Authority in Ancien Régime France:

The Understanding of Jacques Du Bosc

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by
Colleen Fitzgerald
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Head of the Department of History
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon
Saskatchewan S7N 0W0
UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN
College of Graduate Studies and Research

SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION
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of the requirements for the

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by
Colleen Fitzgerald

Department of History
University of Saskatchewan

Summer 1996

Examing Committee:

Dr. J. Julien  Dean's Designate, Chair
College of Graduate Studies & Research

Dr. K. Corrigan  Chair of Advisory Committee
Dean, St. Thomas More College

Dr. B. Waiser  Department of History

Dr. J. M. Hayden  Department of History

Dr. H. Johnson  Department of History

Dr. T. Deutscher  Department of History

Dr. N. Senior  Department of French

External Examiner:

Dr. Peter A. Goddard, Department of History
University of Guelph
Guelph ON N1G 2W1
Authority in Ancien Régime France: the Understanding of Jacques Du Bosc

This thesis addresses the question of authority in seventeenth-century France and argues that through the writings of Jacques Du Bosc we are able to come to a particular, though recognizably common, understanding of the foundations of authority and how different structures (e.g., political, social, religious) were integrated through the organizing principle of grace. Throughout his works Du Bosc argues (both implicitly and explicitly) that grace, which he understands to be divine benefaction, was the motive power of the created universe and consequently the prime authority. He makes this argument not only from the certainty of faith but also through reasoned philosophical argument. He further applies his philosophical conclusions to the Jansenist debate, as one would expect, but more revealing, he also applies them to a series of works that address the role and behaviour of women.

The writings of Jacques Du Bosc reflect numerous interests of seventeenth-century France (philosophy, feminism, Jansenism and hagiography and political panegyrics) and he has variously been described as a feminist, a libertin, a honnête homme, a philosopher and a courtier. Each of these descriptions is true but an additional description, that of priest, must also be included. This thesis argues that his principle perceptions were formed by his culture and his vocation and consequently addresses his culture: the religious, social, and political structures, the intellectual milieu and various debates he engaged to better understand the complexity of lived experience (Chapter Two).

In *Le Philosophe indifférent*, Du Bosc presents a progressive philosophy of history to counter sectarian thinking which begins with Natural Law, is developed in Mosaic Law and culminates in Christian Law. Christian Law, which is validated by the lumière révélée, the revelation of Christ, animates all life via grace. By this immediacy he is able to steer a path between stoic and sceptic. In his attempt to find a middle ground, however, Du Bosc applies Aristotelian and Thomistic moral theory to theology and philosophy which neither philosopher would have accepted as valid and which ultimately undermines his own argu-
ments both in this work and in those works that address Jansenism (Chapter Three).

Du Bosc also incorporates grace as the authority in his writings about women, though with much more success. Grace, in these works, takes on multiple meanings: the natural grace of women, the acquired grace of society and ultimately, the divine grace which enables magnanimity. Du Bosc does not limit himself to Christian women but also addresses the heroism of pre-Christian women. Throughout these works he argues for the viability of an informed, thoughtful womanhood and that what is good, is also true, and beautiful (Chapter Four).

In the Jansenist controversy, his last debate, he again invokes the authority of grace and the structures that safeguard it: Church and State. He initially attempts a balance in his approach though this soon gives way to impatience and he condemns them as heretics for their arrogance. The integrated graceful behaviour he espoused, personified in l'honnête homme, comes undone in the face of intransigence, as does his argument for detachment, and authoritarianism replaces detachment.

In this analysis of authority it is apparent that Du Bosc had a definite understanding of the source of authority and the means by which it was communicated: grace. All of nature, he argued, was united in an organic whole from the grand political gesture to the least action, from the ranking of the estates to the description of the heavens. Any conflict could be resolved, given a proper understanding of history, through a universalism arrived at through indifférence. This detachment held the choice of the individual and the unity of the whole in an exquisite and finely balanced tension. This tension was the means whereby seventeenth-century French society thrived and maintained its complexity. When the tension was further intensified by challenges to this integrated organic whole, the balance was lost and the source of authority recognized by society shifted.
BIOGRAPHY

After working as one of the founding members of Twenty-Fifth Street Theatre in Saskatoon, Colleen Fitzgerald completed an undergraduate degree in Art History. She then worked for a time as an educator and curator, focusing primarily on Canadian contemporary art at the Mendel Art Gallery in Saskatoon. In 1981 she was invited by the U. S. State Department to attend an intensive International Museum Education Study Group. After a brief period in publishing, which included establishing *Vox Benedictina* and the *Canadian Catholic Review* (both still in publication) she undertook a Masters (History) degree at the University of Saskatchewan, followed by this study. Concurrent with this study she worked as a television writer-producer, winning two national awards in that capacity. She is married to Donald Ward, a writer and editor, and lives in Saskatoon with their two daughters.

Publications


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A Note on Spelling and Typography

In transcribing these texts the distinctions between u and v, i and j, s and f, have been modernized. The original punctuation and spelling have been maintained.
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Chapter One

Jacques Du Bosc and the Coherence of Authority

This work seeks to explore the meaning, foundation, and extent of authority in mid-seventeenth century France. It tries to provide a new way of determining, from a somewhat novel perspective, how best to assess the sense and significance of the criterion of authority. The present study will therefore also seek to formulate a different understanding of this period based on an incorporative perspective of an individual, Jacques Du Bosc. It will address his intellectual, spiritual, social and political orientation and his writings on these same areas.

The perception of authority in the preceding sixteenth century varies quite dramatically from that of the following eighteenth century. In the sixteenth century, for the most part, the belief was maintained that there was a single unifying pattern that underwrote nature, science and law. At the core of this perception was an explicit understanding of the doctrine of grace which incorporated Thomistic philosophy that blended Christianity and Aristotelianism, and was supported by Christian Humanism. By the eighteenth century and under the influence of the *philosophes*, this unity was questioned. The shift from a unified world view to one grounded in scepticism and diversity, however, was obviously not an immediate occurrence. There is no single event or document that historians can point to that marks the beginning of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment or the ultimate rejection of the Christian doctrine of grace as authoritative in the intellectual, political and social realms. There is, consequently, a problem in assessing the locus of authority in the intervening years. The phrase "early modern," often used to describe this age, is so general
that it is of little value, for it encompasses too broad a span of time to be genuinely informative. While it is a truism that all ages are ages of transition, the Early Modern period, and more specifically the seventeenth century, can be seen most definitely, as an age in which the locus and perception of authority shifted.

An important part of the present work is that the historian can find new insight into the problem of how this shift occurred not simply by looking at the major writers who bridge these two ages or who stand as stellar pinnacles at either end of each age, but rather by taking the works of a lesser-known figure who was party to a great number of the major issues of the day and wrote popular works on each of these issues. If one looks at history as the accomplishment of only these stellar figures — political, cultural, philosophical, theological or otherwise — one runs the risk of determining an historical epoch in terms of the extraordinary at the cost of the ordinary and of true representation. Moreover, if one characterizes an age solely in terms of public documents of various kinds or again in terms of popular culture alone, one runs the risk of missing the less ordinary forces, people and events which might provide deeper insight into the reality of an age. The historian needs to marshal all these perspectives. There is at least one major perspective, however, that is often overlooked — namely that of an almost-forgotten thinker, involved more or less in every major event or issue of the day, and whose work, because it was capable of appealing to a very wide popular audience (even if it is not read today, even by historians of the period), is arguably more representative of its age, its contradictions, difficulties and aspirations than perhaps any other supposed representative of its time. Jacques Du Bosc was just such a figure. By examining his work one can see the evolution of a national community understood to be integrated religiously, socially and politically to a community in which growing conflict and contradictions began to emerge with greater regularity.

This work does not argue that Du Bosc is the only true representative of his age; it rather makes the much more modest claim that he is representative, first, as an individual who reflects some of the major commonalities of his time and, second, as a contributor
who helped to shape these perspectives and events and in turn was clearly shaped by them. Indeed, as a participant in most of the important debates of his time at a variety of different levels and with a broad appeal to a wide segment of the population, Du Bosc is a particularly excellent representative of his own time.

The task of addressing perceptions of authority in the mid-seventeenth century, however, gives rise to a dilemma. The manner of determining the authoritative means of defining an age must be resolved before approaching the question of authority itself. It would be convenient to label these several decades as precursory to, if not yet fully a part of, the Enlightenment. But the nomenclature of the Renaissance seems equally appropriate for Du Bosc’s age as these older traditions are invoked to support political and religious behaviour. The events of these years themselves demonstrate an age typified by the slow decay of an older order and the emergence of a new order. We must also contend with contradictions such as the support for the challenge of the parlementaires, on the one hand, and for the centralizing impositions of Richelieu, on the other, since both positions advocated a particular understanding of authority. To determine the links between the two centuries — sixteenth and eighteenth — is one means of assessing how authority was expressed and how it changed in the intervening century.

How then does Jacques Du Bosc, whose writing spans these eras, fit into such an age? He supported many of the principles that would emerge fully in the Enlightenment, yet he also provided some of the groundwork for what was to be called absolutism. His rationale for this support of both perspectives was drawn as clearly from Renaissance ideals as from any new formulation of culture. In drawing upon traditional perceptions, he also advocated change to ensure the stability of French society.

The historical problem then is how authority was expressed and felt in its most immediate form. This is an acute problem for the historian, for it is all too easy to view an age in terms of its consequences rather than in its immediate day-to-day reality. If one is to grasp and delineate the age, however, it is necessary to find the internal unity of this time in the
same way that coherence has been identified in other periods. This unity is variously described in terms of cultural constructs, or mind-sets, or world-views. Categories such as Enlightenment and Renaissance, in their broadest interpretations, indicate a shift in culture and different expressions of civilization. That they can be labelled at all speaks of an internal order of sorts. For example, the Renaissance perception of man at the pinnacle of nature within a holistic divine creation is a useful characterization of the age itself. Conversely, the Enlightenment rejection of a divine order in favour of human autonomy, which in turn gave rise to scientism, distinguishes this period from the Renaissance. Clearly the notion of authority itself has undergone drastic revision. How each of these ages is typically characterized certainly brings some clarity to the problem. These characteristics, nonetheless, may also tend to obscure the evolution of the idea of authority, for the mid-seventeenth century is the nexus of two ages, Renaissance and Enlightenment, but belongs completely to neither. To capture something of the singular qualities of Du Bosc’s view of authority and his age the present work proposes a new approach.

The first problem in addressing the problem of authority is to determine the tradition that Jacques Du Bosc fits into and how far he was shaped by a will to preserve the past or by the advocacy of change. If he was oriented to the nascent Enlightenment we would see in his work the principles of that age. But one cannot isolate that framework without reference to the Renaissance ideals that gave form to the Enlightenment itself. The scholarly apparatus that was adopted by the philosophes to define themselves and their world clearly comes from the Renaissance, yet the essence of their thought had undergone a radical shift. In Du Bosc one finds both the scholarly apparatus and the essential vision of the Renaissance I have indicated above, yet he advocated some of the principal changes that were to produce the Enlightenment, such as the validity of non-European cultural constructs and a much more rational evaluation of knowledge claims.

Du Bosc is a good representative of this age precisely because he is neither the exceptional thinker nor the exception to the general temper of his time, but rather the typical.
Chapter One — 5

He is thus a useful guide to the temper and new views of the larger community by which he was shaped but which he also sought to shape. If Du Bosc, moreover, embodies a norm for this age, then clearly both ages will in some sense be reflected in his work. This is clearly apparent, since he held at one and the same time the ideals of the Renaissance and those of the Enlightenment, as we shall see. These ideals are grounded in the religious, political and social values of the Renaissance order which in turn provided the basis for the Enlightenment itself. Du Bosc’s writings, consequently, serve as a particularly appropriate, and hitherto overlooked means by which to assess authority in this period.

One school of thought, known as the ‘traditional view,’ tends to regard the seventeenth century primarily from the political perspective. French absolutism, for example, was understood to be an articulate political force with the same impact (though not consequences) as the Glorious Revolution of 1689. This view of political power envisages a pyramidal structure within which social, religious and political expressions of power function as parts. The question of absolutism has naturally received great attention. The power of the monarch, for example, was understood to have developed throughout Richelieu and Mazarin’s tenure, arguably coming to its fullest development in 1661 with the personal rule of Louis XIV. The success of the Sun King and the seemingly monolithic character of the Ancien Régime created an environment in which authoritative political understandings appeared to be sufficient. This understanding of absolutism incorporates both monarchist and republican perspectives, as they were expressed, for example, in Bodin’s and Hobbes’ analysis of the structures of society. In each analysis, although each theorist regarded the source of authority differently, there is a defined place for the élite, middle class, and peasant and a corresponding niche for political, religious, and social structures.

Later historians questioned this traditional view and found these purely structural understandings of political authority deficient in that they represented the whole (history) by means solely of the part (political history). The nuances of power, it was argued, required the introduction of other perspectives. It is now understood, for example, that there
were many challenges to the monolithic view of the political power of Louis XIV.\(^3\) Although *monarchie absolu* was common usage, it did not translate into an absolutism that was truly effective or pervasive. On a second view, then, limiting the primary criteria of the period to political considerations alone negates the importance of a broad range of factors: economic, social and religious.\(^4\) While both the traditional and newer approaches are partially true, we are left with no authoritative means of determining what was really happening in this period. Absolutism becomes subordinate to a primarily socio-economic model (Marxist or otherwise) to which other forms of power (especially religious) were subjected. Absolutism, then, was not the inevitable product of the machinations of the Bourbons or Richelieu, for it did not really exist in the sense that historians had given it. Out of these alternative approaches grew the "crisis" theory, an attempt to explain the massive changes in social, political and religious behaviours between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries in terms of crisis itself rather than any other term or privileged position.\(^5\) The advantage of the crisis theory is that it provides a cogent explanation for a variety of changes and can even take account of the repercussions of sunspots!\(^6\) This approach enabled the historian of the period to account for events without having to resort to abstract causal mechanisms which tend to atomize history. In part, this theory was a retrospective convenience, for it was able to encompass many conflicts in France, from the Wars of Religion to the intellectual climate that enabled the expression of scepticism. It was also useful for explaining the economic changes seen throughout Europe during the period, as well as the development of Protestantism and the centralizing shift in hierarchical Church authority initiated by the Council of Trent.

Shifts of perspective and focus left the crisis theory curiously dormant for several years.\(^7\) Concurrent interest in a broader understanding of the past, but this time an understanding that included family, women and religious sensibility, supplanted the more traditional approaches, which had relied heavily on the constructs and context of political authority. Many historians turned to an examination of popular perception and experience or,
concomitantly, to more statistical analysis of data or a restricted geographical approach. Rather than make grandiose claims about the definitions of an age, these historians quite reasonably restricted themselves to specific data or to quantifiable evidence of ordinary experience. Social history thus gained prominence and has flowered in significant ways into a richer understanding of the material past. It is consequently appropriate that the fruit of this work be integrated to produce a better understanding of power structures and authority. The crisis theory, together with social history, has been fruitful because it provided a deeper and more profound understanding of day-to-day experience. Social history, however, is necessarily limited by its restricted horizon, for without the larger picture of politics, religion and the greater social forces represented in these, it is impossible to recover in any meaningful way the immediacy of daily experience in an age or epoch.

The recognition that there was a crisis, or a revolution, a restructuring or a cultural shift of some sort, is a reasonable premise whatever the causes. That an attempt was made to maintain stability is an indication that stability was threatened at some level.\(^8\) The difficulty of attributing causes to such events is that those "causes" to which we are most sympathetic, which seem most plausible, and which are invariably closer to the present world-view, will also seem most acceptable.\(^9\) When a motive, stated or implicit, falls outside current cultural patterns, one is less likely to give credence to it, precisely because present defining elements, our *mentalité*, are at odds with the past. The late twentieth century's understanding of universal suffrage regardless of wealth would have been thought absurd in the seventeenth century, and the unlettered peasant would have had little place in the meetings of the Estates General. That one now accepts universal suffrage is an indication that attitudes and, consequently, the authorities that define these attitudes have undergone a shift. This shift in a defining element or mentality is, perhaps, the root of crisis itself. One of the hallmarks of any cultural crisis is an uncertainty as to what constitutes authority. The resolution of a crisis can result in either a shift of the source and expression of authority, or a renewal of the original power base. To understand a crisis in society, one
must initially understand the pattern that is disrupted and the authority that legitimised the pattern. In the case of suffrage, Western European nations were rocked by revolution and upheaval over the course of the nineteenth century as liberal forces struggled to assert their ideals. Despite the attempt by the ruling class to reimpose conservatism throughout the century, ultimately the shift from authoritarian to democratic government was achieved in principle. The defining authorities that underwrote the preceding conservative era and the nascent liberal ideology both needed to be understood in order to grasp fully the conflict and eventual shift in political thinking that occurred. In like manner, the crisis that occurred in the seventeenth century can be attributed to a shift in defining authorities.

This thesis will, consequently, argue two complementary points of view: first, that in order to understand the seventeenth century one must recognize a series of interlocking authorities based on articulated law and modified by tradition; and, second, that the religious dimension has to be taken seriously in itself as the primary definitive perspective for coming to grips with the period.

For the seventeenth century, the realm of religion circumscribed spiritual belief, defined the relationship of the individual with the divine in terms of behaviours, rewards and punishments, and ultimately determined the overall coherence of life itself. Social intercourse, or the manner of daily personal interaction, was obviously closely linked to religion through directly codified behaviours that determined what was acceptable. Furthermore, the action of the community that safe-guarded the well-being of society through judicial and political expression was contingent on social and religious understandings. Each realm of authority — the religious, social and political — was, consequently, ordered according to its own criteria, though it was also intersected and supported by other realms. An obvious example is the attitudes of each realm to loyalty. From the religious point of view, a pledge of loyalty was a solemn oath that carried great weight, for to break it irreparably damaged one's integrity; politically, it was the foundation of influence and often military prominence; and socially, it granted an individual access to the influence of the
patron and honour by association. Less obvious examples are gender relationships and the politics of marriage. St. Paul’s Good Wife subjugates a woman to her husband, and so too did the mythology and iconography of the submissive Mother of God, though perhaps in more subtle ways. The political importance of marriage in the period reinforces this submissiveness, and marriage arrangements were seen as a means of ensuring the continuity of family and the maintenance and advancement of status. Socially, marriage was determined by the level of intercourse allowed between men and women of the same estate or individuals of differing estates. It is here that one begins to see the discord in authorities during this period as women began to assert themselves more readily in religious life and in the salons.

It is apparent, then, that each sphere of influence drew on the conclusions of the others for support and justification. The testimonies of the ancients, the Bible, and Church fathers were all incorporated into this justification, and in each sphere there was an existent vocabulary capable of incorporating new ideas within a common interlocking cultural, linguistic, philosophical and theological framework. Philosophers looked to theologians, theologians to moralists, jurists to philosophers, law-makers to theorists and theorists to jurists. This does not mean that tradition was immutable, but that it was slow to change even under the stresses of new circumstances. The knowledge of other cultures devoid of a classical past or Christian revelation introduced new alternatives. Social stresses were also produced by changing demography and economics as people of bourgeois origin were made noble by royal warrant. At the same time, a developing scientific world-view offered challenges to the interpretation of phenomena that had once been determined by religious and philosophical beliefs. In reaction to these stresses authorities were necessarily adjusted to incorporate new information in the light of changing tradition and belief. The seventeenth century, then, offered a number of systems of interrelated authority that were in process of change.

It is also important to appreciate the religious dimension on its own terms, rather than
subordinating the religious question to political or social concepts. This dimension in its own right is essential to any understanding of Du Bosc’s writings, since the principle of grace serves as the major underpinning for all the different areas of his thought. Moreover, the religious dimension was so fundamental to the people of the period in their understanding of structures that it simply has to be incorporated into any assessment of the age. In other words, one cannot begin to arrive at an accurate perception of Du Bosc’s age nor of the earlier Renaissance period without giving appropriate weight to this dimension. In the present work, the means of arriving at such a view will be through the work of Du Bosc, and it is crucial that this reading not be subordinated at the outset to modern political or social preoccupations but rather shaped by Du Bosc’s own vision of his world.

This approach does not mean that the religious dimension is addressed exclusively or that it is employed to negate other perspectives. To do so would produce an understanding of the age just as distorted as that produced by an exclusively political perspective, since this would emphasise a single perspective at the cost of understanding the whole. Nor does this approach advocate subordinating political or social views, or even the crisis theory, to the religious dimension, as this is certainly not the approach of Du Bosc himself. The thesis argues instead that the religious dimension (informed by grace), as Du Bosc defined it, is the organizing principle by which the significance of each of the other dimensions emerges and is validated. In the view of Du Bosc, nature emerges only in its broader significance when it is organized by a sufficiently comprehensive principle. This principle is grace. Nature, politics, and society, according to this view, are not obliterated but enhanced by grace. In a similar way, following out the logic of Du Bosc’s own vision, the religious dimension should — ideally — not annihilate, but empower other perspectives.

The work of Du Bosc, then, provides a means of assessing the importance of this comprehensive principle and of determining how challenges both to it and to authority occurred. Du Bosc’s writing provides new insight into his age, an age characterized by a coherent, mutually dependent set of perspectives enlivened and organized by the religious
dimension and by the contemporary perception of the reality of grace. In Du Bosc’s works one also sees the effect of the challenges to this notion, and the rigidification which begins to take place under these attacks.

Du Bosc provides an example of a literate individual who was neither an innovative thinker nor one entirely without influence. His value lies in the fact that he, and therefore the reader, crosses the borders of traditionally discrete areas of historical study: social, religious, philosophical and political in this age. By his public participation in each of these realms and through his numerous writings, he serves admirably as a gauge for such a study. An individual such as Du Bosc presents an opportunity to re-integrate these several areas into a more comprehensive perspective and an opportunity to identify the continuities and discontinuities of the age that preceded him and that which followed. Du Bosc can be viewed as both an individual, the product of a particular set of circumstances and history, and also as a member of a variety of historiographical constructs: priest, courtier, libertine and so on. Through his works one is able to discern differing authorities — religious, social, political — and to determine how these authorities afforded either unity or dissension in the lives of mid-seventeenth century Frenchmen. By focusing on one of the lesser lights one may also derive a clearer understanding of the more common intellectual climate rather than of the more rarefied realms of a de Sales or a Descartes.13

Why should the works of this little-known writer be able to function as an accurate yardstick of the norms, challenges and changes of this period? Jacques Du Bosc was very much a man of his time. He presented a popular, traditional, but forward-looking philosophy at a time when the rules were being rewritten. He speculated on how women should be educated. His writings, grounded in ethics, addressed the purpose of education in a period when the debate on proper behaviour included more than simple table manners. He was a courtier currying favour with his superiors at a time when clientage was essential to advancement. His understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of the times, of the religious expression of his countrymen,
and of social conventions add to his value as a benchmark.

Du Bosc's first work, published in Paris in 1629, was a translation of the sermons of Christoval d'Avendaño, *Sermons divers sur les principales fêtes de l'année*... In 1636 he published a second translation, *Prédications faites dans le palais apostolique*, the sermons of Jerome Mautini. These works were typical of the devotional reading that was popular among the literate classes. They served to demonstrate Du Bosc's skill as a translator and though neither was reissued, they served to establish his reputation as a religious writer, for the printed sermon was one means by which a literate public could educate itself.

Du Bosc was, however, best known to his contemporaries and to succeeding generations as the author of *L'Honneste femme*, first published in 1632. This work sets out a standard of deportment for women that is based on a morality dictated by both natural and revealed law, at least according to his own assessment. It is a collection of essays on the virtues and vices of women and needs to be examined in detail for several reasons, but principally because it has largely been misunderstood by modern writers. It was Du Bosc's first true success, as attested to by its publishing history,\(^{14}\) and it laid the groundwork for his other lesser known, but not necessarily less important, works dealing with women.

The success of *L'Honneste femme* apparently prompted Du Bosc to write *Nouveau recueil des lettres des dames de ce temps*... which was first published in 1635 and reissued twice. This work demonstrates both his knowledge of rhetoric and his awareness of current fashion, for letters were a fashionable means not only of communication but of demonstrating one's sophistication with language.\(^ {15}\)

In 1641 Du Bosc published *Le panégyrique du Cardinal Richelieu*, a rather effusive encomium. Like many other writers who wished to bring their work to the attention of grand patrons, Du Bosc attempted to play on the vanity of his superiors. The work serves as a means of identifying what was thought to be praiseworthy and consequently what was admired in his society. The acts and attitudes he praises, what he omits to mention, and the iconography he incorporates, all serve to illustrate implic-
ity his own ideals and those which were valued in the public and political domain.

Du Bosc’s next work is entirely different in tone and indicates a much broader understanding of his intellectual tradition than do earlier works. *Le Philosophe indifférent*, published in 1643, demonstrates Du Bosc’s concerns not only with the expressions of society but also with the rationale for those expressions. In this work he deals with the growing plurality in beliefs and philosophies and provides a rationale for his perspectives of authority. He argues that true detachment or *indifférence* (as opposed to the *ataraxia* or *epoché* of ancient Stoic, Sceptic or Epicurean thought) should belong to the Christian philosopher. He argues this not in the sense that such detachment denies or eliminates pagan thought, but rather in the sense that the Christian philosopher has to assume a more comprehensive and dynamic authoritative viewpoint. This viewpoint avoids the extremes which move away from the world rather than attempt to live in the world in an organic organized way.

Du Bosc was therefore in search of an organizing principle to animate cultural, political, philosophical and theological life, and this he identifies as grace, thus articulating and recapitulating the major themes of all his earlier works. Consequently in the earliest works from 1629 to 1643 one is able to examine Du Bosc’s age from a variety of different perspectives: a religious perspective from the sermons Du Bosc chose to translate; a ‘secular’ perspective from the writings on feminine manners and deportment; a political perspective from his public encomium to Richelieu; and a philosophical-theological perspective from his work on the nature of *indifférence*.

In the following years Du Bosc addressed a variety of subjects. *Le martyrde du R.P. François Bel religieux cordelier* (1644) is a hagiographical work commissioned by M. de la Madelaine, aumônier of the Comte d’Harcourt, ambassador to England. *Consolation à Monseigneur l’Eminentissme Cardinal Mazarin sur la mort de Madame sa mère* (1644) was a second opportunity to address a great patron and was reissued in 1662 along with the panegyric to Richelieu. In the following year, 1645, in *La femme héroïque, ou les héroines comparées avec les héro en toute sorte de vertues*..., he again turned to the subject of
women, integrating the ideals of both *L'Honneste femme* and *Le Philosophe indifferent* and thus providing a rationale for behaviours grounded in a philosophically integrated view of the role of women in society and, by inference, in society at large. The significance of the work is that Du Bosc reaffirms his early views on the education of women in a larger arena which includes the whole of human history, pagan and Christian, on a scale not unlike that envisaged in *Le Philosophe indifferent*. *La femme héroïque* embodies and refines the conclusions of *L'Honneste femme* and *Le Philosophe indifferent*, thus strengthening his assessment of the role of women in terms of social criticism and philosophical foundations.

From 1647 to 1663 Du Bosc's publications are almost entirely concerned with Jansenism: *L'Eucharistie paisible, ou la paix des scavans et les repos des simples*... (1647); *Jésus-Christ mort pour tous*... (1651); *Le Triomphe de S. Augustin*... (1654); *De la vraye rétraction des sectaires et de leurs sectateurs*... (1655); *L'Eglise outragée*... (1657) *La découverte d'une nouvelle hérésie*... (1662) and finally *Le pacificateur apostolique*... (1663). Initially these works attempted to provide a common ground for reconciliation, though as the years progressed the tone became less conciliatory and more confrontational. In Du Bosc's view, the Jansenist party's inability to be reconciled to the Church, despite the numerous opportunities offered them, had significance for others who rejected the authority of Church and state. Du Bosc moves from conciliator to judge. Later still between 1659 and 1664, Du Bosc again addressed his patrons in a second letter to Mazarin (*Lettre à Monseigneur le Cardinal duc Mazarini sur la paix général*, 1659) and to Louis XIV (*Panégyrique du roi...*, 1664) to praise their accomplishments and as a means of calling to their attention the evils of Jansenism.

This breadth of interest in spirituality, women, philosophy, theology, and hagiography, combined with his political sense of self promotion, are a powerful demonstration of Du Bosc's usefulness as a means of focusing on a particular time and class of society, as well as upon the norms, challenges and conflicts of that time. That his works were well received
(indicated by reprints, the continued support of publishers, and the approbations of his superiors) validate them as representative works and Du Bosc as a representative figure. That he ventured into a variety of genres and authoritarian structures (social, religious and political) is further evidence that his works provide an appropriate means to assess authority as it was understood in seventeenth-century France. As an individual his unique perspective serves to counterbalance the contemporary assessments of this age. Nor is he a one-sided representative, for he can be viewed not only as a man of the world but also as a committed Christian. He represents a traditional understanding of behaviour, yet in his advocacy of the education of women presents a new perspective upon this controversy. He supports the Gallican Church of France, yet calls on papal authority to end the Jansenist heresy. These apparent contradictions and the rationale that supports them reveal his understanding of authority and intimate what impelled Du Bosc and, by extension, what impelled his age. It is also in these apparent contradictions that one may glimpse elements of that important evolution from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment.

In attempting to see Du Bosc clearly, it is important to question whether his works addressing the role and ability of women are simply expressions of social conventions and mannered gentility, or whether he is truly asserting a new and more essential place for women. One must assess whether the works addressed to his religious and political superiors are simply expressions of obsequiousness or, in any measure, some degree of tacit support for the authoritarian structures they represented. Crucial, of course, is Du Bosc's attitude to Jansenism: is his condemnation of Jansenism based solely on the unthinking need for submission to the power of Rome, or is it in defence of a clearly articulated understanding of the function of grace?

Du Bosc did not see his own age as an age of crisis though it was an age rich in conflict. He oriented himself very clearly to the tradition of Renaissance humanism, but also recognized the emergence of a new intellectual order that was signalled by the explorations and alternatives offered by the sceptics. From his perspective, as neither a great
thinker nor one of the voiceless masses, he was able to discern, however unconsciously, what was at stake for all classes of people: the élite, the bourgeoisie and the peasant. The fracturing of Christianity into sects meant the loss, ultimately, of what he understood to be a unified Christian civilization.

What, then, in Du Bosc’s view, provided the religious, social and political authority in his civilization? The element that historians have not yet clearly addressed in studying this period is the central importance and function of grace for Du Bosc’s world. Du Bosc unites all of his expressions, religious, social and political, within a cultural dynamic that is animated by grace. It was neither an abstract quality or fiction nor a concrete structure as such, but a principal force with empirical effects significant at all levels of society. For the sake of the modern reader it will be helpful here to give a working definition of grace as Du Bosc understood it. For Du Bosc grace was the free gift of God which moves, organizes and articulates the life of the soul and which was the motive and developmental force of all cultural, moral, intellectual and spiritual human civilization which proceeds and returns to God. It must be emphasized that this is only a working definition to provide the reader with a basic, but accurate, understanding of Du Bosc’s notion. Had grace been a mystical intangible in Du Bosc’s age, then his advocacy of the principle of grace as a palpably real force could only have been seen as madness. That he was not only regarded as sane but read and admired by his contemporaries is an indication of the perceived importance of grace in his age. That all of his views of the different dimensions of authority — regarding women, society, politics — are dependent upon the notion of grace lends added weight to this argument. A new historical appreciation of the perceived role and functions of grace in this era is, consequently, necessary both to understand Du Bosc’s own perspective and to get a deeper insight into ordinary life throughout society.

Since this study is an assessment of Du Bosc’s views of authority and grace, it is entirely appropriate that Du Bosc’s own understanding of grace be considered authoritative. The manner in which he defined grace, how he valued it and how it was apparent in
life reveals the magnitude of its importance to him. The scope of his erudition and the authorities he drew upon are indications of the essential qualities he attributed to grace. He understood it to be, as did Gregory and Augustine, a perennial, essential quality of existence. Grace was supra-historical to Du Bosc, but at the same time fundamental to the understanding of history, for it was implicit in both Antiquity and the Christian era. There was no discernible split between Natural law, Mosaic Law, or Christian Law. For Du Bosc, moreover, grace was not simply a part of the field of human understanding but rather the organizing principle of the field itself: in other words, the foundation of authority. The elimination of grace as a principal organizer in post-rational assessments is an obstacle to the historian’s understanding of supposedly pre-rational or less rational ages, for the motivation and rationale of actions that stem from an understanding of grace are in turn eliminated. The paradigmatic shift from Renaissance to Enlightenment is in fact a shift in the valuing and understanding of grace as a defining element.

This study, based primarily on Du Bosc’s written work, attempts to determine his perception of authority. Although emphasis is placed on Du Bosc’s views, evidence is also marshalled from a range of interpretations of the period including political, social, religious and philosophical works. Essentially this study of Du Bosc and his perceptions of authority is an assessment of one man’s views and the reasoning he used to find coherence in the diversity of his age. It is not the intention of this study to generalize his views to all others of the period but rather to indicate alternative understandings of the mentalités of the period. In assessing Du Bosc’s work, therefore, equal emphasis must be placed on each component of the culture in which he lived, while respecting both the intentions of the individual, the audience for whom he wrote, the context in which he wrote, and finally his participation in the various expressions of that culture. By examining Du Bosc’s views on personal and societal responsibilities to the secular world and religion, one may come closer to recovering a sense of how he understood the various debates he was engaged in and why he framed his responses in the manner he did. By this method, the connections
between his stated interests and his changing milieu can perhaps be accounted for without obscuring the individual himself. While he contributed to several different areas, the boundaries or divisions between areas of opinion or expertise must remain flexible, for an opinion expressed in one work has to be seen in the light of other works and, finally, has to be considered in the interpretation of the whole. In this manner one may be able to re-construct his thought and opinions to produce a coherent sense of both the man and his time. In his early work, for example, he advances opinions on the role of women in society and then turns to philosophy. *Le Philosophe indifférent*, a work of his early maturity, was clearly an important means for testing his views on women in a larger philosophical sphere and it is obvious that this earlier work had a bearing on his mature philosophical understanding. That he later returns to his assessment of women demonstrates his continued interest and confidence in his conclusions. *La Femme heroïque* restates many of the premises of *L'Honneste femme* but with a different focus.

Du Bosc’s place in the religious, social and political hierarchy and the debates in which he engaged will, therefore, form the basic subject matter of Chapter Two, which argues that there existed in seventeenth-century France a reasonably common mentalité that meshed different institutional structures and that there was an intrinsic unity in the sources and expression of Christian culture founded on belief, tradition and authority. This chapter serves as a biographical and structural orientation of Du Bosc.

Chapter Three then takes up the major question of Du Bosc’s philosophical and theological understanding of grace and authority. Although *Le Philosophe indifférent* is not Du Bosc’s earliest work, this major philosophical *opus* is crucial to understanding his thought and must be treated in detail. This examination will enable the reader to move from the most fundamental framework of Du Bosc’s thought (that is, the essential orientation of the individual informed by grace) to the other frameworks in other works (notably, manners, moral conduct, political deportment, etc.) predicated on this.

The following chapters will then take up in turn each of these frameworks (following,
wherever possible, the chronological order of Du Bosc's writings). Chapter Four will examine Du Bosc's works in the context of the *Querelle des Femmes* and will present a new view of these works in the light of his philosophical views of nature. These works are not to be regarded as mechanical guidebooks to self-promotion, but rather as a coherent examination of the implicit, much broader, significance of the most ordinary actions and gestures. Chapter Five will then take up his views of nature and grace and their implications in the Jansenist debate. This chapter will serve to pinpoint the change and crisis in Du Bosc's own views which parallel the retreat of the Church into greater rigidity and more repressive forms of authoritarianism. In these later writings one can trace the closing of the space of ordinary freedoms which in the following century led to the complete rejection of authoritarian norms in violent revolution. An appendix examines the question of what makes an *honneste* human being in the political or public spheres and the implications of the role of the individual in these arenas in the light of two different, but interrelated, sets of Du Bosc's works: namely, the letters to patrons and the biography of Bel.

In short, then, this work will chart from an unusual perspective the process of evolution from an organic ideal of authority based on grace to the dead letter of authoritarianism based on fear, reaction and rationalization.
Endnotes

1. Du Bosc can be placed among the middle rank of writers, neither especially innovative nor mundane. These writers are the link between the monothetic and polythetic cultures identified by Peter Burke, a distinction that is of importance for historians in determining the “typical.” Burke describes a “Great” tradition and a “Little” tradition, though he argues these were not mutually exclusive, for all were members of the little or popular culture, though few were members of the élite. The popular writers can then be understood as a link between these two, for by literacy one was able to move from the larger group to the smaller group. Simple literacy, however, did not signify familiarity with the ancients. See Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), Chapter II and Peter Burke, Sociology and History (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1989), 36–7.


6. Geoffrey Parker initiates his discussion of the crises that affected not only Europe but the entire globe with an examination of solar activity that in turn affected crop
production and initiated a subsistence crisis and led to a decline in population. *Europe in Europe*, 17–24.


8. Marc Bloch *The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France* trans. E. Anderson, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), describes the 1630s as a period in which the unity of theology, philosophy, natural philosophy, political science and social behaviours was sought under the rubric of the sacramental nature of kingship. The motivation to integrate all of these concerns in such a manner was an effective way of controlling speculation and dissent.


10. This manner of incorporating a dialectic is similar to the approach Lucien Goldmann advocates when he claims “… each individual factor or idea assumes its significance only when it takes up its place in the whole, in the same way as the whole can be understood only by our increased knowledge of the partial and incomplete facts which constitute it.” *The Hidden God*, 5; Aston also suggests this incorporative approach in *Crisis in Europe*, 103.

11. The debate surrounding the possibility of unbelief rests, for example, not only on the actions of individuals but on the ability to express ideas. This forms part of the argument of Lucien Febvre in his discussion of unbelief in *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century. The Religion of Rabelais* (1942) trans. Beatrice Gottlieb, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

12. For a working definition of Du Bosc’s notion of grace see p 20 below.

13. This is not to argue that de Sales and Descartes are alike or equal in the approach or intent of their work, but rather to indicate their contemporary popularity, their profound impact on later thinkers and their importance in the development of their respective fields.

14. See Chronological Bibliography for complete publication records.

Chapter Two

Situating Jacques Du Bosc

Jacques Du Bosc contributed to a variety of debates that were shaped by diverse and apparently unconnected circumstances. The relationship between the feminist debate and the Jansenist debate, for example, appears tenuous at first. However, as shall be argued, in essence these two debates, and Du Bosc’s other work on hagiography, on philosophy and ethics generally, are significantly connected in thought and this connection will ultimately provide a useful means of understanding better the relationship between the individual, society, religion and the authority or authorities that each sphere acknowledged. The initial task of this chapter will be to construct a preliminary biography of Du Bosc, drawing on both the assessments of his contemporaries and those of modern historians. While a biographical sketch provides us with an initial understanding of the individual, it is also recognized that in any biography there are a range of temptations for the biographer, anachronism among them. In order to avoid these temptations it will also be necessary to give a brief overview of the religious, political and social structures of seventeenth century France in order to place Du Bosc within the larger field of his age and to establish how the norms of each of these realms functioned in the overall context of the time. Finally, it is crucial that the contexts of the debates themselves be addressed: the circumstances surrounding the Jansenist debate, the Querelle des Femmes, the intellectual environment of the libertins. Consequently, before going on to examine Du Bosc’s own works in detail, it is necessary to situate him as an individual within the context of his society, and to place equal emphasis, as far as possible, upon each prominent component of the culture in which
he lived while remaining sensitive to the particular situation of the individual as well as the fact, for instance, that by profession or vocation Du Bosc was a priest.¹

Du Bosc was born about 1600, became a Franciscan and lived until 1669 in France. Of course, this tells us virtually nothing about the man himself and so we have to reconstruct a picture from fragments, in this chapter primarily from external documentary evidence, in subsequent chapters from internal documentary evidence.

