“There Is No Land Suitable For Agriculture”:
Progress and Agriculture in Post-World War II Saskatchewan

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for a Masters Degree
in the Department of History
University of Saskatchewan,
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an examination of the relationship between ideology, public policy and environmental reality. This examination is set in the context of post-World War II Saskatchewan and the policies established to accommodate returned veterans and reconstruct the province's society and agricultural economy. Canadians believed that the Allied victory symbolized the rightness of the North American way of life. Canadians also believed that technological innovations achieved during the Second World War would translate into prosperity for the country's citizens. The belief that technology could create prosperity is one that this work calls the ideology of progress. From this ideology of progress grew what political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott calls high modernist ideology. High modernist ideology was characterized by technocratic planning and organization of society and the economy. The federal Veterans' Land Act and the provincial Carrot River project are policies that can be studied through the framework of high modernist ideology. Both policies involved planning and organization of agriculture as well as government supervision of veterans' farming operations. This thesis argues that policy reflects ideology, often with no regard to environmental factors. The case study of the Carrot River project gives evidence to the fact that planning and organization cannot change the natural environment in which policies function.
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I am indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Bill Waiser, for his suggestion of studying the Veterans’ Land Act. All of his encouragement, criticism, and pushing made this experience both challenging and rewarding. I would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Valerie Korinek and Dr. Brett Fairbairn for their questions, suggestions and support. And Dr. Michael Cottrell who stepped in at the last minute to judge the final product. Without the financial support of the Department of History through teaching opportunities and the Messer Fund to travel for research this thesis may have taken much longer to finish. I also need to thank Nadine Small and Ken Dahl, at the Saskatchewan Archives Board, for all of their help.

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The support of my family and friends made this time in my life a little bit easier. I need to especially thank Paula Grosso, Jen Milne, Erika Dyck and Cara Pryor – all graduate students who understood the frustration that comes with such an endeavour. My mother, Dr. Kathryn McNaughton, – my inspiration and mentor – has always encouraged by academic pursuits. My step-father, Paul Wolf, an environmentalist and an activist, always showed an interest in my research. And, of course, my daughter, Ceilidh. Without her arrival I may never have decided to continue my education.

Finally, for my Nana, Nancy McNaughton, who brought history to life for me when I was twelve years old. Her stories of life in Occupied Holland during the Second World War made history interesting for me. Her stories of life as a wife and mother in Ontario in the 1950s made me want to study the postwar period.
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the memory of my maternal grandfather, Donald Bruce Lockhart (b. August 12, 1920 – d. April 8, 2001). He served with the Royal Canadian Engineers in England during the Second World War. He farmed and raised his family with the use of Veterans’ Land Act loans in southern Ontario after his discharge from the military. He was a generous and loving man; a veteran who served his country well; a man I am very proud of and miss very much.
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Introduction

"To Assist Suitably Qualified Veterans to Buy and Own a Farm": Studying the Veterans’ Land Act

The federal government began creating veterans’ policies three months after it declared war on Nazi Germany in September 1939. These policies were designed to repay veterans for their sacrifices during the war. Policies and programmes were created to care for veterans with mental and physical disabilities, to allow them to return to former occupations, to continue or begin post-secondary studies, and to establish them in businesses. The Veterans’ Land Act, and its administrative body, the Veterans’ Land Administration (VLA), were designed to fill this last category of veterans’ policies. The primary purpose of the VLA was “to assist suitably qualified veterans to buy and own a farm to be operated on a full time basis; or to buy and own a rural or semi-rural or suburban home (small holding) with the main income earned from industrial, agricultural or other employment in the community; or to become established on a small holding and engage in the commercial fishing industry if commercial fishing is the veteran’s normal occupation.” All veterans’ programmes were designed to further the federal government’s general policy of reconstructing the Canadian economy. In a press release, dated March 5, 1945, the Honourable C.D. Howe, then Munitions Minister, stated that “[b]roadly speaking, the peacetime goal is to provide the greatest possible measure of employment in Canada and to provide adequate measures of social welfare for the Canadian people. Both these measures

will require the achievement of a very high level of production and consumption.” The
VLA was designed to employ as many people in agriculture and fishing as possible. The
policy encouraged high levels of production which, it was believed, would lead to equally
high levels of consumption. This was the basic vision of post-war, peacetime Canada –
employment and production would lead to consumption which would maintain the cycle of
economic prosperity and stability.

All veterans’ programmes and policies were designed to accomplish two goals: first,
re-establish veterans in civilian life; second, to reconstruct the Canadian economy in a
peacetime environment. The term re-establishment was used to convey the idea that the
government would help veterans return to the occupations they had held before joining the
armed forces. But as historians Richard Harris and Tricia Shulist point out, the term is
something of a misnomer. Many veterans were too young upon recruitment to have any
particular occupation to which to return. Therefore the term re-establishment developed a
broader connotation to represent government involvement in settling veterans into civilian
life. In the specific case of the VLA, this meant settling those veterans (mostly male
veterans) on farm holdings and in the fishing industry. Similar to re-establishment
programmes, reconstruction programmes were developed to aid Canadians through the
transition from war to peace. Reconstruction, however, was a term that held grander
connotations than re-establishment. Reconstruction policies and programmes were aimed
at Canadian society and economy. The economic collapse and social disintegration that

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2 Sanford Evans Statistical Service, Post-War Plans Canada: Government Measures: Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation, volume 1, (Winnipeg 1948), section 1.
3 Richard Harris and Tricia Shulist, “Canada’s Reluctant Housing Program: The Veterans’ Land Act, 1942 -
occurred during the interwar years were to be avoided by government intervention. The federal government and provincial governments sought to create and maintain a prosperous economy in the post-war period by developing programmes to support businesses. Both levels of government also sought to create a stable social framework for Canadians by supporting such aspects of social life as education, health, and housing. The experience of the Great Depression led most Canadians to believe that government intervention was necessary for the maintenance of a stable and prosperous nation. Canadians had also held the belief throughout the Second World War that victory would lead to improvements in their general welfare. Reconstruction programmes were developed to ensure this belief became reality.

Specific reasons for the creation of veterans’ programmes are relatively simple. The economic and social turmoil of the interwar years was to be avoided. Almost immediately following the cessation of hostilities in 1918 the federal government ended intervention in the economy. The Canadian economy fell into a severe recession in the early 1920s. The country also saw serious labour unrest in the years following the end of the Great War. The experiences of Great War veterans were not ones of which many Canadians could be proud. Although the federal government created programmes for these veterans – care and rehabilitation of the mentally and physically disabled, an agricultural settlement programme, and some retraining programmes – such programmes were not well funded and by the 1930s many veterans were unemployed and required the assistance of the War Veterans’ Allowance Board. Many members of the federal cabinet and bureaucracy were also veterans of the Great War. These men, therefore, understood well the difficulties that would be faced...
by veterans of the Second World War.

More important than the simple need to re-integrate veterans into civilian society, was the need felt by Canadians to repay the debt they owed veterans. It is difficult to describe in words the depth of emotion that Canadians invested in both the war effort and their debt to veterans. The war effort touched all Canadians and few escaped the loss of a loved one or friend to the war. Canadians were promised improvements should the Allies come out victorious. Veterans were to be the first to experience these improvements to repay them for their sacrifice.

The new social order that was to greet veterans upon their return to civilian life was to include a stable and prosperous economy. It was generally believed that a stable and prosperous economy was the keystone to the new social order of the post-war period. The Second World War had created economic opportunities for Canada where few had existed in the previous decade. In fact, economic activity generated by war industry led to labour shortages during the 1940s. Canadians, while looking forward to an Allied victory, feared that once hostilities ceased so would the economic opportunities that war had brought. The federal and provincial governments developed policies and programmes designed to maintain economic activity into the post-war period. The main thrust of post-war economic policies was to manufacture consumer goods where war necessities had once been manufactured. In this way employment levels would remain stable as those who were employed would have the power to purchase such goods. 4 Similarly, primary industry, that

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4 The corollary being that those women employed during the war were expected to remove themselves from the work force to allow returning men to take their places in the economy. Without women in the work force it was believed that employment levels would be stable as all the available jobs would be open to those men who would make up the Canadian labour force.
is raw materials exploitation (agriculture, forestry, mining and fisheries), and tertiary industry, that is the service industry (retail sales, financial services, health and education services, and the like) would both support manufacturing and be supported by this secondary industry. Such progress of the economy would ensure economic and social stability.

The post-World War Two period is often represented as an era in which the average Canadian was willing and able to accumulate material goods, many of which were electrified machines—washing machines, radios, electric ranges, refrigerators, telephones, and the like. The automobile was, without question, the most important symbol of postwar prosperity. There were many reasons for this: the Canadian government ensured that the average Canadian had the financial capacity to purchase such goods through reconstruction and welfare programmes; Canadians believed that possessing such goods both symbolized and stimulated prosperity; and Canadian industry had the capacity to produce such goods. This was the manifestation of the progress Canadians were promised. In spite of the fact that the average resident of Saskatchewan did not have the same priorities as urban Canadians, both the people and the government of the province saw technology as the way to prosperity. Rural residents of Saskatchewan embraced technology in agriculture just as readily as urban Canadians accepted technology in their offices and homes.

When the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) party came to power in Saskatchewan in 1944 it was determined to create an equitable and prosperous society in the province. Part of the new government's mandate was to create co-operative farming operations to maintain the agricultural industry in the province. These farms were designed to fit into the new progressive economy. They were large, mechanized operations that made
use of chemical herbicides and pesticides. The post-war period saw the rapid transformation of agriculture from a small-business and sustenance model to a big business model. The CCF did not question the transformation occurring in agriculture; the party merely sought to make this transformation equitable. Co-operative farming was the most reasonable solution for the new government to ensure that this transformation did not leave rural people and farmers unemployed. The party itself had long been an advocate of co-operation as a solution to the vagaries of the market and as the governing party it was able to put its beliefs into policy. By combining its dedication to co-operation and co-operative farming with the re-establishment of veterans and reconstruction of the economy, the CCF government was able to use the federal government’s VLA to its advantage.

The CCF government helped a number of veterans’ groups organize co-operative farms between 1946 and 1951. One of the most successful was established in 1946 north of Swift Current and just north of the South Saskatchewan River. The Matador co-operative farm was hailed as a great success and held up as an example of the virtues of co-operative farming. The provincial government, however, believed that the numbers of veterans interested in co-operative farming would be more than the available arable land in the southern portion of the province could support and set about clearing brush land in the north-eastern region of the province near the town of Carrot River. This programme had many advantages for the CCF government. First, the government had Crown land at its disposal in the area. This gave the government the opportunity to arrange tenure of the land in a manner that satisfied its ideological tenets. This arrangement also meant that farmer-operators were not at the mercy of financial institutions when they fell on difficult times.
Secondly, the CCF would have the ability to settle many more returned men than would have been possible if veterans' co-operatives had to purchase land in the south. Finally, the Carrot River Project, as it was known, gave the government full control over the direction co-operative farming would take in the region; from surveying, clearing and breaking the land to educating veterans in co-operative principles, the government had almost complete control over the project.

The project also promised that agriculture would remain the driving force of Saskatchewan’s economy. That was the intention, in any event. The transformation of agriculture meant that many rural people and farmers had no place in rural Saskatchewan and were moving in greater numbers to urban centres. Opening up previously unsettled areas to agriculture ensured that there would be a place for farmers and rural people in Saskatchewan’s economy and society. Establishing co-operative farms was a way to take advantage of economies of scale without losing rural people to urban centres. It was believed that a big loss would occur if single families or corporations ran large-scale farming operations. The CCF, in spite of holding many innovative ideas, believed just as strongly as the general Saskatchewan public that Saskatchewan’s destiny lay in agriculture. Neither the government nor the general public saw any advantage in movement to urban centres. Rural areas were seen as the backbone of province’s economy, identity, and moral fabric. The experience of the interwar years indicated that movement to urban centres led to high levels of unemployment and social unrest. By establishing co-operative farms the CCF government paid tribute to veterans and began its socialist transformation of the province without abandoning Saskatchewan’s deep attachment to agriculture and those people who
lived on the land.

Saskatchewan's provincial government sought to use the resources of the VLA to further its ideological vision. While the province had land to lease to veterans and the resources to open up new land for settlement, it could not necessarily lend funds for the purchase of equipment and buildings. It was still in debt to the federal government for money borrowed during the 1930s. As the first socialist government in North America the CCF also had its reputation at stake – it needed to be willing to work within the existing political and economic system to a certain degree. Part of the reason for the production of this thesis is examine the relationship between the CCF government of Saskatchewan and the federal Liberal government of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Veterans' programmes after the Second World War are studied far less than other aspects of the Canadian post-World War II period. There are few articles, let alone books, that deal exclusively with the VLA. The secondary sources consulted for this work were used for three purposes: background information regarding the postwar period; information regarding Canadian rehabilitation, re-establishment or reconstruction policies; and as the theoretical framework of this work's argument. Information regarding the VLA and the Carrot River project was based entirely on primary sources. In only one secondary source is the VLA the focus of the argument, and even then the study involved the small-holdings and housing aspects of the VLA. The full-time farming aspects and the VLA itself have been given only cursory mention by historians. The following literature review will give the reader some idea of the disparate secondary and primary sources used in this work to piece together the varying aspects of this study. Few of which deal specifically with the VLA or
the Carrot River Project.

One of the few articles regarding the VLA is Richard Harris and Tricia Shulist "Canada’s Reluctant Housing Program: The Veterans’ Land Act, 1942 – 75," published in the June 2001 issue of the Canadian Historical Review. This is an excellent article, but it deals with a semi-rural and suburban component of the VLA. The authors point out that the VLA has been all but ignored by historians. They maintain that a recent collection of essays, The Veterans’ Charter and Post-World War II Canada, edited by Peter Neary and J.L. Granatstein, mentions the VLA in only two articles and that both “assume that the agricultural goals of the act were realized.” However, Harris and Shulist also assert that while the agricultural settlement aspect of the VLA “has never been properly evaluated it seems to have achieved a full measure of success.” The 1998 work, The Veterans’ Charter and Post-World War II Canada, edited by Peter Neary and J.L. Granatstein, is the only published book to be found concerning veterans’ policy following the Second World War.

One book that gives a sense of the mood of the Canadian federal government during the Second World War is J.L. Granatstein’s Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939 – 1945. The work gives some background surrounding the creation of postwar reconstruction policies. Published in 1975, this work is still useful to those interested in the political atmosphere that created postwar Canada. Works that investigate

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6 Ibid., 253.
the growth of scientific research during the Second World War are also useful as they give insight into the reasons for Canadians’ faith in progress and technology in the postwar period. Such books as Donald Avery’s *The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology During the Second World War*, published in 1998, and No Day Long Enough: *Canadian Science in World War II*, edited by George R. Lindsay in 1997, were both beneficial.

There are some useful studies in the area of social history such as Doug Owram’s 1996 work, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby-Boom Generation* and Valerie Korinek’s 2000 work, *Roughing It In Suburbia: Reading Chatelaine Magazine in the 1950s and 1960s*. Both works, however, are focussed on urban as opposed to rural social history, and Owram’s work spends more time examining the political and social upheaval of the 1960s than home life in the 1950s. Alvin Finkel’s *Our Lives: Canada After 1945*, published in 1997, is a useful overview of the fifty-year period following the end of the Second World War, but is not an in-depth examination of any particular period. Robert Collins’ *You Had To Be There: An Intimate Portrait of the Generation that Survived the Depression, Won the War, and Re-Invented Canada* (1997), is a collection of interviews with people of the generation who were veterans of the Second World War. It is a useful tool for understanding something of the mind-set of this generation and is an entertaining read. While interesting and useful, it is not a scholarly publication and was used sparingly in writing this work.

A collection of essays published by the Canadian Committee for History of the Second World War in 1997, *Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and Their World in 1945*, focusses exclusively on the immediate postwar period. The essays are both informative and
well-written. These essays give insight into political issues and policies that have rarely been examined, such as David Slater’s article regarding the 1945 - 1946 Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction and Peter S. McInnis’ essay regarding the debate surrounding reconstruction policies and labour. *War, Finance and Reconstruction: The Role of Canada’s Department of Finance, 1939 - 1946*, edited by David W. Slater and R.B. Bryce in 1995, is an interesting examination, as the title suggests, of the Department of Finance’s role in the creation of postwar reconstruction policies. The book is an examination of a very specific political and bureaucratic aspect of postwar history, but is useful in understanding the ideas that influenced federal reconstruction policy. The VLA was never mentioned though.

There are few secondary sources available concerning the Prairie West during this period, and fewer concerning Saskatchewan and the Carrot River district in particular. One recent publication of particular value is Robert A. Wardaugh’s 2000 monograph *Mackenzie King and the Prairie West*. The book follows William Lyon Mackenzie King’s relationship with western Canada from the late 19th century until 1950. The final two chapters, “The Radical Has Left Us, 1936 - 1940” and “Viewing the Mountains Without Scaling the Hills, 1941 - 1950”, were extremely helpful in understanding the changing relationship between federal and western provincial governments during the period under investigation.

In terms of understanding the state of agriculture in the Prairie West during the period there are a few secondary sources to be found. Although much of his work is over forty years old, Vernon C. Fowke remains the authority on the agricultural economics of western Canada. Two works were of great importance for this work: the 1957 publication
The National Policy and the Wheat Economy; and the 1962 work Fowke co-authored with George E. Britnell, Canadian Agriculture in War and Peace. Both works are dense and crammed with quantitative analyses of the Canadian agricultural industry, but are exceptionally detailed examinations of western Canada’s most important industry. The latter work, in particular, supplied statistics regarding the changing structure of agriculture in the postwar period.

Secondary sources that examine re-establishment and reconstruction programmes in Canada following both the Great War and the Second World War are few and far between. Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright’s work Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life, 1915 – 1930 (1987) is one of the few books devoted to an examination of the rehabilitation and re-establishment of Great War veterans. One of very few secondary sources which dealt with both veterans’ settlement and the north-central forested region of Saskatchewan was John McDonald’s “Soldier Settlement and Depression Settlement in the Forest Fringe of Saskatchewan” published in the journal Prairie Forum in 1981.

Other secondary sources were extremely helpful in this study, though not necessarily concerned with agricultural history or the history of post-World War Two Canada. James C. Scott’s Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, published in 1998, was one such work. The book analyses the effectiveness of state-supported programmes designed to increase the efficiency of work and life for people. In this work Scott puts forward his theory of high modernism. This theory argues that the post-World War Two faith in technology and science to improve human existence
induced policy-makers to ignore existing conditions and traditions when creating "modern" programmes. Scott’s analyses of the Soviet collective farming operations and Tanzanian *ujamaa* villages (government created farming villages similar to collective farms) were particularly important as a starting point for evaluating the co-operative farming operations created by the CCF in Saskatchewan. Don Gayton’s collection of personal essays entitled *The Wheatgrass Mechanism: Science and Imagination in the Western Canadian Landscape,* offered the fascinating insights of an ecologist. Gayton presented new ways of understanding the geography of the prairie that made questioning the status quo possible for this author. Finally, Canadian philosopher, John Ralston Saul’s *The Doubter’s Companion: A Dictionary of Aggressive Commonsense* offered succinct assessments of the North American obsession with progress and technology in the postwar period.

This study depended mostly on primary and contemporary documents. A couple of unpublished theses have proved useful. Denis Patrick Fitzgerald’s 1965 Ph.D. dissertation from the University of Minnesota, “Pioneer Settlement in Northern Saskatchewan,” and “A Challenge to Tradition: Co-operative Farming in Saskatchewan, 1944 – 1960” written by Dion McGrath in 1997 as a Master’s thesis at the University of Saskatchewan, were invaluable both as sources and guides to other sources. The works of Robert England, *Discharged: A Commentary on Civil Re-establishment of Veterans in Canada* (1944) and *Twenty Million World War Veterans* (1950), were both useful as they gave both a history of Canadian veterans’ policies and the impressions of someone close to the situation. A local history of the town of Carrot River and the Rural Municipality of Moose Range.

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offered short essays written by people who had lived on the co-operative farms established with the aid of the provincial government and the VLA.

Generally, this study was built upon the primary documents relating to the issues of the re-establishment of veterans on co-operative farms in the Carrot River district and the development of the Veterans’ Land Administration. These sources included: transcripts and working papers from the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction in 1945; annual reports of the federal Department of Veterans’ Affairs and the provincial Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development; articles from the CCF publication Saskatchewan News, and from the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix and the Regina Leader Post; and a collection of press releases and copies of federal veterans’ policies published by Sandford Evans Statistical Services in Winnipeg in the late 1940s. The Saskatchewan Archives Board’s collection of the Honourable John H. Sturdy’s papers proved to be an extremely valuable source. Sturdy was the minister of reconstruction and his department oversaw the creation of the co-operative farms. Members of this department, as well as Sturdy himself, lobbied the federal government to amend the Veterans’ Land Act to allow co-operatives members to pool their VLA loans. Files of the Saskatchewan Department of Agriculture found in the Saskatchewan archives were also useful as the Carrot River project began under the auspices of this department.

There are specific questions that this work attempts to answer, but the most important question – one that all historical inquiries should answer – is “so what?” Why should anyone else find this study interesting or important? In the first place, as the previous literature review emphasizes, the history of post-World War Two Canada has been studied
only to a limited degree, and the history of Saskatchewan and the agricultural industry in the postwar period to an even more limited degree. This work aims, in a small way, to rectify that situation.

Another reason for writing this thesis, other than the personal reasons listed in the acknowledgements, is that the Veterans’ Land Act (and Veterans’ Land Administration) has typically been regarded as a success – likely because historical examinations have been lacking until now. The Carrot River project is the antithesis to this success. While the project was a modified version of what the creators of the VLA had envisioned, the project was endorsed by the Veterans’ Land Administration and loans were made available to co-operative farmers on the project. The failure of the majority of the Carrot River area co-operative farms implies that it is time to examine the relationship between ideology, policy, and reality. It is the hope of the author that others may extrapolate the findings of this study to other policies and programmes established in the period since 1945 to understand the ideological nature of policy and how it may be at odds with the reality of conditions and situations.

This work is, in essence, a case study of the ideological nature of government policy. This is not to say that only governing parties socialist or social democratic tendencies create policies based on ideology. Scott states clearly that high modernism is not limited to leftist parties, but that it informed the policies and programmes of parties whose ideologies spanned the political spectrum. Saul presents the belief in progress as a North American phenomenon. He states that the idea of progress has been accepted by many regardless of political affiliation. In examining the Carrot River Project the intent is to focus on the
postwar belief in progress. It is important to keep in mind that government policies and programmes are driven by values and ideology in spite of the argument made by some that they are neutral.
Chapter One

“A Growing Need for Modern Methods and Social Welfare Projects”: The Creation of the Veterans’ Land Act

Soldiers have always been compensated for their service. The tradition of settling retired or demobilized soldiers on farm land dates back to the Roman period. The settlement of what is now Canada relied on land grants to veterans from the 17th century to the 19th century. Robert England, a writer and executive secretary of the General Advisory Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation between 1940 and 1942, played a significant role in the creation of settlement policy as well as the documentation of such policy. According to England, “France sought to establish a new empire by settling disbanded troops,” and “British policy saw the settlement of ex-soldiers as a guarantee of security.” The new Canadian government, it would appear, sought the same results in the later 19th century as troops who served at Red River in 1870 and in the Northwest campaign in 1885 were also granted land. The tradition was carried on for the veterans of the First and Second World Wars. The veterans of these wars, however, were different from their past confrères. First, there were many more veterans of these two wars. Secondly, they were, for the most part, volunteers.

Veterans of the First and Second World Wars were mostly men for whom service was intended to be temporary. They answered the patriotic call to duty by the hundreds of

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.

-17-
thousands and by the hundreds of thousands they would return to civilian life. Repayment of Canada’s debt to the veterans of these two wars would be a difficult undertaking. The methods the Canadian government devised to repay veterans, however, did not differ greatly in the years following the First and Second World Wars than it had in the years following other wars. Land remained one of the primary methods of repayment for veterans of these two wars. Canada appeared to have an abundance of land to use for this purpose, although the quality of that land and the way in which people perceived it were entirely different following each war. Veterans programmes, therefore, differed from the post-Great War period to the post-Second World War period.

The Soldier Settlement Act was established in 1917 to compensate veterans of the Great War; it went into effect in 1919. Canadian historian Desmond Morton argues that many politicians believed that “soldier settlement was never more than a business proposition, albeit an excellent one with wheat at $2.02 a bushel in 1918.” While this may have been the case, there was more to rehabilitation and reconstruction policy than business and economics. The sheer magnitude of the Canadian government’s rehabilitation challenge was greater than ever before. The Canadian government had never had to re-establish more than a few thousand veterans until the First World War. The Soldier Settlement programme was more elaborate and better planned than previous land grant efforts. Qualified veterans of the Great War could borrow money for the purchase of land, livestock,

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14 England, Twenty Million World War Veterans, 34.
equipment, and improvements." The Soldier Settlement Board (SSB) "would make its own valuation of a farm before it paid over the purchase price, and supervisors would watch over both the settlers and the government's equity."18 There was more to this programme than mere economics, more than repaying a debt for service and sacrifice, and much more than nation-building or securing territory – although, those were certainly important factors.

When final details of the programme were being put in place in 1919, social unrest was at such a high level that settling veterans in rural areas made sense to the political elite of Canada. Arthur Meighen, the acting minister of justice and minister of the interior, had been involved in quashing the Winnipeg General Strike. He had also been involved in the creation of the Soldier Settlement programme. The programme was intended to calm social unrest by rewarding veterans with land; it was agriculturalists who mattered "the most in the determination of the stability of a country against such forces"19 that would betray the nation – those forces being, of course, Bolsheviks and communism. The Soldier Settlement programme consequently had three intended purposes: repay the debt of service and sacrifice to thousands of qualified veterans; re-establish veterans in civilian society; and calm social unrest by settling patriotic men on the land as a bulwark against communism.

In the short-term the programme achieved some of its goals, but in the long-run the programme was a failure. Failure was not entirely the fault of the policy, Soldier Settlement Board officials or the returned soldiers; postwar economic conditions were a major factor in the failure of the programme. Local officials of the SSB were, for the most part, veterans,

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17 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 144.
18 Ibid., 144.
19 Arthur Meighen as quoted in Ibid.
and as historians Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright point out, “not all could possibly be wise, competent, or even honest.”20 They were, however, chosen because they were expected to be some of these things — they had to appraise farm land, distribute livestock and equipment, and have some knowledge of agriculture with an understanding of the types of difficulties soldier settlers might encounter. In Saskatchewan, men like E.E. Thomson and Andrew Meikle were hired by the SSB. Both men had seen action in Europe during the Great War and both were experienced farmers who had returned to that occupation upon demobilization.21

The SSB approved a relatively small number of veterans for Soldier Settlement loans based on a number of criteria — the board did its best to ensure only those veterans who would be able to make a real success of their farms were approved. Members of local advisory committees rejected much of the land considered by veterans for farming and “the qualification committee declined approximately two applications for every one that was approved.”22

Many veterans who were declared qualified to farm under the Soldier Settlement programme were relatively successful. Between March 1919 and March 1921, 43,063 returned soldiers were granted their qualifying certificates from the SSB; of this number just over 25,000 actually took out loans. By 1941 just over 8,000, or about one-third, of these settlers remained on their farms. Slightly more than 13,000 had abandoned their farms or

20 Ibid., 145.
had been given notice to vacate.23 The fact that approximately two-thirds of those veterans who took up farming either quit or were evicted certainly indicates that the Soldier Settlement programme failed. One must keep in mind, however, that there was an economic recession in the early 1920s where commodity prices fell quickly. One must also keep in mind the devastating effects the Depression of the 1930s had on agricultural prices and income in general, as well as the effect of the severe drought. The majority of those who took up SSB loans settled on the Prairies.24 It was not, then, the policy itself, SSB officials, or the veterans that were to blame for the failure of the Soldier Settlement programme; it was the economic and climatic conditions that persisted during the interwar years.

The years following the First World War were hard for most returned soldiers and for those who became farmers life was particularly difficult. By the end of 1920, "9,802 of the 12,233 settlers with payments due had met their obligations in whole or in part and 390 had paid off their loans completely."25 It would appear, however, that this was the best year for the Soldier Settlement programme. Prices and incomes had risen dramatically due to wartime inflation, but high prices and wages did not last into the 1920s. In the end, few returned soldiers were able to hold on to their investments or make successes of their farms:

The 1921 crop year began a prolonged agricultural depression. By 1924, the economist C.R. Fay would observe that if a Canadian farmer had paid himself wages at the going rate for an unskilled city labourer, he would have put himself out of business. Instead of paying themselves, most farmers had to pay banks and mortgage companies for loans contracted in more buoyant conditions. Soldier-settlers had arrived too late for wartime profits, but they had paid wartime prices for land and stock, and their debts must be paid off as farm incomes plummeted. From 1918, when the SSB

23 Ibid., 266.
24 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 148.
25 Ibid., 151.
began operations, to 31 March 1920, 1,270 settlers were ‘salvaged’; by March 1923, 2,115 more had walked away from their investment.\textsuperscript{26}

These men were the fortunate few who had been selected by the SSB as suitable and qualified for agriculture; the economic conditions had made it impossible for some, and nearly so for others, to continue farming.

The fear of another economic depression in the post-World War II period cannot be emphasized too strongly. This fear was expressed in government policy and contemporary documents. The year before the end of the war, one writer warned that, “[t]here are dangers ahead, dangers concerning things in which our record is not good. ... We helped to lose the last Peace; we entered it planless.”\textsuperscript{27} In the same year Robert England suggested, “there will be a growing need for modern methods and for social welfare projects that might well be backed by the awakened social conscience of all political parties.”\textsuperscript{28} In 1950 England again reminded Canadians that economic and social reconstruction was non-existent in the post-World War I period: “reliance was placed on \textit{laissez-faire} policies, trusting to a return to normal industrial activity; the war was looked upon as an interruption in the march of progress rather than what it was – a fundamental break with the pre-war economy.”\textsuperscript{29} The federal government produced its \textit{White Paper on Employment and Income} in 1945 which “committed the government ‘to maintain high and stable levels of employment and income ... as a primary objective of policy,’ and it reinforced and advertized the extensive set of

\textsuperscript{26} ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} E. Newton-White, \textit{Canadian Restoration}, (Toronto 1944), 2.
\textsuperscript{28} England, \textit{Discharged}, xi.
\textsuperscript{29} England, \textit{Twenty Million World War Veterans}, 22.
reconstruction measures which had already been adopted in the 1944 legislative program. 30

Prime Minister Mackenzie King expressed this sentiment most clearly and eloquently in his address to the delegates of the 1945 Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction:

... by reconstruction, none of us, I am sure, means a return to conditions as they were in the early nineteen-thirties. We must go forward to a better social order, a more reliable economic structure, than we have ever had before. To achieve this will not be easy. It would be a fatal mistake to under-estimate the seriousness of the task. Because the war has demonstrated an unexpectedly large productive capacity in this country is no reason to assume that automatically we shall be better off than we were before the war.

Our productive capacity had been enlarged in response to an immense governmental demand for labour and materials arising out of the war. In order to continue to use Canada’s productive capacity fully after the war other and broader outlets must be found. To effect this, we need to achieve a much higher standard of living, a more rapid rate of capital development and substantial export markets. 31

Canadians were certainly relieved and happy about the Allied victory, but the possibility of economic collapse following that victory preyed on them.

Rehabilitation and re-establishment policies that followed the Great War were more elaborate and better planned than those that had followed past conflicts in which Canada had been involved. The fear of economic collapse and social unrest as well as the belief that Great War veterans had been ill-compensated led the Canadian government to develop post-World War Two policies that were even more elaborate. The federal government’s policies for this postwar period were aimed at compensating, rehabilitating and re-establishing veterans in civilian life, as well as reconstructing the Canadian economy and society. This change in government policy had to do with the rise in popularity of Keynesian economic

theory and socialist social and economic theories during the 1930s. At the height of the Great Depression thirty percent of the Canadian population was unemployed; farms failed due to the drought in western Canada; businesses failed due to the depressed economic conditions. The general feeling is that few of these failures occurred because of individual frailty or laziness; the capitalist system had failed and people turned to the state to remedy the situation. During the 1930s and 1940s laissez-faire policies were no longer politically viable. Throughout the 1940s the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), Canada’s first politically viable socialist party, gained political popularity with its platform based on policies aimed at providing social and economic stability for Canadians.32 In order for Mackenzie King and the federal Liberals to maintain power they had to accept that the state would have to intervene in society and the economy after the Second World War. The campaign slogan that helped the federal Liberals win the 1945 election, “Building A New Social Order for Canada,” indicated that the Liberals had no intention of winning the war overseas merely to lose the peace at home.33

Veterans of the Second World War came home to a different Canada and different treatment by the government. Much of Canada’s difference in treatment of Second World War veterans compared to Great War veterans had to do with the generation that fought the war itself. Most members of this generation came of age during the great Depression and were then thrust into the war effort in one way or another. Their parents remembered all too well the unrest and economic collapse that followed the Great War. Those of the generation

33 Ibid., 397.
who fought the war had known little but economic hardship and war in their relatively short lives. Canadian historian Doug Owram argues, in “Canadian Domesticity in the Postwar Era,” that this generation fought for “home.” They fought for a Canada in which they and their children could prosper economically and socially in a way that they had never known.

The federal government, led by King, began postwar preparations almost as soon as war was declared. Preparations for the rehabilitation and re-establishment of Second World War veterans began in December 1939. A parliamentary advisory committee, with its ensuing subcommittees, was established to study the problems of reintegrating veterans into civilian life as few expressed a desire to remain in the military after the war. Policies were developed largely based on the experiences of the programmes established after the Great War. Policies and programmes were established to allow veterans to assume or resume their education; to train for new vocations; to take positions in the civil service; to receive care and treatment in veterans’ hospitals; to build homes in rural and suburban areas; and to establish themselves as commercial farmers or fishermen. Subcommittees were also set up to study the particular problems of female veterans. Unlike the Great War, in which nursing sisters were the only women overseas, many women served in the Canadian Women’s Army Corps (CWAC), the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Women’s Division, and the Royal Canadian Navy, both in Canada and overseas, during the Second World War.

The measures developed in the early part of the Second World War were intended to assist both veterans discharged before the termination of hostilities and those discharged


35 England, Discharged, 72.

36 Ibid., 91 - 93.
following full-scale demobilization. Many of the rehabilitation and reconstruction policies developed during the Second World War were intended to improve upon those developed in conjunction with the Great War. Most Canadians felt it useless to win the war overseas if no tangible benefits were seen at home.  

