The EU and the War in Iraq:
European Indecision in the Realm of Foreign Policy

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Abstract

By creating a common foreign policy the EU stands to maximize its international clout and leverage over the globe, in much the same fashion as it has done with its united economic policies. European integrationists imagine the EU becoming a major global power, “speaking with one voice”, substantially increasing its political clout. As a major power the EU could stand to become a counterbalance to the United States, stabilizing the current unipolar world system and offering a real alternative on the global scene.

However, standing in the way of such pursuits is the EU member states unwillingness to give up national sovereignty, along with their own individual foreign policy interests, orientations, traditions, and histories. Achieving global superpower status is most unlikely, but the EU can still make great strides in the area of foreign affairs if it can develop some common ground to work upon. This thesis seeks to expand upon the literature discussing the European Union’s foreign policy process. It seeks to clarify the issues preventing the development of meaningful foreign policy, and therefore contribute to the body of knowledge concerning the difficulties that the EU faces. By examining the recent events of the preamble to the war in Iraq, this study analyzes the CFSP as it is to date, and draws conclusion about the nature of collective decision-making within the EU. It is also valuable in its analysis of the foreign policy process and how this in turn reflects upon the wider process of European integration.
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I would also like to thank all my family and friends for all their love and continued support. In particular I am eternally grateful to my parents, Maury and Elise; and my grandparents; Philip, Jacqueline, and Shaaron; who have always believed in me and I know have shaped me into the person I am today.
Dedication

For my grandfather,

Philip J. Hammel, B.Ed., B.A., M.A., Professor Emeritus of Curriculum Studies

From A to Z to Shakespeare, always instilling the importance of an active mind, your ongoing encouragement and love has been a great source of inspiration both in academics and in life.
List of Abbreviations

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF – Combined Joint Task Force
EPC – European Political Cooperation
ERRF – European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy
EU – European Union
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
IGC – Intergovernmental Conference
SEA – Single European Act
WDM – Weapon of Mass Destruction
WEU – Western European Union
Table of Contents

Permission To Use........................................................................................................... i
Abstract.......................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................ iii
Dedication ....................................................................................................................... iv
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... v
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... vi

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
  Focus and Objectives ...................................................................................................... 1
  Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 3
  Importance of Thesis ...................................................................................................... 5
  Outline of Chapters ........................................................................................................ 6

Chapter 2: Theoretical Applications and the Foreign Policy Process ...................... 7
  Introduction .................................................................................................................... 7
  The Development of the CFSP (Common Foreign & Security Policy) ....................... 7
    The 1960s-70s European Political Cooperation (EPC) ............................................. 7
    The 1980s: The Single European Act ...................................................................... 9
    The 1990s: The Common Foreign and Security Policy .......................................... 10
    Post-Amsterdam Developments ............................................................................. 15
  EU Foreign Process: How does it work? ................................................................. 17
  Theoretical Applications ............................................................................................. 20
    Federalism .................................................................................................................. 20
    Neofunctionalism ...................................................................................................... 22
    Intergovernmentalism .............................................................................................. 23
    Other Theories… (Social Constructivism, Multi-Level Governance, Levels of Analysis) ............................................................................................................... 24
  Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 28

Chapter 3: The EU and the War in Iraq: The British Response .......................... 32
  The Timeline to War ................................................................................................. 32
  The UK’s Response ............................................................................................... 37
  The UK’s Rationale ............................................................................................. 50
    Atlanticism .............................................................................................................. 50
  Britain and the Union ............................................................................................ 54

Chapter 4: The EU and the War in Iraq: France’s Response .............................. 58
  France’s Response ................................................................................................... 58
  France’s Rationale ................................................................................................... 76
    France and the Union .......................................................................................... 76
    France, the United States, and the World ............................................................ 79

Chapter 5: The EU in Disarray ................................................................................. 83
  Introduction ................................................................................................................ 83
Chapter 1: Introduction

Focus and Objectives

Since its creation the European Union (EU) has truly grown into an economic power of significant proportions. For much of its existence the EU had been a largely introverted community, primarily concerned with fostering ties among its membership rather than making a name for itself in the international arena. Due to the impressive growth in internal trade and the creation of a single market the EU has developed as an economic superpower alongside the United States. However despite its preeminent economic status, the EU is lacking a strong political presence on the world stage. The EU member states have been largely unable to take common positions on major security issues. Despite its many resources the EU’s inability to act in such incidents as the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Balkan crises of the 1990s, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq has amounted to a lack of political leadership, and in the eyes of critics a failure to provide global leadership.¹

Arguably, by creating a common foreign policy the EU stands to maximize its international clout and leverage over the globe, in much the same fashion as it has done with its united economic policies. European integrationists, who advocate that the EU should become a global power, see the EU as speaking with one voice in order to substantially increase its political clout. As a major power, integrationists argue, the EU could stand to become a counterbalance to the United States, stabilizing the current

unipolar world system and offering a real alternative on the global scene. However, standing in the way of such pursuits is the EU member states’ unwillingness to give up national sovereignty, along with their own individual foreign policy interests, orientations, traditions, and histories. Achieving global superpower status is most unlikely, but the EU can still make great strides in developing a common foreign policy if it can find some common ground to work upon.

The elements of a common foreign policy within the EU exist in the form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Announced under the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the CFSP allows the EU to take joint action in the field of foreign policy that would be initiated by a majority voting in the European Council (although unanimous decision is the norm). The CFSP introduced three organizational tools:

- **Common strategies**, developed when member states have common interests that can be defined by the European Council or by the Council of Ministers. Such strategies are then implemented by adopting *joint actions* and *common positions*
- **Joint actions**, when member states agree to take action in a common area, e.g. humanitarian aid, sending election observers, supporting peace processes: *Joint actions* specify EU objectives, scope, and the resources to be made available to the Union
- **Common positions**, when member states agree to take a stance on relations with other countries; unlike *joint actions* which require operational action by the EU, member states individually ensure that their national policies are in line with adopted *common positions*²

Major weaknesses of the CFSP came to light however in 1993 and 1995 with the EU’s inability to contribute to the peace process in Bosnia, and its weak response to the 1997-98 crisis in the former Yugoslav province of Kosovo. Shamed by its ineptitude, the EU sought to improve the CFSP when it entered negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). A single High Representative (currently Javier Solana) was appointed to head up the CFSP, and ‘constructive abstention’ was created to prevent any country from

² John McCormick, 332-3.
blocking EU action (i.e. joint actions and common positions) by giving them the option of opting out rather than vetoing and thereby paralyzing any EU action. Time will tell however whether the EU member states can truly forge a basis on which meaningful foreign policy can be achieved. What impact the CFSP can have will be tested as new challenges arrive on the international scene to which the EU will have to respond. Can the EU on the basis of the CFSP form a common foreign policy? Or will the member states prevent such advancements in the name of national sovereignty? By examining the CFSP one can learn about the difficulties that get in the way of fostering real European integration, and whether the EU will be able to achieve a presence in the global arena that is both meaningful and effective.

Research Questions

One case to test the workings of the CFSP arose in the aftermath of 9/11. In 2002 the United States’ government sought support from around the world to join in its decision to invade Iraq. Despite the reforms made to the CFSP by the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), which sought to improve the CFSP by introducing both the High Representative and ‘constructive abstention’, the EU was unable to come to a united position on the American decision to wage war on Iraq.\(^3\) The EU sat in disarray, without a clear position and much to the chagrin of the US, as member states took differing positions in support or in opposition of US actions. While the majority of EU Member States supported the US, a few remained steadfastly opposed. Individual national interests and power politics got in the way of achieving a common position on the war. An examination of the run-up

to the war in Iraq will seek to discover the difficulties that prevent collective decision-making in the area of EU foreign policy.

Theoretical debate about European integration and foreign policy currently mainly takes place between two differing camps, that of neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists. Neofunctionalists argue unity and integration moves political activities towards the centre, creating a supranational entity over the pre-existing nation states. Integration, in this manner, would occur as a ‘spill-over effect’, with small steps towards integration creating pressure to integrate further; and as formal control is transferred from the national level to the supranational. In contrast, intergovernmentalism espouses the belief that the spillover effect does not occur, and that national governments are very much in control of the integration process. Central to this understanding of integration is the belief that cooperation among national governments is possible, but it only occurs when it is in their interest to do so. Moreover, when integration no longer suits their needs, national governments can in fact halt or reverse the process.

My thesis will examine the events prior to the invasion of Iraq through the unique perspectives of the United Kingdom and France. These two countries I have selected for several reasons. The first is due to their opposing stances on the Iraq issue; observing countries with differing viewpoints will be essential for my study in order to determine how such divergent approaches are either reconciled or create an impasse for EU foreign policy. The second reason is that of practicality; at the time of the Iraq war there were fifteen EU member states. To examine all fifteen in detail would require much more time

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5 Ibid., 239-240.
and research than this thesis will allow. Therefore examining solely the United Kingdom and France will allow both major sides on the Iraq issue to be examined.

My research project is aimed at answering the following research questions:

- What interests prevented two EU member states (i.e. the United Kingdom and France) from forging a common position on this issue within the context of the EU?
- What does this case-study tell us about the problems regarding the development of a common foreign policy for the EU?
- Which theory, intergovernmentalism or neofunctionalism, best explains this case study, and what does it tell us about the foreign policy process?
- Furthermore, what does this case tell us about the obstacles in the way of European political integration?

**Importance of Thesis**

This thesis will seek to expand upon the literature discussing the European Union’s foreign policy process. It will seek to clarify the issues preventing the development of meaningful foreign policy, and therefore contribute to the body of knowledge concerning the difficulties that the EU faces. By examining the recent events of the preamble to the war in Iraq, this study will analyze the CFSP as it presently functions, and draw conclusion about the nature of collective decision-making within the EU. As well, by contextualizing my study within the framework of intergovernmentalism, it will shed light upon the process of making foreign policy. It will also be valuable in its analysis of the foreign policy process and how this in turn reflects upon the wider process of European integration.
Outline of Chapters

In addition to the introductory and concluding chapters, this thesis includes five chapters. The second chapter provides an overview of the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and explicates how the foreign policy process works today. The second chapter examines the different theories of integration. This chapter examines how previous authors have attempted to explicate the foreign policy process through theories of integration, and discusses which theory can best conceptualize the foreign policy process in this case study. The third and fourth chapters includes in depth studies on the United Kingdom and France respectively. These chapters look at the actions taken by the governments of the UK and France in regards to the Iraqi crisis, and examine their motivations in doing so. The final chapter looks at the involvement of the Union as a whole and attempts to determine what is undermining the foreign policy process, and why a common collective decision could not be made by the EU in regards to the Iraqi crisis of 2003.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Applications and the Foreign Policy Process

Introduction

In this chapter I will examine the foreign policy process of the EU and explore the different theoretical applications that have been utilized in the study of EU foreign policy. The first part of the chapter will explicate how the EU constructs and implements foreign policy, and will examine how the different EU institutions come together to collaborate on questions of foreign policy. The second part of the chapter will examine the differing theoretical applications that have been used to study EU foreign policy. It will conclude with an assessment of the different theories and will determine which one is best utilized for the present case-study.

The Development of the CFSP (Common Foreign & Security Policy)

The 1960s-70s European Political Cooperation (EPC)

The development of EPC foreign policy before the late 1960s was often overshadowed by Europe’s reliance on the United States in security matters. With time the EU became involved in developmental assistance, humanitarian aid, and international environmental matters; but these developments can strictly be classified in the low politics category. High politics issues remained beyond the EC’s grasp until The Hague summit in December of 1969. At the summit, the Community foreign ministers recommended the creation of the EPC (European Political Cooperation). This new policy approach enabled member states to “consult on all questions of foreign policy and where
possible to undertake common actions on international problems.\textsuperscript{6} This new foreign policy structure involved the meeting of all foreign ministers every six months to discuss questions of foreign policy, and to hopefully to develop common actions.

This development in the evolution of foreign policy resulted from a purely political agreement; there would be no pooling of sovereignty at the supranational level. Decisions in this forum where purely verbal, with little institutional pressure to produce follow-up in the areas of concern taken up by member states. The EPC had varied results in the 1970s; with member states issuing joint statements on Cyprus, South Africa, and the Middle East. As well, the EPC led to a “European reflex”\textsuperscript{7} whereby member-state foreign ministers began to look towards each other in the sharing of information and decision making. However, the EPC’s success only went so far. Major international crises, such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the OPEC oil embargo, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not lead to a consensus among member states. In the first decade or so after its inception the EPC had been characterized as “a cycle of hesitant steps to strengthen the framework, followed by periods of increasing frustration at the meagre results achieved, culminating in further reluctant reinforcement of the rules and procedures.”\textsuperscript{8} The EPC became known for making verbal declarations, but produced no follow-through; divisions on major issues confirmed its relative inconsistency.

\textsuperscript{6} John Van Oudenaren, \textit{Uniting Europe: An Introduction to the European Union}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 299.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 299. Van Oudenaren coins this term to describe the growing trend of member states looking to each other on international issues.

The 1980s: The Single European Act

The failures of the previous decade brought on a series of reforms in the 1980s. The foreign ministers recognized the general inefficiency of the EPC, and believed that it needed to better anticipate problems on the international scene. As well, they began to push the EPC in a direction that would begin to address questions of security for the community. Such conclusions led to some development in the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. SEA is perhaps better known for its introduction of the single market, but it also marked the establishment of the EPC on a treaty basis. This action bound member states by a legal agreement, rather than being a simple political commitment to consult on foreign policy and to produce common actions. However, it did not bring foreign policy decision making to the EU institutions, but merely further involved the states in an atmosphere of international cooperation.

The second major development brought forth by the SEA was the reinvigoration of the Western European Union (WEU), as its members felt that even though it had lain mostly dormant for decades the WEU could be useful once again as a forum in which to discuss security issues. The WEU is a defence treaty which came into being as a result of the 1948 Treaty of Brussels. It was created post WWII in an effort to promote economic growth in Western Europe, protect its members from policies of aggression, and to promote the integration of European countries. As well since NATO has no structural ties to the EU it was thought that European countries should have a defense arrangement of their own, in addition to that of the Atlantic alliance, so that it could be responsible for elements of its own defense. As tensions between the US and the USSR were still of high

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9 A tentative first step, as the member-states did not wish to upset their partnership with NATO, but proceeded under the belief that Europe needed to become more responsible for its own security.
intensity during the 1980s, matters concerning European defence were at the forefront of concern among European countries. WEU members felt that strengthening Europe’s defence by way of their organization could only help to promote defence cooperation among European nations in addition to their responsibilities with NATO. The WEU Ministerial Council adopted a new set of guidelines in 1987 for the organization. In the preamble to their newly adopted platform the WEU emphasized its “commitment to build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.”¹⁰ In conjunction with the WEU’s new focus SEA provided that meetings between foreign and defence ministers were to be held every six months to work on such issues as arms control, transatlantic relations, and European armament cooperation.¹¹

The 1990s: The Common Foreign and Security Policy

Despite the improvements made with the reforms of the 1980s, member states remained dissatisfied with the level of cooperation within the European Community. Furthermore, their inability to produce meaningful foreign policy was becoming starkly clear as they were unable to participate in the sweeping changes occurring with the onset of the post-Communist era. At that time, France favoured large scale reforms that would allow the community to act independently from the United States, but the United Kingdom was not in favour of any development that would risk upsetting relations with the US. With such concerns in mind, the member states negotiated the Maastricht treaty to improve the foreign policy process. The Maastricht treaty formally abolished the EPC.

