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PREMIER WALTER SCOTT
A STUDY OF HIS RISE TO POLITICAL POWER

A thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in the Department of
History, University of Saskatchewan

by

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Written under the Supervision of

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April, 1959
We the undersigned members of the Committee appointed to examine the thesis submitted by Douglas H. Bocking in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts, beg to report that we consider the thesis satisfactory in form and in content.

Subject of thesis: "Premier Walter Scott: A study of his rise to political power".

We also report that Douglas H. Bocking has successfully passed an examination in the general field of the subject of the thesis.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Introduction .......................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Journalism (1885-1896) ............... 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Entry into Politics (1896-1900) ...... 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Member of Parliament (1900-1904) ..... 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>The Premiership (1905) ............... 89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography .................................. 136

## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPENDICE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Analysis of election results and religious affiliation of population ..</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Saskatchewan Electoral Map, 1905 .....</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>National Origin and Settlement Map for Saskatchewan, 1901 ....................</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Early in 1885 Walter Scott left his rural Ontario home to seek his fortune in western Canada. He had completed an elementary school education but was not trained for any trade or profession. In the twenty years that followed he acquired control of two newspapers, was twice elected as a Member of Parliament and in 1905 became the first Premier of Saskatchewan. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about his political career was that he achieved success despite the strong opposition of two able, well educated and politically experienced men in the persons of N.F. Davin and F.W.G. Haultain. By the time Scott had completed his training as a printer and was ready to move into the business and political world the issues in western Canada were well defined and the leaders well established, and yet he was able to achieve high political office.

Regina became Scott's home. Here he learned a trade and met the men and women who helped shape his career. When Regina was selected as the capital of the North-West Territories in 1883 there was not even a village on the site.¹ The town grew largely because it was the centre

¹E.G. Drake, Regina the Queen City (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1955), p. 8.
of Territorial government. By 1891 it had a population of 1,681\(^2\) and from it was administered a vast sparsely settled area of 536,806 square miles\(^3\) including all of present day Saskatchewan and Alberta.

Until 1887 the North-West Territories was governed by a Lieutenant-Governor and Council. The Council was only partly elected but in 1888 it was replaced by a fully elected Assembly. By 1897 the Assembly had achieved full responsible government but it did not possess all of the powers of a provincial government. The Territorial government could not charter railways, it did not control the lands, and it could not borrow money. It did not receive the usual provincial subsidies but was dependent for most of its revenues on an annual grant by Parliament, and always seemed to have difficulty in obtaining a large enough grant. As population increased and, with it, the need for public services, the Territorial government found itself almost constantly in need of money. Largely because of this financial problem a provincial autonomy movement developed in the Territories.

The Territorial Assembly did not divide on federal party lines. There was a Government and an Opposition but their division was on the basis of local policy. One reason for avoiding federal party lines within the Territorial government was expediency. In many respects the Territorial government was dependent upon the Dominion government.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 71.

It was felt a non-partisan Territorial government could present a more united front in dealing with the Dominion government. Many also felt that division along federal party lines was simply not applicable to the Territorial situation, as the issues which divided the federal political parties had little or no relation to the problems of the Territories. However, it was assumed that when the Territories attained provincial status the normal pattern of division within the local Assembly with political parties allied to federal parties would be followed. 4

While federal party divisions were avoided within the Assembly and on purely Territorial issues, members of the Assembly and the people generally felt free to participate in federal politics. As a result members of the Territorial Government and Opposition often found themselves aligned differently on federal issues. As an example, the Territorial Executive included members of both major federal political parties. Though they differed on federal issues, they were in agreement on Territorial issues and policies.

The Leader of the Territorial Assembly who, after 1897, was known as Premier, was F.W.G. Haultain, Member for Macleod. Haultain was born in England in 1857, but educated in Toronto where he graduated from the University with first class honours in Classics. He was admitted to the Ontario bar in 1882 and went to Macleod in 1884. 5

4The Leader, "Dominion Party Lines", Nov. 10, 1898.
First elected in a by-election in 1887, he was soon recognized as "one of the brightest and most active members" of the Assembly, taking an active and leading role in its deliberations. A mild Conservative in federal politics he gave distinguished leadership in the non-partisan Assembly.

One of Haultain's chief supporters and colleagues in the Executive Council was J.H. Ross, Member for Moose Jaw. Born in Ontario in 1856, Ross moved west after completion of high school education. One of the earliest settlers in the Moose Jaw area, he became a successful farmer and rancher, and was one of the first members to be elected to the Territorial Council in 1883. Ross was a Liberal in federal politics and, after the Liberals won office in 1896, he was the most influential politician in Assiniboia.

Another colleague of Haultain's was G.H.V. Bulyea, Member for South Qu'Appelle after 1894. He was born in New Brunswick in 1859 and, after graduation from University, taught school there for a number of years. He abandoned teaching in 1883 and moved to Qu'Appelle where he


8Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 182.


established a furniture, flour and feed business. Like Ross, he was a Liberal in federal politics. He developed a reputation as an able but somewhat conservative administrator.11

Regina was located in the eastern section of the federal constituency of West Assiniboia. This riding was represented in Parliament by N.F. Davin, a local newspaperman and lawyer. He was a graduate of Queen's College, Cork, a member of the English bar and author of The Irishman in Canada.12 Davin worked for a short time for the Toronto Mail and in 1878 was an unsuccessful Conservative candidate for an Ontario seat in Parliament.13 With the help of political friends he founded a Conservative newspaper in Regina in 1883 called The Leader.14 Brilliant, colourful, an excellent writer and orator, Davin played an important role in the Territories.

The year 1886 saw the birth of another newspaper in Regina, The Journal, founded by C.J. Atkinson. While lacking Davin's colour, Atkinson was "an educated, sincere, experienced and quite able man".15 He owned two newspapers in Manitoba and founded The Journal to give a voice to the Liberal cause in West Assiniboia.16 The Journal carried

11 Morgan, op. cit., p. 169.
12 Drake, op. cit., p. 19.
15 Drake, Regina, op. cit., p. 47.
on spirited journalistic warfare with The Leader. In 1891 Atkinson sold The Journal to a group of Regina business men and it resumed publication as The Standard. The owners of The Standard hired as editor an outspoken school principal, J.K. McInnis.17 A keen businessman, and an independent Conservative, he was an important figure in Regina business and political circles. It was in association with these newspapers that Scott entered the scene.

Walter Scott was born on a farm near Strathroy, Ontario, on October 27, 1867.18 His father, George Scott, died before his son was born. His mother, Isabella Telfer Scott, remarried when he was about three years old. Scott's stepfather was John McDonald, who apparently was a farm labourer. As a result of this second marriage Scott had two brothers and two sisters.19 Scott began working at an early age leaving home in 1883 to work for an uncle. His mother gave up plans to have her son train to become a teacher because he was subject to attacks of asthma. He was allowed to go west where it was hoped he would find a more favourable climate.

17Hawkes, op. cit., p. 1202.

18Archives of Saskatchewan (hereafter cited as AS), Scott Papers, Autobiography of T. Walter Scott. This covers the period to June, 1894, and is the chief source of information on Scott's early life. His full name was Thomas Walter Scott though he rarely used the Thomas.

19Ibid. They were Minnie, John, Maggie and Willie. A third sister, Lizzie, died as an infant.
When he left home Scott had planned to farm with his uncle, James S. Telfer, at Portage la Prairie. The outbreak of the Riel Rebellion and Telfer's decision to join the government forces as a teamster forced Scott to find other employment. At first he worked in a grocery store. In September, 1885, he started as a printer's apprentice in the offices of The Manitoba Liberal, a newspaper owned by C.J. Atkinson. His starting salary was $3.00 a week and he was required to perform a multitude of minor duties besides learning how to set type. Atkinson advanced his apprentice rapidly and in December, 1886, transferred him to Regina to his newly founded newspaper, The Journal. In Regina Scott became chief printer as well as reporter.

As a news reporter in Regina Scott had many opportunities to meet the leading political figures. He came to know them by their performance in the Assembly, by their utterances from public platforms and - some of them - as private individuals. In the course of time he gained an understanding of the problems these men tried to solve, of the machinery of government and of the art of practical politics. Young, able and ambitious, perhaps he looked forward to the time when he could take a more active part in the affairs of the Territories.

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20James Telfer was the twin brother of Scott's mother. See Scott Papers, Scott to Miss M. Grant, June 27, 1919.
CHAPTER II
JOURNALISM (1885-1896)

The newspapers in the Territories developed a reputation for "vigorous partisanship and frank discussion of public issues".\(^1\) As a result a newspaper editor was usually closely associated with politics and the two careers often merged. Scott became a printer because it provided a source of livelihood with possibilities for advancement. Probably every printer aspired to become an editor and every editor a newspaper owner. Such it appears was Scott's early ambition, and he set about achieving it with the same vigour and thoroughness that was so characteristic of his later career.

Scott joined the staff of The Journal in Regina in December, 1886. He remained with Atkinson's paper until January, 1889, when he moved to the rival paper The Leader. He gave as his reason for changing jobs that he and Atkinson had failed "to agree on some points".\(^2\) Probably one of the points was salary as Scott received \$13.00 a week from Davin which was more than Atkinson had been paying him. He stayed with Davin and The Leader until June, 1890 when he returned to The Journal at \$15.00 a week. After Atkinson sold The Journal in early

1Drake, "Pioneer Journalism", op. cit., p. 17.

2Scott Papers, "Autobiography . . ."
1891 Scott joined the staff of the new paper, The Standard, as printing foreman.

Unlike its predecessor The Standard was inclined to support the Conservative party. For a time it even supported Davin. However, Davin's liking for alcohol gave the editor of The Standard cause to withdraw his support from Davin and follow an independent pro-Conservative policy.

Scott remained with The Standard until January 1, 1892, when he went to Winnipeg. Perhaps he felt he had exhausted the resources of Regina newspapers and that he needed an opportunity to improve himself. The venture does not appear to have been successful as he did not secure regular employment in Winnipeg, and was almost penniless when he returned to Regina to resume work on The Standard at $20.00 a week.

On September 17, 1892, J.K. McInnis and Walter Scott purchased The Standard. For this purpose they borrowed $1,000.00, gave a note for

While the charge was probably justified, Scott later noted that had it not been for the "influence of whiskey" McInnis might have achieved political power. See Scott Papers, Scott to J. Hawkes, May 6, 1905.

The Standard. For editorials supporting Conservatives and Davin see: "Salutary", Jan. 9, 1891; "The Dissolution", Feb. 15, 1891; and "Two of a Kind", Feb. 12, 1891. For editorials revealing the charges of alcoholism against Davin and rejection of him see: "Mr. Davin and His Pledge", Feb. 26, 1891; "Mr. Davin", June 5, 1891; "Our Member", June 12, 1891; "No Defence", July 3, 1891; "Mr. Davin's Threats", Sept. 4, 1891.

Scott Papers, "Autobiography . . ."
$125,00 and a mortgage for $4,000.00. A partnership agreement was drawn up and operations commenced under the name of The Standard Printing Company. The partnership was to run for a three year term and it gave the partners an equal share of the profits or debts of the company. The new company, by publishing a weekly newspaper and by doing contract printing met all of its obligations and even showed a profit.

In June, 1894, at the instigation of J.H. Ross and A. Hitchcock, a Moose Jaw banker, Scott attended a bailiff's sale and purchased a bankrupt newspaper for about $600.00. This was The Moose Jaw Times. As a result of Scott's purchase changes had to be made in The Standard Printing Company. In an addition to the original contract of partnership, signed by Scott and McInnis July 14, 1894, it was agreed that McInnis would run The Standard and Scott would run The Moose Jaw Times but that "... in all respects the partnership shall remain as before until regularly dissolved by lapse of time or mutual consent."

On this basis Scott began publishing a newspaper of his own for the first time.

In view of the fact that The Moose Jaw Times was taken over in bankruptcy and required careful handling to make it a paying proposition and that this was Scott's first experience at editorial duties, it is

6Scott Papers, "Partnership Deed Between J.K. McInnis and Walter Scott, Sept. 17, 1892".
7Ibid., "Autobiography . . . ."
8Ibid., "Partnership Deed . . . ."
not surprising that the newspaper followed the accepted pattern for western weeklies. For example, when drought conditions struck the Moose Jaw area in 1894 Scott called for a public works program and financial aid for the farmers, all to be financed by the Dominion government. He used the fact that the Territorial government was financially dependent on the Dominion government as a reason to seek provincial establishment for the Territories. The Hudson Bay railway, he said, should be built if investigation proved it to be practical but it should not be made an election issue. Tax exemptions on Crown lands were unfair but when they were granted, as they had been, to a private corporation like the Canadian Pacific Railway, they were most improper. It offended Scott's sense of honesty when he learned that some Members of Parliament received free railway passes and at the same time collected travel expenses from the government. Tariffs raised the price of goods that the farmer had to buy and therefore were

9Drake, "Pioneer Journalism . . .", op. cit., pp. 41-54, gives examples of the type of newspaper writing.


12Ibid., "The North-West Bill", July 20, 1894.


bad. As the only solution to the perennial problems of prairie fires and noxious weeds, he advised the passage of laws backed by severe penalties for violators. Finally, he favoured the development, under government sponsorship, of a creamery industry, which would help remove the farmers' dependence on field crops.

While party allegiance had been clearly rejected by Scott in his opening editorial in the Times, his paper came to be recognized as a supporter of the Patrons of Industry. This was a new party which spread rapidly throughout the west during 1892-95. The Patron platform included such things as tariff for revenue, anti-monopoly legislation, economy in government and it condemned land grants to railways. However, Scott did oppose Patron policies in the Territorial election of 1894. In Moose Jaw Scott's friend J.H. Ross was again a candidate and the Patrons nominated George Annable. Scott strongly supported Ross

17 Ibid., "Wake Up! Wake Up!", May 17, 1895; "If you are Awake Listen", May 24, 1895; "The Public is Responsible", June 21, 1895; "The French Weed", June 28, 1895; "Inexcusable Apathy", July 19, 1895; "Weeds Legislation", July 19, 1895.
19 Ibid., "Object Volume VI, No. 1", June 29, 1894.
20 Scott Papers, King to Scott, Mar. 29, 1895.
21 Wood, op. cit., p. 128.
22 Ibid.
23 Hawkes, op. cit., p. 572.
after he had been cleared of charges by the Patrons that he had misused public funds, and at the same time attacked the Patrons for attempting to introduce party politics into the Assembly elections which had always been non-partisan. The editor of the Times even received support for this stand from the editor of the official Patron newspaper.

During the winter of 1895 candidates representing the major parties in West Assiniboia were preparing for an anticipated Federal election. N.F. Davin was renominated by the Conservatives; J.K. McInnis by the Patrons of Industry; and A. Hitchcock, who later withdrew, by the Liberals. From the first, Scott supported McInnis because he represented the principles of the Patrons of Industry not because of any personal attributes. Following the example of Atkinson he supported the Patron candidate by attacks on Davin. He showed mock alarm when it was suggested that Members of Parliament should vote secretly. If this suggestion were carried out it would mean the end of Davin's career because his party would believe that he voted as he talked. The implication was that Davin talked the other way in Parliament to do his duty by the West but always voted with his party. Like McInnis, Scott rebuked Davin for addiction to alcohol and his failure to advance the

26Ibid., "The Times Vindicated", Nov. 23, 1895.
28Ibid., "We Urgently Protest", Mar. 29, 1895.
cause of prohibition in accordance with promises he had made as far back as 1891. According to the accounts in the Times Davin replied to these attacks in like manner.

After nearly a year of this mutual editorial abuse, readers of The Leader must have been surprised when they learned, on August 22nd, 1895, that Davin had sold the paper to Scott. To add to the confusion Scott made it quite clear in his first editorial that The Leader would continue to support the Conservative party. It was nearly a year before the readers were told the story behind this somewhat dramatic change of ownership. Davin and Scott apparently began negotiations in 1894 and an Agreement for Sale was actually drawn up and signed on April 8, 1895. According to it Scott was to pay $4,000.00 for The Leader, and Davin promised not to run, publish or edit, directly or indirectly, another newspaper in Regina for five years. However, Davin refused to honour this agreement.

29 Ibid., "An Explanation In Order", Apr. 5, 1895.
30 The Leader, "Valedictory", Aug. 22, 1895.
31 Ibid., "Wholly Impersonal", Aug. 29, 1895.
33 Ibid., "Open Letter to N.F. Davin", Nov. 9, 1899. In this letter Scott states that Davin offered to sell him The Leader for $4,000.00 in 1894 but he does not give the exact date.
34 Scott Papers, Contract between Scott and The Leader Company Limited dated Apr. 8, 1895. See also The Leader, "Open Letter..." Nov. 9, 1899, op. cit.
According to Scott Davin refused to honour the original agreement because the price was too low,\(^{35}\) though Davin told Scott that the newspaper directors would not give him the power to complete the sale.\(^{36}\) Whatever the actual reason at this point Scott instituted legal proceedings to force Davin to fulfil the agreement or pay damages.\(^{37}\) McInnis had put strong pressure on Scott to start the legal action as he feared Davin would be able to use the agreement to harm him politically. Apparently McInnis had in some way made public the sale of The Leader and was afraid that if the sale did not go through he would be accused of having tried to destroy Davin by a plot to purchase the paper and turn it against him. McInnis was so anxious to have Scott force through the sale that he offered to pay legal costs.\(^{38}\) A Writ was issued\(^{39}\) but the judge refused to allow the action to start until three days after Parliament had prorogued.\(^{40}\) On August 17, 1895, Scott's lawyer reported that the judge was still away but as soon as he returned he would get him to fix a trial date.\(^{41}\) The trial was never held as Scott signed a new

\(^{35}\)Ibid., "Open Letter . . .", Nov. 9, 1899, op. cit.

\(^{36}\)Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, Apr. 11, 1895.

\(^{37}\)Ibid., H.A. Robson to Scott, Apr. 16, 1895.

\(^{38}\)Ibid., McInnis to Scott, Apr. 13, 1895.

\(^{39}\)Ibid., Robson to Scott, Apr. 29, 1895.

\(^{40}\)Ibid., Robson to Scott, June 22, 1895. Davin was away attending Parliament and could not be arrested or imprisoned under civil process. See R.H. Dawson, The Government of Canada, (3rd ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957) pp. 399-400.

\(^{41}\)Scott Papers, Robson to Scott, Aug. 17, 1895.
agreement with Davin and The Leader Company Limited on August 20, 1895. 42

Scott claimed he signed the new agreement with Davin because he needed The Leader's printing presses in order to complete a printing contract. 43 Under the new arrangement Scott agreed to pay an extra $1,000.00 for the newspaper and accepted the addition of a new clause in the agreement. Scott later claimed that he agreed to the insertion of the new clause when Davin assured him that its purpose was to satisfy his business associates and that it would not be binding. 44 Scott apparently was willing to be a party to an agreement when he believed that one clause of the agreement was included with the intention of deceiving some of the stockholders. This clause clearly indicated that Davin's reluctance to give up the newspaper was not based solely on money.

The important addition to the agreement was Clause 16 45 by which Scott agreed to support Davin and the Conservative party until the next general federal election and, if Davin was successful, for a further period to make in all three years from the date the agreement was signed. Davin was to have control of the first two editorial columns of the paper and he was to supply enough political material for this space. Davin's strategy was quite apparent. This would relieve him of the responsibilities attending the running of a newspaper while

42 Ibid., "Memorandum of Agreement", Aug. 20, 1895.

43 The Leader, "Open Letter . . .", Nov. 9, 1899, op. cit.

44 Ibid.

45 Scott Papers, "Memorandum . . .", op. cit.
at the same time assuring him of the newspaper's support. To Scott it meant a chance to gain control of what was probably the most important newspaper in the Territories and eventually complete freedom to use it as he wished. To obtain the newspaper Scott had to agree to Davin's terms. There is every indication that, having agreed to the terms, Scott intended to abide by them.

From the correspondence it appears that Davin did not actually write the editorials but provided Scott with the ideas and material. Scott seems to have followed closely the directions Davin gave him. When Davin gave a series of speeches in Winnipeg he wrote Scott telling him they had been well received and suggesting editorial comment. 46 Shortly after, an editorial appeared in The Leader commenting on the success of Davin's speeches and suggesting that "in essential particulars, he is a man among a thousand." 47 On another occasion, after Davin had made a motion asking the government to give financial support to the establishment of creameries in the West, which was defeated without even receiving the support of Western Members, Davin wrote Scott suggesting that the motion be used as an occasion to call on the people of the west "... to pledge their candidates to support me in the future". 48 Scott dutifully provided an editorial which followed very closely

46 Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, from Winnipeg, Dec. 31, 1895.
48 Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, undated.
the content of Davin's letter. 49

As was to be expected The Leader attacked the Patron party and its candidate J.K. McInnis but not as frequently or as vigorously as the Times had previously attacked Davin. However, Scott did call McInnis a "hide bound Patron", 50 and even tried to prove that the best principles of the Patron party were also those of the Conservative party. 51 On another occasion he implied that McInnis had no principles and acted in a chaotic fashion. 52 About the time this editorial appeared Davin wrote warning his editor not to attack McInnis too much for fear he might attack him into activity. 53 Scott remembered this advice but at the time his interest was probably drawn away from McInnis by the growing importance of the Manitoba School question.