The mechanisms and personnel needed to create and deploy postwar reconstruction policies were already in place in the federal civil service. The Soldier Settlement Board and the War Veterans’ Allowance Board, for instance, were still in operation during the Second World War. Many of the officials working on those boards and for the Department of Pensions and National Health, which was responsible for veterans’ pensions and veterans’ hospitals, were veterans of the Great War. The Soldier Settlement Board employed Great War veterans as field workers and supervisors at the outset. The minister and deputy minister of the Department of Pensions and National Health, Ian Mackenzie and Walter S. Woods, respectively, were both Great War veterans and had both sat on the executives of veterans’ associations. Mackenzie and Woods were always interested in the welfare of veterans and Mackenzie was instrumental in the creation of the Department of Veterans Affairs in 1944. The department was created as the administrative umbrella for all veterans’ programmes that had previously been the purview of other departments. These men were well aware of the shortcomings of post-World War One veterans’ programmes.

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38 England, Discharged, 91; 93.
39 Granatstein, Canada’s War, 272.
40 England, Discharged, 115 - 116; The Veterans’ Land Act, for example, had been under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture, and all employment and vocational training programmes were administered by the Department of Labour.
Walter S. Woods was the first chairman of the War Veterans’ Allowance Board, established in 1930 to aid Great War veterans who were unable to find employment (usually due to “burn-out”). Due mostly to the past experiences of these veterans, who were elected officials and civil servants, the programmes developed for Canadian veterans of the Second World War were more extensive and better planned.

Out of discussions regarding how government and society could avoid postwar economic collapse and social upheaval came the vision of Canada as a prosperous country. The belief was that there were a few elements on which governments and individuals needed to focus in order to turn Canada into a prosperous country. Individuals needed to be employed for them to be prosperous. Industry needed increased production and markets to be prosperous. Agriculture needed to modernize in order to be prosperous. Prosperity at all levels of society would, obviously, avoid economic collapse and create stability. What Canadian governments were expected to do in the postwar era was create and maintain not necessarily prosperity itself, but at least an environment in which prosperity could be created. Without the impetus of the Second World War many of the economic and social changes that created prosperity may never have been conceived.

The Second World War, as has been often said, ended the Great Depression. Canadian industry flourished during the war. Factories that had previously manufactured consumer goods began producing war materials at a huge rate. In conjunction with increased war production was increased scientific research and technological change as a result of such research. “Canadian scientific and technological achievements during the war...

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41 Ibid., 91.
set the stage, and were the foundation upon which the country built a prosperous and forward-looking postwar economy.”42 And indeed, the postwar era was one in which Canadian society was practically obsessed with technology and technological innovations. Advances in technology that came out of the Second World War were channelled into mainstream society as consumer goods – all for the sake of prosperity. In this age anything was possible. Technological innovation was progress and progress led, inevitably, to prosperity. In this new age everyone could be prosperous. Indeed, everyone deserved to be prosperous. All of these paths to prosperity – full employment, increased production and markets, modernization – were considered “progress.”

The 1942 Veterans’ Land Act was just one of the many “progressive” reconstruction policies established by the Dominion government during the Second World War. The intent of the VLA was threefold: to compensate veterans for their war service; to re-establish veterans in their pre-war occupation, or to establish those who were willing and qualified; and, as was the case with most reconstruction policies, to employ as many veterans as possible in order to stabilize the economy and to stifle social unrest. Employment in the agricultural sector was intended to address two concerns. First, employment meant that veterans were able to support themselves and their families as well as contributing to the stability of the economy. Secondly, agricultural employment removed veterans from urban centres which had been the focal points of labour unrest in the period following the Great War. The VLA fit in particularly well with the idea of “progress” as well, in that its purpose was to employ men who wished to farm. Loans were intended to make it easier for veteran

42 George R. Lindsey, ed. No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science and World War II. (Toronto 1997), 4.

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farmers to purchase machinery in order to modernize agriculture, and the use of machinery was intended to increase production. The VLA, then, met all the criteria of a "progressive" policy designed to create stability and prosperity.

At its most fundamental, the VLA was a policy that built upon the belief that rural life was wholesome and encouraged Canadians to be hard-working. A hard-working, rural population continued to be regarded as the backbone of Canadian society. Such diligent workers would be prosperous and prosperity was essential to the progress of Canada. The policy was definitely paradoxical: on the one hand, living on the land was wholesome and pure; and on the other hand, the policy encouraged mechanization, the use of chemicals, and an increased land-base for farms. However, neither governments nor the Canadian public recognized this paradox and the policy was accepted by all involved. This paradox is, of course, only recognizable in hindsight.43

The Veterans' Land Act was given assent on 1 August 1942. It was developed early in the war to ensure the program was well established and the proper personnel in place before general demobilization. The VLA was the child of the Soldier Settlement Act. It was designed to keep more veterans on their land and on a more stable financial foundation. Loans were granted at three and a half percent interest, as opposed to the five percent interest of the Soldier Settlement loans. Veterans were obliged to put up a ten percent down payment, which the Soldier Settlement Board had often waived. Many believed that because veterans of the Second World War were obliged to invest personally in their farms, these

43 This is the work of historian. All historians can do is recognize paradoxes, problems, and what they perceive to be mistakes made in the past. Then a responsible historian will work at correcting the mistakes and ensuring they are not repeated.
men had a greater incentive to keep up their farms and their payments than had veterans of
the Great War." The maximum amount of the loan was increased as land prices rose and
steps were taken to ensure that veterans' debt loads were manageable. 45

Veterans who took up farming under the Soldier Settlement programme were
discouraged from purchasing machinery. 46 Those returned servicemen who farmed under the
auspices of the Veterans' Land Administration, however, were encouraged to purchase
machinery. VLA administrators began making arrangements for the production of farm
machinery with the industry in 1943 to accommodate the demand expected in the postwar
period. Much of the production of farm implements had been halted in favour of the
manufacture of munitions and other necessities of war. In 1945 the federal government
released some of the controls on steel and other required materials on the advice of the
Director of the VLA. 47 This change in attitude towards technology was a direct result of
scientific research and the manufacture of industrial machinery that took place during the
Second World War. The VLA made arrangements with Canadian farm machinery
manufacturers to supply veterans with implements at discounted prices. Some veterans
chose to farm without the help of VLA loans; the VLA provided those veterans with
identification cards that guaranteed them discounted prices at farm implement dealerships. 48

45 Keszen, "Getting It Right the Second Time Around," 74 - 75.
46 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 7.
47 Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Veterans Affairs: Veterans' Land Act, Soldier
Settlement, Canadian Pension Commission, and War Veterans' Allowance Board, for the Year
Ending March 31, 1946, (Ottawa 1947), 63.
48 Canada, Department of Veterans' Affairs, Report of the Work of the Department of Veterans' Affairs:
Veterans' Land Act, Soldier Settlement, Canadian Pension Commission, War Veterans' Allowance
Board, and Civil Defence fo the Year Ending March 31, 1945, (Ottawa 1946), 48 -49.
Under the regulations a farmer who made all his payments on time over the first ten years of the loan was entitled to have a third of his mortgage waived by the VLA and was granted full title to his property. 9

The first requirement of obtaining a loan from the VLA was to be a veteran. This may seem obvious, but the Act was very clear as to who could be considered a veteran.

(d) 'veteran' means a person who at any time during the war declared by His Majesty on the tenth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-nine, against the German Reich and subsequently against other powers, has been therein engaged on active service in a naval, military or air force of Canada, or any of His Majesty's forces if at the time of his enlistment he was ordinarily domiciled or resident in Canada, and,

(i) whose service has involved duties required to be performed outside of the Western Hemisphere; or
(ii) who has served only in the Western Hemisphere for a period of at least twelve months, not including any period of absence without leave or leave of absence without pay, time served while undergoing sentence of penal servitude, imprisonment or detention, or service in respect of which pay is forfeited; or
(iii) who, wherever he may have served, is by reason of disability incurred as a result of such service in receipt of a pension; and has been honourably discharged from such naval, military, air force, or other of His Majesty's forces, or has been permitted honourably to resign or retire therefrom;

and, 'veteran' also means a British subject who was ordinarily domiciled or resident in Canada at the beginning of the said war and who is in receipt of a pension in respect of disability incurred while service upon a ship during the said war.

(Amended by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)

(e) 'Western Hemisphere' means the continents of North and South America, the Islands adjacent thereto, and the territorial waters thereof, including Newfoundland, Bermuda, and the West Indies but excluding Greenland, Iceland and the Aleutian Islands.

(Added by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)

If one qualified as a veteran, then one could be considered "to be certified to be qualified

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9 Schull, Veneration for Valour, 69.
to participate in the benefits of the Act,"" by a Regional Advisory Committee under P.C. 11138, "Order in Council Governing the Granting of Loans to Veterans of the Current War."

In order to be considered qualified for a loan a veteran had to "submit reasonable evidence that he is personally fit and able to carry on the occupation by which he proposed to gain his livelihood; that, by reason of his character, habits, knowledge and experience he is adapted to carry on successfully such occupation; that he understands the financial responsibility required by the Act; and that in all other respects including availability he is qualified to participate in the benefits of the Act." The Regional Advisory Committee was given the authority to consider whatever evidence it believed was relevant. Those veterans who wanted to be full-time farmers had to provide evidence of "at least two years satisfactory farming experience prior to the date" of application.

Although all veterans accepted by the VLA had proved their abilities as farmers, these men would be pursuing agriculture differently than had past generations. The

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51 Ibid., section 2-7, 9.
52 Ibid.
53 Aboriginal veterans could apply for VLA loans, and many were granted these loans, however, they had to go through the Department of Indian Affairs. The Department of Indian Affairs acted as agent for Aboriginal veterans and these veterans could only purchase land that was available on their home reserve. In order to purchase land these veterans had to give up their Indian status and had to remove land from their home reserves.
54 Postwar Plans, Canada: Government Measures; Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, section 2-7, 10.; While the language of the act was decidedly masculine it did not preclude female veterans from applying for VLA loans. Section 12 of P.C. 11138 stated that if both husband and wife qualified for a VLA loan the loan could be granted to only one of them unless they could prove separation. This obviously implies that women were not exempt from the VLA, however, more study is needed to determine the numbers of women who applied for and/or were granted these loans. "Veterans' Land Act." Department of Justice website. http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/2000/34/8084.html. The Veterans' Land Act is still on the books and the Department of Veterans' Affairs is still responsible for its implementation. In fact, it has been amended as recently as the year 2000. Amendments in that year included: merging the position of Director of the VLA with the position of Deputy Minister of Veterans' Affairs; the creation of Review Committees; and how the department would deal with rescinding loans. The department actually stopped approving new loans in 1975 but continues to administer those that remain outstanding.

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immediate postwar period was a time of significant structural change in agriculture and the VLA played an important role in that change. Analysts of western Canadian agriculture, George E. Britnell and Vernon C. Fowke55, argue that yields did not increase during this period but the size of prairie farms increased dramatically. At the same time the numbers of Canadians employed in agriculture declined by higher percentages. The size of the average prairie farm increased by over thirty-three percent between 1941 and 1956, from 405 to 550 acres. The increase was even greater in Saskatchewan – increasing from an average of 432 acres in 1941 to 607 acres in 1956, an increase of more than forty percent.56 The numbers of Canadians working as unpaid family workers declined by approximately forty percent between 1946 and 1956. Those working as hired labour and self-employed farm operators declined by about twenty-five percent. The period also witnessed a rapid decline in the numbers of people living in rural areas who, though not working directly on farms, were supporting agriculture in one way or another.57

All these statistics point to significant structural changes in agriculture during the postwar period. To compensate for the loss of agricultural workers and the increase in farm size, farm operators significantly increased their use of machinery. According to Britnell and Fowke’s statistics, in the period between 1941 and 1951, Canadian farmers in general increased the numbers of tractors by three times. Between 1946 and 1955 Canadian farmers invested three billion dollars in new machinery compared with the one billion dollars

55 Both were political economists working at the University of Saskatchewan’s Department of Economics and Political Science in the mid-twentieth century. Fowke is still considered the authority on the structure and history of Western Canadian agricultural policy and economics.

56 George E. Britnell and Vernon C. Fowke, Canadian Agriculture in War and Peace, 1935-1950, (Stanford 1962), 408.

57 Ibid., 409.
invested between 1936 and 1945. This period also saw an increase in scientific research being conducted to develop pest- and drought-resistant strains of crops, as well as the development of pesticides and herbicides for commercial use. All of these changes allowed fewer farmers to produce more stable yield levels on larger land bases.

Another important aspect of this period for agriculture is that it was the end of the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture in North America, what has been termed the “transition to capitalism.” Settlement policies directed at western Canada had been created to encourage specialization in cereals and commercial agriculture in the region. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries governments and universities encouraged and taught farmers new methods and promoted specialization. It was not, however, until the post-World War II period that farmers and farm families significantly increased their reliance on commercial production as their main source of subsistence. It was in this period that farms began specializing (especially in cereals production in the West) and reduced small-scale outputting of products such as eggs, milk, butter, and vegetables. This phenomenon has been well documented by American historians and sociologists studying changes in the gendered division of farm labour as the decrease in small-scale outputting significantly reduced women’s on-farm role as income earners.

What the examination of this structural transition brings to light is the fact that farming as a lifestyle was entering a new stage. As the Second World War drew to a close

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58 Ibid., 411.
western Canadian farmers were increasingly taking advantage of the technological and structural changes in agriculture. More farmers were using chemical and mechanical innovations, creating economies of scale and were specializing in a few crops. Agriculture had become a bigger, more rigidly structured business. Farm families were consuming less of what they produced and were no longer producing a variety of immediately consumable goods. The VLA cultivated structural and technological changes in agriculture by encouraging farmers to purchase machinery and large parcels of land. The provincial government of Saskatchewan’s policy of co-operative farming pursued the same end by encouraging groups of farmers to work thousands of acres by use of machinery and chemicals.

The intention of the VLA was to create an economically successful agricultural industry that was prosperous and stable. The Act and pertinent amendments also made the government the overseer of these agricultural endeavours. The government, through its Regional Advisory Committees and field workers, decided who would make a good farmer, what land was suitable for cultivation, and the best ways for the land to be worked. These measures were a way for the federal Liberals to protect their investment and work in the best interests of veterans. Such government intervention in the economy also indicated that the Liberals had abandoned a lot of their laissez-faire beliefs in the wake of public support of socialist doctrine such as that expounded by the CCF. It is therefore understandable that the socialist CCF government of Saskatchewan would be interested in using the VLA to its advantage in the postwar period.
Chapter Two

"Without the Economic Base, All Promises of Welfare are Futile": The CCF and the Veterans’ Land Act

The Veterans’ Land Act was an extremely important reconstruction policy for Saskatchewan. The identity and economy of the province rested almost entirely on agriculture. The province expected and anticipated an influx of veterans, immigrants, and refugees in the postwar period. The money available from the VLA would ease the financial strain of establishing veterans in agriculture. The province was in debt to the federal government for relief payments during the 1930s, so the VLA was a much needed source of funds. The number of veterans in Saskatchewan who were accepted by the Veterans’ Land Administration for full-time farming was significantly higher than in most provinces. In Saskatchewan 7,382 veterans had been approved by 1951. Alberta and Ontario both had more veterans approved in total (full-time farming, small holdings and commercial fishing) but the total veterans approved for full-time farming in Saskatchewan exceeded that of its closest competitor, Alberta, by nearly 1,000 applicants. This included 1,408 veterans settled on provincial crown lands in Saskatchewan. 61 In the postwar period agriculture continued to be Saskatchewan’s most important economic sector.

In Saskatchewan the VLA was used primarily to establish veterans in full-time farming. The thousands approved by the VLA for such enterprises attests to this fact. The VLA’s small holdings component was also used in the province, but to a lesser degree – only

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330 such approvals by 1952. The small holdings component was created to allow veterans to settle on a few acres in a rural area. The Saskatoon community of Montgomery Place was established by veterans with small holdings loans. The veterans were expected to support themselves and their families by combining small agricultural enterprises with urban employment. Although this type of re-establishment was useful, it was more important in provinces where available rural space was limited, such as Ontario and the Maritimes. In Saskatchewan the focus was on continuing the trend of ever increasing farm sizes. Large farms were expected to significantly increase production, exports, and income.

The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation’s vision for Saskatchewan’s future depended on continuing the trend of large farms. Before the CCF could implement its vision, however, the party had to win the 1944 election. In 1944 Saskatchewan was still recovering from the Great Depression. The provincial Liberals had been in power for all but five of the province’s thirty-nine year history, and had become a complacent government. The Liberals had passed special legislation to stay in power for an additional year; by the time the 1944 election was called it had been six years since the last election. Throughout the election campaign the Liberals attacked the CCF’s socialist ideology. The Liberal social services policies were vague and involved rather paternalistic programmes for supporting women, children, the aged and the blind. Their natural resources programme would have

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63 The Conservatives were able to head a coalition government under JT.M. Anderson from 1929 to 1934.


65 Ibid.

supported co-operatives “with a pledge of no political interference.” In essence the Liberals hoped that the fear of socialism would carry them back into office. The manifesto, as printed in the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, stated that the Liberal party “reaffirms its faith in democracy as against Socialism; [and] asserts its commitment to the principle of the maximum opportunity for individual initiative and ability.”

The CCF’s election campaign certainly did not shy away from attacking the governing party and its policies. However, the CCF stressed equality for all residents of Saskatchewan and government support of enterprises and individuals. A campaign advertisement made it clear that a CCF government would “set up a complete system of socialized health services ... so that ... every ... resident of Saskatchewan will receive adequate medical, surgical, dental, nursing and hospital services without charge.” The CCF vehemently attacked the Liberal record when it came to supporting the farmers of Saskatchewan. Another campaign advertisement accused the Liberals of giving too much power to the loan and mortgage companies. It then accused the Liberals of claiming to give farmers “protection to the extreme limit;” a statement the CCF believed to be ludicrous. The CCF promised to help farmers receive fair prices for their products, to better manage their debts, and increase their financial security.

The CCF had a number of advantages during the 1944 campaign. The provincial party was fortunate to have Reverend T.C. Douglas as its leader. He was a charismatic and

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67 Ibid. 8.
68 Ibid.
69 “The CCF Plans Health,” *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, June 10, 1944, 12.
70 “The Farmers Know You're Fooling, Mr. Patterson,” *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, June 13, 1944, 11.
71 Ibid.
personable leader who presented the party's platform and ideology as the best alternative to the Liberals. The Liberals were out of touch with the will of the electorate and enjoyed weak support in the province. The support of rural people was paramount in Saskatchewan politics; the sympathy the CCF showed for the plight of farmers made their victory on June 15, 1944 an easy one.

The CCF’s platform was, above all, about ensuring security and prosperity for all members of society. For the CCF the best way to achieve this prosperity was careful and deliberate planning of the economy coupled with government supervision of most, if not all, government endeavours. Policy makers within the party were well aware of the cost of establishing government-funded economic development programmes and social services. The CCF knew it would have to work with the capitalist framework in order for its plans to succeed. By the 1940s the CCF had changed since its beginnings in the early 1930s. No longer did the party advocate the wholesale change of Canada’s economic structure. At a national convention in Regina in December 1943, the national chairman, Frank Scott, outlined the importance of working within the established economy.

The CCF is not just a humanitarian party, promising welfare and security to all; it is primarily concerned with the control and planning of the productive resources of the country so that a secure economic base can be laid on which to build the social service. With greater production and secure employment there will be available the wealth which can support the costs of education, health, leisure, etc. Without the economic base, all promises of welfare are futile.72

The provincial CCF put this statement into action after being elected to government by planning programmes that ensured it would control as much of the provincial economy as possible.

The CCF believed, as most Canadian governments did, that its role was to ensure that society did not fall into postwar depression in the late 1940s and 1950s. In order to achieve prosperity in the post-World War II period the CCF set out to plan and organize the economic and social life of Saskatchewan. Planning was one of the CCF’s fundamental tenets. The provincial party’s 1944 election platform included “the planned development of the economic life of the province.” The provincial party struck a planning committee in 1943 to create policy prior to the election. The most important result of this committee, and its various sub-committees, was that the CCF chose the natural resource sector as the prime area for government ownership and economic planning. “The 1944 program drew the obvious parallel between land and other natural resources – all served as the foundation of staple-led economic development. It would henceforth be the government’s responsibility to plan the development of such industries, and bargain for ‘the lion’s share’ of rents arising from them.”

The CCF’s platform promised prosperity through planning. The Liberals were promising, basically, to stay the course. The public knew that staying the course had led to the economic difficulties of the 1920s and 1930s. The CCF’s promises to plan for a prosperous and stable future won them the election in 1944.

The CCF’s commitment to planning and organization was part of a larger ideological phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century. Yale professor of political science and anthropology, James C. Scott, terms this phenomenon high modernism. According to Scott, high modernism “is best conceived as a strong ... version of self-confidence about scientific

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73 CCF 1944 election programme quoted in John Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West, (Toronto 1979), 93.
74 Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism, 101 - 102.
and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws. It originated, of course, in the West, as a by-product of unprecedented progress in science and industry. Scott traces the history of high modernism from its origins in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century state-building. The creation of the modern nation-state began with the rationalization of leaders’ resources – natural and human resources. In the nineteenth century Canada embarked upon state-building by rationalizing its resources through such things as the Dominion Land Survey, the three-fold National Policy, and the census conducted by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.

High modernism was not an ideology limited to the left of the political spectrum. High modernism reflected the postwar desire to create a new world order and was, therefore, evident in policies of right-wing parties. It was also evident in the policies of middle-of-the-road parties like the Liberal Party of Canada. The VLA revealed the Liberals’ faith in science and technology and therefore contained some element of high modernism. Parties at different ends of the political spectrum held surprisingly similar beliefs regarding the benefits of science and technology as well as the benefits of progress. The VLA was a good fit with the CCF’s plans for the future of Saskatchewan.


76 Ibid., 9 - 84.

77 The National Policy was created by John A. Macdonald’s Conservative government and included policies aimed at bringing immigrants to settle and farm on the Prairies, building a railroad that crossed the country from east to west, and enabling the government to raise revenues by taxing businesses and individuals in the West.
Planning and organization, or rationalization, is an integral part of governance. States cannot raise taxes and deliver services if they do not know from whom to collect or where to deliver services. There are two main differences between simple rationalization and high modernist ideology. The first is that the ideology carried with it faith in science and technology. This faith was "uncritical, unskeptical [sic], and thus unscientifically optimistic about the possibilities for the comprehensive planning of human settlement and production." The second difference lay in the outcomes expected of rationalization. High modernist ideology was found "among those who wanted to use state power to bring about huge changes in people’s work habits, living patterns, moral conduct, and worldview.” The CCF was committed to bringing about such changes in Saskatchewan society through the creation of crown corporations, co-operatives and other modernization programmes.

Saskatchewan’s crown corporations and modernization programmes fit into a high modernist ideological framework because they were carefully planned by technocrats and politicians to rationalize the economy and improve the social well-being of the provincial populace. The CCF’s goal in all of its endeavours was to create prosperity through planning and organization of the economic and social fabric of the province. Still, agriculture and rural life remained the priority for reconstruction of the province. Agriculture, too, would be rationalized to serve the ideological dreams of the CCF.

Once in office, the CCF set about creating agricultural policies that would continue the trend of large, mechanized farming operations. The purpose of continuing this trend was to increase production levels which, the government believed, would ensure fair prices and

78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 5
stable farm incomes. The CCF’s creation of co-operative farms would maintain the benefits of large, mechanized farms and limit the problems. Large enterprises were expensive for individual farmers. Co-operative farms would allow the debt and expenses to be carried by a number of individuals. Large farms also displaced rural people; small farms were purchased to create large ones, thus sending farm families to urban centres in search of employment. Co-operative farms ensured that farm families could remain in rural areas. Instead of heading to the urban centres in search of employment, farm families could band together on co-operative farms. The advantage of co-operative farms was that they encouraged the cultivation of huge areas with the use of machines and chemicals. Co-operative farming was also intended to: eliminate the idea of private property without nationalizing land; make it easier for farmers to own machinery and increase grain production; eliminate rural isolation; and make it easier for farm households to have access to electricity, indoor plumbing and telephone service.\textsuperscript{80} The most important aspect of co-operative farming was its ability to create economies of scale that would allow for increased mechanization and lead to all the other forms of prosperity offered by progress.

Saskatchewan has been known, historically for its co-operatives. The co-operative movement in the province pre-dates the creation of the CCF party. In fact, early co-operative legislation was created and amended Liberal governments. The CCF was, however, more interested in using the power of the state to improve the conditions of people’s lives. After the election of the CCF in 1944 its relationship with existing co-

\textsuperscript{80}Saskatchewan, Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Annual Report, March 31, 1952. Co-operative Extension Services, (Regina 1952), 5 - 6.
operatives was civil, but not congenial. Those co-operatives created by the government were unique and had different dynamics from those with closer relationships to the co-operative movement outside of government.

In order to achieve its vision of co-operative farming, the provincial government needed money. There was the possibility that the federal government would set aside money for the province. The federal Liberals, however, were wary of the CCF “experiment” in Saskatchewan; new federal money was not likely to appear. The CCF was in debt to the federal government for depression-era relief payments, and T.C. Douglas was not interested in borrowing more money. If the CCF wanted federal money to help with its projects it would have to use money already available to the provinces. The Veterans’ Land Act offered loans and grants directly to veterans. The CCF sought to take advantage of the existing federal money. The provincial government had no need to secure more financial resources for the project if those veterans interested in co-operative farming could use VLA loans and grants to establish themselves in such enterprises.

When the federal government held its Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction in August 1945 the Saskatchewan delegation stressed the importance of agriculture to the economic stability and prosperity of the country. The Saskatchewan delegation expressed concern that agriculture was not emphasized by the federal government in the initial agenda for the conference. Premier Douglas argued that the stability of agricultural income in the postwar period would be as important to maintaining Canada’s

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82 Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada, 172 - 173.
high level of national income as full employment. Douglas suggested a number of imperatives to be considered by a committee: that the speculative market be closed by establishing the Canadian Wheat Board as the country’s sole grain marketing agency; a minimum price on hogs be offered to producers, and that a long-term bacon agreement be entered into with the United Kingdom; a price policy for agricultural goods consumed domestically be established; and that floor prices be established for agricultural commodities to give some stability to farm incomes, and that wheat be given special attention when creating these floor prices. Douglas also remarked that the conference agenda made no mention of irrigation projects, reminding the conference delegates that such projects would go a long way in stabilizing production and therefore prices. This statement stressed Saskatchewan’s continuing dependence upon and identification with agriculture, especially wheat farming, in spite of the drastic effects of the drought in the 1930s.

At the 1945 Dominion-Provincial Conference the Saskatchewan delegation expressed its commitment to working with the federal Liberal government to achieve the goals of reconstruction. In his address to the conference Douglas publicly committed the provincial government to serve the national good, to co-operate with the federal government and to “see the Canadian people launched upon an era of economic expansion and social well being.” The CCF needed federal money to reconstruct the province’s economy. The provincial government, therefore, needed to reassure the federal government that the CCF

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84 Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan and Reconstruction: Address, and the Saskatchewan Government Presentation to the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction By Hon. T.C. Douglas, Premier and Minister of Public Health, (Regina 1945), 5.
was just as interested in the welfare of Canadians as the Liberal Party of Canada.

It is likely that the provincial CCF also saw many aspects of federal reconstruction policy that resonated with its own ideology, as high modernism was not limited to any one political party. VLA programmes involved considerable government planning and supervision. All the planning and supervision of the programme was created to ensure veterans were successful in their farming operations. This was not simply an altruistic gesture on the part of the federal government but a way of protecting its investment. Nevertheless, the belief was that if the government ensured the economic success of veterans it ensured the economic success of the nation as a whole. This quite obviously resonated with the CCF’s belief that government involvement in the planning of the social and economic life of the province would create prosperity and equity in society.

Planning and supervision were seen as fundamental to the stability of agriculture and veterans’ farming enterprises by the federal government as well. In 1949, the director of the VLA launched a staff training programme entitled “Operation Good Earth.” In his address to district superintendents, the director clearly stated the role of the VLA in maintaining stability in Canada.

... Ours is more than a rehabilitation programme. It has much wider implications, involving the economic, social and political stability of our country through the more economic use and ownership of the soil which is, and will continue to be, its greatest economic asset. 85

Planning and supervision were the cornerstones of reconstruction policy because they were believed to lead, inevitably, to stability.

The CCF’s co-operative farming project required detailed planning for it to be successful. Not only did the ideology of the CCF demand government planning and supervision, but the programme was too ambitious to allow co-operatives to be established without government intervention. The plan also involved building co-operatives, literally, from the ground up. The co-operative farming project required government planning in everything: from choosing the site; making the land ready for cultivation; instructing veterans in the principles of co-operation; to supplying building materials for new homes. The CCF chose a site on provincial crown land for its ambitious experiment. This gave the government ultimate control over all aspects of its project. The one thing the provincial government needed help with was funding. The CCF turned to the federal government and the VLA to help in that area.

The CCF both hoped for and anticipated large numbers of returned service personnel to apply for full-time farming in Saskatchewan. As far as the provincial government was concerned, the more farmers in the province, the better the provincial economy. The thousands of veterans approved by the VLA to farm in Saskatchewan was good news for the government. The 1952 annual report of the federal Department of Veterans Affairs contained a table outlining the number of approvals as well as the number of veterans who had obtained title to their properties. The VLA had been in existence for ten years and in that time Saskatchewan saw six veterans approved for commercial fishing, 330 approved for small holdings purchases, and 5,845 for full-time farming. 86 Of these numbers all six had

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86 This number differs substantially from the number quoted by Britnell and Fowke. There are a few explanations for this. Britnell and Fowke’s numbers are 1951 numbers and were collected by Walter S. Woods for his publication Rehabilitation: A Combined Operation, therefore the 1952 Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) numbers could indicate that a number of those approved by 1951 decided not to
obtained title to their commercial fishing operations, 277 had obtained title to their small holdings, and 4,816 had obtained title to their full-time farming operations. Saskatchewan also had 3,109 properties for settlement on crown land by 1952. In the first ten years of the VLA the federal government had spent $20,933,724 for the full-time farming purchases, $558,958 for small holdings, and $8,950 for commercial fishing operations in Saskatchewan alone.87

All of these numbers, both in terms of people and dollars, are important in examining the CCF's response to postwar reconstruction in agriculture. One of the reasons for creating co-operative farms was that more people could remain on the land than if only the conventional family farm model was used. Co-operatives could more easily absorb thousands of returned veterans in farming than individual farming operations. The government of Saskatchewan certainly did not expect that all VLA recipients would choose to farm co-operatively, but more veterans could settle in agriculture if they chose co-operative farming. The amount of money the federal government spent in VLA expenditures over ten years gives some idea of the costs the provincial government would face in creating co-operative farms. The provincial government had committed itself to clearing and breaking land, training co-operative members in the principles of co-operation, digging drainage ditches, supplying building materials, and maintaining administrative staff to aid farming co-operatives. The money veterans received in grants from the VLA certainly eased the burden the provincial government bore during the creation of the farms.

87 Canada, Report of the Work of the Department of Veterans Affairs, (Ottawa 1952), 57.
The provincial CCF and the federal Liberal governments both had similar goals in mind when creating agricultural reconstruction policies for the postwar period. Both governments were seeking to create prosperous economies and stable societies. Both governments held high modernist beliefs, although in differing degrees. The reconstruction policies of both governments stressed government planning and supervision. Each government’s reconstruction policies also contained healthy doses of faith in technology and progress. The CCF, as its socialist ideology demanded, took planning and supervision one step beyond what Liberal policy required. Prosperity, stability and, ultimately, progress in all aspects of life were the rights of every Canadian. Their way of life had been proven the right one by the Allied victory in 1945. With almost religious fervour the CCF set out to conquer what had once been considered wilderness. At best the area the provincial government chose for its co-operative farming experiment had been considered submarginal land. In 1946 the CCF led its chosen people into the wilderness to prove the moral superiority of its ideological tenets.
Chapter Three

"Last Year's Crop Stood in the Wet Fields": The Carrot River Project

Soon after the CCF came to power in Saskatchewan it began implementing its ideological agenda. Part of its plan to create an organized economy and society was to create co-operative enterprises. One such endeavour was the creation of co-operative farms. The CCF began with Saskatchewan's need to reconstruct its agriculture sector by settling veterans on co-operative farms. The provincial government chose to create veterans' co-operatives on crown land in the Carrot River valley. The government held title to the land and was, therefore, capable of controlling all aspects of settlement in the area. In 1946 the CCF began planning for the huge undertaking of creating the farms. The government conducted soil surveys and land classification, organized and paid for the clearing and breaking of the land, hired the workers for the clearing and breaking project and instructed the same men in co-operative principles. The government was aware that past attempts at settlement in the area had met with limited success. Therefore the CCF did the best it could to plan the project. With the aid of VLA grants to veterans, it hoped to be more successful at settling the area than in the past. The only flaw in the programme was the CCF's blind faith in its ideology and the possibilities technology had to offer. In the end the Carrot River project was unsuccessful because faith in technology and planning could not conquer existing environmental conditions.

Agricultural settlement in the northern areas of Saskatchewan was limited and disorganized until the late 1930s. Even then it was not as highly organized as the CCF's plan in the late 1940s. In the post-World War One period the federal government controlled
the natural resources of the western provinces. The federal ministry of the Interior supervised land assessment in the northern part of Saskatchewan because it believed Great War veterans from the province would want to farm. The provincial government was not interested in agricultural settlement in the region; it doubted the availability of good land, and transportation systems were not well developed.88

Settlement mostly occurred outside previously occupied areas simply because opportunities in more established agricultural areas were limited.89 But settlers, mainly veterans of the Great War, purposefully avoided the Carrot River valley. They moved north of the Saskatchewan River into the Whitefox valley, north of Nipawin. The land there had better drainage and was less prone to flooding in the spring and fall.90

Settlement in the region during the 1920s did not produce a large population. Settlement was scattered and the population represented only four or five percent of the entire province.91 The population density in the area rarely exceeded five people per square mile.92 According to historian Denis Fitzgerald, “settlement had been achieved with almost no planning either by government or by private individuals. No group settlement schemes had been originated. The pioneer had been largely free to follow his own ideas and inclinations.”93

Northern settlement in the 1930s was unlike settlement of any other period in

89 Ibid., 202
90 Ibid., 212.
91 Ibid., 215.
92 Ibid., 216.
93 Ibid.
Saskatchewan's history. Many families had lost their farms in the south to the drought and poor prices. It is difficult to describe the despair of those who moved north. Many people were destitute; they had pawned or sold what they could, and many had been eating little more than cabbage and potatoes for months. Thousands of people took what they could in horse-drawn automobiles along the highways reminding some World War I veterans of the refugees they had seen in France. Many migrants moved as families and their campfires could be seen in miles-long lines along the highways. They were seeking nothing more than food, shelter and a bit of dignity; the south could no longer provide them with these bare essentials. More than thirty thousand people migrated from southern to northern Saskatchewan between 1932 and 1934 in hopes of easing the despair of the Depression. Many wanted to continue farming but some never intended to settle permanently; these people were only looking for hay for their livestock or for employment. "By 1934 four to five years of complete crop failure had persuaded many southern farmers ... to move north permanently." 

Some migrants were aware that soil conditions might be less than adequate in the north, but were convinced that generous rainfall would compensate for the soil. Those who migrated were looking for any way to survive: they believed that the north was blessed with ample moisture and, therefore, settled or squatted wherever they thought was a good place

94 Ibid., 315.
95 Ibid., 317.
96 Ibid., 314, 315.
97 Ibid., 316.
98 Ibid., 317, 319.
to settle. This belief was substantiated by the fact that rainfall in the northern forest fringe was above normal in the early part of the 1930s and remained adequate until the later years of the decade. Migrants to the northern fringe, however, required more than rain to survive. Many migrants were unable to bring more than the bare necessities with them when they left the south. Without livestock and farming equipment surviving was difficult. People could not just build a cabin and dig a kitchen garden and expect to survive. The thought that living conditions might be just as difficult in the north as in the south could not be imagined – not if these migrants intended to survive.

With thousands of people settling without title to land all over the northern area of the province the government felt the need to intervene and organize the situation. The Saskatchewan government created a northern resettlement program not only to reign in the chaos of migration but because it believed the land would sustain families that might otherwise suffer in the cities. Dawn Bowen succinctly describes this belief in the land in her 1995 article: "‘Forward to a Farm’: Land Settlement as Unemployment Relief in the 1930s." In her study of settlement policies and programmes, she emphasized the agrarian nature of Canadian identity. “In urban environments, people had nothing on which to fall back. On the farm, at least, they would not starve.” Such settlement plans, however, were not intended as schemes for permanent settlement but merely as temporary relief from the

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99 Ibid., 319.
100 Ibid., 320.
101 Ibid., 317.
102 Dawn S. Bowen, “‘Forward to a Farm’: Land Settlement as Unemployment Relief in the 1930s,” Prairie Forum, vol. 20, no. 2, Fall 1995, 225.
In 1933, the provincial government created the Relief Settlement programme to organize the settlement of northern Saskatchewan. The huge numbers of people arriving in the northern area and staking claims wherever they could made for a bureaucratic nightmare. A state needs order to function properly; the swift filling up of the region, mainly by squatters, created an extremely difficult situation for the government. The Relief Settlement system was basically an agricultural welfare programme tacked onto the existing homesteading system. Under the Relief Settlement programme the provincial government was forced to abandon the traditional sixty-four section system to allow for settlement on the best available land. It appears to have been unable to satisfy the needs of those who were already living in the area because in 1934 an amendment had to be made to loosen survey requirements on crown land and improvement duties by settlers. The amendment also included opportunities for credit to be extended to settlers under the programme.

The situation in the north in the 1930s created two types of problems. The first was that the land itself was not well suited to the kind of agriculture practised in the south. The second was that government bureaucracy could not (or would not) create policies and programmes that met the needs of settlers and squatters. By 1935 it was clear that the Relief Settlement programme was not alleviating the problems of settlement in the north. Settlement continued illegally on school land and land reserved for forestry and grazing. Many of these squatters simply could not pay to register their occupancy of the land. The

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103 Ibid., 226.
105 Ibid., 325.
provincial government tried to ameliorate the situation by enacting the Saskatchewan Homestead Act in 1935. It cancelled other existing pieces of land legislation relating to northern regions of the province and made squatting legal. This Act opened some of the forest reserve land for cultivation despite heavy tree cover, rocky soil, sandy soil, and a prevalence of flooding. "All areas released contained isolated patches of good land; but rarely was it possible to find more than 20 to 25 continuous acres in one location." The new Act did little more than give legal title to all settlers – it provided no new financial assistance. In the 1930s, the provincial government spent much of its energy in the north simply following a forest fire with a garden hose. The problems created by migration were too much for the government to rationalize. Near the end of the 1930s, with the return of a more favourable economic outlook, the fire slowly died down. The Saskatchewan government took this opportunity to assess its role in northern settlement.

In the final year of the decade, W.F. Kerr, Minister of Municipal Affairs, expressed regret that so much settlement had occurred on submarginal land. He also stated unequivocally that the government knew of no more land suitable for agriculture and that "the northern advance of agriculture [had] been halted." In 1940 all settlement legislation, including that passed in the previous decade, was cancelled and all Crown lands were removed from potential settlement. This, of course, was not the end of settlement in the
northern forest fringe. The area was again considered when the necessity of settling veterans of the Second World War arose in the 1940s.

The land upon which the Carrot River co-operative farms were established was federal crown land in the Pasquia Forest Reserve until 1931 when it became provincial crown land. The area saw no settlement until the late 1930s; and then it was only settled by squatters.\footnote{Ibid., 217, 313.} The land was proposed to be withdrawn from the forest reserve for settlement sometime between 1930 and 1940 and was being considered as available to enlarge existing farms.\footnote{Ibid., 322, 329} However, even in 1941, none of the land was under cultivation.\footnote{Ibid., 368.} It was only after the area was removed from the Pasquia Forest Reserve in the late 1940s that the land was put under the plough.\footnote{Ibid., 470.}

The government of Saskatchewan's attitude regarding the feasibility of cultivating the northern forest fringe changed entirely due to technological innovations during the Second World War. An organization called the Canadian Society of Technical Agriculturalists suggested that some submarginal land would have to be cultivated in the postwar period. This would be necessary not only to accommodate returned service personnel but also to meet increased worldwide food demand.\footnote{Ibid., 449.} The strong belief in science and technology as the saviours of society led the technical agriculturalists to state that extensive soil surveys were central to further settlement in the forest fringe. Soil classification surveys would ensure that only suitable land would be cultivated; any other

\footnote{Ibid., 217, 313.}
\footnote{Ibid., 322, 329}
\footnote{Ibid., 368.}
\footnote{Ibid., 470.}
\footnote{Ibid., 449.}
land should be set aside for re-forestation, pasture land or other such projects. The irony of calling for scientific soil surveys was that their purpose was underlain by the desire to find more agricultural land. The postwar belief that technology was the key to a better future led to a search for agricultural land where none had previously existed. The provincial government believed that technological innovations in agriculture would make submarginal land suitable for cultivation.

During the Second World War all Canadian governments were examining and creating different policies to deal with the re-establishment of returning service personnel. In Saskatchewan the focus was, of course, agriculture. It was clear to policy makers that new farms would have to be created somewhere other than the established southern portion of the province. Agricultural land in that area was already occupied. Studies were conducted to examine how best to go about settling the northern forest fringe. These studies made a few suggestions regarding settlement in the area. The first suggestion was that the government should encourage large farms. Secondly, the government was encouraged to clear and break land before settlement occurred. Thirdly, the northern settlement programme needed to be extremely well planned; that meant that there needed to be plans in place for hospitals, schools, electricity and transportation as well as homes and farms. Finally, one study suggested that "[t]his would be an excellent area for testing co-operative farming," as "[t]he development of the northern area of Saskatchewan is far too large an undertaking for the individual." All of these suggestions, especially the one regarding experimenting with co-operative farms, were integrated into the creation of the Carrot River

117 Ibid., 450.
118 Ibid., 452 - 453.
When the CCF took office in Saskatchewan in 1944 one of its first acts as government was the creation of the Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development. The first annual report of the department outlined six primary advantages of co-operation in agriculture: the creation of economies of scale in buying and selling; the elimination of middlemen in the grain handling industry; protection for agricultural producers against inferior implements; a superior study of the agricultural market; the belief that co-operation created responsible citizens and induced men to be prudent in their affairs; and, finally, a more cohesive rural society. These advantages of co-operation referred to all kinds of co-operatives – machinery co-ops, grazing co-ops, producer co-ops, and other types of agricultural co-operatives.

Part of the allure of co-operative farming, as stated by the Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, was the ability to create economies of scale in the agricultural sector. The demand for increased production during the war was expected to remain in the postwar period. Increased production would maintain stable levels of employment and income which were imperative to prevent postwar recession. Such an increase in production was possible only with continued agricultural mechanization. The ability to purchase big, expensive equipment required for increased production would be better achieved by farmers pooling their capital in the form of co-operative associations. This phenomenon made it possible for the provincial government to view the Carrot River

district, as well as other sparsely settled areas of northern Saskatchewan, as potential agricultural land. Heavy machinery would make clearing, breaking and cultivating the land possible. In the period following the Second World War anything was possible; with enough heavy machinery any land could now be agricultural land.  

The land chosen for the Carrot River project was not immediately recognizable as farm land. It had relatively heavy tree cover and was mainly muskeg. The only economic activity in the region was logging. It had been avoided by settlers in the early part of the century. The area was sparsely inhabited and transportation to and from the region was difficult. Such a situation was similar to that faced by pioneers in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In the middle of the twentieth century, however, Canadians expected an easier life than their predecessors and were interested in accumulating luxuries. A pioneer experience was not what most Canadians wanted. In order to create an agriculturally productive area and rural communities the government had to embark upon an intensive programme of classifying, clearing and settling the area.

Soil surveys and land classification played an important role in the Carrot River project. A preliminary soil survey of the area was conducted from 1942 to 1944. This was done as part of the Saskatchewan Soil Survey which was established early in the 20th century. The Soil Survey had completed its classification of townships one to forty-eight prior to 1944 in the areas where agricultural settlement had first occurred. The primary

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purpose of the new preliminary survey was to map out land for agriculture, therefore, the
survey began on the northern portion of the province for the postwar period. 121 Essentially,
the surveyors found exactly what they were looking for. In spite of the previous belief that
the province had no more land available for agriculture, the idea of progress made it possible
for the surveyors to believe the Carrot River suitable for agriculture. 122

The final survey of townships north of township 48 was not published until 1950.
The provincial government was, therefore, working with incomplete information while
planning the Carrot River project. Much of the information the CCF was working with came
from a preliminary soil survey conducted by J. Mitchell, a professor of soil science at the
University of Saskatchewan; R.A. Gross, a graduate student in soils at the same university;
and J.S. Clayton, an agricultural scientist with the Experimental Farm Service. The area
encompassed a number of stony ridges “considered to be a succession of beaches marking
the various stages in the level of Glacial Lake Agassiz.” 123 Generally, the area was described
as flat and poorly drained, consisting of muskeg and peat. The western portion of the area
consisted of deep valleys cut by the Carrot and Saskatchewan rivers, whereas the eastern
portion had shallower valleys and experienced frequent flooding. The surveyors reported
that digging ditches aided in drainage in more settled areas (nearer Carrot River and

121 J. Mitchell, J.C. Moss and J.S. Clayton, Soil Survey of Saskatchewan Covering the Agriculturally
Settled Areas North of Township 48, (Saskatoon 1950), iii.

122 The perception of the Canadian prairies has changed in similar ways since the mid-nineteenth century. For
example, the scientific expedition led by Capt. John Palliser from 1857 to 1860 declared the
southernmost portion of what is now Saskatchewan to be unsuitable for agriculture. However,
subsequent expeditions claimed that Palliser had exaggerated the extent of unsuitability and
settlement began in the southern area of what is now Saskatchewan. Of course, much of what
Palliser believed was shown to be true when the area became the “Dust Bowl” of the 1930s.

Gross, “Preliminary Soil survey of a Portion of the Carrot River Valley (Townships 48 to 54,
Ranges 4 to 11, West of the 2nd Meridian),” Saskatchewan Soil Survey, April, 1944, 3.
Arborfield, perhaps) “and has made possible satisfactory agricultural development.” In spite of the fact that the district was covered with rocks and trees as well as being subject to frequent flooding, the scientists still suggested that with enough intervention the district could produce “satisfactory agricultural development.” Due to postwar faith in progress and technology, the findings of the survey did not preclude the area from being considered potential agricultural land.

Another phenomenon that made the Carrot River potential agricultural land in the postwar period was the increased use of chemical herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers. Presenters at a meeting of the Special Planning Committee on Co-operative Farming for Veterans saw great promise for agriculture in the northern forest fringe if chemicals were used. At this meeting in July 1947, Fred Schroer from the University of Saskatchewan’s Soils Department indicated that the use of fertilizers would both speed up the time taken for the soil to reach its maximum productivity and, if applied in spring, would help crops started in the cold soil. J.B. Durrant indicated that the weeds present in the area could be easily controlled both by cultivation and the use of chemical herbicides. Technological developments during the Second World War led to a general belief in the postwar era that such developments were inherently good. The use of chemicals could turn any soil into agriculturally productive soil. The ability of chemicals and machinery to increase productive agricultural acreage seemed to be Saskatchewan’s salvation. Increased acreage meant increased exports and, therefore, farm income.

124 Ibid., 4.
126 Ibid.
As the soil surveys and land classification were being conducted, the Department of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation began the arduous and expensive work of clearing and breaking land for settlement by veterans. The clearing and breaking project had "a double-barrelled objective; firstly to clear land for veteran settlement; secondly to bring veterans together so that they can make their own selection of partners for co-operative farming." 127

The clearing began late in 1946 and by 1947 the project was well underway. In March of that year 200 acres had been broken — all in the area of the Pasquia Forest Reserve’s ‘Big Burn’ of 1937 which had no second growth appearing. 128 Early in 1947 the planning committee projected the possibility of 8,000 acres being cleared and broken that year. 129 The committee also planned to employ forty men at the peak of the season — it had received many applications and had fifteen men scheduled to begin work on May 1. 130

The clearing and breaking project’s second purpose, as described by the government, was to bring veterans together with intention that they would form co-operatives. 131 In spite of the fact that in the same information bulletin the government insisted that the land clearing programme should not be confused with the co-operative farms project, 132 both programmes were inextricably linked. Only veterans who were interested in co-operative farming in the area were hired to work on the clearing and breaking project. The

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127 SAB. Sturdy Papers, M14, I.33; ‘Carrot River Programme’ information bulletin, January 11, 1949.
130 SAB. Sturdy Papers, M14, I. 33; Meetings of the Special Planning Committee April 3, 1947.
131 SAB. Sturdy Papers, M14, I.33; ‘Carrot River Programme’ information bulletin, January 11, 1949.
132 Ibid.
government organized conferences called Co-operative Schools which were designed to give veterans a better understanding of co-operative farming and convince them to form groups which would become co-operative farming organizations. The “veterans who attended the conference[s] would have priority in the opportunity of working on the [clearing and breaking] project.”

In turn those men who worked on the clearing and breaking project would be the men settled on cleared land to begin their co-operative farms. While the government intended to open some land in the region to individual farming, its first priority was to the co-operative farming project and to those veterans who adopted the philosophy of co-operation.

The provincial government was willing to fund the clearing and breaking project with its own money, but it needed to tap into federal funds to settle veterans on the co-ops. Provincial dealings with the federal government were not always easy. The federal government entered into agreements with several other provinces to supply veterans with grants to settle on crown land. However, the federal government was not willing to give the $2,320 grant to a veteran who was a member of a co-operative farming association.

Liberal policy focussed on the individual family farm and its intention was to give VLA grants to veterans who entered into this type of farming. Much of the discussion between the federal Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) and the provincial Department of

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133 SAB. Sturdy Papers, M14, I. 33; Meetings of the Special Planning Committee May 3, 1947.
134 SAB. Sturdy Papers, M14, I.33; Special Planning Committee Meeting, July 19 - 21, 1947.
135 SAB. Sturdy Papers, M14, I.33; Memo from J.F. McKay to M.D. Dalgleish, August 3, 1948.
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation centred on the DVA's concern that an individual's title to land would be lost if he left the co-operative. The provincial government was determined that veterans on co-operative farms should receive the same grant as other veterans.

In 1946 the Parliamentary Committee on Veterans' Affairs had refused proposed amendments to the Veterans' Land Act that would have allowed co-operative farmers similar to individual farmers. Late in the same year officials with the VLA had developed a proposal they hoped might rectify the situation. In March 1947 the provincial Special Planning Committee on Veterans' Co-operative Farming still did not have any assurance from the federal government that changes were being made to the VLA. The Special Planning Committee made the provincial and federal governments aware of the situation. At a meeting in April 1947 J.H. Sturdy phoned Gordon Murchison, Director of the Veterans' Land Act, personally and was able to report good news to the committee.

The Veterans' Land Act was amended on March 31, 1947 to allow for "a grant pursuant to Regulation 38 in an amount not exceeding $1,200 may be made to any veteran in a group consisting of not more than ten veterans who propose conducting joint operations in farming or forestry, for the purchase of machinery essential to farming, or machinery and equipment essential to forestry." With this amendment the provincial government was able to go ahead with the co-operative farming project without dipping into its own resources.

138 Ibid. 57 - 58.
139 Postwar Plans, Canada: Government Measures: Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, (Winnipeg 1948), section 2-7-1, 12A.
The CCF’s dream of creating self-sustaining co-operative farming associations in the province’s northerly bush appeared to be coming true in 1948. By the end of that year, four of the ten veterans’ co-operative farms in the area were incorporated, and by 1952 all ten were established. However, problems began to occur in the early 1950s. The climate and the environment seemed particularly unforgiving during the first five years of the 1950s. Many of the veterans had to find off-farm work to support the co-operative; other members simply dissolved their co-operatives. The ideas that developed the project, it would seem, were sound. The project was intended to re-establish veterans on farms and reduce the economic risk by creating economies of scale and using sufficient labour to turn the co-ops into going concerns. The members were all well acquainted with co-operative principles. The government did not neglect to survey the soil and classify the land before establishing veterans on farms in the region. The question then remains; why did so many of these farms fail?

The ten veterans’ co-operative farms in the Carrot River district were established between 1948 and 1951. Each co-op had between seven and fourteen members. Each member was leased 320 acres of crown land, 100 acres of which was broken before settlement. Each member was also entitled to a $2,320 grant from the VLA for settlement on crown land. Twelve hundred dollars of that grant could be pooled with other members for the purchase of stock and equipment while the other $1,120 was for improving individual members’ leased land. Payment for the leased land was to be made on a crop-sharing basis.
with the provincial government. The first of ten veterans' co-operative farms, the River Bend Co-operative Farming Association, was incorporated on January 14th 1948. The co-op was started by ten veterans and held 3,200 acres, almost half of which was under cultivation that year. In its first crop year the co-op harvested 7,000 bushels each of wheat and malt barley, 12,000 bushels of oats, and 325,000 pounds of Argentine rape seed. The good harvest brought in $48,060. Sunnydale Co-operative Farm, established the same year by seven members, also harvested a good crop in 1948. Sunnydale harvested 1,320 bushels of wheat, 4,010 bushels of oats, 2,434 bushels of malt barley and 85,000 pounds of Argentine rape seed; the farm netted $12,806. If the crops brought in by these two farms were indicative of what the co-operative farms in the region were capable of, it is no wonder that the provincial government and veterans continued to established such institutions into the early 1950s. Three other co-operative farms were incorporated in 1948: Pasquia Hills Co-operative Farming Association; Spruce Home Co-operative Farming Association; and Sturdy Co-operative Farming Association. The Pasquia Hills farm was the largest, with fourteen members; Sturdy was begun by eight veterans; and Spruce Home by six veterans. The Fairview co-operative

140 In 1947 the Special Planning Committee decided on a system of crop-sharing: in the first year there would be no payments; the rental would be increased to one-quarter of the crop for the next six years; after the seventh year the rental would equal between one-sixth and one-eighth of the crop; the one stipulation was that these numbers were the maximum rental and could be reduced if necessary.

141 Saskatchewan, Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Co-operative Development, vol 3, no. 1, January 1948, 1.

142 SAB, Sturdy Papers, M14, file I, 33: Memo from J.F. McKay to Hon. J.H. Sturdy, November 1, 1948.

143 Ibid.

144 Saskatchewan, Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development. Annual Report, March 31, 1949, Co-operative Extension Services, (Regina 1950), E.S. 4.
farm was incorporated in 1949. The Willowdale Co-operative Farming Association was incorporated the next year. The final three co-operative farms were all incorporated in 1951; Pleasant Acres, Papikwan, and Woodland co-operative farms.

The veterans who established farms in the 1950s must have been extremely optimistic because the Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development reported that the 1950 crop in this area was badly frozen and not harvested at all in some places due to a wet fall. And by 1952 one of the first co-operative farms – Pasquia Hills – had dissolved. The co-operative farms performed poorly both economically and socially. The biggest problems faced by the farmers and their families involved the weather and the soil. Although the issues of climate and soil were not the only problems encountered, adequate soil and weather conditions are the foundations of agriculture.

In 1985 the people of the town of Carrot River and the Rural Municipality of Moose Range published a history of the area. A number of people contributed their recollections of life on the co-operative farms. None of the pieces were fond remembrances of their experience. Not only did the farms experience cold, wet springs and early frosts, but the co-ops did not become cohesive social units. The women especially experienced extreme isolation. The stories of the people who lived on the co-operative farms in the 1950s graphically illustrate the difficulties faced by the veterans and their families.

145 McGrath, “A Challenge to Tradition,” 140.
146 Ibid.
147 Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Annual Report, March 31, 1951; Co-operative Extension Services, (Regina 1952), E.S. 6.
148 Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Annual Report, March 31, 1952; Co-operative Extension Services, (Regina 1953), E.S. 19
149 Ibid., E.S. 6.
150 McGrath, “A Challenge to Tradition,” 140.
In spite of the suggestion that plans be made for roads, schools, hospitals and electricity before the co-ops were created, this did not happen. The only project undertaken by the government before settlement was the clearing and breaking of farm lands. The Smoky Burn area of the Pasquia Forest Reserve was “six miles north and eighteen miles east of the town of Carrot River but due to lack of road construction it was necessary to travel thirty-five miles to reach town.”

Until 1952, when a permanent bridge was built across the Carrot River, it was practically impossible to reach town, especially in rainy weather. The road was impassable and the temporary bridge went out each spring due to flooding.

There had been no accommodations made for children, such as schools, playgrounds and recreational centres, even though the co-operative farms were intended as social units of families. Edith Curtis, whose husband was a member of Pasquia Hills Co-op Farm, remembered that when she first moved to the farm with her small son it was a dangerous area for children. She could not let him play outside by himself and spent a lot of time minding him. There were no teenagers or grandparents on the co-ops so the women had no babysitters. In 1949 Edith Curtis taught the area’s children but only for half days. The five dollars paid by each family allowed for the Department of Education’s minimum salary for a teacher working half days. Late in 1949 the local school board, made up of three co-op members, had a school built. The teachers, however, never stayed on very long due to the isolation they experienced.

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152 Ibid., 87.
153 Ibid., 89.
A number of factors contributed to the women’s sense of isolation, geography being only one of them. The wives of the members were not co-op members in their own right and had no say in the operation of the farms. On the Pasquia Hills farm the women did not become friends. Only four of the twelve women had any farming background which made life on the co-op farm particularly trying.

... the farm operations were carried on with the aid of modern machinery. Most households had none of the modern conveniences. Many of the women came from urban centers [sic] where they were accustomed to gas or electric appliances. It was not easy to learn to cope with wood burning stoves, kerosene or gas lamps, and to use a tub and scrub-board for washing. Many came to feel that there must be opportunities elsewhere. They did not wish to live as pioneers while most Canadians were acquiring what were once considered luxuries.

Women’s days were consumed with tending gardens, canning meat and vegetables, chopping wood, doing laundry by hand, and making sure their children did not get stuck in the mud. A few attempts were made at organizing community clubs or associations. In the late 1940s the provincial government sent a representative from the Women’s Co-operative Guild to start a local guild and start craft classes, but without a community centre and babysitters the meetings did not continue for very long. Later the women in the Smoky Burn area did create a community association and were able to bring in a nurse to vaccinate the children, but that association did last long either. The community did not have a church nor a minister who visited very often; this only compounded the problems of isolation and lack of social cohesion.

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155 Curtis, “An Experiment that Failed,” 92.

156 Ibid., 89.

157 Ibid., 92.
The lives of the men on the co-operative farms in the Smoky Burn area were just as difficult as the lives of the women. Few of the first five years of the existence of the co-operatives were easy. Springs were often cold, springs and summers were extremely wet—“It rained so much during the summer that every man, woman and child wore rubber boots almost constantly.” Frost often came early to the region. In 1950 frost came in the middle of August. “Hundreds of acres of standing grain had to be burned that year.” Snowfall was heavy and a new dumping of snow often arrived in mid- to late May. The River Bend Co-operative Farm kept records of climatic conditions between 1949 and 1955. These records give a good idea of why the farms failed:

... 1949, a very early spring, very little run off water encountered, fields dry enough to work without getting stuck. Then on May 22 snow flurries, heavy frost, fourteen degrees F. May 24 – very cold and windy, May 31 – heavy rain showers. May 12, 1950 – a very cold wet spring, very little field work done. Tried doing field work with T.D. Cat and Disc but no progress made. October 9, 1950 harvest operations held up for two weeks due to wet weather. October 19, same year, still no harvesting done. Wet heavy snow has put the crop flat on the ground. November 17, 1950, snowing heavy, looks like the end of the harvest this year. November 21, combining flax but bitter cold weather makes it almost unbearable. May 13, 1951, things drying up good, started to snow at noon, May 29. May 3, 1954 – a very heavy snow fall of a week ago has changed the picture of what seemed like an early spring. May 29, 1954 started to seed wheat but on May 31 the ground was covered with snow again. May 9, 1955 although the snow fall for winter was lighter than usual, because of heavy April rains combined with excessive moisture from last fall, the fields are in very soggy condition. We had four and one half inches of rain in April. In May so far, rain every second day. The river has been flooding continually since spring breakup. ‘A real nice summer’ August 26, began swathing barley, August 31, swathing wheat. September 5, 1955 straight combining wheat – ‘The nicest sample of grain we have ever grown so far.’

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158 ibid., 90
These records paint a particularly grim picture as River Bend was the first co-op farm in the area; it was incorporated in 1947, but did not produce a crop members were proud of until 1955.

The excessive moisture in the area obviously created problems for cultivation. Machines became bogged down in the mud. Much of the work of drawing the machines was done by caterpillars on tracks to reduce the possibility of getting stuck. Excessive precipitation also caused the Carrot River to flood; Edith Curtis recalled the small bridge going out every spring until 1952 when a sturdier bridge was built. The real problem of too much precipitation was that the soil held it all. Drainage ditches had been dug, but did not seem to adequately drain the soil. Sometime in the mid-1950s a new survey was done and it was discovered that “an error had been made in taking the elevations and the ditches were dug incorrectly.”

This information came too late for some co-op members; the Pasquia Hills and Fairview Co-operative Farms had dissolved by 1952.

The farms were not successful financially. Most members worked in the logging and lumber industries around Carrot River to support their families and their co-ops. According to George Preston, a founding member of the Papikwan co-op farm, which had been formed in 1951, “very little farming was accomplished until 1955.” The Fairview farm fared no better. The co-op was formed in 1949 and by “1951 some members left to work out and

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161 Curtis, “an Experiment that Failed,” 91.
162 According to Florence (Flossie) Jones, who lived on the Fairview farm this co-op split up in 1952 although according to the official records of the Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, as collected by D. McGrath, the Fairview farm dissolved in 1955.
earn some much need cash, some never returned. 164 The Sunnydale farm ran with one member during the winter and the others worked in the logging industry or wherever they could find work. 165 The demise of the Sturdy Co-operative Farm illustrates most poignantly the fate of many of the farms and their members.

In the spring of 1955 we voted to dissolve the Co-op farm with each remaining member retaining his own lease. Our farm machinery which was jointly owned by eight members, had to be sold at public auction to pay our debts. No individual had money to buy any of it. 166

The provincial government put a lot of time, energy and money into the planning and creation of the Carrot River Project. Unfortunately the project was an ideological invention and succumbed to the harsh reality of the environment of northern Saskatchewan. The project rested on two ideological foundations: that technocratic planning could bring about success in anything; and that progress and technological innovation could transform bog and muskeg into wheat-growing soil. Of course, climatic conditions are rarely completely predictable and agriculture is always at the mercy of the weather. The high modernist vision of the CCF and its planning committee is apparent in the examination of the Carrot River project. The Saskatchewan government had a fervent and unwavering faith in progress and technology. The government let this faith blind it to the realities of the environment in northern Saskatchewan.

164 Jones, "Fairview Co-op Farm," 93.
166 Tom Derry, "Sturdy Co-op Farm at Smoky Burn," 94.
Conclusion

"The Central Moral Tenet to Succeed Christianity": Progress in Postwar Saskatchewan

The province of Saskatchewan established the Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life in October 1952. The purpose of the Royal Commission was "to investigate and make recommendations regarding the requirements for the maintenance of a sound farm economy and the improvement of social conditions and amenities in rural Saskatchewan." The Commission recognized that the veterans' co-operatives in the Carrot River area were experiencing serious problems. The interim report expressed the commissioners concern that "Saskatchewan has passed the period of pioneer settlement, with its seemingly unlimited opportunities for establishment in farming" and, that "a good deal of the land now under production must be considered sub-marginal, at least until greater success is realized in understanding and encouraging its proper use." The six members of the commission did not disagree with the principles of co-operation nor with the establishment of co-operative farms; they were worried about the status of the farms at the time. The commissioners were troubled by the environment in which the farms operated and the way in which members' leases were granted.

In 1953 the Royal Commission was sufficiently concerned about settlement projects in the northeast to create an interim report specifically regarding government projects on crown land in the region. The report was necessary because the veterans' co-operative farms were experiencing serious problems. The interim report expressed the commissioners concern that "Saskatchewan has passed the period of pioneer settlement, with its seemingly unlimited opportunities for establishment in farming" and, that "a good deal of the land now under production must be considered sub-marginal, at least until greater success is realized in understanding and encouraging its proper use." The six members of the commission did not disagree with the principles of co-operation nor with the establishment of co-operative farms; they were worried about the status of the farms at the time. The commissioners were troubled by the environment in which the farms operated and the way in which members' leases were granted.

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167 Saskatchewan, Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life, Report No. 8: Agricultural Markets and Prices, (Regina 1956), v.
168 Saskatchewan, Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life, Crown Land Settlement in Northeastern Saskatchewan, (Regina 1954), 5.
169 Ibid., 1.
were established on sub-marginal land. The flooding and early frosts in the area jeopardized the continuation of the farms. The environmental problems the co-ops faced seriously undermined the veterans’ optimism and, therefore, commitment to the co-operatives. The way the government issued leases to members was also a deterrent to commitment. The leases were granted to individual members, not to the co-operative as a whole. The leases were tied to VLA grants; the grants were awarded to individuals with the option to pool the money. The Royal Commission recommended removing the VLA influence from co-operative farms and their members. The Commission believed that individual leases with a purchase option after ten years discouraged veterans from making a whole-hearted commitment to the principles of co-operation.

The Commission’s concerns about the suitability of the environment for agriculture were well-founded. All the soil surveys had indicated that most of the area did not have well-drained soil and had a shorter growing season than the southern grasslands. One might argue that the province was built by sturdy pioneer folk who were relatively well acquainted with the rigours of pioneer life. While this may be true, in general, one difference between agricultural settlement in the south and pioneer settlement in northern bush-land is that the southern area is well-suited to growing grass. All the predominant crops grown by Saskatchewan farmers are grasses – wheat, oats and barley – while the northern bush areas did not have fields of native grasses growing before agricultural settlement. The belief that humans could do as they pleased to the land with the aid of scientific and technological innovations created the problems the Carrot River area co-operative farmers faced in the

170 Ibid., 38.
171 Ibid.
1950s. While agriculture has continued in this area and agriculture itself did not cause early frosts and excessive moisture, the arrogance of “progress” created difficult circumstances for veterans interested in beginning prosperous and secure lives for themselves and their families.

Another difference between farming in the early-twentieth century and farming in the middle of the century is that farmers and their families expected to acquire the same luxuries that urban and suburban families were acquiring in the mid-twentieth century. Technological innovation combined with a number of different factors to create the unique atmosphere of the immediate postwar period. The young people who were set to make up the majority of the workforce were determined to give their children all the luxuries they had never known. These people wanted to build the new social order that had been promised them if they won the war. They set about doing so in dramatic fashion. They purchased modern homes and numerous electric appliances for their homes. In the 1950s most families acquired a car. Those who chose to farm and live in rural communities were just as interested in acquiring electricity, indoor plumbing, cars and the household goods that urban Canadians were purchasing.

The Carrot River project was destined for failure because geography and the environment could not be conquered by technology or government planning. The soil held moisture too well; the area often flooded, and people and machines kept getting stuck in the mud. Transportation in the area was difficult without paved roads and good bridges, and the rail line stopped at the town of Carrot River. Progress, and the luxuries that were said to come from that progress, was not coming to the veterans who farmed the area. According
to Edith Curtis, the women of the co-operative farms certainly wanted to acquire the household luxuries that urban women had. The men and women who farmed in the middle of the twentieth century had endured pain and hardship most of their lives. Progress was the antithesis of pain and hardship. Conditions in the Carrot River area were not conducive to progress and the standard of living promised those who won the war.

The idea of progress is at the heart of this discussion regarding agricultural reconstruction in Saskatchewan’s northern forest fringe. The idea of progress is difficult to define; it is deeply ingrained in the North American psyche. The Canadian philosopher John Ralston Saul describes progress in this way:

> Often presented as the central moral tenet to succeed Christianity, progress is a complex and ambiguous mixture of technique and ideology. This ambiguity is erased in our society by reducing the subject to a simple question: Are you for or against progress? thus denying any middle ground. The imposition of a false question to create an equally false moral quandary is a strategy often used by ideologies to ensure the desired answer. To be for is to seek the salvation of mankind (and more recently of women). To be against is to join the LUDDITES [sic] and other pessimistic sentimentalists in their dark corners of refusal, destruction and disorder.\footnote{Saul himself admits that this is a vague definition. His definition is, however, correct. The idea of progress is so entrenched in the North American psyche that few question the underlying implications of the very word \textit{progress}. North Americans are “for” progress; North Americans were especially “for” progress in the immediate postwar period. Saul states that progress is not all bad – “Where we have made progress is in what we can do or construct. The progress of knowledge. Technical progress. Social progress.”} \footnote{\textit{ibid.}, 241.}

North Americans were especially “for” progress in the immediate postwar period. Saul states that progress is not all bad – “Where we have made progress is in what we can do or construct. The progress of knowledge. Technical progress. Social progress.”\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, 239 - 240.} For Saul, however, this begs the question:
... can a specific example of progress be counted as an improvement if it is not part of an integrated change? In other words, does not each specific progress carry within it the power to destabilize other elements if there is no integration? An unintegrated improvement may actually provoke an equal regression. Or an improvement may prosper beside an equal regression which will negate it. 174

It is this conundrum with which this work is concerned. The idea of regression did not accompany the idea of progress in the immediate postwar period. 175 The generation of young people who had survived the Depression and won the war expected to be rewarded by progress and prosperity. They also assumed that their children would prosper to a greater extent than they had, and their grandchildren even more so.

As historian Doug Owram eloquently points out in his study of the baby-boom generation, “[t]he years immediately after the war showed three predominant traits: an irreverence for tradition and classical design, a belief in the possibility of synthetic materials, and a tendency towards mass production of relatively cheap goods. The result was an age typified by a mixture of innovation and shoddy materials, newness and tackiness, modernity and rapid obsolescence.” 176 These three traits can be summarily described as blind faith in technology. What, then, is technology? To quote Saul, technology is an “[i]nanimate, passive material which is not science.” 177 Technology is the application of scientific knowledge in order to serve specific desires of society. Saul argues that during the industrial revolution, “[t]he new rational technocracy – itself devoid of social direction – tended to accept the idea that technological development would provide not simply

174 Ibid.
175 Indeed, one might successfully argue that the idea of regression has not been accepted by mainstream North American society even today.
177 Saul, The Doubter’s Companion, 281.
economic but social and political direction.” This belief can be seen in the atmosphere of the postwar era as well – Canadians believed that technology was the way to economic prosperity as well as social and political stability. Canadians did not question the rapid innovations in technology; they accepted and consumed these innovations as quickly as industry produced them.\(^{178}\)

The postwar period is an especially useful period to study in order to understand the connection between technology, progress, prosperity and stability. In some respects this era was the dawning of a new social order. Never before had Canadians had so much faith in technology. Never before had Canadians had such a strong belief in progress. The years in which this generation had come of age were marred by social and economic hardships and setbacks. There had been little one could point to as “progress” in the life of this generation. The post-World War Two era was also one which saw more scientific research and application of that research than ever before. Perhaps this generation had a right to believe that society would “progress” economically and socially – its members had certainly never prospered in great numbers before. Perhaps this generation also had a right to put its faith in technology – technological innovation appeared to be the way to progress and prosperity. However, to return to the words of John Ralston Saul, “does not each specific progress carry within it the power to destabilize other elements if there is no integration?”\(^{179}\)

One would think that a generation that had suffered through economic collapse and had fought a long, hard war to defend “home” would have been mindful of the precarious nature

\(^{178}\) One will notice that Saul’s definition of “Progress” looks something like this: technique + ideology; one could expand this to represent the postwar concept of “Progress” as: Progress = technique + ideology = technology

\(^{179}\) Saul, The Doubter’s Companion, 241.
The Veterans' Land Act provided a blueprint for agriculture in the postwar period. The creation of the VLA indicated that the federal government envisioned agriculture as a big business. The VLA enabled veterans to farm large parcels of land with the aid of machines and chemicals. Farming in the postwar period would no longer provide subsistence to farm families. Farming would provide an income with which families would purchase the "modern conveniences" that were becoming common—no longer luxuries. For the federal government the creation of the VLA added up to a simple equation: business plus purchasing power equals economic stability. The government believed that once economic stability was achieved then social stability would soon follow. The keys to security in society and the economy were progress and planning. The VLA would help agriculture progress by ensuring that farmers had the means to purchase the necessary machines and chemicals. The VLA could also ensure progress, as well as the stability that would follow, by planning the future of agriculture through the programmes of the Veterans' Land Administration.

In Saskatchewan, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation government believed in progress and planning even more strongly than the federal Liberals. The provincial government's commitment to the principles of co-operation and the creation of co-operative farms is a testament to that strong belief. The provincial government oversaw every aspect of the Carrot River project from choosing the site, clearing the brush, and choosing appropriate men for the project. The CCF wanted to ensure the economic success of these co-operatives and attempted to do so by tapping into the money offered by the VLA. The
CCF saw just as much value in the use of machines and chemicals as the federal government and the general public. In order to achieve the progressive mechanized farms it desired, the provincial government lobbied for changes to the VLA that would enable co-operative farmers to access grants for the purchase of machinery. The federal government provided the blueprint for modern farming and the CCF used that plan to institute its own vision of modern agriculture in Saskatchewan.

The disparities between ideology, policy, and reality have been examined in this work. Policy is at the centre of this argument. Policy is the vehicle by which ideology is articulated. In the case of the VLA, the ideology being articulated was that of progress and the salvation of Canada through technology. Progress, as Saul makes clear, is the great moral tenet that has superceded Christianity – the VLA was part of its canon. In the case of the Carrot River project the ideology being articulated was not only that of progress, but of co-operation. Co-operation would bring about the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth a sacred tenet of the Social Gospel movement from which the CCF emerged.

The policies themselves are a testament to the deeply held beliefs of their creators, but they were not enough to save the veterans who established co-operative farms in the Carrot River valley. Ideologies articulated by these policies were not compatible with the environment in which they were carried out. All the planning and faith in the world were not sufficient to create the new world order in the Carrot River valley.
LEGEND

--- RAILWAYS ---

--- HIGHWAYS ---

--- SECONDARY ROADS ---

- PRAIRIE RIVER
- BJORK LAKE
- CLEMENCEAU
- SMOKY BURN
- LEAF LAKE
- CONNELL CREEK
- RAVENDALE (KENNEDY CREEK AREA)
- CHOICELAND

From Crown Land Settlement in North-Eastern Saskatchewan

-81-
The Veterans' Land Act

An Act to Assist War Veterans To Settle Upon The Land

Bill 65

1. This Act may be cited as The Veterans' Land Act, 1942.

Definitions

2. In this Act, and in any regulation made thereunder, unless the context otherwise requires, the expression

(a) ‘Minister’ means the Minister of Veterans Affairs;

(b) ‘land’ or ‘lands’ includes granted or ungranted Dominion, provincial, or private lands, and real or immovable property, messuages, lands, tenements and hereditaments of any tenure, and real rights, easements and servitudes, streams, watercourses, waters, roads, and ways, and all rights or interests in, or over, or arising out of, and all charges upon, land or lands as herein defined;

(c) ‘property’ includes land, as herein defined, and goods, chattels, real and personal, and personal or movable property, and all rights or interests in, or over, or arising out of, and all charges upon, property as herein defined;

(d) ‘veteran’ means a person who at any time during the war declared by His Majesty on the tenth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-nine, against the German Reich and subsequently against other powers, has been there engaged on active service in a naval, military, or air force of Canada, or of any of His Majesty’s forces if at the time of his enlistment he was ordinarily domiciled or resident in Canada, and

(i) whose service has involved duties required to be performed outside of the Western Hemisphere; or

(ii) who has served only in the Western Hemisphere for a period of at least twelve months, not including any period of absence without leave or leave of absence without pay, time served while undergoing sentence of penal servitude, imprisonment or detention, or service in respect of which pay is forfeited; or

(iii) who, wherever he may have served, is by reason of disability incurred as a result of such service in receipt of a pension; and has been honourably discharged from such naval, military, air force, or other of His Majesty’s forces, or has been permitted honourably to resign or retire therefrom;

and ‘veteran’ also means a British subject who was ordinarily domiciled or resident in Canada at the beginning of the said war and who is in receipt of a pension in respect of a disability incurred while serving upon a ship during the said war.

(Amended by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)

(e) ‘Western Hemisphere’ means the continents of North and South America, the Islands adjacent thereto, and the territorial waters thereof, including Newfoundland, Bermuda, and the West Indies but excluding Greenland, Iceland and the Aleutian Islands.

(Added by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)

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Director And Employees

3. (1) The Governor in Council may appoint an officer to be known as ‘The Director, The Veterans’ Land Act’ (in this Act referred to as ‘the Director’) who shall be responsible to the Minister and be paid such salary as may be fixed by the Governor in Council.

(2) This Act shall be administered by the Minister and the powers and duties conferred or imposed by this Act on the Director shall be exercised or performed subject to the direction of the Minister.

(Amended by BILL 336, passed August 31, 1946.)

4. (1) The Director may from time to time, subject to the provision of the Civil Service Act, attach to his service such officers, instructors, clerks, stenographers and other employees as the execution of the purpose of this Act may require and at such salaries as the Governor in Council may approve.

(2) All such appointees shall perform such duties and functions as the Director may prescribe.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in the Civil Service Act, the Civil Service Superannuation Act, or any other Act, a civil servant who, at the time of his appointment or employment under or pursuant to the provisions of this Act, is a contributor under the provision of the Civil Service Superannuation Act, shall continue to be a contributor under this Act; his service shall be counted as service in the civil service for the purpose of the Civil Service Superannuation Act, and he, his widow, and children or other dependents, if any, shall be eligible to receive the respective allowances or gratuities provided by the said Act; and in the event of his being retired from his office or position under this Act for any reason other than that of misconduct, he shall be eligible, in accordance with the regulation made under section fifty-four of the Civil Service Act, for re-appointment in the Civil Service or to receive the same benefits under the Civil Service Superannuation Act, as if his office or position had been abolished.

Corporate Powers of the Director

5. (1) For the purpose of acquiring, holding, conveying and transferring and of agreeing to convey, acquire or transfer any of the property which he is by this Act authorized to acquire, hold, convey, transfer, agree to convey or agree to transfer, but for such purposes only, the Director shall be a corporation sole and as such the agent of the Crown in the right of the Dominion of Canada.

(2) All conveyances from the Director shall constitute new titles to the land conveyed and shall have the same and as full effect as grants from the Crown of previously ungrafted Crown lands.

(3) All property acquired for any of the purposes of this Act shall vest in the Director as such corporation sole; but the provisions of this section shall not in anywise restrict, impair or affect the powers conferred upon the Director generally by this Act nor subject him to the provisions of any enactment of the Dominion or of any province respecting corporations.

(4) The Director in his corporate capacity shall have an impress seal inscribed with words ‘The Director, The Veterans’ Land Act’ and showing the coat of Arms of Canada.

(5) All documents which require execution by the Director in his corporate capacity shall be deemed validly executed if the said seal is affixed and the name of the Director is signed thereto, the whole in the presence of one other person who has subscribed his name as witness; and every document which purports to be impressed with the seal of the Director and to be sealed and signed in the presence of a witness by the Director shall be admissible in evidence in all courts in Canada without proof of any such seal or of such sealing or signing.

(6) Any land vested in the Director in respect of which an assessment has been duly made by a taxing authority is hereby declared for the purpose of recourse to the land itself for realization of taxed based upon such assessment and for such purpose only, to be held by the
said Director as such corporation sole and not as an agent of the Crown in the right of the Dominion of Canada.

**Agricultural Training**

6. The Director may make provisions for;
   (a) the placing of veterans with selected farmers for practical instruction in farming;
   (b) the supplying of instructors and inspectors to assist veterans with information and instruction in farming, or arrangements to this end with federal respective provincial departments or the extension departments of Canadian universities or accredited agricultural schools or colleges.

**Acquirement of Lands and Other Property**

7. The Director may, for the execution of any of the purposes of this Act,
   (a) purchase by agreement, at prices which to him shall seem reasonable, or
   (b) in any other manner acquire by consent or agreement from His Majesty in the right of Canada or from any province or municipal authority, or from any person, firm or corporation, such lands and buildings situate in any part of Canada and such other property including building materials, livestock, farm equipment and commercial fishing equipment as the Director may deem necessary.

**Buildings and Improvements**

7A. (1) The Director may for the purpose of this Act:
   (a) erect on land acquired by him such buildings or effect such other improvements as he may deem necessary;
   (b) enter into a contract with a person, firm or corporation, or with a province, city, town or municipal authority, for the erection of such buildings and for effecting such other improvements as he may deem necessary; and
   (c) grant a roadway, right of way, easement or other right or interest in, over, through or upon such land.

(2) For the purposes of this section the expression ‘improvements’ includes works for sewage disposal, works for the supply of water, gas, electricity or other services, roads, drainage and the cost of preparing plans of subdivisions and any other plans required for such improvements.

(Added by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)

**Sales of Land & Other Property to Veterans**

8. (1) The Director shall calculate in each case of sale the cost price of any land acquired under the provisions of this Act.
    (2) In calculating the cost to the Director of any land, the Director shall take into account not only the cost of the land but also the cost of improvements, if any, effected or to be effected, by the Director.

9. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the regulations made thereunder, the Director may contract with a veteran certified by him to be qualified to participate in the benefits of this Act for the sale to such veteran of land and improvements thereon, building materials, livestock and farm equipment up to a total cost to the Director of six thousand dollars, but subject to the following conditions:
   (a) that the cost to the Director of the lands, improvements and building materials shall not exceed six thousand dollars;
   (b) that the veteran has paid to the Director ten per centum of such cost and the entire cost price of land, improvements and building materials in excess of six thousand dollars;
   (c) that the cost to the Director of the livestock and farm equipment shall not exceed
twelve hundred dollars of the amount by which six thousand dollars exceeds the cost to the Director of the land, improvements and building materials, whichever is less; (d) that the sale price to a veteran of land, improvements, building materials, livestock and farm equipment shall be, in addition to any sum paid by the veteran before contract made, a sum equal to two-thirds of the cost to the Director of the land, improvements and building materials; (e) that the interest rate payable by a veteran shall be three and one-half per centum per annum; (f) that the balance of the purchase price payable by a veteran may be extended over a term not in excess of twenty-five years with interest at the rate aforesaid on the amortization plan; (g) that at the discretion of the Director terms of payment by a veteran may be varied to provide for payment of interest charges only for a period of five years, first following the date of sale or for annual or semi-annual or monthly payments of principal and interest provided that a maximum repayment period of twenty-five years is not exceeded.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the regulations made thereunder, the Director may contract with a veteran certified by him to be qualified to participate in the benefits of this Act for the sale to such veteran of land and improvements thereon, building materials and commercial fishing equipment up to a total cost to the Director of six thousand dollars subject to the same conditions set forth in subsection one of this section with the words 'commercial fishing equipment' substituted for the words 'livestock and farm equipment' wherever they occur therein.

(3) In lieu of the contract for sale described in subsection one of this section and subject to the provisions of this Act and the regulations made thereunder, the Director may contract with a veteran certified by him to be qualified to participate in the benefits of this Act for the sale to such veteran of land and improvements thereon, building materials, livestock and farm equipment, up to a total cost to the Director of five thousand eight hundred dollars, but subject to the following conditions:

(a) that the cost to the Director of livestock and farm equipment shall not exceed the sum of three thousand dollars;
(b) that the cost to the Director of land and improvements and building materials shall not exceed an amount by which the sum of five thousand eight hundred dollars exceeds the cost to the Director of livestock and farm equipment;
(c) that the veteran has paid to the Director twenty per centum of the cost to the Director of the livestock and farm equipment and ten per centum of the cost to the Director of the land, improvements thereon and building materials;
(d) that the sale price to a veteran of land, improvements and building materials and livestock and farm equipment shall be, in addition to any sum paid by the veteran before contract made, a sum equal to forty per cent, of the cost to the Director of the livestock and farm equipment and fifty per cent, of the cost to the Director of land, improvements thereon and building materials;
(e) that the interest rate payable by a veteran shall be three and one-half per centum per annum;
(f) that the balance of the purchase price payable by a veteran may be extended over a term not in excess of ten years for the payment of livestock and farm equipment and not in excess of twenty-five years for the payment of land and improvements thereon and building material;
(g) that livestock and farm equipment shall be sold under this subsection only to a veteran who at the time of such sale buys land from the Director of who occupies land under a rental or purchase agreement satisfactory to the Director, and the cost to the Director of such livestock and equipment shall not exceed forty per cent, of (i) the cost to the Director of the land, improvements and building materials sold to the said veteran; or (ii) the value of the land occupied by a veteran under a rental or purchase agreement as estimated by the Director.

(4) In the case of any contract made between the Director and a veteran under subsections one and three of this section, save upon payment in full to the Director of the total outstanding cost to the Director, improvements, livestock and farm equipment together with interest at the said rate on the said outstanding cost and all other charges owing by the veteran in respect thereof, no sale, assignment, or other disposition of the subject-matter of a contract between a veteran, nor shall a conveyance or transfer be given by the Director to a veteran during a period of the years following the date of the relative contract and thereafter only if the veteran has complied with the terms of his agreement for the said ten-year period.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection four of this section, in the case of any contract for the sale of livestock and equipment made between the Director and a veteran who occupies land under a rental or purchase agreement and who subsequently enters into a contract to buy land from the Director before the terms of the contract for the sale of livestock and equipment have been completely fulfilled, the Director shall not give a conveyance or transfer in thereon or building materials until the terms of the contract for the sale of the said livestock and equipment have been completely fulfilled.

(6) The Director shall not enter into a contract for the sale of land, improvements, building materials, livestock, farm equipment or commercial fishing equipment with a veteran who is in default in respect of any contract previously entered into under this Act.

(Amended by BILL 336, of August 31, 1946.)

10. Every veteran holding or occupying land sold by the Director shall until the Director grants or conveys the land to him be deemed a tenant at will.

11. (1) The title, ownership and right of possession of all property sold to a veteran shall, save as hereinafter provided, remain in the Director until the sale price and other charges duly made in respect thereof are fully paid.

(2) The Director may at any time transfer to the veteran the title to any such livestock and farm equipment as he may deem advisable but such release shall not relieve the veteran from making the payment therefor as provided under this Act.

12. All sales of property made pursuant to the provisions of this Act and whereon any balance of the sale price shall remain payable by instalments or otherwise, shall be evidenced by agreement of sale.

Advances on the Security of Land Owned by a Veteran

13. The Director may make advances to a veteran certified by him to be qualified to participate in the benefits of this Act to participate in the benefits of this Act to enable the discharge of encumbrances on farm land that is owned and used by the veteran as such, for the purchase of livestock and farm equipment and for the effecting of permanent improvements, of amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of four thousand four hundred dollars, but subject to the following conditions:

(a) advances for all purposes shall not exceed sixty per centum of the value of that land as established by the Director;

(b) advances for the purchase of livestock and farm equipment shall not exceed fifty per
centum of the value of the land, and shall not exceed a total of two thousand five hundred dollars, and all such purchases may be subject to the approval of the Director;
(c) such advances shall constitute a first charge on the land of the veteran with respect to which the advance is made and repayment thereof shall be secured by a first mortgage or hypothecs upon such land;
(d) the term of repayment may be extended over a period of twenty-five years with interest at the rate of three and one-half per centum per annum on the amortization plan;
(e) at the discretion of the Director terms of repayment may be varied to provide for payment on interest charged only for a period not in excess of five years first following the date the advances are made, or for annual semi-annual or monthly instalments of principal and interest provided the maximum repayment period of twenty-five years is not exceeded;
(f) repayment in full of advances made under this section may be made at any time without notice or payment of bonus.
(Amended by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)

Insurance and Taxes
14. While a veteran is indebted to the Director in connection with the sale of land or other property to him, or in connection with any mortgage or hypothecs taken under the last preceding section, the Director may require that the veteran shall insure in favour of the Director any property to the extent of its insurable value and shall assign and deliver over unto the Director, as the interest of the Director may appear, the policy or policies of insurance. If the veteran fails or neglects to keep such property insured then it shall be lawful for the Director to insure such property and all moneys so expended by the Director shall be repaid by the veteran on demand with interest at the rate of three and one-half per centum per annum computed from the time of advancing the same, and in the meantime the amount of such payment shall be added to the sale price of such property, or to the amount of the mortgage or hypothec, as the case may be, and shall become a part of the principal.

15. If the veteran fails or neglects to pay any lawful rates, taxes or assessments due in respect of property in which the Director has under this Act any interest the Director may pay such rates, taxes or assessments and all moneys so expended by the Director shall be repaid by the veteran on demand with interest at the rate of three and one-half per centum per annum computed from the time of such payment by the Director and until so repaid the amount of such payment shall be added to the sale price of such property or shall become a part of the principal secured by any charge mortgage or hypothecs in favour of the Director, as the case may be. Failure of the veteran to repay the amount of such payment on demand shall constitute a default warranting rescission under section seventeen.

Advisory Boards
16. (1) There shall be a provincial advisory board in each province, appointed by the Governor in Council, comprised of three members, the chairman of which shall be a county or district court judge of the province in which such board operates and one member shall be nominated by the Canadian Legion.
(2) The Director, before taking any action or proceedings under subsection one of section seventeen, of this Act, shall, upon due notice to the veteran concerned, refer the question of rescission in any case to the advisory board of the province in which the land concerned is situated, for its counsel as to whether the default in performance of the agreement warrants the Director in exercising the powers given him under the said subsection or as to the remedial conditions to be fulfilled by the veteran, in default of compliance with which rescission of the agreement may ensure? [sic]

Rescission and Resale upon Default
17. (1) If any instalment mentioned in any agreement of sale under this Act is not punctually paid or if the veteran makes any other default in performance of the terms of such agreement, the Director may, subject to the provisions of section sixteen, without any formal re-entry or retaking and without resort to proceedings in equity or at law, rescind such agreement, repossess and resell or otherwise deal with the property as authorized by this Act.

(2) The effect of such rescission shall be to vest such property in the Director absolutely free and discharged of all rights and claims of the veteran and of all persons claiming or entitled to claim through or claiming or entitled to claim through or under him, for any estate in, or lien, charge or encumbrance upon or against such property.

(3) Before exercising as against land the rights by this section given, the Director shall give to the veteran notice of his intention so to do, which notice shall be deemed duly given if mailed in any post office by registered letter addressed to the veteran at his last address known to the Director thirty clear days before the Director acts hereunder.

18. In the event of the rescission of any such contract or agreement by the Director he may, subject to the provisions of section sixteen, hold, sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of such property to a veteran or with the approval of the Minister to any other person.

19. (1) If and when such property is resold by the Director any surplus remains in excess of the balance of cast price outstanding and interest at three and one-half per centum and expenses of taking over and reselling the property, the Director shall pay such surplus to the veteran.

(2) If the veteran’s agreement is rescinded and in the opinion of the Director no surplus will be realized upon resale over land above the balance outstanding and interest at three and one-half per centum and expenses of taking over and reselling the property and it is established to the satisfaction of the Director that

(a) the property did not deteriorate in value due to wilful neglect by the veteran during his occupancy, and

(b) failure of the veteran to observe the terms of his agreement was due to his physical disability, or ill-health of his family, or general unfitness to farm, as a consequence whereof the veteran is in necessitous circumstances.

the Director may report the circumstances to the Minister and the Governor in Council, upon the recommendation of the Minister, may refund to the veteran his initial down payment in whole or in part.

Leasing and Other Disposition of Property

20. Any land or other property purchased or held by the Director may, pending sale, or resale, as the case may be, be leased by the Director or otherwise dealt with upon terms satisfactory to the Minister.

Amended Sale Price

21. If the Director deems that any land or other property acquired by him cannot or ought not to be sold subject, whether as to sale price or otherwise, to the provisions of section nine, he shall report to the Minister the circumstances, with a statement of the cost of such property and shall recommend another sale price or other terms of sale, whereafter any sale of such property shall be made for such sale price, or upon such terms, to any person as the Governor in Council may approve.

Sales for Special Purposes

22. The Director may sell any land which is at his disposal for sale,

(a) as a site for a dairy factory, cheese factory, fruit preserving factory, or creamery, or for any educational, religious or charitable purpose, or for any other purpose in the public interest; or

(b) to any provincial or municipal authority for any purpose.
General Provisions

23. Save with the approval of the Minister loans or advances authorized by this Act shall not be made to persons who obtained loans or advances under the provisions of the Soldier Settlement Act, and who are indebted to the Director of Soldier Settlement.

(Amended by BILL 336, of August 31, 1946.)

24. The Director may decline to purchase land for or resell land to a veteran who, for the purpose of qualifying for assistance under this Act, has made a voluntary sale or transfer of land or property suitable for his re-establishment under the provisions of section nine.

25. The Director, with the approval of the regional or provincial advisory committee where the land is situate, may decline to sell land to a veteran whose parents or other immediate relative is the occupant and vendor of the land to the Director and is not incapacitated by reason of age or other disability or if for any other reason the Director, with such approval, considers such transaction not in the public interest.

26. All agreements of sale and all other documents authorized or required by this Act shall be made in such form and contain such provisions as the Director shall prescribe and every such document shall have effect as if the form thereof were statutory and were provided by and as part of this Act.

27. No wife of any veteran or other purchaser shall be entitled to dower in and no husband of any purchaser shall become tenant by the courtesy of England of lands sold under this Act by the Director.

28. When a veteran dies indebted to the Director under an agreement of sale or otherwise with respect to any property, his rights acquired under this Act shall devolve upon his heirs, devisees or personal representative, pursuant to the law of the province in which at the time of his death the property is situated, but subject to all rights, claims and charges of the Director respecting or affecting such property, and to performance by such heirs, devisees or personal representatives of all the obligations of his testate or intestate with respect to such property and default on the part of such heir, devisee or personal representative with respect to any right, claim or charge of the Director shall have the same effect as would default on the part of the veteran but for his death.

29. All mail matter deposited in any post office in Canada addressed to the Director or any officer attached to his service at the offices of the Director at Ottawa and all mail matter addressed by the Director or any officer attached to his service at the addressees of the Director at Ottawa to any place in Canada and bearing thereon by imprint or writing the words 'The Director, Veterans' Land Act' shall be carried free registered or otherwise, in the Canadian mails other than air mail.

30. Affidavits, oaths, statutory declarations or solemn affirmations required to be taken or made for the purposes of this Act, may be taken or made before the judge or clerk of any court, any justice of the peace, commissioner for taking affidavits, notary public, or any person specially authorized by the Governor in Council to take or administer the same.

31. The Governor in Council shall have the power to appoint persons to hold inquiries in aid of the execution of any of the purposes of this Act, and every person so appointed shall have, for the purposes of his appointment, all the powers of a commissioner under the Inquiries Act.

32. Any person who resists or obstructs the Director or officer or employee of the Director in the execution of his duties under this Act is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two months.

33. (1) No person, firm or corporation shall be entitled to charge or collect as, against or from any other person, firm or corporation any fee or commission or advance of price for services
rendered in the sale of any land made to the Director, whether for finding or introducing of a buyer or otherwise.

(2) No person, firm or corporation shall pay to any other person, firm or corporation any such fee or commission or advance of price for any such services.

(3) The Director may decline to purchase land for the purposes of this Act where it appears that the owner acquired the land for speculative purposes subsequent to the tenth day of September, 1939.

(4) The Director may require of any person, firm or corporation from whom he proposes to purchase land or, who is in any manner interested in a land which he proposes to purchase for the purposes of this Act, the execution of any affidavit in the form in the Schedule to this Act.

(5) If any such fee or commission or advance of price is paid by or to any such person, firm or corporation for any such services the following consequences shall ensue —

(a) any person who in any affidavit made as required under subsection four of this section wilfully and knowingly states an untruth or suppresses the truth with respect to any matter which, pursuant to such subsection, he is required by way of such affidavit to make disclosure, shall be guilty of an indictable offence and be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or to both such fine and such imprisonment; and

(b) any fee or commission or advance in price paid may be recovered by the Director by suit instituted in the name of the Director as a gent of His Majesty, in any court having jurisdiction in debt to the amount involved, whether the transaction was one with respect to a sale or projected sale to the Director, as if such amount were a debt due to the Director, and every person who participated in the receipt of any part of such amount shall be liable to pay to the Director the part of such amount actually received by him; and

(6) No officer, agent, or employee of or under the Director shall directly or indirectly, in his own name or in that of any other person, except by or under the authority or the Director, purchase, acquire or sell any land or other property of such character as the Director is authorized to purchase, acquire or sell under this Act form or to any veteran who is indebted to the Director of whose application for an advance or to purchase any property from the Director is pending, nor shall such officer, agent or employee act as an agent or otherwise for any person in purchasing, acquiring or selling or otherwise as aforesaid, nor receive any commission or compensation in connection therewith, and any officer, agent or employee violating the provisions of this subsection shall in addition to any criminal liability incurred pursuant to the provisions of this Act, be liable to summary dismissal on the order of the Director and the liability to or imposition of such penalty shall not affect the right which any person may have to bring against him any civil action.

Advisory Committees

34. The Governor in Council may appoint regional or provincial advisory committees to advise the Director in respect to the qualifications of veterans, the selection of land generally in respect to such other matters as may be referred to any such committee by the Director; and the Director in Council, may make regulations prescribing the number of members and the composition of each committee, the tenure of office of such members, the remuneration and expenses to be paid or allowed such members and generally the conduct and performance of such committees and the members thereof in the execution of their duties.

35. (1) The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter into an agreement with
(a) the government of any [prov] ince [sic] for the settlement of veterans on any provincial lands that the provincial government may recommend as being specially suitable for settlement by veterans; and
(b) the Minister of Mines and Resources of Canada for the settlement of veterans on any Dominion lands that the Minister of Mines and Resources may recommend as being specifically suitable for settlement by veterans.

(2) An Agreement entered into pursuant to subsection one of this section shall contain such terms, conditions and limitations with reference to settlement of veterans as the Governor in Council may approve.

(3) Subject to the regulations made under this Act the Director may grant an amount not exceeding two thousand three hundred and twenty dollars to a veteran who settles on provincial or Dominion lands pursuant to an agreement entered into under subsection one of this section.

(4) A grant made pursuant to subsection three of this section shall be used only for one or more of the following purposes:
   (a) the purchase of essential building materials and other costs of construction;
   (b) the clearing and other preparation of land for cultivation;
   (c) the purchase of essential farm livestock and machinery;
   (d) the purchase of machinery and equipment essential to forestry;
   (e) the purchase of commercial fishing equipment;
   (f) the purchase of trapping or fur farming equipment but not breeding stock; and
   (g) the purchase of essential household equipment.

(5) A veteran who has received a grant under this section shall not be entitled to enter into a contract with the Director under section nine or section thirteen of this Act, and a veteran who has entered into a contract with the Director under Act shall not be entitled to a grant under this section.

(Amended by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)

35A. (1) The director may grant an amount not exceeding two thousand three hundred and twenty dollars to an Indian veteran who settles on Indian Reserve lands, the said grant to be paid to the Minister of Mines and Resources who shall have the control and management thereof on behalf of the Indian veteran.

(2) A grant made pursuant to subsection one of this section shall be disbursed by the Minister of Mines and Resources on behalf of the Indian veteran only for one or more of the following purposes:
   (a) the purchase of essential building materials and other costs of construction;
   (b) the clearing and other preparation of land for cultivation;
   (c) the purchase of essential farm livestock and machinery;
   (d) the purchase of machinery or equipment essential to forestry;
   (e) the purchase of commercial fishing equipment;
   (f) the purchase of trapping or fur farming equipment but not breeding stock;
   (g) the purchase of essential household equipment; and
   (h) the acquisition of occupational rights to lands, vacant or improved, located within the boundaries of any Indian reserve.

(3) An Indian veteran on whose behalf a grant has been made under this section shall not be entitled to enter into a contract with the Director under section nine or section thirteen of this Act, and an Indian veteran who had entered into a contract with the Director under section nine or section thirteen of this Act shall not be eligible for a grant under this section.

(Added by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)
Offences and Penalties

36. (1) Any person who is guilty of any wilful breach or non-observance of any provision of this Act for which no penalty is specially provided shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

(2) Where any offence under this Act, whether by way of breach or of non-observance of any provision of this Act, is committed by a corporation, every officer or employee of the corporation, who had in any manner aided or participated in the commission of the offence, shall be personally liable as for the commission of such offence by him, and prosecution of the conviction of any one officer or employee of the corporation shall not be a bar to prosecution or conviction of any other of them.

(3) Every land inspector, field supervisor, official, employee or servant of the Directory, and every agent engaged by the Director or acting for him or on his behalf, who knowingly or negligently makes any false or deceptive statement in any report, return, appraisal, statement or other document respecting or referring to any real or personal property, the subject-matter of any inspection, appraisal or examination made for or on behalf of the Director or on the direction, instructions or request of the Director or of any of his officials, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

Regulations

37. (1) The Governor in Council may, subject to the provisions of this Act, make regulations prescribing:

(Amended by BILL 336, of August 11, 1946.)

(a) qualifications necessary in order to entitle veterans to the benefits or assistance or to any particular benefit or assistance under this Act;

(b) the manner in which applications for purchase and sale may be made;

(c) the manner in which the dates at which amortized or other payments shall commence, be repaid, be consolidated or be changed;

(d) the manner in which and conditions upon which veterans may transfer their rights;

(e) the conditions subject to which land may be acquired for the purposes of this Act;

(f) the manner in which lands acquired by the Director may be sold to veterans, others and the conditions as to occupation or otherwise upon which such lands may be sold;

(g) forms of agreements, notices and other documents necessary for the effective operation of this Act;

(h) the circumstances and procedure under which and whereby the Director may take over or repossess property in case of default made by veterans in the observance of the provisions of this Act or of any other covenant or agreement made by veterans with the Director;

(i) authority and procedure for the inclusion within the expression 'veteran' of persons, who being otherwise qualified to be veterans are not yet discharged from military or other service;

(j) with respect to any other matter concerning which the Minister deems regulations necessary for the execution of the purposes of this Act.

(Amended by BILL 336, of August 31, 1946.)

(1A) The Director may with the approval of the Minister make regulations authorizing persons named therein to exercise or perform with respect to such matters as may be
specified therein, any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed by this Act on the Director.

(Amended by BILL 336, of August 31, 1946.)

(2) all regulations made under authority of this Act shall be published in the Canada Gazette, and within fifteen days after the making thereof shall be laid before Parliament, or if Parliament is to then sitting, shall be laid before it within fifteen days after the opening of its next following session.

38. A detailed account of the financial commitments entered into and the expenditures made under the authority of this Act shall be laid before the House of Commons of Canada during the first fifteen days of the then next session Parliament.

39. Notwithstanding the Senate and House of Commons Act or any other law, no veteran by reason only of his entering into a contract or receiving a benefit under this Act, shall be liable for any forfeiture or penalty imposed by the Senate and House of Commons Act or disqualified as a member of the House of Commons or incapable of being elected to, or of sitting or voting in the House of Commons.

(Added by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)

PASSED July 20, 1942.
Amended by BILL 233, passed December 11, 1945.)
Amended by BILL 336, passed August 31, 1946.)

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