Du Bosc is noted in the principal biographical dictionaries, but little more information is given than vague dates of birth and death, his Norman origins and the titles and dates of a few of his works.² These traditional sources tell us that Du Bosc was born in Normandy. Most of them suggest the Diocese of Coutances,³ toward the end of the sixteenth century. Du Bosc was also an intimate of a number of academicians and there are several undated letters to him in the works of the academician, Olivier Patru.⁴ There is evidence that he lived in the rue St. Jacques in Paris for a time, where he welcomed his friend Patru to stay.⁵ He entered the Frères Mineurs de l’Observance, known in France as the Cordeliers, probably in Paris at the Cordelier monastery in the Faubourg Saint Marcel.⁶ After being ordained, he received his bachelor of Theology degree from the Sorbonne, with which the Cordeliers were traditionally associated.

Du Bosc and his work are noted in passing in the memoirs of the Jansenist and scholar Godefroi Hermant;⁷ in 1657 he was referred to as “conseiller et prédicateur ordinaire du roi.”⁸ Holders of this position, chosen by the grand aumônier, had the honour of preaching before the King. The office recognized the authority of their teachings on religion.⁹ In the same passage from Hermant, the judgement was made:

Mais quoi qu’il fût l’auteur de L’Honnête femme, il ne fut pas jugé assez honnête homme pour être évêque, ni assez considerable pour obliger Port Royal à lui répondre par écrit.¹⁰

Whether his failure to achieve the mitre was a result of his writing on women’s concerns, or a lack of ability, or of social status, or simply reflects the fact that there was too
much competition, is open to debate. Hermant’s alignment with the Jansenists and Du Bosc’s great opposition to Jansenism make the tone of the observation suspect at best, for how better to undermine the integrity of an opponent than to cast aspersions on his ability. Another prominent Jansenist, Antoine Arnauld,\textsuperscript{11} echoes this criticism when he identified Du Bosc as “... le plus impertinent de tous les hommes.”\textsuperscript{12}

Chapelain’s\textsuperscript{13} first mention of Du Bosc describes him as “... autrefois sécularisé, et maintenant remis dans le règle et l’habit...”\textsuperscript{14} He later rather caustically observes that Du Bosc se desfroqua par des debauches, et s’est renfroqua par ambition. Il ne médite pas moins qu’une mitre et a mis tout le moine au dehors. Il ne se peut nier qu’il n’ait de l’esprit et du stile,...\textsuperscript{15}

though Chapelain also describes Du Bosc as one of the “honnestes gens et d’hommes de sçavoir...”\textsuperscript{16} So the extent of our knowledge about his early life and character is scanty and conflicting indeed. We do not know for certain when or where he was born. Although we know that he entered the Cordeliers at a certain age, we do not know when, but we may conjecture on the basis of other comparative information that he is likely to have joined the Cordeliers between the age of fourteen and sixteen. The canonical age for ordination was 26, despite many exceptions. Finally, the evidence for his character is problematic, one testimony stating its worthiness and the other dismissing his ability and questioning his honour. We have no other means of deciding between these two conflicting testimonies except to note that the hostile view comes from the Jansenist camp which had no particular reason to approve of Du Bosc.

Du Bosc is said to have left his friary around 1630 and returned in 1640, and this has been the cause of some controversy. It is obvious that the motivation for leaving that Chapelain offers, as well as that for returning, was questionable. There was some speculation that he spent the time as a libertin, though any association with that group does not seem to have continued after his return to the monastery about 1640, nor is it borne out by the opinions expressed in Le Philosophe indifferent or later editions of L’Honneste femme.\textsuperscript{17}
An alternative explanation, that the intervening years were spent in a monastery, is at least as likely, for the practice was not at all uncommon. We do know that in 1653 Du Bosc visited Rome with a friend, François Mullard, who, it is interesting to note, also left his Capuchin monastery and was later re-admitted to the Friars Minor. These conflicting explanations of why he left the monastery and why he returned may also be explained by a confusion of names. Tallemant des Réaux, an observer of the salons, tells the story of a Capuchin, Du Bois, also a friend of Patru, who fell in love with Madame de Rambouillet. Du Bois, he tells us, did leave the monastery for a time, though no dates are mentioned. This confusion is compounded further by La Mothe le Vayer’s work, *Dialogues d’Orasius Tubero*. In this work there is a character named Xilinius who debated “la science des femmes,” and who, it is understood, was representative of Du Bosc. The character’s name, as Pintard explains, is a tri-lingual word play: Xilinius/Bois/Bosc, and a signal of friendship accorded by La Mothe le Vayer to Du Bosc. Thus, the character, Du Bois, was easily confused with Du Bosc, though it remains unclear whether Du Bois and Du Bosc are in fact one and the same or simply a confusion of coincidence. Chapelain’s view of Du Bosc as an *homme de savoir* is in keeping with the approbation written by the Minister General of the Franciscans, Michel Ange de Sambuca. He identified Du Bosc as the *Père de Province en la Province de S. Bonaventure.* In the same statement, further confirmed by Du Bosc’s obituary, he lists titles awarded Du Bosc at the General Chapter meeting of 1658 in Toledo: “*Ecrivain Ecclesiastique Jubilé & Père bien mérité de tout l’ordre.*”

Moreri (a compiler of a biographical dictionary published in 1759) states, without documentation, that Du Bosc died in Guyenne in 1661, though his last work was published in 1664 and could not have been posthumous as it deals with an event that occurred in that year. The only contemporary record of his death is an unpublished notation dated 1669, where he is described as a “noble man and ecclesiastical writer,” and as a person praised by King, Queen and Pope. It is apparent from this Cordelier necrology that his confrères thought well of both his abilities and character.
When we turn to modern treatments of Du Bosc's work (though there are only three authors that deal with his work in any detail) we find that historians have either incorporated solely what was useful to their own arguments, or have seen him only from a single perspective. Carolynn C. Lougee, for instance, is a social historian who views Du Bosc as a facilitator of social mobility.\textsuperscript{27} She cites his work primarily to construct an understanding of the salon culture, although her general assessment seems to be shaped by Chapelain's offhand remark cited above. She interprets Du Bosc as advocating ennoblement not only by blood nor only by virtue, but by meeting social, and presumably also economic, criteria. She understands Du Bosc's work as a response simply to the social pressures of a changing status quo.\textsuperscript{28} As ennoblement became more common the demand for preparatory handbooks that outlined appropriate behaviours grew. In Lougee's view, Du Bosc's works concerning women are little more than codes of comportment. By statistical analysis she shows that manners, determined according to the salon culture, were the exclusive means of acquiring the social graces necessary to make a respectable marriage.\textsuperscript{29} This may well have been the way these books were sometimes used in practice, but it tells us little of the intent of the books themselves.

Ian MacLean also views Du Bosc as primarily a feminist and describes Du Bosc as a serious participant in the \textit{Querelle des femmes}.\textsuperscript{30} He presents \textit{L'Honneste femme} and \textit{La Femme héroïque} as tools for the education of both men and women in so far as they provided some serious spiritual formation and thus reached beyond the salon and social niceties to incorporate ethical and religious connotations. According to this interpretation, Du Bosc advocates \textit{la femme forte}, that is, a woman whose behaviour is grounded in ethics and her ability to make choices, rather than the superficial \textit{précieuse}, that is, someone simply responding to fashion.\textsuperscript{31} Unfortunately, Maclean limits himself solely to the so called "feminist" works, because this is his main focus. Consequently, Du Bosc's work on women is principally for Maclean a means of examining the rhetoric and evolution of language within the context of the \textit{Querelle des Femmes}.
By contrast with Lougee and Maclean, C. Chesneau and Julien Eymard d’Angers both view Du Bosc exclusively as a philosopher and participant in the intellectual life of the age, though they see him as a minor writer. Although Du Bosc treated themes similar to those addressed by Pascal (and in a similar manner), Chesneau concludes that Du Bosc was not fully aware of the implications of his arguments for he views him as a sceptic withdrawing from the world of thorny philosophical issues rather than engaging in the major problems of his day. This is not even a defensible view, however, of Le Philosophe indifferent, as shall be seen. Moreover, it ignores Du Bosc’s important works on Jansenism inter alia. Lougee, Maclean, d’Angers and Chesneau are the only writers who deal with Du Bosc in some detail. A more typical treatment is the work of René Pintard, who only briefly refers to Du Bosc en passant identifying him as a libertine and as a participant in the salon culture. Pintard contextualizes Du Bosc, therefore, as a part exclusively of the secular world and places him on the fringes of the libertins erudits.

Taken together these assessments provide a limited understanding, for with the exception of Maclean and Lougee, Du Bosc is typically seen as a peripheral figure, of little interest to the historian, and primarily a libertin, mannerist or unoriginal secularist. The resultant picture we have of the man, while interesting, fails to provide us with an appreciation of the much greater complexities of either his own preoccupations and extensive writings or the period in which he lived. What emerges is a one-dimensional image that does little more than justify a particular argument. Lougee and Maclean, it is true, go a little further, but because their own interests necessarily limit the focus of their investigations, they can provide no broader picture or deeper analysis of the whole of Du Bosc’s work and its potential importance as an historical document of the age.

Furthermore, beyond these admittedly meagre and clearly conventional details from external sources outlined above, little more is known of Du Bosc except that which can be deduced from his writings. Rather than accepting the view of Chapelain, or even of Lougee, it is perhaps best to allow Du Bosc’s own context and works to shape our understanding of
him, for though both contemporary and modern sources are useful, there is a danger of depending too much on these brief, disparate, and sometimes unconnected references.

A fuller picture can be developed if Du Bosc is situated within the structures of his society. Like all observers of human nature, Du Bosc had a dual relationship with his society. As a product of his society he would have had an instinctive understanding of its structures and have been shaped by them. Conversely, as a writer he was a critic of his society and attempted to shape society to some extent. The models that he identifies for either admiration or condemnation are indicators of what he held to be important or valuable and are a means of understanding what his own views really were. But Du Bosc himself must be placed in a larger context. He wrote on a number of the most important debates of the day and associated with individuals who shaped popular perceptions of the world. It is crucial to understand the context of these debates by briefly outlining the structures of Du Bosc’s society. By understanding not only their context, but also Du Bosc’s position in these debates, and the relationships between debates, we will come to a clearer understanding of his perception of authority. Du Bosc’s writing on women and society make it abundantly clear that he felt the individual had a part to play in the shaping of society. He takes this beyond simple maintenance of the traditions, for he advocates an active engagement in refining and shaping the world. He held the belief that women, and by extension all of society, have the capability to redefine themselves and, consequently, their community. The way in which Du Bosc links authorities demonstrates his view that a certain organic unity is essential to society, for only in unity is there clarity. The interlocking unity of structures that he advocated was, in his view, necessary for the well-being of all structures. One small example of this is his understanding that the suppression of heresy was not only a necessary religious aim but a political aim as well, for these two expressions of French society were simply different expressions of a common ideal.

Before we can look at Du Bosc’s writings themselves, then, we must first establish a clearer appreciation of the complexities of social stratification in early seventeenth century
France and then incorporate several additional well known expressions of the mentalité of the times. Institutional historians have presented a series of definitions to describe the way people operated as members of various groups. Some are models, and some are taxonomies, and there is, naturally, a debate about the accuracy of each. The most common understanding of seventeenth century French institutional history is based on the concept of the three orders: clergy, nobility, and commoner.34 Du Bosc’s place within the First Estate, with the rights and responsibilities which that entailed, cannot but have shaped his understanding of the Second and Third Estates. Although his origins are unknown, his education and friendships certainly connect him to the Second Estate and so it is necessary to examine the composition of each of the orders.35 It must be noted, however, that legal aspects of the ranking of society were under the scrutiny of contemporary jurists and so subject to continual change.36 The manner in which activities were divided and the various roles an individual assumed in society grew out of the medieval concepts of warrior, worker and priest, which further argues for a description of the several areas of activity (religious, political and social) so that Du Bosc’s views and conclusions can be better understood within this framework.

There were certainly institutions that transcended Estate: corporations, clientage, and family networks. Family networks were founded on marriage and so the legal and social implications regarding the place of women in society generally, and the Querelle des Femmes specifically, also need to be incorporated into our understanding. The means that French society had of ordering the relationships between ruler and ruled, priest and believer, and men and women are each effective means of linking religion, politics and social stratification to an understanding of authority. The summation of these examinations is effectively a précis of popular culture or common mentalité.

Perhaps the primary identification of Du Bosc is that of a Catholic priest of a religious order. Although often assumed to be an occupation (i.e. simply a means of making a living), the priesthood was more truly a vocation (i.e. a calling by God through the Bishop or Superior), or at least a profession (i.e. a service requiring advanced training).37 Since he lived in a Catholic
milieu within a religious house, his religious vows (poverty, obedience and chastity) and the sacrament of orders (ordination as a priest) are perhaps the most marked characteristic of Jacques Du Bosc. The priesthood, at this time, was not what one did but rather what one was. This fact is only now beginning to be addressed by scholars with any seriousness.  

The First Estate, the clergy, represented two contiguous understandings of the Church. The first was based on the authority of divine, natural, and positive law, the second on human positive law that reflect, respectively, the spiritual and administrative aspects of the Church. The principal duty of the priesthood was to pray the divine office daily and to fulfil the duties demanded by its various responsibilities. These two aspects of the priesthood were codified in Canon Law and Gallican law, the latter unique to France after the Concordat of 1516. Although there are instances of influential clergy rising from the Third Estate, for example, Vincent de Paul, the élite of the church was more commonly drawn from the Second Estate. As a consequence, the aristocratic ethos of the Second Estate blended with that of the first. Prospective bishops, abbesses and abbots were to be nominated by the King within six months of vacancy, approved by a committee of three cardinals, and these names were to be presented to the Pope who, if no objections were raised by the committee, would make the appointment. Gallicanism, founded on episcopality and regalism, with the provision that the King was not a tyrant, is an obvious example of how various structures and authorities were interdependent.  

There are, as noted above, two aspects to the First Estate: the spiritual and the administrative. The primary purpose of the clergy was to be celebrants of the sacraments, interpreters of scripture and guardians of morality. The necessity of protecting the structure of religion, maintaining the purity of the faith, of dealing with the laity, as well as contending with the royal prerogative of granting benefices, when combined with personal ambition, produced a complex administrative structure. The sacramental nature of the church will be dealt with in Chapter Five, although the recognition of the sacrament as a direct petition and response via grace must be stressed even in the purely pragmatic mechanics of the
church. The administrative nature of the church is comparatively easy to reconstruct as it is documented by copious records. These record the distinctions between regular, secular, and congregational clergy, and between major and minor orders and they chart the channels of communication for relations among the clergy and relations with the laity. Du Bosc, as a priest, made his observations from within this labyrinthine institution which would have had a marked effect on his perceptions.

There is no extant record of Du Bosc’s education, and though he may have been prepared for the priesthood in a seminary, it is more likely he was trained in one of the houses or schools of his order. Seminaries in France were a comparatively recent innovation. They officially date from the Ordinance of Blois of 1579, and initially only a small number were established. The disruption of the Wars of Religion caused problems in continuity but the Estates General of 1614 again affirmed the need for their foundation. Until the 1630s the common belief was that “an advanced secular education and a decent family were sufficient formal qualification” for ordination. On the basis of this one can assume that Du Bosc was from a family either in the upper reaches of the Third Estate or the lower of the Second.

As a Franciscan, Du Bosc, after a period as a novice, would have taken vows of obedience, poverty, and chastity. The regulars were divided by charism, that is a “grace” in the thoroughly practical sense of a particular vocation within their organization as determined by their Rule. The charism of the Franciscans in Du Bosc’s Paris included preaching, working among the poor and in hospices. The Franciscans also had a centuries-old tradition of teaching at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris. Beyond the specific charism, there was a great variety in how a priest might live and so it is risky to assume any archetype. To emphasize unduly either poorly trained and badly educated rural priests or the brilliant urban polemicists is to ignore the aptitude of individuals and the variety of their orders. Direction in faith and morals of the seculars, and some of the regulars, was the responsibility of the bishop of the diocese, aided by his chancery.
French bishops of the second half of the seventeenth century had been educated at St. Sulpice in Paris, but their original Estate and their connections often determined their later positions.  

Above the priesthood was the episcopate, a governing body in all things spiritual. The bishop was the head of the diocese and, according to the decrees of the Council of Trent, obliged to reside there. The diocese was in an ecclesiastical province putatively headed by an archbishop, though in reality he rarely had much, if any, influence over his suffragan bishops. A priest wanting to publish his views was under the direction of either his Bishop or Superior and thus the approbation of either was evidence of the legitimacy of these views. In Du Bosc's case, all of his works were published with this approval, which lends credibility to interpreting his views as representative of more pervasive sentiments.

The administrative organization of the church was directed by the Assembly of the Clergy, which developed during the second half of the sixteenth century and was regularized in the 1590s. The Assembly dealt with the financial obligation, the "free gift" to the King, and acted as a lobby group to the King and his councillors on behalf of the clergy. It met, with the King's permission, every ten years in or near Paris. The extent of the Assembly's influence is obvious when one considers that elections to this body began at the parish level. It also served as a legislative and supervisory body for the French Church and, as a court of appeal, the Assembly ruled on clerical offenses.

The influence the clergy wielded on the formation of social behaviour was immense. Operating at every level of society, from remote parishes and small dioceses to the King's councils, and drawn from both Second and Third Estates, they reflected the ethos of the nation. They were products of secular culture, shaped by their spiritual formation, and participants in the administrative structures of the Church. Ideally their concern for French life, and Catholic French life, was far-reaching, for every behaviour was subject to religious sanction. Placing Du Bosc in this structure forces us to see his work as more than the opinion of one man, but rather as the more significant and representative opinions of an
individual who was subject to both political and religious superiors. His writings on the Jansenist debate, for example, though details of the debate were perhaps beyond the understanding of the general public, were none the less influenced by his particular place in the First Estate. Du Bosc was a preacher and writer, and given his education, his role as a theologian must be borne in mind when reading his work, for he was trained in that discipline. His anti-Jansenist stance is a natural extension of the Catholic reformers’ attempt to purify and refine both the dogma and practice of the French church. His sympathy with the Jesuits, rather than with the Jansenists, in the debate on grace springs as much from his being a Franciscan, rather than a member of the secular clergy, as from any association with Molinists or as a result of currying favour at court. The similarity of Franciscan and Jesuit spiritualities was a natural sympathy, for both had strong traditions of devotion to Christ’s human aspect.

The church, being an orderly body which assumed eternal existence virtually on a day-to-day basis, wrote everything down, eternity being a very long time and human memory demonstrably fallible. The Second Estate, the nobility, was not nearly so tidy. Generally, the nobility viewed themselves as a corporation (on which see page 34 below), but there were many exceptions to this because the authority of the nobility was founded on tradition. Traditions can change and, as Mousnier observes, “every town, every district, had its own stratification.”

Being human and not a race apart, the nobility were distinguished by their privileges. Since nobility was based on the right to bear arms, all nobility were écuyers or knights, a title which could be used by all in the Second Estate and many in the First as well. Only they could properly have armorial bearings, indicating a military past. They were also able to initiate court proceedings at a higher court, to hunt, and importantly, they were exempt from the taille (a primary direct tax) and the corvée (a labour tax). There was naturally an intimate relationship between the First and Second Estates, for numerous younger sons and daughters of the nobility were committed to the religious life.
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The origins of the nobility were rooted in the medieval past and remnants of feudalism were apparent in the contemporary political geography of France. The King's claim to all héritage as "the enfeoffing seigneur" meant a direct chain of ownership and, accordingly, an implicit duty to protect and safeguard the rights of the seigneur. The ground for this understanding of the King's position was rooted in the belief that the King held his power directly from God, a view expressed by the jurist Jean Bignon in 1610 and reaffirmed in 1690 by Jean Domat. The granting of seigneuries then was a sharing of stewardship. Only the King could create, through charter, a seigneur. The role of the nobility, then, seems straightforward until one considers the place of justice in relation to the seigneur. Ideally, a seigneur held three levels of authority: civil, property, and finally ownership. This third level of authority, and the social status that went with it, was only possessed by those with peerages or duchies, though the separation of justice and property began in this century.

The laws regarding fiefs varied from province to province. In this variety is further evidence of the flexibility of tradition as a source rooted in the past but also open to change in the present. The variety of law intimates a society adapting and modulating to reflect changing patterns of belief. In response to these changes, authorities reacted either by maintaining past traditions or by incorporating new expressions. Seventeenth century legal opinion was eclectic in its use of sources to maintain the complexity of Estate. Some seigneuries had existed from the time they were incorporated into France; some originated in law, and others in tradition. There were approximately 70,000 to 80,000 seigneuries in the whole country. In Paris alone there were 364 seigneuries. Of these, only twenty-five had all three levels of authority. Twenty-three of these twenty-five were held by churchmen. One did not need to be a noble to hold a seigneur, so a commoner could conceivably hold a court of justice which eroded the exclusivity of noble stature. Many titles were not an indication of nobility but rather of ownership and in an edict of 1579 a curious equivalency chart was worked out. There was great competition for seigneuries, for with a title
and one or more of the levels of authority, a commoner was closer to becoming a noble. This meant acquiring tax-free status and reaping the fees or fines that would come from holding the seigneurial court, as well as the corvée. Perhaps more important than the material advantages were the social advantages, for cens, the annual fee due to the seigneur, was often paltry. Yet there are cases of long legal wrangles for the right to claim the cens because of the status connected with this right. The competition for seigneuries was fuelled by a variety of impulses each interdependent. The property-owning aspect enabled the owner to avoid taxation. The ennobling aspect allowed the owner to draw closer to the élite and closer (however marginally) to the king.

After the seigneury, the parish and village community were the second of the geographical units. Heads of households met on average once a month, following an announcement made by the parish priest at mass. They were led by an elected syndic subject to the authority of the seigneur, and they met to determine tax assessments and resolve the problems of the community. The towns were another geographical unit with various manners of governance. Effectively the same body, the parish and village, was responsible for the same area. In one guise, it was a religious assembly; in another it was secular. Again, the interlocking of secular and religious dimensions is apparent, as the assembly that met to celebrate the sacraments was the same assembly that met to confer on secular matters.

Another institution was the corporation. A corporation was not simply a loose association of people with like interests nor was it a means of political lobbying, although it served this function too. A corporation was primarily a legal entity that was accorded a rank, a seal, a coat of arms, privileges, and obligations. It governed admission to a profession, set the standards one needed to meet and maintain, and it was able to enter into agreements. Like all the other structures it was hierarchically arranged, with an elected leadership. Its dual aim was self-interest and the common good. As a consequence, membership could be limited. Just because an individual was able to purchase an office did not mean that admission to the corporation, which controlled that office, was automatic or
immediate. After formal application and review, the social, educational, or legal stature of the individual might be found wanting, and he could be turned down. Furthermore, the corporation was pervasive.\textsuperscript{71} It reached into all ranks of society, from the upper echelons of the King’s service to institutions of international commerce such as the Compagnie du Nord, down to the parish or village and the apprentices. It was more than a professional body, for it often provided for the material needs of the widows and orphans of members. It also funded benefices that offered masses for the spiritual respite of their souls.\textsuperscript{72}

Membership in the Second Estate was a quality of birth, usually traced paternally, and conferred on a family by the King as a mark of favour. It was also attached to certain functions or officers that could be hereditary or personal — although in the opinion of some, acquired nobility was not true nobility. It could be lost through \textit{condamnation infamante} (sentence of dishonour), or through derogation because one practised any of the mechanical arts, with the exception of glass-making. Derogation deactivated one’s nobility, but it did not erode it completely since it could be reactivated.\textsuperscript{73} Some argue that nobility was simply a legal state, rejecting the view that it was based on bloodlines, on honourable behaviour, or on military tradition.\textsuperscript{74} This argument consequently incorporates a wide range of individuals into the Second Estate, based on economic or legal definitions. This understanding may be appropriate for an economic or a demographic study, but it is not very useful for assessing authority, for social stature significantly affects the authority an individual wields in certain circumstances. The fact that writers of the period were preoccupied by the minute divisions of each rank is indicative of the importance attached to them.\textsuperscript{75}

What confuses these classifications are the changes in the Second Estate resulting, among other factors, from the sale of offices, discrepancies from region to region, and economic shifts. So many commoners were able to enter the ranks of the nobility during the first sixty years of the seventeenth century that the old traditions had to give way.\textsuperscript{76} Charges of false claims to noble status were brought by individuals or by the
parish, for tax exemption of the wealthy affected the burden of others.\textsuperscript{77} Further confusion as to what constituted membership in the Second Estate resulted from the social ranking accorded the nobility. \textit{Séance} at court, for instance, was determined not only by nobility but by acquired honours.\textsuperscript{78}

The relationship of monarchy to nobility was not always at the behest of the monarch. A long tradition linked the fortunes of monarchy and nobility and the relationship can be seen as a cultural component of state building.\textsuperscript{79} Granting offices had both economic and social ramifications and the nobility had a vested interest in maintaining a monopoly on service to the crown. This monopoly was increasingly broken by members of the Third Estate as the office holders grew in numbers. The Third Estate merged into the Second Estate because its élite had been ennobled legally, though often not accepted socially as \textit{officiers}. There were three divisions within this order: those who lived like nobles, the bourgeoisie, and manual workers who were further divided by residency, urban and rural.

The style of life — education, pursuits — was more important than simple wealth.\textsuperscript{80} The highest groups in the Third Estate comprised those who had retired from business, often financiers, office holders, minor officials, or wholesalers who had acquired a seigneur or an estate. The Third Estate also included \textit{les bourgeois}, who were characterized also by style of life, but rather than pursuing leisure and elegance they often pursued business. As owners and managers rather than workers, they prided themselves on economy and close family ties.\textsuperscript{81} Some of the upper levels of this group moved into the courts as lawyers or purchased offices. In Paris there was an official ranking of the six major corporations, or organizations of profession, that were comprised by the bourgeoisie. A commission of 1582 ranked professions from the goldsmith down to the pig inspector.\textsuperscript{82}

These descriptions are all approximations, for the attributes that constituted membership in an Estate or in a corporation were not static. What enlivened them were the relationships of family and friends. Lineage was the first indication of an individual’s potential future, as indicated by the importance of \textit{livres de raison}. These record books traced the
individual's lineage, both paternal and maternal, his properties and financial dealings, and
the spiritual and moral ideals of the family. Members of the family — that is, the extended
family — had a duty to one another. There was contemporary criticism of the state of
marriage and family relationships, but these structures were the base institution of French
society. The traditional and legal structures defining marriage and inheritance safeguarded
their kinship. By marrying appropriately, family members aided one another in their entry
into corporations, in their appointments, and in business. By right of retrait linager individ-
uals could purchase from a debtor the property that was part of their héritage thus
assuring stability. If an estate had been sold by a family member, an individual was able to
buy it from the purchaser to assure that family status was maintained.

Another relationship was that of friend. Although fealty bound one to a seigneur, this
was becoming less a personal bond than a legality. A different less formal relationship, one
of choice, was replacing the more formal feudal relationship. The bond between maître
and fidèle was a personal one. This case of absolute devotion to a master transcended other
bonds. The choice to pledge oneself personally was freely made, and the relationship was
fuelled as much by affection as by opportunism. The relationship of protecteur and créature
was a political bond, and describes what is now called a "network" of power. This alliance
was often brought about by a broker, a third party who acted as a lobbyist or intervener. A
créature was "created" in that posts were made available, introductions provided, and
information passed that raised his stature. He in turn may have acted as protecteur for his
own créatures.

In general terms, the above analysis presents the ranking of the three orders, their
geographic alignments, and their manner of association. It might seem a straightforward
task, then, to trace the relationships from person to person and the influences that changed
these relationships and thus document the flow of authority. If every member of society
had been content to stand still, content with his or her lot, it would have been relatively
easy for historians to understand how the society worked. But to accept this analysis with-
out taking the disposition of the people into account would be poor history. There is another level of understanding which is not sufficiently accounted for in these descriptions: one must examine the perception of the people themselves. It is well and good to sit outside an institution and identify its components; challenges to authority could then be seen as a problem in the system that blocked the flow of authority, but that would tell us little about why the challenges were made. So it is now necessary to examine not only the structures of a society but also the mentalité which operates within these structures for it is the cumulative behaviour of individuals, after all, which gives meaning to the structures themselves. This particular study is important in that it will serve to provide a context for Du Bosc’s participation in a variety of structures which we can then chart over the course of his writings. These writings will then serve as a specific example of the relationship between individual and structure.

Du Bosc, as well as being a member of the First Estate by virtue of his priesthood, would also have been well aware of the social implications of Estate and might even have been identified as a courtier. Du Bosc’s dedications to highly placed women, and his appointment as counsellor and preacher to the King, would indicate that he was acquainted with the élite of his society. Later editions of *L’Honneste femme* continued to bear Madame de Combalet’s name, which indicates her continuing approval of its approach and contents. Combalet, as the niece of Richelieu, would have exerted a substantial influence. It is evident that Du Bosc was associated, however marginally, with a leisured, educated class: the aristocracy and the *haute bourgeoisie*. In addition, his anti-Jansenist tracts found favour with the government. His panegyrics dedicated to Louis XIII, Mazarin, and Richelieu could also be seen as further evidence of his interest and participation in court life.

The mentalité of seventeenth-century France was formed by more than the social structures. To understand Du Bosc’s work we need to consider the context of the *Querelle des Femmes*, the environment of the *libertins erudit*, and the concept of *l’honnête homme*.
Each context provided a venue for his opinions and so each needs to be addressed.

The *Querelle des Femmes*, which occupied Du Bosc for much of his life, is an effective point of departure from which to gain a better understanding of the *mentalité* of the period and so a brief assessment of the background to Du Bosc’s participation in the debates is valuable. This debate is especially useful in that it permits us to follow the transition from viewing society as a series of interlocking structures to viewing it as a reflection of individual behaviours. François de Sales’ work, which credited women with the conscious ability to develop spiritually, was foundational for some of the views expressed in the *Querelle des Femmes*. The tradition and format of the *Querelle* was that of rhetoric, and in the early part of the century this genre was preoccupied with a re-assessment of older arguments.90 Two examples of simplistic polemic for and against the new view of women are to be found in the works of Vigoureux and Oliver. Oliver’s *l’Alphabet de l’imperfection et malice des femmes. dédié à la plus mauvaise du monde* (1617) was published in both French and Latin. It was an alphabetized list of insults. For example the letter B was *Bestiale brartum/abime de bêtise*, the abyss of folly.91 A counter alphabet was published by Vigoureux the same year, *De leur excellence et perfection*, which used the same format but reversed the intent. There were more thoughtful works in succeeding decades. For example, Saint-Gabriel, a lawyer, published *Mérite des dames* (1660), which presented the situation of women in legal terms and argued that established practice could not legitimate an unnatural tradition, since the subjugation of women was wrong because it was unnatural.92

The sources for the three stances represented in the debate (the superiority of men, the superiority of women, the equality of women and men) were the same: biblical, classical, and philosophical texts. However, both the rhetoric itself and the debate as a purely intellectual exercise were being challenged by pragmatic realities. The relatively recent success of two monarchs (Isabella of Castile and Elizabeth I of England) in the preceding century presented a modern pattern, and although Salic law was a fact in France, a female Regent in practice overrode it.93 The regencies of Marie de Médicis and Anne of Austria,
together with the insight of Catholic Reformers, lent the role of women’s education new importance. This moved the Querelle beyond an argument of philosophy or manners into the realm of religion, and highlighted the interplay between religion and society.

Although Roman Catholic dogma recognized an equality of soul between men and women, there was debate on this point.⁹⁴ Castiglione,⁹⁵ in The Book of the Courtier, has a character express a common view of women’s imperfection: nature strives for perfection, and in the matter of woman it is “rather a default and slacknesse of nature, than her entent.”⁹⁶ He presents, though does not necessarily personally espouse, the view that women are by nature imperfect but that they ought to be governed by the same rules as men.⁹⁷ This view, based at least in part on Aristotle,⁹⁸ was commonly offered as justification for the secondary role accorded to women. Du Bosc, in fact, challenges the acceptance of this view as well as one prevalent perception of courtly love as the latter had evolved in France. He saw courtly love as a debasement of the sacramental nature and fundamental characteristics of marriage — physical intimacy, procreation, living in the spirit of sacrament.

The condemnation of courtly love is also apparent in the Introduction à la vie dévote (1609) by François de Sales. Although it was not considered a feminist work per se, the fact that it was composed at the request of a woman, Mme Charmoisy,⁹⁹ warrants this perspective. By addressing a woman as a means of communicating to “everyman” De Sales established women’s understanding as an acceptable norm, a norm which Du Bosc echoes. This certainly implies the trust that the work will be understood and will benefit all readers. The Introduction was addressed to “everyman” in the guise of a woman:

J’adresse mes paroles à Philothée, parce que, voulant réduire à l’utilité commune de plusieurs âmes ce que j’avais premi èrement écrit pour une seule, je l’appelle du nom commun à toutes celles qui veulent être dévotes; car Philothée veut dire amatrice ou amoureuse de Dieu.¹⁰⁰

The influence of François de Sales¹⁰¹ is apparent in Du Bosc’s work. He has, in fact, been called a disciple of de Sales, but not of the first rank, as he was “un bon moraliste de second ordre, sage, pondéré, judicieux, équilibré, fin. Mais l’originalité reste le lot du
maître."¹⁰² Du Bosc’s feminist writings¹⁰³ include *L’Honneste femme* (1632), *Nouveau recueil de lettres des dames de ce temps. Avec leurs réponses* (1635), and *La Femme héroïque, ou les héroïnes comparées avec les héros en toute sorte de vertus* (1645). These works have prompted his inclusion in a variety of studies on women, notably those of MacLean and Lougee. Du Bosc was not alone in his defence of women, nor in his assertion of their rights. He was a participant in the long-term debate on the place of women in society, the *Querelle des Femmes*. Rousselot has placed him in the company of François de Grenaille,¹⁰⁴ essayist and secretary to Louis XIII.¹⁰⁵ MacLean has associated him with Nicholas Faret¹⁰⁶, secretary to Henri de Lorraine whose *aumônier*, de la Madelaine, commissioned Du Bosc’s 1634 biography of François Bel. All of these writers, including Du Bosc, may have been inspired or provoked by Marie Le Jars de Gournay’s *Egalité des hommes et des femmes* (1622).¹⁰⁷ *L’Honneste femme* establishes the same premise as de Gournay — that there must be a basic respect for humanity, regardless of sex.¹⁰⁸ These then are some of the conditions and the context in which the *Querelle des Femmes* thrived.

Another aspect of the debate on the place of women in society is the contribution of Christian mothers to the stability of society. The strength and continuity of the Church was essentially in the hands of the laity, particularly mothers, though this was not explicitly expressed.¹⁰⁹ It is a truism that children are taught their earliest lessons by their mothers. If these mothers were themselves educated in the practice and devotion of the Church, then their children would be, too. These two realizations — that political power could and did fall to the hands of women, and that the maintenance of a strong Catholic tradition was enhanced by a mother’s ability to teach and explain — removed the debate from the realm of rhetoric to the sphere of pragmatism. An active religious life led many mothers to have their daughters educated in the faith although the continued growth of convent schools was not always supported by the hierarchy of the church. The growth of the teaching orders in France, the Ursulines for example, is evidence of this. Founded in Italy in 1544, by 1700 there were between 10,000 and 12,000 Ursuline houses in France operating both day-
schools and pensionnats.¹¹⁰

A similar movement is apparent in the Counter-reformation's recognition of the need for Christian education available to women as well as to men. This is a pivotal intersection of a variety of concerns: women's education and their role in society, the establishment of the many teaching orders, and the appropriateness of the devout humanist approach to answer educators' needs. These energies were directed in two complementary areas, the adoption of a Catholic ethical and moral foundation for behaviour, and the rejection of traditional magic.¹¹¹

The attempts to consolidate and control Estates through the rules governing marriage enhanced the role of women in marriage. Since widows were free to choose a spouse, and even daughters were permitted a measure of choice if they found a proposed match unbearable, the fortunes of a family could be threatened by either the inopportune marriage of a widow or the rejection of a match by a daughter.¹¹² Although women were no longer "dowered off," they were kept within the financial control of the family.¹¹³ The 1560 edict of François II, which limited the amount a widow could give to a second husband, further protected the family fortunes.¹¹⁴ There is an obvious tension in the need to protect the family by controlling the freedom of women and the recognition of the personal power of women. The necessity of legislating against forced marriage, which increased control of wealth within the family, emphasized this tension.

Marriage as an institution was pivotal both in maintaining a stable power base and in creating new hierarchies.¹¹⁵ The documents of the Council of Trent emphasized the sacramental nature of marriage, thus reinforcing its importance.¹¹⁶ The decrees of the Council also reinforced the civil state of marriage. A royal edict of Henri II in 1556 empowered parents to disinherit their children if they married without permission.¹¹⁷ The Council, in 1563, formalized the role of the priest as witness to a vow exchanged by two individuals. Conciliar documents do not mention children explicitly as the responsibilities of parents,¹¹⁸ but perhaps the obvious was understood; Charles Paris identifies procreation and the in-
struction of offspring as the primary object of marriage in seventeenth-century Catholi-
cism. Mutual support and affection were also recognized, but considered secondary. By
the time of Louis XIV, the average age of brides was between twenty-three and twenty-five
years, of grooms approximately twenty-seven. This resulted in lower infant and mater-
nal mortality, and fewer pregnancies.

Marriage was also a sacrament of the Church as well as the principal means of con-
solidating and controlling material wealth. There were then two authorities that governed
the event; the social-political authority of the secular world and the spiritual authority of
the religious world. The need for the two structures to mesh was paramount and the machi-
nations that brought this about are evidence of their interdependence. Marriage under-
went substantial change in the years following the Council of Trent, in part due to the
pressure to reinforce the event as a sacrament and in part due to the social and economic
pressure of family. The ceremony evolved from the witness of the priest to the union at the
church door to the vows incorporated into a nuptial mass. To avoid consanguinity, to pro-
tect against marriage not approved by parents, and to end the practice of trial marriages
(fiançailles), banns were announced three weeks before the event. This change served to
increase parental control and to sacramentalize the union.

