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THE RELATION OF IMPERIAL AND CANADIAN POLICIES

OF DEFENCE, 1846 - 1862.

A Thesis
Submitted to the Committee on Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the
Degree of Master of Arts
in
The Department of History,
University of Saskatchewan,

by

William Ernest Clive Tallant.

Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, March 1942.
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Chapter I. Introduction.

A Resume of the Imperial Situation after 1815.

For half a century following Waterloo, the general attitude of British statesmen towards the British possessions was that the colonies held and gained by Britain during the Napoleonic Wars constituted a burden to be borne by the British taxpayers who were already experiencing severe financial strain caused by the interest on the nation's war debts and by the difficulties facing the country in the transition from war to peace. The necessity of extending the Empire to include various strategic stations, such as Mauritius and the Cape of Good Hope, was accepted without question, as British interests had suffered at the hands of the enemy operating from these bases. But with the future of the British Empire as a whole there seemed to be little concern.

To account for this manifest indifference on the part of British politicians and economists, it is well to remember that the loss of the American Colonies in 1783 had been a heavy blow to British Imperialism. Popular disappointment over the break-up of the first Empire lasted for a generation, especially in that the taxation in Britain was heavy on account of the national debt occasioned by the Seven Years' War and the American War of Independence. Then came the further increase in the national debt due to the Napoleonic Wars. It was expected that the burden of the British taxpayer would be lightened once these wars were ended, but

the protection afforded by Britain to her colonies during the next fifty years resulted in a continuation of the financial burden. The conclusion drawn from the action of the American Colonies and from the independence won by the former Spanish Colonies in America was that the colonies in British North America, Australia, and South Africa would likewise end their connection with the mother country once they were strong enough to stand alone. This conclusion caused the policy of maintaining the imperial connection with such colonies to appear financially unsound.

Among those who were critical of the old colonial system were the Philosophical Radicals, who followed the teachings of Jeremy Bentham. Economists such as Ricardo, Malthus, James Mill, and J.R. McCulloch were also anti-imperialists. The old colonial system based on mercantilism was the chief target of their attacks. During the period of the first British Empire and until the adoption of free trade, mercantilism, the theory that nations sought colonies for profit derived from trade, was the basis of British imperialism. The place of mercantilism in early British imperialism was later expressed by Lord Grey in his Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration, and by Herman Merivale, who was Under-Secretary of


2 There were some among these Radicals who did not share the typical radical opinions on colonial questions. See below, page 5.

State for the Colonies, 1847-1859, when he stated in his Lectures:
"The benefit of colonies to the mother country consists solely in
the surplus advantages which it derives from the trade of the
1 colonies over the loss." But the Philosophical Radicals and the
new economists disagreed with the mercantile theory. Bentham and
his followers held that the colonies should be "emancipated", because
the colonies created great financial burdens for the people of Great
Britain to bear, because the possession of colonies increased the
possibility of war with foreign powers due to disputes arising from
the dependencies, and further because the colonies encouraged
political corruption in the mother country through the opportunities
offered for employing patronage throughout the Empire. The new
economists pointed to the commercial relationship between Great Britain
and the United States as a proof of the uselessness of the colonial
monopoly on which mercantilism rested. The value of the exports from
Britain to the United States was, they said, seven times as great as
2 before the American Revolution. As might be expected, the new
economists believed in free trade, and their doctrines were adopted
by the new industrialists, the members of the "Manchester School",
who wished to sell their manufactures on a world-wide market rather
than on a relatively unimportant colonial market alone.

1 J.S.Ewart. The Kingdom Papers. Ottawa, 1912. vol.I. p.34.
That the British people were indifferent to the continuation of the British Empire was revealed not only in the dearth of attention accorded by British newspapers and literature to colonial developments, but also by the emigration of self-supporting settlers from the United Kingdom to the United States rather than to Upper and Lower Canada. This indifference to the imperial connection was particularly noticeable in Parliament, where the position of Colonial Secretary was regarded of secondary importance in the Cabinet. Not until Gregy became Colonial Secretary in 1846 did that position carry any great weight in the Cabinet. Because a rapid succession of men of only moderate ability held the position of Colonial Secretary for many years, great responsibilities were thrown on the permanent officials of the Colonial Office. The position of permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies was held in turn by Sir James Stephen (1836-1847), Herman Merivale (1847-1859), and Frederic Rogers (1860-1871), all of whom believed that sooner or later the larger possessions, such as Canada and Australia would ask for national independence. Since on many occasions the Under-Secretary drafted the despatches from the Colonial Secretary to the colonial officials, his influence becomes apparent. The British Parliament of the nineteenth century found itself so occupied with attempting to keep pace with the reforms urged by popular demand at home, that there was little time available for

2 Woodward. op.cit. p.352.
the consideration of colonial problems. Except in times of great crises, it was extremely difficult to persuade the Houses of Parliament to concentrate on matters of colonial concern, and when a colonial reformer or a Colonial Secretary made such an attempt it was usually prefaced by an apology for bothering the members with colonial affairs.

One of the most important imperial developments of the nineteenth century was the movement for colonial self-government. There were those among the Philosophical Radicals who disagreed with the typical radical opinion that the colonies should be "emancipated" for the sake of imperial economy. These "colonial reformers", among whom were Lord Durham, Charles Buller, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, and Sir William Molesworth, were followers of James Mill rather than of Bentham. They were dissatisfied with the old colonial system, but did not believe in separation, suggesting instead the granting of colonial self-government as a means of relieving the mother country of the expense of giving military support to all but purely imperial overseas stations. When self-government had been given to the larger colonies, British ministers were able to urge that the autonomous colonies should assume some of the burdens formerly borne on their behalf by the mother country. Such was the attitude taken by Lord Grey, notwithstanding his convinced imperialism, and likewise by W.E. Gladstone whose matured belief in "freedom and voluntaryism" caused him to favor a liberal treatment of the colonies.

2 Stacey, ibid. p.50; P. Knaplund, "Gladstone's Views on British Colonial Policy". Canadian Historical Review. vol. IV. (1923) p.311.
The question of imperial defence had not occupied the attention of British statesmen to any degree in the period before 1755. Instead, the mother country had adopted a policy of "salutary neglect", leaving the colonies for the most part to care for themselves, except for the presence of scattered and poorly equipped imperial garrisons stationed in one or more of the colonies. But despite the British opposition to assuming new military burdens in the colonies, the cost of imperial defence mounted, chiefly because Britain was beginning a new series of wars with France, bearing the cost herself as each province in British North America had the right to decide on the extent of its participation in war. During the Seven Years' War, however, there was unprecedented colonial co-operation with Britain, and colonial forces played their part in the war in America, although Great Britain paid about two-fifths of the colonial expense in this connection in addition to equipping the colonial forces. Following the conclusion of this war, Great Britain installed in British North America and the plantations a regular garrison of 10,000 men, with the intention of having the colonists contribute to the cost of their defence. As this contribution was not forthcoming, the idea was dropped by 1770, although Britain still claimed the right to tax the colonies, a situation which led to the American Revolution. The American Colonies having gained their independence, Britain reduced her forces for colonial service to 9,500 troops, and, except

in the case of India, bore almost the whole cost of supporting these
garrisons. Britain now had a smaller territory in America to garrison,
but this circumstance was offset by the possibility of a future war
with the United States, and so the mother country made no radical
attempt to free herself from maintaining garrisons in North America. 
There were, however, British statesmen who did not lose sight of
colonial self-defence. During the drafting of the Canada Act of 1791,
Lord Grenville, the Secretary of State for foreign affairs, considered
that the colonies should pay their part of the cost of government and
defence of the Empire. But because Britain had not adopted such a
policy previously, he thought it impossible to attempt such action at
that time. 
Again, by 1792, Pitt had reduced the British Army to
18,000 men, a force which was insufficient to defend the whole Empire.
With the French Revolution in progress, Grenville reduced the force
in Jamaica in order to strengthen the mother country. From the war
with Revolutionary France, Britain emerged with an enlarged empire,
there was an imperialistic revival, and practically every colony had
an imperial garrison and a Governor who was a military man.

1 R.L. Schuyler, "The Recall of the Legions: a Phase of the Decentralization
2 Stacey, op. cit. pp. 9-10.
3 E.A. Benians, "The Beginnings of the New Empire, 1783-1793". J.H. Rose,
A.P. Newton, E.A. Benians (General Eds.), *Cambridge History of the
British Empire*, Cambridge, 1940. vol.II. p.23.
4 J.H. Rose, "The Conflict with Revolutionary France, 1793-1802".
*Cambridge History of the British Empire*, vol.II. p.38.
5 Lucas, op. cit. p. 75.
That the expense of maintaining these garrisons was borne by the mother country was stated by Charles Adderley, who was Under-Secretary for the Colonies in the Derby-Disraeli Ministry, when he stated that "our second colonial policy was to govern and defend colonies from home."

The practice of placing Imperial garrisons in the colonies was carried on to such a degree that by 1861, of the thirty-four dependencies, exclusive of the Mediterranean stations, which were under the Colonial Office, only one did not possess imperial troops. These military forces were maintained for various purposes: for the defence of imperial stations such as Gibraltar and Malta; as precaution against foreign aggression in the case of Canada; for the preservation of law and order amongst the blacks in Jamaica; and at the Cape, as protection against warlike natives. Other arguments in favor of maintaining imperial garrisons included the facts that such forces would serve as reserves for the home army, that their presence was a sign of imperial unity, that such protection was only in justice to the colonies which might become involved in war through Britain's foreign policy, and that the troops formed a protection for the natives who otherwise might have received harsh treatment had the colonial governments controlled their own military affairs.

The imperial defence policy in British North America after 1783 was chiefly influenced by the proximity of the United States to Canada.

1 Schuyler. "Recall of the Legions". p. 22.
The main theory followed was the maintenance in the colony of a strong garrison of imperial troops and the requirement of universal service by the inhabitants. Imperial expenditure on the Canadian garrisons steadily increased, reaching £260,000 in 1800 for Upper and Lower Canada. From 1804 to 1809 the garrison of British North America increased from 3,500 men to 9,000, the idea being to keep the British garrison at about the strength of the American regular army. As a result, the garrison in North America in 1812 consisted of slightly less than 4,400 British regulars, about 4,000 Canadian regulars raised locally but paid by the Imperial Government, and about 4,000 incorporated provincial militia who had received military training and were under the same discipline as the regulars. Thanks to this policy, the total available trained forces in British North America outnumbered the actual strength of the regular army of the United States when hostilities began.

During the period leading to the War of 1812, the militia in British North America was improved by Militia Acts passed in the four mainland provinces. According to these Acts, the obligation to serve was universal, with some exceptions, for all men between the ages of eighteen and sixty. The country was organized into districts, with provision for the formation of battalions and companies of

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2. Stacey. op. cit. p. 11.
5. Stacey. ibid.
irregular size. Periodical musters were held, usually once a year, at which attendance was compulsory but for which no pay was given. Training, also without pay, was provided to a very slight extent. The men were encouraged to supply their own arms, although the authorities issued arms and accoutrements where necessary. In the Canadas the period of service was six months, and the militia could be marched from either province to the assistance of the other, and might be taken into the United States if military necessity arose. In the Maritimes there was no set period of service, and the militia could not be sent beyond the boundaries of the province. Portions of the militia could be called out and embodied for continual service, the term being limited to six months. From the lack of emphasis placed on training as contrasted with that placed on organization, it was apparent that this scheme was of value largely for mobilization purposes.

The purpose of this militia scheme was to provide a total of some 20,000 to 25,000 men, including British regulars, Canadian regulars, and sundry militia forces, for the defence of British North America. When the War of 1812 broke out, about 12,000 trained men were immediately available in the provinces, and the militia, designated the "sedentary militia", were relied upon to supply any additional forces required. Few of the "sedentary militia" actually appeared in action, their general duty being to relieve better trained men at the base. In addition, the Canadians received reinforcements of British

2 Ibid. p. 381.  
regulars previously stationed in New Brunswick, as well as 16,000 Peninsular veterans who, as Wellington boasted, "could go anywhere and do anything."

The Canadian militia system received its testing in the War of 1812, and, as might be expected of an organization comprising citizen soldiers, was found wanting in some respects. The six months' service period for militiamen was too short when it came to campaigning, and the lack of training in field work was evident. As the militia were drawn from a very scattered population, dependent chiefly on farming, there were difficulties experienced in mustering and in keeping men in the field. During 1813 militiamen had to be given leave in rotation in order that their farming operations might not suffer. In contrast with the military efforts of the United States, the Canadian efforts showed to advantage. The army in the United States had been reduced to 3,000 in 1801, and in 1812, although there were 35,000 men in the forces on paper, there were only 6,744 in the ranks. During the war, over half a million men were enlisted in the various forces, yet at no one time or place did any American general ever have 10,000 men fit for action. The British forces had the advantage because they were composed of a greater number of trained regulars and embodied militia than was the army of the United States. The conclusion that was reached by the United States and that should have been arrived at by Canadians

1 Wood. op. cit. p. 117. 2 Hamilton. op. cit. p. 385.
3 Wood. op. cit. p. 54. 4 Ibid. pp. 11-12.
was that it was most important to have a nucleus of trained men around whom the man power of the nation could be organized in time of need.

But the victories won for the Canadians by the British and Canadian regulars over the poorly organized forces of the United States had a vitiating effect on Canadian military policy. In the future, Canadians tended to be too self-confident in their defence policy and to rely too much upon the mother country. Therefore there were no fundamental changes made in the defence policy of British North America, and Britain continued to maintain a considerable garrison there. The obligation of universal militia service was retained and annual musters were continued after the war, but the system fell into decay, the militia force lost the respect of the inhabitants, and the muster day became a farce. A temporary Militia Act was passed in Lower Canada in 1830, but at the time of Lord Durham's mission in 1838 the militia in that province was reported as "but a nominal force", or as Lord Durham himself put it, "the militia is now annihilated". By 1853 the interest in the militia of the United Canadas had fallen so low that the whole appropriation of the provincial legislature for military purposes was only £2,000.

4 Lucas, The Empire at War. vol.1. p.92. 5 Skelton, loc. cit.
13.

As a result of experience gained in the War of 1812, the War Office took a new interest in the defence of Canada. In 1820, following the recommendations which the Duke of Wellington had made in 1819 for a programme to include the building of fortifications in Canada and the development of Canadian waterways, Britain undertook the construction of a citadel at Quebec and of large fortifications at Isle aux Noix. In 1825 a commission of officers headed by Sir James Carmichael-Smyth was sent by Wellington to America to study Canadian defensive possibilities. Their report, following the lines of Wellington's own recommendations, urged the construction of certain fortifications and lines of communication, the holding of the Great Lakes, an attack on the American seaboard, the use of British regulars at decisive points, and the relegation of less important stretches of the frontier to the care of provincial regulars and militia. The total expense was estimated at £1,646,218. The construction of the Rideau Canal was begun in 1826, whereby a route was provided from Kingston to Montreal by the Ottawa and Rideau Rivers which would be a safer waterway than the St. Lawrence in case of war. Although the amount appropriated for the proposed fortifications was reduced to £330,000, Canada received during this period, at imperial expense, not only the Rideau Canal, but also fortifications constructed at Quebec, Halifax, Kingston and Isle aux Noix.

When the long struggle of the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, a reaction against expenditure for military purposes naturally set

in, for all political parties in Britain as well as the British public were utterly tired of the continual financial strain. The problems of imperial defence were thereafter considered almost entirely from constitutional, administrative, and financial standpoints, while the strategic side of the problems was frequently overlooked. Likewise defence problems were considered as of local importance rather than as to their effect on the Empire as a whole. The Tories, who were in power in 1815, realizing the necessity of protecting the imperial interests abroad, distributed colonial garrisons totalling 48,000 men, which amounted to about one-half of the British Army. The total annual cost of these garrisons amounted to over £3,000,000 of which colonial contributions were only a little over £300,000. The Tories were faced with the opposition of the Whigs and the Radical separatists to this policy. The Whigs attacked the expense of the colonial garrisons as too high. They considered that Malta, Ceylon, and the Cape of Good Hope could well afford to defend themselves, that the existence of troops anywhere threatened the civil liberties of the inhabitants, and that the best guarantee of colonial defence would be the granting of responsible government. The Whigs likewise wished to carry their reforming zeal into the overhauling of the naval and military organization. The Radicals and separatists were more extreme than the Whigs, and urged the drastic reduction of British military forces and even their total abolition.

15.

In spite of their desire to protect the recent British acquisitions, the Tory ministers were anxious to economize where possible. The cost of the Napoleonic Wars to Britain was shown only too clearly in the National Debt which in 1816 amounted to £878,000,000. The interest on this huge amount had to be paid by the thirteen million inhabitants of Great Britain, for Ireland was too poor to be expected to share in the payments. When the budget of 1816 was drawn up, it was estimated that the interest paid annually to the holders of government stock was nearly equal to the total income derived from British trade and manufacture. There is little wonder, as the government loans had been raised to finance the forces, that the military and naval forces were reduced to a mere nucleus when peace came. The years 1814 and 1815 had been a severe agricultural crisis in England, with bankruptcy among farmers running high. Concurrent with the agricultural depression came a financial crisis, caused by the return of currency to its normal value. The debts which had been incurred during the Wars when currency was at a discount now had to be paid with currency nearly at its nominal value. To remedy the agricultural and financial crisis, the Government had passed the Corn Law of 1815 which resulted in increased production rather than in higher prices, and so failed to fulfill its purpose. During the Napoleonic Wars there had been an outburst of speculative trade in manufactured goods needed by the belligerent nations. With the return of peace, the exports of British manufactured goods fell to £41,600,000 in 1816 as compared with the total of £51,600,000 for 1815. In an attempt to relieve

the severe financial strain on the mother country caused by the cumulative effects of the wars and the subsequent depression, Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State, suggested to the legislatures of the West Indian Colonies in 1816 that they should pay the whole or part of the cost of their imperial garrisons. But the result was negligible in that only Demerara agreed to pay part of the expenses for additional white troops to be sent from the West Indian Islands.

The Opposition in Parliament was unwilling to let the matter of colonial military expenditure rest. In 1817 a House of Commons Select Committee on Finance drew official attention to the cost of maintaining the garrisons. Joseph Hume, leader of the Utilitarians of the Benthamite School, from 1819 to his death in 1855 was an opponent of maintaining the colonial garrisons. He advocated self-government for the colonies chiefly because he conceived that autonomous colonies would assume the responsibility for their own defence. Hume found supporters in Richard Cobden and John Bright of the "Manchester School", who no longer regarded the colonies of economic value to the mother country, and so advocated separation. Edward Gibbon Wakefield and Sir William Molesworth, along with the other "colonial reformers", opposed the garrison system too, arguing that not only was the imperial defence system an injustice to the British taxpayer, but also that it hindered the full development of colonial self-government, which to them was the only form of colonial government which would prevent the disruption of the imperial connection.

The Tories, bated by the Opposition on the matter of imperial military expenditures, and notwithstanding the failure of Bathurst's feeler in 1816, took the initiative in reducing the colonial garrisons, until by 1829 the number of imperial troops employed in the colonies had been reduced to 30,000, the cost to the imperial exchequer had fallen to £2,500,000, and, what was more encouraging, the amount of colonial contribution had increased to £335,000.

The Whigs, coming into power in 1830, had the opportunity to translate their imperial designs into action. A Select Committee of the House of Commons investigated the colonial military expenditures in 1834 and 1835. As regards North America, the Committee learned that there were 4,720 imperial soldiers widely distributed throughout the British Colonies. Of this number, Canada had 2,408 men in ten stations, principally at Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, and Toronto. The Committee also learned that it was inadvisable to reduce the force in Canada due to the growing dissatisfaction of the Canadians with their form of government, the dangers involved in the Maine Boundary dispute with the United States, and the ineffective character of the local militia in Canada. Accordingly, the Committee did not recommend a reduction of the Canadian garrison, but urged the strictest economy in every branch of colonial military expenditure, and recognized that the imperial government was obligated to provide for the security of the colonies, even in time of peace.

1 Tunstall, op. cit. p. 809. 2 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 16. 3 Schuyler, Recall of the Legions. p. 24. 4 Tunstall, loc. cit.
Although the Whigs had made no drastic reductions in colonial garrisons, only British North America and Ceylon retained imperial garrisons of over 3,000 men in 1835.  

The Canadian unrest and problems of Canadian defence indicated in the recommendations of the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure in 1834, raise the question of Canadian-American relations in regard to defence since the War of 1812. The Treaty of Ghent which ended that War had failed to settle the question of maritime rights, consequently there was danger of disputes arising between the British and Americans again over the stopping and searching of vessels on the Great Lakes. To avoid such disputes, the Rush-Bagot Agreement was reached between the two nations in 1817, which limited the naval armament for each country to one armed vessel on Lake Ontario, one on the Upper Lakes, and one on Lake Champlain.  

