THE EARTHLY STRUCTURES OF DIVINE IDEAS:
INFLUENCES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GIOVANNI BOTERO

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Abstract

Giovanni Botero’s (1544-1617) treatise the *Reason of State* (1589) seemed somewhat uncharacteristic of sixteenth-century political thought, considering the pride of place given to economics in his text. The Age of Reformation constituted not only a period of new ideas on faith but also one of new political thinking, and as the research into the influences on Botero’s economic thought progressed, I began to consider the period as one where economic thinking was becoming more common among theologians of the reforming churches and bureaucrats of the developing states. Having been trained in the schools of the Jesuits, Botero was exposed to one of the most potent and intellectually uniform of all the reforming movements of the period, and I argue it was here that he first considered economics as an aspect of moral philosophy. While it cannot be proven positively that Botero studied or even considered economics during his association with the Jesuits (roughly from 1559-1580), the fact that a number of those who shaped the Jesuit Order in its first few generations discussed economics in their own treatises leads one to a strong circumstantial conclusion that this is where the economic impulse first rose up in his thinking. Indeed, it was this background that readied Botero to consider economics as an important part of statecraft with his reading of Jean Bodin’s (1530-1596) *The Six Books of the Republic* (1576), in which economics is featured quite prominently. Bodin’s own economic theory was informed primarily by his experience as a bureaucrat in the Parlement of Paris, where questions on the value of the currency and on the king’s ability to tax his subjects were in constant debate among the advocates. I argue further that, upon his reading of Bodin’s *Republic*, Botero saw how economics
could be fused with politics, and he then set out to compose his own treatise on political economy (although he certainly would not have called it such). In the *Reason of State*, Botero brought his Jesuit conception of economic morality together with Bodin’s writings on political economy to create a work, neither wholly Jesuit nor wholly Bodinian, which in the end outlined an overall political and economic structure of society quite distinct from the sum of its parts.
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Introduction

The roots of political economy as a field of study have commonly been understood to lay in the 18th century with the French Physiocrats and their leader François Quesnay, and then taken to blossom by their contemporary across the channel, Adam Smith. Smith argued against mercantilism, the system by which he understood the merchants of Europe to have lined their own pockets at the expense of the true potential wealth of their nations. He was responding to the poorly conceived policies for the management of the colonies in particular, instituted by a government unduly influenced by these merchants. Smith was a moral philosopher, and was interested in studying the accumulation and distribution of wealth, both of nations and individuals, as the structural symbol for how morally just a nation is, according to the classical liberal criteria so characteristic of Enlightenment thought. As original as these 18th century thinkers were, they were not the first to examine wealth as a feature of moral or political philosophy. Wealth and state finance had held a prominent position in the European mind since the discovery of the New World.

Sixteenth Century Europe opened to the praises of Erasmus, who claimed that the new century paved the way for an age of gold.¹ His age of gold was one of independent thought, the free exchange of ideas, and both the spiritual and political emancipation of

¹ Erasmus of Rotterdam, An Age of Gold, in The Portable Renaissance Reader, James Bruce Ross and Mary Martin McLaughlin, eds. (New York, Penguin Books, 1983), p. 80. He writes: "But at the present moment I could almost wish to be young again, for no other reason but this, that I anticipate the near approach of a golden age, so clearly do we see the minds of princes, as if changed by inspiration, devoting all their energies to the pursuit of peace."
humanity. In place of his ideal age, however, there came an age of material gold, with all the warfare and avarice concomitant with it. Nowhere was this felt more than in the Kingdom of Spain, which had the greatest access to the gold and silver mines of the Americas. Consequently, it was felt in Spain quite notably in the church, which by this time had been ‘nationalized’ by the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, and used, to match conquest, as a unifying force in the kingdom and its colonies. However, post-discovery Spanish priests and theologians discovered moral problems inherent in the wars of conquest and, more than this, became exposed to a flock which had never been woolier. They thus saw the need to consider political authority and give guidance on the new wealth. Thomism flowed along the sinews of the Spanish church in the sixteenth century, and theologians would bring it and its Aristotelian roots to bear on the moral-economic problems characterizing the sixteenth-century soul. From this they redeveloped theories of natural law which had flowed in and out of history's times and places since the Greeks. In applying it to moral matters they concluded that each individual had certain God-given rights of self-preservation, and the self-governance needed to guarantee this. These rights were naturally related to economics, the means by which we may maintain life. However, the theologians also made it a point to promote the use of reason in the understanding of self-preservation. For the theologians, the jump from the purely moral world to the political was an easy one. It is by reason that people will understand the need to come together into communities, and to transfer their self-governance to a unifying figure, one which can provide them with physical security, material prosperity, and spiritual well-being. This was the political thought further developed by the Jesuits in the sixteenth century, and adhered to by one of their more troublesome members- educator and writer,
poet and priest, ambassador for a prince and secretary to a Saint, the Piemontese Giovanni Botero (1544-1617).

It is no coincidence that Botero would direct himself to political economy—how the prince should manage the wealth of his state. In the *Reason of State*, he writes on the Spanish kingdom's inability to deal with its new-gotten riches, and maintains that it is through the promotion of wealth production through industry that the prince, any prince, will be able to ensure the greatest well-being for his kingdom. Until now, Botero's political economy has been given only passing mention in studies of sixteenth century history, and even in studies devoted to Botero specifically. His main biographer, Luigi Firpo, scarcely even mentions the economic aspects of Botero's work. Others, including the edition of *Reason of State* by the Waleys in 1948, J.W. Allen's *History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, and even Robert Bireley's *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, give Botero's economics only the slightest gloss. One thing these three do all agree on, however, is the influence of Jean Bodin on Botero's economics, even if they do not give many details. Alberto Breglia's 1928 study, *A Proposito di G. Botero 'Economista*', really only studies the context of Botero's thought in the most general of terms, saying that Botero had the advantage of both the traditional and more contemporary views of the world to guide his economic thought. Botero was thus able to reconcile early modern materialist thinking with medieval spiritual belief.²

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² Alberto Breglia, *A Proposito di G. Botero 'Economista*', in *Annuali di Economia*, vol. VI, (1928), pgs. 87-128. In particular, Breglia points out: "*Eterna chiave di volta la enunciazione delle 'cause seconde,' sebbene usata con riluttanza, della conciliazione fra il termine scienza ed il termine fede nel pensiero teistico.*," p. 109. "Although used reluctantly, the enunciation of secondary causes was the keystone of the reconciliation between the limits of science and those of faith in their theistic knowledge." Botero was thus in a position to bring together the well-established methods of theological argument.
This current thesis adopts two new approaches towards understanding the particulars of Botero's intellectual context. First, it will look to the influence that the Jesuit educational program had on Botero in both the political and economic spheres. Second, it will detail the actual influence of Jean Bodin on Botero, showing that, even though he had assuredly read the Frenchman's work and accepted some of his economic policies for the state, Botero does not entirely agree with everything Bodin has to say on these matters. Indeed, Botero's economic views have been almost solely associated with the work of Jean Bodin, who had been considering economic matters since the mid-1560's. It is true that Botero does use some ideas, and even borrows many rhetorical devices from Bodin's *Six Books of the Republic*. However, this thesis argues that, even though he bases some of his political economy on the work of Bodin, Botero was first predisposed to thinking along economic lines by his Jesuit education, and already had a general sense of how politics and economics should be brought together. Ultimately, Botero succeeded in creating a theory of political economy quite distinct from the sum of its parts.

First, a chapter will be devoted to Botero's life and growth through the schools of the Jesuits, the offices of the prelates, and the courts of the princes. We must in chapter two deal with his overall system of political economy, exactly what kind of society he wished to create. It has been called proto-mercantilist, and so we will assess it along these lines. Chapter three will analyze his economic predisposition, the root of which is his and the new knowledge of the natural and moral world. Indeed, Botero adopts both the ‘new thinking’ of the humanists and that of the natural philosophers.
Jesuit schooling, an education which was closely based on the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition that the Spanish theologians had reformulated earlier in the century. Finally, chapter four will show his selective use of Bodin, showing how Botero built the particulars of his system of political economy.

Following the motives both of Dominican theologians like Francisco de Vitoria, whose thought had a great influence over the Jesuit conception of politics and economics, and jurists like Jean Bodin, who had a direct influence on our thinker, Botero sought to reconcile the material with the ideal, to provide a plan for the overall well-being of humanity, which, by the end of the sixteenth century, was coming more and more to be recognized as having both material and spiritual parts, each needing equal attention for the achievement of peace and prosperity. He writes: "The public good has two aspects, the spiritual and the temporal. The temporal consists in civil and political peace, the spiritual in religion and the unity of the Church of God." Botero figured the state as the tool to achieve this, maintaining that the prince may rule his state only in the service of the public good, with the just society as his end.

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1. The Life of Giovanni Botero

Although a number of the ideas of humanity transcend both time and space, the thinkers who conceived them did so within the context of their own time and place. Therefore, in this study of the ideas of Giovanni Botero, it is appropriate to begin with a short biography, to give us an idea of how his life and experiences shaped his thought.\(^1\) He was born in 1544 in the northern Italian principality of Piedmont. Little is known of his family, except that his father Francesco was of modest condition, and his paternal uncle was a priest at the newly founded Jesuit College in Palermo, Sicily, where the young Giovanni would find himself studying in 1559. It is unlikely that this would have been his first exposure to Latin grammar because the Jesuit Colleges, according to the decree of Ignatius himself, did not accept students who did not have at least some proficiency in the Roman language.\(^2\) Considering this policy of the Jesuit colleges, and

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\(^1\) Most of the biographical information of Botero here is taken from Luigi Firpo's article, "Giovanni Botero" in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*. (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, vol. XIII, 1971), pages 352-362. Most of Firpo's sources come from the nineteenth century Italian scholars. Some notable twentieth century sources on Botero's economics in Firpo's bibliography include: G. Prato, on Botero as a statistician and economist (1907), E. Zanette, on Botero's thoughts on the power of the people (1930), and R. Bachi, on Botero's thoughts on the city (1946). In addition to Firpo, other important modern sources are: Robert Bireley's *The Counter-Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early modern Europe* (Chapel Hill, 1990), A. Enzo Baldini's Boterian collection *Botero e la Ragion di Stato: Atti dei Convegni in Memoria di Luigi Firpo* (Firenze, 1992), and Carlo Gioda's older, but still useful, *La Vita e le opere di Giovanni Botero, con la Quinta Parte di "Relazioni Universali" e Altri Documenti Inediti* (Milan, 1894).

\(^2\) Aldo Scaglione, *The Liberal Arts and the Jesuit College System*. (Amsterdam: John Benjamin's Publishing Company, 1986), pages 69-70. He writes: "To a query of 1551 from Coudret, Ignatius' firm answer was that the shortage of personnel could not allow the admission of 'abecedaries' or barely literate children, so they had to be rejected." O'Malley echoes this in *The First Jesuits* (Cambridge: Harvard University
the international character of the faculty and students, Latin would have been the lingua franca of the school. Botero took well to his grammar studies, later distinguishing himself to the superiors in Rome as a verseggiatore latino, or Latin poet. I wish I could say he made the same strides in Greek, which he began studying at Palermo as well, but according to a modern biographer, he made little progress.3 This may be partly due to the lack of emphasis placed on Greek at the colleges, which was to be practiced by the young scholastics only two or three times a week.4 He also began studies in rhetoric at Palermo, a subject which had been the cornerstone of humanist education since the fourteenth century.5 Of course, he would also have been introduced to the Romans and their history as a run-off of these studies, for the sources of the greatest Latin rhetoric were Tacitus and Livy, Cicero and Sallust, all of whom enjoyed a place in Botero's writings.

The Roman College attracted students from all over Europe with its sign over the front door: "School for Grammar, Humanities, and Theology, Free."6 And here is where the Colleges of the Jesuits made their greatest innovation- the combination of two

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3 Firpo, "Giovanni Botero", p. 352. He writes: "Il 5 settembre [1560] successivo il B. era ancora a Palermo, certo al fine di ultimare l'anno scolastico, dedicato allo studio della retorica e del greco (nel quale fece anche in seguito scarsi progressi)....."


5 For essential studies on education in early modern Italy, look first to Paul F. Grendler's Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning1300-1600 (Baltimore, 1989), and then for a look at how this tradition continued more particularly as a large part of the curriculum at the Jesuit colleges in the sixteenth century, consult John W. O'Malley's The First Jesuits (Cambridge, Mass., 1993).

traditionally opposed philosophies and methods of learning, those of humanism and scholasticism. Humanism, the program of which has been slightly touched upon, focused on Latin grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy, while scholasticism was interested in theology, logic, and natural philosophy. In his later work, Botero shows himself to be an avid proponent of both schools, promoting the knowledge of both natural philosophy and history in his advice to rulers.

He was at the Roman College by October 1560, possibly under such eminent teachers as the Spaniards Francesco Toledo (b. 1532) and Juan Mariana (b.1536), and beside such promising students as Robert Bellarmine (b. 1542). Apparently, he had such a disagreeable personality that his Roman masters sent him, quite prematurely, to teach in various colleges, at Loreto in September 1562, and Macerata shortly after that, both towns in northern Italy. It was at this latter college that Botero gave a speech in praise of the seven liberal arts, and taught a course on Aristotle's Rhetoric. Francisco Borgia, then acting head of the Society, identified Botero as "a man of rhetorical qualities", and

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7 Ibid., p. 255. Historians of the Jesuits consider this fusion of humanism and scholasticism to be elementary, and O'Malley puts it most succinctly. He writes: "Although the Jesuits never worked out a theoretical solution to the problem of making scholastic speculation pastorally meaningful, their practical solution was to translate its teachings into a humanist rhetoric, which meant its transformation. They probably thought that they were doing nothing more than putting old truths into new dress, but any new way of talking means a new way of thinking, a new *forma mentis*. It means different sensibilities and sensitivities." This is apparent not only in the general organizational literature of the Society, but most certainly in the style and curriculum of their schools.

8 Botero, *Reason of State*, Bk II, ch. 2 and 3, pages 34-38. He focuses on the importance to the prince of knowledge of the natural world in chapter two and of history and poetry in chapter three of Book Two.
recalled him to Rome to resume his studies, particularly in natural philosophy. Indeed, the program of the Jesuit Colleges, depending on the students' abilities, required three to five years of grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy, both moral and natural, at the completion of which they would go on to theology. Botero did not begin to study theology until later in the decade. Nevertheless, his cumulative five years at the Palermo and the Roman College would qualify him to teach the primary subjects in the colleges. By August 1565, invigorated by his three extra years at the Roman College, Botero was sent to teach in the Jesuit colleges in France, even though he had wanted to go to the colleges of the German states of the Empire "to combat the heretics." However, the colleges of France were recognized by this time to be ever more essential by the Society, considering the problems Catholics were having with Calvinists in France at the time.

Botero taught rhetoric and philosophy at the Jesuit College in Billom in southern France for two years, and beginning in the fall of 1567, at the Jesuit College in Paris, where he would remain until June, 1569. In addition to teaching, Botero often put his pen to paper during his French sojourn. In the late sixties, he is said to have composed an epic poem addressed to Charles of Guise, Cardinal of Lorraine, who was thought to have been the most important adviser to King Charles IX and to have provoked the outbreak of the third war of religion with the attempted arrest of Huguenot leaders Condé and Coligny in

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9 Firpo, DBI, p. 353. He writes: “Fin dal 31 luglio s. Francesco Borgia aveva riconosciuto che un uomo dalle qualità retoriche del B. era sciupato in un piccolo centro, sicché nel settembre venne finalmente richiamato a Roma...”, and “si preferi trattenerlo per due anni nel Collegio Romano a studiar filosofia naturale...”

10 Ulich, p. 275ff.

11 Firpo, DBI, p. 353. Firpo writes that as early as 1562 Botero wanted “di essere inviato a combattere gli eretici in Germania.”
1568. Botero celebrates the Cardinal as "the most powerful minister of the French sovereign," also mentioning his brother Francis, who had been assassinated in 1563, a "victim of the fraud and wickedness of the Huguenots." There is little doubt that Botero sympathized with the pro-Catholic forces of the French monarchy, but he would not always direct his support towards any pro-Catholic force.

Our knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his departure from the school, and indeed from France altogether, is rather sketchy. We know that he was accused of promoting anti-Spanish sentiment among both the teachers and students of the school, perhaps because of the Catholic Spanish army marching up the eastern frontier of France on its way to deal with the revolt of the Protestant in the Netherlands. This move by Philip II was not well received at the court in Paris (indeed, it may even have made the Guise, usually the allies of Spain, a little uncomfortable), and Botero must have gotten himself swept up in the furor, promoting French political interest over Catholic religious. He was recalled to Rome by the Jesuits, who ultimately took pity on the young and temperamental Botero and allowed him to stay over in Milan to teach his specialties.

He remained in Milan from 1569 to 1573, all the while picking up some theology at the Jesuit college. He was eligible to rise to the major orders in 1571, but Jerome Nadal, the Vicar General, considering his less-than-universalist transgression in Paris,

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prevented him from doing so for the time being. Although Botero was recognized by his superiors as a poet, his talents as a theologian were now beginning to be questioned. He moved to Padua in 1573 to continue his theological training, most likely at the Jesuit college, remaining for four years. Even though he was studying theology, he composed no less than three poems during his Padovan years, dedicating an epic to Henry of Valois in 1573, the newly-elected king of Poland, and soon to be king of France. These intrigues and writings show that, even at this early stage of his career, Botero was becoming interested in addressing political concerns as opposed to purely theological ones, often to the chagrin of his Jesuit superiors. His latter years at Padua, as well as a stay in Genoa in 1578, can scarcely be described as a towering achievement, either as a theologian or a soldier of Christ. In the first case, after the better part of a decade in theological training, he was granted the status of what Firpo has called 'the capacity of a lecturer in Sacred Scripture.' More than this, his request to be sent on a proselytizing mission to the Americas was twice denied. No matter how the elders of the Society appreciated his rhetorical abilities, they were not prepared to let him far out of their watch.

By 1579, Botero found himself back in Milan, giving a sermon at the Milanese seminary on the Second Psalm in which he questioned the temporal power of the pope, perhaps promoting the power of secular kings too much. He was quite roundly

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15 Firpo, DBI, p. 354.

16 Ibid.
condemned for this, criticized by one superior as "one who is better suited to human than
divine wisdom." Despite the fact that the Jesuits took a greater interest in political
affairs and recognized the legitimacy of earthly princes far more than other orders, such a
claim, especially in a sermon, went against their firm belief in the God-given temporal
power of the Pope. Thus, Botero was asked to leave the Jesuits after twenty-two years
of service. Bireley mentions that he "honorably" left the Society at this time. Firpo goes
further, noting that Botero requested to be ‘dismissed without dishonour’, and was
granted such. In reality though, given the reaction to his presentation, a more adequate
description is that he was discharged quite dishonorably. Nevertheless, this would not
prevent Botero from keeping contact with the Jesuits, and ultimately finding his way back
into their good graces, being buried at the Jesuit cemetery at his death in 1617. Indeed,
it is not surprising that Botero would turn his attention from strictly spiritual matters to
political. Although he certainly did so by his own choice, his Jesuit education, with the
patronage of secular princes, would have opened the temporal door to him. However, it is

17  Ibid. He writes that "un superiore lo definiva 'persona... che s'accomoda più
presto per prudenza umana che divina'."

18  Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume II: The
both "Suarez and Bellarmine lay a special emphasis on the significance of Christ's
affirmation to Peter, 'To you I give the keys.'"

19  Firpo, DBI, p. 355. He writes that Botero “chiese di venire dimesso senza infamia
dalla Compania di Gesù... e il 12 dicembre ottenne la patente che attestava la sua uscita
onorevole...” (He “asked to be dismissed without ill-fame from the Society of Jesus... and on the 12th of December he obtained a license which attested to his honorable exit.”). Bireley (The Counter-Reformation Prince) mentions that ‘he quietly and honorably left the Society in 1580’ on page 46.

20  Robert Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, p. 49.
clear that he took it much further than most of his brethren.

After Botero's castigation, the Milanese archbishop Carlo Borromeo took pity on the easily excitable preacher, giving him a position as vice-curate in Luino, where he was to make pastoral visitations in the surrounding countryside and reflect on his life. Why Borromeo did so is a mystery, but it may be related to Botero's vigor and enthusiasm, which the Saint would not have wanted to waste. He wished to regiment Botero along Tridentine lines, as indicated by the pastoral assignment, which reflects one of San Carlo's own enthusiasms in the Catholic reform. More than this, the Saint also wanted eloquent preachers who could stir up their flocks with a humanist rhetoric adapted from the care of the republican city to the care of the Christian soul. Coupled with these reasons is the possibility that Borromeo, inspired by the intractability of the Jesuits living

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Alberto Melloni, "History, Pastorate, and Theology: The Impact of Carlo Borromeo upon A.G. Roncalli/Pope John XXIII" in San Carlo Borromeo, John M. Headley and John B. Tomaro eds. (Washington: Folger Books, 1988), p. 284. Melloni quotes A.G. Roncalli, later Pope John XXIII: "History written by others is always somewhat the opinion and impressions of the one who writes it. Here instead in the acts of visitation is San Carlo himself, alive, working, he himself at a distance of more than three centuries just as his own contemporaries encountered and venerated him." In this same edition, A. D. Wright adds, in his "The Borromean Ideal and the Spanish Church," page 192, that "by Charles death, not only was Lombardy essentially free of heresy, but he had even carried the campaign against Protestantism into the Alps, by his visitation, as apostolic visitor, of certain valleys and his concern to train priests to work in such areas."

John W. O'Malley, "Saint Charles Borromeo and the Praecipuum Episcoporum Munus: His Place in the History of Preaching", in John M. Headley and John B. Tomaro, eds., San Carlo Borromeo, p. 139. O'Malley writes: "Fumaroli, in his massive and erudite study entitled L'âge de l'éloquence (1980), has especially inserted Saint Charles into the revival of enthusiasm for eloquence that began in the Italian Renaissance but was transformed and reached a certain culmination in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, particularly in Italy, Spain, and France." O'Malley goes onto discuss Botero's work in particular. He writes: "In 1585, the year after Borromeo's death, Giovanni Botero, another of his collaborators, published his De praedicatorre verbi Dei. This effort to construct a 'fully Christian rhetoric' explicitly owes its origins to Saint Charles's urgings and inspiration," p. 148.
in his diocese, wished to recruit Botero for his own congregation of Oblates, a group of Borrmeo’s own design similar to the Jesuits, but directly answerable to the Milanese Archbishop. Although Botero’s relationship with Borromeo was a close one, there is no evidence that Botero ever actually became an Oblate. Nonetheless, excelling in his duties, Botero later became a personal assistant to the archbishop, and, remaining a loyal servant and secretary to Borromeo until the latter's death in 1584, he would also act as tutor and later as assistant to the archbishop's cousin, Federico Borromeo.

It was during this service to the elder Borromeo in the early eighties, and in fact under his supervision, that Botero produced a now rare work of theology called De regia sapientia, dedicated to Carlo Emmanuele, the Duke of Savoy. The De regia is an explicitly anti-Machiavellian tract, consisting of three books, the first dealing with the importance of the Christian religion in warfare, the second with the means by which a Christian state may be maintained, and the third with how such a state may grow. Indeed, the Reason of State six years later, also explicitly anti-Machiavellian, would deal with these same themes, albeit in a different manner. De regia is written in a scholastic style. Firstly, it is a work in Latin rather than vernacular Italian, but, more importantly, Botero frames his arguments as a series of propositions, which are then each answered by Scriptural citations, very much in the style of his Jesuit brethren Suarez, Bellarmine, and

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24 Firpo, Gli Scritti, p. 20. He writes that Botero himself, in a letter to Borromeo, describes the books of the work thus: "nel primo demonstro i principati e le vittorie dipendere da Iddio; nel secondo le cagioni degli accrescimenti degli stati; nel terzo le aggiunte, che si faranno, d'esempi moderni."

