States and the so-called ultra-orthodox parties in Israel, Shas and Hazit Yehudit Leumit, among others—a variety of social Darwinism is ironically found in a mantra that only those enlightened by
God’s will are entitled to contribute to the direction of the state.

So does the pervasiveness of this view of social relations merit its ascribed link to Darwin’s theory of natural selection, and furthermore is it in fact an accurate social or institutional manifestation of evolutionary processes? These are important questions dealt with in Figure 4.2, and Chapter Five.

1.2. The Genes and Their Hosts

There is, depicted in Figure 4.2, a second unit of analysis through which evolutionary processes may be characterized. Whereas the above discussion focused on the so-called hosting agent and the survival of the host being dependent upon a certain genre of fitness, contemporary evolutionary theory sees this level of analysis as problematic for both biological and ontological reasons. I alluded to the ontological reasons for this in the previous subsection. The biologist would contend that the sophisticated view of evolution permitted by the current depth of understanding afforded by post-Mendelian genetics does not advocate nor provide scientific basis for social Darwinism (Dawkins, 1976/2006, 2004; Depew & Weber, 1995). To understand the biological reasoning that underscores problems with the exclusivity of a host perspective and for the purposes of my argument, the dominance of a social Darwinian perspective in social and institutional relations, I provide a review of elemental modern genetic notions.

DNA is widely discussed in the media and present as a topic in most high school-level biology curricula. DNA (deoxyribose nucleic acid) may be understood
as long chains of chemical instructions for the structuring of life. DNA are strands of nucleotides—created through the regimented hydrogen bonding of purine and pyrimidine nucleobases (adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine). All known living cells and some viruses contain DNA; the cell being the basic unit of life. Single- and multi-celled organisms (with the exception of viruses) can be said to live because the cells of which they are made divide, passing the DNA instructions for the variously required cellular structures of that organism on through replication. When a cell divides the units of information that are passed on through the replication process we know as genes. Cell division ensures that, but for occasional mutations, hereditary genes are passed from one cell to its daughter cells, and ultimately from parent organism to child (Alberts, 2003; Dawkins, 1976/2006; Hood & Galas, 2003).

A contemporary view of the radically new concepts that we may attribute to Darwin—natural selection and the vast time frame required for transmutation of species—when placed within the modern genetic framework, have less to do with the host’s predicament and more to do with that of its genes. Thus the rubicon in Figure 4.2 highlights the modern solution to the altruism problem. Modern evolutionary thinking proposes that the unit of analysis in evolutionary processes is the gene. It is the fittest genes that survive, not the fittest species or hosts, and the fittest genes appear to be those, at least in terms of social relationships, that represent altruistic behaviours.

The gene’s perspective, as modern evolutionary theory suggests, escapes the ontological problem found in the host’s perspective that the world is somehow
ruthless and belligerently competitive. An escape, so to speak, is necessary since our primate social world is clearly neither of these (Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus & Tomasello, 2007). This point is demonstrable in the emotional states of human compassion, concern, empathy, and devotion, not to mention the general democratic principles that guide so many of the world’s nations—and which is even found underlying the social systems of less democratic one’s. Earlier I described many political elements that may be less democratic as characterized by social Darwinian ontologies. I sustain my earlier suggestion that such political movements maintain social Darwinian ontologies, I only point out their practices that, until recently, have proven that all is not ruthless and competitive in certain aspects of their governance.

The gene’s perspective is based upon two elementary biological principles: (a) that a gene’s sole function is to replicate itself—a job for which it is ideally suited, as is shown in the processes of mitosis where the bonded pairs that make up the DNA chains divide and are chemically reassembled in their daughter cells (or in a new offspring cell through meiosis and fertilization)—and (b) that those genes that are most successful are those that are most widely reproduced and therefore present in the population (Alberts, 2003; Dawkins, 1976/2006; Hood & Galas, 2003). On this account, it is unreasonable to suggest that overt competitiveness is a dominant trait of any host population, for such a situation would undoubtedly result in reduced numbers of particular genes coding for competitive behaviour within that population (Axelrod, 1984/2006; Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Dawkins, 1976/2006; Matt Ridley,
Thus, it is the genes themselves that are competitive, not their hosts (Mark Ridley, 2000). With the crucial difference found between genes and hosts in mind, it is clear that the ruthlessness of environments over evolutionary timeframes have built up genes within humanity that seek to ensure the survival of the most fit genes. Fit genes that apparently code their hosts to enable the survival of others as a means of protecting their own survival, as well. The key concept is that the replication of genes drives the process of evolution, not the environmental context (although the environment is a crucial catalyst). As such, the gene’s perspective describes a species that is antithetical to those described by the host perspective.

I contend that a guiding belief about human nature for social—and therefore institutional—relations that most closely matches the actual nature of the human species is one that does not deny the importance of altruistic endeavours, and social systems that ensure the increased survival and success of greater numbers of individuals. It is not surprising that while humans have not evolved a wheel, they have invented one. For by inventing the wheel, and employing it as they do, they have taken the time to altruistically contradict the nature of their species that the host’s perspective attributes to them. Humans have, in fact, done exactly as the gene’s perspective predicts that they ought to do: for human genes had developed sufficiently by at least some six thousand years ago to the point at which altruistic behaviour was at least plausible. With the understanding provided in the discussion of the gene’s perspective as a backdrop, one can assume the plausibility of human ancient (in terms of written history) altruistic nature for two reasons: (a) the
employment of the wheel by humans spread rather rapidly among the inhabitants of the known world at that time, and (b) it would not have done so if the establishing of road systems were not seen as a reasonable alternative to the neglecting of young, finding food or otherwise engaging in the cause of perpetuating the species.

It is at this point that I address the concerns of the liberal, the Marxist and the theocrat. These individuals will argue that my brandishing of the disputable contentions above does nothing more than provide evidence for the causes they promote. In their models of governance, it may be argued, they do not impede the production of roads, and in fact they actively encourage it. Furthermore, they will undoubtedly claim that the whipping boy that seems to be developing within this chapter is one of my own construction and is too stereotypical in its manifestation to be accurate, since a number of contra-examples might be called upon in their defence. But thankfully my task is not to debate these political and social elements on the micro-level. My task is rather to establish the macro-level prevalence of a particular philosophical position within political, economic, and social (and therefore institutional) contexts that is largely based upon and perpetuated by a false understanding of the nature of our species—despite its so-called successes in a number of spheres. To respond to the objections of those mentioned above, then, I would highlight the important consideration of power and how it is most efficiently achieved and maintained: through the exclusion of potentially viable alternate arguments. A point clearly articulated in Machiavelli (1532/1977), and more recently in the growing body of work in the area of critical theory.
The liberal, Marxist and theocrat will point to the enshrinement of certain foundational concepts within their constitutions that promote the questioning of alternatives through educated debates. But the debates in which they engage are typically flawed. For, in endgame scenarios, they inevitably revolve around what emerge as forgone conclusions and appeal to these on simplistic logics (Harris, 2004; Sarkar, 2007). For the liberal and Marxist alike, the conclusion is that human nature is at its root Hobbesian, brutish and requisite of an equally brutish response to ensure survival—so those most fit (in accordance with the respective ideological tenets) survive. For the theocrat, the argument is only marginally more complex, but equally black and white.

1. “And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth” (Genesis 1:26, KJV); a foundational concept of the Hebrew Testament and therefore present in each of the Abrahamic religions.

2. Those over which God granted humanity dominion are distinguished as not being made in His image.

3. Man’s nature is therefore distinguishable in terms of its closeness to the image of God.

4. If an individual strays from the image of God, he is to be held under the dominion of those whose image reflects that of God’s own. This
has been extended to imply that only those who maintain a specific fitness of piety represent God’s people (and hence, in the Roman Catholic tradition, *extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*), or represent people at all (see the Talmudic [c. 200-500] accounts of Rabbi Simeon bar Yochai’s arguments against the inclusion of gentiles, idolaters and heathens as human [Yebamoth, 61A]).

Thus a hierarchy of dominance develops with God at its zenith and the pious above those unfortunate souls who have been created as a digression of, or have strayed from, God. It is important for western educators to remember that infants and unbaptized children are wedded to the lower echelons of this ladder through the Augustinian abomination that is original sin (Dawkins, 2006b; deMause, 1974; Denzinger, 1854/1954; Harris, 2004). Furthermore, the hierarchy is clearly analogous to that espoused by subjugative racist dogma from at least the time of Linnaeus onward where those not of God’s image (read *non-Caucasian*) were considered sub-human (Graves, 2001). Lest we believe that the latter-day twentieth century world escapes these religiously incited dualisms, Tamarin’s (1966) fascinating study of Israeli children’s inability to place the Biblical story of Joshua and the fall of Jericho into an enlightened moral position that does not actively advocate genocide underscores the point that the half-life of such hierarchical in- and out-group classification is very long, indeed. And so the social Darwinian *us versus* them dualism described earlier is again entrenched with historic social and institutional relations (Harris, 2004).
Am I not similarly appealing to a simplistic logic based upon a foregone conclusion? In concentrating my attack on macro-level questions while neglecting micro-level examples have I not in doing so strengthened their point? My answer to the latter objection is to suggest that it is the liberal, the Marxist, and the theocrat who, in their protests, have in fact proven my argument rather than I who have proven theirs. If the world were as brutish and competitive as they ultimately reduce it to being, why would they bother with roads or communal projects of any type? To the former protest, however, I will, perhaps peculiarly but with one caveat, agree with them. If the world were as rooted in altruism as I have claimed, the above discussion would be self-evidently moot. I explore and develop the implications of this position in Chapter Five.

C. Summary

In the current chapter, I have attempted to show the error in the contemporary conception of human nature. I employed an example from the field of socio-biology to point to the inconsistencies upon which arguments are made. As I develop the argument beyond this early contextual stage, the perhaps contrived strict dualism established between gene’s and host’s perspectives is repeatedly invoked. My reasons for doing so are a reminder (a) that simple arguments guiding many organisational representations of the nature of interorganisational relationships are problematic; and (b) that such problematic representations are pervasive, and often opportunistically so—whether a host’s (or, indeed, non-host’s) organisation
recognizes this state of affairs or does not.
CHAPTER FIVE

AN HYPOTHESIS REGARDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE MODERN AND POST-MODERN ERAS

In this chapter, my task is to explore the implications of the exposed host perspective as it pertains to the Zeitgeist embedded within Western institutional relationships since the Enlightenment. I demonstrate the privileged nature of the host perspective, the conflation of science and technology into a singular construct, neo-science, that is solidified in the social Darwinist fallacy. Furthermore, I expose the over-arching flaw in post-modern responses to modernity, and I expose a hypothesis of social and political relationships that under-gird my discussions in following chapters. In the following chapters, I present a clearer view of interorganisational relationships, and the fallacious circumstance within which educators involved in such relationships must contemporarily operate.

A. Reviewing the Argument

The argument advanced in Chapter Four is simple. It is my contention that social relationships since at least the middle of the nineteenth century have been misguided by a collection of socio-political philosophies that span the political
spectrum from right to left, yet when reduced to foundational arguments, maintain
themselves via tenets that are social Darwinian in nature. I proposed that Spencerian
social evolution theory, captured within popular social and economic interpretations
as Darwinian evolutionary theory, provided a scientific basis for these philosophies
since at least the mid-nineteenth century (Marciano, 2005).

In the present chapter, I suggest that only by removing oneself from a modern
and post-modern view can one appreciate that the irony of the above-mentioned
politico-economic philosophies, and the foundational strength they seek in science
to which they commonly appeal, is one of ignorance of the foundations upon which
their foundations are based. I maintain that the advocates of these philosophical
positions neglect to learn the first thing about science generally, and the historical
exemplar embedded within Darwin’s experience as the advocate of a radically new
idea. In so doing, I link the social Darwinist’s view with the popular account of
modernity. Furthermore, I argue that the post-modernist, who critiques the modernist
science within social science without asking whether the heart of a modernist view
of science in social science is an accurate one, does nothing more than perpetuate
the fallacious nature of social Darwinist modernity. The post-modernist does so by
permitting the modernist such an easy escape from any meaningful opposition.

Since at least Aristotle’s (320 BCE/1938) *Organon* there has existed a method
for scientific epistemology, a method that has admittedly developed over time
(Bryson, 2003; Dawkins, 2006b; McClellan & Dorn, 1999). Social Darwinism’s
great claim is that through evolution the fittest survive, and these fittest are therefore
the product of an evolutionary process. If evidence were shown that the social Darwinist’s view of human nature were inaccurate, then their view should develop or fall aside. Yet, so unscientifically, it does not.

In Chapter Four, however, I argued that the very approach I just employed to prove the lack of genuine scientism to be found in the pervasive social and political relationships ætiologically based upon scientific justifications was outdated. Orthodox Darwinism is not the generally accepted opinion of developmentalism in species. The fact is, neither is the gene’s perspective orthodoxy. Yet, the gene’s perspective is certainly more evolved, in terms of its place within a more educated scientific conceptualisation of the world, as an hypothesis of human interaction than is the host’s. Science simply does not operate in absolutes or so called grand narratives. Rather it expects to evolve, and champions evolution in any field, based upon evidence (Bryson, 2003; Dawkins, 2006b). In Chapter Four, I showed how the evidence supporting the social Darwinist was largely dated. Peculiar is the position maintained by the social Darwinist that at the heart of his world view is a scientific argument. More peculiar still is the at times aggressive promotion of the social Darwinist of the “scientific view” of the world. I suggest that the social Darwinist is more accurately viewed as opportunist than scientist.

But what of those who advocate a gene’s perspective in the social sciences? There are a few socio-biologists who maintain that virtue and morality are evolved genetic features of humanity (Kropotkin, 1902/2006; Matt Ridley, 1998; Mark Ridley, 2000). Peculiar, however, is the absence of those who have taken up this
cause, for it is the only position that diametrically opposes the social Darwinist position. It seems that the post-modernist has missed the opportunity presented in a gene’s perspective? It may be that the post-modernist may be viewed as misunderstanding science and therefore the basis of his own critique. Perhaps the post-modernist is no different than his modernist adversary. I address these issues below.

I equate the modernist and the social Darwinist. I similarly equated the post-modernist with the modernist and therefore social Darwinist, as well. At this point, my meaning may appear mired in Ezekielian *wheels within wheels*: am I advocating the gene’s perspective, or am I not; and is the gene’s perspective not the post-modernists’?

B. Modernity, Post-Modernity and an Hypothesis

In previous chapters of this dissertation, I touched upon the contemporary context of political and social relationships. In this section, I elaborate upon what I have concluded to be the nature of such contextualized relationships. In the following four chapters, I extend the hypothesis established at the conclusion of this chapter into contemporary institutional relationships within Western education. In this sub-section, I discuss these types of relations on a more macro level.

I suggest that the failings of modernity in social and political relationships have been met by little more than an anaemic response from post-modernist social scientists. A counter argument may be made that such a statement represents
an example of the close-minded arrogance of the hegemonic [read: patriarchal / positivistic / scientistic / modernistic / nineteenth-century] ontology and epistemology, because it describes post-modernity in objective absolutes, is grounded in a metaphysics of objective truth, ascribes a binary result that is impossible to substantiate in all cases and in all contexts, and it comes without citations of support (see for example Deleuze & Guattari, 1984; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Derrida, 1986; Lyotard, 1979, 1988). In the following section, I analyse these critiques. At the conclusion of this section, I articulate my hypothesis.

1. The Host and Modernity

While one might expect that a definition of modernity is not fully necessary, I will endeavour to clarify issues that might have been implied in my employment of it hitherto and in previous chapters, but have not yet been made explicit. I review the historical buildup to the point of departure for the host’s perspective.

1.1. Pre-Modernity

A merger of several key movements appeared in Europe in the three centuries from 1600–1900. Habermas (1962/2001) detailed the development of public-borne political, social, and mercantile consciousness from relative obscurity through authenticity to eventual exploitation. Contemporaneously, the political-economist philosophically grounded his theories of behaviour and governance in conceptions of human nature. Philosophers continued their debates around the nature of the mind and its relation to the world, and “natural historians” — those who
would eventually be assigned the profession of “scientist”—began the process of the separation of science from religion (Charlesworth, 1982) and the distinguishing of specialized societies of scientists in a manner similar to the established medieval guilds (McClellan & Dorn, 1999). It is probable that any one individual involved within any one of these endeavours would have been influenced by the work of his contemporaries. Of note then was how the mutuality of these movements evolved into the dominant aspiration for societies around the globe, sharing greater and lesser socio-historical likeness with Europe.

Because the host’s perspective is, foundationally, based upon the merger of science and socio-political and economic theory, a reminder of pre-Spencerian Europe is of some utility. Coincidentally, the operative notion feeding Spencer’s time was, in fact, utility. In Science and Technology in World History, McClellan and Dorn (1999) repeatedly return to socio-political and economic interaction with science beginning in around the time humans began governing themselves, and still characteristic today. Their point is similarly made in Goran’s (1974) work: utility almost exclusively drives the relationship between politics and science.

Of what utility might we gain from scientific advancement? So asked the political leaders of history. The rather patent response to this political question from scientists seeking the patronage of government officials—but more realistically, the enormity of their treasuries—was defence. The practical application of science is so simply demonstrated in warfare. All the more so to those who control (and wish to maintain control of) the nation’s finances. The response was patent because
throughout the Scientific Revolution of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe (what McClellan and Dorn referred to as the first Scientific Revolution [c. 1500–c. 1760]), with its advancements of mathematics and pure science attributed to Galileo, Mercator, Cassini, Copernicus, Newton, Kepler, Halley et al., little “technology” emerged. Little demonstrable, practical or utility-bearing science made a tangible impact on society—with the possible exception of cannonry, ballistics, and cartography. Society gained generally little; it remained as agricultural as it had been for millennia, that is, until human existence was transformed in the eighteenth century.

Industrialization represented critical point in the establishment of a peculiar conceptualisation of science within the psyche of post-Enlightenment society, but one commonly overlooked. McClellan and Dorn (1999) succinctly made this very point.

The myth that the theoretical innovations of the Scientific Revolution account for the technical inventions of the Industrial Revolution finds reinforcement in the common [but false] belief … that technology is inherently applied science…. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries [this] was almost never true. This is not to say that science played no social or ideological role in promoting industrialization. … Science raised the status of the reasoned life and was honored as a cultural and intellectual enterprise. … In this sense, scientific culture was important and perhaps essential to the Industrial Revolution. But the scientific enterprise itself continued to be … largely
divorced from the practical affairs of society, except where patronized by the state; technologists and engineers proceeded without tapping bodies of scientific knowledge. (pp. 288-289)

There was a distinction to be drawn between science (a method of discovery) and technology (the demonstrable utility of science). Neo-science is discovery fed by the requirements of utility, rather than the study of phenomena. It is during the second Scientific Revolution that the distinction becomes muddled for a growing public perception of science as technology: what is the useful law that might be utilized? McClellan and Dorn (1999) stated,

As the Second Scientific Revolution unfolded and these processes of mathematization and unification [—“physics”—] proceeded, a single set of universal laws and a powerfully coherent scientific world picture began to emerge. That world picture, known as the Classical World View, seemed at once to integrate all the domains of the physical sciences and, by the last decades of the nineteenth century, to promise a complete understanding of the physical world and thereby the end of physics itself. (pp. 299-300)

Thus, the so named Classical World View may be seen as wrapped in a perspective that assumes, not unlike Fukayama’s social Darwinian end of history, a utility endowed end of physics as indeed expressed in a grand narrative that must prevail. Interesting is the case that this very same contention remained within popular accounts of physics, even among physicists themselves, until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By way of example, Bryson (2003) described the
advice given to Max Planck, an eminent physicist of the twentieth century, at the beginning of his entry into graduate studies. The advice was to study mathematics instead of physics, because physics was clearly nearing the end of its available and exciting discoveries. Such commentary was, it would seem, indicative of an unclear perception growing ever-more dominant within Western scientific circles. If the elite of a field hold a fallacious accounting of its nature, what hope have the public? The socio-politico-economic implications of the popular conflation of neo-science as science are demonstrated in the social movement that followed on the heels of the Classical World View: Modernity.

1.2. Modernity

Superficially, modernity refers to that which is modern or most recent, yet the simplicity of the linkage among modernity and “modern” rests at the heart of the matter. To be modern is to be current and advanced, and remarks related to human natural desire for advancement are more clearly understood in terms of social organisation since at least McGregor’s (1960/2006) “Theory Y”. It is reasonable to assume that societies prefer to feel better about themselves than the alternative, and to this end it is likewise reasonable within human relations theory for a society to seek after a characterization that denotes the same. A dialectic seems sociologically present, and to be modern—rich with the connotation of currency and advancement embedded—or to achieve modernity seems an outwardly wise synthetic social goal.
To define modernity beyond such a characterization is difficult. Recent and less-recent works, in a variety of fields, do not identify a singular historical or geographic point from which modernity might be demarcated: a date, an event, an individual, a discovery, an institution (Benko & Strohmayer, 1997; Brinker-Gabler, 1995; Cooper, 2005; Dudley, 2002; Portes, 1973; Roald, 2001). Earlier, I stated that modernity appeared sometime after the year 1750, and was the product of the merger of a variety of movements emerging around the Enlightenment, as depicted in Figure 5.1. Three characteristics appear to overshadow all others. The

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**Figure 5.1** Constituent Elements of Modernity
first two reflect a definition of modernity as (a) geographically based in the North and Western (European) world and (b) indicative of a certain perceived cultural greatness and, as a result, cultural dominance (Brinker-Gabler, 1995).

Evidence of these first two characteristics is presented in a variety of historical examples—among them, perhaps the most interesting was found in the 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan (although post-Edo [Tokugawa] period modernization was more selective than submissive) (Ong, 1999). The Japanese example is most interesting because it underscores the third defining characteristic of modernity: (c) the rise of a culture of social Darwinian science. This case provides an example of the product of a perpetuated perception surrounding a particular domain. The case is one where a major flaw in the contemporary view of modernity appears. Yet it is also one where those beyond of the flawed view were, while likely unknowingly, attuned to and struggling to limit the implications of the flaw. I momentarily digress to briefly explore some particulars of Japanese modernism.

I detail a Japanese case study in greater depth later in the chapter, but briefly and by way of introduction, in Meiji Japan, selective modernization is demonstrated in a popularized four-character idiom of the time 和魂洋才 [wakonyosai – “Western technique, Japanese spirit”]. The influence was meant to be one of scientific advancement (or more accurately, scientific appropriation) without the inclusion of attractive and popular cultural elements (Ota, 2004; Warner, 1994). While the Meiji Restoration opened Japan to the representation of Occidental dominance (technology cum capital) in its early period, intellectuals sought to protectively decouple it from
what binds it together (a culture that advocates a particular dominant but contextuo-
historically absent philosophy). Questions related to the effectiveness of *wakonyosai*
as a guiding social policy in post-World War II Japan arise for any traveller to Japan
in recent years. The Japanese example of modernity can be applied analogously to
interorganisational relations in education.