Although many saw women as subservient in marriage, the increased maturity of
wives may in reality have changed the relationship. The characteristics of a good wife
were equivalent to those of a good housekeeper: practicality, honesty, and efficiency.
Beauty, and even affection, ranked below these virtues. The traditional duties or
responsibilities of the bourgeois wife included gardening, cooking, sewing, launder-
ing, child care, doctoring, managing the household staff, and often participating in the
family business. Extraordinary roles included acting as patroness, the performance of
charitable works, and the spiritual care of the household. An alternate choice for
women was the cloister. Their presence in the convent was occasionally the result of
parental choice, but as often as not it also represented their own choice. Aside from
those women who had a true vocation for marriage there was an element of social convenience. A modest dowry paid to a convent for one daughter provided a more handsome dowry for a suitor for a second daughter.¹²⁷

Often portrayed as weak, and deprived of a legal presence in society, some women did exert considerable power. A widow, for example, was responsible for rearing her children, managing (and accounting for) family property, the basis of the social structure.¹²⁸ Property, always of concern in marriage contracts, was of principal concern in the climate of unrest which pervaded the early part of the seventeenth century.¹²⁹ Although they had their own corporations that determined professions that were traditionally female, women were often excluded from production, as trades became more organized.¹³⁰ As the applications of technology in trades and farming increased, the division of labour by sex became more pronounced. Women moved gradually from a position of partnership to one of possession; they came to be considered the property of men.¹³¹ One means of maintaining familial influence was through the corporation. Men generally remained a part of the corporate body into which they were born, and jealously guarded their position in the hierarchy which dictated one's faith, the rules of trade, and support of traditions.¹³²

The concern for concentrating wealth, and the value placed on it, was also seen in the practice of both men and women assuming the name of their estate rather than that of their family. This seems to indicate that emphasis was placed as much on property as on family and that most marriages were made within one's estate.¹³³ Marriage arrangements were as concerned with consolidating wealth as they were with the moral qualities of a prospective spouse. Wealth, as well as family, was the key to status. This trend accelerated after the accession of Louis XIV, and was intensified by the complexities of the appropriate, stylized manners of the nobility and parvenus.¹³⁴ Since power was concentrated in the hands of the King, the conventions of etiquette and behaviour became more rigid and pronounced. As members of the Third Estate acquired royal offices, and moved into the Second Estate, manners, dress, education and costume became means of distinguishing between the old
and the new nobility. Simply marrying your children well was not enough to acquire élite status. Personal worth was assessed by one’s standing in a social construction based on wealth, manners, and family.

The writers of the period expressed conflicting views on morality. Some held that women were morally weaker and that it was the responsibility of men to protect them — largely from themselves. A woman’s physiology was thus a reflection of her spiritual weakness. A second view also employed the body as justification for feminine weakness, a view that was supported by the proponents of courtly love. The female body was seen as more delicate, and intrinsically beautiful. If refinement and beauty are reflections of gracefulness, women were by nature more spiritually refined and oriented to sanctity. This belief points to two contrary assumptions: first, that beauty was associated with goodness, and second, that because of their refinements, physical and spiritual, women’s spiritual strength was less than men’s.

If some measure of confidence was expressed in women’s capacity for goodness, however, there was little understanding of their physiology. Hysteria, understood to be the product of sexual repression, resulted from a lack of “wit or will.” The single woman, especially the widow because of her carnal knowledge, was suspect. This view of an obsessive sexual appetite was countered by several women writers who argued that women had sexual appetites equal to those of men. That women in wedlock should enjoy love-making was acceptable, as procreation was the purpose of marriage. But what of the widow, or those unable to satisfy their passions? It was often assumed that some women, once acquainted with carnal knowledge, would continue to crave it and, finding no satisfaction, might turn to witchcraft.

From a legal perspective, women were viewed as *sexus imbecillus*, effectively unable to do wrong, and totally unable to take responsibility for their actions. All legal responsibility was assumed by the father or the husband. For purposes of taxation, however, women could be legally heads of the household and, as such, responsible in the same way
their husbands had been. Despite the restrictions placed on women formally, they were able to influence much and engage in the religious and social life of society.

A further framework which helps to cast significant light on the mentalité both of Du Bosc and of the time is the libertin erudit movement of which he was a minor participant. Du Bosc was an intimate friend of Olivier Patru, a lawyer and a lexicographer, as the letters that survive attest. Others of this circle include Perrot D’Ablancourt, a classicist and academician; Pierre Gassendi, a philosopher and mathematician, and Gabriel Naudé. Their thought and friendship is documented in the massive correspondence of Jean Chapelain, one of the formulators of l’esprit classique.

These men were free thinkers, not in the eighteenth century sense, but rather more akin to the Renaissance tradition of Montaigne. Their concern was not with the destruction of limitations but rather with a refinement of understanding. They debated the value of scepticism, epicureanism, and stoicism. Du Bosc was a part of this circle, but only for a limited time. Their influence is readily seen in Le philosophe indifférent (1643) which is not an expression of agreement with either epicurean or stoic or sceptic philosophy. Rather, Du Bosc uses the premise of these philosophies, indifférence, to attack the philosophies themselves. Du Bosc’s apparent association with, and then abandonment of, the libertins is understandable in light of his later works. The attention of these libertins to ancient philosophies, particularly stoicism, and the attempt to incorporate these into contemporary thought was understandably attractive to intellectuals of the period. Du Bosc, however, rejected the libertin view in favour of “la gloire de la verité Revelée” and of subjugating “la verité humaine à la divine, et la Philosophie à la Foy.” In this same environment of intellectual ferment, Du Bosc can also be assessed as a dialectician in the tradition of Pascal. In the opinion of Chesneau as noted above, however, Du Bosc can at best be said to be a minor writer who made no clear contribution to his milieu.

The final framework for our understanding of Du Bosc is that of civic excellence represented in the concept of l’honnête homme, though to define the phrase itself poses
problems. In part, this concept can be traced from the *auctoritas* of classical times through to the Renaissance ideal of *virtu*. *The Courtier*, by Castiglione, was an attempt to define the ideal of civic excellence and served as a model for later works.\(^{150}\) The concept in the early seventeenth century, as a result of the influence of the Counter-Reformation and devout humanism, incorporated both Christian and ancient pagan virtues such as those represented in Plato’s works, particularly the *Republic*, or in Aristotle’s ethics, such as temperance, justice, fortitude, practical intelligence, magnanimity, etc. The phrase was the subject of much contemporary discussion; and an acceptable synthesis of the diversity of contemporary opinion might well yield the following definition, that *l’honnête homme* embodies and integrates the best Christian and pagan virtues.\(^{151}\) The work of Nicholas Faret, *L’Honneste homme*,\(^{152}\) was an attempt to identify nobility as something more than simple aristocracy, though his explicit observations of court life do not exclude the aristocracy. Faret extended the meaning of *honnête* to include a spiritual dimension.\(^{153}\) He attempted to define *honnête* as an attitude that incorporated an excellence and manner of life beyond the simple accident of fair nature and birth. Faret reflects the influence of Castiglione and Montaigne who in turn reflected a classical ideal grafted onto a Christian culture. These writers articulate a standard of behaviour that transcends birth. The *honnête homme* was an example of how virtue and honour should be entwined. This ideal, to which Du Bosc clearly subscribed, precluded dalliance or superficiality. When Du Bosc advocated a particular behaviour or condemned a heresy, he was motivated by an understanding that integrated ethical, religious, and social responsibility. To have done otherwise would have been to undermine not only this integrated view and interlocking of perspectives, but also his own sense of personal honour.

Du Bosc then presents many faces to the reader. If we permit the meaning of his work to be defined exclusively by a single face, or form, our understanding of the content is delineated by that form. This distinction between form and content is an important one. Du Bosc’s expression (form) and his belief (content) have to be assessed in a broader context
than has been hitherto conceded by others. Henri Bremond’s definition of devout humanism as something more than an intellectual approach to life provides an effective vehicle for integrating the inner reality and its external expression.\textsuperscript{154}

Bremond’s admonition demands that we incorporate more than form, but also find some means of addressing the content. This introduces more than simple externals or material evidence and calls for a broader understanding of seventeenth century French Catholicism, for example, to determine what was meant by holiness for some of the people of the time.

Du Bosc’s feminist writings, for example, in light of his understanding of grace, can be recast as moral, cultural and spiritual formation for women, rather than simply popular or stylish refinements of \textit{le mondain}. Living in Paris when he did and observing educated women, he would have been well aware of the work of Vincent de Paul.\textsuperscript{155} Female congregations such as the Daughters of Charity were as influential in society as were the salons.\textsuperscript{156} Du Bosc’s hagiography and anti-Jansenist tracts also fit this understanding. However, this should not be allowed to obscure Du Bosc’s humanity. Perhaps he was attempting to make a name for himself at the expense of Arnauld. Perhaps he was an ambitious man, currying favour by obsequious panegyrics. A religious person need not be saintly all the time, just as an aristocrat does not necessarily always have to behave nobly. Rather than discounting the appearance of conflicting motives or apparent contradictions in character, it is important to recognize them as a means of reconstructing the individual. This methodological approach then helps to account for some of the disparities and contradictions, as well as the major commonalities that are evident in Du Bosc’s life and work.

This brief review of structures and some of the major elements of the \textit{mentalité} of the time serves to contextualize Du Bosc. If we take account of these various structures as we have presented them, without allowing any particular structure to dominate, then it becomes obvious that previous accounts of Du Bosc’s writings are themselves at best partial accounts, since they focus (for various reasons) on a single facet rather than a coherent
whole. The most obvious example is Lougee’s treatment of *L’Honneste femme* which emphasizes social advancement and deportment and never mentions either grace or the religious dimension. Lougee calls Du Bosc a “sometime Franciscan” which effectively epitomizes the selective appropriation she herself has adopted. The analysis of this chapter would suggest that a more comprehensive approach is needed in order to take into account the multiplicity of structures so very evident in Du Bosc’s time and to provide a basis from which we can begin to determine how those structures were expressed in an integrated fashion. For example, an individual might have had the right to hold a civil court (with secular responsibilities), be a member of the First Estate (with religious responsibilities) and have the loyalty of a number of *créatures* (with social responsibilities). Functioning in a number of spheres meant accommodating each to the other in some manner. This accommodation plays itself out in a number of ways, both conciliatory and contradictory. The complexity of society’s attitude to the role of women, illustrated by the *Querelle des Femmes*, is an example of this. By analyzing the various roles of women, Du Bosc’s understanding of these roles, and how these meshed with society as a whole, we may begin to draw nearer to Du Bosc’s own view of authority.

It has already been argued that Du Bosc is a peculiarly appropriate individual for recovering a more representative view of his age and that from an historical perspective we should allow him to speak for his own times rather than impose our own presuppositions. We must now move beyond Du Bosc as an individual operating within these structures to Du Bosc as an observer and shaper of the debates of his time and specifically to the central problem of authority as perceived by Du Bosc himself.
Endnotes

1. The extent to which we can know another individual is questionable at best. Although dated, Lucien Goldmann's approach to biography advocates a movement between text and context: "The difficulties presented by the relationship between an author's life and his work, far from suggesting that we should go back simply to studying the text, encourage us to keep moving forward in the original direction, not only from the text to the individual, but from the individual to the social group of which he forms a part." Hidden God, 11.

Knowing how to introduce Jacques Du Bosc, therefore, poses difficult methodological problems, which it is necessary that we treat briefly at the outset, before taking a closer look at the events, evidence and broader structures which characterized and shaped his life. To say simply he was born about 1600, became a Franciscan and possibly lived until 1669 in France, is not enough information for the reader to feel any sense of "knowing." The problem is not unique to this man, for many individuals of the past are known only through fragments. This concern was as true in Du Bosc's own time as in ours and the problem of classifying fragments of knowledge, both in the abstract and in the pragmatic world of the librarian, is discussed by Lorraine J. Daston, "Classifications of Knowledge in the Age of Louis XIV" in David Lee Rubin, ed., The Sun King: The Ascendancy of French Culture during the Reign of Louis XIV (Washigton: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1992): 207-220. In some respects, it is this very anonymity that appeals, for because of this lack we are then forced to develop a new understanding of his age. The individual's response to a unique set of criteria and circumstances is determined in part by his time and his place in that time. To come to some clear understanding of Jacques Du Bosc as an individual, as a participant in numerous debates, and as subject to a variety of institutional and social criteria a range of different but related perspectives is necessary.

The danger in approaching someone of this stature is the temptation to use him and his works to justify a particular ideological or historiographical interpretation. Placing him within one of many possible frames of reference gives too great a weight to that role, even though his other roles are equally valid starting points. In emphasizing a particular role not only is that role given precedence; so too is the structure of authority that defines the parameters of that role. The very words "frame of reference" intimate a limiting and pre-determined view. To discuss him only as an anti-Jansenist, or a moral philosopher, or a feminist, or a priest, places him within a particular field of discussion: religious history, intellectual history, social history. The resultant picture we have of the man, while interesting, fails to provide us with an appreciation of the complexities of either his own personality or the period in which he lived. What emerges is a one-dimensional image that may do little more than justify a particular argument.

A further problem for the modern historian is that Du Bosc's writings lend themselves well to parsing into gender studies, or theology, or philosophy and so again we encounter the limitations of a particular discursive context. It is possible, for example, to address only the anti-Jansenist works without reference to his views on women and while this would enhance our understanding of Jansenism it also destroys the coherence of his ideas. The obvious counter, then, would be to present a
straightforward chronology moving from the earlier, less sophisticated works to his later, mature expressions. If we take this approach, his development as a writer is apparent, for the earlier works are often ill-planned in comparison to the later which are well argued and ordered. But whereas this provides a narrative of his life and a listing of views and events, it also presents a problem: it is difficult to develop a coherent sense of the connections between the subject areas. To emphasize distinctions between different genres distorts both the individual and his world-view. Conversely, to assume a consistent and unified philosophy throughout his life is to deny the possibility of change in Du Bosc as an individual and the changes in his milieu. The view that there are particular areas of discourse within which particular arguments can be placed is a simplistic solution, for the result can easily do a disservice to the author. If the work being examined is a feminist tract, then he becomes a feminist, and his other views are subordinated to that perspective. If it is a discussion of the Jansenist debate, he becomes an anti-Jansenist and nothing more. There are risks, then, in both manners of presentation: the thematic approach destroys the unity of the individual, whereas the chronological may destroy his coherence of thought on a given subject. A compromise must therefore be sought between chronological and thematic presentations.

A solution to this dilemma is to provide a construct of who Du Bosc was on the basis of the observations and opinions of his contemporaries. The variety of his works indicate a range of interests, and what little more we know must come from brief glimpses of him in the works of others. It is, therefore, necessary, to review the extant documentary information on his life and to place that information within the context of his age. By this means, our understanding of Du Bosc will be freed of the too specific discursive contexts employed by others, so that we can then proceed to an examination of his writings.


4. Olivier Patru (1604–81) was a lawyer and a lexicographer. Admitted to the Académie in 1640, Patru was an intimate of Vauglaüs, Balzac, Perrot d’Ablancourt and La Fontaine. Little more than the *Plaidoyers* was published despite contemporary recognition of his acuity in matters of literary style. He collaborated with Richelet and contributed to the *Dictionnaire de l’Académie*. He held the 19e fauteuil of the Académie from 1640 to 1681. Undated letter to Du Bosc, *Oeuvres Diverse de Mr Patru de l’Académie Française* 3rd ed. (Paris: Hilare Foucault, 1714), 578–581.


7. Excluded from the Sorbonne in 1656 for his Jansenist sympathies, Hermant (1617–1690) retired to his birthplace, Beauvais. His memoirs, which run from 1630 to 1663, document much of the intellectual activities of the time and are a key source for the Jansenist debate.


10. “But though he was the author of *L'Honnête femme*, he was not judged virtuous enough to be a bishop, nor significant enough to oblige Port Royal to respond to him in writing.” Hermant, *Memoires*, 660. This passage refers to the dedication to Mazarin of *L’Église outragée par les novateurs condamnés et opinaires...* Hermant reports that Du Bosc hoped for a change in his position though is not specific as to what Du Bosc’s position was, nor what he hoped to achieve.

11. Antoine Arnauld, known as the Grand Arnauld, was the twentieth son of a lawyer of the same name who had countered the Jesuits in 1594. Numerous siblings were advocates of Jansenism; three sisters were abbesses of Port Royal. Arnauld twice went into hiding, after the publication of *Second Lettre à un Duc et pair* (1656) and again in 1679. Arnauld can be credited with articulating the Jansenist position, and continuing the debate after the Formulary was renewed by Louis XIV.


13. Jean Chapelain, (1595–1674) was a poet chiefly known for his literary criticism and the role he played in the formation of *l’esprit classique*. Despite producing a fairly small body of work, his extensive correspondence is important to the study of literature and evidence of the continuing influence of Montaigne’s scepticism. His importance was strengthened by his presence at the salons of Madame Rambouillet, his conversation, letters, his membership in the Academie Française and as a creature of Richelieu.


15. “was defrocked by debauch and refrocked by ambition. He meditates no less than a mitre, and has left all the monk behind. It cannot be denied that he has wit and style,...” *Ibid.*, December 16, 1630. 1: 738.


18. R. Aubert, Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1977), 18: col 896. This view is supported by Colomie whose account states that Du Bosc, with the permission of the Pope, spent these years in a monastery with monks of various orders. Bibliothèque Choixie, 239. Little more is known of Mullard than his name and this trip with Du Bosc.

19. Gédéon Tallemant des Réaux (1619–1670) was the son of a wealthy Huguenot financier and is chiefly known as an observer of élite Parisian life. He was an associate of de Retz, knew Voiture, married into the Rambouillet family, and assiduously attended the salons. His character studies and vignettes were first published in the nineteenth century and though initially thought to be scurrilous are now accepted as an excellent source of social history.

20. Catherine de Vionne, Madame de Rambouillet, was Italian born though made a citizen of France by Henri IV. She acquired property (1599) and designed and decorated her home herself, completing it in 1604. Thereafter it became the gathering place for a variety of illustrious figures including Voiture, Madame de Lafayette, and Madame de Sevigné.


23. Permission et Témoignage, La découverte d'une nouvelle hérésie cachée sous la négation du fait de Jansénius et colorée de deux équivoques (Paris: Martin, 1662.), unnumbered pages.

24. Du Bosc is also said to have adopted the title of Abbé Marolles, and though there is no indication of his actually being granted a benefice the title was often used of priests in general. The Franciscans do not use this appellation, nor does it appear in any of his books.


26. "... vir nobilis, scriptor ecclesiasticus..." AN LL 1526 Vedures Obituaires Cordeliers 1440–1600. These sentiments are also evident in the fulsome letters of approbation that were written for inclusion in his later works; see especially Le Triomphe de S. Augustin, et la Deliverance de sa doctrine, ou l'on voit condannation des cinq Propositions des Jansenistes: avec la Refutation de leur Manifeste à trois sens, fabrique pour éluder l'autorité de S. Siege.

28. Ibid., 42–3. Lougee understands Du Bosc to be advocating "a drastic extension of the mechanisms of nobility," and while she recognizes the egalitarianism of Christianity, as Du Bosc himself expressed it, her emphasis remains on the social implications and criteria of this ennoblement rather than the impact of virtue itself.

29. Ibid., 11.


34. These divisions are one simple classification of what was in reality more complex for each term presents difficulties, each has been challenged. There are numerous works that address the problem: Charles Loyseau, Les Œuvres de Maistre Charles Loyseau (Lyon: Companie de libraries, 1701); Roger Doucet, Institutions de la France au XVIe siècle (Paris: A & J Picard, 1948); Mousnier, Etat et Société en France. Each present detailed definitions of each aspect of the social structure, and each interprets the relationships among them differently. For a more recent analysis of these varying interpretations see Robert Mandrou, Introduction to Modern France 1500–1640: An Essay in Historical Psychology (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975), 101–4; Peter Burke, "The Law of Orders in Early Modern France," in M.L. Bush, ed., Social Orders and Social Classes in Europe since 1550: Studies in Social Stratification (Longman: Burnt Mill, 1992). This has certainly contributed to our understanding of where one kind of authority resides, how it is imposed, and how it is transmitted institutionally.

35. Both Hayden and Reddy advocate this contextualization to better understand individuals of the period. J. Michael Hayden, "States, Estates and Orders: The Qualité


39. For more detailed discussion on the function of both the clergy and laity, the expectations the laity held of them, see *ibid*.

40. Gallicanism dates from the beginnings of “ecclesiastical autonomy,” when in 1407 a series of edicts by Charles VI were issued. These were further entrenched by the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438, and finally confirmed in 1516. Ecclesiastical law in France was basically the same as elsewhere in Europe but for the system of appointment to the magisterium. Frederick Baumgartner, *Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate. The Bishops and the Wars of Religion 1547–1610* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), Chapter II.


43. It must be borne in mind, however, that often these observations based on such reconstruction are as much *de jure* as *de facto*, a point made by Professor Hubert Johnson in conversation.

44. The congregational orders, such as the Eudists, de Montfort Fathers, the Oratorians, or St. Vincent’s Priests of the Mission, were founded in response to the needs of a more active clergy as necessitated by Counter-reformation spirituality. They served most notably in the education of the laity. J. Outramm Evennett *The Spirituality of the Counter-Reformation* ed. John Bossy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 67-88, see especially 83-84.
45. Those in minor orders, such as lectors and acolyte, enjoyed the privileges of the clergy and remained celibate though were bound to little else. The major, or holy, orders consisted of the sub-deacon, deacon and priest. The priesthood was restricted by age and wealth (a minimum income of 50 livres per year). The first was to ensure some level of education and maturity, the second to insure that those in major orders would not live in penury or shame the hierarchy as parasites. Their readiness for the priesthood was assessed by the bishop who ordained them, as there were generally not enough seminaries to serve the diocese in the first half of the century. Mousnier, *Institutions of France*, 320–22.


47. The freedom with which religious vocations were embraced has recently been re-examined among female orders though this can be extrapolated to include male orders. Professor Rapley’s conclusions point to the importance of rank in attaining a post further substantiates Du Bosc’s origins among the “distingués.” Elizabeth Rapley, “Women and the Religious Vocation in Seventeenth Century France,” *French Historical Studies* 18 (1994): 613–631.

48. Whether Du Bosc was and Observant or Conventual is not known. The Observants separated from the Conventuals in 1517, and the Capuchins were established as another order in the 1520s. The Franciscans were not organized into their present branches (OFM, OFM Conv., and OFM Cap.) until 1897. The Observants no longer exist.

49. Franciscans first arrived in Paris in 1219, and by 1229 had established their own school in the face of some opposition from the laity and secular religious. This tradition included the great Franciscan theologians Bonaventure and Duns Scotus who incorporated and developed the scholastic tradition, though with a particular Franciscan cast that celebrated poverty and charity. It was also anchored in the three principles laid down by their founder: poverty, penitence and contemplation. Over the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Franciscan spirituality developed a new character, essentially an interior detachment, in an attempt to reconcile the evangelical poverty espoused by St. Francis and the growth of the order (in numbers and in new directions, such as the development of empirical science). The order was reformed in 1517 and the two following centuries are thought of as the “golden age” for the Capuchins, one branch of the Order. Like the Dominicans, the Franciscans were dedicated to preaching, missionary work (both within and outside of Europe) and work among the poor, though perhaps the emphasis placed on Christological and Eucharistic devotion had the most lasting impact. Although devotions were once reserved for times of crisis the Capuchins promoted the practice in a more affective manner. Keith Luria, “The Counter-Reformation and Popular Spirituality” in *Christian Spirituality: Post-Reformation and Modern* ed. Louis Dupré and Don E. Sauers (New York: Crossroad, 1989): 114-15. *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire...* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1964) V: 1323. Jean Leclercq, Francois Vanderbroucke, and Louis Bouyer *The Spirituality of the Middle Ages*

50. Where a priest was positioned depended upon his order or his family connections. One might live with a bishop and assist in the administration of the diocese; another might be a canon who lived in a manse capitulaire, as part of a chapter funded by benefices, in which case he would be bound by a rule and called a canon. Still others might work in a parish fulfilling pastoral duties, or as a personal confessor or chaplain, or university professor. The parish priest was by far the most numerous group. However a member of a religious order might not be considered for many of these positions.

51. There was a hierarchy within the chancery as well, ranging from the provost, who was responsible for justice, to the deacon. The chancery would vary greatly according to the dignity of the bishop.

52. Baumgartner, Change and Continuity, Ch 2. There were approximately 113 dioceses in France but they varied enormously in size and importance — from Rouen with 1400 parishes to Grasse with only 35. My thanks to J. Michael Hayden who drew these statistics from his current research on the Pastoral Visits Project.

53. Although the Edicts of the Council of Trent were never formally registered in France, the Assembly of the Clergy worked toward incorporating the edicts into their own reform. Royal edicts of the sixteenth-century included many of the reforms advocated by Trent. Paul Broutin SJ La Réforme Pastorale en France au XVIIe siècle. Recherches sur las tradition pastorale après le Concile de Trente (Paris: Desclée et Co. 1956) passim, Part I.


55. The approbation of the bishop or superior does not necessarily indicate that Du Bosc's ideas represent an official view, but merely that they are not heretical. In the case of a number of Du Bosc's works the effusive praise he is given in the approbations, and the award of titles to him, these can be read as something more than the normal indication of doctrinal orthodoxy.


57. Ibid., 16; Baumgartner, Change and Continuity, 72–3.


60. Ibid., 116–120.

62. Sovereignty was expressed by "the right to command persons, not their property for public needs." Rowen in this disagrees with Mousnier's understanding in that the Crown was an office, not a proprietary position which was undermined by the sale of offices under Henri IV. H.H. Rowen, _The King's State; Proprietary Dynasticism in Early Modern France_ (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980), 58.

63. The lowest was _jus utendi_ or the ability to hold court on civil matters. The second, _jus fruendi_, incorporated civil matters but was founded on holding the land as a fief. This was generally the situation of those with lesser titles. The highest level, _jus abutenedi_, incorporated justice and indicated ownership of the land. Mousnier, _Institutions of France_, 509.

64. Parker, "Sovereignty, Absolutism and the Function of Law," 42.

65. _Ibid._, 43.

66. These equivalencies are an indication of the complexity of status. A castellany meant holding three levels of justice, having the right to hold a regular market, the right to hold an annual fair, the position of _prévôt_, (a royal appointment in the judicial body) and exerting influence in the church. If one held three castellanies, one could be made a baron. With two baronetcies and three castellanies one could be made a count. With two baronetcies and six castellanies, one could be made a marquis. Mousnier, _Institutions of Modern France_, 480.

67. Mandrou, _Introduction to Modern France_, 110.

68. In Saclé, for a house, garden, 2.5 arpents of meadow and 100 arpents of arable land valued at 13,000 livres, the _cens_ was one _livre tournois_. Mousnier, _Institutions of France_, 545.

69. There is a case on record where a retired soldier, a commoner, bought a seigneury to acquire the _cens_. To prove his claim he fought a court battle that lasted for fifty years, even though his fee would only be a nominal one. _Ibid._, 546.

70. The _seigneurial_ town was under the authority of an individual who would appoint a _prévôt_ and magistry. The _villes de bourgeoise_ based their authority on a patent or charter from the crown. This was granted to a group of individuals, a specific corporation composed of _prud'hommes_ who elected a council of _jurats_ who in turn elected the mayor. Status in the group was hereditary but individuals could join the corporation if invited. The _commune_ was under the authority of an elected mayor like the _ville de bourgeoise_ but the franchise was not limited to an élite corporation, but was extended to all householders.


72. _Ibid._, 429–73.

73. _Ibid._, 131–34.
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74. Mousnier identifies the principal characteristic in determining stature as the longevity of the family. Two orders emerge: the gentilshommes, those whose blood was truly blue, and others, who may have had a commoner in the closet. After three generations of nobility the line dividing commoner and nobleman could be crossed: the fourth generation was entitled to use the name gentilhomme. Chevalier could be used if the individual possessed great estates. Quatre lignes could be used after a further three generations of nobility, providing all one’s parents, grandparents, and great grandparents were all gentils. That was as far as the ennobled could rise. These, and those ranked higher, were addressed as haut because their nobility predated the fifteenth century. Noms et d’arms was the highest rank one could be born to. This was reserved for those whose family origins were lost in time. Institutions of France, 122–4.

75. There is overwhelming evidence that the estates were in a constant state of flux and that a shift was occurring. See Davis Bitton, The French Nobility in Crisis 1560–1640 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965); Mark Motley, Becoming a French Aristocrat. The Education of the Court Nobility 1580–1715 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Ellery Schalk, From Valour to Pedigree Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

76. This point is made by Jay M. Smith who identifies the noblesse ancienne as having a particular perspective but who, together with the arrivistes form the whole nobility. “Our Sovereigns Gaze: Kings, Nobles, and State Formation in Seventeenth Century France” French Historical Studies 18 (1993): 398, note 3.

77. Commissioners empowered by Louis XIV to investigate Languedoc identified only four ranks: the noblesse illustre, d’ancienne race, de robe, and de cloche. The investigation of claims was a serious, costly, and popular undertaking which created a whole new industry for exemption from taxation came with a successful claim of noble stature. Mousnier, Institutions of France, 137.

78. At the head of the table were the King’s fidèles, his friends. Below them were the princes of the blood, those related to the King, who were addressed as très haut. These were followed by those who were dukes and peers. These received the most from the king either for family consideration or for merit. Last among the first rank, or the cercle de cour, were brevet dukes (unregistered by Parlement) and plain dukes. Provincial nobility vied with the grand robins, or high magistry, for the next rank, depending on wealth and personal stature. Below this were the noblesse de robe and the petty gentilshommes. And then came the salt bowl. Ibid., 155–6.


80. Education was obviously an important aspect of upward mobility. For a detailed exploration of noble education see Motley, Education of the French Aristocrat, 68–9. The same point is made by Mettam, Power and Faction, 55.


86. A reasonable argument can be made that the rigidity of the class structure itself was a means of control, and class was an ambiguous term to apply to this period. It is apparent that class and order are not synonymous. As was noted above, the definition of estate itself was unclear. Although change was minimal, economic shifts did allow the continuing development of the bourgeoisie. There seems to have been no specific path for upward mobility. Much depended on chance. Economic changes were neither consistent nor sufficiently defined to permit the drawing of distinct class lines. Any argument solely along class lines, then, would be difficult to justify. The rigidity of the society, however, did not lessen the acquisitive desires of the individual. Emulation of those who happened to be more fortunate was then, as it is now, common.

87. These include Madame de Combalet, the niece of Richelieu, Henrietta Maria, sister to Louis XIII and Queen of England, and the regent Anne of Austria.


89. For a discussion of the importance of patron and client, see Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients, passim*.

90. Joan Kelly identifies a progression in the feminist argument beginning with the intellectual dialectic, followed by a sense of cultural awareness of gender formation, and finally an attempt to transcend the status quo. This progression of the the development of the *Querelle* and of the personal “consciousness raising” of the feminist movement is argued in “Early Feminist Theory and the Querelle des Femmes 1400–1789” *Sign* 8 (1982): 4–28. Ian MacLean on the other hand sees little new in the first half of the seventeenth century. “Feminism and Literature in France 1610–1652,” 81.


93. There were other women who held power as well: Isabelle of Austria, Christina of Sweden, Chrestienne of France. For a discussion of the implications of the power held by these women as well as Marie de Médici and Anne of Austria see Micheline Cuénin, “Les Femmes aux Affaires (1598–1661)” *XVIIe siècle* 144 (1984): 203–210.

95. 1478–1529. Italian diplomat, courtier, and writer, born at Mantua; Castiglione’s *The Courtier* (1518) sets forth a series of dialogues that determine the norms and ideals of Italian élite society. Joan Kelly Gadol sees in *The Courtier* the shift from love expressed sexually to a form of spiritual, platonic love in “Did Women Have a Renaissance?” in Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, eds., *Becoming Visible: Women in European History* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1977), 55.


97. “...forsomuch as the verie same rules that are given for the Courtier, serve also for the woman, for as well ought she have respect to times and places, and to observe (as much as her weakenesse is able to beare) all the other properties that have beeene so much reasoned upon, as the Courtier.” *Ibid.*, 188.

98. In Book I.1 man is described as the “moving and efficient cause,” woman as the passive, receptive; in Book I.2 the role of man is described as generative and creative, that of woman as material *De Generatione animalium* trans. Arthur Platt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912); see also IX.1, *Historia Animalium* trans D’arcy Wentworth Thompson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910); These views are countered by St. Augustine: “the sex in woman is no corruption but natural....The woman was therefore God’s creature as well as the man.” *City of God* trans. John Healy, (London: J.M. Dent, 1945) XXII.XVII.

99. Louise Du Chatel Charmoisy, Mme Claude de Vidorome (c 1599–1645) was cousin to de Sales. She requested spiritual guidance from de Sales, and they corresponded from 1606–07. These letters formed the basis for *Introduction à la vie dévote.* She was widowed in 1609.

100. “I address my words to Philothée, because, desiring to reduce to the common use of many souls what I had first written for one soul, I call her by the common name of all those who aspire to be devout; for Philothée means one who loves God.” François de Sales, *Introduction to the Devout Life* (Paris: Nelson, n.d.), Preface, unnumbered pages (2).

101. François de Sales (1567–1622) was a student of the Jesuits of the collège de Clermont in Paris and received a doctorate in Law at Padua in 1591. He was ordained at Annecy in 1593. A Vatican diplomat, he was made coadjutor to the Bishop of Geneva in 1599 and in 1602 Bishop. In addition to the *Introduction* he published *Treatise on the Love of God* and a rule for the Institute of the Visitation.

102. “...a good moralist of the second order, wise, thoughtful, judicious, fair, precise. But originality remains the lot of the master.” Joran, “Feminisme d’autrefois,” 236.
103. The use of the word feminist in this period is not anachronistic. The writers of the period used it often to refer to the debate on the place of women in society. See especially MacLean, Woman Triumphant, 27.

104. François de Grenaille (1616–1680) entered a monastery at Bordeaux but left after a time to become secretary and historian to Louis XIII’s brother, Gaston, duc d’Orléans. He was an essayist and wrote on theatre. He published L’honnête fille, dédiée à Mademoiselle (1639) and L’Honnête mariage (1640).

105. Rousselot, Histoire de L’éducation des femmes, 259.

106. Nicholas Faret (1596–1646) born in Bourg-en-Bresse, was a lawyer. In 1623 he took the post of secretary to Henri de Larine, Comte d’Harcourt. In 1627 he was made counsellor secretary to the King. He was active in the formation of the Académie Française. He wrote on manners and based the work L’honnète homme, ou l’art de plaire à la court (1630) on The Courtier. His contribution to the querelle des femmes was La femme généreuse qui montre que son sexe est plus noble, meilleur politque, plus vaillant, plus sçavant, plus verteuex, et plus oeconomie que celuy des hommes (1643).

107. Marie La Jars de Gournay (1556–1645) was the adopted daughter of Montaigne. She issued, after his death, an edition of his Essais and defended them in her own works L’ombre (1632) and Les avis ou les présens (1634). Her writing was concerned mainly with mortality.

108. MacLean, Woman Triumphant, 180.


110. Ibid., 48.

111. The ban, or transformation of folk religion is discussed in Jean Delumeau, Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire: A new view of the Counter Reformation (London: Burn and Oates, 1977), Chapter 4.


116. Although the rulings of the Council of Trent were never formally registered in France, the intent of the Assemblé du Clergé to adopt the intent of the Council’s rulings on the sacraments, as well as the reform of clerical life, is argued in Victor Martin, *Le gallicanisme et la réforme pastorale. Essais historiques sur l’introduction en France des dœcres du concile de Trente (1503–1615)* (1919) (Geneve: Slatkine Megariots Reprints, 1975). This work, based on Vatican archives, is balanced by Broutin, *La réforme pastorale en France*.


122. Portemer, “La femme selon le droit français,” 193. The author observes that the rules that controlled women’s marriage choice also affected men, an obvious point although one that has not often been addressed. Young men, as well as young women, were limited by the negotiations of family in marriage. The rules that controlled marriage then were not intended to manipulate women so much as to define society. The groom as well as the bride was a “membre de ce groupe rigoureusement hiérarchisé qu’est devenue la famille.”


126. Rapley assesses the motives of women entering the religious life based on notices that were circulated following their death and concludes that “daughters were not always the passive objects of parental strategies, that they were sometimes the principal actors in the dramas of their own lives...” “Women and Religious Vocation,” 630.


129. Dieffenbord’s study of four Parisian quartiers in 1572, illustrates the extent of women’s power. Of the households that paid the maximum tax of £300, 42% were headed by women. This might also show the extent to which widows were exploited by unscrupulous tax collectors. Ibid., 381.

130. The place of women in the corporation and in commerce outside the home in seventeenth century France is not yet well understood. Women were becoming more active, and may have posed a threat to men, resulting in more rigid control of their legal status. James B. Collins, “The Economic Role of Women in Seventeenth Century France” French Historical Studies 16 (1989): 468. See also Vann, “Toward a New Lifestyle,” 212; Goubert, Ancien Régime, 216.


132. Ibid., 213.


135. Flandrin, Families in Former Times, 124.

136. MacLean, Woman Triumphant, 170.

137. Davis makes this observation in the context of a discussion on the disorderliness of women, tracing popular acceptance of this view to Eve and her responsibility for tempting Adam into disobedience. Among the women who argued for a range of libido, among men and women, were Marguerite de Navarre, Madame de Lafayette, and Aphra Behn. were Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976) 124-26.

138. Ibid., 146.

139. Ibid., 71.


141. Nicholas Perrot, sieur d’Ablancourt (1606–1664), lawyer and translator, was raised as a Protestant, converted to Catholicism in 1626, and on the eve of receiving an ecclesiastical benefice returned to Protestantism. Knowledgeable in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Italian and Spanish, he was encouraged by Conrart to undertake translation. His translations included Cicero, Tacitus, Lucien, and Plutarch. He held the 20e fauteuil of the Académie from 1637 to 1664.

142. Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), was a philosopher and mathematician. Gassendi, a cleric, was the son of farmer. He held a chair at the Collège Royal in Paris from 1643
to his death. A member of the Tétrade, he opposed Descartes’ reductionist philosophy, proposing instead a Christian epicureanism. He wrote exclusively in Latin on astronomy, mathematics and philosophy.

143. Gabriel Naudé (1600–1653), was a doctor and médecin ordinaire to Louis XIII. He is perhaps better remembered as librarian to both Richelieu and Mazarin. He developed and enlarged Mazarin’s collection and it was eventually opened to the public, the forerunner of the Bibliothèque Nationale. He wrote extensively on history, education and contemporary politics.

144. Pintard. Le Libratinage érudit, 333. It is interesting to note that the accusation of debauch which was levelled by Hermant at Du Bosc was also made of Pierre Gassendi based on a letter from Guy Patin. In this letter he describes “unguarded and open discussion among intimates” as une débauche philosophique, and does not refer to any alcoholic or sensual excess. The early seventeenth century meaning of libertin refers to intellectual freedom in the tradition of Rabelais and Montaigne, not the licentiousness with which it later came to be associated. Later biographers have found no evidence of any immoral or amoral behaviour. J.S. Spink. French Free Thought from Gassendi to Voltaire (London: Athlone Press, 1960), 16–17.


