THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNIST TECHNIQUES OF CONTROL

1917 - 1923

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This thesis does not profess to relate in full, or in outline, the history of the Bolshevik Revolution from 1917 to 1923. While the course of events in this struggle was necessarily part of the writer's field of investigation, this study is limited to one particular aspect of the Russian experiment. When the Bolsheviks first annexed power during the November Revolution of 1917, Lenin himself admitted that the new regime could not expect to retain its position unless the proletariat elsewhere in Europe followed the Russian lead. ¹ How then was it that a party which, by its own count, numbered only 240,000 in Russia in 1917² was able, not only to hold its own, but to extend its control beyond the borders of Tsarist Russia? This is the question to which the writer has devoted his attention and of which this thesis will attempt at least a partial solution.

The Bolsheviks demonstrated an amazing ability to improvise methods to suit the situations with which they were faced. From these improvisations, based partially on Tsarist autocratic practices and partially on the theories of Marxism molded to fit their particular problems,

¹ Lenin, V.I. Selected works. 6:288. International Publishers, New York. 1943. A critical note on the character and value of this and other source material may be found in the bibliography.

there developed a pattern of techniques which proved successful in retaining Bolshevik predominance. Although the Communist party has added to and refined the original techniques of control, it is the intention of the writer to deal only with the major aspects of the Bolshevik methods as they evolved from 1917 to 1923.

For information the writer has drawn on secondary sources and translations from the Russian primary materials which have been listed in a bibliography to be found at the conclusion of this thesis. The form used in the references and bibliography is that prescribed by The Canadian Government Editorial Style Manual. ¹

The writer would indeed be remiss if he failed to express his acknowledgment and sincere appreciation for the invaluable assistance of Dr. G.W. Simpson, who suggested this topic of study, and who has given unfailingly of his time and knowledge during the preparation of this thesis, and for the extremely helpful advice of Dr. Hilda Neatby, who assisted materially in the final revision of the work.

¹ Subcommittee on Editorial Practice. The Canadian government editorial style manual. Queen's Printer, Ottawa. 1953. After much of this work had been typed, an anomaly appeared, in that the manual prescribed italics and capital letters for referring to the name of a book or newspaper in the body of the work, but prescribed a different form for the same title cited in footnotes.
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CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY
The victor in any struggle finds himself faced with the immediate problem of consolidating his position or he rapidly loses his new-found ascendancy and falls victim to what has become a Pyrrhic victory. The Bolshevik party, victorious in 1917, sustained its position only because it developed successful techniques of retaining control. These methods had their foundation in the party philosophy and party organization which evolved in the half century prior to 1917.

The Bolshevik party of 1917 may be traced to a throng of radical predecessors, active during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. These revolutionaries are grouped conveniently under the title "Narodnik".¹ It was as a protest against the theories and practices of the Narodniks that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was first organized. Following the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, the gradual industrialization of Russia was accelerated.² During this period, the number of protests, agrarian, social and industrial, expanded rapidly. A class of revolutionaries appeared who first developed a theory that the situation could be improved only by a revolution of the peasantry, the "backbone of Russia".³ They argued that, "being a predominantly peasant country, the specifically Russian peasant commune would provide a direct

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¹. Narodnik - from the Russian "narod", the people. The early Narodnik believed it necessary to live among the common people to incite rebellion against Tsarist authority.

². Lyaschenko, Peter I. History of the national economy of Russia, pp. 474-94. Macmillan Company, New York. 1949. The number of factory workers rose from 706,000 in 1865 to 1,433,000 in 1890.

³. This group later turned to organized terror as a weapon. This was condemned by the Bolsheviks as an unsatisfactory method of gaining power.
transition from the feudalism of the past to the communism of the future.  

This Narodnik philosophy clashed with accepted Marxist doctrine. The followers of Marx held that the Socialist revolution could follow only a successful bourgeois transition from feudalism to capitalism.

In 1883 this conflict in ideologies was forcibly drawn to the attention of the public by G.V. Plekhanov, a former Narodnik. Plekhanov was responsible for the formation in Geneva, during 1883, of the "Emancipation of Labour" group, in opposition to the Narodniks. This organization translated, printed and adapted to the Russian scene, the works of Marx and Engels, as weapons against the Narodniks in a literary war. The development of capitalism and the leadership of the proletariat rather than the peasantry were proclaimed as prerequisites for a socialist revolution in Russia. The writings of Plekhanov and his followers were disseminated in Russian cities by "Leagues of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class", established for this purpose. One of the first members of the St. Petersburg League, organized in 1895, was a disciple


2. Plekhanov, Georgii Valentinovitch (1856-1918) First Russian commentator on Marx in the 1880's, under the pseudonyms of Volgin and Beltov; editor of Iskra. Defencist during the war, and hostile to the November Revolution.


of Plekhanov, Vladimir Ulyanov. In this rather insignificant manner, Lenin, who was to prove the most important figure in Russian Marxism, began his career. This first phase of his career was rather shortlived, however, since he was arrested in 1895 and banished to Siberia.

In order to be effective, the Leagues within Russia had to be united by stronger bonds than the mere common ties to the "Emancipation of Labour" organization. The first attempt to unite these scattered groups occurred in March 1898, at Minsk, when delegates convened from such centers as St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev and Ekaterinoslav, and from the recently formed Jewish Bund or Labour Union. This nine-man Congress announced the formation of the "Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party", and issued the first general party manifesto.\(^1\) Before completing its program, the Congress was dispersed by Tsarist police.

Meanwhile, Lenin, who had been exiled to Siberia in 1895, was gaining fame through the publication of pamphlets and books, and was laying plans for a more successful organization of the party.\(^2\) Arriving in Geneva in 1900, he contacted the "Emancipation of Labour" group and arranged with Plekhanov to issue a weekly Marxist paper, *Iskra* (The Spark). This publication was to assume the lead in defeating three groups considered heretical by the *Iskra* editors. These groups included the Narodniks, who supported the peasants as opposed to the proletariat, the "legal Marxists", who favoured using only legal methods to gain

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1. Ibid., p.22; Carr. op.cit. 1:4; Haimson. op.cit., pp.80-1.
2. Carr. op.cit. 1:5.
their ends, and the "Economists", who argued that the proletariat should confine its program to economic ends and leave political action to the liberal bourgeoisie.¹ Plekhanov and Lenin vigorously attacked the programs of each group as being contrary to true Marxism. By 1902, Iskra was able to publish a detailed draft program for the new party,² and turn to its second self-appointed task, the convening of a new party congress.

The Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party,³ which convened on July 30, 1903, met in Brussels, since most of the leaders had been driven out of Russia. It soon moved to London to escape the police intervention prompted by the Belgian government, who suspected the Congress of sedition.⁴ The forty-three delegates first adopted Iskra as their party organ and accepted the party program advanced by Lenin and Plekhanov. This program stated the party's belief in a socialist revolution and the "dictatorship of the proletariat", and outlined immediate aims, such as the eight hour day, abolition of survivals of serfdom and overthrow of the Tsar.⁵

Following the adoption of the program, a crucial incident in the party history occurred when a basic difference of opinion among the

3. See Appendix "A" for a list of the Party Congresses.
4. Unless otherwise stated, all dates cited are according to the Gregorian calendar, adopted in February, 1918. Julian dates may be arrived at by subtracting 13 days. Thus the Revolution of November 7 becomes October 25 according to the Julian calendar.
5. C.P.S.U. p.41; Carr. op.cit. 1:27.
delegates became apparent during the debate on the party statutes. On
the question of party membership, Lenin and the "firm Iskra-ists" re­
commended that a party member should be one who would accept its program,
support it financially, and belong to one of its organizations; while
Martov 1 who was another editor of Iskra, led a group who accepted the
first two qualifications, but proposed to admit anyone to membership who
professed an interest in the party. 2 Martov was successful on this issue,
but many of his followers withdrew from the Congress on another issue, and
this left Lenin with what was, in fact, an artificial majority. Therefore
the Central Committee, when chosen, would contain a majority of Lenin's
followers, now named Bolsheviks. 3 As a result, Martov and the Mensheviks
refused to take any seat on the Central Committee or the Editorial Board
of Iskra, and the division thus formed became permanent.

Lenin and Plekhanov soon quarreled, and the latter joined the Men­
sheviks, taking with him Iskra, after Lenin resigned from the Board of
Editors. Iskra now became a Menshevik organ in the series of scathing
attacks leveled by each group against the other. 4 The rift between the
Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks widened, as the former advocated a militant
revolutionary party, while the latter advised merely accepting revolu­tion

1. Martov (Tsederbaum), Julius Ossipovitch (1873-1923) Lenin's fellow­
exile and closest intimate until the Bolshevik-Menshevik split in
1903; from then on, a leader of the Mensheviks.

2. Carr. op.cit. 1:29. Carr quotes the resolutions of the two factions.

3. "Bolshinstvo", the majority; "menshinstvo", the minority.

4. C.P.S.U., p.45; Carr. op.cit. 1:32. He naturally gives a different
picture.
as "a process of historical development".1

The first serious test of the Social-Democratic party occurred in the Russian Revolution of 1905. Hardships, aggravated by the Russo-Japanese War, led to disorders and a wave of strikes in European Russia. The crisis appeared to offer an opportunity for the Marxists to advance their ideas of a class struggle. However, the Social-Democratic Labour Party, weakened by its internal struggle, was unable to play the part which might have been expected of it. In 1905, in order to organize their faction, the Bolsheviks held a congress, the Third Party Congress, in London, and yet their role in the Russian events of 1905 was insignificant.2 The uprising culminated in the formation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies during the month of October. The Soviets (Councils) were gatherings of representatives of the various mills and factories which held a short lived preeminence.3 Under the leadership of Trotsky,4 the St. Peters burg Soviet emerged as the strongest of these organizations. However, by the end of December, even the St. Peters burg Soviet had been

1. Carr. op.cit. 1:38. This secondary difference is the one usually emphasized, but it should be remembered that the basic point at issue was that of the party membership.


3. C.P.S.U., pp.78-80, gives a partisan version of their activities.

crushed by the Tsarist forces. The only concession gained by the uprising was the grant of a constitution, which proved an illusory gain since the Tsar retained absolute power.

As a result of their failure in the revolution, members of both wings of the Social-Democratic Party began to press for the recombination of the party, and early in 1906 an attempt at unification was made. Improved relations marked the Fourth Party Congress at Stockholm in April, 1906, when the two groups agreed to cooperate in spite of differences in their party organizations and aims. The respite was short lived however, and at the Fifth Party Congress at London a year later, the rift began to widen once more.

The Mensheviks felt that the events of the unsuccessful revolution reenforced their theories of revolution as "a process of historical development". The failure of the revolt was attributed to weakness of the proletariat, a condition which could be rectified mainly by completion of Russia's gradual but inescapable transformation to a bourgeois state. Mensheviks therefore advocated proletarian support for liberal bourgeois aims until the "time was ripe". Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks claimed that the bourgeoisie had proven incapable of leadership, and pressed for a proletarian and peasant alliance to complete the socialist

1. Carr. op.cit. 1:49.
2. Ibid. 1:50; C.P.S.U., pp.90-2.
3. Lenin. op.cit. 1:52.
revolution.¹ This revolution would be followed by a rising of the European proletariat, which would in turn aid the Russian movement. During this period Trotsky began to evolve a doctrine half way between the two extremes,² and worked as a conciliator.

The period from 1907 to 1917 witnessed the completion of the party schism, and the postponement of further party activity by the outbreak of the World War. In January 1912, Lenin and fourteen fellow Bolsheviks, refusing to recognize the Mensheviks as a part of the Social-Democratic Party, organized a conference at Prague. This conference demonstrated its position by appointing an all-Bolshevik Central Committee.³ Trotsky attempted to call a conference in order to reunite the factions during August of 1912. However, Lenin and his group refused to participate. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the World War complicated the tasks of the Social-Democrats, although this event was to herald the success of the Bolshevik plans. Lenin fled to Switzerland, while other leaders sought haven elsewhere. The Bolsheviks refused to support Russia's war effort, and called for a socialist revolution against the imperialist war leaders. As a result, most of the important Bolshevik leaders still in Russia were exiled to Siberia in 1915. From this time until the outbreak of the revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks were largely inactive within European Russia.⁴

¹. Lenin. op.cit. 3:432.
². Trotsky. op.cit.; pp.224-30; Deutscher. op.cit., pp.194-7; Carr. op.cit. 1:57-63.
³. Carr. op.cit. 1:64. This Central Committee appointed an obscure Georgian Revolutionary, Josef Djugashvili, to organize its work within Russia. Thus Stalin gained the opportunity to begin his climb of the ladder of power.
In early 1917, the Bolsheviks seemed to have a chance to gain power, but once more were forced to postpone their Marxist revolution. In March of 1917, the war-weariness, hardships and disillusionment of the Russian workers boiled over in a spontaneous uprising in the city of Petrograd, and the uprising quickly gained passive or active general support. The Bolsheviks, while unprepared for this event, quickly began to lay plans for a class struggle. However, when the precedent of 1905 was invoked, and a Soviet of Workers' Deputies was formed, few Bolsheviks obtained seats in this body. This was a result of the shortage of Bolshevik leaders within Russia and the disorganization caused by repressive measures during the war. As the Soviet began to assume the right to review and alter decisions of the government, the unique situation known as the "dual power" was developed. In the extremely confused revolutionary period, the Provisional Government, which had replaced the Tsarist Government, unwillingly split the legislative and executive power with the Soviet.

The position of the Bolshevik party remained rather unimportant during most of March, but took an unexpected rise in April. At first the prominent Bolsheviks remaining in Russia combined to issue a manifesto and to recommence publication of Pravda, the party paper. However, even

1. The German name "St. Petersburg" was replaced by the Russian "Petrograd" early in the war.

2. March 12, Prince George Lvov headed a Provisional Government which contained only one left-Socialist, Kerensky, who claimed to represent the Soviet on the government.


after Stalin's return from Siberia during March, the confused Bolsheviks 
had no clear cut policy regarding the war or the Provisional Government. 
The Petrograd Bolsheviks announced that they "would not oppose the 
authority of the Provisional Government insofar as its activities corres­
ponded to the interests of the proletariat", and yet they refused to 
give assistance to the body in any crisis.\textsuperscript{1} It remained for Lenin, who 
arrived in Petrograd on April 16,\textsuperscript{2} to clarify the party position. Lenin 
at once announced that the stage of bourgeois revolution was past, and 
Russia was embarking on the proletarian revolution.\textsuperscript{3} The "dual power" 
must be replaced by a "republic of Soviets of Workers', Poor Peasants' 
and Soldiers' Deputies throughout the country."\textsuperscript{4} As Sukhanov\textsuperscript{5} described 
Lenin's influence:

$\text{Suddenly, before the eyes of all of us, completely swallowing up by the routine drudgery of the revolution, there was presented a bright, blinding, exotic beacon, obliterating everything we lived by. There had broken in upon us in the revolution a note that was not, to be sure, a contradiction, but that was novel, harsh, and somewhat deafening.}^{6}$

\textsuperscript{1} Sukhanov, N.N. The Russian revolution, 1917, p.191. Oxford University 
Press, London. 1955. He describes the Bolshevik attitude to the 
Provisional Government; Carr. op. cit. 1:73.

\textsuperscript{2} Carr. op. cit. 1:80.

\textsuperscript{3} Carr. op. cit. 1:80.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid. 1:80; C.P.S.U., p.185.

\textsuperscript{5} Sukhanov (Himmer), Nikolai Nikolayevitch, (1882-1931) An early non-
Marxist Socialist, who later became a member of the Menshevik 
party. He participated in the revolution and took part in the post-
revolutionary government until his disappearance following the purge 
trials of 1931.

\textsuperscript{6} Sukhanov. op. cit., pp.273-4.
12.

In April an All-Russian Party Conference met in Petrograd, and the Bolsheviks voted overwhelmingly to support Lenin’s plan calling for immediate action in the class struggle. The slogan "All power to the Soviets", who were the representatives of the proletariat, was adopted, even though the party continued to voice demands for a Constituent Assembly, and in spite of the fact that the Bolsheviks did not as yet control these Soviets.

The first Provisional Government fell in May, following which Kerensky, a moderate Socialist, made an attempt to form a coalition with the Soviet parties by including six socialists in his new government. Weakened by this alliance, the socialist parties in the Soviet gradually lost ground to the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks openly announced their intention to seize power. On June 22, a proposed street demonstration by the Bolsheviks was postponed as being premature, but when popular risings occurred on July 16, the main Bolsheviks were imprisoned or fled into exile.

Developments during September further increased Bolshevik power, while the Provisional Government lost ground. Kornilov attempted a military coup from the Right to replace the Provisional government. This proved a fiasco, but the Government was forced to arm the Bolsheviks in order to crush the threat. The strengthened and newly

1. Lenin interrupted a speech in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets to make this point. Carr. op.cit. 1:90; He quotes Lenin’s words.

2. Kornilov - a general of the Russian armies; dismissed by Kerensky, he refused to give up his post and marched on Petrograd.

3. Sukhanov, op.cit., p.505; He points out the importance of these arms.
armed party now gained a majority in the Petrograd Soviet for the first time. Lenin continued to press for armed insurrection. In October a "Military Revolutionary Committee" was established to prepare for the final struggle. In spite of some opposition within their own party, the Bolsheviks completed their arrangements.¹

On November 6, the plan organized by Lenin and his party was put into motion. Almost without resistance, selected units of the armed forces seized the capital’s key points, such as the telephone office, the power plants and the telegraph office. The headquarters of the Provisional Government were stormed and its members were arrested. By the following day, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was meeting in Petrograd, was able to declare the uprising a success. The Mensheviks and the largest number of the Socialist Revolutionaries withdrew from the Congress in protest, and the Bolsheviks were left, the sole victors in the field.

The successful seizure of power during the November Revolution placed the Bolsheviks in an entirely unenviable position. Faced with the necessity of consolidating the hold of an unpopular minority over the majority, the Bolsheviks appeared to possess few tangible advantages. In the newly elected Congress of Soviets the Bolsheviks could command a small majority.² This majority was increased when most of the Mensheviks,

¹. Carr. op.cit. 1:96. Kamenev and Zinoviev, members of the Central Committee, spoke against premature action.

². Schapiro, Leonard. The origin of the Communist autocracy, p.66. G. Bell and Sons, London. 1955. Of 650 members, 300 were Bolsheviks. However, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, which numbered between 70 and 80, supported the Bolsheviks.
the Bundists and the Socialist Revolutionaries left the Congress over the question of the composition of the new government. As a result, the Central Executive Committee, which was to act as the final authority between meetings of the Congress, when formed, was composed of 67 Bolsheviks, 29 Left Socialist Revolutionaries, and only 20 members from the minor parties. Possessing a majority in the truncated Congress of Soviets, however, did not of itself solve the problems which the Bolsheviks faced.

The relative strength of the Bolshevik party in the country as a whole left much to be desired. When the Seventh Party Congress met, in March, 1918, the total membership of the party was admitted to be only 270,000. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly the previous November, the Bolsheviks received less than one quarter of the forty-one million ballots cast. While the Bolsheviks had been successful in seizing control in industrial Petrograd, their success was far from unqualified even in Moscow, and many of the rural Soviets remained anti-Bolshevik. Anti-Bolshevik movements in strength were soon to appear in the Caucasus, the Baltic, the Arctic north and in Siberia.

The path ahead was beset with further difficulties for Lenin and

1. Ibid., p.67; C.P.S.U., p.209.
2. Schapiro. op.cit., p.69.
his followers. In the central government, whatever form it took, the Bolsheviks had to maintain their uneasy alliance with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries in order to give their administration at least the semblance of support by the peasantry, who were predominantly Socialist Revolutionary. The question of the election of a Constituent Assembly was to return to plague the Bolsheviks.¹ Lenin had said, "Even if the peasants should return a Socialist Revolutionary majority to the Constituent Assembly, we shall say 'So be it'."² Faced with the certainty that free elections would return an unfavorable Assembly, and with the possibility that postponement of the elections would precipitate a peasant reactionary uprising, the Bolshevik party had to make a decision.

Other problems throughout the country complicated the situation. Immediately after its assumption of power in Petrograd, the victorious party was faced with an ultimatum from "Vikzhel",³ the railway workers' union: either a coalition socialist government or a rail strike which would work to the advantage of the opposition.⁴ Moreover, the complete breakdown of the Russian economy in 1917 threw millions of factory workers out of work. Employment had to be provided and the factories reopened. In rural areas the peasants were demanding a division of the land into small

². Quoted in Schapiro, op.cit. p.80, from the Russian "Vtory Vserossiysky Szezd Sovotov Rabochikh".
⁴. Schapiro, op.cit., p.70. The Bolsheviks would be unable to send forces out from their centers of control.
independent holdings. However, Marxist philosophy prescribed a nation-
alization of the land following a proletarian revolution. This dilemma
was rendered more complex by the severe food shortage. With growing
independence the peasants refused to donate food for the urban pop-
ulation, and production of food dropped rapidly. Indeed, Ukraine, formerly
the most important food producing area in Russia, was soon to fall under
German influence. At the same time, numbers of Russia's gigantic fourteen-
million-man army, long suffering from shortages of food and supplies,
were disgorged over the country in undisciplined masses.

The international prospect was no more favorable. The Russians had
begun an offensive in June, 1917, but this had been thrown back and had
developed into a rout. The Bolsheviks, who had called for peace without
annexations,¹ were now faced with the problem of parleying with the
victorious Germans. Meanwhile, France and England, Russia's allies,
refused to recognize the new power in Russia, and demanded a contin-
uation of the war without separate peace negotiations.

The extension from a conspiratorial party, faced with innumerable
difficulties, to an authoritarian governing party, took shape through
a series of practical decisions from which evolved the major techniques
of Communist control. Certainly the central technique, most important
in this evolution, was the development of a single party structure
which gradually became synonymous with the state governing structure.

¹. Sukhanov. op.cit., p.657. See Lenin. op.cit. 6:509 for Lenin's
criticism of Sukhanov's book. Text of the proclamation is in
Bunyan, James and H.R. Fisher, editors. The Bolshevik revolution,
This was in reality both a means and an end, in that most of the Communist operations aimed at such an autocratic method of government. An essential weapon in this struggle was an efficient secret police organization, something which the Communist instituted at an early date as the "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation" or "Vecheka". Moreover, the end of the war with Germany also marked the end of the Tsarist armies. The civil war and the allied intervention which followed necessitated the immediate organization of a Red army, over which the Bolsheviks could exercise complete control, and with which they could tighten their grip on Russia. Again, the problem of tightening their grip on the vast Russian empire at once brought the new rulers face to face with the question of the treatment of the many nationalities which it included. The Commissariat of Nationalities, organized under Stalin, proved to be one of the most successful Bolshevik experiments. The use which they themselves had made of the press demonstrated to the Bolsheviks the need of strict control over the mass media. The trade unions, another of the weapons which the Bolsheviks had used to advantage in their rise to power, also presented a field for the fertile inventiveness of Lenin and his associates. The necessity of maintaining power, encircled by hostile governments, resulted in the development of

1. Carr. op.cit.1:158. It was established on December 20, 1917. "Vecheka" is an abbreviation of the Russian title "Vsegrossiskaya Cherezvychanaya Komissia". The shorter "Cheka" actually referred to the local committees, but has come to be used for the central body also.
18.

a Russian dominated Komintern¹ as another tool in a growing list of Communist techniques of control.

Before Lenin retired from active leadership of the Communist party (1923), a firm foundation for continued party dominance had been constructed by means of the various methods mentioned above. The following chapters will discuss each of these techniques in turn, in an effort to trace its evolution, and to clarify its importance and the reasons for its success.

¹. Komintern - abbreviation of "Kommunistecheskiy Internatsional" (Communist International).
CHAPTER II

THE PARTY AND STATE STRUCTURE
The organization of the Bolshevik party was largely the accomplishment of Lenin, its first leader. In developing a centralized party structure, Lenin borrowed some ideas from the Tsarist autocratic form of government, and may have used the "hierarchical centralization and rigid discipline" of the German Social Democratic parties as his model.¹ It is certain that Lenin proved more successful in organizing the Bolshevik party than Plekhanov was in the "Emancipation of Labour" group.² Lenin, whose sole philosophy, apparently, was to gain and retain power in order to put the theories of Marxism into effect,³ demonstrated extraordinary ability both in adapting his theories to actualities and in his practical leadership of the party. His skill as an improviser appeared long before the party took power, and was evident in the various changes of party policy which preceded 1917.

The first indication of Lenin's theories on party organization appeared in his publication, What Is To Be Done?,⁴ issued in 1902. This contains the core of all ideas later labeled Leninist. Lenin visualizes a vigorously centralized hierarchical structure, in which the center issues commands and the locals carry them out.⁵ The party was to consist

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1. Wolfe. op.cit., p.92. He suggests that the conspiratorial party under Lenin was inspired by the German successes. Lenin. op.cit. 2:88 and 2:152-3. He provides some basis for this assumption.

2. Baron. op.cit., p.330. He points out the weakness of Plekhanov's group.


4. Lenin. op.cit. 2:49-140.

5. Ibid. 2:53.
of two parts: a heart of party workers, made up of professional revolutionaries drawn largely from the intelligentsia, and a body of party organizations. In such a scheme, it would be necessary to restrict the membership, thus making it more difficult for government officials to interfere. Lenin adopted the obvious expedient of naming as leaders the already active Iskra editors, who could appoint agents to act under them. The bases of the party as Lenin explained them were:

1) that no movement can be durable without a stable party organization of leaders to maintain continuity.
2) that the more widely the masses are spontaneously drawn into the struggle, and form the basis of the movement and participate in it, the more necessary is it to have such an organization, and the more stable must it be;
3) that the organization must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession;
4) that in a country with an autocratic government, the more we restrict the membership of this organization ... the more difficult will it be to catch the organization, and
5) the wider will be the circle of men and women of the working classes of society able to join the movement and perform active work in it.