1.2.a. Pre-Meiji Tradition and Post-Meiji Scientific Management

The relationship between Japan and the “non-Japanese outside world” is
notable. Few cities in Japan have been the seat of particular relational firsts between
Japan and the outside world as Yokosuka, a small city roughly 40 km south of Tokyo
where all ships entering Tokyo Harbour pass its shores.

The first *first* that places Yokosuka on the historical map of Japanese-
foreign relations took place in 1600 when William Adams (1564-1620) arrived,
aboard a pre-Dutch East India Company expeditionary ship to the Far East, on the
Yokosuka shores at Uraga. He was the first British citizen to step on Japanese soil.\(^57\) Adams’ influence was significant. He was employed as advisor to the first shogun
of the Tokugawa shogunate (a military-government super-ordinate to the rule of
the Emperor), designed the first western-style ships built in Japan, and engaged
the Japanese in some of the first ever trading arrangements with England and the
Netherlands (Milton, 2003; Tames, 1987).

Japanese relations with the West were strained during the Edo period
(1641-1868) that followed Adam’s investiture as a Japanese peer. In 1635,
Tokugawa Iemitsu, grandson of the first Tokugawa shogun and the shogun at that time, seeking to limit European influence within Japan (most especially the spread of Christianity), issued the Closed Country Edict. The Exclusion of the Portuguese Edict followed in 1639. In essence, these edicts served to forbid all foreign travel by Japanese, and all landing of “Southern Barbarian” (read: foreign, and specifically Western) vessels in Japan. His edicts were punishable by death and stood, largely unchallenged, for more than 200 years; longer than any single ruler or ruling class capable of compelling adherence consistent with the Edicts’ original intent. Although introspection and seclusion had indeed repaired the “traditions” of Japan, traditions of these types were no match for technological temptations.

The next first for Yokosuka city took place in 1853, when the United States military envoy Commodore Perry anchored four “Blackships” under his command and demanded in the name of US President Fillmore that Japan open itself to trade with American partners. The letter carried by Perry bore an ultimatum of military force lest the Japanese refuse—because the US wanted accesses to trade and trade routes in East Asia in an attempt to counter European monopolization and demonstrate American strength as an emerging world power. Borthwick (1998) argued that Western traders in Asia during this period unapologetically believed that they were bringing “progress” and “modernity” to less-than-advanced civilizations. The US doctrine of Manifest Destiny clearly spread beyond the shores of North America.

Most Asian governors of the time saw a domestic technological disadvantage when juxtaposed against the naval cannonry, ballistics and cartography exemplars
at their shores. The Convention of Kanagawa was signed between the United States and Japan in 1854, and effectively ended the Japanese period of seclusion.

Ports were opened to American traders, and once again foreign influences began to infiltrate traditional Japanese society. In the century that followed, Japan, too, would follow the path exhibited by the United States—demonstrating to the world its “modernity” and “progress,” euphemisms of competitive (military) might, in the Chinese (1894) Russian (1904), Korean (1910), Manchurian (1931), and French Indochinese, Dutch East Indies, Filipino and Pacific (1941) theatres.

The beginning of the Meiji era (明治 [enlightened rule]) is linked with the arrival of Perry and marked the first sign of substantial political weakness in the military junta that was the shogunate system. The Restoration is so named because it denoted the time when the Emperor (specifically Emperor Mutsuhito [1852-1912], posthumously named Emperor Meiji) was restored as Japanese sovereign in 1868. The timing, in terms of my use for this example, could not have been more significant. First, the birth of the period was based on a display of technological (and specifically military) weakness on the part of Japan. Second, those Westerners who held a technological advantage proselytized a view of relations that was intriguing for a state whose introspective assessment of the past two centuries was as other than modern or progressive.

The challenge for the Meiji era was to modernize the state in a way that would not limit the new regime’s power, and the power of those whose finances had provided the successful military might that had domestically overthrown the
shogunate system. Roberts (1998) pointed to the apparent solution: 国益思想 [kokueki shiso, loosely translated as “theory of national interest”], an ideology based upon a common belief in the supremacy of nationally organised political-economy. But exactly how common was this belief among Japanese?

Based on the theory proposed by social historian Eric Hobsbawm that much of modern tradition was invented to suit the purposes of elites, accounts that detailed a critical analysis of Japanese modern traditions were fashioned into an edited book. Some chapters provide key insights into what the book’s editor, Stephen Vlastos (1998), described as

[g]roup harmony, aversion to litigation, … industrial paternalism: these and other “traditional” values and practices are assumed both to predate Japan’s modernization and to have contributed to its unparalleled success. It was not that long ago, in fact, that Japan specialists ascribed Japan’s successful modernization to the utility of its premodern values and institutions, on the assumption “traditions” were direct cultural legacies. (p. 1)

What Vlastos’ contributors described was an account of the Japanese modernity project. But unlike the modernity project of Habermas, the Japanese variety bares the hallmarks of one contrived in technologically derived wontedness and competition.

Blacker’s (1964) study of Japanese intellectual history points to an attempt on the part of some Japanese philosophers of the early Meiji period, most notably Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835-1901), to initiate a Japanese Enlightenment similar to that
experienced in Europe and predating the Modern period. The popularized, and earlier mentioned, 和魂洋才 [wakonyosai – “Western technique, Japanese spirit”], was an example of Fukuzawa’s contemporaries’ intent. Western influence was meant to encompass the scientific method but not attractive and popular cultural elements (Ota, 2004; Warner, 1994) similar to those that had perpetuated a necessity for the Edo edicts of the 1630s. It is clear on this account that the Japanese shogun dictatorship was simply replaced by imperial dictatorship during the Restoration.

Vlastos’ (1998) contributors, among others, pointed to the short-lived nature of the Japanese Enlightenment, where a theory of national interest tipped government interests toward the technology of warfare, while even outright contributing to the reinventing of Japanese traditions to better suit the needs of industrialists (Gordon, 1998; Roberts, 1998). These needs included, among other social Darwinist motifs, the traditional place in industrial relations for the “‘beautiful custom of master-servant relations’” (Gordon, 1998, p. 34). Science (really, neo-science), as TsuTsui (1998; 2001) explained, became entrenched in Taylorism and Scientific Management—and remain so today.

Modernity provided the Japanese not with the Enlightenment but with technological/techno-cratic and competitive governance, social, and industrial models; yet little historical similarity is shared among Japanese and Western societies.
1.3 A More Distilled View

What can educational administration learn from this example? I selected the historical Japanese example as a case because it demonstrates the three characteristics of modernity noted above, but also because it does so as a non-Western and culturally dissimilar agent influenced by the byproducts of a falsified manifestation of modernity’s promise. In the Japanese example, one sees the strength of which each characteristic is bound together; further, one sees the nineteenth century decoupling effort of the Japanese intelligentsia slowly eroded by the emergence of the twentieth century and industry driven neo-scientific conceptions illustrated in Taylorism; ultimately, one sees the impossibility of a decoupling effort, despite the absence of longeuous modern culture.

McClellan and Dorn (1999) indirectly provided an insightful answer to why the Japanese case is indicative of the fallacy of modernity. As I have presented earlier, a conflation of science and technology into neo-science appeared in the West around the middle to end of the 1800s and has grown into the dominant global understanding of science. The issue is the linking of science to competition—hence, neo-science—that is, the coupling of the simple definition of what it means to be modern and that which is demonstrative of being modern (technology) with an institutionalization of political relations theories based upon “scientific” social Darwinism. As such, it is likely no surprise that social Darwinist social/economic/political theories have sublimated technological advancement as the definition of modernity, for doing so invents a new science—demonstrably competitive—and
consistent with the Spencerian account of human relations and human nature. In this light, the contemporary manifestation of the linkage between government and neo-science (rather than science) is demonstrated in the manipulation and corruption of science and knowledge for the purposes of particular political ends by, among others, US (and most particularly the incumbent at the time of writing) and Soviet administrations (Orr, 2004; Rapoport, 1989; Sarkar, 2007; Union of Concerned Scientists, 2004).

Despite the attempts of the Japanese intelligentsia to decouple a social relations schema (culture) that is antithetical to that traditionally present from the science (technology)\(^5\) or a social relations schema from the capital-market (product of technology), one can conclude that the Japanese and other Asian societies will continue to be wholly incapable of decoupling such elements within the context of what has become the popular definition of modernity. Why can modern society not be decoupled from neo-science? The answer is rooted in a modern fallacy embedded within public consciousness, which skews any attempt to mend the products of the fallacy. The key is found in the host’s perspective and its influence on modernity. In the following subsection, I explore this fallacy and the nature of its overlooked embedment.

1.4. Modernity and Post-Modernity

I subscribe to the definition of modernity that is advocated by Jürgen Habermas (1981/1997), but I will not widely employ his nomenclature within this
dissertation. Rather I explain the manner in which the terms that I use are linked to Habermas’ corpus.

For Habermas (1981/1997; Passerin d’Entrèves, 1997), a conflation of the elements of modernity exists—both, it seems, in terms of epoch and guiding principle. On the one side rests the issue of conflating a single temporal notion of modernity, which is arguably problematic yet commonly practiced among those whose organisational position is grounded in a host perspective when viewed in terms of the second notion of guiding principle. Habermas’ distinction of two guiding principles within modernity rests in (a) the specialization of domains of expertise within society—owing much to the rationalist work of Kant, Fichte and Weber (to which I will likewise add Dewey)—and (b) a radical subjectivism at the heart of Nietzsche, then Foucault and Derrida.

Modernity is conceived as the point at which pure reason emerges (historically for society, rather than developmentally for the individual) (Habermas, 1975). We owe to Kant the birth of the modern era (Howe, 2000). That a metaphysical truth might be universally grounded in human reason is central to the work of both Kant and Habermas, though Habermas’ contribution in this arena is his accommodation of an instrument by which truth might be concretely expressed in human interaction. Hence, the application of speech act theory as the arena for universalizable human truth, the intersubjectivity provided in language and therefore the linguistic turn in philosophy, the recursive justification of validity claims, discourse ethics and the ideal speech situation—each of which represent, at times, cliché axioms of critical
theory and the late Frankfurt School in their widest reading. Of concern here, however, is the analysis that Habermas drew (a) from those whom he characterized as the Enlightenment fathers of modernity, Kant and Weber, and then (b) the reaction to the skewed product of these thinkers as principally found in Nietzsche, then extended by Foucault and Derrida.

On the Kantian-Weberian side reside the roots of an intersubjective articulation of pure rationalist enlightenment, and the maintenance of universal benchmarks (truths) to guide human interaction, and on the Nietzschean-Foucauldian-Derridian side the radical subjectivism conflated into the rational, or the abandonment of universals and the birth of what MacIntyre (1984) called emotivism. For Habermas, the result of the latter is the popularly understood notion of modernity and, by extension, post-modernity; but it is to the former that Habermas is appealing in his so-called unfinished project of modernity.

In Kant and Weber, then, Habermas (1981/1997) found the birth and institutionalization of modernity, because their work represents an important change in human relations. What one now considers social dualisms in the Western tradition were pulled from their historical subservience to the Church. Right and wrong, true and false, are placed into the domain of the specialist in a particular area of social or institutional relations. Debates among these specializations and “societies” begin to fulfil the growing promise of modernity and liberal democracy. The liberation of the individual and rational conceptualisation and governance of the world occur through science and pure reason (Habermas, 1962/2001; Weber, 1914/2006,
1922/1978, 1924/2006; see also Dewey, 1902/1964). As such, the system-world emerges from the lifeworld—the specialized domains of macro-human relations emerge from the familial and communal. With increased specialization, a crevasse between the professional and the layman grows. It is at this point that the path of modernity begins to stray from its promise. Unchecked, rationalization becomes hyperrationalization: reason becomes exclusionary (Wise, 1977).

In an earlier subsection of this chapter, I explained the specialization of natural histories or sciences into societies. In the case of the sciences, these societies defined the foundations of their areas of expertise around questions vis-à-vis the pursuit of study; exclusionary to a degree, but foundationally based upon a developing, unifying, and universally accessible method for that study. Initially, a similar specialization was to be drawn by the social sciences, the domains of human interaction. This initial promise of modernity was, on Habermas’ (1962/2001; 1971/1990; 1981/1997) view, subjugated by what I have called the social Darwinist cooptation of science, subjugated by neo-science. When social science became instrumentalized and techno-cratic, reason became exclusionary and competitive. The result was modern social science embedded with social Darwinist method—consequently, unscientific and, as I demonstrate in the chapter that follows, dysfunctional and pathological.

Social critiques of exclusionary social reason were also addressed by modern scholars. The result was a radical reaction to this new hyperrationalized modernity. The perceived culprit for these reactionaries (e.g., Nietzscheans, Heideggerians,
relativists, feminists, and post-modernists) was, in fact, all that was right about the Enlightenment—science, development, specialization, justification, and the reason that under-girds each of these—seen as that which relentlessly permits exclusionary reason. For the post-modernists, then, blame is placed squarely on the shoulders of science and, especially, its employment in human relationships. I suggest that the post-modernists are both right and wrong.

They are right in that their critique is well-placed in its dedication to a cataloguing of details of problems besetting a system too self-referentially construed. Yet, I believe that the critique fails to find the central kernel of the problems within modernity. It takes for granted that hyperrationalization is the inborn and compulsory by-product of the Enlightenment when institutionalized, and this is a most grim problem for the post-modern argument. Why does it do so? An important question, because this very why is, in fact, the very real and contemporarily present problem with modernity that any reaction other than the gene’s perspective in social science will fail to address.

The Habermasian notion of modernity, then, applies not to the sum of the intellectual production of the epoch since 1848, but applies to the kernel of Kantian-Weberian intersubjective rationalist enlightenment before its subversion into, first, neo-science, and then second, radical subjectivism. In this dissertation, for reasons of simplicity noted above, I have and will equate this conception of modernity with the institutional Enlightenment, and modernity will therefore refer to the subjectified institutional Enlightenment. Post-modernity, as a consequence of the subjectified
institutional Enlightenment, on this account defines the social pattern that seeks to more radically subjectify and deinstitutionalize modernity.

Figure 5.2 depicts the broad landscape of relationships among institutional enlightenment, modernity, post-modernity and religious structures. For Habermas (1981/1997), the institutional Enlightenment represented a guiding principle found in the act, whereas modernity represented a guiding principle found in the other. The act/other antagonism (the antagonism found among the metaphysical truth associated with a discursively validated act and the radical subjective absence of truth found within the relationship to the other) was not properly accounted for in the response to modernity. Post-modernity failed to account for the foundational questions of modernity in any real way. Post-modernity assumed the same milieu as modernity, and was a more strongly worded articulation of the same. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss how the ideas ascertained through the Japanese example relate to the Habermasian definition.

The Japanese case highlighted the early years of the Western conflation of science and technology. Over time, the conflation became more entrenched and less outwardly apparent as a conflation. In any event, popular culture continued to employ science as trope of technology. Neo-science was assumed to be science and the practice seemed to have taken on mimetic (and memetic) proportions. But neo-science is antithetical to science and requires social Darwinist motivations for any reasonable justification of its pursuit. Goran’s (1974) endeavour to correct what he rightly viewed to be the prevailing misunderstanding of science in neo-
Figure 5.2  Landscape of Relationships within Habermas’ Modernity Project

- Spencerianism
- Emotivism
- Institutional Enlightenment
- Enlightenment
- Habermas’ Modern Restoration

Time

Less Concrete  More Concrete

Church
science spoke to the accuracy of a central feature of my current argument. I explore the embedded social Darwinist characteristics of modernity in more depth in the following section.

1.5 Emotivism as Modernist Escape

One may approach Habermas’ definitions of institutional enlightenment, modernity, and post-modernity with some degree of skepticism. MacIntyre (1984), however, helped me to understand why, if post-modernity is nothing more than more of the same, do I maintain the peculiar intuition that it nevertheless does appear to challenge modernity. The answer, for MacIntyre was rooted in the characters that take the place of a metaphysical truth when none is permitted to exist in the first place. Returning our discussion to Japanese traditions, MacIntyre likened his characters of modernity to the characters found in the Japanese fourteenth century theatrical style of nougaku [能樂]. In nougaku, four categories of characters existed, each performing a specific, well-known, and prescribed function within the play. For patrons of nougaku, this collection of formulaic characters interacted in the world and spirit-world according to what might be seen as tacitly agreed upon roles—so formulaic and assumed that they were never questioned. Similarly, for each actor playing these characters certain assumptions about their deportment predefined their very nature. For MacIntyre, three such characters were representative of modernity: the aesthete, the manager, and the therapist. I first contextualize MacIntyre’s perspective on modernity.
Of primary concern for MacIntyre (1984) was a critique of contemporary moral philosophy, and the misunderstood ancient foundations upon which it claims a basis. Arguing that the span of time and intellectual interest separating the ancients from the Renaissance resulted in a misinterpretation of the original achievements of moral philosophy, MacIntyre suggested that this misinterpretation has permeated contemporary moral philosophy. It has ultimately led it astray.

His evidentiary claim was presented in what he described as a denial of “an objective and impersonal moral standard [that] can in some way or other be rationally justified, even if in some cultures at some stages the possibility of such rational justification is no longer available” (p. 19). Those individuals who deny such claims MacIntyre named *Emotivist*, because in the making of their moral arguments they mask their personal preferences. They *emote* personal beliefs as valid and worthy of inclusion in public and private discourse.

MacIntyre (1984) believed that social and institutional relationships are subjectified by a philosophical position that, on the one hand, destroys objectively present standards, and on the other, sublimates the standards emoted by three particular characters. The result of this analysis is a view of the contemporary milieu as ironically governed by the unquestioned characteristics of social characters, while these characters promote the counterfactual tenets of emotivism.

His argument is as follows:

1. The emotivist character represents an assumed place of authority within society. The authority of this character is the product of
what Habermas argued was the moment when rationality became hyperrationality, when knowledge became specialized beyond the grasp of the layman, and when the system emerged from the lifeworld.  

2. The emotivist character sees individuals as means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. The behaviour of the character is thus consistent with the host’s perspective because it is largely informed by a social Darwinism.

3. Owing to the privileged authority of the character, that character’s use of individuals as means to a host’s end is unquestioned.

4. The appeal of the character to the scientific or neo-scientific nature of his authority further solidifies the place of the host’s perspective within modernity.

5. When confronted by the subjective argument of the post-modernist, the character simply appeals to the post-modernist’s own argument as further justification for the maintenance of the character’s position.

Why would individuals consistently conform to a particular perspective on social interaction, especially one in which their liberty of thought is so clearly undermined? Habermas’ (1975) answer to this question drew upon a combination of educational psychology, sociology, and organisational theory.

[W]ith Freud, Durkheim, and Mead, I start from the position that motivations are shaped through the internalization of symbolically represented structures
of expectation. The sociological concept of internalization (Parsons) raises a series of problems at the psychological level. ... [M]otivational development, in Piaget’s sense, is tied to a cognitively relevant development of moral consciousness, the stages of which can be reconstructed logically, that is, by concepts of a systematically ordered sequence of norm systems and behavioral controls. To the highest stage of moral consciousness there corresponds a universal morality, which can be traced back to fundamental norms of rational speech.

Max Weber’s concept of legitimate authority directs our attention to the connection between belief in the legitimacy of orders [Ordnungen] and their potential for justification, on the one hand, and to their factual validity on the other. (p. 95)

To this end, society accepts the status quo, the host’s perspective, and characters because society tacitly accepts that the characters’ legitimacy is factually valid. It is, however, not valid, despite our tacit acceptance of its legitimacy founded in the specialization of knowledge and the separation of the character from the layman.61 This situation is, ultimately, a matter of trust gone awry. As Habermas (1975) explained,

The fundamental question of the continued existence of a truth-dependent mode of socialization constitutive of society is, as one can see, not easy to answer. This could lead one to think that it is not at all a theoretically reasonable question, but a practical question: should we rationally desire that
social identity be formed through the minds of socially related individuals
or should it be sacrificed to the problem—real or imagined—of complexity?
… As partisanship, however, this partiality can be justified only so long as
alternatives are posed within an already accustomed, shared communicative
form of life. As soon as an alternative appears that breaks this circuit of
predecided intersubjectivity, the only universalizable partiality—the interest
in reason itself—becomes particular. Luhmann poses such an alternative:
he subordinates, at the methodological level, all areas of interaction steered
through discursively redeemable validity claims to systems-rational claims
to power and increasing power. Such monopolistic claims of an eccentric
administration permit no possibility of appeal; that is, they may not be
measured against standards of practical rationality, as was the case even in
the *Leviathan*. (p. 142)

MacIntyre presented a line of thought similar to Habermas’; and in the spirit of
their shared position in this regard, I come to the point at which I can concretely
articulate my hypothesis of contemporary interorganisational relationships in the
modern and post-modern eras.

2. An Hypothesis

Interorganisational relationships suffer, on the one hand, because their
participants unknowingly perpetuate the dysfunctions of the system in which they
are engaged. On the other hand, when seeking to genuinely correct the system,
participants are led farther astray by a growing dominant critique of the system that does not account for the central flaw of its dysfunction. The nature of that dysfunction is not the presence of science, rather it is the falsified dominance of neo-science perpetuated by a weak conceptualisation of human nature. In the end, the science of social science has become entangled within its own faults. The contemporary remedy proposed by the post-modernist is similarly entangled.

It is my position that interorganisational relationships, until returned to the promise of modernity before its coupling with social Darwinism, will continue to unknowingly suffer. Until discursive rationality in decision-making is based upon a more true picture of human nature, interorganisational decision-making will remain the domain of the character most adept at social Darwinism’s game.

C. Concluding Remarks

MacIntyre and Habermas, though in very different ways, argue for the nature of the individual as the centre of her teleos, whether interpreted as the universalized locus of pure reason (der Verstand [the understanding]) or as the universalized locus of the ancient virtue (δικαιοσύνη [dikaiosunē – the cardinal virtue]). Herein, a most important and foundational question is answered: is humanity as a species more the same than it is different, or more different than it is the same?

Humanity is, as contemporary geneticists (Cargill et al., 1999; CSAC, 2005; Syvänen, 2001; Wang et al., 1998) and cultural anthropologists (Collard, Shennan, & Tehrani, 2006) continue to provide evidence, more the same than it is different.
Yet, in the social, political, economic, and institutional absence of a metaphysical truth that grounds praxis, humanity has devised a substitute for metaphysical truth through antagonism. This antagonistic truth may be wholly antithetical to humanity’s shared nature. Within the case of modernity, the Fichtian synthesis of this dialectic is the accepted subversion of rationally constituted validity into the host perspective. It is the subversion of the gene’s perspective by the host’s. The cause of post-modernity, rather than seeking the missing metaphysical truth grounded in the *more the same* answer, abandons questions of truth to the *more different* answer. Doing so, post-modernists abdicate all linkages with the gene’s perspective that antagonistically (and as I demonstrate in Chapter Eight, *agonistically*) and actually oppose the host’s perspective on the host’s own terms. The debate among modernist (host) and post-modernist becomes meaningless, since both are ultimately grounded upon fallacy.