¹¹ Van Oudenaren, 301.
and created in its place the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP was formulated to address five general objectives for the Union: “safeguarding the common values and interests of the Union; strengthening its security; preserving peace and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter; promoting international cooperation; and developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”\textsuperscript{12}

With the creation of this second “pillar” of the EU\textsuperscript{13}, decision making was still done on an intergovernmental level; however innovations allowed EU institutions to have a role in it as well. Under the CFSP the Commission now had the right to make recommendations on foreign policy. However, actions were ultimately to be decided upon by consensus in the Council of Ministers. External representation for the Union fell upon the presidency country, backed up by the troika system retained from the EPC.\textsuperscript{14}

These changes increased the legal commitment by the member states, as they were expected “to consult others on matters of mutual interest and to ensure that national policies were in conformity with common positions of the Union.”\textsuperscript{15}

On the issues regarding security and defence, the Maastricht treaty included a stipulation that the CFSP would work towards eventually framing a common defence policy for the Union. The vague and general wording of the stipulation was deliberate as

\textsuperscript{12} Van Oudenaren, 302.
\textsuperscript{13} European Commission, European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, (Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996). The Maastricht treaty established three policy ‘pillars’ (sectors, each with different decision making rules) for the European Union: The European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs. The second and third pillars of the EU are markedly different from the first, which is concerned with economic, social and environmental policies, as they are concerned with areas under the umbrella of national sovereignty and are therefore largely characterized by intergovernmental cooperation.
\textsuperscript{14} The troika system included the current presidency country, the previous holder of the presidency, and the upcoming one. All three would represent the Union together externally so as to increase the clout of the CFSP.
\textsuperscript{15} Van Oudenaren, 302. They were also to coordinate their positions in international forums like the UN and others.
it was unknown when such developments would occur. Again talks concentrated on what linkages the WEU should have with the EU. Full integration within the EU was contentious as member states argued whether the WEU should “develop into an alternative defence organization to NATO, or whether the object was to construct a more effective European pillar of the Atlantic alliance.”\textsuperscript{16} It was decided that the WEU should be developed in order to both strengthen the European pillar within NATO as well as allowing European nations to create a security arrangement that they could conduct on their own accord outside of the Atlantic alliance. Full integration was ultimately decided against, and instead decisions were made to upgrade the WEU’s operational capabilities, including the creation of a planning cell and a European armaments agency, and establishing military units to be administered by the WEU. The WEU was to do so in order to carry out EU actions that involved defence implications. In order to meet the demands of the new CFSP, the WEU was to establish a “planning cell, work towards the creation of a European armaments agency, establishment or designation of military units answerable to the WEU, and possible establishment of a European Security and Defence Academy.”\textsuperscript{17} Later in June of 1992, the WEU’s Council of Ministers’ further clarified the WEU’s role as the defence component of the EU, meant to coordinate its activities with both the EU and NATO. This declaration formulated by the WEU Council of Ministers in Petersberg Germany also ensured that the WEU would make itself available for such missions as peacekeeping, rescue operations, and humanitarian relief missions, as part of the WEU’s new defence capabilities.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} Forster & Wallace, 472.
\textsuperscript{17} Van Oudenaren, 302.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 303. These tasks became to be known as the ‘Petersberg tasks’, areas to which Europe would take full responsible for, without the help of the United States.
The next developmental stage of the CFSP came with the reforms made to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Maastricht treaty had left many areas of the CFSP ill defined and the member states recognized the need to renegotiate certain aspects contained in the second pillar. New calls to reform the CFSP came in 1996, as the Union had been unable to handle the crisis in the Balkans on its own. The EU did not have the command or control structures needed to intervene in the crisis, and its failure to do much of anything demonstrated the CFSP’s weaknesses. During the time of crisis the “West Europeans had instinctively looked to the USA to provide leadership, while the US administration had firmly signalled that the West Europeans should take responsibility.”19 Their inability to take such responsibility clearly demonstrated how far Europe would have to go to take care of itself. Above all, it was recognized that the operational capabilities of the CFSP had proven to be inadequate and needed reform. Discussions at the following intergovernmental conference (IGC) included a proposal to fully integrate the WEU into the CFSP and the idea to introduce a post in which a single individual would stand to represent EU foreign policy externally.20

In response to the general sense that the CFSP needed serious bolstering the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced several new organizational reforms as well as strengthening older ones. The Treaty of Amsterdam gave new powers to EU organizations. The European Council was given the responsibility for deciding upon common strategies in areas where the member states have expressed important common interests. The Council was also given the new responsibility of deciding upon the framing of a common defence policy which member states would be required to adopt in

19 Forster and Wallace, 477.
20 Van Oudenaren, 303.
accordance with their constitutional requirements, as well as establishing policy
guidelines for the WEU.\textsuperscript{21} To complement these developments, all member states agreed
to participate in military actions taken on by the EU and the WEU.\textsuperscript{22}

Another significant reform included the introduction of abstentions to EU foreign
policy decision making in an effort to prevent the blocking of proposed actions. This new
development retained the need for unanimity in the Council of Ministers for voting on
proposed actions, but it allowed member states to abstain on a decision that they chose
without blocking the measure from being passed. Furthermore, “a state that abstains can
declare that it is not required to apply the decision – which might entail, for example,
supplying troops or equipment to a particular military mission – but it must recognize the
Union’s commitment to the decision and is obliged, “in a spirit of mutual solidarity,” to
refrain from steps that conflict with or impede action by the Union.”\textsuperscript{23}
The second
significant development was the creation of the High Representative for the CFSP. This
new post was established to address concerns that the CFSP needed a single authoritative
voice to represent EU foreign policy.\textsuperscript{24} In June of 1999, member-state governments
selected Javier Solana to become the CFSP’s first High Representative.\textsuperscript{25} In a
complementary measure, the treaty also abolished the old troika system and replaced it
with a new one. The new troika consisted of the High Representative, the Council
President, and the Commission President.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{21} Van Oudenaren, 304.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. Such military actions were to include humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis
management. The EU and the WEU remained separate however as member states such as Britain and
others, who themselves were not members of the WEU, opposed the merger.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 303.
\textsuperscript{24} Forster and Wallace, 487. As well as to answer Henry Kissinger’s question/complaint of who to call
when one wished to speak to Europe.
\textsuperscript{25} Van Oudenaren, 304. At that time Javier Solana had been the Secretary General of NATO. With the post
of High Representative he also became the new Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers.
\end{flushleft}
The outcomes of the Amsterdam reforms have been mixed. The treaty did indeed raise the profile of EU foreign policy, particularly with regard to Solana who became an effective spokesman for the CFSP, but other developments fell short. Despite the establishment of the High Representative, member states still employed their own external representation (in this case the High Representative along with the foreign minister of the country that holds the presidency, and the EU commissioner for external policy). Furthermore, “the provisions on enhanced cooperation were never invoked, as member states seemed to prefer least-common-dominator decision making among themselves to decisive action by smaller groups.”26

Post-Amsterdam Developments

Since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, Europe has more and more become confronted with the need to take on more responsibility for its own defence. With the United States taking on more responsibilities in locations elsewhere than Europe, efforts needed to be made to seriously bolster European forces. However, since the WWII period, Europe’s lack of initiative in security and defence matters had left the continent heavily reliant upon the US, and unorganized in respect to its own capabilities. It was decided that by gaining access to US assets by way of NATO, Europe could temporarily fill the gap in its defence capabilities. This approach would “take pressure off US forces more urgently needed elsewhere, and would allow EU forces, pending their professionalisation and modernisation, to take over peace-keeping missions in areas such as the Balkans where the US had no identifiable interests. The drive to force European

26 Van Oudenaren, 305.
militaries to take responsibility for their own back yard.” Therefore, in order to better carry out the responsibilities the WEU had taken on with the Maastricht Treaty, the EU had arranged the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement back in 1996. ‘Berlin Plus’ allowed the EU to borrow US assets, NATO operational planning capabilities, and NATO command options in order to carry out EU-led operations.

By way of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) NATO is indirectly linked to the EU through the WEU. CJTF was a plan established in 1994 to allow the WEU to utilize NATO resources in areas that are outside the bounds of NATO involvement. This arrangement paved the way for the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement, while successful in filling the EU’s capability gap, remained unsatisfactory as the WEU was seen as not having the political responsibility and clout needed for military operations. These inadequacies led to the idea that Europe should build up its own autonomous forces, which could be deployed on missions which the US did not want to be a part of. A European force would help to alleviate dependence on the US, through such arrangements as in ‘Berlin Plus’. Therefore, at a historic Anglo-French summit in St. Malô, Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac agreed that the EU should develop an independent defence force that could respond to international crises. This measure proposed in December of 1998 between two member states who rarely see eye-to-eye on defence matters, signalled a new opportunity for European defence. Eventually established in

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28 Ibid., 185. The agreement enabled the EU to take action in such areas as regional crisis management, and conflict prevention missions.
30 Ibid., 186.
1999, the ESDP became an integral part of the larger CFSP. The ESDP consisted of two key components: the Petersberg tasks and plans for a Rapid Reaction Force. The EDSP has been a significant development for the EU, allowing it to make meaningful contributions to European security and defense. Currently the EU is involved in many foreign missions through the auspices of the EDSP. There is a military and police operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a rule of law mission in Kosovo, a monitoring mission in Georgia, military and police missions in Macedonia, as well as several humanitarian missions in the Middle East and in Africa. This ability, to take responsibility for security threats within Europe without the aid from foreign governments, is an important accomplishment in the development of a collective foreign policy.

EU Foreign Process: How does it work?

As it exists today, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the second pillar of the EU, operates to address all questions related to the security of the Union. Through the CFSP the EU can “make its voice heard on the international stage, express its position on armed conflicts, human rights and any other subject linked to the fundamental principles and common values which form the basis of the European Union.

31 John McCormick, The European Union: Politics and Policies, 3rd ed., (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2004), 337. The Rapid Reaction Force is a European military force designed to be able to respond to crises within Europe before they become full-scale wars. The establishment of the force was done in response from criticisms that Europeans were not equipped to handle their own emergencies, and were too heavily reliant on NATO. The Rapid Reaction Force was partly operational by December 2002 and went on its first mission, a peacekeeping operation in Macedonia, in March of 2003.

and which it is committed to defend.”33 Within the organizational framework of the CFSP member states can take action in areas in which they have decided they possess a common interest. Such actions are carried out through the auspices of the ESDP by virtue of the Rapid Reaction Force, and through implementation of member states’ national foreign policies.

Decision-making within the CFSP is an intergovernmental process whereby decisions are made by majority voting in the European Council. The European Council is composed of heads-of-state and government, who only meet twice a year except for occasional special sessions. Day-to-day decision-making in the Council is formulated by the Council of Ministers on behalf of governments.34 In the Council of Ministers, Ministers vote on specific issues of foreign policy, and although majority voting is in place, consensus to pass measures is required. However, with the Amsterdam reforms, constructive abstention is in place by which member states may abstain from a decision without blocking the measure entirely. Before being brought to the Council of Ministers, issues of foreign policy are discussed and negotiated in the General Affairs Council, made up of member-states’ foreign ministers. Once sent to the Council of Ministers, the EU has three organizational tools at its disposal with which to take action in the field of foreign policy. These tools are common strategies, joint actions, and common positions; which have been previously discussed in the introductory chapter.

Other actors in the formulation of foreign policy include the Presidency of the Council and the High Representative. The Presidency of the Council heads up both the

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European Council and the Council of Ministers for a six month term. Member states take
turns holding the presidency, which is based on a rotational schedule. The presidency is
assisted through the troika system to represent the Union. In matters of foreign policy the
job of the presidency is to organize and prepare meetings and to work to achieve
consensus among the member states on issues of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{35} The presidency is also
responsible for representing the “Union in CFSP matters, notably by conducting political
dialogue with third countries on behalf of the Union.”\textsuperscript{36} The High Representative works
to assist the Council by aiding in the formulation and implementation of political
decisions. The High Representative also acts, like the presidency, to represent the Union
on CFSP matters, and as such conducts dialogues with third countries/parties. As well,
the Policy Unit, a policy planning and early warning unit, falls under the High
Representative’s responsibility. The Policy Unit is made up of staff from the Council
Secretariat, member states, the Commission, and the WEU. The Policy Unit’s principal
tasks are:

1. monitoring and analyzing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP;
2. providing assessments of the Union’s interests and identifying areas where CFSP
could focus in the future;
3. providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may
have significant repercussions, including potential political crises;
4. producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own
initiative, argued policy-option papers to be presented under the responsibility of
the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council.\textsuperscript{37}

The Commission does have a role in the formation of foreign policy. The
Commission plays an important role in the areas of trade, aid, and multilateral diplomacy.
However, when it comes to such things as security and defence the Commission plays a

\textsuperscript{35} Smith, 108.
\textsuperscript{36} Council of the European Union, 12.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 13-4.
much smaller part, even though the Maastricht Treaty did give the Commission the right to suggest foreign policy initiatives and policies.\(^{38}\) Currently the Commission has 118 delegations located around the world, which allow it to have an impact in the area of foreign policy.\(^{39}\) These delegations cooperate, in the area of the CFSP, to assist member-state diplomatic representatives in ensuring that CFSP decisions are properly carried out.\(^{40}\) As well, the EU Parliament plays a role in the foreign policy process, although a minimal one. The Council and Commission are required to consult Parliament on issues of foreign policy, and the presidency is required to deliver Union foreign policy reports to full sessions of Parliament. Parliament is allowed to scrutinize foreign policy to the extent of putting questions to the presidency at the monthly sessions held in Strasbourg. Parliament may also draw up reports on foreign policy for the Union, and meets with the presidency and the Council of Ministers four times a year to discuss matters of foreign policy.\(^{41}\)

Theoretical Applications

**Federalism**

There are a number of theories of integration and these theories have various implications for the study of EU foreign policy. The most prominent integration theories are neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. However, EU integration theory has a long history beginning with early theories of federalism. Murray Forsyth well describes

\[38\] Smith, 109.
\[40\] Ibid., 110-1.
\[41\] Smith, 111.
the federalist school of thought, which during the 1970s and 80s advanced a more direct approach to integration through the development of a federal constitution, as opposed to the slower, undemocratic, and functionalist approach taken by European leaders at the time.

Forsyth identifies three streams of federal thought. The first is based on Immanuel Kant’s ideas, which advocated the development of a federation between states as a means to abolish evil. Because war was the greatest evil and threat to the world, independent states would come together in a federation to avoid it. The second stream sees federal theory as a “superstructure of the idea of popular self-government, or of democracy in the classical, participatory sense.” Believing that true legitimate authority is that which is closest to the people, or in which the people participate directly, federal theorists argue that the best form of government would be one that encompasses such principles. With as little power as necessary given to the higher levels of government, which themselves are organized as loose federal unions of the lower levels, government would be more participatory, democratic, and legitimate. The third stream is not so much concerned about world peace but instead sees federalism “as a phenomenon produced by the pulls and pressures of the political world, with its own logic distinct from that of the unitary state or the world of international relations.”

These theories of federalism are largely concerned with exploring the nature of such a union, and explaining why and how it is established. They are not so much

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43 Ibid., 206.
interested in describing the integration process, but are rather busy developing a course of action to achieve their idealistic pursuits for a United States of Europe. Current debate on European integration theory has been primarily a dialogue between neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist scholarship.

Neofunctionalism

In the opening to his essay entitled “Theory and the European Union’s International Relations” Filippo Andreatta outlines the theoretical underpinnings of neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalism stems from the belief that modern society is increasingly dominated by the concerns of ‘low politics’ such as economic growth and the welfare of citizens. These concerns provide a fundamental motive for integration as “political functions must be performed at the most efficient level, and its logic ultimately leads to the whole world being unified.” Neofunctionalist integration occurs from a ‘spillover’ effect. Small steps at integration create pressures to integrate further, as formal control is transferred from the national level to that of the supranational. As Andreatta explains, “The increasing difficulty in dealing with technical issues at the national level, and the tendency to generate spillovers, can be exploited by supranational agencies, which could therefore promote a strategy for further integration ‘from above’.”

In their essay entitled “Integration, Supranational Governance, and the Institutionalization of the European Polity” Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz utilize the basic assumptions of neofunctionalism to develop the theory that European

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46 Ibid., 22.
integration is driven by transnational activity. In short, while transnational activity cannot itself determine the specific details or timing of integration it does influence the decision-making bodies. Moreover, as transnational exchanges rise so do the costs to governments of maintaining differing national rules. Therefore, along with costs, “incentives [arise] for governments to adjust their policy positions in ways that favor the expansion of supranational governance.”\(^{47}\) In a sense, as well as being in their interest, once started national governments are carried along the integration process whether they want to or not, due to a self-reinforcing continuance of integration.

**Intergovernmentalism**

As opposed to neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism espouses the belief that the ‘spillover’ effect does not occur, and that national governments are very much in control of the integration process. Central to this understanding of integration is the belief that cooperation among national governments is possible, but it only occurs when it is in their interest to do so. Moreover, when integration no longer suits their needs, national governments can in fact halt or reverse the process. Therefore, the EU is not a run-away train of integration as neofunctionalists suppose, but rather an institution of comprehensive cooperation that brakes and starts whenever the national sovereign governments choose to do so.

In his book entitled “The Choice for Europe” Andrew Moravcsik discounts the theory of neofunctionalism and constructs his own theory of intergovernmentalism.

Moravcsik identifies the failure of neofunctionalism as having been proven by facts as “European integration had not expanded steadily but by stops and starts… It had not generated uniformly stronger centralized institutions but a curious hybrid still heavily dependent on unanimous consensus among governments.” Neofunctionalism, according to Moravcsik, is too ambitious in scope; it is too vague to generate predictions for empirical evaluation. Moravcsik stipulates that integration moves ahead when three factors converge: that of commercial advantage, bargaining power of important governments, and incentives for further integration commitments. Without these, governments have no reason to contribute to a process that threatens their sovereignty. Instead, Moravcsik contends that “governments transfer sovereignty to international institutions where potential joint gains are large, but efforts to secure compliance by foreign governments through decentralized or domestic means are likely to be ineffective.” Governments remain in control of their destinies; their participation in organizations like the EU is based on cold hard interests and the incentives of greater gains.

Other Theories… (Social Constructivism, Multi-Level Governance, Levels of Analysis)

Shying away from the grand theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, others have theoretically sought to place the EU as a distinct political phenomenon. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks argue for a multilevel governance model of EU decision-making in their essay “Multi-level Governance in the

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49 Ibid., 248.
European Union”. Unlike the grand theories of integration, multilevel governance steps away from state-centric analysis and focuses primarily on domestic issues. Its primary contention, much like neofunctionalism, is that member states in the EU have lost individual and collective control over the European decision-making process. What is different about this approach, however, is the emphasis not solely on state-centric decision-making but on an interconnected web of institutions at the supranational, national, and subnational levels. Hooghe and Marks cite numerous constraints on the exclusive ability of national governments; to make decisions states can be outvoted within the European Council due to qualified majority voting, and the national veto, while still an option, is not always welcomed by other governments. Moreover, due to a growing number of issues placed on the Council’s agenda, and the mistrust that still exists between members, it has become more reliant upon the European Commission to set the agenda. On top of all of this is the European Parliament, which with increased legislative power over the years, can request that the Commission produce proposals. As well, the authors take into account the growing pressure that can arise from bureaucracies, interest groups, and a nation’s own electorate. Multilevel governance, while more descriptive than theoretical, can help to explain policy outcomes through a domestic outlook that seeks to move European integration theory away from state-centered perspectives.

The governance approach is further explicated by Markus Jachtenfuchs in his essay entitled “The Governance Approach to European Integration”. Jachtenfuchs argues that neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism are good at identifying the causes of

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European integration, but they are not so adept at explaining the ways the EU influences domestic policies, and the interconnectedness of institutions at all levels of government. It is in these areas that the governance approach fills the gap. As Jachtenfuchs states “The state is increasingly faced with largely autonomous functional sub-systems and corporate actors. As a result negotiating systems proliferate. This implies that the clear-cut distinction between the international system and domestic systems is increasingly blurred.”\textsuperscript{51} Therefore, by examining the EU using a governance approach one can observe how Europeanization occurs.