The Manitoba school question originated in 1890 when the province of Manitoba passed an act abolishing separate schools and establishing a uniform non-sectarian school system. The Provincial legislation immediately raised the perennial federal problem of the relative powers of the Provincial and Dominion governments. In this

49 The Leader, "Defeat of Mr. Davin's Proposed Aid to the Creameries", Mar. 12, 1896.


51 Ibid.


53 Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, Feb. 27, 1896. The last part of this letter is not legible but the first part is clear. In addition, Davin reminds Scott that his letters are private.
particular case the question was whether the Dominion government had
the right or the duty to interfere with Provincial legislation in order
to protect the rights of the minority. It was a dangerous political
issue and the Dominion government preferred not to interfere.54 But
the Privy Council ruled that the Manitoba law was valid and then, in
another action, ruled that the Dominion government could intervene.55
In December, 1895, the Greenway government of Manitoba, which had
passed the legislation, was returned to power in an overwhelming
victory. It definitely refused to re-establish separate schools.56
The Dominion government, with its last escape closed now prepared to
introduce remedial legislation in the last session of Parliament which
was to meet on January 2nd, 1896.57

Early in 1895 Davin had definitely expressed himself as being
in favour of a non-sectarian school system.58 The Leader, under the
Scott-Davin editorship, continued to support this policy and to oppose
any interference by the Dominion government in the Manitoba school
question.59 They indicated that, had Laurier come out in favour of
non-interference with Manitoba, they could have praised him, but he was

55Ibid.
56D.Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (New
57Ibid., p. 464.
58The Moose Jaw Times, "His Mouth Was Closed", Mar. 29, 1895.
59The Leader, "Mr. Laurier Behind Torres Vedras", Oct. 17, 1895.
being "evasive and contradictory".\textsuperscript{60} Several editorials stressed Laurier's indecision,\textsuperscript{61} probably in an attempt to strengthen the Conservative stand.

While the crisis deepened, Davin, who was giving a series of speeches in Winnipeg,\textsuperscript{62} became convinced that there was a solution to the Conservative dilemma. Davin expressed the belief that once Greenway was returned to power there would be a settlement of the school problem and remedial legislation would not come before the Dominion Parliament.\textsuperscript{63} The editorial page of The Leader recorded this viewpoint.\textsuperscript{64} However, whatever arrangement Davin tried to make with Greenway failed,\textsuperscript{65} and the problem remained before the Dominion government.

Soon after Parliament assembled the Conservative government faced a crisis with the resignation of seven ministers,\textsuperscript{66} but the crisis was patched up with Sir Charles Tupper replacing Bowell as Prime Minister. During the Cabinet shake-up there was apparently

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., "Laurier's Last Ontario Visit", Oct. 17, 1895; "A Mistaken Standpoint", Nov. 28, 1895; "Resignation of Clarke Wallace", Dec. 19, 1895.
\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., "Not Without Honour Except", Jan. 2, 1896, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{63}Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, Dec. 30, 1895.
\textsuperscript{64}The Leader, "The Further By-Elections", Jan. 2, 1896.
\textsuperscript{65}Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, Jan. 12, 1896.
\textsuperscript{66}Skelton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 466.
some suggestion that Davin might be asked to join the Cabinet, but

The Leader expressed the opinion that it would be better for the West to remain united than to have representation in the Cabinet. Davin wrote Scott informing him that he had told Bowell he would not go into a Cabinet pledged to remedial legislation, and an editorial in The Leader stressed this position. However, a postscript to this letter is significant. In it Davin expressed doubt as to whether he or anyone could possibly fight to maintain the position adopted by Greenway's government because of Greenway's willingness to use the school question to secure political advantage. Surely this letter must have given Scott some indication that Davin might not support non-interference in a crisis.

In February the Conservative government introduced a Remedial Bill. The Bill provided for the establishment of separate schools in Manitoba supervised by a Roman Catholic board of education and supported by Catholic ratepayers who could declare whether they wished to support the public or separate schools. The Bill recommended the payment of a provincial grant but did not specifically command the province to

67 The Leader, "A United West or a Minister?", Jan. 9, 1896.
68 Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, Jan. 25, 1896.
69 The Leader, "Rumors", Feb. 13, 1896.
70 Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, Jan. 25, 1896, Postscript.
71 Skelton, op. cit., p. 468.
Laurier was pleased with the terms of the bill because, while it exercised coercion on the province for the benefit of the minority, the fact that no provincial aid for the separate schools was specified meant, in effect, that the schools could not operate efficiently, leaving the Liberals free to oppose it on these grounds. This they did, asking for a six months delay. Davin thought Laurier should be praised for his stand against remedial legislation but pointed out that those who asked for delay were as much remedial legislationists as the government. Scott followed instructions by praising Laurier but pointing out that his own opposition to any interference whatsoever prevented him from wholly supporting Laurier's stand.

Meanwhile the debate on the second reading of the remedial bill was proceeding in Parliament. It is not surprising that on such a critical issue there was talk of employing party whips and other methods to get the members of the Conservative party to vote with the government. The Leader commented:

We know that in this riding Ministers have used influence to have meetings of Conservatives called to pass resolutions threatening pains and penalties to the Member if he voted against the Bill. It is needless to say that no such meeting was held in

72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 469.
74 Ibid., p. 471.
75 Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, Mar. 5, 1896.
76 The Leader, "The Liberal Leader and the Remedial Bill", Mar. 12, 1896.
West Assiniboia. No representative meeting in this riding could be gathered that would not endorse Mr. Davin's opposition to the Bill.77

On the same day the editorial page of The Leader had occasion to state that Davin had "on many occasions disregarded and braved the tyranny of his party", 78 and there was no indication that he would give in this time. Then came the vote on the second reading of the Bill and both Scott and Davin found themselves re-appraising their positions.

Davin voted with the government for the Bill. In a letter to Scott he explained that he was convinced that it would have been impossible to defeat the Bill and that most of the Members of Parliament were now convinced that some interference was necessary. Despite his vote, Davin said he was convinced that "this bill will never be put into operation".79 It is, perhaps, significant that in this letter he made no mention of what Scott should say in the newspaper about his change of mind. Scott was apparently unconvinced by Davin's arguments.

Scott's answer to Davin's reversal of policy was a strongly worded editorial which clearly placed him in opposition to Davin. The editorial stated, in part:

To say that a majority of the people of Western Assiniboia felt amusement, chagrin and humiliation when the report came that Mr. Davin had voted with


79Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, Mar. 21, 1896.
the Government on the second reading of the Remedial Bill is to express no more than the truth. To say that The Leader was humiliated, chagrined and amazed at the circumstances is to put the case mildly. . . . If Mr. Davin voted under coercion we have no words to designate his conduct. If he voted honestly and honorably according to an altered conviction, we say he knowingly cast a vote which he had no warrant from his constituents to cast, and he occupied the role of a usurper in casting it. . . . If public opinion was a factor, then it was important that public opinion should have been truly represented by the Members; a higher duty devolved upon him than voting on his private convictions. In this case he could properly have followed the example of Messrs. McIsaac and Angus, whose own opinions were against the Bill, but who, because their constituents wished the Bill to pass voted for it.

The editor added that in view of Davin's vote on the remedial legislation he could not continue to support him. This editorial was probably intended to win popular support for Scott's action in turning against Davin but it failed to present a logical analysis of the situation. Scott attacked Davin for voting at the dictation of his party and not according to his beliefs. Then he attacked him for not voting according to the wishes of the majority of his constituents. There is no evidence to suggest that, in this attack on Davin, Scott was justified in applying the delegate theory of representation, which holds that a parliamentarian should vote according to the wishes of his constituents, as this theory does not appear to have been generally accepted in the Territories at that time. In his desire to present a strong case against Davin and justify his own actions, Scott fell victim to a faulty line of argument. Davin reversed his position and Scott either could not or would not change his own views. He could no longer support Davin.

80 The Leader, "For Or Against", Mar. 26, 1896.
In the weeks that followed the publication of the "For Or Against" editorial, Davin tried to persuade Scott to support him again. In a letter headed "Without Prejudice" he told Scott he had not voted under pressure but because he was convinced that his action was right. He suggested that Scott had "jumped at conclusions" and assured him that he preferred friendship to legal technicalities. In another letter Davin suggested that some of the editorials were not written by Scott and made this remark: "Some of your sanguine friends may take roseate views about the prospects of the reform party, but I tell you that Mr. Laurier is in a desperate position."

The relationship between Davin and Scott continued to deteriorate. Scott consulted a lawyer to determine his exact legal position under Clause 16 of the agreement and was informed that it was not legally binding. Davin disagreed with this interpretation stating:

I find it difficult to understand the view you take on the agreement. Putting myself aside altogether but looking just at the transaction, you deliberately undertake to do a certain thing and you say the undertaking does not bind you either legally or morally. . . . Your view of the legal question or rather your lawyer's view is entirely mistaken.

In this letter Davin continued to defend his vote on the remedial bill and assured Scott that despite this vote he would be re-elected by a

81 Scott Papers, Davin to Scott, Apr. 7, 1896.
82 Ibid., Davin to Scott, Apr. 11, 1896.
83 Ibid., Davin to Scott, Apr. 18, 1896. Davin's usual salutatory opening had been "My dear Scott" but this letter opened with "Dear Mr. Scott".
large majority. He ended on a note of optimism expressing the hope that "in conversation we may be able to understand each other better".84

Before Davin got back to Regina Scott indicated that there was very little chance of a reconciliation when he wrote:

... if he returns from Ottawa and tries to convince us by delicate arguments and fine-spun reasoning that both his vote for remedial legislation and his speech against it, were right, there is extreme likelihood that weariness may overtake us ... But Mr. Davin betrayed the west by his vote and that vote was weightier than the leagues of empty declamations delivered at the funeral of the Bill. The west required men to oppose and fight bad remedial legislation in its dangerous life; - to curse at its death after aiding it in life, was a poor equivalent for the fight a true western representative would have made.85

But Scott's strongest attack on Davin came after Davin had returned to Regina and had made some attempt to defend his actions:

Mr. Davin blandly tells those of us who fail to endorse his vote on the second reading of the Remedia Bill, that we are palpably, blindly ignorant, - that we have fed on rhetorical sow thistles, - that our stomachs are distended with the east wind, - that we are deluded with the veriest balderdash of demagoguery. We verily think he believes it of us. Of a certainty he takes us for unmitigated fools.86

All hope of reconciliation had gone and it was clear that Scott was not going to continue to support Davin in The Leader.

84Ibid.

85The Leader, "An Incomprehensible Course", Apr. 23, 1896.

86Ibid., "Fools All Of Us", May 7, 1896.
On May 14, 1896, Scott published a long letter to the readers of The Leader in which he explained the terms of his contract with Davin and his version of subsequent events. He quoted from a Conservative circular which claimed that Scott was acting under the direction of Davin's political opponents, and from a letter he said he had written to Davin on May 9th in which he said:

I will again appeal to you to buy back the paper, place me in the position in which I stood in relation to you before I made the purchase and relieve me from an extremely awkward situation. Fair play demands that you adopt either this or some other course that will relieve me of a bond, which, under the conditions it was made, did not bind; but which to observe to the letter now that your action on the Remedial Bill has so entirely changed the conditions, would be to flagrantly violate my conscience. 87

He went on to explain that, to free himself from obligations under the contract, he agreed to lease The Leader to Davin's friends for a five week period during the election campaign. After the five weeks were up the paper would be returned to Scott and he would be free to follow whatever political course he wished.

Morally, if not legally, Scott was bound to support Davin and he had deliberately broken his word. That he knew this is shown by his willingness to lease the paper to Davin's supporters. Davin probably realized the courts would not consider Clause 16 binding and therefore did not take legal action, but accepted the lease of the paper during the election campaign as full settlement of Scott's obligations under the agreement. In this way Scott was released from

an agreement he should never have signed. Davin's efforts to bind an
able, young editor to his cause, and thus keep the support of The
Leader without having to operate it, also failed.

From the evidence available it appears that Scott originally
intended to carry out the terms of the agreement but could not continue
to support Davin after his sudden reversal of policy. It is possible
that political reasons were behind his actions, as the Conservative
circular he quoted in his May 14th letter stated. Ross and McInnis
were both anxious to see Davin defeated and they both had considerable
influence on Scott. It does not appear, however, that Scott was deeply
enough involved with any political party to have acted on purely
political grounds. If this had been the case it seems highly unlikely
that he would have leased the paper to Davin's supporters for the
election campaign. The more likely explanation is that Scott simply
could not follow Davin's sudden reversal of policy. Probably his
friends encouraged him in this view.

Scott emerged from this unfortunate situation as editor and
owner of what was probably the most important Territorial newspaper.
He was not committed to support any political party but, having publicly
abandoned Davin and the Conservatives, it was logical to expect he
would support the Liberals.
CHAPTER III
ENTRY INTO POLITICS (1896-1900)

The 1896 general federal election was won by the Liberal party and Scott, returning to control of The Leader, rejoiced in Laurier’s victory. Though Davin retained his seat by a narrow margin, Liberals in West Assiniboia were given new hope and were naturally desirous of consolidating their forces before the next general election. Scott’s known antipathy to Davin and his ownership of The Leader, one of the most important newspapers in the Territories, made him a desirable recruit. Young, ambitious and, at the age of twenty-nine, well established in the newspaper field, he was ready to move into more active participation in political affairs.

Perhaps on the mistaken assumption that Scott would like to be on the winning side in West Assiniboia, Davin wrote an editorial for The Leader. According to Scott’s report this editorial would have had him say that he was pleased at Davin’s election and that, as the

1 The Leader, "After an Interregnum", June 25, 1896.

2 Directory of... Elections, op. cit., p. 24. Actually McInnis and Davin were tied but Davin was elected on the vote of the returning officer.

3 The Leader, "Mr. Davin and his Present Position in Western Assiniboia", July 23, 1896. See also The Standard, "Rejected Manuscript", July 30, 1896.
election fight was over, peace and harmony were restored. Scott used
two columns of his editorial page to make certain Davin and the public
knew that he would never again support Davin. Later he accused Davin
of organizing a business boycott of The Leader in order to force Scott
to make peace with him.4

In comment on Davin's narrow election victory, Scott had stated
that there would be a petition which would upset the results. A
petition was presented and then withdrawn.5 According to one report,
the two major parties had arranged a "saw-off" of election protests -
that is, they agreed to withdraw all protests. The case in West
Assiniboia was particularly difficult as McInnis had run as a Patron
candidate with Liberal support. In view of the overall election results
the Liberals were anxious to have Davin's election overthrown as they
felt certain they could defeat him in a by-election. Clifford Sifton,
who was responsible for the arrangement in the West, had difficulty
in persuading them to withdraw their protest and "... probably would
have failed if Walter Scott, destined to defeat Davin at the next
election, had not brought his influence to bear."6 Sifton wrote to

5Scott Papers, Statutory Declaration by H.A. Robson made at
Winnipeg, July 13, 1900. According to this statement the petition
against Davin's election was withdrawn on August 14, 1897. Against
Scott's wishes one condition of withdrawal was that Davin drop a civil
libel suit against Scott. This was done but criminal charges were not
dropped. Infra, p.31.
6J.W. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton in Relation to his Times (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1931), p. 197. See also Scott Papers, McInnis Libel Trial,
1906. An unsigned memorandum implies that McInnis withdrew the
election protest when the Liberals agreed to pay his election expenses.
thank Scott for his help and to explain that sometimes it was necessary to let a man like Davin hold his seat because of a general agreement and the honour of the Government. 7 Apparently Scott had already won the friendship and sympathy of the most important western Liberal.

The Davin-Scott feud finally reached the law courts. On December 14th, 1896, Davin charged Scott with criminal libel. 8 The charge cited an editorial published in The Leader on October 15, 1896, as the libelous action. Probably Scott deliberately published the editorial in order to provoke Davin into legal action.

According to a report in The Leader, during a debate in Parliament on the North-West dairy interests, Davin had referred to its editor as being guilty of "one of the most dishonorable acts in the history of human infamy". 9 Scott replied editorially:

Had we smashed some of his lies, with his false teeth and slandering tongue, down his treacherous throat, that would have been, when viewed in the light of all the circumstances, bare and simple justice to him and the Editor of The Leader. 10

A week later, on October 15th, he wrote:

The Leader Co. (Ltd.), which was Mr. Davin's name as a contracting printer stooped to that truckling to a Government which would enable us, like that cheat, to

7 Ibid., p. 197. No copy of this letter exists in the Scott papers.

8 Scott Papers, The Queen vs. Scott, Supreme Court of the North-West Territories, Judicial District West Assiniboia, Dec. 14, 1896.

9 The Leader, "Mr. Davin's Peculiar Style", Oct. 8, 1896.

10 Ibid.
play the part of a boodler and get our clutches, like it, on public moneys without giving value. If the inference in the foregoing sentence is disregarded by Mr. Davin on the plea that he would be unable to collect damages, the plea might pass in Parliament, but we have sufficient confidence in our own credit to believe that the plea will not pass with the people of West Assiniboia, whose "independent" representative Mr. Davin, the political hedger, has long pretended to be.11

These were harsh words but Scott wanted the whole matter of his relations with Davin aired in the courts in order to clear himself of any imputation of wrongdoing. Davin accepted the challenge and laid the charges.

- Scott appointed Haultain his attorney and entered a long written defense to Davin's charge on February 8th, 1897.12 The defense sought to establish that no libel had been committed because what had been published was true and "that it was for the public benefit that the matters charged should be published in the manner and at the time they were published...."13 To support this claim the Plea set out thirty-four cases of wrongful acts or false statements made by Davin. Among these were false accusations Davin had made against a former Mayor of Regina, W.C. Hamilton, in 1889, an editorial published by Davin in 1889 which cast reflections on the religious views of C.J. Atkinson, various other promises and actions on the part of Davin as well as a number of statements which cast


12Scott Papers, Queen vs. Scott, Plea, Feb. 8, 1897.

13Ibid.
aspersions on Scott's character. Just before the case was to be tried Davin submitted a written apology to Scott for having used the phrase "most dishonorable action in the history of human infamy" to describe Scott's action in refusing to support Davin on his vote on the Remedial Bill and withdrew the criminal charge.

It was really an incredible performance. Scott had denounced Davin in very strong terms, yet he forced Davin to apologize and withdraw the criminal charges. Possibly Davin withdrew the charges because he felt he had a poor case, but it is more likely that he dropped them because of the defense Scott presented. It meant that if Davin proceeded with the charges he would have had to face a full public examination of his conduct over the past ten years. Such an examination would not help his political career, particularly with his opponents in control of the important newspapers. Whatever the reasons, Davin's failure to face Scott in court further weakened his position. This made Scott the logical person to challenge Davin in the next election.

It was becoming increasingly obvious that The Leader was a strong supporter of the Liberal government. Its editor had, from the first, rejoiced at the defeat of the Conservative hierarchy and within a year he was praising the Laurier government for its effective—

14Ibid., Davin to Scott, Dec. 23, 1897.
15The Leader, "Open Letter to N.F. Davin", Nov. 9, 1899, op. cit. See also Ibid., "Mr. Scott and the 'Protest'", Oct. 4, 1900.
16Ibid., "Defeat of the Hierarchy", July 2, 1896.
ness in dealing with the Manitoba school question and various administrative problems. Scott was recognized as a party stalwart when he was appointed by the Central Liberal Association, on January 11th, 1898, to distribute the patronage for West Assiniboia. In answer to attacks by The Winnipeg Tribune, Scott publicly revealed his appointment and stated that he had succeeded J.H. Ross who gave up the post when he was appointed to the Executive Council of the North-West Territories. Evidently Scott's choice had been made and he was now a Liberal.

Meanwhile his paper was engaged in a discussion of the current problems of the North-West. Though the paper almost always supported the position of the Liberal government, the editorials were of a much better quality than those that had appeared in the Times. Scott was definitely maturing as an editor and developing a political philosophy.