**D. Summary**

Beginning from the contextual questions surrounding the host’s perspective as an organisational representation of interorganisational relationships established in the previous chapter, I have articulated several contentions that move my larger argument forward. These contentions include, (a) that a link exists between the period of modernity and the perpetuation of the host’s perspective; (b) that modernity did not originate from within the host’s perspective, but, as demonstrated in the otherwise unbiased (as much as this might be possible) exemplar found in
a non-Western/European historical case with few historic predilections or ties to
a host’s conception of science *cum* technology—Japan—that such a perspective
is easily and successfully contrived through the perpetuation of traditions; and (c)
that post-modernity’s apparent and demonstrable failure to concretely dissuade
modernity does not serve its own purposes, purposes that upon examination permit
modernity’s escape from meaningful criticism. In chapters to follow, I extend my
examination of modern, post-modern and institutional enlightenment relationships
through contemporary game theoretic analysis.
In the present chapter, I extend the argument presented in Chapter Five within the context of interorganisational relationships forged among organisations endowed with various organisational representations. Following an analysis of game theoretic situations employed in decision-making, I specify this argument to the case of educational organisations and their interactions with non-educational organisations. In the chapters that follow, a further assessment of these relations and their implications for leadership is drawn from the work of Mouffe and Habermas.

In the previous chapters, I sought to construct the background principles of this theoretical study. Doing so, my intent was to examine the context in which the relationships of interest exist. I now apply the hypothesis that I used to close Chapter Five.

A. Amalgamation and Plan of Study

I present a summary of Chapters Four and Five.

1. The foundational arguments of predominant political ideologies are based upon a specific form of scientism that is frequently
unscientific.

(a) Human social relationships are not manifest in social-Darwinian (Spencerian) terms.

(b) Appeals to Darwinism demonstrate a fallacy of the underlying arguments of these ideologies.

2. The pathology of this scientism is demonstrable as an elevation of technology, the tangible product of science, over science, the method of discovery.

(a) Technological advancement is a tangible measure of modernity when made quantifiable as a product or instrument of power.

(b) The elevation of quantifiable product further embeds competitive principles into political and economic relations.

(c) With political and economic relations thus aligned, social relations take on social-Darwinist archetypes.

(d) Social archetypes are represented in political, economic, and social relations by certain characters.

3. Reactions to the social-Darwinist manifestation of modernity have generally been anaemic.

(a) Despite the appearance of a post-modernist challenge to modernity, characters of modernity are able to employ post-modernist arguments to sustain their archetypal place.

(b) The post-modern argument results in a strengthening of the
modernist position. This result is demonstrable in the continued strength of the modern position, ideologically, economically, and socially, since theories of difference gained ground in the 1970s (Martin & Frost, 1996).

(c) Critiques of the tangible product of science within the context of theories of difference misunderstand the central flaw in modernity.

In Chapter Six, I apply these presuppositions to theoretical organisations, which I shall call “A” and “B,” and to more concrete examples. I am particularly interested in the relationships between organisations, and I focus my initial discussion on the nature of relationships.

**B. Organisations “A” and “B”**

The theoretical organisations A and B hold (or have emerged from) different world views or organisational representations. In an attempt to delimit this theoretical discussion, I am at this time not interested in the size of these organisations, nor am I interested in their age. Furthermore, I am not interested in the turn over of membership, nor am I interested in their organisational structure or decision-making apparati (although some may assume certain structures based upon there ontological persuasions). The organisations may have as many leaders as one cares to count, or as few, these are of little importance for my purposes. These organisations may deal with other individuals, who themselves may realize their place within the
organisation; or they may not, on both or either account. I reify these organisations as a means of generalizing their organisational idiosyncrasies, purposes, and goals. Simply put, therefore, these organisations merely see the world in a particular way; in doing so, they believe their view is justified (although exactly how is of tangential interest, for the time being). The basic purpose for the relationship among A and B requires that a decision related to some common interest be made.

1. Game Theoretical Relationships

One way of examining the interrelationships between organisations is through the use of game theory. Game theory is used in mathematical, political, and economic literature, but has some, albeit very small, purchase in educational administration. Evers and Lakomski (2000) discussed its merits as a foundation of their coherentist and naturalistic method of decision-making analysis. Their definition of game theory was taken from the work of Heap, Hollis, Lyons, Sugden and Weale (1992), and since mine is an extended juxtaposition of Evers and Lakomski’s employment, I use Heap et al.’s definition, as well.

A game is defined as a situation in which the actions of one [organisation] perceptibly affect the welfare of another and vice versa. These effects can be classified according to the degree to which there are motives for cooperation and for rivalry. …Whatever the case, the basic method of game theory is to argue that [individual organisations] try to predict what others will do in reply to their own actions, and then to optimize on the understanding that
others are thinking in the same way. (p. 94)

As noted earlier, strict game theory has not been widely employed within educational administration,\textsuperscript{63} which raises questions that I examine later in this chapter and in Chapter Seven. Where game theory has been used, some interesting characteristics have appeared.

In 1970, Brown provided an evaluation of risk propensity in decision-making, comparing the administrators of businesses and the administrators of public schools. He argued that a large body of work in organisational theory\textsuperscript{64} independently concluded that game theoretic analysis was appropriate for comparisons of organisational behaviour. The internal structures of these two types of organisations, it was argued, were the same. Brown concluded that business leaders were more likely to take decision-based risks than were educational administrators.

More recently, Evers and Lakomski (2000) employed game theory as a naturalistic method of analysing decision-making within educational management. In fact, it is precisely because Evers and Lakomski have chosen this method, the weight of their view within recent theoretic educational administrative literature, in addition to its use in doctoral programs in Educational Administration where I am not convinced that it is fully appreciated by students, that I too will employ it. Game theory provides an idealized way of understanding basic decision-making practices. Furthermore, the irony of game theoretic analysis is that those who scientistically employ it do not realize the extent to which it demonstrates inherent problems rooted in their particular organisational representation positions.
It is not my present concern to deeply elaborate upon the general thesis argued in *Doing Educational Administration* (Evers & Lakomski, 2000; hereafter, *Doing*). Briefly, however, their thesis is constructed upon a basis in a particular school of cognitive science\(^6\) whose basic underlying theory of mind is simply described as follows: your brain is a computer, or several computers working in parallel, that implements your mind as a computer would software. It is for this reason that the first chapter of *Doing* focuses on parallel processing\(^6\) — since parallel processing, Evers and Lakomski implied, is the current state of thinking in cognitive science. They offered no critique.

Searle (1984; 2004), however, did offer a critique.\(^7\) He explained how parallel processing is, in fact, nothing more than the implementation of syntax on a series of powerful Turing machines. Alternatively said, this branch of cognitive science employs 1940s technology as its scientific view of the brain and mind.\(^8\) As was discussed in Chapter Three, syntax is, quite literally, nothing without a semantic referent.

A transcendental object does not exist for a computer-mind and, as a result, neither does a form of intentionality. Machines, contrary to the implication in Evers and Lakomski’s work, clearly do not think. Nevertheless, Evers and Lakomski (2000) employed this scientistic framework as an extension of game theory in decision-making models and argue that educational administration has much to learn from it. For my purposes, however, I focus on the examples of games between my organisations A and B to Evers and Lakomski’s early conceptions, before they
are naturalized or coherentified.

I present an example from Evers and Lakomski (2000) of game theory. First, one must confine one’s self to a small universe in which a normative view of rational behaviour is assumed to dominate. All parties to this universe seek to behave in such a way that their expected value for the result of their behaviour is maximized (Davis, 1970). The reason for such a confined universe is one of practicality, as Nash (1951) explained: “the complexity of the mathematical work needed for a complete investigation increases rather rapidly … with increasing complexity of the game” (p. 295).

The specific example that was drawn by Evers and Lakomski (2000) examined the decision-making process employed by an individual within this universe where one of two weather outcomes is equally likely (a 50% chance of rain, and a 50% chance of no rain). A decision must be made as to whether or not the individual should bring an umbrella to work. Figure 6.1 shows the basic elements of the decision table as demonstrated in Doing.

The value of carrying an umbrella, or not, will vary depending on whether it rains or not. There are four possibilities. To bring it, with rain eventuating, has high value (+6) because of the advantages associated with staying dry. If it does not rain [sic] there is a small disadvantage (−2) caused by the inconvenience of carrying an unneeded umbrella. The decision not to bring it, and rain occurs, is disastrous (−8), while if it does not rain there is the modest advantage (+2) of not carrying around something unnecessary. As
the theory of reason counsels maximizing expected value, we can put all this into a calculation of expected value for each alternative and make the appropriate choice as follows:

Expected value of bringing the umbrella: \[0.5 \times 6 + 0.5 \times (-2) = 2\]

Expected value of not bringing the umbrella: \[0.5 \times (-8) + 0.5 \times 2 = 3\] [sic]

Therefore, one ought to carry an umbrella. (Evers & Lakomski, 2000, pp. 90-91)

The answer provided for the second equation is indeed –3 rather than 3, but this appears to be a mistake in the printing for their logical written conclusion remains valid. This situation is one where a decision is made based upon specific likely events that are, in a more substantial universe, more complex. Yet Evers and Lakomski suggested that despite the complexity of weather, one does have some means of ascribing probability based upon an ever-growing body of data for a particular

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**Figure 6.1** Decision-Making Under Risk
Adapted from Evers and Lakomski (2000, p. 90)
environment. So the game’s logic can be extended beyond the original universe (assuming that maximization of value remains a determinant of rationality). This example remains one of the simplest one-person games (Davis, 1970).

The next stage of Evers and Lakomski’s (2000) analysis addressed what Goldstein and Weber (1997) described as *framing effects*. The irony of this inclusion is found in the basis of framing effects as related to an intentionality of participants. This concept is, within the epistemological view to which Evers and Lakomski attached themselves, by logical necessity, *in absentia*. In any event, I use framing effects later to help to illustrate my broader point. Ultimately, the point of their inclusion permits the gradual growth of the universe in which the games are manifest. Growth beyond one governed by mere probability of outcomes, and into one where more independent individual or organisational thinking takes place.

Evers and Lakomski (2000) acknowledged that original game theory, developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/1953) was meant to examine cooperative games. Though I return to cooperative games later and argue that cooperative games where education is involved are frequently non-cooperative games in disguise, I will now continue, as they did, and examine their example of a non-cooperative game. “[N]on-cooperative games model the most frequent social situations for decision [sic]” (Evers & Lakomski, 2000, p. 92). The example they selected was helpful, included a scenario, and focused on a most commonplace two-person, non-zero-sum game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

The prisoners of this example are a principal and a union leader and the
scenario relates to “pseudo-bargaining in a school” around “a deterioration in teachers’ work conditions” due to government budgetary practices; the teachers’ union has imposed a work-to-rule practice, the principal is concerned with public image and consequences for enrollments. Evers and Lakomski (2000) explained the strategies of the principal and the union leader if one or the other compromised or resisted. The specifics were outlined in the table shown in Figure 6.2. As with all similar manifestations of a prisoner’s dilemma in which the universe is so construed, Evers and Lakomski explained that the result is a so-called Nash-equilibrium (Davis, 1970; Eichberger, 1992; Ross, 1996; Samuelson, 1992), where strategic decisions typically fall into the resist/resist (–8,–8), or defect/defect, category—despite the disadvantage over compromise/compromise (–1,–1), or cooperate/cooperate.

In a brief passage that followed this example, Evers and Lakomski (2000)
launch what can only be considered a moderate challenge of Ross (1996), on whose work theirs is partially based. They preferred, alternatively, to move the discussion toward the exploitation of game theoretic concepts in distributed cognitive/decision-making networks. Others, including Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Axelrod (1984), Axelrod and Dion (1988), Matt Ridley (1998) and Robson (1992), have provided a more substantial challenge to the ideas established in Ross (1996), and accepted by Evers and Lakomski. By leaving their discussion of game theory at the point they do, Evers and Lakomski (2000) neglected more than thirty years of discussion among political scientists (and, as chance would have it, sociobiologists) around such games. It must be underscored that I do not consider this a failing on the part of Evers and Lakomski. They had, as I have, a specific purpose for the examples included. What, for my purpose, is missing from their discussion is (a) an examination of recent advances in game theory, and (b) how, contrary to Brown’s (1970) conclusion that organisations are similar enough that games requisite of simple universes are adequate for generalizations, the universe of any particular game in interorganisational contexts is made up of two universes. What gives my thinking in this area some merit rests in the attention it draws to an absence in current literature within educational administration.

1.1. A Two-Person, Non-Zero-Sum Game

The second example provided by Evers and Lakomski (2000) was referred to as a two-person, non-zero-sum game.
Games in which the interest of the players are diametrically opposed are called zero-sum games. … After the game is over, the sum of the winnings is always zero (a loss is a negative win). This game is distinguished from a non-zero-sum, union-management bargaining game, for example, in that, there, both players may lose simultaneously if there is no agreement. That is, one man’s loss may not be another’s gain. (Davis, 1970, p. 9)

It makes no difference whether the game is about the competing interests of two groups rather than those of two individuals. The point is to examine strategy in decision-making.

Let us regard all two-person games as lying in a continuum, with the zero-sum games at one extreme. In a two-person game, there are generally both competitive and cooperative elements: the interest of the players are opposed in some respects and complementary in others. In the zero-sum game, the players have no common interest. In the completely cooperative game at the other extreme, the players have nothing but common interests. (Davis, 1970, pp. 65-66)

Davis provided a number of examples of two-person, non-zero-sum games. Below, I have adapted one of his examples.

1.1.a. A simple partnership game

In this game, we suppose that two organisations, “A” and “B,” have been offered an opportunity to collaborate on an initiative. For this initiative, the
government of the area will pay a sum of $1,000,000 to an organisation or partnership. Organisations $A$ and $B$ independently understand that their combined labour ideally suits the initiative; furthermore, they both realize that without the other partner, they would be unable to complete the initiative. For both $A$ and $B$, the prospect of sharing such a large sum of money is extremely tempting. Organisations $A$ and $B$ write a joint proposal regarding the initiative and their proposal is accepted. At this point, $A$ writes to $B$ that they agree to go ahead with the initiative if and only if they receive $700,000 for their work and they will not discuss the matter further, either with $A$ or with the funding government. Organisation $B$ is clear that $A$ will only perform 50% of the work required and feels that they are being exploited by $A$, but $300,000$ is a great deal of money that would otherwise not be available to $B$. In this case, Organisation $A$ has no further options, $B$ must solely make the decision. Figure 6.3 shows the payoff matrix for this example.

### 1.1.b. Preliminary analysis of the simple partnership game

Several key issues emerge from the partnership game articulated in Section 1.1.a. First, defect/defect is no longer available. The only options are cooperate/cooperate (at a gain for $A$ but a loss for $B$) or cooperate/defect (where both $A$ and $B$ lose). The situation is forced into this position by a specific strategy embarked upon by $A$: taking advantage of a first-strike and then refusing to communicate.

Seen in this way, one may take the reasonable view (under the circumstances of a maximization universe) of Organisation $A$, arguing that they saw an opportunity
to maximize their “personal” benefits within the situation and jumped on it in a way that forced $B$’s hand—the assumption being that $B$ would not contemplate defecting, because the stakes were simply too high, even as distorted as they may be. Further, the assumption of this universe would be that $B$ should have behaved as $A$, but was simply too slow to force $A$’s hand.

This assumption demonstrated the common, perhaps even exclusive, view in game theoretic analysis until the 1990s. One can only presume that Evers and Lakomski would argue the same strategy. The reason why this strategy can be assumed was expressed in the requirement of a games universe where the maximization of benefit predominate—but greater analysis of what this precisely means is of some significance considering the arguments made in chapters Four and Five and in that Evers and Lakomski (2000) did not choose that option.
There are many definitions of terms in game theory literature. Indeed, this was the principle purpose of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944/1953) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Of particular interest here was the definition given for “rational” behaviour in the universe of games. Von Neumann and Morgenstern employed the definition found commonplace within economics. Principally, their definition suggested that no matter the circumstances of the economy or game, the participants desire to obtain a maximum of utility or satisfaction. … We shall … assume that the aim of all participants in the economic system, … is money, or equivalently a single monetary commodity. This is supposed to be unrestrictedly divisible and substitutable, freely transferable and identical, even in the quantitative sense, with whatever “satisfaction” or “utility” is desired by each participant. (p. 8)

I take no particular issue, beyond recognizing its simplicity (Scheerens, 2000), with the definition of satisfaction as some representation of money or even with the particular ascription of rationality to those who wish to increase what utility or satisfaction they have. What concerns me more is the context in which such rationality is expressed and considered. A context in which money is understood as the quantifier of satisfaction predominates, rather than a context based on other possible tangible (technological/non-cognitive) or intangible (scientific/pedagogic/cognitive [Scheerens, 2000]; although questions of quantified intangibles are problems that I cannot address here) referents. In this way, money, expenditure, and
capital are directly linked to technology. The dominant host’s perspective draws such a conclusion (Marciano, 2005; Patterson, 2005) and, on this view, tangibles are unquestionably meant to dominate intangibles (Scheerens, 2000).

Ironically, while sublimating tangibles, the neoclassical economic model for human behaviour, the *homo economicus*, is based upon the Cartesian sublimation of subjectivity *qua* objectivity. I recall the Cartesian dualism discussed in Chapter Three:

[Descartes’] solution offered a new conception of the human self, one that, in the centuries that followed, permeated, defined and structured intellectual pursuits including philosophy, social theory and economics, and, through these, shaped the thinking of the general populations of Western societies. By conceiving himself as disembodied, Descartes not only found the metaphysical certainty that he desired, but also initiated the idea of a thinker/observer who is completely detached, existing independently of time, place and other human beings, and therefore, like God, totally objective. (Fullbrook, 2004, p. 404)

Fullbrook’s analysis showed that economics, as a socialized science of mathematics, had no choice in its neoclassical manifestation than to choose a Cartesian perspective, the only alternative at the time being Hegel’s radical idealism—utterly and unapologetically intangible. Sensibly for the time, the study of observable human relations needed to rely upon a foundation in objectivity (even one subjectively, with the aid of an honest and forthright God that clearly would not deceive, inspired). In
this way, individuals were not to be viewed as separate entities. This point would become particularly important to mathematicians and game theoreticians. I can only deduce that it is for this reason that nowhere have I found games in which simultaneities of universes exist. In economic analysis an utterly problematic situation for educational organisations developed, as I will demonstrate.

1.1.c. Tit for Tat

A study of game theoretic strategy, the guiding principle behind a particular manifestation of rational behaviour within a particular game, emerged in 1979. Ridley (1998) told the story of a young political scientist who challenged his field to participate in a game of game theory. For several years before, computers had been engaged by economists and political scientists to play prisoner’s dilemmas, with some rather unexpected results.

What was interesting about the strategies arrived at in computational players (a notion that I employ very loosely), was the frequency with which they cooperated. While it is not surprising that rational behaviour might sometimes be achieved through cooperation, it seemed statistically improbable that it should be frequently achieved this way: “Alarm bells rang throughout mathematics” (p. 60). To solve the matter, Robert Axelrod, the young political scientist in question, devised a tournament in which teams could submit programs to play, according to whatever strategy the team chose or as complicated a strategy as might be algorithmically invested within a computer program, the classic prisoner’s dilemma against each other, and against
itself, 200 times. Scores would be calculated at the tournament’s completion and an analysis of the dominant and failing strategies would be disseminated through scholarly publication. For the final analysis, two additional tournaments were conducted. The results of the tournaments were published in an article by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), and in a book by the same name—*Evolution of Cooperation* (Axelrod, 1984/2006).

From the title of Axelrod’s article (1981) and book (1984/2006), one might assume an elemental understanding of the tournaments’ results. The first tournament included program submissions by 14 participant teams of economists, sociologists, political scientists, and mathematicians. The highest score went to the most simple program, written by a University of Toronto mathematical psychologist interested in nuclear confrontation working at the Vienna Institute for Advanced Study, Anatol Rapoport, called *Tit for Tat*. The guiding strategy embedded within *Tit for Tat* was one, as the name suggests, of reciprocity: its “strategy [was] simply one of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the preceding move” (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981, p. 1393). This very rudimentary and strictly held strategy was able, in the long-run, to overcome more complicated (*parallel*) computational strategies, even “one which [sic] on each move model[ed] the behavior of the other player as a Markov process, and then use[d] Bayesian inferences to select what seem[ed] the best choice for the long run” (p. 1393).

A second tournament was fashioned, similar to the first, but where 62 participant teams submitted challengers. *Tit for Tat* was again submitted by
Rapoport and again won. After analyzing the three million interactions among the participating team programs, Axelrod and Hamilton reported that Tit for Tat’s success was due to three observable factors: “it was never the first to defect, it was provokable [sic] into retaliation by a defection by the other, and it was forgiving after just one act of retaliation” (p. 1393).

Axelrod conducted a third tournament setting each program against one another in a “sort of survival-of-the-fittest war” (Matt Ridley, 1998, p. 61). The progress of the tournament came in phases. In the first, the most brute strategies overtook the more naïve (Ridley’s word, not mine) with little difficulty; in phase two, only brutes and Tit for Tat remained. As phase two progressed, the numbers of brutes began to rapidly dwindle. Tit for Tat remained the sole competitor in phase three and won.

Though differently purposed, Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and Ridley (1998) explored the conclusions that might be drawn from Axelrod’s tournaments for real organisms. Axelrod and Hamilton’s article was published in the journal Science, an ironically odd place for a political scientist to publish, but Hamilton was a biologist and familiar with the work of his predecessors and contemporaries—including Fisher, Williams, Maynard Smith (whose work in the early 1970s that hypothesized the conclusions Axelrod’s tournaments provided had been largely ignored beyond genetics) and Dawkins—on what was becoming known as the gene’s eye-view, or gene’s perspective as the dominant view in evolutionary biology. The audience was principally natural scientists. Ridley’s book was written for a popular audience, and
focused upon establishing the legitimacy among social science readers the new field of sociobiology. In both cases, the point one may derive is largely the same, the antiquated view maintained by orthodox and social-Darwinists was served with a refutation, and from within the context of game theory, nonetheless.

Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) highlighted the implications of their work in terms of evolutionary biology and the important role played by cooperation and altruistic behaviours among members of a particular species, or even among species—because they examined such behaviours in ecological terms, particularly implications for *symbioses*: mutualism, commensalism, parasitism, and amensalism. Ridley’s (1998) work focused on social implications for humans. Of great importance here was the attention he paid to examples where human strategies were based on mistaken assumptions, imperfect information, and faulty communication. The various balances of power and alliance systems engineered in the build-up to the First World War provided an apt example: initial defections (from the macro-perspective) caused a spiral of similar defections, ending in 46 million dead or injured (Harrington, 2002).

**1.1.d. Strategy and manner**

I now consider the matter of *manner*; an issue at the heart of judgments made by game players. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/1953) argued that players will consider certain strategies. These strategies are representations of the image that a particular player has of his opponent. Pinker (1997) articulated, “you had
better think about what he is thinking about what you are thinking he is thinking” (p. 193). But strategies are more than the adjusting of a behaviour based upon an image of an expected, as in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s words, “standard of behavior” (p. 40ff). As von Neumann and Morgenstern conceded, “standards of behavior” exist, since each player will choose his own strategy, subject to “rational” behaviour. The point is that games may be rationally played in a variety of ways, depending upon the nature of the game and the nature of the opponent’s behaviour. Hence, standards of behaviour rather than a standard of rational behaviour. In any event, I wish to distinguish a strategy from a manner.