The publication of an outline for the party organization reenforced the demands for a meeting of professional revolutionaries. Prior to the convocation of the full scale party congress, the editors of Iskra considered it necessary to formulate a Party Program. Plekhanov's draft, with Lenin's criticisms, was published in January of 1902. The draft

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1. Ibid. 2:124. C.P.S.U., p.33.
2. Lenin. op.cit. 2:127.
3. Ibid. 2:134. Haimson. op.cit., p.170. He points out that the former Iskra members were well known, and thus would wield more power.
5. Ibid. 2:224-33.
announced that the working classes would effect their own emancipation through a social revolution, and accepted the task of overthrowing the Tsarist regime and supplanting it with a republic. Sixteen specific reforms were requested for factory workers and five for the peasants.

Armed thus with a nascent organization and program, in 1903 the Iskra group summoned the Second Party Congress (Brussels), which was to give concrete form to the party, along the lines which had been laid down by Lenin. Lenin proclaimed its chief purpose to be the creation of "a real party on that basis of principles and organization which had been advanced by Iskra" and he labored to ensure victory of the Iskra supporters. After heated debate the Iskra party program, which was to remain in force until the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, was adopted. The dispute which precipitated the party split arose over the first of the party rules, regarding membership in the party. Lenin insisted "that the membership of the party must be given a narrow definition so as to distinguish those who worked from those who talked." Lenin desired a party which would be an organized structure subject to central discipline.

Although the Bolsheviks were unsuccessful on the issue of the party membership, Lenin's followers triumphed in the elections to the central membership.

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1. Ibid. 2:412; C.P.S.U., p.39.
3. See above, p.5.
4. Lenin. op.cit. 2:349.
party institutions. As Lenin had suggested in 1902, party control was to be vested in a Central Committee to "perform the function of practical leadership", and a Central Organ (Iskra) to provide "ideological leadership".¹ This Central Committee, to which were elected three Bolsheviks, Krzhizanovsky, Lengnik and Noskov, would "be able to intervene in local affairs, against local interests perhaps, but in the interests of the party as a whole."² Those elected to the Board of Editors for Iskra were Lenin, Martov and Plekhenov. When Martov refused to serve, the other two were given the right to co-opt members.³

The period from 1903 to 1917 was one in which Lenin consolidated the Bolshevik predominance⁴ and perfected techniques of party control. It was a confused time during which, when necessary, Lenin drew in a wide range of sympathizers in order to win a majority on an issue,⁵ and, at other times, expelled holders of divergent opinions to gain unanimity.⁶ Whichever method was used, the firm core of Leninist Bolsheviks remained, and reappeared after each crisis. During this period the Bolsheviks within Russia made use of the press, slogans and public meetings

¹. Ibid. 2:358.
². Ibid. 2:358.
³. C.P.S.U., p.43.
⁴. See above, p.6.
⁵. In 1905, at the Third Party Congress, Lenin accepted wide faction support to widen the Bolshevik appeal during the revolution. Wolfe, op.cit., p.306.
in order to win or retain public support.¹

Although later Bolshevik historians deny it,² the split at the Second Party Congress had been unexpected, and for a time Lenin made overtures to win wider support.³ It remained for Trotsky to analyze the direction of party development when he wrote in 1904 that it would lead to a state of affairs in which: "The organization of the party takes the place of the party itself; the Central Committee takes the place of the organization; and finally the dictator takes the place of the Central Committee."⁴ Prophetic words!

Of the many party crises which occurred during the period from 1903 to 1917, a few will serve to demonstrate Lenin's methods of retaining control and of enlarging the party. The first such crisis arose over the question of the composition of the Board of Editors of Iskra. Plekhanov was uneasy in his alliance with Lenin and suggested co-opting the former members, Axelrod,⁵ Zasulich and Potrosev. Realizing his precarious position, Lenin walked out, deserting the paper and condemning his former associates as Mensheviks.⁶

¹. See below, Chapter VI.
². C.P.S.U., p. 46.
⁴. Wolfe. op.cit., p. 253. This cites Trotsky.
⁶. Wolfe. op.cit., p. 255. C.P.S.U., p. 45. This puts the blame on Plekhanov.
It is possible that the split over centralism made Lenin more obdurate on the question than he might otherwise have been. At any rate, under bitter attack from the party, Lenin wrote articles and pamphlets supporting a highly centralized party. The most influential of these was *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*. Gradedly he gathered supporters once more, and by the end of 1904 began publication of a new paper, *Vpered* (*Forward*).

The second crisis in the Bolshevik faction arose over the Revolution of 1905, which forced Lenin to modify his views on "centralism" into "democratic centralism". "Under free political conditions, our party can and will be built on the principle of election." In this "democratic centralism" Lenin moved away from his earlier idea of a party with completely centralized control from the top, and proposed allowing the masses of the party to assume the final authority. Lenin was forced to browbeat his more rigid followers into accepting his new policy at the Third Party Congress. His weakness forced him to accept unwanted allies at the re-unification congresses of 1906 and 1907. However, he kept his faction apparatus alive.

Lenin was separated even from his own faction during the next crisis, regarding participation in the newly erected (1906) Russian Duma, when he joined the Mensheviks in favouring cooperation. The radical Bolsheviks

1. C.P.S.U., pp.46-9. This puts more emphasis on this than on *What Is To Be Done*. Lenin. op.cit. 21407-66.


3. Lenin. op.cit. 4:30.
held that true Marxists should never support a bourgeois government. It was not until 1909 that Lenin felt strong enough to expel the boycotists and regain unanimity in his shrunken faction.¹ The unity was short-lived, as in 1910 a group of Bolsheviks expressed opposition to Lenin's methods of splitting and expulsion, forcing him to back down on his principles temporarily.² Lenin refused to remain tied down, however, and in 1912 called an "All-Russian Party Conference" at Prague. At this gathering, which was later elevated to the status of the Sixth Party Congress, Lenin arranged to have a new Central Committee named which supported his methods.³ The Congress adopted the now familiar methods of establishing cells or nuclei in trade unions, assisting in strikes, organizing reading rooms and distributing literature.⁴ Such was the party which Lenin led into the Revolution of 1917.

Lenin's arrival in Petrograd on April 16, 1917 led to a new internal crisis when the party leader shocked his followers by issuing the "April Theses"⁵ calling for "All power to the Soviets". Members of his party

¹ C.P.S.U., p.135.
² Wolfe, op.cit., p.525.
³ Ibid., p.530. Lenin, Zinoviev, Orjonikidze, Goloshekin, Spandaryan, Malinovsky and Schwartzman. Stalin was later co-opted. Note that in C.P.S.U., p.141, Stalin's name is added and those of Zinoviev (see footnote 3, p.26) and Malinovsky are omitted.
⁴ Lenin, op.cit. 4:153. The concept of party cells, containing as few as three members was particularly suited to a fugitive conspiratorial party. The idea was formally restated in a party statute in December 1919, which provided for such cells in all phases of everyday life. The cells were charged with responsibility for naming candidates for office, discussing party questions and carrying out rulings of the local party committees.
pointed out that a few years earlier Lenin had argued for Bolshevik support for the Duma, and the Theses, calling for control through workers' councils rather than by territorial representatives, demanded a reversal of policy. However, over the next few months Lenin made use of his oft repeated methods of conciliation and of splitting of his opposition to win over the Bolshevik party. In line with the policy of the April Theses, Lenin was successful in forestalling premature action until, on July 16 and 17, public demonstrations broke out. The suppression of this disturbance forced Lenin to flee, and the party to go underground once more. From his exile Lenin pressed for action and a seizure of power. In spite of opposition from Kamenev and Zinoviev, the Bolsheviks decided to annex control, and the rising of November 7 was the result.

Thus, even before the Bolshevik seizure of power, Lenin had altered his theories of party organization from the original plan for a completely centralized party to a scheme for party control through democratic elective procedures. However, in practice, Lenin had erected a party in which he exercised near absolute control. Anyone who held opposing views was expelled from the Bolshevik Group.

2. Lenin. op.cit. 4:215. Also, see above, n.11.
The growth of the Communist autocracy, after the seizure of power, divides itself naturally into two aspects: the struggle to attain a oneparty state, and the centralization of control within the party. Although the two processes were interwoven in fact, in order to simplify the discussion, each phase will be treated separately. The story of the Bolsheviks' rise to the status of a monopoly party is one of alternate advances and retreats governed by the situation in Russia.¹

During their first days in power, the Bolsheviks sought allies outside the party. In November of 1917 the Bolsheviks gained the support of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries by adopting "in toto" their land program.² This enabled the Bolsheviks to claim peasant support for their government, although the coalition was short-lived and uneasy. The alliance survived the crisis of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, January 19, 1918,³ and that of the negotiations for the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3.⁴

During the spring and summer of 1918, the Bolsheviks reversed their policy and gradually eliminated the opposition parties. On June 1⁵, the Central Executive Committee, or VTsIK,⁶ issued a decree excluding the

¹. Note: Schapiro gives the fullest and clearest treatment of this question.
². Bunyan and Fisher. op.cit., pp128-32. This gives the text.
⁵. "Vserossiiskii Tsentralny Impolnitelnyi Komitet".
Right Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks from participation in the government. One month later the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets convened, including only Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries quarreled with the Bolsheviks, assassinated the German ambassador, Mirbach, on July 6, attempted to assassinate Lenin on August 30, and as a result, were deprived of all positions in the government. Following this, the Bolsheviks organized a Red Terror against opposition parties, with the result that, by the end of the summer, they had virtually no rivals or partners to challenge their authority.

However, the increasing severity of the civil war forced the Bolsheviks "to extend the olive branch" in order to unite the country. When the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets met, a year after the November coup, the Mensheviks were allowed to return to the Central Executive Committee, and early in 1919 this privilege was extended to the Socialist Revolutionaries. This comparative freedom existed in greater or lesser degree for almost two years, until the conclusion of the civil war. The Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met in December of 1920, was the last one to admit opposition parties with voting rights.


5. Carr. op.cit. 1:75.
The reversal in the Bolshevik treatment of the opposition was evoked by the introduction of the New Economic Policy,¹ which was such a dramatic reversal of direction that it caused extreme difficulty in party control and organization. From this time on, the Bolsheviks harried members of other parties into either joining the sole legal party or fleeing the country. The public trial of thirty-four leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries in 1922 marked the end of even the fiction of a legal opposition.² In effect, ever since 1918, other parties had existed merely on sufferance, and the fluidity of membership from one party to another had disappeared.

Meanwhile, the evolution of the Bolshevik party was proceeding as a process both of continuity and of change. The continuity consisted of retaining the traditions of Leninism while increasing centralization, crushing opposition, and becoming the administrative machine for Russia. The methods used to consolidate control of the party membership are of interest because, as the party became synonymous with the state, these methods were extended to the wider field.

An indication of the general policy to be pursued appeared at the Sixth Party Congress, August 1917, which made it compulsory for members to submit to party decisions.³ However, a semblance of freedom of discussion within the party remained after November. This was evidenced by the growth of the Left Communist faction which pressed for extension

¹. N.E.P. Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., pp.127-33. This gives the main decrees included in this policy.


of Marxism to the international field, and which, nevertheless, was crushed early in 1918.  

The Communist party now set out to tighten the party organization. The "democratic centralism" adopted in 1907 conceived of a party with control centralized at the top, but with authority emanating from the bottom. The obvious contradiction of terms did not seem to bother the party theorists. The plan of party organization called for an Annual Party Congress as the supreme body which delegated its powers to the Central Committee between sessions. Each province (guberniya), county (uezd) and district (volost) had its Party Conference and Committee. At the base of the organization were the party cells, forming a hard core in the factories, villages and army units.

Gradually further centralization developed. Congresses proved too cumbersome, soon made few decisions and began to meet irregularly. Even the Central Committee was limited to nineteen members, and three new organs, examples of Communist improvisations, were instituted. A Politburo of five members was "to make decisions on questions not permitting of delay", and gradually became the main source of decisions. The Orgburo of five members was to do organizational work within the party. The Secretariat, consisting of a responsible secretary and five assistants,

1. Schapiro, op.cit., pp.130-46. This gives an account of the activities of the faction, led by Bukharin, at the Seventh Party Congress. They rejected the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, demanded extensive nationalization of industry, workers' control of industry, and communal farming. Carr. op.cit. 1:188.

2. The name "Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)" was adopted in March, 1919.

later replaced by a body of three permanent members, dealt with party
discipline. For closer cooperation and, incidentally, easier control,
the bodies were given an interlocking membership. Krestinsky\(^1\) was made
Party Secretary and a member of the Orgburo, while Stalin was named to
both the Politburo and the Orgburo.\(^2\)

Party unanimity was still not complete, so at the Tenth Party Con­
gress in 1921, a resolution called for a halt to factions and added a
secret rider: "The Congress gives the Central Committee full power in
case of any breach of discipline... to apply all measures of party sanc­
tions, including expulsion from the party.\(^3\) The control appeared to be
complete. It only remained for the same Congress to institute the process
of the "party purge", a weapon used in 1921 to expel 24% of the party
membership. By the time of Lenin's death, the Communist party was sup­
reme in Russia, the Central Committee was supreme in the party, and Lenin
the chairman, was supreme in the Central Committee.

Linked with the party structure, and as already mentioned, becoming

\(^1\) Krestinsky, Nikolai Nikolaevich (1883- ) Member of the Bolshevik
Central Committee 1920-1; Secretary of the Central Committee;
Commissar of Finance 1918-21; Soviet envoy to Berlin, 1921-30.

\(^2\) Carr. op.cit. 1:194. Rostow. op.cit., p.41.

\(^3\) Carr. op.cit. 1:201. It should be pointed out that since this was
a monopoly party, expulsion was a serious punishment.

\(^4\) Ibid. 1:207.

\(^5\) Note that this centralization of power in the hands of one person
became the model Stalin strove to emulate, and the struggle after
Lenin's death was to decide who would assume this control.
almost synonymous with it, was the state structure as it was erected by the inventive Bolsheviks. However, even the state structure cannot be attributed to the Bolsheviks alone. A survey of the development of the system of government will demonstrate the debt owed to the Tsarist regime, and to innovations, such as the 1905 Soviet, instituted by other groups.

One of the disturbing features of Russia for the orthodox Marxist was that, prior to 1905, feudalism still existed in this country, which retained an absolute monarch. The revolution in 1905 had been successful in wresting a nominal constitution from the Tsar; (when) a Duma (Parliament) was granted. However, the autocracy actually lasted on until 1917, since the Tsar retained all the executive authority. The Duma could not alter the constitution, and all its acts were subject to the Tsar's veto. The Tsar appointed and dismissed ministers, who were responsible only to him. Appointment of officials, control of war, peace and foreign policy, and the issue of decrees with the power of law, were all prerogatives of the Tsar.¹

Although the Duma was patterned on the British Parliament, in actual practice it differed widely from its model. The Duma, a bicameral body, was composed of an elective State Duma, and a State Council, half elective and half appointed. When the constitution was first granted in 1905, the franchise was comparatively wide, but a new electoral law in 1907 restricted the vote to males over 25 years of age, excluding soldiers.

¹. Maxwell. op. cit., pp.1-15. This gives a clear picture of the state structure under the Tsars.
and students. Voters were divided into four classes (landowners, burghers, peasants and industrial workers) who elected representatives to an electoral college, which was weighted in favor of the rich landowners, and elected members to the State Duma. The electorate for the State Council was even more limited, including clergy, Zemstvo Assemblies, nobility, Academy of Science members and wealthy merchants and manufacturers.¹

The system of regional and local control under the Tsars was also highly centralized, offering a convenient framework for Communist adoption. Russia was split into seventy-eight provinces (guberniya) with a governor at the head of each. These Tsar-appointed officials had little original authority. The country was also subdivided into 756 districts (uezd)² each under a feared and hated Chief of Police, appointed by the governor with undefined powers. At the base of the structure stood the village communes, grouped into cantons (volost). In both these smallest divisions there existed a semblance of local self government since both elected assemblies, although these possessed little actual power.

Ever since 1864, rural assemblies or Zemstvos had been a feature of local government.³ Each Zemstvo had been composed of a Representative Council and an Executive Board, and had been given wide powers in local taxation, education, public health and similar affairs. Lack of practice

¹. Wolfe. op.cit., P.345. Wolfe points out that the Communists adopted this system of class voting.

². These figures are taken from Maxwell. op.cit.,p.10. Batsell. op.cit., p.665. He states that there were 56 provinces and 476 districts.

³. After the Crimean War, in the liberal period, Alexander II had established these bodies.
in self-government and repressive measures by the central government gradually crippled these bodies. Although a few experienced some revitalization in the period from 1905 to 1917, interference from the Tsarist regime had enervated the institutions.

The structure of the state from March to November of 1917, in the period referred to as the "dual power", altered too often to become formalized. Nevertheless, some of the developments, the Soviets for example, were later adopted by the Bolsheviks. Ordered by the Tsar on March 11 to prorogue, the Duma had refused, establishing a "Provisional Committee of the Duma", which declared itself a Provisional Government when the March disorders forced the Tsar to abdicate. This government consisted of the more conservative liberal leaders and one Socialist, Kerensky. It was Kerensky who was to emerge as the leader of the Provisional Government.

At the same time, an institution dating back to 1905 was reconvened when a "body of some two thousand delegates elected in various ways by factory workers, peasants and revolutionary military units met in Petrograd." This predominantly Menshevik Soviet was the pattern for similar bodies throughout Russia, all of which the Bolsheviks worked

1. The Provisional Government argued that final decisions had to await the Constituent Assembly.

2. Sukhanov. op.cit., pp30-3 gives an analysis of this controversial figure: "Kerensky, the little braggart, but sincere democrat."

steadily to win over. The Soviets adopted the Tsarist electoral scheme with local areas sending delegates to a local Soviet, which in turn sent delegates to a district Soviet; gradually the plan was enlarged until in June, the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets met in Petrograd. This Congress passed a vote of confidence in the Provisional Government; in spite of Bolshevik opposition. Members of this Congress elected a Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) to act between sessions.

The structure of government altered rapidly between September and November. The unsuccessful Kornilov coup in September hastened the end of the Provisional Government. Agitation was continued for a Constituent Assembly which would revise the Russian governing structure. The Bolshevik-controlled Petrograd Soviet established a "Military Revolutionary Committee" under Trotsky, which set out to win the support of the Petrograd garrison, where the strength rested. Once the Committee was assured of military support, it announced that all government orders to the armed forces had to be countersigned by the Military Revolutionary Committee. On November 8, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets proclaimed the passage of all state power to Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants'

1. They did not gain a majority in the Petrograd Soviet until October.

2. Carr. op.cit. 1:90. The two bodies met separately. The Provisional Government refused to recognize any authority of the Soviet. Kerensky was the one link, claiming Soviet support.

3. Ibid. 1:94. Sukhanov. op.cit., p.505. Deutscher. op.cit., p.300. Deutscher quotes Sukhanov, "It seemed that Trotsky spoke everywhere simultaneously. Every worker and soldier of Petrograd knew him and listened to him. He was the chief hero of this remarkable chapter of history." On October 29, the garrison declared that it would disobey Kerensky and obey the Bolsheviks.
Deputies, and organized a Council of People's Commissars. The Council was to act as the administrative body, although it later assumed legislative powers. Rather than adopt the bourgeois title "Ministers", Trotsky suggested the revolutionary "Commissars". Lenin, of course, was named Chairman of the Council.

Uncertain of its fate, the new government hesitated to cancel plans for the Constituent Assembly, which was to plan the form of government to be adopted, in spite of the certainty of Bolshevik defeat. The results of the November 25 elections justified the Bolshevik fears. Branding the Assembly as an organ of bourgeois democracy, Lenin prepared to dissolve it unless the members accepted Bolshevik control. The work of the Constituent Assembly had been anticipated when VTsIK issued a Draft Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, which stated: "Russia is hereby declared a republic of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. All power centrally and locally belongs to the Soviets." The dissolution of the Assembly on January 19 proved an anticlimax.

1. This technique of seizing power first, then having a puppet body recognize the "fait accompli" was so successful that it became standard Communist practice.
2. Carr. op.cit. 1:99. At the same time it adopted decrees on land and on peace; Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., pp.15-22 gives the texts.
3. For a full list of members, see Appendix "B".
4. Radkey. op.cit., p.16.
5. Lenin. op.cit. 6:452.
6. Ibid. 6:455. This quotes Lenin's speech to VTsIK. Carr. op.cit. 1:119.
It fell then to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets to adopt a constitution, which was, in reality, largely a systematization of the forms which had evolved during the revolution. A Committee of VTsIK was struck, under Sverdlov\(^1\) to draw up a constitution before July, 1918. This committee established a procedure which became permanent - it presented the proposed constitution to the Central Committee of the Party for its ratification before introducing it to the Soviets.\(^2\) The Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) included the Declaration of the Rights of Toiling and Exploited People, announced that the Republic would be federal in nature, and outlined the freedoms which the new state ensured.\(^3\) The majority of the Bolsheviks believed that the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" would be a temporary expedient until the state had been eradicated. While it lasted it must be strong, "to secure the complete suppression of the bourgeoisie, the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and the establishment of socialism."\(^4\) Power, however, was supposed to emanate from the bottom. As Lenin explained, "All bureaucratic formalities and limitations disappear from the elections, and the masses themselves determine the ordering and timing of the elections with free right of recall."\(^5\) As was often the case, the actual practice differed widely from the official statements.

\(^1\)Sverdlov, Yakov Mikhailovich (1885-1919) Member of the Bolshevik Central Committee 1917; president All-Russian Central Executive Committee 1918-9.

\(^2\)Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., pp.79-90. This gives text of the constitution.

\(^3\)Carr. op.cit. 1:125.

\(^4\)Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.80.

\(^5\)Carr. op.cit. 1:131. Carr quotes Lenin.
It proved difficult to regulate the actions of scattered, independent local Soviets, so it became necessary to impose control from the center. This conflict appeared in the Constitution itself. Compare, "All authority... is vested in the entire working population, organized in urban and rural Soviets," with, "Supreme authority is vested in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and, in the interval between Congresses, the VTsIK."¹

A classless society was not established by the new constitution, as was demonstrated by the franchise, which excluded all persons who hired labour, rentiers, private traders, monks, priests and former Tsarist officials. The fact that the cities were represented by one delegate for every 25,000 electors, while the country received one delegate for every 125,000 inhabitants also gave evidence of class distinction.² While the Bolsheviks might attempt to justify this by drawing attention to the fact that this was to be a dictatorship, the inequality remained.

The organ with the supreme power in the Soviet Government remained the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, composed of delegates from city, regional and provincial Soviets. The Congress was to elect an All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of less than 200 members, which was to appoint a Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) which included a chairman and the heads of thirteen commissariats.

The constitution drew no distinction between the legislative,

¹ Meisel and Kozera, op.cit., p.80. Articles 10 and 12. This confusion was apparently calculated to escape criticism against centralization.
² Ibid., p.82. Maxwell. op.cit., p.112. This discusses this feature.
executive and judicial powers of the government.\textsuperscript{1} In such a situation, friction soon developed between VTsIK and Sovnarkom. A note in the constitution, "Measures of extreme urgency may be enforced on the sole authority of the Council of People's Commissars,"\textsuperscript{2} allowed the latter body to gain predominance.

The provincial and rural governments adopted the Tsarist divisions and established Village Soviets, District (Volost) Soviets, District or County (Uezd) Congresses of Soviets and Provincial (Guberniya) Soviets.\textsuperscript{3} In each case, the Soviet elected an Executive Committee for interim control.

These local Soviets were:

To take cognizance of the following: (a) Execution of all instructions issued by the appropriate higher organs of Soviet authority. (b) Adoption of all appropriate measures for developing the cultural and economic life of their territory. (c) Solution of all questions of purely local importance. (d) Unification of all Soviet activities within the limits of their territories.\textsuperscript{4}

However, while only seventeen fields were reserved to the central government, a clause opened the way for centralization.

In addition to the questions enumerated, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets...may decide on any other matters which they deem within their jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{5}

This constitution was to remain in effect for eighteen years.

\textsuperscript{1} Bunyan and Fisher. op.cit., p.578. He quotes M.A. Reisner, a Bolshevik authority on jurisprudence, "The Russian Socialist Republic has no interest in any division or balancing of political forces, for the simple reason that it bases itself on the domination of one all-embracing force i.e. the Russian proletariat and the peasant masses."

\textsuperscript{2} Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.83.

\textsuperscript{3} After 1923 the Communists tried to destroy this structure and divide the country on "economic" lines. The new units were territories (krai), circuits (okrug) and economic districts (raion). For some years the two systems existed side by side in different parts of Russia. Batsell. op.cit., pp.665-6.

\textsuperscript{4} Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.87.

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p.85.
The question of the concentration of both political and state power within the Bolshevik party has already been referred to; however, some discussion on the definite party-state links will clarify this primary method of Communist control. The most obvious party-state link was the parallel structure of the two organizations.\textsuperscript{1} In each, the development of centralization ran on parallel lines and naturally began to converge as links appeared. As had occurred in the Central Committee of the party, VTsIK was enlarged and gradually lost power. There was one attempt in 1919 to restore power to VTsIK by giving the presidium of the body a formal stature,\textsuperscript{2} but this failed. As long as Lenin headed Sovnarkom, he used the crises of the civil war and the economic situation to justify the supremacy of that body.