25 Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, pgs. 46-47
Mariana. However, Botero doesn't season his treatment with the usual logical syllogisms of scholastic texts, but considering his penchant for Latin poetry, and reading his political treatises from later in the decade, one gets the sense that he didn't excel in this kind of argument, feeling more comfortable with rhetoric than with logic. De Regia could be called a work of political theology, quoting Scripture extensively, but without finding much of an audience even among theologians, while the Reason of State is strictly a work of politics, primarily citing the Greeks and Romans, and finding a much wider, more general audience.

In the interval between the respective publications of these two works, there is an obvious shift from a theological to a more humanist method of political exposition. In the Reason of State, Botero shows himself to have been influenced by the work of Jean Bodin, most particularly his Six Books of the Republic, first published in 1576. He borrows ideas about economics and geography in particular from Bodin's magnum opus, two themes which are not as explicitly dealt with in the De regia, leaving a number of scholars to conclude that it was not until the mid-eighties that Botero actually read Bodin's work.\(^\text{26}\) Thus, from the Saint's death in 1584 to the publication of Reason of State in 1589, it is apparent that Borromeo's influence on Botero gradually waned. This is not to say that Botero ever forgot his patron, opening his 1585 manual on preaching with a recollection of an inspiring conversation he once had with Borromeo on their way from Rome to Loreto.\(^\text{27}\) Likewise, in both the Magnificence of Cities and the Reason of State,

\(^{26}\) Both Bireley (p. 47) and the Waleys (p. x, introduction) claim that Botero read Bodin for the first time in 1585 during his diplomatic mission to France.

\(^{27}\) Firpo, Gli Scritti, p. 70. He writes: "l'autore narra che il trattatello gli fu ispirato
Botero saves words of praise for how well the Saint tended his flock in Milan, and how enriched the city was from his presence.28

The most likely time for Botero's introduction to Bodin's work is the year 1585, when, after the death of Borromeo, Botero was sent to France on an embassy for Duke Carlo Emmanuele of Savoy. The mission was most likely to make contact with the leaders of the French Catholic League who were trying to prevent the possibility that the next prince in line for the throne, the Protestant Henry of Navarre, would ever become the King of France.29 Botero would have been not only exposed to Bodin's ideas at this time, but also immersed in the political theory of the Guise-led League, the pamphleteers of which by the middle of the 1580's had more than once argued for the option of tyrannicide against heretical kings, an argument which would later be made by one of Botero's own former brethren, the Jesuit Juan Mariana.30 Bodin's text, however, which

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28 Botero, _Reason of State_, p. 75. He writes: "[W]e ourselves have seen Cardinal Borromeo entertain the multitudes of Milan with celebrations of religious feasts and with church functions performed with elaborate ceremony and great dignity, so that the churches were filled with people from morning to evening, and no people was ever so happy, so content and so tranquil as the Milanese in those days." Also, in the _Magnificence of Cities_, p. 250: "Milan, a most populous and famous city, shall ever be a witness what praise and glory, and how much increase it hath gotten by the singular piety and religious life of that great Cardinal Borromeo."

29 Both Firpo (in "Giovanni Botero", p. 356) and Bireley (p. 47) conclude that the embassy to France was to make contact with members of the French Catholic League.

emphasizes the importance of the Crown's absolute sovereignty in the face of religious factionalism, had become more relevant than ever to those who took an interest in French politics, as Botero himself had done since his sojourn to France and his literary dedications to its most prominent figures in the 1560's and 70's, and as he was to do now more than ever in 1585 as envoy to the French kingdom. As compelling as all the political arguments stirring through France in these times were, which theory most appealed to Botero is a matter of debate, to be discussed in later chapters of this thesis.

Botero rounded out the eighties in Rome in the employ of Federico Borromeo, who was made Cardinal by 1587. This has rightly been called Botero's most productive stage, seeing the completion of his three most important works, the *Greatness of Cities* in 1588, the *Reason of State* in the following year, and the first book of his *Universal Relations* in 1591. The first is a discourse on how cities are made great, no doubt inspired by his recent adventures in Paris and Rome, the two great centres of continental Europe. The second has already been mentioned, and the *Universal Relations* is a compendium of information on the kingdoms and lands of the world, and the state of Christianity therein, a work replete with historical, geographical, and demographic descriptions of the various places.31

Botero made the most of his employment with the young Cardinal by dedicating the first two of these works to prominent relatives of the Borromeos. The *Greatness of Cities* was dedicated to one Cornelia d'Altemps Orsini, the Duchess of Gallese, of that

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31 Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, p. 48. He writes: "It was a compendium of contemporary knowledge rather than a creative effort like the *Reason of State*, a vast mine of information about the known world- physical, geographical, anthropological, economic, political, and religious."
same old Orsini line of Roman nobility that Lorenzo "Il Magnifico" de' Medici had married into in the previous century. Cornelia Orsini had married Roberto Altemps, who was the son of Cardinal Mark Sittich Altemps von Hohenems. The Reason of State was addressed to Wolf Dietrich von Raitenau, the archbishop of Salzburg and nephew to this Cardinal Altemps, himself mentioned prominently in the dedication of the Reason of State. This cardinal, along with his contemporary Carlo Borromeo, was nephew to the Medici pope, Pius IV. The dedication of these two works to these two figures of this notable family shows Botero to have been keeping pretty good company while serving as secretary to Federico Borromeo in Rome. These connections may have become somewhat tenuous through the 1590's however, as Botero released his Universal Relations in four parts over a five year period (the fifth part was not published until 1895), dedicating each part to a different person out of an eclectic mix: part one to the Cardinal of Lorraine in 1591, part two to the young Prince Philip of Spain in the following year, part three to Cardinal Borromeo in 1594, and part four to one Juan Fernandez de Velasco, a noted bureaucrat of Savoy, in 1596. He released a complete edition of the Universal Relations in this last year, dedicated to Carlo Emmanuele of Savoy.

Botero's fame in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century rested primarily on his Universal Relations. This is presumably due to the fascination with the New World and the interest in the spread of European, or more appropriately, Christian culture among the native peoples of the Americas. The work was translated into Latin, French, Spanish, German, and Polish by the author's death in 1617, and went through an
incredible sixty editions through the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, his earlier works like the *Magnificence of Cities* and *Reason of State* were well known as well, indeed in some of Europe's most important courts. The former was translated into Spanish, Latin, and English within the author's lifetime, and the latter was translated into Spanish, French, and Latin, while seeing ten more editions in its original Italian, in the same period. The *Reason of State* was read by Gaspare de Guzman, the count-duke of Olivares in Spain, who seems to have used Botero's ideas in his *Memorial on the Union of Arms* in 1625, designed to unite the Spanish Empire. Unfortunately for Spain, the advice was heeded far too laxly. Maximilian II of Bavaria was also an adherent to Botero's principles of statecraft, making reference to, and indeed wanting to follow, Botero's economic advice to princes, as indicated in a letter to his father in 1598. It was also on the reading list of archduke Ferdinand II (Holy Roman Emperor, 1619-1637) at the Hapsburg court at Graz. Botero was thus read quite widely by some of the more prominent figures of the Thirty Years War.

In addition to influencing these political figures, Botero's economic ideas of the *Reason of State* are cited by the German Jesuit thinker Adam Contzen in his *Ten Books*

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on Politics of 1621. Richard Tuck, in his Philosophy and Government, hints that Botero may also have influenced Justus Lipsius, stating first that, according to his own correspondence, Lipsius had purchased a copy of Botero’s Reason of State in 1597, which provided the framework by which the Netherlander began to consider the greatness of Rome. Tuck writes:

To establish the first point [on the size of the Roman population, Lipsius] went into remarkable detail on the demography of the empire, attempting to calculate its total population - a theme which became the standard of works of this kind. (Botero, for example, produced estimates of the population of the contemporary European states which Braudel at least has found remarkably accurate (Braudel 1972, I, p. 395 no. 194)). By stressing the size of population and the organization of taxation as crucial to a nation’s greatness, Lipsius was undoubtedly on the edge of the account of political power which a later generation termed (rather misleadingly) ‘mercantilism’ ….38

As we shall see, population and taxation are two of the most important features of Botero’s thought in the Reason of State.

Another influence Botero may have had is on the work of the English mercantilist Thomas Mun, whose England's Treasure by Forraign Trade has been called one of the foundational documents of English mercantilism. The work was written in 1624, almost twenty years after Mun had been appointed to head the British East India Company. Mun had previous to this been a private trader in the Mediterranean ports of Pisa and Genoa, and could conceivably have picked up and read one of the Italian versions of the Reason of State. Considering that he uses a number of Botero's own rhetorical devices in describing how the king should encourage foreign trade as a means of enriching the entire

37 Ibid., p. 149.
kingdom, there is much to be studied in this connection. Here is a telling sample on the importance of promoting trade. Botero writes:

> Without considerable expenditure it is impossible to draw money for long from a state which does not acquire money from outside. Suppose a state to contain ten million crowns, and that the ruler has an income of one million but does not spend more than a hundred thousand crowns: it is clear that at the end of twelve or so years there will be nothing at all left to the people, and the prince will be unable to sheer his subjects, let alone fleece them.\(^\text{38}\)

Compare Mun, writing thirty-five years later:

> if [the King] should mass up more money than is gained by the over-ballance of his foreign trade, he shall not fleece, but flea his subjects, and so with their ruin overthrow himself for want of future sheerings. To make this plain, suppose a kingdom to be so rich by nature and art, that it may supply itself of foreign wares by trade, and yet advance yearly 200,000L in ready money: Next suppose all the king's revenues to be 900,000L and his expenses but 400,000L whereby he may lay up 300,000L more in his coffers yearly than the whole kingdom gains from strangers by foreign trade; who sees not then that... the life of lands and arts must fail and fall to ruin both of the publick and private wealth?\(^\text{40}\)

Even though their numbers are different (indeed they were dealing in different currencies), the basic idea, along with the characterization of the subjects as sheep, is


\(^\text{39}\) Botero, *Reason of State*, (trans. By P.J. and D.P Waley, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956) Bk VII, ch. x, p. 143. In the original: “Cosa impossibile è che da uno Stato che non riceve di fuora molto si cavi lungo tempo senza spendere assai, perché, mettiamo caso che in uno Stato simile siamo dieci milioni di scudi e che ’l Prencipe n’abbia uno di entrata e non spenda più di centomila scudi, quivi avverrà che, in dodici o poco più anni, i sudditi resteranno affatto privi d’ogni cosa, senza che ’l Precipe possa più, non dirò tosarli, ma neanco scorticarli.” The original quotations of Botero’s *Reason of State* used in this thesis have been taken from Chiara Continisio’s edition of *Della Ragion di Stato* (Donzelli, Roma, 1997). The English translations of this work, and of the *Greatness of Cities* are from the Waley edition.

essentially the same: that the king (or prince) must not hoard more than the amount of
treasure he has coming in by foreign trade.

Botero spent the better part of the nineties in the service of the younger Borromeo, completing the four books for his *Universal Relations* by 1596, and making additions to and overseeing new editions of the *Reason of State*. Having kept in contact with the Savoyard court, he was brought again into its employ as tutor to Duke Carlo Emmanuele's three sons after his service with Cardinal Frederick Borromeo ended in 1598. He remained in this capacity for another sixteen years, flexing his humanist muscles with a *de viris illustribus* entitled *I Prencipi* in 1600, a collection of biographies of Alexander the Great, Scipio Africanus, and Caesar, sure to have been adventurously read by the young princes as classical examples of aristocratic behavior. He also composed a version on Christian princes for their father, the second volume of which actually included the Savoyard line of princes itself. Between 1603 and 1607 he toured Spain with the boys and saw for the first time that kingdom which had been the object both of his praise and blame, recalling in the *Reason of State* Spain's greatness in holding off the Turk at the fringes of Christendom, and its poverty from expelling the Jews and generally discouraging trade.

Botero spent the better part of his life either in the classroom, as student, teacher, and finally tutor, or in the courts of princes and antechnambers of ecclesiastics. He is less well-known for his preaching, writing a manual in 1585 entitled *De Praedicatore verbi Dei*. He did complete theological training, but his main written works are not on this subject at all. Again, by the late 1580's Botero seems to have been addressing exclusively secular problems, inspired by both the secular and theological works of moral philosophy
he read in the Jesuit schools and the political dialogue, both official and otherwise, going on in the most important lay and ecclesiastical circles in Europe. Botero took the political ideas of scholastic and Jesuit theologians and, applying them to the affairs of the late sixteenth century, popularized them in easy-to-read, humanistic treatises. This is not to say that he was disinterested in religious themes. On the contrary, although his focus is indeed on the state, it is a Christian state. He discusses the enemies of the prince, and more often than not he means the ‘infidel’ Turk.

Much has been made of Botero being an anti-Machiavellian, and he is such with respect to the role to be played by Christianity in the state, both in military affairs and in the prince's hold on power, but he does agree with at least a few of the Florentine's ideas for the prince's management of the state. These differences and similarities will be further addressed in succeeding chapters. However, Botero is writing at the other end of Machiavelli's century, and dealing with matters, economics in particular, that Machiavelli barely considers. One of the differences is the way in which the two thinkers account for people's participation in the state. As J.G.A. Pocock writes in his _Machiavellian Moment_, the Florentine, in arguing for a republican state, urges the citizenry to be prepared to take up arms. According to this earthly maxim, it is with their military virtues that the people will be able to take part in the republic as free citizens. Botero, on the other hand, presents a more Aristotelian, Thomistic maxim similar to that of his scholastic forebears.

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41 J.G.A. Pocock, _The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition_. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pgs. 201-202. He writes: "If this [concern for the common good] be virtue, then the warrior displays it as fully as the citizen, and it may be through military discipline that one learns to be a citizen and to display civic virtue. In the anatomy of early Roman virtue given in the _Discorsi_, Machiavelli seems to depict it as built on military discipline and civic religion, as if these were the two socializing processes through which men learned to be
Writing with a principality in mind, but with just as much thought about public involvement in the state, it is the degree to which the people produce wealth and contribute to the *self-sufficiency* of the state that gives them their civic virtue. In the following chapters, we shall look at how Botero's ideas were shaped by his Jesuit education and his reading of Jean Bodin's *Six Books of the Republic*, with the end of seeing just how he envisaged this kind of civic virtue in the state.

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political animals."
2. Botero’s Structure of Society

Botero writes at the beginning of the *Reason of State* that the most important directive of its title is the preservation of a medium-sized state rather than the establishment or expansion of it, claiming that establishment and expansion are of a different nature to preservation, presumably because they both lead to something entirely or at least partially new, whereas the maintenance is the continuation of the same thing. There is a hint in this opening that Botero is less than sympathetic to expansionist policies, considering his statement that "all that is done to these purposes is said to be done for Reasons of State, yet this is said rather of such actions as cannot be considered in the light of ordinary reason." He then goes on to give us ten books setting forth the ways by which the state's preservation may best be accomplished, and, as we shall see, his ultimate definition of preservation include policies seeming to expand the state. Two of these, Books VII and VIII, focus on some of the economic resources of the prince,

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1 Botero, *Reason of State*, Bk I ch. i, p. 3. Translated with an introduction and notes by P.J. Waley and D.P. Waley, and *The Greatness of Cities*, translated by Robert Peterson. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956). Hereafter cited as "Botero, *Reason of State" or "Botero, *Magnificence of Cities." When the original text is given in these footnotes, these translations have been used for comparison. He writes: “State is a stable rule over a people and Reason of State is the knowledge of the means by which such a dominion may be founded, preserved and extended. Yet, although in the widest sense the term includes all these, it is concerned most nearly with preservation, and more nearly with extension than foundation....” In the original: “Stato è un dominio fermo sopra popoli e Ragione di Stato si è notizia de’ mezzi atti a fondare, conservare e ampliare un dominio. Egli è vero che, sebene assolutamente parlando, ella si stende alle tre parte sudette, nondimeno pare che più strettamente abbracci la conservazione che l’altre, e dell’altra più l’ampliazione che la fondazione.”

2 Botero, *The Reason of State*, Bk I ch. i, p. 3.
giving primacy to the people as the source of the prince's greatest strength, followed by money. It may seem strange in the Cinquecento, a century so tempered politically by Machiavelli's The Prince, that a thinker would devote so much of a work on politics to economic matters. Bireley has supposed that the growth of state government in the sixteenth century led to the focus on the economic ways such states might be maintained, especially among anti-Machiavellian theorists like Botero.  

Geoffrey Parker has followed this line, but from a different point of view, in The Military Revolution with a quote from Botero himself, who stated in his Relations of the Venetian Republic (1605) that "war is dragged out for as long as possible, and the object is not to smash but to tire; not to defeat but to wear down."  

Princes of the sixteenth century needed access to massive treasuries with which they could carry out such campaigns of attrition. However, more than simple military matters were driving Botero's economic thinking. Of course foreign wars were a great financial burden on the growing states of sixteenth century Europe, forcing them to evolve into much larger, more centralized bureaucracies than they had been previously, but Botero is also concerned with the situation within states- the prince's relationship to his subjects. Enrico Stumpo tries to tie Botero's thought more particularly to his experience at the Savoyard court, but at the time of the publication of the Reason of

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3 Robert Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1990), p. 23. He writes: "Inflation, the gradual swelling of court and bureaucracy, and above all, war- in the Netherlands, in France, and with the Turks in the Mediterranean and Hungary- and the threat of war and pursuit of security elsewhere led to escalating costs of government,... and the anti-Machiavellians were to be among the first to emphasize the importance of economic development and demographic growth for the creation of a powerful state. They were to be among the first mercantilists."

State, it is doubtful Botero would have been exposed to much of the details of state finance. Bireley elsewhere makes the case that Botero argues for the poor of the country "to be given opportunities in agriculture or a craft, which would in turn give them a stake in the state." This is an important part of Botero's criteria for maintaining states most easily- not only that they be middle-sized, but also that they be made up primarily of 'the middle sort,' who are the easiest to govern and the most economically valuable. It is by directing his economic policy to these ends that Botero's prince will be able to maintain the greatest power in his state. This chapter will outline Botero's economic advice to the prince for maintaining this moderate state with the aforementioned resources- money and people- by looking at the degree to which he embraces mercantilist views on political economy. We will begin with a discussion of Botero's thoughts on money in the state,

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5 Enrico Stumpo "La Formazione Economica di Botero e I Suoi Rapporti con Il Piemonte e La Corte Sabauda," in A. Enzo Baldini, ed., Botero e 'La Ragion di Stato': Atti dei Convegni in Memoria di Luigi Firpo. (Firenze: Leo Olschki, 1992), p. 364. Stumpo argues that it was not other theorists of the late sixteenth century who led Botero to consider economics, but the “informazione [finanze] che circolava ampiamente e diffusamente in quegli anni” (“information circulating widely and well diffused in these years”) in the Savoyard Court. Stumpo goes on to speculate on whether Botero may have known “mercanti, …finanzieri, …proprietari di manifatture” in these years. The only problem with this is that "quegli anni" refers to the period after 1598 when Botero left the service of Federico Borromeo to join the Duke's court in earnest. It is unlikely that Botero did much work along these lines in his service to Carlo Emmanuele in 1585, for his duties were somewhat more focused on the diplomatic issues at hand, and most of his time on these issues was spent outside of the duchy.

6 Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, p. 60.

7 Botero writes that the middle-sized states are the easiest to govern (Reason of State, Bk I, ch vi, p. 7), and that the middle sort are to be favoured as subjects because, "as Aristotle says, they are the most inclined to virtue." (Reason of State, Bk IV, ch ii, p.82)
then continue to the mercantilist means he outlines for the raising of this money, and finally to the conclusion he makes on the acquisition of it, that the prince needs a healthy and robust flock of subjects, not to fleece, but simply to shear. At the end of this, we will be able to assess the apparent tensions between Botero's general principles of state, holding that the stable, medium-sized entity is the best, and his particular economic advice to the prince, promoting the overall growth of the state.

Unfortunately, Botero's ideas are spread out over his text in such a way as to betray a lack of organization. On the one hand, the chapters within the ten books of the *Reason of State* are each relatively well organized by their chapter headings. The only problem is that one can get a sense of the overall organization of each book only after having completed a full reading of the work, for Botero has not labeled any of the books themselves, nor has he outlined them in an introduction. If one were to go about doing so, they could be labelled thus: Book I, On the characteristics of strong states and good princes; Book II, On the qualities of the prince; Book III, On the reputation of the prince; Book IV, On the internal threats to the prince; Book V, On consolidating the state's conquests; Book VI, On external threats to the prince; Book VII, Resources- part i, money; Book VIII, Resources- part ii, people; Book IX, On military matters; and Book X, On military leadership, with a concluding call to arms against the Turk. As I have already stated, the books dealing with economic advice are seven and eight, but considering how much this overlaps in Botero's mind with political and military matters in particular, it does appear in other books. Conversely, political and military matters are also dealt with in books seven and eight.
For Botero, money is important to the prince for two reasons. First, it allows him to raise and maintain armies and wage war without the destitution of his subjects. If the prince held little or no money on reserve, then he would find himself in trouble in times of diplomatic crisis. He would not be able to strike against his enemies, and he would be forced to exact huge and unexpected taxes from his subjects. Not only would this be incredibly unpopular, but it would also be quite difficult, considering the pandemonium that erupts in times of war, which disrupts trade and industry, the main sources of the prince's income. The second reason for having money at hand is that it adds to the prince's prestige, a term which Botero never explicitly defines, but one which can be understood by a number of things he has to say in both the Reason of State and the Magnificence of Cities. He is wont to say that the only thing stirring men to action "these days" is the promise of material gain. If the prince shows his state to be wealthy

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8 Botero, Reason of State, Bk VII, ch iii, p. 134. He writes: "...it is both difficult and dangerous to collect money only in times of need, especially for a war.... [m]oney, then, must be ready to hand, so that it only remains to assemble those who are to fight; otherwise, while means of acquiring money are being deliberated, the swiftness of the enemy or the disruption caused by the war will remove all facility of obtaining either money or men." ("l'aspettare a metter insieme il denaro necessario ne' bisogni, massime della guerra, è cosa difficile e pericolosa... Bisogna dunque che 'l denaro sia apparecchiato, acciò non s'abbia da far altro che la gente: altrimenti, mentre che si consulterà delle maniere del far denari, la celerità de' nemici o 'l disturbo della guerra ci torrà il modo di fare e i denari e la gente.")

9 Botero, Reason of State, Bk VII, ch iii, p. 134. He writes: "...it is essential that a prince should always have a good sum of money by him, both for the sake of his prestige (since the power of a state is today judged as much by its wealth in money as by its size) and for the requirements of peace and war." ("E nondimeno egli è necessario e per uso della pace, e per necessità della guerra [Dall' edizione Roma 1590 appare qui l'inciso: "E per reputazione, perché la potenza degli stati si guida oggi non meno della copia del denaro, che dalla grandezza del paese che il Prencipe abbia sempre in pronto buona somma di denari contanti" )
and powerful, then he should have no fear of being short of the other important resource, that is people. Money attracts people expecting to partake of it by their trades and talents.

These two reasons why the prince should have money at hand exist quite well-fused in Botero's mind. This we get from his work preceding the *Reason of State* by a year, that is the *Magnificence of Cities*, which deals with the world of sixteenth-century Italian city-states, but can be used to further understand Botero's thoughts on larger states and kingdoms in general. He writes in this work that great cities are possible only with the establishment of two main things. The first is physical security between his own subjects and on behalf of his subjects against outside states. This is not all, however, for people need more than mere physical security. Indeed, they also want prosperity. It is the prince's guarantee of this as well as physical security that will not only draw, but also, keep, people in the state. It is the prince's prestige by means of his wealth that persuades subjects to stay and offer their allegiance to him. More than this, the prince will be better able to maintain security among his subjects and against foreign powers with the money that will be raised from taxation of such an abundance of people. As he states in the text on *Cities*, the execution of justice will only be accomplished with a large number of bureaucrats- lawyers, judges, and administrators- each having been drawn to his position

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11 Botero, *The Magnificence of Cities*, Bk I, chs. ii-vii, pages 227-33. Botero here actually gives four essentials for the establishment of a city: force, authority, pleasure, and profit. For the purpose of expedience, I have synthesized them into physical security and prosperity. Indeed, of these four, Botero himself focuses on authority and profit.
by the hope of financial gain. From the argument we have already looked at in the
Reason of State on the maintenance of an army and the defense of the subjects from the
violence of foreigners, wealth in the state is also important for the security of the subjects
within the state. As we can see from this, Botero connects the ideas of security and
prestige in a network of wealth production, since each will promote the increase of the
other.