Strategy is rational, but developmental, behaviour extended a priori a player’s behaviour (not a priori the individual, however) and succeeding possible cooperative or retaliatory opponent’s actions. Manner, I believe, is more basic than strategy. It provides the justifications for judgments upon which judgments are made. In essence, manner is ontology employed in strategy. That manner is manifest in rational behaviour is more likely than its manifestation in irrational behaviour, even by standards of homo economicus design. What remains missing in homo economicus is the rationale under-pinning behaviours of maximization. That I want to maximize satisfaction or utility is clear. Why I want to maximize satisfaction or utility, and how I will maximize, however, is not clear; but it is assumed to be the dominant manner in which such maximizations are manifest. Dominant manners, are linked, I believe, to dominant representations (Fullbrook, 2004).

I have found notions that I believe are akin to manner. Larson (1987) provided
a glimpse of philosophical manner in his examination of Hindu philosophical systems, claiming that “hard,” “tight” and “soft” varieties of manners exist. For example, like Kant (1790/1952) in The Critique of Judgment, Larson described heuristic reasoning as a soft manner where “a set of regulative ideas that are pragmatically and empirically employed for the purposes of getting a useful heuristic grasp on the complexities of the natural world” (p. 251). A second example came from Krause and Béziau’s (1997) discussion of principles of identity in logic. They quote Leibniz’s dictum that *eadem sunt quorum unum potest substitui alteri salva veritate* [those things are identical of which one can be substituted for the other without loss]. “‘[A]greement with respect to attributes’ or … all that can be said of one thing can also be said of an ‘identical’ one” (p. 2) showing that substitution of rationality may be possible. But manner in this sense relates to certain veiled attributes of philosophical positioning that provide their unique description of self, despite deeper (unveiled) substitution likeliness. I am here eluding to the notion explored in Chapter Three related to the ways in which one might epistemically encounter the world: schematized or transcendental. Manners may be schematized (veiled by custom, habit, or association). Alternatively, it may be transcendentally substitutable, if combinations of volition and means are intrinsically (or with less weight, extrinsically) inspired to do so. Manner governs the meaning of strategy in game theory, and specifically a transcendentally substitutable one, but are we so diligent?

Chicken or egg questions immediately arise for the organisational theorist:
Do individuals of particular philosophical manners enter into certain organisations or do certain organisations favour individuals of particular maximizing manners? The answer is both. One enters organisations for many different reasons; occasionally manner will be manifest in a strategy for entering such relations. We remain in organisations when our manners prove to provide increased satisfaction and utility, and it is in this way that organisations favour certain manners.

2. Exploratory Analysis of Games Discussed

My broader point for the entire discussion of game theory in terms of interorganisational relations has been to consider some peculiarities of such analysis that emerge as questions rooted in the discussion presented in the previous two chapters. If contemporary ideological positions spanning the modern spectrum are based upon fallacies, how do some positions come to dominate while other positions do not? Has this dominance something to do with the ways in which humanity has permitted a false understanding of its predispositions to come to dominate its systems of enlightenment? How do these dominances manifest themselves in contemporary and historic interorganisational relationships? How do these dominances exploit the game theoretic means commonly used in their self-analysis? In this section, I will not fully answer these important and large questions. Rather, I raise an emerging critique launched at the complacency with which fallacy has been accepted as rational. I return to the implications of the games discussed above. I do so in reverse order in which they were presented, applying the above premises as minor
critiques and purposeful imbalances.

I endeavour to maintain balance between their storylines and each premise—
(a) that game theory cannot presuppose a singular universe of behaviour, (b) that the
behaviour of players is not advanced by maximization of value via social Darwinist
means, and (c) that substrata of manners guide strategy in ways that demonstrate
different ways in which even universal rationality may be exhibited. I suggest
that a constructive discussion can develop through a reexamination of their general
properties by a variety of observers and juxtaposed against the three premises
outlined above.

In consideration of the game between organisations A and B, where A wrote
to B, forcing the hand of B to accept an unfair reward for their potential work, the
situation might be thought of differently. One can alternatively suppose that the
remuneration was meaningless, viewed as relatively microscopic in comparison to
the organisation’s income from public donations. This view would, likely, adjust
one’s evaluation of the situation. Organisation B, in this case, could (if rational)
easily defect. It seems then that the value of remuneration is, in this light, of some
great significance, because it may be used for or against an opponent as a rational
strategy. Furthermore, from an external observer’s viewpoint, this situation does
not seem so unfair. To this end it could be argued that the situation provides an
example of mistaken assumptions that can be claimed against A, especially if B
were to defect. Indeed, as the Pinker (1997) quote articulated, knowing one’s
opponent’s understanding of the relative value of remuneration can make or break
the performance of one’s own strategy. This analysis is not, however, provocative.

Alternatively, consider the following illustrative scenario. Perhaps five years ago, in 2002, one were to suppose again (but it would in fact be the first time) that, as above, Organisation $B$ saw the value of remuneration as microscopic. This time, however, let us assume that A’s strategy is not perceived as a mistake, neither by A nor by you nor by myself as observer. Now suppose that twenty years from now, in 2027, perhaps after catching some drift of the game theory examples outlined herein, some individual would like to return to the moment in 2002 at which this peculiarly understood “rational” strategy was appropriately applied in this game. This future individual, whom I will call Ms. 2027, as a meta-observer of the 2002-Organisation A, 2002-Dave and 2002-[insert your name here], would clearly question our faculties. For, to Ms. 2027, such an understood game between A and B would appear odd, and our 2002 perceptions of it would likely seem distorted. “How could we possibly believe that B’s strategy was not irrational?” Ms. 2027 would surely ask.

Impatiently watching as the game progresses, Ms. 2027 eagerly awaits B’s rational defection to right the situation—and more impatiently waiting for the debriefing discussion between 2002-B, 2002-Dave and 2002-you. But these discussions will never be, for in the end Ms. 2027 is confounded by B’s response, to accept the situation as if forced by A to do so. What does Ms. 2027 recognize that the rest do not and why do the rest not recognize it?

I now turn to the second example presented in Evers and Lakomski (2000),
where a principal and teachers’ union leader were engaged in a “discussion” around the deterioration of working conditions. Recall that in this game it was postulated that a defect/defect result was likely. If analysed through the dominant rational universe model, both sides will behave in a way that increases their satisfaction. I provide a slight amendment to the original scenario, adding what may more clearly define the notion of working conditions, which seems to be the operative issue.

I assume that the context for this game is enveloped by the notion of school effectiveness. A detailed discussion of school effectiveness rests beyond this dissertation. Nevertheless, let us look to an international perspective on this subject—since generality remains an optimistic goal—and Scheerens’ (2000) work is revealing and helpful. He argued that in the area of school effectiveness the meaning attributed by various parties to effectiveness, coupled with specific and underlying conceptions of organisational theory (economic rationality, organic, human relations, bureaucratic and political views), frequently results in conflicted positions.

In accordance with each organisational theory, a particular criterion of effectiveness is dominant (both in a particular theoretical assumption of its dominance and as an expectation that others share this view). For the economic view, the criterion is productivity; for the organic, it is adaptability; human relations, involvement; bureaucratic, continuity; and political, responsiveness to external stakeholders. Furthermore,

[w]ith regard to the economic rational and organic system models, the
management of the organisation is the main ‘actor’ posing the effectiveness question. As far as the other models are concerned, department heads and individual workers are the actors that seek to achieve certain effects. (Scheerens, 2000, p. 26)

I further assume that in the specification of working conditions, in terms of school effectiveness, both sides in Evers and Lakomski’s example remain true to the economic rational model of both organisational theoretic criteria and game theoretic universes. Interestingly, with the addition of even a simple context (one where the same universe applies to both players of the game), the manners rooting the strategies employed do not align. Consider the economic rational position maintained by a principal in such a situation, based upon productivity: the organisation must maintain or increase productivity, with the result of maintained or increased enrollments. Now, consider the economic rational position maintained by a union leader in such a situation, based, again, on productivity as criterion: the organisation must increase productivity, with the result of reducing enrollments. For the principal in this contrived situation, productivity is seen in increased numbers of student enrollments regardless of the mean quality of education provided. For the union leader, productivity is seen in increased mean quality of education regardless of the student enrollment numbers.
2.1. **Weather Games and a Universes Theory**

These peculiar stories of future observers and past participants, and publicly influenced principals and student influenced union leaders demonstrate the power of a dominant manner. These examples show behaviours that are potentially understood as irrational being played as rational. They explore contested notions of rationality even within singular universes, and provide the foundation for the simplest pronouncement of my critique. I return to Evers and Lakomski’s (2000) first example: the individual *versus* weather.

I recall that the first game examined by Evers and Lakomski (2000) provided what von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/1953) described as a one person, zero-sum game. In that game, an individual lived within a universe where one of two weather outcomes was equally likely (a 50% chance of rain, and a 50% chance of no rain). A decision had to be made as to whether or not the individual should bring an umbrella to work. I recall also that within my initial discussion of this game, I pointed to the notion of framing effect as valuable, but did little to develop the application to the game in any substantive way—limiting my description to the implication that it was rooted in intentionality.

Frames, in organisational theory, psychology, and sociology refer to the ways in which individuals conceptualize, or are taught to conceptualize (Gordon, 1998; Roberts, 1998; Schein, 1993), through organisational or social structures (Giddens, 1979). By organisational or social structures I mean to say the semantic referents of syntax. But what has this matter to do with weather? Is rain not the
same everywhere and to everyone? One might suppose that the trite, but utterly false (Pullum, 1991), aphorism about Inuit words for snow will next emerge from my argument. Rather, I frame the issue in an educated context.

In the paragraph that followed their description of the school-based scenario, Evers and Lakomski (2000) articulated their belief that a frame comes into play for determining the numerical valuing of each alternative outcome.

Being known as ‘the most academically successful school in the state’ and being known as ‘school number 1131’ will lead parents to make strikingly different estimates about their children’s potential school success, even though the expressions refer to the same school. Once estimates of described states of affairs are seen to depend, not on referential properties of those descriptions but on intensional, or meaning-related properties, a person’s global theory comes into play, as meaning is partly dependent on the conceptual role of an expression. (p. 91)

On my own view, this is correct and stands to reason. The question that remains, however, relates to the degree to which (if at all) one permits these values to be disputable. Should weight not be given to those who “understand” the situation more clearly on account of greater study of the subject that is in question?

To better illustrate my point, I will modify the weather example Evers and Lakomski presented. While their example was intended to display one person, zero-sum games, I assume this time that two individuals—a dog trainer and a meteorologist—attempt to work together to decide on the value of bringing an
umbrella. Each individual plays his or her own game, and plays it rationally. Knowing little more about weather than having been an occasional observer of the Weather Network and the weather segment on the nightly news, the dog trainer arrived at the values for each potential scenario as represented in part A of Figure 6.4. Alternatively, the meteorologist provided what I argue are the educated odds represented in part B of Figure 6.4. In Figure 6.5 I summarize the calculations resulting from the odds ascribed by each of the two participants.

Though this rewritten example is simple, if a dominant representation of a dominant universe holds a particular place in its heart for the cause of dog trainers over meteorologists, it is probable that the dog trainer’s calculation will be followed, perhaps even regarded as more accurate or educated. In my adjusted example, I further assume that dog trainers and meteorologists agree upon the categorical nature of the scenario. My assumption is that the principle binaries are rain or no rain, and bring an umbrella or do not bring an umbrella. Should my assumptions be false, however, the dog trainer might devise the scenario odds shown in Figure 6.6.

Calculating the odds ascribed in Figure 6.6, the resulting decision would be that (under the presented circumstances) one ought to combine getting a haircut while eating lunch. This conclusion is clearly a ridiculous prospect for anyone even slightly educated in the area of meteorology.

Admittedly, these recastings are provocative. Yet the scenario that I believe they illustrate, in connection with the critiques and theme of this chapter and those
it follows, is denoted in the following theory of representations of truth in various universes of interpersonal (and interorganisational) relationships. The theory is simple in principle, but convoluted in description:

Figure 6.4  Decision-Making Matrices of a Dog Trainer and a Meteorologist
(Part B was adapted from Evers and Lakomski (2000, p. 90)
1. In a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood fallacious behaviour or strategy is viewed as true by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed in schematized manners that conform to the fallacious nature of the universe, or,

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**Figure 6.5** Calculation Summary for Decisions of a Dog Trainer and a Meteorologist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dog Trainer</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bring Value: ((0.5 \times 1) + (0.5 \times 2) = 1.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave Value: ((0.5 \times [-4]) + (0.5 \times 16) = 6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therefore, one ought to leave the umbrella at home.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meteorologist</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bring Value: ((0.5 \times 6) + (0.5 \times [-2]) = 2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave Value: ((0.5 \times [-8]) + (0.5 \times 2) = -3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therefore, one ought to bring the umbrella with.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. in a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood true behaviour or strategy is viewed as false by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed in schematized manners that conform to the fallacious nature of the universe, or,

\[ F_{\mathcal{F}} = i_{(F)} t \]

3. in a true and dominant universe, objectively understood fallacious behaviour or strategy is viewed as false by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed in schematized (but likely transcendental) manners that conform to the true nature of the universe, or,

\[ F_{\mathcal{T}} = i_{(T)} f \]

4. in a true and dominant universe, objectively understood true behaviour

---

**Figure 6.6** Decision-Making Matrix for a Dog Trainer
or strategy is viewed as true by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed in schematized (but likely transcendental) manners that conform to the true nature of the universe, or,

\[ T \rightarrow t = i_{(T)} t \]

I will hereafter refer to these four constituents by the symbolic representations denoted, where \( F \) is a false universe; \( T \) is a true universe; \( \bar{f} \) is an objectively false behaviour; \( \bar{t} \) is an objectively true behaviour; \( i_{(F)} \) is an individual/organisation whose representation is of the false universe kind; \( i_{(T)} \) is an individual/organisation whose representation is of a true universe kind; \( f \) is a judgment by the individual/organisation \( i \) of fallacy; \( t \) is a judgment by the individual/organisation \( i \) of truth.

### 3. Employing the Universes Theory in Interorganisational Relationships

Organisations \( A \) and \( B \) will engage in a relationship. Organisation \( A \) is of the \( i_{(F)} \) kind, and \( B \) is of the \( i_{(T)} \) kind; the universe of their relationship is dominantly \( F \). The relationship revolves around determining the best interests of a third group, those who will, according to \( B \), bring an umbrella or not bring an umbrella; but according to \( A \), the best interests of the third group revolve around bring an umbrella or get a hair cut. I contend that in the universe as it was assumed, of a dominant \( F \) kind, the dominant view of the behaviour of \( A \) will be as true \((i_{(T)} \bar{t})\) despite the objective fact that the behaviour is fallacious \((\bar{f}; \text{since } F \bar{f} = i_{(T)} \bar{t})\). Similarly, the dominant view of the behaviour of \( B \) will be as fallacious \((i_{(F)} \bar{f})\) despite the objective fact that the
behaviour is true ($i$; since $i^*i = i^*i$).

This scenario is not a theoretical assumption of relationships among organisations. It is a real manifestation of contemporary relationships among organisations. Owing to the dominance of the social Darwinist fallacy in the relational universe, the behaviours of organisations whose manner is not committed to schematized representations of human nature, are judged as fallacious. I do not view educational organisations’ representations as strictly transcendentally defined, however. Rather, I define educational organisations’ representations as internally oscillatory. They are engaged in internal dialectical relations among theoretical foundations on one side, and externally engaging administrative practice. I explore the implications of this internal oscillation for educational leadership and interorganisational relationships involving educational organisations and non-educational organisations in Chapter Seven.

C. Summary

In this chapter, I explored key elements of game theory as it pertains to the contemporary context of interorganisational relationships. The primary point constructed within the discussion of game theory, in terms of these relations, was meant to initiate a process for re-conceptualizing peculiarities of game analysis in the light of the arguments presented in Chapters Four and Five. Through the exploration of examples juxtaposed against those presented in Evers and Lakomski’s (2000) work in the area of decision-making in educational administration, I derived the
initial elements of a basic theory of the *universes* of interorganisational relationships.

I develop this theory in the chapters that follow.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE IRRATIONAL QUA RATIONAL

I here extend the universes theory presented in Chapter Six within the context of interorganisational relationships forged among educational and non-educational organisations. In the chapters that follow, I assess these relations through an adapted model of sedimentation, taken from Giddens (1979), and discuss implications for leadership, in their initial form, from the work of Mouffe (1999; 2005) and Habermas (1979).

A. Irrationality

Shapiro (2002) argued that *irrationality* is a confounding problem in the social sciences: “[i]rrational people create problems not only for themselves and those around them, but also for those who study them” (p. 157). The title of Shapiro’s work, *Ulysses Rebound*, refers to two separate issues. First, the title is a direct reference to Elster’s (2000) book *Ulysses Unbound*, a critical examination of constraints in relationships, where Elster claimed, with respect to freedom and knowledge within relationship, negotiation, and agreement, that less is more. Second, both titles refer to the Homeric passage in the *Odyssey* recounting Ulysses
and his men passing the shores of the western most land of the ancient Greek known-world, the *Land of the Sirens*.

To the Sirens first shalt thou come, who bewitch all men, whosoever shall come to them. Whoso draws nigh them unwittingly and hears the sound of the Sirens’ voice, never doth he see wife or babes stand by him on his return, nor have they joy at his coming; but the Sirens enchant him with their clear song, sitting in the meadow, and all about is a great heap of bones of men, corrupt in death, and round the bones the skin is wasting. But do thou drive thy ship past, and knead honey-sweet wax, and anoint therewith the ears of thy company, lest any of the rest hear the song; but if thou myself art minded to hear, let them bind thee in the swift ship hand and foot, upright in the mast-stead, and from the mast let rope-ends be tied, that with delight thou mayest hear the voice of the Sirens. And if thou shalt beseech thy company and bid them to loose thee, then let bind thee with yet more bonds. (Homer, c. 850 BCE/1909, Book XII, § 6)

Ulysses, being tied to the mast of his ship, and his men’s ears being filled with wax, thus constrained his own freedom and the knowledge of his men in, for Elster’s purposes, a symbolic attempt to advantage himself over the Sirens he encounters. The story represents an example of what Elster described as an *essential* constraint, one of two types of relationship constraints (the other being *incidental*). For Elster, an essential constraint is one where the individual binds him- or herself for the purpose of some expected benefit. Alternatively, an incidental constraint is one
where bindings are serendipitous, but likewise beneficial.

There is a link between Elster’s (2000) notion of an incidental (*serendipitous*) constraint and the broader topic of this dissertation. It relates to questions of rationality and irrationality, yet yields insight beyond that provided in Shapiro’s (2002) admonition to researchers. I briefly return to game theory and the second game highlighted in Chapter Six, and to the discussion of Ms. 2027’s observations.

1. **Reflections on Organisations “A” and “B”, Circa 2002**

Regarding the situation presented in the discussion of Ms. 2027, she has returned to 2002 to observe a particular game theoretic relationship among Organisations “A” and “B”. A, it can now be revealed in light of Elster’s (2000) varieties of constraints, constrains their freedom and information by forwarding the letter indicating their strategy, and then closing all channels of possible communication until B’s decision is made. Up to this point in the analysis, we do not yet know why this was done, *essentially* or *incidentally*. Adding, however, Ms. 2027’s observation that both 2002-Dave and 2002-you are neither surprised by A’s actions, nor by B’s response—to concede to the terms and cooperate—provides some clarity on this question. We know that A’s action was incidental, but not on account of anything specific to A’s behaviour. Rather, it is in the behaviour of 2002-Dave and 2002-you that the constraints are so denoted. Proof is found in the ability of my simple universes theory to explain, and predict, the situation precisely. For both 2002-Dave and 2002-you observe the behaviour of A to be $t$. 
Furthermore, I will, for reasons that have been alluded to in the previous chapters, but which will be made more explicit in the paragraphs to follow, initially assume that the universe of the situation as observed by Ms. 2027 is $F$. Recall that the only possible situation of an $F$ universe where individuals $i_{(F)}$ view the result of the behaviour as true requires an objectively false behaviour $f$, because

$$F^\perp = i_{(F)}^t$$

If either 2002-Dave or 2002-you had reacted differently, the situation would render the postulate

$$F^\perp = i_{(F)} f$$

—where an objectively true behaviour $i$ is required (but is illogical since $B$’s reaction was to cooperate, where an objectively true behaviour would require a non-host-mannered strategy, in which case the universe could not be of type $F$).

There does exist, however, one other potential manifestation of this scenario. One could consider this time that the universe is of type $T$. From this perspective, the behaviour of $A$ must be understood as $\bar{f}$ (because it demonstrates a host-mannered strategy). Thus the fourth postulate is not logically possible, and the only remaining explanation arrives through

$$T^\perp = i_{(T)} f$$

—where an objectively false behaviour is understood as false. Peculiar is the result that emerges from this situation, and it suggests a corollary for each of the various
postulates of the universes theory. These corollaries include

1. In a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood fallacious behaviour or strategy is viewed as false by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed from within a true universe, or,

   \[ F^f = i(T)f \]

2. In a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood true behaviour or strategy is viewed as true by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed from within a true universe, or,

   \[ F^t = i(T)t \]

3. In a true and dominant universe, objectively understood fallacious behaviour or strategy is viewed as true by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed from within a false universe, or,

   \[ T^f = i(F)t \]

4. In a true and dominant universe, objectively understood true behaviour or strategy is viewed as false by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed from within a false universe, or,

   \[ T^t = i(F)f \]

To this end, the situation in question is best described in accordance with the corollary
In Figure 7.1, I have collapsed the original postulates and their corollaries into one list.

Two quandaries emerge: (a) Why would an individual whose frame is of a true universe kind \((i\,(T))\), viewing the result of a behaviour as false \((f)\), cooperate and thus (as commonsense might suggest) perpetuate the dominance of a false universe \((F)\)? and (b) If the scenario described is accounted for in the postulate noted above as 1, why would 2002-Dave and 2002-you not react differently? These are important questions, and I return to them in Subsection 2. and Section B., below.

\[
F^f = i(T)f
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postulate</th>
<th>Corollary</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(F^f = i(F)_t)</td>
<td>(F^f = i(T)f)</td>
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<td>(F^f = i(F)f)</td>
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<td>(T^f = i(T)_t)</td>
<td>(T^f = i(F)f)</td>
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**Figure 7.1** Postulates and Corollaries of the Universes Theory
2. Paradoxes of Rationality and Paradoxes of Cooperation

In 1956, Thomas Schelling (the Nobel Prize winning American economist) began an exploration of the nature of tactics employed within bargaining situations. Perhaps hinting that the reliance of game theoretic exemplars on rationality and a singularity of universe was problematic, Schelling initiated an important discussion of psychological constraints employed by bargainers. His analysis of the nature of bargaining was limited to those he called distributional aspects of bargaining where “more for one means less for the other” (p. 281) rather than situations where both may gain equally, or where more for one means more for the other. In distributional scenarios, two parties will enter a relationship that emerges based upon a “range of alternative outcomes in which any point is better for both sides than no agreement at all” (p. 281).