Gradually the state organs began to recognize the authority of the party. The party Politburo became the final arbiter of policy and the final Court of Appeal. This had not been planned by the Bolsheviks when they instituted their slogan "All Power to the Soviets". Bolshevik plans had never gone beyond the erection of Soviets to govern the country. However, opposition in the Soviets during the civil war, when it was impossible to eliminate such opposition, forced the party to attempt more complete direction. Using the excuse that the party represented the proletariat, who were the rightful rulers, more and more power was annexed to the party.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} See Appendix "D"

\textsuperscript{2} Carr. op. cit. 1:215.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. 1:220. Carr discusses this development.
In February 1920, Sovnarkom established another party-state link, a Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, which was to fight bureaucracy and corruption. This had similar functions within the state as the Party Control Commission had within the party. The extent of party participation became evident when Stalin was named Commissar of this section and the Commissariat was merged with the Party Control Commission. The same officials were now inspecting and controlling party members and checking on government employees.

Another obvious link between party and state existed in the personnel - the same men directed the two structures. The key positions in the administration were filled by party nomination. The Eighth Party Congress resolved that, "In all Soviet organizations it is essential to form party fractions subject to party discipline. Into these fractions all members of the Russian Communist party working in a given Soviet institution must enter." In order to ensure the solidarity of party control, the party set up an "Account and Distribution Section" in 1921, which supervised the party manpower and its distribution.

The situation in 1923, both as to party organization and state organization, differed radically from that planned earlier by Lenin and

1. See Carr, op.cit. 1:96. This gives another link in the early party history: the Military Revolutionary Committee and its allied Military Revolutionary Centre, which had been organized within the party in October, 1917.

2. See Appendix "C".

3. Quoted in Carr, op.cit. 1:221.
the Bolsheviks. The Eighth Party Congress (1919) had stated that it was the duty of the party "to lead the activity of the Soviets, but not to replace them.‖ 1 Trotsky had warned of this danger. 2 Lenin himself criticized the increasing number of appeals from Sovnarkom to the Politburo. 3 Gradually however, the Soviets and allied bodies deteriorated from policy making bodies to agents of the Politburo's policy. 4 By the end of Lenin's life the authority of the party was complete: the Politburo controlled Sovnarkom; the Party Control Commission inspected lower government administration officers, and the party cell led activities in other Russian institutions. In developing techniques of control within the party and within the state, the Communists altered their concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" more and more, until it became the "dictatorship of the party leaders". Even Lenin was forced to admit: "Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand upon it and cannot depart from this ground, since this is the party which in the course of decades has won for itself the position of vanguard of the whole factory and industrial proletariat.‖ 5

1. Quoted in Carr. op.cit. 1:221
2. Wolfe. op.cit., p.293.
5. Carr. op.cit. 1:230. This quotes Lenin.
CHAPTER III

THE VECHEKA
"The change over from oppressed to oppressor was for the Bolshevik leaders a matter of weeks only."¹ While some idealists in the Bolshevik party may have harbored the idea that, since dictatorship of the proletariat would involve control by the majority, compulsion would be unnecessary, it soon became obvious that control rested with a minority party. As Marxists, the Bolsheviks believed in class rule, and since their seizure of power aroused opposition both inside and outside Russia, an organized system of violence appeared necessary to enforce the will of the proletariat.²

In the organization of a secret police, the Bolsheviks used one of the Tsarist techniques of control as a model. During the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century the "Oprichnina" was established as a special police force, responsible only to the Tsar, with power of arbitrary arrest and punishment. In the early nineteenth century Nicholas I reorganized this as the "Third Section of His Majesty's Own Chancery"³ (1826). The immediate predecessor of the Vecheka however, was introduced by Alexander III in 1881 to reestablish order after the assassination of Alexander II. On August 14, 1881 a decree, "Provisions for State and Public Security", established the "Okhrana" as a section of the Ministry of the Interior. This decree provided for administrative arrest and deportation for periods up to five years, and gave the Okhrana power to

¹ Problems Today, editors. The Red menace. Problems Today, London. 1950. This is a quotation from the pen of W. Duranty.

² Carr. op.cit. 1:155. He quotes Marx, "There is only one means to curtail, simplify and localize the bloody agony of the old society and the bloody birth pangs of the new, only one means - the revolutionary terror."

forbid all meetings in order to halt sedition.\textsuperscript{1} The decree was much protested later by Lenin, who stated: "The Social Democrats insist that the police shall not be permitted to incarcerate anyone without trial. Functionaries should be severely punished for every arbitrary arrest."\textsuperscript{2}

Temporarily, after the Okhrana was organized, the Social Democrats were allowed comparative freedom because of their attacks on the Narodniks,\textsuperscript{3} but by the time the First Party Congress met, (1898) they too were under rigid restrictions.

Between 1881 and 1917 the Okhrana developed into an extremely effective secret police organization. They met every plot for an uprising with martial law and executions.\textsuperscript{4} The Okhrana established police spies in every Russian organization. The two most successful classes of spies were the "dvorniki" or apartment house janitors,\textsuperscript{5} and the organizers of police sponsored labour unions. Some of these organizers went beyond what the police planned. One of these was Father Gapon, who led the parade on Bloody Sunday, 1905, which precipitated the first revolution. Some of the spies who entered the Bolshevik party penetrated into the inner circles of the underground organization.\textsuperscript{6} The police labored to prolong the


\textsuperscript{2} Rousset. op.cit., p.18.

\textsuperscript{3} Wolfe. op.cit., p.118.

\textsuperscript{4} Lenin's older brother, Alexander, was executed after one such plot, 1887.

\textsuperscript{5} Sukhanov. op.cit., p.3. He tells of the janitor-spy at his apartment and describes sneaking in to visit his own family.

\textsuperscript{6} Malinovsky, elected to the Central Committee in 1912, was a police spy; thus the omission of his name in C.P.S.U. mentioned above, p.25. Wolfe. op.cit., pp.535-57. Wolfe outlines Malinovsky's career.
Social Democrat party split in order to weaken the Bolshevik threat. Yet, even at its height, the Okhrana had only one thousand agents in all Russia. Bolshevik experience with this organization taught them the strengths and weaknesses of secret police, information they would soon put to constructive use.

For a brief period following the November Revolution, the Bolsheviks apparently attempted to live up to their former ideals. They released almost all of the members of the Provisional Government captured during the preliminary struggle. As Lenin explained: "When we have made arrests we have said, 'We will let you go if you will sign a paper promising not to commit acts of sabotage!'" The first legislative act of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, on the day after the overthrow of the Provisional Government, abolished the death penalty. It seemed to Lenin that this was going too far and he protested the action bitterly, arguing: "How can you accomplish a revolution without shooting?" However, the party idealists forced Lenin to give in on this point.

The Vecheka itself was an offspring of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee, which had been erected by the Bolsheviks in October to effect the seizure of power. Soon after the November rising, this Committee was put under the control of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) for the purpose of fighting counter revolution in the

4. See above p.10.
capital. A special section directed by Felix Dzerzhinsky,¹ was to investigate suspects, and this section continued to be active after the Committee was dissolved.² On December 19, six weeks after the revolution, Sovnarkom, the compact "cabinet" which was assuming more control, approved a plan submitted by Dzerzhinsky for an All-Russian Extraordinary Commission³ (or Vecheka), and established the Vecheka formally by a decree of December 20.⁴ This eight man Commission under Dzerzhinsky was designed primarily for investigation, with powers of punishment limited to "confiscation, confinement, deprivation of (food) cards and publication of the names of the enemies of the people." The Vecheka was ordered to bring counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs before the "Revolutionary Tribunals". These courts, which were organized by a decree of January 1, 1918,⁵ were to judge counter-revolutionaries according to "the circumstances of the case and the dictates of the revolutionary conscience." The Tribunals, elected by the Soviets, were to hold public hearings, to reach decisions by majority vote, and to provide prosecuting and defence lawyers where necessary.

However, the Vecheka soon by-passed these comparatively democratic courts and began to dispose of its own cases. This development was gradual

¹. Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovitch (1887-1926) An organizer of the Polish Social Democratic Party; a revolutionist since the 1890's; member of the Bolshevik Central Committee 1906; arrested and imprisoned 1912-17; Commissar for Communication 1921.

². Carr. op.cit. 1:158. This outlines the birth of the Vecheka.


⁵. Ibid., p.293.
and unpremeditated, and resulted from a series of emergencies which
seemed to demand arbitrary action. On January 14, 1918, Lenin's car was
shot at, and the Vecheka claimed to have frustrated a plot to kidnap
him. Meanwhile, the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk having broken down,
the German advance had begun once more. This military threat prompted
the Vecheka to issue orders to shoot "all agents of enemy spies, counter-
revolutionary agitators, speculators and organizers of revolts." Estimates of the number of Vecheka executions vary widely, but a con-
servative judgement places the figure at 884 during the first six months
of Bolshevik control. Then too, the prisons which had been emptied by
the revolution were rapidly refilled. The policy of the Vecheka was
explained by Dzerzhinsky in these words:

We stand for organized terror - this should be frankly admitted. Terror is an absolute necessity during times of revolution...
We judge quickly. In most cases only a day passes between the apprehension of the criminal and his sentence. But this does not mean that our sentences are groundless....When confronted with evidence, criminals in almost every case confess; and what argument can have greater weight than a criminal's confession?

The technique was crystallizing into a familiar pattern.

When the capital was moved to Moscow in early 1918, Dzerzhinsky
organized a well-planned central office with a staff of 120, and

3. Ibid., p.574.
4. Bunyan, James. Intervention, civil war and Communism in Russia,
p.227. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. 1936. This quotes an
interview published in Svoboda Rossii, No.43.
5. This was the pattern of the French Revolution also.
proceeded to centralize control of the secret police. The number of agents throughout Russia soon grew to 4500, and thus dwarfed the famous Okhrana, which never had possessed more than one thousand agents.\(^1\) The local Soviets were instructed to forward information to this office and to organize local Cheka committees which were patterned on the central Vecheka committee. There was some doubt at first as to whether these local committees were responsible to the central Vecheka or to the local Soviets, but growing centralization gradually brought all the committees under central control.

The activities of the Vecheka were extended in April, after Colonel Robins, the unofficial representative of the United States, complained that his car had been confiscated by anarchists. Lenin used the opportunity to crush the anarchist centers from which the Bolsheviks previously had accepted assistance. On the night of April 11, Vecheka raids on anarchist centers in Moscow netted 600 prisoners.\(^2\) The Vecheka was next assigned to crush the opposition of the Right Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who had already been barred from VTsIK. The oft-repeated "shot while attempting to escape" was characteristic of this period.\(^3\) The Vecheka, which had assumed the right of trying its own prisoners, was now dispensing with even its own summary trials.

Meanwhile, the Vecheka, though undeniably efficient, was arousing

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opposition through its excesses. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries, the "junior partners" of the Bolsheviks, demanded and got representation on Vecheka in an attempt to control it. This alliance, like the alliance in Sovnarkom, was an uneasy one. The death penalty was officially restored on June 16,¹ and this aroused further protests from the Bolsheviks' supporters. The exasperated Left Socialist Revolutionaries within the Vecheka organized a plot to overthrow the Bolsheviks. On July 6 they assassinated Mirbach, the German ambassador, in the belief that this would result in renewal of the war and defeat of the Bolsheviks. In order to cripple the Vecheka the conspirators arrested the Bolshevik members, including Dzerzhinsky. However, the revolt was put down in a few hours and thirteen of the Socialist Revolutionary members of the Vecheka were shot.²

By this time the excesses of the Vecheka were arousing protests from other elements in the country which still had a voice. The newspapers drew attention to arrests based on similarities of name, on a person's wealth, on use of the English language, or on the possession of a picture of someone in court uniform.³ The execution of the Tsar and his family by the local Cheka of Ekaterinoslav, and the publication of

1. The first death sentence was that imposed on Admiral Schastnyi. In reply to the protests of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries that the death penalty had been abolished, the Chief Prosecutor wrote: "The sentence does not say that the accused is condemned to death; what it says is that 'the Tribunal resolves that in view of his guilt the accused is to be shot.'" Bunyan. op.cit., p.236.

2. Carr. op.cit. 1:164. See also, Schapiro. op.cit., p.121. Bunyan. op.cit., p.228. A Pravda report states that 350 were shot in Yaroslav.

an order from the Vecheka stating: "This is the law of the civil war -
kill all wounded of the enemy camp", further aroused the opposition. At
the same time, the beginnings of what was to become a bitter rivalry
between the Vecheka and various departments of Sovnarkom appeared. The
Commissariat of Justice, for example, protested that the Vecheka was
assuming powers outside its jurisdiction. The number of protests served
to dictate a more cautious policy on the part of the Vecheka.

Another crisis intervened to allow the Vecheka to adopt a bold
program once more. On August 30, Lenin was wounded by a would-be assassin,
and Uritsky, a party official, was killed in Petrograd. This was the
signal for what became known as the "Red Terror". Zinoviev, in temporary
control of the Central Committee during Lenin's absence, ordered the
execution of 300 prisoners in Petrograd to avenge Uritsky's death. The
Vecheka issued a warning that, "Anyone caught in possession of arms with­
out the required permission will immediately be shot." Sovnarkom legal­
ized this Red Terror and ordered the taking of hostages. Locally respec­
ted citizens were to be held hostage to guarantee good behavior in a
district. Dzerzhinsky explained that: "The Cheka must defend the revolution
and conquer the enemy, even if its sword falls occasionally on the heads

   Carr states that 512 were shot in Petrograd in one day.
4. Bunyan. op.cit., p.238. This quotes the order.
5. Ibid., pp.239-40 quotes the decree.
of the innocent.\textsuperscript{1} Former Tsarist officials were executed; wealthy citizens not held as hostages were fined or had their property confiscated; even local Cheka committee members who showed hesitation were reported to the central body.\textsuperscript{2}

This Red Terror caused renewed outcry. Members of the diplomatic corps still in Russia protested to the Bolshevik government. The remaining anarchists cried out that, "Blood for blood has become the slogan of the day, and it is bound to lead to an endless mutual slaughter."\textsuperscript{3} The workers of the Ukraine denounced the Bolshevik methods as "a blow to the cause of democracy".\textsuperscript{4} The church called on the faithful to bring a halt to the inhumanity. Once again demands were raised by the Commissariats of the Interior and of Justice that the Cheka should be subordinated to the local Soviets in order to halt its encroachment on their functions.\textsuperscript{5}

The Vecheka fought back against its critics in an attempt to retain its power. It found a defender in Lenin, who pointed out in a speech on the occasion of the first anniversary of the revolution that, "The Cheka must act firmly and quickly. When I place its achievements beside its mistakes the latter sink into insignificance... For this it deserves the

\textsuperscript{1} Carr. op.cit. 1:167.

\textsuperscript{2} Bunyan. op.cit., pp.246-7. This outlines a day's work of a local Cheka; a former police guard was shot, for example, while a worker found guilty of murder was sentenced to only three months in prison.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p.252. From an anarchist editorial.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., p.254. This quotes a resolution of the All-Ukrainian Trade Union Council. During this period Ukraine was under German influence.

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p.259. This quotes a resolution of a branch of the Commissariat of Interior.
gratitude of the proletariat."\(^1\) The Cheka argued that it was "subordinate to the Soviet of People's Commissars only".\(^2\) In order to strengthen its position, the organization of the Commission was overhauled, its aims were restated, and the relationship of the Vecheka to Sovnarkom and to its local sections was clarified. At the same time, Sovnarkom substantially strengthened the Vecheka by assigning army detachments for the use of the local Commissions, thus making them independent of the army or regular police forces.\(^3\)

However, the critics of Vecheka gained the upper hand at the Sixth Congress of Soviets, which convened on November 6. This Congress ordered the Cheka to release all prisoners not definitely charged with counter-revolutionary activities or held as specific guarantees for "comrades in enemy hands". In order to provide a wider popular base, a non-specific "right of supervision" was conferred on VTsIK and the local Executive Committees, although orders to Vecheka still came from Sovnarkom only. Citizens were granted the right of appeal against Cheka actions.\(^4\) The meeting stipulated that extra-legal steps be confined to matters "critical to the war", a loophole of which Vecheka took advantage.\(^5\) On February 17, 1919, the Cheka's power to punish was limited to cases of open armed

\(^1\) Ibid., p.258. This quotes Lenin's speech.

\(^2\) Ibid., p.260.

\(^3\) Ibid., p.261. This quotes a statement by a prominent Vecheka official, (Latsis). Meisel and Kozera, op.cit., p.98. A decree of VTsIK clarified the position and granted the military support to Cheka.

\(^4\) Carr. op.cit. 1:170.

rebellion, all other cases being left to the Revolutionary Tribunals. Again, on April 25, the Commission was ordered to release all political prisoners not regarded as dangerous.¹

However, all these reforms on paper were disregarded as the civil war turned in favor of the Communists. Administrative arrests actually increased. Forced labour camps were established in April, 1919.² In March, 1921 the administrative organs were once more empowered to impose sentences up to five years on "persons recognized as dangerous to Soviet structures".³ It was at this time that the Vecheka established a foreign department (I.N.O.) under Mikhael Trelisser which dispatched spies into the colonies of émigrés outside Russia, spies who soon turned to political action against the foreign powers.⁴

Opposition mounted once more until the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1922 passed a resolution: "The Congress considers that the present strengthening of Soviet power within and without makes it possible to narrow the extent of the activity of the Cheka and its organs, reserving for the judicial organs the struggle against violations of the laws of the Soviet republics."⁵ VTsIK therefore, on February 8, 1922 issued a decree abolishing the Vecheka and transferring its functions to

¹. Ibid., pp.174-5.
². Schapiro. op.cit. p.175. Rostow. op.cit., p.75. Rostow names Nightingale Island, opened in 1923 as the first "Corrective Labour Camp".
³. Schapiro. op.cit., p.175.
⁵. Carr. op.cit. 1:180. He quotes the Congress Record.
a new organ of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the State Political Organization (G.P.U.)\(^1\) The G.P.U. was organized with local sections similar to the Cheka, and again was granted special army detachments. Its agents were authorized to make arrests, searches or seizures without special permission within 48 hours of a crime, but indictments were to be returned within two weeks or, at the end of two months, the prisoners were to be released or handed over to the judicial organs for trial. A loophole was left once more, in that VTSIK could grant permission to hold prisoners indefinitely. When the U.S.S.R. was established in 1923, the G.P.U. was separated from the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and in effect, the G.P.U. soon retrieved all the powers held by the Vecheka at its height.\(^2\)

As in the development of the party structure, the Vecheka, in the course of its growth, adopted some of the methods of the Tsarist autocracy, but was largely shaped by the situations which it faced. As Lenin recognized its value, he gave the Commission his unwavering support and, in spite of surface retreats, maintained the efficiency of this successful technique. The G.P.U. was to be reorganized many times, but in each case the agency, charged with responsibility for crushing counter-revolution, reappeared. The secret police remained a method of party control since it was subordinate to Sovnarkom, which the party dominated.

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1. "Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie" Meisel and Kozera, op.cit., p.131. This gives the text of the decree. This technique of altering the name of an organization, often involving a change of leadership, but in fact retaining the institution becomes standard with the Communist regime.

2. Carr. op.cit. 1:181.
CHAPTER IV

THE RED ARMY
The period from 1917 to 1923 witnessed many startling reversals in Bolshevik policy; a most extreme example of such a volte-face was demonstrated in the attitude adopted by Lenin and his party with regard to a standing army. One of the primary objectives of the Bolshevik party during the World War had been the undermining of the Tsarist armies through anti-militaristic propaganda. However, once in power, the Communists were driven to establish an efficient fighting force with which to consolidate their control. The methods used to erect a Red army, and the techniques devised to retain centralized party authority over the military forces present further graphic evidence of Bolshevik ingenuity.

Between 1905 and 1917 Lenin formulated incomplete ideas regarding a possible military force for a Bolshevik state. In the period after the unsuccessful 1905 revolution Lenin had read widely in military authorities and had outlined detailed military plans for a successful revolution.\(^1\) Lenin advocated destroying the complete Tsarist state machinery, including the Imperial Army, and "merging the police, the army and the bureaucracy with the universally armed people."\(^2\) Lenin argued that a blueprint for an organized armed force would be useless: "When the workers and all the people as a real mass take up this task in a

\(^1\) Wolfe, op.cit., p.372.

\(^2\) Fedotoff White, D. The growth of the Red army, p.26. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 1944. This quotes Lenin. See also Lenin, op.cit. 6158. He states that it was essential "to organize a national militia and to fuse it with the armed people. Service in this militia shall extend to all citizens of both sexes between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five."
practical way, they will work it out and secure it a hundred times better than any theoretician can propose."¹ This new militia would be led by the proletariat, and held together by "comradely discipline".² Thus at this time Lenin hoped to erect not a professional army, but an army composed of militia units of politically conscious workers. He assumed naively that they would need no discipline, but would instinctively support the Socialist ends.

The Tsarist armies of the twentieth century provided little worthy of Bolshevik emulation. The outbreak of patriotic support which greeted Russian entry into the World War was short-lived, and the inefficiency of the Tsarist armies soon became manifest. The vast inadequately armed forces suffered from shortages of supplies and medical services. Their defeats and heavy losses were ascribed in large measure to the government, and the War Minister, General Sukhomlinov, was even suspected of dealing with the German General Staff.³ Despite decay evident in the army, as late as 1916 it had been able to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. The rapidity of its downfall was the result of the 1917 Revolution, which accentuated such factors as the lack of supplies, war weariness, and hatred of the ranks for the officers. A Commanding Officer's Intelligence Report on the efficiency of the Fifth Army, on the Galician front, stated: "The fighting efficiency of the army has been lowered and it is very difficult

¹. Fedotoff White. op.cit., p.26. This quotes Lenin.
². Ibid., p.27.
to count on the army advancing at the present time."¹

Bolshevik infiltration and activities in the Imperial Army provided the catalytic agent for the process of disintegration. Even before March 1917, in many of the military units, party cells were formed which fostered demonstrations against the war, fraternization on the Austrian front, cleavage between officers and men, and wholesale desertions.² Many of the officers had no political background, and thus were bested in political discussions by the fanatical Bolsheviks, who had been professionally trained at dialectics in order to provide convincing arguments. Organized discipline within the Tsarist armies was almost non-existent by this time. "The fighting efficiency of the army is equal to zero... There exists a universal demand for peace and irresistible desire to go home without delay."³

After the March rising, the party press and political literature further weakened army morale.⁴ The Petrograd Soviet's famous "Order Number I", issued at the instigation of the Bolsheviks on March 14, did a great deal to cut away remaining military discipline.⁵ The order provided

¹. Fedotoff White. op.cit., p.4.

². Ibid., pp.6-9. He describes the situation. At times the number of absentees reached 3,000,000 men.

³. Ibid., p.9. This is a quotation from the Headquarters' Report.

⁴. Particularly Isvestia and orders of the Petrograd Soviet.

⁵. See Appendix "E" for the text. Schapiro. op.cit., pp.23-5 and Fedotoff White. op.cit., p.13. These describe the effects of the order. The problem of circulating this order along the badly disorganized front was effectively overcome by the use of radio, a technique for propaganda in which the Bolsheviks were indeed pioneers.
for the election of committees in military units\(^1\) and the election of Soldiers' Delegates to the Soviet. The political actions of the soldiers were subordinated to a Soviet control.\(^2\) The abolition of the privileges of rank when not on duty destroyed the outward marks of discipline and led to wholesale murder of officers. In order to halt the outbreak of excesses, the Soviet, in which the Bolsheviks were still in a minority, issued "Order Number II" the next day.\(^3\) This explained that "Order Number I" had not been intended as a call to elect officers, although the unit committees could object to the appointment of any particular officer. Another clause stated that the arms issued to the Petrograd garrison during the March uprising were not to be confiscated, as the Provisional Government had intended. This supply of arms was to prove important in the November coup.

Although some of the unit committees did make an attempt to maintain morale and restore the army's efficiency,\(^4\) the Bolsheviks gradually extended their disruptive influence. As early as March 31, the Petrograd Party Committee established a Military Commission, the first organized attempt to gain control of the armed forces. Comfortable Soldiers' Clubs attracted men for indoctrination, and an effective soldiers' newspaper (Soldiers' Truth) aroused discontent. In April, too late, the Menshevik-

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1. Contrary to Schapiro, op. cit., p. 23. These committees were not to replace officers, nor were officers to be elected. The committees were to air grievances and to control the issue of weapons.

2. The use of party cells was an extension of the technique which had been so successful in the party. Now, the control of cells from a central point allowed control in scattered units of the army.

3. Meisel and Kozera, op. cit., p. 3. This gives the major part of the text.

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dominated Soviet called on the Russian armies to continue the fight against the foreign enemy.¹ In June, a conference of 150 delegates from military units convened, made further plans for the formation of party nuclei in each unit, and advocated the election of all officers.² The ill-advised offensive of June, 1917, inaugurated at the suggestion of the General Steff in order to restore morale, soon broke down and degenerated into a complete rout, in which officers were killed, weapons were discarded and the countryside was looted. The fiasco aroused further opposition to the continuation of the war. The spectacle of the abortive Kornilov putsch (September 6 to 10, 1917) demonstrated the critical condition in the armed forces. Conditions in Russia appeared ripe for the Communist revolt.³

In March, 1917, the Red Guard, the nucleus for the Red army, first appeared, and its growth was accelerated in April after Lenin's return to Russia.⁴ This arming of factory workers as units of the Red Guard proceeded in all the industrial centers of Russia. An indication of the weakness of the Provisional Government may be seen in the fact that even when Lenin and Zinoviev were driven into hiding after the "July days", Kerensky made no move to destroy this rival power within the state.⁵ By this time

1. Ibid., p.331. He quotes the April 25 resolutions on war aims. The Soviet "calls on the democracy of Russia to mobilize all the living force of the country in all branches of the national life in order to strengthen the rear and front."