Scott, through his paper, took an active part in discussions about the problems of the Territorial government. Federal grants never seemed to catch up to the demands made by the government of the North-West Territories. It was hoped that the new government at Ottawa would be more generous, and Ross was sent east to interview Cabinet

17 Ibid., "Plenty of Action", Apr. 8, 1897.

18 Scott Papers, W.W. Bole to Scott, Jan. 11, 1898.

19 The Leader, "The Winnipeg Traitor", Nov. 30, 1899. Ross was appointed to the Public Works portfolio on October 14, 1897, and since the Territorial government was non-partisan he felt he had to give up his post as patronage distributor for the Liberals.
members\textsuperscript{20} with the object of getting an increased grant. Commenting on Ross' mission Scott expressed the opinion that there was a need for "some definite subsidy to do away with the hand-to-mouth system", and that Laurier had a wonderful opportunity to win favour and support in the North-West.\textsuperscript{21} The West was vital to the future of Canada, and it was time for the North-West government to be placed on the same financial basis as the provinces, with a grant of a half million dollars.\textsuperscript{22} However, Ross' trip ended in failure as the Dominion government decided to retain the original Conservative estimates\textsuperscript{23} which were considerably below the half million dollars Scott had considered adequate.\textsuperscript{24} As he made no editorial comment, Scott was apparently willing to accept the government decision. The financial problem led the Territorial Assembly to prepare a Memorial requesting increased powers.

The Memorial followed the lines suggested by Ross in a speech to the Assembly.\textsuperscript{25} It requested an extension of executive powers, a subsidy based on a per capita grant, debt allowance, a grant in aid of government and at a future time a grant in lieu of control of

\textsuperscript{20}L.H. Thomas, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 250.

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{The Leader}, "North-West Finances", Aug. 20, 1896.

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, "The North-West Grant", Sept. 10, 1896.

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, "Return of Mr. Ross", front page, Sept. 17, 1896.

\textsuperscript{24}L.H. Thomas, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 251.

\textsuperscript{25}For a report of the speech see \textit{The Leader}, Oct. 15, 1896.
public lands. Many of these requests were granted, including the creation of an Executive Council giving the Territories responsible government. The Territorial grant was increased for 1897, though it was still far below Scott's estimate of the need. Nevertheless he enthusiastically greeted the increased grant and the constitutional changes.

With the whole problem of provincial establishment being discussed, the question of territorial limits was raised. Suggestions were made that part of the eastern townships should be turned over to Manitoba. Scott strongly opposed such action because, he stated, the people of the Territories did not want it and because of the heavy tax burden already existing in Manitoba. He suggested that only one province should be created taking in the whole area. This was quite consistent with views he had expressed in 1894.

In 1898 Scott stated that the time for provincial establishment was rapidly approaching. In 1899 he wondered if the time had arrived and agreed with Haultain's


27 The Leader, "The North-West Treated Handsomely", June 3, 1897. The grant was $290,000.00 for 1897.


29 Ibid., "Why We Object", Jan. 21, 1897; "Territorial Opinion", Jan. 28, 1897; "Number One", Feb. 4, 1897.


31 The Leader, "Have We Reached the Point", Sept. 28, 1899.
opinion that it had indeed. Scott also stated that the Territories should be granted the same terms as had been granted other provinces, excepting Manitoba. In the meantime, he said, the Assembly must continue to operate on a non-partisan basis in order not to alienate the Dominion government while they were still dependent on it in so many ways.

Scott did not show a great deal of interest in agricultural problems at first, and during 1896 and 1897 there were few editorials which could be termed agricultural. He seemed to wait for a lead from Ottawa before publicly discussing these problems. Editorialy, he did favour programs aimed at developing a dairy industry in western Canada. He also recognized the problem in the grading of grains, where there was grave danger under existing conditions of either the farmers or the overseas buyer losing to the grain companies. The elevator agent graded the grain and farmers claimed they were often given low grades for high quality grain, which was then mixed with low grades and sold overseas as top grade wheat. To remove farmers' suspicions about the mixing of grains and to prevent any possibility of this action taking place Scott suggested more government supervision of the grain trade. He

also suggested that farmers should form their own elevator companies to break the elevator monopolies. This comprised his contribution to the debate on agricultural problems over a period of nearly two years. But when the Douglas elevator bill came up for consideration, he discussed it fully.

Amendments to the grain marketing acts in 1898 made it possible for a farmer to load his grain directly onto railroad cars. While Scott said that if at all possible grain should be handled through the elevators where it could be properly cleaned, he supported the amendment because it freed the farmer from the oppressive monopoly of the elevator companies. The situation in the Regina area convinced him that the law was working as it was supposed to and that the existence of the law would eventually make its utilization unnecessary. But in many other areas farmers found that they could not get railroad cars when they ordered them. The railroad claimed it could not provide them. Thus the majority of western farmers, regardless of the law, remained at the mercy of the elevator companies. The remedy, Scott stated, was to be found in a new grain trade bill proposed by J.M. Douglas, Independent-Liberal for East Assiniboia.

37 Ibid., "Wheat Buyers Combine", Oct. 28, 1897, and "Fighting the Combine", Nov. 11, 1897.

38 Ibid., "May Load on Cars", July 21, 1898.

39 Ibid., "Loading on Cars", Nov. 24, 1898.

The grain trade bill proposed would have made it necessary for the railway company to provide facilities to receive or ship grain or grant to any person who demanded it the right to build elevators, flat warehouses or grain chutes enabling them to ship grain. 41 It would also have provided for rigid government inspection to check closely on grades and dockages. 42 The bill did not get beyond the committee stage. Scott seemed to be convinced that the bill was defeated because the elevator owners controlled the eastern Members who, having no real interest in the bill, voted against it. 43 Scott's charges against the elevator monopoly and the eastern Members of Parliament launched The Leader into a number of editorial battles with rival newspapers that dragged on interminably beclouding the real problem with political issues and adding nothing toward the solution of it. The journalistic pugilism centred on charges made by The Leader that J.W. Connell of Carnduff, a Member of the North-West Territories Assembly and for a time Conservative nominee for the East Assiniboia constituency for Parliament, was a member of the elevator combine, 44 and led to exchanges

41 Ibid., Parliamentary Supplement, May 11, 1899. An Act to Regulate the Trade in Grain in Manitoba and the North-West Territories, Clauses 1, 2 and 3.

42 Ibid., Clause 9.

43 Ibid., "Slaughter of the Douglas Bill", June 1, 1899.

44 Ibid., "Is There Not Any Combine?", Dec. 21, 1899, and "Mr. Connell's Defense", Apr. 21, 1900.
with the Indian Head *Vidette*, the Carnduff *Gazette*, and *The West* of Regina. If the disputes proved anything it was that *The Leader* was recognized as the government's chief spokesman in West Assiniboia.

To resolve the elevator problem the government resorted to a Royal Commission. Scott approved of this action although he said that the Douglas bill would have solved the problem. When the Commission reported, it advocated, among other things, the removal of railway restrictions against flat warehouses and grain chutes. A new grain bill following the recommendations of the Commission was introduced by Douglas and became law although *The Leader* only mentioned some of the incidental points arising out of the Act.

The immigration policies of the Laurier government met with Scott's full approval. A more active immigration program brought in-

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creasing numbers of settlers, many of whom came from eastern European countries. Among the latter the Galicians and Doukhobours drew the main attacks of the opposition groups. According to them, these people were mentally and physically diseased and in general a shiftless, thriftless, lazy and lawless lot. Scott denied these allegations pointing out that they actually constituted an excellent type of settler that could make a success of homesteading where many others, including British settlers, had failed. He also said the government was quite justified in allowing some settlers in on the understanding that they would never be subject to military service, and that these people did not constitute a major threat to labour because of their lower standards of living. On many occasions Scott found an excuse to point out how well the Doukhobours and Galicians had adapted to the problems of homesteading. But just in case these arguments did not succeed, he also pointed out that the government was spending large sums of money to secure British immigrants.

Railways were a necessary accompaniment to western development. Scott realized this but was highly critical of the way the Canadian

Pacific Railway had been built and of the privileges which it still held from the original contract. These included the exemption from taxation on railway lands for twenty years, freedom from governmental control of freight rates until earnings equalled ten percent of investments and freedom from competition by any railway south of their main line. His attitude toward the Canadian Pacific Railway was expressed as follows:

Those who have relied upon the fact that the destinies of the C.P.R. and the North-West are interminably interwoven as a pledge that the company would deal fairly by the country have rested upon mistaken security. . . . The C.P.R. Co. operates upon the principle that the West exists and is being peopled for the benefit of the Company. 58

He hoped that the Liberal government would put an end to the supreme position of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

Shortly after the Liberals took office the problem of building a railway through the Crows Nest Pass to the Kootenay arose. Scott stated that he would hold Laurier "criminally responsible" if the Canadian Pacific Railway Company got the contract without adequate safeguards to protect the people. 59 Other methods of building the road were suggested, including government construction 60 and a new railway company 61 but eventually the contract went to the Canadian

60 Ibid., "Preserve the People's Rights", Nov. 19, 1896.
Pacific Railway Company. 62 The contract did not give a land grant but a straight money grant and placed definite restrictions on rates and rentals. 63 Scott announced, "The bargain is made, and we think it a good one." 64 The Liberals had passed their first railway test and Scott defended the new policy against all critics. 65

According to Scott, the West would prefer government construction of railways but the time had not come for such a step. Meanwhile the individual must be protected from the railway companies by careful government regulation and by allowing the construction of competitive lines. 66 He was also critical of the twenty year exemption clause in the Canadian Pacific Railway contract but failed to offer any real solution. 67 On this issue the editor of The Standard challenged Scott to abandon the Liberals, comparing Laurier's failure to repudiate the exemption clause to Davis's vote on the Manitoba School question. 68 Scott answered by saying that he believed it would be necessary for the courts to give an interpretation

62 Ibid., "Crows Nest Railway", June 10, 1897.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., "The Crows Nest Railway", July 8, 1897.
66 Ibid., "Transportation Question", May 18, 1899.
68 The Standard, "West Assiniboia", June 27, 1900.
first and then, if necessary, for Parliament to act. He implied that at that time he would decide whether the Liberal action could be supported. 69

Scott's views on tariffs were succinctly expressed: "The price of farm products cannot be enhanced by tariffs so it is unfair that farmers have to buy supplies which are made dearer by tariffs." 70 Thus he approved when the government revised tariffs in 1897 introducing a preferential trade clause for Great Britain 71 and lowering tariffs on some items vital to the settler such as clothing, barbed wire and binder twine. 72 On the other hand he was ready to ask for protection for the farmer when the opportunity arose. In 1898 the mining boom opened the Yukon. Scott said the market there for western farm produce should be protected as a partial compensation for the tariffs farmers had to pay to protect eastern manufacturers. 73 While Scott backed the Liberals there was the implied criticism that they had not gone far enough on tariff revision.

Many other subjects were discussed in The Leader. A number of editorials on the school question praised or defended the Liberal

69 The Leader, "The 20 Years Exemption", July 5, 1900.
71 Ibid., "Preferential Trade", Apr. 1, 1897.
73 Ibid., "A New Field for Protection", Feb. 10, 1898.
settlement of that problem. The Leader strongly supported Clifford Sifton as Minister of the Interior. So consistently did Scott support the Liberal government that The West had some justification for referring to him as a "slavish supporter of the government in all its iniquity".

During 1899 a division serious enough to interest Sifton developed within the Regina Liberal party. The chief cause of the difficulty seems to have been that some of the older Liberals strongly objected to Scott's administration of the patronage. The exact cause of their objection is not clear but Scott claimed that he had angered some Liberals because he refused to have Conservatives who were doing a good job fired from civil service positions to make room for Liberals. There seems also to have been some objection to Sifton among the older Liberals, who felt he was not doing all he should for the West. Eventually a new Liberal group called the Junior Liberal

75 Ibid., "The Campaign Against Sifton", Nov. 17, 1898; "Admirer of Sifton", Aug. 23, 1900.
76 The West, "A Betrayor of Liberalism", June 6, 1900.
77 Scott Papers, Sifton to Scott, Oct. 30, 1899 and Oct. 31, 1899. Sifton planned to meet all the Liberals in Regina on Nov. 11, 1899, but whether he was able to get a unified meeting is not clear.
78 Ibid., Sifton to Scott, Jan. 11, 1899.
80 Scott Papers, Scott to Hon. William Harty, July 20, 1909.
Association of Regina and District was organized with Scott as its first President.\textsuperscript{81} It was intended to replace the old Liberal organization known as the Regina and District Reform Association but this group continued to hold meetings.

In an effort to end the dispute Scott resigned as patronage distributor for the Liberal party in West Assiniboia. A party convention called to choose his successor\textsuperscript{82} met on December 11, 1899, but if the members of the older Regina Liberal organization attended they had little effect on the proceedings as Scott was asked to continue distributing patronage and the Convention went on record as strongly endorsing the leadership of Laurier and Sifton. The Convention also prepared for a nominating convention to be held at a later date by appointing a committee to make all the necessary arrangements.

Scott did not attend the nominating Convention. During the spring of 1900 he had to make a trip to Ottawa to testify at hearings before the Public Accounts Committee concerning printing contracts granted The Leader while Davin owned it. He left Regina on April 19 and did not return until May 25.\textsuperscript{83} Previous commitments required him to join a press excursion at St. Paul, Minnesota, for a journey to

\textsuperscript{81}The Leader, "Junior Liberal Association", Oct. 12, 1899, p.8.
\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., "Regina Liberals", Oct. 19, 1899, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{83}Scott Papers, Pocket Notebook for 1900. See entries for days mentioned.
Detroit, Quebec and Ontario. For this purpose he left Regina on May 28th, the day the nominating Convention met. However, before he left he met with some Regina Liberals and saw some of the delegations that came to attend the Convention.

About thirty delegates from all parts of the constituency attended. According to the rules established by the planning executive set up at the December Convention all delegates had to be selected as a result of open Liberal meetings and were officially accredited. On the ground that they had not been selected according to the Convention regulations, eight delegates from the Regina and District Reform Association were refused admission. The eight delegates from the Regina Junior Liberal Association were admitted. The spokesman for the senior Liberal group stated that his group had refused to attend the open meeting of the Junior Liberal Association as long as Scott continued to distribute the patronage. An attempt was made to have the Reform Association delegates admitted but it was defeated when Ross opposed

84 The Leader, Reports of the Excursion, June 7, 14 and 21, 1900.
85 Scott Papers, Pocket Notebook for 1900, May 28.
86 Ibid., May 25.
87 Ibid., May 26. He states, "Met Western delegates to Convention (Liberal)."
88 Scott Papers, List of Delegates Attending Liberal Convention, May 28, 1900.
89 Ibid., and The Leader, "Liberal Convention", June 7, 1900.
90 The Leader, "Liberal Convention", June 7, 1900.
the motion on the grounds that they did not represent true Liberal ideas. The Convention then proceeded to nominate a candidate.

Ross was offered the nomination but he refused because he wanted to complete work he had started in the North-West Territories. Then, according to the editorial comment, with "enthusiasm and unanimity" the nomination was offered to Walter Scott. Scott had probably already agreed to accept the nomination but he was wired by the Convention chairman and telegraphed his acceptance. The Convention was clearly a triumph for the Ross-Sifton-Scott brand of Liberalism.

In a letter dated June 18th, 1900, addressed to the Chairman of the Liberal Convention but published on the front page of The Leader, Scott stated his political creed:

I feel justified in taking it for granted that I will be expected to act as a supporter of the present Government, but independent and untrammelled by any consideration other than the best interests of this region and the Territories as a whole in particular and the Dominion of Canada in general. . . . It was with confidence, which I am sure was not mistaken, that your convention would expect this nominee to be a truly independent Member of Parliament, perfectly free to oppose by word and vote any action of the Liberal party or a Liberal

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., "Liberal Convention at Regina", May 31, 1900.
94 Ibid.
government that might be inimical to the North-West that I accepted this nomination without hesitation or parley.95

He went on to review briefly and with approval the Liberal program and to state that he felt more had to be done on tariff reduction, transportation and grain marketing. Scott also stated that he deeply appreciated the honour bestowed on him - "an honor unmasked and unsought, as you know, but none the less appreciated."96 The theory of representation Scott outlined in accepting the Liberal nomination in 1900 was exactly opposite to the one he claimed Davin should have followed in 1896,97 but it is probably much closer to Scott's own real opinion and the popularly accepted theory of representation than the one he had expressed in 1896. Scott's program was designed to appeal to a wide cross-section of the Territorial electorate but he realized that with Davin as his opponent a hard contest lay ahead.

Scott actually began campaigning in the middle of August.98

He recalled it as a time of learning:

Perhaps you do not know that I was never on a platform attempting a speech until a candidate against Nicholas Flood who was a master of oratory if nothing else. The debt I owe John Hawkes has to do with that campaign. John followed me at meetings in Davin's interest, and

95Ibid., "Mr. Scott Writes the Liberal Convention Chairman", June 28, 1900, front page.

96Ibid.

97supra, p. 24.

98The Leader, "Getting Into Harness", Aug. 23, 1900.
he was decent always, even generous sometimes. Before the end of it, along with John, I had learned to control myself. 99

According to the newspaper reports of Scott's speeches, his strategy was to avoid personal issues on the campaign platform. Instead he concentrated on the Liberal party record as compared with that of the Conservatives. 100 In support of Scott The Leader kept up a steady stream of editorials which attacked Davin or Conservative policies and invariably praised the Liberals. The news reports of meetings always reported a good reception for Scott, but usually reported that Davin was not doing very well. 101 In addition to The Leader, Scott had the support of The Standard owned by J.K. McInnis, his former business partner. 102

When the votes were counted after November 7th, 1900, Scott was found to be the winner and the new Member of Parliament for West Assiniboia. 103 In a card of thanks to the electors he analysed the reasons for his victory as follows:

The victory is one for the North-West Territories, for the principle of low tariff, for the principle of public

99AS, Haslam Papers, Scott to J.H. Haslam, July 12, 1918.

100For examples see The Leader, "Getting Into Harness", Aug. 23, 1900, and "Scott Speaks for Two Hours and Talks Business From the Word Go", Oct. 11, 1900.

101See The Leader, August to November, 1900.


control of railways, for honest administration and it is a victory against and rebuke to those who think it no shame to misrepresent and slander the public and private character of public men. 104

It was a victory for Scott in the long drawn out battle with Davin which had begun in earnest over the school question in 1896. Scott, of course, was elected partly on the wave of public opinion which had turned to the Liberal party.

Later when Scott became leader of the Saskatchewan Liberals he wrote a friend trying to express his personal feelings:

My feeling now is much as in 1900, - I was inclined to be amazed at the recklessness of my friends in being willing to depend on me; and my determination now is the same as then, that if I fail it will not be because I have shirked the work confronting the position. 105

He also stated, "Probably no person ever went to Ottawa so doubtful of himself and so keenly aware of his lack of education as was the case with me ..." 106 Scott had achieved a great deal and his determination to work hard to make up for his educational shortcomings provided the basis for rapid advancement in politics.

104 The Leader, "Card to Electors", Nov. 8, 1900.
105 Scott Papers, Scott to E.B. Burbank, Aug. 23, 1905.
As one of the four Members of Parliament from the Territories, Scott found that to represent adequately the interests of the West was a heavy responsibility. He worked hard and developed into one of the leading Liberal spokesman for western interests. He also became deeply involved in the problems of administering patronage and of maintaining himself and his party in political power. Of primary importance during his first term was his relationship with Premier Haultain, which centered on Territorial demands for autonomy, the annual federal grant to the Territories and Haultain's political activities.

During his first session in Parliament in 1901 Scott supported the Territorial requests for provincial autonomy. He said the Territories needed increased constitutional powers in order to meet the financial requirements of its government and that inadequate federal grants had forced the Territories into this position. Scott supported his argument by quoting extensively from speeches by Haultain and from an address presented to the Federal government by the Territorial government in May, 1900. He also gave his own views on the terms the Territories should receive when they were granted provincial powers. There should be only one province with no transfer of territory to
Manitoba. Otherwise the terms should be similar to those granted the other provinces, except Manitoba.¹ Haultain thanked Scott for making this speech pointing out that it "was distinguished by being the first real statement of our position by any of our federal representatives either in the House or anywhere else."² In speaking strongly on this issue Scott identified himself as a spokesman for western interests at a time when both Dominion and Territorial governments were giving serious consideration to the autonomy question.

In October of 1901 representatives of the Territorial government and of the Dominion cabinet met in Ottawa to discuss autonomy terms for the Territories. The Cabinet committee showed interest in the question and Laurier asked the Territorial delegation to submit their case in writing. Haultain submitted a preliminary draft of a bill followed by a more detailed survey of the question.³ However, after further study the Dominion government came to the conclusion that the Territories were not yet ready for provincial status. In a letter to Haultain explaining the government's decision Sifton pointed out that the population of the area was too sparse, that the rapidly changing population would alter conditions and that opinion in the Territories differed widely regarding the number of provinces that should

¹Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1901, pp. 2006-17.
²Scott Papers, Haultain to Scott, Apr. 25, 1901.
be established. In reply Haultain dismissed these reasons as invalid and ended by requesting a more adequate grant in order that the Territorial government could provide for the needs of its people.