In Figure 7.2, I illustrate the notion of a distributional scenario presented in Chapter Six. In this figure, one will observe two positions from which the relationship is drawn. On the left side rests the position held by Organisation A, on the right side rests that of B. Where the two positions meet, I have included a distributional zone to indicate the range of alternative outcomes (or, in this case, negotiated remunerative sums). Schelling (1956) argued that within distributional bargaining, it is beneficial for a player to constrain their freedom, akin to Elster’s (2000) description of essential (that is, non-serendipitous) constraints. I include in Figure 7.2 a dotted line representing the essential constraint self-imposed by A. The constraint requires that A receive $700,000 for their work, and maintains
the seclusion of A from further communication. On Schelling’s view, A’s action is clearly representative of an “important class” of tactical manoeuvres in logically indeterminate games where an individual will gain certain advantages by binding their own freedom within, and knowledge of, the game in which they are engaged. These tactics are paradoxical. The importance of Schelling’s work is his exploration of the tactical manoeuvres within this paradoxical class of manoeuvres. Missing, however, was Elster’s argument that these manoeuvres may be either essentially or incidentally enacted. Yet, Schelling did highlight examples of both, perhaps without recognizing the intentionality of those who employ them as particularly significant. For my purposes, the framing effect and the intentionality are most important. I explore some of Schelling’s tactical manoeuvres and exemplars of paradoxes before

Figure 7.2 The Distributional Scenario of Organisations “A” and “B”
returning to intentionality and framing in Section B.

The first exemplar of tactical manœuvres that Schelling (1956) explored illustrates Elster’s (2000) delineation of constraints. If one imagines that you are awoken in the early morning by a frenetic rapping at your back door, you rise to answer the commotion and are confronted by an individual who claims he has cut your telephone line and will stab himself in the lung right then and there if not given $10 or if you call out for help. The bargain in this case refers to the outcome of the relationship into which you have been forced. Your opponent in the bargain has constrained his actions to specific self-imposed determinism over which your only control is manifest in your conceding to his point and paying him the sum. You might, be inclined to pay the individual to end the situation outright and the constraint has therefore increased the power your opponent maintained within the distributional zone.

This case demonstrates Elster’s essentially enacted constraint, because it is reasonable to assume that the individual’s behaviour is in accordance with some planned strategy. But power is relative, and imagine the exact same scenario, except that this time the eyes of the individual you meet at your door are severely bloodshot and the veins of his forearms display the tracks of the heroine addict. This minor addition will, on Schelling’s account, increase the power your opponent wields within this situation, for his behaviour is not essentially enacted, but is as a result of perhaps contemporaneously uncontrolled ætiology. It is incidentally enacted, because the addict is likely of less-than-sound mind. Ultimately, his rationality
is in question and the universe in which he contemplates his strategies (if such
intoxicant-induced pathological behaviour can be considered a strategy and not
merely a distorted reaction to stimuli) is, at the very least, different from your own,
and unalterable through appeals to rationality.

Next, Schelling (1956) described a scenario in which one imagines that you
are looking to buy a house. The price set by the seller was US$20,000 (1956 dollars,
variably estimated between US$116,000 and US$570,000 in 2005 dollars\textsuperscript{69}). You,
however, publicly make a bet with a colleague for the sum of $5,000 that you will
not pay one cent more than $16,000. In this case, the seller is constrained by your
self-imposed constraint; for you will not agree to pay even $16,000.01 because
doing so will ultimately cost you $21,000.01.

The voluntary but irreversible and publicly disclosed sacrifice of your freedom
of choice makes it against your interests to concede. Thus, if you consciously
decide to tie your own hands, you improve the power of your position within the
bargain (Pinker, 1997), just as Organisation A did. Alternatively, buyers will tie the
hands of their agents. Agents are given power to engage sellers in contracts of sale,
but not for prices above a certain ceiling. Perhaps this point is best summarized in
Schelling’s (1968) reminder that “in ancient times, eunuchs often got the best jobs
because they could credibly deny themselves certain intentions” (p. 36).

Credibility is the determining factor in such scenarios. One’s position is
only credible if one is able to clearly demonstrate that his or her position will not
or, even better, cannot be otherwise. One’s strongest position is paradoxically
found when one has constrained one’s self (essentially) or has been, even better, by virtue of some pathological unknown, constrained (incidentally) beyond any hope of regaining one’s freedom. An example of this paradoxically ideal situation is, as Pinker (1997) highlighted, the “doomsday machine” embedded within the 1964 refashioning of George’s (1958) novel, *Red Alert*—Stanley Kubrick’s film *Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*.

The plot of Kubrick’s (1964) film is well known. Of key importance is one particular scene midway through in which the dialogue explains both the doomsday machine and the constraint maintained by its use. The doomsday machine, it is explained by Soviet Ambassador Desadeski in the film, “is designed to trigger itself automatically.” Science Advisor to the US President, Dr. Strangelove, continued to explain:

> Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy ... the fear to attack. And so, because of the automated and irrevocable decision making process which rules out human meddling, the doomsday machine is terrifying. It’s simple to understand. And completely credible, and convincing. (0:47:30—0:55:55)

The cold war interstate relations portrayed within the film as paradoxical deterrents—mutual assured destruction—represent a manifestation of a *doomsday machine theory*. Yet when such a paradox is subject to irrationality its power is not only immense, it is eminently volatile. Harris (2004) engaged this point when he wrote, “[i]f history reveals any categorical truth, it is that an insufficient taste for
evidence regularly brings out the worst in us. Add weapons of mass destruction to this diabolical clockwork, and you have found a recipe for the fall of civilization” (p. 26). These are precisely the circumstances that launch the characters of Dr. Strangelove into their volatile and ultimately devastating scenario.

The analogue of the situation in psychology is demonstrated in Pinker’s (1997) conclusion that in situations where relations are partly cooperative and partly competitive rationality is not an advantage. The point to be taken is not that interorganisational relationships suffer the same degree of volatility as interstate relationships, rather human psychology suffers the same volatility—be it manifest in the leadership of a state, or in the governance of an organisation. Furthermore, if rationality is lacking due to some incidental constraint, it is unknown that the irrational is present and the actor will claim rationality in their decisions. Thus, in a fallacious and dominant universe, irrational (false) behaviour is viewed by individuals/organizations whose frames are constructed within a false universe as rational (true)—and this position is a very strong one, indeed, when faced by an individual/organization whose frames are constructed within true universes and who views the irrational behaviour as irrational (false). I mean, therefore, to say that contemporary interorganisational relationships (within the contemporarily fallacious and dominant universe) among individuals/organizations whose frames are constructed within a false universe \( i_{(F)} \) and individuals/organizations whose frames are constructed within a true universe \( i_{(T)} \) parties will be, at best, unbalanced in favour of the positions maintained by \( i_{(F)} \), and at worst, destructively so. This is a
claim I continue to explore in sections that follow.

3. Freedom, Information, and Rationality in a Host’s Universe

I return now to the first of the two questions posed at the conclusion of Section 1: Why would an individual whose frame is of a true universe kind \( (i_{(T)}) \), viewing the result of a behaviour as false \( (f) \), cooperate and thus (as commonsense might suggest) perpetuate the dominance of a false universe \( (F) \)? If restated in terms of the discussion found above in Section 2., the query might appear as follows: Why would a rational individual, viewing a partner’s behaviour as patently false, cooperate with this partner despite the result of the partnership perpetuating the dominance of a climate in which false behaviours abound? The answer, put simply, is that rational individuals have little power in this situation to do otherwise. Advantage in games where the relations are partly cooperative and partly competitive is found in the limiting of one’s own freedom, information, and rationality. This limited position is more powerful when constrained incidentally (serendipitously, or in accordance with some unknown etiological agent), and the position is most powerful when appeals to an unknown agent are presumed by the partner to be justified under the terms of the their own representations. Such is the case of the relationship among the modernist and post-modernist.

I have shown in earlier chapters how the modernist’s position is based upon the representation provided by the host’s perspective, and that the universe of the host is of the dominant and fallacious type \( (F) \). I have shown that the host’s
perspective is the dominant representation within the arena of contemporary social, economic and political relationships. In this way, employing a combination of the Weberian concept of the authority of the *eternal yesterday* (Weber, 1919/1958), and expert power (*à la* French & Raven, 1959/2005), provides the manner by which a false universe is permitted, expected, and unquestionèdly regurgitated by social actors—organisations among them.

The first great irony to be drawn from this analysis is that the expertise upon which the authority of the *eternal yesterday* is forged is *utterly lacking* in expertise. The regurgitation of false universe is *contra*-experience (*expert, expertise, and experiment* share a common Latin root, *experiri* [the verb, *to try*]), it is neither developmental nor scientific, and commonly antithetical to these. By highlighting the second irony, I call attention to the peculiar circumstances that exist where those organisations whose foundations are both immediately and inextricably concerned with development and science similarly permit such dominance to persist. How and why can this be so? The conclusion I here propose is that a separation exists within these organisations. The nature of this separation is difficult to clearly articulate.

I am, of course, speaking of educational organisations. Organisations foundationally and teleologically forged in science with a historical litany of practice and research demonstrating the consistency of development (intellectually, physiologically, psychologically, emotionally, and socially construed) and scientific pedagogies (as opposed to technological or *neo*-scientific one’s), and touching the lives of almost every individual in the developed world. Yet, organisations whose
conduit into the greater political and economic realm (as a reified manifestation of Rousseauian general will) is all-too-frequently demonstrative in behaviours indicative of the modernist or post-modernist. Employing presuppositions entertained earlier in this and the previous chapters, I dissect this separation of foundation and political behaviour (administrative behaviour) below. In so dissecting, I provide an answer to question (b) noted earlier that referred to why 2002-Dave and 2002-you would not be surprised by Organisation A’s self-constraining action within the bargain, nor Organisation B’s response to it.

B. Contemporary Macro Administration of Educational Organisations

I assume, in the interests of solidifying the argument, that Organisation A represents a non-educational organisation (of a host type) and further that Organisation B represents an educational organisation. Such an assumption is well founded (even though I refrain from endowing educational organisations with a gene type moniker) since host type organisations have been shown to traditionally dominate host type universes. I augment the particulars to more closely represent a real (I recall, however, the proviso in the introduction to Chapter Six) scenario manifest in interorganisational relationships of particular concern to our field. Suppose that an interorganisational relationship is meant to be forged among A, a corporation, and B, a school. The universe of A, if it is to be successful in the contemporary climate, must adhere to certain predefined, expected, prescribed profit-maximizing (Friedman, 1970; McMurtry, 1998; Smith, 1796) behaviours
among its compeers and associates. While the face of this claim may indeed be true, it relies upon a certain dominant view of human relations for its attachment, germination, and establishment (Marciano, 2005). Faced with such dogma, a social construction of social reality is likely, despite the evidentiary reality for which I have (among others, Dawkins, 2006a, 2006b; Harris, 2004; Pinker, 1997) argued; but such claims are nothing new.

The point of particular interest is the range of reactionary paths that exist for Organisation B. Game theory—indeed all game theory, pre- and post-Tit for Tat—argues that two paths are possible: defect or concede. But these simple assumptions about human psychology deny the challenge faced by B’s administrator, assigned to bargain within the confines of such a relationship and dominant view. The paths are more complex than the binary suggests, but their complexity is not so overwhelming to be left to chance. Similarly, the complexity of the relationship is not so overwhelming that it must be thrown to nihilistic epithets like “the murk of contingency,” “incomprehensibility” or “irreducibility” (each of which I have heard presented as arguments, variously appealed to, in presentations at scholarly conferences and among my graduate student colleagues).

Intraorganisationally, B is embedded within a foundationally present presumption of science (as relates to assorted developmentalisms of human existence). I assure my skeptical colleagues in Educational Foundations, Educational History, and Educational Psychology that this embodiment of pedagogy is abundantly present in Educational Administration, and this under-girding gives rise to coherence of
thought in Educational Administration with the ethics of development—hence, I ascribe to $B$ a designation as an organisation whose frame is constructed in a true universe ($i_{(T)}$). Yet for $B$, faced by a fallacious and dominant universe ($i^f$), what are unquestionably irrational behaviours ($j^f$)—and appear to $A$ ($i_{(F)}$) as true—remain patently false; and applying the notions from psychology above, $B$’s response so commonly must succumb to the power of $A$’s position within the game.

I therefore return to the question asked earlier as (b): If the scenario described is accounted for in the postulate noted, why would 2002-$Dave$ and 2002-$you$ not react differently? We react as we do, because we too are confronted by analytical manners utterly irrational in formulation, that commonly appeal to information steeped in the fallacious eternal yesterday, reluctant to accept that freedom from these fallacious contentions about human nature are possible. What did Ms. 2027 know that we at the time did not? The extent to which we have come to accept the schematized nature of our apperceptive model through psychologically based power dynamics to which we are susceptible.

C. Summary

I began this chapter with a discussion of constraints in bargain-based relationships. I established, through psychological conceptions that intercede within, how these constraints may be essentially or incidentally derived. Further, when these two forms of constraints are applied to relative levels of power within bargaining

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† In a fallacious and dominant universe, objectively understood fallacious behaviour or strategy is viewed as false by individuals/organisations whose frames are constructed from within a true universe, or $i^f = \sim f$
games it is apparent that incidentally irrational behaviour permits the perpetuation of dominant but false forms of organisational representations. Educational and non-educational organisational relationships were briefly examined in these terms, and it is from this point that I expand these notions into the strata of contemporary political theatre in the following chapter.
In the present chapter, I extend the universes theory presented in Chapters Six and Seven within the context of the macro administration of educational organisations, and through an adapted model of sedimentation, taken from Giddens (1979). Furthermore, I discuss implications of sedimentation for educational leadership, in their initial form, through the work of Mouffe (1999; 2005) in the area of political relationships within macro theatres.

A. The Political and the Sedimentation of Education within The Political

The recent book by Mouffe (2005) provided conceptual assistance for educational administrators interested in the current (macro and political) state of education as a player within government/political theatres. Her topic was more general, focused on contemporary issues concerning the nature of liberal deliberative democracy. Yet, as a backdrop upon which the philosophical antecedents of educational administration (specifically the contextual view of interorganisational relationships demonstrated in the universes theory and discussion concluding Chapter
Mouffe’s work has striking value. Her point was simple, if not somewhat uncomfortable for the contemporary student of transformational leadership: one must accept that democracy is about the relationships among competing interests and abandon the notion that its purpose rests in consensus-building, negotiation, or other forms of deliberation (Mouffe, 1999; 2005).

Mouffe (2005) argued that agents within the political (the realm in which political positions are debated, distinguished from politics or the everyday way in which the products of political positions interact) must accept that all forms of order are based upon exclusions. Forms of order assign certain characteristics or definitions and deny others. Relationships, which are either adherences to characteristic or definitional criteria or rejections of them, are by definition both intransitively and transitively antagonisms. They are intransitively antagonistic in that their original definition requires exclusion, and they are transitively antagonistic in that their active distinguishing of self against others requires exclusion—

the constitution of a specific ‘we’ always depends on the type of ‘they’ from which it is differentiated. This is a crucial point because it allows us to envisage the possibility of different types of we/they relation according to the way the ‘they’ is constructed. (p. 19)

As such, Mouffe admitted potential variations in definitions of the natures of relationships within their supra-definition as confrontational, or perhaps more simply put: relationships are always subsets of confrontation and can therefore never be genuinely consensus-driven. What is left is the definition of the we, in our case
education or the herein oft employed Organisation B, vis-à-vis they, Organisation A or more broadly other actors within the political as engaged in theoretical games, but not expressly limited to these.

On Mouffe’s (2005) view, the ideal definition of political actors is as agonists, derived from the Greek *agōnistēs* [ἀγωνίστης] meaning a combatant or rival as might be found in a sporting competition. Thus the definition she employed is not one of enemy, but rather of one who respects the role and voice of the other in the (ever-confrontational) relationship. Mouffe saw the contemporary manifestation of liberal democratic power structures as based on a friend/enemy dualism perpetuated by a neo-liberal dominated political. In neo-liberal (those who have inherited modernity) discourse, “an adversary is simply a competitor[;] … their objective is merely to dislodge others in order to occupy their place. … It is merely a competition among elites” (p. 21).

Mouffe’s (2005) agonist project, however, is different from the neo-liberal’s project, seeing the ideal model for liberal democratic structure as based upon legitimate adversary/legitimate adversary pluralities (Tully, 1999; Wenman, 2003). “[I]n the agonistic struggle … the antagonistic dimension is always present, it is a real confrontation but one which is played out under conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 21). In this way, Mouffe removed political actors from the modernist perspective of all other ideas are illegitimate (evident in statements like, “If you are not with us you are with the terrorists”). She similarly removed political actors from the
ultimate nihilist conclusion of the post-modernist perspective that all other ideas are equally legitimate—which, as has been earlier shown through discussion surrounding questions of similarity and difference, in the final analysis, means that on the one hand so too is the modernists’ view legitimate, and on the other, no ideas are legitimate at all (Wenman, 2003).

The problem for certain actors originally of the political is that they have ceased to actively participate within the political. In modernist dominant scenarios, reduced participation is the result of an active process that seeks to elinguate others. In post-modernist critiques and dominant scenarios, those who accept an antagonistic context actively avoid meaningful participation and occasionally react in neo-liberal ways. In other cases, between modern and post-modern, when no longer faced with the stimulation of questions related to legitimate place within the political, entities turn inward. Established and secure in their place within politics, entities become instrumental components of actions within the political rather than active participants. They are thus sedimented in nature; a notion that I use in a way similar but not identical to the sociologist Giddens’ (1979) sense and that I describe in more detail below.\textsuperscript{70}

It is coincidental that Giddens’ (1991, 1994, 1998) work is the target of some critique on the part of Mouffe (2005) in that it remains focused upon friend/enemy relations rather than agonistic combatant one’s. Within Giddens’ (1979) theory of structuration is the notion of sedimentation, which he tangentially defined as a structural component of evolving institutional rules and practices. It is not my
intent to engage in an argument concerned with Giddens’ views, I mention it here only to distinguish its variance from my own view of sedimentation. In defining sedimentation, it is helpful to recognize that there exists some analogue among Mouffe’s notion of the political and the public sphere of Habermas (1962/2001): the location of the organs of public debate, such as newspapers, parliaments, salons, and other public spaces. In Habermas’ historical view of the developmental nature of elements within the public sphere, originating in the 1700s, is a revealing example. During the public sphere’s beginnings, such organs of public debate provided the arena for public discussion of political views on a variety of other topics. But these organs were also the subject of debate. What is the purpose of a newspaper, a parliament and the like? How should the state/power interact with (or dominate) newspapers or parliaments? Over time, such organs evolved into instruments of politics, rather than contestable notions within the political. It is not until more recent work of individuals like McLuhan (1951; McLuhan & Fiore, 1967), Herman and Chomsky (1988), and indeed Habermas (1962/2001) himself, that public debates around the nature of media have reinstalled such notions into their place within the political from out of their sedimented place in politics.

In the above description, I suggest that certain previously contested notions within the political evolve through their own inaction (or are sedimented) into taken-for-granted or instrumental organs of politics—not worthy of debates in themselves, but merely seen as peripheral to real, and typically economic, debates (regarding taxes or the funding of interventions for autistic children within public
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schools, for example) within the political. In Figure 8.1, I depict these ideas in two pictographs. Part A of Figure 8.1 provides a visual representation through which one might understand the relationships and relative positioning of each of the political, politics (or political discourse and action), and the instruments of the political (upon which politics function). The pictograph in part B of Figure 8.1 provides a visual representation of how kernels of once debatable topics within the political have been sedimented to varying degrees as mere instruments of politics. Each level of successive sedimentation further obscures the original purpose and nature of each kernel to the outside observer active within politics.

The specific ætiology of sedimentation is linked to the discussion presented at the conclusion of Chapter Seven. For example, contested positions (positions that do not share a dominant and fallacious universe as the under-girding of their manner) succumb to the pathologies of game psychology manifest in such $i_{(F)} / i_{(T)}$ interorganisational relationships. The result is clear: an unwitting abandonment on the part of $i_{(T)}$—or perhaps an eventual unqualified abdication—of teleological debates over previously debatable notions within the political. In the place of teleological debates evolve (or suffer sedimentation) the definitions of abandoned notions among actors within the political who do not necessarily understand either the teleos of the sedimented actor or its internal function. Debates within the actor remain, but rarely break free of the sedimented weight of a dominant view of the actor in general. My opinion of contemporary education is that it is sedimented, misunderstood within the political, and seen as instrumental rather than organic and
having a *teleos* worthy of public (external *cum* public sphere) debate.

It might be assumed upon review of the discussion at the end of Chapter Seven that I apologetically excused the educational leader from culpability in respect
of education’s sedimentation. I argued that the psychology of the bargain leads to eminently troubling ends when in a fallacious and dominant universe individuals whose frames are constructed in a false universe \( F_{(F)} \) confronts individuals whose frames are constructed in a true universe \( F_{(T)} \). But this would be only a partial view. Psychology provides much leverage in the power of one side over the other among Organisations of type A and those of type B, but so too do intraorganisational debates. The problem in education, as an arena in which internal debate between theory and administration are played, emerges when so much of the debate permits arguments couched in difference to be taken seriously. What do I mean by serious attention paid to arguments of difference? Consider the following line of argument.

1. Education must be divided into, at least, two sub-domains: administration (which has the responsibility for matters of governance and extraorganisational relationships) and foundation (that has the responsibility for matters of direction—theoretic direction, direction of pedagogic classroom practice, and psychological direction). These are not perfectly discrete subdivisions, and responsibilities do somewhat overlap, but such overlapping cases are less important than the general picture and may obscure further analysis.

2. While it has been shown that the administrative subdivision is extraorganisationally engaged in debates (relationships, bargains, or games) that pathologically sediment the place of education within the political, some degree of culpability rests on the part of the
foundation subdivision for not fully appreciating the situation into which the administrative conduit is thrust (and in which education is also generally thrust).

3. Earlier, in Chapter Seven, I argued that educational organisations are (on the whole) bastions of science, pedagogy and development. “As such,” a counter-claim might be made, “we must be more reserved in or suggestions that foundations are at fault, for it is perhaps, in developmental terms of pedagogic science, too early for such appreciations of the general (political) context of education to be manifestly clear.” While this assessment might appear logical, it does little to rationally view the debates that exist within education, and which may in themselves be a root for culpability.

4. There are, within the foundational division, advocates who profess rational science as pedagogy, but there are also advocates who profess post-modern positions, as well. I have elsewhere demonstrated that post-modern claims are of little assistance in confrontations with modernity. If nothing more, post-modern claims often help to obscure the real arguments and debates. Could it be, then, that administration is confronted extraorganisationally by modernity’s (or, to a lesser degree, post-modernity’s) fallacious universe, and the resulting irrationality produced in game psychology. Similarly, administration is confronted intraorganisationally by post-modernity’s (and,
frequently modernity’s) fallacious universe.