2. Ibid., pp.20-30. See also Golder, F. A. Documents of Russian history, pp.384-402. The Century Company, New York, 1927. This describes the demoralization of the army, telling of the dishonorable discharge of four complete regiments for refusal to go to the front, for example.

3. Bunyan and Fisher, op.cit., pp.24-5. This is a graphic description of the demoralized condition of Russia's troops.


5. Schapiro, op.cit., p.42.
the Petrograd Red Guard alone was composed of 10,000 men, organized in
tens (of 13 men!), platoons, companies, and battalions.¹ The organiz­
ation extended rapidly, and soon Regional Committees and a Central Staff'
were established in Petrograd to provide direction for the growing force.²
Kerensky's one attempt to halt the growth of the Bolshevik power, by
calling in Kornilov and the army, "boomeranged" when Kerensky, in his
indecision, turned to the Bolsheviks for help in repelling Kornilov.
The number of Red Guards in Petrograd rose to 20,000 men, now armed by
the Provisional Government.³

By November of 1917, Lenin thought of the Bolshevik seizure of power
as a coup to be carried out by the Red Guard combined with factory and
army political organizations. Outside of the Red Guard, the Bolsheviks
could count on support from various sources. The Latvian Rifle Regiments
had been infiltrated by party members, had adopted elective control and
had declared for the Soviets. As a result, these regiments were used as
guards for the Smolny Institute, party headquarters for the November revolt.

A large part of the Russian navy was Bolshevik, under the influence of

¹ Fedotoff White, op.cit., p.17. He gives this figure. Schapiro, op.cit.,
p.50. He uses Fedotoff White as his authority for the same figure.
However, in Deutscher, op.cit., p.405 the number is given as 4,000.
pany, New York. 1935. Chamberlin states that the force in November
was 20,000 and cites Trotsky as his authority. The higher figure of
10,000 would therefore appear more reasonable.

² Fedotoff White, op.cit., p.17. See also Golder, op.cit., p.580. He
quotes a newspaper report on the forming of the Red Guard in Moscow.

³ Fedotoff White, op.cit., p.17. Bunyan and Fisher, op.cit., p.148. This
gives Trotsky's appeal for workers to meet the Kornilov threat.
Deutscher, op.cit., p.281. He tells how Trotsky persuaded the sailors
from Kronstadt to support Kerensky.
Trotsky particularly, and detachments from Kronstadt and Helsingfors, the naval bases, assisted in the fighting during the critical first days. Other scattered units, especially the armored car sections, were valuable to the Bolsheviks. However, only 30,000 to 50,000 soldiers supported the Reds and the remaining millions merely hoped to return to their homes. After the November rising these forces were sufficient to retain control during a series of drunken riots, and to repel the counter-attack of Krasnov and his Cossacks. However, during the fighting the inefficiency of the Red Guards became apparent. This paved the way for a reversal of Bolshevik military theories when the next crisis arose.

The Bolsheviks had succeeded in destroying discipline in the old army, but had failed to gain the active support of the military masses. In order to rebuild an army, the Bolsheviks had to break the anti-military frame of mind which they had been instilling in the Tsarist forces. This immediately presented the problem of membership in the new army. The Bolsheviks could call on the Red Guards and revolutionary intellectuals as a cadre. But, few of the Tsarist units were successfully transferred to the Red army, and the revolutionary guerillas proved too individualistic to be valuable. The relatively small party could not seek support from the majority without risking loss of control. As Trotsky explained, the Red army was "created to meet the requirements of self-defence of the working class, which had taken power into its own hands."  

2. Ibid., p.4.  
On October 22, 1917, the Bolsheviks had been responsible for the creation of a War Revolutionary Committee, charged with reorganizing the militia, the first move towards transforming the Red Guard into a true army. However, little progress was made in the confused winter of 1917-1918. In November the old Ministry of War was renamed the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, and undertook to complete the dissolution of the old army. On November 10, the Commissariat for the Interior issued a decree forming a workers' militia, a temporary expedient until further plans could be formulated. Another step was taken during this same month with the formation, within the Commissariat for Military Affairs, of the All-Russian Collegium for the Organization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The Bolsheviks retained Marxist theories on the army, however, as was demonstrated by the Decree on Democratization of the Army, issued on December 29. This provided for election of officers and abolition of all ranks and titles between those of corporal and general, inclusive. The decree also abolished saluting, decorations and all privileges of rank. Although VTsIK had issued this document, its terms were disregarded in the Regulations for the Organization of the Soviet Army, which the Collegium issued on January 1, 1918. These regulations called for a paid volunteer army of workers and peasants. On January 28, VTsIK

1. Meisel and Kozera, op.cit., pp.12-3. This quotes the announcement from the Executive Committee of the Soviet.

2. Fedotoff White, op.cit., p.33.


followed the lead of the Collegium with a decree announcing the formation of the volunteer army, an announcement which had little result for the time being, since few of the Russians were interested in continuing the war with Germany.

The renewal of the German advance following the breakdown of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in February made the question of the army an urgent one. Bolshevik plans had shown little success prior to this, and at the Seventh Party Congress (March 6, 1918) Lenin was forced to admit that there was no army. He attributed this to the army itself: "We knew that through the fault of the army we had to make peace with the imperialists." Lenin realized that the proletariat did not want war, and he feared the weakening of the party which would result from losses in prolonged fighting.

Lack of success in rebuilding the army now led to one of the reversals in Bolshevik policy, a necessity so typical of a revolutionary situation. The idea of an army composed of militia units, held until this time, was discarded in favor of an army with a hierarchical structure under strict party control. As a result, the Bolsheviks abandoned the scheme of elective officers. As Trotsky explained it, "Election had never been intended as a method of appointing officers, but as a method of


2. Fedotoff White. op.cit., p.29. White quotes from Lenin's speech at the Congress.
Even the idea of a "volunteer" army was relinquished gradually. On April 22, a decree established compulsory military training of workers and peasants in three stages: the school period, the preparatory period (16-18) and the military service period (18-40). This move was justified by claiming that since the workers had seized power, they must establish their own army. A month later, VTsIK passed a resolution favoring forced mobilization and this was issued as a decree on May 29. Under pressure of war, by November, the new Red army included 16,000 privates, 110,000 N.C.O.'s and 23,000 officers.

A revolution, in overturning the former authority, automatically destroys the military leadership, since officers are drawn from the upper classes. This was true of the Russian Revolution, as it was of the French Revolution. In the latter, success in replacing the directing influence in the armed forces during the continued crisis of foreign war, brought fame to Carnot. The situation of Russia in 1917 was still more critical in that the military forces now not only lacked officers, but had no tradition as a competent machine. In response to the critical need, the Bolsheviks produced a leader in Leon Trotsky who was to succeed

1. Schapiro, op.cit., p.236. A more accurate reason appears in another statement by Trotsky, quoted in Fedotoff White, op.cit., p.34: "The undoubted danger of electiveness is...that the army would regard itself as an autonomous body, which gives itself its laws."


3. Meisel and Kozera, op.cit., p.73. For some reason, Fedotoff White, op.cit., p.42, gives the date as June 29. See also Bunyan and Fisher, op.cit., p.569. This quotes Trotsky on conscription.

in forming an efficient military force, provided with a loyal officer group. Trotsky, who had gained his reputation with the pen, \(^1\) now demonstrated his ability with the sword, proving himself a military genius.

The dramatic expansion of the Red army was enacted against the background of almost continuous war. During war time, a professional body of military men tends to develop an "esprit-de-corps", and to create a force independent of party. It therefore became necessary for the Bolsheviks to ensure the loyalty of their armed forces, a task complicated by the confusion rife within the new Red government. Much that developed was due to chance alone, and the pattern of any organized plan is extremely difficult to follow. However, in picking out the significant trends and events, five major techniques emerge: party control of the General Staff; the centralization of army command; the appointment of Military Commissars; the formation of a party structure within the army; and the establishment of Red Officer Training Schools. A study of each of these in turn will demonstrate the Bolshevik ingenuity in meeting the problem.

The forerunner of the Bolshevik General Staff was the Collegium, erected within the Commissariat for Military Affairs in November. During the month of April, 1918, while the Red army was being organized, the remnants of the former Imperial General Headquarters, composed of civil servants who had accepted Bolshevik control, issued orders to local Soviets to form volunteer companies. However, this relic of the Tsarist army actually retained little power. \(^2\) On May 9, 1918, the Collegium and

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1. In fact for a time Trotsky had used the pseudonym "Pero", The Pen.
2. Fedotoff White. op.cit., p.35.
the remnants of the General Headquarters were replaced by an All-Russian Supreme Staff, which was, in reality, controlled by five Bolshevik party members.\(^1\)

The problem of centralizing control of a scattered army, riddled with local loyalties, individualistic partisan units and ambitious regional commanders was to haunt the Bolsheviks for a full year following the November coup. While units raised by the local Soviets were intended to be available to the central government in case of need, in practice, the Central Soviet could command few of these groups. Trotsky labelled these partisan detachments "utter childishness", and set out to develop complete centralization,\(^2\) in order to halt growing inefficiency. On gaining power, the Bolsheviks inherited the whole structure of the Tsarist military administration, and proceeded to absorb most of the personnel as the first step in their program to centralize control.\(^3\)

On March 1, 1918, a Petrograd Soviet decree established a Supreme Military Council under Trotsky, which was another attempt to control the army, now involved in a renewed war with Germany. Two months later, after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 3, the Operational Department was organized to replace the Supreme Military Council, in an attempt to centralize the direction of the Civil War, an extremely difficult task. Trotsky was responsible for the appointment of his candidate,

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1. Ibid., p.33.
3. Fedotoff White. op.cit., p.36. 10,000 former civil servants joined the Commissariat for Military Affairs.
Vatsetis, as Commander-in-Chief. During July, all the active armed forces were gradually brought under control of the Commander and the Supreme Staff.\(^1\) The Operational Department was reorganized by a decree of September 2nd, which inaugurated a compact Revolutionary Military Council, under Trotsky.\(^2\) This Council was another attempt to coordinate all the operations of the Red army, which still lacked complete centralization. The final step occurred on November 30, when a decree of Sovnarkom established a powerful Council of Defence, which obtained "full power in all matters pertaining to the mobilization of the forces and resources of the country in the interests of defence." Direct control of the army itself, however, was left under Trotsky, Vatsetis and the Revolutionary Military Council, as a section of the Council of Defence.\(^3\)

The institution of Military Commissars, though usually credited to the Bolsheviks, may be traced to a technique of the Provisional Government, which had appointed "Front Commissars" in an effort to rebuild the army morale.\(^4\) Although the device had assisted in the defeat of Kornilov, the early regulations governing the Red army made no provision for continuing the technique. The reintroduction of the system was prompted by the crisis of the civil war. In order to gain experienced officers to

\(^1\) Ibid., p.38. Schapiro, op.cit., p.237.


\(^3\) Meisel and Koszera, op.cit., p.99. The Council of Defence was composed of Lenin, Trotsky, Nevsky, Briukanov, Krasin and Stalin.

\(^4\) Fedotoff White, op.cit., p.73. The Bolsheviks had studied the history of the French Revolution and found that this technique had been utilized by Carnot to control the officer group.
direct the Red army, Trotsky began to recruit former Tsarist officers as "military specialists", a title intended to escape some of the criticism leveled at this move.¹ There were cases of officer desertion or treason which added fuel to the discontent. Trotsky condemned the opponents of his program as "militarily semi-educated, semi-partisans, semi-Communists, who do not wish to tolerate next to themselves...earnest workers in the field of the military profession."²

On April 6, the post of Military Commissar (Voyenkomy) was officially instituted under a Bureau of Military Commissars. Trotsky stated that "four sailors and a soldier were sent to Muraviev (a former Tsarist officer) with instructions to be on their guard, and not to take their hands from their revolvers. That was the origin of the system of Commissars."³

In introducing the decree in VTsIK, Trotsky specified that "every specialist must have a Commissar on his right and on his left, each with a revolver in his hand."⁴ The Commissars were composed of former agitators and party workers who were now made "guardians of the close and inviolable bond between the Red army and the workers' and peasants' regime as a whole."

Commissars were to receive letters, orders and dispatches jointly with the

¹. Brzezinski. op.cit., p.3. 48,000 former Tsarist officers volunteered or were conscripted. Bunyan. op.cit., p.267. This quotes a speech by Trotsky justifying his use of these officers.

². Fedotoff White. op.cit., p.53. Stalin was one who objected to the plan.

³. Trotsky. Lenin, p.166.

⁴. Schapiro. op.cit., p.241. He quotes Trotsky. This was no idle threat. The execution of Admiral Schastnyi, previously mentioned, was the result of a Commissar's activities. Trotsky went a step further, and ordered the families of Tsarist officers held as hostages. Deutscher. op.cit., p.414.
military specialists. Any orders suspected of counter-revolutionary intent were to be reported, as were any derelictions of duty. Commissars were granted state protection and were to be appointed by the central state authority, although local units could express disapproval through an elective apparatus.¹

This desperate measure must have produced extreme confusion, since the source of final authority was not clear. Militarily, the system was considered extremely inefficient, and was never regarded as a permanent arrangement. Trotsky aimed at developing a unified command as rapidly as it became practicable.² This was accomplished in some units since a number of ambitious Commissars took an interest in military activities and extended their powers. In June the Commissars were granted further power in the political field within the army. "The political side of the organization, training and education shall be entirely subordinated to the representatives of the Soviet regime in the person of the Commissar."³

It was suggested that they establish party cells in the army and carry on propaganda and agitation.

Naturally, rivalry developed between the Commissars and officer group for control of the various units. This emerged openly at the Eighth Party Congress in March, 1919. However, Trotsky was strong enough to

¹. Fedotoff White. op.cit., pp.74-5. He describes the functions of Commissars.
⁴. The officers made an attempt to have the system discarded.
crush the opposition, and the Commissars received still more power in
the fields of supply, administration and selection of officers. The
campaign for scrapping the Commissars was accelerated later in 1919, but
while a part of Commissar's duties was taken over by the growing
political organization within the army, the Bolshevik technique remained
a lasting method of control.

In the first year of Bolshevik ascendancy, no organized effort was
made to centralize party structure in the army. Cells of Bolsheviks or
party sympathizers appeared in many units to organize meetings, to control
recruiting for the unit, or to direct the political, cultural and econ­
omic life of their group. In many cases these cells grew powerful, but
most remained independent. Such cells might include as few as two members
and were extended into the smallest army units, the platoons. In an
unsuccessful attempt to centralize control of these scattered cells, in
July 1918, a Political Department of Armies and Fronts was established.
In January 1919, the Central Committee of the party issued Instructions
on Army Cells, designed to halt decentralization of the political struc­
ture, and to limit local interference in the army's operation and
administration. Many firm Communists were introduced into offending
units, and Trotsky ordered that a party-conscious Communist was to be
placed in every platoon, section or squad.²

1. Rostow. op.cit., p.67.
In May 1919, the ineffective Political Department of Armies and Fronts, established the previous July, was replaced by the Political Administration of the Republic (P.U.R.).¹ The activity of all party cells was to be supervised by the P.U.R. along lines laid down by the Central Committee. This conflicted with various bureaus elected by groups of local cells, but the power of transferring members, which was granted to the P.U.R., allowed it to gain the ascendancy. Agitation for local control of party cells within the army reappeared at the Ninth and Tenth Congresses (1920, 1921), but the Kronstadt rising halted the critics for a time. By the end of 1919, there were 7,000 cells and 180,000 Communists in the army.²

Since the institution of Military Commissars had been considered a temporary expedient, the next step in guaranteeing Bolshevik control in the army would be the training of young Communists as officers for the growing army, a problem which received early attention. When announcing the recruitment of former Tsarist officers, Trotsky proclaimed the objective of 2,000 Red Cadets to be trained by military schools.³ Until the end of 1918, this was carried on independently by the old cadet schools under local Soviets. However, in November 1918, the local Cadet Soviets

1. Politicheskoe Upravlenie Republiki. Brzezinski. op.cit., p.4. Fedotoff White. op.cit., p.87 and Rostow. op.cit., p.66 give the date as May, 1919. Schapiro. op.cit., p.212, evidently in error, states that the P.U.R. was formed in May, 1918.
2. Fedotoff White. op.cit., p.90.
3. Ibid., p.34.
were abolished, and Commissars were appointed to each school in the rapidly expanding program. While many candidates did not belong to the party on entry, by graduation most of these Cadets were Communists.

The Communists had succeeded in erecting a strong military force directed from one center. The party became the iron frame which held the army together. As long as Lenin lived, authority rested in his hands. Yet a great deal of credit for Bolshevik success in the military field must be given to Trotsky, the colorful genius who founded the Red army. The personal influence of this fiery, energetic organizer did much to bring order out of the chaos of disintegrating armies. The troops worshipped the leader who eloquently demanded supplies for them: "Neither agitation nor repression can make battleworthy a barefoot, naked, hungry, lice-ridden group of soldiers." Appearing in person in critical battle areas, crushing opposition to his techniques, and granting praise where it was due, Trotsky inspired the Red armies to superhuman efforts. An eyewitness wrote:

Like fresh reinforcements arriving...Trotsky's presence on the spot at once showed itself: proper discipline was restored and the military and administrative agencies rose to their task. Whoever was inefficient was demoted. Trotsky's orders, clear and precise...at once showed that there was a firm directing hand.

1. Ibid., p.56. February 1918, 10 Command Courses; January 1919, 63 Command Courses; January 1920, 105 Command Courses; January 1921, 151 Command Courses.

2. Deutscher, op.cit., p.435. He himself was so scrupulously clean that he required a freshly cleaned uniform each day.

3. Ibid., p.455. He quotes Lashevich, a Red commander.
The conclusion of the civil war marked the end of the necessity for unity in the armed forces. A minor crisis occurred in early 1921, when acute food shortages resulted in a wave of strikes at Petrograd, and culminated in a revolt at Kronstadt. The sailors from Kronstadt had demonstrated anarchist tendencies immediately after the November coup. Although they had been in the vanguard during the November rising, they had distrusted the growing concentration of power in the hands of the Bolshevik party. The rebels seized control of the naval station on March 1, but refused to launch an offensive, and were soon crushed by loyal troops (March 17). Opposition to the growing centralization was not limited to Kronstadt. However, the navy had always had a greater "esprit-de-corps" than the army, so that such techniques as the use of Military Commissars had not had the same success in the fleet as they had in the army. The crushing of the revolt marked the end of the old navy, which had outlived the old army by three years, and halted for the time organized opposition to centralization of military control within the party.

At its height the Red army had numbered 5,300,000 men. During 1921 a rapid demobilization began, so that, by the end of the year, the membership had dropped to 1,600,000 men. The speed of the decrease made it

1. Ibid., p.25. This led Lenin to exclaim, "From anarchy to counter-revolution there is only one step." In September 1920, 23% of the Communists in the fleet were purged. Schapiro. op.cit., p.300.
2. Fedotoff White. op.cit., pp.127-59. He analyzes the causes and effects of the Kronstadt rising.
3. Ibid., p.183.
extremely difficult to continue effective training. At the same time, the army lost its privileged place in the country; workers, who had anarchist tendencies, disliked the troops, which were engaged largely in guard duty for the state. As a result of worker unrest, the supply service became badly disorganized. Even the political work in the army deteriorated as Commissars left for more active posts. The proportion of Communists among the graduates of the Cadet Schools dropped to less than half of the total.\(^1\)

1. Prior to Kronstadt there had been some pressure for a return to an army made up of militia units. While the crisis at Kronstadt demonstrated that militia might become a weapon of counter-revolution, financial difficulties made a large standing army impossible. Trotsky advanced a plan for distributing the army among the industrial centers,\(^2\) and a modified version of this scheme was attempted in 1923. By the end of 1923 the army had shrunk to 562,000 and Trotsky relinquished control of the armed forces.\(^3\) Thus the extremely competent Red army, erected to meet the crisis, was largely disbanded at the end of the civil war, in line with earlier Bolshevik theories of a citizen army. However, the framework and the basic techniques remained and were soon extended once more.

During the period of the civil war, the five basic techniques of Bolshevik army control, a party controlled General Staff, a centralized

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1. Ibid., p.183. 42% of the graduates were members of the party in 1923.
2. Ibid., p.186. This will be discussed in connection with the trade unions.
3. Ibid., p.195. Frunze took over his post.
military structure, a body of Military Commissars, a party organization within the army, and Communist Officer Training Schools proved successful in erecting an extremely competent army, under able officers. Centralized control of this army was now in the hands of the party. Since a concurrent development had been the gradual centralization of authority within the party, the skeleton of the powerful army was now a weapon completely subordinated to Lenin and the small group surrounding him.¹

¹. Although Trotsky commanded much personal loyalty within the army, in the crisis following Lenin's death, Stalin was to prove more able to control the party structure and thus to dominate the army.
CHAPTER V

THE CONTROL OF NATIONALITIES
Few developments illustrate more clearly the contrast between the Bolshevik and Tsarist regimes than their treatments of the problem of nationalism. The twentieth century dawned on a divided Europe which exhibited many contrasts. For instance, the far western section of the continent was composed of a number of independent national states, while the far eastern section remained a heterogeneous, multi-nation Russian Empire. As in Western Europe, the expansion of capitalism within Russia coincided with the appearance of nationalism. The early years of the Bolshevik control witnessed the crisis in the growing problem. As Marxists, the Bolsheviks were interested primarily in the struggle between classes and therefore hoped to bring an end to the rivalries aroused by nationalism. The Bolsheviks were more successful than the Tsarist government in crushing nationalism. As was true of the Bolshevik methods discussed in preceding chapters, the techniques which proved valuable were not fully planned prior to the event, but were advanced to meet the situation as it emerged.

Although the Tsarist Empire, prior to 1917, contained a wide variety of nationalities, it was administered as a nationally homogeneous unit. The autocracy attempted to disregard the national problem and subdivided the empire into such units as "guberniya" and "uezd" under centralized control in which the ruling classes were largely Great Russian.¹ Any signs of national activity were considered as plots against the Tsar’s authority and were crushed mercilessly. The reforms of 1905 had brought a temporary halt to these persecutions. The newly instituted State Duma

¹. Finland, which enjoyed considerable autonomy, was a notable exception.
offered an opportunity for expression of nationalist views, and the national groups of delegates at the First Duma attempted to advance the cause of nationalism, with some success. However, the revised electoral laws of 1907 strangled the early organized efforts by eliminating direct representation from nationally conscious areas.¹

The effective nationalism which began to develop in the Tsarist empire was largely cultural nationalism, aimed at preserving regional languages and customs, and was symptomatic of the instinctive feelings of unity so strong in many regions of the empire.² The national movement was injected with new life by the emergence of modern political parties after 1900.

In the years prior to 1917 the Social Democrats had periodically advanced theories on the issue of nationalism. These theories were altered or discarded once the party assumed power. Marx and Engels offered little assistance on this problem since they denied the validity of national divisions in a socialist world. Thus, pure Marxist theory forecast the disappearance of the nation state with the advent of the socialist order. However, Marxism as adopted by the Russian Social Democrats early made provisions for the peculiar Russian situation. The 1898 Party Manifesto, issued by the First Congress proclaimed the "right of nations


to independence".¹ This was a general statement which had little meaning at the time, but which was often quoted later as the basis of Bolshevik policy. The party's first specific platform was adopted as part of the Social Democratic program at the Second Congress in 1903. This program called for: "broad local self-rule; the right of a population to receive education in its native tongue,...and the right of all nations in the state to self-determination."²

Two alternative plans were proposed by non-Bolshevik socialists as solutions to the problem raised by growing nationalism in a multi-nation empire. The Jewish Bund adopted the Austrian scheme of "national cultural autonomy", which would preserve the empire but provide cultural independence for minorities.³ The Bolsheviks rejected this plan at the Second Congress of the Social Democratic Party (1903). The second plan, calling for a federal union, was advanced by the Socialist Revolutionary party, and was therefore rejected by the Bolsheviks. Having rejected both plans, it remained for the Bolsheviks to devise some other method of treating nationalism.

¹ Carr. op.cit. 1:418. This concept was included in many liberal programs of the period, and was meant merely as a protest against oppression. Pipes, Richard. The formation of the Soviet Union, p.32. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1954. He points out that the national issue of self-determination was not discussed in detail at this First Congress.

² Ibid., p.32. Pipes quotes articles 3,8 and 9 of the program. C.P.S.U. makes no reference to this section in discussing the program.

³ Carr. op.cit. 1:418.

⁴ Pipes. op.cit., p.31. The S.R.'s demanded, "a democratic republic with broad autonomy of regions and communities; the widest possible application of the federal principle to the relations among nationalities." This is a section of the S.R. program, adopted in 1905.
82.