One of the more recent developments in the field of integration theory has been the introduction of constructivism. Constructivists argue that political actors do not always base their decisions on whether or not there will be material gains. Instead actors formulate their decisions within a social context, in relationship with other people or groups. Such groups “operate according to certain norms of behavior; they consider some ideas more acceptable than others; and they agree on certain ‘facts’ about the world. Constructivists, in sum, explore the ways group norms, ideas, and even cultures shape, and sometimes change, the identities and interests of political actors.”\textsuperscript{52}

In his essay “Social Construction and European Integration” Jeffrey T. Checkel identifies two mechanisms that constructivists argue influence European norms, and therefore European integration. The first is that of social mobilization, where non-state actors and policy networks unite in support of norms, and then mobilize to influence decision-makers to change state policies. The second is that of social learning, where


\textsuperscript{52} Nelson & Stubb, 351.
decision-makers adopt societal norms which become internalized and lead to understandings that then, in turn, change behaviour; in other words decision makers adopt new norms. In the case of the EU Checkel explains that “institutions constitute actors and their interests… [This] is to suggest that they can provide agents with understandings of their interests and identities. This occurs through interaction between agents and structures… The effects of institutions thus reach much deeper; they do not simply restrain behavior. As variables, institutions become independent – and strongly so.” In short, constructivism seeks to bring social variables into the explanations of integration.

Returning to the governance approach, in an essay entitled “Making Sense of EU Decision-Making” John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg seek to bring the various theories of integration together by applying the different theories to different ‘levels of analysis’. Peterson and Bomberg outline three separate levels of analysis, in which each level has a set of theoretical perspectives that can be used to explain decision-making at that particular level. The first level is that of the ‘super-systemic’, the system level of cooperating nation-states. The second is that of the ‘systemic level’, the level of supranational institutions. Finally there is the ‘sub-systemic level’, which is described as a system of policy networks.

Decisions at the ‘super-systemic’ level, for Peterson and Bomberg, are those that are the history-making decisions; policies that alter the EU’s procedures, rebalance institutional powers, or adjust the Union’s budget. For this level of analysis they cite intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism as both being complementary rather than

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competitive. Using both theories together can allow for a clearer picture as to how European integration works. For the second ‘systemic level’ they recommend the use of new institutionalism. New institutionalism (NI) “highlights how ‘players’ become socialized to the rules of the game in EU decision-making, and its ethos of bargaining towards consensus.” NI is useful, they argue, as it sheds light upon policy decisions as products of a system that shares legislative duties among institutions. Finally, they offer up policy network analysis for the third level, the ‘sub-systemic’. Policy-shaping decisions occur at the onset of the policy formulation process, even before the formal legislation process begins. At this stage such things as lobbying activity by policy stakeholders is part of the formulation process. Policy network analysis seeks to examine these actors in the formulation of EU policy to see how they influence the process. The inherent value in Peterson and Bomberg’s levels of analysis approach is its all encompassing theoretical examination of the integration process. By utilizing many different theories a clearer picture of European integration can be constructed.

Conclusion

The foreign policy process and its evolution, as described in this chapter, can best be described as an intergovernmental process. As explicated earlier, intergovernmentalism as it is applied to European integration, in the words of Andrew Moravcsik, is where “governments transfer sovereignty to international institutions where potential gains are large, but efforts to secure compliance by foreign governments

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through decentralized or domestic means are likely to be ineffective.”55 As rational actors, states will not pool sovereignty to an international body unless it is in their explicit interest to do so. Integration does not occur through the ‘spillover effect’ as neofunctionalists argue, but through a series of intergovernmental decisions whereby states have weighed the pros and cons and decided in its favour.

Moravcsik emphasizes instead, that power bargaining and incentives are the converging factors that allow integration in the EU to progress. Therefore, intergovernmentalism can explicate how, once interests/policies have been formulated, they are then “bargained in an intergovernmental fashion (the supply side). While the demand side of the process highlights the advantages of cooperative activity and the coordination of policy, the supply side demonstrates the restricted range of possible integration outcomes.”56

Moreover the newer theories such as constructivism and multi-level governance, while intriguing, will not provide an adequate portrait of the integration process as it relates to the EU’s CFSP. Such theories are quite complex in nature and would most likely be best utilized in case studies dealing with issues concerning the other two pillars of the EU.57 As well, Peterson and Bomberg’s levels of analysis approach do not quite fit given how the EU currently conducts its foreign policy. Peterson and Bomberg recommend using neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism to explicate issues of grand decision making. However their idea of such decisions are those that change the

55 Moravcsik, 248.
57 Multi-level governance and social constructivism are largely concerned with factors of social mobility and internal domestic issues; whereas foreign policy in the EU is negotiated between member states at the highest levels. The newer theories have more applications with economics, non-state actors, and issues of the interconnectivity between governments and EU institutions.
nature of the EU’s institutions and procedures. Foreign policy decisions making does not quite make it to that level, but neither does it belong at the second level which is characterized by institutional decision making. As demonstrated clearly in the previous chapter, EU decisions in the area of foreign policy are not formulated by EU institutions but by negotiations among member states.

When applied to the evolution of the CFSP, intergovernmentalism can clearly shed light on the process by which the member states were able to collectively negotiate the terms and structure of political integration in this sphere of the EU. In such a delicate area as security and defence, treaties have to be negotiated and agreed upon unanimously. The evolution from the EPC to the CFSP and beyond was achieved because member states collectively agreed to work together on forming an EU foreign policy. ‘Spillover’ could perhaps be applied in suggesting that the inefficiencies in the ability to conduct foreign policy within the EU directly led to the changes (i.e. Maastricht and later the Amsterdam reforms) that made the process more effective. However, I would argue that such reforms only came about because the member states rationally chose to pursue them. Early failed attempts at integrating foreign policy could have been met with the decision that integration should no longer continue. However, due to incentives, member states actively sought to develop the CFSP with the understanding that it would benefit all. At no point have member states been forced into accepting political integration; steps at achieving integration have been the result of intense negotiation when they have been deemed as serving European interests.

How CFSP decisions are made confirms this explanation. Action can only be taken when a consensus has been reached in the Council of Ministers. First, issues of
foreign policy will only be brought forth when member states have agreed that they have common interests or values in a particular areas, and then action is only taken after intense negotiation and bargaining. In other words, “integration is therefore a process under strict government planning, and proceeds only when governments judge it in their interest to resort to international strategies and to reinforce their control over a certain issue.”58 Once common strategies, positions, or joint actions have been unanimously accepted, member states are then required by the institutional framework of the EU to comply with the Council’s decision, unless of course they have abstained. The foreign policy process is clearly one of intergovernmentalism; as member states decide when, where, how, and if integration proceeds in the development of EU foreign policy. As part of the EU, member states cannot back out of the CFSP, so long as they are members, but they are not controlled by the institutions of the EU. Member states have clear control in affecting how and whether the EU will utilize its capabilities in foreign policy matters. There may come a time when ‘spillover’ takes effect, allowing EU institutions greater power in making and implementing foreign policy, but it is nowhere near that stage yet. Member states remain firmly in control of their individual security and defence matters, and choose to work collectively in certain situations when they have an expressed interest in doing so.

58 Andreatta, 29.
Chapter 3: The EU and the War in Iraq: The British Response

The Timeline to War

After the events of September 11th, 2001, the US administration entered into what it characterized as a new era of global uncertainty and terror. It led a multi-nation force into Afghanistan to rid it of the Taliban and to search for Osama bin Laden. However, the US administration’s plans did not end there; the first hints of a new conflict came with President George W. Bush’s address before a joint session of Congress on January 29, 2002. He singled out Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the new axis of evil, rogue regimes posing grave danger for the US and the rest of the world. He accused Iraq of being continually hostile to the US, plotting to develop biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, murdering thousands of its own citizens, as well as continuing to reject international law and the international weapons inspectors charged with determining Iraq’s weapons capabilities. Bush warned, “America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security. We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”

Taking further steps while speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on September 12th, 2002, Bush announced that the US “will not allow any terrorist or tyrant to threaten civilization with weapons of

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60 Ibid., 252.
mass murder." He also made known that while the US wished to work through the UN Security Council in order to deal with Iraq, military intervention would become unavoidable if Iraq did not comply with UN resolutions.

Bush’s decision to take the UN route was influenced by his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and was reinforced by his primary ally, Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair. Although Iraq had ignored years of UN resolutions, Blair argued that another resolution would be needed in order to build a consensus to bring other nations on board. Preparing such a resolution would prove to be a difficult matter; it needed to be strict enough to get Hussein to comply, but not so fierce that it would be impossible to pass in the Security Council. At that time it did not appear that the Chinese and the Russians would stand in the way of a new resolution, but the US and the UK were aware that it would have to satisfy the French who were unlikely to approve of an ultimatum. After much debate and wrangling, the UN Security Council passed a new resolution on November 8th 2002, Resolution 1441, that demanded that Iraq turn over all of its weapons of mass destruction, and threatened serious consequences if it did not do so. In the following months UN weapons inspectors entered Iraq to gauge its weapons arsenals and determine whether Saddam Hussein was truly deceiving the world.

Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously but would mark the beginning of the end of UN consensus on the Iraqi issue. With its passing countries such as France, Russia and others believed that if the inspections were allowed military intervention would only

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63 Ibid., 54. The approval of China, Russia, and France was necessary as they, along with the US and the UK, make up the five permanent members and veto holders on the UN Security Council. Their approval needed to be gauged before turning to the other ten current seat holders.
come about through a second UN resolution. This, however, was certainly not the intent of the US, which, while it intended to consult the Council, did not believe it needed its permission. The UK was well aware of the US government’s intent and while they favoured a second resolution, the British knew that the US was prepared to go it alone should the UN process prove to be too tedious.\textsuperscript{64} The UN inspectors entered Iraq on the 27\textsuperscript{th} of November, and headed by Dr. Hans Blix, began their search for illegal weapons. While no ‘smoking gun’ was found, the most damning evidence in the American’s eyes came when Baghdad handed over a twelve thousand page report on December 7 detailing its weapons programmes. Blix was unimpressed by the document, citing its failure to detail information on all unaccounted for weapon stocks as well as failing to provide a comprehensive list of Iraqi scientists.\textsuperscript{65} Based on the information given in the document, the US declared that Iraq was in “material breach”\textsuperscript{66} of Resolution 1441, and with Britain, proceeded to continue building up its troop deployment in the Gulf region.

In the coming months it was becoming clear to the international community that the US intended to oust Hussein’s regime whether or not solid proof of a weapons violation could be found, and probably without a UN resolution in favour of military intervention. However, a last ditch effort to convince the world was undertaken as Colin Powell made a presentation before the UN to demonstrate Iraq’s non-compliance with the UN resolution.\textsuperscript{67} Powell’s efforts did not succeed in generating support for the American case, and further setbacks were close behind. First, a fairly routine request for NATO protection of Turkey in case of regional instability due to an invasion of Iraq was rejected

\textsuperscript{64} Kendall, 57.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{66} BBC News, “Timeline: Steps to war.”
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
by France, Germany, and Belgium. These nations saw the request as an endorsement for
war, and would not acquiesce to the US position. The second setback for the US and
Britain was Dr. Blix’s next report. Contrary to expectations, Blix’s report had a fairly
uncritical tone. Though he reported that certain questions remained unanswered and
implied that inspections should continue, he was pleased with the improved Iraqi
compliance and furthermore struck out against the evidence presented by Powell at his
February 5th appearance before the UN. Blix found the US intelligence to be flawed, and
perhaps based on forged documents. Blix’s colleague, Dr. El Baradei, the Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pointedly remarked that
“We have to date found no evidence of nuclear activity in Iraq.”

By this point anti-war sentiment was reaching a new peak. Massive anti-war
demonstrations took place around the world as a clear split was emerging between the US
and Europe. Many Europeans were favouring further inspections rather than proceeding
with war plans. Even Hussein provided ammunition to the anti-war efforts as it appeared
he was beginning to facilitate the work of the weapons inspectors, allowing them the use
of aerial reconnaissance, signing a presidential decree against weapons of mass
destruction, and allowing the destruction of his al-Samoud missiles. The US appeared
determined, however, to oust the despot, and proceeded with plans for a second UN
resolution. The resolution, while not deemed necessary by the US, was attempted anyway
because the Americans believed that it would come to the aid of Tony Blair, who was
experiencing significant opposition back home. However, the second resolution was not
to be, since of the fifteen votes in the Security Council only four were in favour of

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68 Kendall, 61.
69 Ibid., 61-2.
70 Ibid.
military action, with five already decidedly against. Among the opposing five were France, Russia, and China, who with their vetoes made the other votes insignificant.\textsuperscript{71} This second resolution was drafted on February 24, 2003, and was presented by the UK backed by the US and Spain. The resolution declared that Iraq had failed to live up to the previous resolution and had had its last chance. While it did not mention military intervention as recourse for Iraq’s non-compliance, this did not matter as it was already seen as being the resolution’s main intent.

Getting the second resolution passed proved to be impossible. President Jacques Chirac appeared on French television and made clear his intent to block any US action in the Security Council. Chirac announced that there were no grounds for waging war, and that France had no intention of voting yes in any circumstance.\textsuperscript{72} The Russian position was much the same as President Vladimir Putin also refused to go along with the US and Britain. In addition it appeared that the US also was unable to secure votes from other Council members such as Mexico and Chile. Added to the growing list of US problems were developments in Turkey. The Turkish parliament voted against allowing the US military access to Turkish territory; the Turkish population was overwhelming opposed to war and its parliament answered in kind.\textsuperscript{73} Despite the tide of opposition against them, Bush, Blair, and Premier Jose Maria Aznar of Spain met in the Azores on March 16\textsuperscript{th} to discuss their plans for Iraqi disarmament. Together these heads of government established a deadline for the next day to secure the approval of the Security Council, but

\textsuperscript{71} The breakdown of votes included: the US, the UK, Spain, and Bulgaria in favour of the resolution. France, Russia, China, Germany, and Syria opposed. The remaining six included Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, and Pakistan; whose votes became unnecessary as France and Russia planned on using their veto privilege.

\textsuperscript{72} Kendall, 63-4.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
were fully prepared for disappointment. They withdrew the resolution that next day, putting an end to any hope for UN backing.\textsuperscript{74} President Bush also appeared on live television to announce that the US and its coalition of the willing were to give forty-eight hours for Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq or face military conflict. When the forty-eight hours passed without Hussein’s compliance the war began, with the US starting to bomb selected targets within ninety minutes after the deadline on the 20\textsuperscript{th} of March, 2003.\textsuperscript{75}

The UK’s Response

In late August and early September of 2002 the EU called upon Iraq to allow the return of weapons inspectors.\textsuperscript{76} Since President Bush’s State of the Union address back on January 29\textsuperscript{th}, fears of military aggression against Iraq were growing and pressure was building among the EU and others to seek out a diplomatic solution. With pressure growing from within the EU to take the diplomatic route, Prime Minister Blair was increasingly under pressure to clarify the British position. Blair had not made any public comments on the issue until he was questioned while on a three day trip to Africa that August. Blair reiterated the US President’s statements that Iraq could not be allowed to continually be in material breach of UN resolutions. He told reporters, “Doing nothing about Iraq’s breach of these UN resolutions is not an option… That’s the only decision

\textsuperscript{74} BBC News, “Timeline: Steps to war.”
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} BBC News, “Iraq issue ‘must be tackled’,” August 31, 2002. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2227345.stm> A meeting of EU foreign ministers in Denmark agreed that UN inspectors must be allowed to reenter the country to determine whether or not there were weapons of mass destruction. The ministers however shied away from taking a position regarding any eventual military conflict.
that’s been taken so far. What we do about that is an open question.”
Blair acknowledged the growing public opinion against war in the UK, but indicated that many would be convinced once evidence confirming Saddam Hussein’s threat to the world was released. Blair also attested to his belief that Britain could act as a bridge between Europe and the US, particularly on issues such as this one where differences in opinion could create a deep divide among EU members. At this point, nearly over a year before the actual invasion of Iraq would begin, the BBC outlined what it had concluded to be the British government’s initial plans for the Iraqi situation. This plan included three parts, starting with the UN. Blair wanted to bring the issue back to the Security Council for authorization to move ahead with military action if Iraq did not comply with all UN resolutions. The second part was the desire to line up the European powers behind the plan that “combines diplomacy with the threat of war.” Blair recognized that Bush was not a popular figure in Europe, and that this fact would make it difficult to convince others that Hussein really was a current danger in respect to WMDs. Blair also believed that he could act as a bridge between the US and Europe. He believed that the special relationship that Britain had with the US put it into a unique situation where it had a reasonable chance to bring the two continents together. With this belief in mind Britain thought that with its support it could “deliver a neat diplomatic package; the Europeans [would therefore be] upholding US strategy, while the US upheld the authority of the UN.” Finally Blair’s plans included an eventual settlement for the Palestinians, in an

77 BBC News, “Iraq issue ‘must be tackled.’”
79 Ibid.
effort to produce lasting stability in the Middle East. Lining up the Europeans would become a difficult task, but one that Blair thought necessary with their initial outcries against military conflict without the legality of the UN behind such an action.

Prior to 9/11 Blair had spoken about the possibility of major terrorists attacks, and was worried about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. After the events of 9/11, Blair saw a link between these two threats and believed that together they would be the new defining issue for the globe. Furthermore, Blair agreed with the new US position that addressing such threats now rather than later was going to be necessary in this environment of terrorist threats. Blair was quickly able to recognize the fact that the US of post 9/11 would be decidedly different from its former self. Armed with this knowledge Blair came to the conclusion that “America’s allies would have to adjust to what he insisted were the new realities.” As Blair explained to Peter Stothard, President Bush “sees that the problem of terrorist states and terrorist weapons of mass destruction is the problem of our generation. We may have come to that conclusion from different political traditions, different ideological directions, but we both see that. We’re both working to see that others see it too.”