5. The position of the educational administrator is thus objectively hindered both externally and internally.

I present the result of this logical frame within Figure 8.2 where educational administration is commonly situated betwixt extra- and intraorganisational fallacious points of departure. On this view, I contend that this problem is one of our own making, and rooted in the claim that I proposed at the conclusion of Chapter Six: educational administration is not perfectly scientific, but rather oscillatory. We in education have, since at least Callahan’s (1970) insightful work, misunderstood the nature of liberal democracy and have chosen the wrong path. Even when we seek to re-establish ourselves within the political we do so through internally dominant relativist constructs and, in a political that is dominated by neo-liberal (friend/enemy) reductionism, we will inevitably lose. The prize for our losing: perpetual elinguation, continued sedimentation, and relegation to the periphery in political debates, only to be paid lip-service as an instrument when politically advantageous to the governing regime or its critics.

The case I argued above is instantiated through a cursory reading of neo-liberal commentary—the dominant external context for the current discussion. Apropos of this point, Dohrmann and Mendonca (2004) essentially made the argument that by reducing government waste, the funds saved would act as a buffer for detrimental economic effects felt as a result of an increased dependency ratio in years to come. Their suggestions for reducing wasteful spending in the education sector include
decreasing input costs for school food programs and janitorial supplies. On this view, education is not seen as a human endeavour, but merely the assemblage of widget-like economic contributors (at best) or objects (at worst).

Along a similar vein of misunderstanding due to sedimentation, Shearmur’s (2000) insistence that value in education is determined by income following graduation, and economic analysis shows that current salaries do not advocate for the argument that an individual should advance his or her education. Perhaps the
ironic epitome of misunderstanding is demonstrated in the sentiments of former New Brunswick Education Minister Paul Duffie’s reference to students as “products” and suggestion that “The first mistake is assuming schools and teachers will teach our kids”; and from the same article, former business-education partnership coordinator for the New Brunswick Department of Education, David Roberts’ argument that education is “too important to be left to … educators” (Benteau, 1993, p. 3). Such commentary is not difficult to find in both the public debates (see for example literally anything on the subject of education produced by the Fraser Institute) and academic journals. They reduce education to an instrumental and peripheral organ of the political, further sedimenting it.

1. Education as a Legitimate Adversary

Mouffe (1999; 2005) argued for the shifting of contemporary liberal democracy from its friend/enemy structure into a legitimate adversary/legitimate adversary structure. Yet Mouffe’s goal is all the more difficult when legitimate adversaries of neo-liberalism struggle to be taken seriously. Worse yet, is the case where adversaries fail to take themselves seriously (see Newton, in press). I see education as one such legitimate adversary, and I suggest that others would argue the same. While they do not talk in the terms I have attempted to construct above, their thoughts, as expressed through the documents they have written, appear consistent with such a goal for education. Among those who I would place into this category are scholars such as McMurtry (1998), Woodhouse (2001a, 2001b), and
How then do we legitimate education as an adversary? In my view, the process is one of eventually constructing legitimate adversary/legitimate adversary structures out of encounters that politically (read *within the political*) strengthen the relative place of education in friend/enemy scenarios, rather than weaken education’s stance. I am here not advocating the adoption of a neo-liberal friendly position. Rather, I suggest a position that is difficult for neo-liberal combatants to dismiss. The specific nature of the position I envision is emergent, but will undoubtedly require an examination of educational purpose, and an initial discussion of justifications based upon a utility calculus. Put simply, I advocate a strong message for public consumption that is definitive in its view regarding the purpose of education (its *teleos*) and its role within society (its function), packaged in terms that neo-liberal combatants understand (its utility: being more foundational than economic or political principles and different in nature).

Walker’s (1995; 1998) work in the area of ethical decision-making provides an example. Walker questions justifications for decisions made by educational administrators and their appeal to “the best interests of children” as a platitudinous and trite amorphous justification for actions. His concern is one of educational administrative substance in an “ethically schizophrenic society”—a society (political) that should not be confused with a pluralistic (perhaps even agonistic) one. The result is a collection of principles upon which “the best interest of children” might be determined.
Indeed it is in the determination and unification of foundational principles of education that the strength of education within the political will be achieved. Without determining and unifying, education will continue to flounder in the face of political reductionism—only contributing to the ethical schizophrenia manifest in relativism and ultimately remaining dismissed and peripheral within the political.

**B. Education in the Future and the Role for Educational Administration**

I have elsewhere (Burgess, in press) examined a most pertinent context in which such an oscillatory view of education (and its administration) is eminently problematic—the future of education within an aging society. How will sedimented education fare within a antagonistic political guided by five-year cycles of ballot-based participation? When it comes to the interests of political scientists, there are few areas of political research that surpass political participation (Gray & Caul, 2000). Why do some participate politically and others do not? How do we properly define political participation in an age of such advanced communication technology? Do political campaigns really affect the voting behaviour of individuals? Questions such as these are abundant within the breadth and depth of political science publications. Analysis provides some interesting insight into the larger discussion within this chapter and into the relationships between education and other public and private institutions.
1. Age, Interest in Education, and Political Participation

There is research in the field of political science to suggest the commonplace assumption that individuals become increasingly conservative as they age is without merit (Riggle & Johnson, 1996). Similarly, it is problematic to pigeon-hole the political behaviours of individuals simply based upon their age. For example, Binstock (2000) presented an overview of the “Senior Power” model perpetuated by both the media and campaign organisers. The model is based on classical economic and statistical assumptions about the nature of individual choice—that members of a cohort are rational, similar, self-interested, and heavily influenced by the political points of view attributed to vocal individuals who roughly share their age. While there is little evidence to definitively accept the senior power model at face value, Binstock provided international evidence to suggest that the model influences the behaviour of political candidates that both support and deny causes thought to be of interest to older voters. As an extreme, a case in Singapore is cited where high-level government ministers argued in favour of double franchise for tax-paying (non-dependent) citizens in an attempt to stymie the potential weight of senior block voting.

The chief criticism launched against “Senior Power” as a means of determining campaign issues that “guarantee” higher proportions of the senior vote is that attributed to Foot (1998) regarding the determination of “senior citizenship”: there is no evidence to suggest that the differences between 25 and 45 year-olds are greater than those between 65 and 85 year-olds. Furthermore, Binstock (2000)
presented data that showed how differently individuals living under a variety of socio-economic conditions perceive self-interest. Research by Brunner and Baldson (2004) indicated that seniors are indeed willing to direct politicians to spend money on education if a benefit to the community is presented as a justification. Such political behaviour among seniors is not to be definitively understood as altruism (in opposition to self-interest), but it appears to have more to do with interest in the development of social capital—present in the political behaviour of other voting cohorts, as well (Fischel, 2006). Indeed, studies that have presented findings related to senior support for education funding present a variety of opinions on the matter, and many potential influences for the results they report. Some observers predicted that education specific spending will decrease (Poterba, 1988, 1997), while others predicted more optimistic funding scenarios for students, educators, and administrators (Gradstein & Kaganovich, 2004; Ladd & Murray, 2001).

A second political behavioural issue/assumption perpetuated by the media, which does appear to be substantiated, however, surrounds the growing trend among younger enfranchised populations to abstain from political participation, inasmuch as participation may be judged through the casting of a ballot during elections. Interestingly, the analysis of Gray and Caul (2000) suggested that general voter turnout in the 25 most industrialized countries has in fact dropped since 1950—only in Sweden and Denmark have turnout numbers increased—and even in Australia, where law requires citizens to participate in elections, turnout has fallen roughly 9%. Interest in participation among older voters has remained high in the countries Gray
and Caul studied, which has perhaps led some to suggest that political behaviour is habit-forming (Gerber, Green, & Shachar, 2003). If younger voters do not vote, they are not likely to vote in the future.

To this end, it is difficult to definitively suggest that older individuals with little or no direct connection to the school systems will not support these systems, even under the current neo-liberal friend/enemy dominant political. But such research remains tangential to the point of the line of reasoning in which I am here engaged. Rather, the point is that despite likelihods, organisations engaged within the political believe that senior power, among other obfuscations and inaccuracies, is the case—thus tailoring policies, practices, and strategies in ways that both work to perpetuate such beliefs, and consequently garner their survival from such perpetuations. Perpetuations of this variety may superficially appear to have little or nothing directly in common with education and its involvement in interorganisational relationships, but in fact they speak volumes to those who would listen.

For educational administration, the underlying implication of the above discussion is that political behaviour rooted in ideology perpetuates false universes. Thus, with little or misguided understanding of the nature, purpose, function, and utility of education, how are any reasonably informed citizens (no matter their political stripe, or lack thereof) to legitimately direct education spending? It appears, therefore, that a more substantial issue for the future is to bring an accurate understanding of education into the conscious of the politically active.

Further to the point engaged above, suppose a certain (perhaps large) segment
of the older population is compelled to direct their attentions toward unified self-interested ends. Faced by such a case, would it not be helpful to promote active political participation among those recently graduated and enfranchised who do have a strong connection to school systems?

Both increasing public understanding of education, and political participation among youth, are points of action that rest well within the domain of education. As the extraorganisational leadership thereof, educational administration has an important role to play. In the chapter that follows, I expand upon this point, drawing attention to both the problem of an oscillatory and a sedimented manifestation of education for educational administration in the pressing context of an aging electorate and a youth disengaged by traditional means of political participation—basic constituents and members of non-educational organisations.

C. Summary

I began this chapter with an overview of Mouffe’s (2005) analytic separation of politics from the political. With this definition as a point of departure, I made the case for the contemporary assignment of education as a sedimented instrument of politics—hidden from public discourse and evolution and employed as an inanimate tool within the political rather than as a dynamic social organ worthy of macropolitical debate. Thus, interorganisational relationships involving educational and non-educational organisations are susceptible to the limitations of positioning manifest in such configurations: they are debatable/non-debated dualisms. Culpability for the
current context, I argued, is only partly borne by the dominance type universe of
the current Mouffian political. Education has much culpability for this predicament
of its own. In an attempt to initiate a program to rectify the current situation, I
advocated a strong public message that is definitive in its view regarding the purpose
of education (its teleos) and its role within society (its function), packaged in terms
that neo-liberal combatants understand (its utility). The point was not to exchange
a sedimented conception of education for a neo-liberal one, but rather to establish a
definition that (a) ceases to permit further sedimentation, and (b) moves to elevate
education from instrument of politics to issue of the political.
PART III

A RESPONSE TO THE CONCEPTUALISATION
CHAPTER NINE

COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE AND EDUCATIONAL APPRECIATION

This conceptual dissertation of the foundational social, economic, and political structures was embedded in contemporary relationships among educational and non-educational organisations. I have sought to construct a theoretical hypothesis of interorganisational relationships involving educational administration generally, and those conditions under which educational administrators engage educational organisations in relationships with other organisations more specifically. In this final chapter, I connect the oscillatory and sedimented manifestation of education established in past chapters with two important and practical tasks for educational administration and educational leadership. The first task, communicative competence, is grounded in the early communication theory of Habermas and provides an ethic of practice that supports the second task, which is support for the social sciences in school-based student experience. Within the following discussion, I provide a developing position that advocates for a set of tactics for educational administrators when they engage in interorganisational relationships, and relationships with the public, parents, students and school staff.
A. Distorted Communication and Communicative Competence

Fundamental to Habermas’ (1971; 1971/1990; 1975; 1976/1998; 1984; 1987; 1990/2001b; 1992; 1996; 2001) project was his presupposition that all utterances of speech are instruments of communication. When a speaker makes a statement, be it the most basic of utterances or the most complex dissertation, this speech act holds as its purpose both the sine qua non hearer’s comprehension of the statement and his or her agreement as to the speaker’s meaning. Although such a presupposition may appear obvious, a testament to the importance Habermas placed on this posit was found in his continued exploration of its significance, even after more than three decades following his initial theoretical exposition. His ultimate goal was to construct a theory of communication where genuine understanding and consensus between individuals, and for our purposes organisations, are both achievable and universally moral. From the notion of action guided by genuine understanding, Habermas named this theory communicative action.

The position advocated through Habermas’ theory of communicative action seems somewhat contradictory to the agonism of Mouffe advocated in Chapter Eight, and Mouffe (2005) articulated as much by highlighting the work of Habermas as focused upon consensus forming. Furthermore, others critiqued Habermas’ project as being consistent with the pragmatism of Rorty (Harris, 2004). I take particular issue neither with Mouffe’s nor Harris’ assessment. My purposes, however, are fulfilled in work that pre-dates communicative action, and which I believe is fundamental to the agonists seeking a viable legitimation of their very
existence within contemporary antagonistic liberal democracy. Indeed, Mouffe (1989), herself, contended that Habermas’ unfulfilled project of modernity provides a necessary step in the progress of democracy. Communicative competence, the area of Habermas’ corpus that I uphold as practically linked to the agonist’s formative cause, as I argue, provides a means of evaluating, engaging, and directing the nature of interorganisational relationships in general, and those relationships encountered by contemporary educational administration in particular. But to remove any linkage Habermas drew between communicative competence and consensus-building would be patently disingenuous. For this reason, I do not avoid consideration of consensus where necessity requires its discussion.

1. Mead’s Symbolic Interaction

Habermas (1987; 1992) credited the work of George Herbert Mead (1934; 1938) for the stimulation of ideas regarding the tenets of his own work surrounding genuine understanding; thus an exploration of Mead’s ideas regarding the fundamental principles of communication are of value for grounding my broader discussion. For Mead, communication was interaction mediated through symbols. I have earlier differentiated symbols from their referents—syntax from semantics. In fairness to the ideas that Habermas proposed, however, a brief examination of the peculiarities of Mead’s conceptualisation of these ideas is of value—for they are not perfectly identical to the details established earlier.

For Mead, symbols held a particular meaning both among different
individuals and over a period of time. Interaction among individuals can be said to have evolved to a point of where the communication of these meanings is possible (Blumer, 2004; Habermas, 1971, 1987). Furthermore, Mead (1934) explained that the communication of meaning existed in two varieties. The first was the instinctive and stimulus responsive mode, which he called the *conversation of gestures*. The second variety is more complex and known as *symbolic interaction*. The distinguishing characteristic between these two varieties of communication rested in one’s cognizance of the meaning symbolized. Because a conversation of gestures is best thought of as the instinctive reaction to the action of another—when I sweep my arm to block a punch, or step back when confronted by another crossing my path— according to Mead (1934), these articulations of meaning were performed without thought. Symbolic interaction, alternatively, represented articulations of meaning when a speaker encoded a particular message into language, and that message is decoded or interpreted by a hearer who was aware of the need to interpret the meaning. The interaction, or communication of meaning, was therefore conducted through the use of symbols (language, utterances or speech acts) that act as objects containing an intended meaning (Blumer, 2004; Habermas, 1971, 1987).

Of importance for Habermas (1971; 1987; 1992) was the notion that both gestures and symbols, regardless of whether humans consciously interpret them or not, articulated a particular meaning. For Mead (1934), the meaning of either gestures or symbols was interpreted based upon the future implications for action held within that gesture or symbol. For example, Mead would argue that when
another throws a punch at me, the meaning of the punch is instinctively reacted to on account of its future action: hitting me in the face. Alternatively, as is the example used by Blumer (2004), a student of Mead, when an armed robber articulates the command, “Put your hands up,” I contemplate the meaning based upon an interpretation of the robber’s future action: he is either bluffing or will react negatively to my failure to act upon his command—in truth, a game theoretic situation. Furthermore, the robber interprets my reaction in relation to his future action. In either case, a meaning has been passed between individuals. The process of Mead’s logical reasoning eventually constructed a theory of social interaction that does not neglect the importance and influence of context and environment—although Mead (1934; 1938) preferred to refer to these as objects.

1.1. Objects and Influence upon Meaning

Although Habermas did not directly use Mead’s (1934; 1938) construct of objects, he did rely upon the extension of their influence onto meaning for individuals party to communication (Habermas, 1987). For this reason, it is useful to examine Mead’s concept, and then focus on the issues that provided significance for Habermas’ argument.

Objects constitute the individual’s operating environment, the things toward which the individual is oriented, the focal points around which the individual’s activity becomes organized, and the implements by which the individual’s activity is built up in a step-by-step sequence. Put otherwise,
one would understand the organisation of a human being as an actor to the extent to which one would know the nature of the individual’s objects; and one would be in a position to understand any one of the individual’s specific acts to the extent to which one could identify the objects toward which an action is directed and observe how the individual uses objects in developing the line of conduct. (Blumer, 2004, p. 39)

Mead saw objects as the influences on human reactions to gestures, as well as human ability to interpret meaning within symbolic interaction. His characterization of objects was not one of stagnation nor isolation, but rather one of adaptation, development and social construction.

All of these things and their like may be objects to the individual—and are objects if the individual notes them or is aware of them. Taken together, they constitute the individual’s world of existence, that is, the things the individual deals with in life activity. To make this point clearer initially, let us point out that if there were something the individual could not note or did not note, it would not exist for that individual; being unaware of it, the person couldn’t refer to it, talk about it, direct action toward it, or do anything with regard to it. (Blumer, 2004, p. 40, emphasis in original)

Mead believed that such a notion provided ample explanation for why members of a culture would intuitively understand certain things, while others would not. Whereas adults see a chair (an object), and understand its meaning based upon some future action available (the action of sitting, relaxing, etc.), an infant—
unaware of the object’s mode of operation or future action with which he or she may engage the object—does not understand the object’s meaning in the same way. The meaning one holds for the object is socially constructed, in this case, through the infant’s eventual observation of others (Blumer, 2004; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget 1940/1968, 1959, 1963, 1977a, 1977b).

I employ part A of Figure 9.1 to represent an individual, \( a \), and the objects of the individual’s world of existence. I use part B of Figure 9.1 to represent the objects within the worlds of existence of individuals \( a \) and \( b \). In this combined figure, I draw several points of significance for Habermas’ project from Mead’s (1934; 1938) work. First, Habermas held that communication between individuals (and by extension between organisations) exists concurrently within a tripartite scheme consisting of the subjective, the intersubjective, and the objective worlds (Habermas, 1971, 1975, 1976/1998, 1984, 1987, 1990/2001a, 1992, 1996). Second, the totality of objects of one party in a particular communication are rarely the same as those of another party. Third, the tendency of these particular objects being different among individuals means that individuals hold inherently different future actions in terms of symbolic interaction, and this quandary begs the question: Is genuine understanding achievable through symbolic interaction? For Habermas, such discrepancy among worlds of existence—whether seen broadly as Mead’s objects or specifically as intentionality, motivation, rhetorical skill, power, or influence, among others—represented a major issue that any project seeking to represent a theory of universally achievable consensus must overcome (1971/1990).
In his insightful critique of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, Habermas (1971/1990) argued that hermeneutics was both unlimited and restricted.

Figure 9.1  Mead’s Objects of Existence
Hermeneutics is of significance at this point in the discussion because it represents, as Habermas suggested, “the art of understanding and of making-oneself-understood” (1971/1990, p. 245). As such, its capacity and limitations guide its usefulness in the creation of consensus—and relationships of any type. Accordingly, its capacity is shown in its ability to engage the individual in the interpretation of any place, event, social interaction, culture, or phenomenon (or in Mead’s terms, object) that has ever existed, or might ever exist anywhere in the world. However, hermeneutics is also restricted by the individual engaged—specifically by the \textit{a priori} objects of their experience (or in Gadamer’s words, \textit{traditions}).

Part A of Figure 9.2 represents the hermeneutic circle, while part B of Figure 9.2 extends the intentions of those who engage the circle toward understanding. Progress in knowledge construction is accomplished through iterative and timeless understanding-directed circumnavigations of the hermeneutic circle. To this end, the hermeneutic circle is meant to continue in orbit of its focus indefinitely. At the heart of Habermas’ critique was the influence of an individual’s objects on the understanding reached through a hermeneutic mode of communication and reaching understanding. To this end, he presented an argument for an elevation of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to a hypothesis he called \textit{depth-hermeneutics}. To achieve depth-hermeneutics, however, Habermas required the reader to explore his position in respect of \textit{distorted communication} and \textit{communicative competence}. I have thus set the stage for what I currently believe to be the most important aspect of Habermas’ project in terms of agonistic advocacy as a means of reconstituting
A new claim is made that is based on existing traditions. A new understanding results in a modification of the tradition. The new understanding causes a modification of the tradition.
1.2. Distorted Communication

Habermas (1971/1990; 1975; 1976/1998; 1984; 1987; 1990/2001b; 1992; 1996; 2001) invested much effort in the analysis of the common-place phenomenon he described as distorted communication. Because Habermas’ project sought to construct a theory of communication where genuine understanding and consensus between individuals was universally moral, examples of non-genuine understanding were logically either amoral or immoral.

For Habermas (1976/1983; 1981/1998; 1984), a communicative interaction among individuals was considered immoral when one discussant intentionally employed tactics that would result in personal advantage or success—be it their own personal advantage or the advantage of others. Such interaction was labelled strategic by Habermas and was characterized by “at least one of the parties behav[ing] with an orientation toward success, but leav[ing] others to believe that all the presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied”—thus, strategic communication represents “conscious deception (manipulation)” (1981/1998, p. 169). Under such light, strategic interaction is particularly helpful (and analytically consistent) when conjoined with the host’s perspective, and the pathopsychology of games as a third node in a triangulation upon contemporary interorganisational relationships.

Alternatively, an understanding that is void of (or in absence of) morality, while just as pathological as immoral understanding, accounts for unconscious deception. For Habermas (1971/1990; 1981/1998; 1984; 1990/2001b), unconscious
deception provided an account of two ætiologically distinct communicative circumstances. The first order of unconsciously strategic communication was the case where an individual is psychologically delusional, and, as a result of a defence mechanism, deceives him or herself about the intent of his or her communicative purpose (1971/1990; 1976/1998, fn. 2; 1981/1998). The second was found in the case where communication was unconsciously (and/or systemically) strategic through no contemporary fault of either the speaker or hearer (1971/1990). Such cases arise through recursively reconstituted traditions within the hermeneutic circle, and are based upon an initial or subsequent genuinely strategic or unconsciously strategic action (of the first order, see Figure 9.3). Habermas referred to all instances of the communicative modes described here, and in the previous paragraph, as distorted communication. To wit, distorted communication is ultimately defined as the antecedent of all non-genuine understanding.

1.3. Communicative Competence and Depth-Hermeneutics

Habermas’ idea of communicative competence denoted an awareness held by the parties in a communication that distorted communication not only exists, but may also influence the hermeneutic process, and therefore the resulting understanding. A notion similar to that explored within the earlier presented discussion of the pathopsychology of games. In The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, Habermas (1971/1990) described communicative competence as a meta-hermeneutic and, forthwith, elevated his conception of depth-hermeneutics as critically enlightened
in comparison to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.