During the period from 1903 until the outbreak of the revolution in 1917, the treatment to be accorded Russia's nationalities remained a controversial item on which Lenin and Stalin wrote influential articles. Prior to 1912 Lenin limited himself to criticizing the position supported by the Bund, and at the same time rejected the scheme of federalism as a decentralizing agent.¹ Lenin considered it "to be a positive and principal task of Social Democracy to advance the self-determination of the working class within each nationality."² This was not an unconditional acceptance of nationalism, and was a retreat from the Party Program of 1903. However, when it was useful to the Social Democrats, they might "provide support in order to speed the fall of the common enemy."³

The outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912 stirred up nationalism and prompted Lenin to make a full study of the problem during his stay in Austria. At this time he assigned Stalin to write an article on the topic of nationalism, and perhaps directed the writing of "Marxism and the National Question".⁴ Stalin deplored nationalism as a bourgeois sickness, but admitted that nations were sovereign and equal and so had the right to self-determination. He rejected the Austrian scheme of cultural

¹ Wolfe. op.cit., p.579. See also, Pipes. op.cit., p.33. Lenin's views on the Jewish Bund are given in Lenin. op.cit.2:330.

² Lenin. op.cit. 2:322.

³ Pipes. op.cit., p.35. This device of utilizing forces outside the party without necessarily agreeing with them is one of Lenin's most common techniques.

⁴ Carr. op.cit. 1:421. He credits Lenin with the ideas. See also, Pipes. op.cit., p.37, who gives the same interpretation. However, C.P.S.U., p.157 credits the work to Stalin alone. Wolfe. op.cit., p.400. He points out that Stalin's background as a native of the multi-national Caucasus fitted him to write the policy-making article.
autonomy, and suggested "that the only true Marxist solution of the national problem is that advanced by the Social Democratic program: the right to self-determination, the establishment of civic equality and broad regional autonomy, combined with the protection of minority languages."¹

Lenin further clarified the Bolshevik stand in "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", published in 1914.² He still maintained that nations would disappear with the overthrow of capitalism, but admitted that national states would be necessary temporarily as capitalism entered eastern Europe.³ Lenin developed his own interpretation of the section of the party program calling for national self-determination. He explained this as "the right of political self-determination; that is, the right to separation and creation of an independent government."⁴ He felt that economic forces would halt this process at the most favorable stage. This view Lenin was to uphold almost singly until after the Bolshevik coup.

Before their seizure of power, the Bolsheviks had thus rejected two plans for retaining national groups within the empire and had definitely announced their support for the political independence of national groups. Whether they adopted this attitude with purely idealistic motives or whether with the deliberate intention of utilizing national feeling

¹. Pipes. op.cit., p.38.
². Lenin. op.cit. p.249. This reproduces the pamphlet.
³. Wolfe. op.cit., p.588. He quotes another article by Lenin: "Marxism puts in place of any and every nationalism, its internationalism, the fusion of all nations into a higher unity."
⁴. Pipes. op.cit., p.43. This quotes Lenin.
to disrupt the Tsarist empire, is open to debate. At any rate, the Bolshevists, after assuming control, vacated their former position and attempted to crush national aspirations and reunite the heterogeneous empire. In order to do this they adopted some aspects of "federalism" and some aspects of "national cultural autonomy", the two plans previously rejected by the party.

The Twelfth Party Congress (1923), in reviewing the question of nationalities in Russia, considered the Bolshevik solution as a process of three stages: the first stage, during the November revolution, involved breaking the chains of national oppression; the second stage, during the civil war, helped unite the people for the common needs of self defence; the third stage, following the civil war, led to increased cooperation in the fields of military, economic and political affairs. The machinery erected by the Bolshevists assisted in completing the final two stages after the breakdown of the empire during the revolution.

The immediate effect of the March Revolution was to accelerate the process of disintegration of the Empire so that the national question became a vital issue. The Provisional Government attempted to control the situation by placing many of the borderlands under the jurisdiction of special committees, and by postponing decisive action until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. This underestimation of the urgency of the problems which they faced was typical of the Provisional Government, and proved disastrous to their program. The delay aggravated restlessness

1. Carr. op.cit. 1:258.
among the masses, who now added the demands for peace and land to the nationalist program. National minorities, strengthened by returning army units, set up local organs of self rule similar to the Soviets, and assumed control of supply, communications and the maintenance of order. Temporarily, cooperation between these organs and the central Soviet seemed possible, but when the Soviet attempted to expand its authority, opposition developed rapidly.¹

The Bolshevik party recognized the altering situation at its April Conference when Stalin's report on the national question reiterated the party stand regarding self-determination. The resolution adopted at the Conference pointed the direction of Bolshevik policy. "The party of the proletariat must decide in each question (of nationalism) independently...in the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism."² It now appeared that the question of the interests of the proletariat might limit the number of areas granted self government.

When the November Revolution further disrupted the authority of the central government, the various borderlands rapidly established local control. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty split off the western areas and the rise of the White forces alienated further sections of the empire. The Bolsheviks were faced with a broken remnant equal to the size of medieval Muscovy.³ Lenin had wished to utilize nationalism to defeat Tsarism, but had not foreseen that the conglomeration of small states would create a

¹ Pipes. op.cit., pp.50-3. He analyzes the change.
² C.P.S.U., p.190. This quotes the resolution. For discussion see Carr. op.cit. 1:261.
³ Carr. op.cit. 1:253.
shortage of food, fuel and raw materials in Russia. In spite of the possible value of Red acceptance of national aspirations during the coming civil war as a means of gaining the support of the national groups, Lenin realized that firm action was essential to halt the disintegration.

The early weeks of Bolshevik domination offered no opportunity for a change of policy, however. The peace decree, issued on November 8, called for "peace without annexations" and the liberation of "any nation whatsoever forcibly retained within the boundaries of a given state."\(^1\) A week later, the Soviet issued the "Declaration of Rights of the People of Russia" which again proclaimed "the right of the peoples of Russia to free self determination, even to the point of separation and formation of an independent state."\(^2\) The issue took a new meaning in December when the Ukrainian Rada, with popular support, requested recognition for an independent Ukraine. As early as 1913 Stalin had raised the awkward question of whether self-determination included the right of bourgeois secession.\(^3\) Now, on December 12, Stalin indicated the changing official attitude by stating that national self-determination would not be allowed to cloak counter-revolution. The party should "limit the principle of self-determination of nations, by granting it to the toilers and refusing it to the bourgeoisie."\(^4\)

\(^1\) Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.16.
\(^2\) Ibid., p.26.
\(^3\) Carr. op.cit. 1:264.
The Bolsheviks now turned to the problem of reuniting the divided republics. The Socialist Revolutionary program of federalism began to attract the insecure government. An indication of this is provided in a speech by Lenin in early January, 1918: "The Soviet Russian Republic is established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics."¹ This same sentence was included in the "Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People", issued on January 16.² Since this declaration became part of the constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., the framework for the reunification was officially provided.³ Popular support for the new policy also began to appear. Foreign intervention roused Russian patriotism, tending towards reunification. For instance, Kolchak, the White general, when defeated, preferred to turn over his substantial gold reserve to the Bolsheviks rather than to his foreign allies.⁴ The peasants' desire to retain the land seized in November reinforced this desire for unity under the Bolsheviks.

Bolshevik ingenuity had again been put to work to erect machinery for handling the national groups. The Provisional Government had suggested the formation of "a council for national affairs", but had taken no further action.⁵ In establishing the first Council of Commissars, the

¹. Ibid., p.111. Again he quotes Lenin.
². Lenin. op.cit. 6:253. This gives the declaration.
³. Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., pp.79-91. The constitution is given in full.
⁴. Carr. op.cit. 1:256.
⁵. Ibid. 1:275.
Bolsheviks had named Stalin as "Commissar for Affairs of Nationalities" (Narkomnats).¹ The Commissariat possessed a small central staff under Stalin, and was instructed to establish a special department under a Bolshevik member of any national group in which a difficulty arose.² Once a special department existed, all of the national group's institutions in Russia were placed under the section's control. The Commissariat expanded rapidly, so that by the end of 1918 it included sections for most of the influential nationalities, and was even fanning national movements in areas outside Red control in order to weaken White forces. Representatives of Narkomnats were despatched, in the manner of embassies, to the administrative organs of autonomous republics.

At the Eighth Party Congress (1919), the treatment of nationalities was reviewed, and although Stalin was not present to support him, Lenin succeeded in imposing, in the new Party Program, a double standard for Bolshevik action.³ The Bolsheviks had already suggested limiting the right of self-determination to proletarian national groups. Now Lenin proposed that a wide interpretation of self-determination would be adopted in backward areas, but in regions where capitalism was far advanced, only a proletarian request would be acceptable. Thus, national groups in backward areas would have the support of the Russian proletariat in breaking from feudalism or from imperial control, but in advanced areas,


². November 1917, Poland received the first such department.

only the revolutionary proletariat would be recognized as the spokesman for national aspirations. This was the critical turning point in the official Bolshevik policy on nationalism and provides the key to subsequent treatment of nationalities.¹

In May 1920, Narkomnats was reorganized so that the nationalities apparently received more power.² Each nationality, through its local Congress of Soviets was to elect representatives to a Council of Nationalities, to be a “parliament of nationalities” under the Commissar. Another section of Narkomnats was to deal with national minorities with no established territorial limits. In the autumn of 1920, the functions of Narkomnats were enlarged to allow it to appoint delegates to friendly republics.

The first formal declaration of the functions of Narkomnats was issued in May 1921, and included general supervisory powers over political and cultural cooperation within the Soviet orbit.³ However, with the introduction of N.E.P., the emphasis shifted to economic aspects. A new clause on functions suggested “the guaranteeing of conditions favorable to the development of the productive resources of the national territorial units and the defence of their economic interests in the new economic structure.”⁴ This involved establishing sections in each department of Narkomnats to handle agriculture, labour, education and allied fields.

¹ The pertinent terms are given in Appendix “F”.
² Carr. op. cit. 1:280.
³ Ibid. 1:281. He quotes the statute.
⁴ Ibid. 1:283.
As in the growth of the Vecheka, this aroused complaints from other Commissariats about the overlapping of powers. As the problem of nationalism had lost much of its acuteness when the Soviet Union was organized in 1923, the Council of Nationalities became a second chamber of VTsIK, and Narkomnats was abolished.¹

The number and diversity of national groups² precludes consideration of all the movements in a study of limited scope. The example of the Ukrainians as a comparatively large, advanced, Western people, and of the Tatar-Bashkir tribes as small, backward, Eastern groups will serve to illustrate the Bolshevik treatment of the national question. Before the revolution, national stirrings were apparent in both areas. In the Ukraine, separatist tendencies were inherited from the independence-loving Cossacks. In 1900 a Revolutionary Ukrainian Party was organized, and it advanced a demand for cultural autonomy within the Russian Empire. Before 1905 however, this group had split into a number of weaker groups.³ The Volga Tatars, two million strong, were the most advanced Moslems in Russia, while their neighbors, a million and a half Bashkirs, remained semi-nomads. The concept of Moslem unity developed more readily than

¹ Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., pp.152-68. Article 15 deals with the Council of Nationalities.
² Carr. op.cit. 11:25h. He gives the number as above 200. The largest group, Great Russians, numbered 75,000,000; there were 30,000,000 Ukrainians and 4,500,000 White Russians.
³ The separatists formed the National Ukrainian Party; the radicals joined the Russian Social Democratic Party, and the remainder formed the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party. The revolutionaries were faced with the choice of supporting socialism as their major objective or demanding national independence in order to solve their social problems. Different interpretations of the relative value of the two aims led to the divisions. Reshetar. op.cit., pp.16-20.
nationalism among these groups. However, in both areas prior to 1917 there was little tendency towards complete independence.¹

First, how did the Bolshevik methods function in the Ukraine? During the war Ukrainian nationalism had grown more visible, and had received support from the Central Powers, who hoped thus to harass the Russian war effort. The local proletariat in the Ukraine contained more Great Russians than Ukrainians and as a result Bolshevism, being a proletarian movement, remained largely alien and urban.² The main supporters of the nationalist movement were the intellectuals, a small and isolated group. The March rising stirred this group to action under Michael Hrushevsky,³ Vladimir Vinnechenko,⁴ and Simon Petliura.⁵ In March the nationalists organized a Rada (Council) under Hrushevsky. The six hundred man Rada gradually developed a radical nationalist program.⁶ On June 13, it issued a decree, the "First Universal", proclaiming an autonomous Ukrainian

¹. Pipes. op.cit., p.20.
². Carr. op.cit. 1:290.
³. Hrushevsky, Michael. ( ) A learned history professor who provided an historical basis for the movement.
⁴. Vinnechenko, Vladimir Kirolovich. (1880- ) A revolutionary intellectual. Took part in the 1905 rising. Joined the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party in 1901. Fled the Ukraine in 1918, but returned in 1920, served under the Reds, then finally emigrated.
⁵. Petliura, Simon Vaselivich. (1879-1926) A journalist-adventurer. Active in Ukrainian S.D. Party since 1905. Minister of War under the Rada. Led Ukrainian army till 1920, then fled the country and was assassinated in Paris.
⁶. Reshetar. op.cit., pp.54-6. He discusses this question.
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Republic. A General Secretariat under Vinnechenko was established as a government, and this arrangement was recognized by the Petrograd Provisional Government a month later.

The winter of 1917-1918 was a confused period in the history of the new Ukrainian Republic. Following the November Revolution, the Rada, as the only organized body in the Ukraine, assumed control. On November 20 the Rada proclaimed the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic. The Bolsheviks could not object to this because of their declared policy on self-determination. Vinnechenko was named Prime Minister and Petliura became the Minister of War. However, Workers' and Peasants' Soviets began to spring up within the Ukraine under Russian encouragement. The Reds claimed that the Rada did not represent the toiling classes. Finally on December 17, Petrograd issued an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada, demanding a halt to their recalling of Ukrainian army units, to the disarming of Red Guards and to food embargoes aimed at Russia. The next day the Ukrainian Bolsheviks met at Kiev in an All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. Moving to Kharkov, the Reds elected a Central Executive Committee, and claimed to be the legal government of the Ukraine. The Russian Soviet recognized this government but continued negotiations with the Rada. On January 22, 1918, the Rada declared

1. Ibid., p.61. He gives part of the Universal: "Let Ukraine be free. Without separating themselves entirely from Russia, let the Ukrainian people in their own land...order their own lives."

2. Ibid., p.71. He points out that this was limited recognition.

3. Bunyan and Fisher. op.cit., p.335. This quotes the proclamation.

4. Ibid., p.439. This gives the ultimatum.

5. This prior to their declaration of such policy in the 1919 Program.
its independence and was recognized by the Central Powers in return for
a Ukrainian promise to provide food for Germany and Austria.\(^1\) At the
same time the Rada opened negotiations with the representatives of England
and France in an attempt to gain their recognition. Bolshevik forces
now moved into the Ukraine, conquered Kiev on February 8, and established
a Soviet government.

The Rada appealed to the Germans for aid, and a German army swept
into the Ukraine, driving the Bolsheviks out within a month of their
assumption of power. For a time the Rada, under Vinnechenko and Petliura,
attempted to rule in cooperation with the Germans, but by mid-April,
the Germans had decided to abolish the nationalist body. A military coup
on April 28, with German support, overthrew the Rada, and a German-
supported government, under Skoropadsky\(^2\) as Hetman, was established.\(^3\)
Skoropadsky succeeded in achieving some advances in the field of
Ukrainian nationalism.

The German collapse in November, bringing an end to the Hetmanate
which was unpopular in many quarters, Vinnechenko and Petliura once more
proclaimed a Ukrainian Peoples' Republic under a Directory.\(^4\) Petliura
was, in effect, the dictator, and proceeded to call on the Allies for
assistance in maintaining his regime. Little aid arrived, and the

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\(^{1}\) Ibid., p.44\#. This is the "Fourth Universal" of January 22.

\(^{2}\) Skoropadsky, Paul Petrovich (1873-1945) Officer in the Tsarist army.
      Well educated and wealthy; served in the war of 1905 and in 1914-
      1917; attained the rank of General. Fled to Germany in 1918;
      killed by allied bombs in 1945 while enroute out of Berlin.

\(^{3}\) Bunyan, op.cit., p.7. The agreement between Skoropadsky and Germans.

\(^{4}\) Ibid., p.30. This is the proclamation.
dictatorial methods of the Directory began to weaken their hold on the country.

Meanwhile the Ukrainian Bolsheviks reorganized their Workers' and Peasants' Government at Kharkov and sought protection from Petrograd. On January 16, 1919 the Directory declared war on Russia in a final act of defiance. During February the Reds overran the Ukraine, established Kharkov as their capital, and adopted a constitution patterned on the 1918 Russian constitution, proclaiming the Ukraine a Socialist Soviet Republic.

For more than a year sporadic fighting continued in the Ukraine. Petliura in the West and Makhno in the East resisted Bolshevik control. In mid 1919, Denikin, with allied support, advanced into the Ukraine and for a time, in the midst of anarchy, Petliura resumed control in Kiev. In December, Denikin having been defeated, the Soviets regained the area for a short time. At the same time a chain of events outside the Ukrainian-Bolshevik struggle involved Poland and Petliura succeeded in drawing the Poles in to occupy the Ukraine, during the summer of 1920. However the Bolsheviks had crushed the last opposition by August of 1921, allowing the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, theoretically independent, to reestablish control. In spite of pre-revolution Bolshevik support for national self-determination, the Ukrainian national experiment had been crushed by active intervention from Moscow.

In the eastern areas of the Empire, the solution was less clear cut, but the pattern of Bolshevik treatment of nationalities was similar.
Prior to 1917 the Tatars and Bashkirs had begun national movements, given expression by small groups of intellectuals.¹ There was little Bolshevik strength among the Moslems, and the idea of national independence was not as attractive as a scheme for a Pan-Islamic Union. In May, 1917, the First All-Russian Moslem Congress convened, with delegates representing 14,000,000 Moslems, and approved a request for national autonomy. At the Second Congress, beginning in July, 1917, a difference of attitude split the Tatars from the Bashkirs. The Tatars favored administrative unity with cultural autonomy, while the Bashkirs supported the Socialist Revolutionary scheme of federalism.² The First Congress had established a National Central Council (Shura); the Second Congress extended this and called for a National Assembly to meet on November 20. The Provisional Government however, paid small heed to the activities of the Tatars and Bashkirs. Meanwhile the Tatars gathered Moslem regiments which opposed the early Bolshevik attempts to seize power in the region.³

When the Bolsheviks assumed control in Petrograd, they first attempted to win the support of the Moslems peacefully. An appeal of December 7 called on the Moslems to "lend (their) support to this revolution and to its government", and promised that their "beliefs and usages, national and cultural institutions are henceforth free and inviolable."⁴ In January, Narkomnats established a section for Moslem affairs. Stalin

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2. Pipes. op.cit., p.77.
4. Ibid., pp.467-8. This gives the appeal to the Moslems.
offered the Chairman of the Moslem Shura a position in the Bolshevik government, but this offer was rejected. He then found a Moslem Communist, Vakhitov, who accepted the post and set out to establish a network of Communist cells among the Moslems. To some extent the Bolsheviks thus helped rouse nationalism in the region more effectively than had been possible prior to the revolution. However, when the Bolsheviks attempted to extend their control over the region, the local national leaders turned to counter-revolution and joined the Whites in opposition. By March, 1918, Petrograd had crushed the Moslem forces, overthrown the Tatar and Bashkir Republics, and set up a combined Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic. The National Council was dissolved, the national leaders were arrested, and a scheme for enforced sovietization was proposed. However, the rising of the Czech legion and the civil war intervened to halt the Bolshevik plans.

In the Bashkir region, the natives now formed another army to assist the Whites, but Kolchak soon quarreled with them and the Bashkirs agreed to join the Reds in return for a promise of autonomy. As the battle front moved east of the Volga region, the Bashkirs established an Autonomous Bashkir Soviet Republic in March, 1919. The Great Russians monopolized the important positions in the Bashkir Communist Party and incited trouble for the new Bashkir Council. When the Bashkirs attempted to impose their authority on the Communist party (January, 1920), the Red Army moved in and the Bashkir Republic was overthrown. In May, 1920, a

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1. Pipes. op.cit., p.156.
decree of VTsIK established a Bashkir Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, which was dominated by Moscow.

The Tatars had postponed their move until the end of the civil war when they hoped to establish a republic under their Left Communist leader, Mirza Sultan Galiev. However, at the end of 1919 the main body of Communists, supported by Moscow, laid plans for a Soviet Republic. They called a Congress of Soviets, and in June, 1920 declared a Tatar Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic which was actually under the control of Moscow as was its Bashkir neighbor.

The year 1920 marked the final turning point in Soviet treatment of nationalities from the second to the third stage of its development. The "right to separate" was changing to the "right to unite", since unity seemed to be in the interests of the workers and the party. The Communist Party, the Red army and the trade unions all worked towards an all-Russian union. The party condemned national discrimination and hoped to increase production to bring the backward republics to the stage of Russia proper, thus reenforcing the desire for unity. Some of the Communists still felt that Socialism would dispense with all national divisions and regarded the formation of independent republics as merely a method of working off excess nationalism. This was even more the case

1. Ibid., p.168. He was a Stalinist follower who made a play for Pan-Islamic Communism outside control from Moscow.

2. Ibid., pp.170-1. This traces the development.

3. See above, p.84.
when autonomy had to be imposed from without because of lack of local
telligentsia. By the end of 1920, the former Tsarist Empire was div-
ided into states of three categories: independent nations such as Poland,
Finland and the three Baltic states; the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), composed of nearly twenty semi-autonomous regions;
eight separate Socialist Republics, including Ukraine, White Russia,
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. 1

Symptoms of approaching reunification appeared during the civil war
when military unity became necessary. 2 On February 15, 1920, VTsIK set
up a commission to investigate the establishment of a federal structure.

Stalin once more set the tone for the party attitude when he observed:
"Three years of revolution and civil war in Russia have shown that
without the mutual support of central Russia and her borderlands, the
victory of the revolution is impossible." 3 The first official attempt to
reunify the various states occurred on September 20, 1920, when a Military-
Economic Treaty and five supplementary treaties were arranged between
R.S.F.S.R. and the Azerbaijan S.S.R. These provided a military and fin-
ancial alliance and expressed a desire for a unified military command,
unified organs of economy and trade, unified supply organs and unified
rail, water and postal administration. 4 In effect this made Azerbaijan

1. Carr. op.cit. 1:365-80. He discusses this.
2. Ibid. 1:381. Carr quotes a decree from Kiev: "All armed struggle
   against the enemies of the Soviet republics should be unified in
   all existing Soviet republics."
3. Ibid. 1:384. This quotes Stalin.
4. Ibid. 1:385. See also, Pipes. op.cit., p.252.
dependent on the R.S.F.S.R. Three months later, similar treaties were signed with the Ukraine, followed early in 1921 by White Russia, Georgia and Armenia. These arrangements were only alliances in form, since foreign affairs remained outside the treaties.  

It only remained to develop a constitutional cloak for the federation. On December 26, 1922, the Tenth Congress of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R. passed a resolution favoring union.  

Definite action followed when VTsIK set up six commissions on January 10, 1923 to draft a new constitution. The draft was submitted in July and ratified by the new Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

Thus the various national movements which had sprung to life after the breakdown of central control, after short periods of varying success, were absorbed by the better organized Bolshevik minority. Most of the nationalist governments had collapsed without any real opportunity of proving their worth because of Communist armed intervention, coupled with their internal weaknesses. The Bolsheviks had exploited national aspirations to help overthrow the Provisional Government, had recognized national governments during the critical periods of the civil war and then abandoned the movement after their position was considered secure. Nationalism came to be viewed as counter-revolutionary and bourgeois. The Soviet Union as it emerged in 1923 was a compromise between Bolshevik

1. Yet the R.S.F.S.R. spoke for them all at the Genoa Conference in 1922.
2. Pipes. op.cit., p.266.
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desires for a centralized, united state, and the nationalist desires
which continued to exist throughout the Union. This continued existence
was particularly noteworthy since the Communists were able to exert
more complete control over their empire than had been possible in the
Tsarist regime. In effect, the Reds had adopted the national cultural
autonomy which the party had rejected prior to the revolution.
CHAPTER VI

CONTROL OF THE MASS MEDIA
At the time of the 1917 Revolution, Russia had no lengthy tradition of freedom of the press or assembly, a fact which proved advantageous to the Bolsheviks in their struggle to consolidate their position. Profiting from first-hand information as to the effectiveness of various Tsarist methods of controlling public opinion, the new rulers of Russia, in the period from 1917 to 1923, developed successful techniques for influencing the mass of those within the former Russian empire who were not party members. Since 1923 these techniques have been further refined, until at the present time the Communist party exercises complete control of the mass media.

Strict censorship of the press had been imposed in 1796 by Catherine the Great in an attempt to halt the spread of liberal ideas from Western Europe. A statute of 1826 further defined this censorship, forbidding publication of anything which might be construed as an attack on "religion, the throne, established authority, and the morality and honor of the nation."¹ Evidently even this rigid restriction was not successful and, after the rash of revolts in 1848, the Tsarist regime of Nicholas I instituted a secret committee to supervise the censors.²

During the reign of Alexander II, a gradual introduction of liberty of the press and assembly was attempted. A decree of 1865 abolished

². Ibid., p.423.
censorship on books and periodicals in St. Petersburg and Moscow. 1 Publishers still had to comply with instructions from the Ministry of the Interior which prohibited certain topics, and in 1872 control was tightened once more on books. At the end of 1904, control was further relaxed so that few of the former restrictions remained. 2 It was no longer necessary to get official permission to publish a newspaper. Censorship was relaxed, but editors were made responsible before the criminal courts for their publications. Public meetings were allowed, although they ran the risk of attracting police spies who could close the meeting by arresting the leaders.