This point would result in the divide between the British viewpoint and many other European countries; whereas the US was deeply changed by the events of September the 11th, the Europeans, while horrified by 9/11, did not develop a new world view. As Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro explain, the “Americans tended to see the

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82 Clarke, Michael, “The Diplomacy that Led to War in Iraq,” 41.
83 Blair, Tony, in Peter Stothard, Thirty Days: Tony Blair and the Test of History, (Great Britain: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2003), 69-70. Stothard, a reporter for The Times, shadowed the British Prime Minister for thirty days spanning the period from March 10th to April 9th 2003; and subsequently published his experiences into a book giving an insider account of Blair’s actions during the Iraqi crisis.
world almost exclusively through the prism of international terrorism, whereas Europeans were still focused on the consequences of the end of the Cold War.” Blair was resolved to support the US led mission in Afghanistan, particularly when faced with how devoted the Americans were to their belief that Hussein was in possession of WMDs. He believed the consequences for refusing to act could prove disastrous if Iraq did indeed possess WMDs. Blair also concluded that if Iraq was successfully disarmed, with Hussein gone and a stable country emerging thereafter, the world would indeed be a safer place. As The Economist explains, Blair’s world view included the belief that one can only change the world with American support. “American power must be harnessed as a force for good in the world, and only a loyal ally – as [Blair] has shown himself to be – can achieve that.”

By bridging the divide between the US and Europe, Blair believed he was doing his part in attaining world stability.

Blair made what Michael Clarke refers to as a ‘non-decision’; he decided that "Britain would stand foursquare with the United States in all this – a non-decision in that the prospects of not doing so were never seriously entertained." Blair’s resolve to stand by the Americans probably had the side effect of dragging out the issue; he aligned himself with individuals such as Colin Powell who pushed President Bush to take the UN route in confronting Iraq. Blair allied himself with the multilateralists on this issue in order to bring public, political, and legal support if it came to the point where Iraq would have to be disarmed forcibly. If Bush hoped to have European support in his bid to disarm Hussein he needed to at least attempt a diplomatic approach. European governments tend to look for peaceful solutions as their lack of military power requires

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84 Gordon & Shapiro, 106.
86 Clarke, 41.
that they solve their problems through diplomatic means. “After 50 years of integration and of overcoming past enmity, Europeans have come to place more faith in diplomacy and cooperation than Americans, whose lessons of the Cold War include a greater respect for the need to threaten or use military force.” These lessons would strictly divide the two continents on the Iraq issue and would make it difficult for Blair and others to succeed at the UN. Importantly, Blair did not believe from the start that war with Iraq was inevitable, as some would accuse of the US of doing. In the year leading up to the outbreak of hostilities Blair frequently spoke out declaring that a peaceful solution could be arrived at, and that he himself hoped that that would be the outcome. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said as much in January of 2003 when he argued that the odds were quite hopeful that a peaceful solution could be had. Blair saw his support of the US also as an act of coercive diplomacy; Blair hoped that the threat of war backed up by the united western allies would be successful in reinstating weapons inspectors as well as perhaps forcing Hussein out of power. “For Britain, coercive diplomacy required serious preparations for war as a device to try to avoid it.”

Faced with increasing European criticism towards a unilateralist move by the US and Britain to force Iraq to disarm, Blair sought to encourage Bush to allow the UN a chance of producing an effective resolution. Not just within Europe but Britain as well, opposition was strong. Many in the general public as well as a majority of Blair’s own Labour party members were uncomfortable with the idea of going to war and with Britain supporting US unilateralism. With such opposition both abroad and at home Blair

87 Gordon, Philip H. and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies At War: America, Europe, and the Crisis Over Iraq, 108.
88 Clarke, 43.
recognized the importance of gaining UN backing.\textsuperscript{89} A week before Bush was to address the UN General Assembly Blair met with him at Camp David to discuss the situation. After a three hour talk Blair announced that both he and Bush had a “shared strategy” for disarming Iraq, and that they would seek “the broadest possible international support” to do so.\textsuperscript{90} While it remained unclear exactly what route the Americans would choose there was a sigh of relief when before the General Assembly on September 12\textsuperscript{th} the President announced that “we will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolution.”\textsuperscript{91} The announcement was last minute, but it was what was needed if the US and Britain hoped for more international support. However, Bush also included in his address that if the UN failed to act the US would have no hesitation to do so; a position that would continue to put Blair in a tenuous situation. Britain would have to balance the role of attempting to mend the gap between Europe and the US all the while trying to keep the US restrained and away from the unilateralist path. Not everyone would appreciate the Prime Minister’s efforts; as John le Carré put it “the most charitable interpretation of Tony Blair’s part in all this is that he believed that, by riding the tiger, he could steer it. He can’t. Instead, he gave it a phoney legitimacy, and a smooth voice. Now I fear, the same tiger has him penned into a corner, and he can’t get out.”\textsuperscript{92}

On September 24\textsuperscript{th} of 2002 the British government released its fifty page document detailing its evidence against Iraq. The dossier charged that Iraq was seeking nuclear materials abroad, and would be capable of producing a nuclear weapon within a

\textsuperscript{89} Gordon & Shapiro, 109.
\textsuperscript{91} Kendall, 54.
year or two. In the foreword to the dossier Blair attested to his belief that “the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme. I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors.” The release of the dossier was followed that day by an emergency debate in the House of Commons. The day long emergency debate demonstrated the deep divide that existed within Blair’s own party, as 56 of his Labour MPs registered their opposition to Blair’s stance on Iraq. In the coming months Blair carried on trying to convince his own public as well as the world that Britain was right to back the Americans; that Saddam Hussein posed a grave threat to the world and assured that war was not inevitable if Iraq disarmed. Blair received the UN resolution he was hoping for on November 8th 2002, with the passing of Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 “called for tough inspections, driven by a tight timetable and requiring complete Iraqi co-operation. It included the threat that Iraq would face serious consequences if it failed to comply, but only after there had been further Security Council consultations.”

Hussein agreed to let the UN inspectors re-enter Iraq, and the search for the illegal weapons continued for months. Iraq presented to the UN a 1200 page dossier and claimed it to be a full disclosure of its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programmes. Top

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96 Kendall, 56.
UN inspector Hans Blix was unimpressed with the document, citing its failure to address the unaccounted for stocks of weapons. Those on the Security Council recognized Hussein’s only passive cooperation with Resolution 1441 and pushed for further compliance, requiring Hussein to prove that he had nothing to hide. The reaction of the US and British governments took a more severe tone. They viewed the dossier with a much more critical eye, viewing the document a source with which to trap Hussein if he was indeed deceiving the UN. A little over a week from the document’s release Secretary of State Colin Powell conveyed the US’ disappointment over its declarations, “we approached it with scepticism and the information I have received so far is that that scepticism is well-founded.” The US eventually concluded that Iraq was in “material breach” of Resolution 1441, putting the situation that much more closely to war. The US’ resolve in going to war was cemented by Hussein’s unconvincing dossier, and within the month US and British troops were being deployed to the Gulf region in anticipation of the coming war. By January the 11th of the new year a British naval task force was en route to the Gulf, and the Americans announced their intent to send an additional thirty-five thousand troops bringing their total personnel to over 120 000 in the region. Further reinforcements were close behind, when on January 20th 2003 the British government announced the deployment of 26 000 troops to join the 8 000 soldiers of the naval task force. They also announced their intent to send 150 armoured personnel carriers as well as 120 tanks to Kuwait before the middle of February.

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98 Kendall, 58.
On January 28th 2003 President Bush delivered his State of the Union address before a joint session of Congress. In the address he detailed some of the evidence that the US and British governments had collected against Iraq, and made the allegation that Hussein had ties to al-Qaeda. The President declared, “Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.”

The State of the Union speech was quickly followed up by a strategy session at Camp David involving the President and Tony Blair. Before arriving for the session on January 31st, Blair stopped in Spain to meet with Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar. There, both Prime Ministers stated that Hussein had one “last chance” to disarm before the international community took action. A timetable for military action was discussed between Bush and Blair, and it became increasingly clear that the war could be inevitable. Speaking after the meeting, Blair espoused his belief that “there’s no doubt at all at present – he [Saddam Hussein] is in breach… I certainly believe he’s not going to comply.” Three days later Downing Street released its dossier of evidence against Hussein; the dossier accused Hussein of deliberately hampering the efforts of inspectors

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101 President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” January 28, 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html> The charges laid out against Hussein included unaccounted for weapons: 25 000 liters of anthrax, 38 000 liters of botulinum toxin, 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agents, and 30 000 chemical munitions. As well as the British government’s evidence that Hussein had recently tried to acquire significant amounts of uranium from Africa.


in their searches.\textsuperscript{104} The accumulated evidence against Hussein gathered by the US and the UK was outlined to the UN on February 5\textsuperscript{th} 2003, in a presentation given by Colin Powell.

By this time it was apparent that the US would be willing to go into Iraq without the support of the UN, but if Britain hoped to bring allies in on any action it needed the UN. As well, Britain emphasized the fact that it wanted to have legal justification if going into Iraq proved to be the final option and this again meant that UN approval would be needed.\textsuperscript{105} After making their case to the UN, the US and the UK felt pressured by the mounting resistance to any military conflict, and decided to seek a second UN resolution.

This resolution tabled by the UK and seconded by the US and Spain, declared Iraq to be in violation of the previous resolutions to disarm. The resolution was simple but firm in its condemnation: “Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in Resolution 1441,” and it reminded Iraq of the first resolution’s promise of serious consequences if it failed to comply.\textsuperscript{106} That same day, the 24\textsuperscript{th} of February, France, Germany and Russia released a memorandum calling for more time for the weapons inspectors in an effort to counteract the UK’s second UN resolution. The memorandum sought to allow at least an additional four months for weapons inspectors to continue their work; this proposal if it had been pursued would have produced by March 1\textsuperscript{st} of 2003 a list of things that Iraq would have had to have done in order to avoid war. France, along with the Germans and Russians, hoped that by gaining support for their

\textsuperscript{104} BBC News, “Evidence against Iraq ‘unmistakable’,” February 3, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2721759.stm> This dossier of evidence against Iraq was later determined to have been based upon a PhD thesis rather than actual government intelligence.

\textsuperscript{105} Clarke, 44.

memorandum the British draft proposal could be defeated without using a veto, which would have upset the US. Early support for the memorandum would mean more time for inspectors and hopefully less chance for war.\textsuperscript{107} More resistance against war came in the form of a parliamentary revolt against Blair, where on February the 26\textsuperscript{th} 199 MPs voted for an amendment to a motion that declared that the case for war in Iraq had not been made. The motion failed to pass as Blair supporters along with the Tories held the majority, but the discontented numbered an alarming 122 of Blair’s own Labour members. That same night another vote, one to give Saddam Hussein one final warning, passed but with dissenters totalling 124. Blair assured the Commons that the vote was not a vote for war, and that he was intent on working with the UN, hoping that the second draft resolution would help to win over public opinion.\textsuperscript{108}

Winning over public opinion however would not turn out to be in the prime minister’s cards. By March 1\textsuperscript{st} Iraq began destroying its al-Samoud medium-range missiles; a positive development in the eyes of Hans Blix and the weapons inspectors. When speaking before the UN Security Council on the 7\textsuperscript{th} of March, Blix explained the complex situation in Iraq regarding its weapons. Blix reported that Iraqi compliance with the weapons inspectors had greatly increased since that past January; which he attributed to the growing international pressure put upon Hussein.\textsuperscript{109} He pointed to the fact that Iraq had begun the destruction of the al-Samoud missiles, and that it appeared as though Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme was non-existent.\textsuperscript{110} While he found the recent

\textsuperscript{107} “The quality of consensus strained,” \textit{The Economist}, March 1\textsuperscript{st} (2003), 24.
developments encouraging Blix admitted that the Iraqi cooperation could not be described as the “immediate compliance” to which the UN required with resolution 1441. He pointed to the fact that Iraq had at that point insufficiently demonstrated to prove it had destroyed certain weapons and that interviews with Iraqi scientists were not completely candid.\footnote{BBC News, “Blix” Inspectors ‘need months’,” March 7th, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2829213.stm>}

However despite these set-backs Blix announced that there was no evidence that Iraq was indeed hiding biological and chemical weapons as the US and UK claimed; and Mohammed El Baradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency submitted a report challenging the US and UK’s belief that Iraq had purchased uranium from Niger, and arguing that aluminum tubes that were found were determined not to be for the use of enriching uranium. Blix’s conclusion to the Security Council was that Iraqi disarmament was progressing, and that weapons inspectors could fully investigate Iraq’s disarmament obligations within a matter of months.\footnote{Ibid.} With what they viewed as favourable and on-going progress France, Russia, Germany, and China suggested giving the weapons inspectors another four months to complete their work; a move that was not accepted by the US and the UK. By this time the UK realized the extreme difficulty it would have if it ever hoped to pass a second resolution; one that Blair saw as being critical in gaining both public and political support for war.\footnote{BBC News, “Analysis: Bush warning overshadows Blix,” March 7th, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2827801.stm>}

The mounting opposition to war and the pressure to allow more time for the weapons inspectors made the situation at the UN ever more tense. Blair announced that he was fully prepared to go to war without the support of the UN if he felt that a veto
Against the second resolution was applied “unreasonably.”114 With a fairly open ended term that could be used in which ever way Blair deemed appropriate and the growing protestations of those in opposition to war, the situation at the UN was headed for disaster. Blair and Bush remained committed to their belief that Hussein was in direct violation of UN resolutions, and with other countries calling for more time the chance of a compromise grew dim. The impasse at the UN was predictably followed by the US and the UK announcing that the diplomatic route had been exhausted and that military intervention would begin, citing as their legal justification Iraq’s failure to abide by Resolution 1441 and others. On March 17th 2003 the final steps towards war became apparent as Bush gave a television address giving the Iraqi dictator one final ultimatum; in the address he warned: “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at the time of our choosing.”115

A nine hour debate raged in the British House of Commons as Blair brought the question of war to MPs. Blair was able to gain the approval of the House but not without significant opposition; a total of 138 of Blair’s own Labour backbenchers voted against going to war. By that point the move towards war was almost certain; any hope for getting UN support was set aside as the British accused France indirectly of threatening to use their veto no matter how the Council voted, and subsequently the UK, US, and Spain withdrew their plans for a second resolution. Hussein announced on Iraqi television that he had no intent on leaving the country and the US deadline passed on March 20th;

with the commencement of military measures after only ninety minutes after the expiration of the deadline.\textsuperscript{116}

The UK’s Rationale

\textit{Atlanticism}

One dominant form of British foreign policy for the last fifty years has been that of Atlanticism. Healthy relations between the US and Britain since World War II has grown into a close friendship which Britain sees as being entirely unique. Referred to as a “special relationship,” by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, strong ties with the US have continued to be an important factor for those in the British government.\textsuperscript{117} This relationship sprang from the post-war need for US involvement on the European continent to offset the growth in power of the Soviet Union. Europe would have been unable to combat the Soviets without the help of the US, as it lacked the resources to defend itself against communism. NATO was successful in bringing the Western alliance together and keeping the Soviets out. After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union some questioned the usefulness of such an organization but NATO continued on. A display of ongoing Western solidarity was evident as Article V of the Treaty was invoked on September 12\textsuperscript{th} 2001, a day after the terrorist attacks in the US, and for the first time in NATO’s history.

While NATO had brought Europe and North America closer together after the war, none felt this relationship more closely than Britain. While it is a part of Europe,

\textsuperscript{116} BBC News, “Timeline: Steps to war.”
Britain has for the most part entertained an aloofness to keep it from being ensnared by continental affairs. The “special relationship” that Churchill developed with Roosevelt is still felt today, as consultation with the US remains high on the list of British foreign priorities. While developments in the EU with the CFSP and other institutions have increasingly turned Britain’s attention to Europe, partnership with the US remains strong. The EU may challenge Britain’s relationship with the US, but it still remains a large part of British foreign policy thinking. Now Britain makes decisions picking and choosing whom it will consult first, or whose opinion it will support depending on the issue. For Britain making decisions depends on the “issue in hand, whether defence, foreign or economic policy, and an assessment of which channel might be most effective in achieving British policy goals.”¹¹⁸ Like any country the national interest is king; Britain can seek out its interests by way of the EU or in participation with the US, it all depends on what will reap the greatest reward.

Moreover, being closer to the US than other European countries has allowed Britain to enjoy a special status of friendship like no other European country perhaps could. This close relationship between the US and Britain has allowed the British to assume that they possess a special ‘in’ with the US, the most powerful country on the planet; a relationship that can be utilized for its benefit.¹¹⁹ Another belief prevalent in British policy is that the continuing retention of the US as a friend can sometimes be at the detriment to its relationship with Europe. This consequence however is one that Britain is willing to endure when aligning with the US rather than Europe is in its best interest. For this reason Britain tends to see itself apart from the rest of Europe, because if

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¹¹⁹ Rasmussen, 146.
it allows itself to simply become one of the many in Europe it risks losing its special status with the US.\textsuperscript{120}

Losing such a status would generally be seen as a great loss for the British government. Throughout the Iraq crisis Tony Blair consistently reiterated Britain’s role as a bridge between the US and Europe; a role he and other British Prime Ministers hold up to be of the utmost importance. For fifty odd years, the British have been of the belief that the best way to fulfill British interests is to align them with America’s global objectives.\textsuperscript{121} *The Economist* points to a critical time in British history where this belief took hold. During the Suez Crisis in 1956 both Britain and France intervened in Egypt after President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. In contrast to the Iraq crisis, the US voiced concern regarding the legality of such an intervention and took steps to end it, fearing a greater conflict. The US was able to force both Britain and France into a cease-fire by threatening Britain to sell US reserves of the British pound, which would have sent the British economy into a tailspin.