A critically enlightened hermeneutic that differentiates between insight and delusion incorporates the meta-hermeneutic awareness of the conditions for the possibility of systematically distorted communication. It connects the process of understanding to the principle of rational discourse, according to which truth would only be guaranteed by that kind of consensus which was achieved under the idealized conditions of unlimited communication free from domination and could be maintained over time. (Habermas, 1971/1990,
Figure 9.3 represents a re-conceptualisation of the earlier part B of Figure 9.2. In part B of Figure 9.2, the extension of knowledge through the hermeneutic circle was achieved over time. Figure 9.3 shows Habermas’ (1975; 1981/1998; 1984; 1987; 1990/2001a; 1992) extension of knowledge grounded in consensus and understanding through the discursive redeemability of the validity claims proclaimed in speech acts. Gadamer’s conceptualizing around the extension of knowledge is less specific (Gadamer, 1976/1990; Gallagher, 1992). Figure 9.3 depicts a loss of genuine knowledge as a result of multiple (and recursively geometric) instances of consciously or unconsciously strategic understandings that have redefined traditions and objects held by those party to the interaction. Habermas (1981/1998) characterized the supposition explored in Figure 9.3 as the “development of a decentered understanding of the world” (p. 168), and an all-too-common result of humanity’s ignorance of the ideal speech situation and the dominance of the system over the lifeworld—topics I explore in greater depth within section 2.

Figure 9.4 depicts Habermas’ reconciliation of Figure 9.3 through communicative competence. The once decentred understanding of the world is vigilantly and dynamically recentred as parties to the communication are ever-cognizant of potential incidents of distorted communication. In section 2., I present the ways in which Habermas argued that communicative competence is actually employed by speakers and hearers. However, one point that Habermas (1971/1990) made merits inclusion at this time, in that it is more complementary to the generality
To protect speakers and hearers from distorted communication, Habermas (1971/1990) argued that communicative competence is aided by the use of natural language. Natural language is, in perhaps less Habermasian terms, the common vernacular shared by individuals engaged in communication. In most instances, this shared vernacular will be the everyday communication within a social setting. According to Habermas (1971/1990), the advantage of natural language was threefold. First, despite its simplicity, natural language is of enough depth, and is sufficient for clarifying the most complex symbolic interaction; second, a vernacular establishes the commonality of parties in communication as members of a community (see Sergiovanni’s, 1996, 2000, adoption of the term: Gemeinschaft);
and third, parties place aside their ability to engage in linguistically veiled strategic speech acts, which are indicative of distorted communication. Thus, if two speakers agree to communicate exclusively in a language in which they are both equally fluent, they are unable to disguise their strategic intentions within convoluted language-games.

2. Lifeworld and System and Their Implications for Communicative Competence and Interorganisational Relationships

There exists a vein of support within organisational theory literature for the applicability of models of interpersonal relationships in an examination of interorganisational relationships (Galaskiewicz & Krohn, 1984; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Van de Ven, 1976; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984; Westley & Vredenburg, 1997). Much of the discussion is rooted in both objectivist and subjectivist arguments that organisations are inherently human, and are therefore inescapably linked to human action and the Meadian objects an organisation’s membership possess. In this section, I explore the analogous position justified by Habermas’ historical materialism, and the implications of his theory of communicative competence within a context of interorganisational relationships.

2.1. Validity Claims and their Redeemability in the Lifeworld

Notwithstanding his early publications in philosophical criticism, theory of crisis, and emergence of sciences (see Habermas, 1983), Habermas’ massive body of work has, since the early 1970s, repeatedly returned to an investigation of
understanding and its root in acts of speech. It can be said that in establishing his theory of communicative action, Habermas has sought to link all human interaction—whether manifest in communication/linguistics, law, politics, economics, history, sociology, or organisational theory and behaviour—to understanding and speech acts. As such, it appears that to make sense of the implications of his work in any field of study, one must first grasp an insight into his detailed arguments surrounding these concepts.

Until now within this chapter, understanding has been classified as either genuine or distorted as a result of strategic action—conscious or unconscious manipulation of discourse for the purpose of individual gain. Yet, this binary classification of speech acts represents merely a superficial analysis of the basic canon of Habermas’ conceptualisation of understanding. His argument is generally expressed with the following path of reasoning:

1. Progress and development is represented in the results of communication among individuals.
2. Communication is found in the act of reaching understandings among individuals.
3. For an understanding to have been attained, those individuals party to that understanding must accept that the statements (or speech acts), the nature of which they are discussing, are both comprehensible and valid.

Comprehensibility means that speech acts made by one individual are
comprehended by the hearer, and are linguistically accurate; validity, however, is more complex and is a function of the speaker’s claim that their speech act is true, correct, and truthful, and that this claim can be discursively justified (Habermas, 1976/1998, 1984, 1987, 1990/2001a, 1990/2001b, 1992, 1996).

I examine validity in greater depth by first examining Habermas’ (1976/1998; 1988/1998; 1990/2001a; 1996; 1996/1998) tripartite worlds of human existence—subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity. I recall the earlier discussion of Mead’s (1934; 1938) objects, and the second point raised that the totality of objects of one party to a particular communication are rarely the same as those of another party. Habermas (1971; 1990/2001a) deduced that such a rationale represented the existence of a personal subjective world confined within an individual’s own mind. However, further recalling the discussion in question (and specifically the notion depicted in part B of Figure 9.1) Habermas agreed with Mead’s supposition that the construction of some objects was dependent upon social interaction. To this end, Habermas referred to these socially shared or constructed objects as indicative of the intersubjective world—the world of social interaction and agreement of meaning confined only to those party to the interaction. The objective world represents the existential nature of reality.

Figure 9.5 represents a communicative human interaction among individuals $a$ and $b$. As is shown, their communication takes place in relation to the three worlds described above. In accordance with Habermas’ (1976/1998; 1984; 1987; 1990/2001a; 1990/2001b; 1992; 1996) theory, each speech act in which they engage
(either as a speaker or hearer) must be validated within each of the three worlds—speech acts that seek genuine understanding as their goal raise claims to their validity (they leave the speaker’s mouth presupposing their validity is justified).

A speech act is valid within the subjective world (the world of the individual’s own mind and consciousness) when it is said to be *truthful*. In other words, the speaker honestly believes that the statement is true. A speech act is valid within the intersubjective world (the *lifeworld* of socially shared consciousness) when it is said to be *correct*. In this case, the speaker makes a statement that is appropriate
under the condition of meaning inherent within objects shared by both the speaker and hearer. Finally, a speech act is valid within the objective world (the world as external reality) when it is said to be true. In this final case, the speaker makes a statement indicative of existential (what I have endeavoured to call scientific within the context of this dissertation) presuppositions of reality—either something existentially is or it is not (Habermas, 1996/1998).

To achieve genuine understanding, I always construct speech acts in such a way that their validity in all three worlds is assured. I will always make statements that I believe to be true (the claim to truthfulness), that are appropriate and reasonable in accordance with the meaning I ascribe to my world of social experience (the claim to correctness), and that are indicative of external reality (the claim to truth). When this is the genuine mode of communication shared by those party to an understanding, Habermas called this an ideal speech situation (i.e., the ideal conduct of discourse, not the ideal understanding).

Habermas (1976/1998; 1984; 1987; 1988/1998; 1990/2001a; 1990/2001b; 1992; 1996; 1996/1998) argued that any speech act that does not uphold these three claims to validity is a strategic action, and is not able to garner genuine understanding. Communicative competence, therefore, informs individuals that not all speech acts are valid in each of the three worlds, and provides the impetus for a hearer to challenge a claim to validity raised by any speaker in an attempt to discern actual truthfulness, correctness, or truth, and recentre the understanding (Habermas, 1981/1998).
As depicted in Figure 9.5, communication (denoted by the dotted line between individuals \(a\) and \(b\)) has been present for some time, and understanding has been achieved at a point in the past (although one is unable to say definitively that this understanding is genuine). The circular platform upon which the communication takes place represents these previously achieved understandings. Understandings comprise an intricate weave of validity claims that guide future collective or collaborative action—as I presented in section 1.—where past understandings (in Gadamer’s terms, traditions) provide the basis against which new interpretations (new knowledge, new understandings, re-evaluated traditions) within the hermeneutic circle may be made.

In the field of Educational Administration and in its attempts at establishing and maintaining interorganisational relationships, such understandings may be described as contributing to norms, promises, culture, climate, and collaboration. What is important to recognize, and which Habermas (1990/2001a) described in detail, is the placement of these understandings—which he alternatively called normative validity claims and norms (once an understanding has been achieved, I from here on call that understanding a norm). As is shown in Figure 9.5, understandings are generated within the intersubjective lifeworld, and the metamorphosis of an understanding into a norm implies that it may now be called upon in the construction of new understandings, and ultimately new norms. To illustrate the foundational nature of norms, I show them as beneath the individuals. Similarly, individuals \(a\) and \(b\) exist atop a shared norm—denoting the shared, intersubjective nature of
established understandings.

The placement of the individuals in Figure 9.5 atop the norms they share is of significance for one reason: individuals party to a particular norm may always demand that that particular norm be redeemed (no matter how far in the past and no matter how many norms have been established as a result). According to Habermas (1971/1990; 1976/1998; 1981/1998; 1984; 1987; 1988/1998; 1990/2001a; 1996; 1996/1998), the redemption of norms is achieved through a process where the speaker of the validity claims upon which the original understanding rests either reaffirms the validity of the original speech act (to its truthfulness, correctness, and truth), or adjusts the original speech act in such a way that raises a new set of claims to validity in each of the three worlds. Such adherence to redemption provides, ultimately, a practical application of communicative competence.

2.2. The Delineation of Human Collectives: Lifeworld and System

Habermas’ focus on communication was an acknowledgement of the social nature of human existence. Yet it would be naïve to contend that the sole nature of modern human existence rests at the level of interpersonal relationships. Having said this, Habermas did believe that such a time may have existed in the past where all of the norms to which an individual was party would have been established by that individual with others. Thus the individual was born unconnected to norms and established them with those he or she encountered during the course of his or her life. All of these norms, following Habermas’ argument, would be redeemable through
the application of communicative competence in the form of a challenge brought by
the hearer to the speaker. In many ways, it is this stage of human collectivisation/
socialization to which our discussion has hitherto referred. I refer to this stage in
later paragraphs as the *intimate lifeworld*.

Humans are, however, born into norms that have been established not
through their own volition, but on their behalf—whether by their parents, members
of their family or their community. In large part, norms (or rules) are established
for children by their parents without the direct input or consent of the child. Such
norms, despite the method of their establishment, remain redeemable. When the
child has wont and the intellect to demand the redemption of the validity claims
that are *sine qua non* the speech act antecedents of the norms/rules to which they
are subject, such demands appear with frequency. The child is thus engaged in his
or her first pursuit of communicative competence and perhaps for the first time
cognizant of the intersubjectively defined lifeworld, of which he or she is a member
(Habermas, 1971/1990). Figure 9.6 depicts a redeemable norm established by the
community. The individual wades through such norms, so to speak, until they are
redeemed and fall below the individual as foundations of future understanding. It
is important to recognize that although this communicative competence is manifest
*post hoc*, it remains possible because of the reasonable proximity of the hearer to
the speaker. I refer to this stage in later paragraphs as the *community lifeworld*.

Habermas (1971/1990; 1987) argued that as communication among
individuals within the community becomes ever-more complex, norms evolve in
an amalgamative fashion: New norms are based upon a multiplicity of previously established one’s—assembled through a multiplicity of depth-hermeneutics (a scientific method of discovery). At a certain point, the combination of multiplicity and maturity of norms and general collective will-formation overstep their hitherto evolved purpose of simple collective organisation and “[o]rganizational complexity constituted at the level of political domination becomes the crystallizing nucleus of a new institution: the state” (Habermas, 1987, p. 165). It is at this point in the progression
of human collectives/socialization that the individual no longer exists solely within
the objective world and intersubjective lifeworld. Rather, the individual becomes a
the system, a name I also employ in later paragraphs. Through this rationalization,
those well-established norms that have provided functional guidance and influence
over the behaviour of the community become laws.

Figure 9.7 illustrates the experiential interplay for the individual between
norms and system level laws. While intersubjective norms remain foundational for
interpersonal understanding within the lifeworld, laws are elevated and supersede
1996/1998, argued, dominating) its nature. It is important to draw a clear distinction
between the lifeworld and system. In the lifeworld, action is coordinated “through the
consensus of those involved,” whereas in the system, action is coordinated “through
functional interconnections of action” (Habermas, 1987, p. 186). Habermas argued
in this case that within the system, action was seen as a commodity of sorts. As
such, the system seeks to rationalize or improve the efficiency of action (Cooke,

The transfer of action coordination from language over to steering media
means an uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld contexts. Media such as
money and power attach to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-rational
attitude toward calculable amounts of value and make it possible to exert
generalized, strategic influence on the decisions of other participants while
bypassing processes of consensus-oriented communication. Inasmuch as they do not merely simplify linguistic communication, but replace it with a symbolic generalization of rewards and punishments, the lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching understanding are always embedded are devalued in favor of media-steered interactions; the lifeworld is no longer needed for the coordination of action. (Habermas, 1987, p. 183, emphasis)
Habermas (1987; 1988/1998; 1996/1998) found the result of this purposive-rational attitude to be a forfeiture of the individual’s ability to demand redemption of validity claims raised by system-level norms—we “cede to the few the competence to act on behalf of [us] all …[and] relinquish [our]… right to orient [our] actions … by actual agreement with those present” (Habermas, 1987, pp. 170-171) where communicative action is rationalized as a commodity, not unlike money and power. Furthermore, he concluded that “[s]ystems theory can allow only empirical events and states into its object domain and must transform questions of validity into questions of behavior” (Habermas, 1975, p. 6, emphasis in original). To this end, the individual was systemically precluded from reaching any form of genuine understanding within the system domain. Within the system, communicative interaction was interpreted through a rationalized, purposive and success-oriented lens—as such, all communicative action involving system-based entities was inherently strategic and distorted.

**B. Analysis and Implications for Educational Administration**

I highlight two most salient points of this work for specific employment within the broader context of interorganisational relationships involving education. First, the interrelationships described that, on Habermas’ view, are strategically manifest must be juxtaposed against the arguments made elsewhere in this dissertation regarding the psychological constraints at play within interorganisational “bargaining” and
games. It is within Habermas’ thesis that strategic communication is consistent with Elster’s (2000) essential and incidental constraints—for one can certainly behave strategically both non-serendipitously, and serendipitously. These behaviours were largely consistent with Habermas’ point. Yet, while, it does not absolve the agent who is strategic in his communication from the immorality of his position, it does permit that both fallacious and truth-borne positions can be strategic, and therefore immoral (or amoral, as the case may be; I am not here debating morality).

The second point relates specifically to the adoption of theoretic constructs developed within a larger project that seeks as its zenith the universality of consensus, in terms of an admittedly realist, but agonist, position that excludes itself from such pursuits. I justify this position through rational argument. The agonistic position presupposes that individuals or organisations within the political will be taken seriously by those currently served within its dominant friend/enemy frame.

1. Educational Administration’s Emergence from Betwixt Two Fallacies

How will the agonist educational entity emerge from the sedimented politics within antagonism? At the conclusion of Chapter Eight, I argued that (a) education was immersed within a dominant and false universe; (b) in its relations with this universe, educational administration is frequently inconsistent in its adherence to foundational principles of education, but, similarly, (c) so too is much of the debate within the foundational core of education (as a reified entity). Indeed, this statement represents an answer to the question posed as the origin of this study: What are
the dominant foundational and philosophical structures of interorganisational relationships involving educational administration? At this point in my thinking on the topic, the result could be described by Figure 9.8 where education (as an entity consisting of an administrative and foundational duality) rests within the public sphere. On this account, the fallaciously dominant view manifest in modernity butts against education with administration at its periphery, and the fallaciously dominant view manifest in post-modern relativism butts against administration from within.

Figure 9.8  Fallacious Interior and Exterior Abutments to Educational Administration
While this view of these relationships is patently unrealistic, I only depict its nature as a point of departure, against which further illustrations may be judged.

Figure 9.9 is a more realistic characterization of educational entities. While the core principles of education may be well articulated and secure, they rest deep within, but perhaps too deep for public consumption, if one accepts as accurate my belief that the sedimented view of education within the political represents contemporary public/political conceptualisations of our discipline. In this figure, both foundational and administrative elements interact with the public sphere, because administrators do not occupy all points at which education is enjoined with the public.

The view of education from the outside, while public polling demonstrates support in principle (Canadian Council on Learning, 2007), is fraught with problems in practice, as I have already discussed in Chapter Eight. The philosophically central tenets demonstrative in epistemological concern for the growth of knowledge is routinely abandoned in favour of the relativist post-modern conclusion that everyone’s knowledge is useful, and that individuals’ opinions are somehow representative of knowledge. I do not here advocate the position that information is knowledge (as a modernist might; or in the case of Lyotard [1979], as a postmodernist might) but that knowledge—growing through hypothesis testing, employing rational debate, and focusing upon foundations of recursively justified validity—is knowledge. Thus genuine (depth) hermeneutics is a knowledge process. My point is that any argument advocating the obscuring and oscillatory manifestation of education as a
reified entity within the current dominant public sphere is absurd—and therefore, since such oscillation is indicative of the current situation for education, educational entities as currently manifest are absurd, as well.

I now arrive at the point in the discussion where each of the pieces of my argument may be aligned into one conceptualisation of the structures of interorganisational relationships involving the administration of education. I depict in Figure 9.10 my complete conceptualisation. Non-host type organisations \( i_{(iT)} \) (represented by the concept of hermeneutics within the figure) that engage in any
form of interorganisational relationship with host-type organisations \( (i_{i(F)}) \) do so within the contextual system of a dominant and false universe \((\overline{F})\) superstructure. The superstructure is externally fed by the historical misinterpretation of human nature and neo-science. Communication among these organisations, suffering
the effects of the psychopathologies of bargains and distorted communications (whether essentially or incidentally constrained) will ultimately result in distorted hermeneutics—precisely as I depicted in Figure 9.3. As distortions increase through repeated circumnavigations of the hermeneutic circle, the falsity of the dominant universe in which such interorganisational relationships take place increases. Psychopathologies of bargains and distorted communications further increase, and the cycle of systemic distortion within the superstructure repeats. As non-distorted communication decreases within the confines of the system, non-host type organisations \( (i_{(T)}) \) become increasingly sedimented within the superstructure.

A next logical question is what can be done? I answer this question in two ways. First, I explore my developing understanding of the key weaknesses of the superstructure described above. Second, I focus upon intra- and extraorganisational solutions that are specific to education and its administration.

1.1 Weaknesses of a False Universe Superstructure

As was noted, Habermas (1971/1990) provided in his critique of Gadamer the means by which false and dominant superstructures that exist as the context for communication may be weakened in favour of legitimate processes. I therefore repeat his point.

A critically enlightened hermeneutic that differentiates between insight and delusion incorporates the meta-hermeneutic awareness of the conditions for the possibility of systematically distorted communication. It connects the
process of understanding to the principle of rational discourse, according to which truth would only be guaranteed by *that* kind of consensus which was achieved under the idealized conditions of unlimited communication free from domination and could be maintained over time. (Habermas, 1971/1990, p. 267, emphasis in original)

I extend Habermas’ argument into the agonist project and the context of Figure 9.10. The result is depicted in Figure 9.11. To end the cycle of systemic distortions within the superstructure, the foundations of the false universe must be critically enlightened. This means that before educators and educationalist can hope to be engaged in any form of genuine communication within the contemporary superstructure — and therefore any form of genuine interorganisational relationship — the rules of engagement must be redefined. As the discussion depicted in Figure 9.10 showed, constraints within the superstructure do not permit the mechanisms for rational influences on change to exist. The likelihood of their existence decreases with each navigation of the distorted hermeneutic circle. I call to mind the final pages of Chapter Five, and specifically Habermas’ (1975) point regarding Piagetian motivational development as linked to “Weber’s connection between belief in the legitimacy of orders [*Ordnungen*] and their potential for justification, on the one hand, and to their factual validity on the other” (p. 95). Further to this point, I recall the discussion in Chapter Seven of Weber’s (1919/1958) concept of the eternal yesterday and its linkage to French and Raven’s (1959/2005) description of expert power. The result is an institutionalisation of distorted hermeneutic processes
where in each attempt at interorganisational relationships decreases the likelihood of a rational outcome. To move beyond such detrimental and increasingly irrational results, it seems that interorganisational relationships must cease until the processes
outlined below in Sections 1.2. and 1.3. are complete. Educators and educationalists must refocus their attention on developing a position of communicative competence. Their competencies must then be focused upon dismantling the foundations of the superstructure (that is, dominant misunderstandings of human nature and neuroscience, as depicted in Figure 9.11) and the processes within (strategic/distorted communication, also depicted in Figure 9.11) rather than entering the superstructure itself.

I now direct the discussion toward the second part of my answer to the question: what can be done? I focus upon intra- and extraorganisational solutions that are specific to education and its administration in the sections that follow.

1.2 Intraorganisational Competence

The result of this emerging study suggests that educators and educationalists must begin the reclaiming of education from its sedimentation within the public sphere by returning to first principles. By first principles, I do not yet link education to any particular individual, so considerations of the child and the student must be held at bay for the time being. From the results of this study, I suggest that educators and educationalists must agree that education is a scientific pursuit, as it has been defined in this dissertation. Educators and educationalists must next examine, scientifically, if and how education is beneficial to humanity as a whole (not obscured by third order cultural anomalies), but as demonstrative in those questions that unite humans as a species. The words of Rousseau (1763) come to
Were we to divide all human science into two parts, one common to the
generality of mankind, the other particular to the learned, the latter would
be very trifling compared to the former: but we seldom think of general
acquisitions, because they are made as it were unknown to us, and even
before the use of reason; and, moreover, knowledge is observed only by its
differences, as in algebraic equations common quantities pass for nothing.

[sić] (pp. 48-49)

Educators and educationalists must next examine how anomalies are best served by
education, while not sacrificing those benefits deemed requisite for the whole.

The instructions outlined above are unusual treatments, but they seem
necessary if education is to be seen as worthy of debate within the broader political
sphere. Further, the instructions will be best served if examined by educators. That
an examination is happening may satisfy some critics currently within the political,
outright. But, not unlike the earlier game theoretic discussion of the meteorologist
and the dog trainer, education is best served—indeed society is best served—if those
within education examine education first, rather than submitting to examinations
by individuals who neither study education, nor fully grasp the $f$ nature of their
dominant behaviours. From this discussion must emerge consistent articulations of
what education is.

I make these statements based on points that continue to emerged as a result
of this study and those that have been foundational throughout this dissertation.
That educators and educationalists must arrive at a consistent statement depicting education to the public does not imply that it is objectively correct—only that it will be more objectively correct than any which might be achieved externally, or via principles contrary to the original first principles described above regarding knowledge. It would seem that only once this theoretical position is achieved can educators and educationalist begin the practice of excavating education out from under its sedimented position within the political.