Before he could have received Sifton's official notification but in obvious anticipation of its contents Haultain wrote Scott asking him to help the Territorial cause. He pointed out that the Dominion government had turned down his request for provincial status and only intended to give the Territories a small increase in their annual grant. The Territorial Premier asked Scott to make a real fight for increased grants:

You and Frank Oliver should block supply for a day at least. . . . We are bound to make a fight of it and to appeal to the country early this year on our statements at Ottawa. It will not hurt you at Ottawa to make a good stiff fight and will, I think, put you in line with a strong sentiment which we hope to stir up in the West. I have no sinister designs on the Federal Government, but I do not intend to allow any misapprehensions to exist in the West as to who is to blame for the practical suspension of our business which must occur this summer unless the amount we have asked for is granted.

Complete compliance with Haultain's request, which asked him to take rather strong measures, could have put Scott in an awkward position with his Liberal colleagues in Ottawa. In view of his actions in 1901 it seems logical to assume that Scott would have placed the

4Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories, 1903, Appendix, p. 36. C. Sifton to Haultain, Mar. 27, 1902.

5Ibid., pp. 36-38. Haultain to Sifton, Apr. 2, 1902.

6Scott Papers, Haultain to Scott, Mar. 21, 1902.
Territorial cause before Parliament without Haultain's plea.

Scott did not go as far as Haultain had requested in making a plea for increased grants but he also raised the autonomy question. In his speech Scott said that he believed conditions in the Territories had reached the stage where it would be advantageous for the people of the Territories and the Dominion as a whole to grant the North-West Territories provincial institutions. He expressed his regret that the Dominion government had decided not to deal with the question during the current session. He went on to state that until the Territories were granted provincial institutions it was the duty of the Dominion government to provide for the financial needs of the Territorial government and he asked for a great increase in the annual grant. Oliver, Liberal Member for Alberta, pointed out that it was up to Parliament either to meet the financial needs of the Territorial government or to give them provincial powers. Douglas, Liberal Member for East Assiniboia, expressed the same view but added that he felt it would be better for the Territories to have an increased grant than provincial powers. Sifton also spoke during the debate and defended the government's decision to delay the granting of provincial status to the Territories on the basis that the population was too small and there was a division of opinion among the people on desirable

7_Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1902, pp. 3064-71.
8_Ibid., pp. 3071-73.
9_Ibid., pp. 3074-76.
autonomy terms. Possibly Haultain was annoyed by Scott's failure to do all he asked but there is no evidence of any strained relations between the two men at this time and Scott continued to support Haultain's government.

A Territorial election was held in the summer of 1902 and Scott did all he could to help return Haultain to power. The Leader defended the Haultain administration and, in addition, Scott wrote to at least one Liberal asking him to support Haultain and the members of his government. According to this letter, in Scott's opinion there had "never been in the Assembly, excepting Ross, any man who approached Haultain in point of ability to carry on efficiently and economically the affairs of the North-West." However, he did caution his editor, after the appearance of a sharp editorial attack on Dr. Patrick, Leader of the Opposition to the Haultain government, not to give much attention to Patrick. He gave two reasons for this attitude. The first was that Patrick was ineffectual and it would not do to defeat him because a stronger leader might appear. Secondly, Patrick's constituency was not far from Scott's and he might at a future election do Scott some harm. When Haultain's supporters won a majority of the seats The Leader

10 Ibid., pp. 3101-10.
12 Scott Papers, Scott to Donald Wilkie, Apr. 30, 1902.
13 Ibid., Scott to William Trant, Apr. 21, 1902.
expressed Scott's feelings in welcoming the return of the Haultain administration.14

Early in 1903 Haultain answered some critics of his government by appointing a Conservative to the Executive Council. Besides Haultain, the Executive had been made up of two Liberals, Bulyea and A.L. Sifton. When T.H. McGuire, Chief Justice of the Territories, resigned15 A.L. Sifton was given the appointment. To fill the vacancy in the Executive Haultain appointed Dr. Elliott, a well known Conservative, as Commissioner of Agriculture.16 Scott pointed out that the move had "flabber-gasted the Conservative section around here [Regina] and east of here which has been denouncing Haultain."17 Elliott was, in Scott's opinion, "by no means as able as Sifton"18 but the move had helped Haultain with the Conservatives. Meanwhile the Territorial Conservatives had persuaded their party leader, Borden, to call a convention to meet at Moose Jaw on March 25.19

The Leader announced that the Conservative Convention was being organized by enemies of Haultain "with the object of dividing

14The Leader, "The Elections", May 29, 1902.
16Ibid., "Government Changes", Feb. 5, 1903.
17Scott Papers, Scott to G.W. Brown, Feb. 28, 1903.
18Ibid., Scott to J.H. Ross, Feb. 28, 1903.
the Assembly on party lines with R.B. Bennett as the Conservative leader.\textsuperscript{20} The Convention passed a series of resolutions including a demand for immediate provincial status.\textsuperscript{21} Probably the most important resolution was No. 7 which stated:

That in furtherance of the objects of this Convention be it resolved that Conservative candidates as such be placed in nomination in every constituency, at the next General Election of Members of the Legislative Assembly of the North West Territories, and be kept in the field until the close of polls.\textsuperscript{22}

Haultain and some of his supporters opposed this resolution but it passed the Convention with a large majority. Despite this Haultain remained in the Convention and accepted office in the Conservative Association as Honorary President. No one could seriously question Haultain's right to participate in party politics as long as it did not bring party division within the Territorial Assembly. The fact that Haultain, having failed to defeat the party line resolution, did not emphatically repudiate the action of the Convention made the Liberals suspicious of his real beliefs and intentions.

Scott believed that Haultain should have fought the issue out in the Convention and refused to accept office in an association "whose policy was to make a new division in the Assembly."\textsuperscript{23} He went

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{The Leader}, "They Convict Themselves", Mar. 19, 1903.

\textsuperscript{21}Scott Papers, Copy of report of resolutions adopted by the Conservative Convention, Mar. 25, Resolution No. 8.

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Tbid}.

\textsuperscript{23}Scott Papers, Scott to Bulyea, Apr. 3, 1903.
on to say that if Haultain wanted to stay in politics he would have to state at once that his position on the party line division remained unchanged. If he did not take that action his government would not live through the session. He added: "It's nonsense to talk about giving notice to bring in the party lines in four years hence. The moment such a notice is given the division will occur."24

In order to clarify the situation, Scott wired his editor to interview Haultain immediately regarding the party line resolution.25 In the interview Haultain stated that his position regarding the introduction of party division in the Assembly remained unchanged and he was not bound by the Convention resolution.26 Scott did not feel that Haultain had gone far enough because he had not given any assurance regarding future Territorial elections.27 Meanwhile, on Haultain's return from the Convention Bulyea had offered his resignation.28 On the basis of private assurances by Haultain and the published interview Bulyea agreed to remain in the Executive. He also wrote a letter to fifteen of Haultain's Liberal supporters in the Assembly asking them to continue to support the Premier and assuring them that Haultain

24Ibid.

25Ibid., Scott to Kerr, Apr. 1, 1903. He mentions the telegram and gives his views on the situation.

26The Leader, Apr. 2, 1903.

27Scott Papers, Scott to Bulyea, Apr. 6, 1903.

28Ibid., Bulyea to Scott, Jan. 12, 1910.
would make a satisfactory statement in the Assembly.\textsuperscript{29} To the public, despite the party line resolution, Haultain's position appeared unchanged but many of his supporters no longer trusted him.

George Brown, a Member of the Assembly and a Haultain supporter, described the situation in a letter to Scott:

Outwardly there is now no opposition, but there seems to be an element of uncertainty among the members as to what is going to happen next. Apparently Haultain never had so little opposition in the House as he has at the present time, but at the same time, there certainly never was so great a disposition on the part of the real supporters to hold back to see what he means to do before they commit themselves.\textsuperscript{30}

He added that, while the Haultain interview and statement in the Assembly had to a certain extent satisfied the local Liberals, it had not gone far enough to satisfy the eastern Liberals. Brown was of the opinion that Haultain's failure to repudiate the resolution would make it necessary to postpone provincial autonomy until the Liberals knew how much confidence they could place in him.\textsuperscript{31}

Scott at first appeared to believe that the situation was not as bad as it appeared to be and that eventually it would work out to the advantage of the Liberals. As he interpreted the situation,

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., and Lingard, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 118-19. In a speech given Apr. 22, 1903, Haultain promised to keep federal party politics out of local affairs in the Assembly.

\textsuperscript{30}Scott Papers, G.W. Brown to Scott, May 5, 1903.

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid. Lingard, \textit{op. cit.}, repeatedly refers to Haultain's united House of 35 members. There seems to be some doubt as to how united the House was.
Haultain, to remain in power, would have to take a decided stand against the resolution and this would mean that he would have to break with the Conservatives. Haultain would then emerge as the leader of a party in opposition to the local Conservatives.\(^{32}\) If Haultain were willing to make his position absolutely clear and completely reject the party line resolution, Scott said, he could remain in power for many years.\(^{33}\) However, Haultain did not take any further action on the party line resolution or break with the Conservatives. Instead he seemed to draw closer to his party.

Early in 1903 Haultain again demanded provincial status for the Territories and an increased annual grant. His renewed demands were prompted by a speech given in Regina by Sifton, in which Sifton had again claimed the Territories were not ready for provincial institutions and that it would be necessary for the government to proceed slowly.\(^{34}\) In a long written reply Haultain disagreed with the arguments Sifton had given for delay and bluntly suggested that the government must have some other reason for delay. He also pointed out that he had a new mandate from the people and the full support of the Assembly in his demands.\(^{35}\) On February 3rd Haultain sent the

\(^{32}\)Scott Papers, Scott to Bulyea, Apr. 15, 1903; Scott to Kerr, Apr. 6, 1903 and Scott to G.W. Brown, Apr. 8, 1903.

\(^{33}\)Ibid., Scott to Bulyea, Apr. 6, 1903.

\(^{34}\)The Leader, Jan. 22, 1903.

Prime Minister some revisions for his original draft autonomy bill along with the Territorial request for 1903 grants. Later Haultain and Bulyea appeared before a Cabinet committee to present the Territorial financial case. The Dominion government did not give an official answer to Haultain's requests until April, and then only to the financial requests.

Scott was anxious to have the matter of the Dominion grant to the Territories for 1903 settled before the Assembly met on April 16th. He said that if Haultain did not know the size of the grant he might have to adjourn the Assembly and this would not be good publicity for the Liberal party. A final decision had been held up partly because certain information had to be obtained from Sifton who was in England. In a letter to Bulyea on April 15th Scott reported that with the aid of Oliver and Ross they had finally got the Cabinet committee to agree on financial terms for the Territories. Haultain was to be notified by telegram in order that he would have the information in time for the meeting of the Assembly.

36 Ibid., Haultain to Laurier, Feb. 3, 1903, pp. 43-4.
37 Lingard, op. cit., p. 77.
39 Scott Papers, Scott to Bulyea, Apr. 3, 1903.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., Scott to Bulyea, Apr. 15, 1903.
In his telegram to Haultain on April 16th Fielding, the Minister of Finance, offered the Territories the same basic grant as given in 1902. In addition he offered a supplementary grant of $250,000 to cover the 1902 deficit, and a "capital advance" which was a federal loan for capital construction of up to $500,000. Haultain replied by telegram the next day that the supplementary grant was satisfactory but that they needed a much larger basic grant and that he had not asked for and did not want the capital advance. He added that he would give a fuller explanation of his objections by letter. He did not write the promised letter until April 20th.

Shortly after its initial meeting the Territorial Assembly passed a memorial requesting increased grants and provincial establishment. It heard a statement from Haultain on the party line resolution of the Moose Jaw Conservative Convention and voted partial supply. Then, on the grounds that the Executive could not proceed until they had definite information about the Dominion financial grant, the Assembly adjourned on April 24th for a six week period. The adjournment Scott had hoped to avoid had materialized and the government at Ottawa was blamed for it.

Scott said he did not believe that Haultain was justified in

42 Journals, Appendix, p. 46. Fielding to Haultain, Apr. 16, 1903.
44 Lingard, op. cit., pp. 81-2.
adjourning the Assembly for the reason given. In a letter to G.W. Brown he stated that Fielding had intended to give Haultain definite information about the grant in time for the meeting of the Assembly. The fact that Haultain was not satisfied with the offer and Fielding had to wait for his written objections had caused the delay. Scott was certain that had the Assembly not been adjourned the matter would have been decided but as it was:

The fact that the House has been adjourned for the reason stated coupled with the Moose Jaw convention occurrences and other things is certainly making it harder for us down here in our negotiations with Fielding. Excepting with regard to the adjournment I have not a word of complaint to make because I appreciate Haultain's position and I know that a man in that position must have latitude. But those who do not so thoroughly understand the position are disposed to take another view and at the present juncture I may say to you in confidence that Davis is a detriment rather than an assistance.

In reply Brown stated that the real reason for the adjournment of the Assembly was that none of the departments had their work ready and the Members were anxious to get home to look after their spring work.

It appeared that Haultain was doing all he could to embarrass the Liberal government at Ottawa.

45 T.C. Davis was Member of Parliament for Saskatchewan.
46 Scott Papers, Scott to G.W. Brown, May 1, 1903.
47 Ibid., G.W. Brown to Scott, May 5, 1903. The last two sessions of the Assembly were held in the fall of 1903 and 1904.
Scott's response to the situation was typically practical:

... the greater likelihood there is of Haultain endeavoring to use the North-West government against the interests of the Liberal party the greater reason there is to prevent him stating with truth that the North-West is being starved by the Liberal party.48

He immediately went to work to convince the Cabinet Ministers and others involved in the negotiations that the best solution was to give the Territorial government the money it had asked for so that Haultain could not use the financial situation as an excuse to attack the Liberals.49

In the ensuing negotiations at Ottawa Scott risked his standing with western voters by agreeing not to press for provincial autonomy for the Territories during 1903 in return for an increase in the financial grant.50 The government finally agreed to raise the annual grant by $250,000. The Minister of Finance insisted on charging the cost of two bridges which had been built in 1902 against the capital advance,51 but in order to get Haultain to accept the capital advance52 an additional grant was eventually made to pay for them.53 Though the

48Ibid., Scott to Bulyea, May 13, 1903.
49Ibid., Scott to J.H. Ross, June 11, 1903.
50Ibid., Scott to Bulyea, June 27, 1903.
51Lingard, op. cit., p. 91.
52Scott Papers, Scott to Laurier, June 22, 1903.
53Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1903, p. 13920. Scott gives the financial terms.
final grant was approximately $172,000 short of what the Territories had asked for it was an improvement over previous years. The matter of the grant for 1903 seemed to have been settled satisfactorily. Later difficulty arose because Haultain refused to use the proffered Federal loan, or capital advance.

Haultain's real position on the capital advance is not at all clear but Scott suspected he acted in the interests of the Conservative party. According to Scott, before Haultain went east to interview the Cabinet on the financial grants, he had asked Scott if he would support a demand for a capital advance. Scott's immediate reply was that he would. When press reports of the meetings with the Cabinet indicated that a capital advance was being discussed he assumed that Haultain "had made this part of his demand failing to obtain provincial autonomy." However, when Haultain set out his objections to the proposed financial grant in his letter to Fielding of April 20th he claimed that he had not asked for a capital advance. He maintained that as long as the Dominion government controlled the lands it should provide for the financial needs of the Territories and they should not have to borrow money. Haultain also objected to charging the cost of the two bridges built in 1902 against this advance and asked for clarification of terms and conditions attached to the loan. During the ensuing financial

54 Lingard, op. cit., Appendix, Table V, p. 258.
55 Scott Papers, Scott to Kerr, May 14, 1903.
negotiations Scott understood, as a result of correspondence with Haultain and Bulyea, that the capital advance would be acceptable if the two bridges were not charged against it.\footnote{Scott Papers, Scott to Bulyea, Aug. 27, 1903. \textit{The Leader}, Oct. 12, 1904. Scott cites a telegram from Haultain dated Apr. 18, 1903, stating capital advance would be acceptable if not charged with bridges.} Apparently the capital advance was offered in good faith and Scott said he believed Haultain would use it.

In his budget speech during the fall session Haultain announced that he was not asking the Assembly to vote any expenditure to be charged to the capital advance. He stated his conviction that in return for control of the Territorial lands the Dominion government was obligated to support the Territorial government.\footnote{Lingard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 91.} Apparently Haultain had originally wanted to reject the capital advance outright but had modified his policy as a result of a crisis in the Executive Council. Bulyea had understood until almost the last moment that Haultain intended to accept the capital advance.\footnote{Scott Papers, Scott to Sifton, Dec. 4, 1903.} When Haultain informed him of his decision to the contrary Bulyea tendered his resignation on the grounds that Haultain's action was dictated by party interests. In the crisis a conference of interested parties was held. Brown and Rutherford\footnote{Member of the Legislative Assembly for Strathcona, a Liberal.} represented Bulyea while Lake\footnote{Member of the Legislative Assembly for Grenfell, a Conservative.} and Clinkskill\footnote{Member of the Legislative Assembly for Saskatoon, a Conservative.} represented Haultain.
It was finally agreed that Bulyea would withdraw his resignation and that the capital advance would not be rejected. It would simply not be used. Bulyea later stated that he had at the time heard, but was unable to prove, that the decision to refuse the advance was reached at a caucus of all Members of the Territorial Assembly who were Conservative in federal politics. Bulyea's suspicions were probably increased by the fact that the members of the Opposition supported Haultain's final decision on the capital advance.

Bulyea was persuaded to withdraw his resignation as much by Liberal interests as by the compromise agreement worked out over the capital advance question. The Liberals realized that if Bulyea did not withdraw his resignation the non-partisan Territorial government would break down and they would have to accept the blame for bringing about a party division. In the fall of 1903 Scott and others were expecting an early federal election and they did not want a Territorial election at the same time. If Bulyea resigned the administration of

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63 Scott Papers, Scott to John Hawkes, June 14, 1904. Scott again states that Bulyea did not know of Haultain's decision until the last moment. Haultain's version was that Bulyea was forced to fall in line on threat of calling for his resignation. See Lingard, op. cit., p. 124, footnote 42.

64 Scott Papers, Bulyea to Scott, Jan. 12, 1910.

65 Lingard, op. cit., p. 93.

66 Scott Papers, Scott to T.M. Bryce, Dec. 12, 1903; Scott to J.M. Douglas, Nov. 24, 1903; Scott to T.O. Davis, Nov. 24, 1903; Scott to Frank Oliver, Nov. 24, 1903.

67 Ibid., Scott to Sifton, Nov. 23, 1903.
Territorial patronage would be left completely in the hands of Conservatives and this would not help the Liberal cause. Scott and other Liberals suspected that Haultain was trying to force the Liberals into a bad political situation over the capital advance. They avoided the difficulties by persuading Bulyea to withdraw his resignation and remain in Haultain's government. Unfortunately Bulyea lost prestige among Liberal supporters because of his apparent acceptance of Haultain's action.

During the 1903 session Scott reversed the position he had held on the need for immediate provincial autonomy for the Territories. He had agreed in June not to press for immediate autonomy although he did not speak on the subject until near the end of the session. He gave three reasons for his decision. He had urged autonomy as a means of solving the Territorial financial problem but in 1903 the Dominion government had given the Territories most of the money they had asked for, thus removing the need for immediate action. Dominion and provincial authorities were discussing the provincial subsidies and Scott said it would be wise to wait until a decision had been reached on this question before seeking provincial powers. Finally, a decision

68Ibid.
69Ibid., Scott to William Trant, June 22, 1903; Scott to Bulyea, June 27, 1904.
70Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1903, pp. 13915-32.
71Ibid.
reached in the Manitoba Supreme Court in March \(^72\) on a test case concerning the Canadian Pacific Railway tax exemption under the twenty-year clause left in doubt the actual extent of the exemptions and Scott said that provincial autonomy should be delayed until a final decision had been reached on this question. Aside from the tax exemption decision, which was later held to have no effect on the Territories, \(^73\) the reasons Scott gave for delaying action had little validity. He apparently reversed his position as a result of party pressure, and in order to secure the increased grants needed by the Territories.

Before the end of 1903, in addition to the evidence that had already accumulated as a result of the financial negotiations, Scott was given a further reason to regard Haultain as a political opponent. Scott and Ross, at Haultain's request, helped to secure a judgeship for him. The Liberals were anxious to comply with the request as it would eliminate Haultain from the political field and give them control in the Territories, but when the judgeship was offered to him, Haultain began to have serious doubts about whether he should accept it. The situation, if the Liberals were to capitalize on the excellent opportunity Haultain had given them, had to be handled carefully. Everything was prepared for instant action should Haultain accept and

\(^72\) *The Leader*, "C.P.R. Tax Exemptions", Mar. 19, 1903. See also *The Leader*, Mar. 19, 1903, for a report of an interview given by Scott on the decision.