Botero is quick to burst the bubble of princes who would wish to follow his
advice on wealth and begin hoarding as much treasure as they possibly can, because he
has advice on that as well, and his reasons are moral as well as political. The first
argument against hoarding money is that the prince may think twice before doing
charitable works, on which the love of his subjects depends. A prince focused on
hoarding will also begin taxing his subjects far too heavily, so much so that they will
become poor and even rebellious. The possibility that he will forget the other important
precepts of good governing will also serve the prince poorly as he commits himself
exclusively to the raising of wealth. He will come to lose his state for lack of ideas on
how to protect it. Finally, the prince will become a specialist in the 'art of avarice,'
producing two decidedly unfavourable results: it will foster wicked means of building
wealth and it will create spendthrift heirs, such as Solomon after David and Caligula after

Ibid., Bk II, ch iv, p. 253. He writes: "Nay, more than that (which it grieves me to
think on) expedition of justice cannot be had in our days without ready money. For
nothing in the world doth make men run so fast as current money."

Botero, Reason of State, Bk VII, ch ii, p. 132-33. Botero here gives a detailed list
of reasons why the prince must not hoard.
Tiberius. Of course, when discussing the realm of princes, the moral and the political are one and the same, and Botero acknowledges this in the dedication to the *Reason of State*, writing essentially that the prince must rule by his conscience. He writes:

...he who would deprive conscience of its universal jurisdiction over all that concerns man in his public as well as in his private life shows thereby that he has no soul and no God. The very beasts a possess natural instinct which turns them towards useful things and away from harmful ones: shall then the light of reason and the dictates of conscience, bestowed upon man to enable him to distinguish good and evil, be obscured in affairs of state, mute in matters of importance?\(^\text{15}\)

One of the most important differences between Botero's and Machiavelli's ideas on this connection between the prince's prosperity and that of the state is that, where Machiavelli requires that the prince only appear to be good, Botero demands that the prince constantly be a good Christian in order to reap the true rewards of his state, an idea, as we shall see, having its roots deep in his scholastic education.

Thus, the prince should have neither too much nor too little wealth, virtue lying in the middle way. The question naturally arises: How much then should the prince be prepared to keep at hand? In his answer, Botero shines as the proto-statistician he has been celebrated as among modern scholars.\(^\text{16}\) Instead of giving a fixed limit for every

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\(^{15}\) Botero, *Reason of State*, dedication, page xiv. In the original: "...conciosiacché chi sottrae alla conscienza la sua guiridizione universale di tutto ciò che passa tra gli uomini, si nelle cose publiche come nelle private, mostra che non ha anima, né Dio. Sino alle bestie hano uno instinto naturale, che le spinge alle cose utile e le ritira dale nocevoli: e il lume della ragione e 'l dettame della conscienza, dato all'uomo per saper discernere il bene e 'l male, sarà cieco negli affari pubblici, difettoso ne' casi d'importanza."

\(^{16}\) John M. Headley, in "Geography and Empire in the Late Renaissance: Botero's Assignment, Western Universalism, and the Civilizing Process", *Renaissance Quarterly* vol. LIII, number 4, winter 2000, pages 1119-1155, p. 1133. Headley discusses Botero's
prince and kingdom, he acknowledges the relative nature of different kingdoms. Of course, he argues, each kingdom is different, having a different size, population, revenue, and expense, and therefore there can be no golden number for every prince to pursue, each kingdom having a different standard. Although he does not present his solution in mathematical terms, the formula does recall a kind of logic-driven Aristotelian proposition. In short, the prince should have enough money on hand to deal with any foreign entanglements and maintain his prestige without having to overtax his subjects.  

The long version is far more involved. Botero is essentially creating a formula to balance all of the resources of the state—money, people, arms, and food. Given this, the prince must necessarily keep a constant account of all information along these lines, hence Botero's characterization as the proto-statistician. If mere wealth is abundant far in excess of the other resources, this will disable the prince both in times of peace and war. It will make the state attractive to invaders, leave the people destitute and rebellious, and render the military impotent. However, if wealth is balanced along with the prince's other resources, he need not worry about invaders who will not be attracted by the promise of easy wealth and indeed will be discouraged by a strong defensive army; nor need the prince fret about his people, who will be able to enjoy their own wealth and be less likely to revolt, all the while continuing to pay their taxes. Ultimately, for Botero it is not how

reputation as an early demographer, while, in the Counter-Reformation Prince, Bireley mentions that the Universal Relations, a work Botero began within a couple of years after the Reason of State, "contributed to the development of an early science of statistics."

p. 48.

Botero, Reason of State, Bk VII, ch x, p. 140-43. I have in the text given the short version of Botero's lengthy discussion on balancing wealth with the other resources of the state.
much the prince has that is important, but rather how much the prince has coming in.

Botero describes how exactly the prince will be able to know how much wealth should be held by taking his argument from the micro-world of state finance to the macro-world of international trade, that is, from how much the prince has coming in by taxes to how much the country has coming in by trade. He writes:

In order to know exactly how much he may put aside without harming his people a ruler must know in detail how much money leaves his state in payment for the merchandise which enters it, and how much is made or taken in payment for the goods which leave it, and to contrive that the sum laid aside is never greater than the excess of receipts over payments.  

Considering that the amount of tax revenue will be decided by how much the people draw on balance into the state by their industry and trade, Botero here proposes that the prince may take as much money as he needs for security and for his prestige as long as it doesn't exceed the state's balance of payments in relation to trade with other states, and, further, as long as the amount he collects is counterbalanced with the other resources of the state. One can assume from this that Botero would wish this balance to be as favourable as possible to the prince, allowing him the greatest chance of maintaining his state, which again is the object of the Reason of State as a whole. Indeed, the alternative is to have a negative balance of payments, in which case Botero admits that the prince should not even think about adding to his treasury, thereby diminishing his capacity to

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18 Ibid., Bk VII, ch. x, p. 142-43. This is found in the Roma 1590 edition: "Ma per sapere più sottilmente quel che si può mettere da banda senza danno notabile de' popoli, bisogna che l' Prencipe sappia minutamente la somma del denaro che esce dal suo Stato per le mercanzie che v'entrano, e quella che vi nasce o vi entra per le robbe che se n'estraggono; e far si che quello che si mette da banda non sia mai maggiore di quello in che l'entrata avanza l'uscita."
defend his state and his prestige, and ruining his subjects and himself. His only answer in this situation is for the prince to do everything possible to produce a positive balance of payments, best accomplished by encouraging industry, agriculture, and trade among his subjects.¹⁹

This discussion about favourable balance of payments and encouraging industry and trade in one's state brings to mind an idea which gained a great deal of currency in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, that of mercantilism. We must then ask the question: Was Botero an early mercantilist? First of all, what is a mercantilist? The mercantile system was proposed by those who wished to build their states in the ever increasingly accepted way of doing so, that is, by accumulating wealth. Now we must be careful, as prominent mercantilist scholar Eli Heckscher warns in his authoritative *Mercantilism*, that "there can be no question of the right or wrong use of the word [mercantilism], but only of its greater or less appropriateness."²⁰ He gives five types: mercantilism as an agent of unification, as a system of power, as a system of protection, as a monatary system, and as a conception of society. Heckscher's study is rather bloated and unsatisfying, considering especially that he claims mercantilism to have had an essential nature, but never really states what this is.²¹ However, we should be cautious

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¹⁹ Ibid., Bk VII, ch. x, p. 143.


²¹ Ibid, p. 21. He writes: "However, it was held for a long time that mercantilist policy... [represented] a fundamental outlook, uniform in essence, which was expressed in all its measures. But during the last fifty years the meaning of the term has in some respects undergone a change at the hands of historians, with the result that this uniformity
with Heckscher.\textsuperscript{22} He was a classical liberal, seeing mercantilism as bad policy, and may have had the end of mystifying it to such an extent that it ceased to exist as an historical concept. Charles Wilson presents an infinitely more satisfying definition in a pamphlet which is literally 1/14th the length of Heckscher's behemoth, and also titled \textit{Mercantilism}, in which he argues that mercantilist thinking always stressed the importance of the balance of payments, that the amount of wealth coming into the country should be more than that allowed to leave. He argues further that the essential nature of mercantilism, even though it was always directed in this way, had variations in the way in which a particular state went about ensuring this end.\textsuperscript{23} Of course different countries and thinkers would adopt different mercantilist means, only because there was a different conception of state depending on where one was looking. For example, although not entirely stable through the century, the idea of State in seventeenth century appears much more doubtful than was previously supposed.... To my mind, the uniformity does exist.... The proof of the accuracy of this assertion lies in the whole of the following exposition."

\textsuperscript{22} Charles Wilson, \textit{Mercantilism}. (London: The Historical Association,1958), p. 7. He writes that Heckscher was a "firm believer in classical economic theory, [and] he found it (one suspects) difficult to keep patience with those who saw any economic virtue in this system of wholesale interference with the economic process called mercantilism."

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 20. He writes: "The origins and methods of the mercantile programme differed from State to State, reflecting differences of social structure, national resources and characteristics, and the stage of economic and social development attained by different societies. If, for convenience, we think of England with its fairly equally balanced partnership of merchant and State official as the norm, the mercantilism of other European powers seems to diverge on either side of that norm. In the mercantile republics first of Italy and later of the Netherlands, economic policy leans towards private initiative and profit. In France, on the other hand, there is a stronger flavour of raison d'Etat than in England, while in Prussia all the imulse of change seems to come from above, powerfully directed towards the attainment of strategic strength."
England, which included both king and parliament (depending on the timing, of course), was far more inclusive than that of France, where the Sun King assumed the state completely. Thus, the English policies of mercantilism, as outlined by merchant-polemicists like Thomas Mun, included many more people independently involved in state wealth accumulation, "so the private gain may ever accompany the publique good." On the other hand, practitioners of mercantilism in France, like Jean-Baptiste Colbert, finance minister to Louis XIV, would use it to allow the Crown to take an active role in practically every aspect of commerce and trade, including, but not limited to, subsidizing and controlling industry, erecting high tariff walls, and cultivating a skilled labour force from a large population. Even though Botero conceives of a principality, his mercantilism directly benefits the people as much as the prince. Let us focus on how many of the above-mentioned policies—controlling industry, erecting tariffs, and promoting a workforce—Botero embraces in the *Reason of State*. This discussion of mercantilism will also act as a venue in which we may discuss Botero's ideas on that other important resource in the state, that is people.

Let us first look at how Botero deals with the mercantilist policy of the prince subsidizing and controlling trade. He makes it explicit that the prince should generally

24 Mun most certainly includes the merchants in this involvement in state wealth accumulation. In *England's Treasure by Forraign Trade* (Augustus M. Kelley, Publisher, New York, 1965, p.1), he states that "the Merchant is worthily called the steward of the Kingdoms Stock, by way of commerce with other nations; a work of no less Reputation than Trust, which ought to be performed with great skill and conscience, that so the private gain may ever accompany the publique good."
not do so.\textsuperscript{25} This reflects an aristocratic outlook on the nature of royalty, for Botero hints that trade and commerce, although important for the state as a whole, should really be left to the burgher class, calling it "ill-fitting" for a prince to engage in these things. That is, except in three situations, all of which are politically expedient. The first are the cases where no private citizen has sufficient resources to undertake a certain project. The second is when a private citizen may end up gaining too much wealth by the endeavor, thereby posing a direct threat to the prince. Finally, there are the cases where the general welfare of the state is concerned; in times of famine or other crises the prince should step in and redistribute grain or other needed goods. To illustrate these maxims respectively, Botero first gives the contemporary example of the Portuguese, who secured their overseas undertakings by the king's military support of their merchant ships. He goes on to mention the Venetians, who prevented any of their own citizens from becoming too rich in the spice trade. For the final policy, he offers a Biblical citation, quoting the charitable deeds of Solomon from Second Chronicles.\textsuperscript{26}

The second mercantilist policy, the putting up of tariff walls, is really quite central to the former Jesuit's tax program. He agrees that the prince should raise money

\textsuperscript{25}Botero, \textit{Reason of State}, Bk VIII, ch. xiv, p. 165. The paragraph to which this footnote refers is a paraphrasing of Botero's chapter on "Whether the King Should Engage in Commerce."

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., Bk VIII, ch. xiv, p. 165. Although this example of Solomon may seem to be supporting his policy of preventing subjects from rising too high from private commerce, Botero uses it to support his claim that princes should take part in commerce “for the good and well being of the state: in times of great famine and of their subjects’ need great rulers buy corn abroad and sell it to the great advantage of their people. And we may conclude this chapter by quoting the examples of Solomon, that most glorious king….”. However, the original passage from II Chronicles 9:21 seems to be referring only to Solomon’s great wealth, not his charity.
from taxes primarily, which of course includes taxes on goods either leaving or entering the country. He admits that the prince's own people should be subject to these taxes, but says that it is only fair that foreigners should pay rather more in tariffs.\(^ {27} \) This follows the mercantilist line that a favourable balance of trade is the only way for the state to acquire more wealth. It was held by the mercantilists that there was a fixed amount of money on earth, and that if one state wished to accumulate this wealth, it would do so at the expense of other states. In this way they seem to have mistakenly viewed money in the same way that they quite rightly viewed land, as something of which they could not make more.\(^ {28} \) This makes perfect sense, considering that money was in the form of gold and silver, which were both by their natures rare, and ultimately thought to be limited in the world.

Finally, the third policy, that of attracting and cultivating a skilled workforce, is one of the most important ideas in his text, and from it, we should also get a good idea of his thoughts on that above mentioned most important resource of the prince— the people. For Botero, the prince will acquire wealth only so far as he rules over an industrious

\(^ {27} \) Ibid., Bk VII, ch. iv, p. 136.

\(^ {28} \) That Botero thought in these terms is supported further by his claim that “a ruler must ensure that money does not leave his country unless this is quite essential. If considerable expense is entailed in obtaining something in his own dominion the money will at least remain within his country or will ultimately return to the exchequer by way of taxes and dues; whereas once money is sent out of the country it is lost and its potentialities are lost too.” (Reason of State, Bk VIII, ch. ii, p. 150) In the original: “Oltre di ciò, il Prencipe deve aver la mira che il denaro non esca del suo Stato senza necessità. Or, se in esso vi sono cose necessarie, sebben ricercano qualche spesa, è spesa che però resta nel paese o che a lungo andare, per via de’ dazi e di gabelle, ritorna al fisco; non così se il denaro esce una volta fuora, perché si perde e quello è ’l frutto che se ne cavarebbe.”
people, who by their talents can draw more money into the state. Notice, he does not say that they will produce more wealth in the state, for he does not seem to have a sense that money produces itself. Not only does Botero feel it important to draw skilled people into the country, but he stresses the importance of training one's own subjects, and establishing a secure enough commonwealth that they will not be compelled to leave.29 This is related to the previous mercantilist policy in that tariff walls, which were to be levied against foreign manufactures primarily, naturally promote the prince's own subjects to develop the raw goods themselves, thereby becoming skilled artisans.30 Botero asks the question: which is better for the building of wealth, natural resources or industry, and declares quite roundly that it is the latter, giving the example of France and

29 Ibid., Bk VIII, ch. iii, p. 153. He writes: "A prince, therefore, who wishes to make his cities populous must introduce every kind of industry and craft by attracting good workmen from other countries and providing them with accommodation and everything convenient for their craft, by encouraging new techniques and singular and rare works, and rewarding perfection and excellence." ("Deve dunque il Prencipe che vuol render popolosa la sua città introdurvi ogni sorte d'industria e d'artificio, il che farà e col condurre artefici eccellenti da' paesi altrui e dar loro ricapito e commodità conveniente, e col tener conto de' belli ingegni e stimare l'invenzioni e le opere che hanno del singolare o del raro, e col propor premi alla perfezione e all'eccellenza.") On the training of one's own population, he writes in Reason of State, Bk VIII, ch. iv, p. 156: "It is not sufficient, therefore, for a prince to encourage marriages and fertility if he does not also assist the rearing and upkeep of the young,... by helping... those who have not the means... to instruct their sons."

30 Ibid., Bk VIII, ch. iii, p. 153. He writes that the prince "must not permit raw materials, wool, silk, timber, metals and so on, to leave his state, for with the materials will go the craftsmen. Trade in goods made from these materials will provide a livelihood for a far larger number of people than will the raw materials." ("Ma sopra tutto è necessario che non comporti che si cavino fuor del suo Stato le materie crude, non lane, non sete, non legnami, non metalli, non altra cosa tale, perché con le materie se ne vano anco gli artefici, e del traffico della materia lavorata vive molto maggior numero di gente che della materia semplice.")
Italy, which... "have no mines of gold or silver, yet they possess more of these metals than any other country in Europe, for no other reason than the high density of their population and their trade and commerce which draws money from the furthest corners of the earth."\textsuperscript{31}

Indeed, as I have already stated, Botero believes that the prince's greatest resource is his people, "for upon them depend all his other resources."\textsuperscript{32} More people in the state produce more wealth and a larger army upon which Botero would have his ideal prince base his power in the realm and stand in relation to other rulers. It is with this relationship between the prince's need for people and the requirement that he compete with other states that we come to an apparent tension in Botero's overall thought. Going back to the beginning of the \textit{Reason of State}, we remember that Botero is interested more in the maintenance of the state over its foundation or expansion. He goes on to say in the opening chapters of Book I that the kind of state which will be most easily maintained is the medium-sized one, over the small or the large state, the small too easily falling prey to larger enemies and the large too easily coming to ruin by the weight of its own internal problems... "because riches increase with greatness and vices with riches, particularly luxury, arrogance, license and avarice, the root of all evil."\textsuperscript{33} To get an idea of what he

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, Bk VII, ch. xii, p. 145. In the original: "L'Italia e la Francia non hanno miniere d'oro, non d'argento, e nondimeno abbondano e dell'uno e dell'altro metallo sopra d'ogni altra Provincia d'Europa, non per altro che per l'inestimabile frequenza degli abitanti, che fanno venire il denaro per via di commercio e di trafico sino dalle ultime parti della terra."

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, Bk VII, ch. xi, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, Bk I, ch. vi., p. 7. For the original of this quote, see note 35.
means by these vaguely described sizes, we may look at his examples of the various kinds of states; Ragusa and Lucca are small states, and we can agree with Botero that they were at the mercy of their larger neighbors. He includes Venice, Milan, Flanders, and Bohemia in his definition of medium-sized states, each of which, excepting the last, is well known among moderate early modern states and held in high regard by their contemporaries. Botero gives only two examples of large states, and they are the two which he would describe as having the greatest mutual animosity, considering not only their respective sizes, but also their opposed sets of belief. Of course he means the dominions of the Catholic King and the Sultan, rulers of the Spaniards and the Turks, respectively. Now, granted, when Botero first mentions the variously-sized states, he does acknowledge that they are measured "not absolutely, but comparatively, and with respect to their neighbors." This does not change the fact that a continually growing state will eventually outstrip its neighbors in greatness and size, precipitating, according to Botero himself, its own downfall. 

So, how does Botero suppose the prince to maintain his medium-sized state,

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34 Ibid., Bk I, ch ii., pgs. 3-4

35 Ibid. Bk I ch. vi, p. 7. He writes: “Large states are envied and feared by their neighbors who often league together and united accomplish what one alone cannot do. But they are also more susceptible to the internal causes of ruin because riches increase with greatness and vices with riches, particularly luxury, arrogance, license and avarice, the root of all evil. States which have reached their peak through frugality have degenerated through opulence.” In the original: “Gli Stati grandi mettono in gelosia e in sospetto I vicini, il che spesse volte gl’induce a collegarsi insieme, e molti uniti fanno quello che non può far un solo. Ma sono anche più alle cause intrinseche delle rovine, perchè con la grandezza crescono le ricchezze e con questi I vizi, il lusso, la boria, la libidine, l’avariziaradice d’ogni male, e I Regni che la frugalità ha condotto al colmo sono mancati per l’opulenza.”
which is the subject of the *Reason of State*, while at the same time cultivating as large a population as possible to produce the wealth by which he will maintain security and prestige? It seems the kind of state Botero is arguing for could not but become a large dominion by the very advice he gives to maintain a medium one. Botero's ideal principality is one where expansion is almost inherent, although he himself does not seem to advocate this. Yet, while he argues that large states are disasters waiting to happen from their internal moral problems, he acknowledges that a state with a growing population has to expand. This he explains in the *Magnificence of Cities* in another of his formulas, what one may call the ratio of the virtues generative and nutritive.\(^3\) He claims that every city has a virtue generative and virtue nutritive, the former being humanity's rate of reproduction, which remains constant through time, and the latter reflecting the ability of the city or country to sustain its population, which will have a terminal point eventually. Various cities through time have gone through their period of development in which the virtue nutritive has not yet reached its full capacity, thereby allowing the population of the city to grow. However, when the virtue generative surpasses the nutritive of a particular city, the population peaks, and an unpleasant peak it is.\(^4\) The Romans began with 3300 men eligible for fighting in the time of Romulus, and grew to a total fighting population of 450,000, and, according to Botero, grew no further. The

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\(^4\) *Ibid.*, Bk III, ch ii, p. 278. He writes: "For the virtue nutritive of that city had no power to go further, so that in success of time the inhabitants, finding much want and less means to supply their lack of victual, either forbade to marry or, if they did marry, their children oppressed with penury, their parents affording them no relief, fled their own country and sought abroad for better fortune."
citizens began to suffer for lack of resources and found solace only in leaving the city for the colonies. And in his own time, he writes that the kingdoms of Europe have had to set sail to found colonies in the New World, given their lack of adequate resources at home. Therefore, when the virtue generative outstrips the nutritive of a city or a state, it is necessary that colonies be established to bear the run off of people.

This establishment of colonies seems to go against Botero's most basic political principle, that a state of moderate greatness is the most lasting. He makes arguments in favour of colonization which seem to be stepping out of the boundaries of his reason of state. However, the closer one looks, the more one sees just how sophisticated Botero’s view of moderate expansion was. For example, in the last chapter, Botero makes clear that no purely offensive military campaign can be justified; only the defense of the realm is allowable. The only problem is that Botero seems to give a broad meaning to the term defensive campaign, for it seems to include pre-emptive strikes in defense of the state. More than this, Botero includes the establishment of colonies as a defensive measure, each colony acting as a kind of buffer zone between the prince and his enemies. More directly related to population, Botero also claims colonies to be a good source of people, eloquently stating that "...as plants flourish and multiply to a greater degree when they

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38 Interestingly, Botero makes his argument for expansion in the last chapter of the last book of Reason of State, a choice which leads one to believe that he is in a sense counterbalancing the two contradictory notions of moderation, found in the first chapter of the first book, and expansion, found in his exhortation against the Turk.

39 Botero, Reason of State, Bk X, ch. ix, p. 221. He writes: "Defensive warfare has such absolute justification that offensive warfare is only justified by defense, and in no circumstances can offensive action be lawful for purposes of defense." ("È tanto giusta la guerra difensiva, che l'offensiva non può aver altra giustizia, che quella che riceve dalla difensiva.")
are taken out of the bed in which they are sown..." so too do people when relocated to a colony. The one proviso Botero has for the establishment of colonies is that they not be located too far from the mother country, thereby allowing its people to shed their allegiance to their prince and become self-governing. Here again he gives the example of Rome, which did not establish colonies outside Italy for the first six hundred years of her existence, and then only in a defensive way, at Carthage and Narbonne. Thus, in the defence of the state the prince may in fact make aggressive moves against his enemies and establish colonies to act as defensive shields and provide him with a rich source of subjects, whose labour and industry will further draw wealth into the state, and allow the prince to maintain security and prestige therein.

