THE POLITICS OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION: A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF INTRASTATE RELATIONS IN MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY BRITISH COLUMBIA

A Thesis Submitted to the College of Graduate Studies and Research In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the Department of History University of Saskatchewan

Saskatoon

By

BYRON KING PLANT

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines Native-newcomer relations during the “integrationist” era in Canadian Indian affairs: the two and a half decades after World War Two during which the federal government introduced policies designed to integrate Indians into mainstream Canadian social, political, economic, and administrative life. Particular focus is given to developments in British Columbia, where some of the most concerted steps towards integration took place. Growing public and political demands for institutional desegregation and the granting of rights of citizenry to Aboriginal people recast Indian affairs into a matter of unprecedented intergovernmental importance.

Shifting between micro- and macro-historical perspectives, the following chapters consist of a series of comparative policy case studies. Individually, they examine the development, implementation, and effects of the four main areas of federal Indian integrationist planning after WWII: health, education, economic development, and welfare. Collectively, chapters demonstrate how integration was a mission essentially administrative in orientation: every policy undertaken in this period, whether directly or indirectly, sought to implicate the province and other federal line departments in Indian affairs. Not all attempts at “administrative integration,” however, were successful. While BC and the federal government reached joint agreements in the fields of education and health, other areas such as Indian economic development and welfare proved to be a source of significant intergovernmental conflict and impasse.
Aboriginal people were important participants when it came to integrated health, education, and social welfare. Incorporating ethnohistorical insights and Aboriginal perspectives throughout, this dissertation documents how Aboriginal agency in this period—expressed in a range of innovative actions and words—included important combinatorial aspects of compliance, resistance, and accommodation. Many individuals, for instance, demanded access to provincial services as within their rights as Aboriginal people and provincial voting and taxpaying citizens. While post-war integrationist policies varied widely in terms of their local perception and impact, Indian assimilation remained an elusive goal throughout this period. Advances in provincial devolution of Indian administration rarely resulted in the type of social and economic integration envisioned by federal officials.

This study looks beyond unitary conceptions of “the state” towards questions of power and local agency. It engages Foucauldian and Weberian theories to show how a combination of intergovernmental politics, intrastate variables, and Aboriginal agency refashioned Native-newcomer relations in this period. Post-WWII administrative contexts served as theatres for the contestation of old, and formulation of new, power relationships. Developments in this era were to have a significant influence on Native-newcomer relations moving into the modern era.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Statement on Nomenclature

Several terms are used in this study to describe the original and descended inhabitants of the area known as North America. The term “Indian” is used throughout this dissertation in specific reference to those people historically defined as such under the Indian Act. Since “Indians” are subject to historically-changing notions of eligibility, “Aboriginal,” “Native,” and “First Nation” are used in more general reference to those with indigenous ancestry or identity. This includes people having lost Indian status via Indian Act enfranchise provisions as well as those living off-reserve no longer eligible for federal administrative services. This dissertation attempts to use specific tribal or linguistic designations such as Haida or Kwakwaka’wakw whenever such information is known. The terms “non-Aboriginal,” “non-Native,” and “Canadian” are used interchangeably to describe the descendants of those who began settling in North America following the sixteenth century.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCMA</td>
<td>British Columbia Medical Association</td>
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<td>BCMP</td>
<td>British Columbia Medical Plan</td>
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<td>CDO</td>
<td>Community Development Officer</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Community Development Program</td>
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<td>CEP</td>
<td>Community Employment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Canadian Medical Association</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Department of Citizenship and Immigration</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Department of Indian Affairs</td>
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<td>DIANDL</td>
<td>Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Library</td>
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<td>DMR</td>
<td>Department of Mines and Resources</td>
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<td>DNHW</td>
<td>Department of National Health and Welfare</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>Employment Placement Program</td>
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<td>IAB</td>
<td>Indian Affairs Branch</td>
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<td>JC</td>
<td>Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs (1959-61)</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Library and Archives Canada</td>
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<td>LLBC</td>
<td>Legislative Library of British Columbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Assembly</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MSB</td>
<td>Medical Services Branch</td>
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<td>PABC</td>
<td>Provincial Archives of British Columbia</td>
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<td>RSBC</td>
<td>Revised Statutes of British Columbia</td>
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<td>RSC</td>
<td>Revised Statutes of Canada</td>
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<td>SBC</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Statutes of Canada</td>
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<td>SJC</td>
<td>Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act (1946-48)</td>
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<td>UBCA</td>
<td>University of British Columbia Archives</td>
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<td>UBCIC</td>
<td>Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs</td>
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<td>UVA</td>
<td>University of Victoria Archives</td>
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<td>WWIP</td>
<td>Winter Works Incentive Program</td>
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Chapter 1

“Introduction: Integration and Indian Affairs after 1945.”

“I think it will be a clash between the political will and the administrative won’t.”
— Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, Yes Minister.¹

Just months before the release of the now infamous 1969 federal Liberals’ White Paper policy statement on Indian affairs, British Columbia Premier W.A.C. Bennett made newspaper headlines when he pledged a “Take over of Indian Affairs.” Bennett vowed to create a provincial Indian affairs department, reportedly stating that, “if Ottawa will agree, we will set up a provincial department of Indian affairs and all services available to our native Indians, plus special benefits which must go to our native people forever because this was their land.” Also promising to investigate allegations of government discrimination against Indians in the province, Bennett explained:

If the Indian citizens of our province ask for it and are willing to keep their lands in perpetuity so that no person can take them away, and will set up municipal governments in these areas which they will own forever—and they must own them forever—then this government is willing to take over all matters relating to Indians in the province.²

The pledge stood in stark contrast to BC’s century-long prior position of denying the existence of aboriginal rights and title in BC. Here was the province agreeing in principle to special Aboriginal rights and provincial oversight of Indian affairs!


The story gained a quick and loud reaction in Victoria’s political circles. Opposition New Democratic Party leader Robert Strachan condemned the promise as an empty Social Credit platitude and blasted Bennett for “playing cheap politics with the native Indians of this province.”\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Vancouver Sun} reporters quoted Indian spokesmen as thinking no better of Bennett’s plan. Philip Paul, president of BC’s Southern Vancouver Island Tribal Federation, derided Bennett’s pledge as “an empty gesture,” adding that “We’ve had no indication in the past that the provincial government is ready to accept us. … They don’t ask our opinion and they treat us like children.”\textsuperscript{4} Forest Walkem of the Cook’s Ferry band further added that “It was wrong of Premier Bennett to say he was going to set up an Indian branch without consulting us about it.”\textsuperscript{5} Within weeks, the government reversed its stance and backed off the promise, even denying its utterance. BC’s Minister of Municipal Affairs and Social Welfare, Dan Campbell, explained before a convention of the North American Indian Brotherhood: “The premier has no intention of establishing an Indian branch in BC. What he said was, ‘I don’t personally believe in the existence of the Indian affairs department but there is a place for (Indian) advisory apparatus attached to the department of municipal affairs.’”\textsuperscript{6} Soon, the pledge was recognized as another of Bennett’s radical impromptu policy announcements, something

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. Ironically, one-year earlier Strachan urged Bennett to lobby the federal government for constitutional change allowing BC to take over Indian affairs. See \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 6 December 1968, “NDP Urges BC Bid to Change Laws,” 22.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 12 March 1969, “Indian Head Raps Bennett's Offer,” 2.

\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 24 March 1969, “BC Indian Affairs Branch Pledged by Bennett Denied,” 31.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
for which he was renowned.\footnote{One year later, Bennett suggested to a federal-provincial audience that Canada’s provinces be redrawn into five regions. David J. Mitchell, \textit{W.A.C. Bennett and the Rise of British Columbia} (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1983), 393-94.} Subsequent events in the summer of 1969, notably the release of the White Paper, soon overshadowed the memory of Bennett’s vow to wrest administrative control of Indians from the federal government. The creation of a provincial office dedicated solely to Aboriginal matters would wait another nineteen years.\footnote{The Ministry of Native Affairs was established in 1988 by the Bill Vander Zalm Social Credit government.}

Although long-forgotten, Bennett’s pledge was not an anomalous utterance. Called many things, devolutionary attempts to “phase,” or “integrate” Indians into provincial services had been taking place for years in areas such as health and education, and with considerable success. Some provinces, particularly BC and Ontario, appeared willing to accept Indians into public institutions on similar terms as non-Indians. With Indians entering provincial schools and hospitals in record numbers, BC deserved to be called the nation’s leader in desegregation and provincial devolution in the decades after WWII.\footnote{See \textit{Victoria Daily Colonist}, 25 January 1953, “B.C. Called Leader in Indian Progress,” 11; \textit{Victoria Daily Colonist}, 23 March 1950, “BC Moves Forward in Indian Affairs,” 3; \textit{Victoria Daily Colonist}, 4 April 1954, “BC Sets Pattern for Indians,” 25. In 1953, T.R. Kelly applauded granting of the franchise, steps towards educational integration, and creation of the Indian Advisory Act, calling BC, “one of the most progressive provinces in Canada in Indian affairs.” \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 26 January 1953, “Legislation for Indians Wins Praise,” 32.} Not all prior efforts to offload responsibility for Indian administration, however, were successful, and, in many regards, Bennett’s pledge was the latest installment in a series of intergovernmental debates two decades in development. Indeed, as the pledge and its subsequent withdrawal suggest, the province in 1969 remained ambiguous as to
whether it should assume complete control when it came to Indians, provided the federal
government be willing to relinquish it.

Focusing on themes of administration, bureaucracy, and intergovernmental
relations, this dissertation examines Indian affairs during what is known as the
integrationist era in Native-Newcomer relations: the two and a half decades after WWII
during which the federal government introduced a series of policies designed to integrate
Indians into mainstream Canadian social, political, economic, and administrative life.
Particular attention is given to developments in the Pacific province, where some of the
most concerted steps towards integration took place. Shifting between micro- and macro-
historical perspectives, the following chapters consist of a series of comparative policy
case studies. Individually, they encapsulate the four main policy areas of federal Indian
integrationist planning after WWII: health, education, welfare, and economic
development. Collectively, they trace the micro-workings of colonial-bureaucratic
relations and demonstrate how integration was a mission essentially administrative in
orientation; every policy undertaken in this period, whether directly or indirectly, sought
to implicate provincial and other federal line departments in the administration of Indian
affairs. While the earliest architects of assimilation policy saw the transformation of
Indians into provincial citizens as a historical eventuality, post-war policies were unique
in that they marked a complete reversal of how this was to take place. After WWII, the
integration of Indians into provincial institutions came to be seen as a new structural
means for assimilation itself.
Interest in Indian integration was the product of a convergence of several developments unique to the post-war years. Heightened realization and criticism of previous policy failures, combined with a growing public discourse aimed at the promotion of Indian citizenry and democratic rights, catalyzed a gradual shift in the outlook, mandate, and tactics of Indian affairs officials. Although Indians were rarely invited to join the conversation, consensus was growing among social advocacy groups, social scientists, and the Canadian public that prior protectionist policies were failing the interests of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people alike. Differences in opinion undoubtedly existed throughout this history as to what “integration” meant as well as what constituted the most desirable future for Aboriginal people. The failure of federal wardship policies to produce mass Indian assimilation, however, was irrefutable.

Enfranchisement, the main legal mechanism through which Indians were to abandon their legal and cultural identity, was proceeding at a snail’s pace. Massive post-war Aboriginal population growth, largely the result of improvements in Aboriginal health and infant mortality rates meant that “Indians” were not only not vanishing, they were actually increasing in number. Between 1939 and 1959, Canada’s Indian population grew by more than fifty percent. The added administrative expenses associated with post-WWII population growth provided rationale for Indian affairs officials to pursue integrationist policies designed to offload costs onto other provincial and federal line agencies.

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10 See Appendix A.
Amid the fervour of WWII, Indians began to take on new public and political importance. As they had during the Great War and earlier conflict of 1812, Aboriginal people contributed to the Canadian military effort, with both their resources and lives. The continued denial of basic citizenry rights to Indians and Indian veterans after 1945 came to be seen as a perversion of the very ideals the Allied effort was meant to protect.¹¹ That Indian matters were discussed in 1944 in both BC’s legislature as well as before the federal House Committee on Reconstruction and Re-establishment was, as historian Scott Sheffield suggests, “indicative of both the connection between the ‘Indian’ and the war and the increasing salience of the Indian problem in the minds of Canadians.”¹² This salience only increased throughout post-war years. Indians routinely attracted newspaper headlines, editorials, letters to the editor, and special series reports detailing their struggles into the 1950s and 60s.¹³ In his survey of Indian welfare policies in Canada, Hugh Shewell notes how the race-based Indian problem met modern liberal democracy after WWII; a qualitative shift took place in which Indians went from being

¹¹ J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 324.


seen as the problem to people with problems. If the so-called “Indian problem” was changing, so too were the remedies deemed necessary for its solution. Indians increasingly came to be seen as Canadian citizens deserving equitable treatment by government. In BC, the granting of the franchise to Indians in 1949 only increased pressures and demands that Indians be also granted the same administrative rights as provincial non-Indians. Post-war years thus bore witness to a search for a new Indian policy to achieve these ends and to solve what was fast becoming seen as Canada’s “Indian administration problem.”

For the federal government, this search for a new Indian policy took early political expression immediately after WWII. In 1946-48 a Special Joint committee (SJC) of Parliament met to examine the Indian Act and its administration, and offer policy reform recommendations. Although few committee recommendations were implemented in subsequent bureaucratic restructuring and revisions to the Indian Act in 1951 and 1952, the SJC raised new public and political awareness and affirmed the policy principle of provincial administration. The 1950 transfer of the IAB from the Department of Mines and Resources to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration further affirmed the federal government’s interest in Indians as Canadian citizens rather than federal wards. Speaking before an Indian Eskimo Association of Canada conference

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audience in Vancouver several years later, Kwakwaka’wakw Alfred Scow noted of the transfer: “We have seen progress in that now we are recognized by the government as people, instead of minerals and resources.”\(^{17}\)

The search for a post-war policy continued into the latter half of the twentieth century when a second joint committee convened to revisit Indian administration. Released in 1961, the final report of the Joint Committee (JC) further advocated that federal-provincial discussions on Indian affairs take place “in order that such matters may be transferred to provincial jurisdiction as may be acceptable to Indian people, provincial and federal authorities.”\(^{18}\) Canadian plans to include Indians in its own rendition of US “Great Society” emerged after Lester B. Pearson’s Liberals took power in 1963. The Indian Affairs Branch (IAB) began an intensive review of its existing programs and explored new guidelines for the extension of provincial services to Indians that year.\(^{19}\) Notably, Indian affairs were discussed for the first time at a federal-provincial conference that autumn, soon followed by another meeting in October 1964 solely dedicated to this

\(^{16}\) Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, *Fourth Report* [final report] (22 June 1948).


\(^{18}\) Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, *Report to the Senate and House of Commons*, 8 July 1961, 617.

\(^{19}\) LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 2, “R.F. Battle to C.M. Isbister, 26 February 1964.”
purpose. Shortly after, the IAB began consulting with Indians via the creation of regional and national advisory committees composed of Indian representation.\textsuperscript{20}

Throughout the policy discussions of the 1950s and 60s, unfettered integration came to be seen as the solution to Canada’s “Indian administration problem.” From this broader perspective, 1969 capped off an era of federal policies and intergovernmental discussions aligned toward the integration of Indians into provincial administrative structures. The White Paper undeniably marked a blatant attempt at termination, a perversion of the Indian consultation process, and a turning point in Native-newcomer relations moving into the modern era; however, like Bennett’s pledge, it too was rooted in a history of failed policies and intergovernmental negotiations regarding Indians. Indeed, as Sally M. Weaver suggests, the White Paper was less innovative when seen in the light of prior policy developments.\textsuperscript{21} By 1969, BC, long deemed a historical bystander in regards to Indians, had been directly implicated in Indian policy and administration for over two decades.

The notion that Indians would one day fall under provincial auspices was, of course, implicit in the earliest assimilationist designs in Canada. Introducing a revamped Indian Act in 1887, Sir John A. Macdonald stated, “The great aim of our legislation has been to do away with the tribal system and assimilate the Indian people in all respects

\textsuperscript{20} Paul Tennant, \textit{Aboriginal People and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989} (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), 142-143.

with the inhabitants of the Dominion, as speedily as they are fit for the change.”

The early architects of assimilationist policy, however, could only speculate just how speedily this change might occur. What was agreed at the time was that Indians, as part of their development into full citizens, needed to be isolated on reserves and protected from provincial governments who could not be trusted to treat Indians justly.

Historically, BC’s interest in Indians largely related to the acquisition of Aboriginal lands and resources. When colonial Governor James Douglas retired in 1864, his “system” of treaty-making, land reform, and missionization gave way to more repressive policies under colonial officials like Joseph Trutch. The irony of the 1871 terms of BC’s entry to Confederation, which transferred control of Indians to the Dominion on the condition that the federal government adhere to policies “as liberal as that hitherto pursued by the British Columbia Government,” was that prior policy had been anything but liberal. As Brian Titley demonstrates in the context of BC reserve land conflicts in the early twentieth century, variant federal and provincial interests in Indians after Confederation proved a ripe source for intergovernmental conflict. After WWII, branch officials remained wary of historical antecedents and the province’s lack...

22 Return to an Order of the House of Commons, dated 2 May 1887, Canada Sessional Papers (No. 20b), 1887, 37 in Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 254.


24 British Columbia, Sessional Papers, 1871, 12 in Tennant, Aboriginal People and Politics, 43-44 f.n.16.

of interest in Indian protectionism and the assimilationist mission. Speaking before the SJC in 1946, the Indian Commissioner for BC, D.M. McKay, noted of provincial governments: “[They] have washed their hands of the Indians pretty well. They do not consider that they have any responsibility whatever with respect to them. They simply say [‘]they are wards of the Crown, the dominion, and it is their responsibility and not ours.[’]”26

Scholars since the late 1980s in turn have taken evidence of provincial disinterest in Indians to its logical limit and contended that lower governments have always “washed their hands” when it comes to Indian policy and administration. Indeed, the systemic provisions of section 91 (24) of the 1867 British North America Act, which stipulated federal jurisdiction over “Indians and lands reserved for the Indians,” have exerted as much influence on the writing of Aboriginal history as they have on the evolution of Indian-state relations. In their edited work, Governments in Conflict?: Provinces and Indian Nations in Canada, Anthony J. Long and Menno Boldt note: “The provinces have steadfastly resisted accepting greater responsibility for Indian residents within their boundaries.”27 This characterization has some early and modern historical applicability but it flies in the face of evidence to the contrary throughout much of the twentieth century. In BC, official integration with provincial health services began as early as the 1910s when the federal government began compensating the provinces for treatment of

26 Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 4 (11 June 1946).

27 Long and Boldt, eds. Governments in Conflict, 5.
Indian patients in provincial hospitals.\textsuperscript{28} A distinct pattern emerged in post-war decades when dozens of formal and informal federal-provincial agreements were struck in areas of health, education, welfare, and community development devolving administrative responsibility for Indians onto lower government. While the goal of complete institutional assimilation was never realized to its fullest extent, no steadfast policy existed when it came to federal devolution of Indian administration. Whether in BC or in Saskatchewan, as historian Laurie Barron’s study of Indian and Métis CCF policies under Tommy Douglas shows, no static or singular “provincial” perspective existed.\textsuperscript{29}

Throughout the post-war years, federal officials came to see the systemic administrative relationship between Indians and the federal government less as a means to protect and civilize Indians, and more as a barrier to their successful transformation into Canadian citizens. In a 1963 letter to the Minister, Indian Affairs field official John A. Emms epitomized the prevalent sentiment within bureaucratic circles by that time:

Integration programs are not too effective when there are so many areas of activity where Indians are under a separate, or different, form of administration. All separate or different programs for Indians tend to keep the Indian separate and different. If Indians are to become part of Canadian society they must have access to the same social programs and responsibilities as the non-Indians.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{28} The first integrated hospital existed in BC as early as 1859. The Royal Victoria Hospital opened that year on the Songhees reserve in Victoria, on the condition that it serve both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal patients. Grant Keddie, \textit{Songhees Pictorial: A History of the Songhees People as Seen by Outsiders, 1790-1912} (Victoria: Royal British Columbia Museum, 2003), 64.


\textsuperscript{30} LAC RG10 Vol. 13866 File 1/42-1 Pt. 1.1, “John A. Emms to the Minister, 13 May 1963.”
Post-war integration policies represented more than a response to calls for Indian citizenship or a novel moniker for assimilationist designs born in the nineteenth century. They specifically sought to devolve Indian affairs onto lower government. Boldt and Long describe attempts to shift responsibility for Indians onto the provinces as “institutional assimilation,” or the:

phasing out of administrative, political, legal, and economic boundaries between Indians and other Canadians, and incorporating Indians, both individually and collectively, under general federal and provincial policies, programs, and line departments.31

Integration, in short, was a mission administrative in both design and function. It represented a tangible way to dissolve the systemic relationship established between Indians and the federal government by transferring administrative responsibility for Indians from the federal government to the provinces, compelling increased provincial fiscal responsibility for on-reserve Indians, and promoting municipal-style governments on reserve to replace band structures. The federal government came to see all of these goals as possible within the existing parameters of constitutional and treaty law.

The history of federal-provincial relations and Indian affairs after WWII remains largely unwritten, and perhaps for good reason; the task of condensing twenty-five years of policy events, political changes, bureaucratic restructuring, intergovernmental negotiations, and Aboriginal roles therein is a formidable one. For scholars interested in the undertaking, this history can be told multiple ways. As provincial history, events in BC were exceptional in their own right. Under the post-war Coalition government of

31 Long and Boldt, “Federal Indian Policy and the Provinces,” in Governments in Conflict, 22.
Byron Johnson, BC was among the earliest provinces to grant Indians the provincial franchise and the first to elect an Aboriginal MLA in 1949 to the “roaring approval” of the legislature.\(^{32}\) Within a year, the province further recognized Aboriginal people’s new political status—and significant voting power—when the BC legislature passed the Indian Inquiry Act, creating the first provincial advisory body dedicated to consideration of Indian matters.\(^{33}\) BC Aboriginal people in this time began assuming and exercising new participatory roles in BC politics. As leader of the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia (NBBC) in 1954, Haida Rev. Peter Kelly estimated that the BC Indian held the balance of power in at least seven MLA constituencies, “And don’t think he doesn’t know it.”\(^{34}\)

BC also pioneered many administrative firsts with regard to Indians. While it was granting the franchise, the province began accepting Indians into its new public health insurance plan. Joint federal-provincial agreements soon followed opening provincial public schools to Indians. After taking power in 1952, Bennett’s Social Credit carried on integrationist policies but implemented few new ones, excepting sporadic agreements in health, provincial child welfare and off-reserve Indian welfare provisions. Commonly credited for building BC’s social welfare state in the 1950s and 60s, Bennett’s plans did not always include Indians. As Premier, Finance Minister, and chair of Treasury Board, 


\(^{33}\) An Act Authorizing an Inquiry into the Status and Rights of Indians in the Province, Statutes of British Columbia [or SBC] 1950, c. 32.

the premier held tight control over both political and executive arms of government. Bennett, despite any pledge to the contrary, increasingly came to see Indians as a material liability and, like his colonial and early provincial predecessors, treated Indians as secondary to larger provincial economic interests.\textsuperscript{35}

From another perspective, the historical development of BC-federal Indian relations can be told from within a broader federalist narrative. Most successes in federal devolution took place during a period scholars have termed the administrative or cooperative era in Canadian federalism: the period from WWII to the mid-1960s in which intergovernmental relations became more regular and formalized in response to policy needs and the growing capacities of government. Cooperative relations deteriorated around the mid-1960s giving way to executive federalism. Amidst this more competitive and conflictual era under the governments of John Diefenbaker and Lester B. Pearson, devolutionary trends declined once the provinces began exerting greater autonomy in financial matters and jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{36} BC was notorious for its tumultuous relationship with the federal government, especially under the two-decade long premiership of Bennett. Indians, along with tax rentals or equalization payments, were sources of intergovernmental conflict and political maneuvering throughout post-war decades.

\textsuperscript{35} Normal J. Ruff notes how BC’s relationships with Ottawa have always been somewhat enigmatic; BC premiers in general have “been promoters of a distinctive B.C. brand of ‘province building.’” Norman J. Ruff, “British Columbia and Canadian Federalism,” in \textit{The Reins of Power: Governing British Columbia} (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1983), 272.

Indians’ unique constitutional status and the statutory provisions of the federal Indian Act provided convenient means for the province to criticize the federal government for “Hitler-like tactics” but then also to decline any devolution offer it so chose. Provincial officials invoked constitutional and statutory law in areas of health, economic development, and welfare in the 1960s whenever it suited broader political and economic interests. BC’s approach to Indian administration typifies in microcosm what political scientists Norman J. Ruff and Philip Resnick describe as the province’s self-interested regional distinctiveness. “Always,” as BC journalist Bruce Hutchinson succinctly noted in 1948, “British Columbia thinks of British Columbia.”

Institutional frameworks provide yet another lens to assess mid-twentieth century Indian affairs in Canada. An important product of post-war national economic growth was the emergence of “big government.” Growing bureaucratic interest in Indian integration was a consequence of what historian Doug Owram terms the rise to power of the “government generation” and evolution of the modern Canadian state. In *Canada since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism*, Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and

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John English similarly describe how “The real Canadian ‘growth industry’ was ‘public administration plus defence plus service activities.’” If the dire extremes of the Depression and WWII had the effect of compelling new forms of governmental intervention in Canadian life, post-war economic prosperity, demographic growth, and bureaucratic modernization enabled this intervention to occur. Surely, the IAB was not isolated from national trends. From 1940 to 1959, its budget grew from six million to over thirty-six million dollars and its staff doubled in number.

After 1945, the IAB began to undergo a gradual but steady transformation, developing from what Weaver identified as an irrelevant branch within the Department of Mines and Resources, into a large and professional civil service. J.L. Granatstein notes how Canada’s civil service underwent a modernization after WWII. A new class of young, well-educated, and progressively-minded bureaucratic “mandarins” began steering federal civil service departments after WWII. While the IAB largely remained a “lost battalion” repository for ex-military types well into the 1960s, it was not immune from broader bureaucratic changes then taking place. The IAB became responsible for a ballooning budget and clientele population, enveloping many of the “ideal-type” characteristics of modern bureaucracies identified by sociologist Max Weber: hierarchization, officialdom, continuity, impersonality, and expertise, all in the larger

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42 See Appendix B.

name of administrative efficiency.  After 1945 the so-called “Indian problem” became more and more rationalized and legitimated in administrative terms. Increasingly professional, secular, and liberalist, bureaucratic action—what John Leslie refers to as new forms of “administrative activism”—lay at the heart of post-war Indian policies. It was the work of bureaucrats, administrators, and social scientists that recast post-war policy objectives although, as this dissertation shows, political interests never ceased to exert their ubiquitous influence on executive Indian programming.

While political, federalist, and institutional analyses provide important contexts to situate mid-twentieth century policies, none provides a complete framework, particularly when probing questions of power. As sociologists and scholars of public administration have long noted, bureaucracies may appear to but do not always operate in the manner Weber described. Many of those organizations exhibiting “ideal-type” structuralist characteristics are capable of inefficiency, if not outright dysfunction. Domination, in short, is not an implicit consequence of the ontology of government; state institutions,

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44 Weber referred to the historical evolution of different forms of power as “basic legitimations of domination,” which he ordered these into three chronological classifications: traditional (domination based on custom), charismatic (domination based on leadership), and legal-rational (domination based on laws and organizational power). The modern bureaucracy, according to Weber, represented the archetypical expression of legal-rational domination; legal-rational domination is based on the existence of laws and regulations enacted and the authority of a structural administration of politically-appointed officials. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” (Lecture delivered at Munich University, October 1919), 78. See also Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 956-58.

45 John Franklin Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?: The Development of Canadian Indian Policy, 1943-1963” (PhD Dissertation, Carlton University, 1999), 244.

46 Gregory J. Inwood, Understanding Canadian Public Administration: An Introduction to Theory and Practice (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1999), 35.
while crucial to the formulation of power relationships, are not potent determinants in themselves. French theorist Michel Foucault, of course, has done more than anyone else to attract attention to this fact, particularly in his later career works and interviews. As Foucauldian scholars John Caputo and Mark Yount observe, Foucault situated institutions within the thin but all-entangling web of power relations, approaching them as “readily definable macro-objects, grosser instruments for the finer, more elemental workings of power.”\textsuperscript{47} Foucault put it simply as a matter of methodology: “one must analyze institutions from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa.”\textsuperscript{48} His array of theoretical concepts—such as governmentality, biopolitics, and analytic of power—all probed questions about the relational patterning and dynamism of power relationships.

Scholars in the Canadian field have been slow to apply this basic tenet of Foucault’s work. Particularly evident in works published since the early 1990s, a normative paradigm stressing the colonialist and hegemonic implications of state power has dominated the Canadian historiography. Straying little from structuralist insights and homogenized conceptualizations of “the state,” recent and not-so-recent works diametrically juxtapose colonizer with colonized, and gloss over the complex means by


\textsuperscript{48} Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in \textit{Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics} by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 222.
which state power takes form and expression.\textsuperscript{49} This study moves beyond static and unitary conceptions of the state to illustrate how intrastate spaces act as sites for the interplay of both colonial-bureaucratic power and Aboriginal agency. As anthropologist Diane Nelson notes in her study of Guatemalan national development, the state acts as “both a site of demand and the stake of the struggle.”\textsuperscript{50} Accordingly, this dissertation challenges some of the orthodoxy that has emerged in the past twenty five years of deductive theoretical approaches to Native-newcomer relations in Canada. As such, it probes the inner dynamics and micro-workings of administrative relations and draws conclusions that might be best conceived of as revisionist.

While the interplay of power can produce systematic relations of rulers and ruled, state policies, by their mere existence, discursive expressions, or bureau-structural origins, have not always involved the unilateral extension of state power. As Foucault suggests, “[O]ne should not assume a massive and primal condition of domination, a binary structure with ‘dominators’ on one side and ‘dominated’ on the other.” Rather, power relations “serve” because they are capable of being used in strategies and because


\textsuperscript{50} Diane M. Nelson, \textit{A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 76.
they provide the very means for resistance.51 This study contends that a comprehensive understanding of policy can only be addressed through critical considerations of the entire range of processual implications of “government.” In doing so, this dissertation takes up J.R. Miller’s empiricist challenge to question the efficacy of governmental policies and to, “adjust … the generally accepted view of the whole array of policies aimed at political control and cultural assimilation.”52 The following chapters forward evidence that shows, through different policies and periods, how state-directed integrationist measures rarely produced the results envisioned by their architects. While some themes—assimilationist designs, financial first principles, Aboriginal exclusion from the decision-making process, and racist ideas about the inferiority of “Indians”—resonate throughout the breadth of Native-newcomer history, such forces varied widely in terms of their importance, influence, and result. In many ways the contradictions and discrepancies that existed between integrationist policy intentions, operations, and results echoed the theme of the British television comedy Yes Prime Minister: “a clash between the political will and the administrative won’t.”

51 Michel Foucault, “Power and Strategies,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 142. Foucault also describes how power always involves and engenders resistance: “[T]here are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised.” Ibid. See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 194; Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London: Pluto Press, 1994), 15.

As John Lutz demonstrates in his recent study of inter-ethnic exchange in BC, new histories require new ways of talking about the past.\textsuperscript{53} Instead of exclusively adopting national or provincial frameworks of reference, this study utilizes the concept *intrastate* throughout in reference to what French theorist Pierre Bourdieu calls “the field of power,” or “the space of the relations of force.” For Bourdieu, any notion of space carries with it relational understandings of the social world:

\begin{quote}
Apparent, directly visible beings, whether individuals or groups, exist and subsist in and through *difference*; that is, they occupy *relative positions* in a space of relations which, although invisible and always difficult to show empirically, is the most real entity and the real principle of the behaviour of individuals and groups.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

Gesturing towards a combination of theoretical approaches, this study contends that administrative spaces have served as important spaces for the reproduction of old, and interplay of new, power relationships. The impacts and legacy of post-WWII developments continue to unfold today.

In terms of format and method, the overall approach is comparative. Four specific policy episodes are compared and contrasted to show how integrationist policies embodied combinations of both new and old variables. In addition to providing glimpses into the gamut of federal integrationist policies, a comparative approach facilitates both macro- and micro-historical insights and reduces the possibility for analytical myopia


prone to studies of singular policy fields. No two policy areas were identical in terms of historical evolution, popular perception, intention, implementation, and impact.

Integrationist measures in Indian health provide one such example. Chapter Two traces the early development of integrated health and shows how the Indian health system underwent a massive reorganization after 1945 following the transfer of responsibility for Indian health from the IAB to the Department of National Health and Welfare (DNHW). Subject to a federal-provincial cost-sharing framework, Indians began accessing non-Indian hospitals in increasing numbers after WWII. Most scholars to date have characterized the advent of Western medicine as a colonizing process, one in which Aboriginal people were subjected to foreign colonial notions of clinical and bodily health. While the advent of integrated health services undoubtedly entailed a “governmentalization” of Indian health and the imposition of what Foucault might term new biopolitical regulatory controls, growing Aboriginal use of western health care in the twentieth century was not a simple correlative of colonial power. The integration of Indian health was a process fraught with inter- and intragovernmental conflict well into the 1960s. Moreover, Aboriginal people identified, utilized, and demanded new opportunities for improved health care before, during, and after WWII. As such, health care, like so many other government programs and initiatives, was something that cut two ways. It was assimilationist, an expression of federal authority (and funding) in a

55 See Kelm, Colonizing Bodies; Maureen K. Lux, Medicine That Walks: Disease, Medicine, and Canadian Plains Native People, 1880-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

provincial sphere of constitutional power, but it also was something most Aboriginal people actively sought out and used.

Chapter Two offers alternative perspectives on the meaning and implications of increasing Aboriginal involvement with western health care. It shows how the integration of Indian health with federal line and provincial departments had an array of impacts, one of which was the facilitation of improvements in Aboriginal health. By and large, significant Aboriginal interest in Canadian medical services by the mid-twentieth was not an ironic reversal of assimilationist tactics on the part of Aboriginal people, but rather paralleled what other scholars have suggested in the context of syncretic Aboriginal spiritual re-orientation: the emergence of entirely new and innovative forms of Aboriginal bodily health that were neither essentially traditional nor non-traditional in character.\(^57\) Aboriginal people were central players in this process, identifying, seeking out, and demanding improved and free forms of state Indian health care, from both federal and provincial authorities, as part of their perceived rights as Aboriginal people and Canadian citizens.

As in health, Indian education was an area of substantial devolutionary “success.” Chapter Three discusses how the administration of Indian education began shifting from federal- and church-run schools to integrated public schooling in the two decades after WWII. Some of the earliest and most significant steps to desegregate schools took place in BC. In 1949, both levels of government agreed to a per-capita funding arrangement;

shortly after, a series of joint agreements were struck between the federal government and BC school boards facilitating the entry of Indians into public educational institutions. After mid-century, the province joined the Indian policy development community and began administering—later even partially funding—Indian education services under the terms of joint agreements.

The history of integrated education provides another example of how policies are capable of producing a multiplicity of results. Despite the creation of new administrative arrangements facilitating the inclusion of Indians in provincial institutions, the results of integrated schooling rarely delivered on the overtures of Indian affairs officials. Public schools offered some improvements over the federal Indian school system but they also exposed and exacerbated many of the problems of the residential and day institutions. Indian children most often remained segregated in provincial schools in terms of educational achievement, instruction practices, and their treatment at the hands of non-Indian students and school personnel. In the early goings, integrated schooling was no panacea for desegregationist ends nor that of assimilationist state designs. Integration, in short, never occurred beyond a macro-institutional perspective.

Why was integrated schooling in BC an area of such spectacular success and failure? Chapter Three documents how federal and provincial interests, while qualitatively different and often conflictual, converged in the early 1950s when it came to Indian education. Integrated education might have offered a means for the province to desegregate its schools, a way for the federal government to share its costs for Indian education. The immediate effect of integrated schools, however, was not social and
cultural Indian integration. Aboriginal people, marginalized from the decision-making process throughout the integration process, were relegated to marginal positions of power. The inability of integrated public schooling to effect assimilation was apparent by the 1960s and 1970s when Aboriginal people began demanding greater self-control of education.

In addition to tracing the full implications of different policies, a major purpose of this work is to deconstruct “the state” and to critically examine policies through what sociologist J. Rick Ponting and political scientist Roger Gibbins refer to as the multifaceted “six dimensional political spaces” in which Indian administration is negotiated: party politics, Indian government politics, federal-provincial politics, Indian-Indian politics, bureapolitik, and inter-departmental politics.58 Nearly three decades have passed since the publication of Out of Irrelevance: A Socio-Political Introduction to Indian Affairs in Canada, yet the number of Canadian works that move beyond state-centered approaches to recognize the various constituent parts invoked by “government” are few. While recent studies, such as those by historian Robin Brownlie and anthropologist Toby Morantz shift focus away from federal contexts to examine local colonial relations, historians continue to stress state policies as monomorphic, rather than heterogeneous, in expression.59 Another recent work, Hugh Shewell’s study of post-

58 See J. Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance: A Socio-Political Introduction to Indian Affairs in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 315.

WWII Indian welfare policies, similarly fails to move beyond a structuralist paradigm. While more cognizant of the various constituent parts of government, Shewell too privileges an organic view of state action as inescapably colonial in design, constituent part, and effect. Historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer describes how such an approach employs techniques of emplotment, akin to what Hayden White terms the narrative tropism of tragedy. “Mechanistic and reductionist,” Lackenbauer writes, the Canadian facsimile of this mode of historical emplotment “denies complexity and marginalizes aspects of negotiation, compromise, and accommodation.” As he recently demonstrates in the context of Aboriginal-military land conflicts, the Indian affairs bureaucracy operated neither as a monolith nor did it always get its way.60

This dissertation too discards the notion that singular agents, interests, or expressions constitute the sole driving force behind government policies and explores more theoretical and historically-specific treatments of power. In this regard, this study contributes to a small but growing body of compelling Canadian scholarship focusing on similar questions of power, agency, and social action in the context of twentieth century Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations.61 As Paul Nadasdy notes in his study of inter-

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ethnic relations in the southern Yukon, “it is clear that to portray Aboriginal-state
relations as the result of colonialist and/or neo-colonialist policies of exploitation on the
part of ‘the state’ is to oversimplify what is in fact a much more complex situation.” Moving towards this end, this dissertation attempts what Joel S. Migdal terms in
reference to third world contexts, a “disaggregation of the state.” He writes:

patterns of domination are determined by key struggles spread through
what I call society’s multiple arenas of domination and opposition.
Officials at different levels of the state are key figures in these struggles,
interacting—at times conflicting—with an entire constellation of social
forces in disparate arenas. Any individual part of the state may respond as
much (or more) to the distinctive pressures it faces in particular arenas as
it does to the rest of the state organization. Different responses from
within the state mean that we cannot simply assume that as a whole it acts
in a rational and coherent fashion, or strategically follows a defined set of
interests.

Frameworks which probe the inner dynamics of intrastate relations prove useful for any
study of Canadian Indian administration, perhaps no more than during the post-WWII
era. Indian administration took on entirely new forms and expressions, especially once
the provinces and other federal line departments emerged alongside the IAB as primary
agents of Indian service delivery.

In addition to building on existing scholarship, this dissertation draws on
interdisciplinary analyses and comparative international literature similarly recognizing
government as an ensemble of apparatuses, forces, and interests, akin to what Nelson

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62 Nadasdy, Hunters and Bureaucrats, 4.

63 Joel S. Midgal, “The State in Society: An Approach to Struggle for Domination,” in State Power and
Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, Joel S. Midgal, ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 9. 7-36.
refers to as “territorialized interstitial places.” It is from this perspective that this study offers a new analytical perspective to assess how Native space has been structured, defined, and negotiated over space and time: that of administration. Though perhaps less sensational than topics such as land conflicts and rights litigation, administrative matters profoundly have shaped, and continue to shape, Native-newcomer relations. As historian Palmer Patterson notes, the power of Indian administration supplanted that of the missionary following “the decline of the theocratic era in Indian history.” Particularly after WWII, Aboriginal people found themselves and the spaces in which they resided increasingly defined in new administrative terms.

No less than those more familiar analytical “spaces” employed by scholars—discourse, cultures, reserve geographies, workplaces, city landscapes, or contact zones—colonial or post-colonial relations have taken form and expression within administrative contexts. However, by focusing excessively on questions of politics, law, and geography, scholars such as political scientist Paul Tennant and geographer Cole Harris have overdrawn the conclusion that in BC, “the land question has always been at the top of the

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agendas of Aboriginal people.” While questions of land, resources, and rights remained important to Aboriginal people before, during, and after post-war decades, administrative matters dominated the activities of federal, provincial, and Aboriginal leaders during the integrationist era. H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw, and S.M Jamieson affirmed this in a mid-1950s social science survey of BC Indian conditions undertaken for the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Their 1955 report states: “The social and economic welfare of the Indian people is … intimately linked bound up with the policies of the [Indian Affairs] Branch.” Furthermore, as Sto:lo Ed Kelly remembers, “In those days [the 1960s and 70s] we were more concerned about getting proper programs and help for our band members, for the various bands in general, and not so much concerned with treaties and so on.” For most Aboriginal people in BC at mid-century, the acquisition of adequate health, welfare, and education were, quite often, immediate matters of basic survival and quality of life. As a result, administrative spaces—that ensemble of apparatuses, forces, and interests negotiated in multidimensional processes—served as political theatres for the interplay of power relationships during the two and a half decades after 1945.

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66 Tennant, Aboriginal People and Politics, xii; Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002), xxv, xxviii,


69 UVA, Interview with Ed Kelly, Sardis, B.C., 5 June 2002, Interviewed by Byron Plant.
Chapter Four examines the advent of IAB economic development programming through this lens. Beginning in the late-1950s, the IAB implemented a range of policies aimed at integrating Indians into mainstream Canadian life, society, and economy. These initiatives, which fell under the general heading “economic development,” reflected growing awareness of Indian underdevelopment on reserves, the influence of social science research on policy decisions, and the need for more appropriate government-sponsored vocational and employment training. Economic development schemes also provided ways for the IAB to stay public criticisms, reduce welfare costs, and solicit provincial interest in welfare devolution. It is for these reasons that branch interest in economic development exploded into the early 1960s; federal officials embraced it like a tonic; new employment creation and relocation initiatives were described as “work magic” and capable of resolving at last the so-called “Indian problem.”

Chapter Four consists of micro-case studies tracing the policy cycles of three federal programs: the Employment Placement Program (EPP), Community Employment Program (CEP), and Community Development Program (CDP).

As noted, not all policies by their mere existence or bureaucratic-structural origins had significant impact. Unlike prior chapters, which show how various policy initiatives had a range of effects, Chapter Four contends that federal economic development programs had, at best, minor and ephemeral implications. Despite adopting a novel lexicon and appropriating social science discourses about reserves as spaces of

“underdevelopment,” the EPP, CDP and CEP were poorly-designed, small-scale, piecemeal, and short-lived initiatives that failed to affect more than a small portion of Aboriginal people. The province was willing to assume functions and allocate funds for the purposes of integrating schools and hospitals. BC, however, almost always treated Indian economic development on reserves as exclusive federal domain.

Even within the federal realm, interest in Indian economic development schemes was always subordinate to broader political interests and agendas. Chapter Four documents how parsimonious funding allocations by Cabinet acutely hindered branch attempts to implement Indian economic development programming. In the end, the IAB’s experimentation with economic development programming accomplished little. Having never gained the support within governments, or the Aboriginal consent and participation needed to effect actual change, federal attempts at economic assimilation delivered neither integration nor did it lead to subsequent welfare agreements with the province. The history of failed branch economic development programming shows how state directives aimed at economically assimilating Indians in Canada paralleled what scholars describe in other global settings as colonial policies of “apathetic and ambivalent neglect.”

Chapter Five begins where Chapter Four ends by examining post-war intergovernmental relations regarding Indian welfare, and the proceedings of the 1964 federal-provincial conference on Indian affairs, the first ever meeting of both levels of

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71 See Keith Thor Carlson, *The Twisted Road to Freedom: America’s Granting of Independence to the Philippines* (Diliman, Quezon City: University of Philippines Press, 1995), 3 f.n. 3.
government to specifically discuss Indians administration. Archival and government records are examined in detail to show how, of all Indian policy areas, intergovernmental agreement over Indian welfare proved the most difficult to achieve. How and why did the province accept some responsibilities for social welfare programs but resist all federal offers to share cost or assume responsibility for on-reserve Indian welfare? Focusing on the changing character of 1960s intergovernmental relations, Chapter Five discusses how BC came to view Indian welfare as a growing financial burden; federal encouragements to devolve Indian welfare in this period did little to dissipate provincial suspicions that officials in Ottawa merely sought to offload its own cost obligations onto the provinces. In the end, the conflicting interests of both levels of government regarding Indian welfare acutely hindered the trajectory and parameters of intrastate power.

Aboriginal people were among those calling most loudly for a provincial takeover of Indian welfare. Accordingly, this chapter challenges Hugh Shewell’s characterization of mid-1960s welfare reforms as a step towards the termination of Indians and, more generally, as indicative of the hegemony of the Canadian liberal state and market society.\(^\text{72}\) Evidence suggests that many BC Aboriginal people sought the improved benefits from a provincial takeover of Indian welfare and, failing that, found ways to manipulate both federal and provincial systems to meet their own interests. If a “state” policy prevailed or succeeded, it again was of ambivalent neglect. Indian social assistance was never primarily conceived of as a means for economic development or as

\(^{72}\) Shewell, ‘*Enough to Keep Them Alive*’, 331.
an effective way to integrate Indians; both federal and provincial officials consistently viewed it as a racially-loaded fiscal liability.