146. This point is made by d’Angers in “J. Du Bosc, Sénèque et le Stoicisme, 374–6.


148. Le philosophe indifférent, II:1179.

149. Chesneau, “Un précurseur de Pascal?” 447.

150. The popularity and impact of The Book of the Courtier is evident from the publication record. From it’s first publication in 1528 to 1713 there were nearly sixty Italian editions, as well as translations in the major European languages and into Latin. J. H. Whitfield, Introduction, The Courtier, v.


152. Nicholas Faret, L’honneste homme ou l’Art de plaire à la Cour (1630) édition critique M. Magendie (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires, 1925). The popularity of the book is shown by its numerous reprintings: fifteen times between 1630 and 1681, though there is no indication of how large each print run was.

154. “L’humanisme chrétien est plus spéculatif que pratique, plus aristocratique que populaire; il cherche d’abord le vrai et le beau plutôt que le saint, il s’adresse à l’élite plutôt qu’à la foule. Ces deux traits le distinguent de l’humanisme dévot. Celui-ci en effet est avant tout une école de sainteté personnelle... Philothée n’aurait compris ni Pic de la Mirandole, ni Sadolet, ni Molina; elle pourra comprendre François de Sales.”

“Christian humanism is more speculative than practical, more aristocratic than popular. It seeks first the true and the beautiful rather than the holy; it addresses the élite rather than the masses. These two traits distinguish it from devout humanism. The latter (devout humanism) is above all a school of personal holiness ... Philothée would have understood neither Pico Mirandola nor Sadolet, nor Molina; she will be able to understand François de Sales.” Henri Bremond, *Histoire Littéraire du Sentiment Religieux en France* (Paris: Librairie Bloud et Gay, 1935), I:17.

155. Vincent de Paul (1581–1660) was born of a peasant family and entered minor orders in 1596. He was tutor to the Gondi family for a time before renouncing his prebends and going to the parish of Châtillon. There he began his ministry to the poor that eventually spread over France. He founded the Daughters of Charity, the Lazarists, and the first seminaries for the education of the clergy in 1642.

Chapter Three

Grace as a Philosophical Virtue: Le Philosophe indifferent

Central to understanding the intricacies of authority in Early Modern France is the relationship between the physical world (expressed by politics and social systems) and the intellectual and metaphysical world (expressed by theological and philosophical systems). Religious observances, most often understood through the ritual of worship, address primarily the material expression of faith, that is, external observances. To address the deeper level of religious sensibility in Catholic France, the theological and philosophical assertions that underlie these observances must be carefully accounted for. There are distinct difficulties in assessing motivations just as there are in assessing religious sensibilities. Can we assume in Du Bosc’s case that his social and political orientation informed his intellectual understanding of the concept of authority, or is the reverse a more acceptable hypothesis? The answer to this question will shape our understanding of Du Bosc as an individual, of how we perceive his writings, and how his perception of authority is to be understood. In Le Philosophe indifferent Du Bosc provides the modern reader with the means of addressing this question, for he argues over the course of two major books (amounting to approximately 1200 pages) that the only means of avoiding the various one-sided, partial, and sometimes contradictory views of religion, philosophy, society, or morality is to develop a more integrated view in which the organic, interrelated but relatively self-determining significance of each sphere can emerge. He does this by pointing to the primacy of grace, though not as a dominating, so much as an enabling force in natural life, a force which allows the deeper significance of ordinary things to emerge. While this may well be
inherently problematic for a modern reader, it is nonetheless Du Bosc's contention that his notion of grace and its relation to nature only emerges with clarity in this context.

The previous chapter served to contextualize Du Bosc within a variety of interlocking structures and argued that each of these structures affected the transactions and perceptions of the others. To arrive at an understanding of exactly how these structures related to one another and to determine more precisely the specific links between them, it is necessary to examine each component structure through the eyes of Du Bosc himself. This we propose to do in the present and subsequent chapters, starting from the intellectual foundations of Du Bosc's thought and moving from there to his treatments of the other structures.

An immediate question presents itself, however: why should we choose *Le Philosophe indifférent* to start our analysis if it is not first in the chronological order? It might be more reasonable to start with the earlier and highly popular *L'Honneste femme*. The reason is that *Le Philosophe indifférent* provides a basic overview of the major elements in Du Bosc's thought, since it includes, first, an elementary philosophy of history and, second, an extensive treatment of all the major elements of society, which Du Bosc takes up on a less comprehensive basis in other works. Why should *Le Philosophe indifférent* be of interest to the historian? *Le Philosophe indifférent* is a significant work not because of the originality or effectiveness of its major thesis, but rather because it provides (almost despite itself) a definite insight into what Du Bosc took to be a common understanding in his own time. Du Bosc's purpose is to develop a new method of philosophy which will avoid the extremes of what he calls "sects," that is, narrow philosophical or religious viewpoints. He calls this a reduction of sects and claims that the project is original to him. Du Bosc uses the word transcendent in this context specifically to describe his approach. He likens his method to the discovery of still more general and transcendent truths upon which derivative truths depend as "comme entre les veritez, il y en a de plus generales & de transcendantes, desquelles comme des premieres sources, toutes les autres dépendent..." and he proposes "l'Art de reduire les Sectes avec un ordre tout nouveau aux deux Sectes
les plus generales, comme à deux Genres les plus transcendants."

In order to establish as strong a foundation as possible for what he took to be the original side of the project he sets out, first, in Book I, to present a common ground of understanding, that is, what is essentially a commonly accepted view of the relationship between nature and grace. In his understanding, grace is the organizing principle of intellectual and spiritual life and by this understanding, he argues, one may escape many narrow viewpoints to arrive at a broader and more realistic view of the relations between nature and grace or, in other words, between the social, moral, political, philosophical and religious spheres. Philosophy gives truth mediately by means of reason, whereas the Gospels give truth directly or immediately, and grace enables this immediacy.

Je dis immediatement, parce que ce qui vient immediatement de ses mains, a toujours plus de vigueur, plus de pureté, & plus de perfection, mesme pour les choses corporelles...

His focus throughout is not upon a comprehensive account of devotional life as such nor upon mystical experience, but rather upon salvation history. Though pagan philosophy and morals are admirable in many respects, they are incomplete without Christian Revelation.

Voila comme on rehausse en toutes façons la Morale des Payens en la reduisant à la Morale Chrestienne, dans laquelle on voit esclatter avec tant de lustre cette Reine des vertus, j’entens la Charité, dont la fin & la princepe estant d’un ordre surnaturel, elle purifie & annoblit tous les Ouvrages de la Nature.

This chapter will argue that while Du Bosc’s supposed new comprehensive philosophy does not succeed in achieving its aim and should indeed be regarded as his own invention, the initial foundations upon which the project is built can reasonably be supposed to provide us with a world-view which clearly represents common opinions.

*Le Philosophe indifferent*, then, provides a clear exposition of Du Bosc’s philosophical position that nature is intimately linked to grace, which in turn provides a foundation for a theological understanding of nature.
... si l'on doit soumettre la Philosophie à la Foy, c'est sur tout pour ces raisons suivantes. La première, parce que la Foy donne une nourriture plus solide à l'âme que la Philosophie; la grace remplissant mieux, s'il faut ainsi dire, notre insatiabilité, que la Nature. La seconde, parce que la Foy montre mieux la dernière fin, et la souverain bien, nous donnant de plus belles & de plus fermes espérances que la Philosophie. La troisième, parce que si on compare la Philosophie à la Foy, l'une est sterile & sans effet, cependant que l'autre est féconde, mais d'une fécondité surnaturelle. La quatrième, parce que la Foy agit plus divinement que la Philosophie; la Foy fait des prodiges & des miracles, cependant que la Philosophie ne produit que des fantômes & des Prestiges.  

So emphatic is Du Bosc in insisting that the effects of grace appear in all areas of life (note the emphasis upon the activity of grace and faith in the above passage) that later in the book he will argue that there is a natural progression from the effect of grace to the development of honnêteté, which is in turn reflected by both manners and deportment.

Before describing and assessing the work itself, however, it is necessary to develop some appreciation of the intellectual environment to provide a context for understanding _Le Philosophe indifférent_. Du Bosc wrote in a period of intense intellectual ferment. The increasing interest in providing a political philosophy that would support the crown's claim of authority, the Counter-reformation refinement of neo-scholasticism, and the articulation of science as a realm of study distinct from philosophy, all contributed to a lively and sometimes fractious intellectual environment. Stoicism and other alternative understandings of the universe and man's place within it had prompted a number of speculative treatises in the early seventeenth century. Many of these alternative views were developed by the libertins. Concurrent with these developments, and linked in many ways, was the work of contemporary thinkers who were developing new philosophical paradigms. Perhaps the most arresting were those by Cyrano de Bergerac, who adopted the philosophical novel as a form which allowed him to dismiss contemporary concerns and standards and provided a fresh perspective on contemporary problems. He is often thought of as the stereotypical libertin for his rejection of traditional thinking and his open espousal of atheism.

While de Bergerac may have caught the imagination of many, the work of René
Descartes (1596–1650) was to have much more profound effects. An approximate contemporary of Du Bosc, Descartes was born in Touraine, and educated by Jesuits at Laflèche. He was a mathematician who devised new systems of algebraic notation and originated analytical geometry. Often thought of as the founder of Rationalism, and of the anticlericalism which that movement engendered, Descartes was in fact a devout Catholic and probably did not foresee the effect of the dualism inherent in his methodology. One of his most profound works was the *Discours de la méthode* (1637) which both articulated what has come to be known as the scientific method and applied it to philosophy. He was initially urged by Bérulle to develop a system whereby absolute certainty might provide a basis for knowledge. In the *Discours* he established a method based upon immediate introspection which provides indubitable evidence (at least on his own claim) by means of a chain of reasoning, first, that the self, God, mathematical essences, and material things exist; and, second, that the self or the soul is primary and unextended, while the body is secondary and extended in space. Descartes' famous axiom, *Cogito ergo sum*, is the foundation of his system. From this "clear idea" of his own existence, he went on to postulate, on the basis of a mathematical series of reasoning modeled on geometry, the existence of God and that of matter. The Cartesian method was enormously influential in both philosophy and political theory and this is evident in the writings of political theorists and philosophers, such as Spinoza and Locke.

The rejection of traditional self-evident truths in favour of a new notion of self-evidence grounded in subjectivity, and the rejection of tradition as sufficient grounds for truth were to have a massive effect on later thinkers. The radical new subjectivity of Cartesian thought also informed the *philosophes* who questioned the Church and who had a significant influence on eighteenth-century secular society. Though Descartes himself had no such intention, his method contributed to the destruction of the Ancien Régime. Although we have no evidence to determine whether or not Du Bosc actually read Descartes before the writing of *Le Philosophe indifferant*, it is reasonable to assume that Du Bosc was aware
of the debate engendered by the appearance of the *Discours*.$^{25}$

It is important to place the effect of Descartes’ thinking in its chronological order. Although the *Discours* appeared in 1637, it was not accepted by the universities in France until the last years of the century, for in 1625 the Parlement of Paris banned the teaching of any new philosophies and the ban was renewed by the King in 1671.$^{26}$ This does not mean, however, that the ideas of Descartes were not current among the *libertins*. Descartes was a participant in the intellectual life of the time, for he was a friend of Mersenne and acted as an intermediary among many of the *gens de lettres*.$^{27}$ However, as Pintard points out in his analysis of the relationship between Descartes and Gassendi, “[i]es deux philosophes ne parlent pas la même langue; et ils ne s’entendent, quand ils raisonnent ni sur la méthode, ni sur les prémisses.”$^{28}$ It is evident that any debate between these thinkers can not be easily generalized to represent a single *libertin* view, for Gassendi and Descartes were only two among many who were labelled *libertins*, and there were as many variations upon these philosophies as there were participants. It is difficult to classify the *libertins*, for there were neither prescribed nor proscribed beliefs associated with them. The epithet *libertin* is applied to a wide variety of people. Marin Mersenne, a Minorite Friar, was a mathematician and *epistolier* who corresponded with scholars all over Europe.$^{29}$ While he accepted Galileo’s conclusions, for example, he was at the same time quite distinct from the free-thinking of Cyrano de Bergerac.$^{30}$ The best definition is perhaps that of J.S. Spink:

> What made the academic *libertin* was the fact that he was a scholar, an erudite, with a full share of *libido scienti*. He coupled a pronounced interest in what was strange and unaccepted belief in the intellectual world, with a noticeable inaptitude for belief, religious or other.$^{11}$

The immediate impact of the *libertins*, despite the intensity of their analysis and criticism of society, was confined to a fairly limited group.$^{32}$ In this context, Du Bosc’s view is one among many specifically in opposition to the *libertins* and their predominant scepticism. *Le Philosophe indifferen* appeared in 1643, then, six years after the *Discours*, quite possibly in opposition to Descartes’ new method or at least to the philosophical spirit
of unrest associated with the new philosophy, which appears to subvert traditional holistic metaphysics in favour of subjectivity.

Du Bosc, as an observer of the discussions of the libertins, though not a full participant in them, provides a bridge between the libertins and more traditional approaches. The defense of traditional Christian analysis presented in Le Philosophe indifferent, founded on tradition and revelation, can be seen as a reaction to libertinism as well as a defense of what he thought to be a new approach to the assessment of the authority of a variety of philosophies.\textsuperscript{33} Although Du Bosc was acquainted with some of the libertins, there is no indication of any real level of intimacy with this group, for other than the letters from Patru there is no correspondence.\textsuperscript{34} It is apparent, however, from his anti-Jansenist works dealing specifically with the notions of nature and grace, that though he may have questioned much, his commitment to constituted authority was unswerving.

In 1648 Du Bosc published Books I and II of what was planned to be a four volume philosophical treatise that explores the concepts of nature, of grace, the relationship between knowledge and revelation and the impact of these notions on indifférence.\textsuperscript{35} Only three volumes were published. In many ways this work establishes a foundation on which his later arguments against the Jansenists are set. His previous works follow the acceptable literary formula of the day by using comparisons and references to classical literature and scripture.\textsuperscript{36} In Le Philosophe indifferent he tried to clarify and disentangle what he thought to be spurious definitions and methods of philosophy and establish a means of reconciliation.\textsuperscript{37} In doing this he attempted to steer a middle course between the rejection of tradition, on the one hand, and undue observance of tradition, on the other.\textsuperscript{38} Quite possibly to avoid immediate identification of the two contemporary groups, he uses the ancient pagan archetypes of scepticism and stoicism to represent the paradigmatic extremes to which religion and philosophical thought perennially fall victim (as will Hegel much later — in 1804 — in his Phenomenology of Spirit).\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Le Philosophe indifferent} is, briefly, an analysis of how pagan philosophies have been
corrupted by later thinkers (including Du Bosc's contemporaries) with a view to discredit Christianity. Du Bosc undertook to assess pagan philosophies anew from a position of detachment, or *indifférence*. The three books open and conclude with a rejection of both dogmatism, which enervates faith by emphasising rigid external observances, and pyrrhonism, which undermines a faith based on tradition, revelation and nature and substitutes a faith based solely on self-determining reason. Du Bosc does not mean to deny a reasonable dogma nor to evade a balanced scepticism, but rather to argue the necessity of detachment that results in a renewed commitment to revelation and reason. In his view, both dogmatism and scepticism are just different forms of partiality or radical subjectivity that result in “des factieux et des partisans.” Consequently, he adopts the central doctrine of both philosophies, namely *ataraxia*, or detachment for the Stoics, and *ataraxia* or *epoché*, suspension of belief or of commitment, for the Sceptics, and argues for a more comprehensive notion of detachment or *indifférence* in order to provide a less partial picture of the world.

At first reading Du Bosc's approach may seem to resemble that of Descartes, for he opens his treatment with the following:

... la division Reguliere & Methodique, qui éclaircit & qui démesle toute chose: & non pas cette Division broûlée de plusieurs, qui ne fait en subdivisant trop, que des Dedales & des Labyrintes. Je divise donc ce Philosophe en quatre parties, chaque Partie en Plusieurs Traitez & les Traitez en Raisonnemens...  

However, despite appearances, the above introductory passage is not simply a reflective echo of Descartes' own method; for by contrast with Descartes' new emphasis on geometry, Du Bosc clearly imitates a traditional, perhaps even Platonic “division” of an organic whole into its articulated parts. Unlike Descartes, therefore, who starts with the soul or self, Du Bosc starts implicitly with an organic body. The work deals respectively with the distinctions between *la lumière naturelle* and *la lumière revelée*, the principles of *indifférence*, and the stance of *indifférence* as a means of assessing various schools of philosophy. Each book, or treatise, is followed by a series of *raisonnements*, or rationales
that support the arguments.

In the first treatise Du Bosc argues that the perception that Christian doctrine undermines pre-Christian philosophy is erroneous; in fact, he argues, the opposite is true. In this analysis of the hierarchies of truth, he asserts that there are three levels of such truths. At the most basic level is the *parole muette* of creation, understood as Natural Law. The written words of Moses and the prophets form the second rank, that is, the law of the Patriarchs of the Old Testament. The highest rank is that of the incarnation of Christ, *la Loy de Grace*.45

He further identifies three aspects of the science of reason: natural truth, theological truth and moral truth, and asserts that the end of all philosophy is to conserve these three truths. In his view, Christian philosophy accomplishes or perfects pagan philosophy in the sense that it not only corrects its faults and partialities but also brings into focus its real structure and hidden possibilities. In other words, Christian philosophy naturally corrects the limited, partial viewpoints of pre-Christian thinking. How does Du Bosc argue for this view? His argument depends upon the recognition of a variety of truths embedded in different archetypal theologies (e.g. natural, Mosaic, and Christian) and an analysis of the relationship between nature and grace. In the first place, he argues for three sorts of theology arranged hierarchically and chronologically, but ultimately unified in the most comprehensive. Natural theology, for example, is accessible to everyone, although it points to the author of nature only in a mute or hidden way.

_La Theologie naturelle est cette connaissance des Philosophes, qui fait une partie de la Philosophie; & qui a dire vray, n'est qu'une Theologie fort deffectueuse, comme nous le ferons voir en suite_.48

By contrast, Mosaic theology is more comprehensive in so far as it points to the author and giver of nature (that is the creator in the sense of the giver or 'grace' of nature), but still in a hidden way, namely, under the veil of symbols or figures (in scripture).
La Theologie Mosaïque est cette mesme connaissance d'un Dieu, qui a esté revelée; mais seulement revelée dans les tenebres, dans des figures, & dans des ombres...

Finally, Christian theology concerns both the author of nature and grace, but now in his own person, teaching, miracles, etc. as an animating word or *logos*. Christian theology is the only one that is perfect

... ayant esté enseignée par la Sagesse mesme, mais a découvert, le voile de Temple estant rompu, toute choses estant consommées & achevées en Jesus Christ.

In other words, the progression from natural to Christian theology is a progression in which an implicit gift of meaningful, intelligible existence already inscribed in nature becomes fully explicit in what is for Du Bosc simultaneously a more comprehensive and yet more immediate sense of reality as a whole. Each level of “nature” (that is, “the natural condition,” i.e. trees, animals, etc. as well as developed manners and mores, science, etc.) is a visible articulation of grace which remains implicit, in the sense that for Du Bosc everything in “nature” is implicitly a “given” or “gift” of a creator, and each level is perfected and enlarged in the higher perspective of grace.

What does Du Bosc mean by “grace”? Grace retains its primary significance of ‘gift,’ ‘thankfulness,’ ‘beauty,’ ‘purity,’ and ‘extraordinary gesture’ for Du Bosc, as a glance at his usage of the term both here and in his works on women will attest, as we shall see below. Du Bosc defines grace in his works in several ways for like his contemporaries he used the word in at least two distinct ways depending on the context. In some passages grace describes the refinement and elegance demanded in polite society. In other passages grace is used to describe the endowment of divine benefaction. Though he uses the word in different senses, these senses are not mutually exclusive. The opening letter to his first influential work, *L'Honneste Femme*, identifies qualities he admires:

... parce que celles qu'on dépeint adjoutent de jour en jour à leur beaute de nouvelles graces et de nouveaux charmes.
In the same work he devotes a chapter to *la bonne Grace*, and here grace has a different, more developed connotation:

... la beauté du corps dépend en quelque chose de celle de l’esprit, & que les loix de la bonne grace sont attachées à celles de la Morale.53

In the *advertissement* to the same work he further enlarges the definition by incorporating *honnêteté*54 and placing the formation of cultured women within the domain of piety and devotion:

... il est impossible absolument parmy nous, de faire une Honnestre Femme sans la Religion Christienne. Il est impossible de faire une Honnestre Femme d’une indevote.55

The same variance in interpretation is found in those works that address theological and ethical matters. In *Le Philosophe indifferen* he states as his primary premise the necessity of grace in the actualization and development of Nature, and in the development of intelligence:

... la Grace ne détruit pas la Nature, mais ... elle la perfectionne & l’anoblit: .... il est entierement impossible que la lumiere de l’intelligence, de laquelle toute la Philosophe depend, soit choquee ou aneantie par la lumiere revelée, sur laquelle toute la Religion est fondée.56

While he accepts *la Nature humaine*, he does so explicitly because of its integral union with and relative dependence upon *la Nature Divine*. This premise of the implicit presence of grace not only in nature as such but also in human understanding and will is made most clear in his works on Jansenism. Central to the argument of Jansenism is the function of grace and in these works he attempts to define the word itself:

...la Grace n’est autre chose, qu’une clarté ou une lumiere dans l’entendement, et une pieuse affection ou un mouvement dans la Volonté, pour porter les hommes à observer les Commandemens, et mesme à suivre les Conseils Evangeliques.57
The variety of understandings and the nuances of grace would not have been lost on the reader, for the concept and function of grace was so well understood and so integral to seventeenth-century French life that to define it was thought unnecessary. Du Bosc was more concerned with illustrating the effects of grace than with defining the notion itself (at least in *Le Philosophe indifferent*) assuming as he did, that his readers would understand the concept without explanation.

In this Du Bosc is echoing the approach of the edicts of the Council of Trent (1545–63) which do not define grace specifically. The Council, in an attempt to establish doctrine, clarified the source of grace (which is derived through the merit of Christ’s passion), the purpose of grace (which enables the believer to choose salvation), and the means of communicating grace (which comes through the intercession of the Holy Ghost).  

For Du Bosc the propositions that communication with God was possible, that revelation was a legitimate source for directing one’s life, and that the strength to act on this direction was forthcoming in the form of grace, were not open to debate. These propositions seem to have been integral to his life and his belief. Though grace itself was, and is, difficult to define in rational terms, this did not diminish belief in its reality. Grace was not, therefore, the obscure or elusive element it has since become but rather an active, though mystical, force.

In Book I of *Le Philosophe indifferent* grace signifies something more than just beauty, for it serves as a principle which animates all intelligent life, not simply Catholic religious observance. Although grace is directly a gift of God and indeed a sharing in the life of God (according to traditional Catholic theology from Augustine to De Sales), for Du Bosc grace is an intelligible principle which immediately founds and empowers directly all natural life. Thus Du Bosc presents grace as a power which moves all things, on the one hand, but also as an internal principle of intelligibility which illuminates and draws out the capacities of things from within themselves, on the other, that is, a principle which makes things capable of being understood, being attractive, true, good, etc. Therefore, while in
the scholastic terms of Du Bosc’s understanding the soul animates the body, grace as the immediate gift of God actualizes the capacity to live a more developed life, however rudimentary.\textsuperscript{62} It organizes the moral, social, intellectual and spiritual landscapes in the light of the most comprehensive and authoritative view of reality, which is for Du Bosc Christian theology but only in so far as it reflects the true nature of God.\textsuperscript{63} According to this understanding, one has little idea of what nature is at all until one sees nature in the added light of divine intelligibility (namely la lumière relevée). What Du Bosc has in mind here is not the reduction of divinity to a bland religious sameness, but apparently the opposite, namely the attempt to develop the often hidden potential for individual identity. A larger light is needed, he argues, to bring out the potential significance of things in a way which frees them from partiality. This larger light is the light of so called revelation, which Du Bosc places in “une Hierarchie naturelle des lumieres.”\textsuperscript{64} It is a light which allows the mind to go beyond outward appearances to the different realms of ‘truth’ (morality, science, philosophy, theology etc.).\textsuperscript{65} Du Bosc sees this light as a reality permitting the understanding and development of science, enabling movement beyond one’s own egoistic, sectarian, or physical viewpoint to an understanding which can be shared — at least in principle — in common. Grace, therefore, for Du Bosc is the direct and immediate means of forsaking amour propre\textsuperscript{66} in favour of an objective amour, genuinely equal to other people’s real needs and to a scientific view of the world. Of course, he sees this as Divine, but he also views it (however optimistically) as a scientific, empirical reality.\textsuperscript{67} In fact, he terms the optimistic scientific movement from the part to the whole a “reduction” and means thereby not a reduction or elimination of diversity in our sense, but a reunion\textsuperscript{68} or enlargement of focus in which the identity of individual sciences, theologies, sects, etc., together with their failings, emerges.\textsuperscript{69} The reason for this last view appears to be based upon a hidden Aristotelian teleological view, namely, the view that one cannot adequately know what an organism is until one sees the full course of its development or, in other words, its mature holistic form.\textsuperscript{70} In Christian theology, according to Du Bosc, natural and Mosaic theolo-
gies find their proper forms as part of a connected, integral development, just as for Du Bosc the presence of grace gives strength, purity, and perfection even to corporeal things.71

At first glance this 'immediacy' appears to be utterly unfounded. How can grace, an apparently incorporeal principle, have a strengthening effect upon corporeal things? Du Bosc bases his theory upon the traditional Christian distinction between two states of nature, 'created' nature before the fall and 'engendered' nature after the fall which is, as it were, subject to the cumulative effect of many subsequent years of transmitted deterioration.72 For Du Bosc, grace is more immediate for the deeper potentialities of human physical nature than is merely engendered nature, because created nature is the direct gift of God in its entirety without intermediary. It is in this sense that Du Bosc emphasizes time and time again that grace does not abolish nature but rather perfects it.73 Under the unimpeded effect of its original organizing principle, even the human physical organism is invigorated, according to Du Bosc.74 This understanding, as we have seen, he also applies to a comprehensive scientific view of the world and to the relation of different theologies along the lines of a fairly rudimentary philosophy of history.75 For Du Bosc, then, grace is an immediate, practical, and comprehensive organizing principle which makes human spiritual and intelligent life possible just as the soul makes physical life possible. Moreover, Du Bosc thinks that this principle has been progressively revealed throughout the course of history, although for him it is the original ground of any life at all.

What sort of view is Du Bosc presenting in Book I? Is this only his own reading of a particular theology or does it adequately represent a commonly held view and if so, how sophisticated a view is it? Of interest for Du Bosc's view of the comparison between pagan and Christian lives is his interpretation of this grace as Lady Wisdom who appears to Boethius in the Consolation of Philosophy as more new and yet more ancient, more down-to-earth and yet more extraordinary than anything merely mortal — in a word, more comprehensive of opposites or extremes (a favourite theme of Du Bosc).
Her look filled me with awe; her burning eyes penetrated more deeply than those of ordinary men; her complexion was fresh with an ever lively bloom, yet she seemed so ancient that none would think her of our time. It was difficult to say how tall she might be, for at one time she seemed to confine herself to the ordinary measure of man, and at another the crown of her head touched the heavens; and when she lifted her head higher yet, she penetrated the heavens themselves, and was lost to the sight of man.  

Du Bosc cites this very passage in the margin: *pulsare coelum summi verticis cacumine videatur.*  

In Boethius, no Christian motifs appear and so a fair inference from Du Bosc’s allusion would seem to be that we should not think in terms of different dispensations when we speak of three theologies, but rather of epochs hierarchically ordered and embraced *ab initio* (from the beginning) by a grace or bloom which is simultaneously older and yet younger than all, or in other words both more sensual and yet transcendent of everything, since it reaches already to everything created before anything is engendered.

Consequently, the concrete down-to-earth immediacy of divine grace is one of Du Bosc’s fundamental axioms. God’s power literally provides the power for ordinary action, as in Aquinas.  

And Du Bosc himself situates this understanding constantly in the tradition of Boethius, Gregory the Great, Augustine and Aquinas principally.  

From the point of the view of the authorities Du Bosc cites, then, he clearly intends to present a generally accessible and commonly accepted traditional understanding of the relations between grace and nature.

Granted, then, that the presentation of Book I may purport to be a common understanding of the matter, how sophisticated a view is it? What is striking about *Le Philosophe indifferent* is the absence of any sophisticated theological and philosophical distinctions concerning the nature of grace (e.g. habitual, sufficient, cooperative, actual, etc.), some of which distinctions he later draws conspicuously in the anti-Jansenist works. Nor does Du Bosc limit himself here to the domain of theology, as he will later. What are we to make of this? We may suppose either that he lacks the necessary sophistication of thought or that his purpose here is different, given the evidence of the late works, or both. On the basis of
all the available evidence, it would seem better to suppose that his purpose is to avoid complexity in favour of accessibility and simplicity of thought in order to reach as wide an audience as possible. The central thrust of the whole work, then, is to develop not an exclusively theological viewpoint but rather a popular philosophical understanding which can appeal to the best instincts of the widest group of readers. What we find then in Book I of *Le Philosophe indifferant* is not a theological presentation of the doctrine of grace, but a much more bland notion which looks as if it was intended to be immediately acceptable to everybody on a general intellectual level. The very lack of sophistication then may be taken as additional evidence for the unexceptional nature of the views presented in Book I. Du Bosc sets the common foundations for a scientific method which will enable him to bring theology, philosophy, as well as nature and grace, together. His approach is unlike the scientific method of Bacon and others, which tended to split "natural" empirical science from "mystical" theology. It is also unlike that of Descartes, which tended to divorce soul or spirit from nature or the body. For Du Bosc, "theology" and "nature" should be seen together according to his realist transcendental view of created nature as opposed to engendered nature.

This thesis is further confirmed by the subsequent two books of *Le Philosophe indifferant*. In Books II and III he adopts a posture of *indifférence* as a means of assessing the validity of both pagan and Christian philosophies. *Indifférence* as he defines it is not mediocrity in the sense of unexceptional or average performance as it has come to mean in English, but "une mesure universellement nécessaire à l'homme." This is, in Du Bosc's understanding, a removal of oneself from the two extremes of dogmatism and scepticism. The *philosophe indifferant* is objective,

... n'estant infecté ny de l'une de l'autre [extremité]; & par consequent estant plus capable de les purifier & de les pacifier. Il n'est *Indifférent* entre ces deux extremitez, qu'asfin qu'en se retirant de l'une et de l'autre, il soit entierement desinteressé pour toutes deux; & qu'en suite il se rende plus justement leur Reconciliateur & leur Critique. C'est a quoy bute nostre Indifférence.
In order to achieve this philosophical standpoint of *indifférence*, Du Bosc examines a series of philosophical schools: epicurean,\(^{43}\) platonic,\(^{44}\) cynic,\(^{45}\) and pyrrhonist.\(^{46}\) Each is found wanting, principally because it lacks the Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity that are the fruit of grace and the foundation of the two higher ranks of theology and law (Mosaic and Christian).\(^{47}\) The variations of how each school of philosophy defines God and the debates between the various philosophies are held as proof that they are confused, ‘mute’ or not properly articulated and, consequently, unable to identify ultimate truths as such.\(^{48}\) Du Bosc defines *indifférence* as “un éloignement de deux extrémités, un tempérément entre le trop et le trop peu, une médiocrité qui purifie et qui pacifie l’excès et le défaut des affectateurs et des sectaires.”\(^{49}\) At this point the major goal of the work becomes clear. Du Bosc’s method is essentially the attempt to avoid a partial view or views of what he believes should be a shared universe and to discover a coherent perspective accessible to everyone from which (a) a coherent philosophy of history (albeit in the light of Christianity) can readily appear and (b) a more comprehensive view of the interlocking science of the educational and moral excellences, and of the political, social, and moral spheres, as well as of the basic civic virtues and *mores*, can be developed.

There is a further element to this which relates to the thesis of the whole work (viz. that the true *ataraxia* or *epoché* of the Christian philosopher is to assume the dynamic authoritative viewpoint which avoids the extremes of stoic or sceptic *ataraxia*): grace is the element or principle which alone can unite all the virtues and transform the space of the lived moral landscape into a unified, organized *magnanimité* or greatness of soul.\(^{50}\) Du Bosc therefore argues that the pagans could achieve only “the idea of magnanimity” which the Stoic sage proclaims to be the unity of all the virtues acting in accordance with their principle.\(^{51}\) But pagan philosophy is sterile and stoic *indifférence* really only yields “dead virtues,” because they are not animated by love.\(^{52}\) As in the case of the tree of life or the Tivoli, the great discovery of Christianity, or rather the reality of Christianity, in Du Bosc’s view, is that there is in human life a higher, but empirical, form of organic life; the moral,
intellectual, and spiritual life is not a heap of virtues in imitation, but an organism animated by grace. Grace therefore is the real basis of any unified truly human experience; ergo, Christian magnanimité is the organic, empirical foundation of truly human life. Therefore, only through a Christian philosophy, Du Bosc holds, is authorship properly revealed. Grace reveals authorship and by doing so, permits the different realms of authority both in the sciences and in political life to have their own relative but interrelated autonomy. Again, the natural light is not obliterated in the divine light, but is rather perfected.

This comprehensive view of a philosophy of history is not achieved without a hidden price. What is curious about this conception is the genuine contradiction which the modern reader will detect at the root of Du Bosc’s transcendental reduction. The whole purpose of Du Bosc’s work is ostensibly to avoid the blinkers of a partial or sectarian position. For this reason he presents a common and popular view of philosophy in Book I. However, in Book III the solution he proposes offers at best a sham coherence because Du Bosc effectively extrapolates his philosophy from the Aristotelian and Thomistic theory of moral excellence and then applies this, by means of the stoic and sceptic notion of epoché (that is suspension of judgement or impartiality), to every sphere of reality. Aristotle, for example, insists that moral excellence is not a question of rules or absolutes but of intelligent habits whose successful development, while different in the case of different individuals, nonetheless depends upon the avoidance of extremes (i.e. excess and defect) in every case. Intelligent sensibility to circumstances, to one’s own psychological make-up, and to the different, but related needs of other people, in order to avoid extremes of excess and defect (both of which are vices for Aristotle) are essential elements of both Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ theory of moral excellence. However, the Aristotelian tradition equally insists that different sciences require different methodologies and different criteria for determining truth. What works in one sphere cannot and should not work in another. The theory of moral excellence, and the avoidance of excess and defect which goes with it, should not, therefore, be made to apply in Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ views to everything. Consequently, Du
Bosc’s application of an essentially moral theory to a popular theologico-philosophical understanding of the whole of reality is an application of a process which neither Aristotle nor Aquinas could approve, for it smacks of an unwarranted reductionism foreign to what is essentially a more flexible understanding of the different sciences in Aristotelian thought.

We can determine, therefore, both that this transcendental reduction is most likely to be an idiosyncratic invention which unfortunately reflects the quality of Du Bosc’s own intellect and that it is a failure even on the terms on which it is predicated. Nonetheless, the failure of what is clearly the major innovative strategy in the work provides yet further evidence that Book I presents a world-view not of Du Bosc’s own making. The lack of sophistication, the repetitiveness of the major theses, and the extrapolation of a principle from its proper sphere to be the hegemonic principle of all science is strong evidence that there is nothing really original in the work beyond the surely laudable aim to help people of different persuasions to see the unity of a common, shared project in the whole of created nature.

However, both the positive side of this attempt and its limitations can also be seen in the derivative theses of the latter part of the work. Du Bosc’s aim is one of philosophical reconciliation accessible not only to philosophers or theologians but to everyone. Consequently, in Book III after completing (at great length) the transcendental reduction of sects, he takes up both indirectly and directly the question of authority, and simultaneously extends the question of the need for comprehensive balance between dogmatism and scepticism to the holistic unity of the sciences and virtues as well as the civic virtues. In this section too he develops a new view (i.e. new to this work) of the organic magnaminité of all derived and dependent virtues, such as the habits, demeanour and deportment of ordinary life. It is, therefore, part of Du Bosc’s own complex thesis that the principle of grace has to be extended inclusively to all forms of human behaviour if behaviour is to be meaningful both in and beyond itself, that is, if behaviour is to be civilized in an integrated way. Crucial to this understanding is Du Bosc’s emphasis upon the cultivation of the “right
judgement" or proper contextualized mentalité in his treatment of authority, and its relation to the sciences and virtues. In what follows I shall briefly take up the question of right judgement and authority and then conclude by linking this with Du Bosc's treatment of the sciences, virtues and, finally the mores of ordinary life.

Central to Le Philosophe indifférent is what Du Bosc calls the criterium or principle of judgement by which authority is to be determined. Here Du Bosc adopts the pre-Christian philosophical idea that the criterium for judgement must be capable of discerning both good and bad, correct and deformed, since it is by virtue of the canonical that one is able to discern the derivative, deviant or imperfect. Consequently, one needs only one major canon to determine the diversity of experience. Again, he goes on to develop an understanding of this criterium in distinctly Aristotelian terms. The criterium involved in Du Bosc's méthode is an intellectual habit as well as an art of judging between the "too much" and the "too little" and such judgements are essential for the proper conduct of natural, human life. Throughout the later pages of Le Philosophe indifférent Du Bosc frequently (and almost exclusively) cites Aristotle, which is a strong indication that he is here readapting the Aristotelian determinative rule, rational principle, or logos, which guides successful practical action between extremes of excess and defect, according to Aristotle in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics. In Du Bosc's account, however, as we have seen, this criterium is not restricted to moral excellence, or virtue, but is extended to everything:

Qu'on examine maintenant quel est l'estendué de nostre Criterium ou Discernement; qu'on voye à combien de choses nostre Methode est necessaire, qu'on parcoure tous ces Arts l'un aprés l'autre; Qu'en examine l'Histoire, la Grammaire, la Rhetorique et d'autres semblables; qu'on voye toutes sortes de connaissances.

Indeed, in order to extend this authoritative principle even beyond this to grammar, poetry, history, rhetoric and the productive arts, Du Bosc insists that his principle, unlike that of Aristotle, is a supreme criterion, or as he terms it "Hypercritique." Not only does it extend to all the arts and sciences, but to the particular things (not just universal notions)
comprised under these disciplines. In this sense, he views this apparently theological principle to be a pragmatic principle also of the practical intelligence:

Savoir les choses universelles, c'est savoir tout, puisque toutes les choses particulières y sont contenus et comme enveloppées.\textsuperscript{104}

Consequently, the transcendental reduction and the authoritative critique or \textit{criterium} embedded in it come to include “toutes sorts d'Ouvrages, soit des Arts liberaux ou mechaniques; tout ce que peut faire l'homme,\textsuperscript{105} and finally to demonstrate not only a knowledge of the “first principles” of nature and thought but also “... l'infaillibilité de l'Eglise, son authority, son abondonce, son unité, sa fermeté...”\textsuperscript{106} implicitly already demonstrated according to Du Bosc by a coterie of perhaps strange bedfellows: “Les Peres de l'Eglise, Salomon, Moïse, & Jesus Christ mesme” but without the “method” of Du Bosc himself (who appears thereby to have improved considerably on their primitive legacy).\textsuperscript{107}

In other words, the sphere of grace according to Du Bosc's account not only allows everything, universals and particular things, to be themselves, but also serves as the proper, supreme authority over all structures and dimensions of human life which ensures both their own relative authorities and the interlocking relationships between them.

Finally, just before the end of the three books, Du Bosc extends this notion of authority by means of grace so understood to the civic virtues themselves (thereby including implicitly \textit{l'honnêteté} or \textit{l'honnête homme}) and to all the ordinary circumstances of life, particularly manners, conversation, and commerce:

\begin{quote}
Sur tout nostre façon de Philosopher est necessaire pour toutes sortes de vertus Morales, non seulement pour ces quatre principales qu'ils appellant Cardinales; mais pour les autres qui en dépendent, & qui sont absolument requises pour la société & pour le comerce. La Civilité, l’Affabilité, la Courtoisie, la Conversation, la Complaisance, & les autres, ne sont alterées que par le trop & le trop peu; l’affectation corrompt tout: & nostre mediocrité & nostre temperament, sont necessaires dans toutes les circonstances de la Société & de la vie; je dis necessaires en tous les siecles. Viola comme nostre Method est utile en toutes choses & en tous les siecles, parce que quil y peut avoir de l’affectation en quoy que ce soit; à escrire, à parler, dans les sciences, & dans les vertus; dans la Philosophie, &
\end{quote}
This is an important passage, for it demonstrates that Du Bosc’s notion of grace and the transcendental reduction founded upon this are fundamental for his understanding of the ordinary, even apparently frivolous things in life. Unlike Descartes and Bacon, he appears to be convinced of the view that this common traditional understanding is the only way to link nature and the divine (soul and body, creation and the mechanical arts, etc.). The effective end of the whole work is to extend the philosophical-theological concerns of Book I to include not only the arts and sciences but also the minutiae of the apparently inconsequential circumstances of ordinary life. In this he clearly intends to reduce neither the “mundane” to the “divine” nor the “divine” to the “mundane” but to show the significance of each in the other.

It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose on several accounts that the world-view presented in all three books of *Le Philosophe indifferent* represents a popularized philosophical account of commonly held opinions among generally educated people of the time, though presented with impressive philosophical dexterity. This world-view conspicuously includes the theory that the interlocking structures of society, as well as the rudimentary state of nature itself, are organized and animated by grace. Grace acts in relation to these structures as the soul acts in relation to the body. As a supposed gift of God, grace animates, organizes and enlivens any spiritual, intellectual, moral, or cultural life either implicitly or explicitly, for grace ultimately sets things in their most comprehensive context. Furthermore, grace also helps to develop the natural potencies of a nature created by God but flawed by the ‘fall.’ Grace acts immediately on “created” nature, only mediately on “engendered” nature, to strengthen and heighten the physical capacities of natural things, according to Du Bosc’s account, which is a relatively faithful reproduction of traditional Christian thought based explicitly on thinkers such as Gregory the Great, Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas and others. What is striking, however, in Du Bosc’s presentation is
that, as noted above, all sophisticated theological and philosophical distinctions (such as habitual, actual, operative, cooperative grace) are absent, though some of them appear in Du Bosc's later anti-Jansenist work. It would seem, therefore, that Du Bosc's purpose is to provide in the initial part of the work a solid, generally accessible and relatively unexceptional account of the relation of different theologies, philosophies, and sciences, as well as of the relation between grace and nature, in order to pave the way for what he takes to be the original part of his work, namely the transcendental reduction of sects and the interrelation of reality which is supposed to emerge in its wake. *Le Philosophe indifférent*, therefore, does not furnish the reader with a theological or even mystical world-view nor with a devotional, spiritual handbook, but rather a popularized form of philosophical thought, which includes a rudimentary philosophy of history, a scientific method and a critique (or principle and judgement), as well as an evaluation of the practical consequences of this critique.

Consequently, several important points emerge with some clarity. First, Du Bosc's world-view may be taken to be generally representative both of traditional thinking and of commonly held views in his day. Second, we begin to get a first-hand glimpse of what is under attack either by the scepticism of the *libertins* or others or by the new scientific methods of Bacon, Gassendi, Descartes and others, which however unintentionally threaten the unity of traditional thought by splitting body from soul and nature from grace. Third, modern popular conceptions of grace evidently fail to do justice to this seventeenth-century notion, for they suppose grace to have been an intangible, totalitarian force simply waiting for the advent of empirical science to be dissipated forever. Yet Du Bosc's account, if truly representative, shows that this cannot have been so for the people of his own day, for according to him, grace is an immediate, even presumably empirical force (by empirical I mean something whose effects can in principle be observed and recorded) in ordinary life. Far from dominating every other structure and manipulating everything into some pre-selected, procrustean unity, grace actually permits, at least in Du Bosc's view, the
natural capacities of other structures to emerge as such. And in the last book of *Le Philosophe indifferent* Du Bosc himself finally articulates explicitly the connection, which the whole work has implicitly suggested in every argument, between grace, authority, science, art, conduct conversation, and manners.

However, this is still only part of the picture, for in the three books of *Le Philosophe indifferent* we can discern not only the picture Du Bosc wanted us to see, but the one he clearly would not have wanted us to observe. On the one hand, the view of the interrelated sciences makes good sense in relation to Du Bosc's proposed scientific method, that is, to avoid the Scylla and the Charybdis of the different partial views represented by stoicism and scepticism. On the other hand, the other side of the coin is the artificial coherence of Du Bosc's own solution, whereby he takes a theory, which in traditional Aristotelian thought is only operative in a restricted field, namely moral virtue, and erects it into a supreme criterion to cover every science and every eventuality. In other words, there is a distinct irony felt by the modern reader that Du Bosc's work fails ultimately because of what Du Bosc takes to be its greatest strength, that is, his insistence that the comprehensive theological vision of the Church exemplifies the most advanced integration of nature and grace even on ancient pagan ethical grounds. In other words, in *Le Philosophe indifferent* we catch a glimpse both of the traditional organic unity view and its shadow, as it were: that is, the hidden substitution of the part for the whole which threatens to destroy the system. In *Le Philosophe indifferent* this threat of destruction is only the implicit failure of what Du Bosc takes to be his major original discovery in the work. Later in the anti-Jansenist works, however, one might argue that Du Bosc falls victim himself to the rigidification and partiality which he seeks to avoid in the earlier work. In this way, perhaps, his work as a whole may be said to provide a vignette of the disruption which his times embody: that is, the natural ideal and the deconstructive shadow not only inhabit the same worlds but even occupy the same space of a single individual's creative work.

I have argued that Du Bosc is especially representative of his age because he is so
obviously a second or third-rate thinker who was fortunately engaged in most of the major
debates of his day. The above thesis, that Du Bosc’s theory ultimately fails, provides strong
support for this contention. However, the case of Du Bosc is more interesting for histori-
ans, I want to suggest, than this supposed failure might seem to warrant; for if it was a
failure, then it was certainly one which was not to be without spectacular, though implicit,
philosophical and historical consequences. Du Bosc could not entirely pull the project off,
it is true, but a similar form of thinking, some 150 years later, similar even down to the
unity of opposites in the *criterium* or idea (*Begriff*), and the avoidance of extremes (specifi-
cally stoicism and scepticism), can be said to have shaped (particularly through Marx)
almost the whole of modern thinking. I am not for a moment suggesting that Hegel read
Du Bosc. It is much more reasonable to suppose that such a commonplace as the Scylla
and Charybdis of stoicism and scepticism entered common cultural parlance from this and
a host of other influences, to which Hegel was necessarily in some measure exposed; and
thus the failure of this mode of expressing philosophical generality which Du Bosc’s thought
creatively represents even in its limitations, led, however indirectly, to the eventual flour-
ishing of Hegelian and neo-Hegelian historical thought. Nonetheless, the similarity be-
tween Du Bosc and Hegel, though distant, is striking: both emphasize a philosophy of
history culminating in Christianity; both emphasize the importance of the *logos*, *Begriff*, or
*criterium* as a means of uniting opposites and apparent contradictions; the ‘philosophies’
of both are devoted to the need to escape from partial viewpoints into a universe which
overcomes narrow, denominational partiality and, specifically, to the need to avoid the
extremes of stoicism and scepticism if consciousness is to be ‘happy’ and well integrated:
and both stress in different, but related ways, the importance of every single ordinary detail
of natural consciousness. What is fascinating to see in Du Bosc is that despite these archet-
typal similarities, a vocabulary of self-consciousness or subjectivity had not yet been ex-
plicitly formulated (and how could it have been only six years after the publication of
Descartes’ *Discours de la methode*). What makes the mystery even more intriguing is that
Du Bosc clearly anticipates not only Hegel, but Kant as well, for the transcendental reduction of the sects anticipates the Kantian transcendental critique of the forms and judgement of understanding. So it is not as if this mode of thinking which Du Bosc so painstakingly articulated left no historical imprint despite the insufficiencies of Du Bosc himself. Consequently, what is of interest for the present work, is how his attempt, however flawed, to think freely and comprehensively within a traditional perspective plays itself out in relation to apparently subordinate structures and yet finally founders under attack by the Jansenists as a prey ironically to its own strength of conviction. The work of the third-rate thinker may, thus, harbour the crucial building blocks of subsequent stellar minds and of the tyrants who inevitably seem to follow in their wake.

In the following chapters I shall test out the major thesis of this chapter (that *Le Philosophe indifferent* presents a popular representative integralist view for its own times of the relation of nature and grace and the question of authority) first, in relation to women and, then, in relation to the theological and political dimensions of Du Bosc's thought.
Endnotes

1. The manner in which we use the word religion must be specific. Ernst Feil, tracing the use and meaning of religio preceding 1550 defines it as "... the careful and even fearful fulfilment of all that man owes to God or to the gods ... the careful enacting of rituals before political and military actions, as well as, in fear and trembling, attending to every sacrifice and to other demands, handed down from the past ..." and always used in conjunction with pietas or cultus, in a manner which indicates an integrated community. In the century following 1650 Feil identifies a transformation occurs by which religion is interiorized and removed from the public sphere. The distinction that follows is religio and fides, that is, a distinction between observances of ritual and belief. Ernst Feil "From Classical Religio to the Modern Religion: Elements of a Transformation between 1550 and 1650" in Michel Despland and Gérard Vallée, eds., Religion in History: The Word, the Idea, the Reality (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1992), 31–44.


3. One means of conceptualizing religion is as the specific and general interpretations of actions in conjunction with the semiotic, or sign and symbol, in an attempt to address both objective and subjective aspects, that is, both experienced and articulated religious behaviours. By addressing both we are able then to move beyond simply culture. Current problems in the methodology of studying religion is treated in Jacques Waardenburg "In Search of an Open Concept of Religion" in Religion in History, 225–240.

4. "Oui, je soustiens que Dieu n’a non plus donné la lumiere revelée pour tyranniser la lumiere naturelle, en faisant le Christien; qu’il donne l’Ame raisonnable pour opprimer l’Ame sensitive, en faisant l’homme. Au contraire, comme l’Ame raisonnable rehausse la sensitive, la tempere, & la conduit aussi la lumiere revelée n’est ajustée à la lumiere naturelle, que pour l’espurer & pour l’anoblir;..." Le Philosophe indifferent, 68–9.

   "Yes, I assert that God has no more given revealed light to tyrannize natural light in making the Christian, than he gives the rational soul to oppress the sensitive soul in making man. On the contrary, just as the rational soul enhances the sensitive soul, tempers, and conducts her: in the same way the revealed light is added to the natural light only in order to purify and ennoble it."

5. "as among truths, there are some more general and transcendent truths upon which as upon primary sources, all the rest depend..." Ibid., 567.
6. "the Art of reducing the sects with an all new order to the two most general sects, as to the two most transcendent types." *Ibid.*, 1151. As we shall see below, Du Bosc sees in this reduction a critical transcendental stratagem based upon an understanding of judgement (as will Kant one hundred years later). He terms it, for instance "ce souverain Discernment, ou cette Critique transcendente & universelle" "this sovereign discernment or this transcendental, universal critique" (*ibid.*, 1121) and he locates this critical stratagem as a transcendental mean to avoid "two falsities"). According to Du Bosc the primary truths are situated between two extreme falsities and both falsities are "transcendent and universal."

7. "I say immediately, because what comes immediately from his [God's] hands, has invariably more vigour, more purity and more perfection, even for corporeal things..." *ibid.*, 80. Du Bosc therefore does not perceive organic growth and divine creativity as mutually exclusive, or in some way separate. Divine creativity is for him the beginning of every action.

8. "That is how one elevates in all ways pagan morality by reducing it to Christian morality, in which one sees this Queen of Virtues shine with such lustre, I mean Charity, whose end and principle being of a supernatural order purifies and ennobles all the works of nature." *Ibid.*, 398–399.

9. "If we must subject philosophy to faith, it is above all for the following reasons. First, because faith gives more solid nourishment to the soul than does philosophy; grace satisfies better, so to speak, our insatiability than does nature. Secondly, because faith better shows the final end and sovereign good, giving us more beautiful and firmer hopes than does philosophy. Thirdly, because if we compare philosophy to faith, the one is fertile and without effect, whereas the other is fecund, though supernaturally fecund. Fourthly, because faith acts more divinely that philosophy; faith works wonders and miracles whereas philosophy produces only ghosts and illusions." (emphasis added) *Ibid.*, 413–4.

10. Keohane discusses the ideology of monarchy and the points out that the "great chain of being" which placed the king at the apex of earthly order gained popularity in this century but was predicated on earlier understandings. *Philosophy and the State in France*, 56. See also William F. Church, *Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth Century France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), 47–53; R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (London: John Murray, 1926), 102.

11. Thomistic theologians justified the tradition and dogma of the Church on the grounds of faith and reason: knowledge came from experimental and logical evidence; faith came from revelation, but used knowledge to make it compatible with reason. This marriage of reason and faith was achieved through Aristotelian logic as well as the explication of classical and Patristic texts. Scholastic Theology, while making use of reason, ultimately justified tradition and dogma by revelation. Since it was held that reason alone could prove neither the immortality of the soul nor the existence of God, it was rejected by Scholastic theologians as a basis for faith. Scriptural revelation took precedence, and a more rigorous authoritarian view — which stressed man's insignificance — prevailed. For a brief overview which traces the origins of neo-
scolasticism from the renewal in the French Church that was initiated at Trent see Kearns, *Ideas in Seventeenth Century France*, 7–11.

12. The dating of the pre-enlightenment or early enlightenment can reasonably be pushed back to the first decades of the seventeenth century rather than the more traditional dating of the last decades of the century. In this earlier period, now commonly termed the “craie de la conscience européenne,” the distinctions between physics and metaphysics were still certainly blurred but the popularity of scepticism clearly suggest a delineation was beginning. Paul Hazard, *The European Mind 1680–1715* (London: Penguin); Kearns *Ideas in Seventeenth Century France*, 7–11.

13. The stoicism of the seventeenth century is based on, and a development of that proposed by Montaigne. This seventeenth century understanding was not the austere form advocated by Seneca (in whom there was much contemporary interest) but rather a modulated interpretation that shades into Epicureanism. For a more detailed analysis see David Lewis Schaefer, *The Political Philosophy of Montaigne* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 201–226.


15. Pintard concludes his analyses of the libertins with a detailed assessment of the philosophies of three individuals: Naude, Gassendi and La Mothe le Vayer, each of whom proposed a unique view though all can nonetheless be named sceptic. *Libertinage érudit*, 437–539.

16. Savinien de Cyrano, 1619–1654, called de Bergerac after a small family property near Paris, was an associate of Gassendi, a soldier, playwright, and philosopher-novelist. For a more detailed of his contribution to French philosophical thought see Spink, *French Free Thought*, 48–57.

17. There is some debate whether he was in fact openly atheistic. Spink argues that this view was formed in reaction to a few lines spoken by the character Sejanus in de Bergerac’s play *La Mort d’Agrippine* (1654). Whether these few lines actually reflect the view of de Bergerac, or are the views of the character is a moot point. In *L’Autre Monde*, written in 1649, though published after his death as *Histoire comique ou états et empires de la lune*, de Bergerac considered seriously the helio-centric universe, and thus can be seen as in conflict with the views of the Roman Church. However he also considered himself, and described himself as a “good Catholic.” Spink, *French Free-thought*, 48–62; see also Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 330.


20. Descartes was able to accept the Jesuits theological and philosophical prescriptions concerning God, and the nature of angels and man though he rejected the Thomistic scholastic philosophy that was intimately linked to Aristotelianism. Roger Ariew, “Descartes and scolasticism: the intellectual background to Descartes’ thought,” ibid., 66–69.


22. Baruch Spinoza (1637–1677) was a Dutch philosopher who expounded the doctrine of Pantheism. Influenced by Descartes, he ultimately rejected the distinction of God, mind, and matter. He published A Treatise of Religious and Political Philosophy (1670) during his lifetime, Ethics and Opera Posthnumus in 1677.


24. Ibid., 4.


27. Pintard identifies among his acquaintances DuPuy, Balzac, Le Vayer and Naudé, individuals with who Du Bosc is known to have associated. Pintard, Le Libertinage érudit, 203.

28. “the two philosophers do not speak the same language; and they do not understand one another when they reason, either on the method, or on the premises.” Ibid., 484.


30. Spink, French Free Thought, 19.

31. The libertine community transcended religious distinctions and provided a common ground for the open discussion of philosophy, theology as well as natural philosophy as it was currently being transformed into what we currently think of as pure science. In this environment the unorthodoxy which enabled new assessments of old solutions must have been a great temptation, especially in a society so closely circumscribed by orthodoxy. Spink, French Free Thought, 13.

32. Tapié, Age of Louis XIII, 290–92.


34. The letters from Patru to Du Bosc are little more than an exchange of pleasantry concerning Patru’s health, and his affection for Du Bosc. Oeuvres diverses de Mr Patru de l’Academie Française (Paris: Hilaire Foucault, 1714), 578–580.
35. Like his other works, the book is dedicated to illustrious individuals, Cardinal Mazarin and Chancellor Séguier, with an effusiveness that to the modern ear is excessive. Mazarin is compared to "un Ange de paix envoyé du Ciel," Séguier is equated with the ancient oracle.


37. "C'est donc en cêt estat de liberté, d'intégrité, et d'indifference que je mets mon Philosophe pour le rendre comme il faut, et le Crytique et le Reconciliateur des Sects: ne s'attachant qu'à faire la guerre à cette Affectation des Anciens, parce qu'elle est la cause de tout le mal, parce que qu'elle a corrompu la Sagesse humaine, et a rendu la Philosophie l'ennemie de l'Evagile."

"It is then in this state of freedom, integrity and indifference that I place my Philosopher, in order to make him, as he must be, the Critic and Conciliator of sects, determined only to make war on this Affectation of the Ancients, because this affectation is the cause of all the trouble, because it has corrupted human wisdom, and has made Philosophy the enemy of the Gospel." *Le Philosophe indifférent*, 3.

38. Du Bosc describes the affectation of the sects, that is, the blind acceptance of any philosophical position as "... ce Monstre qui a fait naitre la guerre civile dans la Republique des Sages & des Philosophes, les animant l'un contre l'autre, pour deffendre chacun son party; au lieu de conspirer ensemble, à la poursuit de la Verité."

"... this Monster which has given birth to civil war in the Republic of the Sages and the Philosophers, animating the one against the other, to defend each his party; instead of plotting together, for the pursuit of truth." *Ibid.*, 7.


40. "... je veux seulement montrer qu'il se faut dépouiller de tout interest, qu'il faut estre sans preoccupation, et sans passion; qu'il faut estre libre et indifferent, pour l'un et pour l'autre party."

"I wish only to show that one put aside all interest, that one must be without concern and without passion; one must be free and impartial towards the one and the other party." *Le Philosophe indifférent*, 24.


42. "... the regular and methodical division, which clarifies and orders everything, not that confused division of many writers, which by subdividing too much, only makes mazes and labyrinths. I therefore divide this Philosopher (i.e., the indifferent philosopher) into four parts, each part into several treatises and the treatises into arguments..." *Ibid.*, 10.
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43. For an example of the Platonic *diairesis* or division, see Plato’s *Sophist* and *Politicus*. For Plato’s own emphasis on the organic body of any work, see especially the *Phaedrus*.

44. “La plus grande erreur des Philosophes Payens, et leur plus dangereux aveuglement, a esté de croire que la Doctrine Chrétienne estouffe et tyrannisne la Doctrine de la Philosophie: c’est ce qui espouvantait les Sectes et qui les a jettées dans l’aversion de l’Evangile. Aussi comme j’ai dessein de leur oster cette crainte, et de les ramener toutes à l’Église; j’estime qu’il n’y a rien de plus important, que de leur montrer le contraire....

“The greatest error of the pagan philosophers, and their most dangerous blindness, has been to think that Christian Doctrine stifles or tyrannizes Philosophical Doctrine; this is what terrified the sects and made them hate the Gospel. Thus as I intend to remove from them this fear, and bring them all back to the Church, I consider that there is nothing more important than to show them the opposite...” *Ibid.*, 67–8.

45. There are, he argues, three corresponding *paroles*: “La premiere, est la parole muette des creatures: La seconde, est la parole voilée et figurée des Escritures; Et la troissime, est la parole réelle, vivante, et animée de son Fils.”

“The first is the mute word of the creatures, the second is the veiled and symbolic word of the scriptures, and the third is the real, living and animated word of his Son.” *Ibid.*, 76.

46. He quotes with great approval, Dorandus, who discusses different sources of knowledge: “Dieu, adjouzt-‘il, se manifeste en trois façons, parce que sa Sagesse est escrite en trois sortes de Livres; le Livre de la Creature, le Livre des Veritez revelées; & le Livre de Vie: ce sont les trois Escolles, ou il a voulu que l’homme s’instruisist de temps en temps, & se perfectionnast en la connaissance de l’Auteur de la Nature & de la Grace.”

“God, he adds, shows himself in three manners, because his wisdom is written in three kinds of books: the book of the creature, the book of revealed truth and the book of life: these are the three schools where God wishes man to learn from time to time and to perfect himself in the knowledge of the Author of nature and of grace.” *Ibid.*, 79.

47. “... toutes les graces qui ont esté données aux Philosophes pour rendre leur Philosophie plus parfaite, ont esté données par le merite de Jesus-Christ: Je dis les graces mesmes qui ne regardent point le salut de l’ame, ny l’innocence des moeurs, mais seulement la science purement naturelle ou quelque autre utilité humaine, comme seroit ou la Physique d’Aristote, ou la peinture d’Apelle, ou quelque autre chose semblable, qui n’est que dans l’ordre naturel.”

“... all the graces which were given to philosophers to make their philosophies more perfect were given by the merit of Jesus Christ: I mean even the graces which do not pertain to the salvation of the soul, nor the innocence of manners, but only to natural science or to some other human utility, like Aristotle’s *Physics* or a painting of Apelles or some other similar thing which is only in the natural order.” *Ibid.*, 96–97.

Here Du Bosc distinguished three sorts of grace, one which relates to the salvation of the soul, a second which touches upon the innocence of manners, and a
third which appears to arise directly out of nature and its response to art, science, and intelligibility (on these last two see Chapter Four). In other words, grace is not ethereal for Du Bosc in the sense this has so often been understood (i.e., otherworldly or ghostly), but naturally geographical and even useful (i.e., utilité humain) in the sense that it already extends to the ordinary intelligent and intelligible functions of supposedly pagan nature. The notion therefore that grace corrects partial viewpoints is properly situated in the context of bringing those viewpoints into a wider, more comprehensive understanding of reality and thus liberating hidden potentialities.

48. “Natural theology is that knowledge of the philosophers which is a part of philosophy and which is, to tell the truth, only a very defective theology, as we shall show later...” _Le Philosophe indifferant_, 74.

49. “Mosaic theology is the same knowledge of a God, which has been revealed; but revealed only in darkness, in symbols and in shadows.” _Ibid._

50. “having been taught by wisdom itself, but openly, the veil of the temple being broken, all things being consummated and achieved in Jesus Christ.” _Ibid._ 75.

51. This is effectively the thesis of the whole of Book I; see especially 80–84.

52. “... because those one describes add daily to their beauty new graces and charms.” Advertissement, _L’Honneste femme_, unnumbered pages (7–8).

53. “... physical beauty depends in some way on that of the spirit, and the laws of good grace are attached to those of morality.” _Ibid._, 145.

54. In _Le Philosophe indifferant_, as far as I can see, the word _honneste_ itself is not employed. However, the qualities associated with _honneste_ are conspicuously situated within the context of moral excellence and scientific knowledge of discernment, as in the earlier work _La Honneste femme_ (see Chapter Four below) and also the letters (see Appendix A). For a list of these associated virtues in _Le Philosophe indifferant_, see note 108 below.

55. “... it is absolutely impossible, among us, to be an honourable woman without Christianity. It is impossible to make an honourable woman from one who lacks devotion.” _Ibid._, Advertissement, unnumbered pages (2). The point here is clearly that _l’honnéteté_ must be situated in the wider context of Christian morality, which involves, as we shall see in Chapter Four, prudence and grace, not that gracefulness does not and cannot arise out of nature.

56. “... grace does not destroy nature, but perfects and ennobles it ... it is absolutely impossible that the light of understanding, on which all philosophy is founded, would be offended or destroyed by the light of revelation on which all religion is based.” _Le philosophe indifferant_, 68.

57. “... Grace is nothing other than a clarity or illumination of comprehension and a devout affection or action of the will, to enable mankind to observe the Commandments and to live by counsels of the evangelists.” _Le Triomphe de S. Augustin, et la
Deliverance de sa doctrine, ou l'on voit condamnation des cinq Propositions des Jansenistes: avec la Refutation de leur Manifeste à trois sens, fabriqué pour échapper l'autorité du S. Siège, 61.

58. This last, known for centuries as kerygma, was the direct communication of the Holy Spirit in the lives of individuals. Thus, the council recognized as legitimate both traditional understanding based on scriptural sources and the church fathers, and direct revelation through the intercession of the Holy Spirit. The specific influence of the Council in France will be addressed below.


60. “Il n'y a point de doute que les Payens ne scauroient desavouer que la lumiere inspirée de Dieu, ne perfectionne la lumiere acquise par l'industrie de l'homme; & en suite qu'il ne faille reduire la Theologie Naturelle à la Theologie Revelee.”

“There is no doubt that the pagans cannot deny that the light inspired by God, perfects the light acquired by human industry; and consequently that natural theology must be reduced to revealed theology.” Ibid., 86. See also note 63. On the question of animation see Du Bosc’s characteristic usage of the verb animer in notes 9 and 45 above and also a locus classicus in L'Honneste femme which makes precise the kinds of animation Du Bosc has in mind, i.e., integration or harmonization: “L'Ame n’est pas plus necessaire pour vivre que la bonne grace pour agréer: elle donne de l’esclat aux belles & diminué du defaut de celles qui ne le sont point: Depuis qu’on possede cette aymable qualité, tout ce qu’on entreprend est bien seant & agréable.” “The soul is no more necessary for life than good grace is for pleasing: it gives brightness to the beautiful and diminishes the defect of those who are not beautiful. Once one possesses this charming quality, everything one undertakes is proper and agreeable.” L'Honneste femme, 144.

In a similar fashion in Le Philosophe indifferant Du Bosc emphasizes that the effects of theology and philosophy which constitute the order of grace in nature as we have seen in Book I of Le Philosophe indifferant, are measurable and intelligible in that “[Philosophie et Theologie] n’y sont pas décharnées & comme en squelette, elles y sont comme les nerfs & les veines dans un corps vivant, cachés sous la peau & couvertes de chair & d’embonpoint.” “they are not discourse and as in skeleton form; they are there like the nerves and veins in a living body, hidden under the skin and covered by flesh and healthy plumpness.” Philosophe indifferant, 415.
61. Grace aids understanding for “[c]’est la source de ses plus grands avantages; c’est ce qui la rend non seulement plus certaine, mais plus libre, plus feconde, plus agissante, plus genebreuse, & plus parfaite en toutes facons.”

“[i]t (i.e., the union of the revealed and natural lights in the perfecting activity of grace) is the source of its greatest advantages; this is what makes it not only more certain but more free, more fecund, more active, more generous and perfect in all ways.” Ibid., 72. See also note 74 below.

62. See especially in this context Du Bosc’s treatment of the immediacy of grace, partially quoted above: “Je dis immediatement, parce que ce qui vient immediatement de ses mains, a tousjours plus de vigueur, plus de purete, & plus de perfection, mesmo pour les chose corporelles...le vin des Nopces de Cana fait par les mains de Dieu, estoit plus excellent que le vin ordinaire fait par les soins du vigneron.”

“I say immediately because what comes from [God’s] hands always has more vigour, purity, perfection even in the case of corporeal things... the wine of the Marriage Feast of Cana, made by the hands of God, was more excellent than the ordinary, normal wine made by the care of the vintner.” Ibid., 80–81. Note that Du Bosc’s example is related to all corporeal things. While the example of wine may be misleading because it is not a living organism, Du Bosc gives the most conspicuous concrete example of this meaning from the Gospels. Christ makes better wine than human vintners, just as God makes better organisms than human beings can. This is not to say that the distinction between “creation” and “engendering” is a distinction between some hygienic notion of divine creativity and messy human procreation. Du Bosc’s insistence on the immediacy of divine grace is rather the insistence that grace is immediately present to nature and to all natural actions. Consequently, he cites the archetypical miraculous example of this immediacy. On the “physical” immediacy of grace, see below in this chapter.

63. Du Bosc is limiting neither God nor grace to Christianity, but rather extending both to incorporate all created nature. He does argue that God informs all created nature and yet can most completely be apprehended through Christianity. See note 60 above.

“C’est aussi par lui [Christ] que toutes les Graces ont esté faites à toutes sortes de Creatures, et en toutes sortes de siecles, soit avant sa venue, ou depuis son incarnation; puisque en effet, c’est le Dieu des Grecs, et des Gentils, aussi bien que des Hebreux; puis que c’est le Dieu de Pytagore, de Platon, et de Socrate,...”

“It is also by him that all graces have been given to all sorts of creatures, and in all sorts of centuries, even before his arrival, or since his incarnation, since in fact he is the God of the Greeks and the Gentiles, as well as the God of the Hebrews; since he is the God of Pythagoras, of Plato, and Socrates,...” Ibid., 99–100.

64. “Il y a un enchainement dans l’ordre des veritez & des lumieres ...(par lequel) l’on puisse s’elever par les causes subalternes comme par degrez justes à la cause souveraine.”

“There is a progression in the order of truths and lights ... (by which) one can rise by means of subaltern causes as by degrees, until one comes to the sovereign cause.” Ibid., 84–5. See also on the strengthening of the natural perspective or light in the revealed light, 999 ff. and 1711.
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65. “Aussi pouvons nous dire en quelque sorte, que la lumiere naturelle lors qu’elle est parfaitement soumise & unie à la lumiere revelée, elle participe à ses connaissances: Elle entre comme en partage de tant de divins secrets, elle raisonne sur les matieres les plus hautes.”

“Therefore we can say in a way that the natural light when it is perfectly submitted and united to the revealed light participates in its knowledge: it shares in so many divine secrets, it reasons upon the highest matters.” *Ibid.*, 72. See also 1116–7 cited note 108 below.

66. For Du Bosc’s notion of *amour propre* see especially *ibid.* 208. Du Bosc likens *amour propre* to Arachne who spins her threads entirely from herself in order to create a “subtle veil” which will poison its victims. Ancient sectarian pagan philosophies, he goes on to argue, contain the seeds of their own contradictions within themselves in a similar manner. They make a claim on the words but spin their own partialities into an obscuring and killing web (*ibid.* 208–214). Ultimately, the lack for Du Bosc in these forms of thinking is that they are self-generating or self-authoritative, instead of being grounded in “la connaissance de l’Auteur de la Nature.” *Ibid.*, 214. This rejection of pre-Christian philosophies is also dealt with by C. Chesneau, “Un précurseur de Pascal? Le Franciscain Jacques Du Bosc,” *XVIIe siècle* 15 (1952), 431.

67. “... toutes les sciences humaines se perfectionnant, à mesure qu’elles s’approchent de la Science & de la Doctrine de Jesus-Christ... c’est que non seulement les connaissances, qui sont données pour une fin surnaturelle, mais memes les connoissances purement humaines, comme la Physique, l’Astrologie, l’ Eloquence, & la Peintures, se doivent reduire à la Doctrine de Jesus-Christ,...”

“... all the human sciences are perfected in so far as they approach the Science and Doctrine of Jesus Christ... not only knowledge, which is given for a supernatural end, but even purely human knowledge, like Physics, Astrology, Eloquence, and Painting, must be reduced to the Doctrine of Jesus Christ.” *Ibid.*, 104.

68. “C’est en vain que le Sage Stoïque se vante, d’agir par le principe de toutes les vertus ensemble; pour y réussir il faut reduire et reùnier la vertu Payenne à la vertu Christienne.”

“In vain the stoic sage boasts that he acts by the principle of all the virtues together; in order to succeed in this, one must reduce and join pagan virtue to Christian virtue.” *Ibid.*, 394. For the word *reunion* itself see *ibid.*, 1171.

69. See Book III *passim* and also note 104 below.

70. Du Bosc characteristically emphasizes teleological explanation throughout this work. Something of the character of his many references to *la fin* and *le principe* can be seen at *ibid.* 80, for example, or 398–9, or 414. Du Bosc, like Aristotle, does not restrict teleology to biological entities but applies it to the moral, intellectual and spiritual spheres (as does Aristotle; see for instance *Nichomachean Ethics (EN)* I,1.

71. See above notes 7 and 62.

72. This refers, of course, to the fall of Adam and Eve and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden. The covenant made with Abraham promised redemption and the
natural and revealed light (in the person and action of Christ) "sont unies pour delivrer l'homme de son ignorance, tout de mesme que les deux Natures pour delivrer de son crime & de ses peines." *Ibid.*, 151. The *locus classicus* in *Le Philosophe indiffergent* is, in my view, in Book III 81, where Du Bosc illustrates the difference between created and engendered nature by the ananlyse between the wine created by Christ at the Marriage Feast of Cana and ordinary, normal wine: "les choses ont tousours je ne scay quoi de plus que les choses engendrées, comme le tesmoigne S. Chrysostome: soutenant que le vin des Nopces de Cana fait par les mains de Dieu, estoit plus excellence que le vin ordinare fait par les soins de vigneron." *Ibid.*, 81-1.

"created things have invariably something more than engendered things, as St. Chrysostom testified when he maintains that the wine of the Marriage Feast of Cana, made by the hands of God, was more excellent than the ordinary, normal wine made by the care of the vintner."

73. He wants to prove that "la Grace ne détruit pas la Nature, mais qu'elle la perfectionne et l'anoblit..." "Grace does not destroy nature but perfects and ennobles it..." *Ibid.*, 68. On the immediacy of grace see note 62 above.

74. "... elles [Philosophie et Theologie] y sont comme les nerfs & les veines dans un corps vivant, cachés sous la peau & couvertes de chair & d'embonpoint." "... [Philosophy and Theology] they are there like the nerves and veins in a living body, hidden under the skin and covered by flesh and healthy robustness." *Ibid.*, 415. See also 81. In this passage Du Bosc directly links the relationship of man to God through philosophy and theology (the "nerves and veins of a healthy body") to the living organic world.

75. See especially *ibid.*, 79–84 and notes 37, 38, 40, 44–50, 56, 63, 64, 67, 68 above.


77. *Le Philosophe indiffergent*, 81.

78. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate* V 9 and 10; *Contra Gentiles* III 67,70,88,89; *Summa Theologica* Ia q105 a5, q.22 a3; Ia IIae q.9 a4.


80. Although Bacon's real contribution to the development of the scientific method has been questioned, there is general consensus on Bacon's rejection of the Thomistic-Scholastic approach to science and his view of "medieval scholasticism as the embodiment of sterility and futile consciousness" that enabled the development of a shift in the scientific paradigm. See George Molland, "Science and Mathematics from the Renaissance to Descartes" in G. H. R. Parkinson, ed., *Routledge History of Philosophy Vol IV The Renaissance and Seventeenth Century Rationalism* (London: Routledge, 1993), 109–10.

82. "... not being infected by either the one or the other [extremity], and consequently being more capable of purifying and pacifying them. He is indifferent between these two extremities, only so that by withdrawing from the one and the other, he may be entirely disinterested towards both, and thus may become more properly their conciliator and critic. This is the goal our of indifference." *Ibid.*, 504–5.


88. *Ibid*.

89. "a distancing from two extremities, a disposition between too much and too little, a mediocrity (i.e. moderation) which purifies and which pacifies the excess and defect of the posturers and the sectarians." *Ibid.*, 542.

90. This is part of the argument of *ibid.*, 392–396. Du Bosc first argues that pagan virtues were in a sense dead because they were not "animées par charité," *ibid.*, 392. Consequently, the stoic ideal of the unity of the virtues in the "great souledness" (*magnanimité*) of the sage was only a conceptual magnanimity or "une magnanimité en idée." *Ibid.*, 393–4. True magnanimity involves the exercise of all virtues in a soul properly nourished. Du Bosc admits that this ideal was known to the ancient pagans, specifically Pliny in his analogy of the Tree of Tivoli, *ibid.*, 394–5, but concludes that nature alone cannot support such a growth, *ibid.*, 396. "L'humeur radicale" is lacking in nature, whose root must be located in *La Charité Chrétienne* which possesses "un parfait principe pour agir et pour toutes les vertus Morales." *Ibid.*, 396. The implicit conclusion of this argument is then that true magnanimity is a life of moral excellence animated ultimately by love or charity which is the principle of the Christian notion of grace.

91. "Il le faut dire hardiment à la gloire de Christianisme, quelque vanité qu'ayent eu les Philosophes Payens en parlant des vertus Heroïques, qui sont unies ensemble; quelque idée qu'ils ayent voulu faire du Magnanime ou de la Magnanimité, qui rehausse et remue qui contient en soy toutes les autres vertus; ce n'estoit qu'une Magnanimité en idée, & qu'ils n'ont pû reduire à l'effet."

"It must be said boldly to the glory of Christianity that, whatever vanity the pagan philosophers may have had in speaking of heroic virtues which are joined together; whatever idea they may have wished to form of the magnanimous man or of magnanimity, which elevates and which even contains in itself all other virtues, it was only the idea of magnanimity, which they were not able to put into practice." *Ibid.*, 393.

92. "... la Philosophie était sterile..."; pagan virtues were "... des vertus mortes, n'estant point animées de la Charité..." *Ibid.*, 390, 392. Notice again the emphasis on 'animation' and the principle of animation and organization.
93. On the question of authorship of nature (apart from those passages cited in the main text below) see especially *ibid.*, unnumbered page 16, 9, 75, 77, 79, 81, 84, 89, 92, 94–95, 98, 100, 112–3, 142–58, 176, 192, 197, 203, 215, 227, 260, 284, 285, 295, 315, 332, 339–341, 348, 359, 368–70, 384, 387, 388, 433, 445; on the relationship to authority see also *ibid.*, unnumbered page 6, 45, 68, 69, 680, 895, 908, 921, 923, 930, 949, 1010, 1013, 1015; and on the identity of the author of nature and grace see 79, 100, and 617.