Unfortunately, Botero doesn't see the need to remedy this apparent paradox in his reason of state because perhaps he didn’t see it as such. Bireley goes a long way in clearing this up by reminding us that Botero was in fact thinking in terms of two different kinds of growth altogether. At the beginning of Book VII of the *Reason of State*, Botero claims that any "increase [to the prince's state] may be either intensive or extensive: to increase intensively improves your dominion, to increase extensively

\[41\] *Ibid.*, Bk VI, ch. iv, p. 121.
\[42\] *Ibid.*, Bk VI, ch. iv, p. 121.
\[43\] Bireley, *The Counter-Reformation Prince*, p.63-64. He writes that Botero “distinguishes further between the extensive, or quantitative, and intensive, or qualitative, enlargement of a state. The former was essentially its economic development, the latter its military preparedness.”
widens it, and without improvement extension does more harm than good." Bireley has simplified this by interpreting intensive expansion to mean improvement of the quality of the domain, while extensive is an improvement of the quantity. In the end, this does not guarantee that the prince's moderate state will remain a medium one forever, even in relation to other states, but then again, Botero is well apprised of the fact that the rise and fall of states is a universal truth. He writes: "The works of nature fail through two kinds of cause, intrinsic and extrinsic. We call intrinsic causes excess and corruption of the essential qualities, extrinsic causes fire, the sword, and other forms of violence. In the same way states come to ruin through internal or external causes...." In this quintessentially Aristotelian way, Botero characterizes the state as a natural entity, of which even the best are doomed to inevitable decline. This, Botero would of course argue, should not prevent our best princes from aspiring to maintain these moderate states for as long as possible.

The important point in all of this is that Botero was shifting the focus in the late sixteenth century from building political power on pure military might and the conquest of territory to building power on sound economic management of one's domain. Thus, Botero outlined a new way of ruling contemporary European states by considering them economic rather than mere political or military entities. This was a way of thinking that Machiavelli had not embraced, stating in the Prince that a ruler "must not have any other

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44 Botero, Reason of State, Bk VII, ch. i, p. 132.

45 Ibid., Bk I, ch. iv, p. 4. In the original: “Le opere della natura mancano per due sorti di cause, perché alcune sono intrinseche, altre estrinseche; intrinseche chiamo gli eccessi e le corruzioni delle prime qualità, estrinseche il ferro, il fuoco e le altre violenze. Al medesimo modo gli Stati rovinano per cause interne o esterne....”
object or any other thought, nor must he take anything as his profession but war, its institutions, and its discipline."  Boto, The Prince, from The Portable Machiavelli, newly translated and edited, and with a critical introduction, by Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa. (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 124. Remembering the fact that Machiavelli never discusses the finances of princes in any great detail, one can assume him not to have considered economics a part of military matters.

47 Botero, Reason of State, Bk X, ch. ix, p. 222. He writes that "Machiavelli cries out impiously against the Church, and yet utters not a word against the infidels."

48 Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, p. 69.
that Botero’s concept of state power was much broader than Machiavelli’s.49

While it is true Botero was both anti-Machiavellian and interested in economics, it is unlikely that Botero set out to find an effective antidote to Machiavelli’s ideas and then directly came up with economics. What of the various sources one can consider to have directly shaped Botero as an economic thinker? Most immediately, many historians have considered Jean Bodin, who was one of the most prominent thinkers of the latter sixteenth century, dealing with economic ideas in a way that nobody else was. And what of Botero's earlier influences, those Spanish Jesuits who set the tone, educational and otherwise, at the Roman College? The following chapters will first assess the extent to which the Spanish teachers at the Roman College created an intellectual climate of Aristotelean-Thomistic moral economy among the Jesuits which predisposed Botero to thinking along economic lines, and second, they will analyze how much of Botero's economic thought, informed by his Jesuit education, then further drew many of its details from the pages of Bodin's Six Books of the Republic.

49 Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, p. 64. He writes: “Men were more important than money [for Botero], as they were for Machiavelli. Whereas for Machiavelli ‘men’ were essentially soldiers, Botero included soldiers, but took ‘men’ to comprise the general population, which was the most fundamental resource of the state because it produced the state’s wealth, which in turn was the source of the prince’s treasure.
Now that we have a good understanding of Botero's general economic principles of state, it is necessary to explain why he came to consider them, since they seem so uncharacteristic of sixteenth century thought. Again, scholars have given Botero's reading of Jean Bodin certain pride of place as an influence on the former's economic ideas. However, before we can go into detail on how Bodin's economic ideas were used by Botero, we must first show how the latter would have been receptive to them in the first place. This chapter will focus on Botero's general exposure to economic ideas from his early education at the Jesuit College in Rome. As a launching point for this excursion, this chapter will first describe the theory of natural law that had become prominent in the sixteenth century among neo-Thomist theologians, many of whom would teach at the Jesuit College in Rome immediately following its foundation in 1551, and would carry the ideas of natural law through Botero's generation, and even beyond. This chapter will focus on the development of scholastic natural law theory, and its economic and political extensions, in the thought of various theologians through the century, and how Botero, along with a number of his Jesuit contemporaries, seems to have embraced it. Quentin Skinner writes in his preface to the Foundations of Modern Political Thought that his own approach to the study of political thinkers in the early modern period is to focus "on the more general social and intellectual matrix out of which their works arose."¹ That is what this chapter proposes to do towards the understanding of Botero's political and economic

¹ Skinner, Foundations I, preface, p. x.
thought, to place him in his proper ideological context among the Thomist scholastics of the Jesuit colleges. Robert Bireley’s article *Scholasticism and ‘Reason of State’* has brought Botero into the context of the sixteenth century Thomists in a general way, stating that, like the Thomists, thinkers on reason of state like Botero saw advantages in the prince promoting material welfare among his subjects. “Botero stands out as an early mercantilist, and he elaborated a complete program of economic development for the aspiring state.” However, Bireley does not go into particular detail on the connection of Botero’s economic ideas with the Thomist tradition of the sixteenth century. The Thomists’ thoughts on natural law contained a number of features, political and economic justice among them, which we should remember in studying Botero's thought, and more particularly in understanding how Botero received the ideas of Bodin's *Six Books of the Republic*.

The sixteenth century enjoyed a revival of Thomism among theologians at Paris, who elaborated on a number of the Aquinas’ ideas, most especially those concerning natural law. In the *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas Aquinas outlines three different kinds of law: Divine or eternal, natural, and human. Divine law was that known and practiced

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3 Ibid, p. 85. He writes: “My purpose in this paper is to show the relationship between contemporary Scholasticism and “good” reason of state. Its protagonists [including Botero, Pedro Ribadeneira, and Diego Saavedra Faajardo] shared the fundamental principles of the Scholastics, often simply assuming them.” This statement helps my case quite a bit, except for certain things Bireley has to say on the role of popular consent in government (see discussion below, pgs 64-65).

4 St. Thomas Aquinas, Questions 91-97, *Summa Theologica*, in William J. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, eds., *On Law, Morality, and Politics* (Indianapolis:
by God himself, samples of which had been revealed to man in the Old and New Testaments. This immutable law related to all that God had created, and it was the tool by which justice would reign supreme in the universe. Natural law was a necessary part of this eternal law; it is in a sense, the degree to which temporal creatures could appreciate the divine law through reason. Natural law is just as unchangeable as the divine law; it is only its rational appreciation that may be altered, either improved by greater understanding or enfeebled by particular passions. Human law, ideally, should emanate from natural law, which is itself descended from the eternal law. All too often, however, this is not the case, as tyrants, in making laws to suit their own particular purposes, contravene the greater good which the divine and natural laws are designed to ensure. So, when the question is posed, as it so often would be in the sixteenth century, of how one must reconcile the human laws by which men are to live justly in society with divine law by which God has ordered the just universe, the rational inquiry into natural law presented itself as the best way to go about providing the answer.

Aquinas outlines how natural law accounts for both man's economic rights and political associations. First, natural law necessarily includes economic rights and obligations on a moral basis, as a part of a larger concept of individual rights. According to natural law, each individual has the right to secure his own life, and, necessarily, those goods which allow him to do so. Aquinas writes, regarding the use of external things, that "man has a natural dominion over external things because, by his reason and will, he is

Hackett Publishing, 1988), ch. 2. Hereafter cited as "Aquinas". Skinner also gives a concise rendering of the appreciation of these Thomistic ideas on law in the sixteenth century, making a small distinction between eternal law and divine law, the former being God's immutable law, and the latter being that which He revealed to humanity in the Scriptures, (p. 148). Many theologians often connected the two.
able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account, for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect.”

Sixteenth century Spanish Dominicans, such as Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto, would deal with economic ideas in this moral sense after the New World had its treasure gutted by the aggressive campaigns of the conquistadors, shipping the gold and silver back to Spain to make its merchants some of the richest in Europe, only for a time. This immense new wealth brought the need for moral guidance from the theologians against the worldly indulgences now so readily embraced. More than this, they argued that it was not in accordance with natural law that the property of the natives should be taken by Europeans; even though they were pagans, as rational creatures, the Natives had all the property rights included in natural law. Skinner recounts the arguments among theologians on the natives’ rights to their property, which followed the precepts of natural law. Inspired by the problems these both presented to the Spanish soul, these theologians sought to establish that the rights of both individuals and peoples should be protected by adherence to moral economic obligations, the basis of which was the rational appreciation of natural law.

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5 Ibid., p. 177.

6 Skinner, Foundations II, p. 142. He writes of a major theological debate of the 1540’s: “His thesis [that of Juan Gines de Sepulveda, who argued that the Natives, not being Christian, were in fact out of God’s favour, and had no part in natural political or property rights] was somewhat difficult for the orthodox Jesuit and Dominican theorists to oppose, since it was based on the Politics of Aristotle, an authority which they naturally held in the highest reverence. Nevertheless, they clearly regarded it as essential to repudiate Sepulveda’s way of defending the ethics of Empire. They evidently felt some concern about the heretical overtones of the argument, especially its reliance on the quasi-Lutheran contention that any genuine political society must be founded in godliness.” So, not only did they have immediate motive of combating heresy, it was only natural that they argued against such an obvious contravention of natural law. It
Another feature of natural law developed by Aquinas was the idea of conferral of political authority: as communities form by the common reason of their constituent parts (i.e.: the people), they gradually confer authority on a ruler. Aquinas establishes this in his Letter to the King of Cypress (sic). As it is necessary that people live together in community, with the end of fulfilling their physical and spiritual needs, he states that "the rule of one man is unqualifiedly the best" for directing the people towards the rational appreciation of the common good by the creation of human laws in accord with natural law. However, this king may easily turn into a tyrant, so "it is necessary that whoever is elevated to the rank of king, by those responsible for doing so, have the kind of character that makes it unlikely that he would stoop to tyranny." Aquinas is here implicitly stating that it is the people who will confer the kingship on a single man. Natural law facilitates this conferral because, as each individual holds certain rights of self-determination, people having come together in community must transfer these rights to another by their rational understanding of the common good according to natural law. This king will then be the best person to further the understanding of the greater good in society. This conferral is both positive and negative for Aquinas. He writes: "if by right a certain community is entitled to provide itself with a king, it is not unjust that the installed king be deposed by that same community or that his power be curtailed, if the royal power is abused tyrannically." Although Aquinas does not develop this idea much further, his

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7 Aquinas, p. 267.
8 Ibid., p. 269.
later adherents would bring it to bear in the sixteenth century.\footnote{Skinner, Foundations II, p. 154. He writes: “In stressing the inherent capacity of men to apprehend the law of nature, the main polemical aim of the Thomists was to repudiate the heretical suggestion that the establishment of political society is directly ordained by God. They wished on the contrary to be able to claim that that all secular commonwealths must originally have been set up by their own citizens as a means of fulfilling their purely mundane ends.” With regard to the right of revolt against ungodly princes, Skinner claims that a number of sixteenth-century Thomists- Vitoria, De Soto, Molina, and Suarez among them- saw this as nothing but heresy, (p. 140). However, they make the distinction, between ‘tyrants’ and ‘ungodly princes’ considering the former a just target of revolt and the latter an excuse of the Lutherans to revolt against Catholic Kings.}

Let us now proceed to discuss Aquinas' most active adherents in the early sixteenth century, most notably the Spanish theologians Francisco de Vitoria (d. 1546) and Domingo de Soto (1495-1560). It was these two Dominicans who set the theological stage at the schools of Salamanca and Alcalà, from which the Jesuit College in Rome would draw a number of its first teachers and administrators, men such as Diego Ledesma, Francisco Toledo (b. 1532), and Juan Mariana (b. 1537).\footnote{James Brodrick, The Progress of the Jesuits. (London: Longman's, Green and Co., 1946), p. 66-67. Also see O'Malley, John, W., The First Jesuits. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, p. 249. He writes: "When Francisco Toledo began teaching at the Collegio Romano in 1559, he brought with him from the University of Salamanca the tradition of the brilliant revival of Aquinas initiated there earlier in the century by Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, and others."} We begin with the founder of the tradition, that is Vitoria. He was schooled at the University of Paris from about 1507, and eventually came to teach there until his return to Spain in 1523.\footnote{Bernice Hamilton, Political Thought in Sixteenth Century Spain. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 171-76. Unless otherwise noted, the biographical material on Francisco Vitoria is from this biographical appendix in Hamilton. Hereafter cited as "Hamilton".} Within three years, he would be appointed to the Chair of Theology at Salamanca. He had been trying to bring Aquinas to bear on basic moral questions while still at Paris, which meant
looking at the moral world at the human level (natural law) as a means of understanding those moral constants (divine law) laid out by the Grand Artificer. Dismayed at the reports coming in from the New World on the treatment of the native peoples there, he soon began developing theories based on Thomistic natural law which would explain that the native peoples were not naturally damned by their pagan situation; even though they did not know the Christian God, they were still privy to the rights contained in natural law. He argued that they, like any other of God's creatures, should benefit also from the Golden Rule, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you".\textsuperscript{12} For Vitoria, this was a universal maxim, applicable to all humanity: each of us has a natural instinct for self-preservation, and the natural rights, both political and economic, connected to this. He also argued that we always seek what is good. The only problem is that we each have a different estimation of "the good", a condition which creates natural problems. Fortunately, as another feature of natural law, each of us is also naturally endowed with reason by which we may build a common estimation of the good, and eventually come together in communities. This holds even for the pagan natives of the New World. He writes that they do indeed possess reason "because there is some method in their arrangements; they have organized communities, they certainly have marriages and magistrates, overlords, laws, workshops and a system of exchange, which all demand the use of reason…, What is more, they are in agreement on points which are self-evident to others, which proves that they use their reason."\textsuperscript{13} As in the case of all human

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\textsuperscript{12} Hamilton, p. 12.
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communities, these natives further transfer their God-given rights to a ruler in some form or another, who, if violating its commitment to rule in the best interests of the community, can be resisted.  

Vitoria's most prominent pupil, Domingo de Soto, first came under the wing of his master at the University of Paris in the late 1510's. He was attracted to the arguments of morality presented by Vitoria's lectures on Aquinas. Vitoria had argued that natural law had two aspects. The first relates to the immutable truths of the universe which are both decided by God and self-evident to humans. As an example of this, Vitoria presents it as given that a triangle has three sides by its very nature; if a shape doesn’t have three sides, it is not a triangle. The second aspect is that certain things are accepted by people as necessities, like the duty of a father to raise a child. However, this is not self-evident. The features of the first aspect of natural law simply exist, while those of the second are dependent upon people's rational understanding of them. For Vitoria, both kinds of knowledge, self-evident and reasoned, are an inherent part of natural law. De Soto follows this line. He took these ideas to the university at Alcalà in 1520, circulating

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Hamilton, pgs 176-80. Unless specified, details of De Soto's life are taken from Hamilton's biographical appendix.

Ibid., pgs. 12-13. She directly quotes a source of Vitoria, without giving the specific reference.

Ibid., pgs. 12-13.

Ibid., pgs.13-14. She quotes De Soto's *De justitia et iure*, bk i, qu. ii, art. 3.
them among the students there for the next four years. He then moved on to the University of Salamanca in 1525, where he was joined by his mentor in the following year. Together, the two of them would set the stage for how Spanish theology would develop over the next few decades, and not only in Spain.

From these foundational precepts of natural law, both theologians would go forward not only to deal with purely moral matters, but also matters related to economic morality, with the end of establishing the just community. As the Spanish community seemed to be threatened spiritually by the influx of riches from the New World, Vitoria and De Soto directed their theology to economic concerns, which shows how economics was an inherent extension of natural law theory. Following Aquinas, they argued that if everyone has the natural right of self-preservation, then each is also guaranteed ways of securing life, and this meant personal private property, like food, clothing, and shelter, as well as money used to acquire these things. These economic concerns were brought together with the Golden Rule by Vitoria to attack usury, the means by which many secure the goods of their fellows, thereby lessening their capacity to preserve themselves, and reducing the degree to which members of the community can rationally appreciate ‘the good.’ In addition to this, Vitoria was consulted by theologians at Paris in 1532 on behalf of Spanish merchants trading in Antwerp as to the "just price." His reply was apparently not that revealing, but this request led to him developing ideas on the market value theory, which held that those goods which were not priced by regal decree should

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be valued according to the amount the buyer was prepared to pay. He even made mention of luxury items, allowing that they could be overpriced, based on one's desire and means to acquire them. De Soto agreed with this in essence, but added that labour and risk should also be involved when merchants set their prices. These were important questions to the new merchants of Spain, and they led to a new genre of theological discourse in the 1540's, the "soul saving" merchant manual on economic morality. These economic issues were readily taken up by their associates and pupils. Bernice Hamilton has estimated that that some 5,000 students passed through Vitoria's lecture hall at Salamanca between 1526 and his death in 1546, and that dozens of his disciples went on to teach at both Salamanca and Alcalá. One can assume similar statistics for De Soto, who taught off and on at Salamanca from 1525 to his death in 1560. For the most part, at least as far as the just price was concerned, these generations of Spanish theologians agreed that the market was to be the deciding factor in setting prices on the grounds that if merchants were to be allowed to set their own prices arbitrarily, then they would be diminishing the rights of individuals to acquire their material necessities by forcing them to spend too much on them at the expense of acquiring other necessities and preserving their lives with such, thereby contravening the precepts of natural law.

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21 Salamanca, p. 4. The author writes: "From about 1540 onwards there appeared a whole crop of handbooks, written mostly by learned friars, which paint a vivid picture of the business life of the times. Their authors vie with one another in offering the merchant the perfect guide for the salvation of his soul...."

22 Hamilton, p. 175.

23 The rationale behind preventing merchants to set "creative prices" was that
Thus, following principles of natural law on a purely moral basis naturally led to dealing with economic issues. As we shall see, many of these theologians, predisposed to linking the moral with the political, would go forward to present economic principles to be followed by princes and states, and lay the groundwork for theories of political economy to take shape. In the political realm, Vitoria himself dealt with the issue of the just war, finally deciding that the king, having been given power by his subjects, may only go to war in their interest. De Soto as well deals with the nature of ruler and ruled, quoting Aristotle, but refuting the claim that those naturally disposed to ruling should expect others to be their servants. Indeed, he argues, the real obligation is quite mutual; for rulers it is to rule justly on behalf of their subjects, and for subjects, not to be unruly. This illustrates how Vitoria and De Soto were interested in political matters which depended on the natural law precept that the king is merely to administer justice to his merchants may be inclined to using the "labour" that went into a thing as a dishonest means of raising prices, claiming that much more labour had gone into it than really had. For these theologians, the market, i.e.: the buyers’ willingness to pay, should be the deciding factor for the "just price". Grice-Hutchinson supports this (Economic Thought, p. 101), writing that "the same ideas on value and price are expressed in most of the late scholastic treatises I have read. Some authors deny that the cost of production should be allowed any part in the determination of price, others allow that it may be taken into account, but it generally agreed that the most important factors to be considered in assessing the 'natural' or uncontrolled price of a commodity are the 'estimation' in which that commodity is commonly held (such estimation reflecting the utility of the thing in question), and the forces of supply and demand."

24 Ibid., p. 142.

25 Ibid., p. 60. She quotes De Soto from De justitia et jure: "...you may argue that there seems to be no need for greater virtue in the prince who acts than in the citizen who obeys.... We answer that the two cases are not on par; as the prince has to make laws concerning every virtue... how, if he himself is not temperate and just and strong, can he properly command such virtues?... It is sufficient for the strength of the community if the prince possess every virtue and the citizens obey him well."
subjects. In the realm of economics, Vitoria argued that civil laws are to promote civic virtues, and that the most important of these laws relate to taxation and the export of money.\textsuperscript{26} To avoid taxes, or to export money, were to be considered grave offences because both compromised the proper functioning of the state, and all political and moral life would therefore suffer. Likewise, De Soto's 1553 work entitled \textit{De justitia et jure} dealt with a variety of economic issues related to the proper functioning of the state. However, it is important to remember that neither Vitoria nor De Soto actually placed economic powers in the hands of the state in an absolutist mercantilist fashion, preferring to conceive of a more freely flowing economic life among the subjects, with all the moral responsibilities incumbent upon such a life. The shift from moral economy to the realm of political economy would be more soundly executed by the next few generations of theologians exposed to the thought of Vitoria and De Soto, which would include a number of Jesuits.

Ignatius, the general of these "soldiers of Christ," would have been exposed in a general way to the neo-Thomist ideas first at Alcalà (from 1526-28, following De Soto's four years there from 1520-24) and then at the University of Paris (from 1528-35, following Vitoria's stay there from 1507-1526). Jesuit historian John O'Malley hints that young Ignatius, "while in Paris..., attended lectures on Aquinas by the Dominicans at the convent of St. Jacques...."\textsuperscript{27} If true, this makes that essential link between Vitoria and the

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{27} O'Malley, p. 28. He slyly reads Ignatius' Autobiography in arriving at this "hint", saying that the pages on his years in Paris "are remarkable more for what they do not recount than for what they do.... They do not tell us, for instance, that while in Paris he attended lectures on Aquinas...." Unfortunately, O'Malley never indicates where there are pages which do tell that Ignatius attended these lectures.
Jesuits, for it was at St Jacques that Vitoria had taught only a few years before. Diego Ledesma spent time at both Alcalà and Paris around the same time as Ignatius, while Francis Xavier and Diego Lainez joined them only in Paris, and Jerome Nadal, although a fellow student at Paris, came aboard later at Messina. Of course, Ignatius' writings are not works of political philosophy or even theology, and, although O'Malley claims that Lainez wrote a work on usury, the others produced no literature beyond foundational documents for the Jesuit Society. So, how does one make the link? Paul F. Grendler might be inclined to connect Vitoria and Ignatius. Although not linking these two specifically, Grendler associates the *modus Parisiensis* with the Jesuit style of instruction, or *ratio studiorum*, stating that Ignatius "and the early Jesuit schoolmasters frequently cited with approval the style and order of Paris." Grendler then goes on to conclude that both these methods of instruction imitated the Italian humanist program of education. This is important because Vitoria is said to have embraced Renaissance humanism at

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28 Hamilton, p. 176.

29 O’Malley, p. 12.

30 O’Malley, p. 150. O'Malley does not seem to have a source for this. He cites Noonan's *Scholastic Analysis of Usury* in a note (p. 239), and Lainez' name is mentioned with regard to usury in that text, but there is no evidence here of a published work on the subject. Brodrick may clear this up. In *The Progress of the Jesuits* (p. 70), he writes that Lainez composed a theological compendium which has been lost to history. This compendium may have included a section on usury.

31 Grendler, p. 377. He writes: "The term [modus et ordo Parisiensis] signified to them [the Jesuits] (1) a solid foundation in classical Latin grammar; (2) concentration on Cicero and Vergil more than any other authors; (3) emphasis on speaking Latin; (4) repetition, constant review, memorization, disputation, and composition exercises; and (5) an orderly, somewhat rigid progression of studies." And further: "The close resemblance between the Italian *studia humanitatis*, the *modus Parisiensis*, and the Jesuit syllabus is obvious."
This is one more similarity linking Vitoria with the Parisian pupils who would go forward in founding the Jesuit Colleges in the middle of the sixteenth century. Remember, if there is one thing the Jesuits are known for, it is having fused the two pedagogical strains of humanism and scholasticism in their schools in a more concentrated way than anywhere else, applying humanist techniques to scholastic problems. The neo-Thomism we find running through these generations is in the style of Vitoria and De Soto, and would not only have predisposed the Jesuits to considering economic questions in light of their moral repercussions, but also to filling their growing system of secondary schools with like-minded theologians and philosophers.