\(^73\) Lingard, *op. cit.*, p. 109 and footnote 37.
everything was done to persuade him to do so. Scott wrote Sifton:

"If Haultain does now what Ross has arranged for all will be well. He may do it. As he understands it the situation is that he asked, not that we asked him; and in private discussion this week he told Bulyea that he was afraid of the criticism that might follow. Now that Ross is gone, Brown will have to be depended upon to impress him with the reasons that ought to induce him to do as arranged. . . . Until you hear from me do nothing. If and when I wire you to go ahead for Heaven's sakes do not delay a minute. His mind — well, I begin to question whether he has such a thing. If he goes out, Bulyea at the worst can hold the fort for a year and if in the meantime we have won the Dominion elections, Bulyea should then be able to beat what will undoubtedly be his straight Tory opposition."

In reply Sifton urged that as much pressure as possible be brought to persuade Haultain and even suggested that it might be well to point out to him that friends who might object then were not likely to contribute to his support later. Scott was never able to wire Sifton to push through the appointment as Haultain eventually decided not to accept.

Haultain had tentatively decided to accept but, after talking it over with friends in Macleod, refused the position. Scott commented:

"In the meantime the word comes back from Macleod showing that he discussed the matter with so many people there that it is now public property, and I am afraid the common impression will be that the Ottawa Government was trying to get him out of politics. He may, of course, be fair enough to set such a mistake right, but his recent course in other matters does not give me much confidence in this expectation."

74 Scott Papers, Scott to Sifton, Nov. 23, 1903.
75 Ibid., Sifton to Scott, Nov. 27, 1903.
76 Ibid., Scott to J.H. Ross, Dec. 8, 1903.
Scott's worst fears did not materialize as there does not appear to be any evidence that the proffered judgeship became widely publicized.

As a result of Haultain's refusal of the judgeship Ross was, in Scott's words, "grievously incensed" because he felt Haultain had made a fool of him, and was now prepared to do anything in his power to bring about Haultain's defeat. Scott was strongly influenced by Ross and undoubtedly reacted in the same way.

During the 1904 session the financial requirements of the Territories again came up. Haultain opened negotiations for the grant in April by submitting a written statement of the financial needs to the Minister of the Interior. With an election in the offing, Scott was anxious to have the financial wants of the Territories met. As he expressed it to Brown:

My bones seem to tell me that the more the matter [autonomy] is debated from the present point of view (no shortage of funds for local government purposes) and the longer the people have to think over it in this light, the less keenly they desire provincial establishment.

Sifton seemed to hold similar views: "... Sifton's own inclination I know to be to make the grant this year as large as Haultain asks, so as to leave not a vestige of ground for complaint on that score..."
The grant was made sufficiently generous to satisfy Scott\textsuperscript{82} although it did not entirely meet Haultain's demands.\textsuperscript{83}

The negotiations for the 1904 Territorial grant made it clear that Scott and Haultain were no longer working together. Scott was concerned about the grant but it is possible that, for political reasons, he deliberately avoided any show of unity. He did receive a letter from Haultain in which the Territorial Premier again asked for assistance in securing an adequate grant and complained of the inadequacy of the 1903 grant. In a draft reply Scott defended the Liberal government's action in 1903 and attacked Haultain for his inconsistent policy over the capital advance.\textsuperscript{84} When Haultain was in Ottawa negotiating for the grant, according to Scott's report, they did not even meet:

\begin{quote}
Remembering the fight which he knows very well I made for him last year and the year before with regard to his money appropriations, it seemed to me it was as little as he could do to give me a call even if he wanted no further interference by Members of Parliament between his Government and the Government here in regard to North-West grants; and I did not feel that it was my duty to spend time in looking him up.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

While apparently piqued by the fact that Haultain ignored him, Scott made no effort to seek a new understanding. Probably he was thinking of the political effect of the situation. The Liberals could claim that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[82]Ibid., Scott to John Hawkes, Aug. 1, 1904.
\item[83]Lingard, \textit{op. cit.}, Appendix, Table V, p. 258.
\item[84]Scott Papers, Scott to Haultain, undated draft letter, marked on back "Draft letter re grant 1904".
\item[85]Ibid., Scott to William Trant, June 27, 1904.
\end{footnotes}
despite Haultain's failure to consult Members like Scott an adequate grant was obtained for the Territories through the efforts of the western Members.

Haultain again raised the autonomy question in correspondence with Laurier. He asked for an increased parliamentary representation for the Territories on the basis of estimates of the increase in Territorial population given by the Department of the Interior.\(^86\) In a second letter Haultain reviewed all the autonomy negotiations and pointed out that his requests were backed by the thirty-five Members of the Legislative Assembly, elected in 1902 and in close touch with the people. He demanded that the government take up the negotiations where they had been left off and grant provincial status to the Territories.\(^87\) Laurier did not answer either of these letters until September 30th. At that time he stated that the Territories had no right to an annual "review of representation on the basis of estimated population. He also told Haultain that if his government was successful during the election it would immediately enter negotiations for the granting of provincial autonomy.\(^88\) Privately Scott had insisted that the Liberals must announce willingness to proceed with provincial autonomy in order to

\(^{86}\text{Journals, 1904, Appendix, p. 12. Haultain to Laurier, May 19, 1904.}\)

\(^{87}\text{Ibid., pp. 12-14. Haultain to Laurier, June 1, 1904.}\)

\(^{88}\text{Ibid., pp. 14-15. Laurier to Haultain, Sept. 30, 1904. Laurier gave no excuse for the long delay in giving his reply.}\)
meet the Conservatives in the election. Evidently Laurier agreed with this view.

Scott's participation in debate in the House during his first four-year term on subjects other than Territorial financial grants and Territorial autonomy also helped to identify him as a western spokesman. He spoke against increases in the tariffs and specifically sought reductions in the tariffs on woolen goods, lumber and farm implements. Problems associated with railways, which were of vital concern to the development of western Canada, occupied his interest. Personally he preferred government ownership and operation of railways but as this did not seem to be practical he favoured government regulation of railways and the extension of rail lines. In 1903 he took an active part, with other western Members, in action to force the imposition of fixed maximum rates on wheat, coal and lumber on its railway lines before the Government provided aid to the Canadian Northern Railway to build certain extensions. He also opposed any attempt to give more land grants to railways. The need for more railway lines was dramatically illustrated in 1902 and 1903 by the so-called grain blockade. Owing to

89Scott Papers, Scott to Sifton, Sept. 1, 1904; Scott to Levi Thomson, Mar. 24, 1904.
90Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1902, pp. 2089-2107.
91Ibid., 1901, p. 842.
92Scott Papers, Scott to J.H. Ross, July 6, 1903.
93Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1903, pp. 14499-501.
inadequate facilities the Canadian Pacific Railway was unable to move
the grain out of the West fast enough, which worked a hardship on the
settlers who were unable to sell their grain. On each occasion Scott and other western Members drew the matter to the attention of Parliament
and asked for government action to remedy the situation.

One of the primary duties of a parliamentarian was to represent the interests of his constituents. "The work of answering correspondence
that comes along," Scott wrote, "takes up almost half one's time." A large portion of this work had to do with the administration of the
land acts, particularly in relation to homestead laws. Within the
restrictions of the law there was room for interpretation and people wanting special concessions wrote him asking for his assistance. These requests were for such things as extension of the time allowed to
perform homestead duties, permission to purchase homesteads, and a
variety of other cases where personal representation in Ottawa could help the settler.

The use of patronage was an effective political weapon to help maintain personal and party supporters. Scott commented on one occasion respecting some supporters, "A little favor of some sort would do them

94 Ibid., 1902, pp. 919-28, and The Leader, May 14, 1903.
95 Scott Papers, Scott to Donald Wilkie, Apr. 30, 1902.
96 Ibid., Scott to James Crawford, June 1, 1904. This file involved twelve letters.
97 Ibid., Scott to Turriff, Jan. 30, 1903.
good -- make them keen." Patronage was also useful to reward supporters. In the case of a newspaperman who had given valuable aid during an election Scott requested that he be given a commission in the Royal North West Mounted Police. He argued that since the man held an army commission he was excellently qualified for the job and that he had given and would continue to give good service to the party. In requesting the Department of the Interior to allow a settler to abandon his pre-emption, or second homestead, and select another piece of land in its place Scott pointed out that this might win a new supporter. The man in question had been a Conservative but was reported to be wavering in his loyalty to that party and might be won over by this concession provided it could be granted.

Civil Service appointments were also a part of the patronage system, and included all ranks of government employees. Scott suggested the use of this branch of patronage early in 1904 not to reward a supporter but to weaken Haultain's effectiveness as an opponent of the Liberals. He recommended that John A. Reid, an important Territorial civil servant be given a new job as Secretary of the Railway Commission. According to Scott, Reid had the best knowledge of the autonomy negotiations and:

So far as figures and facts go, he is author of all the autonomy correspondence and documents as well as

98 Ibid., Scott to Turriff, Nov. 28, 1903.
99 Ibid., Scott to Sifton, Dec. 24, 1904.
100 Ibid., Scott to Turriff, Jan. 9, 1904.
Haultain's speeches, and lacking Reid to prepare his speeches for him Haultain would have much less material to make speeches out of. He is too indolent to get them up himself.101

The appointment suggested was not made102 but, if Scott's assessment of Haultain's need of Reid's assistance was at all accurate, it did show how patronage could be used to harm an opponent. It should be mentioned that this suggestion was made early in January, 1904, not too long after Haultain had rejected the judgeship and probably reflected Scott's annoyance with him.

Even the suggestion that voting the right way might help to obtain a desired objective could be used effectively to win political support. Before the 1904 general election Scott suggested such a scheme to one of his workers to induce a number of voters to support him. Applications for the purchase of second homesteads had to be decided on by the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior. Scott suggested that it might be advisable to present these applications all at once rather than individually, but added:

I may say that I am coming to the opinion that it will be well not to have any of these cases finally dealt with at the present time and possibly it might be advantageous not to get final decision until after the election but, as to this, I will of course depend upon your advice. It has been running through my mind that possibly a good many of these people may be inclined to

101 Ibid., Scott to Clifford Sifton, Jan. 19, 1904, and Scott to Hon. Mr. Justice Sifton, Jan. 18, 1904.

102 C.W. Parker, ed. Who's Who in Western Canada (Toronto: Canadian Press Association Ltd., 1911), p. 320. Reid remained with the Territorial Government and served in the Saskatchewan Government.
do what is right if they are cautiously given to understand when the proper time comes that the Department has their cases under consideration and is likely to reach a favorable decision. They might naturally think it well not to have the Department disturbed by a removal of the Liberal party from power . . . \(^{103}\)

There is no indication as to whether this plan was actually followed but it is indicative of the fact that the Government had in its hands a very effective mechanism that could be used to garner votes.

Scott's success in politics probably was based to a large extent on his careful attention to the requests which were minor matters to him but which were of vital concern to his correspondent. He commented:

> If strict attention to the countless small individual matters which are sent to me counts with the public, I am inclined to think with you that I ought to stand pretty well because I am not conscious of having neglected a single matter of this sort since I first came down in 1901. \(^{104}\)

The size of Scott's patronage file attests to the accuracy of this statement.

To retain the help of influential people, some of whom worked as agents for him, Scott was occasionally required to go to considerable lengths. A case in point is that of P.M. Bredt, Scott's chief agent among the German speaking immigrants. Between elections Bredt was employed in the Immigration Department. In the winter of 1903 he got into a little difficulty over the use of departmental coal. In the

\(^{103}\)Scott Papers, Scott to P.M. Bredt, July 2, 1904.

\(^{104}\)Ibid., Scott to O.B. Fysh, June 27, 1904.
mistaken belief that he was entitled to it, he had used departmental coal for the heating of his private home. Complaints were raised and Bredt wrote Scott about the matter. To prevent Bredt getting into trouble, Scott advised that he write a letter dated some ten days earlier which would explain the misunderstanding and apparently be ahead of the issue of a circular definitely instructing agents not to use departmental coal. The letter was written as Scott advised, and an attempt was made to have the debt incurred by Bredt cancelled but this failed. From the evidence available this appears to have been a most unusual action for Scott, as he probably could have been charged with conspiring to commit fraud. Political friends had to be rewarded and Scott regarded Bredt as his most important agent among the German settlers.

On January 11, 1904, the Liberals of West Assiniboia held a convention at Moose Jaw. According to The Leader two hundred and sixty-five delegates attended, representing most of the polls in the constituency. The Convention nominated Walter Scott to contest the election which was expected to take place some time in 1904.

105 Ibid., Scott to Bredt, Mar. 30, 1903.

106 Ibid., Scott to Bredt, Apr. 6, 1903. In this letter Scott states he is sending an acknowledgment of receipt of the March 20th letter from Bredt and his acknowledgment is dated March 24th.

107 Ibid., Scott to Bredt, Apr. 29, 1903. Scott informed Bredt he would have to pay for the coal used.

Privately Scott had expressed a sincere wish but not the intention to leave politics:

I should much like to be allowed to return to active newspaper work, but to withdraw from the field would leave a liability of confusion and perhaps renewal of discord. I fancy it is harder to get out of this political business than to get into it. 109

Having accepted the nomination, Scott began to prepare for the election.

Consequently during 1904 Scott was anxious to establish a good record for his own constituency. He felt that a good increase in the Territorial grant would help him and he also wanted to get the Canadian Northern Railway line extended to Regina. 110 Scott wrote Laurier urging that the government guarantee the railway's bonds so that it could build an extension of its line from Manitoba to Regina. He pointed out that this would materially affect the vote in the constituencies of East Assiniboia, Qu'Appelle and West Assiniboia. Even if the railway extension could not be built before fall the fact that the government had guaranteed the bonds would assure the people that the road would be built and would help a great deal. 111 Scott was also working towards a new Post Office for Regina. In the meantime he had advocated a temporary addition to the old Post Office to relieve the congestion and this action caused some complaint from supporters who felt the

110 Ibid., Scott to G.W. Brown, May 17, 1904.
111 Ibid., Scott to Laurier, July 13, 1904.
government was trying to avoid replacing the old structure. \textsuperscript{112} Scott also managed to get the government to complete the transfer of its share of Regina town lots which it held as a result of the old townsite trustee plan under which the government and the Canadian Pacific Railway had pooled their lands to establish the Regina townsite. The city gained four thousand lots as a result of the transfer. \textsuperscript{113}

During the election year Scott revealed some of his own political tactics when he advised Levi Thomson, Liberal nominee for Qu'Appelle, on the conduct of his campaign. He told him to get his opponent committed to particular policies even if he had to use the technique of questions from the audience. Regarding public meetings he said:

Don't expect to change many votes by meetings, -- but they gather people together to become personally acquainted with you. Meet as large a number of the people as possible. It is remarkable what this counts for. \textsuperscript{114}

He also warned Thomson to protect himself from possible charges of corrupt electoral practices by issuing a circular warning his workers against the use of illegal or improper methods. Then, for further protection, he should try to get some evidence that his opponent was using illegal methods. \textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., Scott to Alex Ross, Apr. 11, 1904, and Scott to Frank Callendar, Apr. 15, 1904.

\textsuperscript{113}The Leader, "Regina's Valuable Asset", June 27, 1904.

\textsuperscript{114}Scott Papers, Scott to L. Thomson, Jan. 18, 1904.

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid.
The average voter, Scott realized was interested primarily in everyday affairs and had to be appealed to on that basis.

It has been my experience that the ordinary everyday man is not appealed to effectively by any discussion concerning millions. He simply does not comprehend the meaning of millions and 2½ cents in the price of a gallon of coal-oil which he has to pay in his own store is a much stronger argument with him. A scandal involving $7.62 is a more dangerous one from the point of view of the ordinary voter than a scandal involving millions.\(^{116}\)

If possible, it was wise to avoid weak points in the party's program\(^ {117}\) but it was not good policy to promise something that could not be obtained:

Re implement duties, it would do more harm than good at present for our papers to advocate abolition. It is of no use to excite the people to expect what cannot be got, and at this juncture it is all we can do to hold our own, that is to say, to prevent increases in the duties.\(^ {118}\)

The work of party supporters was extremely important, particularly during election campaigns. As the 1904 campaign progressed Scott expressed concern because he believed his supporters were too optimistic and would not work hard enough.\(^ {119}\)

November 3, 1904, was the date set for the general federal election.\(^ {120}\) In West Assiniboia it became a contest between Scott.

\(^{116}\)Ibid., Scott to O.B. Fysh, June 27, 1904.

\(^{117}\)Ibid., Scott to Hon. A.B. Aylesworth, June 2, 1906. Scott reported he had avoided mention of the Post Offices during the 1904 campaign because they were not well administered.

\(^{118}\)Ibid., Scott to James Robinson, May 20, 1904.

\(^{119}\)Ibid., Scott to G. Patterson, Sept. 16, 1904.

\(^{120}\)Directory of . . . Elections, p. 10.
and G.M. Annable, the Conservative candidate, but Annable received little personal attention in The Leader. The newspaper concentrated on praising the Liberals and condemning the Conservative party policy. On October 12th the newspaper announced that Laurier had written Haultain to inform him that if successful at the polls he would proceed with autonomy for the Territories as soon as possible after the election. The same day Haultain addressed a Conservative meeting in Regina at which he announced Laurier's decision and attacked the Liberal government for its policies on autonomy. Subsequently Haultain spoke at a number of points in the Territories in support of Conservative candidates and continued his attacks against the Liberals.

Haultain tried to make autonomy the main issue of the elections in the Territories, but despite his personal prestige he failed to win any real support. He dismissed Laurier's announcement on autonomy as an election dodge inspired by Scott. Laurier's promise, according

121Davin had committed suicide on Oct. 19, 1901. The Leader, Oct. 24, 1901.

122The Leader, "Mr. Annable should Explain More Fully", Sept. 21, 1904.

123For examples see Ibid., Sept. 28, 1904, Oct. 12, 1904, and Oct. 19, 1904.


126Ibid.

127Ibid., p. 204.
to Haultain, did not mean much because he had failed to state what terms he would offer the Territories.\textsuperscript{128} He attacked Scott personally for having reversed his policy on autonomy in 1903 and offering weak excuses for doing so.\textsuperscript{129} In reply Scott and The Leader launched vigorous attacks on Haultain. Scott charged Haultain with deliberately making a party issue of a question which he had urged should be kept above partisanship.\textsuperscript{130} When he apparently claimed that the Liberals had tried to bribe him by giving the Territories an adequate grant during 1904, Haultain was accused of using his position to further Conservative interests.\textsuperscript{131} The Standard, which supported Scott during the campaign, also attacked Haultain.\textsuperscript{132} The Territorial Premier did make autonomy an issue in the election but, either because they were not convinced by his autonomy arguments or because general satisfaction with the Liberal program outweighed the autonomy issue, the voters failed to respond to his indictment against the Liberals. Probably Liberal party organization and command of federal patronage played an important role. Scott won his seat easily\textsuperscript{133} and the North-West

\textsuperscript{128}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 203.

\textsuperscript{129}\textit{Lingard, op. cit.}, p. 168.

\textsuperscript{130}\textit{Hopkins, op. cit.}, p. 203, and \textit{The Leader, "Haultain's Great Swallowing Feat"}, Oct. 19, 1904.

\textsuperscript{131}\textit{The Leader, "Mr. Haultain's Confession"}, Oct. 19, 1904.

\textsuperscript{132}\textit{The Standard}, Nov. 1, 1904.

Territories returned seven Liberals from the ten constituencies.\textsuperscript{134}

In defense of his entry into the federal election campaign Haultain pointed out that he was completely free to do so and that in discussing autonomy he was dealing with a Dominion question.\textsuperscript{135} He argued that autonomy had remained a local issue until Laurier promised to proceed with autonomy negotiations after the election. Then it became a Dominion issue. The best time to discuss autonomy terms, according to Haultain, was during the election campaign when the members who would deal with the question in Parliament were seeking election. It was his duty as Territorial Premier to fight for the interests of the Territories and this is all he did during the campaign.\textsuperscript{136} To this defense Lingard adds the view that the postponement of autonomy in 1903 by the Dominion government with the approval of Bulyea and the western Liberals was the real reason autonomy became an election issue. As this delay had been for purely political reasons, Haultain was not to blame for making autonomy a political issue.\textsuperscript{137}

Despite these defenses it appears that Haultain's actions were dictated primarily by political reasons and even though technically justifiable were not in the best interests of the Territories. The heat

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p. 10. Lingard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 83. The Territories had been granted ten members for the 1904 election.

\textsuperscript{135} Lingard, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 122-3.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., pp. 124-5.
of an election campaign was not the best place to seek an enlightened discussion of possible autonomy terms. In view of the fact that his speeches included personal abuse of Liberal candidates his motives in introducing the subject of autonomy seem less altruistic. While it can be argued that Laurier's announcement made autonomy an election issue it seemed unwise, no matter what rights were involved, for the chief spokesman for the Territories to run the risk of making himself an enemy of the party which would determine the final autonomy settlement. It appears that Haultain participated in the election campaign, not primarily to fight for Territorial rights, but to defeat the Liberal party. Because of his background and prestige he was probably the only western Conservative who could possibly hope to lead the Conservatives to victory in western Canada. In attempting to achieve political victory for his party, he greatly weakened his own position as spokesman for the Territories and possibly jeopardized the final settlement of provincial autonomy terms.

Scott had won his second victory at the polls. In 1904 he was no longer the political novice he had been in 1900 but was an experienced and capable politician. During his four years in Ottawa he had identified himself with western interests and had matured politically. Scott and Haultain had become political opponents but despite the fact that Haultain had campaigned against him Scott had retained his seat. Their ways had parted because they supported different political parties. As Scott expressed it later, "... if
in politics my associates turn against me what am I to do? Turn too, or maintain my own course?\textsuperscript{138} Scott preferred to follow his own political course and reap whatever rewards it might offer. By 1904 he was one of the leading politicians in the Territories. His success can be attributed to his ability, hard work and political shrewdness.

\textsuperscript{138}Scott Papers, Scott to Dunbar, Oct. 16, 1905.
CHAPTER V

THE PREMIERSHIP (1905)

As Scott entered a new term as Member of Parliament for West Assiniboia he was very conscious of the problems that would have to be faced. "The autonomy question," he wrote, "will be the biggest purely political problem that Parliament has dealt with." As a member of the Government party and a leading Territorial politician he was certain to be deeply involved in the autonomy settlement. Whatever provincial terms were granted the Territories it did not appear likely, in view of what had happened, that non-party government would be continued after the provincial settlement. If Haultain remained in politics after the settlement, and there was no reason to expect that he would not, Scott as a Liberal would be committed to try to bring about his defeat in order to set up a Liberal administration. This would be a difficult task for the Liberals. For nearly eighteen years Haultain had been almost undisputed leader of the Territories and during that time had built up a reputation as an able administrator and government leader. Behind him he had the support of the majority of voters in the Territories. Scott was fully aware of Haultain's power and prestige and he knew that if the Liberals were to defeat him

1 Scott Papers, Scott to Rev. J.A. Carmichael, Nov. 24, 1904.
they would have to plan and develop their program carefully. Shortly after the election Scott began, with other Liberals, to prepare for the future.

Liberal strategy in the Territories during the period following the 1904 election was the first consideration. In view of Haultain's action in "seeking to make . . . [the] Local Government question a Federal Party issue", and the Liberal election victory a certain amount of pressure developed within the party to withdraw Liberal support from Haultain's government and bring about a party division in the Territorial Assembly. Scott was opposed to such action. He admitted that Haultain had "put himself out of court . . . for all time to come so far as the Liberals are concerned" but he did not believe it would do the Liberal party any good to bring about the division. In his opinion the proper course for the Liberals to follow for the time being was "that masterly inactivity which so far has kept us free from any responsibility for, or odium connected with, the conduct of local government." Haultain and the Conservatives had not profited by their departure from the non-partisan stand. Scott was certain that the Conservatives would like to see the Liberals repeat their mistake so they could then be blamed for the party division. "The division is bound to come, indeed it is here," he wrote, "but my advice to the

2Ibid., Scott to Hon. Wm. Eakin, Nov. 22, 1904.
3Ibid., Scott to Dr. J.B. Lafferty, Nov. 29, 1904.
4Ibid., Scott to T.M. Bryce, Nov. 26, 1904.
Liberals is to ignore its presence just as long as possible and so far as formal action goes proceed as in the past." 5

The decision to avoid a party division in Territorial politics shaped Liberal strategy. Scott did not wish to have a Territorial Liberal Convention held until at least the late summer of 1905, 6 and was supported in this view by J.G. Turriff, 7 newly elected Member for East Assiniboia, and T.O. Davis, 8 who had been appointed to the Senate. There was always the possibility that the Liberals might be forced into action by the calling of general Territorial elections, but Scott did not expect Haultain to take such action. 9 A more real danger was that by-elections might be called to fill vacancies in the Assembly. If this were to happen the Liberals could not openly oppose the Government in view of the fact that, at the party's request, Bulyea continued to be a member of the Haultain administration. If there should be Territorial by-elections, Scott believed it would be wise for the Liberals to try to have friendly candidates nominated. 10

In 1904 some Liberals were worried about who was to be the party leader when the division came in the Territories. There was a

5Ibid.

6Ibid., Scott to T.M. Bryce, Dec. 14, 1904.

7Ibid., Scott to J.G. Turriff, Dec. 16, 1904.

8Ibid., Scott to T.O. Davis, Dec. 23, 1904.

9Ibid., Scott to O.B. Fysh, Nov. 26, 1904.

suggestion that Scott might take the position. He rejected this idea, stating that Bulyea would have to lead the local party:

So far as I can see, the local fight whenever it comes, will have to be made with Bulyea as Liberal or Independent Leader. Bulyea has developed greatly in the last two or three years. While he is the reverse of spectacular, he is on the other hand, notably straight and sound. In my own regard, I highly appreciate the compliment conveyed in what you say, but I know my lack of any sort of experience as an administrator and my very short experience in public life in any sense, make my entrance into local affairs in the direction suggested too experimental to command any general confidence.\(^{11}\)

In view of this and similar statements\(^{12}\) it does not appear that Scott was thinking of a career in local politics at this time. However, he was planning to do all he could to defeat Haultain whenever the opportunity presented itself.

Scott assumed that Haultain would oppose whatever autonomy legislation the Liberal government presented. He was also, as a journalist and a politician, very conscious of how important it was to a party to have the support of friendly newspapers. With this in mind Scott began investigating the situation with respect to the political allegiance of newspapers on the Crows Nest road west of Macleod with the object of obtaining, if possible, some control over any unfriendly newspapers.\(^{13}\) His correspondent reported that attempts had been made to secure control of the Macleod Gazette but they had

\(^{11}\text{Ibid.}, \text{Scott to W.E. Seaborn, Nov. 13, 1904.}\)

\(^{12}\text{Ibid.}, \text{Scott to John Hawkes, July 8, 1904.}\)

\(^{13}\text{Ibid.}, \text{Scott to Malcolm Mackenzie, Dec. 22, 1904.}\)
failed, and he gave Scott some information about other newspapers in the area.\textsuperscript{14} Scott was carefully preparing for a fight over autonomy.

True to his pre-election promise, Laurier took up the matter of provincial autonomy soon after the election. Premier Haultain and Bulyea went to Ottawa on January 4th, 1905, and carried out negotiations with a Cabinet committee on autonomy terms.\textsuperscript{15} Before going east Haultain had written Scott asking for his co-operation. In reply Scott had said:

\begin{quote}
I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of Dec. 21st, stating that Mr. Bulyea and yourself will be in Ottawa by appointment on Jan. 4th next to discuss with Members of the Dominion Government the question of Provincial Institutions for the Territories, and that your Government is anxious to have the co-operation of the Senators and Members from the Territories at the outset of these negotiations. I may state that I expect to be in Ottawa very soon following the New Year, and shall be available for meetings as above.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

In view of this correspondence it seems strange that Haultain should have complained about Laurier calling in the Liberal Members of Parliament from the North-West Territories to take part in the autonomy negotiations. He claimed that they could not represent the Territories on the autonomy question as they had been elected on federal issues,\textsuperscript{17} although he had personally tried to bring about

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, M. Mackenzie to Scott, Feb. 28, 1905.
\textsuperscript{15}Lingard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 130.
\textsuperscript{16}Scott Papers, Scott to Haultain, Dec. 24, 1904.
\textsuperscript{17}Lingard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 132.
the defeat of the Liberal candidates in the 1904 election on the autonomy question. The negotiations proceeded rapidly and on February 21st, 1905, Laurier introduced Bills 69 and 70 creating the Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan respectively.\(^{18}\)

In his speech\(^ {19}\) Laurier reviewed the history of the development of the Territories. He announced that, because of the size of the Territories, it had been decided to divide the area into two provinces of approximately equal size. The Dominion government was to retain control of the public lands in order to ensure continuity of immigration policies. Grants to the new provinces were to include the usual grant for civil government and the per capita subsidy, a debt allowance, and compensation in lieu of control of the lands. In addition the provinces were to receive an annual grant for five years for buildings and roads.

The educational clause became the most contentious part of the autonomy legislation. In agreement with Sifton and the western Liberal Members Laurier decided to provide specifically for the continuation of the existing Territorial school system which was working satisfactorily.\(^ {20}\) Instead of giving the new provinces the right to establish their own school system subject to minority rights

\(^{18}\)Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1905, p. 1421.

\(^{19}\)Ibid., pp. 1421-59.

\(^{20}\)Eager, op. cit., p. 95.
as had been done with the older provinces under Section 93 of the British North America Act, the government argued that it had a legal right under the constitution to include definite provisions for education. It admitted that this did not compel it to do so, but claimed there was a moral obligation to the people of the Territories to continue the system of education which had operated satisfactorily for some years. Provision for the continuation of this system was meant to remove all doubt and avoid future difficulty. However, trouble developed within the Liberal party over interpretation of what the actual school law was in the Territories.

The school system in the Territories had been established under the provisions of the North-West Territories Act of 1875. This legislation had permitted the establishment of a system of church controlled separate schools. Under the provisions of the Act the privileges of the separate schools had gradually been reduced by Territorial Ordinances. By 1905 the administration of all schools

Section 93 provided that "In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to education" provided that such law should not "prejudicially affect any right or privilege with respect to denominational schools which any class of persons have by law in the Province at the Union." The section also provided that an appeal should lie to the Governor-General-in-Council from any action by the provincial authorities affecting rights or privileges of minorities which existed by law at the union or were afterwards established and that the Canadian Parliament might pass remedial legislation to carry out provisions of this section.

Lingard, op. cit., p. 190, cites defense of government action given by Fitzpatrick, Minister of Justice.

Eager, op. cit., p. 111.
in the Territories had been placed under the government appointed Department of Education. The main privilege retained by minority groups was the right to establish and assess themselves for the maintenance of their own separate schools. All territorial schools were allowed to use the last half hour of each day for religious instruction. The school clause of the autonomy bills which Laurier introduced on February 21st was a re-enactment of the school legislation provided by the North-West Territories Act of 1875 without taking into consideration the subsequent Territorial Ordinances. It was feared that the proposed legislation would have permitted the establishment of church controlled separate schools in the new provinces.

A serious crisis at once confronted the government. Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior, had been in the southern United States because of ill health when the autonomy bills were drafted. Shortly after his return to Ottawa on February 23rd he expressed to Laurier his opposition to the proposed school legislation. Failing to reach agreement with Laurier he resigned from the Cabinet on February 27th. Sifton opposed the school clause because he feared it might lead to the establishment of a church controlled separate school system. He had the support of most of the western Liberal

25Lingard, op. cit., pp. 159-60.
26Scott Papers, Scott to Gerald Spring-Rice, Mar. 20, 1905.
27Lingard, op. cit., p. 188.
Members in his stand that the separate school privileges in the new provinces should not exceed those already existing in the Territories. The western Members met with Sifton and agreed to submit a compromise clause which provided for the continuation of the existing Territorial school legislation and thus would not permit the establishment of a completely separate school system in the new provinces. On this ground the western Members took their stand and Scott reported on March 5th, "I do not think Sifton will budge an inch, which means that none of us will budge an inch, and Laurier might himself resign. The position is just so precarious." After prolonged negotiations Laurier introduced a new educational clause on March 22nd which partially embodied the demands of the western Members.

Scott, with other western Members, had advised the government that the existing school system in the Territories should be continued. They had understood that this advice would be followed, but when the bills were introduced Scott was not sure this had been done. In a letter to his editor he said:

On the school question there is some doubt. Our expectation was that Section 14 of the N.W.T. Act would simply be embodied in the new measure and re-enacted but they have gone further and inserted additional language proposing to grant to minority schools their share of public grants for education and school land revenues. It is understood that they contend that the

28Scott Papers, Scott to W.F. Kerr, Mar. 5, 1905. See also Scott to W.T. Finley, Mar. 4, 1905, Scott to M. Mackenzie, Mar. 6, 1905, and Scott to R. Rimmer, Mar. 2, 1905.

additional language does not alter the system that has existed at all, and if this is the case it probably means no difference. On the other hand there is a fear that the language must have some meaning and may mean some change and that otherwise it would not have been inserted. If it does mean any change it certainly also means trouble. Those of us from the North-West were united in intention to support the proposal to re-enact section 14, but I do not think we can stand for any additional language. 30

When Sifton returned, according to Scott, his "analyzing acumen quickly picked out the meaning of the clause, which, without question would remove the separate school from public regulation." 31 Scott supported Sifton and the other western Members in insisting that no compromise clause be substituted for Laurier's original education clause. 32

Scott defended the government's decision to make specific provision for education in the new provinces and his own acceptance of the principle of continuing the existing school system. Writing J.K. McInnis he made the claim that the government had a moral obligation to guarantee to the minority the rights which they had under the existing school legislation. In his opinion it was the only sensible solution in view of the fact that the system was working satisfactorily and probably would have been continued by the provinces in any case:

Leave in the guarantee and what does the North-West lose? Absolutely nothing. Things will be just what they would be with the guarantee cut out. Try to cut it

30 Scott Papers, Scott to W.F. Kerr, Feb. 22, 1905.


32 Scott Papers, Scott to W.A. Burton, Mar. 9, 1905.
out and what then? Certainly the break up of the Government, and political chaos for dear knows how long.  

After the Government's compromise clause had been accepted, Scott, in a speech in Parliament on March 31st, expressed full agreement with the settlement that had been reached. In relation to the education clause he said:

... the legislation is no compromise for me as it was for the Hon. Member for Brandon (Mr. Sifton). It is exactly what I wanted, I would not care to accept anything else.

What Scott was really saying was that he had come to the conclusion that the safest course out of the school crisis was to leave the system exactly as it was. At the time of the Manitoba school crisis in 1896 he had, like Sifton, favoured a completely national or state controlled system and privately he had probably not changed his views. In support of the position he adopted on the school clause in the autonomy bills he could argue with some logic that he was still supporting a state controlled school system. The privileges granted the separate schools in the Territories were so minor that for all practical purposes they were actually controlled by the state. The compromise clause permitted Scott to argue that he was a supporter of state schools and had not reversed his original position while at the same time he could claim that he was not ignoring minority rights. It was an excellent position politically although it did leave him open to attack from extreme national and separate school supporters.

33 Ibid., Scott to McInnis, Mar. 14, 1905.

34 Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1905, pp. 3591-3648. See Scott Papers, printed copy of this speech, p. 21.
In the midst of the school crisis Premier Haultain, in an interview published in the Toronto Globe and in an open letter to Laurier dated March 11th, stated his objections to the autonomy bills and in particular to the school legislation. He objected to the school clause on constitutional grounds and stressed that his objections had nothing to do with the problem of separate or public schools. In brief his position was that the new provinces should be considered to have entered Confederation in 1870 and should have the same right to legislate on education as the older provinces, subject to the provisions of Section 93 of the British North America Act. Under the provisions of the constitution the rights of the minority could safely be left to the provincial legislature. Thus he was not prepared to accept even the compromise solution which provided for a continuation of exactly the same kind of schools that his own government had provided under the North West Territorial Ordinances, but insisted that the provinces have the power to pass their own school legislation.

In June federal by-elections were held in the Ontario constituencies of North Oxford and London, and they were made a testing ground by both parties for the autonomy legislation. Bennett and Haultain went east to join the ranks of Conservative speakers while Scott and other Liberals from the Territories campaigned on behalf of

35Lingard, op. cit., pp. 174-76.
the Liberal candidates. During the by-election Scott had practical control of the editorial page of a newspaper in London. Despite these efforts Scott privately admitted that, at least in the case of London, the Liberal victory was:

... more of a personal triumph for Hyman than an endorsement of the Autonomy Bills. A vast number of Ontario Liberals I find have got the facts twisted and distorted and have become prejudiced and it is a matter of more than a day or two remove this kind of prejudice.

The Leader strongly attacked Haultain for participating in these by-elections.

The Leader expressed the view that if Haultain wanted an expression of public opinion on the school question, or other autonomy terms, he should have sought one in the west. The paper pointed out that the Conservatives had avoided a contest over Oliver's re-election at Edmonton, made necessary by his appointment as Minister of the Interior, that Haultain had failed to call the Territorial legislature into session to get an expression of their opinion and that he had avoided filling seven vacant seats in the Legislature. It quoted Haultain as having said after the election that:

He was disappointed with the results, but if Ontario would not assist in the fight the North-West would have to carry it on alone. The Ottawa Government had so arranged the local constituencies as to make it

36 The Leader, "London and North Oxford", June 14, 1905.
37 Scott Papers, Scott to Cochran, June 17, 1905.
38 Ibid.
difficult for him to carry either province, but he still hoped to succeed in obtaining control of one of the two, and if he did he would certainly continue the fight for provincial freedom.39

Lingard points out that Haultain had every right to participate in the by-election but says, "It was not an act of political wisdom to embarrass further the Laurier government at that time."40 According to Lingard, Haultain felt it his duty to protest against what he considered a violation of provincial rights in the autonomy Bills:

He held that the fundamental features of the Confederation scheme had been departed from and an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Imperial Privy Council on the school clause, the question of the public domain, and the Canadian Pacific taxation exemption, could be made quietly by test cases, and would in no way involve popular agitation or stir up religious controversy.41

While Haultain may have been right on the constitutional issue, the Liberals wished to avoid re-opening a question fraught with religious and racial prejudice. The quiet test case Haultain wanted could probably never have been achieved and, if it had, a judicial decision would not have settled the real conflict between separate and national school supporters. Consequently the Liberals regarded Haultain's demands for a test case as an attempt to destroy the Acts creating the new provinces and defeat the Liberal party. After the provincial elections Scott did privately suggest to Laurier42 and Premier Rutherford of Alberta43

39 The Leader, June 28, 1905.
40 Lingard, op. cit., p. 250.
41 Ibid.
42 Scott Papers, Scott to Laurier, Dec. 29, 1905.
43 Ibid., Scott to Rutherford, Dec. 29, 1905.
that a court ruling be sought on the constitutionality of the autonomy Acts in order to end all doubts so that Haultain could not continue to use the provincial rights argument. Laurier turned the suggestion down because he did not want to re-open the issue.44

Sifton's resignation as Minister of the Interior over the school legislation left an important vacancy in the Cabinet. Immediately there was considerable speculation about who would succeed him. Scott was considered a possible choice and as early as March 2nd he commented:

Naturally there is much speculation with regard to Sifton's successor. I have no intimation as to Laurier's intention but of course will not be very greatly surprised to be sent for myself. Just what my answer would be in this case it is yet too early to say excepting that no western Member could possibly accept office or support the education clause as it stands.45

Had Scott been offered the position he probably would have accepted, once the school question had been solved. However he seems to have been genuinely concerned about the wisdom of accepting such heavy responsibilities and his ability to fill the position.46 There was also the practical consideration of whether he could be re-elected, which would be necessary if he accepted the appointment. Scott apparently had some doubts about the situation in West Assiniboia and made inquiries among a number of his supporters.47

44Eager, op. cit., p. 139.
45Scott Papers, Scott to G.W. Brown, Mar. 2, 1905.
46Ibid., Scott to John A. MacDonald, Mar. 15, and Mar. 22, 1905.
47Ibid., Scott to J. Wessels, Mar. 10, 1905; Scott to L.B. Cochran, Mar. 7, 1905; Scott to W.T. Finlay, Mar. 20, 1905; Scott to P.M. Bredt, Mar. 17, 1905.
The appointment of Oliver, Member for Edmonton, on April 8th resolved the problem for Scott. Scott wrote Brown at some length saying, in part:

I daresay some of our friends in West Assiniboia will be a little disappointed over this matter but I think the proper action has been taken and in any event what has been done is quite in accord with the advice I felt it my duty to offer when asked by Sir Wilfrid. I told him I thought length of service and Oliver's undoubted ability and cleverness ought not to be lost sight of and that there was the further fact that his election could be considered a foregone conclusion while in my own district, although I had absolutely no doubt about a favorable result, we would have to look for a fight and perhaps a keen one.

Scott seems to have believed that if he had contested a by-election in West Assiniboia as Minister of the Interior his opponent would have been Haultain. He apparently felt confident that he could have defeated Haultain in such an election but it would have been a major contest. Perhaps this was a factor in Laurier's decision if he had seriously considered Scott as Sifton's successor. Probably Scott was somewhat relieved not to have the added responsibility but also disappointed that he had been passed over for an important advancement.