The Marxists had early realized the importance of the control of the press, since Marx himself had designated the press as a potent weapon in the class war. 3 Thus, when Lenin fled Russia, one of his main objectives was to found a newspaper in order to assist in organizing Russia's Marxists. He felt such a paper was essential "to carry on that extensive and theoretically sound propaganda and agitation necessary for victory." 4 Iskra was the result. The relaxation of controls in 1904 did not solve all the Bolshevik problems, as regulations were soon in force to limit their operations. The list of methods employed by the conspirators to obtain printing presses and paper, and to circulate

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1. Ibid., p.428. deBasilly. op.cit., p.25.
2. Stilman. op.cit., p.431
4. Lenin. op.cit. 2:19. This gives a statement of 1903.
their literature is a story in itself. The dangers of attending public meetings during the period between the revolutions led to individual contacts through the cells, and to Bolshevik infiltration into such organizations as the Trade Unions and workers' educational groups.

In the period of chaos following the March revolution, the Bolsheviks utilized every means at their disposal in their struggle to gain control. Pravda, the party paper, had changed its name twelve times between 1912 and November of 1917 in order to continue publication. Numerous other papers, devoted to advancing party aims, sprang up throughout the country. On March 13, the Petrograd Soviet debated the question of whether to shut down opposition presses. The Mensheviks fought for the principle of freedom of the press, and won a partial victory when it was decided to permit newspapers to continue publication on the responsibility of the editors concerned. The Bolsheviks fought doggedly and reopened the debate ten days later. They argued, "No, we're not going to permit them! When a war is going on we're not going to give the enemy any weapons!" The ruling of March 13 was cancelled and attempts were made to close down the opposition papers.

After the failure of the "July Days", the liberal press felt that the Bolshevik power was crushed and attacked Lenin's party boldly. On


2. It was while attending a meeting of the St. Petersburg group that Lenin met Krupskaya, who later became his wife.

3. Sukhanov. op.cit., p.70. He describes the heated session.

4. Ibid., p.207. He quotes a Bolshevik delegate.
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August 13, the Provisional Government entered the fray, issuing an order which attempted to shut down two of the radical papers. However, the papers merely changed names and continued publication. On September 28, Lenin advocated the nationalization of all presses and newsprint supplies, to be followed by distribution to parties according to popular strength. "The first claim would be that of the government... the second, that of the larger parties."²

The Bolsheviks had never supported the democratic idea of freedom of the press. They had protested suppression of their own papers, but had always promised to close the bourgeois press once in power. It came as no surprise, therefore, when the right wing papers were suppressed immediately after November 7, and the liberal press followed soon afterwards. Lenin argued, "It will be possible with the aid of the printing press, to break down the many traditions and customs which are still retarding the progress and correct evolution of the new ideas."³ A decree issued on November 10 gave the government power to close newspapers which called for "open opposition" or "perverted the facts", pointing out

1. Golder, op.cit., p.434. This quotes the order, aimed principally at Rabochii, the workers' paper, and Novaya Zhizn.

2. Schapiro, op.cit., p.76. He quotes Lenin.

3. Sukhanov, op.cit., p.650. He states that this move turned many who might otherwise have remained neutral into firm opponents. Certainly it forced many writers to emigrate, and explains the sudden appearance of Russian papers in many foreign centers.

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that power could not be left in the hands of the bourgeois press. The
decree promised that "as soon as the new order will be consolidated,
all administrative measures against the press will be suspended."\(^1\)

The opposition papers imitated earlier Bolshevik techniques, and
continued to appear after changing their names. As a result, on Nov­
ember 17, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, Lenin now
introduced a definite proposal that the government take over the presses
and all available newsprint supplies, and allocate both to the minority
groups.\(^2\) The suggestion aroused much debate in VTsIK before Lenin
received a slim majority. As a result of its adoption, Kamenev, Zinoviev
and other prominent Bolsheviks tendered their resignations.\(^3\) The Lenin
group forced the rebels back into line, and the repressive measure was
put into effect. The promise of paper for all shades of opinion remained
a dead letter, and the control of newsprint became one of the most effec­
tive techniques for controlling the press. By December 1, all the non-
Bolshevik papers except Delo Naroda and Novaya Zhizn had been ordered
to close.\(^4\)

Further restrictions met the attempts of the Menshevik-dominated
printers' unions to fight the closure orders by calling for implementa­
tion of the government's promise to suspend the restrictive measures.
A decree of November 20 made advertising a state monopoly, thus making

\(^1\) Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.23.

\(^2\) Schapiro. op.cit., p.76.

\(^3\) Including Nogin, Rykov, and Milyutin.

\(^4\) Bunyan and Fisher. op.cit., p.220.
newspapers dependent on the government for one of their main sources of income. On January 11, 1918, VTsIK established a state publishing house which was granted a monopoly of the printing of textbooks, scientific books and popular editions of the Russian classics. Two weeks later Sovnarkom established Press Tribunals throughout the country. Each Tribunal was made up of three members, appointed by the local Soviet for a term of three months, and responsible for punishing "crimes and offences against the people committed by means of the press... by the publication of any false or perverted reports." The Tribunals could levy fines, impose censures, force a public denial, suppress the publication, or confiscate the press of the offenders. In spite of this pressure, the Kadet paper, Syoboda Rossii, was still being published during the summer of 1918 and a Menshevik organ, Novyi Luch, suppressed in February, reappeared under the name Vpered in April. However, by July, 1918, most of the opposition papers had disappeared. Very few foreign papers could enter the country either, although it was possible to obtain some foreign radical left wing journals.

The period from 1918 to 1923 was used to refine and further organ-

3. Meisel and Kozera. op. cit., p.38. This quotes the original instructions, issued on December 31 by the Commissar of Justice. This was not enforced until Sovnarkom reissued the decree on January 28.
ize these basic techniques. The weapon of censorship, which the Bolsheviks had taken over from the Tsarist autocracy, was gradually altered until propaganda rather than mere repression became its major aim. This development was the distinctive Communist contribution to the control of the mass media. By 1923 the press had become an institution of the Communist party in which no disagreement with the party was allowed. The distribution of news was centralized in the hands of "Tass", a government organ with six subsidiary agencies in the republics. Tass was granted the sole right to bring news into Russia and transmit news of Russian affairs to foreign countries. The number of newspapers had increased slightly, but circulation had fallen off. In each republic there was a party organ, (Pravda was the central one) a number of newspapers specially published for workmen, peasants, Young Communists and the army, and an official government organ. (Izvestia, begun in March, 1917, was the central one.) Then too, Narkomnats sponsored local language newspapers as propaganda outlets. Most of the editorial work was in the hands of party officials; speeches by leaders at party meetings or congresses occupied much of the available space. A government official in the service of the state Censor read through the proofs of each newspaper edition before it went to press.

1. Telegraphic Agency of the Union, "Telegrafnoe Agentsvo Soyuza". Although formally introduced late in 1924, its forerunners were in existence prior to this date.

2. British Trade Unions, op.cit., p.119. This states that in 1914 there were 647 papers with a circulation of 2,730,000; while in 1924 there were 698 papers with a circulation of 2,530,000. Lee. op.cit., p.63. Lee gives the circulation in 1927 as 8,000,000.
The small circulation was partially overcome in two ways. In Workers' Clubs, readers regularly read newspapers aloud for the benefit of those unable to read. Then too, the "wall-sheet newspaper" was continued and expanded. This was a child of the chaos of the November coup. The shortage of ink and paper had combined with the disruption of transport to make regular newspapers impossible. The wall-sheets were handwritten or typed single sheets, posted wherever crowds might gather. These organs, usually under the control of the local cells, were used by the government in an attempt to counteract some of the rumours rife during this period. They had regular local correspondents, and encouraged the practice of sending letters to the editors. This was almost the only method for expressing public opinion, and so gave the government an opportunity to check on complaints. (And incidentally on the complainants.) At the same time, the opportunity given to the people to complain of minor troubles allowed them to release pent-up emotions and took attention away from more critical problems.

The publication of books was regulated by the Commissariat of National Education through the National Publishing Department. Although there were more than seventy-five recognized publishing establishments in 1923, most of these issued only trade union papers or magazines. Books were reserved for the government printing press, where complete censorship prevailed.

1. Jaryc. op. cit., p. 541. He discusses these sheets.

2. Some of the more persistent critics often disappeared, leaving no trace.

3. Lee, op. cit., p. 69. By 1927 the Publishing Department was responsible for 75% of all printing within the Soviet Union.
The Bolsheviks utilized other devices in addition to the press to suppress opposition and to gain wider support within the country. One of the simplest of these was the mass meeting. Such skilled orators as Lenin, Stalin, and particularly Trotsky had attended countless public gatherings, small or large, and had attracted many followers who might otherwise have remained disinterested neutrals or even active counter-revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks thus introduced a technique which the Fascists and Nazis were later to develop to the point where the carefully prepared meetings became emotional orgies for the masses. However, in the period prior to 1923 the Communists were faced with too much opposition within Russia to utilize this device to the full, and the public gatherings during this time were kept relatively small and well organized.

Further emotional, non-intellectual appeals were made through party parades. Allied with this was the skilful distribution of persuasive slogans, such as "All power to the Soviets", or "He that will not work, neither shall he eat". Banners proclaiming the latest slogans were carried in the parades, and were hung on the streets or in places where the public was liable to gather. Factory workers were encouraged by signs proclaiming the objectives for their factory or department. Pictures of Lenin and other revolutionists served to appeal to the public for support for the Communist state, and flattering pictures of Soviet life

1. It was at this time that the annual May Day workers' parade became an institution.
announced the advantages of the Russian system. The typical revolutionary technique of renaming squares, institutions, streets and cities after heroes of the revolution also served Communist ends.

The use of the radio to spread the news of the Soviet's military "Order Number I" has already been referred to. During the confused period after November 7, while transportation and communications were badly disrupted, the Bolsheviks found increasing uses for the radio. As radio advanced, the Russian government developed methods of making use of it for propaganda, particularly to bridge the gaps in a country where many could not read. Tass controlled all radio news as it controlled the newspapers. A network of government regulated stations was established throughout the Union. The Trade Unions sponsored radio clubs to encourage listeners and often installed loud speakers in factories to increase the radio's effectiveness. Loud speakers were erected even in the streets in order that the public could be reached by the Communist radio. During the period prior to 1923, radio was still in its infancy, but the Communists laid the groundwork on which later totalitarian states were to build.

Thus, within the period from 1917 to 1923, the Communist party had been successful in developing a rigid control over the methods of mass media. Basing their techniques on the censorship to which Russia

1. The use of pictures can be traced to the use of icons in the Greek Orthodox Church, and was particularly useful in an illiterate state.

2. See above, p.52.
was accustomed, they gradually laid a foundation on which Stalin was
to build an effective propaganda machine. As a minority party with a
long experience as a subversive party, the Communists realized the
importance of possessing the means of influencing public opinion. This
monopoly was to prove important in retaining full control through the
various crises experienced by the Soviet state in the years from 1923
to the present.
The relationship between the Bolsheviks and the trade unions was an extremely delicate one. Lenin recognized the necessity for union activity which would reach a wider range of the proletariat than the small select party group could hope to influence. The cooperation of the unions was obviously essential as long as capitalism continued to exist. However, as was true with other allies accepted by the Bolsheviks, the alliance remained an uneasy one, and Lenin looked forward to subordinating the unions to the party.

A number of factors contributed to the relative insignificance of trade unions in the Russian Empire prior to 1917. Until serfdom was abolished in 1861, the development of capitalism, under which industry could thrive had been retarded. Russian industry was therefore comparatively young, and most of the workers were recently proletarianized peasants with no tradition of union development such as western factory workers possessed. Then too, trade-union organization was effectively prohibited by Tsardom during the nineteenth century, so that revolutionary energy was channeled into subversive political activities to a greater extent than in Western Europe. Trade unions then, developed from the core of party workers, whereas in most western countries the labour party had been an emanation of the trade unions. After 1917 the path of the Russian unions diverged still further, both from that of its western counterparts, and from the plan originally conceived by the Bolshevik party.

The first stirrings of the Russian proletariat occurred during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Scattered disorganized strikes
marked the birth of labour organization, culminating in a wave of strikes in Moscow and St. Petersburg in 1896 and 1897. In 1902 the government decided to fight the rising labour movement by organizing police sponsored workers' aid societies, under the direction of Sergei Zubatov, the head of the Moscow secret police. As these official unions gained strength, and pushed into activities beyond their original objectives, the authorities attempted to crush their growth, and transferred Zubatov to St. Petersburg.

Meanwhile, after 1899 the non-Marxian socialists known as the Economists began to encourage the Social Democrats to turn to trade union activities. While the party was careful to support Russian labour demands, Lenin protested against limiting the activities of the working class to the economic struggle of trade unionism. He argued that, while the economic struggle might serve as a base, "the task of the socialist is to make the economic struggle of the workers assist the socialist movement and contribute to the success of the revolutionary party." By the time the Second Congress of Social Democrats convened in 1903, the Economists had been defeated in their attempt to win the Social Democrats to union activities.

1. Gordon, Manya. Workers before and after Lenin, p.16. E.P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1951. This states that there were only 48 strikes during the years from 1881 to 1886.


3. See above, p.5.

4. Deutscher, Isaac. Soviet trade unions, p.3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. 1950. This quotes Lenin. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: Deutscher. Unions.
Although the party program adopted at this Congress contained many labour demands, the party recognized the need for unions. Lenin stated that "trade unions were not only legitimate but necessary as long as capitalism existed...in the organization of the working class in its daily struggle against capital and for the abolition of wage labour." At this stage Lenin anticipated a capitalist phase within Russia for some time after any revolution, and was willing to cooperate with the unions during this period. However, as was natural since his main experience with unions had been in Western Europe, he felt the unions had bourgeois tendencies. He believed that trade unions would dissipate their energies on achieving immediate advantages and might then become counter-revolutionary. The Bolshevik party on the other hand, would pour all its energies into preparing for the revolution. Such a party must be clandestine, containing only the most advanced, disciplined members of the proletariat. Since the party was to lead the masses it could not abandon the unions, but it had to remain separate from them. If the unions turned to private economic interests, the party would have to oppose them, since this would tend to recognize the existing capitalist status.

The revolution of 1905 was precipitated by a wave of strikes. However, in spite of the fact that the Tsarist autocracy was in a weakened state and the unions had gained many members, the trade unions

1. Carr. op.cit. 2:101. Such requests as the eight hour day.
2. Deutscher. Unions, p.3. This quotes Lenin.
3. It was this policy proposed by Lenin with which the Mensheviks at the Congress disagreed.
4. Gordon. op.cit., p.45. Nearly 3,000,000 workers were on strike.
proved impotent once the revolution began. It was the political Soviet which wielded the power. Even the campaign for an eight hour day was spearheaded by the Soviet, and it was the Soviet which forced the legalization of strikes.¹

The relationship between party and union was discussed periodically in the years between the revolutions. At the Fourth, or Union Congress (1906) the Social Democrats obliged all party members to join trade unions, but went on record as supporting "non-party unions".² The Bolsheviks argued that the party should try to gain leadership of the unions, but were defeated. The failure of the revolution of 1905 had disorganized both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, and this disorganization continued in the period after the revolution in which the new regime banned many unions and persecuted the strikers. The Mensheviks were therefore anxious to accept non-political unions and attempted to formalize this at the next party congress at London, calling for mere "ideological leadership of the Social Democratic party in the trade unions."³ The persistent question was raised once more at the Sixth Party Congress (1908) when the technique of the party cell was formally adopted. By now Lenin, while he feared unbridled trade unionism, was ready to propose "utilizing the trade unions and other organizations, legal and semi-legal, in order to guarantee in them the predominant influence of Social Democracy, and to transform them as far as possible, into points of support of the Social

¹ Hubbard, op. cit., p.25.
² Carr, op. cit. 2:102.
³ Ibid. 2:102.
Democratic party." It was therefore suggested that party cells should be organized within the trade unions. These cells could then guide the unions indirectly, since the cells would be under the authority of the party.

In March 1917, as in 1905, the trade unions played a relatively small role in the actual uprising. The preliminary strikes, while widespread, were ineffective in the seizure of power; minor union demands seemed unreal in the general economic chaos, and the threat of mass mobilization deterred many of the proletariat. Once again the political Soviets took the leadership from the economic unions. As Lenin realized, the unions did not have revolution as their primary aim and were thus undependable partners for the Bolshevik party.

Nevertheless, there was a rapid growth in union membership between March and November. The Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries struggled to gain control in the expanding organizations. Because of Lenin's attitude, demanding union subordination to party, the Bolsheviks were not able to make much headway, and the Mensheviks, who favoured the unions' political neutrality, wielded the power. In June the Trade Unions called their first conference and established an All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, on which the Mensheviks received a majority of seats.

1. Wolfe. op.cit., p.522. This quotes Lenin.

2. Deutscher. Unions, p.13. In 1905 there were 250,000 members. In 1917 membership rose from approximately 100,000 in March to 1,500,000 in November.

To recapitulate, before their seizure of power the Bolsheviks had come to recognize the necessity of labour unions. They had decided that while these unions should be under party control, they should remain as satellites outside the party organization. During this early period, Bolshevik relations with the unions remained largely in the planning stage since the Mensheviks dominated the Central Council of Trade Unions and the majority of the Unions.

From this point until the death of Lenin, three stages may be traced in the relationship of the Bolshevik party to the trade unions. From June, 1917 until February, 1918 the party struggled to gain control of the leadership of the trade unions and shape the unions to the preconceived Bolshevik pattern. In the second period, coinciding with the civil war, from February, 1918 until November, 1920, the party dominated the unions, but allowed them a maximum of freedom in order to bolster the defences of Communism. The final period begins with the conclusion of the war and the introduction of the N.E.P. in March, 1921, and witnessed renewed attempts by the Communists to make the unions subordinate to the party.

Between July and November, as the Bolsheviks prepared to seize power, they suggested "worker control of industry" through factory committees, in an attempt to wean the workers away from the Menshevik-controlled unions. This would be a temporary partnership of employers and employees. Final control would rest in the workers' hands since three fourths of the vote in these committees was to be assigned to them.¹ The Mensheviks,

¹ Deutscher. Unions, p.15.
seeing the trade unions being bypassed, protested that such a scheme would lead to decentralization and a non-Marxist cooperation with employers. The ultimate aim of the Bolsheviks was still a centralized dictatorship of the proletariat, but they planned to use the decentralization temporarily to weaken the existing bourgeois state. The workers preferred to support the local factory committees rather than the externally controlled trade unions. Such committees also attracted anarchist support. The high point of the growth of the factory committees was reached when a decree of November 27, 1917, granted the committees control of Russia's industries.¹

In the chaotic period after the November coup, the overlapping of unions and anarchist factory committees demanded a centralized control. This at once brought the Bolsheviks into conflict with their factory committees who requested absolute independence. By now the Bolsheviks had eliminated Menshevik opposition, and dominated the trade unions. Therefore these organizations were called on to replace the factory committees. A proposed All-Russian Congress of Factory Committees was forestalled by Bolshevik plans for a Congress of Trade Unions.² During November and December the Bolsheviks issued decrees enacting many of the labour reforms desired by the unions, although these usually remained dead letters. The eight hour day was proclaimed,³ a workers' social insurance scheme was decreed,⁴ and the unions were called on to administer

¹. Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.27. The control was never exercised.
³. Carr. op.cit. 2:104.
⁴. Bunyan and Fisher. op.cit., p.308. This quotes the decree.
the reforms. The All-Russian Council of Trade Unions was granted thirty-five seats in VTsIK. In this way the Bolsheviks sought to retain the support of organized labour.

In January, 1918, the first All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions met, at which the problem of the status of the unions was introduced. The Bolsheviks called for subordination of the unions to the government, while the remaining Mensheviks argued for independent unions, since the revolution in their view, would result in a capitalist state in which the need for unions would remain. Martov labeled Lenin's seizure of power as foredoomed to failure, and claimed that the government could not maintain a proletarian approach in the face of a hostile Europe. What was to be the function of unions in an economy in which the state was the employer? Should the unions remain part of the government? Such were the questions debated. To further complicate the issue, spokesmen of the Soviet demanded that unions take orders from them. Mikhail Tomsky, the independent-thinking president of the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions, pointed out that his organization had already been granted an official position in the government. Many delegates argued that compulsion would ruin unions and therefore they could not be made part of the government.

The final resolution issued by the Congress gave evidence of the

1. Deutscher. Unions, p.22. At this time VTsIK contained 101 members.
2. Of the 416 delegates, 273 were Bolsheviks and 66 were Mensheviks. Carr. op.cit. 2:105.
3. Deutscher. Unions, p.20. Even such Bolsheviks as Myazanov and Lozovsky supported this view.
4. See above, p.120.
conflicting opinions. The unions pledged support to the government in essential matters such as "organizing production, organization of workers' control, registration and redistribution of the labour force, and organization of exchange between town and countryside." Although they agreed that "in their developed forms the trade unions should, in the process of the present socialist revolution, become organs of socialist power... and will inevitably be transformed into organs of the socialist state", they refused to declare themselves part of the new administration. For a time they would remain outside the formal framework. There was no decision as to whether the unions should be allowed to strike, but Zinoviev promised, on behalf of the government, to permit strikes. "The factory and workshop committees should become local organs of the corresponding trade unions" through "Control Distributive Commissions", half elected by the factory committees and half appointed by the trade unions. The unions retained the right to administer the new social insurance schemes, thus overlapping the field of the Commissariat of Labour. Indeed, before March, 1918, the unions had virtual control of the Commissariat.

Although the Bolsheviks were now in control of the state, they were unable to begin their planned subordination of the unions because of the outbreak of the civil war. In the period of confusion the union membership had grown to 3,500,000, and the unions transformed themselves into organs

1. Bunyan and Fisher. op.cit., p.639. This quotes the resolution.
2. Carr. op.cit. 2:105.
of the civil war. As the situation became critical, the need for regulation of labour appeared and this responsibility was assumed by the unions. They organized supply services, listed their members for the armed forces, and attempted to raise the productivity of labour. On April 3, 1918, regulations called on local unions to establish norms of production and threatened expulsion from the union to members who refused to submit to discipline. The reintroduction of piece rate pay was suggested, arousing opposition from the Left Communists, who felt this clashed with the theory of equality of labour.

The unions and the government combined to force labour to an all-out effort during the civil war. In July the Commissariat of Labour, now dominated by the unions, was granted the power to force its decisions on wage arbitrations. The Commissariat of Labour, on October 5, 1918 issued instructions to begin labour conscription of the bourgeoisie. "Labour Books" were issued to the bourgeoisie, to be stamped by their employers, and these had to be produced to receive food ration cards or travel permits. Five days later VTsIK adopted the first labour code of the R.S.F.S.R., which compelled workers to accept positions offered to them. The final step in subordinating labour occurred on October 31, when a decree of

1. 50% of their members were called.
2. Carr. op.cit. 2:110.
3. Ibid., 2:198.
4. Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.94. This quotes the decree.
5. Carr. op.cit. 2:199.
Sovnarkom announced compulsory labour duty.\textsuperscript{1}

The Second All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions, convened in January 1919, once more was faced with the problem of the status of the trade unions.\textsuperscript{2} This Congress accepted the strengthened position of the unions, outlawed strike action, recognized the power of the unions over the Commissariat of Labour,\textsuperscript{3} and adopted a national wage policy. This wage policy divided the workers into groups, in each of which there were twelve wage stages. The ratio of the lowest to the highest in each group was set at 1:1.75.\textsuperscript{4} The process of union cooperation with the government seemed to be advancing. The unions were given representation on the Supreme Council of National Economy, a body formed by the government to manage the national industrial trusts.\textsuperscript{5}

The official party program, issued in March, 1919, unsuccessfully attempted to clarify the position which the unions were to occupy.\textsuperscript{6} The fifth point stated: "The organizational apparatus of socialized industry ought to be based, in the first instance, on the trade union,...the trade unions ought in the end actually to concentrate in their hands all the

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.96. Exempted were those under sixteen, over fifty or incapacitated through injury or illness.
\item[2.] Of 600 delegates, 450 were Bolshevik. Carr. op.cit. 2:200.
\item[3.] Rostow. op.cit., p.60. He points out that the unions were allowed to name the Commissar.
\item[4.] The minimum was set at 600 rubles a month; maximum, 3,000 rubles. A Commissar was to receive 2,000 rubles. Carr. op.cit. 2:203.
\item[5.] Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.91. This gives the decree which founded the Council. The unions appointed 30 of the 70 members.
\item[6.] Ibid., p.113. This quotes the economic section of the program.
\end{itemize}
administration of the national economy." This appeared to be a "Magna Carta" for the unions, and conflicted with previous Bolshevik pronouncements. The term may have been prompted by the gratitude of the party to the unions for their part in the civil war,\(^1\) since other points in the program appeared to conflict with this principle. For example, the power of labour distribution was granted to the Soviets; unions were asked to cooperate with bourgeois technicians, and higher salaries were sanctioned for technicians and scientists. A month later, forced labour camps were instituted to carry out unpleasant labour.\(^2\)

As the positions of the unions, of the Supreme Council of National Economy and of the Commissariat of Labour became more confused, the party insisted on its control through the party cells. At the Eighth Party Conference in December 1919, the rights and prerogatives of the cells were defined. Wherever three party members belonged to a trade union, they were obliged to form a cell (frakstya) and to take orders from the local party committee. If the frakstya included many members, it was to elect a bureau to take charge of party work within the union. The party committee had the last word in any dispute and had the right of appointment or dismissal of frakstya members. The frakstya proposed candidates for union offices, discussed all issues prior to union meetings and voted as a bloc at such meetings. Thus, the Communist trade unionist was a Communist first and a trade unionist afterwards.