At the time both Britain and France were outraged at what they saw as an American “betrayal”\textsuperscript{122}, but Britain would emerge from this international crisis with a new point of view. Britain would determine that in order to achieve its objectives it would need the US on board; that globally it did not have the political punch it once had and would require the influence and might of the US superpower to get things done. Hand-in-hand with this belief was the new role the British would take on for themselves

\textsuperscript{120} Rasmussen, 146.  
\textsuperscript{121} “From Suez to Baghdad,” *The Economist*, March 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2003, 47.  
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. Along with threatening to sell off the British pound, the US also refused to aid both Britain and France when Saudi Arabia began an oil embargo against the two countries the British and French were forced to agree to the cease-fire. Prime Minister Anthony Eden was forced to resign. On Canadian External Affair Minister Lester Pearson’s suggestions the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was created, and peacekeeping troops were sent to Egypt to stabilize the country.
as the bridge between Europe and America. The Suez Crisis opened British eyes to the notion that when Europe and the US are divided it produces an unstable environment globally. With this crisis brewing over Iraq and a noticeable divide occurring between the US and Europe, the British government chose once again to align itself with the US and again try to act as a unifier due to its special Atlantic relationship.

Moreover, the UK has had a long history of dealings with Iraq, and this most recent crisis was not the first time the UK has supported US action against Iraq. The UK was the Iraq administrator under the League of Nations mandate after WWI. The UK established a constitution, a bicameral legislature, and installed King Faisal I as leader. The mandate ended in 1932, with Iraq becoming an independent state. However, the UK continued to have strong military and political influence within the country. Iraq continued to be a pro-British country until the military revolution of 1958 overthrew King Faisal II, and the subsequent Ba’athist Revolution in 1968. The UK supported UN Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. It participated in the Gulf War along with the US, France, and others. The UK also aided the US in the 1998 bombing campaign, Operation Desert Fox, in an effort to destroy Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It also joined the US again in 2001, in a mission to cripple Iraq’s air defense network. As such, continued British participation in keeping the Iraqi regime in check was not surprising when the UK supported US efforts again during the 2003 crisis.

Britain and the Union

Euro-scepticism is a term that has often been associated with Britain. The country’s history with the EU has been one of mixed feelings and cautious, slow developments. Traditionally, Britain has chosen to remain aloof from the larger European continent; but for security reasons it can never truly stay clear of continental affairs.

Before the twentieth century Britain tended to pursue a balance of power strategy when dealing with its European neighbours. Britain saw itself as being better off when no one country or coalition dominates the Europe. When conflicts arose Britain tended to support the weaker player in an attempt to bring stability back to the continent. Having enjoyed the fruits from being a world superpower, Britain could afford to remain apart from the rest of Europe, a situation that would cease after the end of WWII and the rise of the US as the new superpower. However, EU membership has challenged Britain and its normal way of conducting itself with regards to the rest of Europe. Britain’s long history provides insights into its current interactions with the EU.

Britain belongs to a short list of countries that can claim to have not been invaded or occupied in well over two hundred years, and another short list that can claim to not have been colonised in over five hundred years. This impressive historical fact has allowed Britain to evolve into a highly independent and politically stable country. By the middle of the twentieth century Britain had been recognized as the model country for parliamentary democracy, a system it had developed over centuries, and was being

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125 Mark Aspinwall, *Rethinking Britain and Europe: Plurality elections, party management and British policy on European integration*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 4. Aspinwall’s definition of euro-scepticism and euro-sceptic: “These terms imply a respective hostility to all of Europe, which is misleading because they are really intended to denote an individual’s position on integration which results in a loss of domestic authority.”

126 Rasmussen, 145.
adopted by many others because of the stability it had proved to produce, whereas the rest of Europe was battered and bruised following WWII, and could not claim to have the effective government that the British could boast about. European political cooperation arose from the ashes of WWII when the continent collectively started to believe that stability could only be secured in Europe if the countries within it were bound into a political and economic union, which would force them to work together diplomatically rather than resorting to war. This development has come more easily to the countries on the continent than to Britain, who came out of WWII which a different outlook on Europe.

Despite the horrors and tragedy that befell Europe during WWII, Britain saw itself as a winner coming out of the war rather than one of the losers on the continent. Britain saw itself as one of the victors of the war; one of those who with the help of the US, Canada, the USSR and other nations saved the European continent from the Nazis. Despite the fact that Britain also took heavy losses during the war it had avoided invasion and was in much better shape than its European neighbours. 

Having come out of the war in better condition, Britain has tended to see itself superior to the rest of Europe; a belief that has come across as arrogance to the rest of Europe and a source of pride for the British. As well, because of Britain’s history of avoiding foreign occupation or colonization it has not had a history of working with others to arrive at mutually beneficial decisions. As Jeremy Rand writes, “There can be a tendency for Britain, and

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127 Rasmussen, 146.
also the USA, sometimes to stick to moral absolutes and points of principle”;¹²⁹ having not been faced with the difficult decisions and situations that those under occupation would have experienced Britain does not have a history of making “difficult moral compromises.”¹³⁰ As such, when it comes to achieving decidedly British goals within the context of the EU, Britain is less willing to compromise when compared to other EU members.

Another explanation for Britain’s scepticism in regards to the EU has to do with it being an island. As an island, Britain to some degree has been able to control how and where outside influences are able to enter the country. Britain shares more of its cultural perspective with the US rather than with Europe. English is spoken in both Britain and the US; this makes cultural exchanges between the two countries much easier, than with continental Europe. Britain also tends to see itself as a cultural entity entirely separate from the rest of Europe. Cultures on the European continent are indeed varied and numerous, but arguably they are more similar to each other than they are to British culture for the mere fact that they are in constant contact, and have been for centuries. For this reason the British see themselves as having a distinctly ‘British culture’, one much different from that of general ‘European culture’. Whether this distinction is valid or not, the British generally perceive it to be and see increased integration with Europe as a threat to it.¹³¹

Therefore, due to its history and culture Britain has been an uneasy and sometimes uncooperative European. European integration had its beginnings in the European Coal and Steel Community, an organization which while it was created as an

¹²⁹ Rand, 28.
¹³⁰ Ibid.
¹³¹ Ibid., 30.
economic entity had as its underlying purpose political integration to prevent war and bring stability to Europe. Britain was part of the second wave of membership applicants, becoming a full member in 1973. At the time Britain was joining a common market, which it saw as a decidedly economic relationship. Since then Britain has been more accepting of economic integration but continues to keep political integration with the Union at arm’s length. Protecting British culture and sovereignty remains a top priority, hence it sees further integration with the EU at odds with its interests.

What has resulted among British politicians and population is a general belief that the situation between that of British sovereignty and European integration is zero-sum. Rand explains, “a key part of British identity is tied up in the notion of British sovereignty so any challenge to British sovereignty becomes de facto a challenge to British identity.” If sovereignty is indeed preeminent in the British mindset, then it is easy to understand British reluctance to allow its foreign policy to be influenced, let alone conducted by the EU. Foreign policy integration is a major step in the political integration process, and to allow Britain’s voice to become simply one of the many within the EU can be a frightening development for a country that for so long has enjoyed an independent existence as a party of one. In the case of Iraq, the US government clearly laid out a policy of ‘with or against us’; as the British government chose to side with the US and help to preserve its relationship with that country, perhaps at the expense of its relationship with the rest of Europe.

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132 Rand, 31.
Chapter 4: The EU and the War in Iraq: France’s Response

France’s Response

As the summer of 2002 progressed, European leaders began to outline their views and concerns regarding the Iraqi situation and the American push for international action. In late August, France’s Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, speaking before an audience of French ambassadors, denounced Iraq’s flagrant disregard of international law and stressed the importance of non-proliferation. De Villepin underlined the international community’s responsibility not to turn a blind eye from ruthless dictators, and called for the reintroduction of UN weapons inspectors in the country. While his statements did not directly relay a threat of force to Iraq, de Villepin did state that the “steps to be taken must be decided by the international community, according to a collective process… no military action could be conducted without a decision of the Security Council.” These sentiments were reiterated by President Jacques Chirac two weeks later in an interview with the New York Times.

Chirac agreed that Hussein posed a serious threat to the region as well as the people living under his regime. The French President made his position clear that dealing with Iraq should not be pursued through unilateral actions, but through a collective response. He made sure to distance himself from absolute opposition to the threat of force as German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had done and signalled that French support could be achieved through the Security Council. The president explained

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133 Gordon & Shapiro, 104.
135 Gordon & Shapiro, 104.
that French support could be attained if a first UN resolution were passed calling for the return of UN weapons inspectors, and if “indisputable proof” of WMDs in Hussein’s possession were found a second resolution calling for military intervention in Iraq would need passing. This served to placate the Bush administration under the assumption that while the French typically like to put roadblocks they eventually fall in line with the American view. Former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was quoted as saying, France would “undoubtedly play its normal role as a difficult and contentious ally, but in the end, it will not stop the concentrated will of America and Britain.”

Believing that France could indeed be persuaded, Bush was eventually convinced that going before the Security Council would not in fact be a waste of time but an opportunity to gain more international support. When the Americans agreed to bring the question before the Security Council in the form of a resolution, France reacted by stating a number of conditions. The first was the avoidance of any automatic trigger in the resolution that would allow for military action. If military action needed to be taken, a second resolution in the Security Council would be required. The Americans did not like the idea of requiring a second resolution to undertake action if Iraq failed to comply with the first resolution, and insisted that the French accept the threat of force so that the resolution could be effective. The French were not opposed to using the threat of force against Iraq, as long as the final decision to use force rested with the Security Council where France had a veto. The importance of a UN resolution for the French was that it removed the final choice to use force from the Americans. If the Americans remained

139 Kendall, 55.
unchecked, Hussein would have no reason to believe that he could disarm peacefully and still remain in power. Moreover, by forcing the Americans to work within the context of the United Nations the French would be helping to uphold the principle that no country had the right to do whatever it liked without international approval.\(^{140}\)

Resolution 1441, as passed, was clearly the product of negotiation between the Americans and the French, supported by Russia and China, because it led to a result that was acceptable for all sides. The resolution threatened “serious consequences” for non-compliance, but stopped short of giving the Americans a blank check for military action. The French remained hopeful that steps by Hussein toward disarmament would prevent the Bush administration from enacting its plans for regime change. However, the French understood that the possibility existed that Iraq would not comply, but at least were this to happen they were confident that they had successfully engineered a resolution that required the Americans to seek additional approval from the UN before going to war.\(^{141}\) What the French did not anticipate was that once Resolution 1441 passed in the Security Council the Americans were content that they had done their best to consult the international community, and that once Hussein failed to comply, which they were confident he would not, they were justified in taking action.\(^{142}\) The French were confident on the other hand; that the interpretation of the resolution was now the responsibility of the weapons inspectors and that any further decision to go to war would again require negotiation in the Security Council.

The disagreement over the interpretation of Resolution 1441 would become abundantly clear after Iraq released its weapons declaration on December 7, 2002. The

\(^{140}\) Gordon & Shapiro, 108.
\(^{141}\) Ibid., 112.
\(^{142}\) Ibid., 114.
American view of the text was that it was neither accurate nor complete, and
demonstrated that Iraq had failed to live up to its obligations outlined in Resolution 1441.
The Bush administration, with British support, declared Iraq to be in “material breach” of
UN resolutions. The French agreed that Iraq’s weapons declaration was inaccurate, but
differed with the US on what to do about it. This disagreement only convinced the French
further that the inspections needed to continue to verify the Iraqi position and determine
whether or not Iraq was in possession of illegal weapons. As well, the French were
confident that the document did not definitively prove material breach, and that a
declaration to that effect could only be reached through agreement in the Security
Council. The French insisted that the incomplete nature of the Iraqi response could not
alone constitute a material breach; a material breach could only be demonstrated if
Hussein was purposefully inhibiting the work of the weapons inspectors. Therefore,
knowing that he had little support for immediate action, Bush agreed to wait because
Blair promised France and other dissenters that the US and UK would allow Blix time to
report on the situation.

With war no longer an immediate concern, many in Europe began to believe that
it was going to be possible to prevent war altogether. They hoped that this initial restraint
by the US was going to allow time for Iraq to cooperate with the weapons inspectors, and
thus prevent any further conflict. Even some government officials in the Blair and Bush

143 Kendall, 58.
144 BBC News, “France’s economic ties to Iraq,” February 4th, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2757797.stm> France itself had been a supplier of military equipment to Iraq during the 1970s, selling in upwards of 25$ billion worth of fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and air defence equipment. However, all of these materials were destroyed by the end of the First Gulf War.
145 Gordon & Shapiro, 116.
146 Ibid., 117. Blair was convinced that Blix’s forthcoming report would contain the damning evidence they required to win over the international community’s support. As well, after consulting with the Pentagon Bush determined that there was no point yet in declaring the US’ intent since it was not yet fully prepared to take military action.
administrations were commenting that a peaceful resolution was possible. By January 5th of the New Year, Jack Straw publicly stated his belief that the probability for a diplomatic solution had risen to sixty percent. However, these positive sentiments were short-lived as American intentions were becoming harder to ignore. Military deployments to the Middle East began in January, and by mid-month a total of 140,000 US troops had received deployment orders to the region. The US argued that the build-up of forces was necessary as a threat to persuade Hussein to comply with Resolution 1441. 147 However, with such a build-up of US forces in the region, it was becoming all the more unlikely that they would be recalled without having removed Hussein from power, as was becoming all the more clear to the international community. 148

With the growing military build-up by the US and Britain, France sought to make its position known. Speaking before reporters in early January, Chirac stressed the importance of giving Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with Resolution 1441, and that France would only support military action if it were agreed upon in the Security Council. Chirac clarified that point by stating that such a decision could be taken if Iraq were proven “based on a report by the inspectors” 149 to have evaded the UN’s demands. Chirac was clear in his intentions that the US would not have France’s support if the US, and the US alone, chose to invade Iraq. This statement by the French President was followed up the next day when de Villepin sent a letter to the Security Council members, pushing for the disclosure by the US of all information about the Iraqi weapon situation to the

147 Kendall, 59.
148 Gordon & Shapiro, 118.
149 Ibid., 119.
inspectors. De Villepin urged the Council that if the US was in possession of information definitively proving Iraq’s non-compliance the weapons inspectors needed to see it.\textsuperscript{150}

Besides making its case to the Security Council members France sent a diplomatic advisor, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, to Washington to reiterate French concerns and assess the American position. While in the American capital, Gourdault-Montagne met with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. His consultations however proved to be fruitless. France’s position on giving the weapons inspectors more time was dismissed, as the US officials deemed it as being irresponsible at a time when the world was being threatened by WMDs in Hussein’s possession.\textsuperscript{151} Gourdault-Montagne returned to Paris with the message that Chirac and others did not want to hear; that the US was most certainly intent on proceeding with a military campaign, no matter what might come from the weapons inspectors’ report.

Despite America’s insistence on armed action and regime change, the French continued their legal argument that there was no basis for such action. They continued to insist that only a report from the weapons inspectors would allow for more deliberation in the Security Council, and that it was only the Security Council that could authorize the use of force. The French also argued, along with the weapons inspectors themselves, that previous UN resolutions required periodic reports and therefore required more time to implement.\textsuperscript{152} The French’s legal arguments were supported by both public opinion and the situation on the ground. Public opinion in Europe favoured containment rather than military action, and it appeared that containment was proving to be successful. The US

\textsuperscript{150} Gordon & Shapiro, 119.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.,120.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
and Britain’s military presence in the Gulf region seemed to be working as Hussein was allowing inspectors into the country, and the inspectors reported that progress was being made.

Things eventually came to a head between the US and France on January 20th, in a Security Council meeting on terrorism. Prior to the meeting, Colin Powell expressed his wish to skip the rendezvous as he did not want to debate the Iraqi question, and wanted rather to attend Martin Luther King Day festivities. However the Secretary of State was persuaded to attend after de Villepin promised that Iraq would be left off the agenda, but the French Foreign Minister did express to him that his country was not ready to support a war. 153 De Villepin kept his promise the next day and did not bring up the Iraq debate in the UN meeting; however that did not stop his German and Russian counterparts, Joschka Fischer and Igor Ivanov, from doing so. Both stressed their unwillingness to support unilateral action, and argued for a second resolution. Fischer spoke out against war in Iraq, stating initiating war would have “disastrous consequences for long-term regional stability [and] possible negative repercussions for the joint fight against terrorism.” 154 Feeling defensive when it came to his turn to speak, Powell urged the Council: “We must not shrink from our duties and our responsibilities when the material [on Iraqi weapons programmes] comes before us next week.” 155

De Villepin had made a promise to not debate Iraq at the Security Council meeting, however that did not stop him once it had concluded. As France was the holder

153 “Allies at Odds: Behind U.S. Rift With European,” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2003. Meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York the day before the January 20th meeting, Powell and de Villepin discussed their governments’ positions on Iraq. De Villepin emphasized his government’s concern that weapon inspections and not the use of force were the best way to deal with Hussein, whereas Powell warned in turn that the US had resolved to go to war and that the French had better not drag things out.
154 Gordon & Shapiro, 122.
155 Ibid., 123.
of the Council presidency at the time, the meeting was followed with a press conference by the French Foreign Minister. De Villepin, upon being questioned by reporters, urged for the United Nations to stay “on the path of cooperation. The other choice was to move forward out of impatience over a situation in Iraq to move toward military intervention. We believe that nothing today justifies military action.”\textsuperscript{156} At that point he was asked whether or not France would be willing to use its veto to prevent any such military action, to which de Villepin responded “believe me, in a matter of principles, we will go to the very end.”\textsuperscript{157}

Both Powell and de Villepin felt betrayed by the day’s events. Powell was furious that Iraq became the subject of the meeting and that the French were now openly threatening to use their veto. On the other hand, de Villepin left dismayed believing that Powell, who had been a dove within the hawkish Bush administration, was now falling in line with his government’s position.\textsuperscript{158} The day was referred to as a “diplomatic ambush”\textsuperscript{159}, and left all sides pointing figures at each other. The French came to the realization that the US was going to proceed with military action no matter what, and felt it was their moral duty to do what they could to prevent it. The Americans and Powell in particular, were exasperated as they had taken the diplomatic path the international community had wanted, only to find that it was not willing to consider the military option at all. The British also felt they had been mislead, and to find France the new leader of the anti-war camp.\textsuperscript{160} For all, the day represented the final breakdown of trust, and the

\textsuperscript{156} Gordon & Shapiro, 123.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} Kendall, 59-60.
probable end to diplomacy, as it was then clearly apparent that France was not going to follow the US and Britain into war, no matter what evidence would show.