During his March 31st speech on autonomy Scott had objected to Section 23 of the Bills. This section made formal provision for

48 Sifton recommended Oliver on the same grounds. See Dafoe, op. cit., p. 301, footnote 1.

49 Oliver was re-elected by acclamation. See The Leader, "Refused the Challenge", Apr. 26, 1905.

50 Scott Papers, Scott to G.W. Brown, Apr. 10, 1905.

51 Ibid., Scott to F.G. Forster, May 3, 1905.
the continuation in the new provinces of the Canadian Pacific Railway
tax exemption rights. In speaking on the subject Scott said:

... in my opinion the unsettled position of that tax
exemption matter was a sufficient reason to justify
further delay in granting autonomy to the Territories;
and if act, protest or influence of mine could have
prevented the preparation and presentation of these
Bills, the Bills would not be before the House. But
when I found this Dominion government unanimous, to-
gether with the Northwest government and a majority
of the North-West Members all determined to proceed
now, I had to come to a decision which would either
prevent me from exercising any influence in the details
of autonomy or agree to forego my own opinion on the
point, agree to action now, and take my part in obtain-
ing a settlement of terms and conditions according to
the wishes of the electors whom I represent ... .
While voting for the Bills, I hold myself free to
perhaps move an amendment in some direction in committee
to section 23. 52

This statement was in keeping with Scott's declared views on the
twenty year exemption clause and with one of the reasons he had given
in 1903 for advocating delay in granting autonomy. But it was not in
keeping with the fact that he had privately urged the government in
1904 to promise to proceed with autonomy negotiations as soon after the
general election as possible. Scott had requested a declaration by
the government because it was necessary to ensure political victory.
However, he did not feel personally free, because of his election
promises, to accept any autonomy legislation that did not make provision
for ending the Canadian Pacific Railway's twenty year exemption clause.
Scott was committed to a fight on Section 23.

52 Scott Papers, Reprint of speech, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
On May 16th, in Committee of the Whole, Scott moved an amendment to Section 23 of the autonomy Hills which stated:

Provided that the foregoing shall not prejudice the right of the Parliament of Canada, by expropriation or otherwise to obtain the relinquishment by said company of the company's rights under section 16 of the contract aforesaid.\(^53\)

This amendment was rejected and as a result Scott gave his resignation as a Member of Parliament to Laurier to forward to the Speaker.\(^54\) He was apparently persuaded to withdraw his resignation but still intended to try for an amendment to Section 23.

At first Laurier was inclined to accept Scott's amendment, but before doing so he consulted Canadian Pacific Railway officials who strongly opposed it.\(^55\) When Scott moved his amendment on third reading of the Alberta Bill\(^56\) it was opposed by Laurier who claimed that, as Parliament could not abrogate the clause and the privilege could only be removed by mutual agreement or expropriation, the amendment had no meaning.\(^57\) Scott persisted, moving the same amendment on third reading of the Saskatchewan Bill but his motion was again defeated.\(^58\)

\(^{53}\)Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1905, pp. 6060.

\(^{54}\)Scott Papers, Scott to Laurier, May 16, 1905.

\(^{55}\)Eager, op. cit., p. 133.

\(^{56}\)Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1905, pp. 8777-8792.

\(^{57}\)Ibid., pp. 8792-93.

\(^{58}\)Ibid., pp. 8866-8873.
After the defeat of his amendment Scott again forwarded his resignation to Laurier for submission to the Speaker. 59 He explained that as the Government had opposed his amendment he had to submit his resignation in order to redeem his pledge to the electors of West Assiniboia. 60 After interviews with Laurier 61 and discussion between Laurier and Sifton 62 Scott agreed to let his resignation stand in abeyance until a later date. In view of the school agitation Laurier feared that Scott's resignation at that time would be misunderstood. Laurier also promised to take action at a future date to relieve the provinces of the tax exemption. 63

Scott's proffered resignation was motivated by two reasons. The first was his belief that the Canadian Pacific Railway tax exemption was a serious limitation on the taxing power of the provinces and that the Dominion government should have done something to relieve them of it. The second was that he had made a definite promise to both his electors and the House that he would not accept autonomy with this limitation. In order to fulfil these promises and protect his own reputation Scott felt he had to resign and seek re-election. The possible alternative of joining the Opposition does not seem to have...

59 Scott Papers, Scott to Laurier, July 6, 1905.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., Laurier to Scott, July 6, 1905.
62 Ibid., Scott to Sifton, July 11, 1905.
63 Ibid., Scott to Laurier, July 17, 1905.
occurred to him. As it turned out this action was not necessary to protect his position.

When Laurier sent for me the first thing I said to him was that the bridges were cut behind me. Having made the statement openly in the House, it would simply be impossible for me to withdraw. If I withdrew the resignation I would be the laughing stock of Canada. Now the outcome shows that nobody ever saw the force of my statement in the House.64

The resignation was only held in abeyance and was to be submitted at a later date. When Scott left Ottawa after the 1905 session he did not intend to return as a Member until he had been re-elected by his constituency.65 It is possible that Scott was thinking in terms of provincial leadership and that this was the real reason for making an issue of the tax exemption matter. However, this does not appear probable. The proffered resignation was not used during the provincial election campaign and Scott did not ask permission until December 29, 1905,66 to publish his correspondence with Laurier in case of necessity.

As the 1905 session drew gradually to a close it became more imperative that the Liberals in the Territories make some decision about their future course of action. With the erection of the new

64Ibid., Scott to L.B. Cochran, Feb. 23, 1911. A debate on the tax exemption question took place in the Legislature during the 1911 session and Scott publicly revealed the matter of his resignation in 1905 for the first time.

65Ibid.

66Ibid., Scott to Laurier, Dec. 29, 1905.
provinces open division on party lines seemed inevitable and decisions had to be made with respect to Liberal leaders for the two provinces. Haultain's intentions were a major factor in Liberal calculations. Some were predicting as early as February that he would choose to remain in the Province of Saskatchewan, and would have to be met there. In May Scott seemed to feel that Haultain would be called as Premier in one of the new provinces but he really did not care which as the Liberals could "beat him in either Province". Scott felt that Haultain's participation in the Ontario by-elections made it easier for the Liberals to avoid appointing him Premier of one of the new provinces. His action, he wrote:

"... has brought the North-West people generally to the opinion that he is an impossibility at least so far as we are concerned and so far as relates to his being called in either province as the first Premier. ... We can now decide upon party lines and at the same time place the onus directly upon the Conservatives and upon Haultain.

While, in Scott's opinion, Haultain's actions gave the Liberals an excuse to by-pass him in selecting the first provincial Premiers it would still be necessary to defeat him in a provincial election. It was a question of choosing someone in each of the new provinces who could lead the Liberals to victory over Haultain's opposition.

Bulyea was a serious candidate but, according to Scott, had to

67Ibid., M. Mackenzie to Scott, Feb. 28, 1905.
68Ibid., Scott to Bulyea, May 20, 1905.
69Ibid., Scott to D.H. MacDonald, July 22, 1905.
be rejected. Writing to Calder\textsuperscript{70} on June 17, Scott pointed out that the fact that Bulyea had remained in Haultain's government, even though it was at the request of the federal Liberals, had weakened him with the Liberal party and, in addition, it was considered doubtful that Bulyea could defeat Haultain.\textsuperscript{71} While rejecting Bulyea as a possible candidate, Scott stated that he had no intention, despite rumors then circulating, of entering the provincial field himself. He had come to the conclusion that J.A. Calder was the man for Saskatchewan.\textsuperscript{72} In reply, Calder agreed with Scott about Bulyea but rejected the idea that he should lead the Liberals in Saskatchewan. With careful handling Calder thought Bulyea could be persuaded to accept another office but regarding the Saskatchewan leadership he said:

To my mind there is only one other man in sight and there never has been any other and that is Walter Scott. If you will agree to accept the leadership there could be absolutely no question as to the outcome. You are bound to have a united party behind you from the top to the very bottom.\textsuperscript{73}

G.W. Brown also supported Calder's view and urged Scott to take the leadership of the Liberals in Saskatchewan. He agreed that Calder was a "coming man" but if Haultain remained in Saskatchewan it would be very difficult for Calder to defeat him. Brown went on at considerable

\textsuperscript{70}Calder was Deputy Commissioner of Education for the North-West Territories.

\textsuperscript{71}Scott Papers, Scott to J.A. Calder, June 17, 1905.

\textsuperscript{72}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{73}\textit{Ibid.}, Calder to Scott, June 20, 1905.
length to point out that in the eyes of the people there were two political leaders in the Territories and they were Scott and Haultain. He also pointed out that there were no portfolios available in the Dominion government and Scott would have to mark time there. He advised Scott to accept the leadership and become a successful Premier which would give him a strong claim to future offices in the Dominion government. Scott saw the logic of this argument, if he had not already arrived at the same conclusion and when he replied on June 28th, while still professing to prefer Calder, he tentatively agreed to accept the office if called by a convention:

If it actually comes to it that the friends generally throughout the province conclude that I could be of service to the province in the manner suggested, I do not absolutely take the position that I should refuse to agree although I have not yet got myself into the frame of mind which would enable me to say absolutely that I would agree. Even when I decided to go into local politics I think that for some little time it would be better policy for the public not to be aware of the decision for several reasons.

It is possible that, having failed to get a Cabinet position, Scott had decided he should try for the leadership of the Liberals in Saskatchewan. Whatever his reasons, Scott had, by the end of June, with apparent reluctance, tentatively agreed to lead the Liberals in Saskatchewan if called by the party.

Bulyea had the best claim to the office of leader of the Liberal party in Saskatchewan. He had served the Liberal party for a

74Ibid., Brown to Scott, June 28, 1905.

75Ibid., Scott to Brown, July 4, 1905.
long period and, as a member of the Territorial Executive Council, had an intimate knowledge of the problems of local government. Scott recognized Bulyea's claim but had come to the conclusion, which was apparently shared by other leading Liberals, that for practical political reasons Bulyea was not acceptable as leader. It appears that Bulyea's membership in the Territorial Executive Council, which he had retained at the request of the Liberal party, had weakened him as a possible leader by identifying him too closely in the eyes of Liberal supporters with Haultain's administration. Bulyea was not considered a strong enough leader to defeat Haultain in an election. He had served the Liberal cause well but, unfortunately, under such circumstances that he was considered a poor risk as Liberal leader in the important contest for political control of Saskatchewan. It appears unlikely that Calder was seriously considered as an alternative to Bulyea. Despite his potential, Calder was politically inexperienced, and he had also been closely associated with the Haultain administration. Probably Bulyea would only have been prepared to yield his claim to Scott.

Early in July Scott reported to Dafoe that Laurier was still intent upon calling Haultain for Alberta but he did not think he would persist in view of the strong opposition from the others. Apparently

76 Supra, p. 92.

77 Scott Papers, Scott to Dafoe, July 3, 1905.
Laurier did not give up this idea until late in July, though when the decision was made is not clear. When Scott left Ottawa the Liberals still had not made any decision on the future leadership in the Territories, but it had been definitely decided to offer Bulyea either the position of a Lieutenant-Governor or a seat in the Senate. Shortly after getting home Scott reported to Laurier that Bulyea had cheerfully accepted his offer to become Lieutenant-Governor of Alberta.

The Liberals were to convene in Saskatchewan on August 16th and Scott commented, "from what I have been able to learn since arriving here, I fancy that the proceedings may result in harmony with the suggestions which were discussed with you a couple of weeks ago."

The Liberals met in convention in Regina on August 16th with over two hundred delegates in attendance. The first resolution proposed and passed without a dissenting vote was one which called for a division on party lines in the new province. Bulyea went over the story of the Haultain government and his relations with it and announced that "for personal and other reasons" he did not wish to be considered for nomination as Liberal leader.Shortly after, Douglas, seconded by

78 Ibid., Scott to Calder, July 12, 1905, and Scott to Bulyea, July 25, 1905.
79 Ibid., Scott to Calder, July 22, 1905.
80 Ibid., Scott to Calder, July 12, 1905.
81 Ibid., Scott to Laurier, Aug. 5, 1905.
82 The Leader, "Saskatchewan Liberals Select Leader and Adopt Program", Aug. 23, 1905.
83 Ibid.
McCraney, nominated Walter Scott as leader. According to the newspaper report the nomination was greeted with tremendous applause and unanimity.34

In accepting nomination Scott pointed out that non-party government had been necessary during the autonomy negotiations. If the Conservatives had not made continuation of such a policy impossible he would have been in favour of it for a while longer. The first concern of the future government would be "conditions which would permit the prosecution of a progressive and practical policy".35 Scott was in favour of a policy of peace and progress and he promised, if elected, good clean honest government.36 He also spoke at some length on the autonomy terms and was followed by Calder who gave an extensive outline of the school problem.37 Scott wrote the West Assiniboia electors on August 21st, asking for their acceptance of his decision.38 He also wrote Laurier as follows:

The Liberals of Saskatchewan in convention have honored me with the tender of the post of Provincial Liberal Leader, which - having obtained the assent of my West Assiniboia supporters - I have agreed to accept. To sever my associations with yourself and the House for any reason causes me very deep regret and the fact that this severance must have resulted from another cause, even if the present reason had not arisen makes

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., "Mr. Walter Scott to West Assiniboia Electors", Aug. 23, 1905.
me approach with mixed feelings the task of again requesting you to forward to Mr. Speaker the resignation of my seat, which I have already placed in your hands.\footnote{Scott Papers, Scott to Laurier, Aug. 18, 1905. The resignation was apparently written out again on Aug. 29th and sent to the Speaker who accepted on Sept. 5th. See note attached to Laurier correspondence.}

The Conservatives and Liberals organized and selected leaders in Alberta - Rutherford for the Liberals and Bennett for the Conservatives. However, the Conservatives in Saskatchewan declined to make the election a party issue and instead called for non-partisan support of Haultain on the theme of provincial rights. They also endorsed an appeal to the courts at the first opportunity to test the constitutionality of the Autonomy Act.\footnote{Lingard, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 243.} In what Lingard characterized as a tribute to Haultain, the Conservatives passed a resolution which called for:

\begin{quote}
... the entire separation of federal and provincial politics, the resistance of interference by either Dominion political party in provincial affairs; full provincial rights for Saskatchewan and reference to the courts of the federal unconstitutional invasion of their educational rights; the immediate transfer to the province of all lands held by the Crown for railways and other corporations; and construction of a railway to Hudson Bay.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 242-3.}
\end{quote}

With the help of the Conservatives Haultain organized a Provincial Rights party to contest the election against the Liberals. This was a shrewd political move which Haultain hoped would win the votes of many Liberals and thus retain the support that had been his as Premier of the Territories. It would also place the blame for introducing
federal political parties in local elections on the Liberals. His major appeal to the electorate would be to overthrow the Liberals because of the autonomy settlement which violated the constitutional rights of the provinces. This policy placed Haultain in a strong position which was marred only by the fact that it was difficult to make the constitutional issue clear enough to win the support of the general public.

Lieutenant-Governor Bulyea of Alberta asked the Liberal leader, Rutherford, to form the first government in that province. In Saskatchewan Lieutenant-Governor Forget92 asked Walter Scott to form the first government of Saskatchewan.93 Bulyea's action caused little comment but Forget was criticized because he had by-passed Haultain to call Scott.94 Forget obviously acted on Liberal advice in calling Scott. After the Ontario by-election Liberals were convinced that Haultain should not be called and Laurier was persuaded that this course of action was necessary.95 In defense of Forget's action The Leader claimed that Haultain did not have the support of the majority in the Assembly or the country. In their opinion, Forget had selected the man who, as Leader of the Liberal party, probably represented the

92Forget was the last Lieutenant-Governor of the Territories.

93Lingard, op. cit., p. 244.


95Scott Papers, Scott to Bulyea, July 25, 1905.
majority. 96 This argument is supported by the fact that the political affiliation of the majority in the Territorial Assembly at the time of its dissolution was Liberal and that a majority of Liberals had been returned from the Territories in the federal election of 1904 which was partly fought on Territorial issues. 97 In view of Haultain's determined opposition to the autonomy terms, the Liberal action seems justified. Practical political considerations forced them to pass over Haultain's claim to office and choose a man who supported the terms of The Saskatchewan Act.

Scott completed the formation of his government on September 12th, when the Cabinet was sworn in. 98 J.H. Lamont, formerly Liberal Member of Parliament for Saskatchewan, was sworn in as Attorney General. The President of the Grain Growers' Association, W.R. Motherwell, became Provincial Secretary and Commissioner of Agriculture. J.A. Calder accepted the post of Provincial Treasurer and Commissioner of Education. Scott took the portfolio of Commissioner of Public Works as well as President of the Executive Council.

Having chosen his government, Scott had to prepare for the election. Under The Saskatchewan Act twenty-five constituencies had


97 Saywell, op. cit., p. 88.

98 The Leader, Sept. 13, 1905.
been established for the first election. Until otherwise provided by a Saskatchewan government, elections were to be held under provisions of the Territorial election laws. These laws provided that all male British subjects over the age of twenty-one years who had resided in the Territories for a year were eligible to cast a vote in the constituency in which they had resided for at least three months prior to the election. There was no enumeration of voters but a system was established for the taking of oaths and for challenging a voter's right. A plain ballot was provided, and the voter was required to mark an "X" on this ballot with a coloured pencil, according to the colour assigned the candidate for whom he wished to vote.

Under the Territorial election laws a candidate, or anyone acting for a candidate, was forbidden to give, promise to give or procure, money or employment for any voter in return for his vote. A voter in turn was forbidden to accept any such offers. Intimidation of voters, or attempting to procure a vote by offering food, drink

100 Ibid., Section 14.
101 General Ordinances of the North-West Territories of Canada, 1905, Elections.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. Colours were assigned according to order of nomination as follows: blue, red, yellow, black, brown, green. On Scott's suggestion it was agreed that Provincial Rights candidates would be nominated first and have the blue pencil while the Liberal candidates would be nominated second and have the red pencil. See Scott Papers, Scott to all Liberal candidates, Oct. 31, 1905.
or refreshments was also forbidden under the law.\textsuperscript{104} It is difficult to ascertain how effectively the law was enforced, or the extent of electoral corruption commonly practised.

Political corruption, common to both the Liberal and Conservative parties, has been defined as:

\begin{itemize}
  \item the use of civil servants as party workers;
  \item the patronage system by which party supporters were appointed to the civil service;
  \item the use of public works appropriations, particularly the road money, for pork barrel purposes;
  \item and the granting of contracts, especially in public works and printing, in return for financial or press support.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{itemize}

The use of the patronage system seems to have been the most common practice.\textsuperscript{106} However, grosser forms of political corruption, such as bribery, also seem to have been practised during this period. Commenting on the political corruption in Ontario in 1905, Professor J. Cappon condemned the use of bribery and the "spoils system" in elections, blaming the Conservative party for starting the practice and the Liberals for continuing it. He pointed out that party spirit ran high in Ontario and said this was because "an unduly large percentage of our small population is engaged in what it calls 'practical politics'."\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., Sections 123, 124, 125 and 127.


\textsuperscript{107}J. Cappon, "The Responsibility of Political Parties", \textit{Queens Quarterly}, XII, 1905, p. 308. See also N. Ward, \textit{The Canadian House of Commons Representation} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), for his comments on corrupt electoral practices.
In 1913, in answering an inquiry from the Social Services Council of Canada, Scott claimed that "bribery and irregular practices have not been practised to anything like the extent out here" that they had been in eastern Canada. It seems clear, however, that the use of patronage was widespread and that the control of the administration was important, perhaps even decisive, in an election campaign.

Scott originally intended to hold the Saskatchewan election at the same time as that in Alberta but in the end he waited until after the Liberals had won the Alberta election before issuing the writs for the Saskatchewan election. While he felt that the Alberta results ought to do us good, particularly in all the new settlements, his real reason for delay had to do with arrangements being made in Ottawa. Scott had specifically asked as an election aid that the government make announcements of aid to the Canadian Northern Railway in building its southern extension from Manitoba to Regina and to build a railway to Hudson Bay. He even threatened to resign if

108 Scott Papers, Scott to The Joint Secretaries, Social Services Council of Canada, Dec. 1, 1913. He was assured his name would not be used.