The archival record for post-WWII decades provides a rich source for new information on policy details, governmental attitudes, and intergovernmental workings. The following analyses are largely founded on a combination of federal Record Group and provincial Government Records archival series, departmental annual reports, Hansard transcripts, social science publications, and period newspapers. Some source gaps admittedly exist. For instance, prior to the advent of compulsory provincial document disposal legislation in 1960 and official Hansard record-keeping in 1972, many governmental documents were either never created or never saved for posterity. While part of this was symptomatic of the province’s then preference for small government and high ministerial executive power, it also reflects the fact that BC lacked a department solely dedicated to Indian affairs at this time. Intergovernmental liaisons regarding Indians were a complicated parley split along multiple provincial departments and personnel. Provincial perspectives, however, can and have been gleaned from existing provincial records as well as a range of supplementary materials including federal correspondence, commission reports, provincial dailies, social science literature, and political memoirs. Interviews with surviving period officials have been attempted wherever possible or drawn from other secondary works. Since most historiographical sources on integrationist policies to date are episodic and policy-specific, such literature is engaged in respective chapters.
Any study purporting qualitative assessments about the efficacy of state power necessarily entails appraisals about the ability of Aboriginal people to adopt, resist, ignore, adapt to, or benefit from governmental policies and practices.⁷³ One common thread running through almost all post-war integrationist policies is the virtual exclusion of Aboriginal people from the executive and decision-making process. Leslie, for instance, notes how Aboriginal people largely remained peripheral to the integration policy development community during the two decades after WWII.⁷⁴ In a study authored for the 1996 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Douglas Brown similarly writes:

> From the Aboriginal perspective, nowhere has their lack of representation and participation in Canadian government been as symbolically and practically evident as in the institutions of intergovernmental relations. Executive federalism is an exclusive club.⁷⁵

The most obvious source for Aboriginal perspectives, of course, are Aboriginal people themselves. Fortunately for scholars interested in the ethnohistory of post-war periods, many Aboriginal people were not passive, complicit, or silent about their marginalization. Period Aboriginal perspectives, both individual and organizational, can be readily found in government records, contemporary and archived oral interviews, social science reports, newspaper accounts, non-governmental organization publications, works of literature, newspapers, and books.

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⁷³ The same can be said in vice versa for contemporary studies undertaking cultural and discourse analyses at the expense of considerations of policy. Coll Thrush’s insightful study of inter-ethnic urban relations in Seattle, for example, scarcely mentions the role of US termination and relocation policies in motivating US Indian urbanization after WWII. See Coll Thrush, Native Seattle: Histories from the Crossing-Over Place (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007).

⁷⁴ Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?” 405-406.
and field historiography. It is from such sources that Aboriginal perspectives within this study are gleaned.

Scholarly writings since the mid-1990s on the meaning and impact of governmental policies directed towards Aboriginal people have informed a historiographical debate concerning colonial power versus Aboriginal agency. Within this debate, some scholars have been charged with writing works that mythologize Aboriginal agency and promote a “colonialist alibi,” while others have been accused of writing partisan works out of a sense of moral contrition for historical injustices. Others have gone as far as to blame scholars sympathetic to Aboriginal causes for promoting an “Aboriginal orthodoxy” which sacrifices scholarly integrity for sympathetic and politically-motivated historical revisionism. This dissertation seeks to move the debate beyond this polarization. Just as early expressions of colonialism took on multiple forms in BC, ranging from what John Lutz describes as peaceful subordination to outright violence of conquest, Aboriginal agency too was expressed in myriad, complex ways that changed through space and time.


78 Lutz, Makúk, 8, 24-25.
Complicating the ethnohistorian’s task of ascribing meaning to Aboriginal action are ubiquitous deficiencies in language and lexicon. Even our basic concept of agency, as Pierre Bourdieu notes, is problematic since it tends to frame agents as, “eminently active and acting, to simple epiphenomena of structure.” “To endeavor to think the state,” he explains, “is to take the risk of taking over (or being taken over by) a thought of the state, that is, of applying to the state categories of thought produced by the state and hence to misrecognize its most profound truth.”

Aboriginal people can be said to have navigated colonialism with varying levels of “success,” contingent on what terminology and evaluative variables one chooses to base such assumptions. Some Aboriginal agency could be said to have resembled what James C. Scott terms everyday forms of resistance by disempowered social groups; other forms of Aboriginal action might be better interpreted as pragmatic strategic and tactical acts, akin to what Michel De Certeau terms the modality of action. In addition to actions of resistance, Aboriginal agency can also be said to have included elements of accommodation, cooperation, and cooptation, as shown in the work of Peter Carstens and Taiaiake Alfred. Lastly, some expressions of agency might be best seen as owing little to no relation to state forces or “epiphenomena of structure.”


In addition to tracing the policy cycles of several administrative areas, this dissertation is interested in documenting how Aboriginal people plotted course through changing post-WWII administrative landscapes. Whether in the context of health, education, or welfare, historians have depicted Aboriginal people as steadfastly upholding the systemic provisions of the constitutional relationship with the federal government established in 1867. Long and Boldt, for example, write that “Indians have resisted any moves by the federal government to transfer its historical obligations to the provinces.”\(^8\) This study advances new evidence that Aboriginal perspectives on administrative integration have never been so static or singular. In different periods and policy areas, Aboriginal people both condemned and propounded provincial takeover of aspects of Indian administration. Some, such as Andy Paull, focused on resolving the land question with Crown authorities in his various political capacities. Others, including Canada’s first ever federally- and provincially-elected Indians, adopted a different tack; MP Len Marchand of the Okanagan Indian Band and Nisga’a MLA Frank Calder both publicly demanded that BC assume administrative responsibility for its taxpaying and voting Indian populace.\(^8\) The most common Aboriginal perspectives, however—both political and public—appear to have vacillated somewhere between these two poles. Native organizations, leaders, and individuals adopted fluid strategies when navigating

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multiple orders of government. Such behaviour, articulated in both words and actions, included combinatory elements of resistance, accommodation, cooperation, and even abstention. Highlighting the range of period Aboriginal perspectives that existed, this study challenges the prevailing scholarly assumption that Aboriginal people, along with the provinces, have long- and unitarily-rejected the principle of administration by lower government.

The existence of significant period evidence of Aboriginal interest in provincial administration presents a quandary for historians vis-à-vis the predominance of contemporary scholarship and political discourse emphasizing nation-to-nation protocols and the superlativeness of indigenous-Crown relations. At first glance, one might be tempted to suggest, as Alan Cairns and Thomas Flanagan have in varying degrees, that modern expressions of pan-Indian nationalism and political advocacy stand in odd contrast to earlier historical antecedents. However, just as governmental policies developed over time, so too have Aboriginal responses. That federal policies were inadequate might have been novel to non-Indians after WWII; it certainly was not to those people subjected to them for decades. Federal Indian policies have always had a lackluster track record of success and for this reason alone many Aboriginal people turned to those provincial authorities constitutionally responsible and expert in areas of health, education, and welfare for better services.

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De Certeau terms the practice of everyday action the survivalist mode of operation or schemata of action involving systems of operational combination: the pluralism of social and individual determinants that inform “‘ways of operating’ or doing things.” It is from this conception of human action as combinatory operations of both rational and informal logic that aspects of continuity and change, accommodation and resistance, are highlighted in this history. No single or unitary “Indian perspective” exists but if one did, it might be simply that for most Aboriginal people, the material ends—whether they be improved health, better education, or economic well-being—determined and justified the adoption of a wide array of strategic means. IAB officials were not the only ones searching for new strategies to navigate shifting post-WWII discursive and bureaucratic landscapes.

From this perspective, Indian interest in provincial service delivery did not merely signify cooptation or subscription to the assimilationist and fiscal first logic underpinning most devolutionary initiatives. Rather, most Native people viewed the utilization of provincial services as fully compatible with their identity and rights, whether as Indians, First Nations, Canadians, or “citizens plus.” According to historian John Leonard Taylor, this shift originated in the inter-war period. “There began to develop in this period,” he notes, “concepts of ‘being Indian’ that differed from mere enfranchisement and were not necessarily incompatible with full citizenship.”

86 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xi.
87 John Leonard Taylor, “Canadian Indian Policy During the Inter-War Years,” Ottawa: Research Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs, 1984), 7.
rendered free of charge as a constitutional or “Indian” right also appear throughout the archival record, and most often irrespective of which order of government actually stood to bear such expense.

The events of the two and a half decades after WWII thus need to be seen as intimately connected to the post-1969 emergence of special Aboriginal rights movements, land claims, treaty movements, and the post-1990s surfacing of nation-to-nation political discourse and rhetoric of indigenous nationalism. The Aboriginal struggle for rights of citizenry was a fundamental, if not necessary, precursor to subsequent claims that Aboriginal rights extend above and beyond those of other Canadians. The emergence of large political pan-Indian organizations, constitutional and common law precedents positing the existence of Aboriginal rights, and modern land claims processes in the 1970s and beyond, in short, were intimately rooted in shifting intrastate relations in the 1950s and 1960s. Writing in 1964, anthropologist Wilson Duff befittingly predicted: “The story is not over yet, but certainly for the foreseeable future at least, the Indians are not going to be assimilated, but will remain a distinct element of our population and our culture.”

The post-war era was perhaps most remarkable for the fact that Aboriginal people began, in every respect, “to move out of the era of irrelevance in which they had been cast by the majority population in the nineteenth century.” Integrationist policies in this period might have failed to deliver on their terms of reference but the implications of

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88 Duff, *The Indian History of British Columbia*, 88.
89 Miller, *Skyscrapers*, 221.
them were felt long after. New Aboriginal-state power relations began to take shape in this era and in many ways, the release of the 1969 White paper had more a cataclysmic than germinating effect on the emergence of modern pan-Indian political organizations. Nascent power relations forged in post-war decades matured into the 1970s and 80s as Aboriginal people began voicing and exercising this newfound relevance.
Chapter Two:

“‘A Sort of Divided Control and Authority over the Indians’: The Integration of Indian Health in British Columbia”

I used to help at times of birth, yes,
I used to help all the women around here.
I learned it from my book, my blue doctor’s book.
I used to read it all the time.

I made up my mind that if she needs help,
I will help her. I’m not scared.
You’ve got to be awfully quick. There’s two lives there.
The baby and the mother.
—Mary Augusta Tappage (Shuswap), excerpt from “At Birth.”

The development of integrated Indian health in British Columbia followed a unique historical trajectory which predated the post-WWII era. As early as the 1910s, Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) Annual Reports recorded federal subsidies for the purposes of Indian treatments at non-federal hospitals and clinics. Integrated health policies were also unrivaled in terms of their intergovernmental and bureaucratic complexities. Multiple government departments began administering Indian health following the 1945 transfer of the Indian Health Service (IHS) from the Indian Affairs Branch to the Health Branch of the recently created Department of National Health and Welfare. Once removed from IAB auspices, integration with provincial health care institutions increased rapidly. In 1949, the BC government agreed to terms with the federal government allowing Indians into provincial hospitals and healthcare plans under

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2 See Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report for 1911-1912, Sessional Papers (27), H-59; Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report for 1912-1913, Sessional Papers (27), H-59.
similar terms as non-Indians. The desegregation of BC’s health institutions, along with schooling, was an area of discernible achievement in “administrative integration.”

Historians to date know very little about the development of provincial Indian health care in BC. The only existing published monograph study of Aboriginal health in BC is Mary Ellen-Kelm’s *Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in British Columbia*. Despite describing itself as a “provincial rather than a national study,” *Colonizing Bodies* pays scant attention to the specific role of lower government in this history. Similar studies of Indian health policies in other Canadian regions, such as those by Maureen Lux and T. Kue Young, also focus predominantly on federal contexts. While the national government played an important part in the provision of Aboriginal health throughout the 1900s, provincial agencies had begun administering Indian health care long prior to mid-century. Health was an area of increasing governmental responsibility and humanitarian interest, particularly after WWII. Overall economic prosperity and rising government revenues allowed for expansion of the public health purse. BC’s governments even appeared willing to accept some administrative and fiscal responsibility for Indian health as part of their post-war health plans. In addition, a unique combination of moral, humanitarian, and assimilationist impetuses ran high when it came to health; neither level of government wanted to be culpable for opposing what most Canadians came to see as a basic human right and obligation of government.

Politically, the dire realities of Indian health and welfare made for embarrassing

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3 BC initiated its first buy-in health care system in 1949 with the BC Hospital Insurance Plan.

headlines and photo journalist reports, while also stoking non-Aboriginal fears of contagion.  

Advances in the integration of Indian health, however, did not occur smoothly or without considerable conflict. Federal and provincial governments might have agreed about the need to desegregate BC’s hospitals and to displace indigenous medicinal practices with western clinical ones, but implementation was another matter. Federal-provincial clashes over the cost and control of Indian health erupted after WWII and continued well past mid-century. Late-1960s disputes involving Prince Rupert’s Miller Bay Indian Hospital and the implementation of universal healthcare in BC exemplified both the advent of conflictual executive era federalist relations as well as familiar constants in the history of Indian health service delivery: unofficial policies of ambivalence, fiscal evasion, and benign neglect. The convoluted and strained evolution of integrated Indian health in BC underscores how, as with every other integrationist policy area, combinations of intergovernmental politicking, jurisdictional ambiguities, financial first principles, and assimilative interests both facilitated and impeded the implementation of “administrative integration.”

Indigenous people’s experience with Canadian health systems involved bureaucracies, bodies, and minds. Describing the emergence of Western medical discourse in the eighteenth century, Michel Foucault notes:

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For clinical experience to become possible as a new form of knowledge, a reorganization of the hospital field, a new definition of the status of the patient in society, and the establishment of a certain relationship between public assistance and medical experience, between help and knowledge, became necessary; the patient has to be enveloped in a collective, homogenous space.6

BC’s hospitals were “collective, homogenous space,” and in both discursive and physical senses. Provincial institutions were individualizing, clinical, and impersonal, and, in many ways, alien to both traditional forms of indigenous medicine and prior forms of federal Indian health care.7 More generally, escalating federal and provincial interest in Indian health around mid-century reflected what Foucault describes as the highest function of post-classical regimes: the administration of populations and the preservation of life. Foucault termed this a biopolitics of the population, the establishment of new bodily interventions and regulatory controls.8 This trend found expression in the Canadian context, particularly once general economic growth and rising government revenues from the late-1940s on allowed for expansion of the national health service.

While state attempts to displace Aboriginal medicinal practices and beliefs undoubtedly had significant biopolitical underpinnings and assimilationist implications, Aboriginal people were not uninterested or uninvolved agents in this history. Ample evidence indicates that Aboriginal people increasingly sought out and accessed provincial


and private health institutions throughout the twentieth century. They did so irrespective of historical precedents or constitutional provisos regarding Indians’ relationship with the federal government, almost always demanding, in both words and actions, that state health services be delivered satisfactorily and free of charge. Aboriginal people’s engagement, often entanglement, with western hospitals, doctors, and health officials was the consequence of a combination of pressures, needs, and normative forces, not the least of which was a basic desire for improved quality of life. Aboriginal agency was not, as suggested by scholars such as Kelm, limited to simple acts of resistance or cultural resiliency vis-à-vis a colonial incursion of western medicine. Rather, Aboriginal people navigated both federal and provincial health institutions by adopting innovative strategies, practices, and epistemologies to cope with changing pathogenic and biomedical landscapes. Thus, though it has been unappreciated by historians to date, the remarkable rebound of Aboriginal populations that began prior to mid-century was, in no small part, a result of Aboriginal people manipulating and taking advantage of health service improvements afforded by integrationist measures in Indian health care provision.

Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal health relations in BC stretch back to the fur trade era. Prior to the formation of the Indian affairs department in 1880, missionaries, fur traders, and other lay dispensers provided the earliest forms of state Indian health care. Shortly after its creation in 1880, the Department of Indian Affairs adopted an ad hoc Indian health policy consisting of the delivery of basic medical services by Indian agents and
churches via residential schools.\textsuperscript{9} Despite maintaining that it had no legal obligation, whether by statutory, treaty, or constitutional law, to provide Indians with medical care, the federal government nonetheless provided it via limited involvement and annual appropriations to various departments for that purpose.\textsuperscript{10}

Federal Indian health services in this period tended to be minimalist, born from cost considerations, and rooted in the fatalistic view that the Indian race was soon to disappear, either by natural or assimilationist policy design. In this regard, early Aboriginal health care provision differed little from other executive policy areas administered by the DIA under officials like Deputy Superintendent Duncan Campbell Scott: underfunded, minimalist, and informed by racial theories about the inferiority of “Indians.” As Lux notes in the Canadian plains context, early state health care was rooted in a complex interrelated set of assimilationist motivations, federal self-interests, public fears of contagion, and social Darwinist ideas about the incapability of “Indians” to resist disease. More generally, she notes, “Successive Canadian governments continued to see disease as the cause, rather than the symptom, of a much larger

\textsuperscript{9} As James B.Waldram, D. Ann Herring, and T. Kue Young note, early state medical care provision under the Indian Affairs Department was ad hoc, regionally-variable, and shaped by interdepartmental personalities. James B. Waldram, D. Ann Herring, and T. Kue Young, \textit{Aboriginal Health in Canada: Historical, Cultural, and Epidemiological Perspectives} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 176.

\textsuperscript{10} The 1876 and 1880 Acts stipulated that the Superintendent retained the power to use band funds to care for “sick or disabled, or aged and destitute persons.” This provision, however, appears to have only been used in the case of bands with available funds to pay part-time physicians. \textit{Statutes of Canada} [or \textit{SC}] (1876), c.18, s.73; \textit{SC} (1880), c.28, s. 84. G. Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians, 1867-1967,” \textit{Medical Services Journal of Canada} Vol. 23 (February 1967), 116. According to the Department of National Health and Welfare, “A health service for native Indian and Eskimo was developed as a voluntarily assumed moral obligation on the part of the government.” See Canada, Department of National Health and Welfare, \textit{Annual Report, 1947-48}, 40.
economic and political problem.”¹¹ Such views justified the provision of meager federal
health policies for close to two generations. Low budget allocations, limited staff
capabilities, and the formidable task of administering health to a population spanning all
parts of the country meant that early Indian health care consisted of short-term disease
control rather than longer-term preventative, acute, or palliative care. Indian health care
was couched low in the priorities of a disorganized department preoccupied with a host of
other administrative matters.¹²

The inadequacy of Indian health services in the early twentieth century was the
source of numerous inter-departmental and intergovernmental controversies. The
conflicts between Scott and Peter H. Bryce, the DIA’s first medical inspector appointed
in 1904 to oversee Indian health, have been well-documented.¹³ Along with Bryce,
provincial officials were early critics of federal Indian health policy. As early as 1909,
the secretary to the BC Provincial Board of Health voiced concern over fears of
contagion, the disgraceful to near criminal sanitation standards in the province’s Indian
villages, and the inadequate levels of Aboriginal health maintained by the federal Indian

¹¹ Maureen K. Lux, Medicine That Walks: Disease, Medicine, and Canadian Plains Native People, 1880-
1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 192.

¹² As C.R. Maundrell notes, “A study of the reports and correspondence impresses one with the
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¹³ See E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs
in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986), 83-7; Waldrum, Herring, and Young, Aboriginal Health in
Canada, 156-8. Lux, Medicine that Walks, 196. Bryce, an outspoken critic of the standards of medical
care delivered by the government and churches in the residential schools, had advocated the conversion
of Indian schools into sanatoria. Bryce ended up being forced to retire in 1921. Graham-Cumming, “Health
department. As a solution, Bryce proposed the creation of a federal health department under which Indian health services would be transferred. An early bill was tabled proposing to do precisely this but it never passed third reading. Prime Minister Arthur Meighen explained:

I do not think … it would be practicable for [the health department] to do that work, because [it would] duplicate the organization … and there would be a sort of divided control and authority over the Indians which would produce confusion and insubordination and other ill effects among the Indians themselves.

While the transfer would not occur for another twenty-five years, interim steps to create a modern Indian medical health service came in 1927 when a Medical Branch was created in the DIA headed by a medical superintendent, Col. E.L. Stone. Still, budgetary considerations exerted powerful constraint on the development of Indian health services in these years. In 1930-31, the budget devoted to Indian health hit an all time high of $1,061,278 only to be cut during the peak years of the Depression by almost 25%. By 1934, two years before oversight of Indian affairs was transferred from the DIA to the Department of Mines and Resources, the per capita amount allocated for non-Native health services was over three times higher than that paid to Indians. The DIA’s

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15 T. Kue Young, Health Care and Cultural Change: The Indian Experience in the Central Subarctic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 86, f.n. 10.


17 By 1935-36, the budget finally reached pre-Depression current rates. See “Indian Health Service, Ordinary and Special Expenditure from Parliamentary Vote,” in Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 3 (June 6, 1946).

reluctance, or inability, to provide better Indian health services was, as one early critic put it, “The Story of a National Crime.” Early state healthcare hardly resembled a potent and exacting colonial force, but rather typified what Young terms in his study of Indian health in the Central Subarctic as policies of “benign neglect” in which “public assistance in the area of health and welfare in Canada was made available only to an irreducible minimum number of ‘indigents.’”19 Since no statutory obligation existed for government to provide health services to Indians, officials could spin any state medical assistance as either gracious acts of benevolence or as deliberate steps towards the goal of Indian social integration, whenever it suited political expediency or deflected public criticism.

In the years immediately prior to WWII, calls for reforms in Indian health escalated. In 1937, the Rowell-Sirois Commission into Dominion-provincial relations heard submissions urging greater provincial controls of Indian health services. Reserves were described as “focal points of infection for tuberculosis and other communicable diseases”; provinces could do little to protect themselves so long as medical services for Indians were federally-controlled.20 The commission’s final report recommended that integrationist steps be taken and that “The Dominion should consider carefully the possibility … of buying provincial services rather than establishing its own medical services.” The recommendation, however, was only tentative. Since administrative integration in Indian health was not seen as significantly reducing costs or duplication.

19 Young, Health Care and Cultural Change, 90.

between levels of government, the commission speculated that “there may be off-setting advantages in the present arrangement which outweigh the financial considerations.”

Aboriginal people in BC, as in other regions of Canada, sought out and took advantage of Euro-Canadian medical services throughout the post-contact period. While many undoubtedly rejected Canadian medicine outright, and traditional medicinal practices and beliefs endured well into early twentieth century decades and beyond, most Aboriginal people took a piecemeal and pragmatic approach to health treatments. No singular “Indian” health perspective existed by the mid-twentieth century. Rather, Aboriginal people innovated old and adopted new medical practices in response to changing pathogenic and biomedical landscapes. The multitude of Indian attitudes and responses towards Canadian health services created considerable confusion for those officials unilaterally dismissive of the effectiveness or worth of indigenous medicinal practices. For instance, at the same time the 1946 DNHW Annual Report lamented the ongoing influence of “the medicine man … even where modern medical methods are available,” then Chief Medical Officer Moore wrote elsewhere that “on the whole both Indians and Eskimos have come to respect and ask for ‘white man’s medicine.’”


For many Aboriginal people, a common response to introduced forms of Canadian medicine entailed what Kelm and Lux describe as “medical pluralism”: the incorporation of western medical knowledge into more familiar or “traditional” indigenous practices and epistemologies of bodily and spiritual health. As noted, “White” diseases were often seen as best treated by “White” medicine, hence, as Lux suggests, western medical dispensaries offered “a number of novel medicines, or replacement medicines, and the people incorporated these into their own therapeutic regime.”

As Nancy Reifel notes in a brief but insightful study of twentieth-century Southern Dakota Indian views of public health nursing, “The people were survivors. Indians treated the imposition of white medicine in much the same way as they did other aspects of their interactions with white people. They incorporated what was necessary for survival into their cultural practices.”

In BC, colonist and missionary reports as early as 1862 cited thousands of Indians accepting inoculation as a combined result of proactive European efforts and Aboriginal interest in staying the disease.

A recurrent theme in extant studies of Aboriginal-Canadian health relations is the notion that Aboriginal people have steadfastly held the federal government solely responsible for Indian health provision. As Kelm argues, “Throughout the bureaucratic expansion, the financial cutbacks, and the administrative consolidation, Aboriginal people maintained one perspective on Indian Health Services: that the federal

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24 Lux, Medicine that Walks, 227; Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 154, 172.


26 See Plant, “‘The Most Dreadful Scourge,’” 42-44; Boyd, The Coming of the Pestilence, 185.
government was responsible for primary care in their communities.”

Some evidence certainly lends credibility to this view. Decades prior to the establishment of judicial precedents, such as the 1984 Guerin decision’s affirmation of federal trust obligations to Indians, many viewed the Crown as having fiduciary and administrative responsibilities to Indians, responsibilities that included health care services. Peart affirmed this in 1961 before the JC when he stated, “a widespread belief which is shared by Indians and Eskimos [is] that health services are in fact a federal responsibility and the public expenditures in this field lend substance to this view.”

Most evidence indicates that BC Aboriginal people increasingly interacted with Western medicine throughout the twentieth century, but regardless of whether practitioners were of federal, provincial, or private affiliation. For instance, the DHNW estimated in its 1945-46 Annual Report that 16,239 Indian patients nationally (potentially as much as 13% of the total Indian population) received treatment in 434 provincial and

27 See Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 116. See also Young, Health Care and Cultural Change, 92.


29 Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 3 (16 March 1961), 62.

locally-operated hospitals through contractual and special arrangements.\(^{31}\) Of BC’s 1946 Indian population of 25,515, 4,882 cases were reportedly treated in 55 non-federal hospitals.\(^{32}\) By the mid-1960s estimates of the percentage of Indians in receipt of treatment at provincial facilities climbed to range from 25-50%.\(^{33}\) Indians were known to independently enroll in the plans of private medical insurers; some Indian bands went as far as to hire their own private physicians, and even when the services of a department doctor were available.\(^{34}\) Though her analysis downplays it as evidence of Aboriginal political opportunism, class dynamics, and even cooptation, Kelm’s *Colonizing Bodies* also documents numerous instances of BC Aboriginal people voluntarily taking, seeking out, and demanding “White” medicine prior to 1950.\(^{35}\)

It is not surprising that Aboriginal people increasingly turned to state hospitals and medical practitioners during this period. Prior to the 1950s, a range of deadly

\(^{31}\) The actual percentage of Indian patients treated likely varied since statistical data does not account for multiple visits by individual patients. Comparatively, only 4,446 Indian patients, about 3.5% of the total national Indian population, were recorded as having received services in the seventeen Indian Affairs-run health facilities. Department of National Health and Welfare, *Annual Report, 1945-46*, 25.


\(^{33}\) At the 1964 federal-provincial conference on Indian affairs, the province estimated that approximately 25% of public health services were provided by the provincial health department. Two years later, the BC Indian Advisory Committee reported that over 50% of the on- and off-reserve Indian population of the province was receiving public health nursing services under provincial health agencies. British Columbia, Indian Advisory Committee, *Annual Report, 1965*, 14; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Federal Provincial Conference, Appendix D, Health Services Provided to Indians by Provincial and Community Facilities,” 3; D.B. Fields and W.T. Stanbury, “The Economic Impact of the Public Sector Upon the Indians of British Columbia: An Examination of the Incidence of Taxation of Three Levels of Government,” (Ottawa: A Study for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1968), 104.


diseases including influenza, measles, whooping cough, and scarlet fever ravaged Aboriginal communities. Tuberculosis, the “captain of the hosts of death,” was a major contributor to high Indian mortality and morbidity rates throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century. As both Kelm and Lux note, however, early federal responses to treat Indian TB were sluggish and minimalist. While federal interest in TB control gradually increased into the 1920s—motivated by a combination of non-Native fears of contagion, the advent of the Bacille-Calmette-Guerin vaccine, and new preventative measures—it was not until the 1945 transfer that the federal government had the political will or financial ability to implement significant preventative and treatment steps.

BC Aboriginal people were not only active in their liaisons with western hospitals and doctors; they also were among the most vocal critics of Indian health care policy, whether under branch, DNHW, or later, provincial oversight. For instance, Herbert Cook, General Secretary of the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, wrote to the Indian Commissioner for BC in 1944 expressing concern about off-reserve Indians having to pay their own hospital bills. The NBBC resolved at its annual convention that year that hospitals or nurse services be delivered in BC and that “[s]erious consideration

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37 Up until that time, tuberculosis prevention and control received modest attention under the Department of Mines and Resources, except in cases where contagion threatened non-Indian communities. For example, Bryce earlier attempted unsuccessfully to acquire a special parliamentary vote of $20,000 for preventative measures in control of TB. Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians, 1867-1967,” 125. See also Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 119-121; Lux, Medicine that Walks, 191-92.
should be given to the need of better medical care.”\textsuperscript{38} The Quatsino Band on northern Vancouver Island also voiced complaint over their inability to access the local private hospital in Port Alice, further demanding that the provincial government take action on the issue.\textsuperscript{39} Three years later, interior Indians and the North American Indian Brotherhood (NAIB) under Frank Assu petitioned the DNHW for the construction of an interior Indian TB hospital, to provide more accessible health service delivery than the Fraser Valley Sardis hospital.\textsuperscript{40}

Aboriginal protests over the inadequacy of and lack of access to state health services continued after mid-century. In 1950, Frank Calder, the Nisga’a MLA for Atlin, requested that the provincial government establish an air ambulance service for northern BC Indians to alleviate health concerns.\textsuperscript{41} In 1954, Chief Ed Underwood of the East Saanich band near Victoria complained that a nurse had not set foot on the reserve for over a year. Arthur Albany, Chief of the neighbouring Songhees, also noted the need for nurses on their reserve in a \textit{Victoria Daily Colonist} report.\textsuperscript{42} For many other Aboriginal groups residing in small villages spanning wide geographies, such as the Kwakwaka’wakw of the south central BC coast, demands for improved health care

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\item \textsuperscript{38} McKay responded by directing Cook to take up the matter with the local Indian agent. BCA GR-1222 Box 106 File 10, “Minutes of the Fifteenth Annual Convention, Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, 12-18 November 1944,” 5, 20.
\item \textsuperscript{39} BCA GR-1222 Box 106 File 10, “Minutes of the Fifteenth Annual Convention, Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, 12-18 November 1944,” 25.
\item \textsuperscript{40} \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 24 January 1949, “Indians Ask for Interior TB Hospital,” 16.
\item \textsuperscript{41} \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 9 March 1950, “Atlin MLA Asks Gov’t for Plane Ambulance Service,” 9.
\item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{Victoria Daily Colonist}, January 27 1956, “‘Indians Exist—That’s All’ Help-Seeking Chief States,” 3.
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services motivated physical relocations. Jack and Dot Nolie, for example, explain their 1960s move from New Vancouver to Alert Bay in these terms:

Jack: There was nobody there, no boat, radio phone, nothing. Our little daughter got sick. In the village they got nobody to call, and she died.

Dot: … All my kids were sick. One died. And that’s the reason why we left.43

Pete Cook also notes how relocations for health purposes only became more common once federal Indian day schools began closing in the 1960s:

Well, I would say it’s part of the government’s fault. School, everything. They wouldn’t support the school there [Tourner Island]. … [T]he people had to move [to Alert Bay]. And mainly for the hospital too. And other times we had to travel, through the gale, gale force wind, just to bring somebody to the hospital here, which was really tough.44

Cook himself relocated to Victoria specifically for health reasons: “I didn’t move there because I wanted to. I was against it. But if I didn’t I guess I would have been gone a long time ago.”45

For people such as Cook and the Nolies, access to healthcare was a matter of life and death at mid-century; many embraced the services offered by both federal and provincial facilities for this simple reason. Shuswap Mary Augusta Tappage’s poem in the opening epigraph to this chapter can also be read as affirming that Aboriginal people were not culturally predisposed to reject western medical knowledge long before mid-century. Indeed, into the 1960s, Aboriginal women emerged as some of the most vocal


44 UVA, Interview with Pete Cook, Alert Bay, B.C., 8 July 2003, interviewed by Byron Plant.
advocates for improvements in government health provision. In 1968, the British Columbia Indian Homemakers’ Association went as far as to accuse the government of racial bias and neglect in the provision of Indian health services. One representative noted, “I have seen people die because health services available to whites are not available to Indians.”

It is further shown below how Aboriginal people forwarded grievances and demands to both provincial and federal authorities for better health services after concerted steps to integrate Indian health services with BC began.

As noted, BC officials also criticized federal Indian health policy prior to the 1945 transfer of the Indian Health Service from the IAB to the DNHW. Even though British Columbia’s per diem rate for operating Indian hospitals was the highest of all provinces, BC MPs voiced complaints about poor quality of federal Indian health care services under IAB control. To one such critique raised during the 1944 federal estimates debate, the Minister of Mines and Resources, T.A. Crerar, responded:

> The committee knows as well as I do that we have been limited in the amount of money provided by parliament for this purpose. … It seems clearly evident that in future years the federal government whose wards the Indians are will have to spend considerably more money for Indian hospital treatment than it has spent in the past. I am bound to add that our experience to date indicates that we can provide that treatment just as efficiently, just as completely in hospitals operated by the department as we can in outside hospitals, and there is no question of the comparison in

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45 UVA, Interview with Pete Cook.

46 *Vancouver Sun*, 8 June 1968, “Indian Women to Seek Answers,” 33. Later in 1967, a Southern Vancouver Island Tribal Federation brief sent to both levels of government decrying an instance where an Indian cancer patient was denied compensation simply because a provincial referral was not obtained first. BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “Presentation By the Southern Vancouver Island Tribal Federation to the Honourable Arthur Laing and the Honourable Dan Campbell, December 1967,” 14-15.

costs. We operate our Indian hospitals substantially lower than what we are paying in other hospitals.\footnote{48} Crerar unknowingly foreshadowed the precise reasons why the transfer would occur one year later: the IAB, both then and previously, had neither the financial means nor clout within government to expand an Indian medical service. One year later, the disadvantage of having health services administered by a department principally concerned with the systemic assimilation of Indians and a host of other administrative matters was finally recognized and acted upon.\footnote{49} Effective November 1 1945, Indian Health Services became the concern of the DNHW, a newly-created department principally focused on improving Canadian health and welfare standards.

Frequently mentioned in early DNHW \textit{Annual Reports}, TB morbidity was of primary concern to the new health service. The department immediately set about combating the disease, conducting surveys, improving equipment and personnel, and recruiting provincial support via its Tuberculosis Prevention and Control Campaign and the Advisory Committee for the Control and Prevention of Tuberculosis.\footnote{50} Such steps seemed to have an immediate impact. Between 1948 and 1949, the IHS estimated that

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\footnote{48} House of Commons, \textit{Debates}, 14 August 1944, 6446-6447. \\
\footnote{50} Department of National Health and Welfare, \textit{Annual Report, 1945-46}, 27; Department of National Health and Welfare, \textit{Annual Report, 1947-48}, 43; Moore, “No Longer Captain,” 1014. As part of this campaign, annual or biennial surveys of children and staff in residential schools were attempted. Greater use of x-ray and the Bacillus Calmette-Guerin vaccine, discovered to provide a degree of resistance to mycobacterium, were also adopted to combat tuberculosis beginning in earnest in 1948-49. Department of National Health and Welfare, \textit{Annual Report, 1948-49}, 106. By 1963 it was estimated that half of the Indian population}{67}
the mortality rate dropped 30% in one year alone.51 Around 1950 TB ceased to be the highest cause of Indian deaths; from 1951 to 1954, TB fell from being the second to the eighth highest cause of death among Indians.52 That same year the IAB’s monthly newsletter, *The Indian News* reported that tuberculosis deaths had dropped 90% in eight years.53 TB mortality rates continued to gradually drop although epidemics did not disappear after WWII. Sporadic series of “moderate epidemics” of TB and other diseases touched parts of Canada over the next two decades in northern Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and the Arctic.54

While Indian mortality and morbidity rates remained far above those of non-Indians, an identifiable shift had begun by the mid-1950s in which the main causes of Indian mortality began to more closely parallel those of non-Indians.55 Acute respiratory infections like pneumonia remained the leading cause of Aboriginal deaths after 1950 but

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accident-based mortalities moved from fourth to second place. Chronic heart disease, the number one killer of non-Indians, shifted from the sixth to the third highest cause of Indian fatality. Improvements in Aboriginal morbidity and mortality variables after WWII were the result of a range of inter-related factors, including betterments in Aboriginal incomes, standards of living, social welfare services, and reserve infrastructure. Changes to Indian health administration also played an important role. The new attention given to education and preventative medicine under the DNHW was something virtually absent under the prior treatment-focused branch-run system. According to BC regional health inspector William Barclay, increasing TB control allowed the IHS “to devote more time to fighting other diseases among the Indian population.”

Indian infant mortality rates, what Lux describes as, “the most sensitive index of the health status of any people,” also began to significantly improve after 1945. Between 1925 and 1955, Young records that Native infant deaths per 1000 live births dropped by roughly 300% nationally; from 1956 to 1970, the rate continued to decline by an


additional 60%, 20% more than the concurrent reduction in the non-Native rate.\footnote{59}

Reflecting on this trend in 1962, George Manuel told the Kamloops Branch of the Registered Nurses Association:

> Ever since an enlightened government policy has provided free medical services to the Indian people, there has been an amazing increase in the total population. This is due partly to the increased birthrate, but there can be no doubt that the sharp decline in infant-mortality has also been a decisive factor.\footnote{60}

Whether or not government health policies were “enlightened” aside, what appears certain is that declining infant mortality rates drove a uniquely post-WWII “Aboriginal baby boom” that paralleled and outlasted the non-Native baby boom that subsided in the early 1960s.\footnote{61} While both Kelm and Lux downplay the importance of early improvements in Aboriginal infant survival vis-à-vis continuous Native and non-Native gaps in child mortality rates, mid-century improvements in this area might very well be the most important sub-story in this history.\footnote{62}

With a clear mandate, larger budget, and professional staff, the DNHW proved more capable than the IAB in meeting the medical needs of a burgeoning Aboriginal population. Shortly after the war, the department converted two decommissioned


\footnote{60} George Manuel, \textit{The Indian News}, October 1962, “Respect the Old Ways and Accept the New Ways.”


wartime hospitals into new Indian health facilities via the coordination of the Committee on Wartime Hospitals and Hospitalization. A former Royal Canadian Air Force facility near Prince Rupert became the 180-bed Miller Bay Indian Hospital; in Nanaimo, a former Department of National Defense facility was turned into a 220-bed facility. At the time of the 1945 transfer, BC’s sole Indian hospital was Sardis’s Coqualeetza hospital, formerly a residential school and preventorium remodeled and reopened as a 180-bed sanatorium in 1941. The number of nursing stations and dispensaries, an ongoing source of primary health care services for many Aboriginal people in BC, increased from nine in 1946 to forty three in 1961. Budget figures further reflect the rapid expansion of the Indian health care system after WWII. In 1946-47 the budget for Indian health was $3,853,425; by 1961-62 that figure had grown six fold to $23,790,411.

Even though the transfer of Indian health responsibility to another federal line agency facilitated new funding and efficiency, challenges remained for Indian health administrators. As in education, staff shortages were an ongoing problem. The demand

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63 *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 13 September 1940, “Indian School to Become Hospital,” 11; Moore, “No Longer Captain,” 1014; *Vancouver Sun*, 9 June 1945, “Indians Take over RCAF Hospital,” 2; See also Keith Thor Carlson, *You Are Asked to Witness: The Sto:lo in Canada’s Pacific Coast History* (Chilliwack, BC: Sto:lo Heritage Trust, 1997), 100-101.

64 Nurse stations were essentially small hospitals with a few beds under the charge of nurses and supportive staff, deployed in more isolated or semi-isolated regions with limited services. In BC, a nurse station was located at Port Simpson while Lillooet, New Westminster, Kitimaat, Hazelton, and Bella Coola housed field nurse dispensaries. Department of National Health and Welfare, *Annual Report, 1947-48*, 42. The utilization of nurses had been implemented first under Bryce in 1922 as an affordable means to deliver health care to remote and large regions.


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for qualified doctors, nurses, and hospital beds in both Indian and provincial hospitals outstripped supply in post-war decades. Miller Bay, for instance, opened with a limited capacity of 40 beds due to staff shortages; Nanaimo’s hospital also reported labour and equipment shortages. Nursing stations remained chronically understaffed well after WWII and in 1963 it was estimated that one nurse existed per 1,000 Indians nationally. Relations between the DNHW and the IAB also remained unclear after the transfer. While the IHS now oversaw Indian hospitals and medical care, every other policy area determinant of Aboriginal health (i.e. sanitation, housing, education, etc.) remained vested with the IAB. DNHW publications and personnel might have ostensibly maintained that the two departments maintained a “very close liaison” in matters affecting the health and welfare of Indians and Eskimos, but the transfer also created new administrative confusion and duplication as well as ongoing policy differences.

Relations with provincial departments of health were notably better with the DHNW than with the IAB. The DNHW, an agency solely responsible for health matters and a budget several times larger than that of the Department of Mines and Resources, did not suffer from the same intragovernmental insignificance and poor repute as the


67 Vancouver Sun, 17 June 1949, “All Patients Happy at Indian Hospital,” 29; Victoria Daily Colonist, 8 October 1946, “Help Shortage Hampers new Indian Health Plans,” 8; Indian News, June 1963, “Population Exceeds 200,000 – Expanded Services Boon the Indians.” Young notes how understaffing, low wages, and poorly qualified personnel were chronic to the Sioux Lookout hospital in Ontario in the 1950s and 60s. Young, Health Care and Cultural Change, 103-4.

IAB. The IAB’s oversight of a wide range of program areas had only served to complicate individual policy negotiations with the provinces.\(^6\) Moreover, the DNHW had a greater degree of decentralization and higher standards of supervision than had ever been the case under the IAB. BC, for example, had its own DNHW regional director along with three zone superintendents who oversaw health regions and hospitals, including medical officers, doctors, and nurses. Overall, the DNHW was more qualified and capable when it came to both the provision of Indian health and the conduct of meaningful discussions with the provinces to devolve services.

Immediately following the 1945 transfer, it became clear that, along with TB control, integration with provincial institutions was high on the priority list for the DNHW. During the proceedings of the Special Joint Committee in 1946, the Minister of DNHW, Brooke Claxton, stated: “It is proposed to intensify efforts to co-operate with provincial and other agencies working in the same field of health care with a view to the improvement of the service and the avoidance of needless duplication.”\(^7\) In addition to fostering administrative efficiency, DNHW officials pitched provincial devolution of Indian health services as advancing the larger goal of Indian social integration and citizenship. In 1949, the DNHW’s Annual Report announced that “increasingly large sums have been appropriated for [Indian health] … in the trust that it has been dispensed

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\(^7\) Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 3 (June 6, 1946).
wisely and “with the ultimate promise that it will fit the native people for what must be, eventually, an equal place in the community at large.”  

From the outset, integrated Indian health policy was loosely modeled on the Rowell-Sirois recommendation: federal payment for provincial services rendered. Although the IHS provided some construction grants to hospitals in some regions, “integrated” services tended to involve the payment of contractual subsidization rates to provincial doctors for performed medical services. Indians living off-reserve for eighteen months or more were considered the full responsibility of municipalities in accordance with a 1936 federal regulation. This time limit was eventually lowered to twelve months in 1963 when a federal-BC agreement was reached clarifying health and welfare jurisdictional guidelines for off-reserve Indians.

Some provincial doctors were considered part time federal civil servants and paid via annual stipend for providing services to Indians. Other physicians were compensated for such services according to pre-approved fee schedules. In the latter instance, the IHS controlled costs by setting monthly quotas for Indian patient treatments by stipulating that

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73 According to the regulation, “The attendance provided shall not exceed, in amount or kind or cost, that provided by a municipality, at public expense, for indigent members of the municipality. BCA GR-2720 Box 3 File 6 Pt. 2, “Copy of Regulations in Regard to the Medical Care of Indians not Resident on Indian Reserves, 1 February, 1936.”

any clients treated outside of such arrangements were responsible for those costs incurred.\textsuperscript{75} IHS Director Dr. P.E. Moore justified this policy by explaining that otherwise, “any Indian could walk into the city of Toronto, or Ottawa, go to the best specialists, run up any kind of bill in any hospital or receive any type of medical care, and it would be just absolutely beyond our budgetary control.”\textsuperscript{76} The IHS managed to find other ways to cut costs, namely by shifting cost burdens onto local practitioners and hospitals. The fee schedule rates paid to doctors was set at one-quarter less than those paid to non-Indians. Apparently, physicians were expected to look upon the 25% difference as a tariff for indigent patients.\textsuperscript{77} Evidence presented at the 1961 proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian Affairs further demonstrates how physicians were compensated for only a fraction of actual costs and going rates.\textsuperscript{78} The proceedings cited one provincial doctor who incurred monthly costs of $1,500, of which only $437.50 was recoverable through the IHS’s BC division fee schedule.\textsuperscript{79} Accusations of billing inequities, however, could go both ways. Young, for instance, notes how one Ontario health superintendent believed that private physicians were padding health service bills and drawing additional reimbursement from the government.\textsuperscript{80} Most evidence, however,

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\textsuperscript{75} Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, \textit{The Indians of British Columbia}, 405.

\textsuperscript{76} Joint Committee, \textit{Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence}, No. 3 (16 March 1961), 66.

\textsuperscript{77} Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, \textit{The Indians of British Columbia}, 405. The per capita rate of funding allotted to Natives for health finally became comparable term to non-Natives in the 1970s and 80s. Young, \textit{Health Care and Cultural Change}, 126.

\textsuperscript{78} Joint Committee, \textit{Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence}, No. 3 (16 March 1961), 63, 67.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 75.