As the civil war appeared to be drawing to a close, the Ninth Party

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1. Deutscher. Union, p.29. He supports this contention.
Congress in 1920 began to discuss the program for a return to peace. Its decisions caused difficulty later, since the Bolsheviks were not fully aware of the ruin caused by the war and of the popular discontent. The Congress proposed continued conscription of men and wealth, the socialization of all industry, the prohibition of private trade, the compulsory direction of labour and the continuation of rationing and other aspects of "war Communism".

There were two major points at issue at this Party Congress: should there be individual or committee management of industry, and should the party adopt "labour armies" or not? The resolution on individual management was opposed by the unions, but Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin pointed out that industrial directors appointed by the Soviets would in reality owe their appointment to the workers. The final resolution on this issue suggested the appointment of trade unionists where available as industrial managers, or the appointment of a bourgeois specialist with a trade union commissar or two trade unionists as assistant managers. Where a management commission had been successful, the institution might be continued.

The scheme of labour armies was proposed by Trotsky as "the establishment of a regime in which every worker feels himself a soldier of labour. If he does not carry out his orders, he will be a deserter who is punished." The idea of conscripting labour for industry was an old

1. Deutscher. Unions, pp.34-8. This deals with the discussion.

2. This was an attempt to transfer a technique, successful in the Red army, to the field of industry.

3. Carr. op.cit. 2:212. This quotes Trotsky.
Tsarist tradition. The rebirth of the idea had been the outgrowth of the use, in various industries, of Red army troops, who could not be demobilized because of transportation difficulties. The Politburo was able to force a feeble acceptance of the proposal.

However, at the Third Congress of Trade Unions (April, 1920), Trotsky was forced to defend his scheme against determined critics. Trotsky argued that in a socialized state logic demanded that "a man must work in order not to die", and the state had the right to use labour in the way it considered necessary.\(^1\) At the same Congress, wage scales were given a greater differential (1:2) as an incentive, and a scheme was established whereby trade unions were to administer a system of monetary and produce bonuses. Opposition to party interference grew under the leadership of Tomsky. Although Tomsky was a party member, as a unionist he opposed the renewed attempts to subordinate the unions to the party.

At the end of the civil war transportation was in a chaotic condition and the government decided to allow Trotsky an opportunity to demonstrate his methods. Placed at the head of the Central Committee of Transport, he dismissed the railway union leaders and militarized the railway labour force with some success. Trotsky now demanded that his program be instituted in other industries. The unions protested, and in September, 1920 called for a halt to all intervention in union activities.\(^2\) The issue led to an obvious split within the party and was a matter of public debate through the winter of 1920-1921.

\(^1\) Deutscher. Unions, p.37.

\(^2\) Carr. op. cit. 2:221.
The Tenth Party Congress (March, 1921) was faced with the necessity of defining the official attitude of the Communist party. Three resolutions were presented to the Congress. The Trotsky faction desired "statification" of trade unions as "production unions", primarily interested in raising production. They suggested joint sessions of the Central Council of Trade Unions and the Supreme Council of National Economy, in which the unions would become subordinate to the economic administration, but would replace the Commissariat of Labour, thus becoming part of the government.

The Workers' Opposition based their claims on the fifth point of the 1919 Party Program, asking that complete economic administration be granted to the unions. The unions would elect managers, approve all appointments in the administrative-economic fields and generally dominate the state. The Workers' Opposition favoured payment in kind, the free supply of a basic food ration, and free travel, education, lodging and entertainment for the workers.

The "Platform of the Ten" was an attempt to find a middle path, although Lenin felt the greater danger was posed by the Workers' Opposition. This platform, after reaffirming the fifth point of the party's economic program, called for subordination of union policy to the

1. Deutscher, Unions, pp. 43-9 and Carr. op.cit. 2:223-7 discuss these platforms.
2. Trotsky, Bukharin, Andreev, Dzerzhinsky, Krestinsky, Larin, Sokolnikov.
129.

government. However, the unions would not be "statified", but would provide a social base for the dictatorship of the proletariat and a school of Communism for their members.¹

The reorganization of the trade unions from above would be utterly inexpedient. The methods of a workers' democracy, severely curtailed in three years of the most savage civil war, ought to be reestablished, in the first instance and on the widest scale, in the trade union movement. It is necessary that the leading bodies of the trade unions should in actual fact be elected and broadly based.²

Meanwhile, the economic system was completely disrupted and the Kronstadt rising demonstrated the seriousness of the Communist position. The party could count on not even the full proletariat since the Workers' Opposition represented a revolt against party tactics. The Party Central Committee, working through its frakstya, demoted Tomsky and assumed more complete control in the Central Council of the Trade Unions. The resolution of the "Platform of the Ten" was adopted by 336 votes, to 50 for Trotsky and 18 for the Workers' Opposition. The Congress had decided that unions should remain non-governmental and this now became part of the official policy.³ The fact that this issue was not even debated at the Fourth Congress of the Trade Unions, held one month later, was an indication of how completely the party now controlled the unions.

The New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) which was also introduced at the

¹. While the party had only 500,000 members, union membership had expanded steadily from 1,500,000 in 1917 to 2,600,000 in 1918, 3,500,000 in 1919, 4,300,000 in 1920 and 7,000,000 in 1921. Membership in the unions was compulsory. Deutscher. Unions, p.44.

². Ibid., p.49. This quotes a speech by Lenin.

³. Although in practice, the Soviets soon adopted a program very similar to Trotsky's "statification".
Tenth Party Congress, complicated the position of the unions, although this was not immediately apparent. Some officials thought that this called for a return to pre-war unionism; others thought that they should adopt a dual attitude: work for higher production in state-owned industries, and fight for more privileges in private industries. It was obvious that if wages rose perceptibly in private industry, workers would soon flock to it, since N.E.P. involved a return to the free labour market. The Communist party was soon to solve the problem for the unions so that the issue never became critical.

The subordination of the unions, the method by which the party hoped to remove the anomaly, now began to proceed once more. At the Fourth Congress of Trade Unions (May, 1921) the unions were further centralized with the establishment of local inter-union organs under direct control of the Central Council of Trade Unions, a body which was dominated by the party.¹ In February, 1922, the trade unions adopted a Politburo resolution recognizing the unions' duty to secure wages as high as possible, admitting the possibility of strikes, establishing conciliation commissions and making union membership voluntary.² It was to be expected, then, that the question of the status of trade unions would once more become an issue at the next Party Congress (March, 1922). Union influence was then further curtailed: "Unions should not assume directly any functions of control over production in private businesses and in businesses leased to private hands."³ This was a reversal in Communist

¹ Carr. op.cit. 2:325.
² Ibid. 2:327.
policy. Remaining factory committees were to be replaced with individual managers, and industrial managers alone should fix wages and rations.

This caused a split in the Central Council of the Trade Unions, with the result that Tomsky, who opposed this policy, was appointed to a commission being sent to Turkestan. This Congress took another step towards destroying the democratic constitution of the trade unions by decreeing that central and regional union leaders had to be party members of long standing.¹ Even the control of social insurance was now transferred to the Commissariat of Labour.

During 1922 party control over the unions was extended. Unions lost the right to direct labour transfers and the Commissar of Labour was given the right of compulsory arbitration. In September, at the Fifth Congress of Trade Unions, Tomsky was reinstated, but the unions were ordered to reduce the number of strikes.²

Actually, the results of the return to partial capitalism did not affect the unions in the way that many unionists hoped. Only a few workers were involved in private industry and the gradual statification of trade unions continued. In building a monolithic state, the unions had to be subordinated. The Bolsheviks had used the unions to help consolidate their position and had allowed the unions considerable power during the critical days of the civil war. However, in spite of earlier Bolshevik pronouncements, the Communists, faced with the growing might of the trade unions, had begun, before 1923, systematically to impose party domination on the labour movement.

¹ Ibid., p.65. See also Carr. op.cit. 2:328.
² 1922 saw 102 strikes involving 43,000 workers. Carr. op.cit. 2:329.
CHAPTER VIII

THE KOMINTERN
"The program of the Communist party is a scheme not only for the liberation of the proletariat of one country, but for the emancipation of the proletariat of the whole world, for it is a program of international revolution."¹ It was therefore to be expected that the party would make an effort to develop techniques which would precipitate this world wide revolution of the proletariat, or would at least enable the Soviet Union to continue to exist in a hostile capitalist world. The Komintern emerged as an organization interested primarily in the former of these objectives, but which, before Lenin's death, was gradually remodelled by the Communist party into a tool, useful in preserving the lone proletarian state.²

The Komintern traced its ancestry to the Socialist Internationals previously developed in Western Europe. The First Socialist International, which was founded in London by Marx and Engels, and which existed from 1864 to 1872, was the original exponent of "class struggle" and "dictatorship of the proletariat". It had ended in failure as a result of a split between the supporters of the nihilism of Bakunin and the socialism of Marx. The belief in a strict interpretation of doctrine, demonstrated by this party split, became a foundation of Bolshevik theory. The central

¹. Batsell, op.cit., p.755. This quotes a speech of May, 1918 by Bukharin.

². In dealing with the Komintern, the writer has limited himself to tracing its development and its links with the Communist party of the Soviet Union. See Seton-Watson, H. From Lenin to Malenkov. Frederick A. Praeger, New York. 1955, for an excellent study of the history of world Communism. See also Fischer, L. The Soviets in world affairs. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 1951. This provides information on the relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.
theme of the International's 1864 Statute: "The liberation of the working class can be achieved only by the working class itself".\(^1\) was later adopted by the Komintern.

The Second Socialist International was founded in 1889, and, as far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, collapsed in 1914.\(^2\) This was a triumph of Marxist Socialism, and included a wide range of powerful national organizations of workers. However, Marx had claimed that workers had no fatherland,\(^3\) and as the crisis of 1914 approached, nationalism proved too strong for the loose union. At the Brussels Congress of the International in 1890, the left wing had proposed a resolution calling for a workers' refusal to support any war except a socialist one, but had been defeated. At the Zurich Congress in 1903 the proposal for a general strike in case of war had also been defeated. The danger caused by growing military forces was becoming critical and the previous socialist distinction between an offensive and defensive war was growing blurred.\(^4\)

Lenin prophesied a break in the International's unity while at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907. This Congress passed resolutions condemning imperialism, militarism and colonialism, although German delegates wavered on the last one. The left wing then advanced a resolution calling for workers "to do all in their power to utilize the economic and political crisis caused by the war to rouse the peoples, and thereby to hasten the

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2. Actually it was reorganized after the war, but it was not recognized by Communist parties.
abolition of capitalist class rule."¹ This rejected resolution was to become the cornerstone for the foundation of the Third International.

Relations between the International and the Bolsheviks rapidly became strained. An emergency Congress at Basel in 1912, convened to discuss the international situation, drew only five Bolshevik among thirty-six Russian delegates. Lenin was too intent on the split in the Social Democratic party to attend the International which he had already doomed. A meeting in London in 1913 called on the Russian socialists to unite and thus present a solid front. On July 16, 1914, a Subcommission on Russian Unity reiterated this demand, but the Bolshevik representative read a statement from Lenin: "Let those who want unity with us unconditionally accept the decisions of the Prague Party Congress and unconditionally submit to the institutions created by it."² The meeting prepared to denounce the Bolshevik tactics to the next Congress, but the war intervened.

With the outbreak of fighting, war fever gripped many socialist parties; they became "defencist,"³ took posts in capitalist governments and deserted their pre-war resolutions.⁴ Lenin was incensed when the German, French and English socialists supported the war effort, and determined to cause a split in the International, thus adapting one of the techniques of party control to the wider situation. Early in

¹. Ibid., p.600.
². Ibid., p.610.
³. The Bolsheviks used the term "defencist" to describe those who used the excuse of defending their country to support the war effort.
⁴. Plekhanov and even some of the Bolsheviks supported the war effort.
September, 1914, Lenin gathered a few leftists and read the "Berne Theses" which condemned the war, castigated Socialists who had voted war credits, declared that the Second International had collapsed, and called on Social Democracy to work for a revolution "to fight the leaders of the present International who have betrayed Socialism."

International socialism was not entirely dormant during the war. Since Italy could claim no obligation justifying her entrance into the war, the Socialist opposition was strongest there. The Italians and the Swiss, therefore, in 1915, called a conference at Zimmerwald of those opposed to the war. Lenin, Zinoviev, Radek and three others formed a left-wing minority which called on the workers to unite in a fight for peace without annexations or indemnities, to seize control from the capitalists, and to found a Third International. At a further conference at Kienthal in 1916, the majority favoured Lenin's stand at Zimmerwald, but Lenin had decided to precipitate a definite split with the International, so he demanded more radical action, which included laying down arms and turning on the capitalists.

Following the March uprising in 1917, Lenin proceeded in an attempt to institute his plans for a Third International. The tenth of Lenin's April Theses stated as a party aim, "renewal of the International; initiative in founding a revolutionary International, an International against

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1. Carr. op. cit. 3:567. See also Wolfe. op. cit., p.636.
3. The German Spartakist group made the difference.
the 'Social Chauvinists' and against the 'Center'.\textsuperscript{1} A resolution adopted at the Bolshevik Party Conference of May, 1917 called for "founding the Third International which will break definitely with the national defence Socialists, and energetically combat the conciliatory policy of the Center. The new Socialist International can be founded only by the working masses themselves."\textsuperscript{2} However, the new regime was too busy to implement the plan, and it remained a dream for Lenin until 1919. One step was taken shortly after the seizure of power, when the Bolshevik leaders appropriated two million rubles to carry out their international aims.\textsuperscript{3} Then too, in March 1918, at the Seventh Party Congress the Bolsheviks formally broke with the Second International.\textsuperscript{4}

The actual formation of the Komintern followed nearly a year of relative inactivity. The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918) isolated Russia from the world and progress on plans for the International came to a halt. However, the announcement that the Second International planned to convene a conference in order to reorganize, led the Bolsheviks to broadcast an invitation,\textsuperscript{5} two days prior to the Second International conference, (December, 1918), calling on all interested groups to send delegates to an organizational Congress of the Third International. In

\textsuperscript{1} Carr. op.cit. 3:569. Meisel and Kozera. op.cit., p.5. This gives the April Theses.

\textsuperscript{2} deBasily. op.cit., p.71.

\textsuperscript{3} Batsell. op.cit., p.758.

\textsuperscript{4} Schapiro. op.cit., p.131.

\textsuperscript{5} Another instance in which the Bolsheviks utilized the radio to their advantage.
March, 1919, fifty delegates met in Moscow, all but two of whom were either Russian or foreign Communists who happened to be in Moscow when the Congress began.¹

The first phase of the life of Komintern, including the first two Congresses and coinciding roughly with the period of the civil war in Russia, has been termed its "Heroic Period", in which there was widespread revolutionary enthusiasm. Lenin had adopted the Marxist theory of the inevitability of world revolution, and most of the Bolsheviks felt that such a revolution was essential in order for them to remain in power.² They conceived of the Komintern as an agency for explaining the process of the socialist revolution to other nations. Attempts to incite foreign revolutions dominated Bolshevik international activities for the first few years of the Red regime. For example, Trotsky argued that laying down their arms prior to Brest-Litovsk would arouse the workers of Germany to revolt.³ In spite of the fact that Russia was thus vitally interested in international affairs, until 1920 the Reds had no direct relations with other governments,⁴ because of the hostility of the western countries. The Komintern, as a result, though not intended as a tool of Moscow, became essential to Bolshevik aims as Russia's main contact with foreign countries.

¹. The two who managed to get through the hostile forces were the German, Eberlein and the Austrian, Steinhardt. Seton-Watson. op.cit., p.68.
². Florinsky. op.cit., p.33.
³. Ibid., p.37. The German workers would then realize that their government was carrying on a war of aggression.
⁴. Except for a brief interlude of Joffe's appointment to Berlin.
As the strategical and tactical problems of the Third International were unique, its structure would certainly differ from that of the earlier Internationals. It was therefore natural that the Bolsheviks should apply the principles of party organization to the International, and thus Lenin argued for a small select body, with a strongly centralized party control. However, since it was generally felt that revolution was imminent, and that the Komintern would merely "throw the match into the powder keg", little organization was attempted at the First Congress. The Congress was more a gesture than a potent weapon, and contented itself with issuing simple propaganda. Zinoviev was elected president of Komintern, and the same leaders dominated this Congress as controlled the Russian Communist party. The Congress condemned the League of Nations as "the Holy Alliance of the bourgeoisie for the suppression of the proletarian revolution." A manifesto was issued to the workers of the world, praising the Soviet form of government and emphasizing the need of supporting the colonial peoples in their struggle.

During its first year of existence, the Komintern remained a source of propaganda only and was unable to offer much assistance to the Communist movements in Hungary, Finland, Poland or Germany. On May 1, 1919, the first issue of the Kommunisticheski Internatsional, which was soon to be published in many languages, appeared in Moscow. Zinoviev wrote the

1. deBasily. op.cit., p.120. See also Salvadori, M. The rise of modern Communism, p.29. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1952.

2. Bolshevik delegates were Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Stalin, Bukharin and Chicherin. Batsell. op.cit., p.760.

3. Florinsky. op.cit., p.49.

4. Seton-Watson. op.cit., p.69. See also Carr. op.cit. 3:123.
first leading editorial, in which he boasted of the three Soviet republics (Russia, Hungary and Bavaria), claimed that Germany would be next, and prophesied that within a year, "under the flag of the Third International, the working class will be victorious throughout the entire world."¹

The Second Congress of Komintern, which convened in Moscow in July, 1920, retained the spirit of optimism which had characterized the First Congress.² Soviet Russia had survived and was in the process of defeating Poland; the world revolution was still in sight, and although other Communist risings had been quelled, Lenin maintained that their failure was caused by the lack of unity among the proletariat, for which he blamed the remnant of the Second International.³ Zinoviev altered his prophecy from success in one year to success in two or perhaps three years.

The Second Congress approved five documents which became in effect the platform of the Komintern. The most important of these was Lenin's Twenty-one Theses on the duties of Komintern members.⁴ The major terms decreed that member parties were bound to fight "reformism", "Center tendencies" and pacifism; to form nuclei in national trade unions, and fight the Trade Union International;⁵ to spread propaganda in their national armed forces; to make special efforts to win peasant support; to back

¹. Florinsky. op.cit., p.44.
². 200 delegates from various countries. Zinoviev was reelected leader.
³. Ibid., p.51.
⁵. It was formed before the war by the Second International.
movements for the emancipation of national and colonial peoples; to set up "clandestine organizations" even where their party was legal; to support all Soviet republics; to base their party organization on "democratic centralism", carrying out periodic purges; and to accept all decisions of Congresses of the Komintern.

The second document was a resolution on the role of the Communist party in the proletarian revolution. The party was described as the "lever of political organization...directing the mass of proletariat." The resolution called for restricted membership in all Communist parties based on "democratic centralism", in which the upper body was to be elected by the lower bodies within the party, but was to have complete power over them. This system was based on the Russian model. Lenin also presented theses on nationalism, calling for an international brotherhood of workers and Komintern assistance for oppressed people and Communists in backward countries. Another resolution regarding Soviets called for replacement of bourgeois governments by Soviets or dictatorships of the workers, as had occurred in Russia. The final theses dealt with the agrarian question along the lines advocated by the Russian Communist party.

The same Congress passed the Statute of the Komintern in an attempt to provide a solid organization. The first article defined the Komintern aims: "To overthrow capitalism and establish the dictatorship of the

3. Ibid., p.770.
4. Ibid., p.772.
proletariat and the international Soviet republic." It established an annual world Congress as the supreme authority and an Executive Committee of between fifteen and eighteen members as the interim authority. These Committee members were to be appointed by the national parties, and five were to be appointed by the national party of the nation in which Komintern's headquarters was established. Russian leadership was assured by this last clause. During 1920 the Mensheviks criticized the subordination of the Third International to the interests of the Russian Communists.

Lenin maintained, contrary to orthodox Marxist theory, that backward countries need not go through the stage of capitalism prior to their socialist revolution if Soviet governments aided them. This turned the interest of Komintern to the colonial countries as the weak links in the capitalist system. Russia took the lead in an attempt to make use of her position as the "middle man" between Europe and Asia. During 1919, Russia cancelled Persia's debt, relinquished Russian claims in Persia, and granted similar concessions to other Eastern countries. Then the Executive Committee of Komintern called a Congress of Eastern Peoples, to meet in Baku in September, 1920. Zinoviev was elected president by the 1,891 delegates who represented thirty-two national groups. He called for a struggle against imperialism and promised Communist aid for national

1. Florinsky, op.cit., p.55.
2. Carr, op.cit. 3:198.
5. Ibid., p.59.
and revolutionary elements. Many who attended the gathering were not Communists and either opposed the Komintern or were indifferent to it.¹

The Congress finally organized a "Council for Propaganda and Action of Eastern Peoples", which had no clear powers and never developed further.

The period from 1921 to 1923, which coincided with the growth of the N.E.P., witnessed a retreat in the Komintern. The Communists had suffered defeats in Germany, Bulgaria, Poland and elsewhere. The delay in the spread of the revolution and the necessity for self-preservation, of entering into amicable relations with other nations forced Russia to review its policy. Russia had found that the propaganda issued by the Komintern led to blockade and foreign aid to the White armies. In order to escape this difficulty the doctrine was advanced that the Komintern was independent of Soviet Russia,² and therefore Russia should not be held responsible for the Komintern policies. The propaganda method of inciting revolution obviously had been unsuccessful since Communism had not taken control elsewhere, and a revision of tactics became necessary.

Readjustment took place in 1921. A revision in the Communist foreign policy occurred, similar to the N.E.P. in internal policy. At the Tenth Party Congress (1921) Lenin indicated the change:

We have learned in the course of the last three years that our stake in international revolution does not mean that we expect it to materialize within a definite period of time,... therefore we must coordinate our activities with the relationships existing among the various classes in our own country and

¹. Zinoviev asked a Persian delegate what a Communist was, and received the reply, "A man who is an enemy of England!" Ibid., p.60.

². Ibid., p.63. This doctrine became more prominent later as the U.S.S.R. attempted to disclaim responsibility for Komintern policies.
abroad, in order thereby to maintain for a protracted time the dictatorship of the proletariat. 1

This aroused much opposition within the Communist party. 2 Kamenev defended the new approach by characterizing such agreements as the March, 1921 trade treaty with England as "agreements with capitalists which are merely a new form of the struggle for the consolidation of Communism." 3

The Third Congress of Komintern convened in June, 1921, in a much more sober atmosphere. The leaders had to admit that the bourgeoisie had shown a greater ability to adapt than had been expected, and the world revolution was now a matter of years and not months away. The Komintern had to retreat on the Eastern activities since many of the countries (Britain for example) which Russia was trying to approach had colonies in that area. Zinoviev's report contained only three sentences on the Council of Propaganda, formed in 1920. 4 Even the technique of "splitting" national parties, which had been adopted in the "Twenty-one Theses", had to be abandoned in favour of further unity.

The Congress was concerned mainly with tactics which would organize and agitate for a remote struggle and prepare great proletarian armies. As Radek expressed it, "Communist parties are to exercise influence upon

1. Ibid., p. 83. This quotes Lenin.


3. Florinsky. op. cit., p. 85.


5. This included expulsion of dissenting minorities and party purges.
the spontaneous movements of the proletariat, unite them, intensify them and turn them into a struggle for power."¹ Lenin added, "Communists were not to confine themselves to propaganda, but to utilize every avenue which bourgeois society is compelled to leave open for agitation and for organization of the proletariat; the free press, the right of association and the bourgeois parliamentary institutions."² The Communist parties were to take their orders from the Komintern, and were to aim particularly at armies, since this had been successful in Russia.

The most important new policy decreed by the Congress was expressed by the slogan "To the Masses", and ordered Communist organizations to take part in the everyday petty struggles of the workers. They were to assist in all workers' organization, to form underground revolutionary groups and to win over the trade unions.³ The Congress rejected the idea that a small Communist minority in a capitalist country might precipitate a revolt. They could, however, take advantage of other crises, but were to refrain from armed uprising unless success seemed a certainty. These policies were the target for severe criticisms from the Left Communist groups, but remained central in the following years.

At this Third Congress, the Russian Workers' Opposition petitioned for Komintern support against the Russian Communist Party Central Committee.⁴ This appeal by a minority of a national Communist party implied

¹. Florinsky. op.cit., p.97.
². Batsell. op.cit., p.773. This quotes Lenin.
³. Florinsky. op.cit., p.97.
⁴. Schapiro. op.cit., p.332.
that the Komintern was an unprejudiced international body, whereas it was dominated by the Russian delegation. In February, 1922, after the Congress, this petition was extended to a written appeal, signed by twenty-two members of the Workers' Opposition. They described the complete party domination, the control of trade unions, the practice of house-to-house searches and other complaints. However, the decision of the Executive Committee was a foregone conclusion and the investigating commission declared the complaints exaggerations.

The members of the Komintern looked more and more to Soviet Russia as the leader and model. This uncovered a dilemma in Komintern policy. The Bolsheviks, in retaining power, had made use of both the hostility of the workers for the capitalists, and every possible split between the capitalist countries. Komintern could not pursue both policies, since aiding one capitalist state against another appeared to contradict Marxist philosophy, and would certainly antagonize the workers in the countries concerned. This prompted suggestions that the interests of the R.S.F.S.R. might oppose those of the Komintern or some of its member parties. In July, 1921, Trotsky attempted to refute this by pointing out that Soviet Russia could survive only if the revolution spread, and thus, surely, Russia's policies would coincide with those of the Komintern in working towards such a revolution. Both were now forced to retreat, but at the opportune time both could advance once more.