1.3 Extraorganisational Competence

There is a recurring complaint among educators with whom I have spoken that the public believes it understands the job of teachers and how schools work based upon the fact that the vast majority of the public have attended school for a significant and memorable portion of their lives (see also Ungerleider, 2003). The statement is a complaint because its premise assumes that the public understand little about education. I believe that the point made above represents, optimistically, a question of responsibility analogous to that of chickens and eggs—but pessimistically, a self-fulfilling prophecy. For the statement begs the question, “What have you done to change this perception? What have educators done, practically within their classroom and school, or during their conversations with the public, to change these presumed misconceptions?” I put this question forward, within the context of the discussion presented above, as a rationale for the points I propose.

Christopher Hitchens somewhere wrote that what can be asserted without
evidence can also be dismissed without evidence. I agree, and I present this aphorism to every class of students I teach. Thus, evidence is required for public consumption, and public assertions made in reply must be held to the standard that communicative competence puts forward. Educators must decide to uphold the philosophical position that arrives from the discussion assumed above as, at least initially, ethic (cf. Sears & Parsons, 1991). In accordance with the hypotheses developed within this dissertation, for education to become a legitimate agonistic adversary, it must behave as a legitimate agonistic adversary. It must provide solid, coherent, clear, and recursively redeemable arguments to justify its position to the public, and it must do so everywhere and at all times.

To educationalists, to academia, and to administrators I therefore assign the task of articulating a solid, coherent, clear, and recursively redeemable argument regarding education and its utility within the domain of the political proper. To all teachers I assign this task within the domain of their interactions with parents and community. But most importantly, to teachers of the social sciences I assign this task within all that you do. It is from the debates within social sciences classrooms that students must come to appreciate the foundational position of education, and its foundational place within a society constituted on rationality. Therefore, to administrators I further assign the obligation to ensure these debates—and the social and political skills honed in students within social science classrooms—are well supported. I argue that the balance between the further sedimentation and the excavation of education from its currently absurd state depends directly upon such
support.

To illustrate this point, I related in Chapter Eight how voting apathy among youth is rising, and as such, those individuals who hold potential sway within the political, and with whom education as an entity are most temporally familiar, are abdicating their views on the subject. I similarly argued that it was improper to assume that as populations age, they become more conservative and self-interested. Yet, it would be irresponsible for education to take this argument as fact guaranteeing support—for these facts say nothing of how older individuals view the sedimentation or excavation of education. Would it not be better to mitigate potential further sedimentation through the advocacy of (a) voting behaviour among youth, and (b) presenting clear and rational reasons for the presumption that education plays a vital role in the development of society? Would not a reasonable course of action be to proselytize these two critical points? Indeed educators and educationalists have a place within contemporary educational practice where such points are directly upheld: the social science classroom. Administrators, what I propose is much more than an issue to be overseen through curriculum. It is, indeed, an issue of the greatest importance for educational leadership. I submit that the very future of education as educative depends upon such leadership. Intra- and extraorganisationally administrators must lead. Without leadership on these fronts, any discussion of contemporary interorganisational relationships is distorted and pointless.
C. A Reflection on the Context of the Study and the Central Question

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I described the context for the study. Three themes emerged from my discussion. The first theme exposed the shifting conception of organisational life for schools that has accompanied the shifting focus of organisational studies from the formal to the informal (Selznick, 1948/2005). Implications of these shifts for leadership and decision-making were also explored (through Etzioni, 1967, 1986, 1989; and Hopkins, 2001) and the central problem on this front was articulated as the implied assumption of spontaneous generation of and aptitude for the justification of the organisational Form.

Linked to the organisational shifts is the second theme: a humanization of student experiences, and a focus placed upon students with exceptionalities (Robson & Beattie, 2004). Attention placed upon the individual’s experience has raised questions related to the efficiencies embedded within the broader social welfare system (Chaskin & Richman, 1992; Robson & Beattie, 2004), and neo-liberal ideology has pushed for economic answers to questions of redundancies (Bardach & Lesser, 1996; Nelson, Prilleltensky, & MacGillivary, 2001). Efficiency and ideology represent the third theme, and the result has been an increase in interorganisational dialogue and relationships. With the impetus for these relationships ideologically devised, their structures are situated within ideological conditions.

The implication of the above described themes that I chose to examine in this document was summarized in the principal research question: What are the dominant foundational and philosophical structures of contemporary interorganisational
relationships involving educational administration? The argument progressed in such a way as to explore the (a) development and (b) impact of contemporary relational systems writ large—in terms of social, political, and economic antecedents—and (c) popular responses to these systems. I next sought to bridge what was learned in terms of relational systems with the broad experiences of educational interorganisational relations. Finally, after having described the foundational and philosophical structures of contemporary interorganisational relationships involving educational administration in Chapter Eight, in earlier sections of the present chapter I explored the implications of my conclusions for educational leadership: *It is clearly the role of educational administration and educational leadership to remove all spontaneity from human understanding of the educational organisational Form.*
POSTSCRIPT

In a great many ways, this dissertation and its developing hypotheses have been focused upon threads. The threads that bind us as a species, the threads that bind our interests as political, social and economic participants. My hope in writing this dissertation has been to expose the ways in which political, social, and economic threads bind educational interests to the acceptance of falsehoods about education and human nature. My hope has also been to prescribe the means by which education’s bindings may be freed: through competent, rational, and agonistic discussion. The means that I prescribe demand that educators and educationalists take education seriously as a discipline.

In writing this document I have not intended to provide an answer for specific ills in the form of an if / then statement. Rather, I have endeavoured to highlight peculiarities of relationships that affect the manners in which epistemic and axiological decisions are made, which in turn affect the lives of so many individuals. I am concerned that the administrative rudder of the educational organisation is so frequently disembodied from its vessel that most intraorganisational linkages and relationships are reduced to managerialism, or do not exist at all. So frequently do educators and educationalists look extraorganisationally for solutions to their
problems, when intraorganisationally within education solutions are at hand.

Some of my propositions may be provocative, but I wish to provoke an absent discussion, the fate of which will determine the longevity of any other discussion within the field that educators and educationalists might have, and most certainly the degree to which the foundations of our field coexist akin to its administration. Those researchers and practitioners who seek a more close alignment of theory and practice must surely see that my provocations are intended to contemporaneously bolster their laudable goal, but also warn them of the implications of such an endeavour. For not only will the binding of theory to practice and practice to theory affect the pupil, it will affect every relationship among education and the political, social, and economic agents by whom power is brokered.

In *Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder* (1996), the noted Simonyi Professor for the Understanding of Science at Oxford University, Richard Dawkins, contemplated the potential merit in compulsory “science appreciation” courses—akin to those found in music. While I do not here advocate the need to go to the lengths of compulsory classes for school-aged students on “education appreciation,” every student by the end of high school should assume the discovery of such appreciation. If we do not foster educational appreciation in our students, have we as educators not failed? Yet every article and recommendation that is misguided in its understanding of education’s nature, purpose, function, and utility shows just that error: our failure to, at best, encourage the discovery of education’s nature, purpose, function, and utility independently among students, or at worst,
enable students to discover them through direct instruction.

Finally, I make a brief comment upon two long-perpetuated issues within this dissertation that have not been lost on me. First, an orthodox Chomskian may interpret my position as advocating a perverse form of jingoism or the manufacture of consent. I do not dismiss this critique, but will defer my response to another essay at another time. Second, there is an interesting irony within my argument, to be sure. I am here referring to the countless statements I have made herein that variously point out “misunderstandings” of education (which may be misconstrued as illegitimate interpretations) by individuals who maintain neo-liberal perspectives within the political. Indeed, some readers may point to my advocacy of a Mouffian agonist goal for the arena of political discourse and action and juxtapose this goal as inconsistent with claims of a perpetuation of an illegitimate adversarial view. Such a charge would be correct. However, I articulate my view that the current state of affairs within the political demands friend/enemy reactions to garner attention, and I make no apologies for advocating such a course of action. Ultimately, I submit that once educators and educationalists have re-established education within the political, educators and educationalists may only then work toward a more true agonist model—and I emphatically trust they will.
CHAPTER ONE

1 Specifically those created as a result of post-1991 Soviet influence—viz. longevous ideological influence.

2 See also Simpson and Gulley (1962); Thompson and McEwen (1958); and Turner (1976).

3 See also Galaskiewicz (1979) and Van de Ven (1976).

4 See also J. Allen (1998); Kasten (2000); and Sommers (1999).

5 Plato (c. 400 BCE/1945) referred to this as Form and Eco (2000) as innate Being, but arguably it has been more recently supplanted by, and distilled into, mission and vision in educational organisations.

6 This also seems relevant within the general Canadian University governance context (Woodhouse, 2001a, 2001b).

7 Multi-organisationally devised or otherwise.

8 See also Appleton et al. (1997); Atkins, Graczyk, Frazier, and Adil (2003); Atwal and Caldwell (2002); Chaudry, Polivka, and Kennedy (2000); Dinnebeil, Hale, and Rule (1999); S. L. Gardner (1992); Myrtle and Wilber (1994); Polivka, Dresbach, Heimlich, and Elliott (2001); Robson and Beattie (2004); Rosenkoetter and Streufert (1995); and Sloper (2004) who lend further support to these claims.

9 By extension, ethical interorganisational behaviour.


11 In Habermas (1971), see Chapter Three and the discussion of Marx’
“Phenomenology of the Mind.” See also, Barhorst (1999); Chriss (1995); Rockmore (1989); Shabani (2000); Welton (1993); and S. K. White (1995).

See also: Sergiovanni (2000).

CHAPTER TWO

Whitehead (1933/1969) made a similar argument where he wrote, “So far as concerns methodology, the general issue of the discussion will be that theory dictates method, and that any particular method is only applicable to theories of one correlate species” (p. 283).

Plato (c. 400 BCE/1945) made a homologous claim in Book IV (§ 441c ff.) of the Republic when Socrates suggested to Glaucon that the just individual is one for whom each part of that individual provides the innate function for which it is best suited.

Cassam (1987) suggested that a Kantian transcendental act is necessary for the existence of any experiential act and Fuller (1945) concurred in his suggestion that all Kantian transcendental acts or systems are hermeneutic processes designed to understand systems of thought—to seek out those elements of thought that are a priori. Others (Copleston, 1960; Durrant, 1943; Pippin, 1982; Rt. Hon. Lord Quinton, 1995b; Runes, 1962) confirmed such descriptions of Kantian transcendentalism; while Kant (1784/1890), himself, wrote: “I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible à priori. A system of such conceptions would be called Transcendental Philosophy” (p. 16, emphasis in original).

See also: Eco (2000) for further clarification of Being (Sein).

The significance of Stewart (1995) and Madison’s (1990) point should not be underestimated. In fact, it is a concept to which I return in Chapter Three, section 2.2., wherein I argue that the facility for language represents a category of the understanding† and where the socially constructed predilections of the apperception influence our semantic relations to particular element of syntax (or, more broadly, the transcendental object).

† From this point forward, I refer to the Kantian (1784/1892) system that includes the categories of the understanding as the understanding°, that is, understanding marked with °.
Kant (1784/1890) made a complementary argument related to the concept of time, which he regards as similarly an *a priori sensibility* required for our apprehending representations of material objects. While out of place in the current discussion, the *a priori* linkage of our “faculties of understanding” (that is, **understanding**°—see Chapter Three, section 2.1.a.) to space and time becomes an important factor in the construction of the field of pictorial semiotics, discussed in the section that follows. Furthermore, when discussed in relation to the **apperception** and the **transcendental apperception**, I can say without fear of hyperbole that this linkage will prove to be of decisive importance to the very foundations of this dissertation.

See, for example, Alvermann and Boothby (1986); Bazeli and Olle (1995); Dori and Hameiri (1998); Gerlic and Jausovec (1999); Horton, Lovitt, and Bergerud (1990); Hyerle (1996); Macklin (1997); Mayer (1991); McKenzie (1997); McKenzie (1997); Mento, Martinelli, and Jones (1999); Newton (1995); Paivio (1986); Paivio and Begg (1981); Phillips (1989); Pruitt (1993); Robinson and Kiewra (1995); Schreiber and Abegg (1991); Willoughby, Desmarias, Wood, Sims, and Kalra (1997).

Although this may suggest similarities with the requirements of my own thinking, I would distinguish a heuristic as the final product of my goal here a developing (hermeneutic) diagram.

As may be inferred through the discussion in Chapter Three, **sections 2.1.b. through 2.2.**, the **ante hoc** character of the hermeneutic diagram is limited by the nature of the thinker’s apperceptive system. The **post hoc** character is limited by the nature of the reader’s apperceptive system.

*Particular* (unknown) **something**: I use this term in its Kantian (1784/1982) sense—the **transcendental object** is a particular unknown something and is distinguished from the general and amorphous collection of all unknown somethings or **noumenon**. It is upon the transcendental object, and through the transcendental apperception, that the understanding° forms its assumptions about the nature of things-in-themselves.

**Transcendental apperception**: in Kantian (1784/1982) critical philosophy, the transcendental apperception was the aperture-like function through which the development of knowledge via ordered reflection and imagination upon temporal/spatial sequences of transcendental-object-moments is possible—see Chapter Three, **section 2.1. through 2.2.**

**Intentional object; intentionality**: In the philosophy of mind (with roots in scholastic philosophy), **intentionality** represents any act of cogitation by a subject upon a particular object. As Searle (1984) explained, and will provide the definition for this dissertation, intentionality does not merely “refer to
intentions, but also to beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, love, hate, lust, disgust, shame, pride, irritation, amusement, and all of those mental states (whether conscious or unconscious) that refer to, or are about, the world apart from the mind” (p. 16). The intentional object, therefore, is the object upon which a mind’s intentionality is focused.

CHAPTER THREE

25 Descartes additionally argued that God is a third substance, neither mental nor physical.

26 I am here not making the claim, and no assumption of the sort should be made, that folk wisdom or folk psychology is utterly false—as is the notion advanced by Churchland (1981; 1989) and Stich (Ramsey, Stich, & Garon, 1990; Stich, 1983; Stich & Nichols, 1993), among others.

27 Interesting is the fact that Huxley was oft referred to as Darwin’s bulldog on account of his academic defences of evolution, and yet held a view that while animal sentience may exist, it is largely pointless.

28 Searle’s (2004) word, not mine.

29 See any edition of the Index Librorum Prohibitorum published by the Holy See between 1793 and 1939.

30 Including Liebnitz and Spinoza.

31 Letters in Greek, denoted as follows {α}, indicate specific points of key ontological and epistemic importance to which I return in sections that follow.

32 Elsewhere in the passage, transcendental idealism is described as the doctrine which holds that “all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, as presented to us—as extending bodies, or as series of changes—have no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought” (Kant, 1784/1890, p. 307).

33 “The [brain in a vat] hypothesis is an updated version of the sceptical arguments presented in Descartes’ first Meditation, that the entire world might be only a self-made figment of his imagination, or rather a fiction generated by an evil genius” (Steinitz, 1994, p. 214).

34 Gegenstand (pl. Gegenstände): meaning a physical or sensible object. See note
and discussion accompanying footnote 39.

35 I have hereafter combined this and the sentence that immediately follows it into a single premise ($\varepsilon$).

36 To which I extend the premise, recalling Searle’s [1984] account at the closing claim of Section 1.3. and my own argument that such processes are neither mind- nor body-epiphenomenological, nor are they dualistic or monistic.

37 In effect, I have here merely restated the account concluding section 1.3.—at that time, however, it was not sufficiently explained for designation as a key premise.

38 According to Kant’s “Table of the Categories” and the discussion that followed it (1784/1890, p. 64ff; [A 80ff/B 106ff]), quantity represents the mathematical notions of unity, plurality and totality. The category of quantity similarly represents mathematical notions of reality, negation and limitation. Relation and modality were considered by Kant to be “dynamical categories” (p. 67; B 110). Relation includes the dualisms of inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, and community agent and community patient. Beyond these amorphous definitions and some additional comments regarding their interrelations, Kant noted his disinterest in more clearly defining the categories: “I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise [some translations include the amendment: “although I may be in possession of them”].” (p. 66; A 82ff/B 108).

39 See: Schwarz (1982). Hereafter, for clarity, I qualify object with the ° mark to signify the meaning Objekt rather than Gegenstand.

40 See Kant’s (1784/1890, pp. 86-88) account of the Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein, and his account of the Analogies of Experience (pp. 132-161).

41 Such drifting, Rousseau (1762/1957) called a variance in the lessons of our three teachers: nature, things and man.

42 I denote the schematic construction of the apperceptive system as the schemata and the language of perception [or language°]—the latter term I define in Section 2.2.

43 A process that is the reverse of that discussed in the previous section.

44 The theory behind which is largely rooted in materialism and the mind-epiphenomenalism of Huxley and others.
See in Kant (1784/1890) where: “By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition. … [T]he synthesis of a diversity (be it given à priori or empirically) is the first requisite for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis—still, synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.” (p. 62)

CHAPTER FOUR

I am here, of course, referring to a variety of cases within the United States faced by educational administrators related to science curricula, among which the opinion of the Federal District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania in the matter of Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al. (2005) is, at the time of writing, the most recently decided. Further evidence, I would suggest, for the inclusion of a tale such as that of the rhizobium within a dissertation discussing educational administration and the linkages among various organisations (religious in this case).

Biologists would cringe at my description of these (especially the micro-variety) as anatomies, but for our purposes this nomenclature serves just as suitably as any other terminology they might debate but which is equally helpful for a writer who assumes readers with basic understanding of biology.

Look to the dates of earliest research, for example, in Bleckmann, Schmitz, and von der Emde (2004); Hackmann (2000); Waltrup, White, Zarlingo, and Gravlin (1997).

While it is true that other primates (and indeed other species in orders, classes and phyla beyond our own) employ tools (Alcock, 1972; van Schaik, Deaner, & Merrill, 1999), none appear demonstrative of radically new ideas in MacIntyre’s (1984) sense, nor are any rooted in “contra”-evolutionary socialized phenomena (described later in this chapter). Having said this, each example does seem to imply intentionality and may be a marked distinguishing feature of consciousness, an important notion for a later discussion in Chapter Six of epistemology in contemporary educational administrative philosophy found in the work of Evers and Lakomski (2000).

This point is rather clearly articulated in his second chapter: “but now I admit … that in the earlier editions of my ‘Origin of Species’ I perhaps attributed too
much to the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest” (Darwin, 1874, p. 61).

Lamarckian rather than Darwinian in nature.

This very point was meticulously detailed within the context of modern economic theory by Marciano (2005); see also Patterson (2005).

See Burrell and Morgan (1979).

I employ the word “predict” here with some caution, for my meaning requires as its backdrop the discussion of MacIntyre’s (1984) critique of the social sciences that I examine in Chapter Five.

This is argued in terms of relative time. That is to say, in so much as the dates of earliest modern humans established by Underhill et al. (2001) may be regarded as accurate, the ratio of pre-wheel-human existence to wheel-human existence is roughly 22:1.

An argument could be made that such endeavours might be forced upon other individuals, both the construction of roads, the finding of food and, perhaps, acts of species continuance. While I do not dispute the historical record of societies where indentured or bonded servitude (for lack of a better euphemism, slavery) was the practice, and the likely employment of those bonded to the state in engineering projects of all variety (see for example the discussions of Egyptian Pharoh’s abolition of the death penalty and the Roman opus publicum and opus metali in Sellin, 1965), there exists a suggestion of practicality that persists at a more elemental level. First, notwithstanding accepted issues of compelled labouring in earlier times, construction of any road is merely a singular event in the life cycle of that road; and, even in the case of the most brutal of despot, governments would be wholly pragmatically myopic if state sponsored programs of omni-present defence were to be initiated and sustained in perpetuity. Second, in most cases, even the most despotic examples in history, roads, despite their means of construction, were monikered as gifts to the people—just who these “people” were is a separate issue, and is taken up later within this chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

The first Japanese in England had landed only thirteen years previous, and Europeans (mostly Portuguese and Dutch) had only reached Japan for the first time in the 1540s. Adams served as the inspiration for James Clavelle’s John Blackthorne, the chief protagonist in the 1975 historical fiction Shōgun.
This is perhaps only a half-truth, not to say that it is inaccurate, but that to be unapologetic is likely a morsel too modest. US envoy Caleb Cushing’s 1843 mission to open China to American trade was undertaken, as Clark (1932) reported, “according to [Cushing’s] own words, ‘in behalf of civilization.’ The amazing letter from President Tyler, … which [Cushing] bore to the Emperor of China, breathed condescension and cited ‘the will of Heaven’ that a treaty should be the outcome of the mission” (p. 7).

Here, indeed, I mean to say “‘neo-scientific view’ of the world.”

I shall endeavour to highlight the MacIntyrian characters traditionally present in Asian society from their antithetical social Darwinian characters in pages to follow.

A careful reader will caution that I have portrayed MacIntyre as sharing some commonly held opinion with Habermas, or with Habermas’ reverence for Weber; but I am, in truth, attempting no such thing. I do recognize and appreciate the differences of opinion that these two maintain regarding the work and place of Weber. I attempt to adequately address this very point some pages farther into the argument.

CHAPTER SIX


In a full-text search at the time of writing for “+‘educational administration’ +‘game theory’” within a prominent electronic meta-search engine of scholarly works (scholar.google.com), only ninety raw results returned. Removing those works that had no more than tangential relation to the topic, Furthermore, a key-word search at the time of writing for “ ‘administration’ AND ‘game theory’” within a prominent electronic search engine of educational resources (ERIC) returned twenty-two results. Of these seventeen discussed simulations for use in the teaching of educational administration, one described statistical validation of game theoretic results for research analysis, one dealt with library administration and three provided a discussion of the use of game theory as an analytic tool for research conducted in the field of educational administration and decision-making.
Works written by many notable figures within the field (including Argyris, McGregor, Simon and Etzioni), Brown (1970) argued, independently concluded that all organisations share large numbers of internal structures and mechanisms. These shared structures made them reasonable candidates for game theoretic analysis.

Searle (2004) referred to this school as Strong A.I. (Artificial Intelligence) and Capra (2002) described it as Neuroreductionism and (Neuro-)Functionalism.

Supposedly, as opposed to von Neumann or Turing processing.


Searle (1984) argued that such a usage of “current” technology as a view of the brain has much historical employ. The Greeks argued that the brain was a catapult; Leibnitz compared the brain to a mill. In the 1800s the Jacquard loom provided the view of the brain; in the 1940s it was a telephone cross-bar system.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Valuing money over time is not an exact science and economists will employ a number of different factors to equate funds. In the case of the value of US$20,000 from 1956 in 2005 US dollars, Williamson (2006) explained that if based upon the Consumer Price Index, the sum would equal US$143,708.61; if based upon the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator, the sum would equal US$116,286.75; using the value of the consumer bundle (viz., the average annual expenditure of entities entitled to make spending decisions), US$191,259.02; using the unskilled wage indicator (based on US Bureau of Labor Statistics collected for variously designated unskilled labourers’ hourly wages), US$189,169.68; nominal GDP per capita, $321,837.94; and using relative share of US GDP, the value would equal $569,408.00.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The notion of sedimentation is here also distinguished from its use in Tolbert and Zucker (1996) as a constructivist view of objectification.

I here separate the notion of the teleological argument (currently associated
with *intelligent design*) from its more foundational and general association with the study of purpose. Throughout this chapter, I refer exclusively to the latter form.
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