110 Scott Papers, Scott to Gilliland, Oct. 3, 1905.

111 The Leader, "Conservatives Completely Annihilated in Alberta", Nov. 15, 1905.

112 Ibid., Nov. 22, 1905.

113 Scott Papers, Scott to Dr. A.W. Hotham, Nov. 11, 1905.

114 Ibid., Scott to Laurier, Aug. 12, 1905.
the government did not live up to its promises to him to give aid to the railways.\textsuperscript{115} Despite the government's failure to make the announcements, he finally agreed to carry on as Liberal leader and the Saskatchewan election was set for December 13th, which was the anniversary of the day Scott had arrived in Regina in 1886.\textsuperscript{116}

In order to ensure victory Scott made careful practical preparations for the election. He tried to have a bank manager and a police superintendent moved from Regina because they were influential opponents.\textsuperscript{117} A new public building had been planned for Regina in 1904, but plans had not been drawn up or a contract awarded by the fall of 1905. Scott thought if a contract could be awarded before the election it would help his cause.\textsuperscript{118} He arranged for a limited number of outside speakers to be ready in case of need\textsuperscript{119} although he did not feel there would be enough money to bring in many speakers.\textsuperscript{120} Arrangements were made for the publication of campaign material in at least one foreign language\textsuperscript{121} in order to reach the new settlers. In addition

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., Sifton to Scott, Aug. 16, Oct. 5 and Nov. 3, 1905, and undated copies of telegrams exchanged between Scott and Sifton.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., Scott to Hon. Hyman, Jan. 9, 1906.

\textsuperscript{117}Laurier Papers, Scott to Laurier, Dec. 16, 1905.

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{119}For example see Scott Papers, Scott to Wadlinger, Sept. 12, 1905.

\textsuperscript{120}Ibid., Scott to Alex Ross, Sept. 28, 1905.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., Scott to Alex Ross, Oct. 30, 1905.
the Liberals kept a check on the names of people who would be naturalized in time for the election, and arranged to wire this information to their district organizers.\footnote{122}{Ibid., Scott to Alex Ross, Nov. 27, 1905.}

As part of his campaign strategy Scott arranged to place all the Cabinet Ministers, including himself, in difficult constituencies.\footnote{123}{Ibid., Scott to T.M. Bryce, Dec. 20, 1905.}

He believed that if he had not done so:

\ldots we should not now be in a majority. \ldots

Lumsden was not at all difficult for me, but we should likely have lost it had I not run there, otherwise McInnis would have been the opposing candidate against some weak local man \ldots \footnote{124}{Ibid., Scott to J.H. Ross, Dec. 22, 1905.}

Early in the campaign Motherwell broke his leg. While Scott was naturally very sorry about the accident he did not regard it as all misfortune. Writing about Motherwell's accident, he said:

He is really a splendid man, but of course in many cases a man's strength as a vote-getter in politics does not depend on his intrinsic worth. It is really too bad that the accident has befallen him at this time, but is it not possible that a broken leg may be made a very fetching argument for him. A sympathy cry is sometimes a strong factor.\footnote{125}{Ibid., Scott to W.T. Lawler, Oct. 16, 1905.}

Placing the Ministers in difficult constituencies was a risky move but one which showed Scott's political shrewdness.

The election campaign was fought mainly on the autonomy term with the school question taking the centre of interest. As early as
October 27th Scott expressed the view that the school question was causing the greatest difficulty, particularly in the southern part of the province where, according to Scott, even many Liberal supporters were confused about it.\textsuperscript{126} By the end of October Scott had mapped out a plan of attack. The Liberals tried to show that Haultain's policy could allow the establishment of separate schools under clerical control while their policy ensured a continuation of public control of all schools.\textsuperscript{127} They tried, also, to show that Haultain and the Conservatives were using a technical school question in order to cover an indefensible record which included: the Moose Jaw Convention; robbing the Territories of $250,000 by failing to use the capital advance; Haultain's abuse of his position as a non-partisan Premier; and Conservative policies on tariff, immigration and the Canadian Pacific Railway.\textsuperscript{128} Numerous editorials appeared in \textit{The Leader} tending to show that Haultain's position on the school question was not clear.\textsuperscript{129} Some campaign literature also tried to show that Haultain had made contradictory statements about the school settlement he would make if he became Premier. The Liberals quoted Haultain as saying in February that he would not change the Territorial school system even if he were

\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., Scott to Dafoe, Oct. 27, 1905.
\textsuperscript{127}Ibid., Scott to E. Farrer, Oct. 30, 1905.
\textsuperscript{128}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129}For examples see \textit{The Leader}, "The Issue", Oct. 4, 1905; "Sectarian Schools Might Follow", Dec. 6, 1905; "Clerical Control a Myth", Nov. 1, 1905.
given dictatorial powers. They quoted him as refusing to say at Saskatoon on September 19th what he would do if the province had the power to legislate for the schools; as saying at Maple Creek on October 24th that he would nationalize the schools, at Arcola on November 22nd that he would not change the educational system and in his final address to the electors on November 27th that he would establish a completely national school system. After the election Scott expressed the opinion that if Haultain had not "so tangled himself up with meaningless and contrary declarations on the school question I think he would now be in power in Saskatchewan." It is only fair to add that the Liberals did their best to keep Haultain's position in confusion.

On November 22nd The Standard published a Memorandum signed by Archbishop Langevin of St. Boniface in which Haultain was condemned for his treatment of the separate schools and Roman Catholics were asked to support Scott and his government. Although Langevin

130 AS, Liberal Party, Campaign Literature, Saskatchewan Election 1905, "The School Question in the New Provinces".
131 Ibid., "Scott Education Pledge".
132 Ibid., "How I Boxed the Compass".
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Scott Papers, Scott to Rivet, Jan. 9, 1906.
136 The Standard, Nov. 22, 1905.
admitted authorship of the Memorandum,\textsuperscript{137} according to Scott the Memorandum was not signed.\textsuperscript{138} As a result of this Memorandum Haultain charged that Scott actually supported separate schools and that a compact existed between him and Langevin.\textsuperscript{139} This compact charge was immediately denied by Langevin\textsuperscript{140} and by Scott and the members of his Cabinet.\textsuperscript{141} Scott also issued a challenge to Haultain to meet him on a public platform in Regina on December 11th to prove his charges,\textsuperscript{142} and gave a detailed statement in which he promised the electors that the educational system would not be altered,\textsuperscript{143} but the damage was done. Scott explained, "All the prejudice that ever had existed as regards the Education Clause was as nothing compared to the storm the 'Langevin Letter' aroused."\textsuperscript{144}

Probably the thing that saved the Liberal party was that Haultain mishandled his opportunity. In a letter to Hawkes after the

\textsuperscript{137}\textit{The Leader}, Dec. 6, 1905.

\textsuperscript{138}Scott claimed the Memorandum was unsigned and was simply a circular, not constituting an order, nor was it read from any pulpit. Scott Papers, Scott to J.C. Hopkins, Aug. 25 and Sept. 22, 1906.


\textsuperscript{140}\textit{Canadian Annual Review}, 1905, p. 255.

\textsuperscript{141}\textit{The Leader}, Dec. 6, 1905.

\textsuperscript{142}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{143}\textit{Ibid.}, "Hon. Walter Scott to the Electors of Saskatchewan", Dec. 6, 1905.

\textsuperscript{144}Scott Papers, Scott to Hon. R.F. Sutherland, Jan. 22, 1906.
election Scott pointed out: "But his crowning tactical blunder was to make the 'compact' accusation early enough to allow me to answer and challenge him to the proof when he had no proof." In fact, according to Scott, the compact charge was in itself a blunder:

If Haultain had not foolishly made the compact charge he would hold the majority today. About the memorandum itself we were helpless, we could say nothing. The compact charge gave me opportunity to say something, and I think I said it good and hard.

According to newspaper reports Haultain failed to prove that a compact existed and partly retracted his charges during his debate with Scott. One result of the Langevin memorandum was that Haultain made it clear that he favoured a national school system.

In Sifton's opinion probably the most damaging aspect of the Langevin memorandum was that it compelled Haultain to make a straightforward declaration in favour of national schools:

Its effectiveness, according to my view, resulted from the fact that it compelled Haultain to take a straight stand for uniform schools. Until he did this those who were sore on the question could see no advantage in leaving you to support him. You will remember that I always emphasized the desire to prevent him from getting to an issue with you on this question. If he had taken the same stand at the beginning of the campaign I imagine no one could have told what the result would have been.

149 Scott Papers, Sifton to Scott, Dec. 26, 1905.
The Langevin memorandum could have seriously damaged the Liberal position. As it was Scott felt that the Liberals would have taken all but three seats if it had not been for the memorandum. If Haultain had used the opportunity more skillfully, perhaps the results would have been much different.

The campaign was a particularly bitter one and during it some of Scott's supporters changed sides. One of these was J.T. Brown, a prominent young Moosomin lawyer. Brown had attended the Provincial Liberal convention but shortly after he informed Scott that he had decided to support Haultain. According to Brown the sole issue of the election was the school question and he favoured a judicial interpretation of the Autonomy Act. Scott expressed intense surprise at Brown's action and warned him that the fact that he had failed to withdraw from the Liberal Convention left his motives open to suspicion. Later on Scott suggested that Brown had been disappointed at not getting the Liberal nomination for Moosomin and also had expected to be named Attorney General in Scott's government. J.T. Brown became a candidate for the Provincial Rights party and was successful.

\[150\] Ibid., Scott to Sifton, Jan. 3, 1906.
\[151\] Ibid., J.T. Brown to Scott, Sept. 7, 1905.
\[152\] Ibid.
\[153\] Ibid., Scott to J.T. Brown, Sept. 11, 1905.
in winning the Souris constituency. But probably the bitterest blow was delivered by J.K. McInnis.

McInnis also opposed the school clause of the autonomy Bills and had turned his newspaper against the Liberals. On December 7th, toward the end of the election campaign, he charged Scott with attempted bribery. According to McInnis, Scott had offered him $12,000 for property worth only $2,000 if he would support the Liberal campaign. In answer to the charge Scott at once laid charges of criminal libel against McInnis. During a campaign speech at Wolseley Scott was compelled to defend himself on a public platform against the bribery charges when McInnis appeared without warning as his platform opponent. It was a trying evening as Scott received word during the meeting that D.S. Williams, a campaign worker, had suddenly joined the opposition. In answer to McInnis' charge, Scott admitted that in a private interview he had conveyed to McInnis an offer for his share in a railway charter but claimed that the offer was made by a syndicate, and that he only acted as an agent. Scott later credited

156 The Standard, "Mr. Scott's Speech", Apr. 26, 1905.
158 Scott Papers, Scott to D.S. Williams, Dec. 26, 1905.
159 Ibid.
160 The Leader, "Walter Scott Meets his Traducer at Wolseley", Dec. 11, 1905.
his experience on the platform during the election campaign in 1900
with preventing him from losing control during the Wolseley meeting
and "smashing McInnis with all the material I had, and I had what
would have put him out of public affairs for keeps." 161 As Scott
realized, the fact that he did not possibly saved his government and
party from defeat at the polls. 162

Following the Wolseley meeting Scott assured the people of
Saskatchewan that he would clear himself of the bribery charges or
retire from public life. 163 McInnis was tried in March, 1906, and
found guilty of criminal libel. 164 There does not appear to be any
doubt that Scott had been falsely accused of attempted bribery, nor
does there appear to be any explanation for McInnis turning so
viciously against Scott. McInnis did desire political office, 165
and it is possible that Scott's failure to help him achieve this
goal angered him.

Scott described the election campaign as "the hottest kind of

161 Haslam Papers, Scott to J.H. Haslam, July 12, 1918. The
material Scott probably referred to was that McInnis had apparently
accepted payment of his expenses incurred during the 1896 campaign by
the Liberals as the price for withdrawing his election protest. See
supra, p. 30, footnote 6. Revelation of this fact probably would
have hurt the Liberals at the polls.

162 Ibid.

163 The Leader, "Will Clear Himself or Retire from Public Life",
Dec. 11, 1905.

164 Ibid., Mar. 2, 3 and 5, 1906.

165 Scott Papers, Scott to John Hawkes, May 6, 1905.
a scrimmage¹⁶⁶ but the Liberals won, taking sixteen of the twenty-five seats.¹⁶⁷ The Liberals polled 52.9 percent of the total vote, the Provincial Rights party 46.7 and the remaining 0.6 percent went to an independent candidate who contested the constituency of Prince Albert city.¹⁶⁸ On the evidence available it is impossible to determine what particular set of factors decided the election results in each of the constituencies but certain broad trends are evident.

It seems clear that the school clause of The Saskatchewan Act, and the religious issues involved, were a factor in the final results. The Liberals took all seven constituencies which, according to the 1901 census figures, had populations made up mainly of people who were Roman Catholic, Mennonite, Doukhobour or Greek Catholic in their religion, while in all of the nine seats won by the Provincial Rights party the population was mainly Protestant. In one Protestant constituency won by the Liberals, Moose Jaw County, the religious issue was clearly a major factor. The Liberals won the seat by a majority of only seventy-six votes. The Willow Bunch poll, made up mainly of French Catholics, voted 79-12 for the Liberals.¹⁶⁹ Scott commented:

As it turned out Sheppard's election depended entirely upon the Willow Bunch poll. The North end went back on

¹⁶⁶Ibid., Scott to W.H. Beddoe, Jan. 6, 1906.
¹⁶⁷Directory of... Elections, p. 32.
¹⁶⁸See Appendix A. The results of the elections are taken from Directory of... Elections.
¹⁶⁹The Leader, June 10, 1906.
him. As a matter of fact had Rothwell done as well in the country immediately around Moose Jaw as even our people expected him to do Sheppard would not have the seat. . . . The few votes they got at Willow Bunch must have cost them a pretty penny. 170

It is true that if the Liberals had not done so well in other parts of the Moose Jaw County constituency the Willow Bunch majority would not have stood up, but as it was the Roman Catholic vote was a deciding factor. The Langevin memorandum, though perhaps not used as effectively as it might have been, did damage the Liberal position in Protestant areas and, according to Scott, "cost us five seats and chopped our majorities to pieces in several other districts." 171

It is difficult to generalize about settlement patterns in Saskatchewan because often relatively recently developed areas existed beside old established ones. However, it is perhaps significant that of the thirteen constituencies north of the main line Canadian Pacific Railway, much of which was relatively new area, the Liberals won twelve seats. The only seat in this area won by the Provincial Rights party was Prince Albert County, which was one of the oldest settlements in the province. Of the twelve seats in the southern area, the Liberals won only four and most of these by narrow margins. If it were possible to make a detailed poll analysis it could probably be shown that in the southern districts the Liberal vote was strengthened by the vote of people who were of foreign origin and comparative new

170 Scott Papers, Scott to L. Hamner, Jan. 5, 1906.
171 Ibid., Scott to James Straton, Dec. 16, 1905.
The fact that the Liberals depended to some extent on this new vote is indicated by Scott's comment on the contest in Grenfell. He said of the Liberal candidate, "If Rosborough can get the foreign vote as strongly as he expects he will win." He apparently did not get the vote, as the Liberals lost this seat.

Railways do not appear to have played a significant role in the election, though Scott regarded the Canadian Pacific Railway as a definite opponent. He stated that the Liberals were defeated in Moose Jaw city by the opposition of the Canadian Pacific Railway. However, the Liberals were strongest in the areas not serviced directly by the Canadian Pacific Railway.

In individual constituencies there were other factors which, though very difficult to assess, probably had an important influence on the election results. The Liberals won Regina city by only three votes. The trouble here, according to Scott, was that the Liberal candidate felt too certain of victory and did not put enough effort into the final weeks of the campaign. Scott and his three cabinet ministers ran in constituencies that were difficult for the Liberals. These were: Scott in Lumsden, Motherwell in North Qu'Appelle, Calder

172 Ibid., Scott to J.G. Turriff, Sept. 26, 1905.
175 See Appendix B.
176 Scott Papers, Scott to J.H. Ross, Dec. 22, 1905.
in South Regina, and Lamont in Prince Albert city. The risk was
justified according to Scott:

> The outcome pretty fully justified my selection of colleagues and the strategical advisability of placing each of them in difficult districts. Lamont, Motherwell and Calder have everyone of them won districts which in each case nobody else could have held. 177

Haultain's strategy of dividing the Liberals by forming a Provincial Rights party was apparently successful in at least two constituencies. In Whitewood the Provincial Rights candidate, who won the constituency, was Gillies who had been supported by Liberal party adherents in previous Territorial elections. In Souris the successful Provincial Rights candidate was J.T. Brown 178 who was further helped by the fact that many Liberal party supporters in Souris were apparently not willing to work for the Liberal candidate, Dr. Lockhart. 179 Scott ascribed the Liberal defeat in Wolseley partly to the defection, near the end of the campaign, of a prominent Liberal supporter. 180 Nevertheless these local issues may have been overshadowed by the more fundamental divisions on The Saskatchewan Act.

To Scott the victory for the Liberals was proof that "the present political sentiment is overwhelmingly Liberal, and also that

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177 Ibid., Scott to T.M. Bryce, Dec. 20, 1905.
178 Supra., p. 127.
our organization was pretty effective. Effective party organization was to be a feature of the Liberals in Saskatchewan and probably was an important factor in the 1905 election. Organization, combined with Liberal control of the administration at both the federal and provincial levels, gave the Liberal party a strong position. Scott was also probably helped by what Sifton described as "the delightful way in which Haultain blundered at every step," particularly in his handling of the Langevin memorandum.

In 1905 Scott had been drafted, or had arranged to be drafted, to lead the Liberal party against Haultain in the Saskatchewan provincial election. Prominent Liberals such as Ross, Sifton, Oliver and Laurier had urged him to accept the office, and the Liberal Provincial Convention had issued an unmistakable call which Scott found "simply impossible ... to decline." It is readily apparent that he was the only Liberal available who had the qualities of leadership, the political skill and the prestige to have any chance of leading his party against Haultain.

Scott achieved political power primarily because he was a skillful politician. He did not have the wide knowledge or speaking

182 E. Reid, op. cit.
183 Scott Papers, Sifton to Scott, Dec. 20, 1905.
184 Ibid., Scott to F.L. Dunbar, Oct. 16, 1905.
185 Ibid., Scott to H.C. Lawson, Dec. 20, 1905.
ability of some of his opponents such as Davin and Haultain, but he had learned how to win votes. His ability to win votes brought him the support, not only of the voters, but also that of the important political leaders who helped to place him in a position of power. Ownership of one of the leading western newspapers gave him a powerful and effective medium to use in presenting his case. During his years in Ottawa he built up an enviable record of service to his supporters through his representations and his adept application of the accepted rules of patronage. He was able to interpret and give expression to the wishes of the people. Scott carefully prepared for political campaigns and worked hard to win. He had learned how to organize his forces, to pick the battleground and to carry the fight to the enemy. This practical skill gave him victory over Haultain and the office of Premier of Saskatchewan.
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Secondary -


### APPENDIX A

**ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF POPULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Liberals Total vote</th>
<th>Provincial Rights Party Total vote</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Doukhobour</th>
<th>mennonite</th>
<th>Greek Catholic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humboldt</td>
<td>Won by the Liberals by acclamation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkton</td>
<td>777 59.0</td>
<td>539 41.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Batoche</td>
<td>679 85.0</td>
<td>120 15.0</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>Redberry</td>
<td>310 60.5</td>
<td>202 39.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battleford</td>
<td>914 60.9</td>
<td>588 39.1</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
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<td>Saskatoon</td>
<td>951 54.0</td>
<td>809 46.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rosthern</td>
<td>628 68.9</td>
<td>283 31.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
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<td>Saltcoats</td>
<td>1066 67.4</td>
<td>488 32.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
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<td>701 43.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<td>South Regina</td>
<td>872 52.2</td>
<td>800 47.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
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<td>Prince Albert City²</td>
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<td>234 37.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>81.5</td>
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<td>North Qu'Appelle</td>
<td>872 56.6</td>
<td>668 43.4</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>62.2</td>
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<td>1133 51.7</td>
<td>1060 48.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>85.7</td>
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<td>36.5</td>
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<td>1788 55.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>89.7</td>
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<td>Moosomin</td>
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<td>915 51.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>92.5</td>
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<td>Constituency</td>
<td>Liberals Total vote</td>
<td>Liberals %</td>
<td>Provincial Rights Party Total vote</td>
<td>Provincial Rights Party %</td>
<td>Religious affiliation of population (in percentages)</td>
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1 Figures calculated from Fourth Census of Canada, 1901 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1902), Vol. I "Population" and Vol. IV, Appendix B "Boundaries of Sub Districts in the Territories of Alberta, Assiniboia and Saskatchewan", and reduced to percentages. These figures are for total population and do not distinguish between voters and non-voters.

2 The Independent candidate in this constituency won 94 votes, or 15.2 percent of the total votes.
Saskatchewan Electoral Map, 1905

The constituencies coloured blue are those won by the Provincial Rights Party. Constituencies not coloured were won by the Liberal Party. The abbreviation C.P.R. is used to designate Canadian Pacific Railway lines, C.N.R. for Canadian Northern Railway lines.
This map is based on the Dominion Government Decennial Census as no map is available for 1905. It does not distinguish between persons born in Canada and those born in the United States or overseas.