But more significant than the question of naval armaments was the problem of frontier fortifications. There were definite reasons why there continued to be a lack of land fortifications along the common frontier. In the first place, a Canadian war of aggression against American soil was evidently impossible, and whereas Canada was thought to be defensible throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the immense cost of building the necessary fortifications made the attempt prohibitive. Secondly, the United States, feeling that the northern boundary was reasonably secure, was more concerned with the problems of relations with the Indians and of

1 Tunstall, loc. cit.
strengthening her coastal defences against naval powers. Thirdly, after 1818 Britain depended still more on the United States commercially, as a source of cotton for British mills and of food for British people. The men of the new commercial and industrial aristocracy in Britain did not wish their investments in English factories and plantations overseas to be endangered by a war with the United States. This new ruling class made its influence felt after the Whigs came into power in Britain in 1830. As to the maintenance of troops, both Britain and the United States had drastically reduced their forces after 1815, and retained them at a low level until the Canadian rebellions caused the fear of international complications.

The Canadian rebellions of 1837-1838 brought with them frontier disturbances and the "Caroline" affair, which might well have brought Britain and the United States into war. But Britain had no real desire for a conflict as she was suffering from a financial crisis, and the Peel ministry when it came into power was determined to avoid additional expenditures for the armed forces. The depression of 1837 affected Canada and the United States as well as Britain. In British North America speculation had been high, so that when the financial crisis occurred the Canadian provinces were unprepared for it. In the United States, government manipulation of finance had resulted in economic instability. In Britain the retrenchment policy of the

3. Corey, loc. cit.
government had been followed by financial unsettlement, and that in turn by failure. The British commercial houses, burdened with credits in America, could not meet the demands of the British bankers, and in their efforts to save themselves from bankruptcy, applied such pressure upon their debtors in the United States that American commercial houses began to fail in numbers. The danger of hostilities between Britain and the United States was doubtless considerably minimized by the depression common to both countries.

Although the Canadian rebellions were suppressed with comparative ease, they upset the designs of the British Government with regard to economy and to maintaining a minimum force in British North America. Reinforcements were sent which raised the number of imperial troops in North America to 13,000 in 1838, and to 15,000 in 1840. In addition to bearing the expense of these regular troops, the British Government provided the finances to make possible an extensive mobilization of Canadian militia. The total imperial expenses for North America were increased from £500,000 to £1,000,000, in addition to which the imperial exchequer was burdened by the immediate increase of the British army at home by 9,000 men in order to provide reliefs. The situation brought about by the Canadian disturbances exposed Britain's military weakness and Parliament's indifference to the needs of the Empire.

2 Tunstall, op.cit. p. 309.
3 Stacey, *Canada and British Army*. p. 18.
4 Tunstall, loc. cit.
Following the suppression of the Canadian rebellions, the British Government under Lord Melbourne sent out Lord Durham as High Commissioner and Governor-General of British North America, for the purpose of "the adjustment of certain important questions depending in the Provinces of Lower and Upper Canada, respecting the form and future Government of the said Provinces". In his Report, which was composed at a time when it was necessary to maintain strong British forces in Canada, Durham stated that the regulation of foreign relations was one of the points on which the mother country required a control, and that control was sufficiently secured by the protection which the colony derived from Britain against foreign enemies. That the mother country intended to provide for the protection of Canada was intimated in a despatch written May 3, 1841 by Lord John Russell to Lord Sydenham, the Governor-General of Canada, in which Russell stated: "Canada must be maintained by a judicious preparation for defence in time of peace, and vigorous exertion of the resources of the Empire in time of war....We have no alternative. We have only to consider the means....of defending her territory". Consequently, continued Russell, the mother country would not neglect "the construction and completion of permanent works calculated for the protection of the points of most importance to us", nor would it fail to provide the presence of a large effective regular force which would be aided by a registered and enrolled local militia. The Imperial Government was

2 Ibid. p. 207.
prepared to vote £100,000 annually for the defence of Canada, which
sum could be used for "the maintenance of militia and volunteers,
the improvement of military communications, and the erection or repair
of fortifications."

The Anglo-American dispute over the Maine Boundary, which had been
one of the influences behind increasing the British North American
garrisons, was settled amicably in 1842 through the diplomatic efforts
of Lord Ashburton and Daniel Webster. As a result the existing
tension was eased, and the regular British force in America was reduced
by about 5,000 men, although the force remaining was still twice as great
as it had been before 1837. But the Webster-Ashburton Treaty did not
clarify all outstanding differences existing in Anglo-American
relations. In 1845 there arose danger of conflict over the apparent
determination of the United States to possess the whole of Oregon,
then jointly occupied by the United States and Great Britain. The
British arranged for the construction on the Great Lakes of six
steamers which could be used as gunboats. Other precautions taken
were the strengthening of defences at Kingston, the appointment in 1846
of Lord Cathcart as Commander of the Forces as well as Governor-
in-Chief of British North America, and the despatching of a small
force of British regulars to Fort Garry in the Hudson's Bay Company's
territory. The British desire for an amicable settlement of the

1 Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada, 1841. pp. 177-178.
2 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 20.
4 Stacey, Canada and British Army, pp. 20-21.
Oregon Boundary question was influenced by the economic situation in Great Britain. The failure of the grain crop and potato harvest in many countries of western Europe, including the British Isles, meant that the Peel Administration was faced with the problem of trying to prevent starvation in the British Isles. This involved the reconsideration of the whole question of the Corn Laws and tariff, which in turn led to the adoption of free trade. The period of readjustment through which Britain was passing was not a time for war, especially with the United States, which could have crippled British commerce and brought starvation to Great Britain. Moreover, the British cotton industry depended heavily upon the supply of raw cotton from the Southern United States, and therefore a war with the United States was opposed by the manufacturers, of which Peel himself was one.

When the Peel Administration was at the height of its power, thirty years had passed since Britain had been involved in a great military struggle, yet the colonial garrisons still existed and the necessary imperial expenditures on their account continued. By 1850, the annual cost of the imperial troops stationed in Canada was about £30 per man. Between 1841 and 1851 Great Britain had spent more than £500,000 in safeguarding Canada, an amount greater than the legislature had spent in administering the province. During this decade provincial expenditure on militia was very light, as the force defrayed most of

Adams, op. cit. p. 228.
its expenses from fines levied for non-attendance. In the House of Commons the debates on estimates were usually featured by criticism of the expenditure on naval and military establishments. In 1846 a member considered that since the differences with America over the Oregon Boundary had been settled, it should not be necessary to estimate for £55,500,000, which was an increase of £7,320,000 over the estimates of 1835. Lord John Russell replied by defending the amount of the estimates as being necessary in order to station naval forces for the protection of British commerce, which had increased annually. Furthermore, Russell pointed out that the great need of military reliefs for overseas regiments prohibited the curtailment of expenditure. Later in 1846 Williams attacked the military and naval expenditures again, pointing out an increase of £5,181,000 over those of 1835, and an increase of 65,041 in the forces for the same period.

The problem of providing reliefs at decent intervals for the regiments on "foreign service" had been perennial ever since colonial garrisons had been established. The heavy demands on the relatively small British Army made it difficult for the War Office to reduce each regiment's share of foreign service to an amount which would make for efficiency as well as for the health of the troops. During the period from 1814 to 1837 the Empire was involved in six wars which kept the majority of the infantry regiments abroad. 

1 Hamilton, op. cit. p. 392.
2 Mr. W. Williams.
3 Hansard. Third Series. vol. LXXXVII. pp. 1097-1101.
4 Hansard. Third Series. vol. LXXXVIII. p. 331.
5 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 52.
apparent methods of providing more adequate reliefs were either by increasing the Army so as to diminish the time each regiment had to spend on foreign service, or by reducing the number of garrisons abroad. The necessity of providing reliefs was used effectively by Wellington in opposing any proposals for reduction in the army in 1827, and the same argument was employed by ministers in defence against the radicals' attacks on the size of the army.\textsuperscript{1} The constant exile of so large a proportion of the infantry made the army service unpopular, and so attempts were made from time to time to improve the situation. In 1837 improvements were brought about by Lord Howick whereby regiments serving abroad followed a somewhat circular route, serving first in the Mediterranean, then in the West Indies, next in Canada, and finally in England.\textsuperscript{2} Sir Henry Hardinge, as Secretary at War from 1841 to 1844 made an increased use of "colonial corps" paid by Britain but located permanently in certain colonies, and also converted nine of the "depôts" at home into relief battalions. Sir Robert Peel, speaking on the budget in 1845, referred to the question of reliefs with the blunt statement that no reductions in the military establishments were possible while Britain retained her vast colonial empire.\textsuperscript{3} Lord John Russell, in defending the estimates of 1846 pointed out the inadequacy of the system of reliefs. He gave an instance of regiments that had been little more than four years at home being ordered for foreign service, and of others that had been abroad since 1825. Russell stated his

\textsuperscript{1} Stacey, \textit{Canada and British Army}. pp. 53-55. \textsuperscript{2} Young, \textit{loc. cit.} \textsuperscript{3} Stacey, \textit{Canada and British Army}. pp. 55-56.
preference for a system whereby each regiment would be ten years abroad and five years at home.

At times during the period from 1815 to 1846, especially when the mother country was suffering from economic crises, there were instances of willingness on the part of British statesmen to abandon parts of the Empire. A proposal that Britain should abandon the whole of the coast of Guinea was made in 1827, at a time when retrenchment in public expenditure was imperative. The suggestion came from Wellington, who was master of ordnance, and was backed by Huskisson and Herries, both members of the Liverpool Ministry. With the fall of the Ministry later in 1827, the proposal was dropped. In 1842 Peel discussed with Aberdeen, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the advisability, in certain contingencies, of abandoning Upper and Lower Canada. Peel's attitude was caused by the facts that the Canadian rebellions had cost the British £3,000,000, that he wished to make an end of the contest between the Colonial Office and the Canadian Radicals over responsible government, and that he wished to escape the danger of a war with the United States over the Maine Boundary dispute.  

By 1846 it was apparent to all British political parties that some change in the old colonial system was long overdue. Certain of Peel's contemporaries had come to feel that it was time to follow Durham's recommendation of limited colonial self-government, in anticipation that with self-government the colonies would assume more self-reliance and would relieve the mother country of at least part of the burden of imperial defence.

1 Hansard. Third Series. vol. LXXXVII. pp. 1097-1101.
2 Porritt, op. cit. pp. 296-303.
3 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 25.
Chapter II.

The War Office and the British Army during the Nineteenth Century.

The organization and management of the War Office and the British Army during the nineteenth century passed through three stages, namely, confusion, centralization, and decentralization. During the period of confusion, which lasted until the weaknesses of the organization were cruelly brought to light during the Crimean War, the duties and powers connected with the Army were dispersed over seven independent government departments. These seven authorities had no co-ordinating link, never met officially to regulate the business of the Army, and generally only communicated with each other by letter. For example, when the soldiers required arms, the Commander-in-Chief stated the requirements to the Secretary at War, the information was passed on from there to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who finally submitted the requisition to the Ordnance Board which had control of the arms and equipment. This confusion of authorities was a serious handicap to the Army in time of war. Nevertheless, the condition continued partly due to the desire of the Crown to retain the prerogatives which it enjoyed in respect to the standing Army, but mainly due to the reluctance of Parliament to admit the necessity of a permanent standing Army.

As his duties in the management of the Army, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies had the responsibility for the size of the Army, the general policy concerning it, and the strength of troops

3 Ibid. pp. 222-4.
on foreign or overseas service. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible to the Crown for the discipline of the cavalry and infantry at home, their appointments, promotions, rewards and punishments; but he had no power over the movement of troops, no voice in equipping the men, and no authority over the troops abroad. The Secretary at War, who was not a Secretary of State nor often a member of the Cabinet, was responsible to Parliament for the money voted for the Army, controlled the movements and quarters of the troops, secured the civil rights of the citizen, and supervised the fair treatment of the soldier under the Mutiny Act. The Commissariat was a department responsible for letting contracts for army supplies and was directly controlled by the Treasury. The Ordnance Board, usually represented in Parliament by the Master-General of Ordnance, was responsible for the efficiency, discipline and pay of the artillery and engineers, for the defences of the country, and for all arms and equipment. The Secretary of State for the Home Department looked after the reserves of militia and yeomanry and was responsible for military questions relating to Great Britain. Finally, there was the Board of General Officers which attended to the clothing of the infantry and cavalry. 2

In 1783 the first definite Parliamentary responsibility had been placed upon the Secretary at War, who in future was to account to Parliament for the annual Army Estimates. When the office of Commander-in-Chief was revived in 1793, there began a dual control of the Army

1 In 1837 it was proposed to make the Secretary at War a Cabinet Minister. Tunstall, *op. cit.* p. 811.
between the Secretary at War and the Commander-in-Chief, for the latter in future controlled the internal discipline and regulation of the Army. In 1794 a third Secretary of State for War was appointed, who took over from the Secretary at War the control of the numbers and employment of the forces, leaving the Secretary at War with only the responsibility for the preparation of the Army Estimates. As was to be expected, a collision occurred between the Secretary at War and the Commander-in-Chief. The Cabinet decided that the Secretary at War should continue to control the finances of the Army, but he should consult the Commander-in-Chief on all new orders or regulations. Any further dispute between the two officials could be referred to the Exchequer, or to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.

The office of Secretary of State for War had been created in 1794, and in 1801 the business of the Colonies was attached to it as well. The work of this Secretary was complicated by the differing problems faced by the two units of the Department as well as by the complexity of the whole military organization. The Secretary of State for War had to refer all matters of internal defence to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and the details of military appointments to the Commander-in-Chief. When Lord Grey held the combined War Office and Colonial Office, he experienced difficulty in persuading the Duke of Wellington, who was Commander-in-Chief, to select younger and more active officers for the Army, for, said Grey, "the Duke still fancies himself and all who served with him in Spain to be the same men they were then thirty-five years ago." 2

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However, on the constitutional side, the appointment of a Secretary of State for War was important, for it placed the general policy of government as to the Army in the hands of a definite person holding a Cabinet position and responsible to Parliament.  

During the Crimean War the serious examples of departmental inefficiency caused by the dispersion of military duties over so many departments led to Parliamentary criticism which resulted in a complete change in the system of military administration. The Aberdeen Ministry separated the War Office from the Colonial Office in 1854, and appointed to the War Office a fourth Secretary of State for War. In 1855 the Palmerston Ministry went further by commissioning the new Secretary of State for War to act also as Secretary at War. Further steps in this general centralizing of the military departments included: the transfer of the Commissariat to the War Office; the absorption of the duties of the Board of Ordnance, the Board of General Officers and the Army Medical department by the War Office; and the appointment as auditors of the military accounts, men chosen from the War Office but responsible to the Commissioners of Audit. Under the resulting centralized organization the Secretary of State for War, assisted by a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and a permanent staff, assumed responsibility for the entire civil administration of the Army, leaving the Commander-in-Chief with independent military control, for the exercise of which, however, the Secretary of State was responsible to Parliament.

1 Anson. op. cit. p. 230.
2 Tumstall. op. cit. p. 816.
3 Anson. op. cit. p. 231.
The reforms of 1855 aimed at simplification and unity of control for the Army, but although the work of three departments had been united under the Secretary of State for War, his relations to the Commander-in-Chief were still indefinite. In addition, the separation of the Colonial and War Offices led to new difficulties in matters of colonial defence. The Secretary of State for War found himself at a disadvantage in not knowing the needs of the Colonies for whose defence he was responsible.¹ Accordingly in 1859, the War Office, at the direction of the secretary, General Peel, suggested to the Colonial Office that arrangements should be adopted "which should define the respective liabilities of this Department and the various Colonial Governments, in respect to military expenditure."² This suggestion resulted in the appointment of an inter-departmental Committee to prepare a general scheme of colonial military expenditure.³ Because the report of this Committee resulted in no radical change in the system of colonial defence, a further investigation into the colonial defence problem was made by a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1861.⁴ In 1862, as a result of the findings of this Committee, a resolution was passed in the House of Commons to the effect that the "Colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to

2 Schuyler, loc. cit.
3 See below, Chapter IV, for details on the work of this Committee.
4 See below, Chapter V, for details on the work of this Committee.
undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security, and to assist in their own external defence. The changes necessitated by the application of the resolution of 1862 were carried out by Mr. Cardwell, the Secretary of State for War and by two successive Colonial Secretaries, the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Granville.

The process of the decentralization of the War Office came likewise during Mr. Cardwell's term of office as Secretary of State for War. The burden placed upon the Secretary for War by the centralization of 1855 was found to be too great. When the work of decentralization began, it did not restore the former independent departments, but rather apportioned duties to those most competent to discharge them, with the Secretary for War retaining the responsibility for all that was done without being encumbered by the details of the various departments. After 1855, due to the indefinite relationship retained between the Secretary for War and the Commander-in-Chief, there was still something in the nature of a dual government of the Army. In 1870, in order to make the Commander-in-Chief part of the War Office organization and at the same time to create a division of labor that would relieve the Secretary for War and make for efficiency in the War Office, Cardwell created three departments of the War Office. The Military Department was to be under the Commander-in-Chief, the Ordnance Department was to be represented by a Surveyor-General of Ordnance, and the third Department, that of Finance, was to be represented by a Financial Secretary. The heads of the

1 Quoted in Stacey, Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871, p. 129.
Departments of Ordnance and Finance were to be chosen and controlled by the Secretary for War, and were eligible to sit in the House of Commons. The Secretary for War was to be generally responsible for all military affairs, with the Commander-in-Chief completely subordinate to him.  

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Chapter III.

Imperial and Canadian Defence Policy. 1846-1859.

The pressure which had been gathering force gradually towards the curtailment of colonial military expenditure broke through the surface of imperial policy very definitely during the decade following Lord Grey's advent to the Colonial Office. The change in colonial policy which was adopted by the Whigs under Lord John Russell and continued by the subsequent ministries under Lord Derby, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Palmerston and W.E.Gladstone, came as a result of pressure from a number of sources, political, economic and strategic. There were those men who advocated separation and those who favoured retaining the imperial connection, but without any noticeable exceptions the members of both groups considered that it was time for the colonies to relieve the mother country of the expenses connected with their internal defence.

The anti-imperialists had as their aim the abolition of the old colonial system which had burdened the trade of the colonies and mother country with restrictions for so long, while it had kept the colonies under a centralized, bureaucratic form of government, and had cost the mother country so dear financially. The separatists advanced the argument of the cost of colonial connection very strongly. One Radical, Sir Henry Parnell, argued that the number of British colonies should be greatly reduced and that those retained should bear all the cost of their defence. He estimated that Canada had already cost the mother country £60,000,000 and that the annual expense was at least £600,000.

2 Ibid.
For the year 1846-1847 approximately six-sevenths of the amount spent on the colonies was for defence, while in the North American colonies the military expenditures were about nineteen-twentieths of the total. For the same year the colonial military expenditures formed nearly one-third of the whole military expenditure of Britain, and about one-seventeenth of the total national expenditure. There were those among these "Little Englanders" who thought that, through adopting free trade, Britain had lost the one advantage of Empire, commercial monopoly, and retained only its burdens, for they pointed out that the colonies were a great expense but brought in little profit. A second argument used against the imperial connection was that the possession of colonies brought with it the increased danger of war. The separatists pointed to Canada as an illustration of this situation, for they considered that Canada's proximity to the United States created a possibility of Britain becoming involved in a war with that Republic along a frontier very difficult to defend. The fortunes of British anti-imperialism from the 1840's to the 1860's corresponded closely to the trend of Canadian-American relations of that period. An argument that even the strongest supporters of the imperial connection failed to refute was that the colonies would never come to the assistance of the mother country in case of war. It remained for those colonists who volunteered for overseas

1 Stacey, op.cit. pp.42-43.  
2 Goldwin Smith held this view.  
3 Cambridge History of the British Empire. vol.II. p.752.  
service at the time of the Crimean War and on many later occasions, to prove the short-sightedness of the Mid-Victorian view in this respect.

In the Free-Trade group there were men who were anti-imperialists, and others who were not, but all agreed that self-governing colonies should accept the responsibility of self-defence. Not only had free trade ended Britain's commercial monopoly of colonial trade, but Peel's British Possessions Act of 1846 permitted the colonists to use the free trade policy to their own advantage, and the Canadians had promptly done so by withdrawing the differential duties on American wheat. Such action prompted influential Englishmen to support imperial retrenchment in colonial military expenditures. Such retrenchment, according to Richard Cobden, leader of the "Manchester School", could only be accomplished by remodelling the colonial system. The commercial argument seems to have been instrumental in bringing the most influential British newspaper of the day, the London Times, around to support the policy of retrenchment in imperial expenditures on behalf of the colonies, although this paper did not become anti-imperialistic.

4 Stacey, op. cit. p. 49.
5 Cambridge History of the British Empire. vol. II. p. 753.
W.E. Gladstone, who had been Colonial Secretary in 1845-1846, just prior to Lord Grey, also favored colonial self-defence, as he considered that "no community which is not primarily charged with the ordinary business of its own defence is really, or can be, in the full sense of the word, a free community". He thought that the maintenance of imperial garrisons in colonies had evil results, and pointed to the wars against the natives in New Zealand and South Africa as occasions during which the colonists, confident in the support of the local garrisons, had brought on the wars in order to enrich themselves. As a first step towards colonial self-defence, Gladstone advised self-government. The colonies should be left to manage all questions in which no imperial interest was involved, although the mother country should continue to control the foreign relations of the colonies and to protect them from external aggression. In common with most moderate and reasonable men of the time, Gladstone believed that the separation of the colonies from the mother country was inevitable, but he felt that by the use of the principle of "freedom and voluntaryism" the imperial connection would be retained the longest, and that under such a principle the separation would be a friendly one when it did come. Similarly, if the aid of the colonies was sought in an imperial war, then that aid should not be given under compulsion, but freely through the desire of the colonies to share the burdens of defence with the mother country. Unfortunately, some of Gladstone's statements on colonial policy left the impression

1 Quoted in Lucas, op.cit. p.78.
2 P.Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy. London,1927. p.36.
3 "Gladstone's Views on British Colonial Policy". Knaplund, Canadian Historical Review. vol. IV. pp.309-313.
with Lord Grey and Lord Elgin that Gladstone favored the separation of the colonies from the mother country.

The expense that the possession of the colonies caused the mother country was the characteristic of the old colonial system most frequently attacked by the "colonial reformers". Prominent in these attackers in the House of Commons was Sir William Molesworth, who did not recommend separation as the solution of the problem, but stood for a reform of the system of colonial government. On July 25, 1848, Molesworth proposed and spoke at length on the following motion: "That it is the opinion of this House that the Colonial Expenditure of the British Empire demands inquiry, with a view to its reduction; and that to accomplish this object, and to secure greater contentment and prosperity to the Colonists, they ought to be invested with large powers for the administration of their local affairs." In beginning his speech, Molesworth stated that in 1848 the military force in the colonies amounted to about 42,000 men at a cost of about £2,500,000 to the mother country; the naval force maintained on account of the colonies consisted of forty-five ships with a complement of 8,000 men at a cost of £1,000,000; the civil expenditure of Great Britain on account of the colonies would amount to about £300,000, and the extraordinary expenses could be estimated at £200,000. Against this grand total of £4,000,000 a year spent on the colonies, Molesworth stated that Britain must balance the £9,000,000 worth of exports sold annually to the colonies. In considering the advantages derived by Britain in return for this expenditure,

Molesworth discussed the military stations first. Most of these colonies, he said, were so far removed from the centre of the Empire that in time of war they would be sources of weakness, for the forces would have to be widely scattered in order to retain the stations. He proposed to withdraw imperial military protection from the Ionian Islands, to abandon the West African stations, to reduce the forces at the Cape of Good Hope and Mauritius and give those colonies self-government with the responsibility of self-defence, to transfer Ceylon to the East India Company, to abandon the Falkland Islands, and to watch expenditures closely in other stations. In respect to the military stations, Molesworth estimated a saving of at least £1,000,000 a year could be made to the imperial exchequer. With regard to the colonies in North America, the West Indies, and Australasia, Molesworth considered that a reduction of imperial forces could be made safely. The North American colonies, he maintained, should be given responsible government and left to manage their own affairs, and thus the imperial military force and expenditure there could be reduced. The West Indian Islands should not be abandoned, but their garrisons should be reduced to half their numbers. The forces in the Australian colonies might be reduced, leaving 3,000 men to keep the convicts in order. The total reduction in imperial expenditure on this second group of colonies would amount to £1,000,000, which added to the reduction proposed in the military stations, made a grand total of £2,000,000, or one-half the annual imperial expenditure on the colonies. In considering the amount of
military expenditure defrayed by the colonies, Molesworth stated that he found the colonies possessing self-government were the most economically governed, therefore he added this fact as a further advantage of self-government.

Molesworth's second important speech on imperial policy was given on April 10, 1851, in support of the following resolution which he had moved in the House:

"That it is the opinion of this House that steps should be taken to relieve this country, as speedily as possible, from its present civil and military expenditure on account of the colonies, with the exception of its expenditure on account of military stations or convict settlements. That it is expedient, at the same time, to give to the inhabitants of the colonies, which are neither military stations nor convict settlements, ample powers for their local self-government, and to free them from that imperial interference with their affairs which is inseparable from their present military occupation." (2)

Dealing with the matter of reduction of imperial forces, Molesworth stated that the troops might be withdrawn ultimately from Van Diemen's Land with a saving of £93,000 a year to the imperial exchequer since the inhabitants wished the transportation of convicts there discontinued. Since he considered that the strength of an empire depended on its ability to concentrate its troops in as few military stations as possible, he would suggest Britain placing garrisons only in Gibgaltar, Malta, Bermuda, Halifax, Barbados, the southern peninsula of the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, Singapore, and perhaps Hong Kong. The North American, West Indian, Australasian, and South African colonies he considered should pay the expenses of all troops required for local purposes, although the mother country should support any

1 Egerton (ed.), Speeches of Molesworth. pp. 154-211. (Speech "On Colonial Expenditure and Government", July 25, 1848.)
2 Quoted in Kwart, op.cit. p.38.
forces kept there for imperial purposes. He felt convinced that, if the colonies possessed self-government, they would gladly and willingly come to the aid of the mother country in any just and necessary war. In the case of a self-governing colony having troubles with natives, Molesworth believed that it was best that the colony should bear the expense, for in that case the local government would not engage rashly in a war, or if it did undertake a war, it would terminate it as quickly as possible. In this way there would not be the same tendency for corruption to creep into the expenditures in connection with native wars. Briefly then, in order to make his proposed reduction in colonial expenditure possible, Molesworth suggested that imperial military expenditure on the self-governing colonies should only be in case the Empire was engaged in a war with a foreign power or where there were certain strategic stations of imperial value located in those colonies.

Another "colonial reformer" who keenly criticized the garrison system was Edward Gibbon Wakefield. In March 1851 he addressed a paper to Gladstone on the garrison question, hoping to obtain Gladstone's support for Molesworth's motion on the reduction of imperial military expenditure on behalf of the colonies. In his paper, Wakefield did not use the need of retrenchment as an argument, but dealt instead with the evil effects which he considered the garrisons had upon the colonies in which they were stationed. In the first place, the very presence of imperial troops in a colony

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1 Egerton, op.cit. pp.266-286. (Speech "On Reduction of Colonial Expenditure", April 10, 1851.)
made their removal difficult, for disturbances arose often caused by the over-confidence of the inhabitants in the presence of the troops, and as a result imperial forces had to be retained for the sake of order. The Kaffir Wars in South Africa, the Canadian Rebellions of 1837-1838, the Canadian Riots in Montreal in 1849, and the Maori Wars in New Zealand, were, he said, examples of this vicious system at work. Secondly, Wakefield maintained that the occupation of a colony by imperial troops produced evil effects on the system of government, politics and society in the colony. Where garrisons were stationed, he said, the colonists came to prefer dependence, idleness and extravagance to self-reliance, industry and thrift. Therefore it would be most necessary if imperial troops were retained as garrisons in certain important centres that those troops should be employed for imperial purposes only. Finally, according to Wakefield, before the reduction of imperial forces referred to in the second part of Molesworth's motion could be accomplished, it would be necessary to establish in the formerly garrisoned colonies new policies respecting such matters as government and relations with the natives. It would be unjust, for example, to withdraw the imperial garrisons from The Cape of Good Hope or New Zealand without first having established a new system of relations with the natives based on the principle of no military occupation by imperial troops.

The arguments of the "colonial reformers" had their weaknesses. The reformers in their considerations of reductions did not differentiate

between the dangers facing Canada and the Cape of Good Hope. They failed to see that a Kaffir attack on the Cape was much more probable than an American attack on Canada. Likewise, as we shall see, they proposed to do at once what the Government proposed to do gradually. The reduction of garrisons was not an affair that could be carried out abruptly without causing many inconveniences and misgivings in the colonies. Quite probably the evil effects of the garrison system were exaggerated by Wakefield, although a leading colonist of New Zealand later held that the presence of the garrisons was one of the chief causes of the Maori Wars, and there were some suspicions that the Kaffir Wars in South Africa were encouraged by colonial merchants who profited from the presence of imperial troops. By 1851, the self-government argument of the "colonial reformers" was already outdated with reference to Canada, where Lord Grey had already made responsible government a reality. The imperial troops stationed in Canada had ceased to be regarded as a possible determining factor in colonial politics, and were merely a guarantee against foreign aggression.

Although, except in the case of the Crimean War, England took no part in the European wars of the mid-Victorian era, there were

3 Ibid. C. M. Owen. Evidence No. 1779.
4 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 46.
occasions when fear of becoming involved in a European war caused the British to look to their own defences. Invariably those defences appeared inadequate, and the reaction which followed affected the composition of the imperial garrisons stationed in the colonies. Such was the case in 1845 and 1846 when the possibility of a French prince becoming King of Spain caused apprehension in Britain that the European balance was becoming unstable. Lord Palmerston, speaking on national defences in July 1845, drew attention to the large standing army and formidable fleet maintained by France, and stated that because disputes might easily arise unexpectedly due to the extensive empires of Britain and France, it would be strategically important to have the British Isles in a position to resist any sudden or early attack. Because he considered that no state in Europe was as defenceless as Great Britain at that time, he suggested that the internal garrisons should be strengthened and the militia called out for training. Sir Robert Peel replied that the people of Britain would never agree to a standing army of 100,000 or 200,000 men, and furthermore that the British navy would be ready to cope with any eventuality. Again, during the debates on the Estimates in July 1846, a member advised caution in the reduction of military expenditures due to the large expenditures of France in constructing fortifications and in support of her army. Wellington, the Commander-in-Chief, who had long

deplored the defenceless state of the British Isles, wrote to Grey in December 1846, showing how the demand for troops for overseas service had diminished the forces at home and asking for an increase in the military establishment. Grey replied that the Treasury had been urging the strictest economy, therefore an increase in the army was impossible, but he promised to achieve the desired effect by reducing the colonial garrisons. When the British public was informed of the unpreparedness of Britain through reports made by Palmerston and by Sir John Burgoyne, the Inspector General of Fortifications, much uneasiness ensued. Parliament debated the matter of increased expenditure, but increases were opposed by the members of the Manchester School. The uneasiness ended in 1848 when the French drove Louis Philippe from the throne and established the Second Republic. The coup d'état by which Louis Napoleon overthrew the Second Republic in 1851 caused consternation in Britain again. The question of increased military expenditures was again debated in Parliament, and on this occasion a Bill for increased military expenditures at home passed. In the course of the debate the radicals had again urged that the colonies should adopt self-defence so that the money previously used for their defence might be diverted for the protection of the mother country. The establishment of the Second French Empire in 1852 increased the British apprehension. The Whig


4 Stacey, *Canada and British Army*, p. 61.
Government of Lord John Russell, of which Lord Grey was Colonial Secretary and Secretary for War, was defeated in 1852 because of public opposition to a plan reviving the local militia enrolled by ballot or partial compulsion.

The demands for retrenchment that faced the Peel and Russell Administrations were not without an economic background. The policy of making Britain nearly self-supporting in food production, through the adoption of the Corn Laws, had caused Britain’s export trade to be sluggish. Although the quantities of goods exported increased, they brought lower prices. The home market did not expand as fast as the capacity of the manufacturers to supply it. By 1847 the value of exports from the United Kingdom was £58,800,000 as compared with £51,600,000 for 1815. The so-called "railway mania" came in 1845-1846, and was speedily followed by the Bank Crisis of 1847. The Bank Charter Act passed by Peel in 1844 had been designed to prevent excessive credits by the limitation of note issues. But it failed in its purpose, as other means of giving bank credit had come into vogue besides the issue of notes. The passing of the Bank Charter Act, while it deflated currency, was followed by a rapid and enormous increase of credit, which was largely caused by the railway mania. The fluctuations of the harvests likewise complicated matters. The harvests of 1842, 1843 and 1844 were good, a circumstance which brought the price of food-stuffs down and other prices fell in sympathy. This condition left capital to be invested in railway

Skelton, op. cit. p.337.
construction. Then came the years 1845 and 1846 when a potato
famine in Ireland was accompanied by bad harvests in England and
the neighbouring continental countries. This situation caused the
rate of discount to rise, and the price of wheat to rise also.
Grain speculators then rushed wheat into the country, the prices
fell, and the speculators and their creditors were ruined. To ease
the crisis, the Government suspended the Bank Charter Act, the Bank
of England was allowed to grant loans readily to sound borrowers at
high rates of interest, and credit was restored.

Such were the factors, political, strategic, and economic,
which were exercising their influence in imperial affairs during
the years of Lord Grey's occupancy of the Colonial Office. Grey had
the ability and tact to adopt a colonial policy which would meet the
necessities of the Empire of the period, and with his advent to
office a new chapter in the life of the British Empire was opened.
Having formerly held the posts of Secretary at War and Under-
Secretary for the Colonies, Grey had valuable experience to draw
from, and applied that experience to good advantage as Colonial
Secretary until the defeat of the Russell Administration in 1852.
Grey was both an imperialist in that he opposed the separation of
the colonies from the mother country and assisted in the granting
of responsible government in the leading colonies, and also a free
trader in that he encouraged the removal of the preferential system
and the repeal of the Navigation Acts. He believed that since it
was no longer the intention of the mother country to exercise a
dominating influence on the internal government of the leading colonies

1 Slater, op. cit. pp. 337-345.
2 Stacey, Canada and British Army. pp. 64-65.
or to levy commercial restrictions upon them, the colonists concerned should assume a larger proportion of the expenses incurred on their account. The chief source of expense on account of the colonies being in their military protection, Grey considered that the colonies should contribute much more than they had formerly done for their own defence. On this matter, the Premier, Lord John Russell, agreed with Grey, to whom he wrote in 1846: "I have always thought that the British Colonies should provide militia for their own defence, and pay for the construction of fortifications." Accordingly, Grey attempted to establish gradually the principle of colonial self-defence in internal affairs, with the mother country only responsible for the permanent defence of certain important naval and military stations and for the protection of all colonies in case of an attack by a foreign power.

There was, of course, colonial opposition to this new colonial policy which evidently was about to be undertaken. There was generally little readiness in the colonies to admit any large obligation for defence. The defensive works and military establishments in some colonies were so extensive and so costly of up-keep that they seemed to be of imperial rather than local concern. In addition, because Britain continued to control the foreign policy of the colonies, and because this situation might involve them in an imperial war of no concern to them locally, the colonists argued that Britain should bear the burden of defence. There were always colonial merchants who found the presence of imperial troops profitable, and so were not eager to

2 Morrell, op. cit. p. 475. Grey, op. cit. p. 44.
see the garrisons withdrawn. To some colonists, who heard the arguments of the "Little Englanders" above those of the imperialists, the recall of the garrisons seemed to initiate the process of separation from the mother country, therefore those colonists who wished to retain the imperial connection opposed the policy of reduction. And finally, to use the caustic words of Robert Lowe: "The upper classes think that it (the presence of the garrisons) makes society more agreeable; the young ladies are frantic upon the subject; and people who keep public houses are always glad to see our soldiers."

The Russell Administration put its new policy into operation almost immediately. When the Whigs came into power in 1846, the Oregon controversy with the United States had just been settled, and in August of that year Grey sent a despatch asking Lord Cathcart, the Governor-General and Commander of the Forces in Canada, if it would not be possible to withdraw some imperial troops from Canada and reduce the number of outlying detachments. Although Cathcart did not favor this reduction, two regiments were returned to England from Canada in 1847. The reduction in the case of Canada at this time was slight, for the proximity of the United States to Canada and the Canadian depression resulting from the new free trade policy of the mother country were factors to be considered. In the case of Australia, however, Grey was able to apply his policy more vigorously,

1 Young (ed.), op. cit. vol. I. p. 358.
3 Quoted in Lucas, The Empire at War, vol. I. p. 78.
4 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 66.
for the Australian Colonies were considered to be the safest of any from foreign attack, and there were no formidable native tribes to contend with there. Accordingly, in November 1846, Grey instructed Governor Sir Charles Fitz Roy of New South Wales to send 900 men to New Zealand where a Maori war was in progress, and recommended that a local police should be formed in New South Wales for the maintenance of internal order. A small force of imperial troops was to remain at Sydney, for that port was considered to be of imperial importance. When Governor Fitz Roy requested that the mother country support the expense of building fortifications at Sydney, on the grounds that Sydney was of equal imperial importance to Quebec and Halifax which had been fortified at imperial cost, Grey would not agree. He considered that the fortification of Sydney was no doubt a prudent undertaking, but that New South Wales was wealthy enough to assume the expense entailed, and that furthermore it would be unreasonable to expect the heavily taxed British people to pay for such Australian defences when there were fortifications required at home. However, Grey assured Fitz Roy that New South Wales would always have the benefit of Great Britain's support against foreign attack. The troops were sent from New South Wales to New Zealand, where they were to be stationed temporarily and then withdrawn to Britain. Attempts were made by New South Wales to have these troops return, but Grey was firm in his policy of reduction, stating however that the home government would transfer the imperial barracks, ordnance buildings and lands in New South Wales to the local government, which should in future be responsible for the barracks of the small guard of
imperial troops which would remain at Sydney. Furthermore, Grey
was willing to despatch any additional troops that might be required
in New South Wales, provided that the expense of their maintenance
was undertaken by the colony, and he would aid in the settlement
of the colony by encouraging soldiers to take their discharge there.
He also offered to increase the number of enrolled pensioners in the
1
colony. In February 1850, Russell, speaking on the Australian Colonies Government Bill, stated that it was the duty of the home govern-
ment not to abandon the colonies. He affirmed that the defence of
the colonies against foreign aggression was one of the principles of
the colonial policy of his administration, the other principle being
2
free trade. The Australians took advantage of the imperial offer
of further military assistance, when in 1851 at the time of gold
discoveries in the colony, the local government asked for and received
imperial reinforcements on condition that they should pay all the
3
expenses except arms and clothing. Grey's attempts at reduction of
imperial forces stationed in the West Indies resulted in two regiments
being brought back to Britain in 1846, although the depression
suffered by the West Indies made it difficult for them to support
4
their defences alone. At the Cape of Good Hope, Grey's attempt to
extend his policy met with a setback, largely owing to the Kaffir Wars. Grey did not agree with many in Britain who believed that
most of the Cape should be abandoned due to the immense cost

1
Appendix 17, pp.312-316.
2
Morrell, op.cit. p.49.          3
Stacey, Canada and British Army, p.86.
4
incurred for the mother country through these wars, but rather held that the British government could not abandon settlers whom they had encouraged to go out to South Africa. As a result, imperial troops were increased in number at the Cape from 2,000 to 5,000 men between 1840 and 1847, and to 9,000 men by 1852. At the same time, because there had been extensive financial mismanagement and corruption in connection with the Kaffir wars, Grey warned the colonists not to expect the imperial government to carry the cost of any new war of the same kind. New Zealand likewise provided a special case due to the wars there between the settlers and the native Maoris. At the request of the governor, Sir George Grey, the imperial forces in New Zealand had been raised to 2,500 men. This increase in troops resulted in the conclusion of the Maori war, and, before Grey left the Colonial Office in 1852 reductions had been carried out and the imperial military expenditure in New Zealand had been reduced to within very moderate limits. In order to provide for the future protection of settlers in New Zealand, Lord Grey had adopted the policy of settling military pensioners in villages near Auckland on the North Island where the Maori troubles had occurred.

Lord Elgin, the Governor chosen by Lord Grey to inaugurate the new colonial policy in Canada, arrived in his new charge early in 1847 in the midst of a serious Canadian economic crisis even greater than that of 1836-1837. During the period 1842 to 1846 Canada had enjoyed exceptional prosperity brought about by a most favorable

1 Ibid. pp.248-252.  
2 Morrell, op.cit. p.476.  
British market. The British railway mania had provided a market for Canadian timber, the imperial preference had supplied a certain and profitable market for Canadian grain and flour, while an imperial loan had enabled the province to provide work for native workmen and for immigrants. The British railway crisis of 1846 caused a collapse of the timber market at about the same time that the removal of the imperial preference on Canadian wheat caused the price of bread-stuffs to fall. At the same time Canadian finances met a crisis when Grey refused to extend the imperial guarantee to fresh Canadian financing. The immense emigration to Canada of 90,000 starving and dying Irishmen following the Irish famine of 1846, coming as it did in the midst of a commercial depression in Canada generally ascribed to British legislation, produced discontent in Canada and encouraged a separatist movement there. At this date the Canadians contracted their own position as members of the British Empire with the far more prosperous condition of the independent United States.

This uneasy situation in Canada did not prevent Grey from raising the question of military expenditure almost immediately after Elgin had assumed office. The Act passed by the government of Canada in 1846 granting a Civil List to Her Majesty had been reserved because

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1 R.S. Longley. "Francis Hinde and Canadian Public Finance". Canadian Historical Association Report. (1934) p.36.
In 1847, in order to expedite matters, Her Majesty assented to the reserved sections of the Act of 1846 and the British government repealed the clauses of the Canadian Act of Union relating to the Civil List, thus making Canadian colonial expenditure a purely local affair. No change was made in the responsibility for the payment of the Governor's salary, and in connection with this matter Grey suggested that the province should undertake a part of its military expenses in return for the imperial government paying the Governor's salary. Grey stated six months later that he considered that since the Canadians possessed self-government they ought to pay all the province's expenses including those for military protection, the only exception being the salary of the Governor. In reply to these proposals Elgin pointed to the dangers involved in attempting to enforce such a policy at

1 Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 1847. 10-11 Vict.