Only two days later on the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty\textsuperscript{161} Chirac would leave no doubt to his commitment to the anti-war camp.\textsuperscript{162} In a meeting Chirac assured Schröder that he was opposed to the inevitability of war, despite what the Americans and British were saying. In a press conference following the day’s ceremonies, Chirac voiced his opinion to the public of his solidarity with Germany on the Iraq issue. In front of the press Chirac emphasized two points about the Iraqi crisis. The first was his and Schröder’s belief that it was the Security Council and the Council alone that could make a final decision on the question of war. Secondly, and firmly placing himself as anti-war, Chirac stated that “war is always a proof of failure and the worst of solutions, so everything must be done to avoid it.”\textsuperscript{163} Schröder pushed the position even further, stating, “Don’t expect Germany to approve a resolution legitimising war, don’t expect it.”\textsuperscript{164} Chirac left open the possibility of war, if proper evidence surfaced and the Security Council decided on war as a final option, but his encounter with Schröder made his own preferences strikingly clear. Chirac’s comments that day, along with de Villepin’s at the UN, sent a clear message to the international community that France was not prepared to support war unless its interpretation of Resolution 1441 was the one followed.

\textsuperscript{161} Also known as the Treaty of Friendship, the Elysée Treaty signed by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, marked an important moment in strengthened relations between France and Germany in 1963.\textsuperscript{162} The show of unity on the Iraq crisis between Chirac and Schröder on the anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, harking back forty years before when Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer cemented their two nation’s friendship, added double weight to their reaffirmation of French and German solidarity.\textsuperscript{163} BBC, “Analysis: Diplomatic rift over Iraq,” January 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/europe/2684953.stm>\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
The immediate reaction from the US was anything but positive. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld referred to both France and Germany in a Pentagon press briefing as being ‘old Europe’. His insult had even deeper resonance as Rumsfeld continued by stating that the power within NATO Europe was shifting to the east away from the old Franco-German leadership. In an obvious effort to demean the two nations, Rumsfeld went even so far as to place Germany in a grouping along with Libya and Cuba, as a nation which had refused to ‘help’ in any context.\textsuperscript{165} The growing tension put France and Germany at the forefront of the anti-war campaign, and France happily carried the mantle of UN defender and the voice of public opinion. However, France and Germany could not help but notice that they were largely alone as the European champions for peace.

The newly formed French-German position might have appeared opportunistic, both sides benefited from the other’s support, but neither Chirac nor Schröder were hypocritical in their anti-war approach. Chirac in particular had hoped that by working through the auspices of the Security Council Iraq could indeed be contained and disarmed without resorting to military force. He was confident that the French interpretation of Resolution 1441 was the correct one, and that the US and Britain would back down without getting international backing through the UN. His insistence on UN approval for war garnered both domestic political support and generated widespread positive European public opinion for his position. They were at odds with the other European states, but with widespread public support Chirac and Schröder saw in the Iraqi crisis a new opportunity “to influence the future of Europe.”\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{165} Gordon & Shapiro, 128.  
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 127.
Before that point the traditionally good French-German relations had become a little worse for wear; Chirac and Schröder were not the best of friends, and had previously had difficulty in finding common ground. The Iraqi crisis provided an ideal opportunity for the two European giants to again stand together. Together France and Germany share a special relationship based on the belief that when united they represent the best leaders for Europe. The Economist succinctly explains the rationale behind this belief:

Germany is Europe’s leading industrial power, France its leading farming producer; Germany is mainly Protestant, France largely Catholic; Germany wants a European federation, France believes in the nation; Germany straddles eastern and western Europe, France is both northern and southern; Germany is in, France is yang… Together, the pair encompass Europe’s diversity. [And therefore] If these two countries form a common view, the rest of Europe can fall happily into line, confident that all conceivable interests have been taken into account.167

At a time when the Union was about to enlarge by ten new members and with the increasing influence of Britain and Spain, France saw a joint Iraqi stance as an opportunity to re-establish its leadership at an important point in the EU’s development.168 However, despite what the French and German leaders hoped, the other EU countries were not generally interested in a Franco-German led vision for the Union.

On January 30th the other European powers made the move to set themselves apart from the Franco-German position, and pledged their support for the United States. In a letter published in The Wall Street Journal, eight European leaders reaffirmed the enduring bond between the US and Europe, and reiterated the demand that Iraq comply with Resolution 1441. Besides Blair and Aznar, the obvious signatories, the others were Durao Barroso of Portugal, Berlusconi of Italy, Medgyessy of Hungary, Miller of Poland,

168 Gordon & Shapiro, 127.
Václav Havel of the Czech Republic and Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark. The letter emphasized the special relationship between the US and Europe, a relationship the letter describes as being based upon the shared values of “democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the rule of law;” and charged the Security Council to “face up to its responsibilities” if Iraq were indeed found to be in violation of Resolution 1441. The letter included an underlying threat that if the Security Council were unable to ensure Iraqi compliance it would “lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result.” The letter also reiterated the signatories’ wish to pursue a solution within the UN framework, but its timing could not be ignored as a clear slap in the faces of the leaders of Germany and France.

The letter appeared in other newspapers around Europe a week after the anniversary of the Elysée Treaty in Paris. Chirac and Schröder had used the anniversary of the Elysée Treaty to repair French-German relations but also to reaffirm the Franco-German leadership of Europe, a position that the two nations had symbolically held for over forty years. While France and Germany might have seen themselves as the natural leaders of Europe and the engine behind European integration, the other European nations saw the letter as an opportunity to hinder Chirac and Schröder’s leadership aspirations. Resentment towards France and Germany had been growing for some time; the Iraqi crisis was not the cause but presented an opportunity to upset French and German leadership in Europe. Britain had always felt that it should have as much as an impact as the French and Germans upon Europe’s future. With its economic growth Spain felt that it deserved more respect than it was getting, Italy felt much the same, and the smaller eastern countries believed that Franco-German leadership gave far too much

influence to the western countries. Therefore when Chirac and Schröder stood up and claimed to speak for Europe, the eight letter signatories took the chance to express solidarity with the Americans on this particular issue, and in doing so challenge France and Germany’s leadership.

The “Letter of Eight” as it had been dubbed was not long after followed by another statement crafted by dissenting European voices, the “Vilnius 10.” The signatories of this second letter included the leaders of ten central and eastern European countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania. The ten were upset that they had not been asked to sign the previously discussed “Letter of Eight”, and with help from Bruce Jackson, a former Pentagon official, published their own letter in support of the United States on February 5th. Chirac and Schröder had been surprised by the first letter, having not known of its existence till the date of publication, and shocked by the second. The Vilnius 10 gave an even stronger message than the “Letter of Eight.” The ten nations, all of which were former communist satellites, stressed the importance for unity on the Iraqi crisis and urged its allies to consider the “dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The transatlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction.” As well, in a move that particularly upset the French and German governments, was the letter’s declaration that Colin Powell’s

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170 Gordon & Shapiro, 130.  
171 The “Vilnius 10” were named as such after the capital of Lithuania, where these ten nations had launched their bid to become members of NATO in May of 2000. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia formally joined the Union on May 1, 2004. Romania and Bulgaria joined on January 1, 2007. Croatia and Macedonia are currently still on the EU’s candidate country list, while Albania remains only a potential candidate country.  
172 Gordon & Shapiro, 133.
presentation to the UN provided “compelling evidence” of Iraq’s non-compliance. The text of the letter had been finalized the day previously, before anyone had heard Powell’s presentation to the UN of the 5th.

Chirac was livid at the other European nations. For the French president, the Vilnius 10 had just fulfilled what he had feared, “that they were reflexively Atlanticist countries waiting to become Trojan horses for the Americans within the EU and challenge Franco-German leadership of Europe.” France had been wary of the eastern Europeans for some time; their membership in the EU could pose serious problems if France still considered itself to be Europe’s natural leader. The Economist characterized the French position as follows:

The EU’s enlargement threatens France’s traditional dominance of the club. Faced with the horror of the Union being pro-American, economically liberal and English-speaking, its strategy has been to try to reassert the traditional leadership of France and Germany within the EU. If Germany could only be tethered to France in perpetuity, then together the pair could still set Europe’s agenda. However with the “Letter of Eight” signatories and then the Vilnius 10 setting themselves in direct opposition, the authority of the Franco-German alliance was being directly questioned. Chirac could point to the fact that the Franco-German position was in line with the majority of European public opinion; however their leadership was still being threatened by its neighbours.

Urged by the Greek presidency of the Union, EU members met to resolve their disagreements on the Iraqi issue at a summit in Brussels on the 17th of February. Member states issued a joint declaration calling for Iraqi compliance. The document explicated that the Union’s ongoing “objective for Iraq remains full and effective disarmament in

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173 Gordon & Shapiro, 133.
accordance with the relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1441. We want to achieve this peacefully."\textsuperscript{175} Despite the appearance of unity and resolution among European Union members, Chirac made it clear after the summit that there was still resentment on all sides. Chirac openly criticized the eastern Europeans, who were in the process of achieving membership status in the Union. He lectured the Vilnius 10, describing EU membership as requiring “a minimum of policy coordination. If, when a difficult subject come up, you start giving independent points of view that have not been coordinated with the group you want to join, well, that’s not very responsible behavior.”\textsuperscript{176} Chirac’s annoyance was further made clear, when he stated that the eastern Europeans had “missed a good opportunity to keep quiet.”\textsuperscript{177} Using increasingly undiplomatic language, Chirac issued a thinly veiled threat that EU enlargement needs to be ratified by referendum, and that it only takes one country’s dissent to end a membership bid. Chirac pointed out the strength of public opinion as opposed to the position taken by the Vilnius 10, and warned that there would be a price to pay for aligning themselves so easily with the American cause. The letter’s signatories in turn felt their own growing resentment towards France and Germany; for all of Chirac’s words about unity and policy coordination within the EU had not stopped him and Schröder from purporting to speak on behalf of Europe.

However determined publicly to oppose war, Chirac had continued to make plans in the event that French cooperation in a military campaign became unavoidable.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{176} Gordon & Shapiro, 134.
\textsuperscript{178} BBC News, “France ‘facing both ways on Iraq.’” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2721963.stm> The French were also keen to protect their economic interests in Iraq; French companies were set to profit

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Chirac would have been willing to support war if certain conditions had been met. These conditions included “blatant Iraqi obstruction to weapons inspectors, refusal to destroy any illicit arms that were found, the discovery of a “smoking gun” too important to ignore, or an Iraqi military provocation.” Chirac’s government was even involved in making tactical plans in the event that France were required to join the fight. Even as early January plans were being made for military combat, and French General Jean-Patrick Gaviard was sent to Washington to discuss possible French contributions. Gaviard’s discussions with the Americans included the possibility of sending fifteen thousand troops, one hundred airplanes, and naval assets including an aircraft carrier to be used in the case of war. However the possibility of French involvement in any military action became less likely as the early months of 2003 passed.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, by February the mounting opposition to any military action proved difficult for Tony Blair. With public opinion and a growing number of his own Labour party members opposing him, Blair increasingly vied for a second UN resolution to give him the legal and moral authority to act that he was severely lacking in. Blair hoped to gain the “moral majority” by getting at least nine of the fifteen Security Council votes and to avoid a veto by Russia and China. Such a situation even with a veto from France would have given what Blair saw as enough legitimacy to act militarily. On the 24th, Britain with backing by both the US and Spain, introduced the second resolution. The resolution declared that Iraq had failed to

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179 Gordon & Shapiro, 142.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid., 146.
take proper action and while it did not recommend military action as the next step, the
general view was that such action would be taken if it passed.182

France had previously pushed the US not to return to the UN. Days before the
introduction of the resolution, the French ambassador to the US, Jean-David Levitte, met
with Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley and proposed a gentlemen’s
agreement. Levitte argued that if the US went to the UN it would be undermining its
previous contention that the US already had the authority to pursue military action, and
that if a resolution were vetoed in the Security Council the US would be committing an
illegal act; a situation that would be far worse if it had simply circumvented the UN in the
first place. By not bringing the matter before the UN again, the US would avoid the
international crisis that would occur if France were forced to use its veto and the two
countries would simply agree to disagree on the issue.183 However, by that time the US
had decided that Blair needed the support another resolution would bring, and the US was
confident that the undecided votes would come over to their side. If this were achievable
the US believed that any “rupture” could then be blamed on the French, and it and Britain
would be in the clear.184

From then on both the US and France fiercely lobbied the six undecided countries
in the Security Council, Angola, Guinea, Cameroon, Mexico, Chile, and Pakistan. On
March 9th de Villepin traveled to Angola, Guinea, and Cameroon in an attempt to secure
their support. As de Villepin was traveling, both Powell and Blair spent their time
phoning the capitals of the undecided countries. British Foreign Office Minister Valerie

182 Kendall, 63.
publication.html?id=5774>
Amos traveled to the same countries as de Villepin, and David Manning, a diplomatic advisor to Blair, traveled to Mexico and Chile to try and get their support. The intense lobbying would not last long, as that weekend the British developed a list of six benchmarks and a new deadline for compliance that could be added to the resolution in the hopes that the resolution would finally persuade the remaining votes to their side.¹⁸⁵ These attempts however proved fruitless as the UN route would lead to a dead end by the 10th of March.

Appearing on a televised interview, Jacques Chirac put the final nail in the coffin of Security Council debate. Chirac declared that France had no intention of allowing a second resolution to pass. “Whatever the circumstances France will vote no.”¹⁸⁶ Chirac stated his belief that at that time there was no reason to attack Iraq, and that doing so would go against the main objective of disarming the country. Faced with an outright refusal to cooperate, the Americans and British were left with what they saw few options. Soon after Blair spoke with Chirac to clarify the French President’s statement; Chirac agreed that he would consider new benchmarks and deadlines for weapons inspectors but he would refuse to allow any resolution to pass that would allow for an “automatic use of force”.¹⁸⁷ Chirac’s statement let the undecided voters off the hook; they would not need to choose sides if France would refuse in any event. By the 17th, the second draft resolution died and the Americans and British made plans to go on alone. That same day

¹⁸⁵ Gordon & Shapiro, 152. The benchmarks were a list of six requirements that Iraq would have to meet in order to avoid war; they included arranging unmonitored interviews with Iraqi scientists, providing information on alleged inventories of nerve gas, anthrax, ballistic missiles, and remotely piloted aircrafts, require that Hussein appear on television to admit about lying about the weapons, and a new deadline for compliance set for March 17th.
¹⁸⁶ “Against America? Moi?” The Economist, March 15th 2003, 47.
¹⁸⁷ Gordon & Shapiro, 153.
President Bush gave Hussein and his sons a forty-eight hour deadline to leave the country, and just three days later the war began.

France’s Rationale

France and the Union

It is clear that France has played a momentous role in the evolution of the European Economic Community/European Union. France has often acted as integration’s biggest supporter, touting the benefits that could be enjoyed by the whole of the continent if it were to join in a deeper partnership. France’s attitude towards the EU tends to shift between two competing visions of the union. The first is the idealistic vision, defined by such a figure as Jean Monnet, whose ultimate vision of the EU culminates in a true federal union. The second vision is the one championed by those like Charles de Gaulle; a union in which members would enjoy all the benefits of a customs union but one that would not infringe on French sovereignty. Throughout the history of European integration, French leaders have encouraged its growth and development, for what could be seen as very nationalistic reasons.

Traditionally there are three concrete reasons explaining why the EU and its predecessors are of such importance for the French state. The first is economic. The economic gains achievable through the EU stand to not only benefit but strengthen France. The second and third reasons are strategic in nature: an EU that has Germany as

\[188\] John S. Ambler & M. Shawn Reichert, “France: Europeanism, Nationalism, and the Planned Economy,” The European Union and the Member States: Cooperation, Coordination, and Compromise, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 29. Jean Monnet was preeminent among the creators of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the EU’s earliest incarnation. He also founded the Association for a United States of Europe. De Gaulle, the Fifth Republic’s first president, much more preferred the idea of a Europe of the States.
member helps to protect France from its historic foe, and, as first expressed by de Gaulle, a united European Union could act as a counterbalance in the international arena to such powers as the United States and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{189} Two of France’s major goals in respect to the EU have been accomplished. Germany is no longer a security threat to France; the democratization of Germany is an all out success and it has become a strong member of the Union, one which France needs not fear militarily. Second is its economy: France cannot deny it improved dramatically since the beginning of European integration. Within thirty years of WWII, France’s economy went from being partially industrialized to fully developed and it surpassed even Britain in per capita wealth.\textsuperscript{190} The economic benefits to France from integration are many and this reason alone provides ample support for the EU in France. France continues to have much to gain economically from the EU, but it also stands to gain international influence by way of the Union.

With the Soviet Union dissolved, a lone superpower emerged from the Cold War. This situation with the United States of America, the sole superpower has chagrined the French. De Gaulle believed that a united Europe, preferably with France in the lead, could act as the counterbalance against the superpower. He stated his belief that “if there was a voice that might be listened to and a policy that might be effective with a view to setting up a new order to replace the Cold War, that voice and that policy were pre-eminently those of France.”\textsuperscript{191} For this purpose the EU can act as the platform on which France can have a substantial effect on the world. As Margaret Blunden summarizes,

\\textsuperscript{189} Ambler, 31.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 34. This period of time is known as the ‘Thirty Glorious years’ (Trente Glorieuses) in France, where the French standard of living rose dramatically.
“Europe is to France what the United States is to Britain, the optimum multiplier of national power.”¹⁹² France may still sit as a permanent member of the UN Security Council but it no longer has the power status which it previously had. French leaders are well aware of France’s diminished influence on the world stage, and see the EU as the context in which France can play a pivotal role. As one of the prominent members of the EU, France is able to increase its international clout by shaping and influencing EU policy.