\textsuperscript{80} Young, \textit{Health Care and Cultural Change}, 109.
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suggests that doctors bore a significant portion of the costs of treating Indian patients throughout the integration process.\footnote{See Fields and Stanbury, “The Economic Impact of the Public Sector upon the Indians of British Columbia,” 117.}

The advent of public health insurance in BC provided new opportunities for “administrative integration” in Indian health. In early 1949, the province and the federal government agreed to terms allowing Indian inclusion in the British Columbia Hospital Insurance Service (BCHIS), with the federal government subsidizing Indian enrolment costs. Treatments rendered at both provincial and federal Indian hospitals qualified for reimbursement from the BCHIS. The DNHW lauded BC’s willingness to include Indians in its plan as “one of the most outstanding advances in the history of native health,” and “a major step in the social and economic advancement of these people.” While Indian coverage under the BCHIS marked a step towards integration, the DNHW’s assertion that, “[t]he Indians will, in every way, be on the same basis as all other residents,”\footnote{Where the cost of non-Indian health care coverage came via prepaid premiums, co-insurance per diem charges, and municipal revenues, Indians’ premium and co-insurance charges remained subsidized by the federal government. Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1948-9, 191, 207; Victoria Daily Colonist, 7 January 1949, “Want Indians in Hospital Plan,” 8; Vancouver Sun, 3 February 1949, “Indians Covered by Hospitals Set,” 30. See also Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1948-49, 107.} was an overstatement. The early years of the BCHIS proved to be an administrative nightmare during which the federal government continued to operate its Indian hospitals and fund the bulk of cost for Indian enrolment.\footnote{See Jean Barman, The West Beyond the West: A History of British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 198; David J. Mitchell, W.A.C. Bennett and the Rise of British Columbia (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1983), 184. It was not until 1954, when a 5% sales tax payable by all residents, including Indians, replaced the former system of prepaid premiums, that Indians began systematically contributing to the costs of plan coverage on an individual user basis.}

Moreover, some uncertainty initially
surrounded whether Indians would even be assured provincial coverage under the BCHIS plan. During March 1954 discussions to replace BCHIS prepaid premiums with a 5% provincial sales tax, health minister Eric Martin refused to confirm whether BC or the federal government would guarantee Indian health coverage under the reformed plan, prompting Frank Calder to accuse the Social Credit of a “dirty low-down trick.”

Within days, however, Martin caved to pressures and announced that Indians would not only be included in the plan but also that all outstanding Indian premium arrears would be forgiven.

As noted, early federal legislation lacked specific references to the general responsibility or maintenance of Indian health. This began to change in the 1950s, once it became clear that administrative integration required a clarification of federal-provincial roles. Section 87 of the Indian Act of 1951, the long-awaited response to the recommendations of the 1946-48 Special Joint Committee, stated:

Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law made thereunder, and except to the extent that such laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under this Act.


86 See *Indian Act, Statutes of Canada* [or SC] 1951, c. 29, s. 87.
Specifically regarding health, section 72 (1) (g) of the new act granted cabinet the right to make regulations “to provide medical treatment and health services for Indians.”\(^87\)

Although the act made mention of federal-provincial/municipal health agreements in the case of enfranchised bands,\(^88\) it stated no legal obligation of the federal government to provide or pay for Indian medical care.

More significant legal reforms came two years later when the federal government passed regulations granting agency superintendents the power to compel medical treatment for both Indians and non-Indian residing on reserves. Part one of the regulations reified the principle that Indians were subject to all provincial laws and regulations relating to health or sanitation, punishable by summary conviction of fines and imprisonment. It stated that Indians “shall comply with all laws and regulations in force within a province relating to health and sanitation.”\(^89\) Part two, supplemented by an explanatory note issued in 1954, laid out jurisdictional terms by which Indians residing off-reserve were entitled to receive government health service:

(a) An Indian is eligible to receive treatment if he resides on a reserve or in an Indian community, and the Indian concerned is unable to obtain the required attention through his own or any other source.

(b) Where an Indian has established residence off the reserve in an assessing community (municipality) in accordance with the terms of the residence and responsibility clauses of the appropriate provincial legislation with respect to public assistance, he must be considered a resident and a responsibility of the municipality or province concerned.

\(^87\) Ibid., c. 29, s. 72.

\(^88\) The 1951 Indian Act continued to grant the Minster, but now with band council approval, the ability to use band funds, “to assist sick, disabled or destitute Indians.” See Ibid., c. 29, s. 66, 111.

\(^89\) LLBC, The Canadian Gazette, SOR/54-310, 683.
(c) When an Indian returns to a reserve and it is reasonably certain that he intends to take up residence on the reserve or in an Indian community, his eligibility on the basis of residence is re-established…

In addition to elaborating on- and off-reserve Indian health care eligibility, the regulation clarified minimal requirements for federal health provision. Indians were to receive federal assistance only in cases where any other agency-provided health care, such as a prepaid medical plan, worker’s compensation, or health insurance, were unavailable. In keeping with both early assimilationist policies and the post-war integrationist impulse, Indians were encouraged to pay for their medical expenses whenever possible, just like non-Natives.

The regulation might have been clear that Indians were expected to pay like other provincial citizens but enforcement was another matter. Few Indians could afford health care premiums and it appears that the IHS rarely pursued those with medical costs incurred. Before the House of Commons in 1953, DNHW Minister Paul Martin stated that he felt the policy of having capable Indians pay for their own health care was “common sense” before admitting that, “[t]here are not many Indians in that category.”

Director Moore also noted in 1961 that “[w]e have never pressed for payment of medical accounts, and we practically take it as per se that the amount of money that would be collected from an Indian on a reserve, if we attempted to collect from him, would not

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92 House of Commons, *Debates*, 8 May 1953, 5004.
justify the time and effort involved.”93 Seemingly, the IHS had no past or future plans to collect payment from Indians even though Moore later went on to estimate that half of Indians in settled parts of Canada then had the financial means to pay their own medical premiums.94 This unofficial policy of forgiving medical costs was as much a result of the impracticability of enforcing the regulation and collecting arrears as any governmental benevolence. Moreover, no means test existed at the time to even determine Indian fitness to pay. Quite often, assessments of whether a patient was a Treaty or indigent Indian was made by the physician at the time of treatment.95

Provincial authorities similarly appear to have prosecuted few Indians for non-payment of medical services; BC preferred to take up collection issues with the deeper-pocketed federal government.96 Speaking before the JC in 1961, seven years after the regulations were enacted, Dr. Arthur F.W. Peart, deputy general secretary of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) noted: “[m]unicipal authorities and other officials appear firm in their belief that the federal government is entirely responsible for the health care of Indians and responsibility is promptly transferred even in cases which do not meet the criteria of eligibility.”97 Ignorance of the 1953 regulation also appears to


94 Ibid., 74.


97 Joint Committee, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 3 (16 March 1961), 64.
have been a significant source of administrative confusion and non-compliance in other Canadian provinces. Peart quoted the experiences of one doctor who stated:

I can truthfully say that I have yet to meet an Indian who is even faintly aware of this. It appears that this policy, as outlined in the fee schedule, is revealed only to the doctor. ... There is a firmly-rooted belief that a Treaty Indian is entitled to free hospital and medical care, and any attempt on our part to convince them otherwise is met with great indignation and ill-feeling, not only from the Indian but from the local I.H.S. nurses and officials to whom he takes his complaint.98

Peart went on to cite other examples in which Indians charged for medical service were instructed by IHS nurses to “go right back and get your money refunded as they have no right to charge you.” He described this as “an example of a government employee sabotaging the aims and polices of their own department perhaps unwittingly.” Indians also appear to have shared the view that free medical care was their right. Peart noted how Indians questioned the honesty of physicians attempting to collect payment following the delivery of medical care; others went “straight to the Indian health service nurse, to complain.”99 Some bands refused to pay for their own medical costs knowing that others were receiving premium-free medical care, thus forcing the IHS to pay. Even those Indians aware of the expectation that capable members pay their own medical expenses, Peart noted, used “various types of arguments to get out of it.”100 Moore even described instances in which Indians in receipt of treatment collected reimbursement

98 Ibid. Amazingly, Moore too appeared to have only a partial understanding of the 1953 regulations when he suggested before the JC that the only regulations affecting the service were in regards to compulsory treatment of TB patients. Ibid., 72.

99 See Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 3 (16 March 1961), 72, 75.

100 Ibid., 77.
cheques from their health insurers only to keep them and then charge the federal government to pay the costs of the procedures.\textsuperscript{101} Of course, discrepancies between stated and actual policy did not always work to the advantage of Aboriginal people. In their federally-sponsored 1955 survey of BC Indians, “The Indians of British Columbia: A Survey of Social and Economic Conditions: A Report to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,” H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw, and S.M. Jamieson identified treatment delays and the arbitrary handling of cases of exclusion as products of the residency regulations, as well as the IHS’s apparent use of “a good deal of discretion in applying its policy.”\textsuperscript{102}

Despite earlier \textit{Annual Report} pronouncements that the IAB and DNHW enjoyed, “the finest co-operation,” in relations with provincial medical departments, growing conflicts over cost sharing and jurisdiction incubated during this period.\textsuperscript{103} The splitting of Indian healthcare responsibilities between federal and provincial departments might have removed many of the hurdles to more effective administration and provincial devolution; however, it also created new conflicts and uncertainties which in turn inhibited the formulation of a long term Indian health policy. Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson’s 1955 report noted that “[s]ometimes the policies of the Indian Health Service

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 74.

\textsuperscript{102} The study found evidence of Indians living within municipal boundaries working at canneries and those with children attending residential schools being unfairly treated under the 1953 regulations. Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, “The Indians of British Columbia,” 861.

and the Indian Affairs Branch seemed at cross purposes."\(^{104}\) Briefing the Joint Committee in 1961, Peart also remarked that the splitting of administrative functions for Indians between the Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and National Health and Welfare contributed to misunderstandings, difficulties, differences in philosophy, and a confusion of policy.\(^{105}\) By the 1960s, it was becoming readily apparent that “cross purposes,” particularly in regards to cost and jurisdiction, were boiling into federal-provincial strife.\(^{106}\) Events involving the Miller Bay Indian Hospital, provide one case in point.

Since the introduction of the BCHIS in 1949, health services rendered to Indians at Indian hospitals were eligible for coverage under the plan. At Miller Bay, the number of cases treated at the hospital charged to the BCHIS had grown steadily throughout the 1950s. The provincial Department of Health Services had become so concerned by 1960 with the high rates and costs of Indian hospitalization that it began enforcing a regulatory provision of the Hospital Insurance Act mandating that provincial coverage for services rendered at a federal hospital be provided only in the prior denial of treatment at a


\(^{105}\) Joint Committee, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 3 (16 March 1961), 64.

\(^{106}\) In 1968, a provincial Medical Service official complained of instances in which off-reserve clients would be accepted as IAB welfare charges yet be denied federal medical care, noting that “there is no clear cut policy.” BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 94, “T.T. Hill to P.W. Laundry, 17 September 1968.”
In other words, local Indians had to attempt to receive treatment at the Prince Rupert public hospital and acquire proof of a refused admittance before they could be treated by their local Indian hospital. Immediately, the number of cases paid out by the BCHIS to the federal hospital plummeted.

The issue spawned a lengthy and prickly exchange between the Eric Martin, provincial minister of Health Services and Hospital Insurance, and J. Waldo Monteith, Minister of the DNHW. In a 1961 letter to Martin, Monteith noted that Indian children were being denied service at the federal Miller Bay facility due to the provincial regulation and threatened to withhold grant payments to force the issue. Martin later responded by reminding Monteith that the BCHIS adopted this measure to reduce duplication and overlapping of services. Indian hospitals, he noted, were “subject to the prior approval of the Provincial Authority in the same manner as is required for other hospitals.” BC’s deputy minister of Hospital Insurance in BC, D.M. Cox explained earlier that year: “We have … always expected hospitals, in dealing with Indians, to consider them only as residents of the Province and as patients requiring the services of the hospital.” Provincial health officials like Martin and Cox justified their position by stating that BC was merely doing as it was asked by the federal government; as with integrated schooling, the province was encouraged, if not legally compelled, to treat

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109 BCA GR-0678 Box 16 File 11, “Eric Martin to J. Waldo Monteith, 4 April 1963.”
Indians no differently than it did other provincial citizens, whether in regards to BCHIS eligibility or treatment.\textsuperscript{111} The inability, or unwillingness, of the federal government to provide adequate health care services on reserves, BC officials argued, unfairly shifted service and fiduciary burden onto a province already struggling to manage high costs and overcrowding in its public hospitals.\textsuperscript{112} Those regulatory and statutory provisions demanding unfettered integration just so happened to provide a convenient means for the province to control rising costs, compel administrative efficiency, and assert jurisdictional supremacy in the area of health.

The issue dragged on into the summer of 1963 when the federal government began publicly discussing intent to close Miller Bay and its other Indian hospitals in Nanaimo and Sardis. Declining numbers of TB cases and deteriorating facilities were the primary reasons for the planned Miller Bay closure, although federal officials took the opportunity to explain it as resulting from “being very unfairly treated by the B.C. Hospital Insurance Service.”\textsuperscript{113} The province, however, never budged. Secondary appeals to BCHIS by Indian affairs officials failed to bring resolution to the dispute. Those most inconvenienced by the impasse, local Tsimshian, also appear to have had

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\item \textsuperscript{110} BCA GR-0678 Box 16 File 10, “Donald M. Cox to Joanna R. Wright, 3 January 1961.”
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ironically, the province also didn’t discriminate between public and federal hospitals when it came to funding; the BCHIS underpaid the per diem rate below actual cost at both federal and provincial hospitals. Fields and Stanbury, “The Economic Impact of the Public Sector upon the Indians of British Columbia,” 297.
\item \textsuperscript{112} To resolve the issue, Martin flippantly suggested that Indian health service workers seek to qualify for membership on the staffs of provincial public hospitals. BCA GR-0678 Box 16 File 11, “Eric Martin to J. Waldo Montetith, 4 December 1961”; Mitchell, \textit{W.A.C.}, 357.
\item \textsuperscript{113} House of Commons, \textit{Debates}, 13 April 1964, 2086; BCA GR-0678 Box 16 File 11, “P.E. Moore to H.F. Ross, 2 July 1963.”
\end{itemize}
little influence in changing provincial attitudes. Even BC’s own Hospital Finance Manager, W.J. Lyle, sympathized with the federal position, stating that “the present approach to the Indian problem is not satisfactory. Perhaps what is needed are more public health and other services located at the reservation.” Resolution of the dispute finally came when the province proposed that it commit to pay some of the outstanding unpaid claims and remove the admission ticket requirement; in exchange, the federal government agreed to limit the total number of chargebacks to the BCHIS at Miller Bay to 4,400 accounts annually. The agreement was a decided provincial victory and the federal government later asserted that it was “practically coerced into making this agreement.”

BC knew that it was a mere matter of time before the federal government closed its Indian hospitals such as Miller Bay anyway, which the federal government did in 1971 when a new provincial facility was erected in Prince Rupert.

While the Miller Bay dispute was brewing, the integrationist cause received new support with the release of the report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Commission) in 1962. The report, which assessed the organization and methods of federal departments and agencies, described the existence of federal health facilities in the provinces in servicing those “now entitled as ordinary citizens to facilities under provincial jurisdiction,” as “an example of duplication and

114 BCA GR-0678 Box 16 File 12, “W.J. Lyle to D.M. Cox, November 19, 1963.”

115 BCA GR-0678 Box 16 File 12, “Judy LaMarsh to Eric Martin, November 4, 1964.”

116 Nanaimo’s Indian hospital closed in 1966; Sardis’s Coqualeetza hospital closed in 1969.
waste from the national point of view.” Regarding Indian and Eskimo health, the report advocated that:

1. A positive program be developed for the more rapid transfer of Indian health care to normal community facilities in populated areas of the province
2. Where possible, medical and dental care be arranged through private practicing physicians and dentists (with the federal government bearing the cost of pre-paid medical plans where necessary).117

The Glassco report essentially affirmed the established policy of the DNHW, compelled further consolidation of health institutions, and served to channel more Indians into more cost-effective provincial facilities and health plans. The same year the Commission issued its report, the Indian Health Service was dissolved and responsibility for Indian health was merged into the Medical Services Branch (MSB). Moreover, as early as the 1950s the IAB had already begun a general consolidation of administrative services in hopes of controlling expenditure and compelling Indian urbanization. The 1996 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples describes how IAB administrative consolidations were commonplace in this period nation-wide for the purposes of cheapening and improving Indian administration and services such as health and education.118 Much like those events surrounding the Miller Bay hospital, the mantra of


integration justified administrative consolidations and the streamlining of more costly components of the medical service. Official policies aimed at devolving and consolidating federal health and education services with those of the province thus provided the federal government with coincidental and new opportunities to cut costs and advance assimilationist agendas.

While assimilationist agendas and federal interest in cost-saving sometimes complemented each other, they also often conflicted. Federal and provincial officials might have both supported integrated health as a way to incorporate Indians as provincial citizens, but the Miller Bay incident revealed that governments could disagree over just how far “administrative integration” should be taken. Federal administrators were likely surprised to learn that unfettered integration could result in both higher costs and increased hardships for Aboriginal people. In that instance, IAB and DNHW officials fought to mitigate the full effects of “administrative integration” and BC’s assertion of full domain in the realm of health. Indeed, neither the Glassco recommendations nor subsequent bureaucratic restructuring prevented intergovernmental clashes like the Miller Bay conflict from occurring. The mid-1960s advent of universal health care in BC incited another similar incident providing a second case in point.

119 Dr. G.F. Amyot, provincial Deputy Minister of Health, stated in 1956, “Indians should be encouraged to leave their reserves and join in the economic life of the majority of the people of the province.” Victoria Daily Colonist, 15 February 1956, “Assimilate Indians, Dr. Amyot Advises,” 2. A few years earlier, Moore stated, “whatever plan is adopted in any province, we will endeavour to see the Indian brought under exactly the same regime as is instituted for the rest of the population of the province.” Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 3 (16 March 1961), 68.

120 See BCA GR-0678 Box 16 File 11, “J. Waldo Monteith to Eric Martin, 10 November 1961.”
In 1965, BC replaced the BCHIS with the BC Medical Plan (BCMP) and passed the Medical Grant Act, establishing a subsidization scheme for low income residents to participate in the plan.\(^{121}\) The province agreed to continue to accept Indian enrolment under the BCMP but on the condition that they not apply for the subsidy, a 50% stipend given to designated needy recipients. Indians were already able to receive a federal grant of up to 50% to cover the cost of provincial premiums for unemployed or unemployable Indians. Conflict erupted when the province learned that the MSB staff had been instructing Indians to apply for the provincial grant. MSB officials saw the step as shifting costs to the province and as a way for Indians to gain coverage under the provincial plan, since BC medical officers discouraged bulk applications.\(^{122}\) In response, the province began invoking a Medical Grant Act clause prohibiting the provincial provision of the grant for any persons whose health and welfare were deemed the responsibility of the federal government. BC Medical Plan executive director A.W. Brown informed DNHW regional director R.D. Thompson that “[we] cannot accept these application in the form in which they have been written, as we understand these persons are the responsibility of the Federal Government.”\(^{123}\)

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\(^{121}\) Barman, The West Beyond the West, 298. Even though the intent was to share costs on a 50-50 basis, the federal government footed most of the bill for public health in BC. Fields and Stanbury note that in 1966 the provincial share was amounting to only 39% of the total operating costs for BC’s public hospitals. Fields and Stanbury, “The Economic Impact of the Public Sector Upon the Indians of British Columbia,” 122-23.

\(^{122}\) BCA GR BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “Chronological Resume: B.C. Indians and B.C.M. Plan [1965],” 3.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., 3-4; BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “A.W. Brown to R.D. Thompson, 2 December 1965.”
The matter gained higher profile when Aboriginal people began wading into the issue. In July 1965 the executive of the Nishga Tribal Council forwarded a resolution to the IAB demanding federal coverage of the costs of BC Indians to receive provincial health insurance coverage. That December, three Squamish band members also met with Brown to demand Indian eligibility for the provincial medical grant. James Nahanee, one delegation member, noted the inadequacy of medical attention under the federal government only to be reminded by Brown that the province would not allow grant provision for persons “for whose health and welfare care the Government of Canada is responsible.” Nahanee decried this as representing unfair treatment since Indians paid provincial sales tax in support of the BCMP but did not receive due benefits. With no resolution in sight, Nahanee reportedly concluded the meeting by warning that “the Indians would have to do something about this.”

The Squamish men did precisely this, taking up their claim with G.A. Stewart of the BC Medical Plan. They again demanded provincial health coverage as a right in the absence of any statute asserting federal responsibility for Indian health. Nahanee even offered band funds towards the securing of Indian enrolment to which Stewart declined since “that would be considered a group application,” and contravene the eligibility provisions of the Medical Grant Act. The meeting ended with Nahanee simply asking how coverage might be obtained, to which Stewart answered, “Our Government is

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125 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “A.W. Brown to W.D. Black, 8 December 1965.”

126 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “G.A. Stewart to W.D. Black, 10 December, 1965.”
interested in the Indian, and wants them treated as any other resident,” before directing the three men to take up their issue with provincial secretary W.D. Black. Stewart would later privately write to Black, warning him that that the Squamish men were attempting, “to get something for nothing.” Subsequent appeals the following year by H.F. King, Medical Superintendent of the MSB, to Black and other MLAs, similarly failed to change provincial minds.

As the Miller Bay and Medical Grant incidents indicate, Aboriginal complaints and intergovernmental conflicts over Indian health administration endured over two decades into the integration process. Aboriginal people lobbied provincial health officials for fair treatment under the MSB; provincial officials, in turn, publicly decried the inadequacy of federal housing and sanitation services on reserves to enhance Aboriginal ill-being. BC newspaper reports condemning the poor living and health standards on federal reserves provided further ammunition for provincial health officials to level blame at their as frugally-minded federal counterparts for policies of neglect. Aboriginal people also continued to protest instances of being denied equitable medical treatment from government institutions. In February 1969, Len Marchand, elected to the House of Commons in 1968 as Canada’s first Indian MP, said it was “damn silly” that

127 Ibid; BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “G.A. Stewart to W.D. Black, 19 April 1966.”

128 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “H.F. King to W.D. Black, 28 January 1966”; BCA GR BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “H.F. King to Tony Gargrave, 7 December 1965.”

Kamloops Indians were denied access to a nearby provincial health unit.\textsuperscript{130} The growing participation of Aboriginal people in health debates in the 1960s exemplified what Foucault refers to as the ability of strategies which co-ordinate relations of power to produce new effects and advance into hitherto unaffected domains.\textsuperscript{131}

Vocal critics at the JC proceedings in 1961, BC’s doctors also continued to weigh into the debate in the latter 1960s. In 1968, the Indian Health Committee of the BC Medical Association (BCMA) undertook an independent investigation of Indian health care in BC. The report condemned the federal government for engaging “in a general withdrawal of services and a placing of the responsibility of providing services on the provincial government and on the Indian people.” The committee noted ongoing jurisdictional confusion, low Indian socio-economic standing, and inadequate sanitation on reserves as exacerbating poor Indian health. It criticized the current division of responsibilities between the MSB, IAB, and the provincial health department as “irrational, inconsistent, and ineffective,” and demanded the development of a more systematic and orderly plan to ease the changes taking place in the administration of Indian health.

Just like Peart nearly a decade earlier, BC doctors cited ongoing jurisdictional confusion and misinformation as producing wide variances in service delivery standards from region to region. The report stated that “There is considerable confusion in the minds of both Indians and non-Indians with respect to the responsibility of the Federal

\textsuperscript{130} Province, 24 February 1969, “Provinces Shirk Duty, Declares Indian MP,” 11.


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Government for medical services." The committee also attributed much of this confusion to the virtual exclusion of Aboriginal people from the decision-making process and, more generally, the lack of a long-term health plan for Indians. The solution, according to the committee, lay in increased Indian health spending and a transfer of all residual legislative authority in matters of Indian health and sanitation to the appropriate federal and provincial departments of health. The committee concluded that “It is quite apparent to the committee that present conditions of sanitation and general public health on reserves are far below anything which would be acceptable to the Provincial Department of Health.”

In his seminal Economy and Society, Max Weber defines the first characteristic of modern bureaucracies as operating within official jurisdiction areas “which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations.” Sociologists now acknowledge that Weber over-assumed implicit correlations between bureaucracy, jurisdiction areas, and resultant domination; a similar criticism can be leveled at Canadian scholars of Indian health policy. When it came to providing Indian health

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132 BCA GR-0899 Box 5 File 3, “Indian Health Committee, Meeting Notes, [1968].”

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid. See also Victoria Daily Colonist, 29 September 1968, “Indian Health Care Snarled by Confusion,” 15.


services, basic questions of cost responsibility and jurisdiction were, and perhaps remain, unresolved since the nineteenth century. The conflicts surrounding Miller Bay and the BC Medical Grant demonstrate how such questions endured amidst advances in “administrative integration.” Government discourse and implemented policy varied significantly when it came to integration policies and their stated results. The BCMA committee’s report noted one of the ironies of most integrationist policies in this period: despite their so-called integration in health, Indians often remained separate in terms of their administrative treatment and health indicants. “Integration” in BC, whether in health or as discussed in the context of education and integrated schooling, was never fully implemented, let alone realized. Post-WWII integrated Indian health was, as Meighen predicted it would be in 1920, “A sort of divided control and authority over the Indians.”

Although long-standing federal involvement in Indian health shaped events and attitudes in this period, evidence indicates that BC Indians were not of singular mind when it came to provincial health care. If one “Indian” view ever existed in BC—an area not ceded by treaties with medicine chest provisions—it did not survive long into the twentieth century. BC Aboriginal people routinely demanded that medical care be adequate and delivered free of charge by both federal and provincial sources. Whether demonstrated by the Squamish delegation to Victoria, or by repeated Indian demands for inclusion in early provincial medical insurance schemes and the BC Medical Grant, Aboriginal people in BC tended to view free medical care as wholly within their rights, as
federal wards or as voting and sales-tax paying provincial citizens. Another point to consider is that few Aboriginal people likely understood the jurisdictional intricacies of Canadian federalism or those complex funding arrangements underpinning a simple visit to a local hospital. What mattered most was that health services be delivered at the place and point of need; responsibility for cost was something for federal and provincial officials to figure out. “The Indians,” the Minister of the DNHW remarked in 1950, “are not inclined to consider that they have any responsibility with regard to premiums.”

In his study of European feudal class struggles, James Scott coins the notion of weapons of the weak: self-interested, informal, and commonplace forms of effective resistance by lower class societies seeking to defend their interests from both conservative and progressive orders. Judging by most evidence—whether in the form of doctor complaints about bearing cost for Indian treatments, statistics showing growing Indian visitations to provincial and private hospitals, government forgiving of unpaid premiums, or federal-provincial squabbling over the costs of Indian enrolment in public health plans—Indians were somewhat successful tacticians when it came to seeking out and acquiring medical care, and in forcing the cost issue on government. As a result, both the provincial government and its doctors increasingly came to share in the costs and duties of administering Indian health by mid-century.

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137 BCA GR-1071 Box 1 File 6, “A.D. Turnbull, Memorandum re: Visit of Reverend P.R. Kelly, June 12, 1950.”


139 Graham-Cumming noted how it was impossible to estimate the precise costs of Indian health care owing to factors such as informal practices, blurred jurisdiction, and partial and hidden expenses. Graham-
the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, D.B. Fields and W.T. Stanbury estimated that $8.35 million was spent on Indian health and hospitalization in 1966-67, roughly half of which was paid out by the BCHIS. \(^{140}\)

After over a century and a half of decline, Aboriginal populations began undergoing remarkable growth around WWII. The lessening of the deadly grip of diseases such as diphtheria, influenza, and tuberculosis on Aboriginal communities contributed to the population rebound. While significant gaps remained (and still remain) when comparing Native/non-Native health statistics, Canadian scholars have been too quick to dismiss or ignore the basic fact that changing health policies, integrationist measures, and Aboriginal agency around mid-century had a significant influence on this demographic resurgence. The full impact of colonization on Aboriginal bodies was not played out by 1950 but rather is part of a larger continuum whose effects are still being felt today. \(^{141}\) The post-1970s growth of Aboriginal demands for self-control of health thus can be seen as stemming from both changes brought about by the integration of Indian health services as well as ongoing deficiencies within that system. \(^ {142}\)

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\(^{140}\) According to Fields and Stanbury, federal grants offset some of the provincial contribution to the BCHIS; in 1966, BC contributed to 39% of the total expenditure of provincial hospitals. See Fields and Stanbury, “The Economic Impact of the Public Sector upon the Indians of British Columbia,” 119-120. The 1960s also saw the province begin contributing capita grants to the federal government towards the service of the Indian Health Units. Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, *The Indians of British Columbia*, 407.

\(^{141}\) Kelm contends that “it was during these years, 1900-50, that the full impact of colonization played out upon Aboriginal bodies, through increasing restrictions on access to land and resources, and through intensifying interventions into their lives.” Kelm, *Colonizing Bodies*, 18.

Chapter 3
“‘One Form of Discrimination for Another’: BC Aboriginal People and the Integrated Schooling Experience.”

Come with me to the playgrounds of an integrated high school … See how level and flat and ugly the blacktop is … but look … now it is recess time … the students pour through the doors … soon, over here is a group of white students … and see … over there, near the fence … a group of native students … and look again … the black is no longer level … soon the bell will ring and the students will leave the play yard. Integration has moved in doors.


Scholars often discuss Indian education within the context of two distinct eras: the period of federal control, or residential schooling, and the post-White Paper era of growing First Nations control of Indian education. Marie Battiste, for instance, writes: “For a century or more, DIAND attempted to destroy the diversity of Aboriginal world views, cultures, and languages.” Framing the 1969 White Paper as a “crucial turning point,” she adds, “Aboriginal people began to see educators, like their missionary predecessors, as nothing more than racists, patriarchs, and oppressors who hid behind fine-sounding words or ideology.” In such works, the entire history of Canadian Indian educational policies is compressed as colonialist, hegemonic, and of exclusive federal domain. Integrationist era developments and growing post-WWII provincial control of Indian education, when

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mentioned at all, are treated as simple extensions of prior federal policies born from the residential era.³

While the shift from residential schools to public schooling that took place after WWII involved much continuity—namely in terms of the perpetuation of paternalistic relations and the marginalization of Aboriginal people from the decision-making process—it also marked a significant departure from earlier policies. The primary agents responsible for educating Indians shifted in this period from the churches and federal government to the provinces. Long before the mass school closures of the 1970s, the church-run residential system ceased to serve as the primary means of educating status Indians.⁴ The change was the result of a combination of reasons. In the aftermath of WWII’s exposure of the extreme capabilities of human racism, Indian schools became seen as symbols of racial segregation and the denial of rights of citizenry to Indians. Disapproving depictions of residential schools as discriminatory and akin to United States segregationist policies regularly surfaced in BC newspapers in post-war years.⁵ In addition to the normative sway of sympathetic popular and political opinions, more practical eyes could see that the Indian education system was failing to achieve its own

³ Jean Barman, Yvonne Hébert, and Don McCaskill, for instance, devote a scant two paragraphs to integrationist developments in Indian education in their overview of Indian education in Canada. See Jean Barman, Yvonne Hébert, and Don McCaskill, “The Legacy of the Past: An Overview,” in Indian Education in Canada, Volume 1: The Legacy, Jean Barman, Yvonne Hébert, and Don McCaskill, eds. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986), 13-14.


stated assimilative ends. The allowance of Indians into provincial schools by the late 1940s thus came to be seen as a necessary step towards the granting of citizenry rights to Indians as well as a means for integration. Neither province nor the federal officials was willing to resist the push to integrate schools for these reasons.

An integrationist impulse swept through the Indian Affairs Branch’s (IAB) education directorate in post-war decades. In 1950, both levels of government agreed to official terms allowing Indian attendance in public schools via joint agreements and an unprecedented per-capita cost sharing arrangement. Integration, however, occurred not only with regard to the physical placement of Aboriginal children in public schools, but also in operating standards. Throughout this period, the federal government moved to harmonize its inspection, staffing, and curricula standards with provincial ordinances. More generally, in its early stages, the desegregation of Indian education was seen as an important symbolic means for, and end of, Indian integration. Only by attending provincial schools could Indians gain the required skills to adjust to mainstream Canadian society; the successful placement of Indians into provincial classrooms itself represented a tangible sign of integration.

This chapter focuses on developments in British Columbia during the first two decades of the school integration process. Of all policy areas of federal Indian service devolution, BC was most amenable when it came to education. Some of the first and most significant steps to desegregate schools took place in BC. With Indians entering BC’s public schools throughout the 1950s and 60s, BC deserved to be called the
provincial leader in integrated education. At 1958, more Indian children were attending provincial than residential institutions; by the mid-1960s, roughly half of all school-going Indian pupils in the province were attending provincial institutions.\(^6\)

In addition to tracing policy developments, this chapter explores Aboriginal perspectives of integrated schooling. Virtually excluded from the decision-making process, both before and during the process of integration, most Aboriginal people appear to have taken some, albeit moderate, interest in the prospects of public education. Aboriginal people, just as they had around the turn of the century with residential schools, looked to provincial schools in accordance with their own interests, the least of which was desire for complete cultural assimilation.\(^7\) The actual results of school desegregation in BC indicate that federal promises and Indian expectations were rarely realized during the integrationist period. The long-term results of integrated schooling are difficult to discern but what appears certain is that stated policy “successes” were not synonymous with actual integration. Despite their successful “administrative integration,” Aboriginal children remained segregated in public schools in terms of educational attainment, treatment, and even physical placement.

Why did integrated schooling in BC prove to be an area of such tremendous success and failure? This chapter draws on Foucauldian theories about the playoff of


\(^{7}\) See J.R. Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 120.
power to show how intrastate relations are capable of producing clear power polarities. The history of integrated education policy in BC provides a poignant example of how federal and provincial interests, even if dissimilar, were capable of converging in specific historical circumstances; they did when it came to integrated education and the results were largely negative for Aboriginal people who were relegated to marginal positions of power. In the case of Indian education, the combination of a convergence of intrastate interests, specific administrative procedures, and Aboriginal exclusion came to constitute efficacious powers at work. While integrated education undoubtedly marked some improvements over the prior Indian school system, actual integration did not occur beyond a macro-institutional perspective.

Education had always been a cornerstone of early assimilation policy. In 1911, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott characterized the education of the Indian as, “by far the most important of the many subdivisions of the most complicated Indian problem.”\textsuperscript{8} The importance attributed to education in IAB programming had changed little by the mid-twentieth century. In a 1956 report in the \textit{Indian News}, J.W. Pickersgill, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, reiterated Scott’s view:

There is no question in my mind that the most important of all the activities of the Indian Affairs administration, so far as the future is

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs}, 1911, in Milloy, \textit{“A National Crime”}, 3. See also Titley, \textit{A Narrow Vision}, 74.
concerned, is education. … Education appears to be the main key not only to useful employment but also to the eventual integration of the Indians.⁹

The primary goal of federal post-war Indian education—educational preparation for incorporation of Indians into mainstream Canadian society and economy—only increased in the interim period. A glimpse at the IAB’s budget during the years between Scott and Pickersgill’s comments suggest as much. In 1910-11, the Department spent a total of 37% of its total budget on schooling. By the mid-1960s, the IAB was spending 60% of its fiscal appropriation on Indian schooling and deeming education the most advanced and structurally developed of all its program areas.¹⁰

Although a small number of Indian children were already attending public schools by WWII’s conclusion, significant interest in integrating Indians into the provincial education system began in the mid-1940s. In 1946, 201 Indian pupils in BC were already enrolled in provincial schools, a trend the Indian Commissioner of the province, D.M. McKay, encouraged “at every opportunity.”¹¹ Steps towards the integration of Indians had been taking place in the United States since the 1930s when passage of the Johnson-O’Malley Act in 1934 allowed closures of boarding schools in favour of community day schools.

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¹¹ Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 6 (18 June 1946). See also British Columbia, *Report of the Royal Commission on Education* (Victoria: Province of British Columbia, 1960), 140. Most common among Indian communities proximal to white communities, small numbers of Indian children attended provincial schools under ad hoc agreements struck between the IAB and local school boards, with the federal government assuming most tuition costs.
schools. More notably, post-WWII US termination and relocation policies were
principled on the transfer of Indian education to state education departments.\(^{12}\) While
Canadian steps to integrate its schools never matched the pace of US policies,
devolutionary successes in the US did not go unnoticed by IAB education officials.\(^{13}\)
Neither did comparisons of Canadian Indian education to US segregationist policies,
which one 1958 *Victoria Daily Colonist* article did, describing “Segregation of Indians in
parts of interior British Columbia is as bad as segregation of Negroes in the southern
United States.”\(^{14}\)

Support for integrated Indian education in provincial schools appears to have been
widely held, or at least rarely opposed, by most non-Native Canadians.\(^{15}\) By mid-
century, it was becoming apparent that Indian schools were not providing the necessary
tools for the type of social, economic, and cultural adjustment envisioned by the IAB.
The push to integrate schools began gaining significant momentum during the latter years
of the war. Members of the Special Committee on Reconstruction and Re-establishment
discussed the subject in 1944, agreeing that integrated education could “indicate to some

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\(^{12}\) LAC RG 10 Vol. 8475, File 651/25-1, MR C-9701, R. Hoey to Bishop W. Bird, 23 January 1939 in

\(^{13}\) By 1963, several states had accepted full responsibility for Indian education and 72,159, or 52.6% of all
US Indians were registered in state schools, one third of them at no cost to the federal government. See
L.G.P. Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in Provincial Schools,” in *The Education of Indian
Children in Canada: A Symposium Written by Members of the Indian Affairs Education Division, with
Comments by the Indian Peoples* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1965), 66.

\(^{14}\) *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 23 January 1958, “Color Bar in Parts of B.C. as Bad as in U.S. South,” 31;

\(^{15}\) In very few cases were protests raised in regards to the attendance of Indian children in non-Indian
schools. See Russell Moses, *Indian News*, January 1966, “Indian Views”; See also C.G. Wallace,
extent and in a small way the policy that governments may adopt in the future.”

The matter of Indian education was canvassed in greater length during the 1946 proceedings of the Special Joint Committee. Although the bulk of the committee’s attention focused on immediate problems in the Indian education system, such as staffing shortages and facility improvements, the SJC recommended school integration in its final report.

“[W]herever and whenever possible,” the report states, “Indian children should be educated in association with other [non-Native] children.”

Even BC appeared to favour the plan to admit Indian children into the provincial education system around this time. In 1950, W.T. Straith, BC’s Minister of the Department of Education stated that he sought close cooperation with the Indian Affairs Branch “in an attempt to avoid duplication in the building of schools and in looking forward to the time when Indian children, wherever their residence, will be admitted to schools under provincial jurisdiction.”

Concomitant calls for integrated educational programming were also mounting outside governmental offices. SJC testimony delivered by anthropologist Diamond Jenness further advocated the integration of Indians into provincial schools as part of his

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17 Special Joint Committee, Fourth Report [final report] (22 June 1948).

“Plan for Liquidating Canada’s Indian Problem within 25 Years.”\textsuperscript{19} Indian advocacy groups, such as the BC Indian Arts and Welfare Society, also recommended that year “the continuance of the system of sending Indian children to ‘White’ schools whenever possible.”\textsuperscript{20} As they had been since the nineteenth century, Aboriginal people were also vocal critics of the residential education system. While, as Miller notes, not all Aboriginal people in BC and elsewhere believed that education was not important or that the churches should not play a role in the education of their children, a consensus was forming that the Indian Affairs educational system in general, and its residential schools in particular, were failing Native communities.\textsuperscript{21}

Despite growing criticisms from politicians, advocacy organizations, and Aboriginal people, few signs suggested that the federal government had the interest or ability to wrest permanent responsibility for Indian education from the churches in the late 1940s.\textsuperscript{22} Although some Branch officials, such as R.A. Hoey, expressed preference for the creation of new state-run day schools over residential schools, to do so would have required a massive injection of funds, something the IAB could not or would not secure from cabinet. The IAB, quite simply, had neither the structural, financial, nor political means to assume total control of Indian education from the churches. Branch testimony delivered before the SJC exposed the already dire state of federal schools in the

\textsuperscript{19} Special Joint Committee, \textit{Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence}, No. 7 (25 March 1947).

\textsuperscript{20} BCA GR-1071 Box 1 File 2, “BC Indian Arts and Welfare Society, Report of Conference on Native Indian Affairs at Acadia Camp, UBC, Vancouver BC, April 1-3, 1948.”

\textsuperscript{21} Miller, \textit{Shingwauk’s Vision}, 380-81.

\textsuperscript{22} Special Joint Committee, \textit{Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence}, No. 6 (18 June 1946).
province. The Indian Commissioner for BC, D.M. McKay, noted that BC needed twenty new day schools and about half of the 55 existing day schools operated in a state of disrepair.\(^{23}\) Prospects for a burgeoning Aboriginal population meant that existing federal facilities would only be further taxed.

The push to end the partnership with the churches coincided with post-war federal bureaucratic and budgetary growth. In 1947, the Indian Welfare and Training Division split into separate Welfare and Education Divisions, reflecting and facilitating the expanded capacities of each service.\(^{24}\) With growing budgets and responsibilities, the IAB began professionalizing by hiring more experienced and professionally-trained personnel, such as experienced educator R.F. Davey, appointed Superintendent of Education in 1954.\(^{25}\) Between 1921 and 1945, the Indian education budget had remained low, fluctuating between roughly $1.1 and $2.3 million. After WWII, however, a combination of increasing school enrolment, rising school operating costs, and bureaucratic growth placed enormous budgetary pressure on existing branch agencies.\(^{26}\)

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\(^{25}\) Davey began his teaching career as an Indian day school teacher before returning to UBC then becoming principal of Coquitlam Jr.-Sr. High School. Davey served in the armed forces in WWII, following which he worked for the provincial Department of Education. Davey returned to the IAB in 1947 to fill a vacant post of BC Regional Inspector of Schools. In 1952, he was appointed Assistant Superintendent of Education before becoming Superintendent two years later. R.F. Davey, *Indian News*, January 1955, “Indians Indicate Growing Interest in Opportunities for Education.”

\(^{26}\) In 1957 the IAB ended the per-capita grant system used to fund the church-run school system since 1892. LAC, RG 10, Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567, File 1/1-2, Pt. 1, “Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, n.d. [circa 1958-59].” The IAB now funded the schools with a controlled-cost system based on actual expenditures within defined limitations. Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, *Annual Report, 1957-58*, 63.
In the five years after 1945, the Indian education budget tripled from $2,156,882 to $6,221,792. By 1960, the budget was $25 million and climbing. In response to this growth, further restructuring took place into the 1960s when the Education Division was split into three divisions including administration, school supervision, and vocational training.27

Rising costs were a major force informing the federal government’s interest in integrated education. Along with welfare, education accounted for the vast majority of the branch budget. Previously, under the residential system, the government was able to control costs by offloading them onto church organizations through its per capita grant system. With the residential system in decline, Branch officials realized that integration with provincial schools was a cheaper solution than operating a federal Indian school system. In 1944, Branch Director R.A. Hoey noted that integrated schools would cost “substantially less” than an exclusively federally-funded system of residential and day schools. 28 Of course, pressures to close the residential schools existed as long as the schools did, which was significantly longer than most federal officials expected. A significant number of residential facilities continued to operate well into the latter twentieth century.29 By 1962, for example, sixty-five residential schools remained in


29 At 1944, for instance, the branch operated eighty residential schools. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 14 August 1944, 6450; W.D. Hamilton, The Federal Indian Day Schools of the Maritimes (Fredrickton, NB: University of New Brunswick, 1986), 19.
operation, of which six were church-run.\textsuperscript{30} Instead of closing, some residential facilities took on new roles providing social welfare functions as hostels for those children deemed needing child welfare services as well as those attending day and provincial schools. The IAB’s 1960-61 \textit{Annual Report} summarized the new primary function of residential schools at the start of the 1960s: “One of the major tasks of the Indian schools is preparation for entrance to a non-Indian school.”\textsuperscript{31} R.F. Davey confirmed this in 1965 when he stated: “The developments over the past ten years have tended to incorporate the residential schools into the total Indian school system whereas previously they had operated as independent units.”\textsuperscript{32}

With school integration accelerating into the 1960s, the federal government found new reasons to close its day schools, thereby channeling more students into public schools and forcing many communities to relocate for access to education.\textsuperscript{33} As Milloy suggests, once integration had begun, federal budget considerations and cost-cutting


\textsuperscript{31} Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1960-61}, 63; SJC, No. 4, June 11, 1946. Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 33 File 9, “Terms of Reference – Survey to Establish Criteria for Admission of Welfare Cases to Residential Schools.” To help assist this endeavour, official eligibility criteria were established to assess pupil entry for residential schooling. Eligible candidates had to be 1) orphans, 2) residing in poor home conditions necessitating removal, 3) without access to day school, and 4) without access to provincial high school.