It was entrusted to Diego Ledesma to organize the staff and set the curriculum in the Jesuit Roman College in the 1550’s. To this end, he brought in a number of teachers not only from his former Alcalà but also from the university at Salamanca. Included were Francisco Toledo in 1559, who came first to teach philosophy after holding the same position at Salamanca, and then "moved on to teach physics, metaphysics, cases of conscience, and scholastic theology." Juan de Mariana spent the better part of the fifties at Alcalà, possibly under De Soto, and arrived in Rome to teach

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32 Hamilton, p. 171-72. She writes: "He [Vitoria] was also deeply influenced by Renaissance Humanism, and plunged into a study of classics and of languages, paying great attention to literary form and to accuracy of sources."

33 Brodrick, p. 66-67. Brodrick is the only source on this. There is nothing in either Grendler or O’Malley on Ledesma’s administrative position.

34 The direct quote is from O’Malley, p. 233. It is Brodrick who gives the particulars on how Toledo initially came to the Roman College, p. 67.
moral philosophy and theology in 1561, the year after Botero arrived there. According to James Brodrick, historian of the Jesuits, Mariana was "destined to become one of the classical historians of his native land, an expert in economic problems, and an absolute torment to his long-suffering order." This last part is a reference to his calls for tyrannicide in the 1590's, allowing people to violently depose their rulers who did not fulfill their duties as rulers vis-à-vis private and spiritual necessity, following the line of natural law to the extreme. His work, De rege et institutione regis, although not conceived until long after his tenure at the Roman College, deals with economic features of the state in a mode resembling that of Botero, promoting regular taxation, encouraging industry and commerce, and stressing bullionist protectionism to win the ‘zero-sum game’ of international state finance. To have produced a work of political economy so thoroughly erudite and well-organized would have taken a number of years of imbibing and considering the issues involved; Mariana had most assuredly been doing so since his early years as possible student under De Soto and possible teacher of Botero.

One cannot over-emphasize the highly regimented and uniform nature of the Jesuit colleges under Ledesma's stewardship, which was itself greatly informed by Ignatius' Constitutions. O'Malley writes that in the "Fourth Part of the Constitutions, directives were given on the order of teaching the disciplines, the techniques for teaching

36 Ibid., p. 67.
37 Gunther Lewy, Constitutionalism and Statecraft During the Golden Age of Spain: A Study of the Political Philosophy of Juan de Mariana, S.J. (Geneve: Librarie Droz, 1960), p. 107. ‘Zero-sum game’ refers to the idea of limited quantity of things, in this case gold. Economic historians have characterized early modern attitudes on gold as a ‘zero-sum game’ as a way to describe fact that when states competed for wealth, some necessarily ended up in winning positions and others in losing positions.
them, the texts to be used, the degrees to be conferred, the moral and spiritual values to be inculcated, and the duties to be fulfilled by the officials in charge of the institutions.”

Surely not all of these were able to be followed at every college in the early years, but such regimentation was reached at least at the Roman College, with progress to be made across the entire Jesuit college system in the following years. More than this, O'Malley recounts the Jesuit population at the Roman College to be not more than 150 in the years that Botero was there, indicating that, in addition to the tightly controlled curriculum, the social life of both Jesuit priests and novices was rather exclusive. The point is that Botero would have been familiar with many of the above-mentioned figures, some perhaps even personally, and been taught to address the same problems in the same ways.

Although during his stay at the Roman College Botero would have studied only the


39 Ibid., p. 216ff. He writes: “In these early days the outstanding example of a school that did more than teach the lower disciplines was the Collegio Romano, which within a few years of its inception [1551] taught the full curriculum described in the Constitutions and was, in effect, a ‘university.’ This meant, however, that it also taught the ‘lower disciplines.’ The two stages beyond ‘humane letters’ taught at the Collegio Romano, the Gregorian University, were ‘arts,’ or ‘philosophy’—logic, metaphysics, ethics, mathematics, and physics, according to the text of Aristotle for the most part—and, finally, theology, considered the apex of the curriculum.”

40 Ibid., p. 54. He writes: “By 1555, for instance, there were 180 [Jesuits] or more at the three major institutions [in Rome]- 112 in the Collegio Romano (faculty and students), a few at the Collegio Germanico, and the rest at the casa professa, of whom a large number were novices who had just entered the order. By 1565 there was close to 300- about 143 in the Romano, 30 in the Germanico, 94 in the casa (including 30 novices), and 14 in the newly founded Seminario Romano.” O’Malley says further on the sense of community among the Jesuits: “By 1563 the Collegio Romano was the international meeting place for Jesuit priests and scholastics from all of Europe, and the Collegio’s particular adaptation of the confraternity to young students began to be diffused to other Jesuits schools and eventually became an integral part of the education offered in them,” p. 198.
‘lower disciplines’- grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy, O'Malley claims there was some Christian Doctrine and casuistry taught to the lower levels.\textsuperscript{41} This would have given him at least some exposure to the theological questions of the day in this formidable educational environment from his first year at Rome. Thus, he was most certainly of this social and intellectual matrix.

Having come out of this first generation of Jesuit education, rooted in the theological tradition begun by Vitoria and Soto, Botero had an understanding of political power which could only have been rooted in Thomistic natural law. He conceived of the prince as politically almost completely dependent on his subjects, and never tires of maintaining that the prince is invested with authority by his people. Bireley disagrees with this, stating that the “writers on reason of state showed little interest in the issue of government’s origin in consent or in the forms of government. Botero presupposed an absolute principality and did not discuss the issue further.”\textsuperscript{42} However, Botero does discuss the origin of government in consent. He writes in the \textit{Reason of State}: "There is no doubt that in earliest times men were moved to create kings and to place themselves under the rule and leadership of others..."\textsuperscript{43} This follows the Thomistic line that as each

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\item \textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}, 218.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Bireley, “Scholasticism and ‘Reason of State’,” p. 92. Bireley does confirm on the page before, however, that the scholastics agreed consent to be “at the root of political authority. To be sure, authority came ultimately from God, who created man in such a way that by his very nature he needed to live in a community, and this community required an authority endowed with the power to direct it properly. Authority rested first with the community, which then determined both the form of government and the holders of governmental power through its voice and consent.”
\item \textsuperscript{43} Botero, \textit{Reason of State}, Bk I, ch. viii, p. 12. Botero elaborates on this idea in Bk I, ch. ii, p. 3. He writes of natural and acquired dominion, saying that by "natural we mean dominion where those who rule do so by the will of their subjects” (“\textit{Naturali chiamo quelli de' quali siamo padroni di volonta de' sudditi,...}”) and in the case of
individual has certain natural rights of person and property, and as these same individuals come together into political community by means of ratiocination, they further transfer authority to a prince for purposes of security, making the conferral of power, from God through the people to the ruler, complete. God begins by giving power to his reasoning creatures, and they go on to give political authority to their prince. His power is ultimately derived from God, but directly dependent on the people, who may take back the conferred authority and revolt against their prince in the event that the prince has failed to uphold the natural law. Botero writes: "The only circumstance that releases the subject from due obedience to his prince is contravention of the natural or divine law; and even then he may have recourse to open revolt only after all else has failed." This general idea was the political doctrine espoused by a number of other prominent Jesuits in the latter part of the century, including their spokesman, Robert Bellarmine, who nonetheless stressed that the people first need the approval of the Pope in order to depose their king on the grounds that the king is challenging their ability to sooth their souls through God. Botero goes further than this, moving closer to his contemporary and

unnatural or acquired dominion, "the greater the resistance offered to the acquisition the worse will be the quality of the dominion ("E la qualita loro è tanto peggioire, quanto maggior resistenza vi fu nell'acquisti"). Also in Bk I, ch. xiv, page 17, he says: "A people must bestow upon their ruler such powers as are necessary for him to maintain law among them and to defend them against the violence of their enemies."

Botero, Reason of State, Bk II, ch. 16, p. 66. He writes: "E non e cosa alcuna nella quale disoblighi il suddito dall'obbedienza debita al Prencipe, se non e contra la legge della natura o di Dio: e in questi case vuole che si faccia ogni cosa, prima che si venga a rottura manifesta,..."

J.W. Allen, Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1957), p. 358 (hereafter cited as “Allen”). He writes of Bellarmine's thoughts on secular and ecclesiastical power: "The Pope has no power to make law or abrogate law concerned with earthly or bodily welfare. But he has, and by reason of his position, must
possible former teacher, Juan Mariana, who argued that it is in the absolute authority of
the people to depose their king.\textsuperscript{46} Although Botero would probably not go as far as
Mariana with the individual's right of regicide, both deny that the people need a special
divine sanction from the Pope, because, as they interpreted natural law, the people
already have it.

Even though Bellarmine does not deal with economic concerns in his
controversies, he nevertheless, as a contemporary of Botero, conforms to the same basic
doctrine of natural law in the political realm. In the section of his \textit{Controversies, De
laicis}, he makes clear the source of political authority, writing that "power belongs to the
collected body... by the same natural law, this power is delegated by the multitude to one
or several, for the State cannot of itself exercise this power...."\textsuperscript{47} His lack of emphasis on
economic policy in the state does not detract from the claim that others among the first
few generations of Jesuit thinkers were predisposed to economic thinking. Bellarmine
never wrote a work of political economy as Botero did, for his concern was with
relationship between spiritual and temporal authority, a different focus altogether.

\textsuperscript{46} Allen, p. 262-63. On Mariana's political sense, Allen writes: "He put it, therefore,
that the authority of any Prince must be held to originate in a grant made by the
community and that this grant cannot rationally be conceived as having been
unconditional." And further, "He proceeded to draw the conclusion, that if the Prince
overstep the limits of his authority, he may rightfully be restrained by force, warred upon
and deposed and killed."

\textsuperscript{47} Robert Bellarmine, \textit{De laicis, or The Treatise on Civil Government}. Kathleen E.
Botero had, on the other hand, a number of other Jesuit contemporaries who dealt with economic affairs in their texts, and even though they were not all educated at the Roman College, they did imbibe the same sources and methods for appreciating natural law and its political and economic implications that the Jesuit college system, centred in Rome, specialized in. To further show the ideological matrix of which Botero was a part, we will here focus on four of these contemporaries, the Spaniards Pedro Ribadeneira (1526-1611), Luis Molina (1535-1600), and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), and the Belgian Leonard Lessius (1554-1623).

Pedro Ribadeneira was reared under the Jesuit program from an early age and went on to write a work of political philosophy presenting a number of economic policies. Born in Toledo, he arrived in Rome in 1539 in the service of a Cardinal, and found himself in the following year under the wing of Ignatius himself. He soon after entered the Jesuits and became a priest in 1553. After spending the late fifties in the Netherlands and England, he went to Italy to administer various Jesuit colleges until 1574, when, due to poor health, he returned to Spain, devoting himself to writing until his death in 1611. Ribadeneira's main motive in writing his Christian Prince of 1595 was the promotion of religion and piety in the state as the first duty of the prince. As a prominent feature of his thoughts on justice in the state, he, like Botero, discusses economic policy. Although his economic program is not as detailed as Botero's, he stresses taxation, commerce, and proper management of state revenue. There are distinct

48 Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, p. 111. Most of the biographical information on Pedro Ribadeneira is taken from Bireley's chapter on him.

49 Ibid., p. 119
differences, however. Ribadeneira requires taxation to have a greater basis in the consent of the people, echoing Bodin, whom he is sure to have read. It is not clear that he is taking this directly from Bodin, however, given Bireley's assertion that he "inclined to the older tradition, very much at home in the Spanish kingdom, which required consent." It may have been more complicated than this, however, in that he was responding to that natural law imperative that the prince must answer to the people, and connecting this to direct consent of the people following the Spanish tradition. Another difference is Ribadeneira's lack of stress on the promotion of industry, preferring agriculture.

However, as Botero himself points out, the Spanish Crown had done little in the way of promoting agriculture in the kingdom, preferring by the late sixteenth century to focus on conquest and precious metals. Perhaps Ribadeneira, cued by Botero, was trying to fill out this section of Spain's underdeveloped economy.

Ribadeira's *Christian Prince* is a perfect example of a Jesuit political work dealing with princely rules of conduct while taking economic matters into close view. Considering that he wrote this work six years after Botero's *Reason of State* arrived on the scene, one must wonder if he were inspired directly by it. However, like Mariana, he certainly would have been thinking along such lines over the period of years. Having studied at the Roman College about a decade earlier than Botero, he would not have been exposed to moral economy under the same teachers, but, if he were inspired to thinking along these lines at this early stage, then his presence there in the fifties supports the

\[50\] Ibid., p. 128
\[51\] Ibid., p. 129.
claim that economic concerns, originating in the moral theology of Vitoria and De Soto, were already a focus of those who founded the Jesuits and their schools through the forties and fifties after studying in Vitoria's Paris, namely Ignatius, Lainez, and Ledesma.

Luis Molina seems to have been given a double dosage of economic morality under his lecturers after arriving at Salamanca in 1547, the year after Vitoria's death, where he spent a year of study, and then after moving on to Alcalá, where he continued until his formal entrance into the Jesuit Society in 1553. Indeed, at Salamanca he may even have attended the lectures of Domingo De Soto. By the 1550's, the University of Alcalá had become closely associated with the newly founded Jesuit College there, and he surely would have been further exposed to the moral economy which was now emanating from the Roman College. He spent the better part of his life not in Spain, however, but in Portugal, lecturing at the universities in Coimbra and Evora, and writing works which not only deal with the same themes that Vitoria and De Soto did, but also actually borrowing De Soto's title, *De justitia et jure*, a work which Molina based on his lectures from as early as the late seventies, but did not begin to publish until 1593. This roughly fifteen year interval between tending the seeds of these economic moral themes in lectures to sowing them in published form again shows how these theologians struggled with the same questions over a period of many years, and suggests that the

53 Hamilton, pgs. 180-84. Unless noted otherwise, the biographical information of Luis de Molina is taken from Hamilton's appendix.

54 Ibid., p. 181. She writes: "His Six Books on Justice and Law are the outcome of the courses of 1577/78 and 1581/82." Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson accounts for the stream of these Neo-Thomist ideas thus: "A long line of scholastic theologians wrote commentaries on this treatise [the Summa], generally under the titles of *De justitia et jure, De secunda secundae*, [and others]."
actual planting of them went back to their most formative years as students.

He follows the precepts of natural law in the economic realm in the sixth volume of his work, *De justitia et jure*, with his thoughts on the nature of private property, relating it to the New World pagans. He writes: "For rule, jurisdiction and ownership are things common to the entire human race, being based not on faith or charity, but arising directly or indirectly from the very nature of things and their first foundations." While he does not make clear whether private property is inherent in natural law, or merely an extension of it, this shows the connection between the principles of natural law and individual economic rights. Like Botero and others, he also extends these natural economic rights to the political level, stating that it is the duty of the king to protect his subjects' use of the natural resources of the kingdom, not only from outside aggression, but also from inside, which includes both that of one's fellow-subjects and of the king himself. No one subject can usurp too much of the kingdom's resources, nor can the king, whether it be in the form of monopolizing natural resources or levying too many taxes on his people. He cites the law of charity, which "demands this, and the existing division of property cannot predetermine that anyone should be unable to use what he urgently needs, even if the owner of the thing is unwilling." Although the king must levy taxes in order to maintain his state and the well being of his people, he cannot refuse

55 Ibid., p. 120.

56 Ibid., p. 136. On Molina's political sense, she quotes him as saying: "Failing any common superior authority which could redress wrongs, the country would only be able to defend itself by driving away the enemy and could not pursue its rights in the war by remedying its injuries."

57 Ibid., p. 136.
his subjects a basic livelihood, which indeed, according to natural law, he has been entrusted to secure.

Francisco Suarez was not quite as concerned with the economic implications of natural law, preferring to focus on the political in his *De legibus ac Deo legislatore*, which, although not published until 1612, would nevertheless have been the product of years of lectures and research.\(^{58}\) Born at Granada in 1548, Suarez is famous for having been one of the worst pupils at the University of Salamanca after beginning in 1561, and later being repeatedly refused entrance to the Jesuits.\(^{59}\) After finally being admitted as a novice into the Society, he continued his studies in philosophy at the Jesuit College in Salamanca, going on to the university itself to study theology. It was here that the youth discovered his penetrating mind, and his professors began to recognize him as a worthy intellect.\(^{60}\) Through the seventies, he taught at Valladolid, Segovia, and Avila, afterward to be appointed to the Chair of Theology at the Jesuit College in Rome in 1580, where he would stay for five years.

In his *De legibus*, Suarez continues the neo-Thomist line that the king's power is conferred on him by the subjects, and that it is God who first implants in individuals those natural rights which will allow them to secure their well-being. They entrust their rights to the prince, who then makes laws and wages war to protect his subjects. In the

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\(^{58}\) Bireley, p. 35. He writes: "Suarez's philosophy of law and politics was set forth most completely in his *On the Laws and God the Legislator*, published in 1612, by which time he was teaching at Coimbra in Portugal, but many of his leading ideas seem to have been worked out well before then."

\(^{59}\) Brodrick, p. 285.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 286.
event that the king overreaches his authority, the subjects are permitted to revolt.\textsuperscript{61} However, Suarez follows Bellarmine's stress on the importance of the pope in this process. In response to James I of England, who argued for the theory of the divine right of kings, Suarez makes clear that the pope's disposition towards any king will gauge the degree to which his subjects will obey him. He writes that even though the pope does not necessarily have any direct power over the subjects of the king, such a king is to be "frightened and disquieted by the pope's coercive power, especially that part of it which extends to the forfeiture of his kingdom, as, if he continues in his error, James is not sure whether his throne will be secure if his subjects really believe that the pope has this power."\textsuperscript{62}

With his emphasis on the authority and purpose of the secular state, Suarez does not directly deal with economic issues. However, the economic well-being of the subjects is an inherent part of the state's very purpose. He writes: "It is a state of affairs, a status, in which men live in a order of peace and justice with a sufficiency of goods that are related to the conservation and the development of material life..."\textsuperscript{63} He draws an important distinction between the purpose of the secular and ecclesiastical realms of human authority, again agreeing with Bellarmine, that the ecclesiastical is for the subjects' spiritual well-being, and the secular for their material benefit. This follows

\textsuperscript{61} Hamilton, p. 39. She quotes Suarez as saying in De legibus: "Once power has been transferred to the king, he is at once the vicar of God and by natural law must be obeyed.... and for the same reason the king cannot be deprived of his power- for he has acquired a true dominion- unless he falls into tyranny, when the kingdom may wage a just war against him...."

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 92. Hamilton presents this as a direct quote of Suarez.

\textsuperscript{63} Heinrich A. Rommen, \textit{The State in Catholic Thought}, (St.Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co. 1945), p. 310.
perfectly with the basis of authority presented by natural law, in which the people's ability to preserve themselves is tied to their natural rights to keep private goods and to appoint secular rulers who will further protect their bodies and goods from harm and provide them with what Suarez calls *felicitas politica*. It is clear from this that, for Suarez, economic prosperity is an essential part of political security, a position which has its basis in natural law theology with all of its political and economic corollaries.

It is now more than appropriate to discuss that late sixteenth-century theologian who is considered "the foremost continuator of the Spanish School of economic thought", that is Leonard Lessius.64 This is a seemingly ironic characterization, considering that the Belgian never studied at the traditionally recognized institutions of the school of Spanish economic thought, Salamanca and Alcalà. However, after studying at the University of Louvain, he joined the Jesuits in 1572, and it is probable that he considered problems of economic morality at this time, considering the primacy with which he would treat these questions later on. The other reason that he is to be discussed here is that he is perhaps the best known of Suarez' own pupils at the Roman College, Lessius having studied there under him from 1581 to 1583.

Lessius followed his master's lead in attacking James I's claim of the divine right of kings, and like De Soto and Molina, titled one of his works *De iustitia et iure* (1605), in which he deals with a number of economic ideas at the moral level, and which was read by a number of prominent statesmen.65 In this work, Lessius devotes himself to

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65 *Ibid.*, p. 245
questions of economic morality like the just price and, of course, usury. Preferring to focus primarily on moral concerns, his writing nonetheless deals with political and economic questions. Even though he does not bring them together into a complete conception of political economy, it is obvious that his thoughts are rooted in natural law precepts, both at the political level, arguing for the right of revolt against a tyrant, and the economic, presenting arguments for the material well-being of individuals in civil society, and further for the political well-being of the state as a whole, just as Vitoria himself had done generations before.

So, how does Botero fit into this continuum? Aside from the particular instances where Botero is seen here to agree with the fundamental political principles of natural law and an interest in economic matters, there is an overall sense of natural law running through his work which will help to connect him to this intellectual tradition, and also to provide the basis for us to understand his assent to the ideas in various cases, including, as we have seen, those on the rational political community and the right of revolt. More generally, though, the most fundamental feature of Thomistic natural law is justice; it is by justice that God ordered the universe, and it is by justice that he expects human beings to order themselves. Spanish theologians had been dealing with questions of the "just war" and the "just price" since Vitoria, and although Botero explicitly mentions only the former, we can see that, in the *Reason of State* in particular, justice is that quality which best allows the state to be maintained.

Botero establishes the importance of justice early on in his *Reason of State*, saying that there are two kinds of justice in the state, that between ruler and subject and
that among the subjects themselves.\textsuperscript{66} His basis for both lies in the Thomistic tradition of natural law revived by Vitoria. In order for there to be justice between ruler and subject, Botero writes that the "people must bestow upon their ruler such powers as are necessary to maintain law among them and to defend them against the violence of their enemies."\textsuperscript{67} Immediately, we get the sense that Botero is here considering political authority as something which is "bestowed" by the people onto the prince. He later goes on to say that the "only circumstance that releases the subject from due obedience to his prince is contravention of the natural or divine law; and even then he may have recourse to open revolt only after all else has failed."\textsuperscript{68} This is one of the few times Botero mentions natural law by name, and it is of key importance. Not only do subjects confer their natural rights onto the prince who may then rule over them, but those same subjects have the right to take back such authority if the prince shows himself unable or unwilling to uphold the natural law. (Botero gives an interesting spin to this idea of revolt, associating it with excessive taxation, an idea that will be dealt with later in this thesis). As we have seen, this kind of political thinking is to be found in the thought of Thomas Aquinas himself, and those who led (and followed) the Thomist revival in the sixteenth century. It is apparent that Botero had been exposed to such ideas by his early exposure to this movement at the Roman College.

Next in the discussion of political justice comes that between subject and subject. Botero shows himself here most obviously to have been influenced by the theological and

\textsuperscript{66} Botero, \textit{Reason of State}, Bk I, ch. xiv, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Ibid.}, Bk I, ch. xiv, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid.}, Bk II, ch. xvi, p. 66.
moral economic thought of the Salamancans and Jesuits because the basis for this kind of justice seems to be economic more than anything else. After ensuring that the state is not overcome by outlaws and robbers, Botero argues, the prince ought to apprise himself of the fact that unjust commercial dealings of swindlers are just as dangerous as the violence of criminals. He writes that "to give false weights and measures, to forge wills and contracts, to counterfeit money, to regrate, to create monopolies and so on, is to undermine the peace and harmony of the state. The prince who can remedy this will win the love and affection of his subjects". However, more than any of these, usury among the subjects ought to be avoided. Not only does he call it a sin and a crime, but also says that it impoverishes both the subjects and the state.

With all of these economic imperatives, Botero is here echoing the call made by Vitoria, De Soto and others that morality in our commercial dealings with one another is a central feature of natural law, of prime importance in both following the divine law of God and making the human laws that will conform to the justice which the divine law dictates.

Just as these references to justice in the state reflect Botero's concordance with the natural law theory that had been promoted by thinkers since Vitoria and De Soto, so too do his thoughts on war, which had been the main impetus for Vitoria to reconsider Thomistic natural law in the first place. Aquinas had argued that three conditions existed for the just war: that the prince be the only one with the authority to declare war, that the

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69 Ibid., Bk I, ch. xv, p. 20. In the original: "La fraude, sebbene non fa tanto romore, non è però di minor danno: altera le misure, cambia i pesi, falsifica i testamenti, i contratti e le monete, riduce i traffichi a monopoli, sopprime le vettovaglie, e fa simili altre cose che a guisa di mine sottoterrane distruggono concordia e la pace."