2 The clauses were No's. L to LVII of the Union Act, 1840, (3 and 4 Victoria, c.35). See W.P.M. Kennedy, Statutes, Treaties, and Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1713-1929. Toronto, 1930. pp.443-444.


that time. If Britain withdrew her protection Canada could easily turn to the United States for security against aggression. Elgin admitted that the adoption of free trade probably had caused many British people to feel that expenditures incurred on behalf of the colonies were wasted, and he felt that dependence on the mother country for protection tended to check the growth of national and manly morals in a country. However, he considered that the movement towards colonial self-defence should be made cautiously, especially at a time when certain British statesmen were hinting at separation. Elgin was worried lest the French Revolution of 1848 and the threatened rebellion in Ireland during the same year might affect the radicals in Canada of French and Irish descent. Furthermore, the American Irish were attempting to stir up discontent against Britain among the people in Canada, and were even talking of invading Canada. He feared that the action of the British Parliament in shelving the measure to repeal the Navigation Acts was likely to displease the Canadian merchants. Therefore, because Elgin could not expect aid from the Irish or French in Canada or from the Canadian commercial class, he resorted to calling out the military forces, having


two regiments of Volunteers take over the defence of Montreal so as to leave the imperial garrison stationed there free to 1 act on the frontier. He considered that this was an opportun- ity to show the Canadians the value of the British connection.

The economic conditions in Canada in 1848 which aroused Elgin's anxiety were indeed serious, due partly to the increased burden caused by the famine emigration of 1847. Elgin wrote to Grey stating that Britain could hardly refuse to make good to the province what had been spent in immigration service during 1847. But Grey disagreed, replying that Canada should pay at least one-half the expenses, for Britain had already been put to heavy expense on account of Canada through maintaining the military and naval defences and through retaining the protective duty on Canadian timber. Elgin warned Grey that to threaten withdrawal of the imperial troops with a view to burdening Canada with her own defence, at this dangerous period, might turn the Canadians to support the movement for separation. Grey agreed with Elgin that any attempt at bringing about military


3 Ibid. p. 115. Grey to Elgin, Private, January 28, 1848.

4 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 71.
reduction or Canadian contribution to defence should be pursued with caution. He believed that the problem of military reduction could be solved by combining it with railway construction, for military pioneers could be employed in building the Halifax to Quebec Railway and could also replace the regular troops as a garrison. Nevertheless, the continued agitation in the House of Commons forced Grey to broach the subject of reduction of the imperial forces in despatches to Elgin dating from July 1848, to November 1850. Grey asked Elgin’s opinion on the possibility of arranging for the reduction of military expenditure in Canada in return for taking over the salary of the Governor, and stated that if the British Government agreed to pay the Governor’s salary, the colonists should provide the barracks for the imperial troops and pay the expenses of internal defence. The barracks at the imperial fortresses at Quebec, Kingston, and Halifax, would continue to be maintained by the Home Government. On a later occasion, Grey suggested that it would aid greatly in persuading the British Parliament to adopt a plan for the Quebec Railway, if Elgin, in recommending the plan, could also propose a way of reducing the military expenditure. Grey again mentioned the question of barracks and repeated his suggestion regarding the substitution of military labourers for regular troops.

To these proposals by Grey, Elgin remained cool. He did not consider that Canada should be used as a proving ground for experiments in raising local military corps as suggested in plans submitted through

3 Ibid. p. 257. Grey to Elgin, Private, December 1, 1848.
Grey by Captain Elliot and Colonel Tulloch. He disagreed with the plan for using military labourers as suggested by Tulloch, as it would result in these men feeling inferior to the other inhabitants of the colony. If the men, while armed, became discontented, their presence might necessitate an increased garrison rather than assisting in its reduction. Elgin constantly emphasized the need for caution in undertaking a new defence policy, for at that time he felt that any change in policy would increase the uneasiness in Canada which had been aroused by Britain's free trade policy and by the unguarded language of British statesmen. The unsatisfactory condition of the provincial finances would make any suggestion for increased provincial expenditures extremely unpopular. Furthermore, Canada had a special claim for protection, because her connection to Great Britain exposed her to hostile aggression, especially from the United States. Therefore, he believed that any reduction of imperial forces should be carried out prudently, as a measure of economy only, without adding to the financial burdens of the colonists. If the time should come when it would be possible to make reductions, Elgin considered that it would be necessary to leave sufficient imperial troops to provide a nucleus around which the Canadian militia might rally in time of war. In compliance with a request for recommendations regarding reductions possible at some later date, Elgin suggested that some 2,000 men

1 Ibid. p. 216. Elgin to Grey, August 2, 1848.
2 Doughty (ed.), op. cit. vol. IV. p. 1436-1457. Sullivan, Memorandum on Colonel Tulloch's Plan, etc.
could be spared from Canada, leaving about 3,000 men to act as garrisons along the American border. He recommended, however, that the Imperial Government should continue to have charge of the barracks and fortifications. This extensive reduction suggested by Elgin was greater than that which Grey himself had contemplated. He stated that he would be satisfied with a reduction of 500 men at first, to be accomplished either by withdrawing one regiment, or by choosing a total of 500 men from several regiments and persuading them to take their discharge and settle in Canada. But by the same despatch Grey once more appealed to Elgin for the immediate reduction of the imperial forces in Canada, and for the reduction of the expenses of the forces which would remain. Financial conditions in England, said Grey, demanded retrenchment. To suggest a possible means by which reduction could be made, he reminded Elgin that imperial troops were not to be used as police in the colony, for that form of protection was the responsibility of the local government. At the same time, Grey showed that the Imperial Government realized the necessity of keeping sufficient troops in Canada to guard against foreign invasion.

Because Grey felt that the growing resentment in England against the expense connected with the colonies constituted a threat to the unity of the Empire, he brought about a number of minor reductions in the cost of the Canadian military establishment during 1849.

1 Ibid. p. 266. Elgin to Grey, Private and Confidential, December 6, 1848.
2 Ibid. p. 274. Grey to Elgin, Private, December 29, 1848.
The last of the local forces raised after the rebellion were disbanded, although both Elgin and Sir Benjamin D'Urban, the Commander of the Canadian forces, protested. The lack of barrack, said Grey, necessitated the decision to withdraw the regiment stationed in Montreal, as the House of Commons would not consider the additional expense of building a new barracks. Grey pointed out, however, that the colonists might retain the regiment in Montreal by providing the necessary barracks. Because of the recent serious rioting in Montreal on the occasion of the Rebellion Losses Bill crisis, the local government was anxious that the troops should remain in the city. Accordingly, Elgin was able to persuade the provincial authorities to meet the cost of the troops, although he warned Grey not to consider this a precedent for future action.

During 1849 the North American military command was divided, with Canada forming one section and the Maritime Provinces the other. At the same time the office of Commander of the Forces in British North America was abolished. Through these alterations, Grey hoped to effect a considerable saving in the Army Estimates. In addition, Grey insisted that the Canadian Government should defray the expenses of imperial troops which Elgin had sent to Lake Superior to protect miners there from the Indians. When the Clear Grits in the provincial legislature objected to the province being charged with these expenses, Elgin was able to silence them by sending to the Legislature extracts from Grey's despatches in which it had been insisted that local

2 Doughty (ed.), op.cit. vol.II. p.716. Grey to Elgin, June 20,1850.
police be provided to preserve order within the province, and that the expense of the troops sent to Lake Superior be borne by the provincial government.

Thus far Elgin had persuaded Grey to avoid asking the Canadian Government to undertake any additional expenditure for military purposes. Grey had decided to wait until the Canadian depression had passed before making further demands on the Canadians. During 1849 commercial conditions in Canada grew progressively worse, giving rise to the Annexation Movement. The Annexation Manifesto issued in Montreal in October 1849 stated that it would be to the advantage of Britain if Canada was annexed to the United States, for it would lessen the military expenditures of Great Britain and relieve her of the danger of collision with the United States over Canadian affairs. The Manifesto further stated that Britain's threatened withdrawal of her troops from the other colonies and the continuance of her military protection to Canada only on the condition that Canada should defray the expenditure were illustrations of Britain's intentions towards Canada against which it was weakness in Canadians not to provide.

Under the circumstances created by the Annexationists, Elgin attempted to avoid still more emphatically fulfilling any imperial suggestions for the reduction of British troops in Canada. When Grey forwarded estimates submitted by the Ordnance on the accommodation of troops in Canada, Elgin was outspoken in his belief that the Canadian

Parliament would never agree to spend the £200,000 for fortifications on the American frontier as recommended by the Ordnance. The imposition of new burdens on Canadians at that time would only encourage annexation. Elgin continued to discourage reduction in reply to a confidential despatch inquiring into the possibility of the reduction of forces in Canada. He stated that D'Urban did not consider any reduction possible due to the length of the international border which needed protection. It would be wise, thought Elgin, to notice the effect of the disbandment of the provincial cavalry before beginning any new reduction. D'Urban had suggested that if the regular troops were reduced in number, militia should be posted at the important strategic points, but Elgin was doubtful of the wisdom of this suggestion due to the danger of party spirit running high and involving the militia. Elgin agreed that the colonists should provide for the internal defence of Canada, but thought that it was well to remember that the presence of a British garrison was a great aid in maintaining order on the international boundary, and that the removal of British moderating control in Lower Canada, where French and English were living as neighbors, would be followed by a serious collision between the races. He likewise referred to the statements made by the Annexationists that Britain intended to withdraw from Canada the protection of the Empire, a policy which would place Canada in a precarious position owing to the proximity of the United States and to Canada's dependence on British foreign policy.


2 Doughty (ed.), op. cit. vol. IV. p. 1500. Elgin to Grey, Confidential, February 9, 1850.
Retrenchment in military expenditure on behalf of Canada appeared to be more possible in 1850 owing to improved conditions in the country. With the lifting of the economic depression, the annexationist movement died out. Grey returned to the question of reduction with an argument that in time of peace it would be safe to withdraw troops from the American boundary to posts from which they could be sent quickly when needed. The Canadian Government also adopted a retrenchment policy, resulting in suggestions for economy through a reduction in the Governor-General's salary. The Canadian executive council investigated the salary question and drew up a report in which it was recommended that some arrangement regarding the Governor's salary should be made, which would remove the salary entirely from the control of the provincial legislature. Elgin approved of this report, and suggested to Grey that the Imperial Government should undertake to pay the salary, but that it should be explained that the Canadian Government would be expected to assume some of the financial burden borne by Britain on account of Canada. He proposed once more that the British troops in Canada should be limited to two or three posts, with the understanding that if the troops required reinforcements the colonists should provide the accommodation for such additional forces.

The immediate outcome of Elgin's suggestions was Grey's despatch of March 14, 1851, in which he outlined a new imperial military policy.

2 Parliamentary Papers,House of Commons,1851, cd.1344, vol.XXXVI. Correspondence relating to the Civil List and Military Expenditure in Canada. April 8,1851.
3 Stacey, Canada and British Army. pp.78-79.
Canada, being a self-governing colony, wrote Grey, should undertake a larger share of the expenditures which had been incurred on her account, the heaviest of these being the military charges. Canada's prosperity now made it possible for the colony to take over a large proportion of the defence expenditures, a proceeding which would be a return to the former policy of colonial self-defence followed before the American Revolution. The measures to be taken under this new policy were as follows: except for enrolled pensioners, the imperial troops remaining in Canada were to be confined to two or three important fortified posts, probably Quebec and Kingston, for, due to Britain's amicable relations with the United States, the Canadian militia and the remaining imperial troops would be sufficient to secure the safety of Canada. If Canada wished to maintain the barracks which would no longer be required for imperial troops, the British Government would transfer these barracks to the provincial authorities. If Canada wished to retain any additional troops to those in the two or three fortified posts, Britain would supply the troops, provided that Canada was responsible for their actual cost. The Home Government also expected the province to assume the maintenance of the Canadian canals which had been built at great British expense chiefly with a view to the military defence of Canada. In return for Canada's assumption of a larger portion of the expenditure on defence, the British Government would provide for the salary of the Governor-General. The despatch also announced the intention of the British Government to apply to Parliament for a guarantee for a
loan to assist in the construction of the Quebec and Halifax Railway, for Grey hoped that he would make the intended reduction of Britain's military expenditure in Canada more palatable to the Canadians by coupling it with proposed assistance to the railroad.

The reception of the announcement of the new imperial defence policy was much milder than Elgin had expected. He anticipated that there would be active discussion on the new policy in the Canadian Parliament, but he considered that the time was most opportune for attempting the proposed changes as the Canadian Parliament had put itself in the wrong by meddling with the Civil List. The publication of Grey's despatch on retrenchment was followed by no bad effects. Indeed the "Clear Grits" rather approved of Grey's new policy, and the only criticism came from partisan newspapers which disliked the Governor-General and his ministers. The Toronto Examiner, an ultra-Radical newspaper, saw in the new policy a guarantee that Britain would never again attempt to coerce Canada, and stated that Canadian morality would gain through the withdrawal of imperial troops. The reduction was an act of justice to the over-taxed people of England, and the policy depended on a generous reliance in the unbought affections of the people -- the best guarantee for the continuance of the British connection.

3 Ibid. p.819. Elgin to Grey, Private, April 23,1851.
5 Stacey, Canada and British Army, p.83.
In putting his new policy into effect, Grey adopted Elgin's suggestion of making the military changes gradually. Within a year the imperial troops in Canada were reduced in number from 6,106 to 4,960 men. The settlement of pensioners in Canada was begun, and the provincial government was required to provide barracks at Montreal and to defray the expenses of moving the troops when they were required to aid the civil authorities. In Australia and Canada Grey was able to put his policy into effect, but the outbreak of a new Kaffir war at the Cape made it necessary to increase the force there and to add some 3,000 men to the strength of the British Army.

The Russell Administration fell before it had completed the programme described in Grey's despatch on retrenchment, with the result that the British Government neither assumed the payment of the Governor-General's salary nor did the incoming ministry guarantee the loan for the Halifax to Quebec Railway. However, when Grey left the Colonial Office in 1852, in addition to the reductions in Canada, eight minor imperial stations had been abandoned.

The successive Colonial Secretaries in the Derby-Disraeli and Aberdeen Ministries attempted to continue Grey's policy. By 1853

1 Ibid. p.85.
3 Stacey, Canada and British Army, p.85.
5 Stacey, Canada and British Army, loc. cit.
Newcastle had succeeded to a slight degree in reducing the number of imperial troops in the West Indies, while at the Cape he had secured a temporary reduction of 2,500 imperial troops following the temporary cessation of the Kaffir War and the grant of a representative constitution to the colony. The approach of the Crimean War influenced Britain to accelerate the reduction of her garrisons abroad in order to have as large a force as possible at her disposal in Europe. Because of the peaceful Canadian-American relations, it was decided to reduce the Canadian garrisons to one regiment of infantry, two companies of artillery, and the Canadian Rifles. The latter were to be stationed at Kingston, with two companies detached for service at Montreal, and the whole of the remaining troops were to be stationed at Quebec. By the end of the fiscal year 1854-55 there were only 1,887 imperial troops in Canada, as compared to 4,742 for 1852, and the troops in all the British Colonies totalled 39,637 as against 45,843 in 1852.

The period of the Crimean War, Indian Mutiny, and Second China War was one of strategic crisis for the Imperial Government. Because the British Army lacked the means of rapid and effectual expansion, England was only able to send a force of 30,000 to the Crimea in 1854, reinforcing it with 21,500 raw troops in 1855. The necessity of recalling the imperial troops still stationed in the self-governing colonies became apparent, and in the course of time, under Edward Cardwell, this was accomplished and the army was reorganized.

3 Stacey, Canada and British Army, p. 90. Hamilton, op. cit. p. 393.
The Crimean War quickened the feeling of loyalty in the colonies and brought home to them the possibility of self-defence becoming a necessity. As a result volunteer forces were raised in Australia, Natal and Canada, while militia forces were raised in Nova Scotia. At the Cape an act for internal defence was passed. A Patriotic Fund amounting to £143,000 was subscribed among the colonies to be used to provide relief for those in Great Britain affected by the casualties of the war. Most significant of all as indicative of future co-operative imperial action in time of war was the presence of Canadian volunteers in Crimea.

During the Crimean War considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining recruits for the British Army. In Canada the local government was not inclined to favor recruiting for the regular service as it might interfere with that for the new Canadian volunteer force. Other drawbacks to imperial recruiting in Canada were the relatively high wages earned by even unskilled laborers, the unattractive accounts of the soldiers' life in the Crimea, and the long period of enlistment. In order to obtain the required men, the British undertook to recruit among the Americans. These recruiting operations led to a dispute with the United States, which did not develop seriously due to pressure brought to bear on Lord Palmerston by the manufacturing and commercial interests and the moderate politicians in Britain. At the conclusion of the Crimean War there was an

1 Tunstall, op.cit. p.318; Lucas, Empire at War, vol.I. pp.66,68.
2 Stacey, Canada and British Army, pp.95-96.
increase of the garrisons of British North America, partly because of the diplomatic difficulty with the United States over the recruiting, and partly because Britain did not possess sufficient accommodation for her own army. The military necessities of the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny allowed the British government no opportunity of retrenchment in military expenditures. The imperial military expenditures for 1857 amounted to £4,037,000 (of which the colonies contributed £378,000), compared with the total of £2,450,000 for 1849-50. The Indian Mutiny placed a further strain on the military resources of the Empire. As the above expenditures illustrate, the British Army was again increased. In Canada, volunteer corps offered their services either in India or in the province in order to release imperial troops needed elsewhere, but the offer was refused. However, with the approval of the Canadian executive council, the 100th Prince of Wales Royal Canadian Regiment was raised in Canada, although it was organized, equipped, and paid at British expense, and became a unit of the imperial army. In addition to the Royal Canadian Regiment, three battalions of imperial infantry were withdrawn from Canada for service elsewhere. This diminution of British forces in America was regarded as being strategically safe, due to the recent improvement in Anglo-American relations effected at the Congress of Paris in 1856.

3 Stacey, Canada and British Army, pp.105-6.
The colonial defence policy of the Aberdeen Ministry, which held office during the Crimean War period, was centred chiefly around the proposals of Sir William Denison who became Governor of New South Wales in 1854. Denison disagreed with Grey's policy of making the colonists pay for everything in excess of their quota of imperial troops, because, he said, it took no account of the difference between internal and external dangers. He advocated that the mother country should contribute in equal proportions towards the expense of any colonial military force, and that the colonial government should have the responsibility of determining the amount of the force. The objection to this plan was that it would have given the colonists the right to fix the size of their imperial garrisons, instead of the imperial government having the initiative in deciding the numbers to be in the garrisons. On this account, Denison's plan was rejected, and in 1858 the Imperial Government reaffirmed Grey's policy.

Unlike the Australians, the Canadians did not take advantage of Grey's offer that they might increase the imperial forces in the colony by bearing the expense involved. Instead, the Canadians preferred to organize a local militia, for which their Government voted from 1851 to 1853 an annual grant of about £2,000. We have noticed that this militia had been much neglected, as the Canadians

1 Tunstall, op.cit. p.819.
2 Schuyler, Recall of the Legions. pp.29-30. 3 Tunstall, loc.cit.
4 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p.86; Hamilton, op.cit. p.393.
5 Referred to in Chapter I above.
were not alive as yet to the duties and possibly the necessities of self-defence. But the military reductions during the Crimean War awakened the Canadians to the need of action. Furthermore, with the disappearance of the former isolation, it was necessary to be able to put a force into the field with reasonable speed. Accordingly, in 1854, a militia commission was appointed consisting of Sir Allan MacNab, Colonel E.P.Taché, and Colonel T.E.Campbell, to consider the problem of defence. At this time Lord Elgin retired, having continued to advise a moderate and cautious military policy after the fall of Grey. Elgin's successor was Sir Edmund Head, who adopted methods similar to those of Elgin in carrying out the imperial military policy. The report of the militia commission was embodied in a Militia Bill presented to the Legislature in 1855. This Bill retained the "Sedentary" Militia, which was to consist of all male inhabitants of the province between eighteen and sixty years of age, of which those under forty years of age should muster once a year. But the chief feature of the Bill was the authorization of an active or volunteer militia which should be kept uniformed and armed and should be subjected to regular training. The object of this system of double forces was to keep the old "Sedentary" Militia as the essential element for the defence of the province against a foreign power, but to provide in addition the volunteer force, which would be better disciplined and more available, and which accordingly

1 Hamilton, op.cit. p.396.
2 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p.92.
would be capable of dealing with sudden minor emergencies. The training period for the volunteers was to be ten days annually for the infantry and twenty for artillery, with pay for officers and men during this period. The volunteer force, numbering not more than 5,000 men, was to be organized into separate, unrelated companies, which, in case of war, would be formed into battalions. Although the Bill provided for staff officers to organize the volunteer companies, the rest of the task of army administration was ignored, with the intention that it would be undertaken by the administrative staff of the regular British army stationed in the province. Another innovation contained in the Bill was the provision of arms and ammunition for 100,000 men, but the legislature later refused to make the necessary appropriations for such an expenditure. The whole scheme, except for the initial cost of the arms and armouries would cost less than £24,000 a year, an amount which compared favorably with the annual £43,000 which was the cost for one regular regiment of the line. The Militia Bill, as introduced, was to be in force for three years only. The Bill met with opposition from L. H. Holton, A. T. Galt, and a group of Upper Canadian Liberals. These critics contended that it was an attempt to create a standing army, that it would create a large amount of patronage, and that there would be great expense involved in carrying out its various provisions. No doubt the fact that

Canadian politicians were treading on strange territory in dealing with military matters was partly the cause of this opposition. The Bill passed, however, aided considerably in the passage by the patriotic enthusiasm aroused in the province by the Crimean War.