In many ways the essential identity of France is tied to its European roots. Over the years French political leaders have argued that a European identity is not one that is outside of present French understanding of itself, or one that even needs to be sought out and adopted because it is already at the heart of the French people. Therefore there cannot be any reason why the French state cannot be intimately connected with the European Union. There is a “direct connection between existing political culture in France, such as the ideas of republicanism, enlightenment, and the European Union, blending France and the other states of the Union in a community of progress and liberal democracy.”¹⁹³ It is this connection between French political culture and the EU itself that helps to promote “French universal concepts”¹⁹⁴ to the rest of the world. The French argue further that French direction in the EU can in fact protect Europe’s national identities from the forces of globalization and American cultural invasion.

Any issues about the loss of sovereignty would be made up for in the influence that France could then exercise as a major player in the world. The European Union then

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.
in turn does not force France to “abandon sovereignty, since in most cases this sovereignty is already formal or illusionary, and the exercise in common of sovereignty permits on the contrary the recovery of a little of what has been lost. In general terms, Europe is about adding, not subtracting. In specific terms, it is about asserting independence from the United States.”195 Like many nations in the EU France plays the balancing act of negotiating increased integration with the protection of French national sovereignty. It can exist at the same time as the homeland of the early EU visionaries and the fierce protector of French industries and agriculture against interference. The idea that France can be both a European integrationist and nationally protectionist is paradoxical, but it is a dichotomy “rooted in strong national pride, dismay at the decline of French influence both in the world and in Europe, and fear that many aspects of traditional culture are in jeopardy, countered by a recognition that life outside the EU likely would be worse than within.”196 In the case of Iraq, France used the opportunity to demonstrate both its power within the EU and around the world. By opposing the US and the UK on the Iraqi crisis, France attempted to set itself up as a leader among European nations in order to further its own influence.

*France, the United States, and the World*

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Suez Crisis had a profound impact on the direction of British foreign policy. The fallout from this event however did not affect Britain alone, as France came out of the crisis with a new viewpoint also. While the British believed that the future of successful foreign policy lay in the convergence of its and America’s interests, France left Suez with a new found sense of purpose: as the

195 Blunden, 22.
196 Ibid., 54.
leader of Europe and counterweight to American power. Back in 1956, when President Guy Mollet was informed that Britain had agreed to the American enforced cease-fire he was in a meeting with Konrad Adenauer. Historian William Hitchcock remarked on the pivotal event, “When Mollet, totally deflated by Eden’s call, returned to the room, the German chancellor bucked him up by denouncing the Americans and British as unreliable. Instead, he declared, ‘Now is the time to build up Europe.’”

De Gaulle’s vision for the then European Community stressed the importance of an “unwavering solidarity” between France and Germany for the purpose of creating a “European center of power and prosperity comparable to the United States.” France held throughout its history a sense that through strength, culture, and ideas that it could shape not only Europe but the world. However after WWII France was demoralized and Germany was in ruins, and it would be in this mutual sense of weakness that the two states would rebuild together. Both countries embraced the idea that together they could work to bring the differing European nations and peoples together in an act that would both strengthen the continent as a whole and make future conflict between them impossible.

While the creation of the Union may have been the common goal, France and Germany differed in two respects: the nature of the Union’s evolution, and Europe’s relationship with the United States. Germany has been the strongest advocate for a federal Europe, whereas France has been wary of taking the Union too far. Germany has typically been more welcoming of America and has greatly valued the Atlantic alliance,

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197 “From Suez to Baghdad,” The Economist, March 22nd 2003, 47.
199 Ibid., 24-5.
with a notable exception in the case of the Iraq crisis when Germany opposed the US position. France’s vision has been much more ambitious, one of “Europe as a power in her own right, able to form her positions autonomously and to achieve a balanced relationship with the United States.”

To become a counter-balance against the US has been a clear cut goal for France. In a world where globalization threatens French culture and influence, France is keenly aware of what it might achieve if it stood at the forefront of a new world power.

Globalization has in some circles been intrinsically linked to ‘Americanization’. The US’ global reach in such areas as trade, culture, and foreign policy has made it the power to be reckoned with, a position that weighs heavily upon France. France dreams of a time where it can boast the power and influence around the world that the US currently holds. “France, as a messianic nation which wants to be the teacher of the human race, exists in a competitive relationship with the Unites States, and tries, like the United States, to establish a model of civilization valid for the entire planet.”

France continues to worry about American influence and power, and fears that if remained unchecked it will continue to lead the world leaving others unable to influence or oppose it. The Iraq crisis gave the French a unique opportunity to stand against the US and lead others around the world towards its vision of multilateralism and peace.

200 Andréani, 28.
201 Robert Graham, “France: Ending the Gaullist Era?,” In Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security, ed. by Ronald Tiersky, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2004), 255. According to Graham French culture is a primary area of concern as globalization poses something of a threat to its continuance. For instance the French have watched as their language has been replaced by English as the lingua franca of the European Union. Having previously dominated as the primary language in print within the Commission, by 2000 only thirty-three percent of all documents were in French as opposed to English which had overtaken it with fifty-five percent.
202 Blunden, 22.
One of the primary Gaullist goals of the post-WWII era was to establish Europe as a power that could balance the American and Soviet superpowers and with the fall of the Soviet Union France has had to change its relationship with the US. The old Gaullist strategy was to play the US and the USSR off of one against another in order to achieve French goals. The fall of the Soviet regime and the increase of American power have seen French influence towards the US decline, as the positions it has taken have mattered less and its support is no longer needed. While currently France itself may mean less on the international stage, France at the forefront of a strong European Union would amount to a power that the US could not ignore. This is what France attempted with its stance on the Iraqi issue. Even though it ended up encountering opposition by most EU members, by standing against the US, France saw an opportunity to potentially expand its influence not just within Europe but to the rest of the world. France hoped to be seen as a leader on the international stage, one that could be turned to as a credible option as opposed to the US. In explicating the diverging values that separates the US from Europe, Robert Kagan points to the creation and success of the European Union as the universal message which Europe wishes spread across the world. By emerging from the horrors of war and from the old “European Machtpolitik” to a “Kantian world of perpetual peace,” the Europeans now have a new history to share; a history, not one of “power, but the transcendence of power”, and which has become “Europe’s new mission civilisatrice.”

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203 Graham, 254.
Chapter 5: The EU in Disarray

Introduction

Having explored what occurred in the United Kingdom and France, this chapter turns to actions of the other member states and the attempts by which EU officials desperately tried to achieve some semblance of coherence. Itself a stunning success of multilateralism and collective decision-making, the EU was unable to utilize the very qualities that constitute the basis of the Union to come together on this issue. Instead it was torn apart by differing opinions on Iraq, unilateralism, and the pre-eminence of the United States.

This chapter outlines the events and negotiations that occurred within the EU in the attempt to formulate a collective foreign policy in the face of the possibility of an invasion of Iraq. It examines the series of events that occurred between the differing EU member states as they debated the Iraqi issue, and the efforts taken by EU countries and officials within the EU to attempt to reach a consensus. The second part of the discussion takes a look at the underlying cleavages between EU members, and how opposing opinions regarding the US can affect the foreign policy process.

The EU’s Response

Early debate within the EU was fractured on the Iraqi issue, and the absence of consensus would become the common theme throughout the months. After August of
2002, the EU had collectively called upon Iraq to allow weapons inspectors back within the country. However, any further action had not been discussed because Denmark’s Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller commented “no decision had been taken about military action because no-one had as yet proposed war.” Such proposals would arrive not too long afterwards, and EU diplomats were sure to insist that any decision regarding Iraq would need to be made by the UN Security Council. After Bush’s keynote UN speech that September, EU members France and Britain both welcomed the idea that the UN should play the major role in resolving Iraqi non-compliance, and many other countries joined in the call that international cooperation was essential on this issue. In an almost clairvoyant prediction, EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten warned that “we want to see multilateralism as an effective way of dealing with problems, not as an excuse for failing.”

At the time of the Iraqi crisis, Prime Minister Costas Simitis of Greece had commenced his country’s six month term in the presidency of the EU. The Greeks had promised to make the CFSP the primary concern of their presidency, and Prime Minister Simitis saw the Iraqi crisis as an opportunity to demonstrate the EU’s collective decision-making abilities. Simitis outlined his country’s objectives at the beginning of its turn, stressing the need to “reinforce common foreign policy and defence and security policy so the European Union can play an even more important role on the international stage.” Admitting that the Union had far to go in that respect, Simitis declared his

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intent to bring unanimity to the EU on the Iraqi crisis in an attempt to bring the EU’s potential in foreign policy matters to fruition.

Unanimity, however, would prove trying for the EU as it struggled to find small areas of consensus in which to handle the Iraqi crisis. Meeting at the end of January, the EU’s foreign ministers were able to agree on a joint statement. In the statement the Council reiterated its concern over the situation and urged the Iraqi government to comply with UN resolutions.

The Iraqi authorities must, as an imperative, provide the inspectors, without delay, with all additional and complete information on questions raised by the international community. The Council expresses its appreciation for the work accomplished by the inspectors so far and reiterates its confidence and full support for Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei to complete their mission in accordance with UNSCR 1441. It welcomes their intention to continue and intensify their operations.208

The carefully worded statement gave no indication of how EU members might handle the crisis if Iraq failed to comply. Furthermore, the generality of the statement masked the already divisive environment between the European countries. France and Germany were already calling for more time for weapons inspectors as Britain argued that disarming Iraq was already twelve years overdue.

With early division already apparent within the EU the presentation of Hans Blix’s first report to the UN did nothing to bring the sides together. The US and its allies pointed to Blix’s report, in which Blix stated that Iraq had still not provided inspectors with all information pertaining to its weapons, as evidence of Hussein’s continued breach of UN resolutions, whereas opponents stressed that it indicated that weapons inspectors only needed more time. The EU’s own foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, echoed calls

for restraint before plunging into war; “Much better, say the hawks, to use force as quickly and decisively as possible, since only force will achieve results. I say that diplomacy must be not just the instrument of first resort, but at the centre of our efforts.”

The Greek presidency however was determined to bring about a collective decision regarding Iraq within the EU, despite its own disappointment over the Group of Eight and Vilnius 10 letters. Prime Minister Simitis was angered, along with France and Germany, that he had not been consulted beforehand and added that the letters “did nothing to contribute to a common approach to Iraq.” In a bid to show that the widening gap between EU members was not insurmountable Simitis moved to convene an emergency summit in which the fifteen members could gather to try to find some sort of common ground. The summit was called for Monday February 17, three days after Blix’s report to the UN, in the hopes that it would provide developments in which to finally build unity on the issue. The Greeks had high hopes as well as cautious concerns for the summit as its Foreign Ministry expressed its wish to arrive at a common position at the meeting, stating: “If this is not achievable then the Greek presidency will have exhausted all the institutional and political possibilities a presidency has in its hands. The European Union will enter a deep crisis.” Achieving the Greek's goals for the summit appeared daunting as the Group of Eight and Vilnius 10 letters had only too recently caused deepening bitterness and hostility among EU members.

Before the commencement of the summit, Javier Solana was interviewed and asked about his opinions regarding the possibility of arriving at an EU common position on the Iraqi crisis. When asked if EU leaders would be able to come to some sort of agreement, Solana emphasized his belief that the EU leaders were already in agreement when it came to three specific points related to the Iraqi crisis. First that everyone agreed that Hussein must be disarmed of any WMDs that were in his possession. Second, that they all agreed that the United Nations should be at the heart of any final decision regarding Iraq, and finally that all considered the weapons inspectors to have a fundamental role in containing the threat of weapons proliferation. Solana remained confident that with an agreement in those three key areas a common position would not be difficult to craft at the summit. When asked to comment further on the EU’s ability to formulate a common position and its relation to the credibility of the Union, Solana remarked, “I think [it] is much more important that we get a common position to solve this crisis by diplomatic and peaceful means. That is the most important thing. If the European Union can help to do that, I am sure they will try to do it with their utmost effort.”

The summit took place on February 17, 2003, and along with all the heads of state and government from across the EU also in attendance were UN Secretary Kofi Annan and the President of the European Parliament, Pat Cox. The European Council’s common position reached that day reaffirmed the EU’s desire for Iraq’s full and complete disarmament in accordance with UNSC resolutions. The position emphasized the

213 Ibid.
preference for a peaceful resolution of the Iraqi crisis, and declared that “War is not inevitable. Force should only be used as a last resort. It is for the Iraqi regime to end this crisis by complying with the demands of the Security Council.”\textsuperscript{214} The position went on to reiterate the Union’s support for the UN inspectors’ work, but acknowledged that inspections could not continue “indefinitely” and that the “Iraqi regime alone will be responsible for the consequences if it continues to flout the will of the international community and does not take this last chance.”\textsuperscript{215} The Greeks were pleased with the summit’s results. Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou praised the summit, declaring that EU members were “united again” and that “The message from this summit is loud and clear – Saddam Hussein must comply and Europe speaks with a united voice. We come away from this summit with flying colours.”\textsuperscript{216} Javier Solana and the Greek presidency achieved their goal of a common position at the summit; however unity would prove to be fleeting.

The European Union leaders may have been able to agree on paper what Europe’s goals for Iraq were, but the deep seated differences underlying the debate resurfaced quickly. Tony Blair reaffirmed his view that if Iraq could not resolve the situation peacefully “it has to be done by force,” while the French and German governments renewed their distaste for any sort of military action.\textsuperscript{217} Chirac for his part was still very much annoyed with the signatories of the Vilnius 10 letter, dismissing their importance to

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
the Union and referring to their behaviour as being irresponsible. He also singled out Bulgaria and Romania as culprits, commenting that they had perhaps sabotaged their own chances of membership in the Union. The Eastern Europeans did not take Chirac’s criticisms lightly. Romanian President Ion Iliescu labelled Chirac’s comments as “inappropriate;” Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Adam Rotfeld emphasized Poland’s “right to decide what is in its own good, and France should in its turn consider it with respect;” and Estonian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Tina Maiberg remarked “that the more plurality in Europe, the better it is. Our country and other countries have a right to express our opinions.”

Over the next month consensus within the Union remained elusive. Faced with stern opposition both at home and in Europe, Tony Blair attempted to formulate a second UN resolution that ended up going nowhere. France and other like-minded nations attempted to secure more time for the UN weapons inspectors, but it was to no avail. By the end of March the United States had had enough of waiting for Iraq to disarm and for the international community to come onboard; and therefore on March 20th after a final forty-eight hour warning the war in Iraq began. By April relations among EU members were just as tense at the signing of the accession treaties in Athens. The focus of the summit was meant to be on the admittance of the Union’s ten new members; however the fallout over Iraq still loomed over the proceedings. Dismayed by the current situation Costas Simitis urged his fellow EU members to find some unity. “We must do everything… to reinforce the transatlantic dialogue and avoid any worsening of relations

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218 BBC News, “Split EU leaders find Iraq compromise,” It was on this occasion that Chirac made a hypothetical threat to oppose the bids for EU membership towards seven of the ten signatories as their admittance into the EU had not yet been ratified.

between Europe and the United States… In the long term, nobody can govern the world alone.”

Diverging Rationales

The previous two chapters included a discussion on the historical background that both influences and guides the current British and French approaches to the EU, in an effort to explore how such factors influenced their decision making in regards to the Iraq crisis. What follows is a similar study looking at the history of integration within the EU in respect to its Eastern and Central members. By exploring Eastern and Central history and their attitudes towards the EU, and in respect to their own relationships with the United States, one can see how they influenced the Iraq crisis. This, in conjunction with the disagreements between their Western Europeans brothers ultimately caused the impasse which made a collective European decision on Iraq impossible.

The most successful aspect of European foreign policy appears to be the Union’s own enlargement policies. The EU has successfully grown into an intergovernmental institution with twenty-seven countries currently holding membership. Enlargement has been so successful because, for a large number of Eastern and Central European states, EU membership is viewed as a critical part of their evolution from communist satellite states to stable and prosperous members of the new European order. The collapse of the Soviet Union had left many of these countries in a depressed state; poor, largely agricultural, unstable and undemocratic. The post-communist states were left outside looking in at the ever growing prosperity that those within the EU were enjoying.

‘return to Europe’ would translate into a rebirth for such countries, and in this regard the EU’s ‘power of attraction’ cannot be ignored.\textsuperscript{221}

The prosperous and stable nature of the EU was exactly what the newly democratic post-communist states aspired to achieve. The EU’s ‘soft power’ attributes were highly appealing to “the newly democratic countries of central and eastern Europe [who] looked westward for help in bolstering their political systems and their newly established market economies.”\textsuperscript{222} The process of democratic transition as well as the liberalization of their burgeoning economies was very early linked with European integration and deepening ties with the western world, including not just the EU but NATO, represented another opportunity to distance themselves from the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{223} Before the collapse of the Soviet Union arguments within the EU seemed to favour ‘deepening’ rather than ‘widening,’ the parameters of the Union, an idea which promoted furthering integration within the EU before allowing more members to join. However, such sentiments were quickly abandoned in the wake of the intense interest to return the post-communist states back to Europe.

Despite some fears that enlarging the Union quickly might lead to instability, many EU countries felt a sense of obligation towards their eastern and central European neighbours. “Membership in a strengthened European Union was probably the only way to ensure, over the long term, that upheaval and reversion to dictatorship were banished

from the region.” A moral obligation was also keenly felt for inclusion in the EU as their European neighbours had suffered greatly under the old communist regime and therefore deserved to partake in the west’s prosperity. To combat the fears of instability the EU drew up an extensive test criteria which a country had to adopt in order to seek EU membership, and the EU actively worked with its Eastern and Central European neighbours in the accomplishment of these requirements before they became member states. The fears about ‘widening’ the Union before ‘deepening’ have not proved unfounded. Not all transitions have been completed successfully and it is far from an inevitable conclusion to suggest that the EU will be able to progress to the point of a supranational state, but success as it pertains to enlargement so far cannot be denied. The integration and enlargement of the EU is one of the greatest political and economic success stories of the modern age.

If enlargement has been the EU’s most successful foreign policy, why has that not translated into a better functioning CFSP? While member states have been able to put aside differences to better their own political and economic fates, differences will remain which the membership process cannot erase, and will continue to lead to impasses on issues like that of the Iraq crisis. Through enlargement the EU has undeniably changed the domestic and foreign policies of its member states. However, the EU cannot change history, and it cannot instantaneously change the existing relationships and worldviews that each individual member state brings to the table. Like the ties between France and

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224 Oudenaren, 123.
225 Ibid., 125. There are four main requirements: “(1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; (2) existence of a functioning market economy; (3) capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forced within the Union; and (4) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.”
Germany and the special relationship between the US and the UK, enlargement means the inclusion of new and possibly conflicting relationships. Klaus Goetz explains that these relationships can be “historically and politically highly charged. One need only mention Poland and Germany; Cyprus and Greece; Hungary, Slovenia and Austria; or Malta, Italy and the UK. These ties indicate a potential for interstate cooperation and strategic alignment, but, in some cases, they also mark a source of conflict.”

When such conflicts do arise, as in the case of Iraq, it leaves the CFSP in disarray as the member states abandon the EU and retreat to their national capitals to make foreign policy.

When it comes to the arguments surrounding Iraq, the influence that the United States has with many European countries comes to the centre as a major source of divergence between EU members. “The difficulty is that current arguments within Europe are not really about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. They are about attitudes to the United States and to its pre-eminence. Such differences of opinion are always likely to re-emerge, at some point.”

As explored in the previous chapters, the different relationships that the UK and France share with the US emerged as a major source of contention on the Iraqi issue. The same issue emerges for other EU members, particularly the new eastern and central European countries. The “Vilnius 10” were made up entirely of eastern European countries who were either in the process of becoming EU members, or ones who hope to do so sometime later. Attitudes in Eastern Europe towards the US help to explain these countries’ position on Iraq.

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227 Goetz, 259.
France’s great fear towards enlarging the Union is its belief that the joining Eastern European countries would shift the EU’s focus and opinions even more in alignment with those of the Americans. For their part the Eastern Europeans still retain a certain degree of suspicion and distrust for their western neighbours; as slights from recent history are still keenly felt.

“Central European officials have taken to talking about ‘appeasement’ – the policy of accommodating Nazi Germany pursued by France and Britain in the run-up to World War II – usually at the expense of Germany’s eastern neighbours. Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and Romanians still feel a debt of gratitude towards America for its contribution to bringing down the Soviet empire.”229

With the fall of the Soviet Union in the early nineties the former satellite states rushed to shake off their former eastern ties and join the western alliance of NATO. This new relationship not just with the west in general but specifically with the US has an important impact on how the new Eastern Europeans would engage in the Iraq debate.

Poland acts as a good example for exploring the relationship Eastern Europeans have both with the EU and with the US. Geopolitically situated between Germany and Russia, Poland suffered gravely during WWII and the communist era and felt justifiable bitterness towards the Big Three of Britain, the US, and Soviet Russia for their dealings both at Yalta and at Potsdam. Feelings of betrayal by their Western European neighbours, resentment for the oppression under Russia, and gratitude for the US for its role in precipitating the downfall of communism has left Poland with diverging options to consider as it presently operates on the world stage. This situation is easily apparent in considering Poland’s actions during the debate on Iraq. As Ray Taras characterizes it “Poland’s foreign policy options can be framed in the following way: (1) to choose the

American side as the rift within NATO deepened; (2) to support NATO as represented by France and Germany, also in this way more accurately reflecting antiwar opinion across all of Europe; or (3) to be on the side that Russia was not – a consideration that should not be taken lightly, given Polish history.”

Poland ultimately chose to side with EU countries such as the UK, Spain and Italy. Poland was one the “Letter of Eight” signatories, declaring its support for the US, and the US utilized Poland’s pro-Americanism in an attempt to blackmail western Europe. In January of 2003 the Pentagon allowed rumours to spread that it was considering moving stationed American troops from Germany to Poland, and even that it considered moving NATO headquarters. While nothing ever came of the re-stationing plans it demonstrates that the US also recognizes the differing viewpoints towards America in Europe, and that it can use the loyalty of the post-communist countries to coerce “uncooperative EU states.”

Conclusion

“The build-up to the war in Iraq revealed increasingly apparent and bitter divisions between the European states. At the heart of these disputes were opposing conceptions of the appropriate relationship for Europe to maintain with the United States.”

The Iraqi debate reveals one of the deep seated problems preventing meaningful European foreign policy; at the heart of the issue European member states, particularly when plunged into crisis, tend to act as countries and not as a united front.

231 Ibid., 468.
EU members disagreed at many levels on the Iraq issue: they debated the presence of WMDs, Hussein’s previously broken resolutions, timetables for weapons inspectors, multilateralism versus unilateralism, and the pre-eminence of the US. On this issue it becomes apparent that when conflicts arise in the “high politics” sphere, in this case foreign policy, it becomes increasingly difficult for EU members to form a collective decision. The neofunctionalist steps aside and the intergovernmentalist takes over.

Membership in the EU can be equated with an increase in wealth and overall prosperity, as well as international security and stability. In other words, European countries have pooled their sovereignty in certain areas of EU supranational institutions when it is in their distinct interest to do so. Supranational control over foreign policy does not yet exist among EU members and, as the Iraqi debate has shown, EU members’ history, worldviews, and interests can become crippling to the forging of a European foreign policy.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

The promise of a European Union foreign policy has proven elusive; with progress taking place in fits and starts and in nowhere near the amount which has been attained in other areas of integration. However the dream of a common foreign policy is one that refuses to die. Advocates for a stronger and united EU foreign policy have not given up on the idea that the EU, which has undergone revolutionary developments as an association between countries which only some sixty years earlier were engaged in warfare with each other, can form an ever closer union and become “one” on the international stage. From the ashes of war Jean Monnet’s proposals went beyond the economic and into the political as:

Europeans had to overcome the mistrust born of centuries of feuds and wars. The governments and peoples of Europe still thought in the old terms of victors and vanquished. Yet, if a basis for peace in the world was to be established, these notions had to be eliminated. Here again, one had to go beyond the nation and the conception of national interest as an end in itself. 233

National interest along with national traditions, histories, and interpretations have remained key stumbling blocks in the development of meaningful foreign policy. This has not however prevented the Union from trying to create a foundation upon which a functioning foreign policy could be implemented, one that suits the needs of today’s Europe.

Europe’s ability to act on the world stage has been called into question. Failure to act cohesively, most particularly during the Balkan crises of the 1990s and again with the

invasion of Iraq in 2003, have illustrated the EU’s inherent weaknesses in its third pillar. Institutional and ideological changes are needed if the EU hopes to maintain its resolve to “implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.” Such lofty ambitions will not be met, however, if the lessons learned from the Iraqi crisis are not examined and applied in an effective way.

The events of 2003 in the lead-up to war in Iraq made startlingly clear the hurdles that the EU will have to overcome if it wishes to make further gains in the area of foreign policy. First of all, member states such as the UK and France have opposing views on how they should operate in relation to the world’s superpower, the United States of America. Europe was arguably split, with the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain prominently on one side and France and Germany on the other. Each member state fell in line with one side or the other, and some straddled the line when the question became no longer about whether or not the Iraq war was in violation of international law but if the US had the right to act unilaterally against Iraq. Countries such as the UK and France have deep and passionately-held sentiments and histories when it comes to the US.

As explained in previous chapters, the UK shares a renewed bond with the US, a bond born out of the Suez Crisis, which for the UK demonstrated a need to include consideration of American interests and views in forging its foreign policy, even secure its assent in the conduct of its international affairs not only to secure peace but to pursue its own interests abroad. The Atlantic relationship is key to the UK’s prominence on the

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world stage. If it does not preserve a good relationship with the US, the UK risks becoming lost in the voices of the many and possibly losing its international influence. Aligning British interests with American global objectives becomes impossible if Atlanticism is brushed aside in favour of complete unity in Europe.

The UK learned that without American support promoting British interests would be difficult, whereas the French learnt that the US could be a potential threat to French, and, they felt, therefore European, international leadership. The UK’s interests are likely best to be expressed when it knows it has the US as a friend and ally now that it is no longer the global heavyweight of times past, but France also sees itself as a world leader. France too, no longer wields the same influence it once did, but she refuses to give up attempts to attain her former glory. If the US and the rest of the world do not currently recognize her as the pivotal actor she aspires to be they could not ignore her if she were the leader of a united and powerful EU.

The myriad of reasons to be either close or apart from the US weigh heavily in the interactions among member states. The UK and France seem to hold opposing views, while other European states have their own complex relationships with the US. Eastern Europeans, for example, still hold some strong resentments toward their Western neighbours, as their previous wartime experience taught that the best support and aid came not from their fellow Europeans but from the US. A relationship with the US was born out of the world wars, a relationship that Eastern Europeans hold on to, not just to secure their voices in a new world order beyond communism but to ensure their individuality within a Europe that may not treat them as principal players.
Secondly, how member states relate to each other within the EU has pronounced effects on the development and functioning of foreign policy. Britain has always tried to be somewhat aloof from the rest of Europe. A former superpower itself, Britain has enjoyed a history of not being dependent upon the rest of Europe, and in the past has not had to make tough compromises to achieve its goals. As a result, Britain is less likely to compromise its goals and values within the context of the EU if it believes doing so will infringe on British interests. Whereas the British are cautious in their approach to the EU for fear of possible infringement on their sovereignty, the French have utilized the EU in the pursuit of expanding theirs. France has benefited greatly both economically and politically from its central role in the EU. The French also seek to expand their international clout by becoming a leader within the EU, to both maximize their own interests while helping to develop the EU into a global heavyweight. Moreover, France and Britain are only two pieces of the puzzle; the EU is currently made up of another twenty-five countries and each brings its own perspectives and concerns to the table. Reconciling all these different interests in pursuit of one EU vision is complicated at best.

The Iraqi crisis ultimately demonstrated that the intergovernmentalist school of thought as it applies to integration can provide a clearer picture than that of the other schools of thought on integration of how member states come about their decisions. In this case the member states did not come to a unanimous decision that would have been beneficial for all of EU Europe, but instead retreated to the familiar notion of separate national foreign policies to express their interests. Why did they do so? The members of the EU are supposed to create a European identity felt by all its members and in turn that relationship was to create better understanding among themselves and with the world as
well. In this case study a greater European identity could not overcome long standing divisions within the EU, and member states fell back into the comfortable parameters of national interest and gain. As Jonathan Kallmer explains:

A common foreign policy, in any real sense of the term cannot succeed because it is contrary to the EU’s inherent identity as an organization of sovereign states. There is no more fundamental component of state sovereignty than the authority to decide how to deal with those outside a country’s borders. When a country yields its power to make foreign policy, it therefore surrenders its most elemental sovereignty… The development of a common EU foreign policy is not only problematic in theory, it is also impossible in practice. If the debate over how to deal with Iraq has taught us anything, it is that the countries of Europe will go to great lengths to differentiate themselves in urgent foreign policy matters.”

The countries of Europe do have the ability to stand together internationally, but this will only occur when interests align. Foreign policy decisions in the EU require unanimous consent by its members; qualified majority voting does not apply in such cases. The EU will continue to forge a meaningful foreign policy only when member state interests are in line and when national concerns do not clash.

The EU Marches On

In an effort to replace the rejected 2005 draft constitution, the European Union has crafted a new treaty, which was signed by all member states in December of 2007 and was to be ratified by the member states by 2008 in the hope that it could come into full force in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty, formerly known as the Reform Treaty, amends the Union’s previous treaties instead of replacing them completely the failed constitution

attempted to do. Many of the constitution’s provisions are included in the new Lisbon Treaty, however it does not include any references to EU symbols such as the flag, motto, and anthem. The new treaty disregards such symbols as they are in nature controversial due to their allusions to an EU statehood. Instead the treaty seeks to retain the important provisions from the constitution that would aid the EU’s functioning and structure. Some of these provisions are:

1. The introduction of a two-and-a-half year term for the presidency of the European Council
2. Combining the posts of External Affairs Commissioner and the High Representative of the CFSP into one position: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, thus giving the EU greater powers of coordination and additional clout in the area of foreign affairs
3. A restructuring of the European Commission by reducing its size from 27 commissioners to 18
4. A redistribution of voting weights between member states; ‘qualified majority’ voting in the European Council would require 55% of member states representing 65% of the EU population to pass proposals, except on issues of foreign policy and defense which require unanimous decisions
5. A variety of new powers for the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Court of Justice

The Lisbon Treaty has a greater chance of success than the ill fated EU Constitution even though it contains many of its provisions. However another stumbling block has arisen as Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty in their referendum on the 12th of June, 2008. Since a treaty can be ratified only by unanimous agreement of all member states, it is presently (December 2008) in limbo. As of August of 2008, current presidency holder France is working with the Irish government to find a solution to the impasse on the treaty. A cross party committee within the Irish government has concluded that the option to hold a second referendum is well within legal grounds, however supporters of the “No” vote remain opposed to that potentiality. By the end of 2008, the Irish government

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is expected to present ideas about how it could possibly resolve this problem, by which time all other EU member states will have passed the treaty. Ireland was the only EU member committed to holding a referendum on treaty ratification, whereas the other EU members are only requiring passage in the national parliaments.

In regards to foreign policy, the creation by the treaty of a new High Representative could be a step in the right direction. This new development would allow the minister to represent both EU member “governments and the European Commission… [and] have political clout, money and his own diplomatic service. He will speak for the EU in places like the United Nations, whenever governments have unanimously agreed on a foreign policy position.” It is hoped that the abolition of the current six-month rotating system for the presidency and a delegating of power to the High Representative will give the Union’s foreign policy process more focus and clout than it has been previously able to muster.

If the new treaty is finally ratified by Ireland, the High Representative will not only serve to represent foreign affairs and security policy within the Union, but will also become a Vice-President in the Commission and will continue to chair the Council of Ministers when it is consulted over matters of foreign policy. The High Representative will also be assisted in this new configuration by the External Action Service. This service will take over the previous foreign policy responsibilities of the European Commission and will “work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member

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States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States.\textsuperscript{240}

What is not known, however, is how exactly the three European presidencies will work in relation to one another in the Union. The Council of the European Union will retain its six month rotating presidency held by a member state, and with the introduction of the new High Representative position along with the new President of the European Council it is not quite certain which one will stand out as “Mr. Europe”\textsuperscript{241} to lead the EU. The High Representative has definite responsibilities when it comes to the coordination of foreign policy, but whether the role of the President of the European Council will be “a globe-striding "Mr. Europe", a low-profile broker of Brussels deals, or merely a ceremonial figure,”\textsuperscript{242} is not yet fully understood. It will not be clear until the post is filled and the first occupant helps to determine its parameters.

What is certain is that the formulation of foreign policy among EU members will continue to be a difficult endeavour. Collective policy is made when the spirit of cooperation exists and when immediate concerns do not infringe upon national sovereignty. This will only occur on a case to case basis. The Iraq crisis demonstrates that fractures and ideological differences are still keenly felt by member states; and that the national interest is still a prevalent concern, one that despite ongoing developments in supranationalism refuses to ebb. The Treaty of Lisbon looks promising as the creation of

\textsuperscript{241} “The parable of presidents,” \textit{The Economist}, March 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2008, 66.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid.
the External Action Service and the streamlining of more power to the new High
Representative will hopefully help to produce more cohesive and orchestrated policy by bringing together Commission officials and the national diplomatic services into closer contact. However, foreign policy decisions will still require unanimous consent in the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers), and when old wounds and views come into play getting now twenty-seven member states, to agree is challenging at best.

This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that long standing views about the United States, the role of the EU, and the relationships between member states prevented the formation of any meaningful joint foreign policy during the Iraqi crisis. What is needed among EU members is a stronger sense of European identity at the supranational level. The intergovernmental nature of EU decision-making helps to reinforce the pre-eminence of national decision making instead of collective EU policy, and fails to cultivate an environment where the overriding best interest for the continent is sought. Until the national governments are willing put more of their sovereignty aside in favour of collective EU decision-making, common foreign policy will be stunted when certain issues arise.

Further research is needed in the area of European identity formation to understand how and under what conditions it could grow and prosper. As Hartmut Mayer explains:

The European project has lost some popular appeal among European citizens. Growing dissatisfaction with European integration, general enlargement fatigue, a culture of blaming Brussels for shortcomings in national politics and a desire to search for a European identity that integrates national roots and distinguishes Europe from “others” is a common feature in all European countries. Against this background, there is a serious need for political leadership in Brussels and in the various
national capitals to explain why Europe is more needed than ever and why it remains relevant for ordinary citizens in the globalizing world.\textsuperscript{244}

Understanding how an overarching European identity is being fostered, and in what ways it is or is not taking hold, can give a clearer picture on what is needed to promote a more unified front in the international arena. This thesis has focused its study on the crisis in Iraq and examined how EU member states approach the making of collective foreign policy, and how member states’ histories, traditions, and interpretations can impede the foreign policy process. What is apparent is that history and tradition still have a strong hold upon how EU member states relate to one another and the international community. Until a strong leadership emerges to inspire both national governments and their people to act as one at the supranational level, member states will revert back to the familiar framework of the national in times of international crisis, and largely sidestep the EU.
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