70 Ibid., Bk I, ch. xv, p. 20.
purpose of war be to right some fault against the state or its people, and that war be justly practiced.\textsuperscript{71} Vitoria began to consider the question of the just war in relation to those being waged by the Spanish against the Natives of the New World. He concluded that these wars were not just because there was no wrong committed by these peoples, either spiritually or materially, and that the wars were directed to no overall good. Vitoria includes the following reasons whereby the Spanish might be considered to be waging war unjustly: that religious difference is no just cause, the extension of empire is not a just cause, nor is the personal glory of the prince.\textsuperscript{72} Vitoria cites both Aristotle and Aquinas in his argument, leaning heavily on Aristotle's \textit{Politics} in which he interprets the Philosopher to state that "the difference between a lawful king and a tyrant, [is] that the latter directs his government towards his individual profit and advantage, but a king to the public welfare."\textsuperscript{73} This again contains the natural law precepts both politically and economically, that the prince is the secular minister to the subjects and that each individual person and state has certain natural rights of self-preservation and property, which no king may appropriate beyond his duties to protect his subjects and promote their prosperity.

Botero follows through with this line of thinking, stating that the prince may not take part in warfare without just cause.\textsuperscript{74} The justness of defensive wars is self evident, but echoing the thought of both Aquinas and Vitoria, he argues that the way in which

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{71} Aquinas, p. 221.
  \item\textsuperscript{72} Vitoria, pgs. 170-71.
  \item\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 170.
  \item\textsuperscript{74} Botero, \textit{Reason of State}, Bk X, ch. ix, pgs. 220-21.
\end{itemize}
even the most defensive war may be waged could detract from its status as just. "But [the prince] must beware of passing the limits beyond which defence turns into offence every time a likely advantage is offered. The Romans behaved excellently in this, for they would never refuse an undefeated enemy reasonable peace terms, and such should be the end of every war."  

As we saw in the previous chapter, Botero does deal with offensive wars, but allows them only in defense of the public good, again echoing Aquinas and Vitoria. Such wars must be just, and the prince is able to establish this by "taking God to witness that he is entering upon the war not out of caprice or ambition, nor to hazard the life and blood of his people in an unworthy cause, but to defend religion and to uphold the state and his honour." This is not to say that Botero accepts difference of religion as a just cause of war, but rather the defense of the Catholic Faith. Although he is not explicitly arguing from the precepts of natural law with regard to the just war, Botero is quite obviously following those precepts laid out by Aquinas and Vitoria, and followed by his own contemporaries like Molina and Suarez, that the prince alone has authority to make war, that the cause be just, and that the practice be just. The important thing to remember is that Botero is arguing for the overall justness of the prince's rule, and doing so in the context of neo-Thomist natural law.

Whether Botero actually cites natural law by name or simply takes it as read, it is clear that this kind of thinking was the foundation on which he built his conception of political economy before writing the *Reason of State* in 1589. Both the political and economic predispositions a Jesuit educated thinker like Botero had at the time of reading

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Bodin's *Six Books of a Republic* would have made him receptive to the various economic policies Bodin himself presents. It is true that Botero does not fully accept all of Bodin's economic precepts, preferring to alter various policies that should be enacted by the prince. In addressing the question of where this interest in economics originated, we can see that, like a number of his contemporaries, Botero would have been well-prepared to think along economic lines, both morally and politically, from his exposure to Jesuit education, and its emphasis on neo-Thomist natural law, beginning with his introduction to it in the late 1550's. Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson supports the existence of this ideological line in her study of sixteenth century Spanish neo-Thomism, *The School of Salamanca*. She writes that the monetary ideas of Spanish scholars since Vitoria and De Soto would, after their tenure at Salamanca in the 1540's and 50's, begin to spread over other fields of thought. It would no longer be reserved exclusively for theologians to deal with economic matters in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, she says, but rather, these ideas would be addressed in texts on a variety of subjects, including law, politics, and morality. "Yet, though the discussion of economic problems was diffused over so wide a field, there was never any fundamental breach in the continuity of economic theory."\(^77\) This continuity was established by the theology of the Salamancans, carried through the moral philosophy of the Jesuits, and brought into the seventeenth century by political thinkers like Botero. As the economic thought inspired by Thomistic natural law remained relatively constant, so too it can be argued that the political theory contained in this strain of natural law remained so as well.\(^78\) This is essential to

\(^77\) *Salamanca*, p 59

\(^78\) *Spanish Economic Thought*, pgs. 107-08. Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson seems to
understanding how Botero came to use Bodin's *Six Books of a Republic* when writing his works of the late 1580's; He was predisposed to selectively consider the particular economic policies in the text, while at the same time to be somewhat less interested in the political claims that the prince be absolutely sovereign, a predisposition which we must now consider in an analysis of Botero's use of Bodin.

have expanded her focus between the *School of Salamanca* (1952) and *Spanish Economic Thought* (1978), from a purely economic one to both political and economic, as she acknowledges in the latter that "[n]on-scholastic works on political and economic subjects had begun to be written at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and as time went on they appeared in increasing numbers. The authors of such books had received a scholastic education, and the ideas they imbibed at the universities were reflected in their work. But they had also learned how to present traditional doctrine in a new and attractive form. It was no longer the fashion to arrange one's treatise in the form of a long chain of scholastic disputations, probably written in highly technical Latin and rendered still more abstruse by the employment of an elaborate code of references and abbreviations that could be understood only by experts. On the contrary, there was a vogue for freely composed works, meant to entertain as well as inform, in which the scholastic form and apparatus were discarded while the doctrines themselves suffered no sudden modification."

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4. Botero’s Reading of Bodin

On reading the various modern works dealing with Botero and political philosophy in the sixteenth century, one name keeps recurring quite frequently as an influence on Botero's economic thought presented in the *Reason of State*, that of Jean Bodin. The one problem with this is that it has not been thoroughly verified by any scholarly effort. Therefore, it is a major goal of this chapter to do so. Bodin and Botero were both mercantilists, but, as we remember from chapter two of this thesis, mercantilism as an economic theory depends on how one conceives of political authority. Botero did not borrow his economic ideas blindly from Bodin. Rather, we see him at once borrowing various policies, disavowing others, and sampling still others which, although not wholly consonant with his own system of political economy, could nonetheless be adjusted to fit. Therefore, before we begin with an in depth analysis of Bodin’s influence on Botero’s economic theory, we must first show how this influence was to be shaped by their respective views on political authority; Bodin’s will be presented in this chapter in distinction to those of Botero as presented in a Thomistic context in chapter three. Their thoughts on political authority differ most notably in the

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1 Robert Bireley in *The Counter-Reformation Prince* (p. 47), J. W. Allen in *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, and D.P. and P.J. Waley in their translation of *Reason of State* (intro. p. x) all make the claim that Bodin influenced Botero, without giving many details. In his Biography of Botero in the *Dizionario degli Italiani*, Luigi Firpo makes absolutely no mention of Bodin. Bireley, however, notwithstanding his assertion that Botero was influenced by Bodin, admits that Botero’s economic understanding was not as fully developed, stating that “the limitations of Botero’s economics were shown by his failure to take note of the current currency fluctuations and inflation, which Bodin had addressed in 1568.” (*The Counter-Reformation Prince*, p. 65) Bodin had done so in a text of rather limited circulation, *The Response to the Paradoxes of Malestroit*, but Botero would have had exposure to the
way they conceive of public and private authority- Bodin wishing to separate the two completely, and Botero, acknowledging the difference, but promoting a more interdependent relationship between prince and subjects. After this, we will compare the thought of the two on the subject of usury, which, although not explicitly part of state finance in the writings of either, nevertheless must be included in any comparison of their economic ideas. We will then go into a comparative analysis of their thoughts on selected economic policies, such as: the use of public lands, trade tariffs and the promotion of industry (two things closely connected in the minds of both), and taxation. This comparison will be organized first according to those ideas Botero was able to borrow from Bodin outright, then those which he adjusted to fit his political-economic system, but in a different way, and finally those which were quite incompatible with his system. In doing so, we will get a glimpse of how Botero uses the text of Bodin- agreeing with certain policies, but disagreeing with others, sampling economic information, but creating different policies with them, and even borrowing Bodin’s sentences directly, but in fact using them in different contexts altogether. It is important to note that Botero never names Bodin, nor does he mention his most famous work, the *Six Books of the Republic*. Nevertheless, Bodin’s presence is apparent throughout Botero’s *Reason of State*. In the end, we see that, even though Botero was clearly influenced by Jean Bodin’s *Six Books of the Republic* in compiling his economic advice to the prince, because of his somewhat different view of the very nature of political authority, Botero had a distinct vision of how the state’s wealth ought to be amassed and used.

Before jumping right in to assess the influence of Jean Bodin (1530?–1596) on arguments because they were again presented in the *Six Books*. 
Botero in the realm of economic ideas, we must first present the Frenchman's own political thought in light of Chapter Three’s study of Botero’s. Then, we ought to compare the political ideas of both to emphasize the fact that Botero seemed interested primarily in the economic rather than the political ideas of Bodin's gargantuan 1576 text, the *Six Books of the Republic*, which he is said to have read on his trip to France in 1585. One of the main ideas with which one walks away from the *Six Books* is that of the sovereignty of the prince, certainly an important topic in France in the years following the brutal Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre in the late summer of 1572. Bodin's conclusion is that the sovereignty of the prince is in fact absolute, subject to censure by none, save God. As Botero had been trained and consecrated as a priest in the age of Catholic reform, his political sense was quite far removed from this idea of God-given political authority, which in fact had itself been maintained by the Lutherans. Indeed, his political thought was closer to that of his Thomistic contemporaries who

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2 The Waley edition of *Reason of State* (intro., p. x), and Bireley *Counter-Reformation Prince* (p. 47).

3 Julian H. Franklin writes in his *Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory* (Cambridge University Press, London, 1973): "The absolutism of the Republique... was a sudden and dramatic shift which is best explained by a new political concern. It was, specifically, the outcome of [Bodin’s] alarmed reaction to the revolutionary movement set off by the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572," p. 41.

4 Skinner explains in the *Foundations II*, (p. 139) that the Lutheran “reformers had contended that men with their fallen natures cannot hope to apprehend the will of the Deus Absconditus and in this way produce a reflection of God’s justice in the arrangement of their lives. They had thus concluded that the powers that be must have been directly ordained by God and granted to men in order to remedy these moral deficiencies. It was a doctrine which, as the Thomists recognized, it was particularly important for them to be able to reject.” To the Thomists, these beliefs went against the natural law claim of individual autonomy in making both moral and political choices. Of course, men were in a lapsed state, but they still had reason by which they could understand God’s will, and the freedom to accept or reject it.

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argued that the “secular state [according to Jesuit thinkers like Roberto Bellarmino and Luis Molina]... develops from the nature of man and his circumstances. The Prince, therefore, is a delegate and a minister to the community.”⁵ Instead of the prince's position being secured from above, and separate from the people, Botero argues that political authority, although originating with God, must go through the people to the prince. For Bodin, the authority of the king (public) and that of the people (private) is separately secured by the laws of God; for Botero, all political authority is given first to the people, and is then conferred onto the prince, whose position is dependent on his subjects. This difference in their thoughts on political authority is essential to understanding how Botero uses Bodin’s text and ideas.

By 1576, Jean Bodin had a legal-humanist background by education, and a bureaucratic one by occupation, both of which are relevant to understanding not only his economic thought, but also his place as a leading politique. He was born around 1530 in Angers, and as a youth given to the care of the Carmelite order there to study for the priesthood.⁶ Later arriving in Paris, he studied philosophy and ancient languages, including Greek and Hebrew, at the Carmelite monastery. It is sometime in the mid- to late-1550's that he left the order, for reasons which are too unclear to warrant speculation here, although some have argued that it was due to "a growing unorthodoxy in his

⁵ J.W. Allen, History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century, p. 359. The early Jesuits had more constitutionalist ideas about the nature of government, a view which ultimately led to the acceptance of regicide among some of them towards the end of the century.

⁶ This information is taken from Kenneth McRae's introduction to his edition of Bodin's The Six Bookes of a Commonweale (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962) in which case the page number has an "A" before it. When the actual text of Bodin is cited, both the page number and the "Book, chapter" numbers will be indicated.
religious beliefs." From his departure until 1562, he studied and then taught law at the University of Toulouse, where he came under the influence of the ideas of the Italian humanist Andrea Alciato. Bodin was introduced to a humanistic method of interpreting the law under the ideas of this Milanese scholar, a method that placed the laws of ancient Rome into historical context. Bodin was quick to apply this method to French law and its medieval roots. After swearing the requisite oath to the Catholic faith as a new member of the Parlement of Paris in 1562, Bodin went forward to outline his ideas on the importance of the authority of both the sovereign ruler and the constitutional tradition. These ideas are found throughout his texts, from the very misleadingly titled Method for the Easy Comprehension of History (1566) through the various editions of the Six Books. Bodin came to emphasize more the authority of the ruler than of the ruled as he grew older, indeed quite exclusively after the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572.

For Bodin, the authority of the ruler, that is sovereignty, is dependant on one thing alone, God's Will. Traditionally, Chapter Eight of the First Book of the Republic has been studied as the primary source for Bodin’s ideas on sovereignty. However, Chapter Ten is in fact much more explicit in the particulars of sovereignty. Bodin begins this chapter with the paragraph:

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8 Franklin, Preface, p. vii.

9 J.W. Allen maintains in his *History of Political Thought* that one “can eliminate from Bodin’s Republic all his references to God, and to Princes as the lieutenants of God, and the whole structure will stand unaltered.”(415-16). This is a problematic contention, considering that Bodin expects that his prince be bound exclusively by the law of God. If one takes away the author of such law, he will nullify the law itself, leaving the prince’s power to rule well in justice or poorly in tyranny absolute; the prince would therefore be answerable only to his own caprices.
Being that nothing upon earth is greater or higher, next unto God, than the majestie of kings and sovereign princes; for that they are in a sort created his lieutenants for the welfare of other men: it is meet diligently to consider of their majestie and power, so that we may in all obedience respect and reverence their majestie, and not to think or speak of them otherwise than as the lieutenants of the most mightie and immortal God: for that he which speaketh evil of his prince unto whom he oweth all duty, doth injure unto the majestie of God himselfe, whose lively image he is upon earth. As God speaking unto Samuel, of whom the people of Israel had [unadvisedly] asked [to be their] king, *It is not thee (saith God) but me whome they have despised.*

The only imperative on the king is that he follow the laws of God. Those laws and traditions which secured such sovereignty, like the Salic Law, were implicitly part of God’s law. And, as Bodin writes, “[w]herefore in that we said that the sovereign power in a commonweale to be free from all [positive human] lawes, concerneth nothing the laws of God and nature.”

So how are we in the modern world to understand this principle that the sovereign is responsible to God alone? How does Bodin substantiate his imperative?

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11 McRae writes that “Bodin used natural law as a foundation for two specific limitations upon the sovereign. First, a ruler is bound, at least as strictly as private men are, to keep his promises, and with certain exceptions this obligation extends to the promises made by his predecessors. This limitation on the sovereign is founded upon the belief that the keeping of the faith and the performance of covenants are absolutely essential to the preservation of social order. Second, natural law asserts that that every man shall have his due, and upon this precept Bodin builds a defense of private property so sweeping that even taxation of property requires the consent of the owners, except when necessity is so pressing that to wait for consent would endanger the very existence of the state.” (p. A16) On the same page, McRae adds that “Bodin also mentions certain specific limitations upon the sovereign which have proved a stiff exercise in logic for all later commentators on his theory. He calls them by a special term *leges imperii*, or- in the French version- ‘laws which concern the form of government (*l’estat*) of the realm.’ In the final analysis he finds only two of these in France. The first is that governing the succession to the throne; the Salic law, barring female succession, constitutes one provision of this law.”

12 Ibid., Bk I, ch. viii, p. 92.
More practically, how would the king establish himself to have been confirmed by God? To prove this in our world would be close to impossible, but in the late sixteenth century the idea was a very realistic one. If one could establish in the minds of the people, nobles especially, that one had been particularly chosen to command, then all that was left to do was to behave as such. For an idea of what this meant, we may go to an example, contemporary to Bodin, who illustrated this sovereign behavior, that of Henry of Navarre making the conversion to Catholicism from his former professed Protestantism. It was only after this act that he was seen as one who, in the eyes of the Catholic League and its supporters, could legitimately take the name Henry IV as king of France in 1594. Indeed, Paul Monod has gone so far as to suggest that Henry of Navarre was consciously aware of Bodinian ideas on sovereignty from the beginning of his reign. He writes:

Henry IV probably never read Bodin, but he did grasp the implications of sovereignty, which became the core of his royal self-fashioning. When he failed to give his predecessor a state burial, Henry rejected the ‘ceremonial interregnum’ between the death of the old king and the public appearance of the new, implying that the king never died…. It was carefully noted, moreover, that the popular acclamation at his coronation did not mean he owed his power to the people: he ruled by hereditary right alone, infused in his blood by God.\(^\text{13}\)

Even though this example could not have influenced Bodin, it does show how Bodin’s ideas in particular were circulating through the politics of France in the age of the Religious Wars.

It may be surprising that Bodin had associated himself with the League after 1589, the summer of which had seen the assassination of Henry III, and the reality of a

Protestant coming to the throne.\textsuperscript{14} By 1594, however, Bodin had sided with Henry of Navarre.\textsuperscript{15} Even though in real life he seems to have shown political flexibility, supporting whatever would buttress the state, Bodin remained consistent in his thought following the publication of the \textit{Six Books} in 1576. Of course, one had to please the nobles and the peasants, but Henry's eventual conversion would have seemed to Bodin a sign that the king, showing such prudence, had been chosen, and that in fact the need for popular support, itself an important part of Bodin's view, was in actual fact God's tool for placing his King on the throne.\textsuperscript{16} Once the sovereign was placed, however, he had to maintain his position, and Bodin shows how this would be possible only under the authority of God. He writes on the investing of the Tartar king as the perfect example:

\begin{quote}
...he is taken out of his high throne, and set upon the ground upon a bare board, unto whom the bishop again turning his speech, saith, Looke up unto heaven and acknowledge almighty God, the king of the whole world, and behold this table whereon thou sittest below: if thou rule well, thou shall have all things according to thy hearts desire; but if thou forget thy duty and calling, thou shalt be cast headlong down from thy high seat, and despoiled of thy regall power and wealth, bee brought so low, as that thou shalt not have as much as this board left thee to sit upon.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Six Bookes}, p. A11. McRae writes: "His adherence to the League has been censured by some, excused by others. Whichever judgement be adopted, it is clear that force and fear were major factors in his decision."

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, p. A11. McRae Writes: “In April 1594, with the tide visibly turning, Bodin and other Royalists slipped away to join Henry IV as he approached.”

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Six Bookes}, p. A12. McRae makes a similar, and related, argument with regard to Bodin and the Catholic League. He writes that by 1589, "[Bodin] had come to believe that the days of Henry III were numbered on account of his cold-blooded murder of his subjects, the Guises; that God would intervene directly to strike down the House of Valois and establish a new line of kings in France; that the League, though evil in itself, was God's chosen instrument for the execution of His purpose; and that the ultimate result of this divine action was far beyond human understanding."

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Six Bookes}, Bk I, ch. viii, p. 89.
Even though the subjects bear witness to this investiture, the King is not to look out into
their eyes, but “up unto heaven and... almighty God,” for it is there that his power is
based. In the same way that the need for popular support is a tool for God's use in
conferring the kingship on someone, so too is popular dissent in bringing down the king.
Bodin of course stresses that it is certainly not for the peasants, nor even the nobles, to
question the king's authority, and any civil unrest will be God's doing alone. For both the
peasants and nobles to question the king's sovereignty, God would have to act through
them as part of a divine plan.\(^{18}\)

It may seem ironic that Botero, having also come from a religious background in
his education, would not place the sovereignty of the prince directly in the hands of God,
but rather in the affection and admiration of the prince in the eyes of the people.\(^{19}\) These
two qualities, instead of direct divine favour, were for Botero those defining features that
distinguished the prince from others. The prince must do well by his subjects by showing
himself just, liberal, valorous, and prudent.\(^{20}\) It is these that will win him the admiration
and affection of his subjects. More than this, Botero outlines how the prince may come to

\(^{18}\) Ibid, Bk II, ch. v, p. 224. Bodin writes that it is against God’s law to rebel against
a sovereign king, “howbeit that the most learned divines, and of best understanding, are
cleere of opinion, that it is not lawfull for a man not only to kill his sovereign prince, but
even to rebel against him, without an especiall and undoubtfull commandment from
God.” McRae reminds us of Bodin’s exception “that subjects need not obey when they
are commanded to do something clearly and unmistakably contrary to divine or natural
law.” Six Bookes, A16)

\(^{19}\) Paul Monod in his Philosophy and Government has addressed this tension
between the political thought of Bodinian thinkers and Thomists like Botero, writing that
“the use by these Catholics of ostensibly Aristotelian arguments about citizenship led
their opponents to investigate the possibilities of new anti-Aristotelian sciences, and
particularly Bodin’s political theory,” p. 260.

\(^{20}\) Botero, The Reason of State, Bk I, ch. xi, p. 15-16.
hold his dominion, either naturally or by acquisition:

By natural we mean dominion where those who rule do so by the will of their subjects, either explicitly, as by the election of kings, or implicitly, as by legitimate succession.... By acquired we mean dominion which has been bought by money or its equivalent, or won by arms.... And the greater the resistance offered to the acquisition the worse will be the quality of the dominion. 21

Whether the dominion be gotten naturally or by acquisition, the more perfect dominion will be the one in which the prince holds the favour of the people. Natural dominion already has popular support, and acquired dominion, if it is to be powerful and have longevity, must make popular support a primary goal, by means of exhibiting the princely characteristics outlined above. Botero does stress the importance of the use of religion by the prince for binding his subjects to him in both body and conscience, but he does not tie the prince's position to God in the way that Bodin does, thereby turning the prince's eyes downward rather than upward for the source of his power.

An important corollary to this is that Bodin and Botero have different views on public and private authority. For Bodin, both public and private authority are each secured directly by God. 22 The king’s responsibility is to God and His law, the fulfillment

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21 *Reason of State*, Bk I, ch. ii, p. 3. In the original: “Naturali chiamo quelli de’ quali siamo padroni di volontà de’ sudditi, o espresso, come avviene nell’elezione del Re di Polonia, o tacita, come accade nelle successioni, legittime agli Stati: e la successione è per ragione manifesta, o dubbiosa.... E la qualità loro è tanto peggiore, quanto maggior resistenza vi fu nell’acquisto.”

22 *Six Bookes*, Bk I, ch. viii, p. 92. Bodin writes: “But as for the laws of God and of nature, all princes and people of the world are unto them subject.” Bodin states that “the principall point of sovereign majesty, and absolute power, [consists] principally in giving lawes unto the subjects in generall, without their consent,” (Bk I ch. viii, p. 98). The private subjects have no authority to make laws. He goes further to illustrate the nature of the private authority the subjects do have, writing that “it is needful in a well ordered Commonweale [ruled absolutely by a king], to restore unto parents the power of life and
of which will allow the king to rule his people justly, without them having any say in the maintenance of his authority. The ‘contract’ is not between king and subject, but between God and king. For Botero, authority is distributed by God equally to human beings, who then further transfer the authority to their prince. Therefore, the prince has a direct responsibility to the people and their felicitas politica. The people, in turn, have a responsibility to maintain their prince’s authority. The people’s ‘contract’ with God is unconditional; their ‘contract’ with their prince is not.

No matter how their respective political beliefs compare, Botero and Bodin share an understanding of the ideal economic conditions for the strong dominion, and conversely, those economic conditions by which the king is most threatened, even if they do express this understanding in two different ways and for different reasons. The ideal is similar to one earlier expressed by Aristotle: that it is best for the state to be comprised primarily of 'the middling sort', those who would be neither too haughty from riches nor too wicked from penury.\textsuperscript{23} Citing Aristotle directly, Botero reiterates this idea almost word for word, except that his focus is more on the middling sort as subjects who "should be prevented from causing riots and rebellions" and not fully endowed as "those who would take part in the constitution,” as Aristotle proposes.\textsuperscript{24} Botero promotes the idea

\textsuperscript{23} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}: Bk IV, ch. xi. Aristotle writes: "The [rich] incline more to arrogance and crime on a large scale, the [poor] are more than averagely prone to wicked ways and petty crime. The unjust deeds of the one class are due to an arrogant spirit, the unjust deeds of the other to wickedness."