\textsuperscript{32} Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 33 File 9, “Terms of Reference – Survey to Establish Criteria for Admission of Welfare Cases to Residential Schools.” By the late-1960s, the IAB began characterizing the Education Services Directorate of the Branch as serving to a greater degree, the role of consultant. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, \textit{Annual Report, 1968-69}, 134.

measures only served to accelerate the program.\textsuperscript{34} In 1964, for instance, 25% of the branch budget was being spent to maintain residential institutions accommodating only 20% of the Indian school population.\textsuperscript{35} Branch officials noted that “a disproportionate amount of our education budget is spent on the maintenance of these [residential] institutions.”\textsuperscript{36} In 1969, Peter Powell, vice president of the BC School Trustees Association, even described religious schools as financially and technologically incompetent, and seriously damaging to the prospects of Indian integration.\textsuperscript{37} A long-established tenet of the residential school’s civilizing logic—the necessary separation of the child from parents and community—underwent radical change in the integrationist era. Milloy notes how, with the drive to integrate schools, “the Department went forward, assigning an active part in education to parents whose supposedly indelible “savage” character and baleful influence mysteriously disappeared.”\textsuperscript{38} By 1964, Davey went as far as to describe the residential institutionalization of children as akin to parental delinquency.\textsuperscript{39}

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\textsuperscript{34} Milloy, “A National Crime”, 201, 203, 208-9.
\textsuperscript{35} LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7984, File 1/19-2-10, Pt 1, “R.F. Davey to Dr. H.B. Hawthorn, 17 June 1964.”
\textsuperscript{36} Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 33 File 9, “Terms of Reference – Survey to Establish Criteria for Admission of Welfare Cases to Residential Schools.”
\textsuperscript{37} Vancouver Sun, 16 May 1969, “Religious Schools Hit—“Harm Indian Integration,” 37.
\textsuperscript{38} Milloy, “A National Crime”, 196.
\textsuperscript{39} LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7984, File 1/19-2-10, Pt 1, “R.F. Davey to Dr. H.B. Hawthorn, 17 June 1964.”
\end{footnotesize}
As both Miller and Milloy note, the secularization of Indian schooling did not occur quietly or with the unanimous consent of the churches. Denominational and regional differences also shaped attitudes towards integrated education. Protestants in northern and more isolated areas favoured Indian attendance at provincial schools with children continuing to reside at home or boarding in residential schools. Catholic orders, on the other hand, often conceived of integrated education in terms of the attendance of Indians in mixed Indian-White Catholic schools, particularly in the west. While most church representatives approved of the goal of integration, not all viewed integrated education as appropriately serving that end. In 1958, a conference of Catholic teachers noted:

Due to differences in cultural background and in view of the fact that the majority of non-Indians are not educated to understand the Indians, no school can prepare Indians for the same kind of life experience and vocational opportunities as if they were non-Indian.

Other church officials offered an even more sober view. E.S.W. Cole, principal of the United Church Residential School in Port Alberni stated in 1958:

A lot has been written, and as much said, about “integration for the Indian.” It is, in this writer’s opinion, very stupid of us to talk about integrating the Indian as, by no stretch of our imagination, can we do this. Integration will come from the Indian himself and will come quietly and permanently when we have finished our job of education.

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41 Information obtained from Father Berbado, OMI, Sechelt Residential School Principal (July 1958), in Peterson, “Indian Education in British Columbia,” 130.

By 1958, however, integration was already in full swing and church protests appear to have had little to no impact on staying the change. The Anglican Indian School Administration, responsible for oversight of its residential schools, lamented this in a 1959 brief: “The old spirit of co-operation of Church and Government working together for the good of the Indians [sic] children has been lost.”43 Into the 1960s, the Branch held conferences with remaining church residential school officials to impress upon principals the new direction of state education and affirm the primary post-war objective of Indian residential education: preparation for integration, citizenship, and leadership.44

In addition to phasing out the relationship with the churches, another important step towards the desegregation of Indian schooling took place prior to the physical placement of Aboriginal bodies in provincial classroom. After WWII, the Indian Affairs Department began harmonizing its operating standards with those of the provinces. Since educational programming, such as staffing standards and curricula, had previously fallen under church auspices, it seemed only fitting for Indian affairs officials to turn to those constitutionally charged with responsibility for education after WWII: the provinces. In 1949, federal schools adopted the full day of academic schooling and in 1950 residential schools began using provincial courses of study. By decade’s end federal schools also started implementing provincial school calendars and curriculums in respective

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43 INAC file 6-21-1, Vol. 2, Brief to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in Reference to a Special Deputation of the Anglican Church of Canada, November 20th, 1959, 7 in Milloy, “A National Crime”, 220.

provinces. Discussed below, the federal government’s wholesale adoption of provincial educational standards resulted in severe gaps in Aboriginal pupil educational attainment and achievement, effects that only became apparent in the mid 1960s.

The harmonization of standards with the provinces appealed to branch education officials for several reasons. Integrated schools offered a solution to the department’s lack of operating regulations of its own, and a means for deflecting criticism of its education system as segregationist. The adoption of provincial education standards also represented a way to remedy the staffing shortages endemic to the federal day school system. Teacher shortages were noted by one local Branch official in 1944 as “one of the big problems facing the Department,” and one exacerbated by growing enrolment. In BC alone, fifteen day schools were closed in 1946 due to teacher shortages and lack of enrolment. Beginning in 1947, and likely in response to staffing problems made apparent from SJC hearings, Indian school teacher classifications, pay scales, and benefits began to be brought into line with other federal and provincial standards.

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45 Peterson, “Indian Education in British Columbia,” 117. By 1959, provincial textbooks began to be used in most schools. Ibid., 111; Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in Provincial Schools,” 63. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Annual Report, 1967-68, 81.

46 BCA GR-1222 Box 106 File 10, “Minutes of the Fifteenth Annual Convention, Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, 12-18 November 1944,” 11. From 1946 to 1956 the provincial pupil enrolment rate increased by 77.8%. BCA GR-1113 Box 1 File 2 “Deputy Minister and Superintendent of Education to Boards of School Trustees, 12 December 1956”; Special Joint Committee, Minutes and Proceedings, No 4 (11 June 1946).

47 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1947-8, 217. Previously, Indian school teachers had been exempted from the Civil Service Act passed in 1934 which granted terms and conditions of employment such as remuneration and medical insurance on terms comparable to those established by the provinces. A. Moore, “The Teaching Staff in Indian Schools,” 38. Treasury Board approved a new salary schedule and teacher classificatory regulations that year. Teachers began to be classified and paid in accordance with
the 1950s, all Indian school teachers became eligible for federal superannuation benefits and salary scales continued to be updated in accordance with academic qualifications and provincial rates.48

Teacher employment increased further by 80.8% during the ten years between 1946 and 1956 but a general teacher shortage in the province meant that demand still outstripped supply. By the mid-1950s, for instance, 1750 new teachers were needed annually in the province to fill new and evacuated positions.49 In the 1963-64 fiscal year alone, almost thirty percent of all teachers turned over, including the youngest and most qualified teachers, the majority of whom resigned.50 One federal solution to this problem was to recognize other forms of qualifications based on academic, professional, and military experience.51 This, however, did little to raise standards or improve Aboriginal opinions that many Indian school teachers were deficient. As late as 1968—the same year provincial teacher certification standards were finally required for all federal schools—Aboriginal people decried some Indian residential teachers as being “as dumb

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50 55.6% of all Indian school teachers were between 21 and 30 years of age, of which only 43% served for one academic year or less. Moore, “The Teaching Staff in Indian Schools,” 39-40.

51 If included, “qualified” teaching staff percentages increased dramatically. For instance, in 1954 86% of teachers in day schools were deemed qualified for the position; by the mid-1960s the figure was in the mid-90s. In 1954-55, only 8.3% of Indian school teachers held university degrees; by 1964-65, this percentage had only increased to 15.5%. See Moore, “The Teaching Staff in Indian Schools,” 41-42.
as we are,” before urging officials to provide better education services under the Indian
Act. Staffing shortages were also not confined to the teaching profession. In 1965, the
IAB noted the loss of experienced federal school superintendents to higher-paying
provincial administrations. A paucity of qualified staff plagued federal schools well
into the 1960s and provided ongoing incentive for integration with provincial schools.

In addition to staffing standards, steps towards harmonization with provincial
inspection standards also took place in the 1940s. Historically, responsibility for school
inspections fell to overburdened agency superintendents, a system Miller describes as
having been “laughable” and incapable of preventing abuses from occurring. Indeed,
throughout pre- and post-war years few of the province’s Indian schools underwent
regular inspection; those in more remote regions or with adverse weather, rarely saw
inspection at all. The inadequacy of school inspections was another source of ongoing
complaint for Aboriginal people. In 1944, the Native Brotherhood of BC resolved to
acquire the power to inspect the residential schools. Three years later, Thomas Gosnell
told the SJC that “During the term of position as chief councilor in the village of Pert

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52 *Vancouver Sun*, 2 November 1968, “Better Education Urged By Indians,” 66; Department of Indian

Ending June 30, 1965.”

54 As late as 1960, 11.7% of day school and residential school teachers were insufficiently qualified. Indian

55 Miller, *Shingwauk’s Vision*, 334-37, 422.

56 BCA GR-1222 Box 106 File 10, “Minutes of the Fifteenth Annual Convention, Native Brotherhood of
British Columbia, 12-18 November 1944,” 27.
[sic] Simpson I have seen an [Branch] inspector arrive there once in the ten year period, what they call a school inspector. Once is all I saw him.”

The IAB took steps to improve its inspection capacities after WWII but inspections remained “laughable” well into the 1950s and beyond. In BC, one federal regional school inspector located in Vancouver was responsible for overseeing fifty-five day schools, thirteen residential schools, and thirteen seasonal schools spanning BC and the Yukon. Remarkably, for a brief time in the 1940s, the IAB had no positions on its payroll specifically devoted to the inspection of BC’s federal schools. Inspection standards appeared to improve in 1953 when a federal-BC agreement was reached in which the province’s Department of Education acquired the ability to inspect federal day schools. However, without any power to compel or enforce, provincial inspectors


58 While BC’s inspector received the services of an assistant in 1958, the adequacy of school inspections in the province did not improve until the mid-1960s when the regional inspectors were replaced by thirty two school superintendents and supervisors, and sixty four guidance personnel. Peterson, “Indian Education in British Columbia,” 111; Rodine, “The Administrative Structure of Indian Education, 1965,” 25-6. In 1951, the Branch appointed five additional regional school inspectors in Calgary, Regina, Winnipeg, Toronto, and Quebec City, coordinated under one federal chief inspector. As was the case in BC, however, these inspectors were charged the double duty of handling inspections in a growing number of classrooms under department control as well as working with local school boards and officials towards the creation of a joint educational program. As in BC, each inspector was situated in an urban-located office, hopelessly incapable of effectively overseeing massive regions and multitudes of schools. See Rodine, “The Administrative Structure of Indian Education, 1965,” 24; LAC, RG 10 Vol. 8596, File 1/1-13, MR C-14226, B. Neary to Director, 28 September 1950, in Milloy, “A National Crime”, 200, f.n. 56.

59 The Indian Commissioner for BC, McKay acknowledged before the SJC that the duties charged to the inspector were unrealistic. Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 4 (11 June 1946). The position was eventually filled by R.F. Davey who later went on to direct the Branch Education Division. Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 38 (24 June 1947); R.F. Davey, Indian News, January 1955, “Indians Indicate Growing Interest in Opportunities for Education.”

merely compared IAB-run to provincial schools and reported findings back to branch headquarters.\(^{61}\) By the 1960s, Aboriginal people increasingly turned their attention to provincial inspectors in their ongoing lobby to ensure that school facility standards met the needs of their children.\(^{62}\)

Lastly, the adoption of the provincial school curriculum was another important step for IAB officials seeking to harmonize federal with provincial education operating standards. At no prior time, as Milloy notes, did the Indian Department draw up a comprehensive curriculum for the instruction of Indian children or answer calls from regional school inspectors for curricular reform.\(^{63}\) The IAB lacked the required capacity, expertise, or political will required for curricula development, having previously preferred to delegate such matters to the churches. With its educational responsibilities growing into the latter 1940s, however, the branch Education Service decided to officially adopt provincial programs of study in its schools.

In addition to having practical impetus, the adoption of provincial curricula had assimilationist underpinnings. The 1959 branch Annual Report summarized this driving rationale of federal Indian education moving into the later twentieth century:

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\(^{61}\) In 1959-60 the BC provincial school system was divided into five school districts under the supervision of District and Regional School Superintendents. Provincial school inspectors were paid by the federal government according to a per-classroom rate. Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1956-57, 61; H.B. Hawthorn, ed. A Survey of Contemporary Indians: Economic, Political, Educational Needs, Volume Two (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1967), 78; Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 38 (24 June 1947).


\(^{63}\) See Milloy, “A National Crime”, 198.
Indian education is largely concerned with the social and economic adjustment of a minority group whose culture and standards of living differ from those of the non-Indian majority group which surrounds them. The task of education is to assist acculturation, to promote intercultural respect and understanding, to provide vocational training and to prepare Indian youth for economic competence and social stability.\textsuperscript{64} 

While couched in more fashionable terms, the goals of post-war curricula remained fixated on assimilationist ends. References to Aboriginal people and culture were often portrayed stereotypically and unrealistically, when noted at all, in provincial classes and textbooks.\textsuperscript{65} Inversely, no forms of training were provided to non-Indians to become “more educated to the Indian way of life.”\textsuperscript{66} Under the façade of integration, as Milloy notes, “Education remained assimilation.”\textsuperscript{67} 

Any accommodation to specific Aboriginal needs or languages was structurally absent in provincial schools. With the province controlling all curricula joint agreement terms, the IAB remained reluctant or unwilling to recommend the adoption of any special curricula.\textsuperscript{68} In 1959, while appearing before the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Davey responded to a committee member’s suggestion that a more culturally-relevant curriculum be adopted by flatly stating: “We

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1958-59}, 60.
\item Lisa Jane Peltier, \textit{The Indian News}, July 1964, “No Excuse for Ignorance.”
\item Milloy, \textit{“A National Crime”}, 195.
\item BCA MS-2848 Box 3 File 5, “Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada [IAB Commentary],” 24, 26.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
have made no representations to any provincial department of education that they exchange their curriculum to meet our requirements.”

School desegregation began in earnest while the federal government looked to “integrate” its school operating standards with those of the provinces. As early as 1948, the IAB started approaching provincial school boards and departments of education requesting the inclusion of Indian children in public schools. In BC, R.F. Davey, then inspector of Indian schools, specifically urged BC’s school boards to accept Indian enrolment. Most initial federal attempts to devolve Indian education, however, met with modest success. L.G.P. Waller, Chief Superintendent of Indian Schools, noted how selling the idea of integrated schooling to local school boards, Indian band councils and parents, and church officials, was a “time-consuming task” and one of “slow progress at the outset” due to common Indian and non-Indian opposition. It appears likely that many provinces looked warily upon desegregated schooling as carrying the possibility for federal intrusion into a provincial preserve. Accordingly, Waller termed the duration of the latter 1940s and early 1950s as an “experimental period,” which “gave governments at all levels the opportunity to study the legal and administrative implications of a planned transfer of Indian children from Federal to provincial schools.”

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69 Joint Committee, *Minutes and Proceedings*, No. 3 (June 17, 1959), 57.

70 This task later was delegated to the six regional school superintendents appointed after 1951. Indian Affairs Branch, *Annual Report, 1948-9*, 199.


72 Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in Provincial Schools,” 64.

73 Ibid.
Of all the provinces, BC and Manitoba appeared most amenable to the idea of integration at mid-century. In 1949, Byron Johnson’s Coalition government passed a new Public Schools Act, granting the Minister or school boards the ability to negotiate and ratify educational agreements with the federal government allowing Indian enrolment in BC’s schools. The federal government followed statutory suit in 1951 with its long-awaited amendment to the Indian Act. The new act embodied the federal government’s new interest in integrated schooling. Previously, Indian Act components regarding Indian education comprised no more than three sections. This changed in 1951 when nine new sections pertaining to the administration of Indian education and education standards were added. Section 87 stipulated that Indians were subject to provincial laws of general application; section 113 granted order in council and ministerial power to enter into agreements with provinces, territories, school boards, or church organizations “to establish, operate and maintain schools for Indian children.” Subsequent Act revisions in 1952 and 1956 continued integrationist trends by clarifying compulsory school attendance guidelines. With Indian children now compelled to attend either

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74 An Act to Amend the “Public Schools Act”, SBC 1949, c. 57, s. 4.

75 See An Act Respecting Indians [Indian Act], Revised Statutes of Canada [or RSC] 1906, c. 81. s. 9-11.

76 See Indian Act, Statutes of Canada [or SC] 1951, c. 29. s. 113-122.

77 Ibid.,c. 29 s. 113. The 1927 Act only contained provisions allowing for the establishment of day, industrial, and residential schools. Indian Act, RSC 1927, c. 98, s. 8.

78 Compulsory attendance at Indian schools was first enacted in 1920. Section 115 of the 1951 Act compelled children between the age of six and sixteen years of age to attend school. Section 116, which allowed children who had passed entrance examinations to be exempt from further attendance, was also repealed. See An Act to Amend the Indian Act, SC 1920, c. 50, s.10; An Act to Amend the Indian Act, SC 1956, c. 40, s.29. The 1956 Act also clarified application for on- and off-reserve Indians and granted the Minister the power to authorize the use of reserve lands for Indian schools, a power previously vested with cabinet.
provincial or federal schools, the IAB noted in its 1956-57 Annual Report that “Indian education in general, and more particularly the integrated program of education, has been greatly strengthened by this amendment.”79

Federal officials such as Brown and McKay invoked statutory law as precluding federal wrestling of control of Indian education from the churches in 1946.80 Legal obligations, however, did not inhibit the branch when it came to striking agreements with the provinces devolving Indian education. In 1950, one year prior to the passage of enabling federal legislation, BC and Manitoba reached joint agreements with the federal government facilitating Indian attendance at provincial schools. BC alone, however, became the first provincial government that year to agree to a blanket province-wide per capita rate for Indian attendance in public schools. The lack of enabling federal statutes did not impede the first joint agreements from being reached at the local level. By the fall, joint agreements were reached in Campbell River, Ashcroft, Terrace, Telegraph Creek, and Prince Rupert facilitating federal subsidization for 883 of BC’s roughly 5700

79 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1956-57, 61. The amendments further brought federal standards in line with the provinces, who had compulsory attendance provisions in effect by that time. Philip Oreopoulos, “Canadian Compulsory Schooling Laws and their Impact on Educational Attainment and Future Earnings,” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Family and Labour Studies Division, 2005), 9, 30. The federal government could only approximate provincial standards since they varied from province to province. In British Columbia, for instance, the compulsory schooling age was seven, the minimum leaving age, fifteen. Compulsory attendance age limits in the other provinces varied from federal standards by up to two years.

80 Before the SJC in 1946, McKay stated: “The present policy, as far as I can determine it, is for the government to co-operate with the church in the education of the Indian children and until the legislators of the dominion in their wisdom decide to make a change in that policy we are obliged to carry out the system that exists.” Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 5 (13 June 1946).
Indian pupils. Although, some legal uncertainty surrounded those early agreements preceding statutory sanction, no objections were raised by either BC or federal officials.

Joint agreements were the main mechanism through which integrated schooling was implemented in BC. These agreements, negotiated between the IAB and local school boards, specified admission quotas for Indian children at the federal per capita subsidization rate. In addition to setting enrolment rates and the financial terms, the agreements also stipulated that the federal government surrender any rights of supervision to the province. BC was to have complete and exclusive jurisdiction over the administration, control, and operation of all schools identified under joint agreements.

In the second volume of his 1967 national survey of Indians in Canada, H.B. Hawthorn summarized the joint agreements as contracts in which “the federal government buys a service which is already in existence, and in no way tries to exercise control over the current methods of operation in a given school district.”

The joint agreements served a multifold purpose. One, they represented a clear policy statement for the IAB and a tangible step towards integration. By stipulating that no racial segregation of Indian children take place in provincial schools, joint agreements


82 Agreements were subject to approval by BC’s Council of Public Instruction. Created in 1896, the Council of Public Instruction was composed of the provincial education minister and members of cabinet and responsible for directing provincial education policy under the authority of the legislative assembly. See British Columbia, Report of the Royal Commission on Education, 50.

83 See BCA GR-1071 Box 1 File 1 Box 7, “Agreement between His Majesty King George the Sixth and School District No. 72, August 29 1950.”

84 Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two, 69.
also provided means for the IAB to allay criticisms of the residential and day school system as discriminatory. Two, by stipulating provincial autonomy over matters including curriculum, staffing, and standards, the joint agreements removed the possibility for future jurisdictional conflicts. The province would have accepted no less when it came to education, an area of decided provincial jurisdiction. Fortunately for BC, the federal government was only too willing to surrender these controls, much as it had throughout the process of harmonizing its education standards with those of the provinces. Even the federal right to inspect provincial schools with Indian attendees, included in the earliest joint agreements, was removed from later contracts.85

The joint agreements also provided fiscal incentives, notably in the form of capital contributions, for both levels of government to participate in the program.86 For the federal government, the per capita rate was a cheaper alternative to maintenance of a separate federal school system. Just as it had worked with the churches prior to 1957, when the IAB abolished the per capita grants in its residential schools, this funding system was a proven means to control expenditures and share its administrative responsibilities for Indians. In exchange for allowing Indians to attend provincial schools, $150 per Indian student per annum was to be paid to school boards by the IAB under the 1950 agreement. The federal government pitched these grants as equivalent to

85 See GR-1071 Box 1 File 1 Box 7, “Agreement between His Majesty King George the Sixth and School District No. 72, August 29 1950.” This might have occurred in 1953 when the province assumed responsibility for inspection of the federal day schools.

municipal taxes normally paid to the province to fund public schooling. While the federal government long hoped for the eventual incorporation of reserves as municipalities, extant provisions in the Indian Act prohibited bands from collecting or contributing taxation monies to the province for provincial schooling.

At least initially, the province found the financial terms of joint agreements also agreeable. The federal per capita annual contribution of $150 exceeded the actual non-Indian per capita costs incurred by the province for pupil enrolment. Provincial per capita costs for non-Indians were $124.59 per pupil on enrolment and $138.63 per pupil on average daily attendance. The inclusion of provisional grants for school operating costs in the joint agreements, including expenses relating to the construction and maintenance of facilities, school administration, and instruction, also piqued provincial interest. These grants offset costs for new school construction and expansion initiatives normally shouldered by schools boards. Over the next five years, additional agreements enabled the construction of new integrated high schools. In 1955, for instance, terms were reached for the construction of an Alert Bay high school and classroom accommodation for one hundred Indian and eighty non-Indian students; in

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87 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “R.F. Davey to Acting Director.”


1960 an integrated junior college in Prince George was established.\textsuperscript{91} By 1965, the federal government was allocating close to $5 million nationally to local school boards for joint school construction.\textsuperscript{92} In some areas, federal school facilities were turned over to provincial school authorities for operation as provincial schools.\textsuperscript{93}

With agreements in place, Indian integration climbed steadily throughout the 1950s, outstripping rival growth in the federal day schools. At decade’s start, 557, or roughly 10\% of the province’s school-attending Indian children were enrolled in provincial or private institutions. At decade’s end, this percentage had climbed to almost 30\%.\textsuperscript{94} In their \textit{Annual Report} to close the decade, the IAB observed that Indian enrollment at BC provincial schools was taking place at a “gratifying level.”\textsuperscript{95} In 1958 the number of children in provincial schools finally outstripped those attending residential schools.\textsuperscript{96} Nationally, it was not until the 1966-67 fiscal year that the national percentage of Indians attending provincial schools finally exceeded that of Indian

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\item \textsuperscript{92} LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Record of Achievement in Indian Affairs – 1965.”
\item \textsuperscript{93} These arrangements entailed payment of a nominal rental to the federal government with the school board assuming full responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the school buildings. S.W. Kaiser, “Financing Indian Education,” in \textit{The Education of Indian Children in Canada: A Symposium Written by Members of the Indian Affairs Education Division, with Comments by the Indian Peoples} (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1965), 34.
\item \textsuperscript{94} See British Columbia, \textit{Report of the Royal Commission on Education}, 140 [Table 79].
\item \textsuperscript{95} Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1959-60}, 69.
\item \textsuperscript{96} British Columbia, \textit{Report of the Royal Commission on Education}, 1960, 140. See also Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1960-61}, 57.
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schools. The findings of the 1958 BC Royal Commission on Education also approved of the trend taking place. The commission’s 1960 report noted that while no pressure was brought to bear on Indians to leave federally-run for provincial public schools, “The Department of Education and various school boards have co-operated in this endeavour.” The commission concluded that “the present trend towards integration is desirable and should be encouraged. The Commission gained the impression that, on the whole, the programme of integration was progressing in an encouraging manner.” This progress was further evinced in November 1963, when a three year term agreement, retroactive to January 1 1963 escalated the federal per capita rate to $250 following a provincial request for an increase. Treasury Board approved the request that February, terming it “most reasonable” and noting that “failure to meet the request of the provincial government would seriously damage the excellent relationship which has existed in connection with the integrated education of pupils in this province.” The federal government was acutely aware of the fiduciary and political costs that might derive from alienating the province.

By the 1960s, Canada’s other provinces began to follow BC’s lead in school desegregation. Between 1959 and 1961, the number of joint agreements nationally grew

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97 Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Annual Report, 1966-67, 47.


100 Treasury Board Submission, February 8, 1963 in Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two, 72.
from 72 to 550. R.F. Davey, Director of the Branch Education Division, encouraged the trend, summing up the federal position before an audience of provincial education ministers in 1963:

What is now required, where it does not exist, is a common understanding at all levels of government on attitudes towards the Indian problem and areas of responsibility and the necessary legislative machinery to carry out a program which will eventually bring Indian education within the jurisdiction of the province.  

In BC, of course, a “common understanding” already existed. Later that year, Deputy Minister Perry added that “the officials of this Branch have done everything possible to implement and expedite the processing of school board requests to provide accommodation for Indian children.” The following year, integrated education was further discussed at the 1964 federal-provincial conference on Indian affairs where several provinces, including BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island agreed to the principle of integrated schooling. Minister Tremblay was recorded as being “impressed by the response received from the various provincial delegates.” Integration in BC only accelerated throughout the 1960s. At 1965, fifty-three individual joint school agreements existed in the province providing for

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102 Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in Provincial Schools,” 22.


the attendance of an estimated 43% of Indian pupils in provincial public schools.\textsuperscript{105} That year, BC’s Education Minister Leslie Peterson proudly told the provincial legislature that, “BC is leading the rest of Canada in integration of Indian youngsters into the public school system.”\textsuperscript{106}

Joint agreements enjoyed high successes in BC for several reasons. For one, few requirements existed for joint agreements to be negotiated. A provincial school had to be considered as good as or better than a federal school and a majority of Indian parents had to consent to the plan. Neither of these conditions appears to have inhibited joint agreements from being finalized. No extra-governmental standard existed by which to assess school resources under the control of both the federal government and the provinces. Even though the federal schools were notoriously underfunded and often operated in states of disrepair, it was not unheard of for both levels of government to assert the superiority of their schooling institutions over those of the other.\textsuperscript{107} Precisely what constituted majority Aboriginal consent was also never clearly articulated. No systematic means existed to garner approval since both band resolutions and petitions were acknowledged as proof of Indian support.\textsuperscript{108} Some questions also surround whether


\textsuperscript{107} Hawthorn, \textit{A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two}, 66.

\textsuperscript{108} In correspondence to Hawthorn, R.F. Davey, Assistant Director of the Education Division maintained that it had Indian support for integrated education, stating that the Branch policy precluded the striking of
discreditable tactics were employed to acquire consent. The 1967 Hawthorn report documented Indian claims that in certain cases federal officials used “discreditable means (intimidation, undue pressure, biased explanations, etc…) to obtain the necessary number of signatures for an agreement.” Regardless, it is unlikely that Indian parents would have had much reason to withhold, or to give informed, consent. Neither federal nor provincial school officials took significant steps to improve Aboriginal understandings or to arrange preliminary visits to provincial schools. The existence of a public school proximal to an Indian reserve was the most likely actual requirement for school integration to occur.

The specific structure of educational administration in the province also facilitated joint agreements. The organization of school boards into larger administrative units under the Council of Public Instruction made easier umbrella agreements such as those reached in 1950 and 1963. It was not until 1965 that a second province, Manitoba, agreed to a province-wide per-capita rate. That joint agreement negotiations were conducted along non-tradition intergovernmental channels also improved their chances of success. Localized negotiations for joint agreements involved IAB officials and individual school boards rather than provincial ministers of education. In BC in 

agreements with school boards without the support of the Indian community concerned, either by way of band council resolution or by petition from the Indian parents. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7984, File 1/19-2-10, Pt 1, “R.F. Davey to Dr. H.B. Hawthorn, 17 June 1964.”


110 Ibid., 150.

particular, rapid growth and staff shortages then endemic to the provincial school system had the further effect of impairing communications between field and central administration. The BC Royal Commission on Education noted these gaps in its 1960 report, adding that “long term planning, with regard to the public school system is not being carried out to the extent that is required in the light of modern school conditions.” Early agreements also took place prior to the 1952 rise to power of Bennett’s Social Credit, a government notorious for exerting high political and ministerial control over bureaucratic affairs. Through the joint agreements, Milloy notes, “change was being instituted in an area of undoubted provincial jurisdiction with little consultation between Ottawa and Provincial ministries of education. Most provinces took greater interest in the joint agreements only after their “significance” was discovered, which sometimes only occurred once Indians began actually entering provincial schools. Those most excluded from discussions about integration were those most affected by it: Aboriginal people.

Despite being marginalized from the decision making process, many Aboriginal people appear to have taken some interest in the prospects of public schooling, particularly in the initial stages. Integrated education represented a means to acquire previously-denied measures of equality and citizenry. In the mid-1960s Hawthorn

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observed that many Indian parents felt that integrated schools helped their children to “learn about Whites” and better interact with non-Indians “on an equal basis.” Others saw integration as providing a form of education for non-Indians and a way to eliminate racial prejudices. Elliott Moses of the Six Nations reserve stated this sentiment in a 1958 Indian News article:

The policy of having Indian children attend non-Indian schools or vice versa, is I believe, a step in the right direction. … for since there are no high schools on Indian reservations, it is necessary for them to attend such schools adjacent to their homes in non-Indian communities. … Integration at school age is an effective time for destroying racial prejudices.  

Most commonly, however, Aboriginal people saw public schools as potentially providing long-sought skills and knowledge to deal with western modernity. By the mid-century it was painfully obvious that the labour-intensive “curriculum” of the residential system and the elementary grade-limited day schools left much to be desired. Particularly for those Aboriginal people living in BC’s more remote regions, access to secondary education under the federal system proved difficult, often requiring relocation. Speaking in 1969, Haida John Williams, noted: “We’ve had a few complete high school since the war but for years the best our youngsters could do was grade 8 and then they had

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nowhere to go for high school.” Other period individual and organizational sources further suggest that Aboriginal people shared some interest in provincial public schooling. In 1950, a group of Vancouver Island Indians lobbied the federal government to fund Indian enrolment at the local public Craigflower school in Esquimalt in response to lacking residential school facilities. One of the most outspoken Aboriginal proponent of integrated education was Peter Kelly. As secretary of BC’s Indian Advisory Committee in 1953, Kelly stated that integrated schooling “was the only answer” to Indian woes. Later, as chairman of the Native Brotherhood of BC in 1959, Kelly continued advocating the full integration of Indians into the public school system.

Indian opinions of provincial schooling were always shaped by the perceived alternatives. For example, some Aboriginal children preferred residential schools over those public schools prone to racial discrimination or when home life was particularly unpleasant. It is likely that many Aboriginal parents favoured provincial over residential schooling simply on the basis that their children would be allowed daily return to their homes after school. It is also for this reason that some favoured expansion of the

117 BCA, Imbert Orchard Records, Interview with John Williams [location unknown], 1969. Similar Indian views from other parts of Canada can be found in the Indian News in this period. See Moses, “Some Thoughts on Leadership.”


120 See Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Minutes and Proceedings, No. 6 (2 July 1959), 143.

121 Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two, 139.
day school system over integrated schooling. In 1944, for instance, Alfred Adams stated before the Native Brotherhood of BC annual convention that “There is something lacking in the educational program for Indians … Ideal is a day school where children can live at home.”122 Regardless, the extent to which Aboriginal people would have known much about provincial schooling remains unclear. Having never before been permitted to attend provincial facilities, few Aboriginal people likely knew much about what went on inside public schools. That provincial schools were better equipped to meet the changing needs of Aboriginal people than residential and day schools appears to have been a gamble that many Indian parents were willing to take.

Aboriginal people remained outside onlookers to integrated school policy planning and development throughout the first two decades of integrated schooling process. As noted, early Aboriginal involvement in the decision to integrate was limited to the granting of consent. The lack of any provisions in joint school agreements securing ongoing Aboriginal involvement or representation on school boards ensured that Indian parents remained marginal to the decision-making process. IAB officials treated this as fait accompli, an unfortunate but necessary consequence of the special legal and tax exempt status of Indians. It was not until 1957 that the IAB implemented a means for Aboriginal participation in the process of school integration via school committees. School committees were essentially ad hoc advisory panels set up at the community level by branch regional superintendents. According to the IAB’s Annual Report for that year,

122 BCA GR-1222 Box 106 File 10, “Fifteenth Annual Convention, Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, 12-18 November 1944.”
committees were created on a number of reserves “as a means of enabling Indian communities to assume more responsibility in the development of educational facilities.”

By 1958, eleven committees operated in BC, Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, and Nova Scotia. The IAB hoped that the committees would eventually develop into bodies akin to provincial school boards since the provincial property and school tax exempt status of Indians prohibited their participation on school boards.

It became clear early on that the committees were poor substitutes for Indian representation on provincial school boards. Not only were school committees belatedly created long after integrative trends were established, they had few responsibilities and no powers beyond that of recommendation. Hawthorn, while a proponent of integrated schooling, criticized the school committees’ poor funding and limited responsibilities. His 1967 survey recommended the inclusion of Aboriginal representation, either formally or informally, on school boards where provincial laws applied. The BC Indian Advisory Committee also found fault with the virtual exclusion of Indian participation in integrated school programming, issuing recommendations calling for the inclusion of

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124 Indian Affairs Branch, *Annual Report, 1965-66*, 63; Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Annual Report, 1966-67*, 49. By 1962, the number of school committees had expanded to thirty-one, a figure that more than doubled within four years. By 1971, 184 school committees were in existence. Milloy, “*A National Crime*”, 197.


Indian representation on school boards through an exemption to the property tax requirement.\textsuperscript{127} Even though the IAB ostensibly favoured Indian representation on provincial school boards, it lamented that implementing such was beyond federal control.\textsuperscript{128} The provincial education department, in turn, rejected any provisions allowing for special Indian representation on school boards. When Ontario passed legislation in 1967 allowing the appointment of Indians on provincial school boards, Perry stated: “I am a little disturbed as to either the logic or the ethics of such an amendment as the Ontario amendment.”\textsuperscript{129} While several provinces, including BC, eventually passed legislation allowing Indians to serve as school trustees, the electoral requirements inhibited most Indians from reaching such status.\textsuperscript{130} In 1972, Indian Affairs Minister Jean Chrétien admitted to the Council of Ministers of Education that when it

\textsuperscript{127} BCA GR-0151 Box 17 File 6, “Statement of Recommendations relative to Education from the British Columbia Advisory Committee Meeting held in Nanaimo, November 16 and 17, 1965.” In 1967, the IAB proposed to enlarge the role of the committees via regulatory change following the passage of a new Indian Act.


\textsuperscript{129} BCA GR-0899 Box 5 File 2, “F.P. Levirs to G. Neil Perry, November 22, 1967.”

came to the education of their children, Aboriginal parents “remained on the fringe, powerless to influence policy.”  

Aboriginal people remained vocal critics of the integrated school system from the outset although their exclusion from the decision-making process had the effect of rendering their criticisms impotent. The structural exclusion of Aboriginal people, combined with the surrendering of all federal powers of jurisdiction and inspection to the province, meant that IAB officials knew little about what went on in integrated schools. It was not until the mid-1960s, over a decade after school integration started, that officials began realizing that school de-segregation was not synonymous with integration. The 1965 publication of a collection of essays authored by members of the Indian Affairs Education Division disclosed the wide array of challenges facing Indian educators. The proceedings of a one-day workshop sponsored by the Penticton Indian Affairs Committee that same year further highlighted problems in areas of Indian adjustment, attendance, educational attainment, and teacher inexperience dealing with Native students. That fall, the BC Indian Advisory Committee recommended in its annual report that the province begin to provide special education to Indians.

The greatest criticisms of the integrated system, however, were saved for the second volume of the 1960s Hawthorn survey. Devoted primarily to the matter of Indian education, the 1967 report highlighted a range of problems stemming from desegregated

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132 BCA GR-0899 Box 5 File 2, “Penticton Indian Affairs Committee, One-Day Workshop, ‘What Can be Prepare Teachers for the Task of Working Effectively with Indian Pupils,’ December 6, 1965.”
education and the failing of provincial schools to effect Indian adjustment. Hawthorn et al. described Indian attendance in public schools midway through the 1960s as “sporadic and low,” with neither parents, schools, the RCMP, nor IAB officials taking responsibility.\textsuperscript{133} The report noted bleak achievement statistics nationally under the integrated system, and “alarming” Indian pupil retention rates during the twelve years leading up to their study: 94\% of Indians dropped out during grades one to twelve; by the eighth grade Indian children were, on average, two and a half years behind the non-Indian student.\textsuperscript{134} Analysis of branch statistics reveals that Indian enrolment actually decreased by 50\% between 1939 and 1959. Less than 10\% of Indian children attended any school beyond grade six; under one percent of Indian children attended grade twelve.\textsuperscript{135} Compared to non-Indians, Indian children attended school in higher percentages than non-Indians in elementary grades, but lower percentages after grade six.\textsuperscript{136}

Glaring discrepancies in educational attainment became apparent between Indian and non-Indian pupils in integrated schools. Hawthorn’s report cited Indian children of high academic standing in federal and residential schools encountering failure in provincial schools due to variances in workloads, evaluation, and curriculum between Indian and public schools.\textsuperscript{137} Hawthorn described Indian students as suffering from a

\textsuperscript{133} Hawthorn, \textit{A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two}, 133-34.

\textsuperscript{134} This compared to a national non-Indian rate of 12\%. Hawthorn, \textit{A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two}, 130, 132.

\textsuperscript{135} Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1963-64}, 23; Moore, “The Teaching Staff in Indian Schools,” 56.

\textsuperscript{136} Moore, “The Teaching Staff in Indian Schools,” 53, 54.

\textsuperscript{137} Hawthorn, \textit{A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two}, 131-32, 133.
“cumulative deficit” in provincial schools, one that hampered student successes, particularly in the upper grades. He also noted how high grade repeat rates actually worked against the Indian Act provisions setting minimum age requirements for Indian school withdrawal. For instance, an Indian child who entered school at age seven, failed grade one and four, was legally able to leave school at grade six. Resultant differences in age further alienated Indian from non-Indian classmates and precipitated Native drop outs.

Racism shaped Aboriginal experiences in public schools and also provided incentive for drop outs and low Indian retention well into the 1960s. As early as the 1940s, the NBBC noted that racial prejudice was a factor inhibiting Indian school attendance. Many Aboriginal parents worried that their children would not be accepted or received sympathetically by non-Indians, a fear that was often realized once in provincial schools. Differences between Indian and non-Indian children, particularly in the earliest stages of integration, were pronounced in terms of dress, speech, and behaviour. School yards were commonly socially divided along racial lines.

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138 Hawthorn et al. noted from samples taken throughout the provinces that 80% of Indian children repeated grade one, with many repeating it three times. Hawthorn, Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two, 131.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid., 141.


and fights between Indians and non-Indians were cited as common, notably in lower grades. Feelings of inferiority and negative self-image among Native pupils was a common response of older students to low academic achievement in public schools, non-Indian teasing, and singling out by teachers. As Chief Dan George observed in his 1969 short story ""My Very Good Dear Friends,"" the metaphorical blacktop was never level in public schools; Aboriginal children remained segregated, evident in regards to academic attainment, attendance, and treatment at the hands of non-Native students and teachers.

Ongoing administrative divisions, the result of the assemblage of different federal, provincial, and church schools involved in the Indian education system, proved to be the source of numerous additional problems. Whereas entire generations of Indian students were often accustomed to attending one school for the duration of their studies, Indian children in the integrationist period could expect to be transferred several times over the course of their education. Such transfers from church or reserve schools to provincial schools provided natural “drop out” points. Even the discontinuance of Family Allowance payments to families, something the Department of National Health and Welfare could do to families whose children did not regularly attend schools—Indian or not—had little impact on compelling school attendance. Milloy notes how field staff feared that a reduction in Family Allowance payments, paid out by another line department, would result in an increase in Branch relief costs; accordingly, not many

143 BCA GR-0899 Box 5 File 2, “Penticton Indian Affairs Committee, One-Day Workshop, ‘What Can be Prepare Teachers for the Task of Working Effectively with Indian Pupils,’ 6 December 1965.”
field staff took steps to enforce the Family Allowance requirement.\textsuperscript{144} Interdepartmental interests, at least in this case, served to undermine IAB efforts to compel school attendance. Furthermore, Aboriginal attendance at provincial institutions was not always guaranteed by joint agreements. When specified quotas were exceeded, for instance, Indian children could be excluded from provincial schools or forced to travel further to attend institutions based not on convenience but rather quota availability.\textsuperscript{145} Overall, even under the guise of integration, the Indian education system remained a conglomerate effort involving multiple intrastate agencies.

Integrated schools also exposed major gaps in English and French language proficiency among Indian and non-Indian pupils. Language barriers were endemic problems in day and residential schools. Haida John Williams notes:

\begin{quote}
I could understand a word here and there in English but for 2 years I learned nothing at all. [in the Skidegate Indian day school] … We couldn’t understand what it was about. I had to learn English as I went along. … When I went away to Coqualeetza at the age of 10 years I still didn’t speak English. I did all my thinking in Haida.\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}

In BC, a questionnaire distributed by provincial superintendents in the late 1950s revealed that an estimated 75\% of Indian children continued to speak their ancestral language.\textsuperscript{147} Yet, with stark evidence like this, IAB officials made no effort to ensure that language barriers would be remedied while in provincial schools. It was not until the

\textsuperscript{144} Milloy, \textit{“A National Crime”}, 205-6. DNHW \textit{Annual Reports} made noted gross rates of allowance suspensions due to school absences but did not identify Indian rates within aggregated statistics. See DNHW, \textit{Annual Report, 1953-54}, 102.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 153.

\textsuperscript{146} Interview with John Williams.
1960s that IAB officials even acknowledged the existence of significant language problems in public schools. In 1962, for instance, the IAB’s Supervisor of Language Instruction, R.C. Colliou, estimated that 25% of Indian school beginners aged five to eight were classified as having no knowledge of English or French; 19% were described as being able to speak some English or French; 30% and 13% were respectively categorized as being fairly fluent and fluent in either language. Colliou remarked again in 1965 that language barriers remained an ongoing problem, noting: “Grade repetition, loss of interest and age-grade retardation were common characteristics of Indian pupils.” Provincial school administrators commonly responded to the problem by placing large numbers of Indian children in special needs classes separate from the main student populace. Never before was it so apparent the failure of prior church and state attempts to supplant the use of traditional languages with English and French.

As revealed by language issues, public institutions were, in many ways, worse-equipped to deal with the educational needs of Aboriginal people than those under federal and church oversight. Earlier federal attempts to harmonize Indian school standards with provincial standards had little, if any, impact in easing this transition. While provincial schools presumably offered reprieve from the physical abuses endemic to many residential schools, the Indian education system lost any ability to adapt to local needs.

147 See Peterson, “Indian Education in British Columbia,” 99-103.

148 R.C. Colliou, “Second Language Instruction for Indian Children,” in The Education of Indian Children in Canada: A Symposium Written by Members of the Indian Affairs Education Division, with Comments by the Indian Peoples (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1965), 76.

149 Colliou, “Second Language Instruction for Indian Children,” 76.
and circumstances once under provincial control. The provision of basic social welfare services, a supplementary feature of the residential system, was absent in provincial schools. Children, parents, and school superintendents would cite how Indian pupils’ lack of adequate clothing, lunches, and books impeded student attainment and attendance in public schools.\textsuperscript{150} Public school teacher shortages and inexperience and lack of resources or training for working with Indian pupils did little to stay the problems of Indian adjustment. It may be for these reasons, in addition to denominational affiliations, that some Aboriginal people such as Andrew Paull opposed integrated schooling from the outset. Paull, as head of the North American Indian Brotherhood defended the historical role of the church in 1956, stating that, “if it were not for the churches our position would be much worse.”\textsuperscript{151} Perhaps not surprisingly, IAB officials observed that some Indians came to see integrated schooling by the 1960s as a “genocidal and … sinister plot by government to shift its responsibilities on to the province or the Indian community.”\textsuperscript{152}

It remains unclear to what extent school officials were even aware of the differences between IAB integrationist rhetoric and the lived reality of integrated schooling. In 1960, for instance, Indian schools superintendent J.C. Lawrence proudly

\textsuperscript{150} Hawthorn, \textit{A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two}, 140, 145, 151. For other evidence of a range of Indian problems of adjustment in a Saskatchewan integrated school context see Mitsuru Shimpo and Robert Williamson, \textit{Socio-Cultural Disintegration among the Fringe Salteaux} (Saskatoon: Centre for Community Studies, 1965), 160-170.


\textsuperscript{152} LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7983, File 1/19-2-10, Pt. 1, “Observations on the Integration Program of the Education Division, Indian Affairs Branch, February 1963”
announced that “the gap is closing” between Indian and white students in public
schools.¹⁵³ Much like those early annual reports that inflated the achievements of
residential institutions, integrated schools were described as promoting improved
responsibilities, daily routines, habits, hygiene, health, and social life, benefits that no
responsible Aboriginal parent could refuse.¹⁵⁴ Well into the 1960s, Indian affairs
officials reported that most Indian children and parents propounded and benefited from
attendance at non-Indian schools. In 1965 Waller claimed that “The reaction of the
majority [of Indians to public schooling] has been one of satisfaction. … All this is in
strong contrast to the silence and seeming mass indifference of the past,” before
admitting that “no objective analysis of pupil opinion has been made.”¹⁵⁵ Hawthorn’s
survey rendered a more sober view of Aboriginal perspectives of integrated schooling.
While he found that a majority of Indian parents still preferred provincial over residential
or day schools, Hawthorn described Indian opinions of provincial schooling nation-wide
as neutral at best; the most prevalent attitude noted was verbal support for education but
behaviour that denied it.¹⁵⁶ Lester Ray Peterson similarly observed in a 1959 study of
Indian education in BC undertaken, that “[i]ndividual Indians who speak in favor of

¹⁵³ Victoria Daily Colonist, 30 April 1960, “The Gap is Closing,” 10. Eight years later, a Williams Lake
newspaper story citing instances of physical segregation in a local public school were quickly dismissed by
provincial Department of Education officials as the result of grade differences. See Williams Lake Tribune,
11 September 1968, “Thinks Integration is More like Segregation” [n.p.]; BCA GR-0899 Box 5 File 3,
“D.L. Brothers to Dave Powell, 30 September 1968.”

Program of the Education Division, Indian Affairs Branch.”

¹⁵⁵ Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in Provincial Schools,” 69.

ethnic integration do so because they have hope that their children, or their children’s
children, may have a chance some day to cross the color line and emerge as Whites.
Those with no such perceptible hope do not speak of integration. Many do not want
it.”157

Neutral opinions appear to have increasingly turned negative by the late 1960s
when rounds of federal consultations for proposed revision to the Indian Act uncovered
critical Aboriginal views of integrated schooling. In the spring of 1969, a Confederation
of BC Interior Indians report outlined the failings of integrated schooling, stating that “it
has become apparent that there is a breakdown of integration in the public schools.”158
That year also saw the North American Indian Brotherhood release a “Brief Regarding
Indian Education in British Columbia.” In addition to noting “a very definite need for
improvement,” in regards to the provincial takeover of schooling from the federal
government, the brief stated that “this assembly is in total disagreement with the
Department of Indian Affairs, especially in the lack of consultation with Indians
concerning the education of Indian children.” The brief further criticized government’s
lack of consideration for the special needs of Indian children and the assimilationist
underpinnings of the provincial curriculum.159 Another brief from the Indian

157 Peterson, “Indian Education in British Columbia,” 125.

158 The brief demanded greater federal and provincial consultation with Indians and a review of the

159 BCA GR-0899 Box 5 File 3, “A Brief Regarding Indian Education in British Columbia, [1969].”
Homemaker’s Association of BC issued that year drew similar criticisms; both briefs described integrated education as the area of “greatest need” for reform.  

Alongside Aboriginal political organizations, social scientists also escalated criticism of integrated education policies around this time. In 1966, UBC anthropologist Barbara Lane condemned integrated schooling “for trying to turn Indians into middle class white children.”161 In a paper written for the Indian Advisory Committee titled “Unequal ‘Equality’: Failure in Indian Education,” Wilson Duff, another UBC anthropologist, similarly noted that “In Canada we are working on the assumption that equal access to education means equality of education, and the error of this view is now too obvious to ignore.”162 Two years after the release of the second volume of the Hawthorn report on education, Hawthorn authored a full-page article on Indian education in the *Province* leveling an array of criticisms at federal, provincial, school board, and band authorities. While continuing to support the principle of integrated education, Hawthorn rearticulated criticisms of its implementation articulated in his 1967 report. Hawthorn restated his recommendations as, “still generally pertinent,” adding that, “[t]he

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Indian child needs more than equality or similarity of education. In some ways he needs more and in some ways different schooling.”

Calls for reform appear to have had little impact on swaying either provincial or federal officials. The provinces had no legal obligation or historical precedent for providing special services to Indians and under the terms of joint agreements merely made this policy official. The joint agreements, by stipulating that Indians be provided the same education services as non-Indians, forbade the development of any special curricula or instructional provisions for Indians in public schools. From the province’s perspective, it was merely fulfilling the federal government’s request for equal treatment of Indians in provincial institutions as non-Indians. BC officials remained fixated on the idea that integrated Indian education be implemented on identical terms as provincial public schooling.

The fiscal terms agreed to in 1950 and 1963 made it even less likely that any special educational services might be provided to Indians. Initially, the per capita rate paid out by the IAB exceeded provincial costs, thus likely spurring provincial interest. Into the 1960s, however, provincial costs began to outstrip the per capita payments. In 1963, when the contribution rate was increased to $250, provincial per-capita costs per non-Native pupil was already well in excess, averaging $370. By 1966-67, the federal...

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contribution covered only 40% to 60% of the total costs in select school districts. The residential system had been funded via a similar capita grant system for decades, and with specific reason. Miller notes how government was able to effectively control schooling costs, particularly during inflationary periods such as WWI, by reducing the grants and shifting fiscal burden onto church organizations. The per capita system appears to have worked similarly with the province once the trend towards integration was firmly established and per capita education costs began to rise.

The federal government, lacking any power to influence curricula or compel the province to provide special services to Indians, did little to press the province to develop educational services better tailored to address Aboriginal needs. Even with mounting evidence of the failings of integrated schooling noted in Hawthorn’s report on education, the IAB took few remedial steps. In its commentary on the report, IAB officials rejected Hawthorn’s assertion that integrated education should, as a general principle, take into account differences in background, value, and motivation but rather rebutted that consideration of such “differences be minimized.” The IAB saw the need for special education services only at the pre- and primary-school level and even these were always contingent on available financial and staffing resources. Just like their provincial counterparts, federal education officials too upheld the joint agreement terms, declaring any special and remedial programming as falling within the sole domain and discretion of

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166 Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision, 384.
provincial school authorities.167 Davey confirmed this much in 1968 when he stated that “Provincial governments will take over more and more responsibility for education of students in Indian residential schools.”168 Even the 1969 White Paper, while affirming the principle and expansion of integrated schooling, advocated a more moderate path than that previously undertaken by prior officials. In regards to integrated education, the White Paper proposed:

The provincial governments will be approached to support this goal through their many agencies operating in the field. Provincial educational authorities will be urged to intensify their review of school curriculae and course content with a view to ensuring that they adequately reflect Indian culture and Indian contributions to Canadian development.169

Apparently, at least in regards to education, the consultation process leading up the White Paper and earlier provincial demands for full control of Indian affairs had some influence on those federal policy intents released in 1969.170


168 Vancouver Sun, 13 March 1968, “Indian Schools Role Under Review,” 7. It should be noted that some within the IAB, such as Chief of Welfare Division Walter Rudnicki, identified the elimination of the federal-Indian trust relationship as leaving open the possibility for provincial discrimination against Indians. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Rudnicki to Acting Senior Administrative Officer,” 3.


170 See Vancouver Sun, 4 February 1966, “MLA Suggests Indian Takeover,” 13; Vancouver Sun, 6; December, 1968, “NDP Urges BC Bid to Change Laws,” 22; Vancouver Sun, 15 March 1969, “Full Integration of Indians into School System Urged,” 13. Sally Weaver contends that the consultation process leading up to the White Paper’s release bore little semblance to the demands raised by Aboriginal people, particularly via the regional and national advisory council structure established in 1965. See Sally M.
For Michel Foucault, what was most significant about power lay in its exercise, not its ontological or institutional origins. He notes, “power means relations, a more or less organized, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations.” Indeed, if we view power as sets of relations having the generative capacity to “serve” in differing historical contexts and periods, we can undertake what Foucault referred to as an analytic of power and study power relations through interpretive grids of analysis.171 Foucault’s theories provide a way to make sense of the convoluted history of early integrated schooling in BC. Power relations “served” federal departments, provincial departments of education, school boards, and Aboriginal people in myriad and often divergent ways throughout the first two decades of integrated schooling process in BC.

While the interplay of intrastate power relations in other policy areas, such as health, involved significant clashes within intra- and intergovernmental agencies, a discernible convergence occurred in the area of integrated education. The general deterioration of federal-provincial relations, evident with regard to those late-1960s conflicts over Indian health, appears to have not significantly impeded the formulation of intergovernmental consensus when it came to Indian school desegregation. A convergence of intrastate interests, motivated by a combination of political, economic, ideological, and moralistic impetuses, took place beginning in the late-1940s. Federal

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and provincial interests in integrated education were hardly synonymous, but enough common ground and understanding existed—made official by the terms of the joint agreements—for “administrative integration” to proceed uninterrupted through two decades.

In the initial stages at least, this process had clear policy and power implications which proved largely detrimental for Aboriginal people. Integrated schools inherited old problems from the residential and day school system while introducing new ones. The results could hardly be deemed very successful. While Indian pupils were “administratively integrated” they remained separate in almost every other regard. It appears obvious today that Indian children bore the brunt of one of the most efficacious expressions of integration policy. Officials at both levels of government capitalized on Aboriginal demands for new education, using the mantra of integration to answer growing public demands for equal rights while balancing its own agenda for fiscal prudence and the termination of special Indian status.172

While Indian assimilation was an important motivating force behind the drive to integrate schools, BC’s public schools served as spaces for the formulation of both old and new power relations. Just as most Aboriginal people had long approached Canadian education according to perceived material gains and available alternatives, many Indians continued to support integration long after the shortcomings of public schools became painstakingly obvious. Prior to the post-1969 growth of Aboriginal self-control of

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education, many Aboriginal people saw provincial schools as offering vast improvements over prior residential and day schools. Entire communities continued to relocate for access to provincial schools well into the 1960s and beyond. 173 Although critical of integrated schooling, Dan George saw western education as a basic necessity, noting that, “In unprecedented numbers our young men and women are entering fields of education. There is a longing in the heart of my people to reach out and grasp that which is needed for our survival.” 174 Others, such as John Williams shared such a pragmatic view of integrated schooling. He notes:

> it’s only in the last 5-8 years that our people have begun to be integrated into the provincial school system in BC and the results will not be visible for another 15-20 years because it takes times for education to take effect. … The time is coming when it will be necessary for our people to have real education in order to take part in the life of the country. 175

Williams, speaking in 1969, showed great foresight. Into the late-1960s and beyond, Aboriginal attendance rates in secondary schools began to increase and a new political leadership began to emerge, one with greater experience navigating BC’s high schools, cities, and other “non-Indian” spaces. 176 While, as Paul Tennant notes, public schools 173 In 1966, for example, the Brotherhood further demanded the end of segregated schooling at Alert Bay and called for closure of the day school which kept Indian children “deprived of the same standards of education as those enjoyed by children attending the integrated public school.” Native Voice, December 1966, “End Segregation at Alert Bay, Says Brotherhood.” See also Vancouver Sun, 31 January 1969, “Indians Quit Isolated Reserve to Avoid Boat Trip to School,” 6; Plant, “Hank Snow and Movin’ On,” 120-123.


176 Moore, “The Teaching Staff in Indian Schools,” 58. Aboriginal post-secondary university attendance remained virtually non-existent in the 1960s. Ibid., 59; Vancouver Sun, 31 January 1969, “Education Creating Leaders for Indians, Scholars Told,” 55. Still, very few Aboriginal people reached university levels in this period. The BC Indian Advisory Committee’s 1966 annual report noted that only one in
were not the same source for skilled pan-Indian leaders as were the residential schools, neither were they cauldrons of assimilation and cultural genocide. Over the coming years, integrated schools produced a new generation of bicultural and politically skilled Indian graduates.177

1,600 Indians, attended university compared to a 1 in 60 non-Indians. Indian Advisory Committee, *Annual Report, 1966*, 16.

177 Both Tennant and Miller note how prominent Aboriginal leaders such as Peter Kelly, Andy Paull, and Frank Calder were brought together and educated in the residential system. Tennant notes, “The school system ceased to be a factor in pan-Indianism, since children from distant points and different tribal groups were no longer collected together.” See Paul Tennant, *Aboriginal People and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), 140, 150; J.R. Miller, “The Irony of Residential Schooling,” *Canadian Journal of Native Education* Vol. 14 No. 2 (1987), 3-14.
Chapter 4  
“‘Work Magic’: Indian Affairs and Economic Development Programming.”

“Education and Training Work Magic for Young People Coming to City”  
—*The Indian News* (1965).

Henri Lefebvre theorizes that the social production of space has both mental and physical dimensions. He notes, “space serves as a tool of thought and action; that in addition to being a means of production it also is a means of control, and hence of domination, of power.” Historically, Canadian Indian Affairs officials approached the geo-political construct of the Indian reserve from such a perspective. Reserves were seen as spatial tools capable of transforming both thought and action, a way of simultaneously displacing, protecting, and civilizing Indians. Once viewed by government administrators as training grounds for assimilation, however, reserves underwent a discursive transformation around the mid-twentieth century; Indian reserves were recast as peripheral spaces of economic and social underdevelopment. Like segregated schools, reserve geographies came to typify racial segregation, economic underdevelopment, and perhaps most importantly, a material challenge to effective administration. With the post-war “Indian problem” becoming increasingly defined in secular and administrative terms, federal economic development programming came to be seen as a way to bridge ongoing socio-economic inequities between Natives and non-Natives. Economic

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development schemes were also seen as facilitating new forms of Indian administrative and cost sharing with the provinces. In short, economic development was pitched as a panacea. It was forecast that economic assimilation would “work magic” and implicitly lead to and the administrative integration of Indians.

The advent of federal economic development programming in the late-1950s reflected what historian John Leslie refers to as the emergence of new forms of bureaucratic intervention in Indian affairs. The solution to the economic marginalization of Indians, Leslie notes, “was framed in administrative activism: increase the government supervision of Indian people, devise community development projects to enhance the delivery of social services, and provide economic development opportunities.”4 By the late 1950s, many Indian advocates, Aboriginal organizations, social scientists, and even Native people came to see the successful integration of Indians into mainstream Canadian life as having a requisite economic component.

Inherently integrationist, devolutionary, and intergovernmental, the economic development designs of the late-1950s and 1960s were also tools of social and physical production. Indian affairs officials hoped to see Indians leave their reserves, adopt Canadian work habits and values, and cease to be federal cost-burdens. Under the mantra of economic development, IAB plans entailed Aboriginal people falling under other federal line agencies and provincial governments, and becoming subject to non-Indian statutory and taxation requirements. While Indian affairs administrators always hoped to

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4 John Franklin Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?: The Development of Canadian Indian Policy, 1943-1963” (PhD Dissertation, Carlton University, 1999), 244.
see reserves become municipalities, mid-twentieth century economic development
schemes proposed a more incremental path towards this end that did not require statutory
revision or even Indian cultural assimilation. Under extant federal law and
intergovernmental agreements, the mere relocation of Indians off-reserve entailed an
increase in provincial Indian administrative responsibility. Into the 1960s, IAB officials
increasingly came to recognize that a structural mechanism for “administrative
integration” already existed to be exploited.

This chapter examines the three main economic development initiatives
undertaken by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in the integrationist era:
the Employment Placement Program (EPP), Community Employment Program (CEP),
and the Community Development Program (CDP). While each varied in specific
purpose, structure, and implementation, these programs all shared one basic
characteristic: none was effective in achieving its intended goal. Political-executive
disagreements, provincial intransigence, budgetary restraints, limited Aboriginal interest
and involvement, and the IAB’s desire for immediate program successes inhibited federal
attempts to implement effective long-term economic development programs for those
Aboriginal communities in most need. Undoubtedly, the EPP, CEP, and CDP failed to
grant economic parity to Aboriginal people. Few Aboriginal people were affected by
economic development programs; even fewer appear to have shared the government’s
view of reserves as undesirable spaces of underdevelopment. This chapter illustrates how
intrastate power was not an implicit consequence of all integrationist policies. The
discursive construction of space, while providing potential ways for the extension of both
physical and cognitive domination also, as Lefebvre notes, “escapes in part from those who would make use of it. The social and political (state) forces which engendered this space now seek, but fail, to master it completely.”

Growing governmental interest in reserves as cognitive spaces of social and economic underdevelopment originated out of the IAB’s long-standing lack of any programmatic means to provide adult Indian education or vocational training. Prior to the late-1950s, the IAB viewed economic development as an area of provincial domain. The only federal policy at that time was to encourage Indians to access provincial institutions for adult and vocational educational services. At least under the Social Credit rule of W.A.C. Bennett, the province of BC appears to have accepted Indians in its extant vocational training programs. However, while some provincial officials, such as Labour Minister and BC Social Credit League founder Lyle Wicks, might have talked about creating a “New Deal” and bettering the living conditions for Indians, little specific provincial action towards this end was undertaken in the two decades after WWII.

During the latter half of the 1950s, federal interest in Aboriginal people’s economic status increased. Along with segregated schooling, Indians’ marginalized socio-economic status came to be seen as major determinants precluding their successful integration and status as Canadian citizens. In 1956, IAB Director H.M. Jones stated

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before a regional inspector’s conference that “integration and community economic development would enable ‘the Indian … to take his place as an Indian with other citizens of the country.’”

At a 1959 meeting of superintendents, branch officials noted the need for community development and education for employment initiatives as an urgent and pressing problem.

Structural changes within the federal government further underscored the changing nature of the so-called “Indian problem” after WWII. In 1950, oversight of the IAB shifted from the Department of Mines and Resources to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Leslie notes how the new department had greater research and liaison capability than Mines and Resources and was interested, more generally, in issues of citizenship and training. It also was home to more progressively-minded senior civil service “mandarins” and “movers and shakers” such as Assistant Deputy Minister Jean Boucher and Citizenship Branch Director Eugene Bussières. The 1954 commissioning of a comprehensive survey of BC Indian social and economic conditions under the directorship of UBC anthropologist H.B. Hawthorn, was one of the early

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10 The department was, more generally, philosophically oriented towards defining citizenship values, devising schemes for social adjustment, and educating the receiving society to accept foreign customs, cultures, and values. Senior officials in the department, including Minister J.W. Pickersgill and Deputy Minister Laval Fortier provided political support for many of the changes instigated at the assistant deputy minister and director level. See Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?” 274, 276, 282. See also J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).
actions of the new IAB masters. The final report of the survey, completed in 1955 and later published in 1958 as *The Indians of British Columbia: A Study of Social Adjustment*, revealed the dire economic plight of most Aboriginal people in BC. The report also advocated a wide array of administrative reforms underscoring the connection between Indian economics and socio-cultural adjustment.\(^{11}\) In addition to recruiting social scientists for new policy development purposes, the IAB added an economic development division and increased funding to its BC Revolving Fund, a small-scale credit program for Indians, to $1,000,000. Headed by Jules D’Astous,\(^{12}\) another ex-military-type turned bureaucrat, the new division was charged with the objective of fostering “more efficient operations amongst Indians in the primary fields of production,” and providing “assistance, encouragement and essential training to enable larger numbers of Indians to enter into other fields of employment off the reserves.”\(^{13}\)

In addition to growing interest from social scientists such as Hawthorn, social advocacy groups and the non-Native public also began taking greater interest in the economic plight of Aboriginal people into the 1950s and 1960s. Incorporated in 1960 as an advocacy group for Aboriginal issues, the Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada


\(^{12}\) D’Astous had served previously as an agency supervisor in Quebec and New Brunswick and as head of the Branch Superintendent of Agencies. He also worked in the Quebec Department of Agriculture and the federal Department of Veterans’ Affairs. See Jules D’Astous, *Indian News*, April 1955, “Indian Affairs Superintendents Provide Community Services.”

described community development as a means by which Indians could achieve economic, social, and political equality, and as the “most satisfactory method of overcoming the severe handicaps under which Indians suffer.” Other organizations, including the Y.M.C.A. and Friends of the Indians Society, shared this concern over the widening gap between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, advocating increased spending on economic development programming to raise Indian living standards.¹⁴ Calls for an end to Indian segregation on reserves, often compared to “refugee camps” or “concentration camps,” also surfaced regularly in published newspaper reports, editorials, letters to the editor, and photo exposés. Such reports publicized the impoverished living conditions of Indians and demanded rectification of what one author described as the “wretched hovels that the Department of Indian Affairs thinks good enough for the Indians.”¹⁵

Ever defensive, particularly after the scrutiny and criticism raised by three years of 1946-48 Special Joint Committee proceedings, the IAB was acutely sensitive to such forms of negative publicity. Branch director H.M. Jones remarked in a 1959 letter to his future successor, R.F. Battle, that:

> I am more than a little concerned over the apparent increase in criticism of the work of this administration, both in the press and from other sources. … I feel that much of the criticism we have been subjected to could have

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been avoided by intelligent and timely action on the part of our officials in the areas where it originated.¹⁶

Jones went on to add that:

The reputation of this Branch is very much at stake and it is up to you and me to double our efforts to give it a new luster and regain the recognition of our sincere, honest and dedicated contributions to the task. We owe our best possible administration to the Government and we must never forget our responsibility to the Minister.¹⁷

W.S. Arneil, BC’s Indian Commissioner, voiced the same concern in a 1959 circular to all superintendents and staff:

[Indians] are more before the public eye than ever before. Discussion and criticism, both constructive and otherwise, goes on apace. … This awakening of the public interest is a good thing. It was bound to happen and should. It inevitably produces critical discussion of Indian Affairs Branch policy and functions, and it is here that we must take a searching look at what we are doing to see that causes of unjust and unnecessary criticism are avoided by intelligent and timely action on our part, in the areas in which the problems originate.¹⁸

In this atmosphere of growing public scrutiny, criticisms of IAB economic development policies, and shifting discursive ideas about “Native space” and the so-called “Indian problem,” federal officials began implementing new programs targeting promotion of Indian economic well-being.


¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol.. 8567, File 1/1-2, Pt. 1, “W.S. Arneil to all Superintendents and Staff, 14 April 1959.”
Agency and regional office staff began placing individual Indians in urban employment positions as early as the 1940s. The Employment Placement Program created in 1957, however, marked the Indian Affairs Branch’s first programmatic attempt to facilitate off-reserve movement for work purposes. Jointly operated by the IAB and the Special Services staff of the National Employment Service the program, the EPP was designed to assist in the employment of selected individual Indians in urban and rural settings and to support the movement of Indians off-reserve. The stated long-range objectives of the program were: (1) the exploitation of existing employment opportunities for qualified Indians; (2) the development of new opportunities in a wider range of employment; (3) in co-operation with the Education Division, the training of Indians for employment; and (4) Indian social orientation and integration into the non-Indian community. The IAB hoped that the program would help “to meet the needs of an increasing Indian population for whom the job resources and potential of the reserves are no longer adequate.”

Rural employment targeted by the Program included work in agriculture, road construction, woods’ operations, mining, and similar positions in frontier areas. Urban employment consisted of skilled and semi-skilled work in small businesses and the government civil service.

At the time of its inception, the EPP stood in stark contrast to federal discourse born in the nineteenth century: that Indians belonged on reserves and employed in agrarian-based occupations. For example, the Indian Affairs Department’s short-lived

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prairie farm education program of the late-nineteenth-century, as shown by Sarah Carter and Helen Buckley, stressed manual labour and small scale peasant farming techniques as the keys to Indian self-sufficiency. The EPP broke with prior policies in several ways and more closely paralleled relocation initiatives then being undertaken by the United States’ Bureau of Indian Affairs. To the south, large scale attempts to relocate Indians in cities and employment positions began after WWII under a relocation and urban education program, and through the extension of state agency services to reservation Indians. While Canadian policies never matched the intensity or scale of US ones, evidence suggest that Canadian officials were aware of US precedents.

The EPP was small in scale in its early years of operation. Initially, the IAB had only three Indian Placement Officers appointed in regional offices in Toronto, Edmonton, and Vancouver under the coordination of a Chief Placement Officer. According to the IAB, Placement Officers were “given an intensive training course at Indian Affairs


headquarters in Ottawa to familiarize them with the special aspects of work with the Indian population and of the services of other government departments upon which they can draw.”25 The number of candidates eligible for participation in the EPP also remained low during its early years. The program was initially focused on integrating individual young adults in the 16-25 year age range in the labour force. The highest preference was given to single Indians with a minimum standard of grade eight education, good health, preexisting employment experience, favourable personality factors, and the deemed support of family and the band. Only those carefully screened applicants with “better than average qualifications” seen as showing the most potential for success were chosen.26 Regional criteria also appear to have exerted importance in the selection process. The IAB admitted giving particular attention to centrally-located reserves proximal to regional offices.27 In its first two years of operation, the EPP handled 261 cases, less than 1.7% of the Indian population aged 16-21. Over the next


26 Latham, “Indian Placement Program,” 56-57; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1957-58, 4; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1958-59, 47; The relocation of families was not stressed in the early going although it did occur in later years. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 3, “Memorandum to the Acting Deputy Minister, 26 April 1963.” In 1964-65, the Branch began experimenting with the relocation of families into frontier industrial communities in Manitoba. In 1967-68, 248 Indian families were assisted to relocate to training or employment. Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1964-65, 28; Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Annual Report, 1967-68, 88.

27 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1959-60, 45.
few years, figures gradually increased and by 1963-64 the number of relocatees grew to 511 candidates.28

Shortly after its creation a secondary goal was added to the EPP: placements for short-term seasonal work via the coordination of federal, provincial, and private interests. Placements for casual wages enjoyed the highest statistical successes. In 1960-61, Placement Officers oversaw the filling of over 4,000 short-term jobs for Indians in agriculture, logging, pulp cutting, prospecting, and other general labour, more than thirteen positions for every permanent one filled; by mid-decade, the IAB claimed to have filled more than twice this number.29 It seems most likely that the EPP merely served to expand, rather than invent, casual Indian work. Significant Indian employment in provincial industries had been taking place well prior to the late 1950s, particularly in BC, where Indians had seasonally migrated as far south as Washington State for hops picking work and other wage work since the mid-nineteenth century.30 Similarly, most positions created by the EPP were in sugar beet farming and fruit picking work involving Alberta and Saskatchewan Aboriginal groups.31 This, however, did not stop the IAB

29, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1963-64, 33.
from, as it had with residential schooling, equating statistical evidence with program successes in its publications; nor did it prevent IAB officials from depicting regional successes in casual work placement as enjoying widespread national success. The following analysis is largely based on the EPP’s primary objective of permanent urban employment placement during the early years of the program.

Actual policy successes under the EPP were impeded by a number of factors and were unlikely ever as high as estimated in IAB publications.\(^{32}\) For one, very few Indians appear to have been aware of the program’s existence. In an MA thesis examining the early experiences of eleven EPP participants, Carl Latham found that in all cases, candidates became involved in the program via personal overtures from branch officials rather than from voluntary initiative. Latham also noted how some Indians in placement positions did not even know the name or purpose of the program while others had entered the program unknowingly via extant educational and training institutions in the city.\(^{33}\) It was no coincidence that few Aboriginal people knew about the EPP. Fearful of bad publicity and program failure, the IAB limited enrolment in the program and maintained stringent qualification standards precluding most Indians from partaking. The minimum education standard alone, would have excluded most Indians from EPP consideration. Ironically, those Aboriginal groups with the greatest need for employment were

\(^{32}\) The branch reported in the October 1958 *Indian News* that 85% of Indians cases handled by the placement officer in Vancouver made a successful adjustment in their new jobs. Five years later officials briefed Hawthorn that 80% of candidates remained successfully placed in the non-Indian community. See *Indian News*, October 1958, “Placement Officers Help Indians Move into New Jobs”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7983, File 1/19-2-10,Pt. 1, “Background Information for Integration Research project, Indian Affairs Branch, March, 1963.”

\(^{33}\) Latham, “Indian Placement Program,” 75, 132-3, 133-4.
considered the most unlikely to succeed in the program, hence deemed the least eligible for participation. Even if the EPP had been widely publicized, it is unclear how extensive Indian interest in it would have been. Latham noted how, in most cases, the only reason cited by Indians interested in entering the program was a lack of employment on reserves.34

Even though the IAB maintained in its public relations high rates of placement success, it appears that problems associated with adjustment to skilled and semi-skilled employment and urban life inhibited EPP successes from the outset. Placement Officers were not specially obligated, trained, or equipped to adequately meet the special needs of young Indian adults undergoing placement. Placement Officers treated Native candidates on the same terms as non-Natives and conducted little follow-up work with placed cases.35 As it did in most other integrationist policy areas, such as education and health, the federal government maintained that it had no legal or direct administrative obligations to Indians permanently residing off-reserve; the treatment given to placement candidates appears to have diverted little from this policy. Few support services were delivered to Indians during their initial placement under the program. IAB officials assumed that relocatees once in the city would exploit, if needed, non-IAB provincial and community services, such as YMCAs, church groups, and Friendship Centres.36

34 Ibid., 88, 91-92.
36 Indian News, December 1963, “Friendship and Center and Clubs Make Indians Feel at Home.”
Complaints about the inadequacy of vocational training for placement were common among early participants in the EPP. Many Aboriginal participants in the EPP experienced difficulty identifying available services, navigating government offices, and contending with racism in predominantly non-Native workplaces. The IAB, however, apparently never considered providing counseling or education assistance for those making the transition from reserve to urban life as part of the EPP. Moreover, even though permanently placed Indians would have been, for most administrative purposes, considered provincial citizens, at no point does it appear that the provinces were consulted or involved in the program. It was not until 1963, when BC’s first urban Indian Friendship Center was created in Vancouver, that the province began independently funding specific services for urban Aboriginal people.

High incidences of return migration to reserves were common to most Aboriginal urban relocatees in this period. With few supports off-reserve, EPP candidates were no different in this regard. For instance, of Latham’s eleven interviewees hand picked by the IAB as being the “best qualified” to represent the EPP, three expressed plans to return to their reserves within three months and six manifested the desire to return to the reserve

37 Latham, “Indian Placement Program,” 141-2.

38 Ibid., 94-95, 96, 115-16.


sometime in the future.\textsuperscript{41} The IAB unlikely achieved anywhere near the rates of success reported in its publications, especially since annual reports noting up to 80\% rates of permanent placement only referred to cases immediate to the previous year and not rates of actual permanent employment and placement. Some doubt also surrounds the extent to which the IAB was even aware of the meager program successes initially, even though, as early as the fall of 1960, H.M. Jones voiced concern to the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration about the slow pace of placements.\textsuperscript{42} As noted, the IAB made no effort to study the actual extent of integration and had no notion of how many placement candidates made use of provincial and municipal welfare agencies. The IAB also preserved no record of candidates having undergone multiple placements. At least one branch school superintendent recognized in 1965 that “many Indian students will be unable to adjust to the working world in their first, or even second placement.”\textsuperscript{43} Just as with integrated schooling, it was not until the mid-1960s that the IAB even acknowledged how little it knew about those Aboriginal people who left their reserves.\textsuperscript{44}

Once IAB officials began to realize the EPP’s meager successes and other branch and departmental programs began to offer placement services, the EPP diminished in

\textsuperscript{41} Latham, “Indian Placement Program,” 85, 111, 129. \\
\textsuperscript{42} LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “H.M. Jones to the Deputy Minister, 3 November 1960.” \\
\textsuperscript{43} G.K. Gooderham, “Prospect,” in The Education of Indian Children in Canada: A Symposium Written by Members of the Indian Affairs Education Division, with Comments by the Indian Peoples (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1965), 99. \\
importance. In 1964, branch interest shifted to the Community Development Program and in 1965, Indians became eligible for assistance under the Manpower Mobility Program administered by the Department of Labour.\(^{45}\) By 1966-67, responsibility for Indian education and placement was transferred from the Resources and Development Division to the Education Directorate.\(^{46}\) The EPP, however, languished on for close to a decade before being scuttled in 1975, when most of its budget was incorporated into general programs developed by the Department of Manpower and Immigration, which replaced the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1965.\(^{47}\)

Two years on the heels of the EPP’s creation, the IAB initiated another economic development project targeting a transformation of “underdeveloped” reserve spaces: the Community Employment Program.\(^{48}\) Similar to the EPP, the CEP was an inter-

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\(^{45}\) LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Record of Achievement in Indian Affairs – 1965.”


\(^{48}\) The CEP was one of several federal employment creation initiatives undertaken in the 1960s, including the Winter Works Incentive Program (WWIP), a Department of Labour sponsored subsidization program also designed to create public works employment opportunities during winter months. The Community Employment Project was often called the Winter Works Program in its early years and should not be confused with the WWIP. Although the WWIP primarily targeted municipalities, bands were allowed to participate in the program under the same terms. Eligible bands had to initiate, plan, develop, operate, and finance winter employment projects following which the Department of Labour reimbursed 50% of the direct payroll costs. Typical WWIP projects included road construction, sewage works, and construction. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “H.M. Jones, Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 22 August 1959.” See also LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 4, “Dept. of Labour, Municipal Winter Works Incentive Program, 1961-62.” Since most Indian bands lacked the funds required to foot the entire costs for WWIP projects, the IAB operated the CEP as a program alternative to direct relief for bands. See Indian Affairs Branch, *Annual Report, 1965-66*, 51.
departmental undertaking that grew out of the Department of Industry’s Area Development Agency Program, a federal economic initiative of the time. Unlike the EPP, however, which sought the promotion of off-reserve employment placement, the CEP was meant to address the creation of work opportunities on reserves. According to D’Astous, the first attempt to implement a winter works employment program began in 1959 as:

[A]n effort to offset unemployment of various reserves … [through projects] where the maximum amount of labour can be used. Projects in this category would include things as clearing and brushing of roadways, new road allowances, etc. The airing of equipment and procurement of materials should be avoided so that funds may be devoted fully to the payment of wages.

The stated objectives of the CEP were to provide alternatives to the issuance of direct relief to able-bodied Indians and, more specifically:

- To afford the Indian people added opportunities to acquire experience in the duties and responsibilities of self-government by involving them in the selection, planning and operation of projects.
- To promote the harvesting and marketing of local resources.
- To orient and train Indian workmen in various trades as an introduction to wage employment.
- To develop and improve public assets on reserves not provided for otherwise.

Despite being an interdepartmental undertaking, the IAB administered and oversaw the CEP via its extant Placement Section and branch protocols. Agency superintendents,

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49 Local offices of the National Employment Service were also used for the Program. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 1, “Department of Industry Press Release, 6 September 1965.”

50 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “Jules D’Astous to Indian Commissioner for BC and all Regional Supervisors, 21 December 1959.”

requested to identify and submit proposals for work projects on reserves, submitted these to regional superintendents. Regional superintendents in turn, including the Indian Commissioner for BC, then forwarded project applications for approval to headquarters, and then finally, Treasury Board. Once funds were approved, local agency superintendents began coordinating proposed CEP work projects.

Just like the EPP, Aboriginal people were assigned little power to determine or influence the CEP. The main source of consultation between the branch staff and band councils consisted of the selection of CEP workers and supervisory staff. Although branch correspondence suggests that band councils were increasingly encouraged to get involved in CEP administration after 1961, no efforts appear to have been made to alter the centralized manner in which winter works were administered. Even in early instances

52 Under the Department of Industry CEP, designated areas in need of federal assistance (initially limited to three tax exemption measures) were identified by Area Development Officers via qualification criteria and subsequent negotiations with other federal, provincial, municipal, and corporate authorities. See Montreal Gazette, January 29, 1965, “Changes in Designated Areas Not Ready Yet.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 5, “Assistant Secretary, Treasury Board to Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 21 November 1963.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Jules D’Astous, to Director, ‘Evaluation of the Community Employment Program,’ 1 May 1964.”


where the IAB used band funds to fund the CEP, little consultation or inquiry was made into whether bands would welcome the use of their funds for such projects.\footnote{LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 3, “J. O’Neill, Community Employment Program, March 2, 1962.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 9 December 1963.”}

The CEP was, for all intents and purposes, a work for welfare payments scheme designed to transform reserves into spaces of employment and economic opportunity. Pitched by the IAB as providing vocational training and industrious work habits, the CEP primarily served to reduce escalating on-reserve welfare dependency and costs on reserves, which were then climbing at an alarming rate: by 1959, the branch was paying up to thirteen times the non-Indian average of some provinces.\footnote{See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 9 December 1963.” Shewell notes the existence of an IAB temporary work for welfare scheme during WWII. Hugh Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’: Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 131. See also Appendix C.} Jones stated in a 1961 branch memorandum his “concern about the staggering relief costs and what these mean in terms of dependency and initiative amongst the Indians.”\footnote{LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 3, “H.M. Jones, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch [Memorandum], Winter Works Program, 1 December 1961.”} The CEP worked to reduce branch welfare costs in two ways. One, it alleviated welfare dependency by providing employment credits to Indians, allowing more Indians on social assistance to qualify for unemployment benefits.\footnote{Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1960-61, 72.} Two, CEP funds came from Treasury Board allocations separate from the IAB’s normal budget. The IAB submitted annual applications for funding laying out the exact number and cost of CEP initiatives to be undertaken that
By replacing IAB welfare payments with unemployment benefits and wages paid through CEP funds, the program represented a structural means for the IAB to reduce its annual operating costs.

In the first fiscal year of the CEP, 60 projects were undertaken for a total cost of $96,732. Seventeen of these took place in BC, mostly road construction and brush clearing projects, amounting to $22,675. BC projects accounted for roughly one third of the number of all national winter works projects and one quarter of total CEP expenditures. Over the next four years, the CEP underwent expansion, thanks to increases in its budget and project base. 1962-1963 appears to have been the peak year of the program, when the CEP underwent its greatest growth. That year, Treasury Board approved an increase in the supplementary appropriation to $1 million; the number of projects increased to 470 nationally.

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59 Since winter works projects fell between October 15th and the following April 30th, and were one-time ventures, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration had to annually submit proposals for new initiatives. See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 2, “Allan J. MacEachern to J.R. Nicholson, 7 June 1965.”


61 By 1961, some 153 projects covering 137 bands were carried out across Canada. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “J.H. Gordon to Chief, Welfare Division, 7 November 1960.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 2, “R.D. Ragan to Winter Works Sub-Committee, 18 April 1961.” From 1959-1962, 558 projects were implemented nationally, employing 5,518 Indians at a total cost of $894,245. 169 BC and Yukon projects were approved employing 1,429 Indians at a total cost of $261,503. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 4, “H.M. Jones to Indian Commissioner for BC, Regional Supervisors, Superintendents of Indian Agencies, ‘Summary: Community Development Program’ 3 October 1962.”

As with the EPP, early branch reports lauded the success of the CEP. Nicola Agency Superintendent E.J. Underwood remarked:

[W]e have been able to reduce, in many cases, the amount of relief issued to families on this reserve in view of the extra income received. … We are also pleased in that a few of the people seemed to have caught the “clean up” spirit that has been needed in this village so badly.  

Skeena River Agency superintendent, R.H.S. Sampson also commented in 1960:

There is ample evidence that this winter works programme is filling a vital need in our Indian villages. The councils have been only too ready to accept these projects in lieu of relief from both the point of view of accomplishing much needed improvements to their villages and keeping families off relief. 

Regional superintendents also shared early excitement over the benefits of the CEP. R.D. Raga, Alberta’s superintendent, noted in 1961 that “Most gratifying reports have been received from Indians, from field staff, and from the public in general.” Like his agency counterparts, Raga was sure to note the added welfare savings: “a very important result of this employment program was an apparent reduction in the relief costs over what had been anticipated, as well as the satisfaction of the Indians in earning their own livelihood on worthwhile works on the reserve.” However, as historian Jarvis Brownlie suggests in her study of southern Ontarian Indian agents, field employee reports often distorted


64 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “R.H.S. Sampson to Regional Office, Vancouver, 21 March 1960.”

Favourable views of the CEP complemented regional and agency staff job performance and helped garner cabinet support for the fledgling program.

Aboriginal responses to the CEP, on the other hand, were rarely, if ever, favourable. Even though the IAB began separating CEP funds from those expended for Indian relief in 1960, this apparently had little effect on altering Native views of the CEP as a “work for welfare” scheme. Such views appear justified when considering the manner in which the CEP was funded and administered. Despite being pitched as an employment creation program, the CEP was in every respect tied to Indian welfare policy and provision. For instance, CEP projects were specifically targeted for regions with high per capita relief costs and unemployment rates. In BC, this meant that interior agencies, notably those in the Okanagan Valley, received the bulk of CEP funds. The rates of pay given to participants in the program also were determined by relief amounts paid; CEP wages were usually set at 10% above normal relief entitlement. The existence of maximum per capita allotments instituted for CEP work also spoke of the program’s intimate ties to social assistance. Men were to be employed for periods of time each month that would enable them to earn amounts akin to that provided by social assurance.

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67 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 2, “Pages 81, 82, 99 and 100 extracted from ‘The Administration of Indian Affairs,’ prepared for the 1964 Federal-Provincial Conference on Indian Affairs.”


69 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 5, “Assistant Secretary, Treasury Board to Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 21 November 1963.” This amount was again allocated for the CEP in 1965-66.
assistance. Within internal staff memorandums, headquarters was firm that “[t]he available jobs must be shared amongst the unemployed in accordance with their needs calculated in exactly the same manner as for relief assistance.”70 What IAB staff didn’t realize was that as long as CEP programming remained wedded to welfare cost considerations, it was unlikely to provide any incentive for Indians to not seek welfare or to alter established seasonal work patterns.

Local Aboriginal complaints about the CEP as work for welfare made their way to Ottawa as early as the second year of the program’s operations. On January 18 1961, Indian and band representatives met with IAB officials in Ottawa to discuss the program. Thomas Moyah [location unknown], questioned the utility of CEP works, stating: “You will never know how poor the people are on this Reserve. We can’t see how this project could help us.”71 One band representative from Saskatchewan described a typical situation:

If you are going to ask people to work you have to pay more than the amount received for relief otherwise why work. The government has set aside money for winter works, also they inquired as to how money could be used. They then line up all these jobs and how much they would cost. There were more jobs than money. They thought that at Frog Lake they could widen the present trails by brushing them out, allowing them to dry sooner. They allowed $1,000 for this work. Unfortunately, instead of coming to the Chief and Council for list of names to do this, the office set up a list of names to do this work, which did not please the band. This list

70 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 3, “H.M. Jones, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch [Memorandum], Winter Works Program, 1 December 1961.”

71 Other band representatives used the meeting to question whether specific CEP projects like brush clearing would bring benefit to the band. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 2, “No title [Minutes from meeting with band members and IAB, 18 January 1961.”
was set up off the biggest recipients of Welfare Assistance. There is no use getting a man who is getting 90.00 ninety [sic] dollars relief to work for one hundred dollars.72

With little incentive to participate in the program, Aboriginal people were more likely to see the CEP as a discriminatory way to force menial work for welfare pittance, rather than as a way of promoting industrious work habits. In Alert Bay, Pete Cook remembers the CEP no differently:

And when I used to get welfare I had to work for it. And then the other people did. They used to go digging ditches around houses for drains and things like that [with] the rain blowing. Other people, they just go in the office and they get their money, whatever they gave out. They used to just give out a piece of paper written on there how much you’re gonna get. How much they’re allowed to get in the store. They’re better now. I was at the wrong end of a stick I guess. I was too black or something. Everybody else didn’t have to work for it.73

Cook’s comments imply that within reserves, some individuals were targeted for CEP “eligibility” and had to work for their social assistance cheques while others did not.

Early 1960s IAB correspondence, superintendent field reports, and evidence presented in the following chapter further suggests that Indians saw relief as a right and not requiring CEP-related work.74

72 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 2, “No title [Minutes from meeting with band members and IAB, 18 January 1961.”

73 UVA, Interview with Pete Cook, Alert Bay, B.C., 8 July 2003, interviewed by Byron Plant.

Faced with Aboriginal opposition to the program, the IAB struggled throughout the 1960s to alter views of the CEP as a work for welfare scheme. A series of early 1960s directives and a guide sent to field staff repeatedly emphasized that, “These are not ‘work for relief’ projects.”

Perceptions of the CEP as a work for relief program, however, endured well into the latter 1960s. In 1966, Cowichan superintendent Samson told J.V. Boys, the BC Indian Commissioner: “I believe that most participants felt it was merely ‘work for relief.’”

That fall, Boys notified headquarters that, in several agencies throughout the province, “Concepts developed, in some cases, unfortunately give the impression that works projects are for the soul [sic] of establishing a ‘Work for Relief Programme.’” The IAB itself admitted in a brief issued that year titled “Attitude and Participation of Band Councils and Members,” that “Branch instructors insist that these are not ‘work for relief’ projects yet the Indians think differently about this.”

Some non-Indians also appear to have shared Indians’ views on the CEP. One MP commented during the estimates debate for the Department in 1963 that, “in lieu of being paying out welfare, these men should be given some remuneration … In that way

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77 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 6, “J.V. Boys to Indian Affairs Branch, ‘Community Employment Programme,’ 7 September 1966.”

78 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 6, “Attitude and Participation or Band Councils and Members, n.d. [1966].”
they could be paid instead of being handed out welfare.”

Ever sensitive to public and political perceptions of the CEP, the IAB felt the need to issue an official correction by commenting: “In general the response of the Indians has been most positive to this program and they have shown a sincere appreciation for the opportunity to work towards the development of their reserves and natural resources instead of merely receiving relief.”

Negative attitudes towards the CEP, however, had even started surfacing within government ranks by the summer of 1962, when the branch issued a questionnaire to its superintendents soliciting feedback on the CEP and WWIP. In addition to revealing a range of administrative problems, the questionnaire results showed that poor supervision, shortages of equipment, weather challenges, and low band initiative hindered CEP successes in 31% of the agencies participating in the program. Band involvement in CEP administration was shown to be particularly low, non-existent in some cases. The questionnaire results revealed councils as having a combination of enthusiastic, indifferent, and poor attitudes in regards to each program.

Claims that bands were indifferent, however, also could work to the IAB’s advantage; in addition to providing a convenient means for the IAB to assess blame for the ineffectiveness of the CEP, they


81 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 4, “Jules D’Astous to Assistant Director, Operations, Report to the Policy Committee on the Winter Works Incentive and Community Employment Programs, 2 August 1962.” Of the remaining problems noted, four were related to program administration and financing, and two attributable to problems coming from the band councils. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 4, “Jules D’Astous to Assistant Director, Operations, Report to the Policy Committee on the Winter Works Incentive and Community Employment Programs, 2 August 1962.”
allowed branch staff to dismiss Aboriginal protests that the CEP was a work for welfare scheme.