The new defence system was first tested by the danger of an Anglo-American clash in 1856 over the British recruiting system adopted in New England. Canadian forces were placed on the Niagara frontier to check any incursions. Following the Congress of Paris in 1856, at which Anglo-American relations were improved, the Colonial Secretary, Labouchere, informed Governor Head that, although three regiments of regulars were being sent to Canada, the principles affirmed by Grey in 1851 still stood. He stated that the British Government placed their main dependence upon Canadians to repel any hostile aggression, but that should aggression occur, the Canadians would receive the full support of the whole power of the British Empire. The volunteer force became so popular in 1856 that the Militia Act was modified to allow the formation of unpaid companies. In 1857 there were nearly 7,000 officers and men on the rolls of the volunteer forces, and about 275,000 of the sedentary militia were enrolled on paper. The provincial expenditure

1 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 94. 
2 Ibid. p. 98.
  Labouchere to Sir E. Head. May 2, 1856.
4 Hamilton, op. cit. p. 398.
5 Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada. 1858. Appendix 27. 
  "Report of the Adjutant General of Militia on the State of Militia for 1857".
on militia increased during this period to between $150,000
and $200,000 a year, until in 1859 the government was forced
to retrench. This retrenchment was made necessary by the great
Canadian depression of 1857 and 1858. In addition to the loss
of the market at the conclusion of the Crimean War, Canada
suffered from the reduction of railway expenditure and also
from the deficient Canadian harvests of 1857 and 1858. Furthermore, it became necessary in 1857 for the provincial government
to assume the payment of interest on railway advances, amounting
to about £200,000 annually, and also to advance the interest on
the municipal debt, an additional £100,000 per annum. Governor
Head had foreseen opposition to the renewal of the Canadian Militia
Act of 1855, and attempted to persuade the Legislature to maintain
and improve the existing militia organization. But the Government
was determined to retrench, and by the Militia Act of 1859 it
reduced expenditures on defence from $102,968 in 1858 to $69,430
in 1859. The new Militia Act was unpopular with the volunteers,
because the number of paid corps was lessened, the establishment
was reduced, and the annual training dropped to twelve days for
artillery and six days for other arms. Under this Act, the number of
volunteers fell to 4,400, and their efficiency declined with the
strength.

1 Hamilton, op. cit. p.399.
3 Stacey, Canada and British Army. pp.107-108.
4 Hamilton, loc. cit.
Another matter arising out of Grey's new military policy was the transfer of the Ordnance lands to the Canadian authorities. While the imperial troops were being withdrawn from Canada between 1851 and 1855, the Canadian Government decided to undertake the upkeep of the buildings and Crown property vacated. The Home Government at this time proposed to transfer to Canada military lands surrounding the posts no longer occupied. In 1855, the Canadian Government, eager to obtain some revenue with which to defray the expenditures occasioned by their new militia organization, accepted the offer of the British Government, and passed an Act authorizing the Governor-General to agree to the transfer. The Act provided that the revenue derived from the transferred lands should be appropriated to internal defence. The transfer of the ordnance lands was completed in 1856, the Imperial Government retaining the ordnance property at Quebec, Montreal and Kingston.

The period of 1846-1859, viewed in retrospect, presents the imperial defence policy undergoing vast alterations. Political, economic and strategic considerations had exercised their influence, and had left their imprints on the military organizations at home and in the colonies. Throughout the period the financial aspect of the problem of imperial defence had loomed large in the eyes of all but a few enlightened statesmen, and these few had ultimately surrendered to their more mercenary-minded critics. Once entered upon with due caution by Lord Grey,

1 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 91.
3 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 97. 4 Ibid. p. 102.
the new policy of military reduction in the colonies and colonial contribution to defence did not follow a road that was entirely free from obstacles. Crises and near-crises, imperial wars and local disturbances, interrupted its course. In Canada, the most important British colony, and therefore the truest testing ground of the imperial defence policy, Grey's program reached its peak in 1851. Canada emerged at the end of the period apparently weaker, it is true, for it possessed fewer imperial troops, and was none too strong as regards its own military organization. But in a way that apparent weakness was really a strength, for Canada had gained responsible government and had realized at last the value of self-defence, although its efforts in that regard were still conditioned by financial considerations.
Chapter IV.

Events Leading to the Appointment of the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, 1861.

During the 1850's Britain had abandoned the policy of depending for defence upon a strong navy and had adopted the policy of retaining troops at home to defend her from attack. A new outlook on the problem of defence emerged as a result of the revival of the French invasion scare. After the Crimean War, France had occupied new colonial possessions and had made extensive improvements on the dockyard and defences of Cherbourg on the English Channel. Such activity was viewed with alarm by the British and steps were taken immediately to put the British Isles in a more defensive condition. On the naval side marked changes were effected, and British warships became propeller-driven, iron-clad, and armed with guns firing high explosive shells. By 1861, because of her numerous naval bases at home and abroad and the improvements which had been made in the propulsion, construction and armament of her warships, Britain was able to protect her trade routes far more effectively than any single power was able to attack them. In spite of the presence of the fleet, the "invasion scare" continued for some years and reached its height during the War of 1859-1860 in which the French Empire assisted Sardinia against Austria. From all sides the British Government was urged to increase the home defences, for it was admitted that even if the whole regular army, exclusive of the
garrison of India, were concentrated at home, Britain would still be unable to repel a powerful invasion. The first step taken to strengthen the home defences was the enrolment of volunteer corps, which were bodies of half-trained amateur infantry without the necessary supporting forces such as artillery and engineers. The volunteer movement spread so rapidly that by 1861 the volunteer army consisted of 160,000 men. The second effort to secure Britain against invasion was one suggested by professional soldiers who were justifiably sceptical of the value of the volunteers. The suggestion was that fortifications should be built along the British coasts. The report of a royal commission appointed in 1859 "to consider the defences of the United Kingdom", contained recommendations for the construction of fortifications on the British coasts which would involve the spending of £11,000,000. Chiefly because of the enormous expense, these recommendations were never completely carried out. The invasion scare subsided in 1861 when the French Emperor showed himself friendly to Britain during the Anglo-American crisis occasioned by the "Trent Affair". In addition to bringing about the organization of the British volunteer force, the French panic of 1859 had also caused the British Government to retain in the regular army the increase which had been produced by the Indian Mutiny.

The panic of 1859, by directing attention to the necessity of strengthening the home defences, had revived the question of the colonial garrisons. The War Office, Treasury, and Colonial Office, Tunstall, op.cit. pp.821-827.
2 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p.111.
all concerned with the defence of the Empire, faced the following problems: first, the great difference which existed between the various types of colonies; secondly, the difference in speed in which they were developing; thirdly, the difference between the types of military danger to which they were subject. In addition, the colonial contributions to their own defence were not collected, spent and accounted for by the colonial governments to the imperial exchequer in a uniform manner. The War Office, in a note dated March 14, 1859, made the suggestion that the imperial government should only be responsible for defending the colonies against white aggressors and to a less extent against native tribes, but it should not bear the whole expense except where the garrison was stationed for purely "imperial purposes". The colonists were either to contribute part of the expenses of defence or to raise local forces. Consequently, a departmental committee was appointed to consider the expense of military defences in the colonies with a view to discovering whether any such principle as the War Office suggested could be applied generally. The committee, which was composed of J.R. Godley, the Under-Secretary of State for War, George Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, and Frederick Elliot, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, brought in its report in January, 1860.

As the members of the committee were not unanimous in their opinions, a majority report was submitted by Godley and Hamilton, Elliot submitting a minority report. The majority report considered there were two objections to the mother country being responsible for 1

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2 Tunstall, op. cit. p. 323; Lucas, Empire at War, vol. I. p. 81.
defence of the colonies, namely: an enormous burden of expense was imposed on Britain, and the defences at home were weakened by sending troops to the colonies; furthermore, the system prevented the development of self-reliance in the colonies -- "self-defence should be regarded as a corollary of self-government". The defects of the prevailing defence system were then examined. In the first place, the contributions of the colonies towards their defences were inadequate, for out of a total military expenditure of £3,968,599 for 1857-1858, the colonies had contributed only £378,253. In the second place, there was marked inequality found in the contributions made by the colonies. For example, for the year 1857-1858, Victoria had paid about two-thirds of its military expenditure, Ceylon about two-fifths, and Canada about one-fifth, while Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Tasmania, and New Zealand had contributed nothing. The military expenses at the Cape of Good Hope had proved to be a severe drain on Britain's resources, without many benefits resulting; yet the expenditures there were rising, while the only contribution made by the colony was the support of a small body of frontier police. Although Victoria made large contributions, part of the British troops there had been withdrawn and sent to Tasmania, which contributed nothing. Canada, the first colony to organize a local militia, had received no financial aid in this regard from Britain, but rifles had been distributed free by Britain for the use of volunteers in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland, colonies which made no contribution.
It was considered in the report that a further anomaly existed in the chaotic system of "colonial allowances." Because in some colonies, such as Victoria, liberal allowances were given to the troops by the colonial government, the imperial government was forced to give corresponding allowances in neighbouring colonies. This procedure placed at an unjust disadvantage the troops serving in colonies of which the governments were not so liberal, for in such cases the allowances paid by the imperial government were less than those paid by the colonial governments. The procedure was also objectionable in that it caused the pay of the troops to fluctuate at the pleasure of the colonial governments.

In their proposals for altering the prevailing system, the framers of the majority report established the proposition that it was neither necessary nor desirable to defend the colonies by means of small and scattered imperial garrisons. In supporting this proposition the general principles used were: that while Britain was obliged to assist in the defence of the colonies against foreign attack because she controlled the foreign policy of the colonies, this did not completely relieve the colonies of the financial responsibility of self-defence; and, that the right system of defence would be one based on local efforts and local resources. It was argued that the maintenance of British rule over scattered and distant territories depended either on "the nature of the countries", that is presumably their geographical positions and physical features, and on their populations, or upon the British command of the sea.


Since it was neither possible nor desirable to maintain scattered garrisons, except in a few cases, the retention of the colonies must depend upon Britain's naval superiority.

With these principles in mind, Godley and Hamilton proceeded to make recommendations for obtaining from the colonies a reasonable contribution towards their military defence. It was admitted that Earl Grey's plan of 1851 was favourable to the British Exchequer. But this plan was not recommended for the following reasons: first, the basis of the plan was unsound, for it tended to scatter small garrisons all over the world, whereas it would be better to station a few really efficient and adequate garrisons in places which were calculated to resist invasion; secondly, the number of men in the garrisons would fluctuate according to the danger, and with each fluctuation negotiations would have to be renewed as to the proportions in which the expense would be defrayed; thirdly, the presence of imperial garrisons would tend to continue the dependence of the colonies on the mother country and would thus fail to stimulate self-reliance. In the description of the plan recommended, the colonies were divided into two classes: military posts such as Malta and Gibraltar which were garrisoned purely for imperial purposes, and all the rest of the colonies. The first class should be dealt with exceptionally and should not be expected to contribute towards defence, but the system of defence in the case of the other colonies should be founded on the principles of colonial management and joint contribution at a uniform rate. In the system proposed for the latter class of colonies, it was suggested that the imperial government should let each colony decide on the needs for its defence.

Ibid.
and then should offer to assist by bearing a share, perhaps one-half, of the entire cost, specifying the maximum amount beyond which Britain should not be required to contribute without further agreement. This system, if adopted, should be uniformly applied. If a colony wished a garrison of regular troops, for whose expenses it was willing to pay a fixed share, the Imperial Government would consider what troops could be spared and would make the stipulation that all troops so sent would be at the disposal of the Home Government in case of emergency. When a plan similar to this had been proposed by Sir William Denison in 1856, the objection raised to it had been that it appeared to give the colonists the right to fix the number of troops required. It was considered in the majority report that this difficulty could be removed by retaining for the Imperial Government the power of deciding whether it could spare the troops requested. Objection to the laying down of a uniform rate of joint contribution was anticipated, as it would be argued that the more exposed, poorer, and thinly populated colonies should receive more imperial assistance than those under more fortunate conditions. It was maintained, however, that since it was impossible to equalize the natural advantages and disadvantages of colonies, any system based on the estimated needs of each colony would lead to injustice. Warning was given that caution and liberality should be exercised by the Home Government, if the new system were adopted, in order to impress upon the colonies that the course decided upon was adopted with a view to the permanent advantage of themselves as well as of the mother country.

Ibid.
Frederick Elliot, the representative of the Colonial Office on the Select Committee of 1859, submitted a Memorandum separate from the majority report. Elliot agreed with the first principle laid down by his colleagues, that it was impossible to make the colonies defensible at all points and at all times. With regard to the exceptional treatment suggested for the posts especially valuable for imperial purposes, Elliot considered that any contribution such places might care to make should be accepted, provided that the amount fell short of the expenses of the number of troops they required. But he failed to agree with the third principle that the remainder of the colonies should pay a uniform proportion of their military expenditure. He was willing to admit the value of uniformity where circumstances were uniform. But the diversity of conditions existing in the British Empire, where the colonies differed in degree of exposure to invasion, of population, and of wealth, made the system of uniform contributions to defence unsatisfactory. Elliot believed that the control Great Britain exercised over the foreign policy of the colonies was not the only reason for the imperial government assuming obligations concerning colonial defence, for Great Britain also found the colonies of commercial value as sources of raw material. To Elliot, the principles laid down by Grey in 1851 seemed satisfactory. In the first place, under that system the question of imperial and colonial contributions to defence was to be settled without delay by the home government; secondly, the system lent itself to the varying circumstances of the colonies; and, thirdly, it was already in operation in the North American and Australian Colonies.

Ibid.
In criticism of Elliot's Memorandum, J.R. Godley prepared a paper which he later submitted for consideration by the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure appointed in 1861. In his "remarks", Godley criticized Elliot's Memorandum on the grounds that although it exposed and condemned the results of the existing system, no practical alteration in the system was proposed. Godley could not agree with Elliot that the present system was satisfactory, for Canada had been the only colony which under this system had made any attempt at self-defence. In reference to Elliot's objection to the adoption of a uniform rate of colonial contribution, Godley stated that any attempt to adopt the principle of contribution by the colonies according to their exposure to danger would be unsatisfactory. It was equally impossible, he urged, to estimate the amount of contribution that should be paid by attempting to gauge the comparative capacities and resources of different colonies. The most important principle required in the defence system that should be adopted, was, according to Godley, that of colonial responsibility and management. Under that principle, the whole system of defence would be decided upon by the colony, as the most competent and most interested party, and to the expense of that system the mother country would contribute. Such a situation, Godley considered, would be preferable to a system based on separation and independence, both of action and contribution, in which the mother country was vested with the primary responsibility.
The latter system, favoured by Elliot, had resulted in enormous expense for Great Britain, with the colonies contributing only slightly. In order to show the military efficiency of the colonial self-defence policy, Godley pointed to its successful working in North America during the period of the old colonial system. Godley likewise attacked Elliot's contention that the British exports found better markets in the colonies than in the United States. Trade, said Godley, depended not so much on political status as on economic conditions. He quoted statistics to show that the trade between Great Britain and the United States had not suffered from the change of the American Colonies from dependence to independence. In conclusion, Godley drew attention to the fact that the prevailing system of British imperial defence was the only example in history of a mother country assuming the entire responsibility for the defence of her colonies. It was most desirable to reduce this colonial dependence, for in that way the colonies would develop a higher and stronger national character. A minimum of imperial interference in the freedom and independence of action of the colonies was, maintained Godley, the theory behind the policy which he defended.

While the Committee of 1859 had been making its investigations, the attack on the colonial garrisons was led in the House of Commons by Charles Adderley. In 1860, having obtained the publication of the Committee's report, Adderley used the report as a basis of a demand for reforms in the imperial defence policy. Suggestions were made in the House that the whole problem of defence should be referred to a select committee, but the Government gave the suggestions little support.

1 Ibid. p. 319.
In March 1861, Arthur Mills, a "colonial reformer", moved for a select committee on colonial defence and expenditure. The motion was seconded by Mr. Marsh. Mr. Chichester Fortescue, the Under Secretary for the Colonies, opposed the motion stating that the task could not be fulfilled by a committee of the House of Commons. He said that the task should be left to the Government and to the Duke of Newcastle who was head of the Colonial Office. Viscount Palmerston, the Prime Minister, stated that he felt that it would not be within the competence of a committee of the House of Commons, of the House of Commons itself, or of the British Government, to determine what contributions the colonies should make, because many of the colonies had independent legislatures and any arrangement for dividing the expense of the garrisons could only be effected by negotiations between the British Government and the colonial legislatures. Nevertheless, because it seemed to be the wish of the House that the motion should be agreed to, Palmerston stated that he would not oppose it. The fact that W.E. Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was in sympathy with the motion assisted in its passage, and the select committee was appointed. Arthur Mills became chairman of a committee "to inquire and report whether any and what alterations may be advantageously adopted in regard to the Defence of the British Dependencies, and the proportions of Cost of such Defence as now defrayed from Imperial and Colonial Funds respectively." The committee began its investigation, but before its report was completed the American Civil War brought on a new emergency in British North America.

2 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p.113; Tunstall, op.cit. p.829.
The American Civil War had a direct effect upon the military policy of Great Britain and her Empire, for once more the retrenchment policy of the mother country suffered a set-back. From the outbreak of the struggle, some alarm about the safety of British possessions in North America was experienced. At the end of March 1861, there were less than 4,300 imperial regulars in those possessions, of whom only 2,200 were in Canada, where the danger was greatest. The local forces in Canada were not impressive, due to the effects of the retrenchment carried out by the Canadian Government in 1859. Less than 5,000 volunteers were enrolled, there were only 15,000 rifles in store, and there was no modern artillery in the province. The Maritime Provinces had volunteers to the number of about 5,000. The man power of all the provinces was available for reserves, but would be of little value due to the lack of arms and training. The Imperial Government immediately sent out three infantry regiments and a battery of artillery as reinforcements for Canada. This action was immediately criticized for the expense involved, and later because it might cause suspicion in the United States. The Home Government defended its action by explaining that the reinforcements had been requested by Sir Fenwick Williams, commanding in British North America, not through apprehension of an attack by the Government of the United States, but to guard against filibustering incursions by discharged soldiers after the war. Gladstone considered that if

1 Stacey, ibid. p.118.  
2 Hamilton, op. cit. p.400.  
3 Stacey, Canada and British Army. loc. cit.  
5 Ibid. Evidence of Herbert. No.3504.
Canada were involved in the consequences of a war between the United States and Great Britain, the mother country would be morally responsible for a large portion of the cost. The Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, had great admiration for the volunteer movements in British North America, but felt that the volunteer forces needed the assistance of regular troops in the defence of Canada, and that therefore any large efforts made by Canada for her own defence should be met by corresponding assistance from the mother country. Attitudes such as those, held by British statesmen in responsible positions, doubtless accounted for the considerable reinforcements and equipment sent to Canada during the American Civil War.

The Canadian Government under G. E. Cartier and John A. Macdonald, realizing Canada's lack of arms and equipment and that within eight weeks the navigation by the St. Lawrence River would close, suggested to the British Government that 100,000 rifles and a proportion of artillery be sent out and stored in the colony in preparation for emergency. The British Government replied that there would not be time to send further equipment that year, but that they would ship 25,000 rifles and some guns early in the spring.

In November 1861 there occurred the "Trent Affair", which caused the British Government to recast its plans and send reinforcements and equipment in spite of the lateness of the season. Relations

1 Ibid. Evidence of Gladstone. No. 3795.
2 Ibid. Evidence of Newcastle. No’s. 2981-2983.
between Great Britain and the Northern States had been under tension since the beginning of the Civil War. British economy was immediately affected by the outbreak of war, as Britain depended upon the Southern States for raw materials with which to keep her factories operating. In order not to antagonize the Northern States, the British Government had not recognized the independence of the Southern States. When President Lincoln announced a blockade of the ports of the Southern Confederacy, Britain had to announce her neutrality, thereby recognizing the belligerency of the Southern States. Many people in the Northern States could not distinguish between the recognition of belligerency and that of independence, and became indignant towards Great Britain. In the midst of this explosive atmosphere the incident of the Trent occurred. Although the news of the seizure of the Confederate agents from the British ship reached Britain late in November, the British Government took immediate steps to send to Canada a force of about 14,000 men, including artillery and engineers. These reinforcements could not proceed up the St. Lawrence River due to the lateness of the season, therefore had to be landed at Halifax and transported overland through New Brunswick to their destination.

The "Trent Affair" having been settled in January 1862, the British Government suspended any further movements of troops to Canada, but did not withdraw any troops thence for the time being.