\textsuperscript{24} The first quote on sedition is from Botero, Bk IV, ch. ii, p. 83. He writes: “The middle rank are sufficiently wealthy to have no lack of what is required for their station. And yet their affluence is not such as to tempt them into ambitious schemes. They are
because these kinds of subjects are the easiest to rule, not that they take part in rule most easily. While Botero shows his scholastic erudition in citing Aristotle, Bodin shines as the humanist in his description of the ideal economic conditions. Indeed, Bodin goes to the mentor of the "master of those who know", citing Plato as the source for the idea that extremes of poverty and wealth are ruinous to the commonwealth. Implicit in this idea is that those with middling means are most favourable to the state. Coincidentally, Botero is more in line with Bodin and Plato than Aristotle as far as the purpose of having the middling sort as the majority, for this condition will lessen the possibility of sedition. This is not to say that Bodin condoned sedition in the case of poverty per se among the subjects. His use of Plato in this case reflects his views on usury, stating that, in the past, as the poor saw “themselves in libertie and oppressed with poverty, they were forced to borrow upon interest,… and the longer they lived the more they were indebted, and the usually friends of peace, contented with their station and neither exalted by ambition nor prostrated by despair; as Aristotle says, they are most inclined to virtue. We may suppose, then, that these middle folk will be peaceful…. (ma I mezzani hanno tanto, che non si trovano aver necessità delle cose appartenenti allo stato loro, e non sono però così possenti, che possa dar loro il cuore di far disegni e di entrare ad impresi grandi, sono per l’ordinario amici della pace e si contentano dello stato loro, l’ambizione non li balza in aria, né la disperazione li atterrae, come dice Aristotele, sono attissimi alla virtù). The second quote in this note on ‘those who would take part in the constitution’ is from Aristotle, Politics: Bk IV, ch. 11.

25 Six Bookes, Bk V, ch. ii, p. 569. Plato’s thoughts on the antagonisms between rich and poor are most explicitly dealt with in the discussion of oligarchy and oligarchic man in the Republic (Translated with Introduction and Notes by Francis MacDonald Cornford, London: Oxford University Press, 1945, pages 280-81). Plato writes that “while the [oligarchs] multiply their capital by usury, they are also multiplying the drones and the paupers. When the danger threatens to break out, they will do nothing to quench the flames, either in the way we mentioned, by forbidding a man to do what he likes with his own [like lending at interest], or by the next best remedy, which would be a law enforcing a respect for right conduct. If it were enacted that, in general, voluntary contracts for a loan should be made at the lender’s risk, there would be less of this shameless pursuit of wealth and a scantier crop of those evils I have just described.”
lesse able to pay.”

It was not that they were poor that made them dangerous to a commonwealth, as Botero would argue, but that their poverty forced them to allow themselves to be taken advantage of in a way quite against God’s law (but we will deal with Bodin’s thoughts on usury presently).

That they hold the same ideal for the economic situation in the state does not necessarily mean that Botero and Bodin have precisely the same views on how this ideal is to be achieved. For example, Botero goes into some detail on the need for liberality in the prince, being charitable to the poor of his lands. He writes: “No action is more royal, more divine, than to bring help to the wretched,… and indeed there could be no surer and more certain method of winning the hearts of the populace and their gratitude” than by relieving the needy from want.

Bodin, on the other hand, disagrees that wealth ought to be redistributed, for this is even worse for the position of the king than extremes of wealth and poverty. In this, Bodin cites the rule of law as a standard by which any state must prosper and any king must rule. He writes: "...there is nothing more pernicious and dangerous to Commonweales, than equalitie of goods, ...[a condition] which [has] no firmer support and foundation than faith, without ...which, neither justice, nor public society can stand, neither can there be any faith, if there not be due observation of conventions and lawfull promises.”

From Bodin's legal perspective, the state cannot redistribute goods because the ownership of those goods is one of the things recognized by the laws and contracts which hold the commonwealth together; if they are allowed to redistribute goods, it would undermine the stability and fairness of the state.

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26 Ibid., Bk V, ch. ii, p. 569.
28 Six Bookes, Bk V, ch. ii, p. 570.
be broken, then must not all other laws and contracts be at risk?

Surely, Botero borrows a number of examples from Bodin's text, but he seems to have used them in a different way. Botero's solution to the problems of extremes of rich and poor and how the prince will in fact prosper from his state are found in the earlier discussion of economic ideas, but to what extent does he borrow his general economic principles? Does Botero base his economic program completely on the work of Bodin, or does he create his own general conclusions merely by borrowing some of Bodin's examples? We will look at how Botero does in fact borrow various ideas of Bodin, and then go on to assess how he differed from Bodin in his understanding of such ideas. Before going into a comparison on their thoughts on state finance, the study of one particularly important subject should give us a good sense of how Botero borrowed from Bodin's text, but yet had a different understanding of the particular ideas. The subject in question is that of usury.

Usury

What exactly is usury? Its meaning has certainly changed in the last 500 years. In the modern world, usury refers to the charging of exorbitant or illegally high interest, like 30 or 40%. In the modern world, the ones involved in usurious activity are loan sharks, and possibly credit card companies, depending on one's standards. In the medieval and early modern period, however, anyone who lent money at interest was considered a usurer, and officially condemned by the Church. The familiar maxim that money is the root of all evil is also the root of the Catholic prohibition of usury. St.
Augustine had argued against it, as did medieval scholars who quoted him, like Anselm of Lucca, student of the more famous Anselm of Canterbury. One of the most significant sources for medieval arguments against usury comes from the Decree of the Third Lateran Council of 1179, which states that usury should be discouraged because of the incredible profits it can win for those who practice it, and that because of this so many people have already given up their trades and become usurers.\textsuperscript{29} Shortly after this, Pope Urban III explicitly cited Luke 6:35 of the New Testament, which presents the moral imperative: "Lend freely, hoping nothing thereby." By the end of the twelfth century, both the Old and New Testaments had been matched with the authority of the Church Fathers, Roman traditions, and decrees of church councils to create a comprehensive Church ban on usury.\textsuperscript{30} In the thirteenth century this was brought together with a rational argument by St. Thomas Aquinas who used Aristotle's ancient condemnation of usury to buttress the contemporary Christian ban. Outlining the idea of the sterility of money, Aristotle writes in the \textit{Politics} that "...money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural."\textsuperscript{31} In addition to this,

\textsuperscript{29} George O'Brien, \textit{Medieval Economic Teaching}. (London: Longman's, Green, and Co., 1920), p. 174. He quotes the decree: "Since in almost every place the crime of usury has become so prevalent that many people give up all other business and become usurers, as if it were lawful, regarding not its prohibition in both Testaments, we ordain that manifest usurers shall not be admitted to communion, nor, if they die in their sins, be admitted to Christian burial, and that no priest shall accept their alms."


\textsuperscript{31} Aristotle, \textit{Politics}: Bk I, ch. 10.
Aquinas followed the ancient Roman example prohibiting usury, the argument being that money, like wine and grain, was fungible; that is, it is something consumed. In trade, Aquinas equated the thing itself being traded and the use of the thing. One could not sell a bottle of wine, and then sell the use of the wine as well; this would be charging two prices for one thing. When one sells wine, it is gone; likewise, when one spends or lends money, it is also gone. Fungible goods are those which one is not able to rent out. These are to be distinguished from non-fungible goods, those being houses and other pieces of property that could be rented out. Aquinas argued that a price could be charged for the use of these kinds of goods.  

Let us begin by discussing Bodin's thoughts on usury and compare them with what Botero has to say. On the whole, Bodin's understanding of usury is somewhat more sophisticated than that of Botero. For example, there is the practice of the Roman Emperors- Augustus, Antoninus Pius, and Alexander Severus. In the same paragraph, Bodin writes that Antoninus Pius and Alexander Severus lent gold at five percent and that:

Augustus long before, was accustomed to lend which came cleere into the Exchequer, without any interest, giving good assurance of land; and upon penalty to forfeit the double, if it were not paid at the day...[because]...he that hath taken the public money, and restores it not at the appointed day, he commits theft; it is therefore the penalty of theft, and not of usury.

Bodin is here making a distinction between the practice of Augustus and that of the other

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33 *Six Bookes*, Bk VI, ii, p. 673.
two emperors. It is clear that Botero used this as a source, claiming that Augustus lent out money from his treasury "at interest against security, and Antoninus Pius also lent out at five per cent, as did Alexander Severus." However, Botero does not seem to make much of a distinction between the two practices, for it is here that he makes his general statement that the prince’s lending at interest is against both reason and divine precept. Robert Bireley maintains this as well, stating that Botero had a limited understanding of the particulars of the usury prohibition. Unlike Bodin, Botero does not consider certain circumstances where a slightly masked form of usury was allowed, one that had in fact become relatively well accepted through the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Scholastic thinkers had struggled with the fact that every kind of usurious activity was taking place in their burgeoning commercial economies, and that certain moral standards had to be set. They isolated situations like _lucrum cessans_ as acceptable. This was for cases where the loan caused a definite "ceasing of profit" for the lender. If, for example, one merchant lent another merchant money which the first merchant could use in his own trade, the charging of interest could be allowed. The Florentine Archbishop St. Antonino in particular thought _lucrum cessans_ to be acceptable. This is not to say that Bodin had definitely read St. Antonino, but, perhaps from his Carmelite and legal education, and bureaucratic career, he came to understand

34 Botero, Bk VII, ch. ix, p. 140.
35 _Reason of State_, Bk VII, ch. ix, p. 140.
36 Bireley, _Counter-Reformation Prince_, p. 65.
37 In _Medieval Economic Teaching_, O'Brien cites an allowance by Thomas Aquinas, the source of which has yet to be found, p. 194.
38 Roover, _Scholastics and Usury_, p. 262.
some of the general allowances that Botero did not seem to. The general argument in favour of *lucrum cessans* was that it simply was not usury, and Bodin follows this, saying that any private citizen who does not pay back a loan from the public funds is guilty of theft rather than usury, and should be forced to pay the state back. At the same time, Botero cannot be said to disagree with this proposition, for he does not even present Bodin's stipulation in a negative light. However, considering that Botero's does not seem to make the same distinction between the methods of Augustus, and Antoninus Pius and Alexander Severus, one can assume that he did not fully appreciate some of the arguments presented by Bodin which allowed a subtle version of usury.

Reading Bodin's text, one can see how he built his understanding of usury from a far wider variety of sources and in a much more sophisticated way than Botero, who seems ironically to have constructed his own more limited understanding of it based partly on his seemingly hasty reading of the *Six Books*. Bodin cites the Hebrew Scriptures, the pagan lawmakers Solon and Lycurgus, and the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle. More than this, he goes into a detailed discussion of the place of usury in Roman law, from the fourth century B.C. to the compilation of Justinian's *Corpus Juris Civilis* in the early sixth century A.D. The Romans originally established lawful usury at twelve percent, limiting it to half of that in 386 B.C., and finally outlawing it altogether in the following year. The French jurist then goes through the various instances in Roman and contemporary history where usury was allowed officially with strict limitations, only to increase by means of unofficial abuse. After giving his exhaustive analysis, he finally concludes that it "...is far better to relieve upon the Law of God, which doth absolutely

39 *Six Bookes*, Bk V, ch. ii, pgs. 569-72.
forbid usury." Why such an outright condemnation? Bodin shows us how every historical instance of legal usury has been abused to such an extent that it grew out of control. He writes that "the Hebrews called usury a biting, which doth not only wast the debtor unto the bones, but doth also suck both bloud and marrow, so as in the end the number of poore being increased, and not able to endure this want, they did rise against the rich." For Bodin, the king would do well by the law of God to forbid outright usury in his state.

In the Reason of State, Botero follows both the Christian and Aristotelian arguments against usury, in accordance with his earlier Jesuit education. In discussing whether or not the prince should lend any excess money from his treasury out at interest, Botero claims that it is against both divine precept and human reason, and one can make the inference that this applies to all usurious activity in the state. As far as the divine precept is concerned, Botero is not shy in describing usury as sinful behavior, a plague to be equated with avarice itself. With regard to reason, given his partly scholastic background in Aristotelian philosophy, one can assume that both Aristotle and Aquinas helped to shape his thought. Instead of regarding usury as a means to produce money in the state by allowing merchants to use it in their trades, he says that usurious activity actually takes money out of circulation, following the Aristotelian line that money is in fact sterile. Given the general early modern view that the supply of money is limited in nature, it is easy to understand how he came to this conclusion. Indeed, Bodin was one of

\[\text{\cite{Ibid}, Bk V, ch. ii, p. 573.}\]
\[\text{\cite{Ibid}, Bk V, ch. ii, p. 569.}\]
\[\text{\cite{Botero}, Bk I, ch. xv, p. 20.}\]
the first to recognize and outline that the value of money is not absolute, and the idea was slow to circulate. Botero writes that usurers "consume the resources of their fellow citizens..." If people, even merchants, were forced to pay back their initial loans and the interest on them, the country would seem to require more money to be circulating than it had at the time the loans were allowed to be made. Assuming that loans would be made continually, the amount of money circulating would constantly be decreasing. More than this, Botero would agree with the earlier-cited Decree of the Third Lateran Council, saying that because "everyone likes to gain without labour, [usury] is bound to lead to deserted marketplaces, to the abandonment of industry and the disruption of trade." As Botero argues for a robust and dynamic commercial economy from which the prince may raise his wealth, usury ought naturally be avoided, except, he concedes, when the prince finds himself in only the most dire need of quick cash.

In addition to these sources for Botero's understanding of usury, it is interesting to note that his first mention of usury comes in the chapter relating to justice between subjects, the theme of which is economic in nature. This is significant because Bodin mentions usury as a scourge to the commonwealth in the same chapter that he argues against extremes of rich and poor, leading one to conclude that Botero most assuredly read, and agreed with, Bodin's ideas here on these extremes and on usury, even though he

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43 Ibid., Bk I, ch. xv, p. 20. He writes in the original presented by Chiara Continisio: "[gli] usurari... consumano dall'avarizia le facolta de[i] particolari [della Republica]."

44 Ibid., Bk I, ch. xv, p. 21. He writes: "...perché ad ognuno piace il guadagno senza travaglio, si desertano le piazze, si abbandonimo le arti...."

45 Ibid., Bk VII, ch. v, p. 137. He writes: "...potrà il Prencipe pigliar in pretito da' sudditi pecuniosi, o ad interesse, il che però non si deve fare se non in casi estremi, perché gl'interesse sono la rovina degli Stati...."
does not cite the Frenchman on the extremes as he does Aristotle. Either way, Botero
does tie the usury argument to the overall justice in the state, a conceptualization we have
seen having its roots in his Jesuit education. One piece of evidence which confirms that
Botero had considered Bodin's ideas on usury is the citation of Cato the Elder. Botero
describes usury as worse than robbery and says "...according to Cato, the usurer, if he
took more than twelve percent, was condemned by the ancients to pay quadruple,
whereas the robber had only to pay double."\(^{46}\) The Waley edition of the *Reason of State*
notes that "Cato's aversion to usury is well known.... but we have been unable to trace
Botero's reference."\(^{47}\) Apparently, this quotation is not to be found in the only extant
source on Cato's ideas on usury, that being Cicero's *De officiis*. If Botero did not take it
from a surviving source of Cato himself, or from Cicero, where does he get it? When
reading Bodin's chapter against extremes of rich and poor, and the usury that will further
these extremes, one finds that he too cites Cato the Elder. He writes: "...the usurer which
exacted any more [than twelve percent] was condemned to restore fourfold: esteeming
the usurer (as Cato said) worse than a theefe, which was condemned but in double."\(^{48}\) In
addition to borrowing the Cato citation, Botero follows Bodin in allowing the prince to
borrow only in extreme circumstances.\(^ {49}\)

Further establishing that Botero followed the basics of Bodin’s usury theory is

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\(^{46}\) *Ibid.*, Bk I, ch. xv, p. 20. He writes: "...l'usuraro era condannato dagli antichi,
come scrive Catone, s'egli tirava più di dodici per cento, nel quadruplo, dove che il ladro
non era condannato se non nel doppio.", p. 27.


\(^ {48}\) *Six Bookes*, Bk V, ch. ii, p. 572.

Botero’s quote illustrating how usury will disrupt industry and trade:

the craftsman will leave his workshop, the peasant his plough; the nobleman will sell his inheritance for ready money, and the merchant, whose business is to travel untiringly from one country to another, will become a stay-at-home... [and] lastly, the people, reduced to misery and despair, will long for a change in regime.  

This should be compared with Bodin, writing that "as the [merchant] for the sweetnes of gaine gives over his traffique, the artificer scornes his shop, the labourer leaves his labour, the shepherd his flock, and the noble man sells his land of inheritance..., [finally the people] give themselves to thieving, or to stir up seditions and civill warres." It is obvious from these that Botero, in addition to condemning usury according to the neo-Thomist ideas on justice, includes at least part of Bodin's understanding of usury in his own argument.

Both Bodin and Botero condemn usury, but again based on different sources, and for slightly different reasons. Bodin, as the legal humanist he is, looks to the laws of the Jews and the Romans to make his historical argument against usury, whereas Botero, in contrast, follows both Christian tradition and scholastic thinking, in addition to following Bodin's lead. Bodin's own reasons for discouraging usury were twofold: first, he wished to promote stability in the state; and second, he wanted industry to be encouraged by a greater flow of money- usury naturally diminished the ability of money to produce wealth. It is from Bodin that Botero takes the advice that for a prince to "lend freely...
produces two good effects: the money is safe, against security given: and the subject who
borrows is under an obligation, and has the means of enriching himself, which ultimately
is beneficial also to the prince."\textsuperscript{52} Botero actually has three reasons for prohibiting usury:
first, like Bodin, he wished to promote wealth production in the state by which both the
prince and the people may benefit; second, he was partial to the Aristotelian-Thomistic
moral imperative against lending money at interest, notwithstanding any sophisticated
exceptions Aquinas and various other scholastic thinkers may have allowed; and third,
like Bodin, he mentions the possibility that sedition will be the natural result of allowing
usury. “[L]astly,” he writes, “the people, reduced to extreme misery and despair, will
long for a change of regime.”\textsuperscript{53} However, the focus of the two thinkers is slightly
different. For Bodin, it is usury itself which is contrary to the law of God, and kings
permitting it invite their own ruin; for Botero, usury is sinful because it produces avarice
and poverty, two conditions under which the prince will find himself in the contempt of
his subjects. These respective admonitions reflect a somewhat different conception of the
laws of nature and of God.

Now, let us go forward to appreciate how Botero used Bodin’s text in building his
program for the economic well being of the state, and to assess the degree to which
Botero only borrows from Bodin, or in fact developed his own principles of political
economy in a mercantilist fashion. That is, how much economic power did they each put

\textsuperscript{51} Six Bookes, Bk V, ch. ii, p. 574.

\textsuperscript{52} Botero, \textit{Reason of State}, Bk VII, ch. ix, p. 140. He writes: "\textit{Nell'imprestare
liberamente fa due buoni effetti, l'uno, che assicura il suo denaro pigliandone coazione; l'altro [effetto], che n'accocoda il suddito e li porge occasione d'arricchire, il che finalmente ridonda in utilità d'esso Prencipe}," p.149.

\textsuperscript{53} Botero, Bk I, ch. xv, p. 21.
directly in the hands of the state? They both deal with the policies of trade tariffs, industry, princely trade, and taxation. However, they can not be said to agree on each of these completely. They both discuss each of these sources of revenue as either ordinary or extraordinary, but they clearly do not agree on which sources are of the former or of the latter. Most notably, Bodin argues that taxing the subjects is an extraordinary source, yet Botero calls it an ordinary source; likewise, Bodin would have us accept the king’s involvement in trade as an ordinary source, while Botero seems to think of it as extraordinary. Rather than comparing their respective views on ordinary and extraordinary sources of revenue, the remainder of this chapter will compare each policy one by one, to show the various ways that Botero used Bodin’s text. It is clear that, while Botero borrowed certain economic polices outright from Bodin’s text, he also adjusted a few of them to fit his system of political economy. Further, it is also clear that Botero found some of Bodin’s policies quite incongruent with his system, and disavowed them.

We will look first at those policies which Botero seems completely to have agreed with. This will be shown not only by his approval of such policies, but also by his use of Bodin’s examples and the very sentences describing them. Next, we will look at those economic ideas which Botero was able to fit into his system only partly, by borrowing the examples directly, but in fact using them for different purposes. Finally, we will outline those economic principles which Botero was not able to reconcile with his own. In the end we will see that, as in the case of usury, Botero found plenty of Bodin’s ideas and examples to his liking, while at the same time recognized others to be inconsistent with his overall system of political economy.
Where the Two Agree

Of the kinds of princely revenue, tariffs are important not only for understanding Botero’s economic advice to the prince, they are also quite important for illustrating how Botero used Bodin’s text. Botero’s policy on tariffs is outlined in chapter two of this thesis, but it is important here to reveal his source for it; there is no doubt that he borrowed the policy almost wholesale from the Six Books. This is true not only for their arguments in favour of tariffs, but also for the intended ends of such tariffs, the promotion of industry among the subjects. Bodin writes quite despairingly, and disparagingly, that in France the subjects are charged an impost on salt whereas foreigners traffic freely. This tariff was reformed by Francis I with the idea of drawing more foreign traders and money into the realm, but in reality it had the effect of impoverishing the subjects and enriching the foreigners. For Bodin, a better policy was that of the Turk, who “takes ten of the hundred of all Marchant strangers going out of Alexandria, and of his Subjects five in the hundred.” However, Bodin would restrict this to raw goods and not manufactures. Only those goods that are in want in the foreigner’s domain should bear an impost; likewise any raw foreign goods scarce in the kingdom should have the tariff diminished, if not entirely removed. By this, one’s own subjects will benefit, first by not having to pay more than foreigners, and second by being able to put themselves to work as artisans manufacturing the raw goods. The ruler will

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54 Six Bookes, Bk VI, ch. ii, pgs. 661-62.

55 Six Bookes, Bk VI, ch. ii, p. 661.
also benefit directly by the tariffs on these manufactured goods.\textsuperscript{56}

Botero makes no mention of the salt tax, but he otherwise follows Bodin’s policy to the letter, repeating the Frenchman by stating that “it is only just that foreigners should pay rather more than your subjects. The Turks also practice this, for on the merchandise that leaves Alexandria foreigners pay ten percent and the inhabitants five.”\textsuperscript{57} Botero continues by saying that raw goods flow to those places where they are most in need, and therefore, “the ruler must do all he can to encourage his subjects to cultivate the land and to practice every kind of skill; this will be discussed at greater length in its proper place.”\textsuperscript{58} The proper place, for Botero, is in his discussion on industry. Botero further agrees with Bodin that one’s subjects will benefit from imposts in the above-mentioned ways, and he follows him further by claiming that the ruler will benefit as well. He writes: “Trade in goods made from these [raw] materials will provide a livelihood for a far greater number of people than will the raw materials; and the export of the finished manufactured article will provide the ruler with greater revenues than will the material alone.”\textsuperscript{59} We can see from this that both thinkers, even if one follows the other, are taking

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., Bk VI, ch. ii, pgs. 662-63.