Perhaps partly for these reasons, the IAB took few steps to improve areas pointed out in the questionnaire. Dissemination of the questionnaire results to field staff did not even occur until January 1963, six months after the results were tallied. Instead, Jones instructed the Indian Commissioner of BC, regional supervisors and agency superintendents that:

Where time and travel limitations will permit, band councils should be consulted with respect to [CEP] projects which might be undertaken. However, this is not essential at this stage because of the urgent need to obtain general information on the projects to be undertaken with an estimate of the costs involved.\(^{82}\)

Apparently, consultations with Native people were not seen as necessary. Jones went on to paternalistically add that, “Care should be taken to exclude projects which require contracts with non-Indians of the use of non-Indian tradesman,” before finally restating the criteria to be used in establishing priority of projects: the provision of work to allay high unemployment, initiatives that improve reserves, and the promotion of self-help and industrious habits.\(^{83}\) Jones could have been describing the farm education program of the late nineteenth century which stressed manual labour and small scale peasant farming

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techniques as the keys to Indian self-sufficiency.\textsuperscript{84} Indeed, 1960s IAB perceptions of reserves as underdeveloped spaces never broke completely with historical antecedence.

Since the CEP operated as a branch program, the charge of implementing CEP projects fell to agency superintendents. Little consideration appears to have been given to whether superintendents, already notoriously overburdened with administrative tasks, had the time or resources to oversee the new program. Prior to the creation of the CEP, for instance, Hawthorn noted in his 1955 survey how, “One can only stand in awe at the myriad responsibilities of the average superintendent and wonder how he accomplished so much.”\textsuperscript{85} The 1962 questionnaire further revealed how extant staff lacked specialized knowledge or training on how to effectively design and implement winter work programming.\textsuperscript{86} Apparently, aware of these problems, D’Astous unsuccessfully attempted to improve staffing levels in 1962, describing the situation as reaching a “critical stage and that a breakdown in administration might occur should assistance from other Branch divisions not be lent to the Section.”\textsuperscript{87} Staffing shortages had the effect of confusing even the basic goals and purposes of the program. In 1964, IAB Director R.F. Battle admitted that a “[l]ack of information as to philosophy, objectives and criteria for

\textsuperscript{84} Sarah Carter, \textit{Lost Harvests}, 209-10.

\textsuperscript{85} Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, \textit{The Indians of British Columbia}, 409.

\textsuperscript{86} The majority of agency staff spent less than 20 percent of their time on the projects. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 4, “Jules D’Astous to Assistant Director, Operations, Report to the Policy Committee on the Winter Works Incentive and Community Employment Programs, 2 August 1962.”

selection of projects has somewhat hampered the program in the past.”

That year, D’Astous also noted how the division of funds between two bureaucratic structures caused, “a great deal of confusion in the field.” The branch attempted to secure the appointment of ten regionally-assigned staff to help coordinate the CEP in 1965, only to have the proposal declined by Treasury Board due to a stated lack of funds.

Although insufficient staffing impeded the functioning of the program, the largest problem with the CEP stemmed from its funding structure. Applications for CEP projects had to be submitted and approved for funding every year via annual supplemental estimates. Treasury Board approval for winter work funding was given in October or November, too close to the start date of CEP projects for proper planning or band consultation to occur. A 1963 branch memorandum to deputy minister C.M. Isbister noted how fall appropriations “made difficult or impossible advance planning of projects with Band Councils and the development of administrative processes because of the uncertainty of funds being provided at all.”


90 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 6, “V.F. Valentine to Chief, Resources & Industrial Division, ‘Five Year Forecast,’ 13 May 1965.”


92 See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 9 December 1963.”
until projects were slated to begin, Jones was firm that, “under no circumstances should field staff incur expenditures chargeable to a project until they have been notified that funds are available.”

During instances of budget shortfall before fiscal year end, the IAB would limit or pool monies from other Branch divisions to meet basic CEP expenses. In the case of budget surpluses, monies had to be quickly spent since carry-overs presented rationale for Treasury Board to reduce its CEP appropriation for the following year. Superintendents voiced both of these scenarios at a conference in 1964. Island Lake’s agency superintendent noted how “The council set up projects – Region [headquarters] cut the money available.” The superintendent of Northern Ontario (Chapleau) described the CEP as “a glut of money … [spent] whether projects are worthwhile or not.” With an even sharper sense of cynicism, the superintendent for Iford remarked: “No money this year. The less we do the less we get criticized!!” Such testimonies demonstrate how field staff did not always exaggerate policy successes nor agree with the views and actions of their regional and headquarters superiors.

While Treasury Board appropriations for the CEP increased in subsequent years, problems relating to funding and staffing plagued the program throughout its existence.

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In the 1963-64 fiscal year, for example, ninety CEP projects were undertaken in BC’s eighteen agencies, costing the Department $139,715 in Indian wages and $72,825 in materials. Only $116,000, slightly more than half of the total cost of $212,540, was covered by Treasury Board funds earmarked for the CEP. The remaining funds presumably came out of the IAB’s welfare budget. Funding and staffing limitations hindered the CEP’s ability to foster long-term meaningful employment opportunities and training. The IAB was keenly aware of this, having made several attempts to address the CEP’s funding woes. In 1963, for example, the IAB requested to have CEP funds authorized in regular spring estimates, only to be denied by Treasury Board. The following year, branch officials unsuccessfully attempted to secure funding for perennial rather than annual projects via greater capital allocations and a contingency fund for CEP projects. The IAB tried yet again in May 1965 when it requested a five year appropriation that would have secured funding and staffing increased for the CEP into the 1969-70 fiscal year. Treasury Board declined the request. These repeated refusals to

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96 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 1, “Projects Approved, 1963-64 CEP.”


99 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 6, “J.W. Churchman, Director of Development to Indian Affairs Branch, June 15, 1965.” Subsequently, the IAB attempted to garner funding for the CEP as part of the War on Poverty program. It was forced to reduce their request by 40%, commit to a reduction of their welfare expenditure by $125,000, and file their application with the Special Program Committee of Cabinet, which it did on 30 June 1965 along with a funding proposal for Indian housing. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 6, “Community Employment Program,
expand the CEP through greater capital allocations demonstrate how Treasury Board officials viewed the program as a mechanism to offset and control rising Indian welfare costs.

Did the CEP promote new work experiences and opportunities for Aboriginal people? Most CEP work consisted of labour-intensive manual tasks with little to no educational value. CEP projects such as road maintenance and brush clearing offered only ephemeral work opportunities since they needed to be undertaken once every several years. In this regard, the CEP was no better than the EPP in creating permanent long-term employment. Furthermore, by modeling projects on the fiscal calendar year rather than the cyclical economy of particular regions, CEP work proved incapable of adapting to, or making use of, local resources or economies. Winter work employment paid no heed to the needs of Aboriginal sustenance economies, seasonal cultural practices, or the traditional forms of social welfare systems that persisted on most BC reserves throughout this time. Partly for this reason, many Aboriginal people came to view branch economic development plans as an assimilationist ploy by the late-1960s.

Intradepartmental correspondence reveals that the IAB even speculated that CEP employment might hinder longer-term economic development opportunities by inducing Indians to look to the IAB for employment or turn down commercial forms of work in the


winter months such as trapping. \footnote{101} While this possibility was downplayed in early years, \footnote{102} it gained sudden importance in 1965 when headquarters discovered that wages in excess of local municipal rates were being paid to Indians under the CEP. The IAB deemed that since CEP labour rates exceeded those paid by local municipalities, “community employment programs sponsored by the Branch are destroying any initiative the Indians may have in seeking outside employment.” \footnote{103} Within a month of the discovery, the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration delegated his authority to set casual wage rates—provided they match the lower provincial Department of Labour pay scale—to the BC Indian Commissioner and regional superintendents. \footnote{104}

Although the IAB saw the CEP as being more successful than the WWIP, \footnote{105} it was never even clear whether the CEP significantly reduced branch welfare costs. D’Astous, for instance, noted how the ongoing lack of funds for CEP programming vis-à-

\footnote{101} Ibid.

\footnote{102} LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 6, “Superintendent’s Conference, 19 November 1964.” Prior to 1964, such concerns were oft-raised and downplayed. For example, in December 1963 acting Branch Director, J.H. Gordon, noted that since the prospects for off-reserve employment provided greater opportunities for Natives to earn higher returns, part time CEP work was unlikely to lead to Indian dependency on CEP work. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “J.H. Gordon, ‘Memorandum to the Deputy Minister,’ 9 December 1963.”

\footnote{103} LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 5, “L.L. Brown to Acting Director, Indian Affairs, 6 January 1964.”


\footnote{105} The CEP was seen as more successful since it created more work hours per dollar spent and was more oriented towards the creation of public assets. See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 9 December 1963.”
vis the ongoing availability of social assistance created additional conflict and confusion in branch policies. Just like other areas of IAB programming, the IAB lacked any objective means to even gauge program successes or failures. J.H. Gordon, serving as interim IAB Director after Jones’ retirement, stated in December 1963 that:

[T]here was no attempt to establish statistically the effects of community development projects in reducing relief or stimulating reserve development and economic growth. At this stage we believe we are not in a position to provide the kind of elaborate information necessary to give a clear picture of the impact of this program in all the areas of our activities in which we are convinced it has had a profound influence. Obviously, we need these kind of statistics and information in order to plan, develop and manage this program most effectively. Similarly, the Treasury Board needs this information to discharge their responsibilities.

Gordon did not need to look beyond the IAB’s own existing statistics to surmise that reductions in welfare rates were “not so readily established.” Welfare dependency rates continued to grow throughout the duration of the CEP. Between 1960-61 and 1961-62 alone, Indian welfare rates increased by 15.6%. While rates of growth fell in the following 1962-63 fiscal year, possibly due to CEP works, they still continued to increase at a rate of 5.7%. Branch documents from 1964 reveal that every dollar spent on the CEP resulted in a reduction of welfare cost of only $.46 per dollar.


107 See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 9 December 1963.”

108 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 6, “H.R. Conn to Director, ‘Community Employment Program,’ 7 August 1964.” Welfare Division officials estimated in 1963 that relief was reduced by half of every wage dollar of Community Employment program funds expended, or
By the early-1960s, it was becoming increasingly clear that extant branch economic development programs were incapable of transforming reserves into special tools of “thought and action,” let alone conjuring Aboriginal economic parity. Testimony delivered before the 1959-1961 Joint Committee on Indian Affairs (JC), the second Senate-House committee struck to re-examine Indian administration after WWII, further revealed the ongoing economic marginalization of many Indian reserves. The committee recommended in its summary of findings the development of adult education programming to check Indian poverty. One year later, the IAB announced in its 1962-63 *Annual Report* intent to create a “Tentative Plan for Community Development,” in fulfillment of that recommendation. Initial post-JC branch attempts to initiate community development programming were apparently delayed by failed participation from the Department of National Health and Welfare and issues with the 1964 Agriculture and Rural Development Act, a larger economic development policy then being undertaken by the federal government.

Signs of provincial interest in community development programming were also emerging in the early 1960s. In 1962, the “Program Five” was created in cooperation

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40% of the total funds expended. See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 9 December 1963.”


with the federal Department of Manpower, the IAB, and provincial governments.\textsuperscript{111}

Several provinces also raised the matter of Indian community development during preliminary talks in August and September leading up to the federal-provincial conference on Indian affairs.\textsuperscript{112} At the 1964 meeting, Department of Citizenship and Immigration Minister Guy Favreau pushed for the creation of a community development program as part of federal welfare devolution plans.

In their studies of the CDP, Rob Cunningham and Hugh Shewell note how branch interest in community development stemmed from a range of developments locally and abroad.\textsuperscript{113} In 1963, for instance, new governments in both Canada and the US began experimenting with new social welfare policies. Pearson’s Liberals, having defeated Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives, began working to implement promised social security policies such as national pensions.\textsuperscript{114} To the south, Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society plans also involved community based-economic development

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\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Indian News}, December 1966, “Indian Adults Return to School–40 Take Up-Grading Course at Ottawa.”

\textsuperscript{112} LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Summary: Federal-Provincial Discussions on Welfare Programs and Community Development during August and September.”


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programming. Canadian interest in US social welfare programming and relocation and termination policies appear to have helped instigate a special 1963 meeting of officials from the Canadian IAB and US Bureau of Indian Affairs. Officials met in Scottsdale, Arizona that October to discuss policies and areas of mutual concern, the first cross-border meeting of Indian affairs officials of this type. Canadian administrators described the meeting as “an interchange of information between the administrators of Indian affairs in the two countries on a wide range of problems of mutual concern.”

Discussed problems of “mutual concern” included economic development, education, Indian local and self government, welfare, resource development, employment placement, housing, and health.

If political impetuses incited interest in community development, bureaucratic change in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration catalyzed it. The 1963 change in government brought sweeping changes to senior departmental personnel. New “civil service mandarins,” such as deputy minister Claude Isbister, took over senior official posts. Within the IAB, long time branch director Colonel Jones retired in 1963, to be eventually replaced by another WWII veteran, R.F. Battle. A younger Walter Rudnicki, less familiar with war in both title and service, assumed the head of the welfare division. Amidst this time of change, branch excitement for community development programming ran high although most branch staff, new or old, had little knowledge or


experience with community development. Few of the branch “mandarins,” Rudnicki recalls, had the faintest idea what community development was all about, but the plan was accepted because “somebody there [in the IAB] decided that they should at least appear progressive.”

The CDP was announced in July 1964 after Treasury Board approved a submission detailing the program and earmarking funding for $3.5 million over three years. Authored by Rudnicki, the cabinet submission was premised on the idea that “Indian communities remained outside the mainstream of Canadian economic, social, and cultural life.” According to the document, Indians needed to make better use of their resources, have more initiative, and be self-sufficient. If these objectives were, as Rudnicki suggests, included to appeal to Treasury Board interests, they worked. The program received guaranteed funding allowing for longer term planning than that carried out under either the CEP of the EPP. The amount of funds received also marked a slight increase over prior amounts allocated for economic development purposes, although Department Minister Rene Tremblay described the sum as “the minimum needed for an intensive three year programme.”

The CDP was to be carried out by Community Development Officers (CDOs) specifically selected and trained to carry out the program at both agency and regional levels, reporting directly to headquarters. As Cunningham and Shewell note, the program was novel in terms of both personnel and procedure, as

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117 Interview with Walter Rudnicki, Ottawa, 21 February 1994, interviewed by Robert Cunningham.

118 Canada, “Memorandum to Cabinet, Community Development, Indian Affairs Branch in Cunningham, “Community Development,” 59.

119 House of Commons, Debates, July 7, 1964, 5128.
well as in its recognition of reserves as permanent Aboriginal communities. In a December 1964 *Indian News* article, Tremblay explained: “As a general principle the community development programme will recognize that it is neither desirable nor practical to abolish reserves.” Even though it sought the integration of reserves into mainstream Canadian economy, the CDP envisioned the long term presence of reserve communities, a tenet endorsed by both of Hawthorn’s reports.

The CDP’s goals were less novel. Branch officials pitched the CDP, like the EPP and CEP, as an ambitious program capable of simultaneously improving Aboriginal economy and reducing branch welfare costs. Battle described the implementation of community development programming as a means to address a prior Treasury Board request to reduce Indian dependency on the federal government and to promote Indian self-sufficiency. Ever mindful of fiscal interest and political Cabinet masters, the CDP submission specifically noted the potential welfare savings to be had from program initiatives: “community development would be inversely proportional to welfare payments.” Similar to the CEP, the allocation of CDP funds via separate Treasury Board allocations provided a structural means for the IAB to reduce its annual operating budget.

If both the EPP and CEP indirectly sought to increase provincial involvement in Indian affairs, the CDP marked a more explicit attempt to devolve administrative

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120 *Indian News*, December 1964, “Community Development Programme Widely Supported.”
122 Personal Communication with K.D. Uppal in Cunningham, “Community Development,” 60.
capacity onto the province. By 1964, intergovernmental discussions regarding the sharing of Indian welfare costs and duties had stalled; senior branch officials began discussing the introduction of a stepped-up community development program as helping to facilitate subsequent joint welfare agreements. As Cunningham notes, the Cabinet submission was clear on this point:

In aiming to improve the status of Indians, a form of social and economic gain is held forth to the provinces. Current indications are that this would establish the necessary basis for negotiating the extension of provincial services to Indians.

The federal government had some reason to believe that a community development program would facilitate subsequent devolution agreements with the provinces. Several provincial governments had, after all, already initiated pilot Indian community development programs by the time of the CDP’s announcement. Manitoba struck a province-wide community development agreement with the federal government in 1962 following a 1959 recommendation made in Jean H. Lagasse’s provincially-commissioned study of socio-economic conditions in Manitoba. IAB staff seemed encouraged by early successes on at least one reserve, Fort Alexander, which cited increases in employment in logging industries and reducing welfare costs and crime rates. Other programs were

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124 Canada, “Memorandum to Cabinet, Community Development, Indian Affairs Branch in Cunningham, “Community Development,” 61.

initiated in Ontario in 1962, Alberta in 1963, and Saskatchewan in 1964. Federal officials hoped that stepped up community development programming would provide the incentive for the provinces to sign welfare agreements. Once the Treasury Board funding for the CDP was guaranteed, a subsequent agreement format was created to recruit provincial participation. Treasury Board approved the allocation of funds to the provinces on an interim “project area” basis. More than either the EPP or the CDP, community development programming was conceived of as an administrative means to further the goal of provincial integration.

Like the EPP and CEP, the CDP started out small in scale. In 1964, nine CDOs—three each in the Maritimes and Manitoba and one each in Quebec, Ontario, and Alberta—were appointed. The program was expanded in its second year when provisions were made for the hiring of thirty five additional CDP officers and assistants, the latter of whom were to be Indian. In BC and the Yukon, the agencies of Mt. Curry, Lytton, Bella Bella, and Anahim received a total of four CDOs. Overall, the branch planned to appoint a total of sixty two CDOs and fifty assistant Indian community development workers as part of the three year funding guarantee.


127 Contributions were made to Manitoba and Alberta in 1965. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Record of Achievement in Indian Affairs – 1965.”


CDOs were specifically selected from a national competition and trained for the purposes of CDP work. Successful applicants tended to be young, well-educated, and hired from outside the branch. CDOs received three months of intense training to help them acquire “extraordinary sensitivity and skilled powers to diagnose and treat interrelated economic and social problems.” Once assigned on reserves, placed CDOs were to establish direct relations and trust with local communities and assist Indians in exploring and developing new economic opportunities. To have local and direct access to Aboriginal people, CDOs were instructed to report directly to headquarters rather than to regional superintendents like other field staff. This had the effect of not only giving CDOs “the freedom to practice community development relatively unfettered by the bureaucracy,” but also of alienating the CDOs from agency staff who, as Cunningham notes, would have seen the CDOs as a threat to their traditional authority.

Since they were unencumbered by the same bureaucratic protocols as agents, CDOs “practiced” community development in a number of ways. Some, such as Jean Kitchen, apparently “did nothing” in the Quebec reserve of Mistassini while others such as Tony Karch, along with CDA George Manuel, immediately set out to improve housing conditions on the Cowichan reserve. Other CDOs had no direct interaction with reserves but rather worked in regional offices, a trend that increased into the twilight years of the

130 Canada, “Memorandum to Cabinet, Community Development, Indian Affairs Branch in Cunningham, “Community Development,” 64. CDO training took place under the auspices of University of Toronto psychiatrist Farrell Toombs.

131 Cunningham, “Community Development,” 87.
Citing interviews with former CDOs, Cunningham notes how conflict between Indian agents and CDOs developed immediately. This might have been predicted as pronounced differences in responsibility, attitude, and experience separated IAB local field staff and CDOs from the outset. Unlike Indian agents, for example, CDOs were instructed to step outside the role of a typical bureaucrat in carrying out community development. CDOs questioned branch policies and answered to Indian people rather than senior officials in headquarters. IAB field staff, on the other hand, acted as local representatives charged with maintaining bureaucratic protocols, balancing budgets, and carrying out policy manuals. One former CDO, Gerry Piper, noted the vast attitudinal differences between CDOs and IAB regional and headquarters staff:

[O]ne doesn’t tell a group of battle-scarred, dedicated, overworked and underpaid old vets that their work has been in vain, especially when the group-doing-the telling is relatively new to the battlefield. Nor does one tell the underworked and overpaid, pension-calculating civil servant that he’s about to lose his soft touch. That is political naïveté beyond comprehension. But tell it they [CDOs] did. 134

Many CDOs found that their services were not welcomed by field staff who saw the CDP as a threat to their position and power. Although headquarters instructed branch staff to assist in their work, CDOs quite often found themselves immediately isolated and lacking

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132 Interview with Jean Kitchen, Ottawa, 7 July 1994, interviewed by Robert Cunningham. The actual work of CDOs is more fully documented in the studies by Shewell and Cunningham.

133 Cunningham, “Community Development,” 88.

supports and resources once placed. Others discovered that some agents even blocked CDOs from taking up placement on reserves to begin work.135

The CDP was remarkable more for its unorthodox bureaucratic protocols, strange self-motivational strategies, and controversial status within the IAB, than its actual effectiveness. Based on its longevity alone, the CDP was an abysmal failure. As early as 1966, less than two years into the program, a series of events spelled the decline of the program. In January of that year, Rudnicki left the IAB for a position in the Privy Council Office. With Rudnicki, a driving force behind the CDP, gone, headquarters reassigned as CDOs subordinates to agency superintendents. This action had the effect of removing the CDOs from the actual field and stripping them of their ability to operate independently of regional supervision. According to Rudnicki, by 1968 only 15 of the 58 CDOs hired worked on reserves; the rest were transferred to Ottawa or regional offices. Now engrained in the old bureaucratic chain of command, CDOs, ceased to exist as a source of change within the bureaucracy.136 Manuel later described the CDP in similar terms, noting: “Participation began as a way of helping people to take a local initiative and was redefined to mean gaining the consent of the band council for Ottawa-desired projects.”137 In 1968, the IAB’s experiment with Community Development programming, as originally conceived, ended. Under the branch’s new welfare director, Wilf Churchman, CDOs were made answerable to regional superintendents, a change that

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135 Interview with Jean Kitchen, Ottawa, 7 July 1994, Interviewed by Robert Cunningham.
136 Cunningham, “Community Development,” 74.
further undermined CDOs’ autonomy and innovation. Traditional lines of authority in the IAB were re-established and the CDP was recast to serve other functions such as leadership training and infrastructure development on reserves.\footnote{Shewell, “‘Bitterness Behind Every Smiling Face’,” 78, Manual and Posluns, The Fourth World, 155. For instance, in 1966 a Community Improvement Program was announced to assist in the provision of infrastructure on Indian reserves. Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1965-66, 42.}

As an economic development initiative, the CDP failed on grounds similar to the EPP and CEP. The CDP, like its predecessors, was a small scale piecemeal program designed to produce immediate results. Simply too few dollars and positions were allocated for the program to have much significance. At the peak of the program’s operation, CDP work was carried out by sixty-seven Community Development workers for Canada’s over 550 bands.\footnote{The sixty seven included twenty-eight provincial Community Development workers working under provincial agreements. Annual Report, 1967-68, 72-73; H.B. Hawthorn, ed., A Survey of Contemporary Indians: Economic, Political, Educational Needs, Volume One (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1966), 279.} Nationally, this meant that a maximum of one in eight bands could have had a CD worker simultaneously employed. Manuel later noted how a lack of funding for actual implementation of economic development impaired the fundamental functions of the CDP: “What happened to the Community Development program at the Cowichan is not really different from what happened at a hundred other Indian reserves across Canada. There was no money for economic development.”\footnote{Manuel and Posluns, The Fourth World, 150.}

By most accounts, Cunningham’s characterization of the CDP as, “much ado about nothing” is fitting. In an unpublished paper, E.R. McEwan, Executive Director of the Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada, similarly commented that the CDP was “no

\footnote{Manuel and Posluns, The Fourth World, 150.}
panacea to Indian problems.” McEwen noted how the lack of a clear definition of community development created divergent interpretations of the program’s purpose, particularly among Community Development workers. He also pointed out how jurisdictional and eligibility issues created intergovernmental confusion which in turn inhibited the effectiveness of the CDP.141

As Shewell suggests, the CDP failed to resolve the question of the extension of provincial services and that of First Nations peoples’ place within Canada.142 Most of the resources needed to facilitate the policy were controlled by the provinces and the absence of significant provincial participation or endorsement provided an unworkable context for the program to succeed.143 Cost-sharing arrangements were finalized with Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia in the two years following the creation of the CDP.144 No province-wide cost-sharing agreement, however, was reached in BC. According to the branch, BC was too slow to assign responsibility for community development to one of its departments and was thus unprepared to discuss the striking of a comprehensive agreement at the time of the CDP’s introduction. The province did agree in 1965 to share the costs of funding a pilot community development project on the

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142 Shewell, “‘Bitterness Behind Every Smiling Face’,” 82-83.


144 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “W. Rudnicki to Chief – Social Programs Division, 19 July 1965.” In Alberta, Community Development services were administered on a contractual basis via a committee responsible to cabinet.
Port Simpson reserve but the final results were unspectacular. In 1968, the concluding year of the project, BC’s Indian Advisory Committee reported that, on the recommendation of Boys, “it was felt the project should be discontinued because the Indian residents have now progressed to a point at which further assistance by the worker could defeat the purpose of self-management.” Internal IAB correspondence told a different story. G.A. Whitman, a branch regional training officer, recommended termination of the project, mainly because “B.C. has not indicated any interest whatsoever in either continuing this particular project or embarking upon any further project area submissions.”

After the pilot’s discontinuance, the CDO formerly responsible for the BC pilot project remarked that while improvements had been made, it was difficult to determine the exact effects since he was there “as a catalyst rather than as an administrator.” Just like the CEP and EPP, the branch lacked any method or criteria to assess CDP program results. This ongoing lack of ability to evaluate program successes or failures further reflected the self-protectionist and survivalist orientation of the IAB, what Yngve Georg Lithman refers to in his study of 1960s Manitoban economic development schemes as a


characteristic trait of this instrumentally non-functioning branch of government. Even in those provinces where provincial-federal agreements in economic development occurred, the results appear to have been less than successful. The Indian Affairs Branch, as Lithman explains, “in spite of itself or together with other public agencies commanding considerable resources, capital, people, skills, is so ineffectual in actually being a conduit for the improvement of the lot of the Indians.”

In his study of Canadian Indian administration, Noel Dyck refers to the “awesome and disturbing” ability of the federal government to turn stereotypical images of Indians into administrative realities. Dyck’s characterization poorly applies to IAB economic development programming after the late-1950s; the branch failed miserably several times in attempts to create new “administrative realities” on Canada’s Indian reserves. While some Aboriginal people undoubtedly experienced both hardships and benefits from these programs, federal economic development initiatives in the integrationist era were simply too small, short-lived, and poorly implemented to have had any lasting impact on those

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148 Lithman notes how, “the multi-stranded and often-times vague tasks of the IAB, spanning virtually all aspects of the lives of the Indians … contributes to the inability to define what is success or failure, what should be supported and what should be scrapped. An economic development project might fail in the sense of never achieving the economic goals, but still be claimed to be a success as it brought e.g. skills or experience to the people in a reserve community. The IAB must thus be understood in this more complex way, and not as an instrumentally functioning bureaucracy.” Lithman, The Practice of Underdevelopment, 154.


people targeted by them. All three programs, despite adopting the novel discourse of economic development, were essentially pilots affecting only a small minority.

Accordingly, as late as 1966, BC’s Indian Advisory Committee noted in the aftermath of Aboriginal community consultations that most Indians tended to be unaware of any economic development opportunities stemming from government policy or regulation.¹⁵¹ Late-1950s/1960s economic development programs simply failed to provide a “work magic” tonic to end Aboriginal economic marginalization.

Those economic development programs begun in the late 1950s perpetuated two familiar patterns endemic to the earliest assimilationist Indian policies: the political setting of administrative funding at levels far below actual need and the exclusion of Aboriginal participation from the planning and executive process. All of the programs undertaken in this period were similar in that the behest of Cabinet interests and political expediency dictated budgetary decisions, not the actual needs of Indian people. That requests for more generous funding allocations were repeatedly denied underscores this fact. Proposals to alter extant funding mechanisms from branch administrators, amid overwhelming evidence that programs such as the CEP were failing, were repeatedly ignored. As a result, post-war economic development policies in Canada were pathetically small and ineffectual, particularly when compared to US programs. For example, during the 1957-58 fiscal year, the height of the US Urban Relocation Program, $3.5 million was spent to relocate and train 10,000 Indians. This amount equaled the entire three year budget of the CDP and matched the total annual operating budget of the

IAB’s Economic Development Division during the peak year of the EPP.\textsuperscript{152} George Manuel would later lament in \textit{The Fourth World: An Indian Reality} that “until that commitment of capital is made, no government will ever solve the problem of communities whose own indigenous resources have been undermined.”\textsuperscript{153}

The absence of political and financial wills guaranteed that branch economic development programs could never deliver on their terms of reference. Social scientists had known this for some time already. Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson noted in their mid-1950s BC survey that “the total burden of additional cost implied in our recommendations is a heavy one.”\textsuperscript{154} Hawthorn’s national study rearticulated this basic tenet a decade later:

An adequate program for economic development of Indians will require public expenditures on their behalf in the hundreds of million of dollars per annum over the foreseeable future. This will entail a much larger budget and staff for the Indian Affairs Branch, as well as more assistance from other government agencies at all levels.\textsuperscript{155}

The IAB’s reaction to this specific recommendation suggests that it was not new information to officials. In its commentary on the report, IAB officials stated: “In economic development the Branch is ready to advance on major program improvements

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{153} Manuel and Posluns, \textit{The Fourth World}, 150.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, \textit{The Indians of British Columbia}, viii. Lagasse also recommended numerous policy reforms that demanded significant increases in expenditure. See Lagasse, \textit{A Study of the Population of Indian Ancestry}, 4-6.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Hawthorn, \textit{A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume One}, 14.
\end{itemize}
if the government approves the new authorities and finances required." While the widespread and rapid decline of Aboriginal participation in capitalist economies that began in BC into the 1960s had no direct relation to branch economic development policies, the effects were little mitigated by them.

The EPP, CEP, and CDP were conceived of as unrealistically multifunctional policies designed to simultaneously enhance Aboriginal economic well-being while reducing welfare costs and offloading IAB administrative responsibilities onto other federal line agencies and the provinces. That these variant interests might be incompatible or serving cross purposes was never fully understood or acknowledged by those in power. The secretive and centralized manner in which economic development programs were developed and operated additionally hindered their success. Well into the 1960s, the IAB remained highly centralized, ruled by fiscal parsimony, and overly concerned with achieving immediate policy successes.

Another significant debilitating factor to economic development policy successes was the exclusion of Aboriginal people from the decision making process. As was the case with integrated education and health, economic development programs were developed and implemented without the meaningful consent or participation of Aboriginal people. Manuel later noted how “economic development without full local control is only another form of imperial conquest.” Long after his stint as a CDP

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157 Manuel and Posluns, The Fourth World, 151. Manuel, however, does maintain that the CDP helped Indians to gain solidarity and gain, “a new measure of their own individual and collective capabilities.” Ibid., 155.
worker, Manuel continued to critique federal economic development policies while
President of the National Indian Brotherhood. In 1972, he delivered a paper before the
newly-formed Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs condemning prior Indian
economic development programming as prone to poor planning, implementation, scope,
and quality of staff. Manuel described branch economic development as “A Whiteman’s
Whitewash.”

Several years earlier during the 1967 provincial budget debate, Frank
Calder similarly stated, “Community and economic development on reserves is a basic
step toward extinguishments of the reserve system.”

As attempts at “integration,” the EPP, CEP, and CDP had far less impact than
integrationist policies in health and education. Sto:lo Henry Pennier lamented this in the
1960s, noting how, outside of a labour context, Aboriginal people like him “could not
join the white society, socially.”

No work, quite simply, meant no integration. In
addition to failing to provide even an integration of workplace with non-Indians,
economic development programs were fundamentally misguided by the assumption that
economic integration was synonymous with, social and/or cultural integration.
Aboriginal people did not share the government’s view of reserves as marginal,
undesirable spaces of underdevelopment nor were they swayed by the progressive
rhetoric of IAB economic development policies. Even Hawthorn, who highlighted the

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Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Annual Conference, October 1972). Citing interviews with
Rudnicki and former CDOs, Cunningham similarly observes that the CDP gave voice to Aboriginal
communities and undermined the power base of the IAB. Cunningham, “Community Development,” 88.

connection between mobility and gainful employment, and advocated off-reserve migration to improve economic livelihoods, appears to have significantly underestimated the power of place for Aboriginal people at mid-century.  

Although made in reference to imperial processes of prior centuries, Mary Louise Pratt’s comments on the relationship between peripheral and metropolitan spaces prove relevant here. She writes:

> While the imperial metropolis tends to understand itself as determining the periphery (in the emanating flow of the civilizing mission or the cash flow of development, for example), it habitually blinds itself to the ways in which the periphery determines the metropolis – beginning, perhaps, with the latter’s obsessive need to present and re-present its peripheries and its others continually to itself.  

For many Native people, both prior to and after the growth of urbanization that began in the latter twentieth century, Indian reserve spaces did not solely represent spaces of “underdevelopment.” Similar to what Lefebvre refers to as counter-productions of space, Indian reserves did not lose their normative functions as anchors of identity, culture, family, community, and traditional economy. For Aboriginal people, permanent off-reserve movement for the purposes of socio-economic advancement carried a high cost: familial loss, community fragmentation, and cultural disruption.


163 See Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 367.
Perhaps most importantly to federal officials, economic development programs failed miserably as attempts to foster additional forms of “administrative integration” with the provinces. BC was only legally and administratively concerned with off-reserve non-registered Indians and, as the following chapter shows, was entirely uninterested in shouldering any cost for Indian welfare benefits. Ongoing perceptions of the CEP as a work for welfare scheme, combined with the inability of federal economic development programs to effect permanent off-reserve relocation, ensured that provincial interest in Indians remained low. Hopes that economic development would provide the catalyst for the striking of subsequent joint federal-provincial welfare agreements also were never realized. After 1959, no province agreed to a comprehensive welfare agreement. Instead, federal-provincial relations regarding Indian affairs only became more strained once IAB officials increased their efforts to devolve Indian welfare onto the province in the 1960s.

As demonstrated in Chapter Four, post-WWII Indian Affairs Branch economic development programs policies indirectly sought to devolve responsibility and cost for Indian welfare administration onto the provinces. By the early-1960s, Indian welfare was fast becoming the largest area of IAB expenditure and of great concern to federal officials. Although BC was no bystander to integrationist trends in Indian social welfare in the years after WWII, accepting greater administrative responsibility for Indians in areas such as family allowances and child welfare, the devolution of on-reserve Indian welfare services onto BC proved to be an elusive goal. The 1964 convening of a federal-provincial conference devoted solely to Indian affairs reflected growing federal concern about the uneven progress of administrative integration. The first national meeting of its type, the conference canvassed a range of administrative topics but one clearly motivated and dominated the proceedings: Indian welfare.

In his study of Indian welfare policies in Canada, Hugh Shewell suggests that Aboriginal people “could have agitated for direct [provincial] involvement in their
affairs, but there was no evidence that very many did.”\(^3\) While, as Shewell notes, Aboriginal people remained third party onlookers when it came to welfare policy discussions, they were neither silent nor inactive when it came to the matter of welfare devolution. Along with federal officials, many BC Aboriginal people favoured provincial control of Indian welfare, and for obvious reason. Provincial social assistance rates were three times higher than branch ones and were not paid in truck. BC social assistance was also not subject to discriminatory work-for-welfare qualifications like the Community Employment Program. For such practical reasons alone, Aboriginal people demanded access to provincial welfare as a long-denied right of citizenship and they lobbied the offices of both federal and provincial welfare officials accordingly. As this chapter later shows, however, Indian perceptions of welfare began to change after the mid-1960s, largely in response to declining employment opportunities and growing welfare dependency in Aboriginal communities.

Government perceptions of Indian welfare proved far less dynamic throughout this period. Stereotypical assumptions about Indians ran high when it came to welfare. Since its earliest provision, governments saw welfare as dulling Indian incentive to work and hindering the prospects of Indians becoming self-sufficient citizens. Attitudes and policies in the 1960s strayed little from earlier historical trends. When it came to Indian welfare, fiscal interests and intergovernmental politics trumped those moral, social, and humanitarian interests that facilitated administrative devolution in Indian health and

\(^3\) Shewell only cites a Saskatchewan Indian Joint Committee brief and Hawthorn’s 1966 recommendation for the need to consult with Indians regarding welfare devolution as evidence of Indian disinterest. Hugh Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’: Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 320 f.n. 198.
education. By the mid-1960s, Indian welfare was becoming an area of fruitless intergovernmental impasse in BC, and despite demands for reform from Aboriginal organizations, Indian advocacy groups, and social scientists.

The 1964 federal-provincial conference, in many ways, marked the climax of the integrationist era. During the months leading up to the event, Guy Favreau, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, told the House: “I sincerely believe that through this new development we are entering a new phase and have reached a turning point in the field of Canadian Indian affairs in Canada.”⁴ Favreau’s foresight would prove correct, although for reasons unanticipated. Federal and provincial officials butted heads during the conference; following the meeting, welfare devolution talks in BC deteriorated rapidly into political squabbles more typical of broader conflictual executive federalist relations. By the mid 1960s, BC had no interest in financing what it saw as a growing financial liability. The federal government, in turn, gave few reasons for the provincial officials to change their minds by insisting that any devolutionary measure contain some cost-sharing provision. Moreover, by consistently positing a distinction between legal and administrative jurisdictions, federal proposals affirmed Dominion disallowance powers and legal limitations on the scope of provincial responsibility.

That an integration of Indian welfare with provincial services never occurred in BC underscored the challenge of trying to renegotiate new administrative relationships for Aboriginal people within Canadian federalism. In the end, extant jurisdictional

⁴ Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 14 December 1963, 5881.
arrangements and the constitutional relationship established in 1867 to protect and assimilate Indians provided mechanisms for the provinces to resist administration devolution attempts. The conflicting interests of both levels of government impeded the integration of Indian welfare services in BC.

Federal Indian welfare policies underwent a qualitative transition in the post-war period. As Shewell notes, “the emphasis shifted away from harsh admonishments to be self-supporting toward a search for ways to make these goals achievable in physical, social, and economic terms.” In other words, while the discourse surrounding Indian welfare had changed, the underlying motivations had not. Indian welfare was seen as a mechanism to hasten Indian assimilation and to further Indian enfranchisement, the legal mechanism first introduced in 1869 to strip Indians of their status. Prior to the Indian Act of 1951, which removed compulsory enfranchisement provisions for men, qualifying Indians had to demonstrate self-sufficiency and the capability to hold land in fee simple. After WWII, Indian affairs officials began realizing that ongoing Aboriginal socio-economic underdevelopment, not some racially- or culturally-inferior predisposition, was obstructing successful enfranchisement.

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5 Shewell, 'Enough to Keep Them Alive', 173.

6 See An Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, the Better Management of Indian Affairs, and to Extend the Provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, Statutes of Canada [or SC] 1869, c.6. s. 16; Indian Act, RSC 1906, c. 81, s. 108. Entrenched in law in 1920, compulsory enfranchisement was removed from the books in 1921 only to be reintroduced and 1933. Involuntary aspects of this policy were lifted in 1951, 1960-61, and 1985.
For federal Indian Affairs officials, ubiquitous fiscal concerns about escalating costs offset pressures to extend or improve social welfare benefits to Indians after WWII. Indian welfare was an area of rapid expansion and cost growth after WWII; in 1947, the IAB’s Indian Welfare and Training Division split into separate divisions, reflecting the increased activities and capacities of each service. At least early on, however, Indian affairs officials could dismiss political pressures for a desegregation of social welfare services as opposition party rhetoric and as topics for the upcoming Special Joint Committee to determine. During a debate regarding the extension of pensions to Indians in 1947, one MP scoffed at Department of Mines and Resources Minister J.A. Glen’s suggestion that Indians seeking old age pensions could simply gain it via becoming enfranchised, pointing out that aged Indians’ ability to demonstrate self-sufficiency was hindered by their inability to collect pensions!

Just as in health and education, a combination of moral and fiscal concerns motivated the integration of Indian social welfare services with other federal departments and lower government. Administrative integration provided a convenient mechanism for IAB officials to skirt public and political pressures to include Indians in Canadian post-war social welfare programs, as well as reduce its own operating costs. While most branch efforts to offload Indian social assistance failed after WWII, successes in administrative integration did occur in several other social welfare program areas. For

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8 See House of Commons, *Debates*, October 24, 1945, 1460.
example, when responsibility for Indian health was being transferred from the IAB to the Department of National Health and Welfare, Indians were granted the ability to collect Family Allowances. In 1945, an agreement between the Departments of Mines and Resources and newly-formed National Health and Welfare extended eligibility for Family Allowances, which had come into place one year earlier, to Indians.\(^\text{10}\) However, as with so many other areas of “administrative integration,” administrative realities did not break fully with earlier policy traditions. Indian Family Allowances, for example, were still paid in kind—mostly in the form of food and clothing—and overseen by agency superintendents. This was justified, according to Glen, in order to “see that there is no abuse of the money,” and that “the Indian is capable of using the allowance for the benefit of his children.”\(^\text{11}\) At least initially, BC topped the list of provinces with the highest number of family allowance recipients.\(^\text{12}\)

Calls for Indian eligibility in newly-created post-WWII social welfare benefits continued into the latter 1940s and 1950s. Church briefs delivered before the 1946-48 Special Joint Committee hearings encouraged the extension of social welfare services to Indians on the same basis as non-Indians. The SJC also went on to affirm the general principle of provincial integration of services in its final report. That BC Indians were granted the provincial franchise in 1949 further fuelled pressures to include Indians in


\(^{11}\) House of Commons, *Debates*, 14 December 1945, 3523; Moore, “Indian Health Services,” 142.

\(^{12}\) Families whose children were in residential schools did not qualify for the allowance. Indian Affairs Branch, *Annual Report, 1946-7*, 224. In 1954, a new system was implemented administered by regional superintendents. A registry of Indian recipients was created allowing greater control over the dispensation
post-war social welfare programs. In 1952, Indians became eligible for Old Age Security Pensions on the same basis as other provincial residents. Also that year, blind Indians received Old Age Assistance and Blind Persons’ benefits, both administered by provincial governments. These integrationist firsts, enacted by Byron Johnson’s Coalition government, met with the wide approval of non-Indians. In his 1958 report, for instance, Hawthorn described the conferring of equal eligibility status for Indians in such programs as “Probably the most significant development in the history of public assistance for Indians.” In addition to lauding this trend, Hawthorn went on to predict that the appearance of good will between the federal and provincial staff “promises well for a transition from federal to Provincial administration in these [welfare] services.”

Other intergovernmental agreements struck in the area of child welfare during this period fuelled federal hopes that a takeover of Indian social assistance would follow. In 1952, the federal Department of Citizenship and Immigration and BC Department of Social Welfare informally agreed to extend provincial child welfare services onto reserves in matters relative to delinquent children, unmarried mothers, and adoption cases. After 1960, the granting of control of on-reserve child welfare services to the

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15 At least initially, the agreement had minor implication and the province only became involved at the request of local Indian agents. When BC clarified its policy for on-reserve child welfare services in 1955,
province, combined with growing public interest in child protection, resulted in a rapid increase of Indian child apprehensions, \(^{16}\) a phenomenon described by one former BC ministry worker as the “Sixties’ Scoop.” \(^{17}\) Several other provinces also assumed greater control of Indian child welfare around this time. In February 1956, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration reached a formal agreement with Ontario transferring responsibility for child welfare services to the Children’s Aid Society. \(^{18}\) As in BC, the number of Aboriginal people affected by the arrangement was initially small but the branch considered the agreement “outstanding” and hoped that other provinces would follow the Ontarian precedent. By 1965, similar agreements were in place in Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Nova Scotia, Quebec, the Northwest Territories and the Yukon. \(^{19}\) As for instance, only twenty-nine Indian children received provincial foster care. Gene Elmore, Sharon Clark, and Sharon Dick, “A Survey of Adoption and Child Welfare Services to Indians of B.C.” [Victoria]: A Report Presented to the Union of BC Indian Chiefs by the BC Department of Human Resources, 18 February 1974, 3-5.


with those joint arrangements in education and health, child welfare agreements stipulated that Indians receive the same provincial statutory services as non-Indians, in exchange for federal per diem cost reimbursement.

Ontario set another important precedent in April 1959 when it agreed to extend its welfare services onto reserves following an amendment to the province’s General Welfare Assistance Act. Under the arrangement, bands were reimbursed 80% of the cost of assistance via provincial and federal contributions under the Unemployment Assistance Act and the Department of National Health and Welfare on a 30/50 basis. The IAB again lauded it as a progressive measure, a positive step towards the fulfillment of desires for greater Indian self-management and the remodeling of Indian reserves as municipalities. Although, like the 1956 child welfare agreement, the welfare arrangement

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20 The agreement also invoked section 68 of the Indian Act, which granted cabinet the power to allow bands to, “control, manage, and expend” their own funds. SC (1951), c. 29 s. 68. Shewell notes how the release of the 1954 report Civil Liberties and Rights of Indians in Ontario, which recommended that Ontario extend its welfare programs into reserves, influenced this development. Hugh Shewell, “‘Bitterness Behind Every Smiling Face’: Community Development and Canada's First Nations, 1954-1968,” The Canadian Historical Review Vol. 83 No. 1 (2002), 65.