3 Stacey, Canada and British Army. pp.121-122.
The Canadians, too, had been active during the crisis. Batteries had been erected at Toronto and Kingston, and provision was made to call out 38,000 of the sedentary militia as well as to increase the number of volunteers. The British Government was asked to send out 100,000 uniforms to be at the disposal of the sedentary militia; barracks were made available to the regulars; and the post of provincial "Minister of Militia Affairs" was created, the first Minister being John A. Macdonald. Another sign of Canadian activity was apparent in the changed attitude towards enlistment in the volunteer forces. Before the Trent episode enlistment in the volunteers had been dull, but in 1862 the attitude towards volunteering was most enthusiastic. In August 1862 Newcastle had urged upon the new Governor-General, Viscount Monck, the importance of increased Canadian measures towards self-defence, especially due to the first appearance of "a large standing army in North America and to the unsettled condition of the neighbouring States." As a result of the wave of patriotism which swept over the whole of the province, and no doubt encouraged by the Governor-General, by the end of the winter of 1862 the volunteer force was over 14,000 strong and included cavalry, infantry, engineers and artillery. Including the "Volunteer Militia" of the Maritime Provinces, there were about 19,000 volunteers in British North America by 1863.

1 Ibid. pp.122-123.
3 Hamilton, op.cit. p.400.
91.

No real opportunity had been afforded for attempting to carry out the recommendations of the Committee of 1859 made up of Godley, Hamilton and Elliot, due to the serious interruption accompanying the American Civil War. But the important progress made through the work of this committee towards the solution of the imperial defence problem was that action had been started towards a more detailed examination of the prevailing and proposed defence policies. The work of the select committee of 1861 on imperial military expenditures was made easier through the investigations of the committee of 1859. It remained to be seen whether the new committee would do its work conscientiously and whether Parliament would support its recommendations.
Chapter V.

The Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, 1861.

The Select Committee of 1861 was to inquire primarily into the possibility of alterations to the current defence policy, and also into the proportions of the cost defrayed by the Imperial and Colonial Governments respectively. This committee had more scope for its investigation than had formerly been allowed such committees, but its work was limited in that no mention was made of naval defence in the instructions which it received. Nevertheless, some naval officials gave evidence before the committee and supported an imperial defence system based largely on naval supremacy.

The Select Committee was composed of some of the ablest men in the House of Commons. Mr. Arthur Mills, a prominent "colonial reformer", was chairman. General Peel represented the War Office, and Sir George Grey represented the Home Office. Lord Stanley, another member of the committee, was a former Colonial Secretary and had been First Secretary of State for India. Mr. J. A. Roebuck, a member for Sheffield, was a Benthamite who had criticized the management of the British Army during the Crimean War, and subsequently had been appointed chairman of a committee which investigated the system of administration in operation within the British Army. Mr. Thomas George Baring, who was also on the Select Committee, had been offered the Chancellorship of the Exchequer under Lord Derby.

Mr. Charles Adderley, another member, was a prominent "colonial reformer" and a determined critic of the garrison system. The Committee also included Mr. Fitzgerald, who had been Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Lord Derby, Sir James Fergusson, a former Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Malta, Mr. Chichester Fortescue of the Colonial Office, Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Baxter, Mr. Childers, and Mr. Marsh. Mr. E. Ellice, another member of the Committee, had been Secretary at War in 1833-1834, and in 1855 had been a member of Mr. J. A. Roebuck's committee on the British Army. Although these men were considered to be experts in colonial affairs, they were experts almost exclusively in matters relating to colonial administration, government, and finance, but not in problems which involved the question of defence. Their outlook, too, was inclined to be biased in favor of colonial self-reliance. They did not take the broadest view of the question of defence, because many of them thought that the object of reorganizing imperial defence was to lighten the burden carried by the Imperial Government. The dangers which the Committee discussed were those of a local nature, threatening the individual parts of the Empire, rather than those connected with a war which would involve the whole Empire. The Committee was named on March 13, 1861, began its sittings on March 18, and submitted a report on July 11, 1861.

1 Tunstall, op. cit. pp. 829-830.

Judging from the questions asked by members of the Committee and the evidence submitted by witnesses, it is clear that both the members of the Committee and the witnesses divided the British possessions exclusive of India into two classes: the "Colonies proper" and the "Imperial Stations". This division had been suggested in the report of the Select Committee on Defence of 1859. To the class of "Colonies proper" belonged the North American and South African Colonies, the West Indies, Mauritius, Ceylon, New Zealand, and the Australian Colonies with the exception of Western Australia. The "Imperial Stations" or military garrisons, convict depots and dependencies maintained chiefly for objects of imperial policy, included Malta, Gibraltar, the Ionian Islands, Hong Kong, Labuan, Bermuda, the Bahamas, St. Helena, the Falkland Islands, Western Australia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast.

Evidence concerning the composition of the imperial forces stationed in the British possessions, and the cost incurred in the defence of those possessions, showed that these two matters had fluctuated according to the circumstances affecting them. In 1861 there were about thirty-four overseas possessions, excluding those in the Mediterranean, administered through the Colonial Department. Of these thirty-four possessions, Prince Edward Island alone lacked a garrison of imperial troops. The returns submitted for the years 1851 to 1861 show that the chief tendency had been towards reducing

2 Ibid. Evidence of T.F. Elliot. Nos. 5-7.
the number of imperial troops stationed abroad, except in the case of newly established colonies like New Zealand. The increases in strength of imperial garrisons had taken place mainly in the "Imperial Stations", but out of a total of 44,581 imperial troops stationed abroad in 1861, 21,595 were in the "Colonies proper". The main withdrawals of imperial troops from the overseas possessions had been caused by the needs of Great Britain during the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, and the Second China War.

There had been an increase of the imperial forces in British North America in 1856 due to the near-crisis with the United States over the recruitment episode, as well as to the inability of the mother country to provide sufficient accommodation for troops returning from the Crimean War. The increase of strength in British North America in 1861 was only temporary, and was the result of the request of Sir Fenwick Williams, the Commander of the forces in British North America, for troops to guard against American filibustering at the conclusion of the American Civil War. With regard to Canada in particular, Mr. Elliot stated that the imperial forces stationed there had been reduced from 8,000 to 3,000 during the fifteen years prior to 1858, and that on January 1, 1861, there were in Canada, stationed mainly in garrisons at Quebec, Kingston, and Montreal, 1,968 men, comprised of one regiment of the line and the Canadian Rifles, which was a local corps paid by the Imperial Government. The force of all arms in Canada in 1861 was only 2,200 men.

1 Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, 3070.
2 Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, 3171.
3 Ibid. Lord Herbert, 3501-3.
5 Ibid. Lord Herbert, 3504 and 3634.
6 Ibid. T.F. Elliot, 30, 37, 83.
7 Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, 2955.
The imperial expenditures on colonial defence had varied with the changes in garrisons abroad. For the year ending March 31, 1860, the total was £3,225,081, to which the overseas possessions had added £369,224, making a gross total of £3,594,305. Of these totals, £206,264 was the imperial expenditure on Canadian defence, while Canada had paid out £13,393 for the maintenance of local forces but nothing for allowances or fortifications.

H.W.S. Whiffin, the Assistant Accountant General in the War Department, and W.G. Anderson, the Principal Clerk in the Treasury, revealed through their evidence that some of the appropriations in aid of military expenditures made by the Colonial Legislatures were not accounted for to the Imperial Treasury. It was the duty of the War Office to ascertain whether the colonial contributions were in order. A method of simplifying the involved system of keeping track of colonial contributions had been under consideration for some time by the Treasury and the War Office. There were three classes of colonial contributions to military expenditure: contributions made in repayment of imperial expenditure actually voted by Parliament, colonial allowances for the imperial troops, and colonial expenditure for military objects such as guns and expenses involved in the maintenance of local forces. But the War Office did not know what contribution was designated under each of these three classes, for the colonial contributions were stated as a total.

1 Ibid. pp. iv, v.
3 Ibid. Whiffin, 313-318.
amount and not by classes, and it was possible for colonial payments to reach the Imperial Exchequer without the knowledge of the War Office. For example, the contributions made by Canada or the other British North American Colonies to the military expenditure therein did not pass through the War Office, and yet it was the duty of the War Office to see that the payments which the colonies were supposed to contribute were made. As a result, the army estimates were much larger than the actual cost of the Army to the Imperial Exchequer, because they showed accounts that actually would be paid by the colonies. The general public, therefore, was misled by the estimates. It was agreed by the witnesses from the Treasury and War Office that it would be preferable to have every sum contributed by a colony brought into the public accounts, and that there should be but one method of dealing with contributions, in whatever form they were made. These views were adopted by the Committee which included in its report a recommendation "that all monies received as colonial contributions should appear in the Home accounts, and that there should be appended to the Army Estimates statements showing the sums so received during the last financial year in each colony, as well as the total military charge for that colony defrayed from the Imperial votes".

1 Ibid. 957.  2 Ibid. 747-750.  3 Ibid. 951.
4 Ibid. Lord Herbert, 3613.  5 Ibid. Anderson, 1172-1180.
6 Ibid. 1229.  7 Ibid. p.v. No.6.
Further inconsistency was revealed in the matter of colonial contributions to extra allowances paid to officers and soldiers stationed by the imperial government in overseas possessions. The payment of extra allowances to imperial troops abroad had originated in Australia during the gold rush, when the cost of living had been unusually high. In some colonies, where a shortage of labor existed, allowances were paid to discourage desertion among imperial troops. The question of allowances presented a maze of inconsistency, in that there was no uniformity in the granting of the allowances.

As we have seen, some colonial governments granted allowances to imperial troops while others did not; in some colonies the allowances were paid entirely by the local governments while in others the imperial government met the expenditure; furthermore, the British Treasury had no knowledge of the details as these were arranged between the colonial government and the military officers. The usual procedure by which the amount of the colonial allowances was arrived at was for the colonial government or the military authorities in Great Britain to suggest to the Secretary of State for the Colonies what they considered to be a suitable allowance. If the Secretary of State for the Colonies approved of the suggestion he communicated his approval to the Secretary of State for War, who made the final decision on the amount of the allowance. The disadvantages of this

1 Ibid. T.F.Elliot, 161. 2 Ibid. 204. 3 Ibid. Whiffin, 830.
4 Ibid. T.F.Elliot, 162. 5 Ibid. 161. 6 Ibid. Whiffin, 322.
7 Ibid. T.F.Elliot, 393.
system of providing allowances appeared when the imperial government had attempted to discontinue the extra allowance in Tasmania. This colony immediately appealed against such an action pleading that as a liberal allowance was made in other Australasian colonies, it was but reasonable to extend it. The fact that some colonies, for example Victoria, gave allowances, forced the imperial government, as we have seen, into giving extra allowances at other stations. Whiffin, the Assistant Accountant General in the War Office, in his evidence spoke in favor of the payment of allowances by colonial governments to imperial troops in the colonies. He stated that if the colonial governments did not pay the allowances, the imperial government would, so that the payment by colonial governments effected a saving to the British Exchequer. Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, opposed the payment of extra allowances, maintaining that the monies paid by way of extra allowances by the colonial governments made up a large proportion of the amount of military expenditure credited to the colonies, but did not actually relieve the British Exchequer of any financial burden. Gladstone likewise pointed to the inconveniences caused by the irregularity of the allowances. For example, extra allowances were made in some parts of Australia and not in others, and none at all in Canada, with the result that the imperial troops became dissatisfied when moved from a colony in which extra allowances were provided to one in which they were not provided.

In order to satisfy the troops, the British Exchequer was often forced

1 Ibid. Whiffin, 932.  
2 Ibid. 768 and 778.  
3 Ibid. Gladstone, 3770.
to pay extra allowances, which placed an additional strain on the Exchequer. The Committee recommended "that all rates of colonial allowances drawn by officers serving in the colonies should be fixed by specific warrants, under the authority of the Secretary of State for War".

The question of the cost of colonial defence and the responsibility for bearing that cost bulked large in the evidence submitted to the Committee. All witnesses questioned on the defence of "Imperial Stations" were in favor of the imperial government bearing the entire responsibility for and cost of the defence. In the case of colonies like Trinidad which did not possess representative institutions, Earl Grey considered the proper course would be for the British Government to take the responsibility and determine what was best both for the mother country and the colony, and act upon their own judgment. Accordingly, the Committee recommended "that as to the second class of dependencies (i.e. the "Imperial Stations") the responsibility and main cost of their defence properly devolves on the Imperial Government".

The case of the "Colonies proper" provoked much outspoken comment. It was revealed that seventeen of the thirty-four British overseas possessions contributed neither men nor money to their military defence, and that the total imperial cost for the defence

1 Ibid. 3777.
2 Ibid. p.vi. No.7.
3 Ibid. Godley. 2120;
4 Earl Grey, 2530; Merivale, 2211. Ibid. Earl Grey, 2554-5.
5 Ibid. p.vi. No.9.
of both the "Imperial Stations" and the "Colonies proper" during the year ending March 31, 1858, had been £2,549,019, while the colonial contributions (excluding those from the Mediterranean stations) for that year, had only amounted to £353,016. The opinions expressed on the defence of the "Colonies proper" ranged from those of Robert Lowe, who objected altogether to colonial governments contributing to the upkeep of imperial troops in the colonies, to those of the Duke of Newcastle, who stated that he could not anticipate anything but a negative from the British North American colonies if they were asked to contribute. J.R. Godley stated in his evidence that his main object was "to throw upon the colonists the habit and responsibility of self-defence". It was "a secondary but very important object (in his policy) to diminish imperial expenditure". He considered that the colonies should undertake the primary responsibility of their own defence, the mother country contributing such a quota towards their external defences as might be reasonable on the ground that they were involved in Britain's foreign policy. He saw no reason why the colonies, any less than India, should not pay their own military expenses.

Earl Grey, another witness called before the Committee, had previously stated in his Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration that the colonies should be required to contribute more than they had hitherto done for their own protection. He

1 Ibid. T.F. Elliot, 8-11. 2 Ibid. Lowe, 3332. 3 Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, 3042. 4 Ibid. Godley, 2101. 5 Ibid. 2176. 6 Ibid. 2201.
repeated his conviction on this matter in his evidence before
the Committee. He thought that the amount of colonial contri-
butions should be determined according to the amount of revenue
the colony collected, the method by which the revenue was raised,
the degree of pressure exerted upon the population, the other
available sources of revenue, and the social conditions of the
colony. Because portions of the British Empire were at a great
distance from Great Britain, Earl Grey considered it necessary
that "in some respects the management of local affairs should be
transferred to local authorities, and that at the same time a
portion of the duty of self-protection should be transferred",
but he considered that there was nothing in that type of intra-
imperial relation to exempt colonists from furnishing men and
money for their own defences.

Lord Herbert, the Secretary of State for War, in giving his
evidence considered that in the "Colonies proper" the number and
cost of imperial troops should be reduced to the minimum, the
colonies should be made to contribute to their own defence, and
those colonies unwilling to contribute should be brought gradually
into the way of doing so.

The Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
also approved of the colonies sharing largely in their own defence.

\[\text{Ibid. Earl Grey, 2529.} \quad \text{Ibid. 2542.} \quad \text{Ibid. 2600-2601.} \]
\[\text{Ibid. Lord Herbert, 3694.} \quad \text{Ibid. 3563.} \quad \text{Ibid. 3652-4.} \]
\[\text{Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, 2946.} \]
He could not foresee the time when the provinces of British North America would contribute more substantially to their military expenses. He anticipated that Canada would refuse to increase her contributions to her defence, not only because her revenue was small, but also because the Canadians had become accustomed to the maintenance of a much larger force at imperial cost. When that force was reduced in 1854 certain arrangements were made which the Canadians regarded as binding and which they were not willing to reconsider. Moreover, the Canadians would feel justified in refusing additional contribution to their military expenses because the only war in which they would necessarily become involved would be one with the United States resulting from the imperial government's control of Canadian foreign policy. The Duke of Newcastle appeared anxious to spare the dignity of the imperial government by avoiding the possibility of either a colonial refusal or an argument between Canada and Great Britain over the question of military expenditure.

The Committee followed the general trend of opinion by recommending that in the case of the "Colonies proper", "the responsibility and cost of military defence ought mainly to devolve upon themselves". A reservation was added that "the practical application of this recommendation, both as to time and place, must necessarily be left to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the local resources of each dependency, to its dangers from external attack, and to the general exigencies of the Empire".

1 Ibid. 3040-3046. 2 Ibid. p.vi. No.10.
The evidence presented to the Committee showed that amongst experts in colonial government there was a very strong feeling in favor of withdrawing the imperial garrisons from the self-governing possessions. The representatives of the War Office and the fighting services, aware of the weaknesses of Britain's home defences, were strongly in favor of reduction. J.R. Godley, the Assistant Under Secretary of State for War, did not believe that if Britain left the colonies to defend themselves there would be any danger of their defence being neglected. If the imperial garrisons were withdrawn from Canada, for instance, he felt certain that the Canadians would take steps eventually to defend their province against foreign aggression. He saw no reason why the present British North American colonies should not look after their internal and external defence, for the former British colonies in North America had practised self-defence in spite of the serious dangers they had faced from the Spaniards and the French. He believed in the general principle of letting the colonists settle for themselves the best way of defending themselves; if they wanted garrisons or a nucleus of British troops for the colony and would pay the larger portion of the expense, the mother country might let the troops go if they could be spared. But he thought that it would be a better plan for the colonial governments to arm and train their own people. He did not believe that the withdrawal of imperial troops from a colony would involve the risk

1. Ibid. Godley, 2070.
2. Ibid. 2078.
3. Ibid. 2150-1; 2195.
4. Ibid. 2099; 2100.
of separation, but, if in protest against the reduction of troops
a self-governing colony deliberately desired separation, he did not
think that it would be advisable or expedient for the mother country
to attempt to retain her dominion over such a colony. Godley
considered the dispersal of British garrisons abroad a weakness,
and pointed out that at the time of the Crimean War it had been
necessary for Great Britain to employ mercenaries in order to supply
the requirements of her own army. His opinion was that in order to
reduce colonial garrisons, the policy which Earl Grey had adopted
towards the Australian Colonies should be followed: namely, that the
imperial government should propose the conditions on which it would
give assistance and if the offer was not accepted the troops would
be withdrawn.

Rear Admiral Sir Charles Elliot was blunt in his statement
that he had never been able to understand the object of maintaining
imperial troops in Canada. He would not withdraw imperial forces
from Halifax, which he considered a very important imperial station,
because he did not believe the Nova Scotians alone could defend the
port against a surprise attack. He placed his confidence in the
Navy for imperial defence, and considered that no positions should
be strongly garrisoned by the British Government except such as were
necessary for maintaining Britain's maritime supremacy. Lord Herbert,
the Secretary of State for War, was in favor of reducing the colonial

1 Ibid. 2075; 2122-3.  2 Ibid. 2903; 2145.  3 Ibid. 2086.
4 Ibid. Rear Admiral Elliot, 1125.  5 Ibid. 1131.  6 Ibid. 1137.
garrisons, but not those of Malta and Gibraltar. He considered it best to leave a few troops as a nucleus in all colonies even in time of peace. General Sir J.F. Burgoyne, Inspector General of Fortifications, felt that even if the railway from Halifax to Quebec were completed making year-round communication between Canada and Great Britain and permitting the rapid transportation of reinforcements, the present garrison in Canada could not be reduced. The garrison would act as an example for local troops and would supply officers and a staff for them also.

Robert Lowe, an extreme "Little-Englander", considered that in time of peace there should be no imperial troops in a self-governing colony. In time of war, however, the colony should be defended as part of the Empire. He believed that because of the length of the Canadian frontier, Britain could not undertake to protect that colony, and should advise it to look after its own defence. The imperial garrisons should be withdrawn from Quebec and Kingston in time of peace, but the garrison in Halifax should remain. He looked forward to the time when some of the colonies might wish for separation. The presence of imperial troops and garrisons in those colonies would form, on such an occasion, a formidable obstacle in the way of an amicable separation. Instead of Great Britain taxing the colonies in the matter of military expenditure, the colonies were permitted in a great degree to tax the mother country. Such an unsatisfactory condition, Lowe

1 Ibid. Lord Herbert, 3693.  2 Ibid.  3 Ibid. Burgoyne, 1364-90.  4 Ibid. Lowe, 3370-75.  5 Ibid. 3333-4.
considered, could be remedied by withdrawing the majority of
the imperial troops from the overseas possessions.

W.E. Gladstone, representing the Exchequer, gave evidence
which strongly favored letting the self-governing colonies take
care of their own military establishments in peace time. This
would be not only of immense advantage to the British Exchequer,
but also would raise the colony closer to the status of nation­
hood. "The privileges of freedom and the burdens of freedom are
absolutely associated together", he said; "to bear the burdens
is as necessary as to enjoy the privilege, in order to form that
character which is the great ornament of all freedom itself".
However, Gladstone had no desire to abandon the colonies, for he
stated that in the case of war with a foreign power they were to
be protected by Great Britain. He agreed with Lord Herbert that
the maintenance of Britain's supremacy at sea was absolutely vital
to the existence of the Empire. Gladstone realized that the
imperial government ought to go slowly in changing from the existing
system of colonial defence to a new one, as the colonies would not
give up British support readily. He believed, however, that the
more responsibility the colonies accepted for their own defence,
the more they would be disposed to go beyond the bare idea of self­
defence, and to aid the mother country in the defence of the Empire.