\textsuperscript{57} Botero, Bk VII, ch. iv, p. 136. He writes in the original: "Ma perché quei che traficano o sono nostri sudditi, o forastieri, e cosa onesta che i forastieri paghino qualche cosa di più che i sudditi: il che osserva anso il Turco, perché, della mercatanzie che si cavano d'Alessandia, gli stranieri pagano dieci per cento e i sudditi cinque....", p. 145.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., Bk VII, ch. iv, p. 136-37. He writes: "...deve il Prencipe impiegare ogni diligenza per eccitar i suoi al culto della terra e all'esercizio dell'arti d'ogni sorte, di che parliamo, più diffusamente al suo luogo.", p. 145.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., Bk VIII, ch. iii, p. 153. He writes: "...del trafico della materia lavorata vive molto maggior numero di gente che della materia semplice, e l'entrate de' Prencipe sono di gran lunga ricche per l'estrazione dell'opere che delle materie....", p. 158.
imposts to their furthest, and necessarily mercantilist end: the promotion of a skilled workforce whose manufactured goods will enrich the king’s treasury to an even greater extent than the tariffs on mere raw materials. Not only does Botero borrow the policy itself from Bodin, and argue for the same benefits to one’s state, but he also actually uses one of the same examples, that of the Turk. The two can easily agree on such a policy, considering that it does not cross the line between public and private authority of Bodin’s king and subject, nor does it detract from the idea of mutual benefit of Botero’s prince and citizen. It is not as though the prince or king is to tax the citizens’ property directly. Rather, he is to tax only that wealth which is made possible by his own regime’s maintenance of roads, bridges, and ports.\(^60\)

**Where Botero Only Sampled**

While Botero takes the example of tariffs directly from Bodin, he uses other examples from the Frenchman which, although not fitting in perfectly with his political-economic system, could be adjusted somewhat for his advice to the prince. Considering Botero and Bodin’s different views on the public and private domains, it should be no surprise that Botero’s thoughts on the revenues from public land should be somewhat different from Bodin’s ideas on it. Botero clearly uses an example from Bodin to build his argument on raising revenue from the produce of land, even though Bodin himself

\(^{60}\) Botero writes that there “is no more just and legitimate revenue than [tariffs], for it is reasonable that whoever makes a profit on and by your possessions should make some kind of payment.” *Reason of State*, Bk VII, ch. v, p. 136. One should take “your possessions” to mean in part the infrastructure maintained by the prince.
does not use it for this purpose. The example in question is Bodin’s argument for an important means of gathering treasure—by conquest, for which the Frenchman recalls that:

Sultan Mahumet king of the Turkes, found meanes to inrich his treasu re by meanes of Christian slaves, which hee sent in Colonies into conquered countries, giving to everyone fifteen acres of land and two oxen, and feed for one year: and at the end of twelve years he tooke the moytie [half] of their fruits, the which he continued forever.  

Compare Botero:

When Mahomet II had acquired many lands he sent out colonies of slaves, to each of whom he gave fifteen days of land, two buffaloes, and seed for the first year. After twelve years he required half of the profits, and in the following years a further seventh of the other half, so that he was thus assured of a good perpetual revenue.

Botero here does not focus on the fact that these were lands of a vanquished enemy, but rather that this is an example of how state lands may be utilized to produce revenue. This might be strange if it were not for Botero’s maxim, in Book V of the Reason of State, that conquered subjects should be assimilated as quickly as possible. Thus, he is not considering it primarily in terms of conquest, as Bodin does, but instead, his focus is on the revenues that may be brought to the treasury in a matter of fact way, with conquest

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61 Six Bookes, Bk VI, ch. ii, p. 656.

62 Botero, Bk VII, ch. iv, p. 135. He writes in the original: "Maometto II, avendo acquisitato paese assai, vi mandò colonie di schiavi, a' quali assegnava quindici giornate di terreno per uno, e due bufali e la semenza per lo primo anno; e in capo di dodici anni volle la metà de' frutti, e la settima dell'altra metà negli anni seguenti: così constitui una buona rendita perpetua.

63 Ibid., Bk V, ch. i, p. 95. Botero writes: “The prince should above all do everything in his power to make these new subjects acquire an interest in his rule, and become as like as possible as natural subjects.”
being a secondary notion. Bodin considers it a form of tribute; Botero merely the ordinary fruits of the produce of the prince’s own state and people.

Botero never explicitly states whether the prince’s own partaking of trade is an ordinary or extraordinary form of increasing revenue, but he does outline the few cases where it is acceptable, as described in chapter two. Taking his cue from Bodin’s discussion of the fifth means to gather treasure, that is, directly taking part in trade, Botero mentions the Portuguese kings as having enriched themselves by securing trade routes to India and Ethiopia by the military might of the realm, only because no private citizens of that realm could undertake such an enterprise, and “no undertaking which requires the might of a king can ever become him ill.”

There can be no doubt that, on the point of the Portuguese trade, Botero borrowed Bodin’s example and used it for a different purpose, considering that the latter describes it so distinctly, and that Botero samples other pieces of information from the same section for use in another argument, which we will soon deal with. Botero’s two other arguments in favour of the prince taking part in trade do not seem to come from Bodin at all- the two arguments being the case of the Venetians taking part in the spice trade for fear of too much power growing in private hands and Solomon’s trading in raw goods to benefit the poor. From this one can conclude that Botero had significantly different designs in allowing the prince to trade

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64 Ibid., Bk VIII, ch. ivx, p. 165. He writes: "...non disconviene ad un Re impresa nessuna nella quale si ricercano forze di Re.", p. 171.

65 Six Booke, Bk VI, ch. ii, p. 660. Bodin writes of the Portuguese: “In the yeare 1475 they discovered the rich mines of gold in Guinee, under the under the conduct of John Bastard of Portugall, and twelve years after the spices of Calicut, and of the East; and continuing their course to the Indies, have so well trafficked there, as they are become lords of the best ports of Affrike, and have seized upon the Ile of Ormus in despite of the king of Persia....”
than Bodin, who, given the praise he has for the Portuguese and Italian nobles who have enriched themselves and their states, would seem to give carte blanche to any noble, including the king, interested in trading, except in trading with one’s own subjects.66 Botero, on the other hand, reminds us that, aside from special circumstances, it is unbecoming a prince to take part in trade.67

Botero borrows another of Bodin’s examples of the prince taking part in trade to build a single and wholly separate argument altogether, and indeed, one which gives us a greater insight into why Botero discouraged trade among princes. Instead of using the example of Alfonso II of Naples to argue against trading with one’s own subjects, as Bodin uses it, Botero presents Alfonso in his discussion on whether the prince should accumulate riches, in which he outlines all of the troubles to befall a prince given over to avarice. He writes:

...ask Alfonso II of Naples, who gave his pigs out to his subjects to fatten and if they died made them pay compensation, and who purchased all the oil of Apulia, and all the corn before it was ripe, reselling at the highest possible price forbidding everyone else to sell until his own was all sold.68

66 Ibid., Bk VI, ch. ii, p. 661. He writes: “Neither doth the trade of Merchandize engrose dishonour, or imbase the Signories and nobilitie of Italie, neither did Tully disavow of it, but of such as sold by retayle, whome he termed sordido. As for the trafficie which Princes practice upon their Subjects, it is no trafficeke, but an impost or exaction....”


68 Botero, Bk VII, ch. ii, p. 133. He writes: "Alfonso II Re di Napoli, che dava i suoi porci a' sudditi per ingrassarli, se morivano, glieli faceva pagare; comprave tutto l'olio di Puglia e 'l formento in Erba, e 'l rivendeva al più alto prezzo ch'egli poteva, con divieto che nissun altro ne potesse vendere sin ch'egli avesse venduto tutto il suo.", p. 141.
This is taken almost word for word from the text of Bodin:

This was one of the reasons which made Alphonso King of Naples most odious; for that he gave his swine to his subjects to make fat, and if by chance they died, he made them pay for them; he bought the oyle in Apulia, and gave his own price; and the wheat in grasse; and sold it againe at the higgest price he could, forbidding all others to sell until he had sold his.  

Botero continues in the same breath to describe the dangers of selling honours and offices, taken from the same page as the Alfonso example in Bodin’s text. This sample perhaps explains Botero’s aversion to princely trade, because of the avarice it inspires. Bodin is not quite as concerned with casuistic matters as Botero; rather than discussing it in the context of avarice per se, he characterizes it strictly as bad policy. It is quite interesting that, even though Botero is obviously sampling from Bodin here, he is employing the example in a different argument, one which he clearly developed based on his own agenda.

In dealing with how a prince should tax his subjects, Botero gives us a precept, advising the prince to tax real property and to refrain from taxing personal property. The difference between these two kinds is that the former, a tax on real estate, or rents, refers to progressive taxation based on one’s ability to pay and the latter, a tax on personal property, refers to a flat head tax, where everyone pays the same amount. Indeed, Botero takes this advice from Bodin, who writes that:

[in] other governments [in the French realm, excluding Languedoc and Provence], if there be a clergyman, a nobleman, a counselor, and & a vigneron, the last pays for all and the others are

\[69\] Six Bookes, Bk VI, ch. ii, p. 661.

\[70\] Ibid, Bk VI, ch. ii, p. 661.
free… If then necessitie force the prince to raise some extraordinary imposts, it is needful it should be such as everie one may beare his part, as is the impost of salt, wine, and such like things.\textsuperscript{71}

Bodin here wishes the king to avoid the arbitrariness of the less-than-centralized taxation system in France, which, in many cases, had church benefices and noble offices being farmed out by the Crown to the highest bidder, often leaving the clergy and gentry free from taxation. Botero would have his prince follow this advice, arguing that, if the taxes are real they will not be transferred from the rich to the poor as they would with personal taxation.\textsuperscript{72} Botero may borrow the policy from Bodin, but he uses it in an entirely different way, considering especially that Bodin in no way supports a regular income tax. Notice, he talks about ‘necessitie’ forcing the prince ‘to raise some extraordinary impost.’ Indeed, the two disagree completely on the subject of taxation. For Botero taxes should be regular and manageable, for Bodin, they should be levied only in an emergency.

\textbf{Where the Two Disagree}

In fact, it is on this point of taxation that the two thinkers differ greatly, seeing that Bodin, even though he himself asserts imposts and tariffs to be ordinary revenue,

\textsuperscript{71} Six Bookes, Bk VI, ch. ii, p. 669.

\textsuperscript{72} Botero, Bk VII, ch. iv, p. 136. He writes: "These taxes, however, must not be personal but real, that is, not paid per head but according to property owned; otherwise the whole burden of taxation will fall upon the poor, which is the usual case....", and in the original: "\textit{Ma simili tasse non debbono esser personali, ma reali, cioè non sulle teste, ma sui beni altramente tutto il carico delle taglie acdera sopra de' poveri, come avviene ordinariamente....}", p. 144.
considers direct taxation of the subjects extraordinary, stating that this means of increasing revenue should only be used in times of war, when the state is in dire need of building its war chest. As we have seen from chapter two of this study, Botero explicitly cautions against increasing taxation in times of war especially because of the difficulty and unpopularity of such a measure, opting rather to tax on a constant basis, thereby allowing the prince to defend the state. In addition to responding to Bodin, Botero may have let his personal experience influence his position. Early modern Italy is renowned for being the place of prosperous republican city-states, but by the sixteenth century, it had developed almost exclusively into the land of Spanish-controlled dominions, like that of Cosimo I of Florence. According to Bodin himself, this Grand Duke "did raise out of his estate six millions, having but a small territory.... But a new prince shall doe wisely at his first entrance, to cut off the extraordinary exactions of his predecessor, or at least a great part of them, as well in regard of his own dutie, as to get the good will of his people." Bodin also points out in the same paragraph that both Charles V and Francis I, during their wars in the first half of the sixteenth century, exacted taxes from the duchies of Northern Italy when they were was in their possessions, and it is entirely probable that this policy was continued even after peace was declared in 1559. Botero, having lived in various cities of Italy, would have had a characteristically Italian sense of this tribute turned taxation of the Italian vice-royalties.

Bodin and Botero differ on another point of taxation, their respective ideas on which seem to contradict the political principles of each thinker. Bodin is wont to argue

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73. Six Bookes, Bk VI, ch. ii, p. 663
74. Ibid, BK VI, ch.ii, p. 668.
throughout his text that, even though it is the prince alone who has the authority to tax, a good prince will take advice from his subjects by means of colleges and corporations in general, and the Estates General in particular. This seems to contradict Bodin's political principle that the king be subject to no scrutiny except from above. However, Bodin would not see the meeting of assemblies to involve scrutiny, but rather advice, which the king has every right to ignore, if he supposes his rule to remain unaffected by doing so. In most cases, however, the king would do well to follow the advice of his subjects that he may not overtax or sink into tyranny in any other way, by means of which he will lose his kingdom and not have so much as a board to rest upon. In no way is this to say that Bodin was creating a loophole to the Divine Law that the Prince could not appropriate the property of his subjects. Rather, he is maintaining simply that to follow God's law is solely in the discretion of the sovereign. Bodin cautions in the opposite direction as well, saying that the very colleges and corporations which will prevent the king from becoming a tyrant, may themselves become tyrannical. This reflects Bodin's legal and


76  *Six Bookes*, Bk I, ch. viii, p. 95. He writes: “And in that the greatnesse and majestie of a true sovereign prince, is to bee knowne; when the estat es of all the people assembled together, in all humilitie present their requests and supplications to their prince, without having any power in anything to command or determine, or to give voice, but that that which it pleaseth the king to like or dislike of, to command or forbid, is holden for law, for an edict or ordinance…. For otherwise if the king should be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people, hee should neither be king nor sovereign.”

77  It may be said that J,W. Allen would disagree with the claim that Bodin saw the assemblies as mere advisory boards (*Political Thought*, p. 418-19), but what does Bodin himself have to say. Bodin writes on the king's duties to assemblies: "not for that it is necessarie for the king to rest on their advice, or that he may do not the contrarie to that they demand, if naturall reason and justice do require." *Six Bookes*, Bk I, ch viii, p. 95.

78  *Six Bookes*, Bk I, ch. viii, p. 95. He writes: “Wherein they which have written on the dutie of magistrates, & other such like books, have deceived themselves, in
bureaucratic affinity for the law, and perhaps for the political traditions of the French realm, notwithstanding the fact that in the sixteenth century the king called the Estates General sparingly to say the least. Ultimately, Bodin's political principles are assured by his conclusion that the king not only make all the decisions of the realm, but also remain doing so as far as he is prudent enough to follow his subjects' advice in matters of great interest to him, that is, the preservation of God's law. Their advice may be tainted or incorrect; the king’s knowledge of God’s law must be absolute.

Botero too seems to stray from his political principles by not even mentioning any form of assembly or college in the context of taxation, as one who turns the prince's head downward to the people as the source of his power might do. He spends much of his text outlining the various particular precepts the prince should follow in the reasoning of state, like this advice on taxation- that the prince should not collect from the people more than they bring into the state by their trade. It is by following such precepts that Botero’s prince will necessarily win himself the affection and admiration of his subjects. For Botero, the prince may look down for his power without explicitly soliciting the opinions of his subjects. When at any time he is not maintaining his status with his subjects, he will know about it, "for when a people is burdened beyond its resources, either they leave the country or turn against the ruler or go over to an enemy power."  

The most fundamental difference between Bodin and Botero’s respective systems maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the prince; a thing which oft times causeth the true subjects to revolt from the obedience which they owe to their sovereign prince....”

79 In the sixteenth century, the Estates General met one time before the publication of Bodin's text in 1576. That was in 1560.

80 Ibid., Bk I, ch. ivx, p. 17.
of political economy is in how they view public and private authority, and any assessment of how one influenced the other will best be framed in such terms. For Bodin, the two authorities are very strictly separated. The king has absolute authority over public policy and resources, and each individual, in turn, has absolute authority over his own private affairs and property. Bodin cites the law of God found in Scripture to support his view, stating that the king’s authority to make law is absolute, except when it intercedes in a father’s authority over his family, which is inviolable. According to Scripture, fathers have an absolute right to dispose of the lives of their children, and kings may have no say in how a father rules his household. Likewise, private individuals have no place challenging the king’s authority, even if he becomes a tyrant. It is the king alone who will make the laws of the realm, for the good or the bad, and the only recourse open to the subject is disobedience, rather than revolt or outright regicide.

So too does Bodin believe this to be the case with public and private property. The king may use the resources of the realm in any way he sees fit for the benefit of the public good, including levying tariffs on shipped goods and taking part in trade himself. Where the king’s economic authority ends is at the property of the private subject.\textsuperscript{81} The king has no right to this without either the consent of his subjects or an emergency necessitating some kind of appropriation.\textsuperscript{82} Should the king do otherwise with the goods

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Ibid.}, Bk I, ch. ii, p. 12. Bodin writes: “So the lawfull and certaine government of a familie, divideth every privat mans wives and children, servants and goods, from all other mens families: as also that which is unto every particular man proper, from that which is to them all common in general, that is to say, from a Commonweale.”

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Ibid.}, Bk VI, ch. ii, p. 663.
of his subjects, he will be casting aside the law of God, the only law which he himself is absolutely bound to uphold, and putting his own rule in peril. In Bodin’s view, political and economic authority is sanctioned directly by God, and it is exclusive for both the public and private realm; that of the public may not touch the private and that of the private may not challenge the public. He writes: “Whereby it evidently appeareth this opinion for the communitie of all things to be erroneous, seeing Commonweales to have been to that end founded and appointed by God, to give unto them that which is common; and unto every man in privat, that which unto him in privat belongeth.”

Botero is somewhat more casual in his separation of the public and private spheres of political and economic authority. The reason for this is perhaps that the relationship he conceives between the prince and the people is one in many ways of mutual benefit, and mutual accountability. In the *Reason of State*, he makes much mention of the prince’s duty to administer justice to his people, and in turn the peoples’ responsibility to contribute to the wealth and prestige of the prince, without which he could not secure their justice, and so on…. Even though Botero acknowledges a difference between the public and private, there is not nearly such a strong statement against the prince’s right to the private goods of his subjects, or the subjects’ right to recall the political authority of the prince. Given Botero’s thoughts on the origin of princes, and his place in the context of Thomistic political thought, his prince is in fact quite dependent on the people; it is only by a grant from the community, the private authority, that the prince may take his place as head of the state, the public authority. The public authority is therefore connected to the private.

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Like Bodin, Botero maintains that the prince has control over the public goods of the state. The prince may impose tariffs, but he should not take part in trade himself, except in special circumstances, saying that this is more suited to men of private station. Botero’s prince also has an authority over the goods of his subjects that Bodin’s king does not have. This authority is conditional on his administration of justice. Botero allows his prince to tax the subjects on a regular basis, in complete distinction to Bodin. However, Botero’s prince must never abuse this right to levy taxes. On the whole, Botero’s prince has a broader authority over the people than Bodin’s king, but it is not absolute. Bodin’s king has absolute authority in the state but no claim on the people’s property, and the subjects have no claim on his authority; Botero’s prince does have a claim on the people’s property but is ultimately answerable to the people for his authority.

In the end we can say that Bodin and Botero were both mercantilists. It would be pointless to assess which one was more of a mercantilist than the other. On the other hand, it is important to look at how each of them embraces the idea of mercantilism in his overall political economy, and to assess their programs in a qualitative rather than quantitative sense; Yes, they were both mercantilists, but they were different kinds of mercantilists. The primary end of mercantilist policies was to produce for one's state a favourable balance of trade in relation to other states, thereby giving them power over those states. Remember though, the state has a different meaning depending on where one is, and on how one conceives of political authority. This is not to say that one is more of a mercantilist than the other because he proposes more mercantilist ideas; instead,
Botero can be considered to be more of a liberal mercantilist thinker, given his attitude that the people be the prime economic mover in the state, while Bodin places more emphasis on the crown’s economic activity. In this way, Botero is presenting an economic program quite consistent with his notion of political authority, in accord with that of the Jesuits, that the people are the basis of power, both politically and economically. Given their respective overall economic principles discussed earlier- Bodin being more interested in the king’s direct control over the generation of wealth in the state, and Botero more concerned with placing in the hands of the people the power to generate wealth- it is clear that the latter anticipates the economic policies associated with the more liberal states of the seventeenth century, like England and the Netherlands, the countries of Thomans Mun and Justus Lipsius respectively, themselves perhaps influenced by Botero, than the thinker whose kingdom would enact more absolutist mercantilist policies under Louis XIV and Colbert.

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Conclusion

This thesis began as an investigation into the general economic influences on the work of Giovanni Botero, but has ended up doing quite a bit more. It has in fact revealed the fundamental political and economic principles of this thinker. It is not enough to look at what he thought about economics. What is far more important is how he thought about political economy; what was his purpose for advising the prince on the financial management of the state? In first looking at his thoughts on the matter as he outlines them in the *Reason of State*, and to a lesser extent the *Magnificence of Cities*, then showing how he came to focus on this, based on his education under the Jesuits, and finally comparing his work to that of his contemporary Jean Bodin, we have been able in the end to understand not only what he thought, but *how* he thought, and the difference is an important one. What were his predispositions and assumptions about the world? What was his ideal for human society? Botero was interested in promoting justice in the political entity he considered to be the most important to the sixteenth century world, the state. He writes in the *Reason of State* that in his contemporary world, the traditional means of securing the good life, that is Christian charity, is no longer adequate and that "because men are imperfect and charity grows continually colder, justice must set up her seat among them and administer the laws so that order may prevail in cities and peace and tranquility in communities of men."¹ He realizes that attending to the material world

¹ Botero, *Reason of State*, Bk I, ch xii, p. 16. He writes in the original: "Ma perché gli uomini sono per l'ordinario imperfetti e la carità va continuamente raffredando, bisogna, per rassettare le città per tenere in pace e in quiete le communanze degli uomini, che la giustizia vi pianti il suo seggio e vi faccia ragione."
is just as important as attending to the spiritual. Yet, in order for justice to reign supreme, the two worlds must in fact be reconciled, and brought together into a unified whole.

Botero's overall political economy should first be understood in light of his exposure to natural law under the Jesuits. On the one hand, his education in their schools laid the groundwork for his general interest in economic matters, which, as we have seen, developed from the neo-Thomist theories on natural law. Ideas on natural law also predisposed him to having a political sense which placed the power of the prince in the hands of the people. In both these respects, politically and economically, Botero's understanding of natural law theory led to his pursuit of justice in the state. It can be argued that Botero's early writing career never sought to reconcile the two topics, as he was interested in publishing works related to religious fortitude among kings and preachers, exhibited respectively by his works De regia sapientia (1583) and De praedicatore verbi Dei (1585). It was upon his reading of Jean Bodin's Six Books of the Republic in 1585 that Botero began to focus on a political economy that would promote justice in the state as he had understood the concept for years previous, but had had neither the ambition nor method for expressing it. Bodin's work was a prominent example of how economics could be presented in a political context. Botero then borrowed the format, and, considering a number of the economic ideas and using many of the rhetorical devices for expressing those ideas, grafted them onto his Jesuit political sensibility in writing the Reason of State.

The question remains: how does Botero reconcile these two major influences in his general theory of political economy, neither wholly Bodinian nor wholly Jesuit, but encompassing both? Botero does indeed synthesize these influences in a mercantilist
theory which involves the transfer of both wealth and authority from subjects to prince, so that the latter may administer to the needs of the former without overstepping the parameters of his position. In this synthesis, Botero's economic vision of the relationship between prince and subject is completely consistent with his political one. Indeed, Botero's mercantilist plan for society provides the material symbol for the divinely inspired relationship between prince and subject. Just as authority is transferred upwards to the prince from the people, so too is wealth. Remember, Botero's most explicit mention of natural law comes in his discussion of the ways and means by which the subjects are no longer expected to abide the prince's rule. In the section on royal justice between prince and subject, Botero gives abusive taxation as the first cause of revolt. This is important. If the prince attempts to draw too much money through excessive taxation, the people must necessarily see this to be a usurpation of too much authority, authority which is rightfully theirs by divine command. A prince who acts this way will drive his subjects to leave the state, join the enemy, or even revolt against him directly.\(^2\) The people should not be averse to some direct taxation, for the prince requires it to maintain peace and security for them, as it is his divine duty. The constant stream of royal taxation Botero imagines is for this immediate end. More than this, Botero argues that the prince must neither expend his revenues frivolously nor hoard wealth in his coffers.\(^3\) In the long term, then, the prince's overall management of the state's wealth is the concrete indicator for how well he fulfils his duty, and the qualifier for the degree to which his subjects need

\(^2\) Reason of State, Bk I, ch xiv, p. 17.

\(^3\) Ibid., Bk I, ch xiv, p. 18. He writes: "A sovereign must be equally careful not to expend frivolously his revenues, for these are no less than the blood and sweat of his vassals."
be obedient. Not only is the people's obligation to the prince gauged by his revenues on their property and industry, but so too is his degree of authority over them. The more money the prince tries to extract beyond the people's means, the less he will find himself recognized as the just ruler of a just state.
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