21 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1960-61, 53; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Summary: Federal-Provincial Discussions on Welfare Programs and Community Development during August and September.”
initially covered only a minority of bands, the IAB hoped it would facilitate additional sub-agreements and similar umbrella frameworks with the remaining provinces.\footnote{Initially, only seventeen bands, or approximately thirty-five percent of the provincial on-reserve Indian population fell under the terms of the agreement. Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1959-60}, 45, 52. By 1964, thirty-four bands covering about half of the provincial Indian population, administered assistance under provincial regulations; remaining bands, mostly those lacking the funds to pay the municipal share, did not fall under the Act.}

Encouraged by the Ontarian agreement, the branch submitted a memorandum to cabinet that fall titled “Application and Extension of Provincial Welfare Services to Indians,” recommending the negotiation of new agreements involving either band or provincial administration of on-reserve Indian welfare assistance.\footnote{LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Draft Report of the sub-Committee of the Federal-Provincial Conference, Appendix A,” 4.} The IAB went public with the policy the next spring when Ellen Fairclough, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration since 1958, announced that the federal government was prepared to negotiate agreements with provincial governments to hand over control of Indian welfare services.\footnote{Ibid., 2.} Later that year, the IAB decided “on humanitarian grounds” to start providing welfare services to some non-Indians residing on-reserve, notably those Aboriginal women and children compulsorily enfranchised through non-Indian marriage under the \textit{Indian Act}.\footnote{See \textit{SC} (1956), c. 40, s. 26. This affected approximately 7,240 individuals as of 1960. Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1960-61}, 53.}

While Ontario was the clear leader when it came to provincial devolution of Indian social welfare services, BC appeared at least willing to discuss welfare reform in the 1950s. In 1956, the BC legislature directed its Select Standing Committee on Labour
to investigate the “Welfare, Health, and Housing of Native People in British Columbia.” The final report of the committee tabled in March of that year, however, made few recommendations. Affirming the primacy of federal jurisdiction in matters of Indian welfare, health, and housing, the committee concluded that “the Indian Act, which in general provides the necessary legislative machinery for administering Indian affairs throughout Canada, may undergo such changes as to make any recommendations of this Committee at the present time difficult.”

Discussions concerning Indian welfare between authorities in the IAB and BC’s Department of Social Welfare continued in the late-1950s. To entice provincial interest in devolution, federal officials mimicked a strategy employed earlier in education: the harmonization of Indian welfare standards with those of the province. After two years of experimentation, the IAB boasted in 1959 that the former welfare “payment in kind” system was being replaced with a more equitable system of eligibility criteria and relief scales modeled on provincial standards. According to the IAB’s Annual Report of that year, the new system placed greater responsibility on Indians and paid out assistance “on substantially the same basis as non-Indians.” Once again, however, branch public disclosures and administrative realities varied. One year later, the IAB admitted that only


27 LLBC, Journals (Victoria: Queen’s Printer, 1956), 147-148.


20% of welfare payments to bands were made in cash; welfare payments of dollar value orders still dominated the Indian relief system.\textsuperscript{30} Furthermore, the same year it announced the abolishment of payments in kind, the IAB initiated the Community Employment Program, which demanded menial employment service as a qualification for relief assistance.

With Indian relief still being paid out in kind or subject to work-for-welfare qualifications, it is not surprising that many Aboriginal people demanded more equitable social assistance provision from provincial departments. BC’s major Aboriginal organizations appear to have favoured the principle of provincial welfare administration. In 1947, Guy Williams and Peter Kelly presented a brief to the SJC on behalf of the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia stating: “If the governments have the right to impose taxation on the Indians then such social benefits as are enjoyed by the taxpayers of the country should be granted to the Indians.”\textsuperscript{31} Twelve years later, Kelly rearticulated this same position at the JC hearings:

As citizens of British Columbia the native people are aware of the advantages of being more closely connected with certain departments of the provincial government. … However, the health and welfare recommendation has not been expanded enough. Since health and welfare matters are essentially local problems which should be dealt with by local authority, we therefore suggest that the federal government should negotiate with the province in order that British Columbia may enjoy the same standard of services enjoyed by other citizens. This would help to

\textsuperscript{30} Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1959-60}, 51.

\textsuperscript{31} Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, \textit{Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence}, No. 15 (1 May 1947).
eliminate the present double standard of services which have tended to make the Indian feel different and inferior.\textsuperscript{32}

Throughout the 1960s, other Aboriginal organizations similarly declared federal oversight of Indian welfare as both impractical as well as a denial of national and provincial citizenship rights. A North American Indian Brotherhood (NAIB) brief recommended to the federal government in 1961 “The gradual extension of all existing [provincial] programs to Indians.”\textsuperscript{33} One year later, the NAIB sent another brief, this time to BC’s government, advocating consideration of “the consolidation of [welfare] services under one administration wherever possible.” The brief also noted how IAB Indian welfare payments amounted to $22 per head per month, much less than the provincial rate of $67.50, and demanded that “the Provincial Government furnish the difference in welfare amounts.”\textsuperscript{34} BC’s Provincial Secretary, W.D. Black, would later admit at the 1964 federal-provincial conference that the federal welfare proposals then being discussed were “those which the Indians have been asking for in British Columbia for years.”\textsuperscript{35} Of course, both federal and provincial politicians were not above using “Indian demands” to further their own political agendas and to either defer action or compel it on the other. After the release of the 1969 White Paper, for instance, BC’s

\textsuperscript{32} Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, \textit{Minutes and Proceedings}, No. 6 (2 July 1959), 142.

\textsuperscript{33} RG 10 Vol. 13867 File 1/42-2 Pt 2.2 “Evidence that Indians Favour Provincial Administration of Welfare Services.”


Minister of Municipal Affairs, Dan Campbell, vowed to never attend another federal-provincial conference without Indian participation.36

The IAB had some reason to be hopeful that a comprehensive welfare agreement with BC might follow the 1959 Ontarian precedent. An earlier arrangement had been reached whereby the province began providing welfare assistance, on a refundable basis from the IAB, to Indians off-reserve having not established residency in a municipality.37 The creation of new liaison bodies designed to further intergovernmental talks raised integrationist hopes. In 1959, a standing Federal-Provincial Indian Committee was created to “clarify existing policies and procedures … and to make period recommendations for improvement and extension of social services to Indians.”38 Within a year, the committee drafted a statement of policy clarifying health and welfare service entitlements for off-reserve Indians and on-reserve non-Indians.39 The addition of a Federal-Provincial Relations Division to the IAB and appointment of a Provincial Relations Secretariat in the Privy Council Office in 1964 further provided forums for new


38 BCA GR-0361 Box 12, “Social Welfare Services in British Columbia: An Address Delivered by Wesley D. Black, 14 February 1961.” LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “The Standing Inter-Departmental Coordinating Committee on Indian Welfare Programs.” The Standing Committee was composed of three members of each department involved.

39 Similar agreements were reached the same year in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1960-1, 74-5; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1961-62, 34.
Such reforms reflected, more generally, the changing face of federal-provincial relations in the 1960s and the shift from cooperative to executive federalism. Political scientist Garth Stevenson characterizes intergovernmental relations in the 1960s as becoming more prioritized, formal, and technocratic in response to changing tax sharing arrangements and provincial concerns over rising expenditures.\(^{41}\)

In the meantime, the push to integrate Indian welfare services in BC received new impetus. In January 1962, federal Treasury Board approved financial arrangements transferring welfare services in the northern Babine Agency to the province.\(^{42}\) That year, a statement of policy modeled on the earlier coordinating committee recommendation was agreed upon, further clarifying jurisdictional welfare guidelines for both off-reserve Indians and non-Indians living on-reserves, contingent on full reimbursement from the respective welfare authorities.\(^{43}\) This meant that Indians with twelve months of established welfare-free residence off-reserve would receive services from provincial welfare offices; on-reserve non-Indians would be administered by federal Indian offices. The statement enshrined the principle that social assistance “be granted and administrated

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\(^{40}\) LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 2, “Provincial Relations Secretariat Terms of Reference, 1964.”


\(^{43}\) The agreement became effective 1 April 1963. Under the agreement, both governments reimbursed the other 100% of the costs associated with providing welfare services for Indians off-reserve and non-Indians on-reserve. The agreement was initially reached in 1961-62. Indian Affairs Branch, *Annual Report, 1961-62*, 34.
to the Indian at the place and point of his application and/or need.” It also epitomized what Shewell terms the liberal-democratic discourse endemic to post-war Indian welfare policies by stipulating that “[a]n Indian applying for, or receiving social welfare services is like … any other applicant or recipient. He is best able to use these services … if the administrative machinery and practice allow for consideration of individual need and individual treatment.”44 Although the statement essentially affirmed what was already provincial policy under the terms of the BC Residence and Responsibility Act, it was significant in that it clarified “certain conflicts and confusion” and provided provincial welfare for urbanized Indians. Rates of Indian urbanization had begun to rapidly grow during this time.45

As previously noted, early post-war integrationist measures in BC were largely the product of negotiations carried out by specific federal and provincial executive agencies. The convening of senior-level political discussions to examine Indian affairs, however, had been advocated as early as 1948. The final report of the SJC issued that year called for Indian affairs to be discussed at the next Dominion-provincial conference since “There are certain aspects of Indian Affairs administration which, perforce, require co-operation between Dominion and Provincial officials, to bring about the future

44 Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 37 File 13, “A Statement of Policy on Social Assistance and Health to Indians in British Columbia [n.d.].”

economic assimilation of Indians into the body politic of Canada." As with most of the SJC’s recommendations, the proposal was never implemented in subsequent years. Indian affairs were not discussed at a following January 1950 Dominion-provincial conference, likely since a new Indian Act was forthcoming. Even after the 1951 Indian Act’s passage, the IAB attempted to have Indian affairs placed on the agenda of federal-provincial discussions only to fail in 1955, 1957, and 1958. Like the SJC before it, the JC unsuccessfully advocated that intergovernmental discussions take place regarding Indian administrative matters.

With provincial integration proceeding rapidly in the areas of education and health, calls for first ministerial discussions on Indian welfare continued in the 1950s. In March 1954, the BC Indian Arts and Welfare Society advocated an Indian parley between Dominion and provincial officials to address the “appalling” present health and welfare condition of Indians. By 1963, even BC officials began advocating the initiation of federal-provincial discussions to improve Indian social and economic underdevelopment on reserves. That May, provincial Deputy Secretary L.J. Wallace notified Favreau of a BC Indian Advisory Committee recommendation that Indian affairs be the subject of a

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46 Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Fourth Report [final report] (22 June 1948).


48 Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Report to the Senate and House of Commons, 8 July 1961, 617.

Dominion-provincial conference.\textsuperscript{50} In March 1964, the Advisory Committee passed another resolution further recommending that “negotiations be continued with the Indian Affairs Branch with the aim to extending Provincial Government Welfare services to Indians living on the Indian reserves at the same levels as those received by non-Indians living in British Columbia”\textsuperscript{51}

The 1963 change of federal government brought new means to act on such demands.\textsuperscript{52} Noted in Chapter Four, the return to power of the federal Liberals under Pearson instigated sweeping personnel and policy changes, and the formulation of more systematic approaches to dealings with the provinces. In 1964, for example, Pearson restructured and empowered the cabinet committee system in hopes of improving administrative efficiency and government coordination. He also established a Federal-Provincial Affairs Division within the cabinet secretariat charged with formalizing contacts with lower government.\textsuperscript{53} Changes taking place within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration further reflected the new impetus on administrative integration. 1963 saw the Department of Citizenship and Immigration receive cabinet approval to pursue the Community Development Program; one year later Indian Affairs Branch commissioned Hawthorn to undertake a second national Indian survey, of which

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\item \textsuperscript{50} BCA GR-1661 Box 36 File 7, “L.J. Wallace to Guy Favreau, 8 May 1963.”
\item \textsuperscript{51} BCA GR-0128 Box 5 File 44, “L.J. Wallace to E.R. Rickinson, 24 March, 1964.”
\item \textsuperscript{52} John Leslie suggests that 1963 brought an end to prior policy discussions and “the end of a twenty year policy cycle during which the basic tenets of Canadian Indian policy were reviewed, evaluated, and recast along historically familiar lines.” John Franklin Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?: The Development of Canadian Indian Policy, 1943-1963” (PhD Dissertation, Carlton University, 1999), 406.
\end{itemize}
three entire chapters considered the matter of federal-provincial relations. The convening of a federal-provincial conference on Indian affairs was rooted in this era of reform.

Fifteen years after the SJC made its initial recommendation, Indian affairs was discussed as part of the proceedings of the federal-provincial conference held November 26-29, 1963. Guy Favreau, appointed Minister of Citizenship and Immigration after the April 1963 election, spoke about the need for “economic emancipation” of the Indian and lower governments’ constitutional responsibility for services such as health, education, welfare, and roads. Favreau added that “it has become clear that significant progress in the future depends upon extension of provincial services to Indians and to Indian communities in the provinces.” At the event, the federal government introduced what would be the first of several cost-sharing formulas to finance the extension of provincial welfare services on reserves. Under the framework, provinces were expected to make welfare cost contributions to Indians modeled on non-Indian rates. Differences between Native and non-Native per capita relief rates were to be paid out by the federal government. While this meant that federal contributions to the provinces would constitute the majority of Indian welfare costs, delegates immediately observed that “in the long run, the formula enables the Federal Government to extricate itself from rapidly


55 Richard A. Bell replaced Ellen Fairclough as Minister in the eight month interim period starting August 1962.

increasing welfare costs.” This federal extrication was to occur once differences in the per capita relief rates diminished over time, as a result of Indian community development and economic improvement schemes. The supposed inducement for the provinces to partake was the promise that their per diem welfare expenditures would never exceed those paid to non-Indians. With the exception of Ontario, this proposal, along with several subsequent ones modeled on similar terms, met with provincial rejection during and after the 1964 conference. At 1963, however, IAB officials were hopeful and Favreau concluded his remarks by professing a desire for provincial cooperation, Indian consultation, and the signing of immediate agreements between the federal and provincial authorities on general principles and objectives. It was agreed that a subsequent conference, this time specifically devoted to Indian affairs, would take place in forthcoming months.

The promised conference, however, faced months of delays and challenges. An initially-planned May meeting date was pushed back for several months as scheduling and the setting of the agenda proved more difficult for federal officials than initially estimated. In March 1964, L.L. Brown, appointed from the Agencies Division to


59 BCA GR-0128 Box 5 File 43, “Rene Tremblay to W.D. Black, 20 May 1964.”
temporary Chief of the Federal-Provincial Relations Division,\textsuperscript{60} visited various capitals to meet with provincial officers and to discuss agenda details. Brown’s notes for these meetings provide interesting insights into provincial perspectives leading up to the conference. In Manitoba, Brown met with provincial officials and noted their dissent over the Community Development Program and, more generally, the lack of consultation with the province regarding the creation of new program areas.\textsuperscript{61} Unlike the “somewhat frosty” reception in Manitoba, Brown described meetings with Saskatchewan and Alberta representatives as “friendly” and “most pleasant.”\textsuperscript{62} Although Alberta, like Manitoba offered little comment on the agenda, Saskatchewan did suggest it would make specific proposals at the conference and entertain bilateral agreements. Lastly, in Victoria Brown met with BC Indian Commissioner J.V. Boys, Deputy Attorney General G.D. Kennedy, and Deputy Minister of Social Welfare E.R. Rickinson. Brown described officials as holding the viewpoint that they were farther ahead of the “more backward” provinces when it came to Indian integration. Provincial officials described time being best spent “getting down to brass tacks” and working towards more collaboration in specific program fields.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{60} LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13866, File 1/42-1, Part 1.1, “R.F. Battle, Director to All Officials, Headquarters, Indian Commissioner of BC, Regional Superintendents, Superintendents of Indian Agencies, 24 January 1964.”


\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 2, 5.

As Brown’s correspondence notes leading up to the October conference reveal, provincial attitudes varied widely regarding what needed to be discussed and how. With regard to the cost-sharing proposal, the IAB’s summary of discussions classified Manitoba, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island as having a favourable attitude; Alberta and BC, however, rejected in principle any provincial expense for Indian welfare. Subsequent federal and provincial meetings leading up to the conference further revealed differences among lower governments regarding interests and even desires to participate. As late as October, two weeks prior to the actual event, the IAB continued to struggle to solicit provincial feedback on the proposed agenda. Even though T.L. Bonnah described relations at that time between the Federal-Provincial Relations Division and various provincial Departments as “most cordial,” it became apparent early on that most provinces preferred to negotiate on their own specific terms, if to negotiate at all.

Aboriginal people had been increasingly involved in policy discussions since the 1940s, partaking, albeit on a limited scale, in the proceedings of the two prior joint committees. No provision, however, was made to solicit Indian sanction, participation,

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64 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Summary: Federal-Provincial Discussions on Welfare Programs and Community Development during August and September.” The positions of the remaining provinces, with the exception of Ontario, were not stated.

65 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 21 October 1964.”

66 Ibid.

67 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 2, “T.L. Bonnah to Branch Director, 28 April 1964.”
or opinion surrounding the 1964 conference.\textsuperscript{68} At the event, several provinces criticized the exclusion of Aboriginal people, including Ontario, who unsuccessfully attempted to include Elliot Moses, a member of the Six Nations band, in their delegation.\textsuperscript{69} Tremblay explained the absence of Indian participation as a result of time restrictions, a lack of adequate machinery, the high number of bands, inter-tribal jealousies, and language and cultural barriers.\textsuperscript{70} Those Aboriginal people even aware of the conference taking place condemned their exclusion. Kahnawake Kahn-Tineta Horn, for example, criticized the government for conducting the proceedings “without the presence and observations of the human beings involved.”\textsuperscript{71}

The first ever federal-provincial conference on Indian Affairs took place in Ottawa on October 29-30, 1964. It was, as Tremblay stated in his opening commentary, “both an historic and auspicious occasion in the annals of Indian affairs administration in

\textsuperscript{68} Tremblay did circulate two letters to bands immediately prior to the conference notifying them of ongoing intergovernmental discussions. Given so little notice, bands were unable to respond or take action in time for the event. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “R.F. Battle, Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, October 16, 1964”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Open Letter to Chiefs and Councilors of Indian Bands, 19 October 1964.”


\textsuperscript{70} Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Federal-Provincial Conference}, 16.

\textsuperscript{71} Horn added that the Province of Quebec had no historical obligations or affinities towards people such as the Iroquois. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Kahn-Tineta Horn to Rene Tremblay, October 3, 1964.” The \textit{Globe and Mail} reported, “Quebec Iroquois Fear Transfer to Old Enemy.” \textit{Globe and Mail,} 31 October 1964, “Quebec Iroquois Fear Transfer to Old Enemy,” in Shewell, \textit{Enough to keep Them Alive’}, 320 f.n. 199.
Tremblay’s opening speech affirmed the federal view of the conference’s core purpose: to probe the possibilities for provincial cooperation in Indian administrative devolution. He told the provinces that although Indians had a legal-constitutional relationship with the federal government, this did not mitigate the fact that the provinces owed administrative obligations to both on- and off-reserve Indians. “Indians are citizens of the Provinces,” Tremblay insisted, “not legal wards of the Federal Government as it is popularly believed.” He further reminded provincial delegates that Indians were important contributors to the general tax revenue of the provinces and that administrative devolution was not akin to a federal shirking of its legal and constitutional obligations to Indians. He noted:

This proposal should not, and must not, be interpreted as an indication that the Federal Government is seeking to transfer to the provinces the jurisdiction over Indians and the lands of Indians, vested in it by the British North America Act. It is simply a proposal that envisages local services as the best instrument for implementing correlation of federal and provincial policies.

Brief statements from the provinces followed, and it became immediately apparent that significance differences in opinion among the provinces had not dissipated in the lead up to the event. Quebec and Saskatchewan, for instance, noted their readiness to extend a range of specific services to Indians on the same basis as non-Natives; New Brunswick

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72 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, “Appendix D: Opening Remarks and Speech made by Hon. R. Tremblay, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, at the Federal-Provincial Conference on Indian Affairs Ottawa, October 29 and 30, 1964,” (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1964). The Report of Proceedings is an incomplete record of the proceedings. The following analysis is based on the Report and draft remarks circulated within the IAB in the two weeks leading up to the conference.

73 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, “Appendix D: Opening Remarks.”

74 Ibid.
and British Columbia provided no formal submission but orally agreed in principle with
the idea of integrated administration. The remaining provinces ranged in their response
to the federal proposal. Manitoba’s Minister of Welfare, J.B. Carroll, bluntly stated “we
see no value in merely substituting provincial services for federal service. … Our efforts
should be more constructively directed towards broad social, economic and educational
programs designed to solve the basic and fundamental problems of these people.”

Nova Scotia and Alberta refused to accept Tremblay’s drawing of a distinction between
constitutional, legal, and administrative rights. Jems W. Harding, Nova Scotia’s Minister
of Public Works, reminded Tremblay that under the B.N.A. Act the federal government
“was in a position whereby it must sell the idea of extension of services to the
Provinces.” Alberta was another hard sell. While Alberta’s delegates apparently
endorsed the idea of Indian provincial citizenry, their brief stated that “Our position is
based on the further belief that so long as the Indian occupies a special position
constitutionally and legally he cannot at the same time occupy the position of the
ordinary citizen who has obligations different from those of the Indian.”

The designation of an appropriate strategy to devolve administrative services was
one, if not the most, important goal of the conference. Initially, the report of the earlier


76 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, 7.

1963 sub-committee recommended a comprehensive approach to devolution as the most expedient means by which to satisfy the administrative, financial, and tax requirements of provincial devolution. Sometime between 1963 and October 1964, however, the federal government reverted to its long-established preference for a function-by-function approach. This was most likely a decision of necessity rather than choice. Brown’s earlier discussions with the provinces revealed that a piecemeal approach offered higher possibility for success than an overall, or lump sum transfer. Furthermore, as Anderson et al. note, many believed that a function-by-function model was a less threatening approach for Indians fearing major changes. Not all provinces, however, shared the department’s decided preference for a function-by-function protocol. Most provinces agreed on the need for federal-provincial coordinating committees and the negotiation of province-specific agreements; Alberta, Quebec, and Saskatchewan delegates favoured more a comprehensive strategy. During preliminary talks it became starkly evident that federal officials were unprepared to moderate debate, let alone offer single solutions satisfactory to every province.

Deliberations on the subjects of welfare and community development received the lengthiest attention at the conference. These discussions revealed that again, few

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80 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.1, “Draft of Introductory Remarks by the Minister, 9 October 1964.”
provincial delegates shared synonymous views. Brief introductory comments by Tremblay and Dr. J. Willard, the federal Deputy Minister of Welfare, gave way to contrasting views, numerous digressions, and disjointed declarations by participating provinces. Alberta and Manitoba took the first opportunity to assert the inadequacy of the federal government’s welfare proposals to resolve the more fundamental problems facing Indian people.  

Carroll noted:

[C]ommunity development is not the only answer of a constructive nature. Planning must go much further and include a wide range of promotional activities including economic development projects of one kind or another, adult education, good health services and so on.

BC’s Black declared the federal proposals indicative of a federal intention to divest itself of responsibility for Indian affairs. The Provincial Secretary stated that the single most important point that must be decided at the conference was in “the area of financial responsibility between the federal and provincial governments in connection with Indian affairs.” According to Black, people in BC were already quarreling about the increasing costs of welfare and the possibility that Indian welfare would be added to the provincial tax burden. These concerns epitomized the main source of the province’s obstinacy in the latter-1960s: fear of provincial assumption of any expense for Indian affairs.

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81 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, 28.

82 Ibid., 28-29. Ironically, the CDP implemented that same year, along with earlier economic development programming, would fail in part for precisely this reason.

83 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, 32.

84 Ibid.
With negotiations already at a seeming impasse, the conference resumed the following day when provincial responsibilities for Indians were discussed. In a brief outlining its position and provincial responsibilities, the federal government reiterated in greater detail the main objectives stated the day prior:

(1) To have the Provinces recognize that Federal jurisdiction over Indians as effected by the British North America Act, is not inconsistent with the concept of an Indian as a citizen of the Province, to whom the Province has the same basic obligations as to its other citizens.

(2) To have the Provinces agree that as applied to the extension of provincial services to Indians, this concept implies that the Provinces shall share in the cost of extending such services.\(^{(85)}\)

The brief went on to argue that the provinces held responsibility for Indians based on the following reasons:

(a) Indians are citizens of the Provinces, not legal wards of the Federal Government as is popularly believed.

(b) The jurisdiction over Indians vested in the Federal Government is an exclusive legislative jurisdictional, rather than all-embracing, and is not inconsistent with the concept of the Indian as a citizen of the Province.

(c) Indians … contribute to the general revenue of the Provinces on the same basis as other citizens.

(d) That through their sharing of costs with the Federal Government in the categorical pensions field, Provinces have recognized some responsibility for Indians.

(e) That some Provinces have given recognition to the principle in other fields and extend services to Indians and Indian communities on the same basis as to non-Indians and non-Indian communities.

(f) That to deny any Provincial responsibility is to hold that the Indian is not a citizen of the province.\(^{(86)}\)

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\(^{(86)}\) Indian Affairs Branch, “Appendix M: Financing, Including Consideration of the Scope and Extent of Provincial Responsibilities.”
Never before had the federal government so frankly laid out its position regarding the desirability of provincial assumption of Indian administration. Indians were not federal wards, but rather, provincial citizens with all the same rights to provincial services as non-Indians. The federal position was shockingly disjointed vis-à-vis constitutional law and the long history of federal wardship policies. The accusatory tone of the brief was also undeniable. It was provincial governments, not the Dominion, who were culpable for denying Indians their rights of citizenship.

If any of the provinces harboured doubt that the federal government was looking to shirk its legal, historical, and jurisdictional responsibilities to Indians, the federal brief was proof confirmed. Here was the federal government privileging an arbitrary interpretation of the B.N.A. Act and instructing the provinces to implement it. The federal government, however, was not done. The final part of the brief laid out Ottawa’s position on the desired scope and extent of provincial responsibility. This included:

(a) The only limitation to the scope should be those that may be imposed by Federal legislation pertaining specifically to Indians.
(b) Provincial responsibility should extend to (A) providing full services to Indians who have established residence off reserves, and (B) providing to Indians on reserves those services which normally fall within the jurisdiction and capability of a Province.\(^{87}\)

Absent from the federal brief was any confirmation of federal fiscal, legal, or historical obligation to Indians beyond that owed to ordinary citizens. It is interesting to note that despite the federal government’s apparent desire to offload and share administrative responsibility for Indians, the Dominion seemed more intent than ever to limit the scope

\(^{87}\) Ibid.
of provincial responsibility. Earlier joint education and health agreements struck in BC, for instance, required provincial statutory change and entailed the entire surrender of federal powers of oversight to the province.

The federal proposals were noteworthy for their brazenness and provincial reactions could have been predicted based on the prior day’s discussions. One can hardly imagine a more confrontational approach having been taken. Divided during the first day’s proceedings, the provinces now had common ground to unite on: opposition to the federal brief. Even those provinces previously amenable to devolution now took issue with the federal position. Saskatchewan’s delegates, once prepared to discuss cost sharing specifics, now sided with Nova Scotia’s stance that Indians were legal and administrative wards of the federal government. Saskatchewan’s Minister of Natural Resources, John Cuelenaere, stated that due to the B.N.A. Act, his government “could not fully agree that the Provinces should be required to provide services to Indians on the same basis as to other citizens.”88 Alberta’s Minister of Public Works, F.C. Colborne, previously interested in discussing comprehensive devolution, reminded federal officials that Alberta was already assuming the costs of off-reserve Indians; the additional burden of administering services to on-reserve residents was too much to ask.89 Other provinces, including BC, apparently did not even respond to the federal brief. Following this barrage of negative provincial reactions, Tremblay retreated by asserting that “it was not the intention of the Federal Government to reach complete and final agreement on any of

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88 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, 39-40.
89 Ibid., 39.

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the topics, specifically on the matter of finance.”90 The conference concluded soon after following brief discussions of general and other miscellaneous matters.91

In many ways, the 1964 Federal-Provincial Conference on Indian Affairs was a remarkable event, undoubtedly both “historic and auspicious.” For the first time since 1867, the Dominion and the provinces met to specifically examine Indian affairs and to discuss alteration of the systemic relationship between Aboriginal people and the federal government created by the B.N.A. Act. Considering the lengthy history of failed attempts at such a conference, the assembling of most of the provinces at a table to discuss Indians was a significant accomplishment in itself. In the IAB’s Report of Proceedings, Tremblay, with characteristic overstatement and boldness, stated that he was satisfied with what had been accomplished and that “the real beneficiaries would be the Indians themselves.”92

For federal officials like Tremblay, however, the actual results of the conference could hardly be termed propitious. The IAB’s representatives, after forestalling the conference by several months, seemed unprepared entering the event. They apparently lacked any negotiation strategy beyond the uniform approval of their policies by the provinces. Discussions remained general, unfocused, and divisive. While the provinces

90 Ibid., 41-42.

91 These included the subject of future federal-provincial conferences on Indian Affairs and new research projects. Brief discussions on legislation, namely the Indian Claims Commission Bill and the Indian Act also took place.

92 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, 53.
agreed in principle on proposals for integrated education, cost-sharing community development programming, and on “the fundamental need to consult Indians and to involve them at the planning stage in matters of interest to them,” no formal agreements were struck.93 The most important areas of discussion—negotiating frameworks, cost-sharing, and Indian welfare—produced no overall consensus. The provinces even disagreed on whether future conferences were needed or desirable. No further conference was planned and matters pertaining to Indian welfare subsequently were delegated to specific coordinating committees on welfare. Consultations with Indians also began shortly after via the 1965 establishment of regional Indian advisory councils.94

BC officials in particular were less than impressed by the results of the conference. One month after the event, Black told the BC Advisory Committee that

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94 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol.13867, File 1/42-2, Pt. 3.1, “Agreement Format – Welfare Programs.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol.13867, File 1/42-2, Pt. 3.1, “Co-ordinating Committee, 9 August, 1964.” LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Record of Achievement in Indian Affairs – 1965.” In 1965 eight regional committees were established in the following areas: the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and the Yukon and Mackenzie District. The committees were composed of eight to twelve members elected by the bands of various regions. Matters raised by these councils were to be forwarded onto a National Indian Advisory Board, composed of eighteen Indians elected by regional members. This national board coordinated recommendations to be sent to the appropriate political offices. All council members were to serve a three year term. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, DIANDL, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, “Appendix K: Details of Proposed Regional Indian Advisory Committee,” in *Federal-Provincial Conference on Indian Affairs, Report of Proceedings* (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1964).
“close to nothing” came of it and “there was nothing too constructive discussed.” A Province reporter also quoted Black as stating that, upon his return to BC:

[I] might have well have … stayed at home and cut out paper dolls for all the good he [Tremblay] and the conference did. Large amounts of Federal arrogance were on display. The press release brought in for approval on the last day of the conference had already been released to the press the night before. The federal Government seemed to know very little of the implications of handing the responsibilities for Indian affairs over the provinces, and hadn’t taken the trouble to make much of a study. And despite all the suggestions from the provinces, it was clear that Ottawa wasn’t changing its thinking a bit.

Tremblay responded to Black’s comments by explaining:

It is, of course, to be expected that delegates attending a Federal-Provincial conference come with different points of view and with different hopes and expectations. … I am not at all sure what the Hon. Wesley Black expected would be achieved at our recent conference. … In fact, it was not anticipated by us that the Conference would reach firm decisions on most matters. … and we saw it as basically providing an opportunity for frank discussion of the problems that would have to be faced in extending provincial services to Indian reserves. From our point of view, useful discussions took place on both aspects.

Federal and BC officials could not even agree over their interpretation of the results of the conference, let alone specifics regarding cost and jurisdictional sharing of responsibility for Indian affairs. If anything, the conference underscored the challenge of restructuring Indian affairs administration amid deteriorating 1960s executive federalist relations.

95 BCA GR-0285 Box 8 File 6, “Meeting of BC Advisory Committee, New Westminster, BC, 16 November 1964.” Some provinces called for future ministerial discussions including officials while others preferred greater attention towards the striking of specific agreements in areas of service delivery.


Tremblay might have been correct in suggesting that conference clarified provincial stances and key areas of concern. However, one can only wonder why this was done through such confrontational means and at the cost of creating considerable provincial alienation and distrust of the federal government. Realizing that the possibility for a nation-wide welfare agreement was nil, the IAB reverted back to more province- and policy-specific negotiating strategies after 1964, holding out that “more purposeful discussions” might still take place. Federal responsibility for continuing negotiations gradually shifted from senior departmental ranks to branch regional level and regional superintendents who were instructed to assume more provincial liaison responsibilities. Federal devolutionist strategy, in many ways, had come full circle to resemble the negotiating protocols of the late-1940s and 1950s.

In the meantime, pressures for greater provincial involvement in Indian welfare from social advocacy organizations, Aboriginal groups, and social scientists continued. Just before the conference, the Indian-Eskimo Association submitted a brief to provincial premiers encouraging the principle of provincial Indian welfare administration. The brief, like Tremblay’s opening comments, affirmed the overall goal of equality of opportunity for Indians and reminded first ministers that Indians, as voting and taxpaying citizens of the provinces, deserved those services and treatments afforded to non-Indians: “The Province should accept the Indian reserve as an integral part of the provincial

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community for services.”99 BC Aboriginal people also continued to press for a provincial takeover of Indian welfare. In December 1967, the Southern Vancouver Island Tribal Federation delivered a brief to the federal minister of Indian Affairs and the provincial minister of Social Welfare criticizing the effectiveness of government social welfare measures to alleviate BC Indian poverty. The brief stated that “Where provision is made for extending such services, they are too often poorly planned, implemented with widely varying competence and effectiveness, and usually highly paternalistic.”100 Like the IEA report, it described the splitting of welfare jurisdiction between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people as “grossly discriminating toward a group of people, all of whom pay provincial taxes and are residents of the province.”101 The federation also noted that the federal/provincial division of responsibility for Indian welfare was not clear and that “much ‘buck-passing’ and confusion inevitably results.”102 The most public call for expedition of the slow progress of devolutionist discussions in welfare, however, came in Hawthorn’s 1966 report. Hawthorn noted how “Indians have consistently received


100 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “Presentation by the Southern Vancouver Island Tribal Federation to the Honourable Arthur Laing Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Government of Canada and to the Honourable Dan Campbell Minister of Social Welfare, Government of British Columbia, December 1967.”

101 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “Presentation by the Southern Vancouver Island Tribal Federation.”

102 Ibid.
different and in most cases inferior welfare services to those provided to non-Indians,” and recommended that provincial welfare services be extended to all Indians.103

Bilateral discussions between the federal government and the provinces continued in the two years following the 1964 conference. In line with the main thrust of the conference, the federal government drafted another comprehensive welfare-sharing agreement. Ontario, however, was the only province to sign any further contract with the federal government pertaining to Indian welfare; all other provinces raised various objections.104 The main source of provincial reluctance appears to have been in regards to cost. The financial formula proposed at the time, according to Anderson et al., was modeled on the idea that the Indians were a “high cost” group and that these exceptional costs should be covered by federal contributions. Under the proposal the costs for Indians would again be shared, with the federal government picking up all costs above the average non-Indian per capita amount. Since Indian rates of welfare dependency far exceeded those of non-Indians, the federal government still stood to pay the vast majority of the actual costs.105

As noted by officials at the earlier 1963 meeting, two principles underpinned the cost-sharing proposal. First was the assumption that as the socio-economic status of Indians improved via economic development initiatives, Indian welfare per capita costs


105 Anderson et. al. estimates that the federal government would have paid 97% of the costs in most program sectors. Anderson et al, “Recent Evolution of Canada's Indian Policy,” 525.
would eventually go down in relation to non-Indian rates. Second, it was predicted that as this occurred the provincial cost share would increase. As subsequent events in BC demonstrated, later renditions of the 1963 cost-sharing proposal were no less abhorrent to officials who never wavered in their demands that the federal government assume 100% of the costs associated with Indian welfare. At the 1964 conference, BC’s delegates had already rejected the federal suggestion that the provinces should, regarding on-reserve Indians receiving provincial services, “contribute at least that share of cost that it would incur if the recipients of the service were non-Indian.”106

Intergovernmental discussions continued to take place and, for a brief period at least, it appeared as though the federal and provincial delegates might indeed finally have been “getting down to brass tacks.” A federal progress report from 1965 noted favourable ongoing discussions with several provinces, and less than one year after the conference, Dan Campbell, the BC minister for both Social Welfare and Municipal Affairs, announced that provincial jurisdiction would benefit Indians, noting that “[Indians are] entitled to all of the national building programs that are involved and it is only a question of federal-provincial co-operation in transferring jurisdiction.”107 Later that year, Prime Minister Pearson sent a personal letter to Premier Bennett encouraging continued cooperation in the areas of integrated welfare and community development.

One month on the heels of Pearson’s letter, *Victoria Daily Colonist* and *Vancouver Sun*
articles reported Black and Attorney General Robert Bonner as announcing that the province was negotiating a welfare pact with the federal government to provide integrated community and welfare services to Indians.\textsuperscript{108} Frank Calder, the Nishga’a MLA for Atlin, concurred with the trend and continued his urging of the BC government to wrest control of Indian affairs from Ottawa, starting with welfare and education.\textsuperscript{109}

Whether or not the province was actually interested in continuing talks by that time is unclear, but federal officials seemed to believe the rhetoric coming from Victoria. Convinced that a welfare agreement with the province was still obtainable, the IAB took perhaps its greatest step yet toward harmonization with provincial welfare services when it adopted provincial welfare rates of assistance and eligibility conditions. Provincial Social Welfare Department officials had been calling for such measures since at least January 1964 when they began noticing that Indians were moving off-reserve to take advantage of the threefold higher welfare rates paid by the province.\textsuperscript{110} It remains unclear if or how enforcement of the twelve-month residency requirement prevented this from occurring.

Reflecting on the 1965 harmonization, Shewell contends that it marked the climax of devolutionary talks, a victory for integrationist and terminationist designs. He notes how the change marked an abdication of federal direct control over social assistance

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\footnote{\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 4 February 1966, “MLA Suggests Indian Takeover,” 13.}
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policy and procedures, and more generally, introduced a more complex, rationalized system for determining eligibility and benefits which was modeled on market-based systems of welfare eligibility.\textsuperscript{111} Closer examination of this development, as well as events subsequent to it, however, demands a more nuanced assessment. First, the 1965 harmonization was never intended as an end in itself. Branch officials viewed it as an interim measure taken in anticipation of total provincial assumption of Indian welfare.\textsuperscript{112} Inter-department circulars and ongoing discussions with the provinces after 1965 reveal that federal officials hoped that lower governments would respond to the federal gesture by extending their welfare services to on-reserve Indians. Second, the equalization of welfare payments with provincial rates entailed increases in federal welfare payments, and a step away from more frugal relief administration. Between January and October 1965, BC’s welfare costs increased by 31\% and enrolment rates grew by 23\%.\textsuperscript{113} In its first year of implementation, the decision to harmonize welfare rates cost the federal government an additional $4 million. While Indians affected by the change were subject to new eligibility requirements, the harmonization of welfare rates marked an increase in

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    \item[113] Province of British Columbia, Indian Advisory Committee, Annual Report, 1965, 17.
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federal-Indian administrative relations and a departure from earlier parsimonious federal welfare policies.\textsuperscript{114}

Third, it remains unclear how widely the policy was even implemented. Only those provinces with welfare rates above the federal scale, for instance, were affected. Quebec and the Maritimes were excluded from the arrangement since the IAB determined that provincial rates were lower than federal ones and “it would not have been to the Indians’ advantage.”\textsuperscript{115} Even in those provinces affected, the policy appears to have been unevenly implemented. With welfare rates on the rise, by 1967, one federal official, D.L. Clarke, was reported as stating that the branch had made a “gross underestimation” of the costs of delivering welfare at provincial rates. Clarke added that this “made it very difficult to implement the policies of provincial welfare, as was included in the agreement.”\textsuperscript{116} Around that time, the \textit{Vancouver Sun} reported a federal “Welfare Warning to Chiefs” in which the BC’s Indian Commissioner requested bands to “help control a steady increase in welfare expenditures among the Indian people” or face resultant cuts in basic reserve infrastructure development.\textsuperscript{117} One year later, the branch

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\item[\textsuperscript{114}] LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol.13867, File 1/42-2, Pt. 2.2, “Indian Welfare Services”; Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1965-66}, 4. According to Director of Social Welfare J.A. Sadler, the IAB began using provincial forms, including “the declaration of earning, the grant sheet and the social allowance record card.” BCA GR-0128 Box 5 File 43, “Memorandum to all Regional Directors, District Supervisors, and District, Municipal and Divisional Offices, 13 November 1964.”
\item[\textsuperscript{115}] The measure only affected Indians in the Northwest Territories, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario (those living on reserves not overseen by agreement the with Children’s Aid Societies). Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1964-65}, 26; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Record of Achievement in Indian Affairs – 1965.”
\item[\textsuperscript{116}] BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 96, “Minutes of Meeting, Federal-Provincial Welfare Committee on Indians, Parksville, BC, 5 October 1967.” See also Appendix C.
\end{itemize}
did just that when Fraser Valley Indian welfare rates were reportedly slashed by fifty percent, provoking negative publicity and criticism.\(^\text{118}\)

If intended as a way to pique provincial interest in integrating its welfare policies to include Indians, the harmonization gesture failed. Instead, the skyrocketing welfare costs and growing recipient rolls that resulted from the measure only exacerbated federal pressures to reach agreement with the province. Within the year, IAB officials took additional steps to facilitate welfare devolution. Realizing that Treasury Board approval alone was legally insufficient for the federal government to enter into agreements with the provinces, the government attained Cabinet sanction to negotiate intergovernmental agreements that December.\(^\text{119}\) A format for new agreements and cost-sharing formula was also referred to Treasury Board.\(^\text{120}\) The proposal consisted of the striking of a memorandum of understanding and the adoption of a “phasing out formula” which would see the province assume greater costs of administering welfare.

Just as they rejected the principle of any new cost assumption at the 1964 conference, BC officials found the federal proposal unacceptable.\(^\text{121}\) The province was

\(^{118}\) Agency Superintendent J.C. Letcher was reported as stating that such a reduction was common annually, “during the peak employment summer.” \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 2 August 1968, “Cut in Allowances to Indians Flayed,” 20.


\(^{120}\) LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567, File 1/1—2 Pt. 2, “Record of Achievement in Indian Affairs – 1965.” Welfare agreements were made contingent to band acceptance under the plan.

\(^{121}\) BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 96, “E.R. Rickinson, [untitled document], 31 August 1967.”
becoming only more wary of federal motives in regards to Indian welfare devolution, and apparently with valid reason. Despite behaving to the contrary during and after the October conference proceedings, the IAB continued to maintain that its interest in welfare devolution was not indicative of a federal wish to abdicate or delegate its constitutional responsibilities to Indians.\textsuperscript{122} Although federal officials held on to hope for immediate welfare agreements to be reached, even some within Ottawa were coming to the realization that longer-term negotiations might be needed.\textsuperscript{123} In 1966, a statutory provision was proposed to incorporate the 1964 cost-sharing formula under Part II of the Canada Assistance Plan, but never implemented.\textsuperscript{124} The next year, BC’s Indian Commissioner told Rickinson, “it does not appear likely that we are going to reach an accord on terms for a Federal-Provincial Welfare Agreement in the Province of British Columbia.”\textsuperscript{125}

As noted, the 1964 conference provided grounds for provincial solidarity in opposition to the federal proposals. Accordingly, into the latter 1960s, western provincial representatives began meeting amongst themselves to discuss matters relating to Indians and Indian welfare. In 1966, a Prairie Provinces Ministerial Conference on Government Matters Pertaining to the Affairs of Native People took place in Winnipeg.\textsuperscript{126} One year

\begin{footnotes}
\item[122] Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, \textit{Annual Report, 1965-66}, 42.
\item[124] Anderson et al, “Recent Evolution of Canada’s Indian Policy,” 527.
\item[125] BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 97, “J.V. Boys to E.R. Rickinson, 19 September 1967.”
\item[126] Anderson et al, “Recent Evolution of Canada's Indian Policy,” 528.
\end{footnotes}
later, senior officials from the welfare departments of the four western provinces met to discuss Indian matters.\textsuperscript{127} Another meeting, this time between the Deputy Ministers of Welfare for the four western provinces, took place in Regina one month later to discuss problems relating to on- and off-reserve Indians.\textsuperscript{128} Even though the federal government was not involved, differing provincial and regional interests prevented the reaching of consensus on fundamental issues. While all provinces agreed that Indians faced great social and economic problems and that extant federal palliative and treatment services were inadequate, BC stubbornly maintained that the federal government should bear 100\% of the costs for palliative services for both on- and off-reserve Indians. Provincial attitudes had progressed little from earlier discussions in 1964.

The Federal-Provincial Welfare Committee on Indians also continued to meet after the conference, but, by the fall of 1967, it was becoming clear that the intergovernmental impasse and internal divisions were inhibiting its work. At a Parksville meeting that October, the committee split over whether the federal government should pay the entirety of the costs of administering Indians under provincial offices. Even though the committee acknowledged the disruption caused to Indian families by the existence of separate policies, priorities, and budget considerations in welfare, most members rejected the federal government’s cost-sharing proposal. Divisions within the committee became further evident when its BC members drafted and released their own

\textsuperscript{127} See BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 96, “Western Provinces on Indians, Minutes of Meeting, 27 October 1967,” 3.