1 Ibid. Gladstone, 3781. 2 Ibid. 3795. 3 Ibid. 3798. 4 Ibid. 3829. 5 Ibid. 3797.
The witnesses who had been or were connected with the Colonial Office expressed opinions which were exceptions to the general trend of attacks upon the garrison system. The Duke of Newcastle, who had begun the arrangements with Lord Elgin in 1854 for reducing the number of imperial troops in Canada, was another witness who believed that the British forces in North America should be reduced no further. He thought that the small force of 2,220 men should be retained as a nucleus for the formation of a local force and as a means of improving the discipline of local troops. He agreed with Merivale that Great Britain was responsible for the defence of Canada due to the danger of Canadians becoming involved in war through a foreign policy over which they had no control. Herman Merivale, Under Secretary of State for India and a former Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated that he believed that the imperial troops were maintained in Canada through fear of the United States. The Canadians, he said, always feared that their country would become the first battle-ground in the event of war between Great Britain and the United States. As long as the mother country controlled Canadian foreign policy, he believed that a garrison of imperial troops should remain in Canada. If, however, the British North American Provinces formed a federation, Merivale anticipated that their connection with Great Britain would be slighter, and therefore it would not be thought

1 Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, 2948. 2 Ibid. 2993. 3 Ibid. 2955. 4 Ibid. 2993. 5 Ibid. 3045. 6 Ibid. Merivale, 2236-7. 7 Ibid. 2242-7. 8 Ibid. 2287-9.
necessary for the mother country to maintain troops in those provinces any longer.

Earl Grey had begun the reduction of the colonial garrisons, intending to leave in Canada imperial garrisons at Quebec and Kingston only. In his evidence, he stated that these troops should be retained at Quebec and Kingston in order to provide for the ordinary upkeep of the fortifications, and that the cost of keeping the men in Canada would be little more than the maintenance of the same units at home. He did not think that the presence of imperial garrisons deterred colonists from providing their own forces. As an example, he pointed out that Canada had raised a militia force while imperial garrisons continued to be stationed in the province.

The conclusion reached by the Committee was that there should be no negotiations between the mother country and her overseas possessions about the reduction of imperial forces abroad, but that the procedure "adopted by Lord Grey in 1851 in announcing to the Australian Colonies the terms on which alone imperial troops could be sent there, may be gradually applied to other dependencies". To apply these principles in detail, the Committee recommended that imperial troops should be reduced still further in number in the self-governing Australian Colonies; that the colonists of New Zealand should rely chiefly "on their own resources"; that "local

1 Ibid. 2390. 2 Ibid. T.F. Elliot, 24-25. 3 Ibid. Earl Grey, 2616-2623.
efforts" against warlike tribes should provide as far as possible for the security of the South African Colonies and that the settlers there should be asked for a larger contribution; that Ceylon should make a larger contribution, and in the West Indies the imperial force "should be gradually reduced".

General Burgoyne, the chief military witness appearing before the Committee, made a strong plea for the construction of forts throughout the Empire, repeating much of the evidence he had already given before the royal commission appointed in 1859 to investigate the defences of the United Kingdom. He believed that all colonies or stations should be defended thoroughly by means of fortifications. Most of the colonies needed new fortifications, while some fortifications, such as those at Quebec, needed repair. He presented a rough estimate that £1,000,000 would be required for constructing new works necessary in the colonies. T.F. Elliot did not paint a favorable picture for the future of fortifications within the Empire. He testified that when Sir Fenwick Williams had assumed command in British North America he had observed that new forts were needed in the Lower Provinces. The War Office had communicated Williams' views to the governments of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, offering to pay one-half the expense if the governments of those provinces would pay the remainder. The governments of the Maritime

4 Ibid. 1432. 5 Ibid. 1360. 6 Ibid. p.231.
Provinces had refused the offer, pleading lack of money for additional imperial troops to man the proposed forts. Yet when the Maritime Provinces had appeared to be threatened by the United States at the time of the Maine-New Brunswick boundary dispute in 1839, the Legislature of Nova Scotia had voted £100,000 for their defences; furthermore, the Maritimes had undertaken their own defence at the time of the Crimean War.

The representatives of the Colonial Office and War Office who appeared before the Committee were opposed to the construction of more fortifications throughout the Empire. The Duke of Newcastle opposed the building of more forts as it would involve more troops. He considered that the application of steam to navigation helped to protect distant colonies from external attack, and lessened the need for additional fortifications. He preferred to leave the defence of the Canadian frontier to the emergencies of war, rather than to attempt its defence by providing fortifications. Earl Grey disapproved of the whole policy of extensive expenditure upon fortifications in the colonies, considering that much money had already been wasted in this regard. He and Rear Admiral Erskine agreed that "overgrown" fortifications, that is, fortifications insufficiently garrisoned, were a menace to the safety of the colonies, and "the wisest thing to do would be to blow them up". Lord Herbert believed that the policy adopted

1 Ibid. T.F. Elliot, 132, 134. 2 Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, 3151-2. 3 Ibid. 3048. 4 Ibid. Earl Grey, 2565; Erskine, 3322-3.
since 1815 of building forts abroad and neglecting them at home was wrong. He would spend as little as possible on forts abroad while strengthening those at home, where a very narrow channel separated Great Britain from a possible enemy. He, too, saw a great danger in inadequately garrisoned forts abroad, and did not believe that Great Britain could undertake to put them in an efficient state because she could not spare the troops from home. With such evidence on which to base its decision, the Committee expressed the opinion "that the multiplication of fortified places and the erection of fortifications in distant colonial possessions... on a scale requiring for their defence a greater number of men than could be spared for them in the event of war, involve a useless expenditure, and fail to provide an efficient protection for places, the defence of which mainly depends on superiority at sea".

The concluding item of the Committee's Report recommended the concentration of the majority of the imperial troops within the mother country. Lord Herbert was in favor of accumulating all the forces possible at home, and of keeping as few men as possible in the colonies. Robert Lowe, contemplating the possibility of an attack at the heart of the Empire, hoped that in such an event the British Government of the day would be inclined to keep every man in Great Britain, and even to recall the troops from the colonies. Gladstone also favored the idea of concentration of forces, because

1. Ibid. Lord Herbert, 3599. 2. Ibid. 3669-70. 3. Ibid. p.vii. No.18.
4. Ibid. Lord Herbert, 3552. 5. Ibid. Lowe, 3377.
with the existing improvements in communication, and with Great Britain the very centre of the communications, the British Government had enormous advantages for supporting the colonies upon the principle of keeping the great mass of force at home and sending the forces abroad as they were required. The Committee adopted these suggestions, pointing out that "the tendency of modern warfare is to strike at the heart of a hostile power; and that it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops required for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, trusting mainly to naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of the Empire".

Several side issues arose during the sittings of the Committee, with the result that opinions were expressed on a variety of topics loosely related to the imperial defence question. Some of these minor topics were the merits of local forces, the advantages of naval defence, the projected Halifax to Quebec Railway, and the recent increase in the Canadian tariff.

In considering the question of the withdrawal of imperial troops from garrison duty in Canada, the Duke of Newcastle was doubtful of the ability of volunteer troops to fill the places of imperial garrisons. He preferred regular troops for garrison duty because such troops were better disciplined. Nevertheless he expressed his admiration for the spirit shown in British North

1 Ibid. Gladstone, 3816.
2 Ibid. p. vii. No.19.
113.

America during the recent volunteering. Robert Lowe, in supporting his arguments for the withdrawal of imperial garrisons, was of the opinion that the Canadians would have provided troops if the British forces had been withdrawn, and he had no doubt that Canadians would volunteer gallantly, as always, if necessary. Lord Herbert regarded the Canadian volunteering spirit as proof that the Canadians could supply the man-power for self-defence.

During the discussions over the withdrawal of imperial forces from Canada, permanently localized imperial forces, such as the Royal Canadian Rifles, came in for considerable comment. Merivale saw disadvantages in such forces, in that they were not so good in point of discipline as were the regulars, nor could they, in contrast with regular imperial troops, be moved throughout the Empire at the pleasure of the mother country. Lord Herbert agreed as to the disciplinary problem, but pointed to the savings to the British Exchequer in that the transportation of imperial regulars would be unnecessary to places where localized imperial forces existed. The chief advantage of the Royal Canadian Rifles over imperial regulars was that there was less desertion from their ranks than from those of the regular army. The Royal Canadian Rifles was an imperial regiment which had been raised in Canada in 1840-1841 as a special regiment of the British Army to man the border posts between the United States and Canada. With a view to

1 Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, 2986, 2988. 2 Ibid. Lowe, 3382-3.
3 Ibid. Lord Herbert, 3514. 4 Ibid. Merivale, 2486.
5 Ibid. Lord Herbert, 3529. 6 Stacey, Canada and British Army, p. 20.
reducing the number of desertions from the Regiment, it was composed of veteran soldiers with earlier claims to pension who would therefore be less tempted to desert in favor of the high wages paid in North America and the bounties offered for enlistment in the army of the United States. The Royal Canadian Rifles were paid by the British Government and were under imperial authority. The advantages derived from the adoption of such a local force moved the Committee to recommend that a similar organization be formed in the South African Colonies as a provision for "security against warlike tribes or domestic disturbances."

Naval defence was strongly advocated by Rear Admiral Erskine, whose references to the possible economy involved in adopting such a defence policy were attractive to the Committee. Erskine's plan was to discover the nature and object of possible attacks on a colony by maintaining good reconnaissance by means of small ships cruising near the colony, and by having a battle fleet concentrated at the colony. Such a policy, he considered, would make possible the recall of numerous imperial troops. The many references to dependence on "naval supremacy" contained in the report are evidence that the Committee took the view that many British possessions could be held only while Great Britain had supremacy on the sea. This attitude was one of several factors which induced the Committee

to recommend the withdrawal of the imperial garrisons from the overseas possessions and the increase of contributions from the colonies for their own defence.

The project of the construction of a railway in British North America for imperial purposes had been originated by Earl Grey in communication with some of the authorities in the British North American colonies. It had been planned that the railway line should run from Halifax to Quebec following the "North Shore" of New Brunswick along the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Bay of Chaleur. Since Earl Grey had believed that the railway would be of importance in a military sense, he had indicated the willingness of the British Government to contribute to the cost of construction. However, as Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had preferred a proposed commercial railway running inland, for which the Colonial Office would make no guarantee, the matter was dropped temporarily. The railway scheme had been under the Duke of Newcastle's consideration when he was Colonial Secretary in 1854. In his evidence before the Committee, the Duke of Newcastle stated that the railway was desirable for the development of the resources of the provinces as well as for military purposes. He pointed out, however, that the Canadian railways had not prospered, a fact which made it difficult to secure financial support for the proposed railway. When asked by the Committee if he thought a federal union of the British North American provinces would increase the efficiency and economy of the defence of those

1 Tunstall, op. cit. p. 833.

provinces, the Duke of Newcastle would not commit himself. He did admit, however, that a federation of the British North American provinces would facilitate arrangements for the construction of railways, as such a union would obviate the necessity of mutual financial arrangements.

In the course of the investigation by the Committee, numerous references were made to the existing Canadian tariff which had been increased on manufactured goods following the Canadian depression of 1857. The increase in tariff had aroused much criticism from the British manufacturers, who argued that although Canada had been ready to assert her fiscal rights as a self-governing province, she did not show any willingness to assume part of the responsibility of her own defence. Gladstone considered that the commercial freedom which had been recently established between Canada and Great Britain was an advance in the status of Canada, but he looked upon the existing Canadian tariff as adverse to the relations between the mother country and Canada, and hoped that it would not be permanent. The Duke of Newcastle defended the action of the Canadian Government, stating that Canada, being self-governing, could impose a tariff on British goods. He believed that the tariff was meant more as an assistance to Canadian finances than as a protective tariff against British goods. The fact that Canada had the constitutional right

1 Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, 2964-8.
2 Stacey, Canada and British Army, pp. 109-110.
to impose a tariff on British goods did not make it any easier for British manufacturers to resign themselves to the situation, and their complaints played a part in influencing the British Government to withdraw the imperial garrisons from the colonies.

The Select Committee of 1861 had dealt in considerable detail, although with monotonous repetition in many instances, with the subject assigned to it for investigation. The witnesses called had responded well, and had testified with a frankness that was commendable. The Committee had shown good judgment in its selection of witnesses, as nearly all parts of the British Empire and fields of imperial thought were represented. The accumulation of evidence, documents, and returns submitted by the witnesses, has provided a valuable and comprehensive record of imperial policy dating from the early years of the British Empire to 1861. The proof of the practicability of the recommendations of the Committee was to be seen in the manner in which the removal of the imperial troops from the British overseas possessions was carried out during the subsequent decade.
Chapter VI.

Repercussions of the Report of the Select Committee of 1861.

Charles Adderley was one of the first to make use of the information revealed during the investigation held by the Select Committee of 1861, of which he had been a member. A strong opponent of the garrison system, he wrote a very able brief containing the arguments of witnesses who favoured the withdrawal of imperial troops from the colonies, and also refuted the points raised by those who supported the existing defence policy. This brief he published in the form of a letter to Benjamin Disraeli, who had opposed the sending of reinforcements to Canada in 1861. Adderley criticised the attitude of the mother country on the matter of defence as "a magnanimity of universal philanthropy among the colonies", and strongly advocated a policy of self-defence for the colonies, which should be combined with an imperial defence policy based on co-operation among the component parts of the Empire. He proposed the withdrawal of British troops from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the West Indies in time of peace, except for a few troops which the colonies might be allowed to retain temporarily, and also the removal from British parliamentary estimates of all votes for colonial civil service. This process, Adderley considered, should be carried out gradually, and could be

2 Ibid. p.43.
3 Ibid. p.44.
4 Ibid. p.56.
accomplished best by the method approved by the Select Committee of 1861, namely, that used by Earl Grey in 1851 when dealing with the Australian Colonies.

The failure of the Select Committee of 1861 to refer specifically to Canada in its recommendations concerning withdrawals showed that it had not considered the garrisons in North America unduly large. But the situation after the "Trent Affair" was quite different, for the number of imperial troops in North America had been increased early in 1862. The cost of transporting these reinforcements amounted to £234,000 while the supplementary army estimates for 1862 amounted to £609,000. Although little objection was raised in the British Parliament to the amount of the recent expenditures, interest was shown in the future cost to the imperial government of British North American defence. Reference was made to the Canadian tariff once more, and it was suggested that in future Canadians might tax themselves to a greater degree in order to assume a large share in the cost of their own defence.

The first formal expression of opinion on the principles of colonial defence made by the House of Commons came as a result of a resolution presented by Arthur Mills on March 4, 1862. Mr. Mills, the chairman of the Select Committee of 1861, moved "That this House,

1 Ibid. p.57. See above. p. 105.

2 10,605 additional troops actually reached America. Stacey, Canada and British Army, p.122, f.n. i.

3 Ibid. p.128.
while it fully recognizes the claim of all portions of the British Empire on Imperial aid against perils arising from the consequences of Imperial policy, is of the opinion that colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security.  

In supporting his resolution Mr. Mills stated that the principles embodied in it were based on opinions expressed by Earl Grey in his official correspondence with Lord Elgin and by Sir William Denison in his despatches to the British Government. General Peel, Lord Herbert, Mr. Gladstone and Earl Grey had supported these opinions. All witnesses examined by the Select Committee had agreed that where responsible government was given to a colony the primary responsibility of its military defence should also be cast upon it. He had embodied this principle in his resolution, for he maintained that when a colony accepted self-government it made a compact to maintain its own internal order and security, and to undertake its own external defence except in cases arising from imperial policy. Either Britain must go forward and leave the colonies more to their own resources, or draw back and deprive them of self-government. The latter course was practically impossible. He would suggest pursuing the course adopted by Earl Grey in the case of the Australian Colonies. As a result of this system the colonists would be less eager to become involved in war, and would be more circumspect in their dealings


2 See above, p. 105.
with the natives. Furthermore, a great saving would be effected for the imperial treasury.

In seconding Mr. Mills's resolution, Mr. Buxton discussed the main objections which had been made to the changes suggested in imperial defence policy, and stated the motives for making the changes. He believed that fewer wars between colonists and natives would result from the adoption of the proposed defence policy. He considered the existing defence system obsolete as it was no longer generally felt best to keep the majority of the imperial forces away from Great Britain. He believed that Great Britain would strengthen the bonds of empire by entrusting to the colonies a greater responsibility for imperial defence. In his opinion, the aim of Great Britain for her colonies should be "to surround herself with a noble band of sister states, bound only to her by the tie of loyal love, standing shoulder to shoulder with her against all attack, but not released by her from the invigorating necessity for self-reliance".

Mr. Baxter was the next speaker on the resolution. While he agreed that the colonies should have the entire responsibility for their internal defence, he did not think that the resolution went far enough. He considered that the main grievance connected with the imperial defence policy was that the burden of expense imposed upon Great Britain was too heavy. He proposed an amendment to the

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1 *Hansard, 3rd. series. vol. CLX. pp. 1031-8.*

resolution by the addition of the words "and ought to assist in their own external defence".

Mr. Chichester Fortescue, the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, represented the Government in the debate on Mr. Mills's resolution. Mr. Fortescue said that the Government agreed with Mr. Mills that imperial troops should not be employed as domestic police in a colony, although they might be required to assist in maintaining order in colonies which were not purely British communities. He considered it the duty of the British Government to provide for the defence of the colonies, as they desired to be attached to her, and the only question was as to the amount of expenditure which such protection might require. He thought that the resolution and amendment would aid the Government in carrying out its duties both of protecting the colonies and of effecting a saving in expenditures on imperial defence.

At the conclusion of the debate, Mr. Mills's resolution, as amended, was accepted by the House of Commons without division.

Although the resolution was little more than a hint of a change in imperial defence policy, the principle which it expressed resulted in the gradual withdrawal of imperial troops from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. Since 1862 South Africa has been the only one of these colonies, which we now call Dominions, which has received military aid for the furtherance of

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1 Ibid. pp. 1044-1053.  
2 Ibid. pp. 1053-1055.  
3 Ibid. pp. 1055-1060.
imperial policy. The policy of the resolution was even extended to shifting the burden of military defence for the most part from the Imperial Government to the governments of some colonies which were not self-governing. The defence of the "Imperial stations" like Gibraltar continued to be maintained by the Imperial Government.

Little difficulty was experienced in the reduction of the imperial garrisons in Australia. In 1863, the Duke of Newcastle suggested to the Australian colonies that all but Western Australia should pay an annual sum for each imperial soldier allotted to them. This suggestion was accepted. Shortly afterwards, the imperial troops in Australia were transferred to New Zealand, their places being taken by volunteers. One battalion of British regulars did return to Australia from New Zealand in 1870, but was immediately sent to England. The Australians were willing to adopt a policy of self-defence, for they had no near neighbours and felt secure while the British Navy controlled the seas.

In New Zealand, the program of reduction was complicated by wars with the natives. The Government of New Zealand had wished to set up a local department of native affairs subject to the

3 Lucas, Empire at War, vol. I. p. 38.
4 Tunstall, op. cit. p. 335.
5 Lucas, Empire at War, vol. I. loc. cit.
supervision and control of the Governor, but the British Government, due to its heavy expenditures for the defence of the settlers in New Zealand, declined to hand over the administration of native affairs. When a Maori War broke out in 1840, the British Government sent one regiment to New Zealand as reinforcement, but pointed out that the amount of aid a colony should expect would depend upon the demands on imperial forces elsewhere and on the attitude of the colonists towards sharing in their own defence. As the war proceeded, the home government found the responsibility it had assumed over native affairs irksome, and in 1865 transferred control over them to the local government. In 1868 the Gladstone Ministry decided to proceed with the withdrawal of imperial troops from New Zealand and this was accomplished by 1870. The New Zealand Government protested the withdrawal at this time because another Maori War had broken out recently. The Colonial Office proceeded with the withdrawal because the war was the result of local policy. Thus the colonists were forced to become more self-reliant and to adopt wiser relations with the Maoris who became in time citizens with equal rights in a modern Dominion.

1 Bell and Morrell, op.cit. pp. 588-9. Memorandum of Richmond, September 29, 1858.
2 Ibid. p. 592. Carnarvon to Gore Browne, May 18, 1859.
3 Ibid. pp. 594-5. Lewis to Gore Browne, July 26, 1860.
7 Ibid. p. 233.
125.

Early attempts at reducing the imperial garrisons in South Africa were hindered by the fact that Cape Colony did not receive a responsible government until 1872. After that date continued difficulties with the natives, the general unrest caused by the discovery of gold, and increasing friction with the Boers, prevented the complete withdrawal of the imperial troops before the Great War of 1914. Nevertheless, Cape Colony contributed to its internal defence by maintaining the Frontier Armed and Native Police, and also made a contribution towards the maintenance of the imperial troops.

Conditions in the United States in 1862 were not conducive to the reduction of the imperial forces in British North America. Nevertheless, after the tension caused by the "Trent Affair" had subsided, the garrison of imperial troops in Canada was reduced gradually. In 1864 there were still some 11,000 imperial troops in Canada, but by the spring of 1865 these had been reduced to 8,200 in number. The volunteer movement in Canada had been stimulated by the dangers inherent in the proximity of the war in the United States. By 1862 the Canadian Government had determined to take steps to improve the defences of the country through local efforts. Accordingly, a strong Militia Commission was appointed consisting of John A. MacDonald, George E. Cartier, A. T. Galt, Sir Allan MacNab, Sir E. P. Taché, two senior officers representing the

2 Lucas, Empire at War, vol.I. p. 91.
3 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 154.
provincial forces, and a regular officer with experience in the British Volunteers representing the imperial view. The instructions given to this Commission were: "to report a plan for the better organization of the department of the Adjutant-General of Militia; to investigate and report upon the best means of organizing the Militia, and providing an efficient and economical system of defence for the province; and to prepare a Bill or Bills on these subjects, to be submitted to Parliament at its next session".

The Militia Commission submitted its findings on March 15, 1862, and recommended that an active force of 50,000 men and a reserve of the same number, together with the co-operation of a strong body of regular troops on land and a powerful flotilla of gunboats on the lakes, were necessary for the efficient defence of Canada. The active force was to consist of the volunteer militia corps of the cities, and of battalions of regular militia to be raised in the rural districts. The active force was to be raised by voluntary enlistment, by ballot, or by a combination of the two methods. The province was to be divided into military districts which would in turn be divided into regimental divisions. One active and one reserve battalion were to be raised from each regimental division, taken as nearly as practicable in equal proportions from the male population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. The volunteer militia were to be enrolled for five years, and the

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regular militia for three years in the active force. After serving
their term in the active force, the regular militia were to pass
into the reserve force for three years, at the end of which period
they were to be exempt from a call until all men above them on the
list had served. The volunteer and active regular militia were to
train for at least fourteen days a year, and the reserve force
would be called out for six days' training a year. The militia
corps were to be encamped, when practicable, during their period
of training. The volunteer and active militia would go on active
service in case of war or disturbances, within or without the prov-
ince. In time of war, no man was to be required to serve in the
field continuously for a longer period than one year, with the
possibility of six months' additional service in cases of unavoid-
able necessity. The rates of pay suggested were one dollar a day
for officers in the volunteer and regular militia and fifty cents
a day for non-commissioned officers and privates in the same. In
addition to the volunteer and regular militia, in the event of war
the Commander-in-Chief was to have power to raise regiments of
militia by voluntary enlistment. The Commissioners estimated the
cost of such a defence scheme at $1,110,000 a year.

A Militia Bill incorporating the recommendations of the Militia
Commission was introduced by John A. Macdonald in May 1862, but owing
to public criticism of the proposals, the bill was worded so as to


2 Hamilton, op. cit. p. 403.
permit, but not to oblige the Government to put the Commission's
suggestions into effect. The large expenditure that the measure
entailed made it unpopular with some of the French Canadians, and
the immediate cause of its defeat was the secession of fifteen
French Canadian supporters of the ministry. The Government itself
was weak and unpopular, for the methods of the group which had
dominated it since 1854 had aroused dissatisfaction. Provincial
military circles disapproved of the proposal to rely on the regular
militia instead of developing the volunteers. The compulsory train-
ing period and the methods of enrolment for the volunteer and active
militia gave the measure a savour of conscription. The bill was
given second reading, but when put to a division it was rejected.

Shortly afterwards the Government resigned. The Canadian public
were in large measure ignorant of the gravity of the situation in
which Canada would be placed in the event of war with the United
States. Their lack of information concerning the weaknesses of
provincial defences was largely due, according to Christopher Dunkin,
to the Government's failure to place sufficient importance on the
matter of imperial and provincial defence relations.

1
Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 132.

2
Hamilton, op. cit. p. 403; Stacey, Canada and British Army. pp. 133-5; Skelton, op. cit. p. 341; Pope, op. cit. p. 237.

3
Province of Canada. Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the
Confederation of the North American Provinces, 3rd. session,
Speech by Christopher Dunkin, February 23, 1865.
The new Canadian administration, led by John Sandfield Macdonald and L.V. Sicotte, was pledged against militia schemes as extensive as that recently proposed. The ministry amended the Militia Act of 1859 in the direction of infusing vitality into the volunteer force. The appropriation for defence was $250,000 as compared with $84,970 for 1861. The rejection of the Militia Bill of 1862 increased Governor Monck's anxiety for the safety of the province, and he took the excuse of Sandfield Macdonald's weak Militia Act to ask the British Government for an increased supply of arms, ammunition, and equipment. The War Office granted practically all of Monck's requests.

The rejection of John A. Macdonald's Militia Bill aroused apprehension in the British Government, and bitter criticism in the House of Commons and the British press. The Duke of Newcastle, the Colonial Secretary, in a despatch to Governor Monck, August 21, 1862, urged the importance of more extensive Canadian action for self-defence. He considered the existing volunteer force of about 15,000 men to be too small to protect Canada in the event of war, and thought it essential to have a minimum of 50,000 partially trained Canadian troops to aid imperial troops in Canada. A well organized system of militia, he believed, would help to sustain

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1 By 25 Vict., cap I. Stacey, Canada and British Army, p. 143. m.2.
4 Ibid. Lugard to Elliot. July 30, 1862.
the favourable position of Canadian credit in Europe, and could best be supported financially by securing a sounder basis of taxation in Canada. In order to keep the militia and the fund for their support free from political interference, he suggested that the expenses of the militia should be defrayed from the consolidated fund of Canada, or voted for a period of three or five years.

The Duke of Newcastle also raised the question of a uniform system of militia training and militia organization for all the British North American provinces. Since such a scheme would affect more than one colony, it would have to emanate from the Secretary of State, but the Duke of Newcastle wished the opinion of the Canadian Executive Council on the matter. He also suggested that Monck should discuss this proposal with the Lieutenant Governors of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. This scheme for a military union of the British North American provinces with the Governor General of Canada as Commander-in-Chief, and therefore responsible to the British Government, would have invaded the rights of the self-governing colonies. Monck advised the Duke of Newcastle that at his meeting with the Lieutenant Governors, it had been decided that the scheme for consolidation of the militia forces was impracticable owing to the inadequacy of inter-provincial communications. Since it was apparent that the scheme was not

3 Province of Canada. Sessional Papers, 1863. No. 15.
acceptable, the matter was dropped.

The Sandfield Macdonald - Bicott ministry rejected the Duke of Newcastle's proposals for an increased Canadian militia in very definite terms. They stated that they had defeated John A. Macdonald's Militia Bill because they had no desire to provoke the hostility of the United States. Their action, they said, had been endorsed in recent elections embracing more than one-third of the population. They opposed the Duke of Newcastle's suggestion for increased taxation, on the ground that the people would not support the innovation of local taxation for military purposes. They claimed to be the best judges of methods to sustain Canadian credit, and declared that careful budgeting was the proper plan to follow. To the suggestion that the funds required for militia purposes be removed from political control, the ministry replied that such would be an interference with the privileges of the representatives of the people. They would not entertain a plan of union for defence in which the management would be entirely independent of the local legislatures. They understood that the Duke of Newcastle's arguments were based on the theory that the right of self-government should carry with it the responsibility of self-defence. But this principle they considered to be indisputable only in the case of sovereign states, and not in the relation between a colony and the parent state, because a British colony had to submit to the imperial foreign policy. This was the position in which Canada was placed, a
situation made all the more dangerous by the proximity of a powerful neighbour along an exposed frontier. The Canadian ministry therefore believed that Canada should be assisted to the fullest extent of imperial resources. They did not think that Canada would be able to repel an invasion from the United States without receiving extensive assistance. Since Canada would become involved in a war with the United States only as a result of imperial policy, the ministry maintained that Canada should be supported in the work of defence with the whole strength of the empire. On the constitutional side, the arguments of the ministry were justifiable, but their effectiveness was reduced by the emphasis placed on the need of British assistance to Canadian defence.

The Canadian ministry presented their own plan for Canadian defence. Their scheme was based on volunteering. It held out no inducement for men to enrol or serve and would tend to become confused with the existing sedentary militia and active force schemes. It therefore, thought Monck, was likely to lead to failure. The Governor submitted a plan of his own to the Canadian Government, and enclosed a copy in a despatch to the Duke of Newcastle. The essential parts of Monck's scheme were voluntary enlistment, voluntary drilling, and complete battalion organization which would enable the different regiments to turn out for field exercises.

By spreading the expense over a period of five years, Monck estimated that the annual cost to the province would not be much more than the sum appropriated for militia purposes in the last session.

The Duke of Newcastle agreed with Monck that the militia plan suggested by the Canadian ministry would prove "completely illusory". He believed that Monck's own plan for the formation of a militia force of 50,000 men was much more satisfactory. He did not wish to diminish the control of the Canadian Parliament over its own affairs, but warned that the amount of aid which Britain would give would depend on the disposition shown by Canada to protect herself. He admitted that Canada was liable to be involved in wars in which she had no immediate interest, yet he pointed out that Canada had a manifest interest in helping to maintain the power of the British Empire upon which she depended. The Duke of Newcastle's final comment in this series of exchanges was that British control of Canadian foreign policy did not necessarily guarantee the presence of an unlimited number of imperial troops in Canada at British expense, even in time of war, much less in time of peace. It did remain true, however, that "the defence of Canadian territory must depend mainly upon the Canadian people itself".

2 Ibid. The Duke of Newcastle to Monck, December 20, 1862.
134.

During 1862 the fear of an American attack on Canada had increased. This was caused, in the first place, by an enormous enlargement of the American armed land and naval forces during the first two years of the Civil War, and secondly, by the pessimism with which British military experts viewed the possibility of a successful defence of Canada. During the spring and summer of 1862 a group of British experts had made a thorough survey of the problem of defending the Canadian frontier. Their report stated that the defence of Canada was feasible if a force of 150,000 men was organized, if the canals on the St. Lawrence River system were enlarged to admit armoured vessels, and if about £1,611,000 could be spent on permanent fortifications.

With conditions as they were in 1862, it was useless to approach either the Canadian Government or the British House of Commons with such an elaborate scheme. The Canadian ministry failed to take any action on Monck's suggestion for increasing the militia to 50,000 men, and the year ended with the local forces remaining at a total of 18,000 volunteers.

Sandfield Macdonald's Government took steps in 1863 to improve Canada's militia system. Two militia acts were passed. The first provided for "service battalions" to be chosen by lot every three years.

1 Army increased from 10,000 to 600,000; naval vessels increased from 83 to 671. *Canada, Parliamentary Debates on Confederation*, pp. 129-130. Speech of D'Arey McGee.


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. p. 149. fn. 4. 27 Vict., cap. 2.
years from the men first liable for service. These were to have six days' annual drill, and were to be officered by men who had qualified in schools of military instruction. The act authorized the appropriation of $100,000 for the establishment of these schools. The second act gave authority to increase the volunteer militia to 35,000 men who were to be unpaid, but all (except the officers) to be supplied with uniform and arms. The supply act passed in the same session appropriated $462,000 for the militia and volunteers, in addition to a credit of $121,000 unexpended from the 1862 vote.

As a result of these militia acts, the "service battalions", composed of 88,000 men, exclusive of officers, were enrolled on paper in 1864, but were not called out for drill. Two military schools opened in 1864 and were so popular that the ministry decided to open four more in 1865. Parliament encouraged the volunteer force by authorizing the payment of non-commissioned officers and men for a training period up to sixteen days in length. By the summer of 1864 the strength of the volunteer force was 21,700.

Until the date of the Canadian Confederation, the British policy stated in the defence resolution of 1862 was carried out with regard to Canada partly in the attempts to persuade

2 Ibid. pp. 149-150.
3 Ibid. pp. 150-1.
successive Canadian administrations to increase their local forces. The dangers associated with the strained relations between Britain and the United States during the Civil War, and with the threats of Fenian raids after the conclusion of the war, made it inexpedient for the British Government to go beyond the reduction of the garrisons carried out in 1865. In fact, the British Government sent further imperial troops to Canada in 1866, raising the force of imperials there to 11,923. This increase was the result of an appeal by Governor-General Menck, who was alarmed by reports of renewed Fenian activity along the Niagara frontier.

In 1867 the British Government intended to withdraw some of the imperial forces stationed in Canada, but postponed action because the Fenian menace continued. Proposals for the reduction of the imperial garrison in Canada in 1868 brought protests from the Canadian Government. Nevertheless, towards the end of 1868 Disraeli's ministry in Great Britain gave orders for the recall of two battalions from Canada. It was intended to reduce the imperial garrison to 5000 men in Ontario and Quebec, 2000 in Nova Scotia, and 1650 men in New Brunswick. The defeat of Disraeli's Conservative Government in the general election in Britain left the question of reduction to the Liberal ministry led by W.E.Gladstone.

As we have learned from the evidence which he gave before the Committee of 1861, Gladstone favoured the reduction of imperial forces

1 See above, p. 125. 2 Stacey, *Canada and British Army*. pp. 190-3. 3 Ibid. pp. 198-201.
in Britain's overseas possessions. He now entrusted to Edward Cardwell, the Secretary of State for War, the task of bringing about such reductions. Cardwell declared that the "remarkable and exceptional reasons" had ceased to exist which had prevented the application in Canada of the defence policy of 1862, and he now proposed an extensive reduction of the imperial troops in Canada. Because there had not been any actual aggression by the Fenians since 1866, the majority of the Canadians were not disturbed by the announcement of the withdrawals. But in 1869, when the Fenian menace arose again, the Canadians awoke to the danger of the situation and protested against the withdrawal policy.

Early in 1870 the British Government announced to the Canadian Government the details of the impending reduction of imperial troops. It was intended that imperial troops would be withdrawn from Canada except for a garrison in Halifax which was still considered an "Imperial station". At this time British-American relations were unsettled due to negotiations concerning the Alabama question. The Canadian Government was further embarrassed by the rising led by Louis Riel in the Red River settlement. The British Government tempered the effect in Canada of the announcement of the withdrawal of troops by intimating that imperial regulars would be allowed to take part in the expedition to Red River. A serious Fenian scare

1. Ibid. pp. 204-212.  
2. Ibid. p. 218.  
in April further worried the Canadian Government and led Sir John A. MacDonald to condemn the new imperial military policy. The long-threatened Fenian raid was attempted in May 1870, but was repulsed. The raid resulted in Canadian public criticism of the new imperial military policy. The British Government agreed to suspend the withdrawal process during the actual emergency in Canada. The Canadian Government attempted to have the withdrawal suspended beyond the actual emergency and to persuade the British Government to consider a permanent imperial occupation of Quebec. The Gladstone ministry, however, refused to alter its imperial military policy in any essential.

The last of the imperial troops in Canada, with the exception of those remaining in Halifax, were withdrawn from Quebec in November 1871. That Canadians did not have any great apprehension for the future safety of Canada was due chiefly to the Treaty of Washington signed late in 1871, by which the existing difficulties between Great Britain and the United States were removed. After 1871 the only imperial troops in Canada were stationed at Halifax and Esquimalt, from whence they were withdrawn in 1906.

The question of the contribution by the self-governing colonies to naval defence remained unsettled to the end of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, attempts were made to interest the colonies

1 Ibid. pp. 231-8.  
2 Ibid. p. 242.  
3 Ibid. pp. 242-6.  
5 Ibid. p. 254.  
in naval defence. The Colonial Naval Defence Act, passed in 1865, was intended to result in the extension to naval matters of the policy of colonial self-reliance. This act made provision for the commissioning of warships and the raising of naval personnel by the colonies, the ships and men to form a part of the Royal Navy. The results of this attempt were disappointing, for the colonies took practically no advantage of this opportunity to share in the naval defence of the British Empire.

In Canada, the danger of Fenian raids caused the Canadian and British Governments to take joint action in providing naval protection for the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes. In 1866 steamers were hired on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River by the Canadian Government and manned and armed by the Royal Navy. In 1869 the British Government insisted that the Dominion Government should pay the whole cost of the gunboat service on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River, but instead of doing so, the Canadian Government laid up the two remaining vessels in harbour, thus making them useless in an emergency. Toward the end of 1869, when apprehension of Fenian activity again arose, the Canadian Government finally decided to commission the gunboats and to call out volunteer gunners to man them.

1 Tunstall, op. cit. p. 835; Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy. p. 127.
2 Stacey, Canada and British Army. p. 190.
3 Ibid. p. 215.
4 Ibid. p. 221.
5 Ibid.
The report of the Select Committee of 1861 had provided the stimulus needed for the withdrawal of imperial troops from Britain's overseas possessions. The concrete nature of the defence resolution of 1862, which was the offspring of the report, resulted in the adoption of the new imperial defence policy. From this policy the colonies derived an extension of autonomy, in the form of responsibility for and management of their internal and external defence.
An examination of imperial and Canadian policies of defence between 1846 and 1862 has revealed that throughout the period there was a growing desire on the part of British statesmen to effect a reduction of the burden borne by the mother country on account of colonial defence. The first outstanding attempt to reduce imperial expenditure for this purpose took place during Earl Grey's term of office as Colonial Secretary. Fortunately Earl Grey began his experiment at a time when Canadian affairs were ably guided by Lord Elgin, who by his timely advice assisted in the inception of a new colonial defence policy based on the principles of a reduction of the imperial garrisons abroad and an increase of colonial contributions to the defence of the colonies. The varying fortunes of the new policy resulted in the appointment of the Select Committees on Colonial Military Expenditure in 1859 and 1861. The findings of the Select Committee of 1859 revealed the necessity for the more extensive investigation, which was capably carried out by the Select Committee of 1861. After the latter committee had submitted its report, the program of reducing the overseas garrisons in the self-governing possessions was undertaken. Associated with this policy of reduction there arose the problem of colonial self-support in matters of defence. Throughout the years between 1862 and 1871 the withdrawal of imperial forces from
Canada was retarded by such factors as the apprehension aroused in Canada by the Civil War in the United States and by the Fenian raids. Nevertheless, events in Europe, such as the aggression of Prussia against Denmark and Austria, brought home to British statesmen the vulnerability of the British Isles and thereby the necessity of recalling their overseas troops. Canadian statesmen of the day, although aware of the dangers to Canada inherent in the situation in the United States, continued to rely mainly on imperial troops to safeguard their country. It became increasingly apparent in the years between 1862 and 1870, however, that the withdrawal of imperial garrisons was a determined policy which would be carried out no matter which political party was in power in Great Britain, and no matter how loudly the withdrawal was protested by the Canadian Government. Then only did Canada move slowly and unwillingly towards the adoption of a policy of self-defence.
Appendix I.

Graph showing fluctuations in the number of imperial troops stationed in North America.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>British &amp; Canadian depressions, 1836-1837.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>Canadian Rebellions, 1837-1838.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>Ashburton &amp; Oregon Treaties; British depression; retrenchment policy of Grey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>Retrenchment policy of Lord Grey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>Crimean War, 1854.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>Enlistment dispute with United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Indian Mutiny; French &quot;Invasion Panic&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>American Civil War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>&quot;Trent Affair&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Trent Affair settled; tension in Europe over war between Prussia and Denmark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Fenian Raids.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Fenian Raids ended; Washington Treaty; Cardwell's policy of troop concentration in Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II.
Map of the British Empire in 1861.
Key to Map of the British Empire in 1861.

1
"Colonies Proper": indicated by numbers in black.

1. Canada
2. Nova Scotia
3. New Brunswick
4. Newfoundland
5. British Columbia
6. New South Wales
7. Victoria
8. South Australia
9. Tasmania
10. New Zealand
11. Cape Colony
12. British Kaffraria
13. Natal
14. Ceylon
15. Mauritius
16. Jamaica
17. British Honduras
18. Barbados
19. St. Lucia
20. Trinidad
21. British Guiana

2
"Imperial Stations": indicated by numbers in red.

1. Malta
2. Gibraltar
3. Ionian Islands
4. Hong Kong
5. St. Helena
6. Bermudas
7. Bahamas
8. Falkland Islands
9. Western Australia
10. Labuan
11. Sierra Leone
12. Gambia
13. Gold Coast

3
The dependencies of either of the above classes making contributions to the military expenditure are underlined in red.

The following were also within the British Empire in 1861 and have been included on the map although they were not mentioned in the Parliamentary Paper No. 423:

Prince Edward Island
Queensland
St. Kitts I.
Nevis I.
Antigua I.
Virgin Is.
Dominica I.
Grenada I.
St. Vincent I.
Tobago I.
Singapore
Aden
Ascension I.

1

2
Ibid.

3
Ibid.
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1863, No.15.

Return to an Address of the Legislative Council, February 24, 1863; for a copy of the correspondence with the Colonial Office, on the subject of Colonial Defences and Militia.


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  Chapter I: E.A. Benians, "The Beginnings of the New Empire, 1783-1792".
  Chapter II: J.H. Rose, "The Conflict with Revolutionary France, 1793-1802."
  Chapter XIX: E.A. Benians, "Colonial Self-Government, 1852-1870".
  Chapter XXI: H.J. Habakkuk, "Free Trade and Commercial Expansion, 1853-1870."
  Chapter XXII: W.C.B. Tunstall, "Imperial Defence, 1815-1870."
Vol. VI: "Canada and Newfoundland".
  Chapter IX: D.A. McArthur, "The War of 1812."