2. Ibid. 3:397. Trotsky presented this argument at a Congress of the Communist Youth International, meeting after the Third Congress of Komintern.
Various techniques were employed after the Third Congress in order to put the slogan "To the Masses" into effect. Komintern recognized and encouraged various specialized international agencies. The Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern) was organized with the object of wooing national trade unions away from the Amsterdam Trade Union International, which had the support of the Second International. The Communist Youth International received official recognition and support. There were also attempts to organize "fellow-traveller" societies, which would widen the party's appeal.

Another technique which developed after December, 1921, was the "United Workers' Front", in which Communist parties would cooperate with any groups opposing capitalism, such as anarchists or syndicalists, but in which the Communist organizations would retain their identity. Lenin suggested supporting the leaders in such a movement "as the rope supports the man who is being hanged." Where the Communist party was illegal, such a "Front" was not possible, but the "Front" did achieve some success in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Great Britain. An unsuccessful attempt was made to form a united front even with the Second International and the Center, or so-called "Two-and-a-Half-International."

The Fourth Congress of November, 1922, the last Congress which Lenin attended, marked the end of the dramatic period of Komintern. The Soviet

1. "Krasnyi Internatsional Professional'nykh Soyuzov"

2. These included such organizations as the International Workers' Aid Society and the National Unemployed Workers' Movement. Ibid. 3:404.

3. Ibid. 3:407.

4. Ibid. 3:408-9. Carr discusses this interlude.
regime in Russia appeared to have made great strides. After signing the trade agreement with Britain, Russia had been represented at the Genoa Conference of April 10 to May 19, 1922, which considered Russia's situation and general economic problems. On April 16, Russia signed the Rapallo Treaty forming an alliance with Germany in which reparations were renounced and economic concessions were granted. The U.S.S.R. had been formed, and the N.E.P. seemed to be functioning successfully. However, the world revolution appeared no nearer. The Komintern could only remain on the defensive and fortify Soviet Russia as its only hope. The Fourth Congress therefore added little to the aims, methods and procedures of Komintern, but reviewed its progress and emphasized the "United Workers' Front".  

The prestige and authority of Soviet Russia overtopped all, and the Russian Communists succeeded in altering the organization of Komintern so that it followed still more closely the organization of Lenin's party. Komintern Congresses were held irregularly after 1922, since the Central Committee was given power to invite delegates to attend its sessions, thus forming miniature Congresses. The Central Executive was enlarged to twenty-five, and was no longer appointed by the national parties, but was elected by the Congresses, in which Russia held a majority. Centralization followed the Russian model in that a Praesidium of the Executive was recognized, (similar to the Politburo) and it was to set up an organization committee

1. Florinsky. op.cit., p.103. See also Batsell. op.cit., p.775.

2. Carr. op.cit. 3:394. Since Russia controlled the Executive, the extra delegates were usually Russian.
Before Lenin's death the exclusive control of the Russian Communist party over Komintern was virtually complete. The Komintern had been created to organize international Communism's struggle against capitalism. During its early history it limited its activities to propaganda. However, as the possibility of the outbreak of world-wide revolution faded, the Komintern was dominated more and more by the Russian Communist party as the only Communist party actually governing a state. Komintern thus became an organ of Russia's international policy, which helped to consolidate the position of the Russian Communist party.

1. Ibid. 3:449.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION
"If we had not seized power in November, we would not have seized it at all."¹ Thus Trotsky acknowledged the debt owed by the Bolshevik party to the combination of particularly favorable circumstances which existed at the time of the November coup. A brief survey of these factors may clarify some of the reasons for the party's preliminary success. As a minority party, under normal conditions, the Bolsheviks had small hope of successfully gaining power.² However, increasing antagonism to the war gained support for the Bolsheviks from other less radical parties, such as the Left Socialist Revolutionaries and Martov's Menshevik Internationalists, who opposed the Socialist "defencist" stand. This was the major internal factor favoring the coup. Then too, the scruples of Kerensky and the moderate socialists of the Provisional Government also encouraged radical action. In their desire to discard completely the autocratic practices of the Tsar, the government remained inactive during the crisis, when effective and timely measures could have halted the Bolsheviks.³ The opposition hesitated to take up arms to halt the Bolshevik upsurge. This hesitancy and lack of unity was particularly noteworthy at the time when the Constituent Assembly was dismissed. Trotsky contemptuously describes the delegates arriving, "armed with candles and sandwiches" in case the Bolsheviks shut off

¹ Trotsky. Lenin, p.111.
² Although some Social Democrats followed L.A. Blanqui in believing that a revolutionary elite might accomplish the overthrow of capitalism, Lenin rejected this concept. Hammond, T.T. Leninist authoritarianism before the revolution. In Simmons. op.cit.,p.148.
³ Sukhanov. op.cit., pp.603-19. He marvels at the failure of the Provisional Government to take decisive action.
the power or attempted to starve them out.\(^1\)

In contrast, the Bolsheviks proved resolute and bold in decision. During the pre-war years Lenin had not hesitated to split his party or alter his approach in order to achieve his objectives. The crisis proved that Lenin's skill, both as a theorist and as a practical political leader, was without rival. By the end of three years of war, the Bolsheviks had harnessed the popular discontent and the Narodnik tradition to their party, and were thus assured of at least passive support from masses of workers and peasants.

External factors also contributed to the propitiousness of the times. Germany, pressed on two sides, and sensing the impending collapse of Austria-Hungary, looked with favour on a revolution which would remove the threat to her eastern border.\(^2\) Lack of unity among the allies gave the Bolsheviks encouragement that opposition to their coup might fail to develop in strength. This lack of unity was extended to the population of the individual nations. There were strong indications that labour and socialist groups, in England and France particularly, would wield sufficient power to cripple any attempt to crush the Leninist uprising.

Although the original Bolshevik success in gaining power might be attributed largely to luck, the retention of power depended on the party's

\(^1\) Moore, Barrington, Soviet politics; the dilemma of power, p. 120. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1950.

\(^2\) German willingness to allow Lenin and other Bolsheviks to travel through Germany was a symptom of this.
skill in developing and using various techniques. Once in power, the Communists were able to utilize the picture of a Socialist Russia, as a base for world revolution, surrounded by hostile nations, to justify an indefinite postponement of such idealistic aims as welfare legislation and abolition of the autocracy, and to excuse the initiation of the various techniques of retaining power. Through the preceding chapters, the writer has attempted to trace the background of these methods to Tsarist autocratic practices and Marxist doctrine as interpreted by Lenin, to outline the distinctive contribution which the Bolsheviks made, and to analyze the effects of the national and international situations on the developing pattern. Lenin had been eminently successful in solving problems as they arose. In his last article, Lenin reminded his followers of Napoleon's maxim, which he felt applied to Communist practice, "On s'engage et puis...on voit."¹

In the period from 1917 to 1923, the policy developed was governed by two crises. To meet the crisis of the civil war and foreign intervention, a series of improvisations known as "war Communism" was adopted. "War Communism" was successful to the extent that it allowed the Bolsheviks to retain power, but it brought with it serious political unrest and a decline in production. The New Economic Policy² was a general policy advanced to meet the new crisis. In effect this was an adaptation of the Menshevik program after the removal of the Mensheviks. N.E.P. was successful in that the decrease in the rate of population growth halted,

¹. Moore. op.cit., p.39.
². N.E.P. It was known to its opponents as the "New Exploitation of the Proletariat".
and industrial production gradually regained its prewar levels.¹

The various specific techniques were developed within these general policies, and were conditioned by them. Centralization of party control was the first requisite for success. The erection of a strong party surrounding a firm core of Communists was the primary technique of control. The Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat were designed to accomplish this aim. As early as October, 1917, the trend of limiting the decision-making power to a small group had become evident. This became permanent with the establishment of the Politburo in March, 1919. The Central Committee met less and less frequently as the efficient, speedy Politburo took over its duties.² Lenin's position within the party led naturally to further centralization and strong influence by a single leader.³ Adoption of Lenin's own proposals for Brest-Litovsk was an early example of this trend. Although it was more an art than a technique, Lenin was a master at subordinating individuals of almost equal ability to his own. This ability was valuable in enforcing centralized control within the party. The struggle at the Tenth Party Congress over the role of trade unions was one of the last public controversies within the party. In only three cases, Brest-Litovsk, the trade union controversy and the debate on party bureaucracy, the party cells (but not the general public) were invited to discuss party decisions. The device of Party Control

¹. Moore, op.cit., p.95.
². A party official could phone the Politburo and, within a few hours, have his suggestion implemented. Moore, op.cit., p.142. tells of one such instance.
³. This cult of the single leader was condemned by Kruschev at the Twentieth Party Congress, February, 1956.
Commissions\(^1\) reenforced the central authority, and the rank and file gradually lost influence within the party.

Allied with centralization of the party was the technique of the centralization of power within the state. This had two aspects: the development of effective state machinery, and the erection of a one-party state. The state machinery was actually modelled on the Tsarist autocracy, in spite of early promises of "All power to the Soviets". The party gradually gained control of these Soviets, and suppressed their independence at the local, regional and national levels. This was most successful at the top. Here, the theory that the Communist party was the sole representative of the proletariat, and thus had final authority, made it the ruling elite.\(^2\) The idea of the one-party state had never been officially proclaimed by the Bolsheviks prior to their coup. The fiction of opposition parties, in fact, had been continued for some time after November, 1917. In 1905 Lenin had announced to the party that alliances with non-proletarian or opposition elements were to be temporary expedients to strengthen the party position.\(^3\) The suppression of the opposition which followed was always justified by a charge of "counter-revolution".

This lumping together of anarchists, Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries and others as counter-revolutionaries was false but effective.

\(^1\) See above, p.41.

\(^2\) This might be compared to the idea that the party was the conspiratorial elite before the revolution.

\(^3\) Moore. op.cit., p.34.
The one who had control over the central party apparatus had the sole power of deciding who was in the right; the remainder were all in the wrong. In actual fact, most of the opposition was not directed against the revolution or the Soviet form of government, but against the Communist abuse of power.

In 1917, lack of experience and initiative had hampered the opposition; from 1918 to 1920, lack of armed force and inability to unite or to trust the Whites had the same effect, and by 1923 the Communists had anchored themselves too firmly to be toppled easily. Party monopoly of control, though threatened by the Kronstadt rising, was fairly secure.

A number of the techniques employed successfully by the Bolsheviks were largely adaptations of Tsarist practices. The use of the secret police and the extension of terror was one such technique. The use of terrorism through a strong bureaucracy and secret police had been renounced by Lenin prior to the seizure of power. However, the minority party was compelled to utilize repressive force in order to remain in control. Nevertheless, it was hoped that this would disappear as the state withered away. The hostility of a large part of Russia's population to the Communist regime was cited as a reason for continuing the authoritarian control. Although there was opposition to the use of terror, even within the party, after the attempt on Lenin's life of August, 1918, repression was extended, and it continued to be a potent weapon in retaining control. Indeed the use of terror was later refined by the Communists. Mere imprisonment was no longer enough and fear of execution became a major

1. See above, p.57.
deterrent to opposition.

The use of an army to crush opposition was another Tsarist technique adopted by the Communists. The army had been marked by Lenin for destruction with the bureaucracy and secret police, but the continuation of the war necessitated the erection of a new armed force. Although there had been periodic clashes of interest between the professional army and the Communist party, the party employed the techniques which had been effective in centralizing its own internal control in order to assume control over the armed forces. Then the disciplined force was, in turn, used by the party during the period of the civil war to defeat the Whites and dispose of foreign intervention.

The Communists patterned their control of the mass media on Tsarist methods, but extended this so that their propaganda was more effective than previous attempts had been. They were able to present freedom in terms which were not contradictory to their own policies, but which were acceptable to the Russians. The Russian masses came to believe that their rights and duties according to the Communist doctrine constituted true freedom.

The Communist party also developed a number of techniques distinctly its own. The most successful of these was the party cell. These small islands of Communists were used to infiltrate the government bodies, the trade unions and the Red army. In each case, the presence of a politically active minority allowed the party to gain influence in the various organizations. These cells gradually came to dominate the actions of the "host" organizations.
The techniques of party "splitting" and expelling holders of divergent opinions, used in the period of underground activity, were adopted by the party once in power. In the new situation the method was altered slightly and became the well-known "party purge". At intervals the party bureaucracy reviewed the activities of the various party members and those who appeared to be dangerous were removed from the party and were often never heard from again. In many cases there was slight justification for the selection of those purged.

The use of jargon became a technique which the Communists used to cover any action which might be unpopular. For example, Lenin justified the centralization of party control in these words:

While in the matter of ideology and of practical control of the movement and of the revolutionary struggle we need the maximum possible centralization for the proletariat, so far as concerns information on the movement, the center needs the maximum possible decentralization. We must decentralize...as much as possible the responsibility before the party of each individual member.¹

Certainly the majority would be entirely confused by such jargon!

One of the most successful techniques employed by the Communists was the utilization of willing or unwilling allies to advance their aims. Independent movements were harnessed by the Communists and discarded when they were no longer needed. This was true of the trade unions, of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries and of the national groups. N.E.P., in fact, was an attempt to use the remaining small capitalists to bolster the Communist position, and forced labour camps even made use of the party's enemies to accomplish desired ends.

¹ Schapiro. op.cit., p.343. This quotes an article by Lenin written in 1902.
The party's capacity for changing its policy and yet carrying the people with it was a technique which proved most valuable as the various crises were met. "Lenin's policy as it crystallized by 1921 - dictatorial power at any price, including the abandonment of much of the revolutionary program at home and abroad - violated important aspects of the Bolshevik beliefs." The success of the party was largely due to the ability of its leaders to improvise. The resulting bureaucratic dictatorship differed drastically from the ideals which had originally attracted supporters to the Social Democratic party.

A brief survey of the major Bolshevik aims which were altered will demonstrate the extent of the process and the value of the technique of rapid policy change. In order to justify the uprising as a socialist revolution, it had been necessary to reject one of the basic tenets of Marxism. Marx had declared that the socialist revolution would follow the breakdown of the capitalist system. The early Social Democrats therefore theorized that after the March uprising there would be a period of bourgeois democracy. However, in his April Theses, Lenin rejected this belief, and called for immediate erection of the socialist state.

Once in power, various other basic beliefs of Marxism were discarded or postponed by the Bolsheviks. The withering away of the state was postponed indefinitely. The "democratic" aspects of "democratic centralism" gradually disappeared. As a result, organized political opposition was


2. "Democratic Centralism" was explained as "Freedom in discussion; unity in action".
eliminated, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, and the party
authority became supreme. Whereas before the revolution the Bolsheviks
were wont to claim that any literate file clerk could carry on the
government, by 1919, Lenin spoke of "the incredible burden of admin­
istering the country", and declared that only a few were educated and
capable political leaders. Instead of eliminating the old bureaucracy,
as planned, secret police, army and civil service were all enlarged.

The aim of worker control of industry was completely repudiated by Lenin
and N.E.P. brought a large proportion of industry under private management.
The Marxist ideal of equality of wealth was discarded even during the
period of "war Communism", and N.E.P. dealt it a death blow. Even the
Bolshevik aims for world-wide revolution were set aside, and the
signing of the Rapallo Treaty marked Russia's return to balance of
power politics.

By 1923 the Communist party appeared to be firmly in the saddle,
although the horse it rode, instead of being Red, was a mixture of
varied shades. Lenin and his cohorts had succeeded in taming the animal;
it remained for Stalin and later Communists to put it to work. In the
years to follow, the success of the rider apparently became more
important than the condition of the horse. The various techniques which
had emerged between 1917 and 1923, although gradually refined and expanded,
remained basic to party control of Russia.

1. Moore. op.cit., p.162.

2. In 1925 there were 1,850,000 civil servants. In some sections as
high as 50% were former Tsarist officials. Ibid., p.164.
APPENDIX A

PARTY CONGRESSES

First R.S.D.L.P. Party Congress  - March 1898  - Minsk
Fourth R.S.D.L.P. Party Congress  - April 1906  - Stockholm
Sixth Party Congress (unofficial)  - January 1912  - Prague
Sixth Bolshevik Party Congress  - July 1917  - Petrograd
Seventh Communist Party Congress  - April 1918  - Petrograd
Eighth Communist Party Congress  - March 1919  - Moscow
Ninth Communist Party Congress  - March 1920  - Moscow
Tenth Communist Party Congress  - March 1921  - Moscow
Eleventh Communist Party Congress  - March 1922  - Moscow
Twelfth Communist Party Congress  - April 1923  - Moscow

APPENDIX B

THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATS

Chairman  V. Lenin
Commissariat for Interior  A.I. Rykov
  Agriculture  V.P. Milyutin
  Labor  A.G. Shliapnikov
  Military and Naval Affairs  V.A. Ovseienko
  Trade and Industry  V.P. Nogin
  Public Instruction  A.V. Lunacharsky
  Finance  I.I. Skvortzov
  Foreign Affairs  L. Trotsky

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Commissariat for Justice  
G. I. Lomov

Food Supply  
I. A. Teodorovitch

Post and Telegraph  
N. P. Glebov

Affairs of Nationalities  
I. V. Stalin

Railway Affairs  
vacant

APPENDIX C

MEMBERS OF

SOVNAKOM - 1917

Chairman - V. I. Lenin
A. I. Rykov
V. P. Milyutin
L. D. Trotsky
I. V. Stalin
V. Nogin
A. G. Shliapnikov
V. A. Ovseienko
A. V. Lunacharsky
I. I. Skvortzov
G. I. Lomov
I. A. Teodorovitch
N. P. Glebov

PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE - 1917

Chairman - V. I. Lenin
A. I. Rykov
V. P. Milyutin
L. D. Trotsky
I. V. Stalin
V. Nogin
G. Zinoviev
L. Kamenev
A. Kollantai
Y. Sverdlov
N. Bukharin
A. Sergeev
M. Uritsky
Y. Berzin
A. Bubnov
F. Dzerzhinsky
N. Krestinsky
M. Muranov
I. Smilga
G. Sokolnikov
APPENDIX D

STATE STRUCTURE

- Lenin - Chairman
- Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom)
- All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK)
- All-Russian Congress of Soviets
- Guberniya Congress of Soviets
- Uezd Congress of Soviets
- Volost Congress of Soviets
- Village Soviet
- Voters

PARTY STRUCTURE

- Lenin - Chairman
- Politburo - Orgburo - Secretariat
- Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party
- All-Russian Party Congress
- Guberniya Party Conference and Committee
- Uezd Party Conference and Committee
- Volost Party Conference and Committee
- Party Cells
- Members
APPENDIX E

ORDER NUMBER I

March 14, 1917.

To the garrison of the Petrograd district, to all the soldiers of the guard, army, artillery, and navy, for immediate and strict execution, and to the workers of Petrograd, for their information:

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved:

1. In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons, in the special services of the various military administrations, and on the vessels of the navy, committees from the elected representatives of the lower ranks of the above mentioned military units shall be chosen immediately.

2. In all those military units which have not yet chosen their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, one representative from each company shall be selected, to report with written credentials at the building of the State Duma by ten o'clock on the morning of the fifteenth of this March.

3. In all its political actions, the military Branch is subordinated to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and to its own committees.

4. The orders of the military commission of the State Duma shall be executed only in such cases as do not conflict with the orders and resolutions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

5. All kinds of arms, such as rifles, machine guns, armoured automobiles, and others, must be kept at the disposal and under the control of the company and battalion committees, and in no case turned over to officers, even at their demand.

6. In the ranks and during their performance of the duties of the service, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside the service and the ranks, in their political, general civic and private life, soldiers cannot in any way be deprived of those rights which all citizens enjoy. In particular, standing at attention and compulsory saluting, when not on duty, is abolished.

7. Also, the addressing of the officers with the title, "Your Excellency", "Your Honor", etc. is abolished, and these titles are replaced by the address of "Mister General", "Mister Colonel", etc. Rudeness towards soldiers of any rank, and especially addressing them as "Thou", is prohibited, and soldiers are required to bring to the attention of the company committees every infraction of this rule, as well as all misunderstandings occurring between officers and privates.

8. The present order is to be read to all companies, battalions, regiments, ships' crews, batteries and other combatant and non-combatant commands.
9. With reference to the nationality question the All-Russian Communist Party is guided by the following theses:

(1) The principal aim is to bring into closer relations the proletarians and semi-proletarians of different nationalities, for the purpose of carrying on a general revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the landlords and the bourgeoisie.

(2) In order to remove mistrust on the part of the working masses of the oppressed countries towards the proletariat of those states which formerly oppressed them, it is necessary to abolish all privileges of any national group, to proclaim the fullest equality of all nationalities and to recognize the rights of colonies and oppressed nations to political separation.

(3) For the same purpose, as a temporary measure toward achieving the unity of nations, the party suggests a federative combination of all states organized on the Soviet basis.

(4) The All-Russian Communist Party regards the question as to which class expresses the desire of a nation for separation, from a historical point of view, taking into consideration the level of historical development of the nation, i.e., whether the nation is passing from medievalism toward bourgeois democracy or from bourgeois democracy toward Soviet or proletarian democracy etc.

In any case, particular care and attention must be exercised by the proletariat of those nations which were oppressing nations, toward the prevailing national feelings of the working masses of the oppressed nations, or nations which are limited in their rights. Only by such a policy is it possible to create favourable conditions for a voluntary and real unity of different national elements of the international proletariat, as has been proved by the combination of different national Soviet republics around Soviet Russia.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

A sympathetic but sketchy treatment of the events from 1917 to 1923. Useful for its bibliography.

A good study of the work of the "Emancipation of Labor" group in the period from 1883 to 1893.

An excellent study of the Soviet system of rule. Includes the texts of a number of valuable documents.

A penetrating analysis of similarities in the structure of the English, American, French and Russian revolutions.

A report by ten Socialist or Labour leaders from England who visited Russia for one month in 1924. Their prejudice is obvious.

Deals largely with the contemporary Red army, but has an historical introduction. Edited by former Russian officers.

Bunyan, James, editor. Intervention, civil war and Communism in Russia. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. 1936.
A collection of documents and source material for the period from April to December, 1918.

An excellent collection of documents, topically arranged, dealing with the period from March 1917 to April 1918.

A scholarly but extremely readable account of various aspects of the rise of the Bolsheviks. Although he attempts to maintain objectivity, Carr evidently has little sympathy for liberal democracy.

A newspaperman's report of conditions within Russia in the period from 1924 to 1930.
A standard history of the revolution.

A text for a short course in the history of Communism for party members. The bias is obvious. Published in 1939, it is a victim of Stalinist editing, and may have been largely Stalin's work. (See Rostow. op.cit., p.262).

Deals mainly with recent developments, but contains a brief section on the early period.

A general history of Russia since the revolution.

An excellent study of the history of the relations between the Communist party and the trade unions. Deutscher has had access to a great deal of unpublished material.

A well documented and very entertaining biography of Trotsky's early years, from 1879 to 1921. It is to be followed by another volume, The Prophet Unarmed.

Excellent for material on the formation and development of the Communist army.

Fischer was a Communist sympathizer at the time this was written. He therefore was able to gain access to much Soviet material.

A brief and general discussion of Communist world activities from 1917 to 1955.

A study of the place of the Marxist theory of world revolution in Russia's foreign policy.
An extremely useful selection of documents of the period ending in November, 1917.

A detailed description of the living conditions of Russian labour. Obviously attempts to be unbiased.

An excellent study of the formative years of Russian Social Democracy, from 1860 to 1905.

Written under the influence of anti-Russian feeling prior to Russia's entry into World War II.

A brief report on the position and growth of the press after 1917.

A brief but interesting discussion of the theories underlying the Bolshevik treatment of nationalities.

Based on a ten day visit to Russia. The author's tour was evidently conducted by Communist officials.

Translations of Lenin's more important writings, arranged chronologically. In places, a victim of Stalinist editing.

A well-documented treatment of Russia's economic history up to 1917, from the Marxist viewpoint.

Valuable as a source for description of Soviet government and institutions.

Copies in translation of important laws and decrees from 1917 to 1950.
A discussion of the role of ideas in the struggle for power in Russia. Attempts to decide what early Bolshevik theories have been discarded.

An excellent study of the Communist approach to nationalism.

A pamphlet outlining briefly the Soviet secret police system. Traces it to its Tsarist counterparts.

A scholarly report and analysis of the results of Russia's one relatively free election.

An exciting personal record of the November revolution by an American "fellow traveller" who was in Russia at the time.

A sympathetic study of the growth and failure of Ukrainian nationalism.

An attempt by a group of historians and political scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to give a background for understanding the sudden changes in Soviet policy.

A brief documented outline of the development of administrative exile in the U.S.S.R. from 1917 to the present.

A brief survey of world Communism prepared for use in a college history course. Contains a number of inaccuracies.

An excellent study of the growth of Bolshevik control over the opposition parties.

A concise history of International Communism.
A series of articles by various authorities, tracing developments in certain aspects of Russian life as influenced by the Revolution.

Brief discussions of the philosophy of Lenin interpreted by Stalin.

Lively personal memoirs of the year 1917. Contains excellent characterizations of prominent leaders of the period. Sukhanov was a Menshevik Internationalist and supported the revolution.

 Tells as much of Trotsky as it does of Lenin. Sketchy and undocumented.

 A lively autobiography, written by the banished Trotsky to justify his career.

A valuable history of the revolution. Trotsky attempts, with some success, to write an unbiased history of the period of his greatest power.

Trotsky presents his case and criticizes developments under Stalin.

A general history of the period.

An extremely readable history of the period prior to 1917, giving biographies of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin.