HENRI BOURASSA AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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by
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ABSTRACT

Henri Bourassa, 1868-1952, was a Canadian politician and journalist. He was a Member of Parliament from 1896-1904 and from 1926-35 and editor of Le Devoir, the Montreal daily he founded in 1910, from 1910-32. As a Canadian Nationalist, he attacked closer imperial ties between Britain and Canada and fought restrictions on the use of the French language throughout the Dominion, in the two decades prior to World War I. Both these struggles climaxed during the war. Imperialism in Canada reached its zenith in 1917 with the adoption of conscription and the institution of the Victory Loan campaign. The fight for French language rights climaxed in Ontario in 1915-16. As well as criticizing imperialism and French language restrictions, Bourassa pointed out the problems Canada would face unless she ended her war effort. He wanted his country to be independent and neutral in North America. As the war progressed, he realized that the conflict in Europe was destroying Christian civilization. Only the adoption of Pope Benedict XV's peace proposals by the belligerents could prevent this development. Canada also had to follow Christian principles if she was to reconstruct herself from the destruction she had suffered during the war. Only these principles could combat the imperialism and materialism that had caused the conflict. By the end of the war, Bourassa was placing less emphasis on Nationalism, more on Christianity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Canada in the first two decades of the twentieth century faced the evils of industrialization and urbanization. The new and expanding industrial enterprises carried in their wake seasonal employment, poor working conditions, and labour exploitation. They also caused the accumulation of millions of Canadians in overcrowded and unsanitary dwellings in the cities. When a recession in one business or the industry as a whole occurred, thousands of these people were thrown on the private and public dole, straining them both. Aggravating these problems were large numbers of recently-arrived immigrants, who fell victim to this system.

Such a situation gave rise to reformers, such as J. S. Woodsworth and Henri Bourassa, who were concerned with economic and social conditions. In 1909 Woodsworth wrote Strangers within our gates, decrying the fact that because her immigration policy was not selective Canada was receiving the criminal and lazy classes of Europe. By 1911, when he wrote My neighbor, he had broadened his outlook to see that those suffering from socio-economic problems were the victims of a system that emphasized individual success. The solution was twofold: to alleviate that suffering through social work and to prevent it by instilling the new ideal of the social gospel, based on Christian brotherhood, throughout society. Bourassa also believed that Christian principles had a social function, advocating their use in the business world to prevent the abuses of capitalism. One result of that proposal would be an improvement in the lot of the workers. Another, less obvious, would be the survival of the French Canadians.
For him, Catholicism, the religion of these people, was the only true Christianity. In Quebec, Protestant English Canadians and English-speaking Americans dominated business. Tempering it with Catholic principles would reduce the grip of the Anglo-Saxons and hence lessen the degree of French assimilation to the English. He sought the same two results when he called for the establishment of Catholic trade unions in his province. A union would improve workers' conditions, while Catholicism would preserve their French-Canadian heritage and prevent their absorption into a nonsectarian American international. Immigration also worried Bourassa, for the incoming Central and Southeastern Europeans upset the country's French-English balance, upon which his concept of Confederation was based. Furthermore, they posed a threat to Canada. French Canadians put her interests first; English Canadians often put Britain's first; the immigrants were sure to put their homelands' interests ahead of their adopted country's. Instead of bringing thousands of foreigners into the Dominion, the government should promote French-Canadian colonization of the West, thus preserving the country's duality and independent existence. He believed that the best settler for the West would be the Canadian citizen, from Eastern Canada or repatriated from the United States, who had settled the older parts of Canada.

To the desire to improve society through the application of Christian principles, which he shared with men like Woodsworth, Bourassa added a concern for the survival of French Canada's traditions and language, a goal that reflected his heritage and upbringing. Born in 1868 in Montreal, he was raised, upon the early death of his mother, by his aunt, Ezilda Papineau. His primary education ended in 1882 at Plateau School in Montreal.
Thereafter, as he states, the rest of what he learned he owed to his "spiritual father", Frédéric André, from whom he acquired a universal curiosity and a desire to learn. He also attended two more schools: the Polytechnical School in Montreal in 1885, where he studied mathematics, and Holy Cross College in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1886. He regarded the latter year as an experience that broadened his outlook, for he was the only French-speaking student in an English school and for the first time he had left his protected environment in Quebec. His aunt, Ezilda, and uncle, Médard Bourassa, an Oblate, both ultramontanes, and Édouard Desjardins, one of his father's friends and co-author of the "Programme Catholique" of 1871, taught him to be a devout Catholic. As a youth, he was influenced by the French historian de Maistre, who advocated the fusion of patriotism and religion, by the French Catholic polemicist Louis Veuillot, who championed Catholic schools and called for supra-party patriotism, and by the conservative and ultramontane French-Canadian newspapers, La Vérité and L'Étendard. In his uncle Médard's library Bourassa read these authors and papers, and through them developed his ideas on the Catholic Church's vital role in society. If only the above had influenced Henri, he probably would not have become a national figure. The fact that he did is due to the influence of his grandfather, Louis Joseph Papineau, the anti-clerical leader of the Patriotes of 1837, a rouge and defender of the rights of the French Canadians. From him Bourassa acquired an orator's temperament and an invincible independence. He also inherited half his grandfather's seigneurial title at Montebello, where he absorbed himself in his habitants' welfare and where his concern for people developed. The people responded to his concern and elected him mayor of Montebello when he was twenty-one. This was his first public office.
But his political career had begun earlier, with the Riel affair, the key to his political debut. Riel's execution stirred him to participate in politics. A Liberal, he supported Honoré Mercier, Quebec's Liberal leader, during these years. Profiting by French-Canadian nationalism, aroused by Riel's hanging, Mercier formed a National government in Quebec in 1887 and, as premier, kept alive the racial conflict between English and French by means of the Jesuits' Estates Act, which, by appointing the Pope to distribute funds to Catholic claimants in Quebec, provoked cries of "No Popery!" in Ontario. In the 1890s the conflict centred on minority rights in the West, specifically public support for denominational schools in Manitoba. Associated with this dispute was the use of French as a language of instruction. Bourassa was concerned with the latter issue, for he believed in the equality of French and English everywhere in the country. After his election to Parliament in 1896 he was sent with Israel Tarte, Laurier's Minister of Public Works, to Manitoba to reach a compromise with provincial authorities.

Before his first term as a Member of Parliament expired, Bourassa became involved with the issue most closely connected to his name: imperialism. In 1899 Britain called on her colonies for aid in a war against the Boers in South Africa. Prime Minister Laurier, not wanting to become involved in the "vortex of militarism", yet wishing to please English Canadians desirous of supporting the mother country, compromised by sending volunteers that England would maintain. Thus there would be no precedent for Canada sending troops to future British wars. Bourassa denounced such reasoning, for, as he saw it, the precedent was the established fact; Canada was to support all Britain's wars. He opposed such a state of
affairs because he felt that his country had no role in the formulation of the policy that led up to those wars or how they were conducted. He was against taxation without representation. A more important reason for his opposition was his belief that Canada should go to war only for her own, not England's, interests. 14

By 1900 he had become involved with the two issues that were to mark his prominence in the Dominion: French-English relations and imperialism. Anglo-Saxon racial superiority had contributed to the growth of both imperial feeling and English nativism. But imperialism was not solely racism: it involved the belief of many Canadians that their country would achieve greatness only through closer association with Britain. 15 Bourassa rejected this idea for his type of nationalism believed Canada would be great on her own. 16 Furthermore, he saw closer imperial ties as an attack on Confederation. Its authors had recognized the Dominion's duty to defend only its own territory. Canadian participation in any British war outside of Canadian territory was thus a breach of the constitution. 17 Since imperialism was leading Canada to take part in British wars, it was a threat to the Dominion. As for nativism, Bourassa saw it primarily as a further attempt to destroy Confederation, the Anglo-French compact. 18 English Canadians were leading this attack, for they believed that Canada as a British nation must be English. Bourassa knew that his country as a British nation was Anglo-French. 19 Thus to preserve the Dominion, he fought for French language rights and against imperialism. These were the stands of the French Canadians as well. For Bourassa the French-Canadian position was the Canadian one, for the French Canadians knew what the country's true interests were. He took it upon himself to educate the
remainder of Canadians in these interests. His means were the political and journalistic platforms.

His political career began early and encompassed all three levels of government. At twenty-one he had become mayor of Montebello. He was a federal member 1896-1904 and 1926-35, and a member of the Quebec Assembly 1904-08. As well as speaking in these parliamentary bodies, he spoke to the public, for he believed they should know the issues. To further this aim he was a journalist, an occupation that began for him in Montebello when he edited L'Interprète and continued when, as a provincial politician, he contributed articles to the independent Nationalist daily, Le Nationaliste, founded in 1904 by Olivar Asselin. In 1910 Bourassa founded his own independent Nationalist newspaper, Le Devoir, which he directed and edited until 1932.

Since he wanted to educate people, he explained every problem at great length, exploring each argument, its good points and bad, before stating his own opinion and why it was best. This manner of arguing left him open to being accused of "playing with fire", seemingly advocating a policy in contradiction with his earlier statements. He never did. He explored all possibilities fully, forcing his audience to read his speeches and editorials carefully in order to ascertain his argument. Yet the subjects he was dealing with were emotional, not given to reasoned discourses that his impassioned opponents would not read. His dialogues could have been simpler, stating only his policy. Then he might not have been misunderstood. However, since he appealed to reason in his arguments, he had to show why it supported his stand and not those of others. Thus his discourses became complex and open to varying interpretations.
Their other characteristic was their crusading spirit, for Bourassa was not only a commentator but an advocate. His newspaper, for example, had a social and political program for Quebec and Canada. In order to win acceptance of that program, he often resorted to exaggeration and misrepresentation. This trait, when added to the passion his policies aroused among his opponents, resulted in the following statements:

And so he goes on, this preacher of discord and strife, this snarling Ananias, seeking to stir up rebellion in the hearts of his French-Canadian readers by making it appear that everything is wrong, everything vile, everything corrupt—nothing honest, nothing sincere, nothing worthy.

And this is the man to whom we are asked to give a 'courteous hearing'—this fomentor of strife, this breeder of rebellion, this hater of all things British, this cowardly misrepresenter of facts—this journalistic snake in the grass.

Thus Bourassa, the man of reason, contributed to national discord. But his policy was national unity, a fact few people realized in the period 1896-1918. After the stress and tension of the war had passed, Canada began to reflect. Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, a former Minister of Justice in Laurier's government, stated, in a letter to Le Devoir's editor in 1920, that the journalist's policy during the war might prove to have been the wisest one. No one can presume to judge absolutely. The discussion that follows attempts to determine Bourassa's significance for the times.

Why World War I? During that period the emphasis in his thought changed, because he had failed to prevent the climax of the French-English conflict and imperialism in Canada and because the war had marked the collapse of Western civilization. Bourassa's solace, his Roman Catholic faith, became his new cure for the old sufferings that remained and the new ones that appeared after 1918.
CHAPTER II
CANADA FIRST

Imperialism dominated the early years of Bourassa's public life. His first pamphlet, Grande Bretagne et Canada in 1902, dealt with this issue, exploring the relations between Canada and Britain arising from the former's participation in the latter's war against the Boers in South Africa, 1899-1902. The French Canadian defined English imperialism as colonial contributions in men and money, but above all men, to the mother country's wars. The danger or war was increasing because the jingoist policies of Britain's leaders were bringing her Empire into intense rivalry with its competitors. Faced with the likelihood of conflict, England was seeking to strengthen herself, by increasing the size of her army and navy. Her own population did not supply enough volunteers, and conscription would be resisted by her workers, following their tradition of voluntary enlistment. Neither would it be accepted by the colonies, unwilling to pay forced tribute. But they might give their men freely, if an imperial sentiment could be developed among them. "England wants soldiers and sailors; to induce the colonials to furnish them, she will employ all the possible forces of attraction", such as commercial reciprocity or political representation. These forces were doing their job. Imperialism was growing in Canada, due to public indifference nurtured by party newspapers, strict party discipline, and the absence of a non-partisan educated class concerning itself with political issues.¹

Bourassa saw his role as that of a disinterested citizen battling the wrong of imperialism. But he was not disinterested. He advocated
the preservation of the status quo, colonialism, although he would reject the colonial label. He wanted to see the development of a national consciousness that would result in Canada's problems being solved on the basis of mutual respect between her two races and exclusive duty to the country. In Canada there were no victors or vanquished, only two allies, neither of whom had the right to ask the other to assume new political links with either of the mother countries. Was she then to be independent? No. Since her people were not yet sufficiently united for that step, she would continue as a self-governing part of the British Empire. If imperialism triumphed there would be a violent backlash when Englishmen and Canadians compared notes; for the latter thought of the issue in economic terms, the former, in military ones. The reaction would lead the Dominion to independence. Bourassa saw a difference, however, between the independence of a strong and united people and that of a disunited one, which would quickly be absorbed by the powerful United States. What he wanted was "that between the old English frigate that threatens to sink and the American corsair that is preparing to collect its waifs, we manoeuvre our boat with care and steadfastness in order that it does not become swallowed up in the abyss of one or carried away in the wake of the other". His policy was independence in the future, but for the time being the status quo, which meant opposition to imperialism.

In 1914 he appeared to have dropped the second half of this policy when he supported Canadian participation in Britain's war in Europe. On September 8 in Le Devoir he argued that Canada had no moral or constitutional obligation or interest that would involve her in the war. If she was independent she would be secure and at peace, since her territory
was not exposed to attack from any of the belligerents. She was at war only because she was a British colony. Since the mother country had declared war, for its own interests and without consulting its colonies, its duty was to defend them, not vice versa. Yet as an embryonic nation, a human community, the Dominion could not remain indifferent to the European conflict. As an Anglo-French nation, tied to England and France by a thousand ethnic, social, intellectual, and economic links, it had a vital interest in the survival of these nations and the maintenance of their prestige, power, and freedom of action. Canada's duty was to contribute to the triumph and above all the endurance of the combined efforts of Britain and France. To make her contribution useful, she must take a look at the real situation, render an exact account of what she could do, and assure her internal security before she undertook an effort she might not be able to sustain for the duration of the conflict. 3

This was support for Canadian participation in the war and hence support for British imperialism—that is, Canadian contributions to the mother country's war. In 1899 Bourassa had opposed the Dominion's involvement in Britain's war in South Africa, yet in 1914 he supported such involvement in Britain's war in Europe. Why in the latter year did he support the imperialism he had been fighting for fifteen years? Perhaps because of a conflict between his nationalist and religious thought. In a pastoral letter of September 23, 1914, the hierarchy of Quebec acquiesced in the sending of troops overseas. 4 Bourassa wrote Archbishop Bruchési of Montreal, asking him if the letter was to be considered a directive. No, replied the churchman, you are free to speak and write as you wish. 5 Two years later the journalist wrote that the pastoral letter was not
a dogmatic teaching. But had he tried to follow it? In May 1916, in a letter to a Monseigneur Gauthier of Montreal, he stated that he had tried to maintain a position in 1914 loyal to the principles he had defended for fifteen years, Nationalism, but one that would not place Le Devoir in opposition to the hierarchy. This inner conflict does not explain his inconsistency. The hierarchy drew up its pastoral letter two weeks after the appearance of the article in which Bourassa supported participation. He may have guessed the clergy's attitude, but to make sure he could have waited until the twenty-third, even at the risk of leaving his readers dangling.

There is another more plausible reason for his attitude: he wanted to aid the land of his ancestors, France. In that country when the war broke out, he was impressed by the way Frenchmen put aside their individual differences for the national good. Believing that perhaps Canadians could act the same way, he returned home to support the "national" war effort. As it became imperialist, he turned against it. Jules Fournier, a former Nationalist colleague, found three faults with Bourassa's stand. First, it assumed that the character of the war effort had changed from national to imperial. Fournier knew that it had been imperial from the first day of the war. Bourassa had deceived himself by believing that it had been national. Secondly, the stand of the editor of Le Devoir assumed that he opposed only the imperial character of the war, when in fact he opposed all wars. As pointed out below, he did believe that Canada could always be at peace. Thirdly, the stand assumed that there were two periods in Bourassa's thought, one when he was for and one against participation. Fournier knew that there was only one, when the editor...
of Le Devoir was for and against: for in appearance, against thoroughly and furiously.¹¹ Fournier could not explain that inconsistency. The explanation is that Bourassa let his emotional love for France temporarily overcome the anti-imperial stand he had adopted since 1899.

But as a man of reason he could never admit to being swayed by emotion. Thus he deluded himself into believing that his country's participation was in its national interest. Such a belief ignored the growth of imperial sentiment in Canada and the remarks of the leaders of her federal parties, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Prime Minister Borden, in the Special War Session of Parliament on August 19, 1914, that Canada supported Britain in her fight.¹²

By October Bourassa had overcome his temporary aberration of September and had returned to his policy of opposition to imperialism, which meant opposition to his country's participation in the war. On October 20, in an article significantly entitled "Tout pour l'Empire, Rien pour le Canada", he denounced the Dominion's leaders for not taking measures proper to support the country's war effort and for allowing profiteers to speculate on the equipping of troops and the organization of "Patriotic Funds".¹³ A week later, he expressed fear for his country's future because of the appeal made to French Canadians to enlist in order to aid their "second mother country", France. If that country and Britain became enemies after the present war, Canada would be split by racial strife. This argument assumed that both English and French Canadians would put their European ancestral lands ahead of their own. He believed they would, for they were responding to recruiting that emphasized those nations, not Canada.¹⁴

On October 31 he censured the Dominion's leaders for not organizing the
economy in order to increase production, reduce suffering, and limit spec-
ulation.\textsuperscript{15} Two speeches by Conservative ministers in November confirmed
Bourassa in his belief that his country's war effort had become imperial.
Speaking in Toronto, Borden stated that Canada would send as many troops
as needed to save the Empire. For \textit{Le Devoir}'s editor this was imperialism,
a commitment of unlimited Canadian manpower to Britain's war effort.
In Winnipeg, Solicitor-General Meighen went further by declaring that
the government was ready to bankrupt the country to save the Empire.\textsuperscript{16}
Reports of the speech in the two Winnipeg dailies of the time make no
reference to "save the Empire".\textsuperscript{17} For Bourassa this phrase was implied,
because the war was not in Canada's direct interest, only Britain's. The
Dominion had an interest in helping the Allies endure, but this fell far
short of bankrupting itself.

In 1915 in \textit{Que devons-nous à l'Angleterre?} he explained why he op-
pposed participation. If Canada had looked only at her own interests in
1914 she would not have actively involved herself in the war. However,
she could not stand idly by watching Britain and France suffer; she had
to help them endure, provided their action was just and not a threat to
world peace. France would never act as a menace; England would and did.
In his country, the English were destroying the French and Catholic civ-
ilization. Canada should have declared that her intervention was national,
in her own interest, and that she would support Britain and France as
long as her interests and theirs coincided. This had not been done. Under
the party truce, or, more correctly, the hypocritical complicity of blind
and corrupt politicians, British imperialism had triumphed in the Dominion.
Using various pretexts, such as love of France, the imperialists had per-
suaded French Canadians to serve England and recognize in fact the obligation they had always denied: to participate in all the mother country's wars. The national tradition of no participation in imperial wars had been reversed. For the sacrifice of her soldiers in Britain's war, Canada would receive nothing, no territorial gains like South Africa or Australia.¹⁸ She would become further indebted, cut off from English finances needed in Britain, and forced to turn, at the risk of annexation, to the United States for help in reconstruction. By sacrificing herself for England in the war, Canada had sold her soul and the salvation of her children. Her only hope was that the next generation would repair the errors of the present one and return her to her national traditions.¹⁹

The imperialists had used the war as a means of attaining their goal: the involvement of the colonies in all the mother country's conflicts. Under their influence, Canada's intervention took on disastrous proportions for her national security and economic equilibrium, treasonable acts according to Bourassa.²⁰ The country's economy was already in a shaky condition because of excessive spending and borrowing in recent years. Even before the war a recession had set in; the war aggravated it.²¹ Bourassa feared that a heavy war effort would ruin the economy.²² He wanted Canadians to concern themselves with their country's internal problems. Instead of contributing to the Red Cross, Belgian Relief, and the Patriotic Fund, they should help their own poor and unemployed.²³ As well as a numerous, ardent, and disciplined army to fight the war, there should be one to fight misery.²⁴ Unfortunately, Canada's leaders did not think in these terms, as others did. The French formed a National Committee of politicians and leading citizens whose cry was "Forward Citizens!"
They organized work for the old, women, the young, and wounded soldiers. After taking a census of factories, they organized the unemployed to work in the empty ones. In England Lord Milner called for agricultural mobilization in order to increase the country's food supply and hence avoid starvation. Hastened prevailed in Canada. She would not be able to sustain her war effort until steps were taken to stimulate economic production, accelerate money circulation, and diminish unemployment and misery. These steps were necessary as a means not only of giving work and bread to the population, but also of helping France, Belgium, and Britain endure. Victory would go to the nations able to feed their armies and populations the longest.

Le Devoir's editor felt that if the Borden government was sincere in its desire to aid the Allies, it must take over, temporarily at least and without compensation, the unused lands granted to the Canadian Pacific Railway, the Canadian Northern Railway, the Hudson's Bay Company, and any others. It must then put the unemployed on these lands and provide them with the equipment, animals, and seed necessary to farm. The resulting rise in agricultural production would prevent an increase in prices for consumers the following year. The number of unemployed would drop, easing the strain on municipal welfare budgets and private charity, and removing a potential source of revolution. Stagnant industries, such as construction and transportation, would be stimulated, further reducing unemployment. "And the ultimate and permanent result? These ten or fifteen thousand new farms established on the open prairie, will they not return a hundredfold the temporary sacrifices made by the state? Will not that be the true national colonisation, more useful than the immigration of
foreign settlers practised at great expense for fourteen years?"27 This argument's biggest flaw was its presumption that unemployed city-dwellers would want to go back to the land and would make good farmers. The truth was the opposite.

The significance of the above was that Bourassa was equating socio-economic problems and the war effort. Temperance groups used the spirit of sacrifice prevailing in Canada during the war to gain acceptance of prohibition. He was appealing to a similar spirit, that of doing one's best. Canada's best policy was to develop herself economically, as a means of benefiting herself and helping the Allies. The journalist found a supporter in Finance Minister White, who called for increased agricultural and industrial production. The French Canadian found in this call an answer to Meighen's bankruptcy policy and hoped White could win his colleagues over.28

By February 13, 1915, he knew the Finance Minister had not. The Canadian debt was rising and by 1916 would be double its pre-war amount. In two years Canada, because of her participation in the European conflict, would assume a debt equal to that accumulated over the last half-century to build the country. "We see what it costs to 'become a part of a great Empire'". In order to avoid insolvency, White announced the postponement of all new public works for the duration of the war. Since the situation probably would remain critical for a long time after the war, there would be little government action to develop the economy. In Canada artificial links, such as railways, were needed to tie the country together, because geography did not favour east-west unity. Since these links might not be expanded, one of the effects of Canadian partic-
ipation in the quarrel overseas could be the rupture of Confederation. The saviours of the Empire would thus be the destroyers of their own country. Bourassa was being unfair. No one in 1914 could have predicted the length or the cost of the war, but since Canada had promised to do her utmost she had to bear the cost, which by 1915 was proving to be heavy. The imperialists had not caused this development; the war had. Furthermore, although the financial situation was becoming critical, steps could and would be taken to meet it, some in the very budget speech he was criticizing.

Continuing to pass judgment on that speech, the journalist stated that, since money was the sinew of war, most nations at war had raised taxes. Poor but extravagant Canada, who had been on a spree for the last twenty years, urgently needed to follow their lead. She faced a loss in her tariff revenues and the sudden drying-up of her sources of credit in Britain. To repay her debts and meet the formidable cost of her military expenses, 100 million annually, she had added $190 million to her budget. In order to meet an increased deficit, the Minister of Finance proposed new loans that would place the burden on future generations for whose individual and political liberty the present one was fighting. Bourassa believed that such a proposal was without conscience; the minister should raise taxes instead. White disagreed, arguing that, because the war was causing disarray in the country's finances, the time was inopportune. The French Canadian found this excuse weak, for the disorder would worsen as the war continued. The minister was proposing loans only because the imperialists, who controlled the government, did not want naive Canadians to realize the cost of imperial solidarity. Bourassa was repeating
his belief that Canada was at war because of the imperial revolution. In fact, the imperialists did not control the government and the budget reflected, not imperialism, but the conservative financial beliefs of its author, Thomas White. The editor of Le Devoir refused to believe that the Canadian government, like all governments, expecting a short war, did not want to threaten the country's financial and economic stability through radical measures. He blamed the imperial conspiracy, not the government's inherent conservatism, for its unwillingness to tax Canadians directly for the war.

On March 4, he returned to his criticism of the war effort from an economic standpoint. He was upset that in order to help Britain the Canadian Parliament had sent troops overseas and sacrificed the Dominion's present and future economic well-being. Both parties were guilty of supporting these policies. Instead of sending more soldiers to the slaughter, Canada should keep her men at home to produce the goods English workers, in conflict with their government, would not produce. Bourassa felt he had found support for his economic arguments in Lloyd George's call for more workers and increased production to strengthen the English war effort. Not exactly. Britain's Minister of Munitions was reacting to the military situation in Europe, where 1915 disclosed that guns and shells more than men determined victory. The French Canadian was not reacting to military problems, but advocating a policy in his country's "national" interest. Prime Minister Borden, who in 1916 persuaded the Allied governments to purchase goods in quantity from Canada, implemented Bourassa's policy. Thereafter until the war's end Canadian industry boomed.
But whatever the government did, Bourassa was not satisfied. For example, in his 1916 budget speech White proposed new taxes on industrial and commercial profits, the beginning of taxes on revenue. One would expect that the journalist would welcome this proposal, for he had called for increased taxes in 1915. Yet he continued to criticize, stating that if the present administration continued the Dominion's exaggerated participation, within two years all revenue would be taxed. The minister was confiscating profits by making his new taxes retroactive to August 3, 1914. Commerce, industry, all sources of revenue, and savings were in danger of being placed at the whim of Parliament. A year and a half later, when the minister introduced the income tax, which earlier he had refused to do, Bourassa attacked him for somersaulting. The proposal was, however, in line with the French Canadian's earlier argument that the war should be paid for through direct taxation. White could accuse his critic of somersaulting in his criticism. Bourassa was so thoroughly against the war effort that he was beginning to use conflicting and unreasonable arguments. Witness his reasoning for the introduction of the income tax: not only to meet the expenses of raising additional troops, but also to succour the profiteers. Nothing was further from White's mind; he introduced this measure because of the demands to conscript wealth as well as manpower.

Bourassa's economic argument was a strong one, but it was always secondary to the political one of whether Canada had any obligation to help England. He used the former stand as a means of strengthening the latter. If he could show that Canadian economic interests were best served by a moderate war effort, he might win support for reducing the degree
of his country's involvement. He was unsuccessful; the war effort remained heavy, for the government was committed to participation. He was not. He believed the war was a British one that the Dominion had no direct interest in. When he put Canadian interests first, he was advocating no involvement. When the government put Canadian interests first, it was undertaking intense participation. Bourassa failed to understand the latter viewpoint, for he believed that his alone was right.

He saw no constitutional or moral reason for Canada to participate in Britain's war, for "Great Britain, solely responsible for her foreign policy, is solely obliged to carry the burden [of that policy]. Canada, devoid of all authority and even national existence outside of her territory, is not obliged to participate in the defense of the Empire, except to assure the security of her own territory". These were the principles on which the Fathers of Confederation had based the constitution and on which Anglo-Canadian relations since 1867 had developed. The Dominion should not contribute to the defense of the Empire beyond its own shores because Canadians exercised authority over themselves only on their own territory. In all foreign affairs, including declaration of war, they had less power than an ordinary Englishman, who could at least vote his approval or disapproval of the policy of Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. But when the war ended Canadians could not; they could only return to their colonial pasture and bless the peace, or curse it.\[40

Bourassa wanted recognition of Canada as a nation before he would consider involvement in the war. Sir Robert Borden, on the other hand, used participation as a means to recognition. In a letter to Acting Canadian High Commissioner Sir George Perley in London on January 4, 1916, the
Prime Minister complained about the lack of consultation between Britain and the Dominions on war policy. Canada would not tolerate putting four to five hundred thousand men in the field and receiving no more consideration than if they were toy automata. Since the war was being waged by the Empire, there must be consultation; otherwise the situation would be reconsidered.\textsuperscript{41} Borden may have been hinting at a reduction in the Canadian contribution, but, if so, he never went through with it. That he did not was due to the cooperation between the Dominions and Britain that began in 1917 at the Imperial War Conference, where "Great Britain presided, but the Dominions met her on equal terms", and was continued in 1918 with the Committee of Dominion Prime Ministers.\textsuperscript{42} At the 1919 Peace Conference, Canada's Prime Minister, considering it intolerable that the Dominions, who had numbered their dead in the hundreds of thousands, would have a voice only through England, demanded and received a separate seat for his country.\textsuperscript{43} Borden used participation as a means of acquiring consultation and international status for Canada. Bourassa wanted the status first, but the Prime Minister was more pragmatic. He understood that his country had to show the world that it was fit to be a nation. Bourassa believed that Canada had nothing to prove; she was already a nation. Since she was, she could be isolated and neutral in North America, free from the problems of Europe.

The editor of \textit{Le Devoir} voiced this feeling of isolation and neutrality many times, once in 1913 in \textit{Imperial Relations}, where he stated that the United States was Canada's only possible enemy. Since the British fleet, the mother country's strongest weapon, could not prevent American aggression across the border into Canada, he felt that his country should not
fight any British battles elsewhere.\footnote{14} In fact, England had protected her colony many times, during the Wars of American Independence and 1812 for example. Bourassa called that help self-interest, for Britain had been responsible for those conflicts with the United States. If she had been independent, Canada never would have become involved in those wars. She would have been permanently at peace, for he saw no possible conflict between his country and its southern neighbour.\footnote{15} As for Canadian-American relations, the two countries shared many things, one of which was the Monroe Doctrine, "a declaration of the right and determination of all free communities in America to govern themselves unhampered by the domination or pressure of European nations—with due regard of course for existing rights". For this reason, Canada should support the doctrine as strenuously as the United States. Furthermore, "if it is to endure, it must carry as a reciprocal consequence the abstention of American nations from interference in the affairs of Europe, except for the protection of their citizens and the safeguard of their interests". In other words, Canada as an American nation must be neutral in European affairs and Europe in hers. Of course, in North America the United States must not try to force her will on Canada. If the southern nation practiced fair arbitration with the northern one, the latter would work with the former in the cause of international arbitration, not directly, but indirectly as an example of nations living peacefully side by side, free from the crushing burden of armament races.\footnote{16} A rather naive proposition, this argument ignored American expansionism, a problem Bourassa noticed and argued forcibly against during the war in a context different from imperialism.\footnote{17} Consistency was not his strong point.
His isolationist tendencies are further explained by his attitude toward the Great Powers: by 1915, after his temporary aberration of September 1914, he detested them all. The Allies were not fighting for Christianity, for the Pope was neutral. Neither were they defending the rights of small nationalities, for as imperialist Powers they had trodden on many peoples. They were not fighting to preserve the sanctity of treaties either. They broke them just as readily as the Germans, for Great Power diplomacy was based on immorality, opportunism, and hypocrisy. They did not stand for liberty and democracy against tyranny and absolutism, for the descendants of the English were tyrannizing the French Canadians in Manitoba and Ontario. He saw no difference between the belligerents and hoped that no one would win the war, for "no race, no nation has the right to claim world supremacy".

Thus Bourassa opposed Canadian participation in the war between the imperialist Great Powers. For its own good, his country should get out of that war and retreat into North America, especially if one accepted the imperialists' argument that unless Canada supported Britain and France, Germany would triumph in Europe and turn her attention to the Dominion. That presupposed the Germans would defeat the British fleet that lay between them and America and would find Canada an appealing conquest. Given these presumptions, Canadians should fortify their shores and strengthen their defenses instead of squandering men and money in Europe. Bourassa was no military strategist, for he ignored one of the lessons of war: to divide one's forces in the face of the enemy invites defeat. He also ignored the character of World War I. It was the first of the world wars, those that involve many countries. It was also the first of the total
wars, those that involve all of a country's resources. Canada could not remain neutral or limit her war effort; neither could the United States; neither could the world's Great Powers nor most of its Medium ones. As a member of the world's greatest Empire and considering her resources, albeit small population, Canada ranked as a Medium Power. Even if she had been independent, she would have been drawn into the war. But Bourassa believed that independence would secure the neutrality and isolation he sought for his country.

As early as 1902 he said that independence was the basis for solving Canada's national problems. However, it was unacceptable until the country's internal peace was secured, a state of affairs that would not occur until its two races concluded an entente. This goal would be achieved when the Canadian people forced their leaders to adopt truly Canadian policies that both the English and the French could support. He had argued himself into a circle: national policies would not be adopted until independence was achieved and independence would not occur until Canada's leaders adopted national policies. He was essentially arguing for the status quo: colonialism, with no responsibilities. By 1911 he no longer advocated this status for the situation had changed; in the form of its proposed navy the Dominion was paying tribute to Britain. The mother country would use the navy in wars it decided on through a foreign policy it conceived and executed, subject to the approval of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Canadians had no voice there and hence no way of expressing their approval or disapproval of any war in which they would be participants. If British authorities would share power with the colonials, the French-Canadian journalist would accept the opinion
of the Canadian majority if it decided in favour of imperial partnership.

What kind of a statement was this from the champion of anti-imperialism? A logical one given his belief in "no taxation without representation"—that is, no contributions without control of their use. His one important qualification was that true imperial partnership, "the magic formula", be found first. He was taking the wind out of the sails of his opponents by seemingly advocating taxation for representation, except that he opposed all proposed methods of representation and thus any taxation. He was placing the burden on the supporters of imperial partnership to come up with a method acceptable to him. The pressure was on them to design policies, leaving him free to criticize.

His attitude becomes clearer in *Independence or Imperial Partnership*, an answer to Lionel Curtis' *The Project of the Commonwealth*, the imperialist argument. Bourassa found five points of agreement between the Nationalists and Curtis. First, Canada was a sovereign state, a nation independent by right, though not in fact. Secondly, the monarch of the United Kingdom could not demand and expect Canadian military aid without the consent of the elected representatives of the Canadian people. Thirdly, each Dominion had the right to proclaim its independence and remain neutral in any British war. Fourthly, since Britain alone had complete control over international affairs, she alone was obliged to support the burden of war. Lastly, since the participation of the colonies in the war was a radical change in the traditions of British government, some constitutional change was inevitable, the present status of the colonies being intolerable. The choices were independence or imperial partnership, of which the Nationalists favoured the former because it was consistent with the principles of self-government.
Canada, as an independent nation, would face three perils: economic rivalries, internecine strife, and external aggressions. Completely independent, she would face less danger from them all. Economically, Canadians would devote themselves to their own country, not Britain. Bourassa was speaking of Canadian economic tribute to the mother country, which, following his definition of imperialism, Canadian participation in the conflict overseas was. If Canada was independent, she would no longer be paying this tribute—that is, be in the war. This was his neutrality argument once again. As for internecine strife, without Britain to look to for dubious protection, Canadians would be forced to come to an understanding with one another. "So long as the majority of Canadians have two countries, one here and one in Europe, national unity will remain a myth and a constant source of internecine quarrels". In other words, national unity would develop in an independent Canada. The problem of his country's future status now had become of extreme importance for Bourassa. In 1902 he had stated that independence would not occur until Canada's leaders adopted national policies. By 1916 they obviously had not, for they were sacrificing the Dominion in an imperial war, a sacrifice so distressing to him that he called for independence. In 1902 he had opposed this step because of the immediate and exclusive proximity of the United States, a situation still present in 1916. But imperialism had not been an accomplished fact at the turn of the century; by the middle of the war it was. Independence, the only policy Bourassa advocated despite his flirtations with imperial partnership and annexation to the United States, was his answer to the imperial revolution. He felt that entanglement with Britain was ruining Canada, as he stated when he dealt
with the third peril facing her as an independent nation, external aggressions. Her only possible enemy was the United States. No longer tied to Britain, Canada would be free of Anglo-American quarrels and free to deal with her neighbour on her own. The two American nations would peacefully arrive at a settlement of all their disputes and be an example to the world of peace-loving nations. Perhaps. What, as an independent nation, Canada would be was neutral, isolated in North America. By the second year of the war, convinced that his country’s war effort was imperialist, Bourassa was advocating the independence he had up until that time held out as the best solution in the future.

But he still insisted on flirting with imperial partnership, saying that if Canadians would not accept independence, they should not remain in their present state of servitude, but become true and equal partners with Britain. He had previously rejected this solution and he rejected it again by telling those, mainly the French Canadians, who would rather have the status quo than imperial federation, that "if Imperial partnership is untrue to its promises, it will soon break asunder". If he judged its truth, it would break up, paving the way for independence.

Preferring the status quo of colonialism with no responsibilities, Bourassa fought imperialism until its triumph forced him to advocate independence, which, he felt, entailed very few responsibilities. He based these policies on his conception of Canada in the world: an American nation that could live peacefully in isolation. She could devote all her attention to her internal problems, one of the most important being the restrictions on French language rights. Such restrictions were wrong, for the French Canadians were the only true Canadians, the ones who put
the country's interest first. The stronger these people were, the more Canadian the Dominion would be. Bourassa fought for the preservation and extension of the rights of the French Canadians, as he had fought against imperialism, in the interests of Canada.
CHAPTER III
CANADIAN DUALITY

Henri Bourassa believed that Canada was an Anglo-French nation. Her leaders had recognized this characteristic in 1867 when they instituted Confederation, an Anglo-French compact. French Canadians were the country's pioneers; they had overcome nature to build a colony that had resisted attacks from Indians, Englishmen, Americans, and Frenchmen. They had protected it from the exactions of French intendants and the despotism of English governors. Furthermore, they had proclaimed the principles of political autonomy and civil liberty that guided present Canadian society. "In a word, we sowed here the seeds of everything that constitutes a nation". To maintain the nation, the treaty of 1867 had to be preserved and applied where it was being broken, in the West. This region must become part of Canada, not through the building of transcontinental systems of exchange, but by planting there a branch of the old French-Canadian tree and providing an atmosphere in which it could flourish. This tree had resisted all assaults on the St. Lawrence; it would also endure prairie storms, ensuring the future and unity of the country. Since the French Canadians had discovered the West and first civilized it, they deserved the same rights there that the English Protestant minority in Quebec had.¹

Behind these specific arguments was Bourassa's belief that the French Canadians were the only true Canadians, the minority who put Canada's interests first, for the English Canadians were still more concerned with the mother country.² Canada would survive only if her French element was strong enough throughout the land to show the other ethnic groups

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the way. If the French Canadians were excluded from the West, that re-
gion and the country would suffer. The editor of *Le Devoir* was thus pro-
jecting a French-English country where the two races would enjoy equal
privileges. But his quest for equality rested basically on a moral ar-
gument: that, because the French Canadians had done this for Canada,
they deserved that. Could his people be given a privileged position in
the country because of their contributions to it in an earlier period?
No; the past could not be allowed to run the present. His argument had
strength only as part of a larger one, that the French Canadians were
numerous enough throughout the land to deserve their privileges. But
to Bourassa, numbers did not matter. What was important was the British
North America Act, which, according to him, had as its primary *raison
d'être* an end to the secular conflict between the English and French in
Canada. It was thus an Anglo-French compact. To the argument that the
French language was guaranteed only in Quebec, by Article 133, he replied
that this article, by recognizing French and English as the official lan-
guages of the Canadian Parliament, the Quebec Legislature, the federal
administration, and federal courts, made them the official ones of Canada.
Every taxpayer, no matter where he went in the Dominion, had the right
to use French in federal courts or when dealing with the public service.
True, but this right was not inalienable, guaranteed in perpetuity by
the constitution, for constitutions can be amended as the times change.
He believed otherwise, demanding that this right had to be kept alive
by the use of French as a language of instruction in all Canadian schools.
According to Article 93, each province determined its educational program,
with guarantees for denominational minorities. For Bourassa this meant
the right of the French Catholic minorities in the English provinces to establish separate, French-speaking schools. But the French Canadians' right to French language instruction rested on a larger and more solid base: the spirit of duality of the British North America Act. Since the federal government served the general interests of the country, provincial jurisdiction, limited by the constitution, could not be exercised in opposition to its powers. Any provincial law that limited the rights citizens had as taxpayers of Canada was an abuse of and contrary to Confederation. Restrictions on the French language by certain provinces were injurious to the French Canadians and thus a violation of the federal pact. If the courts decided in favour of these restrictions, they would prove that they interpreted the law not according to its living spirit, but to its dead letter, giving French Canadians reason to believe that Confederation was a pitfall of infamy.

Bourassa was convinced that duality had been recognized by the country's leaders in 1867 and confirmed since then, especially by Sir John A. Macdonald. In 1890, when speaking in the House of Commons on D'Alton McCarthy's resolution calling for linguistic unity in Canada and the abolition of French as an official language in the Northwest Territories, the Prime Minister said that the Dominion had "a constitution now under which all British subjects are in a position of absolute equality, having equal rights of every kind—of language, of religion, of property and of person. There is no paramount race in this country, there is no conquered race in this country; we are all British subjects, and those who are not English are none the less British subjects on that account". Macdonald was not supporting the compact theory, but advocating compromise
on the question of minority rights. The Fathers of Confederation were not the fathers of duality, but the French-Canadian journalist believed they were and he continually harked back to their spirit when trying to roll back the English nativist tide prior to and during World War I. Yet if he could see the agreement of 1867 as an Anglo-French compact, others could see it as a recognition of English dominance in the country. Outside of Quebec, French language and school rights existed only in limited form in the other three provinces of the new Dominion, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. When the Northwest Territories were acquired, supporters of the French claim there, and hence throughout the country, found support in the Manitoba Act of 1870 and the Northwest Territories Act of 1875 which guaranteed French language and school rights. Opponents found backing in the fact that British Columbia and Prince Edward Island had entered Confederation without the bilingual-bicultural question being raised. As practised, the Confederation agreement resulted in an English-French stand-off: unilingual English provinces and bilingual French-English ones, a state of affairs short of Bourassa's dream of Anglo-French equality throughout the Dominion. What seemed to be occurring was the granting of French rights proportional to the strength of French influence in the province under consideration, a question of numbers. When their share of the total population decreased, as in the West after 1870, their influence declined and their privileges disappeared. Yet in one province, Ontario, their school rights were taken away as their numbers, both absolutely and proportionately, increased. The French Canadians bitterly opposed this action, for if they were restricted in the teaching of French, future generations would lose their ability to speak this language and hence their culture, becoming easy victims of English-Canadian assimilation.
The editor of *Le Devoir* definitely did not want that. In response to Archbishop Bourne of Westminster, who, at the Twenty-First Eucharistic Congress in Montreal in 1910, called for the Catholic Church in Canada to become more English in order to win over the majority of the country's people, Bourassa claimed the right of the French Canadians to speak French in the Church, although he by no means wanted it to be solely French in Canada. But he did feel that his people had a providential role in North America, to be an example of the type of state Catholic ecclesiastics wanted, for Quebec was the only part of the continent where the social, religious, and political conditions approached those the Church found desirable. His audience enthusiastically responded to his defense of French-Canadian rights, Abbé Groulx feeling that Bourassa had spoken for a people. He had, for he was at his best when he fought for the rights of the French minority, as he did over the Ontario Bilingual Schools Issue.

This controversy began in 1912 when the province's Department of Education issued an instruction, known as Regulation 17, restricting the use of French as a language of instruction in its bilingual schools in favour of English, in order that those schools and their pupils would become more efficient and, of course, English. French Canadians, fearing the loss of their culture if their language use was limited, became active in opposing this regulation through the French-Canadian Educational Association of Ontario, which Bourassa supported.

During World War I, he tied the schools problem to French-Canadian participation in the war. He called for public support to aid the Franco-Ontarian minority, more oppressed than the French by the Prussians in Alsace-Lorraine. The "Prussians" of Ontario could not be allowed to es-
ablish in Canada, under the flag and institutions of Britain, that which
his people were being urged to fight overseas: tyranny. The French
Canadians were fighting for the same thing in Ontario as the French and
British were in Europe, the triumph of oppressed nationalities. This
was exactly what English Canadians could not understand. J. Castell Hopkins,
editor of the Canadian Annual Review, realized that the French loved their
language, but felt that the Ontario Department of Education was doing
a good job in providing for "adequate English education" with "adequate
provision" for French. J. S. Willison, former editor of the Toronto
Globe, believed that French Canadians should learn English in order to
"have equal advantage and opportunity in commercial and industrial pur-
suits, in the services of the State, and in all activities and offices
where English is required". After English, French should be a preferred
language. Both men advocated the use of English first since the major-
ity in the country spoke this language, but they were willing to see French
used, in a secondary role. Bourassa feared such a ranking. If the su-
periority of the English language over French was accepted, it was only
a matter of time before all French-speaking Canadians would become English-
speaking, lose their French language and culture, and cease to be a dis-
tinctive group. The Ontario Schools Issue was only another battle in
the war French Canadians had waged since the Conquest for la survivance.
"Do not forget that the conservation of the language, the cultivation
of the language, the battle for the language, are together the fight for
national existence. If we let the cultivation of the language weaken
among us, if we let public and private use of the language diminish, we
undermine at its base the work of the French civilization erected by three
centuries of effort and sacrifice."
Le Devoir's editor felt that the enemies of the French language and civilization in Canada were not only the Anglo-Saxons, but above all the French Canadians, who, blinded and debased by three hundred years of colonial servitude, were surrendering their rights. For example, the Alberta Legislature, on March 30, 1915, unanimously passed a resolution opposing bilingual instruction in the province's schools. Two French Canadians, Gariépy and Lessard, voted for the motion, subject to existing laws, which guaranteed French language instruction. This same process had occurred in Ontario. French Canadians there had supported a school policy opposing bilingual schools, provided that the existing stipulation that French be a language of instruction was not interfered with. Then they stood helplessly by as the English majority used this vote to limit that instruction. The same development would occur in Alberta. In Saskatchewan, a primary course in French could be taught in school after regular hours, provided it was paid for by the pupils' parents, who had to pay regular school taxes as well. A proposal by the Scott Government in May 1915 to pay for the course out of provincial funds was withdrawn after English Canadians, from Saskatchewan and Manitoba, criticized it as an attempt to extend bilingualism. Bourassa was disgusted with the way his people had accepted these attacks on their privileges. If they allowed the minorities in Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan to be crushed, the turn of the other French-speaking minorities in Canada would follow. In order to preserve the foundation of Confederation, Anglo-French equality, Quebec had to take up the defense of French rights throughout the country. If she failed to do so, the false principle of the Anglo-Saxons that linguistic unity was necessary for national unity would triumph, leaving her without
a solid argument when they would try to make the federal administration
and then her unilingually English. This was already happening. Even
in Montreal, service in French was unavailable at federal offices. In
appearance, to herself and others, Canada was becoming English.19

The attack on French rights and privileges had become stronger in
recent years due to the federal government’s immigration policy, which,
by favouring unlimited foreign entry into the Dominion, had resulted in
the present wartime detention of aliens, Germans and Austrians, and mas­
sive unemployment in the cities among foreigners, Italians and Russians.
Realizing the dangers of this policy, the politicians and public men of
the West had met it by Prussian and American methods—that is, forced
assimilation. Canada was losing her Anglo-French character, due to the
influx of foreign immigrants and the practice of anglicization. If English
Canadians had remained loyal to the spirit of 1867 and accepted the co­
operation of French Canadians to preserve the country’s bilingual bicultural character, the assimilation of the foreigners would have been easier.
The English refused that cooperation and, by treating the French as in­
ferior citizens, destroyed the Confederation pact and forced the French
Canadians to join with the newcomers to resist Anglo-Saxon assimilation.20
The nativists in the West and Ontario were trying to reduce French to
the rank of an alien—by implication, second class—language and make
English the Dominion’s only official language, all in the name of national
unity. Such unity was not ensured by linguistic oneness, as Belgium and
Switzerland demonstrated. There would be national unity only when English
Canadians understood what French Canadians already knew, that Confederation
had been born in an aura of fruitful alliance between the two races and
would die unless they respected each others’ rights.21
Le Devoir's editor believed that Canada was an Anglo-French nation whose traditions were British. He feared for these characteristics if the government permitted aliens to enter the country in unlimited numbers. Since their only purpose in coming to this country was to make money, these immigrants would fall under the influence of the Dominion's larger, wealthier, and independent neighbour, the United States. Here lay the threat. If Canada's leaders let the aliens enter in unlimited numbers, they would soon swamp the English and French Canadians, who were loyal to British traditions, and would turn the country over to the Americans. Instead of aliens—eastern and southeastern Europeans—, Canada should bring in the best farmers of France, Belgium, and Britain, "the countries of Europe that are akin to us in temperament, in feeling, in religion, in national traditions." The French and English in Canada could easily assimilate the latter category of immigrants and thus preserve the Dominion's bilingual bicultural character. There would be no "foreign" element in the country. By 1915 it was apparent that the immigration policy had not been changed to Bourassa's satisfaction; large numbers of aliens had entered Canada and were destroying her duality and British traditions. English and French Canadians had to join together to preserve these features.

But why should Canada retain the French half of her character? Because it was a barrier to Americanization, was Bourassa's answer. This influence had been growing in Canada because of the similarity in language between English Canada and the United States and the northern nation's reliance on American finances during the war. Britain, being absorbed overseas, could not offset this influence. Only the French Canadians,
who spoke a different language and had different traditions and ideals from the Americans, could resist Americanization. However, their resistance would be successful only as long as their rights were maintained throughout the country. Yet any alien group, which spoke a different language and had different beliefs from the Americans, could make the same claim. Furthermore, English Canadians were not as slavishly American as the French-Canadian journalist found them. Loyalists had left the republican United States for the stability of a British colony after the American War of Independence, and English Canadians, for a century and a half, had lived under British rule, absorbing British ideals. Twice they had rejected closer ties to their neighbour, in the elections of 1871 and 1911. Economically, the English in Canada had been drawing closer to the United States, but so had the French, Quebec as well as Ontario having looked to New York for loans. Bourassa refused to consider that English Canadians could resist Americanization as well as French Canadians, for he believed the latter were the only true Canadians, the only ones who could repel the American, as well as the imperial, threat to Canada.

Externally, French would be important for his country, useful not only as a language of commerce but as one of diplomacy as the Dominion came into contact with non-English-speaking nations. Finally, French was the language of civilization. One day Canada would give the world not only its wheat, railway ties, and soldiers, but also its civilization, one that would owe much to French influence, provided this influence was not destroyed in the interval.

Bourassa made good points, since French was an international language and one of civilization, as were English, German, and Spanish. There
were enough members of the first three language groups in the country to merit its people learning those languages. The journalist would disagree, arguing that all Canadians should learn French and English, and only these two tongues should have official recognition and special rights, for Canada was Anglo-French. Frenchmen had come to this northern land first; for over three hundred years their descendants had been on its soil. Englishmen had come later but their descendants had been here for over one hundred and fifty years. For the latter period of time the two groups had cooperated in building the country, this cooperation forming the basis for his claim that Canada was Anglo-French. It was a good claim, considering that these two racial groups were the largest ones in the country. They were, in comparison with other races, its pioneers. It had taken form under their direction, although other immigrants had been and still were needed to fill out its shape. Canada was as he had described her, but in an uneven balance, the French being concentrated in Quebec. From a broad national viewpoint the Dominion was Anglo-French, but from a narrow regional one it was not, being English, French, German, and Ukrainian. From the latter viewpoint, special rights given to one language group had to be given to all or else a lingua franca had to be adopted. That would be English, the language most commonly spoken. French Canadians lost out in the West because there had not been enough of them there to keep the area English-French. Bourassa had realized the problem and had tried to persuade federal authorities to encourage French and Belgian immigration. But as Asselin found in 1912, the Canadian government provided little encouragement to Frenchmen and Belgians who wanted to come to Canada.25 As for the migration of French Canadians from Quebec, it
went not to the prairies but to the industrial centres of New England. 26

The West thus received little new French blood, and Bourassa's belief in duality won no acceptance there because of his people's numerical inferiority.

It also was rejected in Ontario, whose school dispute was the focus of the racial conflict in the country up to 1917. In August 1914 there appeared to be no clash as the French and English joined together to cheer Canada's participation. 27 It was a measure of the division caused by the schools issue that by the end of the year the racial split had reappeared. In December, the "Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Canadienne-française" organized a fund to aid the "blessés d'Ontario". Bourassa supported this action for by it French Canadians could divert their money from funds designed to aid European refugees to a fund to fight for the French language and civilization in Ontario, a much more worthy cause. 28

French Canada was now extremely concerned with the schools issue, Cardinal Bégin of Quebec City saying, in 1915, that French Canadians had the right to speak their own language, because it was the guardian of their Roman Catholic faith and the instrument of their culture, and that the French of Quebec were under an obligation to assist their brethren in their sister province of Ontario. That same year the Quebec Legislature passed a resolution stating that it hoped the division in Ontario could be settled amicably with regard for the rights and privileges of the minority. In 1916 it passed a bill authorizing municipalities to contribute "up to five per cent of gross revenue to funds opened by corporations or persons for public subscription for patriotic, national or school purposes within the province or elsewhere". 29 In other words, government aid for the Franco-Ontarians.
That same year the dispute was brought into the national spotlight when Liberal member Ernest Lapointe introduced, on May 9, the following resolution in the House of Commons:

That this House, especially in this time of universal sacrifices and anxiety, when all energies should be concentrated on the winning of the war, would, while fully recognizing the principle of provincial rights and the necessity of every child being given a thorough knowledge of English education, respectfully suggest to the Legislative Assembly of the province of Ontario the wisdom of making it clear that the privilege of the children of French parentage be not interfered with.

The vote three days later was 107 to 60 against.

Bourassa felt that the debate on the resolution had two salutary effects. First, it gave the Ontario Schools Issue national prominence. Secondly, it forced the English-Canadian press, previously conspiring to keep the issue under wraps, to publicize the facts of the dispute and the arguments of the French minority. Unfortunately, the debate had taken place among politicians, who, while pretending to work for the country's advantage, were working for their party's. The Liberals were trying to win back support in Quebec and regain the political momentum there from Premier Gouin, whose Liberal-dominated Assembly had been active in support of the Franco-Ontarians since 1915. The Conservatives were trying to please the Orange bloc and pose as the defenders of the English provinces that had given them power. But that was why parties existed, to debase everything they touched by restricting it to their interests and paltry ambitions. As for the resolution, Le Devoir's editor felt that it had two intrinsic weaknesses. First, it lacked practical application, since the two parties opposed the remedy of the French-Canadian Educational Association, disallowance. Secondly, it was linked by Laurier, its architect,
to the conflict overseas, "when all energies should be concentrated on the winning of the war". Bourassa wanted the school dispute and support for the war kept separate. Since the resolution made no reference to Manitoba, where the recently-elected Liberal Government had amended the School Act to put an end to bilingual teaching, the Conservatives could accuse the Liberals of playing politics, trying to embarrass the Conservative administration of Ontario. For Bourassa, such an argument was not a good enough reason to reject the resolution. Parliament had the right to intervene in both Manitoba and Ontario. Its duty was more imperious in the western province, where the teaching of French was guaranteed by the Laurier-Greenway Agreement of 1896. If the Leader of the Opposition and his partisans let the opportunity of dealing with Manitoba pass, the Conservatives could treat the motion as a farce. But doing that would not modify the situation in Ontario or change the essential value of the Lapointe Resolution. Borden could also reproach the opposition for having allowed the period during which the Ontario legislation could be disallowed to pass. This would be a valid criticism if the motion demanded disallowance, but the Liberals had abandoned this solid proposal, preferring to present a simple remonstrance to the provincial government, an action that had the same value, scope, and efficacy before or after the expiration of the date for disallowance. The ministers' principal objection, that Parliament had no jurisdiction over the provincial issue, was refuted by their decision to follow the Speaker in allowing it to be debated. By suggesting the minority appeal to the Government of Ontario, the federal government, which knew that that had already been done, was insulting the Franco-Ontarians.32
Bourassa was unhappy that the representatives of the nation, who, for two years, had inundated the people with appeals to be moved by the fate of the small nationalities of Europe, had not seized the occasion to affirm the right of the French minority in Canada to live its life as much as the Belgians, Serbs, or Poles. The Lapointe Resolution, in spite of its gaps, weaknesses, and unfortunate digressions, involved an element of justice and truth. It deserved the support of all those who pretended to be the guardians of national traditions and the champions of right and liberty. The motion was a public and solemn testimony of sympathy by the country's representatives for the French Canadians of Ontario, who were defending French civilization against the stupid and cunning hatred of the "Huns" of Toronto. Casgrain, Blondin, Patenaude, Forget, Lesperance, Descarries, Girard, Chabot, and Robidoux, who voted against the resolution, earned disgrace in the eyes of their French-Canadian compatriots and scorn from English-Canadian Tories. But the politicians' vote did not matter. Above them and their contortions, the great battle would continue until final triumph.33

Another sign of the French Canadians' lack of faith in the federal administration was the resignation of Senator Landry, the President of the French-Canadian Educational Association of Ontario, as Speaker of the Senate on June 2. Borden brushed aside the resignation as unimportant, for the Senator's temperament had not been suited to "the dignified discharge of his duties".34 Le Devoir's editor felt that Landry's act was not only a protest against the iniquity of the Ontario government and the cowardly inaction of the federal one, but a rallying cry. By his resignation, the Senator had fortified all those who were fighting for
justice and the respect of treaties in Canada.35 One such man was Bourassa. At Hull on June 25, he urged, as he had all year, a commercial boycott of Ontario firms that refused to recognize the French language in their dealings. He also asked his compatriots to patronize exclusively French-Canadian banks and commercial institutions, as long as Ontario refused to recognize the just rights of the French minority.36 The year before he had advocated a similar patronage, but from a positive standpoint, to develop a cult among his people for their language.37 Now he was recommending it as a chastisement for the English Canadians of Ontario. In 1911, before the war's outbreak, when speaking of the attitude of the English Canadians in Montreal of being a closed, anti-French community, he had stated that although some French Canadians demanded retaliation, he was against it, for one wrong never righted another.38 Now he was advocating retaliation, a sign, at least in his case, that the wartime dispute over French language rights had replaced moderation by extremism.

After the Lapointe Resolution the controversy shifted to the courts, Ontario defending Regulation 17. The case was eventually carried to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, a course Bourassa supported because he believed that the Council, by ruling on the regulation, could decide whether Confederation was a pact of honour.39 For him the school issue was the national one, whether French and English were to be equal. On November 2, 1916, the Committee ruled Regulation 17 Intra vires. Earlier, Pope Benedict XV had issued Commissio divinitus which counselled moderation on the school issue. Both events helped to calm the agitation over this dispute.40
The racial conflict continued, however, as the disputes over French-Canadian enlistments and conscription replaced the quarrel over language rights in Ontario. For English Canadians, the quarrel was an unwarranted infringement by Quebec in what was an Ontario matter. Furthermore, the French Canadians appeared more concerned with language rights than with the war effort, a concern their declining enlistments reflected. The French, on the other hand, felt little desire to fight overseas for what was being destroyed at home. If the war was a national effort, why were they being treated as second class citizens in Canada? The problem of slow French-Canadian enlistments was overshadowed by the schools issue until the summer of 1916, when the need for reinforcements and a shortage of labour for industry and agriculture became "urgent and serious considerations". To coordinate manpower requirements, the federal government set up a National Service Board. This step was the first one on the road to conscription and the crisis that enveloped the country the following year. The racial split of 1914-16 over Ontario schools became a chasm in 1917 over conscription.

Even during the period of conflict in Ontario, to which he contributed with his tirades on behalf of the Franco-Ontarians, Bourassa never lost faith in Canada. In reply to a letter of the time advocating separatism for Quebec, he stated that it was an undesirable solution for two reasons. First, it would leave his province isolated in North America. Secondly, the French Canadians outside Quebec would be abandoned, at the mercy of the overwhelming English majority in the rest of the Dominion. He was confident that as the intolerant and barbaric English of Europe had civilized themselves, so would the English of Canada. In other words,
Confederation would continue and, as soon as the English Canadians became civil, would improve. Unfortunately for Bourassa's hopes, they continued in 1917 to be the "Boches" of Canada.
CHAPTER IV

PARTY GOVERNMENT AND CONSCRIPTION

Conscription was the second and final round in the French-English conflict during the war. For Bourassa it also involved the question of party government, since, as he saw it, federal parties had forced this measure on the country. He had always been suspicious of political parties, ever since he had first run for federal office, in 1896, as Liberal candidate for Labelle. Then he had put two conditions on his candidacy: that, if elected, he would vote following his convictions, not his party, and that, instead of using party funds, he would pay his own electoral expenses in order that his convictions could not be compromised.¹ Three years later he placed his beliefs above his party loyalty, resigning his seat in protest against the Laurier Government's decision to send troops to South Africa. Re-elected, he continued to oppose involvement for the duration of the Boer War, advocating in March 1900 a plebiscite on participation.² Since parties compromised their principles, the people should directly decide all important national problems.

But if politicians could be corrupted so could the people. There was a need for an impartial group of men who would enlighten the public to make the proper choice. Such a group was the Nationalist League, formed June 25, 1903, by Olivar Asselin, Omer Héroux, and Armand Lavergne. It had three major policies:

For Canada, in its relations with England, the largest measure of political, commercial and military autonomy compatible with the maintenance of the colonial tie.
For Canadian provinces, in their relation with the federal power, the largest measure of autonomy compatible with the maintenance of the federal tie.
For all of Confederation, the adoption of a policy of exclusively economic and intellectual development. 3

Bourassa, though not a member of the organization, was its guiding light. Essentially concerned with public education, it advocated its policies through the newspaper Le Nationaliste, founded by Asselin in 1904. The League wished to educate people on the important questions of the day in order that public opinion would sway the politicians to adopt better policies. It was theoretically nonpartisan, but with its platform of specific reforms and its unofficial leader, one of French Canada's leading orators and public men, it developed into a semi-political party. In 1908, Bourassa, Laverne, and others were elected to the Quebec Assembly as independent Nationalist members, working in close cooperation with the Conservative Opposition against the Liberal Government. 4 Four months after his victory, on October 2, Bourassa spoke at the Monument National in Montreal, where he called for public spirit to replace that of parties in order that Quebec could progress economically, morally, and intellectually. The new spirit would develop through the establishment of clubs that would "work to purify opinion, to create a new political mentality" and through the founding of a daily newspaper in Montreal. This was Le Devoir, founded in January 1910 with Le Nationaliste as its weekly edition. 5

The new paper had a political and social program. Federally, it advocated Canadian autonomy under the British crown, respect for minorities, and bilingualism. Provincially, the call was for honest administration and a good return for the sale of Quebec's national domain, her natural resources. Le Devoir's social program was more important, for here Bourassa's philosophy appeared. The daily was to work to teach French Canadians to love and practise their national duties, such as conservation
of the faith and attachment to the soil. Secondly, it was to form a leading class to guide the people and furnish them with trustees, picked because of their social principles, their integrity and impartiality, the strength of their character, and their intellectual competence, to look after the people's interests. Thirdly, the paper was to combat the venality, unresponsiveness, and cowardice of parties, so that public service would become accessible to honourable and impartial men. Fourthly, it was to create and sustain a strong and free public opinion that would assure the independence of magistrates, the incorruptibility of politicians, and the integrity of popular suffrage.

Thus Le Devoir attempted to educate the people so that they could decide on important matters and elect incorruptible men to political office. In 1910 its editor called for a plebiscite on the Laurier Government's proposal to establish a Canadian navy that in times of emergency could be turned over to Britain. In the 1911 federal election, Bourassa and the Nationalists worked with the Conservatives in Quebec to defeat the imperialist Liberals, only to have the more imperial Conservatives take power nationally. In this election the Conservatives and Nationalists reached a tacit agreement not to run candidates in the same constituency, thus avoiding three-cornered fights. The Liberals won 38 seats in the province, the Autonomists, as the Nationalists were known, 27. Bourassa did not run. Once in Parliament, the Autonomists fell under the influence and control of the government, prompting Le Devoir's editor to call them traitors. Once again power corrupted. Clearly for him the only hope was to redouble his efforts. During World War I, the conscription issue provided him an opportunity to do so.
Conscription was the culmination of recruiting in Canada. When the war broke out, English-born and native-born Canadians of English ancestry volunteered in the largest numbers, French Canadians the fewest. Since Britain, not Canada, was directly threatened, Englishmen and English Canadians enlisted to defend their motherland. But as Bourassa pointed out, French Canadians' only homeland was Canada. A direct threat to their country would bring a hearty response from them as it had in 1775 and 1812, but an indirect threat would not. This argument had a degree of truth, but so did Senator Raoul Dandurand's that French Canadians were a pacific people. Whatever the reasons for their initial reluctance, it was strengthened by government actions. The chief recruiting officer in Quebec was an English-Canadian Protestant clergyman, hardly the man to stir French-Canadian Roman Catholics to enlist. French Canadians were given minor posts in the Canadian war effort, directed from an English standpoint by the Minister of Militia, Sam Hughes, who did not send the highest ranking French-Canadian officer, General Lessard, to Europe with the First Division. Furthermore, Hughes was reluctant to grant requests for French-Canadian units, forming the 22nd French-Canadian Battalion on September 22, 1914, only after the government had received great pressure from leading French Canadians. Three further French-Canadian battalions, the 11st, 57th, and 69th, were raised in 1915. What military pride developed among the French in Canada by the raising of these formations was destroyed by the government's refusal to allow French Canadians in the 13th and 14th Battalions to transfer to the 22nd, the only French-Canadian unit at the front, and by its policy of taking drafts from the 11st and 57th to reinforce English-Canadian units. A feeling arose in Quebec that the Dominion's war effort
was English, not Canadian. French Canadians remained unenthusiastic about enlisting.

By 1916 enthusiasm throughout Canada for the war was fading. That summer the Prime Minister became worried about the country's manpower needs for war and industrial purposes. In October he established the National Service Board to coordinate these requirements and in January 1917 it undertook a national registration of manpower. R. B. Bennett, the Board's Director-General, and Borden toured the Dominion in December 1916 to stimulate recruiting and urge men to register. Many in Quebec suspected this registration of being the preliminary to conscription, as it turned out to be. In 1917 the Prime Minister went to England for the meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet. He also visited the troops in France, where he concluded that voluntary enlistments in Canada were not keeping pace with casualties in Europe. Conscription was the answer.

On May 18 in the House of Commons he announced selective conscription, repudiating any suggestion that the Dominion was introducing the measure at Britain's request, instead emphasizing the need for reinforcements.

In a series of articles from May 23 to June 6 in Le Devoir, later published in pamphlet form as Conscription, Bourassa criticized the government's policy. He stated that he had been proven right. For eighteen years he had fought imperialism, which had reached its peak in conscription: colonial manpower forced to fight Britain's war. He advocated calm opposition, such as the signing of the petition of "La Ligue patriotique des intérêts canadiens" against the measure, while warning against demonstrations, for French Canadians were the true defenders of order and the constitution.
His opposition centred on his belief that Canada had done enough. In proportion to population, she had contributed more men and money to the war than Britain and France had or than the United States would be able to. She had reached her capacity to pay for destruction, being faced with bankruptcy, an event that would shake the credit of the Empire. Canadian industry and agriculture were suffering manpower deficiencies, resulting in high prices to consumers and shortages. A policy of selective conscription instituted at the beginning of the war would have alleviated this labour problem, but now any measure of conscription or voluntary enlistment would only aggravate it. To increase her agricultural production, and thus help Britain and France avoid starvation, Canada should stop sending troops to Europe.

He called for the conscription of capital and industry if that of manpower was to be accepted, warning big business of the post-war social revolution if it refused to sacrifice itself as the people were doing. This was a good argument, one that Finance Minister White echoed when he introduced the Income Tax and Business War Profits Tax later that year.

Bourassa also opposed conscription because of its harmful effects on foreign immigration. While never in favour of this immigration, he noted that it would be necessary after the war to replace Canadians lost in battle and to stimulate industries facing bankruptcy. If Canada followed the United States in adopting conscription, after the war refugees fleeing a militarized Europe would not come to these two nations but go to South America. They might, however, as they did, flee a devastated Europe for an untouched North America.
He also examined conscription in terms of French-English relations in the country. He felt that French Canadians were the true Canadians who had no loyalty but that to Canada and who recognized their obligation to defend their country when attacked, but left external defense to Britain. As long as the English and French in the Dominion had accepted this doctrine, there had been no dispute between them on the nature and extent of their common and respective obligations toward Britain and the Empire. But heavy immigration from Britain that had changed the physical, intellectual, and moral characteristics of the English Canadians, and imperial propaganda had destroyed this people's exclusively Canadian patriotism. Among them, the idea of a single homeland, Canada, had disappeared, but it would return in the post-war reaction. Bourassa was taking a stand of moral correctness, that French Canadians were doing what was right for the country, English Canadians what was wrong. Considering that he spoke for the minority in the land, he had to take this position, for his people were not numerous enough to impose their will.

But they had to be united or the English Canadians would overwhelm them. Thus he stated that two million French Canadians were opposed en masse to conscription. Speaking for this group, he demanded the drafting of British slackers in Canada and an end to the enlistment policy that was turning the country over to the foreign elements, the Germans and Slavs, prohibited from fighting because they were enemy aliens. If the government was going to exempt Mennonites, Quakers, and Doukhobors from conscription on religious grounds, it should exempt French Canadians on moral ones, that of not fighting except in Canada's defense. For the government and many other Canadians the war was in her defense, although
the battles were in Europe. For Bourassa the war, any war, was in his country's defense only when the battles were on its territory. He prophesied revolution if the federal administration did not exempt French Canadians from the measure, a statement that contradicted his earlier one that his people were the defenders of order. But they were also the defenders of the constitution, which they would fight for against the small minority of English-Canadian imperialists who were leading the country away from its national interests. The editor of Le Devoir believed that most English Canadians opposed conscription, but only a referendum could make their opposition known. He was confident that French Canadians would accept a majority vote for conscription, but he was certain that English and French opposition would combine to defeat the proposal. What he wanted to avoid was its approval by a parliamentary majority, under the control of English-Canadian imperialists, that did not represent the thinking of Canadians. Such an action would split the Dominion racially, the governing English Canadians versus the defenders of Canada's true interests, the French Canadians. "Popular consultation is the only safety valve that will allow us to avoid a dangerous explosion."24

Bourassa then dealt with what he considered to be the Prime Minister's about-face on conscription. On January 17, 1916, Borden had stated his government's decision not to introduce this measure, but a year and a half later it was doing so. According to his critic, three factors had changed his mind: the renewal of submarine warfare by the Germans, the Russian Revolution, and the entry of the United States. The U-boat threatened Britain with starvation, unless it or its bases in Belgium could be destroyed. Canada's best contribution would be to stop sending troops
overseas and retain her manpower at home to increase agricultural production and build the ships necessary to combat the submarine threat. Bourassa had a good point, for no quick victory could be expected on the stalemated Western Front. The only way to fight the U-boat was at sea in convoys that would be bringing Britain her needs. This solution required ships, which he proposed his country build, although he did not say anything about sailors. It also required agricultural goods, which he proposed his country produce, although, since most of the crops were already in for the year, this suggestion was good only for future years. The Russian Revolution, the next factor, had been proclaimed a signal service by Lloyd George. How could Borden then pretend that this service had to be paid for by the sacrifice of additional Canadians? Since the revolution had been hailed as a victory for the Allies—they were now all democracies—Germany would be defeated. The French-Canadian journalist was carried away by the rhetoric, for there was still a German army to defeat, a task that required soldiers. The final factor, American intervention, justified the end of sending Canadian troops to Europe because the richer and more populous United States could support conscription better than Canada. As well, the Dominion was in need of a rest, having bled itself white for three years. It also needed its men at home to relieve a labour shortage that, just before the American entry, it had attempted to ease by calling for seventy thousand agricultural workers from its southern neighbour.25 He was correct: Canada had done enough and the United States would be able to provide the margin for Allied victory in 1918. However, if conscription had not been adopted, the Canadian Army Corps, of which the country was so proud, might have withered.26 It did not, but in 1917
no one could have foreseen that the war would end the following year without the conscripts playing an important role. Given the increasing discrepancy between casualties and enlistments, the Corps might have become ineffective if the war had lasted longer. Since Canada had decided to participate, she undertook the responsibility of doing her utmost, including introducing conscription, to ensure victory.

Bourassa felt otherwise, believing that because the United States had intervened, Canada’s duty was to keep her men at home in order to increase agricultural production and produce ships to supply the Allies. Unfortunately, the American action had caused Borden to do an about-face on conscription. Fearing that her own draft-dodgers and those of Britain on her territory would flee north once she adopted conscription, the United States had pressured her neighbour into the same policy, thus saving herself the expense of patrolling her own borders. It was not to save democracy and civilization, or to aid Britain and France, or to support her own war effort, but to act as police for the American government that Canada had adopted conscription. Such reasoning indicated the extent to which Bourassa was prepared to go to vilify Canada’s leaders in order to end the country’s war effort. American pressure, as well as that of the other Allies, had been important in the Dominion’s decision, for without conscription she would not be following their lead in contributing as much as possible to the war effort. A more important factor was the Prime Minister’s belief that only by this measure could the Canadian Corps be kept at full strength. Thus he introduced the Military Service Bill into Parliament on June 11. Two months later, August 29, it became law.
Quebec was outraged by the measure, feeling betrayed as Archbishop Bruchési of Montreal stated. Anti-conscription meetings attracted large crowds in June, July, and August, culminating in riots in Montreal on August 29 and 30. On August 9, the home of Hugh Graham, owner of the pro-conscription Montreal Star, was dynamited. Those responsible divulged plans to kill others who supported the measure. Le Devoir’s editor cautioned against such acts in his "Steriles Violences" article of August 11, warning the people not to follow demagogues who stirred them to violence, for that would result in more violence and martial law. French Canadians had two enemies: those who lulled them to sleep and those who incited them to riot. The former had led the people to servility; the latter were trying to lead the people away from the consequences of the former’s policy through violence. Thus servility had resulted in violence, for the French Canadians, disillusioned with those who had led them to give up their rights, had turned to disorder. The Nationalists had fought the first abuse in order to denounce the second. Speaking for them, Bourassa stated that the only way to combat conscription was to rouse public opinion to prevent the measure’s adoption. If it became law, the only way to fight it would be by electing the largest possible number of anti-conscription candidates. Those counselling violence were criminals who were leading the young into crime, bringing reprisals on innocent crowds, and placing civil liberties in danger. These agitators were the enemies of the French-Canadian race. Most Quebeckers were not helping them, but to those who were he stated that violence would bring English-Canadian retaliation and the destruction of the hope for a French-English accord, an abominable task that no French Canadian had the right to serve.
The storm in Quebec calmed in September as Canadian attention was diverted to the federal election, finally announced for December 17, to be fought over the Military Service Act and the war effort. Bourassa welcomed the election as an end to the government's abuse of power. In his pamphlet on conscription, he had stated that the Prime Minister was trying to impose the measure on the country through a party coalition and another extension of the life of Parliament.33 The French Canadian feared that such action would result in the establishment of an oligarchy based on the military. British democracy would disappear in Canada, for its basic principle was that ultimate control lies with the people. Voting conscription without their consent in a referendum would be a violation of this principle. He compared government to a board of directors. Both had the length and extent of their powers set and could, in extraordinary circumstances, take exceptional measures, subject to later approval from the people they were responsible to. The time was overdue for the Borden Government to put its record to the Canadian people for approval. In the election the people would vote on a number of issues: conscription, the government's record, popularity of the local candidate. Thus a vote for the government party would not necessarily be one for the Military Service Act. A plebiscite had to be held separately on this measure so that the people could decide directly for or against it.34 The problem with this proposal was that conscription was not a single issue, being bound up with participation in the war and the government's direction of the war effort. The election was a wartime one; conscription was a wartime problem. The two could not be separated.35
Two parties contested the election, the Unionist coalition of Conservatives and English-Canadian Liberals from the West and Ontario opposing Laurier's Liberals. The result was a foregone conclusion for the government had used its power to ram through Parliament the Military Voters' Act, passed August 29, and the War-time Elections Act, passed September 6. The former, concerning voting among the troops overseas, provided that they could vote for individual candidates or for the government, opposition, or another party. The Liberals objected, for the soldiers would naturally vote for the government that maintained them. The latter act enfranchised women, but only those who were relatives of soldiers overseas. Disenfranchised were naturalized Canadians born in enemy nations and those born before 1902 in German-speaking countries. The women would naturally vote for the government in order to ease the pressure on their husbands and brothers, while the disenfranchised were mainly Western Canadians who had voted Liberal in previous elections.

Borden used Meighen's argument to defend both acts. Under the Military Voters' Act, if the voter could identify the electoral district he had resided in for at least four months immediately prior to his enlistment, his vote would be applied in that district. If he could not remember that district but could remember any other where he had resided, his vote would be applied there. If he could not remember any district, his vote would be applied where he pleased. Since it would be impossible for a military voter to know the names of individual candidates, it was provided that he could vote Government, Opposition, Independent, or Labour. Women relatives of soldiers were enfranchised in order to replace those soldiers who would be unable to vote, who were fighting in Allied armies, who were
dead, who were prisoners of war, and who, being overseas, were unable
to influence other Canadians. Disenfranchisement was enacted because
the recent arrivals in Canada could not be expected to have separated
themselves from the sympathies of their home countries. They had been
excluded from enlistment and "being unable under that policy to render
the highest service to the State, it was only just that they should not
be called upon to determine by their vote the direction of a war in which
their kinsmen were fighting in the enemy armies". 37

Bourassa did not believe this argument. For him the War-time, or
as he called it, the Mad-time, Elections Act created a double social rev-
olution. Passed without reason, judgment, or simple common sense, it
established a privileged military caste, of soldiers and their female
relatives, and was the stepping stone to general female suffrage. Any-
one guilty of disobeying the Military Service Act would be denied the
right to vote, even if his crime was refusing to answer the questions
of a conscription agent. By contrast, all the female relatives of a sol-
dier could vote, be he a murderer or a thief. 38 The enfranchisement of
women was wrong, for they were above politics. 39

Next he criticized the disenfranchisement of enemy aliens. Not only
did they lose the vote, but so did those people naturalized less than
fourteen years ago, whose maternal tongue was that of an enemy country,
even if they were born citizens of a country today allied to England.
This double exclusion included naturalized Germans, Jews from the Central
Powers, all second-generation German-Americans, Italians from Trieste
and the Austrian littoral, German Swiss and Alsatiens, Poles, Galicians,
and Danes born German or Austrian subjects. Emigrés who had come from
countries the Allies were pretending to free from the yoke of Prussian militarism lost the vote. "See the confidence the saviours of the 'oppressed nationalities' accord to their proteges". By this act Canada was becoming as oppressive as Germany. Most of the immigrants had come to the Dominion at the urging of government agents who had painted the land as one of peace, liberty, and equality. These people had become British subjects and Canadian citizens and had aided in the building of the country. Yet with one hand the government gave the vote to the soldiers, a group of nomads who would never return home, and with the other tore up the naturalization papers it had granted to Canada's adopted sons, forcing them to return to Europe to fight or to live here as outcasts. He was using the argument that the government was mistreating the people it had invited, even though he never cared for them. He had argued previously that the foreigners swelled the ranks of the unemployed, becoming a drain on the country. Their imprisonment during the war as security risks symbolized the failure of their immigration. As well, they had upset the French-English balance in Canada. Bourassa was being misleading when he feigned concern for the loss of the immigrants' rights. What did concern him was by disenfranchising these people, the government had assured its re-election, a distasteful result.

He did not want either party elected, for there was nothing to choose between them. Both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition supported the war to the utmost, to the exhaustion of Canada's natural resources, to the bleeding of the country white. The only difference was in technique, Borden forcing his policy on the country, Laurier seeking to persuade the people to sacrifice themselves. Both wanted national suicide in the interests of foreign nations.
Bourassa had obviously learned something from the last federal election in which he had worked to defeat Laurier, only to have the more imperialist Borden take power. In 1917 he would choose the lesser of two evils, the Liberal leader. On October 31 Le Devoir's editor called the Unionist coalition the first-born bastard of English imperialism and American plutocracy. The Prime Minister was not working to win the war; he was delivering the country to English and American manipulators. Bourassa had fused his anti-imperialism and his economic and social thought. In 1902 he had stated that imperialism and "love of money" threatened the French Canadians. These threats were separate ones until the coalition brought them together. To meet this double threat the journalist turned to Laurier, the only man who could rally sincere Canadians to defend the national inheritance, if he met two conditions: to speak bluntly and to put the safety of the nation above the interests of his party.

The next two days Le Devoir's editor discussed the Liberal leader's election platform, agreeing with the politician on the right of the people to be consulted at least once every five years, on his call for the repeal of the Canadian Northern legislation, on his denunciation of the new electoral act, on his call for restricting war profits, and on his proposals to ease the high cost of living. Yet Laurier still supported a heavy war effort. This was wrong, for the effort was leading the country to exhaustion, bankruptcy, and national suicide. Bourassa was pleased that the Liberal leader had promised a referendum on conscription but was displeased that he had not committed himself to repeal, for while the Liberals, if elected, made arrangements for a plebiscite the Military Service Act would continue to be enforced. There were still differences between the politician's platform and the journalist's aims.
But Bourassa was not going to commit his error of 1911, helping to install the greater of two evils in office. Although Laurier's policy was bad, Borden's was worse. Therefore, he would support the former, as he made clear in an article on November 12 entitled "Pas de lutte à trois". There were to be no Nationalist candidates, for running them would risk dividing the opposition vote, allowing the coalition candidate to win. Instead, support was to be given to Liberal candidates in order to defeat the government, the immediate and urgent aim. This support for the Liberals did not mean that the Nationalists would be tied to that party any more than they had been to the Conservatives after 1911, for they had been, were, and would remain independent.\(^49\) In his last pre-election article, Bourassa exhorted his readers to vote, not for the best man, but against conscription and the government.\(^50\)

What is significant about his stand during the election campaign was his belief that opposition to participation and conscription was right not only for Quebec but for Canada. This attitude was obvious in his post-election comments. The Unionist victory was first of all an approval of the coalition cabinet and its direction of the war, but not of the Military Service Act, for people could approve continued participation short of national bankruptcy. Yes, but on the other hand some people could not see participation without conscription. Secondly, Quebec and French Canadians were not isolated by the result, for opposition to the Unionist Government was directly proportional to one's degree of devotion to Canada. This degree was highest in Quebec and lowest in the West and Ontario.\(^51\) True Canadians were not represented by the present administration. The majority was in the wrong.
But it ruled, thus raising the question of how Quebec should act toward it. She should stand aloof because there could be no reconciliation between French Canada and the Unionist Government, for the Prime Minister and his colleagues had deliberately appealed to ultra-British sentiment in order to win re-election. They could not now escape the consequences of this action. A national accord could not be re-established and French Canadians could not actively participate in the government of the nation until the day the so-called government of union disappeared, or until a new party or group launched itself on the course of true and sane national traditions. No true French Canadian would work with Borden. Although he would probably be able to find some Quebec ministers, they would not represent the French Canadians. The journalist was correct. The only three Unionist members elected from Quebec were English Canadians: C. C. Ballantyne in St. Lawrence-St. George, C. J. Doherty in Ste. Anne, and Sir Herbert Ames in St. Antoine. Only one French-Canadian Unionist, Dr. J. L. Chabot of Ottawa, was elected. Bourassa called on French Canadians not to allow themselves to be seduced by promises of shared power into agreeing to cooperate with the Anglo-Canadians, for this policy, followed for so many years, had resulted in a spirit of greed and servility among his people. One of the benefits of the election might be to release them from the yoke of political patronage. At any rate, Quebec's members should not tie themselves to any government or party until they obtained an association honourable to themselves and hence the French-Canadian people and the country. More than ever French Canadians had to be the champions of justice, truth, and the "real" Canadian interests. There could be no working with English Canada until it realized its mistake.
From the English-Canadian point of view the mistake was Quebec's.
The day after the election, J. W. Dafoe, editor of the Manitoba Free Press, proclaimed in his paper that the results had saved Canada "from shame, from national futility, from treachery to her Allies, from treason to the holiest cause for which men had ever fought and died". In a letter to a Quebec Liberal that same day he blamed the racial division in the country on that province. Only she could change the situation.55 "Chubby" Power, elected as a Liberal member from Quebec for the first time in 1917, stated that the aftermath of the election was an English-Canadian attack, through newspapers and politicians, on his province and its people.56

One would expect that anti-conscription riots in that province in March and April 1918 would strengthen the English-Canadian belief that Quebeckers were slackers. The riots culminated in Quebec City on April 1, when four civilians were killed, at least thirty-two wounded, and fifty-eight arrested.57 Appeals from leading citizens and the Church to restore order and the declaration of martial law on April 4 prevented further outbreaks.58 Next day Bourassa cautioned against further violence as a means of combating conscription or the war policies of the two federal parties, for such action would bring measures of suppression from the government.59 The aftermath of these riots was not the further isolation of Quebec, but a realization that opposition to the government's conscription policy was not confined to that province. Farmers, for example, were angered by an order-in-council cancelling exemptions, granted the previous autumn, to their sons. Another problem the federal administration faced in 1918 was challenges to its practice of governing by order-in-council. This procedure was used to grant and revoke exemptions under
the Military Service Act, to declare martial law in Quebec City, and to impose censorship on war news. On July 20, in a case involving conscription exemptions, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the order-in-council method of governing. 60

This opposition to the Unionist Government made Quebec appear less isolated than she had been at the time of the federal election. Another reason for this development was the almost total absence of comment from Bourassa. In the public spotlight for the previous three and a half years of war, he dropped out in 1918, leaving Quebec's anti-war forces leaderless. They became less vocal in their criticism of the government, allowing the complaints of others, such as the farmers, to be heard.

One reason for Bourassa's silence was the imposition of censorship on war news in April 1918. From the beginning of the war, he had adopted as an absolute rule the divulging of no information on Canadian troop movements that would have endangered the life of a single Canadian. He believed that everyone had the right to decide for himself whether the government's war policy was good or bad and to discover the differences between Canada's interests and those of her allies. The federal administration believed otherwise, feeling that the time had come to prohibit the freedom of opinion that would create divergent attitudes toward the war. Le Devoir had no choice but to submit to the authorities' total ban on war news. 61 Accordingly, he wrote only five more articles before the war ended, two on the armistice, one on post-war colonization, one a welcome to the new papal delegate to Canada, and one on people who dropped out of society. 62 He published only one more pamphlet before the war's end, that a collection of his wartime articles on the Pope's proposals
for peace, Le Pape, arbitre de la paix, and gave only two public speeches, both at the Monument National in Montreal and both on Catholicism, "La Langue, gardienne de la foi" on November 20, and "Le Canada apostolique" on December 5.63

From 1914-18 Bourassa unsuccessfully fought against imperialism, restrictions on the use of the French language, conscription, and the policies of the country's public leaders. He had seen imperialism triumph with the adoption of conscription, French language rights eroded, and Canada sacrifice herself for Britain. His country had not accepted his policies, and his nationalism, still Canadian in scope, had become French-Canadian in practice.
CHAPTER V
A SPOKESMAN FOR QUEBEC

Did Bourassa speak for his province during the war? Yes, if one accepts the comments of its leaders as representative of its people. Quebec, like him, demanded justice for the Franco-Ontarian minority, was unwilling to support the war overseas, and opposed conscription and the Unionist government. She did not however adopt all his alternatives. Many of her people agreed with the editor of Le Devoir on the ills, but not the remedies.

Olivar Asselin, a former Nationalist colleague of Bourassa, believed that although Canada had no duty to participate in the conflict, she should voluntarily support the Allies, after putting her own defenses in order. She should fight for British institutions, better than German ones, and for France, because the French in Canada could retain their ethnic characteristics only by remaining close to their mother country. To the claim that the duty of the French Canadians was to fight for their language at home, in Ontario, he replied that they would triumph there only when they were rehabilitated in their own eyes, a process that would occur if they fought for civilization, the rights of the weak, and the freedom of the world, without being obligated to and without hope of recompense. To put his words into practice, he raised the 163rd French-Canadian Battalion for service, a unit that failed to fill its complement and was broken up for reinforcements. Asselin reached France, where, at a meeting of the Canadian section of the Comité France-Amérique, he stated that his country should have adopted conscription at the beginning of the war, because
it was a better system than the ruinous and inequitable one of voluntary enlistment. Bourassa would agree on the need to put the country's defenses in order and adopt selective conscription, until Canada's war effort became so burdensome that it had to be ended. He would strongly disagree that French Canadians should regenerate themselves in France, for they could do that in their own country, provided they fought all tyranny here, such as the language restrictions in Ontario schools. The difference between the two men was that Asselin had a love of adventure, which led him to fight in Europe, while Bourassa was inward-looking, a man whose attention was focused on his homeland.

There was a similar division between Le Devoir's editor and his remote cousin, Captain Talbot Papineau of the 22nd Battalion. In a letter to the former, the latter called for support of the war effort for a number of reasons. First, Canada was being born as a nation during the struggle in Europe. Secondly, her nationality was British and if Britain went under it would not survive. Thirdly, French Canada had a duty to repay English-Canadian generosity and not split the Dominion by refusing to fight. Fourthly, New France had to fight for Old France and French civilization. Fifthly, Canada had to take part in the conflict because it was a fight for the freedom of the world. In conclusion, the soldier stated that French and English Canadians were dying side by side in Europe, cementing there the foundation of a true Canadian nation, an ideal in which all Canadians should share.

Bourassa stated that the letter was a hoax. As for its claims, he ignored them, preferring to deliver his own views on the war. Although he had supported Canada's free and independent participation in 1914,
he was now against involvement, as a result of two developments. Enlistment was no longer voluntary; it was carried on through blackmail and intimidation. Secondly, the imperialists had taken advantage of the emotion caused by the war to advance their doctrine of imperial solidarity, to the point where the Dominion's participation was no longer national, but imperial. Furthermore, he believed that Europe was the victim of her own mistake, that of submitting to the imperialists in England, France, Germany, and Russia who had led the people to the slaughter in order to increase their own "reapings of cursed gold". The journalist hated all imperialism and felt that his country should not bind herself to the fate of the Old World or any Empire. As for the number of men under arms, he stated that enlistment varied in inverse proportion to people's closeness to the soil and the traditional patriotism arising therefrom. In decreasing numbers, volunteers came from English-born, English Canadians, and French Canadians. The West supplied more recruits than Ontario, which supplied more than Quebec. Urban dwellers enlisted in greater numbers than farmers, showing that military service was more repugnant to rural than urban populations. The French-Canadian people, who had the largest percentage of farmers of the ethnic groups, and who had been in the country the longest, thus volunteered in the fewest numbers. By refusing to fight for other countries, they were expressing true Canadian patriotism. The Nationalists, the spokesmen of the French Canadians, remained loyal to the spirit of Canada, while the politicians of both federal parties, who had sold out to the imperialists, betrayed the country. The jingoist claim that the Nationalists were hindering recruiting in Quebec because of restrictions on the use of the French language in Ontario and
Manitoba was nonsense. The two problems were separate: one was domestic, the other international, concerning Anglo-Canadian relations. Language instruction should be carried on in the spirit of Confederation. Participation in the war should be limited to the agreements concluded half a century ago by Britain and Canada, that the latter defend only her own territory. The bilingual schools issue gave French Canadians one more reason not to go overseas, for it was hypocritical to speak of defending minorities abroad while oppressing them at home. In conclusion, Bourassa made his only reference to Papineau, stating that the soldier, because he was American by birth and training, was unqualified to judge French-Canadian attitudes.

Yet one man who was French Canadian by birth and training echoed the captain's call for support of the war effort. In 1917, in *L'Appel aux armes et la réponse canadienne-française*, Ferdinand Roy, a lawyer, took a stand in favour of conscription, although he was not pleased with the conduct of the war effort. He believed that French-Canadian enthusiasm for the war had been eroded by English-Canadian persecution—denial of promotion to French-Canadian officers, restrictions on the French language in Ontario, a Protestant clergyman as director of recruiting in a Catholic and French province. Canada's politicians not only ratified these measures, but went beyond them, pushing the country toward bankruptcy to save the Empire. Only one man spoke out: Henri Bourassa. But he too made an error. He looked on the war as England's alone and ignored his country's duty to help defend Britain and France against German brutality. Canada should fight to defend her civilization, culture, patrimony, and liberties. The French Canadians, wishing to rid themselves
of other parties and leaders, followed Bourassa who, losing his way in the fog, misled them further. They did not respond to the call to arms. Together these mistakes and errors had led to a house divided into two racial groups over the present war measure, conscription. French Canadians should support this measure, to prove that they had conserved the primordial virtues of dignity and courage. They should accept the fait accompli because it would be law and involved honourable obligations that no man or people could shirk without reproach.  

Roy also dealt with the arguments of Bourassa, who had stated, in 1914, that Canada had a duty to contribute as much as she could to the endurance of Britain and France. She should provide for her security, examine her condition, and decide what aid she could offer. The lawyer felt that these were wise counsels, but the government, aided by an approving opposition, had wasted the Dominion's men and money. Despite the mistakes, the time was not opportune to criticize the country's methods, for the war was continuing. Furthermore, conscription was not a step toward national suicide. The present generation lived and thrived through the sacrifices of previous ones and if, to prevent external oppression, it suffered bloodshed for freedom, the blood of its children would be purer. Regenerated, with its soul intact, the French-Canadian nation would regain its vitality.  

The journalist would reply that future generations would benefit if the present one developed a Canadian identity, a goal that would be achieved if the French-Canadian policy of placing the interests of Canada ahead of those of any other country, such as Britain or France, was followed. As for their soul, French Canadians would preserve that by fighting
for their rights in their homeland, not overseas. Although both men agreed that the state of affairs in their country was far from ideal, Roy felt that such a situation should not deter French Canadians from participating in the war, while Bourassa believed that whatever the situation no Canadians should become involved in the conflict.

Many of the arguments of the editor of Le Devoir were echoed in the debate of the Legislative Assembly of Quebec on the resolution introduced by J. N. Francoeur, a Liberal member, in January 1918. The motion stated: "That this House is of opinion that the Province of Quebec would be disposed to accept the breaking of the Confederation Pact of 1867 if, in the other provinces, it is believed that she is an obstacle to the union, progress and development of Canada". Its author explained that he was presenting the resolution as a protest, not against the Unionist victory in the recent federal election, but against the insults, slanders, and lies to which his province had been subjected during the campaign. He feared that the English Canadians were destroying Confederation, the pact between the two races, by their attacks on the French Canadians, who "remained Canadians before everything". This was Bourassa's argument. French Canadians were Canadians first who had always remained loyal to the spirit of Confederation, the Anglo-French pact, that the English Canadians, under the spell of imperialism, were trying to destroy. The two men disagreed on the solution to the widening racial split. The politician wanted to live and let live, with his people going their own way, following their own tastes, developing their own province and through it the country, preserving their language, faith, traditions, and laws. In order to build the Canadian nation, all ethnic groups should be granted recognition of
their liberty, language, faith, and traditions. The journalist wanted an Anglo-French nation, where all people would share the same sentiments, those of the French Canadians, the true Canadians. Francoeur concluded by calling for an end to the struggle in Canada that was negating the principles her soldiers were fighting for in France: liberty, civilization, respect of treaties, and the independence and autonomy of all nations. Canadians had to be worthy of their sacrifice.9 Slaughter would be Bourassa's term, for he believed that the troops were fighting, not for justice, but for world domination.

The debate continued with Conservative member Arthur Sauvé stating his opposition to conscription, for it would paralyze Canada's productive capacity and ruin her economic organization. His country could help the Allies more by increasing its output to meet their demands.10 This statement repeated Bourassa's call for the sending of food, not men, overseas. Anthanase David, a Liberal, further echoed the beliefs of the editor of Le Devoir. Since Quebec had been established by providential will, it would be a sin for her to sacrifice her development and traditions in the war. Imperialism had to be combatted because it prevented the growth of a Canadian mentality and despoiled the world. David was concerned with his province's future greatness, which he would not jeopardize for the present needs of England and France.11 Bourassa was not debating in the Assembly, but his spirit was there.

One member who found that spirit objectionable was L. A. D. Cannon, a Liberal. He stated that Quebec had been senior partner in Confederation until 1911, when Laurier's defeat signalled her slackening influence at Ottawa, a diminishing of other provinces' respect for her, and a diminution
of her citizens' rights. These developments had coincided with the Nationalist campaign that had turned her citizens inward. When the war broke out and England and France united to save civilization, Bourassa and his friends agitated against them, almost to the point of supporting Germany. English Canadians, reading his pamphlets, felt that Quebec was disloyal, an allegation she denied. In the climate of rising emotion, extremism generated more extremism, and the moderates, the Liberal party, suffered. Quebec's influence at Ottawa declined because she refused to elect any French-speaking government supporters. To this argument Bourassa would reply that his province would have been the senior partner in Confederation except that its leaders had bartered away its right for the twenty years prior to 1911. Nationalism was an attempt to restore these rights and to show all Canadians that their country was bilingual and bicultural. Britain and France were not fighting for civilization but for control of the world, not one of Canada's goals. The extremism was all on the English-Canadian side, a continuation of the pre-war drive toward imperialism and nativism. Having no member in the Conservative government was not an embarrassment, but a credit to Quebec, for that administration was imperialist. His province was remaining true to Canada by refusing to cooperate with Ottawa.

Even Cannon could not refrain from repeating some of the arguments of Le Devoir's editor. The politician felt that Quebec would never leave Confederation because she was its centre. She would not "sink under a wave of insults" by late arrivals who did not know how to apply the constitution and treat French Canadians as equals. "We have the right and the duty to remain at the head of Confederation and we must see that the other provinces know it". French Canadians would expand throughout the
Dominion, developing Quebec's economy, colonizing Northern Ontario, swarming into the West, always setting the example of tolerance and justice to minorities, following the constitution. His province had a providential mission in North America, to play there the role of France in Europe, that of being "the Catholic nation par excellence spreading abroad the reign of the beautiful and the true". Bourassa's belief that French Canada was the defender of the treaty of 1867 and had a providential role had been seconded by another French Canadian. Another of his stands, that Quebec must remain part of Canada in order to protect the French Canadians outside her borders, was repeated by Premier Gouin.

The journalist commented that the motion was a desperate proposal, for it contemplated a unilateral declaration of independence for his province. Such action would result in an attack from English Canada to preserve the Dominion. His paper declared that the resolution had never been taken seriously.

Throughout the debate, which ended without a vote, the ideas of the editor of Le Devoir were echoed. The members agreed with the journalist on Quebec's defense of the constitution, her role in North America, and her suffering at the hands of English-Canadian extremists during the war. So did Roy. They differed with Bourassa on the need to continue the war effort. Quebec had voted overwhelmingly against the extension of this effort, through conscription, in 1917. But there was a difference between wishing to stop and wishing to retreat, his stand. The province was opposed to the war effort, its burden and mismanagement but not to taking part in the conflict. He opposed any participation, no matter how well organized. Canada's interest was not in the war, but in her own development.
Thus he rejected Asselin's argument that the Dominion should fight for Britain and France and Papineau's that the country's future greatness was ensured by its sacrifice overseas. Fighting abroad would not cure Canada's ills or make her a better country; only fighting the problems at home would. Their declining enlistments and growing concern over the Ontario schools issue in 1915 and 1916 showed that French Canadians agreed with Bourassa that their country's concerns had to be dealt with before any other country's, but not that Canada should get out of the war. In his earliest days in public life he believed that his duty was to expose the problems and educate the people in their solutions. During the war, he was at his best when he expressed Quebec's concerns, but her people did not always accept his proposals to ease these worries.

As well as engaging his province's public men, Bourassa had to deal with its leading spiritual body, the Roman Catholic Church, and its spokesmen. One such man was the Abbé d'Amours, editor of the semi-official organ of the Archbishop of Quebec, L'Action Catholique, who, in a series of articles from June to September 1916 in La Presse, criticized the stand of the editor of Le Devoir. The Nationalist doctrine that preached complete sovereignty for Canada was dangerous, for it would lead to the return of the pagan theory of race, by which every stranger was an enemy. Nationalism would divide peoples and provoke rivalries. As practised in Canada by Bourassa it had divided French and English, by pretending that its anti-British stand was that of all French Canadians. These people had to turn from nationalism to patriotism, the love of la patrie, a geographic, ethnic, and legal entity. Since Canada was a British colony and the majority of her people English, patriotism was also British.
The rights of the French Canadians could be safeguarded only by accepting these facts and not angering the English-Canadian majority.17

In reply, Bourassa stated that following the Pope's last letter to the Canadian bishops, to avoid weakening the unity of the Church by internal quarrels, he would not engage in debate with the clergyman. He would comment on his actions however. D'Amours, knowing that his own opinion meant nothing and would be disapproved of by most of Quebec's clergy, pretended that his ideas were sanctioned by the Church. Anticipating the silence that charity and prudence would force on his superiors, he made it appear as if they supported him. Since, in fact, they did not, his action was scandalous. Bourassa's advice to himself and others was not to accentuate the scandal by displaying it in broad daylight. Speaking to the clergyman's ecclesiastical superiors, pointing out his use of the Church to serve the interests of a political party and cause, would result in sufficient punishment, especially considering that the party, the Tories, and the cause, the war, were both on the fringe of the national tradition. The editor of Le Devoir believed that his convictions would withstand the poisonous assaults of the curate.18

In 1917, another clergyman, Hermas Lalande, writing under the name of Jean Vindex, wrote Halte-la "Patriote", in which he supported Bourassa's Nationalist policy of independence for Canada and an end to her war effort against D'Amours' of subservience to Britain.19 The dispute between the two priests might have reflected a division in the Church between the pro-war attitude of the hierarchy and the anti-war, pro-Bourassa stance of the lower clergy,20 except that since 1915 Church superiors had been drawing closer to the Nationalist leader. In 1914 the bishops of Quebec
issued a pastoral letter in favour of the country's participation in the war, a stand they reiterated the following year. In a speech in Montreal on December 8, 1915, Archbishop Bruchési of that city thanked French Canadians for understanding their duty and taking part in the war. Yet 1915 was also the year the hierarchy took an active interest in the Ontario schools dispute. In a letter to Bruchési, published January 9, Cardinal Bégin of Quebec City stated that French Canadians had the right to speak their language throughout Canada. In 1916, the bishops, while continuing to support the war effort, petitioned the federal government to redress the grievances of the Ontario minority. The hierarchy thus differed with Bourassa on the question of participation, but agreed with him on the problem in Ontario. It adopted part of his stand on the war, in 1917. Bruchési, an opponent of conscription since the war's outbreak, felt betrayed when the government proposed this measure. He joined with Le Devoir's editor to advocate reasonable, non-violent opposition to the Military Service Bill. Although the bishops did not adopt a policy against the war effort, they were upset by its increasing burden. The last year of the conflict saw the Bourassa-hierarchy rapprochement grow stronger, primarily because of the journalist's support throughout the war for the Pope's peace proposals. Le Pape, arbitre de la paix, a collection of Bourassa's wartime editorials on these efforts, was published that year and favourably received by all bishops. He published it not only to exalt the Pope's teachings, but to prove to the Church authorities that the French Canadians were devoted children of the Pontiff and that the Nationalists were the most ardent defenders of the Papacy. Bourassa's Catholicism had emerged as a major characteristic of his public life.
By 1918 Quebec had accepted the greater part of Bourassa's opinions. She was opposed to the management of the war effort, but did not go to his extreme of opposing participation, and agreed with him on the right of the Franco-Ontarians to speak French. There was disagreement, however, over the means of putting the province's wishes into practice. Most of Quebec's leading public figures advocated compromise with the rest of Canada. Bourassa opposed this policy, for he believed that his province represented true Canadian interests and that there could be no dealing with the other provinces until they admitted their mistakes. Such a stand contributed to French-English confrontation, a state of affairs Quebec wished to avoid. Bourassa did not fully represent his province. He expressed Quebec's feelings and desires, but she did not accept his means of satisfying them.
CHAPTER VI
THE FUTURE AND CHRISTIANITY

For Henri Bourassa, Canada's exaggerated participation in the war compromised her future; she would be economically disorganized, under the sway of the United States, and militaristic. His solution to these problems was independence, which for him meant an end to involvement in the conflict. At the same time, he advocated peace based on the Pope's proposals, an urging that became more intense as the slaughter dragged on, leading the world into barbarism. All countries faced this future, even Canada, unless they adopted the Christian principles as set forth by God's authority on earth.

The Dominion faced disaster because it had accepted a disproportionately heavy share of the war's burden. Before the conflict, it had been one of the world's most indebted nations, a state of affairs satisfactory as long as its economy boomed, allowing it to raise new loans to pay off old ones. The country suffered because of the war, for the general disorder in the financial world made loans difficult to obtain. Added to this, the "saviours of the Empire" had made Canada intervene to a ridiculously burdensome extreme, threatening her with bankruptcy. Her direct war debt would be over a billion dollars, while her indirect one would be larger because of public and private contributions to the Patriotic Fund, the Red Cross, and other charities. Her only compensation would be French and Russian purchases of munitions from her industry. English expenditures would be offset by the purchase of transport, equipment, and arms from British industry for Canadian soldiers in Britain. War
industries in the Dominion were ephemeral, not compensating for the im-
mobilization of capital that would only slowly re-establish the permanent industry paralyzed by the war. Essential public works—railways, canals, ports—had been delayed, perhaps never to be built. The East-West dispute had been aggravated, to worsen after the war as the free trade West would battle the protectionist East over the likely increase in the protective tariff to meet the war debt.\textsuperscript{1} He was partially correct. There was conflict, not so much between East and West as between manufacturer and farmer. In November 1918, the Canadian Council of Agriculture, meeting in Winnipeg, adopted the "New National Policy", one of the planks of which was tariff reduction. Two years later the National Progressive Party emerged as the focus for the farmers' political action.\textsuperscript{2} The war also embittered race relations in Canada, for the English Canadians had fallen under the spell of imperialism. Externally, this meant a heavy contribution to the military conflict; internally, it meant strenuous efforts at anglicization, in the West and Ontario. The stronger England emerged from the war, the vainer the imperialists in Canada would be, and the more brutal and tyrannical their racial intolerance would be.\textsuperscript{3}

The solution to these problems was to end the war, not for all the belligerents—for in 1916 narrow Canadianism took precedence in his thought over universal Christianity—but for the Dominion. It had to declare its independence. No longer tied to Britain, Canada would not be involved in any of the mother country's numerous disputes, such as the present conflict in Europe.\textsuperscript{4}

Independence would also lessen the three principal internal discords: the rivalry between French and English Canadians, the diversity of races,
and the East–West dispute. As long as English Canadians had two homelands, Britain and Canada, there would exist an incurable misunderstanding between them and the French Canadians, who had only one homeland, Canada. In case of armed conflict between England and France, the Dominion faced civil war, for English Canadians would be stirred to strike down the French wherever they found them, even in Canada. Once the imperial link was broken, English and French Canadians, forced to concentrate their attention, effort, and work on their common homeland, would see that they shared more interests than they suspected and had less reason to be suspicious of one another. Bourassa refused to believe that a national feeling had been developing on the battlefields of Europe, a belief expressed by J. W. Dafoe in Over the Canadian Battlefields in 1919 and by Captain Talbot Papineau in his letter to Le Devoir's editor in 1916. As for the argument that the French-Canadian minority had been protected by the British tie, Bourassa stated that whatever rights his people had they had acquired through their own efforts. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had sometimes favoured, sometimes opposed French-Canadian claims. Whatever its decision, experience had shown that French rights had been guaranteed only as far as the English-Canadian majority had been willing to accept. He was not sanctioning majority rule, pointing out only that Canadian problems had always been dealt with by Canadians. As stated before, he felt that the French Canadians were the only true Canadians and that through education and persuasion the English Canadians would become the same. When that happened, French and English would live peacefully together in the country as they had at the time of Confederation. The imperial revolution had diverted Canada from her path of internal
co-existence; only independence would bring her back to it. Unable to
depend on England and forced to live together on their own, the two races
would find solutions to their problems and support one another for their
common good. Since imperialism and nativism went hand in hand, the elim-
ination of the former would mean the extinction of the latter. The anti-
French hatred, the principal barrier to national unity, would be reduced
to insignificance. Discontent, prejudice, and conflict would remain,
but all nations had these problems. Tied to Britain Canada had more.8

Accepting the Dominion as their only homeland was not only best for
English and French Canadians, but for the immigrants. The most certain
way to assimilate them, divided as they were by language, religion, and
race, was to concentrate their attention on a unique object: the great-
ness, prosperity, and well-being of their country of adoption. Colonialism
was an obstacle to patriotism and national pride, not only for the native-
born but also for the new-comers. Independence would remove this barrier.
But this solution would not solve the East-West antagonism, based as it
was on economic and geographic problems. At least independence would
not aggravate these problems as imperialism had done.9 In the long run
Bourassa was right. Canadians did concentrate their attention on Canada.
But to adopt his policy of an immediate declaration of independence during
the war would have thrown the country into chaos, for the majority of
its people were not ready for this step. In time they became ready, marking
him as a man ahead of the times.

The politicians' solution to the economic disorder caused by the
war was to advocate an intensive post-war immigration. After promising
to send five hundred thousand Canadians overseas to serve Britain, they
turned to foreign lands to make good the deficit in the ranks of the na-
tion. While they made Canadians, through threats and intimidation, believe
it was their duty to sacrifice their lives for Britain, France, and Russia,
the politicians invited foreigners as replacements, promising them that
they would never have to take up arms, not even in the defense of Canada.
Colonial servitude did not suffice to explain this aberration, but polit­
ical self-interest did. To hide the consequences of the country's par­
ticipation from its people, the politicians would resort to immigration
to create an artificial prosperity. This policy would also satisfy the
voracious appetities of the speculators and the transportation companies.
The immigration would however fail to create the prosperity necessary
to fill the enormous void in the Dominion's finances caused by its mas­
sive expenses for war and the exodus of European capital. An example
of the politicians' action was the government's advertisement in the United
States for agricultural workers to combat a labour shortage in the Canadian
agricultural sector. To attract them the government was exempting them
from military service. If the country were attacked in the near future,
it would be defenseless; thousands of Canadians would have been killed
in the European butchery and their foreign replacements would have been
exempted from bearing arms.

The politicians were also betraying Canada to the Americans. Cul­
turally, Americanization had been going on for years and would continue
as long as English Canadians, not realizing that the French culture was
the greatest obstacle to the Americans, continued their attack on the
French language. Economically, Americanization had grown during the war
as Canada, finding the British market closed, turned to the United States
for loans. The greater Canada's war effort, the greater her debt, and the greater her dependence on the Americans. Her financial reliance on the United States would be permanent, for in the post-war period Britain would not return to supply the Dominion's capital needs, channelling her finances instead into her own and Europe's reconstruction. Besides, the United States would not easily give up her title as her neighbour's creditor. If Canada's credit rating was poor, the Americans would be unable to find takers for her debts; if it was good, they would refuse to give up their rights on these debts. Either way the United States would hold the Dominion's public and private debts. Once the war ended Canada would turn from wartime to peacetime manufacture, needing new capital to finance her operations. Americans would supply this, but, unlike the English, they would follow their capital, sending their managers and technicians north to watch over their investments. The American influence would further increase because of the Dominion's desire to attract large numbers of immigrants after the war. Most of these people would come from the United States. This development posed a threat to Canada's independent existence since American colonists had been traditionally agents of American expansionism, as the history of New Mexico's and Texas' entry into the Union demonstrated.

Bourassa believed that the entry of the United States into the war, in April 1917, would increase the forces of attraction, already almost irresistible, that the stronger American nation exerted on the weaker Canadian one. The latter's links to Britain were artificial, no matter how strong and beneficial they had been. A simple accident, the fall of the monarchy, a defeat of British arms, a quarrel over money, would
break these ties. Whether Canada was quarreling or agreeing with the United States, the two countries would remain neighbours, sole neighbours. If war broke out between them, the northern nation would be quickly absorbed. If their relations stayed friendly, if above all they developed into a wartime alliance, the danger for Canada would be even greater, because it would be less visible and more insidious. The threat would grow because her political and social leaders, preoccupied by their sympathy for England and France, did not worry about the permanent dangers menacing their country.\textsuperscript{11} He underestimated the ties between his country and Britain, over one hundred and fifty years old and not likely to be broken by a "simple accident". They were not artificial but real, for the Dominion had previously looked to the mother country for defense and capital. Furthermore, Canada had contacts not only with the United States, but with Japan and Western Europe as well. Bourassa ignored these links for he was a North American isolationist.

Economically, the consequences of American entry for Canada were severe. After the war, the two nations would face a recession caused by their intensive war efforts. The northern country would suffer more because it was the weaker Power economically and had bled itself white for three more years than its neighbour. The more the Americans aided Canada in destroying Europe, the less they would be able to aid her reconstruction. The United States would need all her manpower for war and reconstruction purposes, thus reducing, perhaps ending, the flow of her people north. The Dominion, needing immigrants to replace its losses and stimulate its post-war economy, would seek them in Europe.\textsuperscript{15} Europeans would not come to a North America militarized by the adoption of conscription
in its two largest countries. They would seek refuge from war and militarism in South America. He was wrong: European immigrants came to Canada in great numbers after the war. They fled militarism and devastation in their homelands to find neither in the Dominion.

Bourassa also believed that the more his country borrowed from its neighbour to finance the war, the less would its industry be able to borrow to finance reconstruction. The post-war decrease in agricultural and primary production in the United States, caused by labour shortages, would increase the cost of foodstuffs and necessities in Canada. To meet this development, the government would have to take measures to prevent monopoly control by distributors and wastage by consumers, and set maximum and minimum prices. Such actions, he felt, were revolutionary, for they would establish state socialism and mark the triumph of German philosophy, for socialism was a German product. Government action to regulate the economy was hardly equivalent to state socialism, especially if the measures were only for the war's duration. Furthermore, socialism was not a German but an international doctrine. What Le Devoir's editor was trying to do by equating state action with German philosophy was to show the futility of war: the Allies might triumph over German arms but "Germanism" would triumph over them. As for the revolutionary aspect of state socialism, he felt that the government should interfere in socio-economic matters only if the economy's leaders did not follow Christian moral principles. Even then, social problems should be dealt with by individuals or private organizations.

Thus Canada, because of her involvement in the European conflict, was being rapidly Americanized. For Bourassa this should not have been
an unsatisfactory development, for he had repeatedly stated that his country was a North American nation. Since the Dominion could not defend itself against the United States, not even with the aid of other Powers, it should establish an entente with its neighbour in its own interest. The war had brought about this tie, in fact but not in name. Yet the journalist preached the American threat to his country, seemingly contradicting himself. He was not, for he was using both arguments to attack Canada's participation in the war. First, if she was an American nation she had no interest in Europe's affairs and thus could be neutral in Europe's wars. Secondly, the imperialists had imposed such a heavy war burden on her that she had had to turn to the United States for help, at the risk of her independent existence. Not at war, she would not have had to turn south and her being would have been secure.

Canadians could resist the American threat in two ways. First, they should extend the French language and culture throughout the country. Secondly, they should subscribe to national loans, as they had during the war, to raise the capital they needed to develop their country and repay their debts to the Americans.

As well as meeting this threat, Canadians had to face another because of their involvement in the war: militarism. Bound by no obligation or treaty, Canada had thrown herself into the "vortex of European militarism", becoming marked as a bellicose nation. For this indulgence she would continue to pay, large post-war military expenses being necessary to ward off vengeful countries. Socially, a military class above the law had been created. None of the military rioters at Valcartier, Quebec City, Ottawa, Toronto, and Calgary had been punished. Military service
had become the key to social success. Soldiering had become the most honourable state for an honest man, for, although he might have no particular ability, it opened all doors to him. It had become the most advantageous for the dissolute as well, because it assured him impunity for his crimes. The best service one could render his country, that which brought him the greatest honour and reward, whatever his character, was to take up arms. The social order was becoming demoralized because of the raising of villainous and amoral soldiers to high standing. Since this development had come about because of the need to save the Empire, and in Quebec to save France, Canadians were being led to believe that sacrifice for foreign nations counted for more than service to Canada. By plunging her into war, the imperialists had caused the anti-social and anti-national doctrine of militarism to develop. Yet no country at war could avoid becoming militaristic. The danger was if the country continued this way after the war, a future Bourassa predicted for Canada. She would be obliged to participate in all Britain's wars and police actions. British imperialists, after defeating the Germans, would set themselves up as the rulers of the world with Canadians as their soldiers.21

To stimulate recruiting in the country, Canadian officials had promised pensions, indemnities, free land, and privileged positions in public and private administration to men who enlisted. Such promises had made the military, in the eyes of the public and the soldiers themselves, a privileged class. To meet the cost of these promises taxes would have to be increased. This step would not be the only drain on the country. Soldiers, after years in the trenches, would have lost their ties to their farmlands and would not return there, especially after having been promised
a better life elsewhere. Agricultural production would thus suffer. As for the favoured positions, once the war was over industry, facing an end to war orders, heavy taxes, and abundant labour, would not want to fulfill this promise. No manufacturer would replace skilled workers by unskilled veterans. The social order and economic equilibrium would force the state to retain a multitude of soldiers unsuited for any other profession but soldiering. Militarism, in the form of government responsibility for veterans, was in Canada to stay. 22 Contrary to Bourassa's beliefs, not all soldiers were unskilled and their skills would be in demand after the war. Furthermore, as he had stated before, 23 the Dominion would need immigration to replace her losses, something over half a million returning demobilized soldiers could do. He was so convinced that his country would remain militaristic unless it quickly changed its policies that he used conflicting arguments to prove his point.

According to him, the entry of the United States into the war ensured the permanency of militarism in Canada for two reasons. First, the southern nation, which had instituted conscription, would force its neighbour to adopt the same measure. Secondly, American participation had resulted in an Anglo-American entente. If it continued after the war, Canada would be pressured into fortifying her Western coast against Japan, an American rival in the Pacific region. The Americans would not permit their neighbour to be used as a springboard for a Japanese attack on the United States. If the entente did not continue, the Americans would still want their desires met, accomplishing them at Canada's expense if this country refused to grant them. To protect itself, the northern nation would have to arm against its neighbour. Whatever the status of the Anglo-American
entente, Canada would remain militarized, either for or against the Americans. This argument assumed that the Dominion would remain a British colony, a pawn to be used by Britain in her game with the United States. Bourassa felt that England, "to strike a good bargain" with the Americans, would allow them to pillage her colony or Americanize it completely. If she was independent, Canada could avoid being used this way.

In Hier, Aujourd'hui, Demain in 1916 he stated that his country was a North American nation that could rely on the Monroe Doctrine for protection. Canada should proclaim her adherence to it, not as an act of submission to the United States, but as a recognition that the doctrine was American in the continental sense of the word. It should also be broadened into a Canadian-American defensive entente that would protect the two countries from foreign aggression. Since the United States would not want to defend Britain as well, Canada must be independent or completely autonomous, free to proclaim her neutrality in any British war. To protect herself against the renewal of imperialist fervour in her neighbour and foreign aggression, she should conclude defensive ententes with the countries of South America, thus establishing a pax americana among all the American nations. Such a system would also strengthen hope for peace in the world, much better than the famous balance of military power among the European nations that had resulted in the massive bloodshed and savage hatred of the present war.

Canada had a role to play in the resolution of this conflict. It was to make sure that no nation was forced to accept a settlement that would raise a desire for revenge. In other words, she should act as an impartial arbitrator. To do this, she would have to claim the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the deliberations leading to the settlement of the world's affairs. Even more important was that all nations adopt a new moral code, strengthened by practical sanctions, that would restrain the hatred of peoples and destroy the infernal strength of the agents of war. Such measures had to be taken the day after the war ended, before people forgot its horrors and madness. The best hopes for peace were international arbitration, disarmament or at least a considerable reduction in armaments, immunity of maritime commerce from attack and seizure, complete publication of all treaties, the dismantling of secret alliances, and in parliamentary countries the annulment of all agreements concluded without the approval of the representatives of the people. To those who argued that such a system had been tried at The Hague International Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 and had failed, Bourassa replied that on the contrary it was the system of alliances, balance of power, secret diplomacy, and large armaments, all necessary in the words of the militarists to "assure the peace of the world", that had failed. International arbitration was a good proposal, but if it failed to resolve a dispute war might result. To guard against this possibility, countries armed themselves, sometimes to the point of looking for an opportunity to use their military machines. The circle was vicious: peace-loving nations, fearing conquest by war-loving ones, armed themselves "to the teeth" and became war-loving.

Bourassa felt that his country, if it united its efforts with those of the United States and the South American republics, could exercise a considerable pressure on Britain and, through her, the other European nations to adopt a new code of international law. By herself, Canada
could do many things if she wanted to work for right, justice, peace, liberty, the emancipation of peoples, and genuine progress in the world. She must pronounce herself in favour of international arbitration for all disputes and state that she would not take part in any war unless serious arbitration between England and her enemies was rejected by the latter. The Dominion should demand immunity of maritime commerce from seizure and refuse to cooperate in any naval policy as long as the British government refused to work with the American one to introduce this reform. Canada should remain neutral in any war the mother country found itself in because of its treaties, secret conventions, or vague ententes, that had not been discussed or voted on by the Canadian Parliament. Imperial cooperation should be refused as long as Britain refused to support armament reduction among the Great Powers. If disarmament was accepted and instituted by Europe's Powers, the United States, and Japan, the Canadian government should adhere to the agreement without reservation. Above all, the Dominion must reaffirm its right to neutrality in any war not threatening its territory. The French-Canadian journalist was primarily concerned with Anglo-Canadian relations, for he felt that if Canada followed his outline she would render a real service to England, that of curing the mother country of the ruinous vertigo of imperialism. This role was nobler, as well as more glorious, productive, civilized, and Christian than that of furnishing soldiers to England and France. For Canada, the benefits of his policy would be twofold: materially, she would not have to spend great amounts for her defense, and morally, she would be pursuing an ideal of peace, justice, order, and true liberty. His proposals involved no responsibility for the Dominion. It would have
only one entente, a defensive one with the nations of North and South America, and would take no part in any wars unless its territory was attacked. But as stated above, he believed that his country was threatened by no nation and hence could always be at peace. Thus its American defensive alliance was unnecessary. Canada's stand in favour of arbitration would be useless unless it was backed up by a willingness to enforce it. The League of Nations died in the 1930s when it failed to back up its policy of collective security. International cooperation would lead to peace if the Powers were prepared to take practical steps to preserve peace. Bourassa supported the cooperation but not the enforcement, his stand being similar to that of Canada on Article X of the League in the 1920s.

He would allow his country to use its influence as a belligerent to work for a just peace. Before the Imperial War Conference in 1917, Le Devoir's editor advised the Prime Minister that in order to justify the direction he had given the country for the last two and a half years and to be pardoned by his contemporaries for the large sacrifices he had imposed on the country, he had a duty to insist that the representatives of the Empire at the peace conference advocate the adoption of the principles their countries had fought for in the war: the destruction of militarism and the restoration of the rights of oppressed peoples. Not only Germany, but the Allies as well, must be subjected to these principles.

All of the above proposals were not certain of success. Only the return of Christian principles to mankind, through the Pope's teachings, could guarantee peace, according to Bourassa. Raised and educated as
an ultramontane, he considered the Roman Catholic Church and faith vital for the French-Canadian race.\textsuperscript{32} Le Devoir had been founded in order to educate the French Canadians in their Christian duties and to show them that Roman Catholicism was a force for social and educational good.\textsuperscript{33} One would expect that its editor would also find his religion useful in the cause of peace.

Early in the war, he said that he hoped that one of the outcomes of the conflict would be the restoration of the kingdom of Christ over peoples and nations. Later, when commenting on the death of Pope Pius X and the election of Benedict XV to succeed him, Bourassa stated that although nations would come and go, the Church would remain unalterable, continuing "to enlighten the world, to save souls, to prepare the kingdom of God".\textsuperscript{34} He was referring to the Roman Catholic Church, headed by the Pope. It was the only universal one. Never had it been the Church of an epoch, a land, a race, or a nation. Throughout the ages, it had fought without respite to defend its independence against the tyranny of rulers and its Catholicism against the prejudices of peoples. It had recognized all groups, respected and protected them equally, the victorious and vanquished, strong and weak, rich and poor. In all times and in all countries, the Church had recognized the traditions, languages, and national aspirations of its followers. It had adapted its hierarchy, parish organizations, rites, and discipline to their needs. Whether in America, Asia, or Europe, under Pius X or St. Pierre, yesterday or today, the Catholic, apostolic, and Roman Church had been and was universal, the servant of no race. Thus in Canada, tying its cause to that of the French language and race would be an error. Equally absurd and
odious would be making the Church an agent of Anglo-Saxon assimilation. Catholicism was all-embracing, a faith for all mankind.

But not everyone practised this religion. In America, the work of converting the disbelievers fell to the French Canadians, who, as missionaries had done as much as possible for the Church. Their greatest service had been and was to be an obstacle to the recurring attempts to turn the Catholic apostolate into the instrument of a race or the arm of domination of a government. Bourassa was mistaken. The history of the Church in America had been that of converting heathens into Catholics and thus supporters of the Catholic colony of New France against the Protestant English colonies surrounding her. After the Conquest, the Church was the agent of survival for the French Canadians. Catholicism in Canada became identified with the French. But Bourassa believed that it was a faith that could unite everyone, an urgent necessity in time of war.

Thus he supported the Pope's attempts to end the armed conflict. On August 3, 1915, he commented on Benedict XV's statement of July 28 that peace could be based solely on the just aspirations of all peoples and respect by nations for the rights and dignity of others. Only the Pope could make and implement such a proposal, for he alone possessed the moral authority above the passions, interests, and ambitions of the peoples who were fighting for world domination. He could mediate among them, provided they knew their true interests. The Powers ignored his appeal, preferring to ask for his blessing on their arms, much to Bourassa's distaste. The journalist felt that the Pope's voice had been the only one to call out during the orgy of blood to proclaim that the war was infamous and useless and to tell kings and their subjects to end the terrible
slaughter. For Le Devoir's editor, the war marked the collapse of the political system based on the false goodness of men, conceited diplomacy, the thirst for conquest, and the pagan cult of gold and brutal force. Perhaps, once the ruins of human folly were heaped up, the mercy of God would guide society in reconstructing itself along Christian lines. People would stop trying to tyrannize one another. There was a difference however between wanting the war's end and achieving it. Given the prevailing belief in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe that nations struggled for power and survival, the conflict would end only with the defeat of one side by the other. Bourassa's hopes for a Christian world that he believed more desirable than the triumph of German scientific militarism, British mercantile imperialism, French revolutionary democracy, or savage and perfidious Slavic mysticism, were rejected by the real one.

He continued to have faith that the Pope's teachings would form the basis of a true, just, Christian, and lasting peace. For having failed to reconstruct their society on Christian lines, the Romans had fallen to barbarians. For having belittled the Pontiff and, through their quarrels, allowed the Turk to invade, the Christian princes had let a cancer penetrate Europe. If the European nations remained deaf to the warnings of Benedict XV, the masses, roused from their torpor by the bloody orgy of the leaders who oppressed them, might shake off their military and economic yokes and take retribution on the burning ruins of civilization. Bourassa was conjuring up the spectres of heathen conquest and social revolution to scare the Powers into making a peace that would last.
Another man who agreed on the need to end the conflict in such a manner as to avoid another was the American President, Woodrow Wilson. On December 18, 1916, he addressed a note to the Central and Entente Powers, requesting the terms on which they would make peace. Bourassa found this act useful, since it might lead to a peace conference. Wilson had taken the attitude of the Pope, the only one that corresponded to the needs of the world and offered the warring nations the opportunity to end the war honourably before their total exhaustion. The President paraphrased Benedict XV once more, in his January 22, 1917, "Peace without Victory" speech to the American Senate. The French-Canadian journalist believed that Wilson was a virtuous man who, although he might become involved in the conflict, would remain faithful to his maxims of peace. The Pope would remain upright on the luminous summits from where he could continue to teach the world the lessons of duty, justice, and charity, without which there would be no real peace. Once the war ended, the President would add his weight to that of the world's highest moral authority to establish a just and durable settlement, one that would profit all parties, recognize the rightful aspirations of all peoples, give liberty to all oppressed nations, and rid the world of all unbearable pretensions and arrogant and unjust dominations. 

Once the United States entered the war, Bourassa worried that Wilson might not be able to remain faithful to his aim of peace without victory. If the so-called "Christian" nations of Europe had the good sense to accept the Pope as arbitrator of their mad and devastating quarrels, justice and reason might regain their place in the world. If, as events indicated, the American President separated the nations of Europe and
prevented "the suicide of Christian civilization", there would be reason to fear that peace would be bought at the price of a glittering victory for revolution. If the United States led the Allies to a military solution of the war, she might be tempted to persuade other nations, under threat of armed action, to adopt her democratic system and principles. She would be following the examples of revolutionary France and Victorian England, who had fostered revolution in other lands in order to spread their ideas there. Such action, once started, was difficult to stop; the world faced disorder.

Le Devoir's editor found in Wilson's reply to the Pope's "Note to Heads of State at War" of August 1, 1917, a call to revolution. Benedict XV had urged an end to the war based on the status quo ante bellum, disarmament, and international arbitration. Bourassa felt that little would come of the appeal because most governments, tied to the insatiable greed that had launched the war and to those who profited by its continuation, would keep their people hypnotized so that the exploiters of human blood could continue to lead them to the slaughter. The duplicity would not go on forever, for soon the masses would see that no military success could compensate them for their additional sacrifices. They would rise up in a bloody and revengeful revolt, unless the nations' leaders accepted the Pope's proposals. The American President rejected them and sought to foment revolution in Germany by appealing to her people to overthrow their masters. Benedict XV, faithful to Christ's doctrine and the practice of the Church, did not glorify or condemn any form of government, unlike Wilson, who was more concerned with causing upheaval in Germany than in closing the gaping wounds of humanity. No, he wanted the latter, as
soon as possible. Believing the German people to have suffered at the hands of their leaders, who had led them to war, he called for the freedom of all peoples and a representative German leadership.\textsuperscript{45} Since the military in Germany, the ruling group, still believed it could win the conflict, his appeal was a good one. It offered an opportunity to do away with this war-loving government and make peace. Bourassa's criticism of the American leader for being adverse to human suffering was unfair.

But understandable, given the journalist's belief that a just and durable peace could not come about through the victory of either side. In a letter to Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, he stated that he appeared anti-English because he refused to admit that the crimes of the Germans erased those of the English, French, Russians, and Americans, and because he did not let the threat of Germany's domination of the world by its arms obscure that of Britain's by its gold. Each day confirmed his conviction that the Pope was right in wishing that the combatants pardon their reciprocal crimes, renounce their particular ambitions, and retreat to their respective spheres. Bourassa continued to feel "that the best way to respond to the ideas of the Pope, was to present and develop them in the Catholic, that is, the universal, sense and not to narrow them to the measure of the passions, rancours, or ambitions of one or the other of the nations at war".\textsuperscript{46}

In August 1917 the President of the United States had subordinated Benedict's proposals to the American interest, but the following year, in his "Fourteen Points" and "Four Principles of Peace" speeches, he returned to the Pope's teachings, to suggest self-determination of peoples
and an end to annexation by conquest. The journalist was pleased that Wilson had come back into the Pontiff's fold, for more than ever the world needed to follow God's authority on earth, not only to end the massacre and re-establish harmony between nations, but to prevent the conflict developing in each country between the executioners and victims, the profiteers and martyrs, the satisfied and hungry. The people had to turn to Benedict XV, for he remained above the clash of arms. If they did not, they would fall under the yoke of internationalism without religion, morals, or direction. In other words, Christian civilization might perish.

Since the war was a cooperative crime by the belligerent Powers, only an impartial man, the Pope, could separate them and establish the conditions for a lasting settlement. For all men he was the surest and most disinterested guide, the guardian of public right, the key to the entrance to the society of nations. Believing that true peace would not come from the victory of one or the other of the coalitions, Bourassa felt, like Benedict XV, that the rights and aspirations of all peoples had to be considered. Convinced that it was false to believe that the conflict could be terminated only by the violence of arms, Le Devoir's editor opposed those who urged unlimited warfare, to the annihilation of the enemy. He also believed that in order to achieve a just and durable peace, the settlement must not profit one party, but all. Therefore, each belligerent had to sacrifice some self-respect and particular interests and not make exaggerated and impossible demands, as Canada's partners had done. Forced to battle an almost universal current of intense chauvinism, he had indicated the contradictions between the principles
the Allied leaders wished to impose on the Central Powers and their application in their own lands and Canada, a reference most likely to the Ontario Bilingual Schools Issue. He was aware that because of his stand he was accused of being pro-German, \(^5\) disloyal to Britain, and indifferent to France. These were unjust accusations, especially when they came from those who exploited the religious faith and the sympathy toward France of the French Canadians for the benefit of Anglo-Saxon and Protestant imperialism. \(^4\) Much to Bourassa's disgust, Canada had taken part in the war. As a participant, she faced the same evils other belligerents did: heavy loss of men, economic strain. Only the restoration of Christian principles to all the nations at war could save them from a future of tyranny, jingoism, and lust after gold.

This was the substance of his Armistice Day editorial. He stated that at the present hour one certitude remained, the omnipotence of God. Governments and peoples had to implore from Him the light, courage, strength, and endurance necessary to restore order from the chaos of moral and material ruin caused by the foolish passions of man. If peace was inspired by the convictions of the Pope, expressed to a lesser extent by President Wilson, it would truly be just and durable. Christians had a duty to pray, to thank God for having silenced the murderous voice of cannons, that is, the voice of pride, hatred, and brutal and blind force. God must be asked to make the call of humility, repentance, reason enlightened by faith, and true social charity louder than all others and to illuminate the conscience of the masses and the spirit of governments. During the war, the theories of divine right of kings and sovereignty of peoples had been heard. Hopefully, peace would recall to fallen monarchs and
and chastised races God's unlimited rights. Only in the re-establishment of these rights would leaders find the basis of their authority and people the secret of true liberty. Le Devoir's editor believed that the world would become better if it followed the Christian principles of brotherhood and humility. Unfortunately, men would interpret these principles differently. Furthermore, not all men were Christian. Some universal system was needed, however, or wars would continue.

For Bourassa, World War I had been such a terrible disaster that he found solace in his Roman Catholic faith, which would save his country and humanity. The conflict had brought together all that he detested: imperialism, militarism, materialism. Only the purifying aspects of his religion could combat these evils. He became less a Canadian nationalist, more an apostle of Christ.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

World War I was of such magnitude that tremendous strains were imposed on peoples and nations. Revolution and collapse of empires spread throughout Europe in the last years of the war and the immediate post-war period. Canada, insulated in North America, escaped the worst of these shocks. She still suffered, racial tension, class conflict, and regional disunity combining to make her four years of participation a heavy trial. Bourassa believed that his country's problems and the world's were caused by the yoke of imperialism. As well as continuing to fight this evil at home, he realized that an international attack must be made against it. Such an offensive would not be launched by the Great Powers, for they were the imperialists. It could be led only by a disinterested universal party, the Pope, God's authority on earth. Christianity took the prominent place in the thought of the editor of Le Devoir. He never despaired in the face of either his own country's particular problems or mankind's suffering during the war.

He believed that the infamous God of Gold, the idol of the pagan world, had caused this conflict. Race hatred, thirst for conquest, and even the legitimate claims of peoples were only the instruments by which preying international high financiers served their own interests in hurling nations against one another. Caused by the lust for gold, the war was supported by its power. To hide these facts and to ensure popular support, cupidity was resorted to, reaching its zenith in the Unionist government. Borden was misleading the public when he pretended that his administration had to be re-elected in order to win the war. To hear
him speak, one assumed that Germany was waging war on Canada alone. The truth was that any additional troops the Dominion could send would not affect the future course of events. Neither England nor France needed more soldiers, but the profiteers needed more deaths in order to make more money. The government was bankrupting Canada to save Britain, by swelling the national debt, squandering millions to organize an army more costly than that of any other country, multiplying the number of sinecures and parasites, disorganizing the productive energies of the country, letting the cost of living rise so as to wipe out the wage increases of workers and make indigents of them, refusing to take steps to limit the monstrous gains of profiteers, and allowing the British government to ruin Canadian credit by inundating the American market with Canadian notes. To all this squandering, the Prime Minister had added the millions wasted on the Canadian Northern. 2

To pay for its gluttony, the government was making an appeal to the savings of Canadians, instead of reducing its own appetite. This Victory Loan was a bluff. There could be no victory in the face of Russia's complete collapse, Italy's disaster, 3 France's mutinies. The truth was that the Borden administration, facing an immediate deficit of three hundred million dollars and the refusal of its creditors to supply its needs, found in the savings of the population its only recourse. In every country, the people were suffering under the burden of expenses and debts accumulated by their government. The enemies facing each nation were not external, but internal: the profiteers, monopolists, venal politicians, false patriots, parasites, and exploiters, who devoured the substance of the population and, by stirring up the fire of its hatreds,
rancour, and prejudices, led it to ruin and butchery. To supply the money for war was to favour this work of destruction. There were victory loans everywhere, but the only victory they assured was that of the destroyers of peoples and speculators on national bankruptcies. If, in each country, the citizens decided to dry up the sources of credit for death, the war would end immediately. The Victory Loan, a forced loan, was, like conscription, "the unavoidable consequence of the unlimited war effort". To support this effort it was necessary to take men by force, when not enough were found to volunteer for suicide, and money by force, when not enough benevolent lenders were found to maintain the dance of death of millions. Thus the Victory Loan was the zenith of imperialism, following Bourassa's definition of it in 1902: forced colonial contributions in men and money to Britain's wars.

Clearly, something new was needed to fight this evil which, in spite of his struggle against it since 1899, had grown to maturity in Canada. His panacea was the same one for the world's suffering: Christianity. His country and the other belligerents were under the yoke of imperialism, the greedy lust for gold, that had caused the most horrendous of all wars. Man was seeking only material gain; he had forgotten his moral and spiritual advancement. The result had been World War I. Christianity, through the universal Roman Catholic Church, could restore to man what he was missing. The war would end and a better world would be created. Bourassa was not seeking refuge from the problems of mankind in Catholicism, but their solution.

For example, in 1919 and 1920 he fought renewed proposals for an imperial fleet. If one was created, it would be a continuation of English
imperialism and a triumph for its cult of gold. The French Canadian hated the British frenzy of pride and greed that threatened the peace of the world. The only way to combat it was through Christian charity, which would repress the evil of imperialism while developing good.6

In 1920 the editor of Le Devoir outlined his paper's future course, to concern itself less with politics and more with social and religious questions. It would continue to fight imperialism, feminism, destroyers of the social order, and Canada's internal and external enemies, but all these battles would be subordinated to "the unique and constant conviction to serve God". Bourassa's desire was to increase the number of people who realized that their society and institutions must follow His laws and designs.7 The journalist was upset that people fulfilled their duties to God, the Church, and the Pope passively, accepting religious teachings but not practising them, in effect denying them. All French Canadians and Catholics had committed this sin of denial during the war, when Benedict XV's voice had been the only one to try to quell the fury of the massacre and make humanity heed the calls of faith and reason. If these people were offered another occasion to show their faith in the Papacy and their love for the Pope, they should remember that he was not only the infallible guardian of dogma and ethics, but in human affairs more enlightened than men of state, stronger than any soldier, and more disinterested than the men of finance who managed the politicians and made war. Bourassa wished that all Catholics, by their faith, prayers, words, and acts would hasten the day when the Pontiff's social authority would be exercised once again, useful, pacifying, and enlightening, on a world restored and made better by the unity of belief in order and liberty.8
As before, he saw in journalism the means to educate the people. In 1922, in a pamphlet significantly entitled *La presse catholique et nationale*, he stated that Canada and the world, threatened by man's pursuit of material gain, could be saved by Christianity. The passion for gold, all-powerful at the moment, was the most dishonourable yoke mankind had ever borne. It had caused the war, ruined the peace, plunged the world into its present disarray, weakened the forces of moral and even material reconstruction, and prepared the way for revolution. In French Canada, the pursuit of gold, business, was the most active agent of Anglo-Saxon and Protestant values and a measure of the hold that materialism without faith, ideals, or homeland had. To battle the influence of this passion, *Le Devoir*, in its role as propagator of Catholic truth, the Christian social order, and sound French-Canadian traditions, denounced it. Religion was universal, patriotism particular to a country. A nation had to have both to be good, for without the latter it was only a religious society, without the former barbaric. To save mankind, patriotism had to be governed by the rules of faith, morals, and reason that guided individuals and societies. The war had revealed the true evil, materialism, and the means to fight it, Christianity. Fortified by this knowledge, Bourassa continued the struggle.

The other significant trend in his thought during the war was that he never lost faith in Canada. English-French conflict reached a serious degree because of the Ontario schools issue and French Canada's weak war effort. The strife resulted in the presentation of a resolution of separatism in the Quebec Assembly in January 1918. Bourassa felt that such a step should not be considered, for it would bring down all of English
Canada's wrath on his province. His main reason for refusing to consider separatism was his belief that the French Canadians were the only true Canadians, the ones who put Canada's interests first. The country would remain Canadian only if its French element was strong. This was why he fought for French language rights in all the provinces. He could not separate Canada and the French Canadians, as a letter he wrote eleven days after the Unionist victory indicates. He was convinced that when the war ended there would be scissions in that party, particularly between the West and Ontario. There would also be a reaction against imperialism and militarism. The duty of the French Canadians was to be patient and dignified, conserving their strength for the day when they would find English-Canadian allies, more Canadian than English, ready to support Quebec in restoring the base of the Canadian nationality. Thus, French Canada was Canada.

Yet if Quebec withdrew unto herself, following his advice, there would be no force in the country to make English Canadians Canadian, unless they were already. This was the problem: both races believed they were acting in the national interest. Compromise was necessary if the nation was to be united. To French Canadians, accepting all English Canada's proposals was tantamount to assimilation. The opposite was true for English and other Canadians, who had cultures and languages they wished to preserve. For them, Bourassa's position was unbearable. They believed that he wanted the French language and culture to predominate in the country. If this happened, Canada would become solely French, a state of affairs as unacceptable to the non-French Canadians as English would be to the French Canadians.
Thus his intransigent stand contributed to racial division in the Dominion. It also contributed to the origins of the post-war Laurentian school of thought in Quebec. If she followed his advice and went into isolation, what was to prevent her remaining in that state? Only her willingness to join with the progressive elements in English Canada, was his answer. If there was no such inclination, Quebec would remain isolated, in a condition responsive to Groulx's doctrine of Laurentianism. Thus Bourassa's thought could lead a Quebecker to a point from where he could come under the influence of separatism. This does not mean that the editor of Le Devoir advocated separatism. Only once did he mention it as a possibility. At a banquet in Quebec City on December 21, 1921, celebrating Armand Lavergne's victory in the federal election two weeks earlier, Bourassa stated that Confederation would probably break up one day. His pessimism resulted from a total disillusionment with parliamentary democracy as practised in Canada. During the 1917 election he had supported the Liberals as the lesser of two evils. He adopted the same position in Quebec during the 1921 federal election. Both times he had no enthusiasm for the Liberals and in the latter year he had none for Canada's parliamentary system. In 1920 he stated that the war had shown the complete failure of this system as an effective form of government. The joy displayed at the banquet for the victory of Lavergne, elected as a Liberal, may have stirred Bourassa to speak hastily. This assumption is supported by his later reference to his "ill-considered improvisation". That it was. Throughout his career he fought English-Canadian nativists and French-Canadian separatists, both of whom threatened his dream of a bilingual, bicultural Canada. His one moment of disillusionment with Confederation cannot negate his lifetime of support for it.
His Canadian nationalism never showed more clearly than during World War I when, despite the strains the conflict imposed on her, he never lost faith in Canada. The war also brought to the fore his belief that the Roman Catholic Church could make the world a better place. The clash of arms only strengthened the faith in his country and Christianity that Bourassa always had. He had become four years older in body, but not in mind.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


2. Ibid., pp. 16-17, 51; see also J. S. Woodsworth, Strangers within our gates, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972, and My neighbor, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972.


6. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, April 15, 1907, pp. 6725, 6748.


9. Rumilly, p. 11.


13. Ibid., p. 40.


17. See below, p. 20.

18. See below, pp. 29-32, 36-37.


21. He was forced to resign because his criticism of corrupt clergy was losing his paper subscriptions. See Rumilly, pp. 727-729.


NOTES

Capitalization rendered as in the originals.
23. For the program see Henri Bourassa, "Le Devoir": son origine, son passé, son avenir, Montréal, Imprimé au Devoir, 1915, pp. 51-53.


NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO


2. Ibid., pp. 39-42.

3. Lettre pastorale du 8 septembre 1914.


5. Rummil, pp. 511-512.


10. See below, pp. 21-22.

11. Fournier, pp. 311-315.


13. Le Devoir, October 20, 1914.


15. Ibid., October 31, 1914.

16. Ibid., December 9, 1914.


18. This would be imperialism anyway. Bourassa was trying to use the imperialists' argument against the imperialists.


22. Le Devoir, September 8, 1914.

23. Ibid., October 11, 1914.

24. Ibid., October 15, 1914.


27. Ibid., October 17, 1914.

28. Ibid., December 16, 1914.

29. Ibid., February 13, 1915.
Bourassa felt profiteers would benefit by the law's lower tax on personal, as compared to corporate, income. They would be able to divert business income to personal income and thus pay less on their war profits. Furthermore, foreign stockholders of Canadian companies were not subjected to the personal income tax. Le Devoir, August 1, 1917.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


5. Ibid., p. 53.


12. Ibid., February 9, 1915.


19. Ibid., April 20, 1915.


22. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, April 15, 1907, p. 6730.


24. Ibid., pp. 146-149.

25. Oliver Asselin, Emigration from Belgium and France to Canada, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1913, passim.


27. CAR 1914, pp. 510-511.


33. Ibid., May 17, 1916.


36. CAR 1916, p. 566.


NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE


2. Olivar Asselin, Pourquoi je m’ enrôle, Montreal, 1916, pp. 43-44.


5. Henri Bourassa, Canadian Nationalism and the War, Montreal, 1916, pp. 16-23.

6. Ibid., pp. 24-30.


8. Ibid., pp. 31, 35.
9. Quebec and Confederation: A record of the Debate of the Legislative Assembly of Quebec on the Motion proposed by J. N. Francocour Member for Lotbinière, eds. A. Savard and W. E. Playfair, Quebec City, 1918, pp. 6-8, 14, 16-17, 20-22.

10. Ibid., p. 33.

11. Ibid., pp. 47, 50, 52-53.

12. Ibid., pp. 96-97.

13. Ibid., pp. 97-98.


16. See above, pp. 6-7, 47-49.


20. Ibid., pp. 218-219.


22. Armstrong, p. 181; Durocher, pp. 266-269.


24. Henri Bourassa to Cardinal Bégin, February 18, 1918, in Ibid., p. 270.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX


4. Ibid., pp. 126-127.

5. Ibid., pp. 127-128.


9. Henri Bourassa, Hier, Aujourd'hui, Demain, pp. 131, 132; see above, pp. 81-82.


12. He was contradicting himself. See above, p. 82, where he was concerned about Britain's post-war strength.


15. This statement appears to contradict his earlier one about American immigration to Canada after the war (see p. 86). But it does not. There Bourassa dealt with a neutral United States; here he deals with a United States at war. To reconstruct itself after the war, the southern nation would have to keep its people at home, instead of sending them to other countries, as it would have been able to had it remained neutral.

16. The government did adopt these measures in limited form in 1918 when it established the Fuel Controller to regulate fuel prices and distribution and the Food Controller to conserve food. See Brown and Cook, pp. 237-238.

O'Connell, "Henri Bourassa and Canadian Nationalism," p. 277. Levitt states that the Nationalists wanted to temper "capitalism with the spirit of Catholicism" and "believed that a moderate use of the state could make a substantial contribution to the achievement of the twin goals of strengthening French Canada and fostering Catholic social reform". See Levitt, pp. 110-111. The key word here is moderate, for Bourassa wanted state action to alleviate the worst of socio-economic abuses. For example, his solutions to the Depression were temperance, justice, and charity. Governments had to cease spending extravagantly, for they caused credit to be too easily available and thus set a bad example for the public. Governments also had to stop aiding business in exploiting the people. Charity, however, had to be an individual, not a state, act. See Henri Bourassa, *La crise...trois remèdes: Temperance, Justice, Charité*, Québec, *L'Action Sociale*, 1932, pp. 4-5.


*Le Devoir*, November 12, 1918.


He never indicated what these would be.


Ibid., pp. 173, 176-178.

See above, pp. 21-22.

Canada wanted the obligation under Article X to help a League member when attacked made dependent on geographic neighbourhood. Since the United States was her only "geographic neighbour", Canada was advocating isolation. See W. L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada*, Second edition, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1969, p. 111.


Henri Bourassa, "*Le Devoir*": son origine, son passé, son avenir, pp. 51-52.


Ibid., April 13, 1916.

Ibid., December 27, 1916, February 6, 1917.

The phrase is Benedict XV's. See *L'intervention américaine*, p. 37.

Ibid., pp. 17, 22-23, 36-38.


NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

3. Caporetto in 1917, where the Austrians, bolstered by the Germans, smashed through the Italian front in the Alps.
5. See above, p. 8.
9. See above, pp. 6-7, 47-49.
11. See above, p. 76.
12. Probably over the tariff.
14. "Extrait d'un compte rendu du Devoir d'une conférence de Bourassa, prononcée à Québec le 21 décembre 1921 (Banquet Lavergne)", in *ibid.*, p. 845.
15. In 1921 he supported the Progressives nationally but the Liberals provincially, for the former did not run candidates in Quebec. See Rumilly, p. 634.
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