\textsuperscript{128} BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 96, “Deputy Ministers’ Meeting, 6 November 1967.”
alternative proposal, one advocating limited provincial involvement within federal
devolution plans.\textsuperscript{129} By 1968, internal divisions and ambiguity over the committee’s role
and function cemented any doubts about the ability of the committee to facilitate an
agreement. That year, N.S. Brooke, committee chair and supervisor of the BC Social
Assistance and Rehabilitation Division, stated:

\begin{quote}
There is general frustration in the Committee with its role since it is
considered the integration of the Indian as a Canadian must involve
extension of provincial services and in the case of welfare this is
stalemated by the inability of federal and provincial jurisdictions to agree
on a basis for cost-sharing.\textsuperscript{130}
\end{quote}

In May 1968, internal committee divisions prompted an unsuccessful motion from the
Department of Social Welfare to suspend the committee’s activity until the committee’s
purpose and function could be clarified.\textsuperscript{131}

Negotiations continued to degenerate into confusing sorties of political posturing
and finger-pointing, with both federal and provincial officials accusing the other of
hindering integration. Bennett’s 1969 public pledge to take over control of Indian affairs
might be best seen as one such example. Even Campbell, who later defended Bennett’s
pledge as “a great deal of misunderstanding,” had told a \textit{Vancouver Sun} reporter earlier in
1965 that he supported provincial jurisdiction for Indians. “Indians,” Campbell noted,
“are entitled to the same welfare conditions as anyone in the country … and it is only a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[130] BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 94, “N.S. Brooke to E.R. Rickinson, 15 March 1968.”
\item[131] BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 98, “Minutes of the Federal-Provincial Welfare Committee on Indians, 3 May 1968.”
\end{footnotes}
question of federal-provincial co-operation in transferring jurisdiction.”

Political wrangling over who was culpable for the impasse appears to have confused even Indians and advocacy groups like the Indian-Eskimo Association. Previously critical of the provinces for stalling social welfare reforms in its 1964 brief, the association subsequently began criticizing federal officials for the impasse. In 1968, the association delivered a brief to Pearson urging the transfer of welfare, community development, and educational services from the IAB to provincial and joint governmental organizations.

Among those then advocating the brief’s recommendation in principle were Tsartlip Chief Philip Paul and East Saanich reserve Chief Edwin Underwood. Paul stated, “I’m very much concerned at the lack of provincial contributions towards services. … We pay taxes but get nothing in return from the provincial government towards services. This is something which has to be settled.”

Regardless of which level of government was ultimately to blame for the stalled negotiations, the bottom line was that a welfare agreement was unlikely to be reached in BC.

The welfare impasse showed further signs of strain when provincial officials escalated their criticisms of federal devolution plans. In 1967, Department of Social Welfare representatives commented that federal-provincial relations in Indian Affairs should be limited to only urgent problems. J.A. Sadler, the department’s assistant deputy minister, told an audience of other western senior provincial bureaucrats that “the province was experiencing a Federal withdrawal from the Indian situation and that the

Federal Government was thereby silently requesting the province to assume these responsibilities.\textsuperscript{134} Even those officials within the BC government previously amenable, at least publicly, to the principle of provincial involvement in Indian welfare, were losing faith that an agreement might be forthcoming. Campbell referred to Indian needs as “one of the most serious problems in the province” before criticizing the federal government’s Indian welfare system as reducing the province to a “cheque dispensing apparatus.”

C.W. Corby, the Social Welfare department’s director for Vancouver Island and mainland regions, stated that federal and provincial welfare authorities had a “long pull” ahead of them to integrate the Indian people with the rest of the province.\textsuperscript{135}

Provincial suspicions that the federal government was secretly looking to absolve itself from Indian administration gained further substance in 1968 when two disputes arose between the province and the Dominion regarding Indian welfare costs. That year, the province attempted to recover $600,000 spent in the 1964-65 fiscal year for off-reserve Indian welfare costs. In March, Campbell wrote to Arthur Laing, the Minister responsible for Indian affairs following the branch’s 1966 transfer to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, criticizing the federal refusal to provide monies as “most unsatisfactory.”\textsuperscript{136} Laing responded by stating that the issue was a matter of misinterpretation and that it would be investigated by the Indian Commissioner for BC. Unresolved, the matter was eventually referred to the then-dysfunctional

\textsuperscript{134} BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 96, “Western Provinces Meeting on Indians, 27 October 1967.”


\textsuperscript{136} BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 94, “Dan Campbell to Arthur Laing, 12 March 1968.”
Federal-Provincial Welfare Committee and later to the Federal-Provincial Coordinating Committee. The episode typified what American bureaucrat James H. Boren infamously stated in 1970 as a fundamental rule for bureaucrats: “When in trouble, delegate.”

Another dispute arose later in 1968 when the Indian Commissioner for BC refused to reimburse the province for $27,298 in overdue social allowance accounts. Although the reimbursement appeared owed under the terms of the 1963 federal-provincial agreement, Boys invoked a six-month time limit for the processing of such claims and refused to provide back dated compensation. Federal interests might have prevailed in these disputes—evening the score when considering those provincial victories in earlier 1960s cost conflicts involving Indian health—but the victory carried a political cost. The conflicts exacerbated the impact of over a decade of failed welfare negotiations and served to further alienate provincial officials, who now were certain that federal devolutionary motives were primarily, if not entirely, financial in design.

Remarkably, even with federal-provincial relations at both the department and committee level at a standstill by 1968, the IAB stubbornly clung to hopes that an agreement authorizing the extension of welfare services remained feasible. The same year it was alienating the province by refusing to pay welfare back payments, the federal


139 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 94, “J.V. Boys to E.R. Rickinson, 1 August 1968.”

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government drafted another “more generous” cost-sharing proposal for the extension of provincial welfare for Indians living on-reserve, but, with the federal government now offering to pay 90% of the costs associated with extending welfare provision on reserve, then as well as in projected coverage growth.\textsuperscript{140} N.F. Cragg, Director of the Canada Assistance Plan, noted that under the terms of the proposed agreement, “the provincial contribution bears no relationship to the actual costs of providing assistance to the Indians under the agreement.”\textsuperscript{141} No evidence exists that the province ever seriously considered the new proposal.

In February 1969, Boys reminded Rickinson that successes in integrated education in the earlier decade came via lengthy and successful prior negotiations, and added that “there would be real value in attempting to approach a welfare agreement by the same methods.”\textsuperscript{142} By then, however, the province had little interest in revisiting the negotiation strategies of the prior decade, and irrespective of any subsequent pledge by Bennett to the contrary. For provincial officials such as Rickinson, all unresolved administrative matters relating to Indian welfare were federal domain.\textsuperscript{143} The release of the White Paper that summer only confirmed provincial fears that the federal government

\textsuperscript{140} Again, this agreement involved 50-50 cost sharing up to the amount equivalent to non-Indian costs. All expenses in excess of this were to be assumed by the federal government. BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 94, “N.F. Cragg to E.R. Rickinson, 13 November 1968.”

\textsuperscript{141} BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 94, “N.F. Cragg to E.R. Rickinson, 13 November 1968.”

\textsuperscript{142} BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 98, “J.V. Boys to E.R. Rickinson, 21 February 1969.”

\textsuperscript{143} See BCA GR-0145 Box 7 File 97, “[untitled Department document] 31 August 1967.”; BCA GR-0145 Box 7 File 97, “Federal-Provincial Indian Committee, Cowichan Project – Terms of Reference, 4 October 1967.”
had been plotting all along to offload cost and jurisdiction for Indian welfare onto the provinces. The White Paper stated:

Propose to the governments of the provinces that they take over the same responsibility for Indians that they have for other citizens in their provinces. The take-over would be accompanied by the transfer to the provinces of federal funds normally provided for Indian programs, augmented as may be necessary.\textsuperscript{144}

For BC officials, the White Paper was not only confirmation of a federal conspiracy in regards to Indian welfare, but also an attempt to abrogate all prior joint agreements. The White Paper proposed to entrench the devolutionary principles first articulated at the 1964 conference, principles then and thereafter unanimously rejected by the province.

The BC reaction could have been easily anticipated. A few months after the release of the policy statement, Campbell confided to the Premier:

I believe that they [federal officials] are deliberately working toward the situation which will present the Provinces with a fait accompli as to programs we can share. … I strongly emphasize that the unilateral methods of organization within the Indian Affairs Branch are implying very substantial on-going commitments by Provincial Governments.\textsuperscript{145}

Campbell also rejected Boys’s earlier suggestion to revive prior methods of reaching joint cost-sharing agreements with the federal government, stating: “I consider it extremely dangerous … for single Government Departments to unilaterally negotiate particular formula-sharing arrangements between the Federal Authority and the Provincial

\textsuperscript{144} Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, \textit{Statement of the Government Of Canada On Indian Policy}, 1969.

\textsuperscript{145} BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 98, “Dan Campbell to W.A.C. Bennett, 16 December 1969.”
Authority, e.g., education.”146 Never before had the shift in provincial attitudes from earlier decades been more apparent.

The release of the White paper also spelled the ruin of the Federal-Provincial Welfare Committee. After months of stalemate, committee operations were finally suspended that December. According to spokesperson A.W. Rippon, the committee’s provincial members prompted the suspension since they did “not consider that the Committee is the only method of solving these concerns.” Rippon lamented that while the committee provided the ideal means to facilitate intergovernmental discussions, it could not function as long as the federal-provincial impasse continued.147 Ironically, the federal-provincial coordinating committees, the main mechanisms created to facilitate discussions, proved incapable of reconciling intergovernmental differences.

Writing in 1966, Hawthorn described the activity of garnering provincial involvement in Indian welfare as a “glacial process.”148 It is a fitting metaphor when considering intergovernmental relations after the 1964 conference. Despite early successes in the extension of social welfare benefits to Indians in the decade after WWII, the trend halted by the mid-1960s. BC was an early pioneer in not only advancing the integration of Indian health and education, but also when it came to rebuffing federal

146 Ibid.
148 Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume One, 327.
devolution offers regarding Indian welfare. The history of failed attempts at an integration of Indian welfare services underscores how provincial interest in Indians varied from policy to policy, period to period. No singular or steadfast provincial perspective existed.

Why was Indian welfare such a great cause of intergovernmental impasse in BC? Several factors and developments unique to the 1960s appear to have had a significant influence on provincial attitudes and actions. Liberal-democratic discourse and popular desires to grant Indians administrative equality exerted less force in welfare than in other areas such as health and education. Stereotypical ideas about Indians as indolent, welfare dependent, and lacking work ethics and thrift persevered well into post-war decades. As John Lutz, Hugh Shewell, and Helen Buckley note in their studies of Indian welfare in Canada, racist ideas about “Indians” have a long genealogy stretching back to the nineteenth century. Many non-Indians sympathized with the plight of Indians and detested the IAB’s long-established frugal welfare policies but negative popular and political attitudes about Indians and welfare remained resilient amid post-war integrationist years, particularly under the Bennett Social Credit government.149 Both provincial and federal officials appear to have subscribed to the notion that the goal of Indian self-sufficiency justified or required minimalist welfare provision.

IAB officials lacked any long-term plan to remedy ongoing Aboriginal economic marginalization, something the province likely realized long prior to the devolutionary

talks of the mid-1960s. Federal officials consistently viewed Indian welfare on a temporary and ad-hoc basis, and, just like those previously examined areas of education, health, and economic development, such attitudes justified ongoing policies of neglect. As Shewell notes, welfare administration was seen as serving finite objectives: assimilation and the transformation of Indians into independent wage labourers. If the province ever seriously considered assuming control of welfare as contingent on the implementation of effective economic development programming, federal programs did little to instill provincial confidence. Hawthorn explained this in his 1966 report: “In the absence of a detailed and comprehensive policy position there was no basis for intensive negotiations with the provinces in search of mutually-satisfactory agreements.”

The general deterioration of federal-BC relations that occurred in the 1960s also impeded progress in the area of Indian welfare devolution. Although executive federalism is often discussed within the context of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, BC experienced its own alienation from Ottawa in the 1960s. Escalating intergovernmental conflict over the Canada-US Columbia River Treaty, the creation of a provincial bank, federal transfer payments, and taxation arrangements influenced all BC-federal discussions in that decade. That disputation over the costs of Indian welfare would


151 Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume One, 334.

occur might have been predicted at the 1963 federal-provincial conference. At that event, Bennett stated:

British Columbia believes it is time that independent decision on all matters other than those of genuine national and international concern be restored to the provincial legislatures. … We submit that much of the strain of recent years on national administration has arisen from a failure on their part to recognize the appropriate boundaries of their sphere of operations.  

Party animosities and philosophical differences between provincial Social Credit and federal Progressive Conservatives and Liberals also did not help smooth discussions. Bennett’s cabinet was notoriously opposed to big government and the creation of a social welfare state, even though, as former BC social worker Bridget Moran notes, “Socred social policies ensured that a welfare state was in the making.” Communication barriers, local agent misinterpretations of policy, and successive 1960s ministerial and bureaucratic changes in Ottawa further challenged intergovernmental discussions. Between 1962 and 1968 alone, the minister responsible for Indian affairs changed seven times. After being transferred to Department of Northern Affairs and National Development in 1966, Indian affairs again moved within a year to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

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In many ways, federal-provincial strife over Indian welfare was a product of both governments’ desire for cost savings. Bothwell, Drummond, and English note how the Pearson government of the latter-1960s faced an enormous budgetary crunch once the fiscal effects of the expansion of earlier social welfare programs began to be felt. Ushered in without any rational assessment of their costs or controllability, federal programs such as universal medicare, pensions, and Canada Assistance were propelled by “need” or by demography, and were largely run by the provinces.\(^{156}\) Similarly, the Bennett Social Credit, after coming into office in 1952, looked to reduce budget costs and control the provincial debt wherever possible.\(^{157}\) Large scale development projects, the nationalization of BC electricity and healthcare, and BC’s 1962 financial crisis, only exerted additional pressures on provincial budgets and executive decisions.\(^{158}\)

Whether BC officials would have agreed to any welfare plan offering less than full federal remuneration can only be speculated. However, by insisting that any devolution plan contain forms of long term cost-sharing, BC officials came to see federal interests as driven by financial first principles. In many ways, the view from the west was well-justified. Parochial federal negotiating strategies did little to allay provincial concerns as did federal insistence that fiscal arrangements be reached prior to the extension of provincial services to Indians. In 1966, the IAB rejected a recommendation made by both Hawthorn and the IEA that funds facilitating the extension of provincial

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\(^{156}\) Bothwell, Drummond, and English, *Canada After 1945*, 305.


\(^{158}\) Mitchell, *W.A.C. Bennett*, 314.
services be provided via extant federal-provincial fiscal arrangements rather than “by an
infinity of specific agreements dealing with particular functions.”159

In turn, the extant constitutional status of Indians provided ready means for the
province to reject federal welfare offers. BC officials might have downplayed legal and
costitutional factors in areas of Indian education and health but they invoked them
handily when it came to welfare. Section 87 of the Indian Act meant little to provinces
such as BC vis-à-vis the overarching powers of section 91(24) of the B.N.A. Act.

Hawthorn noted this in his 1966 report, stating:

[T]here is an elementary consideration that the provinces are
constitutionally endowed with an autonomy which by its nature includes
the right to determine the kind and extent of the responsibilities they will
assume in areas traditionally regarded as outside their orbit of concern.160

In other words, the provinces felt free to pick and choose which areas of responsibility
they wanted and entertain select federal devolution proposals accordingly.161 In the
absence of sufficient incentives to the provinces for extending their services to Indians,
Hawthorn concluded, federal-provincial devolution discussions would fail. While
incorrect in his earlier 1958 prediction that an integration of welfare services seemed
likely to occur, Hawthorn was more accurate in his 1966 assessment.

159 See Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume One, 16; BCA MS-2848 Box 3 File 5,
“Commentary on the Hawthorn Report,” 5; BCA GR-0128 Box 5 File 43, “B.W. Snider to J.A. Sadler, 7
October 1966.”


161 See also Brian D. Marshall, “Some Problems in Indian Affairs Field Administration,” (MA Thesis,
Carleton University, 1962), 41.
When it came to social assistance, BC thought it was already doing its part by providing off-reserve Indian welfare under the twelve-month residency rule; its officials saw on-reserve welfare administration as bringing only added costs and risks. Citing interviews with former federal officials, Shewell cites this as one of the main reasons for provincial reluctance to take on Indian welfare.\textsuperscript{162} The provinces realized, according to senior branch clerk C.N.C. Roberts, “what a can of worms they would be getting into. Ottawa was … glossing over so much of it. They realized … it was going to cost an awful lot of money.”\textsuperscript{163} By 1963, the per-capita welfare costs of Indians were twice as high as those for non-Indians in British Columbia; by 1968, they had grown to five times the non-Indian average; an estimated one-quarter of both on- and off-reserve BC Indians depended on welfare to the tune of $6.5 million.\textsuperscript{164} Oral testimonies corroborate how the flow of Indian welfare increased dramatically in this period. Squamish elder Louis Miranda notes: “And when they started dishing it out, like 80 dollars, 100 dollars a month for each one, that’s when things went really haywire … after ’67 that’s when they started

\textsuperscript{162} Shewell, “‘Bitterness Behind Every Smiling Face’,” 72.

\textsuperscript{163} Interview with C.N.C. Roberts in Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’, 320.

dishing it out.” The underlying causes of growing Indian welfare accession and dependency, of course, also related to the general economic decline of BC’s Aboriginal communities that began in this period. Greater regulations, industry consolidations, and unionization practices in BC’s resource industries—the main source for Indian employment—squeezed out many Aboriginal workers. Neither the provincial nor federal government appears to have looked beyond the welfare impasse to devote effort towards stemming growing Indian economic marginalization in this period.

Undoubtedly, as Shewell noted in 2004, the phrase “Indian welfare” today conjures up pejorative opinions, among both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. Period evidence and Aboriginal perspectives from the 1950s and 1960s, however, tell another story. Aboriginal people accepted, even demanded their inclusion in social welfare and provincial welfare programs as part of their rights as voting and tax-paying citizens. Many more individuals took a less public approach by moving off-reserve and back to collect provincial welfare cheques. One MP speaking in 1963 empathized with Aboriginal demands and stated the obvious: “it costs a native person just as much to eat and fill the bellies of his children as it costs a non-Indian.” Furthermore, as John Lutz and Liam Haggarty recently suggest, Aboriginal people historically espoused their own

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165 BCA, Reuben Ware Collection, Interview with Louis Miranda, North Vancouver, 1 June 1979, Interviewed by Reuben Ware.


168 House of Commons, Debates, 14 December 1963, 5906.
cultural views of social assistance, whether as a complement to a syncretic sustenance/wage labour “moditional” economic system, or as a neo-traditional form of “spirit money.” What appears certain is that Indian attitudes towards welfare became increasingly negative into the 1970s and today, and as a result of growing welfare dependency and economic marginalization. Sto:lo Grand Chief and former BC Treaty Commissioner Doug Kelly described this shift in 2005: “what was intended as a safety net has become a way of life.” Aboriginal people, in addition to holding their own views of welfare, also have not shared the same parochialism as government officials when rationalizing the underlying causes of Indian welfare dependency. Haida John Williams similarly stated in 1979: “welfare is not the main problem facing Indian affairs. It is just a symptom of your main problem which is a lack of education and the lack of orientation to city life on the part of Indians. And this is a direct result of Indian affairs policy for the last 100 years.”


170 Interview with Doug Kelly in Lutz, Makúk, 272 f.n. 56. See also UVA, Interview with Chris Cook Jr., 18 May 2003, Alert Bay, B.C, Interviewed by Chris Cook III.

171 BCA, Imbert Orchard Records, Interview with John Williams [location unknown], 1969. Interviewed by Imbert Orchard.
On June 25, 1969, just three months after Bennett’s pledge to take over Indian affairs and create a provincial Indian affairs department, the federal government introduced its

Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, now commonly referred to as the White Paper. Jean Chrétien, the minister responsible for Indian affairs, delivered a brief speech before the House of Commons describing the statement:

From the early days of this country, a trustee relationship of a highly paternalistic nature developed between the central government and the Indian people. The Indian people should have the right to manage their own affairs to the same extent that their fellow Canadians manage theirs. … True equality presupposes that the Indian people have the right to full and equal participation in the cultural, social, economic and political life of Canada.²

Chrétien advocated repeal of the Indian Act and the statutory removal of any legal distinctions between Indians and non-Indians. He also outlined what the provincial role would be in the new policy. The White Paper “propose[s] to the governments of the

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provinces that they take over the same responsibilities for Indians that they have for other citizens of the provinces.”

The White Paper, as Sally Weaver suggests in *Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-70*, was the product of Pierre Trudeau’s ideological vision of an egalitarian and liberal Canada, a “just society.” In terms of its political development, she notes, the White Paper signified new and growing powers vested in the Prime Minister’s and Privy Council Offices to shape executive policies. Despite being described as an exercise in democratic consultation, she adds, the White Paper ignored the recommendations of Indians via the advisory council system created in 1965. Aboriginal people responded with shock to the contents of the federal proposal and in anger to this apparent mockery of the consultation process. BC officials considering the fiscal implications of the White Paper were just as aghast, even though the White Paper eerily echoed the philosophical principles of Bennett’s earlier March pledge.

The White Paper stimulated a wave of unprecedented pan-Indian activism and provincial opposition. News and understandings of the implications of the policy statement took several months to reach BC, but the resultant fireworks were worth the wait. By the fall, a chorus of Aboriginal and provincial politicians, Bennett included,

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3 Ibid., 10582.

chastised Pierre Trudeau’s Liberals for attempting to offload federal responsibility for Indian affairs onto the provinces, condemning the White Paper as an arbitrary shirking of the federal government’s constitutional obligations to Indians. The proposal was labeled a “misfire” by October, triggering protests at the BC legislature.5 Guy Williams, president of the NBBC, predicted that “The Indian will suffer more under provincial jurisdiction than he has in 100 ‘disastrous’ years of federal administration” and that “All this will do is unite all the Indians of BC—in opposition.” Williams was right. In November, a conference of BC Indian chiefs in Kamloops attracted the largest ever group of Indian representatives in one place. Repeated calls for unity were heard and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs was formed.6 The White Paper also fuelled national calls for pan-Indian activism which, influenced by the growing “Red Power” movement in the US, had been brewing in Canada since the mid-1960s.7 Indian News editor Elliott Russell issued one such call in 1965:

Many of us in the southern areas of Canada have little in common with our northern brothers, except that we are Indians—I do not say Mic Mac, Cree, Chipewyan or Salish, but Indians! This is what really matters for whether we live north, south, east or west, our basic problems are the same however much of our ways of earning a living may differ.8

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With an unprecedented pan-Indian political movement born and the BC government alienated, Bennett’s 1969 pledge was promptly forgotten in the wake of the White Paper fiasco.

The White Paper is often described as Canada’s last-ditch attempt at final “termination” of the so-called “Indian problem,” one that instigated a turning point in Aboriginal-state relations. Undoubtedly, the White Paper failed in its attempt to end the separate legal status of Indians and expedite the passing of both the “Indians” and the Indian Affairs department. The federal government, faced with a barrage of criticism and opposition, quickly distanced itself from the 1969 statement. By November, Chrétien was exhorting that the policy statement was “NOT a final policy decision,” and:

- does NOT propose that the provincial government should take over responsibility for Indian land. …
- does NOT propose that the federal government “abandon” the Indian people to the province without ensuring that the provinces have the resources to maintain and improve upon the existing level of programmes and services…
- does NOT advocate the assimilation of Indian people…

By then, however, the damage was done. With a new pan-Indian political movement spawned, the federal government began adopting more conciliatory tactics, initiating a core program to fund Indian organizations and announcing the creation of a Court precedents also prompted the 1974 creation of the Office of Native Claims to deal with Aboriginal treaty and land disputes. In 1965, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in *R. v.*

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10 *Indian News*, November 1969, “The Policy Debate Continues.” Chrétien reportedly delivered this speech to the Saskatchewan Women’s Liberal Federation. It is unknown who added the capitalization emphasis.
White and Bob that the Douglas agreements signed on Vancouver Island in the 1850s were valid Indian treaties under Canadian law. The Supreme Court Calder decision of 1973, although technically a ruling against the Nisga’a plaintiffs, affirmed the prior existence of Aboriginal title in BC. Following the Calder judgment, Trudeau purportedly told a delegation of Union of BC Indian Chiefs, “[y]ou have more legal rights than I thought you had.”

Although the White Paper marked a turning point, it was less novel in other ways. The statement was, as Weaver notes, “simply an extension of the policy direction of the Laing era. The transfer of DIAND programs to the provinces, for instance, had begun in the fields of health and education in the 1940s and 1950s.” Although it was a product of discernible post-1968 political and ideological changes ushered in by the Trudeau Liberals, the White Paper was also grounded in a lengthier post-WWII history of integrationist government policies. Government efforts after 1945 looked to solve at last the long-standing “Indian problem” via administrative acts and devolution schemes involving the provinces. The White Paper offered a sweeping remedy to a devolution process that had slowed to a crawl by the late-1960s. The policy statement also promised fifty million dollars for economic development purposes alone. However, even this was

14 Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy, 196.
hardly innovative. The government had already made similar expenditures for Indian economic development purposes as incentives for the provinces to extend their welfare services onto reserves. Furthermore, while $50 million was a significantly greater amount than anything ever allocated under prior initiatives like the Community Development Program, it too fell far short of the “hundreds of million of dollars per annum,” called for in the Hawthorn report three years earlier.15

John Leslie’s aphorizes the history of Indian policy community development from 1943-1963 as an era of “continuity within change.”16 His description rings true when examining the White Paper and political developments to 1969. Indian affairs took on new national relevance and unprecedented public and political scrutiny and criticism, yet racist attitudes, assimilationist agendas, fiscal first principles, and paternalistic faith in administrative solutions also remained remarkably durable throughout. Well into the 1960s, the Indian Affairs Branch remained overly centralized, underfunded, defensive-oriented, and short-sighted in its policies. It answered to Treasury Board and Cabinet masters instead of Indians; it remained an agency whose ironic main function was to not exist. BC’s Indian Commissioner, J.V. Boys, affirmed this fundamental guiding principle of the Indian affairs bureaucracy when he stated in 1964, “There should be no special legislation. There should be no Indian Affairs Branch.”

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16 John Franklin Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?: The Development of Canadian Indian Policy, 1943-1963” (PhD Dissertation, Carlton University, 1999), 406.
Both change and continuity can also be found when examining administrative developments. Indeed, one can only be struck by the remarkable shifts that took place in this era. In BC especially, the administrative mechanisms of Indian service delivery changed profoundly. Beginning in earnest at mid-century, the province reversed its long-attitude towards Indians as anything more than potential sources of land and resources to exploit. Urged on by federal officials as well as by a non-Indian provincial public demanding desegregation and the granting of basic rights of citizenship to Indians, BC began allowing Indians into its public hospitals and schools around mid-century. A range of other supplementary agreements in areas such as off-reserve Indian social assistance and child welfare furthered devolutionary trends into the 1960s. Not all areas of administrative integration, however, were met with provincial agreement or interest. BC actively resisted involvement in the provision of Indian welfare on-reserve; other areas, such as Indian economic development piqued little to no provincial interest at all.

While the post-WWII era witnessed remarkable administrative change as well as bureaucratic proliferation and professionalization, the Indian affairs bureaucracy proved highly immutable and resilient to change. As Weber suggests, bureaucracy, once established, “is among those social structures which are hardest to destroy.” He adds: “Such an apparatus makes ‘revolution’ in the sense of the forceful creation of entirely new formations of authority, more and more impossible.” For Walter Rudnicki, his experiences in the IAB while heading the CDP epitomized such a gloomy view of government. He would state in a later interview that:

Changing the bureaucracy is virtually impossible. Again, when one talks of bureaucracy, you can't just speak of the IAB, or the Indian Affairs Department today, you have to talk about, if you like, the whole Mandarin system throughout the whole public service, and our objectives of our civilization...and so the DM [Deputy Minister] of Indian Affairs by himself, doesn't necessarily, or the Minister of Indian Affairs, doesn't decide what direction it’s going to go – the policy. The DM of Finance, the Secretary of the Treasury Board and the Secretary of the PCO [Privy Council Office] and so on and so on are the people who decide these things. And since they renew each other, since they pick people like them to replace them.  

Vis-à-vis Boys’s 1964 statement about the desired ephemerality of the Indian affairs department, the observations of both Rudnicki and Weber seem apt.

Although a discourse of “integration” replaced “assimilation” after WWII as the guiding mantra of Indian Affairs activities, the meaning and implications of this change remained unclear. For some, integration was merely another word for assimilation, one carrying the same socially and culturally erosive connotations. For others, including some IAB officials, it meant desegregation, a granting of long-denied rights of citizenship and of equal administration to Indians, rights that did not demand or require surrender of cultural distinctions. In 1944, for instance, the Minister responsible for Indian affairs, T.A. Crerar, wrote to Peter Kelly and the NBBC stating that:

it is my own view that the policy of Indian administration should be directed along the lines of encouraging the Indians to take an active part in the life of the country and to accept the privileges and responsibilities of full citizenship but retaining at the same time the traditions of their race.  

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18 Interview with Walter Rudnicki, Ottawa, 21 February 1994, interviewed by Robert Cunningham.

Others, notably H.B. Hawthorn, went one step further in 1966 when he coined the concept of “citizens plus” in his national survey of Indian conditions. For Hawthorn, Indians were charter Canadian citizens with unique cultural traits whose rights, particularly administrative, included, but were not limited to, that of non-Indians.²⁰ While the desired ends of integration policy remained marred in interpretive differences well into the late-1960s, the means deemed needed for “integration” were less contested. The forging of new administrative relationships between Indians and federal and provincial governments came to be seen as a requisite step, whether towards the complete assimilation of Indians or towards the acquisition of Indian rights above and beyond those of non-Indians. This partly explains why so many Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in BC supported those initiatives aimed at administrative integration during the two and half decades after 1945.

If we define bureaucracy like Max Weber as “the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action,” the very continued existence of the Indian affairs department speaks to the failure of branch attempts to bring about Indian assimilation and assert state hegemony in this period. Indeed, for branch officials during post-WWII decades, old habits died hard. The lack of an effective long-term policy strategy, ubiquitous concern with financial first principles, and defensive-minded instincts are familiar themes stretching back to the earliest DIA policies of the nineteenth century. After WWII, even the most ardent advocates of Indian assimilation had ample grounds to

criticize Indian Affairs officials for their lackluster track record and apparent inability to
develop long-term sound planning. Diamond Jenness, seven years after he delivered his
“Plan for Liquidating Canada’s Indian Problem within 25 Years” before the Special Joint
Committee in 1947, continued his diatribe on the IAB in a journal article titled, “Canada's
Indians Yesterday. What of Today?”:

What were the obligations of the Canadian Parliament and people?
Briefly these: to protect the Indians from exploitation, to safeguard their
health, to educate them, and to train them for eventual citizenship. No one
ever asked how long the training should endure, how long the Indians
should be kept as wards whether for one century, two centuries, or a
millenium. The Indian administration did not ask: its job was simply to
administer, and, like many a custodian, it was so involved in the routine of
its administration that it forgot the purpose of its custodianship, especially
since the fulfilment of that purpose would sign its own death-warrant.21

When looking beyond period IAB rhetoric it becomes readily apparent that, even in those
devolution areas federal officials described as progressing to “gratifying” and
“outstanding” levels, actual integration remained elusive. Administrative realities did not
entail the types or breadth of desegregation promised by both federal and provincial
officials. Particularly when it came to education, institutional assimilation did not mean
that Indians were socially, and sometimes even physically, integrated with non-Indians
even though Indians and non-Indians shared the same public facilities. Furthermore, as
demonstrated in those areas deemed of highest devolutionary and integrationist
“success,” Indians still remained the predominant legal and fiduciary responsibility of the
federal government. In both education and heath, for example, Ottawa continued to fund

and Political Science Vol. 20 No. 1 (1954), 98.
the bulk of the cost of schooling and healing Indians in provincial institutions. This was likely the only way provinces like BC would have ever agreed in the first place to allow desegregation to occur, even under the seemingly more “progressively-minded” coalition government of Byron Johnson. Bennett’s Social Credit regime proved particularly frugal when it came to Indians, particularly into the 1960s periods when budget belts were tightened and more conflictual relations erupted with Ottawa.

The protectionist impulse also proved difficult to shake, even amid the fervour for desegregation that swept through federal political and bureaucratic offices in WWII’s aftermath. Despite encouraging, often demanding, the provinces to implement unfettered integration in health and education, federal officials were sometimes surprised to learn that unfettered integration could produce unintended effects and actually be to the detriment of Aboriginal well-being. Whether in the context of the White Paper proposal to adopt a more culturally-relevant school curriculum or in calls for Prince Rupert Indians to be afforded more equitable treatment under BC health planning, federal bureaucrats often struggled to reconcile gaps between policy expectation and realized effect. This, however, was nothing new or unique to post-war years. In the area of Indian health, contradictions between the Department of Indian Affairs’ stated lack of legal obligation to provide Indian health care, and its actual conduct in this area, existed from the outset. Such contradictions, in turn, created jurisdictional ambiguities and new opportunities for officials to adhere to minimalist policies of neglect and frugality while deflecting criticisms that the federal government was failing to meet its constitutional obligations to Indians.
The IAB also struggled with gaps between its historical and post-WWII mandate and identity. While it was increasingly self-identifying as an agency facilitative of provincial devolution after WWII, Ottawa continued to act as a protectorate of Indian wards. As noted, the IAB maintained its primary legal and fiscal ties to Indians, for those ostensibly “administratively integrated,” both on-reserve and off. Continued IAB administration of welfare and the creation of new “integrationist” programs in economic development only served to further entrench and legitimize the unique Indian-federal relationship. Writing in 1964 in an Ojibwa community context, anthropologist R.W. Dunning noted how Indians continued to belong to a unique legal, political, and administrative system. “This fundamentally different structure,” he writes, “plays an important role in the ‘separateness’ and ‘differentness’ which Indians feel.”

Yet, as the federal brief delivered before the 1964 federal-provincial conference revealed, the federal government was not prepared to discuss constitutional reform as a means to facilitate provincial devolution. Prior to 1969, Indian affairs officials proved alternately unwilling and incapable of completely severing its ties to Indians.

Age-old paternalistic views and, what J.R. Miller describes as a “Great white father knows best” mentality also never lost their fashion in both federal and provincial minds after WWII. Sufficient evidence of this can be gleaned from both bureaucratic words and actions throughout post-war decades. 1960s initiatives such as the EPP and CEP reeked of the century-old patronizing mission, something Noel Dyck terms the

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policy of “coercive tutelage.” Colonially-minded governments also ignored the primary recommendations of both Hawthorn surveys: that Aboriginal people deserved special administrative rights and that changes of a social and cultural nature only occur at the behest and discretion of Aboriginal people. BC eschewed these principles by asserting that Indians had no special privileges beyond those of other citizens. Federal officials found Hawthorn’s recommendations no less objectionable as within them lay a fundamental challenge to the long-standing paternalistic and protectionist orientation of the Indian affairs department.

Recent Canadian scholarship has affirmed the survival of colonialist mentalities around the mid-twentieth century. Scott Sheffield’s intellectual history, *The Red Man’s on the Warpath: The Image of the “Indian” and the Second World War*, examines wartime-era constructions of Indians in the public and administrative imagination. Considering events up to the conclusion of the SJC proceedings in 1948, Sheffield argues that “There was far too much continuity within both public and administrative images of the ‘Indian,’ even after the war, to support any claims of a paradigm shift.” Mary Ellen-Kelm’s study of Indian health and healing in BC ends around the same time and similarly finds little evidence of changes in both Canadian attitudes and policies. While these works illustrate how assimilationist ideas endured well into the twentieth century, they also exemplify what Foucault warns of a fault prone to works excessively occupied

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with finding singular and static expressions of discourse: “the quest for and repetition of an origin that eludes all historical determination,” and, “the interpretation of ‘hearing’ of an ‘already-said’ that is at the same time a ‘not said’.” To avoid this, Foucault urges:

We must be ready to renounce all those themes whose function is to ensure the infinite continuity of discourse and its secret presence to itself in the interplay of a constantly recurring absence. We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption … Discourse must not be referred to in the distant presence of origin, but treated as and when it occurs.25

When examining mid-twentieth century Canadian Indian Affairs contexts, Foucault’s lesson is an important one. The war both coincided with, and helped to catalyze, a major shift in governmental discourse, albeit one that took both subtle and non-so subtle expression over the course of many years. “Irruptive” events included WWII, but also countless, albeit less sensational, integrationist administrative developments thereafter. All had important influences on Native-newcomer relations leading into the modern era. The broader point to be drawn here is that Aboriginal people gradually became more “relevant” throughout this period, and as a result of a combination of discursive change, shifting administrative landscapes, political reforms, and Aboriginal agency. For these reasons, the quarter-century between WWII and the 1969 White Paper may very well be the most influential time in the history of twentieth-century Native-newcomer relations. In terms of demographics alone, this era saw Indians outlive the notion that they were

destined to “disappear,” a popular fiction Brian Dippie terms in the US context as the “pathology of the vanishing American.”

Post-WWII Canadian-Indian relations can be described as “the politics of Indian administration.” Indian administration was negotiated in “six dimensional political spaces” involving multiple actors, offices, and interest groups. Although intragovernmental processes had a significant influence on developments in this period, federal-provincial politics appear to have exerted the most influence on 1950s and 1960s integrationist developments. IAB personnel admitted this much in internal correspondence regarding the 1966 Hawthorn Report: “Political factors exercise most of the restraints in our Federal-Provincial negotiations.” Moreover, politics, when defined in the specific sense of, “the often internally conflicting interrelationships among people in a society,” also provides an overarching analytical rubric to encapsulate those broader shifting relations between Aboriginal people and governmental agencies that took place in the two and a half decades after WWII. Aboriginal people, along with both federal and provincial governments, political parties, advocacy agencies, and social scientists, engaged in interstitial “political” processes in contexts this study terms intrastate spaces.

26 See Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas, 1982), 32-44.

27 See J. Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance: A Socio-Political Introduction to Indian Affairs in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 315.


Closer examination of the gaps between discourse and lived experience suggests that the administrative landscape of “Indian affairs” has, and likely has always been, contested terrain. This dissertation has gone to considerable lengths to demonstrate how government discourse, structural considerations, and “official” policies, while potentially hegemonic, are not necessarily inherently potent determinants in themselves. It is from this perspective that this study has also striven to incorporate ethnohistorical insights and render voice to those people targeted by integrationist policies. Such a task is long overdue. Historians, by privileging structuralist analyses about the monomorphic existence and efficacy of colonial “state” power, whether expressed in governmental discourse, law, or assimilationist institutions, have implicitly relegated the perceived need to give due credence to Aboriginal agency and voice. Noted in the introduction chapter, Bourdieu warns of this danger of taking over, or being taken over by a thought of “the state,” when endeavouring to even think or speak of it. Indeed, as Bourdieu adds, “when it comes to the state, one never doubts enough.”30 Historiographer Hans Kellner further cautions the tendency of scholars to approach historical sources, and history itself, as containing continuous self explanatory “truths.” Rather than attempting to “get the story straight,” Kellner notes, historians should strive to “get the story crooked” by acknowledging research and evidence as being governed by rhetorical principles of selection and patterning.31


Healthy doubt and a rejection of the notion that a singular narrative exists to characterize the intended and realized actions of officials are necessary when gauging the import of post-WWII administrative relations. Not all officials, government departments, or intergovernmental parties acted or viewed Indian integration in the same manner. Indians, too, varied widely in terms of attitude and opinion. Some, such as Frank Calder, demanded administrative integration and envisioned a future than involved a provincial takeover of Indian affairs. Others, particularly after the 1969 White Paper, held the federal government solely accountable for improving Indian well-being and livelihood. While, as Terry Wotherspoon and Victor Satchewitz suggest, most Aboriginal peoples’ political struggles prior to the 1960s may have been “primarily local in nature,” they were important struggles nonetheless that directly and indirectly precipitated broader subsequent struggles of a national and international character.32

Articulations of Aboriginal agency defied any singular form just as their associated impacts produced a multiplicity of results. In health, Aboriginal people demanded and took advantage of improvements in health care provision facilitated by the involvement of other federal line agencies and provincial departments in Indian health. The remarkable reversal of Indian mortality and morbidity rates that occurred around WWII owed in no small part to the actions of Aboriginal people seeking out new forms of Canadian medicine. In the area of welfare, Aboriginal people also appear to have long-identified the inadequacies of federal policies and sought change. Whether in

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condemning the work-for-welfare Community Employment Program, demanding social assistance from provincial authorities, or moving off-reserve to take advantage of loopholes in federal-provincial residency requirements for welfare assistance, Aboriginal agency was clearly manifested. The latter strategy appears to have, in turn, even helped to influence federal policy and the IAB’s decision to harmonize its on-reserve Indian welfare rates with those of the provinces. Furthermore, the ongoing inadequacy of federal welfare provision into the 1970s provided reason for Aboriginal people to demand greater powers of self-administration. Sto:lo Grand Chief and current BC Lieutenant Governor Steven Point describes how the ongoing impoverishment of federal health and welfare service administration in the late-1960s motivated local Sto:lo to organize for greater self-control. Point describes how:

[local Sto:lo] got together with a lawyer … and they formed the Chilliwack Area Indian Council. That was 1969. That organization was a non-profit society that contracted with Indian Affairs to provide, to give out the welfare checks, basically. And government was happy to do that.  

The council soon began taking on greater capacities in other areas such as education. Ed Kelly also notes how the Chilliwack Area Indian Council, whose constituency was modeled on the Indian affairs departments’ district council structure, eventually became a vehicle for Sto:lo pursuit of the land and treaty question into the mid 1970’s. Even in the field of integrated education, the harsh effects of desegregation on Indian children,

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33 Interview with Steven Point, Sardis, B.C., 3 June 2002, Interviewed by Byron Plant.

34 UVA, Interview with Ed Kelly, Sardis, B.C., 5 June 2002, Interviewed by Byron Plant. The council eventually developed in the Sto:lo Nation.
and resultant inequities in Native/non-Native academic achievement and treatment had varying long-term effects.

Further research on this largely ignored era in Native-newcomer relation remains sorely needed.\(^{35}\) This study, too, has necessarily been guided by principles of “selection and patterning” and by no means does full justice to the full scope and breath of change encapsulated by post-war decades. Other subjects of provincial significance deserving further study include Indian housing, child welfare, urbanization, municipal relations, and fish and game law. Thematic attention to other important areas such as Aboriginal cultural change, economic relations, and gender and class dynamics also warrant greater attention than that given above. Studies of developments in other provincial contexts will allow for comparative studies of administrative integration. Although Aboriginal people left a discernible imprint on the archival record during this period, the inclusion of oral and community-based research will shed important perspectives on all of these areas. By focusing on gaps as well as consistencies in the extension of state power, both continuities and contradictions between discourse and realized action, a more nuanced image of Native-newcomer relations can emerge.

In light of the post-1970s explosion of Aboriginal participation in political discussions, rights and title movements, self-government talks, and court litigation, new historical narratives are required that better connect modern Native-newcomer relations to developments in earlier periods. Indeed, when considering period Aboriginal

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perspectives and the full range of articulations of Aboriginal agency in this era, Shewell’s assertion that “the period of citizenship was characterized by the complete hegemony of the Canadian liberal state and market society” becomes increasingly difficult to justify.\(^{36}\) Most Aboriginal people were undoubtedly marginalized from the decision-making arena in this period, but this did not inhibit them from developing and discovering new ways to use, manipulate, and even contravene administrative landscapes to serve their own survivalist interests. Unfortunately, a number of assumptions perpetuated by recent scholarship—namely Aboriginal abstention from the political process prior to 1969 and provincial non-involvement in Indian affairs—have been incorrectly projected onto the post-WWII era.

The history of Native/non-Native relations in the two decades after WWII helps to explain and contextualize Indian survival and resurgence, and the modern era of Aboriginal rights, redress movements, and nation-to-nation protocols in which we currently live. Many of those “historic” themes examined in previous pages, whether public interest in Indian integration, consistent bureaucratic faith in administrative action to solve social and economic problems, or attempts to recruit the provinces as service delivery agents of the federal government, continue today. The 1990s emergence of the BC treaty process, for instance, has simultaneously elevated the importance of the province in Indian affairs while circumscribing its role to that of tertiary land and resource provision in treaty negotiations. Contemporary intergovernmental strife is

another carry-over from the post-WWII period. At the time of this dissertation’s completion, debate erupted over the issue of responsibility for improving Native housing conditions on the Tsluquate reserve of northern Vancouver Island following the public disclosure of mould-related prenatal deaths and high rates of child apprehensions.37 Disputes like this endure even though both BC and the federal government recently agreed in principle to put cost and jurisdictional considerations aside, and to provide services to children, youth, and their families solely on immediate need-based terms.38

Recent events in Native-newcomer relations need to be seen from within a broadened historical framework, one accounting for provincial roles in post-WWII Native-newcomer history and all forms of Aboriginal agency. Sto:lo Steven Point frames the events of the past forty years as part of a longer struggle for basic recognition of Aboriginal rights. He notes:

[In 1969] all that we were fighting for in those days was the recognition of the existence of Aboriginal rights. We weren’t fighting for a treaty; we were saying because we don’t have a treaty, we still have Aboriginal rights. They haven’t been extinguished. … Right up until the time that B.C. came to the table to negotiate land claims, they said that B.C. didn’t have Aboriginal rights, that they were extinguished when they became a province. … By 1969 you have the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs being

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formed to fight for Aboriginal rights. That was their primary purpose, just
the fight for fishing rights, for hunting rights, for land rights. To get our
rights recognized again. But B.C. was still going, “we don’t recognize
your rights.” They wouldn’t even talk to us about it. So these
organizations in those days weren’t talking about treaties because they
couldn’t get anyone to talk to them!  

Today, the BC and federal governments are talking with First Nations about treaties.

Judging by governments’ growing recognition of Aboriginal rights into the 1970s, the
actions of Aboriginal people in the post-war period profoundly reshaped Native-
newcomer relations moving into the modern era.

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39 Interview with Steven Point.
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APPENDIX A

Indian Affairs Branch Budget, 1944/5 – 1964/5 (Current Dollars, Millions)

Source: Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Reports, 1945-1949; Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Reports, 1950-1965.
APPENDIX B

BC Indian Population, 1934 – 1969

APPENDIX C

Indian Affairs Branch Program
Social Assistance Program