94. Du Bosc dismisses the idea that grace entirely replaces natural reason: "... comme si la Grace qui n’est donnée que pour perfectionner la Nature, devoir la ruiner ou l’aneantir: comme si la Foy estoit inspirée pour effacer la Philosophie, et non pas pour la purifier et la secourir."

"... as if grace, which is given only to perfect nature, were meant to ruin or destroy it; as if faith were inspired to eliminate philosophy, and not to purify and aid it." *Ibid.*, 995.

95. See Aristotle *EN*, II, 1–6.

96. See *EN* II 6: "Moral excellence then is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle (*logos*) ... a mean between two vices ... excess ... and defect."

97. See for example *EN* I, 3: "Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for in the same manner in all discussions ... it is equally foolish to accept probable reasoning for a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs."

98. This idea that a single *logos* or *kanôn* (discriminatory rule) is able to discriminate between both positive and negative is found already in Plato (see *Theaitetus*, 176).

99. "Je diray seulement que ce Criterium ou discernement a deux effets essentiels: Le premier, c’est de sçavoir reconnoistre la Verité et sa situation: Le seconde est, de sçavoir reconnoistre les faussetez et les erreurs. L’un et l’autre est essentiel à cet art de discerner, afin d’en juger sur la Loy des contraires; parce qu’ayant trouvé les traces de l’erreur, peu à peu on s’approche de la Verité, comme nous l’allons montrer."

"I will say only that this criterion or discernment has two essential effects. The first is to know how to recognize truth and its situation, the second is to be able to recognize falsities and errors. Both are essential to this art of discerning, in order to judge them by the law of opposites, because having found the traces of error, little by little one approaches the truth, as we shall show." *Ibid.*, 1056.

100. See above note 83.

101. Du Bosc uses excess and defect in the same manner as does Aristotle who writes: "Now in everything which is continuous and divisible it is possible to take an amount which is greater than or than or equal to the amount required, and the amounts taken may be so related either with respect to the thing itself or in relation to us; and the equal is a mean between excess and deficiency. By ‘the mean,’ in the case of the thing itself, I mean that which lies at equal intervals from the extremes ... and this is neither just one thing nor the same for everyone." *EN*, 1106 A 25–30.
102. “Let us now examine the extension of our Criterium or Discernment, let us see for how many things our Method is necessary, let us run through all the arts one after the other; Let us examine History, Grammar, Rhetoric and other similar disciplines; let us see all kinds of knowledge.” *Ibid.*, 1085–6.

103. “L'on pourra bien mieux donner à nostre Discernement, le nom d'Hypercritique, qu'à tout autre; puis qu'il n'y a point de Critique, ny pour la Grammaire, ny pour la Poésie, ny pour l'Histoire, ny pour la Rethorique, ny pour tout ce qui se peut faire par Art, qui ne doive employer nostre mediocrité et nostre temperament pour en bien juger...”

“One may much better give the name “hypercriticism” [metacritic], to our discernment that to any other [kind of criticism], since there is no criticism, either for grammar, poetry, history, rhetoric, or anything that can be made by art, which does not have to use our mediocrity and our disposition to judge it well.” *Ibid.*, 1086.

104. “To know universal things is to know all, since all particular things are contained and enveloped in them.” *Ibid.*, 1095.

“Ne faut-il pas conclure que nostre methode est absolument necessaire pour la conduite de la lumiere Naturelle, & que c’est comme le moule & la regle de l’entendement de l’homme puisque mesme elle est la mesure de sa plus pure connaissance, qui est celle des premiers Principes.”

“Must one not conclude that our method is absolutely necessary for the guidance of natural light and that it is so to speak the mould and the rule of man’s understanding since it is the measure of his most pure knowledge, which is that of first principles.” *Ibid.*, 1084.

105. “... all manner of Works, whether the liberal Arts or mechanical” *Ibid.*, 1174.


108. “Above all, our fashion of doing Philosophy is necessary for all kinds of Moral virtues, not only for these four principal ones which they call Cardinal; but for the others which depend on them, and which are absolutely required for society and for commerce. Civility, Affability, Courtesy, Conversation, Kindness, and the others, are spoiled only by the too much and the too little; affectation corrupts everything: and our moderation and our temperament are necessary in all occasions of Society and of life; I say necessary in all centuries. This is how our method is useful in all things and in all centuries, because there can be affectation in everything no matter what; in writing, to speaking, in the sciences and in the virtues; in Philosophy, and in Theology, in conversation, and in commerce; and in a word, in all circumstances of society and life.” *Ibid.*, 1116–7.


110. The Hegelian notion of *begriff* or concept is not unlike the ancient notion of *logos* used by both Aristotle and Plato to signify word, account, rational principle, speech, definition or principle of judgement. The concept is defined as “a determinate synthesis
of subjectivity and objectivity” and as a “sythesis of opposites.” Howard P. Kainz
Hegel’s Phenomenology Part I: Analysis and Commentary (University of Alabama
Press: Alabama, 1979), 194, 197. For Hegel and Aristotle there is one source of
definition of opposites (Kainz, Hegel, 57–8). For Aristotle, in the Ethics, the principle
by which one judges between opposites is called a logos (EN 1106 B 36–1107 A 3).
This notion enters common Christian usage partly through the works of Plotinus,
Pseudo-Dionysius, and partly through the work of Augustine where logos is translated
into ratio, verbum, and criterium. See A.H. Armstrong, Cambridge History of Late

111. “Transcendental” as used by both Kant and Du Bosc may be defined in the case of
Kant as the basic rules of human experience or set of categories or rational judgements
by which all humans must live. In the case of Du Bosc it is the ultimate or most
general (in the sense of comprehensive) criterium of judgement. See Robert Solomon,
Chapter Four

Grace as a Personal Virtue: The Case of Women

To understand Du Bosc’s vision of ideal behaviours, underwritten by the unity of his understanding of authority grounded in grace, this chapter will concentrate on Du Bosc’s contributions to the Querelle des Femmes and will address the question of how he translated his philosophical stance vis à vis the religious, intellectual, moral, scientific and secular realms to the pragmatic realities of day-to-day behaviour; and it will then examine in particular L’Honneste Femme, (first edition 1632) his first and most popular work, which established a basis for how he assessed behaviour. In this work while Du Bosc accepts the importance of the context of society, he concentrates primarily upon the individual’s contribution to the shaping of that context. Du Bosc goes far beyond the compendium of manners in this work since he bases his ideals not on a restricted social necessity but rather on his comprehensive understanding of grace. L’Honneste Femme was followed in 1635 by a collection of letters, Nouveau recueil des lettres des dames de ce temps. Avec leurs responses, which provides further examples of the practical means by which women can shape society. Generally, although these works are of different genres, their cognate range of problems situate both centrally in the Querelle des Femmes. La Femme héroïque, ou les héroïnes comparées avec les héros en toute sorte de vertus, develops this examination by extending the focus of comparison to women of the classical and Judaic traditions. Just as Le Philosophe indifferant demonstrates a profound appreciation of the varieties of truths (‘pagan,’ ‘Judaic,’ and ‘Christian’), so does La Femme héroïque propose the view that Du Bosc’s world had much to learn from those traditions which in fact helped to shape it. This
work goes somewhat beyond the normal Plutarchan mode of *comparatio* popular in the Renaissance, for it includes comparisons between men and women (e.g. Thomyris and Cyrus) within each stratum of tradition and, on the basis of a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses, presents women as (at least) equally capable of heroic behaviours.

The previous chapter identified the manner in which Du Bosc articulated grace as the organizing element by which behaviours were circumscribed and the tenets by which these behaviours were validated.¹ In Du Bosc's view, these ideal behaviours would not damage the structures of his society, but in fact serve to reinforce them. In addressing public, social and political roles, Du Bosc was attempting to demonstrate how his particular vision integrated a variety of authorities.² Du Bosc expresses his interpretation of civilized behaviour in several contexts. In examining these works on women one begins to discern what could be called his social vision and the place of the individual within that vision. He viewed the world and his society from a particular vantage point that was neither exceptional nor exclusive, and which consequently provides the reader with a sounding of the temper of the times.³ This will become apparent in his descriptions of admirable and ideal behaviours as well as of those behaviours he condemns. An examination of his judgements and arguments is useful in giving depth and clarity to the whole period.⁴ How Du Bosc understood each specific realm of authority and how he integrated the specific into a more comprehensive authority can be arrived at by examining these works in some detail. At the outset, however, it is worth remarking that while throughout these works the issue of estate or status is frequently addressed, nonetheless it is not necessarily the traditional social ranking which Du Bosc emphasised, but rather a status based on heroism or virtue.⁵

Du Bosc's place among feminist writers has been discussed in a preliminary fashion in Chapter Two. Du Bosc does not advocate that women should become leaders or public figures, but argues that they have the capability of outstripping conventional or archetypical male leaders. The heroism of women is not an unnatural expression. It is rather an expression of the relationship between nature and gracefulness, the importance of which we have
indicated on a different level in the previous chapter. That he was principally concerned with a leisured, educated class, that is, the aristocracy and the haute bourgeoisie, is apparent in his first work that dealt specifically with women: L'Honneste Femme. He assumed throughout this and later works that readers had the leisure to read; thus, his conclusions are initially directed toward a limited group. Perhaps Du Bosc's intended audience was wealthy and literate and part of an élite culture; however, his admonitions are in no manner limited to these few. He addresses the work specifically to women yet also petitions men to learn from it. Consequently, in principle his prescriptions are clearly intended to apply to everyone and probably to every class, since such behaviours are in principle open to all and also grounded in his understanding of law and nature. However, we should also remember that his primary addressees form only a small portion of the community. As we have seen in Chapter Two, the questions of social class, of rank within the social class, of wealth, even of geographical location, are all crucial to the conditions and expectations of an individual. Occasionally, the distinction of sex seemed to be as great as these other factors for, like the corporate body, women as a group were restricted by economics, politics, and (principally) traditions. In this sense they were a single unit, although wealth, literacy, and leisure determined those who could be active in, or affected by, the Querelle des Femmes.

Carolyn C. Lougee sees l'Honneste Femme as a syllabus of social accomplishments enabling the reader to educate herself sufficiently to marry above her station. Lougee presents Du Bosc as part of le monde, without incorporating his other works on philosophy or theology. I shall argue here that this book is much more than a compendium of manners or a simple listing of rules; it is rather an attempt to reach beyond superficial posturing to a universal basis for social intercourse. Du Bosc sets out a standard of Christian behaviour based on the Humanist tradition. He places great emphasis on the ability to read and converse with humour and wit. These are not proposed as simple practical skills, but as a means of developing acuity in thought and judgement in action. Therefore, Du Bosc emphasizes the importance of implicit habitual forms of gracefulness as a natural basis for the
development of more refined, self-reflective, active, intelligent dispositions.

*L'Honneste Femme*, first published in 1632, sets out a standard of deportment for women.\(^{10}\) It is a collection of essays on the virtues and vices of women. It is examined here in detail for several reasons. It was Du Bosc's first true success, as attested to by its publishing history.\(^{11}\) It lays the groundwork for his other works dealing with women, and a close examination of it serves to demonstrate his style and manner of argument. The introductory material, preface, dedication, *avis*, varies in the numerous editions of the work. The earliest edition contains an *Epistre* addressed to Madame de Combalet\(^{12}\) signed only “D.P.” The preface of the 1633 edition, with the same dedication, explains that the work had been so well received that Du Bosc felt it necessary to acknowledge his authorship. In this edition the *Epistre* is signed “Vostre tres-humble et tres obeissant serviteur, DV BOSCQ.”\(^{13}\)

This introductory letter tells of the response of the critics (of which much is said in the preface) and informs the reader that the approval of Madame de Combalet prompted Du Bosc to reissue the work. Because he had sold his copyright to a printer who was apparently unable to read his hand or understand his marginal notations, the first edition was flawed.\(^{14}\) When it became known that he was the author, he began to edit the work though d'Ablancourt completed the editing.\(^{15}\) The importance of issuing a corrected edition is indicative of the value and weight attached to the work, not only because of Du Bosc's reputation but also because of the content.\(^{16}\) A second section was added after 1634 and by 1635 a third section was included. These additional sections are each as long as the original, of which they are for the most part reiterations and expansions. After the initial publication in 1632, at least eight further editions were issued by 1643.\(^{17}\) The third section of the 1643 edition contains an additional dedication to “… Son Altesse Royale Madame Christine de France Princesse de Piedmont Duchesse de Savoye et Reyne de Cypre.” The variety of additions to the introductory material indicates that both Du Bosc and the publisher felt the work to be both important and lucrative. Published in English in 1639 as The
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Compleat Woman, it was re-translated and published numerous times, into the eighteenth-century in England and Holland as well as in France.\textsuperscript{18}

The preface of the first edition, written by d’Ablancourt, was replaced by a letter from the author in later editions. In the original work there are eighteen chapters, each of which could be read independently.\textsuperscript{19} They deal with three themes: characteristics of the individual, the moral foundation of the behaviours advocated, and the individual in society.

Part One of the 1658 edition is untitled and consists of eighteen chapters. Although Du Bosc did not segment these chapters there are natural divisions. The first three chapters analyze reading, conversation, and the humours — melancholy and pleasant. This is a discussion of basic skills and appropriate attitudes. The second seven chapters deal with deportment in society. This section defines the responsibilities of the individual in society and examines admirable behaviours and virtues such as chastity, constancy, and prudence. The final eight chapters define relational behaviours; that is, the deportment necessary to function comfortably in society. Responsibilities to society are also defined, as well as behaviours that should be shunned — curiosity, cruelty, slander, and jealousy, and the last two chapters include specific discussions of virtue and vice.

The concluding chapter of Part One, “De l’Amitié, et de l’Amour d’Inclination, et d’Eslection,” draws on the lessons presented throughout the book to illustrate how to maintain balance and proportion in all things, but especially in love. Du Bosc attempted to establish a standard of behaviour based on reason and an analysis of nature together. This is not to say he eschewed the teachings of Christianity; rather, he placed them within the context of universal behaviours. For Du Bosc as a Cordelier and student of theology, Christian teachings were intrinsic to his understanding of the world. He was, however, writing in a popular mode for a secular audience, familiar to some extent with classical literature and he was following current usage by meshing a classical understanding with Christian teaching. This is perhaps the most arresting aspect of the work, in that it brings together several threads of French interest in the early seventeenth century. His ideal behaviours incorpo-
rate those characteristics that fit into the classical philosophical and Christian structures of the period, making the work acceptable to either order.

The dedicatory epistle to Madame de Combalet is a letter claiming authorship and offering thanks. The letter is that of a courtier, claiming Madame de Combalet as the source of his inspiration. Holding her up as a model, he wrote:

J'advoue que si toutes les Dames pouvoient contempler vos actions, cecy ne leur seroit point necessaire: ...

By the 1658 edition this letter was modified, and credit given to many women who lived exemplary lives. Du Bosc expressed thanks to the *Dames Illustres* for the popularity of the book and stated that its presence in “la Cour des plus grands Princes de l’Europe” was due to their efforts. He concluded:

... l’Honneste Femme confesse enfin ingenuement, qu’elle ne propose rien aux Dames qu’elle n’ait appris des Dames mesmes.”

Throughout this introductory epistle, Du Bosc articulated his beliefs concerning the relationship between society and the ethics embodied in Christianity. The first, integral to his approach and subtly demonstrated throughout the book, was the certainty that true Christian behaviour and the secular world are not mutually exclusive. One can and should live in the world, without disdain for society. Du Bosc attempted to reach beyond de Sales. He described a much fuller life than does de Sales, who was concerned primarily with private devotional life. Du Bosc places women in the salon and advises on the kind of conversation and behaviour expected in what could be described as a secular environment:

Il est vray qu’il n’y a rien de plus important que de sçavoir l’Art de plaire, et de se faire aimer dans la Compagnie: comme nous avons tous une inclination à société...

But like de Sales, he grounds behaviours in the virtues and vices as viewed by Christianity. The inclination to society that Du Bosc observes is far more that pleasantry or self-aggrandizement. It is the means by which an individual is able to express virtue and overcome
vice and so achieve a fuller understanding and recognition of the grace-filled life. By
citing neither doctrine nor tradition as proofs, Du Bosc illustrated the essential correctness
of that tradition according to natural law, which he understood to be a primary foundation
of authority. That is to say, while natural law is primary from the viewpoint of nature or
human experience, ‘divine’ law is nonetheless primary from the point of view of its
comprehensiveness, as he had argued in *Le Philosophe indifférent*. Natural law, formulated
to provide a rationale for pre-Christian concepts of virtue, incorporated innate or implicit
knowledge of reason and justice, because man, created by God, is according to Du Bosc
naturally reasonable, naturally just.\(^{24}\)

This understanding of natural law, and of the hierarchy of mosaic and finally Chris-
tian law, supports Du Bosc’s belief in the important position of women within society. He
writes in the dedication to the duchesse d’Aiguillon,

> ... Dieu faisant voir dedans une mesme Race, la merveille des Dames aussi bien
que celles des hommes, il veut laisser l’un et l’autre à la Cour, pour les faire
paroistre en mesme temps, et sur un mesme Theatre, comme les plus grand
ornements de notre siecle.\(^ {25}\)

His direct references to *L’Honneste homme* by Faret further support this position.\(^ {26}\) Quite
simply, the text could be as much directed to men as to women.

The 1658 edition also included an *avertissement*, giving his reason for adding a third
part to the work:

> ... J’ay voulu leur découvrir [aux Dames] l’impertinence aussi bien que la mal-
ic de ceux qui leur veulent persuader, que la Devotion est importune pour la
Société et désagréable pour l’entretien; ... \(^ {27}\)

In other words, he condemns those who would enforce a strict demarcation between religious
and secular lives. Du Bosc insists that the purpose of his work is to demonstrate the natural
complementarity of religious expression and normal social intercourse, and beyond this, to
point to the necessity that external life should be permeated by meaningful interiority. Du
Bosc then goes on to point to the warm reception by women of de Sales’ work. He also
notes that men have been less receptive to the work and the ideals presented, and hopes that his own text will fare better. He recognizes the prevalent distinctions made between men and women, but observes that as far as integrity is concerned such external distinctions are of minor importance:

\[ ... \text{cette différence de sexe, ne regarde quasi que l'exterier, aussi elle est de si peu d'importance, que je me serois rendu ridicule, si j'auois voulu descendre en particulier à ce qui regarde les habits, les mines, les reverences, ou la coiffure ...} \]

The preface tells more of the history of the work and, incidentally, speaks to the timeless relationship between author and critic. It is valuable because d'Ablancourt, who wrote the preface, cites the criticisms levelled at the book and rebuts them. As a consequence the modern reader can better understand the kind of arguments that surrounded the subject. The preface opens with a condemnation of critics, who are described variously as silly and calumnious, and who

\[ \text{are so poor and so weake, as they have not other means to shew themselves and cannot be equall with others, if they abate them not lowe enough, and make them not as little as themselves:...} \]

D'Ablancourt did recognize their usefulness, in that they compel accuracy and careful writing. His comparison, though, was rather unkind: he described them as insects which sting the author to wakefulness, and in this instance it appears they were the cause of the re-edition. The preface continues not as a laudatory statement but in an analytical and critical vein. In examining the criticisms, d'Ablancourt meant to disarm them. Additionally, he meant to instruct the reader, supposedly a woman, on the style and intent of the text.

The rebuttal of criticism the work received indicates the attitudes and expectations of its readers. The strongest criticism seems to have been that too much praise was given women, thus making the title a misnomer. What these readers seem to have wanted, and what would have fulfilled the promise of the title for them, would have been a catechism of approved behaviour. In their view the book, as written, served
rather to delight then instruct, and to please then persuade. That instead of giving precepts to women he gives them praise: And that he is a great deal readier to corrupt their mind then to teach them how to live, and makes them rather good Gossips then good Women.  

This was countered in the preface with the statement that, by praising one manner and condemning another, the author makes it clear which is desirable, and credits women with the ability to draw their own conclusions. A further justification for using this method was that

[t]here are hardly any willing to admit things in form of instruction, acknowledging their ignorance. It was needfull then to set another face upon it...  

That “other face” is framed in praises and fable, but is nonetheless accurate. That it was written for women and not philosophers was also given as justification for writing it. Women, according to the author, need to be entertained as well as instructed in their reading. There is, unfortunately, no way for modern scholars to know whether the work was more popular among women or men. Du Bosc assumed that a philosopher would prefer less example and elaboration, needing only the arguments, though he has not in fact oversimplified his arguments. This seems at first glance a condescension — that women would have neither the understanding nor the determination to read such a text. In a later passage, however, he condemns the very language of philosophy and science, and their proofs. He also questions the limits of language and logic and uses Zeno’s argument against motion as an example: the premise may well be logically irrefutable, yet with our senses we are able to see the untruth.  

D’Ablancourt reported the critics’ claim of the corrupting influence of the book, a claim based on the fact that most examples were drawn from mythology rather than fact. This was countered by the assertion that the genre is popular with women, and that he has

_taken away from them an idle tale and given them a morall; a divine Metamorphosis, a thousand times fairer then that of the poet; so as now that which corrupted them instructs them; where they found their evil they meet with their remedy; their poyson is become their antidote, ...
D’Ablancourt here epitomizes the central feature of the work itself. Far from pagan mythology detracting from the Christian focus of the work or from the scientific tenor required of a supposed factual account, Du Bosc’s method is to transpose the apparent “idleness” of ordinary society by means of mythological example into something graceful, indeed divine. This involves a reversal of normal perspectives: the ordinary or habitual may appear to be the death or the “poison” of civility or grace. The trick, according to D’Ablancourt, is to show that what appears to corrupt them (e.g. the apparent frivolity or uselessness of mythology or idle conversation) can in fact more deeply instruct if the “story” or “myth” is transposed into a different context. D’Ablancourt therefore catches the fundamental timbre of Du Bosc’s work on women, and consequently endorses Du Bosc’s position of support for the literate Christian woman who reasons out her actions according to her knowledge and observation rather than according to a precept learned by rote. In his view the “Virtue of Particulars, and the inclination to do good” far outweigh laws or rules. Were this not true, he asserts, Rome would still stand today. 35 According to D’Ablancourt’s assessment, then, Du Bosc places ultimate authority in the efficacy not of rules or laws, or even systems as such, but rather in the natural efficacy of grace and nature cooperating in individuals, although in this passage he does not use the terms grace or nature directly.

The critics seemed to be suspicious of a cleric who knew of these things. It was felt “that he hath more commerce with Women, then suits well with a man of his profession.” 36 This was answered, perhaps ironically, by D’Ablancourt’s pointing to the very fact that Du Bosc was a priest. Who better, after all, to instruct, not only in the mysteries of the faith, but in morals? It could be assumed that, if the arguments were well taken, the book would be useful in bringing women to a more enlightened view of their behaviour. As to the title, the distinction between Honnesté and Vertueuse was questioned by these same critics. Calling on Saint Paul as a precursor in this approach, D’Ablancourt refers to Du Bosc’s intention to teach women “que la Pieté Chrestienne n’est point empeschante comme la
pieté Payenne.”37 In other words, Christian piety — at least in D’Ablancourt’s assessment, was less restrictive, and less prescriptive than pagan piety.

Honnêteté is a complex term. In Magendie’s view, it is “plus large et plus compréhensive que la politesse,...”38 and incorporates a quality of morality as well as civility. Du Bosc’s usage intimates that honnêteté also incorporates a measure of wisdom, and especially of sanctity. The grafting of wisdom and sanctity onto virtue to produce the honnête homme or femme was undoubtedly the product of a range of elements: the questioning attitude of the so-called New Philosophy, the impact of Neo-platonic humanism, and the effect of the reforming Church.39 In this context the wider notion of honnêteté thus enabled Du Bosc to speak on several different levels simultaneously.

In the avertissement Du Bosc asserts that even in pagan times, the importance of religion in women’s education was recognized “… pour former une Honneste Femme en quelque siécle que se soit, on a deu luy desirer la Religion de son pays,...”40 In his own time Christianity, being the true religion, is all the more necessary. Christianity, however, is not the only source of inspiration. Those that he identifies as most influential in his thinking are drawn from both pagan and Christian traditions: Jerome, de Sales, Seneca and Plutarch.41 There is implicit in his arguments a second debate, that of the rigorists and the casuists. Du Bosc, reaching beyond the example of de Sales, advocates a society that, while founded on Christian principles, is also open to le monde. Recognizing that his readers would be engaged in the world, Du Bosc attempts to define the world in terms of the sacred. By contrast, de Sales advocated a certain distancing from the world and its temptations:

Les jeux, les bals, les festins, les pompes, les comédies, en leur substance, ne sont nullement choses mauvaises, ains indifférents, pouvant être bien et mal exercées; toujours néanmoins ces choses-la sont dangereuses, et de s’y affectionner cela est encore plus dangereuse.42

Du Bosc agrees to some extent but his rationale differs, for L’Honneste Femme is an ethical work, addressing morals and manners. However Du Bosc is also a theologian, and while addressing so-called secular life and its trials, he is constantly aware of the
theological implications of his statements.

The tradition of blending day-to-day occurrences with a theological perspective is already evident in the work of de Sales, and before him, in the work of the Jesuit Richeome.\textsuperscript{43} Richeome’s first work, Très humble remonstrance et requête des religieux de la Compagnie de Jésus, au roi très chrestien de France et de Navarre, Henri IV (1598), is an example of the reconciliation between, and the integration of ethics and theology. For, as Bremond remarks, “[a]vant eux, d’autres renaissants avient obligé Platon et Virgile à parler chrétien.”\textsuperscript{44} The reasoning can easily be labelled as casuistry, but that is too facile a resolution for questions of morality. Condemned by some as sophistry, it was also, however, an effective means to reconciling austere religious prescriptions with le mondain.

The first section of Part One of L’Honneste Femme is made up of the three chapters, entitled “De la Lecture,” “De la Conversation,” and “De l’Humeur gaye, et de la Melancolique.” In this section Du Bosc establishes a basis from which all activities may be measured. He argues that for women it is not only permissible to read and reason, but that it is an absolute necessity for them to attain these skills.\textsuperscript{45} Reading is a primary skill, so that the other skills, conversation and contemplation, can be brought into play. As reading is the mother of knowledge, judgement is the father. Reading serves for the acquisition of manners and fecundity of thought. It is useful as a distraction when others talk of hawks and hunting and the wars of the Netherlands. Finally, reading makes “la solitude moins ennuyeuse.” That he saw the need to defend even these uses of reading for women tells much about the disapproval the skill provoked. He returned to this subject later in “Des Dames Sçavantes,” which reiterates what is said in this first section.

Conversation was thought by some to be sufficient for gathering information and distraction. Du Bosc allows that the “bons esprits” and their conversation were necessary, but he does not agree that they were sufficient. The written word is more trustworthy: the reader is not prey to the charm of the speaker. He raises here a point that has been examined in respect to women artists.\textsuperscript{46} If there is only a patronizing criticism of one’s efforts,
with little analysis or guidance, little progress is made. Du Bosc concurs, finding in reading a possible substitute for acquiring critical and analytical skills as well as knowledge.\textsuperscript{47}

The posturing of "experts" is dealt with in short order. He warns of those who establish themselves as arbiters of taste and truth, calling to mind the advice of St. Jerome to Fulvia to limit herself to the Scriptures only. He concurs that it is more desirable to know a few books of quality well rather than many: "ce n'est pas estre moins riche, mais estre seulement moins embrouillé."\textsuperscript{48}

The difficulty of knowing what was worthwhile to read was further complicated by the numerous pamphlets available. His remarks about pamphlets suggest that he is referring to amatory poems, a popular subject. In a later context he uses the word to describe novels. There follows a difficult argument. The opening salvos are a recognition of the foolishness of the overly scrupulous who are fearful of profane works.\textsuperscript{49} These people would be afraid of virtue itself if they read of it in Plato or Socrates. As a justification for going to the ancients or any other source for knowledge, he cites a passage from Genesis, where the Hebrews robbed the temple of the Egyptians for their vessels.\textsuperscript{50} There is also the foolishness of the overly bold. Pamphlets contained a subtle poison, and the good they possessed was not worth risking the evil for "[I]a lecture de tant de choses lascives echauffe peu à peu, elle efface insensiblement la repugnance et l'horrer ... "\textsuperscript{51} The gravest danger was that not only did these acquaint the reader with evil; they also taught devious means to practise it and to sin cleverly. The temptation of forbidden fruit is both universal and timeless, and Du Bosc cautions accordingly.

Du Bosc stresses first reading, then conversation, recognizing that conversation is a principal means of communicating and an essential skill. Far more than entertainment, it is a primary method of acquiring knowledge and presenting oneself to the world. Consequently, discretion in one's manner and expression is as necessary as virtue. Du Bosc deals with the complexity of conversation and cites the criticisms that can be levelled against it. On the one hand, people can be criticized for being too simple and straightforward in their
speech. On the other, if they have conversational skills, they can be seen as too manipulative.\textsuperscript{52} As we have seen already in \textit{Le Philosophe indifférent}, Du Bosc effectively advocates an Aristotelian mean between these two extremes, though he only makes this explicit in the later philosophical work.

Du Bosc cites three qualities that Socrates wished in his disciples — discretion, silence, and modesty\textsuperscript{53} — pointing to the opposites for proof of their necessity: imprudence, babble, and impudence. However, these virtues should not be taken to excess: "Je n’aurais pas bonne grace, de vouloir composer la Conversation de personnes muettes."\textsuperscript{54} He recognizes that discretion is far more difficult than eloquence. Keeping secrets, hearing good advice, or gaining knowledge are all prevented when one babbles. The most telling comparison he makes is to butterflies, an analogy that is still current, for those unable to focus on a single topic, flitting from one idea to another.\textsuperscript{55} As with the chapter on reading, he moves from proving the value of virtue to pointing out the dangers of vice. Pamphlets, which posed such a threat to the reader, are here replaced by two sorts of people: the vicious and the ignorant. Prudence or practical intelligence is essential, for without it virtue fails. Those who have no means of judging individuals or conversation fall prey to conversation of the looser sort. Du Bosc stresses the danger of conversation with vicious or evil persons, citing the examples of Alcibiades,\textsuperscript{56} St. Mary the Egyptian,\textsuperscript{57} and finally Eve.\textsuperscript{58}

He lays blame on the ignorant for their state, but also on those who have withheld knowledge from women. His major criticism is levelled at the exclusivity of the universities and readers of Latin. Is not French a sufficient language?\textsuperscript{59} This rigidity in the stewardship of knowledge is reflected, says Du Bosc, in the manner many people adopt in conversation. While those who have not studied or read much are "veritablement stériles,"\textsuperscript{60} so, too, are some who are more learned. There is little order, flexibility, or transferability in what they know. When the conversation turns to a subject about which they know something, "... elles en veulent dire tout jusque aux marges, aux feuilllets, aux dates, et d’autres circonstances superfluës."\textsuperscript{61} His solution for these people — the observation could be made
of either sex — is to observe daily life. Again, Du Bosc’s primary emphasis rests upon the natural organic quality of daily life. He argues against the erection of conventions or rules into absolutes or blueprints, proposing instead that the natural gracefulness of integrated human emotion is the best guide to the understanding of manners. He proposes that l’honneste femme eliminate the façade and stilted convention in favour of the natural.62

The final chapter of the first section examines the humours63 and is introduced by this statement:

Il n’y a rien de plus nécessaire aux Dames pour la Conversation, que de bien conaitre leur humeur, afin de la reformer si elle est mauvaise, ou de la polir si elle est bonne. C’est le fondement de tout ce qu’il y a de plus important... 64

The admonitions of the previous two chapters would come to naught if an appropriate humour were not the foundation. The manner of argument used in this chapter sets the tone for the remainder of the book. Rather than espousing either melancholy or pleasant humours, Du Bosc argues both the benefits and drawbacks of each.65

Melancholy is described as the musings of those who travel in far lands, and compared to a maze wherein people become lost because they live so much in their imaginations and so are more susceptible to fear and despair, as well as to desire and sorrow. Being without heat, by which he means animation, they are to be pitied. Calling them “hypocondres,” Du Bosc questions their condemnation of pleasure, citing the “bonne humeur” of St. Elizabeth of Hungary, who was canonized despite the fact that she “ne refusoit point de danser.”66 He admonishes his readers to resist the fashionable reserve that would cast suspicion on pleasure.67 He also praises the rational judiciousness, constancy, modesty, a tireless seriousness, and patience of melancholy.68 Although the lighter humours are described as more graceful, kind, less forced, and innocent of devious designs and better received in company, the pleasant, too, have their drawbacks.69 The “humeurs gayes” easily descend to impiety and slander, making light of religion and reputations, and they are no more able to fend off unhappiness than the melancholy, as they are subject to explo-
sive behaviours. Where the melancholic resembles the Eagle of the Apocalypse with eyes hidden within, the pleasant person is compared to the Peacock who has colour and show only.

Throughout the chapter Du Bosc attempts to balance the excesses and defects of the two humours. Each has desirable qualities which need to be integrated. He stresses again the importance of wisdom and concludes the chapter (which also concludes the first section) by restating the importance of balance. This is achieved through the integration of the "good grace," or positive aspect, of each of the humours, in a passage which is typical of his search for balance:

... j'estime que comme l'entretien de la vie dépend du mélange du chaud & du froid: aussi toute la source de l'agréément [sic] & de la bonne grace, dépend du temperament de ces deux humeurs lors qu'elles se servent de remede à l'autre.

However, it is clear in this conclusion that this graceful, indeed delicate and subtle integration takes place not automatically but in the context of a new developing self-awareness which not only serves as integrating principle but brings about a transformation of the whole individual, form and content:

Car comme les Abeilles se doivent retirer pour former le miel, quand elles en ont cherché la matière sur les fleurs: aussi est-il nécessaire qu'après avoir veu plusieurs objets, nous r'entrons dans nous mesmes pour en tirer le fruct, & pour en faire des consequences.

In other words, this first section opens with ordinary manners and various temperaments and closes with the need for a balance between extremes which is capable of being integrated by a new developing capacity for self reflection.

The second section deals with the behaviours women should strive for and the difficulties they will encounter. Du Bosc here calls himself a casuist, not only for women, but for a right-minded attitude to life. Disdaining extremes, he supports neither the libertines who question everything, nor those who live entirely by the dictates of society. He recognizes that reputation may not accurately reflect character, since the reputation of an indi-
individual is based on the response of others to his or her behaviour. On the other hand, Du Bosc feels we should not cease to care about reputation, for some people model their lives by example rather than by prudence. He repeats his earlier criticism of the dourness of the age:

C'est le jugement des ignorans, qui croyent que la vertu doit toujours pleurer, et qui ne savent pas qu'il se faut donner de garde d'une humeur sombre, comme d'un temps couvert, et que de tous les esprit il n'y en point de meilleurs que les plus gayes.

This is a theme he returns to on a number of occasions. In the following chapter, "De l'Inclination à la Vertu, de la Devotion," he supplements this by identifying devotion as a characteristic of strength rather than of weakness, and he takes issue with those who would make their devotion a burden to themselves and to others. By devotion he means the proper observances of external rituals. Devotion is to be valued because of the joy it brings, not because of the misery. It is a quality to be integrated into one's life, and "n'est pas contraire à la civilité" in any way.

The need for balance demonstrated in this chapter is reiterated in the following, "De la Chasteté, et de la Complaisance," which argues that chastity is not a particularly feminine characteristic. Du Bosc maintains that married women should not become jailors of their husbands' virtue. He advocates chastity for both spouses, grounded in spiritual disposition rather than in physical conduct. He does, however, recognize human failings, and counsels constant vigilance, which may disarm any enemy.

His refusal to identify any virtue as specifically feminine or masculine is repeated in the following chapter, "Du Courage." Of women, he observes that

Les histoires sont pleines de leurs actions genereuses, pour la conservation de leur païs, pour l'amour de leurs maris, et pour la Religion de leurs ancestres.

He begins his argument by defining courage. It is not seeking out dangerous situations; that is simply rashness. Rather, courage is a virtue of freedom, unforced, and with a good
measure of prudence. Women are particularly disposed to courage as they have the appropriate temperature, neither too hot nor too cold. He illustrates his argument with numerous examples. Theoxene, choosing suicide and infanticide over submission, exhibited courage. He is quick to condemn suicide, drawing a distinction between resolution and courage. Suicide in the face of adversity, which we read of in the ancients, is not a courageous act but one of avoidance. His final observation in this section is that women, whether through resolution or courage, are more constant than men, for they have the example of the Three Marys of the New Testament. This sentiment is also the foundation of *La Femme héroïque*.

Constancy and loyalty are the subjects of the next chapter. In a rather convoluted argument he at first presents inconstancy and constancy as equally virtuous, equating inconstancy with flexibility and openness to change. Change is necessary in all things, even matters of the soul. He accuses men of falseness for labelling women's virtue as vice. Change, even necessary change, could be called inconstancy. Loyalty, even well-deserved, could be called obstinacy. He then discusses constancy as a virtue. As proof of the constancy of women, he refers to Pompeia, wife of Seneca, who committed suicide when her husband was condemned by Nero to commit suicide. In this chapter, as in others, Du Bosc draws the final and most powerful example from Scripture: the constancy of Mary Magdalene. Du Bosc repeatedly calls for prudence in the text, and deals with it directly in this chapter. Constancy must be guided by prudence, as he points out. In the chapter, "De la Prudence et de la Discretion," he claims that it is indeed the touchstone of all virtue: "... c'est la vertu qui leur est plus necessaire et qui leur donne plus d'authorité." Again, the graceful and harmonious link between the best elements of constancy and inconstancy is practical intelligence, or *phronēsis* in the Aristotelian and *prudentia* in the Thomistic traditions. For Aquinas, for instance, prudence is the major integrating virtue in so far as it is capable of providing both the most comprehensive and the most down-to-earth view of reality. Significantly, Du Bosc here indicates that this virtue is the most authoritative,
because it is the arbiter of the organic structure of the soul’s life. That women are capable of prudence, and exhibit it, leads him further to question their exclusion from government.

This chapter closes the second section of Part One; it contains the crux of his presentation and was also one of his motives for writing the book. He has, to this point, articulated desirable behaviours and attitudes not by isolating them as atomistic instances of conduct, or as responses to prescribed rules, but rather by situating them in the context of the virtues founded on prudence, which appears to be the self-determining basis for free, spontaneous, but intelligent and responsible action. At every turn he has called on prudence to be the arbiter. Prudence guides reading, conversation, and the development and improvement of one’s humour. A prudent woman guards her tongue and so demonstrates discretion, silence and modesty in conversation. She chooses her reading with care and discrimination; she moderates her temperament and balances her humours. The authority that Du Bosc is suggesting to guide behaviour is certainly not an external set of rules, but rather a much more subtle means of determining behaviour.

"Des Dames Sçavantes" is a restatement of the need for the skills he encourages: constancy, prudence, devotion, etc. The first section is a detailed description of these skills; the second illustrates how they enable one to develop desirable virtues. Before beginning the final section — on those behaviours to be avoided — this chapter reiterates the reasons set out earlier. Du Bosc restates the need for literacy and condemns those who would prevent it. He would extend literacy and opportunity to all women, even a married woman to better care for her children and home. In this he is espousing the cause of the dévôtes who advocated the knowledgeable practice of the faith. It was the aim of many educators, and Du Bosc is in agreement, that religious observance be incorporated into civilité. Thus a mother needs the knowledge both for her own development and for her role as primary educator of her children.

The final section of Part One deals in the main with behaviour in society. Du Bosc’s manner of exposition — presenting both sides — is convoluted and confusing. This was,
perhaps, his means of introducing complexity of argument to his readers. It might also have been a reaction to the multitude of stresses in society at that time, notably the tension between the extremes of the popular aristocratic ideal and a balanced moderation. The reader is never certain whether he is simply reluctant to set down absolute rules or whether he is unable to do so. In light of later works and in accordance with the argument of the present chapter, it is more likely that he consciously refrained from setting absolute rules, for to do so would have restricted choices and consequently the value of those choices. It becomes obvious that the criticisms encountered in the preface concerning the difficulty of the work were not unfounded. The work is decidedly clumsy as Du Bosc attempts to satisfy the expectations of the devout as well as the reader predisposed to le monde.

"Des Habits ou des Ornamens" takes a different view from that which might be expected of a moralist. Du Bosc feels that to resist fashion would be foolish. Idealizing the ancient world, if taken to its logical extreme, would result in the emulation of Adam and his animal skins. As in all other manners, prudence and simplicity should rule. "De la Beauté," the following chapter, continues in the same vein. Beauty is a gift from God and must be recognized as such. Beauty may indicate a natural disposition to the good ("[e]t certes il faut que ce soit une marque de l'incidence que nous avons au bien")

Everyone is drawn to beauty as to the good (a common Neo-platonic view which Du Bosc mentions specifically at the beginning of the chapter). Contrary to the view of "le vulgaire," there is no opposition between beauty and virtue: "... veritablement si la vertu est necessaire pour l'establissement des autoritez souveraines, au moins la beaute y semble bien seante." Here again the interrelation of beauty, virtue, authority, and sanctity (which for Du Bosc is a function or consequence of grace and nature in cooperation) is explicitly stated. At the same time, he recognizes at the opposite pole the danger of beauty and, using the polite analogy of a town under siege, blames not the beauty but the spirit for falling to the enemy. This allusion to illicit seduction, or the failure of the spirit, as it were, to organize the flesh vitally, is also an apt analogy for society. By abandoning the guidance of authority, society
was in danger of falling prey to isolation, fragmentation, and vice. His observation about
the artifice of sham beauty is telling:

... les beautes feintes tombent honteusement à la veue de tout le monde presque
de la mesme façon que ces fausses Etoiles, les quelles apres avoir abusé nos yeux
quelque temps, nous montrent par leur cheute, que nous prenions une vapeur
pour un Astre.⁹⁷

The two conditions of true, healthy beauty, and sham or illusory beauty are so alike that
unfortunately the difference between them can only be diagnosed in the different
consequences of each. In the first case, true beauty, in Du Bosc’s view, depends upon the
authority of its organizing principle; in the second case, which may look almost identical,
there is no integrity or authority, but merely “une vapeur’ instead of a cosmic divinity, “un
Astre.”

In the following chapter, “De la Curiosité et de la Médisance,” the constant theme of
discretion or discrimination is raised again. Du Bosc distinguishes between a “divine
curiosité” that prompts the inquiry of philosophers and scientists, and common curiosity.⁹⁸ He
condemns the second sort, as it is often vicious and prevents self-awareness. The pattern he
discerns is that of a woman who is imprudent and cannot abide in silence. The need to have
news, and to share it, leads inevitably to slander. He draws an apt parallel between slander
and flattery, finding a lack of courage in each. In the first instance, it is the inability to
excuse faults; in the second, it is the failure to speak honestly. The solution he offers is
simply to hold one’s countenance and refrain from such conversation.⁹⁹

The following chapter, “Des Cruelles et des Pityables,” again presents a convoluted
argument that reveals Du Bosc as an apologist as much as a casuist. As in the examination
of constancy, where inconstancy was found also to have value, so too does deferred re-
venge. Du Bosc argues that revenge held in abeyance to be later exercised with greater
strength shows, perhaps, a just passion. He presents it as no longer petty malice but thoughtful
righteousness. “Les Esprits mediocres,” he observes, are easily appeased. In these, as in
earlier pages, Du Bosc not only typically charts a course between Aristotelian extremes of excess and defect, but also clearly anticipates the later Hegelian technique of discerning even in privative circumstances, or in apparently straightforward ‘evil’ archetypal traits, early primitive glimmerings of later more intelligible archetypes or manifestations of Spirit. Du Bosc also indicates an admiration for extremes, common to his age, for he virtually excuses revenge though later he begs the reader to understand that “je soumets toujours ma Morale au Christianisme” and that he admires only the constancy of the vengeful. He argues against the error of revenge, and calls on compassion, knowledge, and courage.

From such disreputable behaviour he turns again to virtue in an important chapter, “De la Bonne Grace.” Women, he says, seem to possess this quality naturally. “Veritablement il semble que cette agréable qualité, (i.e, la bonne grace) soit naturelle aux femmes, et qu’elles la possèdent quasi sans peine et sans étude.” Social grace is necessary for harmonious life in society.

L’Ame n’est pas plus nécessaire pour vivre que la bonne grace pour agréer: elle donne de l’esclat aux belles & diminué du deffaut de celles qui ne le sont point: Depuis qu’on possede cette aymable qualité, tout ce qu’on entreprend est bien seant & agréable.

Although grace is a natural quality, at the same time, it has règles and loix; for just as “la beauté du corps dépend en quelque chose de celle de l’esprit,” so the laws of grace are intimately linked to morality. To preserve bonne grace, one must know how to “... régler les movements de l’ame aussi bien que ceux de corps.”

He argues next that the most important first rule is to avoid not only unnatural artifice and constraint but also the striving for an impossible excellence or expending too much effort, for in such cases, no matter how worthy, hate and not love is the result. Naivety, by which Du Bosc seems to mean unaffected natural simplicity, is the best rule of thumb: “... comme la contrainte déplait dans les plus belles actions, la naïveté agréée dans les moindres;” for naivety is a reflection of the ‘good grace’ which does everything “par
nature et sans étude" — naturally and effortlessly. This profound simplicity eliminates
vanity. For Du Bosc the opposite of simplicity is duplicity: “il n’y a rien qu’on doive tant
eviter que le trop d’artifice à [sic] contrainte.”106 He finds the source for this in the exces-
sive desire to please, which is often the fault of the environment. If women are educated to
be nothing more than decorative, they are little better than slaves.

Du Bosc’s advocacy of education and self-awareness is a bid to free women from that
servitude and to enable them to develop a conscious moral sense. In his view, there is
evidently a connection between gracefulness in action and the virtue of honnêteté. L’honneste
Femme is by definition free because her educated inclinations (i.e. developed nature) bring
her actions within her own power. In contrast,

Celles qui sont élevées dans l’esclavage, ne sçavroient rien faire avec liberté;
elles n’oseroient hausser la veuë avec cette honnête assurance, qui done de la
grace aux actions: leurs pensées sont toujours basses et quelque bonne inclina-
tion qu’elles puissent avoir, la honte et l’ignorance les empeschent de reüssir
dans leurs entreprises.107

The chapter on “La Desbauchée” deals with promiscuous women and their ability to
mask their obscenity as love. Promiscuity draws others to sin and substitutes physical
concerns for intellectual and spiritual pursuits. Du Bosc admits to a certain difficulty in
dealing with the subject because of modesty, although he condemns these unfortunate
women in the true sense:

C’est un feu d’enfer qui a pour fumée l’aveuglement, pour eclat le scandal, et
pour cendre l’infamie et la honte. Et comment leur sale desire se pourroit-il
nommer amour puis qu’au lieu d’élection, il n’y a plus qu’une brutalité
universelle?108

Du Bosc uses analogy and example to make his point. He parallels these “vitieuses” with
the sirens, luring sailors to their death.109 He sees in them a spiral of self-hatred for their
own hypocrisy and hatred of others for following their example. To emphasize the horror
of these women he concludes as follows: “... que le pinceau me tombe de la main: ayant
trop de colere et trop peu d’injures, pour achever cette piece avec des couleurs assez noires.”110

This level of horror appears to be prompted not simply because of their ill manners, but much more because of the sinful states in which these women live.

The final chapter of the section, “De la Jalousie,” again shows the apologist, not only for women but for human frailties. Du Bosc understands the need to guard what we love:

Y a-t-il tant d’offence à veiller pour la garde de ce qu’on ayme, principalement dans un temps où la fidelité est si rare, ... ?111

But to guard and protect something can easily slip into jealous protectionism, which he condemns. Du Bosc’s ultimate example, the moral to be drawn from rejecting jealousy, is that of Joseph on the pregnancy of Mary “... il vaut mieux en cette extremité croire un miracle qu’un peché, et advoquer la puissance de Dieu, et que la foiblesse d’une creature.”112

The conclusion of the text, “De l’Amitié, et de l’Amour d’Inclination et d’Eslection,” draws together the principal threads of the book in his treatment of love. Again, contrary views are presented through example and analogy: eslection is generative and constant like the sun; inclination is reflective and variable like the moon. The intensity and passion of both approaches are defined and defended. Du Bosc recognizes the intensity of desire that inclination produces and deals at length with the irresistible nature of passionate love; however, this love is also dangerous and can lead to regret. Conversely, eslection, grounded in considered dispassionate judgement, lacks fervour. One of the many analogies he uses to demonstrate the value of passion is the story of Solomon. Two women each claim a child as their own, the mother whose love for the child was instinctual (i.e. passionate) withdrew her claim to spare the child’s life.113 Du Bosc’s solution is again to combine the two in a moderated balance114 as he did when addressing grace in “de la Bonne Grace.” Grace, he argued, was the product of nature and a reflective morality, and he maintains that love is best understood as both natural affection and esteem based on reflection.115 Du Bosc concludes by situating the whole discussion in a larger context of self and love, in which the Jewish and
Christian traditions are implicitly united in the images of the Ark of the Covenant and an (unspecified) episcopal authority who appears to be St. Augustine:

Comme l’Arche estoit entre deux Cherubins, il faut que Dieu se trouve entre deux coeurs, qui s’entr’ayment: ce doit estre là le noed de nos amitiez, pour les rendre fortes et raisonnables. Et pour en parler avec ce grand Evesque qui a si divinement écrit de cette matiere, l’amour est plus louable en terre, à mesure qu’il est plus semblable à celui qu’on se porte dans le Ciel.116

In both this chapter on love, and the earlier chapter on grace, Du Bosc’s addresses social graces and sexual love but he is at pains to demonstrate that these are both grounded in a wider meaning of both grace and love. Just as prudence guides the development and expression of grace, so too the moral character of the lover, and the loved one, are integral to a true and lasting love. In Le Philosophe indifferent Du Bosc’s aim was to find a middle ground between extremes and the same approach is used in L’Honneste Femme. In both works he shows how grace is manifested in all aspects of nature, and through reason and ultimately through formal Christianity.

In this early work, then, Du Bosc presented women as part of a larger society. He believed them to be as capable as men of controlling their passions and coming to an intelligent basis for moral and virtuous behaviour. The argument is often tenuous and convoluted but it is unlikely that it presented any major difficulty for integration into contemporary life. Its efficiency is rather to be seen in its providing a rationale for the development of behaviours within a much larger context than simply that of manners or apparent frivolities. Du Bosc’s implicit thesis appears to be that there are no independent mores outside of the context of what it means to be human, and that this essential humanity must naturally include different sorts of related gracefulness which lead to prudence, friendship and love. However, Du Bosc is clearly challenging a narrow and fragmented view of society as well as the view which limits authority to the nature of man alone. He effectively argues that if we are to get a proper grasp of nature, one must first extend this concept to everything in human nature (that is, to women and also to the apparently inconsequential
elements in daily female commerce) and second, one must provide an articulated understanding of how such nature fits into a coherent account of cultural, moral, intellectual, and spiritual behaviours. If one reads only the early edition, the assessment of this work as primarily a book of manners may seem to hold true, for Du Bosc’s advocacy of reading, conversation and moderated behaviour are more easily seen as social accomplishments alone. In the later editions, however, Du Bosc provides explicitly a larger context (presumably developed in light of his philosophical work *Le Philosophe indifferente*). By 1647 he had added two further sections, each as long as the original text. These sections are reiterations and expansions of the same ideas, but serve to bind them more closely to his understanding of right behaviour. As we have seen, this right behaviour is far more than simple social nicety. But in the later editions, Du Bosc adds an explicit theological dimension, which in his view augments his notion of the authority of the moral, intellectual and spiritual dimensions, for he grounds his analysis (as in *Le Philosophe indifferente*) on natural law fulfilled in divine revealed law. As a consequence appropriate social law (the venue of manners) becomes explicitly an integral reflection of both natural and divine law. Here the analysis employed to illustrate the relations between nature and grace elsewhere, are pressed to similar service: to demonstrate, first, the necessary compatibility between *civilité* and *la piété de Dieu* and, second, the organization of the life of the soul under the authority of Christian *vertu*, which, as we have seen throughout, is informed or infused by grace (note that the word *infuse* is, as elsewhere, prominently employed in the passage below). While admitting that galiantry, airs and studied posture are necessary in social life, they are only, so to speak, “les ongles & les cheveux” of the honest man and the honest woman. In order to gain real respect, one must have prudence, which is based on reflective morality.

... comme on ne peut acquérir cette estime dans l’un ny dans l’autre sexe, sans avoir de la prudence: aussi est-t’il impossible qu’il y ait de la prudence sans probité, ny de probité, sans Morale. C’est le fondement de tous mes discours, & ce doit estre celuy de tous les desseins.”
The morality of which Du Bosc speaks is grounded in Christian virtue.

La vertu Christienne apporte le mesme advantage aux vertus Morales, que l’ame raisonnable aux ames grossieres & corporelles, qu’elle rencontre quand elle est infuse.\textsuperscript{118}

The necessity of obedience, based on Christian teachings, to societal stability is paramount, for, according to Du Bosc, Christian teachings validate the whole. He was aware of the pressures on society that were undermining the traditional hierarchical structures and sought to entrench these structures by reasserting the importance of its foundation: empowering grace.

La lumiere de la grace supplée aux éclipses de la raison ; elle l’empesche d’estre errante et vagabonde; elle luy donne des ternes et des limites qui ne luy ostent pas sa liberté, mais seulement son incertitude; qui ne l’empeschent pas d’agir, mais de saillir.\textsuperscript{119}

Recognizing these things, he did not counsel the rejection of pleasure or the austerity of Jansenism. In this matter he was echoing Richeome and De Sales: our humanity is a gift to delight in, not something to be rejected as unholy.

There are no references to the Catholic Church in these chapters, for Du Bosc prefers to justify his observations by obvious good sense. To give weight to an argument or to condemn a position he often quotes François de Sales, and frequent reference is made to Scripture, but on the subject of morality or ethics the Ancients are referred to as often as the Fathers. Du Bosc drew upon numerous classical, and occasionally biblical, sources to argue for and against a range of emotions and postures. He justifies his views as much by example as by reasoned argument. He illustrates his points through examples found in mythology, history, and occasionally daily life, thus strengthening authoritative tradition.

This approach may be a result of the genre; but it is also a function of Du Bosc’s education. Theology was divided into two distinct branches, positive and scholastic theology. Positive theology concentrated on biblical study and church history, touching on ethics and morality as they were relevant to changing social milieux. Scholastic theology was
divided into dogmatic and moral. Dogmatic theology specifically addressed doctrinal questions; moral theology explored the appropriate Christian response to moral dilemmas.¹²⁰ With an undergraduate degree from the Sorbonne, Du Bosc would have only studied thoroughly a single division of theology, and by his sources and approach it would appear his area was moral theology.¹²¹ *L’Honneste Femme* and *La Femme héroïque* obviously belong to the genre of ethics; and as we have seen, it is an ethical principle mistakenly elevated to the status of a hypercriterion which is also at the root of *Le Philosophe indéfendu*. Du Bosc then is already developing in these works an ethic that was popularly acceptable to Christian theology.

Du Bosc was also concerned with preaching and, as the title *prédicateur* indicates, he was recognized for this skill. His translations of d’Avendano and Mautini are further indications of this apparent interest, which allows a second means for understanding his work. As a *prédicateur* he would naturally be knowledgeable of current form. Rhetoric was an essential part of classical education and was incorporated into sermons, both written and presented. Many of the handbooks used were composed of passages from Quintilian, Cicero and Aristotle.¹²² The French bishops, following the Council of Trent, were quite clearly aware of the need to improve the quality of preaching, as their decrees addressing the subject suggested.¹²³

Du Bosc’s knowledge of rhetoric is apparent in *Nouveau recueil des lettres des dames de ce temps. Avec leurs responses* and so this work can also be taken as more than simply a style book. I shall briefly comment on this work before taking up the later *La Femme héroïque*. The dedication, to Madame Puysieulx,¹²⁴ is not unusual in its fulsome praise for a lady well connected to the court. It contains, as do all other works by Du Bosc, the Privilège du Roy. There is an anonymous *Avertissement* by “un des amis de celuy qui a fait ce Recueil.” The purpose of the work is to demonstrate the knowledge and accomplishments of women in the realm of letters and scholarship, and to provide a pattern of appropriate style and content.
In this book Du Bosc proposes a role for women that may appear superficially to be the same as that enshrined in tradition: the role of a chaste and graceful individual, but it is a role nonetheless with a different basis. He proposes the intelligent informed acceptance of duty and responsibility instead of a mindless acceptance of what is imposed. The end may be much the same, for Du Bosc seldom mentions, and never questions, the occupation of his readers, and though he raises the possibility of women in public life he does not dwell on it. However, he envisions a society in which all actions are to be well thought out and all tasks undertaken voluntarily without coercion either by political or by religious authority.

*La Femme héroïque, ou les héroïnes comparées avec les héros en toute sorte de vertus,* places the debate on morality in a much broader chronological and cultural context. In this book Du Bosc takes up and develops fully the heroic ideal that played a limited, though important part of *L'Honneste Femme. La Femme héroïque* was completed by Du Bosc in 1645, years after his initial contribution to the *Querelle des Femmes.* The intervening years, from 1632 to 1645, had been occupied with translating sermons, and composing the biography of a Franciscan martyr, François Bel (discussed in the appendix) and *Le Philosophe indifferen.* When he returned to the study of women it was with a larger understanding of the impact the individual had on society. Like the two previous works that deal exclusively with women, *La Femme héroïque* also attempts to place women on a par with men in terms of courage, nobility of purpose, and self-sacrifice. But unlike in the earlier works, Du Bosc is more concerned here with the integrity of the individual. The stated intent of the work is to find examples of virtue and moral excellence in both Ancient and Christian writings. These examples are to serve as models to contemporary women in their own pursuit of excellence. In accomplishing his purpose, Du Bosc provides a means of assessing contemporary society. As in earlier works, he identifies an order that is reflected in natural law and presages revealed Old Testament and New Testament formulations. He questions and analyzes the norms of behaviour and the accepted terms of reference. But, as has been pointed out, Du Bosc is primarily concerned with the *femme forte.* The lessons to
be derived are not for the faint-hearted, but rather for those who are ready to undertake a difficult life. If the reader of *L'Honneste Femme* was advised to live nobly and avoid the occasion of sin, the reader of *La Femme heroïque* is advised to live heroically and seek out occasions of virtue. What appears to have occupied Du Bosc in the intervening years is the genuine question of how ordinary morality is related to heroic morality. It might be argued that there was much at stake for Du Bosc in this question beyond its academic interest, for Jansenism in this period emphasized the need for heroic morality and the rejection of any other serious considerations. Du Bosc’s purpose, therefore, in *La Femme héroïque* seems to have been at least in part to demonstrate the heroism of ordinary life — even ordinary pagan life, as opposed to the apparent Christian exclusivity of the Jansenist heroic ideal. Again, what clearly underpins Du Bosc’s preoccupation here is the need for the integration of nature and grace as opposed to the destruction of nature in favour of some heroic, but ethereal view of grace.

The structure of the book is simple. After the dedicatory letters to Anne of Austria and (in volume two) Maria Henrietta, come the *privilège du Roi* and letters of approbation of the *Docteurs et Gardien du Grand Couvent*. There follows an introductory book that sets out his general argument. Eight further books then deal with specific views of women and their accomplishments; each is a study of individuals drawn alternatively from ancient pagan and Jewish writings. The work is essentially one of comparisons, useful in that the examples are both proofs and models of behaviour. It is evident that Du Bosc was intimate with the work of the Greek author Plutarch, for his work is closely based on it. The choice of individuals throughout the book and the sources he cites also indicate his breadth of knowledge and his ability to read both Latin and Greek.

The initial argument and justification are simply that he seeks to discover the common element in heroic virtue of all ages, which has been traditionally viewed as something ‘divine’ (he cites Aristotle in support of this). He excludes Christian examples entirely and instead compares great Old Testament Jewish figures, on the one hand, (cf. Mosaic Law)
and pagan Graeco-Roman heroes, on the other (cf. natural law). The ‘divine’ heroic quality should therefore emerge without the denominational blinkers. One must, he says, not look at the name Vertu heroïque alone or even the principle, but look at the thing itself and what it signifies:

... ce n’est pas assez d’examiner [son] Nom, ou son Principe, il faut la voir dans elle mesme, dans sa vraye nature, & dans son essence; il faut voir la chose que ce nom signifie, & l’effet que ce principe produit.\footnote{128}

A brief outline of the book is given: he will explain the excellence of heroic virtues and “ce qu’elles ont de plus grand et de plus divin que les autres vertus Morales.”\footnote{129} Men and women are equally capable of achieving this heroism, and Plutarch’s model is most appropriate for this exercise.

Chapters One and Two are devoted to defining and enriching the meaning of heroïque, which he equates with magnanime. He approaches the word from several perspectives.

Etymologically, heroes or heroines are

des personnes qui sont à moitié divines, et à moitié humaines, soit de l’un ou de l’autre sexe; parce que les Anciens ont reconnu des Heroïnes entre les femmes, aussi bien que des Heros parmy les hommes.\footnote{130}

In the same way, heroic virtue has something more than human.

Les vertus ordinaires ne meritent pas ce nom d’heroïque, il n’appartient qu’à ces grandes et extraordinaires, qui ont quelque chose de plus qu’humain, et qui ont en partage la grandeur et la hauteur, que nous appelons degré heroïque.\footnote{131}

This quality refines and elevates humanity to the rank of angels, rather than being simply a refinement of manners or civility.\footnote{132} The principle of Vertu Heroïque is founded in “le grand coeur.” His sources for this interpretation are the writings of Aristotle,\footnote{133} and the concept as further affirmed by Aquinas.\footnote{134} Although magnanimity is the primary source of this strength, two further virtues are necessary: charity and prudence. Prudence orients the moral virtues and informs temperament and conduct. Charity informs the Christian virtues,
and magnanimity strengthens both. Magnanimity alone is not enough, for without wisdom and love it would produce tyranny.¹³⁵

Chapters Three and Four are devoted to the legitimacy of comparing men and women. Women, Du Bosc feels, may aspire to *Vertu Heroïque*, as do men. To reinforce this point he calls on the Fathers of the Church, specifically St. Ambrose’s comments on Deborah, Basil on Eve, and Clement of Alexandria generally. Deborah was chosen among the Israelites above all other men and women. Arguing for the equality of achievement, Du Bosc cites St. Basil as further justification:

> Que l’image de Dieu soit également honorée en l’un et l’autre sexe: que tous deux aspirent également à la vertu, et que l’un et l’autre tesmoignent par les actions et par les effets cette premiere viguer, & cette semence naturelle qui leur est donnée pour leur bien.¹³⁶

As further reinforcement from the Church Fathers, he cites Clement’s *Pedagogue Chrestien* which was addressed to both men and women. If women are obliged to obey the same laws as men, and if they are to suffer the same punishments as men, then they are capable of the same achievements. Along with this reasoning, Du Bosc directs the reader to look at history. The past is peopled with individuals capable of *Vertu Héroïque*. Du Bosc looked to his own time in the same manner as Plutarch who found that, among the Romans, women were given the same honours because of equal achievement.¹³⁷

Chapters Five and Six are devoted to an analysis of Plutarch’s reasoning and its appropriateness in this instance. Du Bosc seeks to find a balance between the two sexes rather than elevating one at the expense of the other, for “chaque sexe a ses avantages particuliers.”¹³⁸ He does not present men and women as equally competent or gifted in all areas, but recognizes that both have their own qualities that are necessary for harmony. He recognizes that, traditionally, men were thought to have a greater inclination to valour, but throughout the remainder of the book he demonstrates that many women were equally capable of it. He implies that, in contemporary society, opportunities for men and women
to express excellence vary. One can conclude then that Du Bosc saw a gap between what was socially acceptable and what was possible, even desirable, and he employs models from non-Christian cultures to indicate the continuing serious defect in an apparently Christian milieu.

Simply to identify women’s virtues is too broad and too open to debate: thus the comparative method is used. Additionally, the comparisons must be factual, for even though the entertaining is often the most instructive, it is necessary to base one’s argument on firm ground. The eight comparisons themselves are extremely detailed. Within each book there is a common pattern. The first chapter presents the argument, the reason for choosing the individuals examined and a précis of the virtue examined. Generally each pair of individuals is used to illustrate a single virtue. This is followed by a series of chapters that examine their stories, detailing specific incidents and the honours accorded them. The conclusion of each book is another series of chapters, Reflexions Morales, on the lessons to be derived by the reader. These comprise various lessons, interpretations, and applications of the virtues and failings of the individuals. To illustrate the techniques it is sufficient to examine in detail a single book from each of the Jewish and pagan perspectives. The purpose of this development is to link the apparently abstract ideal to the story of an individual. In most instances the historical situation demanded the refinement of virtue to overcome an individual or her enemy’s vice. The reflections then allow the reader to integrate the abstract with the concrete story and gauge the value of virtue in a particular instance.

Book Three, “Thomyris Reyne des Scythes et des Massagetes comparée à Cyrus Roy des Mèdes et des Perses,” is one of the pairs I have chosen from the pagans. Thomyris was chosen, we are told, because of her great accomplishments and magnanimity. The sources Du Bosc uses most often in this section are Justin and Herodotus, for both describe the events to which he refers, namely the battle and eventual defeat of Cyrus at the hands of Thomyris.
Du Bosc begins by first analyzing the motives of both parties.\textsuperscript{141} Cyrus was already recognized as a great conqueror (though not the greatest, for Du Bosc cites Plutarch’s description of Alexander as the perfect conqueror), but his desire to conquer the Scythians was fired because they were “une Nation la plus beliqueuse du monde.”\textsuperscript{142} Thomyris’s initial resistance was motivated not by colère but by politique, prompted by wisdom. Cyrus assumed that when battle was engaged, he would be successful. Because of his readiness for battle, Thomyris’s sex, and the fact that her son was too young to lead an army, Cyrus looked forward to an easy conquest.

These comparisons address military strategy, the response to defeat, disinterested courage, how ordinary life prepares one for extraordinary events,\textsuperscript{143} the importance of patience, clemency, virtues and finally the role of providence. In each case Du Bosc weighs the motivations, choices and response of both individuals. He is critical of both individuals, though more so of Cyrus than of Thomyris for he casts her in a defensive stance and sees Cyrus as the aggressor. He offers an apology, for example, for Thomyris’ actions after her military victory when she called for Cyrus’ head to dip in a basin filled with blood, thus sating Cyrus’ appetite for blood. Du Bosc presents Thomyris’s actions as politically expedient in discouraging other princes, although the event is treated with horror.

One might well assume that Du Bosc has adopted the heroic aristocratic ethic as described by Paul Benichou:

La substitution, comme valeur suprême, d’une puissance morale hors d’atteinte à la puissance physique menacée, de l’attitude du défi à celle du succès, sert en tous cas de point de départ à toute la métaphysique spiritualiste de l’orgueil.\textsuperscript{144}

Looking only at \textit{La Femme heroïque} one might agree for his heroes and heroines fit this model. However, taking \textit{L’Honneste Femme} and \textit{Le Philosophe indifférent} into account, one can see that Du Bosc’s argument, while distinguishing between ordinary and heroic morality, supports a continuous development in such a way that the heroic aristocratic ideal is not seen as foreign to nature but a natural expression of human potential. The ideal
and the ordinary are therefore distinct, but interrelated, for the aristocratic ethic must be grounded in nature. Both ordinary and heroic ideals, as Du Bosc has demonstrated in *L'Honneste Femme* and *Le Philosophe indifferrent*, are moderated, balanced, prudent and naturally accessible to both the pre-Christian and Chrisitan individual. His emphasis on moral education and the ethical formation and implementation of this knowledge in all aspects of life bears this.

The *Reflexions morales* which follow these comparisons develop two themes in a further series of eight chapters. The first theme is tragedy; Du Bosc uses the experience and reactions of Thomyris to explicate the right attitude to tragic events in our lives. The second is greed. Cyrus’s greed for power becomes an example of what happens when no limits are imposed by either individual or society. Again, Du Bosc’s purpose is to attempt to eliminate private prejudices, religious, cultural or historical, by seeking out a common structure of action and heroism which may form part of the basis for a public debate rather than exclusive individual appropriation. For Du Bosc, therefore, the moral life, as well as the life of faith, is an implicitly public landscape, not a private preserve.

Thomyris’s resistance is the source of her strength in fighting despair. Rather than attempting to assuage her grief, she used it to fuel her determination in the battle that lay ahead of her. The activity was a *vraye médecine*, for any other diversions would only be temporary. Du Bosc develops this theme in as detailed a manner as the comparisons preceding this section. He examines the manners in which grief is commonly dealt with: the passage of time, diversion, reason, and religion. The most desirable is religion “... qui gormande la douleur, et qui parle en maistre.”¹⁴⁵ Thomyris, denied this solace, was wise in choosing reason. The question Du Bosc poses is how one is to deal with death. His answer is pragmatic, comparing reason and grief:

"A bien regarder la douleur de tous costez, je ne voy pas par où elle peut sembler belle, si ce n’est celle de la penitence. Mais qu’elle est differente de l’autre, puis qu’elle resuscite les morts, et que l’autre fait mourir les vivans, puis que l’une rend l’innocence, et que l’autre ne fait rien qu’augmenter notre malheur."¹⁴⁶
It is apparent that Du Bosc approves of the actions of Thomyris; if we extrapolate from this, we can conclude that all women have the ability to behave in like manner, demonstrating great nobility and purpose. Other women are cited — Judith, Deborah, Zenobia — who have led armies and performed heroic deeds. The reader is reminded, however, that men are men and women are women, and both have their sphere. Du Bosc compares virtues to a tree; to plant a tree in strange soil may damage it. Though the Amazons were capable of war and chastity, they were born and bred to it. In instances where men lack the courage to carry out their responsibilities, women, Du Bosc allows, are called to act. In other instances, where one usurps the virtues of the other, such actions may distort nature.

[p]arce qu'affecter les vertus d'un autre sexe, c'est une espece d'usurpation, qui n'est permise qu'avec beaucoup de temperament et de sobriété. Il en faut user comme par privilege, et non par proprieté. C'est la Prudence qui sçait y mettre des bornes, c'est la directrice des autre vertus....

Again, in order to remedy the distorting imbalances of extreme situations, Du Bosc emphasizes the necessity of a more comprehensive, integralist approach or, in other words, the need for prudence, which provides organization and direction to the complex of other virtues. As we have seen in the Christian context of *L'Honneste Femme*, prudence is also to be informed by charity and grace. Here, in the pagan context of *La Femme héroïque*, the presence of grace remains implicit in the need for directive, naturally compensating, prudence.

The blame for Thomyris's tragedy is set squarely on the shoulders of Cyrus and his greed for power. This second theme is elaborated specifically in the example of Cyrus and generally in the section subtitled "Deux Reynes leur enseignent la vraye Morale." Three vices — "la Volupté, l’Ambition et l’Avarice" — are linked respectively with animal, demon, and man. Cyrus provides an example of the folly of man’s greed and Thomyris the peace of contentment.
The general observations are interesting, for he feels it is necessary to limit the ambition of princes. If false and corrupt philosophers praise conquerors, how is this limiting to be done? Du Bosc presents the words of a living monarch to the dead as prophetic. The first is Nitorius to Darius\textsuperscript{148} and the second is Thomyris to Cyrus. In both cases unwarranted aggression ends in failure.

The section on Thomyris and Cyrus is concluded by Du Bosc’s observations on the freedom that is granted the magnanimous. They have no need to be secretive but are open in all their actions as Thomyris was in her dealings with Cyrus. But, as in so many of Du Bosc’s observations, there is a hidden contradiction: there are occasions when we respond to the loudest rather than the wisest advice. On some occasions secrecy can be desirable if the purpose is honourable. Again, it is the balance achieved by moderating prudence which permits magnanimous freedom. The final observation echoes the wheel of fortune that spins then stops. Long-lasting good fortune is bound to end; therefore, moderation during the good times and patience during the bad are called for.

This is the pattern and specificity of each of the comparisons in the book. In Book Two, Deborah’s\textsuperscript{149} bravery after twenty years of subservience is compared to Joshua’s\textsuperscript{150} lifetime of battle. Merit is found in each, though the humility of Deborah, echoed in that of Barach,\textsuperscript{151} is the central theme. Book Four compares the loss of Salomone, mother of the seven Maccabees,\textsuperscript{152} and the threatened loss of Abraham.\textsuperscript{153} Abraham, directed by God to sacrifice his child, is understood to have suffered less than Salomone, who exhorted her seven sons to martyrdom at the hands of Eleazar. Du Bosc in praising the nobility and sacrifice of Salomone examines the concepts of an \textit{éducation héroïque} and comments on the transcendent qualities of nobility itself.

Education is a necessity for Christians, according to Du Bosc, who cites three aspects of such education. The first is nature, a recognition of the capacity of the students. The second is reason, or knowledge of doctrine. The third is usage, the familiarity with correct behaviour. The progress of education is compared to that of a garden: capacity is the soil,
reason and knowledge are inculcated by the gardener, and the content is the seeds which are sown and will grow and blossom. Du Bosc argues, however, that Christian mothers are able to teach their children more effectively because of essentials that were denied Pagan and Jewish mothers: the perfection of Christianity, knowledge of original sin, and the grace that is forthcoming in Baptism and the other sacraments.\textsuperscript{154}

Of the nobility he is critical — not of the institution itself but of the behaviour of the nobles. Du Bosc believes that nobility was initially granted because it was deserved, and he sees irony in the fact that the derogation of the nobility is attendant not upon oppression or cowardice, but on commerce. The roturiers, drawn by the noble ideal, strive for something grand. True nobility — that which was inculcated by Salomone in her sons — made them plus constans à souffrir, plus animés contre les Tryans, plus ennemys de la vanité, et plus zelez pour la Loy.\textsuperscript{155}

In Book Five Portia and Brutus are presented as examples to develop the theme of generosity in marriage and the importance of mutual respect. Brutus kept from Portia the plot to kill Caesar; she did find out before the event, and her reaction was to stab herself to prove her courage. Du Bosc forgives her this act of violence, but cautions that it could have been avoided had Brutus respected the ability of his wife to understand events and behave accordingly.\textsuperscript{156}

Judith and David, each the conqueror of an enemy, are compared in Book Six. David is presented as a man trained for the task, whereas Judith, who undertook the task, was unprepared. Their respective rewards — Judith’s retired contentment and David’s acquiescence to temptation — are offered as proof of their relative merits.

In Book Seven, Tanaquil is compared with her husband Tarquin and her son-in-law Servius Tullius. Chosen for her example as \textit{une Dame Politique}, she stands in contrast to her husband, who is condemned by Du Bosc for his arrogance, and her son-in-law, who is condemned for his obscenity. He uses her to explicate the virtue of political acuity in gaining the confidence of the Romans and in conserving the state.\textsuperscript{157}
Susanna is compared with Joseph in Book Eight. The discussion is limited to the ideal of fidelity to God and to one’s master. Susanna’s wish to remain faithful to the commandment of God is judged more virtuous than Joseph’s wish not to offend his master. Susanna’s two accusers, the elders, are judged to have posed a greater danger than Joseph’s accuser, who was the wife of his master.\(^{158}\)

Book Nine, the final section, compares Lucretia and Cato. This section is a discussion of suicide and develops some of the ideas presented in Book Five. Both Lucretia and Cato committed suicide, but from different motives and in a different manner. Du Bosc judges Cato’s reason for suicide, the fear of servitude, as less valid than Lucretia’s fear of infamy. Lucretia’s immediate, emotional decision is more forgivable than Cato’s pondered resolution. Du Bosc does not, however, contradict Church teaching by approving of either act. He draws on his previous assessment of Susanna’s patience to condemn Lucretia’s action.

The conclusions Du Bosc draws are understandable in light of Christian teaching. By the use of reason alone and by the proper organic development of nature, many of life’s problems can be solved and society can function well. He illustrates this by the examples drawn from the ancient texts. He argues, however, that reason strengthened by grace is even more powerful. Pagan mothers were concerned about the moral education of their children, and it is even more important for Christian mothers to teach

\[\ldots\] la Morale Chrestienne, qui n’est autre chose que l’art de perfectionner la Nature par le secours de la Grace, que l’art de faire une guerre plus sanglante au vice, et de conserver ou d’augmenter cette innocence qui nos est rendu par la Baptisme.\(^{159}\)

Injustices will occur, as in the case of the Maccabees, but temporal injustice pales in light of eternal justice. Du Bosc has used, and occasionally manipulated, the stories of these lives to exemplify the importance of a variety of virtues. The virtues necessary in ordinary life were first explicated in \textit{L’Honneste Femme} and their efficacy in daily life demonstrated. \textit{La Femme héroïque}, on a grander scale, offers the veracity of history and the entertainment
of drama to reinforce the importance of faith and the consequences of a life lived even in an implicitly graceful state. It also provides Du Bosc with a venue for demonstrating his knowledge.

It is in this last work on women that we are best able to assess Du Bosc’s views of society. Each individual is placed in the context of birth, occupation, and influence. While Du Bosc is at pains to demonstrate that women are as capable as men when called to heroic deeds in the public sphere, he adds the qualification that this should only occur when there is no man around to bear that burden.160

The manner of presentation gives us a further clue as to how Du Bosc orients his world. He analyzes each example in detail, and never approves of any behaviour that is not rational and theologically sound. He does consider that by choosing the lesser of two evils, one necessarily chooses the greater good.

Each behaviour is ranked. It is his constant ranking of every behaviour that leads one to the conclusion that Du Bosc saw his world hierarchically. This was not, however, the hierarchy of the estates or even the standard theological arrangement of pagan, Christian, or religious hierarchies, since the duties of a monarch were more fittingly carried out by Thomyris than by David. Nor is it the hierarchy of gender, for Abraham, though father of the chosen people, was assessed as less honourable than the briefly mentioned mother of the Maccabees. Du Bosc’s criterion for a worthy life is one that is lived in accordance with the precepts of Platonic and Christian virtues, reflecting, as he argues, either directly or indirectly the hierarchies of nature and revealed truths.

There is continuity through these works. The themes that he touches most often upon are the necessity of grace, or gracefulness, to inform one’s life and the necessity to live that life within society. Du Bosc, speaking ostensibly to women, approaches behaviour at an intimate daily level in a manner similar to that of de Sales. The motivation of the least action is both grounded in and reflective of a universal order. Where he differs most clearly from de Sales is in his acceptance and incorporation of the secular world. De Sales sets out specific spiritual exercises and prayers for the orientation of the reader. Du Bosc, on the
other hand, observes the social situations his readers contend with and offers guidance. In taking this position he is not abandoning the austerity of the devout, but rather infusing the principles of Christian ethics into the realm of polite society. Du Bosc’s approach to the Querelles des Femmes, then, is much more than simply a superficial guide to polite behaviours. He demonstrates first of all the implicit gracefulness, or the need for grace, in all human society from manners through conversation to conduct and moral excellence. Du Bosc’s popular philosophical notion of grace clearly extends to the minutiae of human conduct by means of the paradigmatic test case for nature, that is, the case of women. Apparently frivolous feminine behaviour possess an implicit significance beyond itself within a Christian context in L’Honneste Femme and heroic actions in a pagan-judaic context demonstrate the moral character of the heroine in La Femme heroïque. Clearly nature is not a principle independent of grace or destroyed by grace, but one dependent on grace at every level to inform and develop it. Consequently, L’Honneste Femme leads the reader through the gracefulness of ordinary behaviours to the need for the authoritative presence of prudence and charity, in order for grace to organize and authorize all the many kinds of graceful human behaviour from gesture to moral virtue. Du Bosc undertakes a similar but more radical manoeuvre in La Femme heroïque in order to show that this is not simply an imperative of Christianity alone. He shows how the natural heroism of ordinary life prepares pagan and judaic heroines for their great actions. One can then see life in nature itself, as it were, and the potential unity of the ideal and the natural in such a way that one is not compelled to see either grace or heroic activity, as limited to only one segment of human life (religious, historical, or otherwise). Again, grace is not an ethereal notion, but one which implicitly organizes and impels any noble temporal life. Du Bosc’s engagement in the Querelles des Femmes, then, extends his philosophy of grace and authority in a plainly demonstrable fashion both to all human behaviour and to all human history, but in a manner which is plainly designed to avoid both dogmatism and scepticism. His emphasis rests upon the freedom of an organic physical, cultural, moral, intellectual,
and spiritual life directed by grace and reflected at every level of existence. In this he exemplifies, according to my argument, first, a traditional Christian notion of grace and, second, a popular accessible view in his own time that contrasts with the splitting up of nature and grace (as in Jansenist thought) or mind and matter (as in Descartes) or physics and metaphysics (as in Bacon or Galileo). Du Bosc therefore appears to be an excellent representative of a traditional view generally popular in his time but beginning to come under increasing attack. The present chapter has also shown implicitly that though Du Bosc may have been a second or third-stringer, he was not without significant, even visionary, ideas. His intention, to show the working of grace in the phenomenon of heroism in pre-Christian times rather than to remain within sectarian prejudices, is a strong indication that if in Du Bosc we have a third-stringer, he was nonetheless an intelligent, even insightful one. Therefore, we may reasonably suppose that Du Bosc is also an intelligent representative of his age and that the picture we are able to discern in his writings is a genuinely useful one for our present purposes. If this is so, then it is equally reasonable to suppose that his reaction to Jansenism is not merely a reflex prejudice, but a profoundly reflective manoeuvre which represented something deeper in the contemporary series of events than mindless obedience to external authority or the mumbo-jumbo repetition of already meaningless formulae. In turning to Du Bosc’s Jansenist and political works, therefore, we might well ask, first, how far the argument of this thesis is borne out in this context and, second, whether we can detect in these works the point at which any shortcomings in Du Bosc’s own theory become more apparent and thus, however unconsciously, reflect a context for understanding the later ineffectiveness of this view in the subsequent age.
Endnotes

1. For a discussion of the use of “typical” see Peter Burke, *History and Sociology* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1989), 36–37. Burke distinguishes between monothetic and polythetic groups and the importance of this distinction for historians in determining the “typical.” In many cases these norms are the result of one ethic being imposed on, and accepted by, the community as a whole. The examination of accepted behaviours, that which constitutes normal or understandable actions, it is understood can only truly address public behaviour.

2. Keohane argues that “[s]omeone’s private reason must be made trump in order that society may function; someone’s private reason must be raised to the status of public reason.... anyone can be given authority to produce a solution, and this delivers us from the chaos of conflicting opinions that tears society apart. Therefore, in politics the first virtue of the citizen is obedience.” Although Keohane refers here specifically to politics, I would argue that the integration of religion and politics in Du Bosc’s view enables her understanding to be broadened to include religion as well. The chaos of conflicting religious beliefs in this period was easily as damaging as political conflict. *Philosophy and the State in France*, 109.

3. Keith Luria has argued effectively that the so-called Counter-reform was far more than an imposition of a standard of belief and behaviour which allowed more extensive control of the population by the élites. Luria presents the process of cultural change, of which religion was a part (the substantial part in Luria’s view) as an interaction. This interaction involved all sectors of society and with varying interests and agendas. Keith Luria, *Territories of Grace Cultural Change in the Seventeenth-Century Diocese of Grenoble* (Berkeley: University of California, 1991), 2–3. Thus Du Bosc’s views can be said to be founded in his experience as a Frenchman, his education, his interactions with an educated élite as well as his perspective as a cleric in light of Luria’s argument for the abandonment of archetypes and the acceptance of complexity.

4. The preoccupation with the place of women is, as MacLean observes, an attempt at “accommodation within the existing framework of contemporary French society.” In many ways this was one among many adjustments of traditional understandings of authority. The challenge that the *Querelle des Femmes* posed to this framework necessitated some shifting of perspective as to the role of women. That a segment of society attempted to adjust their views to this challenge rather than reimpose older more restrictive understandings of women’s role is an indicator of conflicting understandings of authority.


6. Chapter 3, 21 n. 72.

7. It has been pointed out that the work was aimed at “an elite social group, and not for what we would call today the general public.” Margaret Belcher, “The Compleat Woman: A Seventeenth Century View of Women,” *Atlantis II* (1977): 16–21.
8. The corporation of the Early Modern period evolved from the medieval guilds and served to control commercial activity and maintain standards. In a similar manner tradition and law controlled the extent of women's engagement in the public realm as religious prescriptions attempted to safeguard standards of behaviour. John Lough, *An Introduction to Seventeenth Century France* (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1976), Chapter II.


11. See Chronological Bibliography for complete publication records.

12. Marie-Madeleine de Vignerot, duchesse d'Aiguillon (d. 1675), was a frequent guest at the salon of Madame de Rambouillet. She married Antoine de Combalet in 1620, but was widowed in 1622. In 1638 she was made duchesse d'Aiguillon. She entered a Carmelite convent but, at the request of her uncle, Cardinal Richelieu, returned to the secular world. After his death she placed herself under the direction of Vincent de Paul and became actively involved in his ministry to the poor as a Lady of Charity. In addition to Du Bosc, de Scudéry, Corneille, and Rotrou dedicated works to her. In *L'Honneste femme* the salutation refers to her by her married name. Her likeness was sculpted by Giradon on Richelieu's tomb.


15. Nicholas Perrot d'Ablancourt (1606–64) was a noted lawyer, translator and man of letters. His translation of Lucian earned him the name "le bel infidèle."


19. On pagination: In *Compleat Woman* the preface of the book is unnumbered and rectos are irregularly lettered (bottom centre). Where a sequence of A1, A2, A3,... is followed by a blank, page A4 is understood. The text is numbered in two parts and referred to as Book I (pp. 1–66) and Book II (pp. 1–87). Book I is misnumbered in two places. Facing 30/31 and 34/35 are repeated. 32/33 and 36/37 are omitted. The numbering of these pages is noted as follows: 30/31, 30(32)/31(33), 34/35, 34(36)/35(37). In *L'Honneste femme*, Book I is pages 1–328, Book II is 1–233. The pagination is usually consistent, but where misnumbered the sequential number is given in brackets following the printed number i.e., 29(28).
20. “I confess that if all women could view your actions, [my advice to them] would not be necessary.” *L’Honneste femme*, v recto.

21. “... finally the honourable woman candidly confesses that she proposes nothing for women that she has not learned from women themselves.” *L’Honneste femme*, unnumbered (9).

22. “It is true that nothing is more important than to know the art of agreeableness, and to make oneself liked in company: we all have an inclination to society.” *L’Honneste femme*, 185.

23. Chapter 3, 30, n 98.

24. Lucien Febvre argues that this assumption was not Du Bosc’s alone but a generally current one. *The Problem of Unbelief*, 290–1.

25. “... God, demonstrating in the same race, the wonder of women, as well as those of men, would have both in Court, to make them appear in the same time and Theatre as the greatest ornaments of our age.” *L’Honneste femme*, Epistre, unnumbered pages (a iiiij).


27. “I wish to expose to them the impertinence as well as the malice of those that wish to persuade them that Devotion is tiresome in Society and disagreeable in conversation.” *L’Honneste femme*, Avertissement, 1.

28. “... this difference of sex concerns almost nothing except the exterior; therefore it is of so little importance that I would have made myself ridiculous if I had tried to discuss in detail dress, airs, curtseying or hair ...” *Ibid.*, I 4.


33. Called by Aristotle the founder of dialectic, the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea flourished c. 460 B.C. He proved logically that motion is illusory. The most famous example of this argument is Achilles’s inability to catch the tortoise. The fastest runner, Achilles, can never catch the slowest for he must reach the point where his opponent began and as the tortoise has advanced to a new position he can never be caught if space is infinitely divisible. *Compleat Woman*, Preface C3, recto.


36. Ibid., Preface, B4 verso.
37. *L’Honneste femme*, *Avertissement* unnumbered (1).
40. "... those who wanted to shape the virtuous woman in any century have wanted her to be of the religion of her country..." *L’Honneste femme*, *Avertissement*, unnumbered pages, (2).
41. Ibid., unnumbered pages, (5).
42. "Games, dances, parties, ceremony and theatre are all things that in themselves are not at all evil. They are neutral and can be well or badly used. At the same time they are dangerous and it is even more dangerous to be attached to them." *Introduction à la vie dévote*, 67.
43. Louis Richeome (1544-1625), identified by Henri Bremond as the original Devout Humanist, founded the Jesuit College at Dijon and was influential in the Society of Jesus until his death. He published *L’adieu de l’âme dévote laissant le corps* in which the protagonist, Lazare, is taken on a series of picaresque adventures, each a vehicle for meditation. On the relationship between de Sales and Richeome see Bremond, *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux*, 19.
44. Ibid., 1:28.
46. "They [critics] talked and wrote fulsome nonsense with impunity, as long as a woman was its subject, for compliment is the recognized commerce between the sexes." Germaine Greer, *The Obstacle Race: The Fortune of Women Painters and their Work*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1979), 1:68; see also 1:88.
48. "It is not being less rich, but only less confused." Ibid., 1:8.
49. Ibid., 1:7.
50. Ibid., 1:9.
51. "Reading so many lascivious things excites little by little; it gradually destroys repugnance and horror." Ibid., 1:16.
52. Ibid., 1:30.
53. Ibid., 1:31.
54. Ibid., 1:31-32.
55. Ibid., 1:36. The original analogy comes from Aristotle, *Psyche*. 
56. An Athenian general, Alcibiades recommended support of Segesta in her war against Selinus. Called to trial in Athens from the battlefield, he escaped to Sparta and betrayed Athens's weaknesses. On the demise of the Athenian democracy he returned, but in a later battle with Sparta was distrusted and fled to Persia where he was assassinated by Spartans. He is mentioned in Plato (Phaedo, Symposium) and Aristophanes (The Clouds).

57. The heroine of a popular morality tale, Mary the Egyptian was, at twelve years old, a prostitute in Alexandria. Earning her passage to Jerusalem as the sailors' whore, she was refused entrance to the shrine to adore the Cross. She retired to the desert and lived as a hermit, coming to sanctity only by constant prayer and physical denial; Jacobus de Voragine, "The Life of Marie the Egyptian," trans. Margot H. King, Vox Benedictina, I (1984), 232.


59. Ibid., I:41.

60. Ibid., I:42.

61. "they try to tell everything, even marginal notes, page numbers, dates and other superfluous details." Ibid., I:43.

62. "...on voit en elles [indiscreet women] que ce n'est pas sans raison, que les Philosophes ont dit, que la Prudence estoit la piece la plus necessaire pour les action humaines. Comme elles sont sans conduite, elles sont aussi bien souvent sans vertu:..." Ibid., I:38–9.

...one sees in them that the Philosophers were right to say that prudence was the most necessary part of human action. As they are without guidance they are also often without virtue."

63. This reference is not principally to the physiological science of the Humours understood as the four principal liquids of the body (blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile) corresponding to the temperaments (sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, and melancholic). Du Bosc here refers to melancholy and pleasant humours or moods, though these were often associated with the bodily humours.

64. "There is nothing more necessary, for women in conversation, than to know their own humour: to reform it if ill, or polish it if it is good. It is the basis of all, and the most important thing ... " Ibid., I:45.

65. In this work, as in Le Philosophe indifferent, Du Bosc describes prudence as the fondation of all other virtues: "C'est la vertu qui leur est plus necessaire & qui leur donne plus d'authorité: puis que sans elle toutes les autres belles qualitez sont sans ornement ou pour le moins sans ordre, comme des fleurs esparses que les vents emportent confusement." Ibid., I:106.

"It is their most necessary virtue and the one that which gives them most authority, since without it all other good qualities are without embellishment or at least without order, like scattered flowers carried off by the wind."
72. These are of course the traditional terms from Aristotle.

73. "I consider that as the maintenance of life depends on the mix of hot and cold, so all the source of pleasantness and good grace depends on the balance of these two honours, since each serves to correct the other." *Ibid.*, I:61.

74. "For as the bees must withdraw to make honey, when they have found the matter on the flower, so it is necessary that after seeing many things, we withdraw within ourselves to extract the fruit and to draw conclusions." *Ibid.*, I:60.


76. "This is the judgement of the ignorant, who think that virtue should always weep, and who do not know one should beware of a sullen humour as of cloudy weather, and that the gayest spirits are the best of all." *Ibid.*, I:69; see also I:34.


80. "Histories are full of their noble actions for the conservation of their country, for the love of their husbands, and for the religion of their ancestors." *Ibid.*, I:89.

81. Theoxene was the wife of Porus, whose kingdom in India was conquered by Alexander the Great in 327 BC. On Alexander's death they travelled to Athens but enroute were taken by mercenaries. Theoxene chose suicide rather than slavery.


84. *Ibid*.


87. "... it is the virtue which for [women] is most necessary and which gives them more authority." *Ibid.*, I:106.
Prudence, as understood in traditional occidental Christianity, and as Du Bosc uses the term, is not akin to moderation or avoidance, but is rather the virtue that precedes all others moral virtues in the sense that the integration of all the other virtues cannot occur without prudence, or practical intelligence, or intelligent insight into what is really the case (as opposed to false opinion or illusion about what is really going on). Prudence therefore organizes moral life in accordance with the most complete grasp of reality possible in the circumstances. Prudence in this sense is concerned with the practical transformation of our knowledge of reality from perception to concrete realization of the good, that is, from cognition to practical response. The transformation is completed through the process of deliberation, judgement and decision. The elements necessary to arrive at prudent decisions are memoria (memory), docilitas (openness), and solertia (responsiveness). Magnanimity, or greatness of soul, therefore, is achieved only when the action, as well as the means by which that action is determined, are prudent. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Translation with Commentaries and Glossary trans. Hippocrates G. Apostel (Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1975) Bk Z 5-13, 105-114. Joseph Pieper The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 10-16.

For Aquinas’ views on prudence see Sent. III 33.2.3; Summa Theologica Ia IIae q.58, a4; q.64, a1; q.66, a3 ad 3; IIa IIae q.47 a 6 ad 3; q49 a 1-8; De Virt Card. 1ff, 3.

L’Honneste femme, I:101(110).

Prudence also goes far beyond this in protecting women in an area where they are susceptible. Sexuality is never directly mentioned in the text, but Du Bosc occasionally refers to it obliquely, using the analogy of the walled town. He comes as close as he is able, without offending his readers, to stating his belief in this matter: to become l’honnête femme (as he has defined it) will enable her to protect her ‘virtue’ more readily.

Ibid., I:113.

Ibid., I:115.

For the development of a pedagogy that addressed the needs of young women see Rapley, The Dévotes, Chapter Seven.

“and certainly this must be a sign of the inclination we have to goodness” Ibid., I:127.

“Truly if virtue is necessary for the establishment of sovereign authority, beauty at least seems suitable to it.” Ibid., I:127.

“... counterfeit beauties fail shamefully in the sight of everyone, almost in the manner of false stars, which after they have deceived our eyes for a time, show us by their fall, that we took a vapour for a star.” Ibid., I:132.

“Je ne blasme pas cette divine curiosité des Philosophes & des bons esprits qui nous a découvert les secrets de la nature, & qui nous a donné les moyens de regler les passions de l’ame. Je condamne seulement cette curiosité, qui nous porte à sçavoir ce
qui est inutil [sic] ou vitieux, & qui nous esLoigne de la connoissance de nous-mesmes.”


"I do not condemn that divine curiosity of philosophers and good minds which has revealed to us the secrets of nature and has given us the means to rule the passions of the soul. I condemn only that curiosity which moves us to know what is useless or vicious, and which removes us from self-awareness."


100. Of course, Du Bosc does not develop a distinction between primitive customary behaviours (such as revenge for justice, etc.) and a developed morality as Hegel will do in the *Phenomenology of Spirit (die Sittlichkeit und die Moralität)*, but his willingness not to draw a hard and fast line between supposed ‘good’ and ‘evil’ behaviour is interesting and noteworthy in itself. Hegel defines *die Sittlichkeit* as immemorial custom or implicit morality or spirit; *die Moralität* as developed morality. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 266–294; 364–409.

101. “It truly seems this pleasing quality is natural to women, and that they enjoy it almost without difficulty or study.” *Ibid.*, I:144–45.

102. “The soul is not more necessary for life than good grace is in order to please. Grace gives brilliance to beautiful women and compensates for the lack of beauty in others. When one possesses this charming quality, all that one undertakes is becoming and pleasant.” *Ibid.*, I:144.

103. “the beauty of the body depends in some way on that of the mind...” *Ibid.*, I:145.

104. “... to rule the movements of the soul as well as those of the body.” *Ibid*.

105. “As constraint displeases (even) in the finest actions, naturalness pleases in the least (most ordinary) ones.” *Ibid.*, I:146.

106. “There is nothing which one must avoid so much as too much artifice and constraint.” *Ibid.*, I:145.

107. “Those [women] who are trained in servitude can do nothing with liberty; they dare not lift up their face with the sober assurance which gives grace to actions; their thoughts are always base, and no matter how good their inclination, shame and ignorance prevent them from succeeding in their enterprises.” *Ibid.*, I:148.

108. “It is a fire of hell, which has blindness for smoke, scandal for light, infamy and shame for ashes; how can their foul desire be termed Love, when instead of election, there is but a total brutishness? *Ibid.*, I:151.


110. “... let my brush fall from my hand, for I have too much anger, and too few invectives, to finish this piece with colours black enough.” *Ibid.*, I:156.

111. “Is there so much offence in keeping watch, to guard that which we love, especially in a time when faithfulness is so rare, ...? “ *Ibid.*, I:156.
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112. “... it is better in this extremity to believe a miracle, than a sin, and to admit the power of God, than the weakness of a creature. *Ibid.*, I:167.


115. Du Bosc here, and previously, developed this understanding of prudence (incorporating practical intelligence as a mediator against excess or defect in the preception of reality) as foundation for the employment of any virtue. He uses the metaphor of dawn preceding daylight to express the need for prudence as precedent to love: “Car comme l’Aurore precede le Soleil, la connaissance doit precéder l’amour,...” *Ibid.*, I:173. “Just as the dawn precedes the sun, knowledge must precede love.”

116. “As the Ark was between the two Cherubims; so God must be between two hearts which love each other: he should be the knot of our amities, to make them strong and reasonable. And to speak like that great Bishop, who has written so divinely of this matter, love is the more laudable on earth, as it resembles that in Heaven.” *L’Honneste femme*, I:184. The reference is to Exodus 25.18–21 where the construction of the ark of the covenant is detailed. The cherubim were to be of beaten gold and placed, facing one another, at either end of the ark. The allusion here is, of course, that as the ark held the covenant between the Hebrews and God, God is the covenant between two hearts.

117. “... as neither man nor woman can acquire this esteem without prudence, in the same way it is impossible to have prudence without probity, or probity without morality. This is the foundation of all my arguments, and must be that of all their intentions.” *Ibid.*, II:40–41.

118. “Christian virtue brings the same advantage to Moral virtues as the rational soul to the coarse physical souls that it encounters when it is infused ...” *Ibid.*, II:40–41.

119. “The light of grace compensates for the eclipses of reason; it prevents it from wandering; it gives it limits which do not remove its freedom but only its uncertainty, which do not prevent it from acting, but from going out of bounds.” *Ibid.*, II: 241.


124. Probably the daughter of Villeroy, the secretary of State for foreign affairs of Louis XIII, and spouse of Brulart de Puysieux, the son of Sillery.

126. The comparative style was popular in printed sermons as it provided the reader with examples and allowed writers to demonstrate their knowledge. Bayley, *French Pulpit Oratory*, 78–9.


128. “It is not enough to examine its name, or its principle, we must see it in itself, in its true nature, and in its essence; we must see the thing that this name signifies and the effect that this principle produces.” *Femme heroïque*, 9.

129. “The way in which they are greater and more divine than the other moral virtues.” *Ibid.*, 1.

130. “indicates the people who are half divine, half human, of either sex, because the Ancients recognized heroines among women as well as heroes among men.” *Femme héroïque*, 4–5.

131. “The ordinary virtues do not merit the name heroic ... it belongs only to those great and extraordinary virtues which have something more than human, and which share in the grandeur and nobility that we call the heroic degree.” *Ibid.*, 11.


133. *Ibid.*, 7, the reference is to Aristotle’s *Morale à Eudimium L*. 7 chap 4.


136. “Let the image of God be equally honoured in both sexes, let both aspire equally to virtue and let both, by their actions and by their deeds, show that original vigour and that natural seed which is given to them for their good.” *Ibid.*, 29.


138. “each sex has its particular advantages.” *Ibid.*, 42. Plutarch’s reasoning, he asserts, is the same as the reasoning of the Fathers of the Church, and he uses two principles to guide the comparisons that follow and ensure their validity. The first is to match appropriately the individuals chosen. Men vary as much as women. An equitable match must be made in regard to their accomplishments and to the context in which they operated. It is therefore necessary to match pagan women with pagan men and Jewish women with Jewish men. The gauging of the effect of these accomplishments is the second point of validation.
139. He compares this concern for facts with the painter’s aim of producing either reality or fantasy: the fantastical artist will produce a dozen variations, while the realist will produce a thousand. Du Bosc then aimed at living within the realm of accepted fact as present in his society rather than creating a fanciful realm in which his admonitions regarding women were not possible. Were he to advise something entirely outside of accepted behaviours the whole of the argument could well be dismissed out of hand.

140. The others are Portia and Brutus (Book Five), Tanaquil and Tarquil and Servius Tullius (Book Seven), Lucretia and Cato (Book Nine).

141. Du Bosc assumes in this and in all the other books that the reader is familiar with the story. For those readers who are not, citations are given as marginalia.

142. “One of the most warlike nations in the world.” *Femme héroïque*, 187.

143. There is, for example, a lengthy passage on the moral education of children. In Volume I Book IV, Du Bosc uses the comparison between Salomone (mother of the Macabees) and Abraham to discuss the role of parent as moral educator. See especially Chapters II-VII.

144. “The substitution, as supreme value, of an impregnable moral power in place of threatened physical power, the substitution of an attitude of defiance in place of success, is in any case the starting point for the whole spiritual metaphysics of pride.” Benichou, *Morales du grande siècle*, 23.

145. “which rebukes sadness and speaks as a master.” *Femme héroïque*, 230.

146. “Considering suffering from all sides, I do not see how it: can be considered beautiful, except for the suffering of penitence. But how different it (the suffering of penitence) is from the other, since it brings life to the dead, while the other causes the living to die, since the one restores innocence, while the other only increases our unhappiness!” *Ibid.*, 240-1.

147. “Because to claim the virtues of the other sex is a type of usurpation, which is allowable only with great moderation and restraint. It is necessary to avail oneself of it as by privilege and not by natural right; It is prudence which knows how to set the boundary, it is the director of all the virtues.” *Ibid.*, 245.


152. 2 Maccabees 7:1-42.


155. “more enduring in their suffering, more active against tyrants, more vigilant against vanity and more zealous of the law.” *Ibid.*, 386.

156. Brutus eventually committed suicide after his defeat by Mark Antony and Octavian Caesar.

157. Tarquin was an Estruscan nobleman who, despite his wealth, was excluded from the Roman citizenship. His wife Tanaquil, was skilled in reading portents as well as being politically astute, advised him and he was accepted by the Romans and eventually made king. He was murdered by the sons of Ancus Marcius, the previous king. Servius Tullius, Tarquin’s son by a slave was adopted by Tanaquil who engineered his succession to the throne in the face of the opposition of the sons of Ancus Marcius. His reign ended in bloodshed, by his daughter’s plotting.


159. “Christian morality, which is nothing other than the art of perfecting Nature by the aid of Grace, the art of waging a fiercer war against vice, and of conserving or increasing the innocence which is restored to us by Baptism.” *Femme héroïque*, 358.

Chapter Five

Religious Formation: The Jansenist Debate

Du Bosc's engagement in the Jansenist debate provides a further extremely effective means of demonstrating how he viewed the integration of authorities organized by the precept of grace. This chapter will examine his contributions to one of the principal contemporary religious debates of Catholic France. Through an analysis of his stance as articulated in his writing the chapter will demonstrate his understanding of traditional expressions of Church order, theology, and the challenges he saw threatening French society.¹ In these works we see, however, a shift in his posture from that of reconcilor to that of defender and an apparent abandonment, in practice, of the principle of indifférence that he presented in Le Philosophe indifférent to the extent that he is unable to maintain a non-sectarian vantage point, but becomes more and more constrained in practice to abandon the transcendental view in favour of partis pris.

Despite the difficulty of communicating and documenting interior developments in both the individual and the collective, it is necessary to establish a sense of the milieu of the spiritual life. Jouhaud, writing on the integration of religious literature into lifestyles and language in Bordeaux, reiterates the problems confronting the researcher, citing language and the radically subjective experience of the individual as inherent dangers in assessing spiritual development.² Yet, as Henri Bremond states,

Nous le verrons, l'extase ne fait pas le vide dans l'âme du mystique. Quoi qu'il en soit du mystérieux enrichissement qu'elle apporte au centre même de cette âme, elle stimule toutes les facultés et devient par là un facteur historique de premier ordre.³
This statement, taken with Bremond's belief that the early seventeenth century abounded with mystics in all walks of life, forces one to assess the impact of spiritual acuity on the larger world.4

The influence of the Church — including the élite understanding of theology and dogma, the popular expression of practice, as well as personal observance — cannot be under-estimated. Religious reality was inextricable from the social and economic facts of society. Infants were baptized within twenty-four hours of birth. At age thirteen or thereabouts, one received the Eucharist and became a full-fledged Catholic.5 Entrance to an occupation, profession or vocation was usually ratified by religious ceremony, whether it was membership in a guild, a profession of religious vows, or the solemnization of a marriage.6

Despite the monolithic appearance of the Catholic Church of the time, the challenges posed by the Reformed Church managed to shake the hierarchy and the papacy out of their complacency. The stability of the Church was further threatened by the enthusiastic response of reformers within the Church that was founded on the belief that "ultimate authority in the Church lay in the general body of Christendom as a whole."7 Though the faithful were in theory the ultimate authority, the emergence of hierarchy and the division of priesthood and laity were inevitable. The Council of Trent was an attempt by the Catholic Church to regenerate its structural and dogmatic integrity, just as the aesthetic expression of the Baroque was an attempt to rekindle a sense of awe among the faithful.8 These movements were the products of two forces: the continuation of internal reform and the reaction to external threat. The rulings of the Council of Trent can be seen as both a political offensive against an external threat9 and a theological clarification in response to internal demands for reform. As such, Trent was an attempt by the hierarchical Church to reassert itself and reclaim the power and authority its leaders felt was rightfully and traditionally theirs.10 The reforms initiated at Trent were embraced by many, and the regeneration of an active laity was itself something of a threat. The apparent conflict between an
active laity and the ultimate authority of the hierarchy is resolved when the formation of society is taken into account, as we have seen above in Chapter Two.¹¹

The questions that these threats raised about society (belief, culture and tradition) prompted Du Bosc, as part of the institutional Church and as an educated gentilhomme, to respond by providing a rationale for reconciling the religious, political, and social realms. As demonstrated in Chapter Four, his feminist works are an indication of his desire to orient the individual to a more comprehensive spirituality without alienating the standards of society. In the same manner, his approval of particular behaviours in the works addressed to his superiors (see Appendix A) were an attempt to strengthen the social and political order in light of philosophical and religious sensibilities.

The hierarchical Church, or the magisterium, was understood as the human political order that guards, interprets, and teaches the gospel. This interpretation was grounded in the understanding of the Catholic Church as the mystical body of Christ. In this light, the Council of Trent can be viewed as the spiritual regeneration of a corrupt institution within the context of the Catholic Reformation. Thus it can be understood as both a reaction against the Reformation (i.e., a Counter-Reformation) and a creative response to the promptings of the Spirit (i.e., a Catholic Reformation). The autocracy of Caraffa¹² is countered by the responsiveness of Borromeo,¹³ though both were adamant in their defense of dogmatic purity.

In the first, defensive understanding of Trent, it is necessary to place the promulgations and their reception in the context of an international body of government.¹⁴ All the assemblies were motivated by the challenge of Protestantism, but each was also shaped by its presiding personalities and specific agenda.

The first convocation, 1545–47, held under the leadership of Paul III,¹⁵ made decisive moves to clarify doctrine. Reformers inspired by Luther were invited to take part, but the rigidity of the papal line made it apparent that no real negotiation would take place.¹⁶ Justification by faith alone was explicitly rejected,¹⁷ and man was deemed to have the
freedom to choose to cooperate with God or to reject grace.\textsuperscript{18} Pluralism\textsuperscript{19} and absenteeism\textsuperscript{20} were condemned, tradition was placed on a par with scriptural authority,\textsuperscript{21} and the seven sacraments were declared to be efficacious regardless of who was administering or receiving them.\textsuperscript{22} This assembly, brought to an end by the victory of Charles V at Mühlberg, focussed on retrenchment rather than reform.

The second convocation ran from 1551 to 1552 under the leadership of Julius III (1550–55). Although open to Lutherans, few attended, as it was apparent that the focus of the assembly was the further reinforcement of papal authority, moving always toward absolutism. It confirmed the doctrine of transubstantiation, thus condemning the Protestant view of the Eucharist.\textsuperscript{23} The convocation ended when Maurice of Saxony rebelled against Charles V, allying himself with Henri II of France, and forcing Charles to flee.

Pius IV\textsuperscript{24} recalled the Council of Trent for the final sessions which ran from 1562 to 1563. By manipulating the Spanish, German, and French delegates, Pius was able to increase dramatically the power of the papacy. The Spaniards wanted no change in tradition or observance; the Germans, in an attempt to reconcile the Protestants, wanted concessions such as clerical marriage; and the French wavered depending on the situation at home where the Wars of Religion were under way. Under the guidance of Cardinal Morone,\textsuperscript{25} and in the face of considerable opposition, the final assembly produced a startling programme of reform.\textsuperscript{26}

The results of all the sessions were confirmed on 26 January, 1564 by Pope Pius IV who thus armed the Church with two defences: doctrinal clarity and ecclesiastical discipline. As to the former, the most far-reaching action of the Council was its recognition that the sacraments were a certain and authorized means of growing in grace;\textsuperscript{27} as to the latter, the refinement of the curia was crucial. Congregations had been used by earlier popes (i.e. the Congregation of Cardinals) but Sixtus V, in 1588, refined their use and focus under the direction of a reformed Cardinalate. In many ways they parallel the centralizing bureaucracy evident in secular government of the day.\textsuperscript{28} This administrative reform was the first
and necessary step in the implementation of Tridentine Reforms. The realization of these reforms was not without opposition, both at the Council itself and in the acceptance and implementation of reforms in France and elsewhere.

The clergy at the Estates General of 1614 proposed the adoption of the Edicts of the Council but the proposal was resisted by the Third Estate. The French prelates, in their assembly of 1615, accepted the Conciliar documents though this was never ratified by the King. The obstacles were numerous: the nepotism of the pope and bishops was feared; the inertia of the French Church, and the wealth of the current prelates all worked for the maintenance of the status quo.

The machinery of the Council did not allow challenges to the central, authoritarian government of the Church as is apparent from the lack of conciliation with Protestant reformers. A single, unified set of documents emerged from the Council, though the event was unable to reconcile completely the divergent positions of theologians within the Church. The most à propos example is that of the Jansenist perspective which, despite the clarification of doctrine, continued to resist the rulings of Rome. The role of theologian itself represents at least two rather different views of the Church. On the one hand, theologians drawing on scripture, tradition and reason, defined and clarified the beliefs of the Church, thus offering succour and guidance to the believer on a very personal and intimate level. On the other hand, their findings and pronouncements, approved of by Pope or Council, clarified the business of the Church. Their deliberations and conclusions determined what constituted acceptable behaviour and expression on a public level. Any discord among these men, then, had ramifications in both realities of the Church: the ‘mystical’ body of Christ and the political machinery of a large institution.

Because of conflicting views about the true foundation and expression of authority and about man’s relationship to God, tensions continued to develop both within the Church and in society at large. Concurrent to these tensions a religious renaissance emerged that assumed a variety of expressions (the use of catechisms, the refinement of sermons, the
activity of devotional groups, etc.). Though many of these expressions flowed from the Edicts of the Council, other movements also flourished, movements which had an impact on secular as well as on religious authority. The argument has been made that the support accorded the Church by secular government was awarded by “enforcement of a political identity, extension of a monopoly of power, and [aid in] disciplining subjects” which further strengthened the Church’s political status.\textsuperscript{31}

Out of the Council of Trent grew one of the principal means of proselytizing — the catechism. The format was a traditional one though reinvigorated by both Protestant and Catholic reformers. The process of learning in the Early Modern period was hampered by low literacy levels, by the lack of optical aids, and in a more pragmatic vein in a world lit only by fire, the dependence on candles.\textsuperscript{32} The result was a great dependence on aural learning which, in turn, fostered a largely oral tradition. The sermon and the rote of the catechism were, as a result, both effective and preferred instruments for transmitting the tenets of the faith. By maintaining control of expression, the Church and State were able to control interpretation. As the creation and subsequent flouting (in some quarters) of the Index makes apparent, this control was both essential to dogmatic purity and yet virtually impossible to maintain in practice.\textsuperscript{33}

The spiritual dimension of reform initiated by Trent must be considered in light of older reforming movements as well. One of the continuing trends of Church reform — more specifically of spiritual reform — was the undiminished impact of the devotio moderna.\textsuperscript{34} Devotio can be translated as devotion or consecration; it is also used to describe an enchantment or incantation. Moderna can be translated as just now or modern. The devotio moderna was a body of devotional writing written primarily for lay readers on the means of contemplation and meditation.\textsuperscript{35}

Originating in the reform movement of the Lowlands and the mystical theology of Ruysbroeck,\textsuperscript{36} the devotio had continued to survive well into the seventeenth century. On the Imitation of Christ by Thomas à Kempis,\textsuperscript{37} perhaps the best known work of the devotio
moderna, continued to be read avidly. In this work self-knowledge (which includes methodological practice and vivid use of imagery) is promoted over knowledge of the material world and wisdom is described as human conceit. Others writing in the same genre were Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross. Spanish religious writers, numbering in the hundreds, were cultivating a climate of asceticism and mysticism that quickly spread to France. The intent of these works was to aid in self-knowledge, for through self-knowledge came the awareness of one’s failings, the necessary dependence on God, and the necessity of ascent through self-integration and dependence on the mystical vision.

The influence of both the devotio moderna and the Spanish mystics is apparent in the works of François de Sales. His Introduction à la Vie dévote was translated and reissued in seventeen languages and was long a popular favourite. The Introduction reflects in many ways the influence of the Imitation. The work is divided into sections that lead the reader through a progression: the necessity of a devout life, the means of achieving devotion and of integrating the devout life with le monde. The first part presents a series of meditations on the relationship of God and believer. This serves to prepare the reader for the second part, which advises on the practice of prayer. The final section addresses the individual in society, and as has been remarked, advises the reader to hold herself aloof from society. Where the Imitation concludes with the exhortation to frequent communion as an aid but also as an end in itself, the Introduction offers this as a means of strengthening the bond between man and God. Both base their advice on scriptural reference rather than on dogma. Each attempts to return the reader to the essence of Christian teaching and so avoid the problem of conflict within the hierarchical Church. The Introduction parallels the humanist and Christian understandings of the virtues. By initially examining these ideas without using philosophical terminology, de Sales was able to introduce a broad range of ideas to a wider reading public. There is no rejection of the formulas or of the proscriptions of the Church, but de Sales attempted instead, as does Du Bosc, to re-establish a personal foundation for spiritual formation.
In the *Introduction*, and the later *Traité de l’amour de Dieu* (1616), De Sales encouraged the Devout Humanist movement.\(^{45}\) This was foreshadowed in the works and ideas of Louis Richeome: beyond simple faith and devotion is the call to activity. That 48% of the books published in France between 1643 and 1645 were on religious topics is compelling evidence of the popularity of spirituality generally and of this movement in particular.\(^{46}\) First called Devout Humanism by Henri Bremond, this movement was heir to both the Christian Humanists and the *devotio moderna*. Less exclusive than Christian Humanism and more pragmatic than the mystics, it had much broader appeal and impact. Humanism as a technique, an instrument rather than a belief, was easily adapted to Christian needs. It provided intelligible, non-scholastic prose, not through a *summa theologica* or a set of *quaestiones*, that could win the minds and hearts of men.\(^{47}\) Bremond remarks:

Pendant cette période, chez nous, en France, dans les deux clergés, dans toutes les congrégations de femmes, dans tous les classes de la société, les mystiques abondent. Tel est le fait capital...qui domine tous les autres ...\(^{48}\)

The reformers who gave voice to these mystics, and to others pursuing the same ends, were Pierre Bérulle,\(^{49}\) Vincent de Paul, Jean Jacques Olier,\(^{50}\) and Jean Eudes.\(^{51}\) These men were together known as *l’école française* and based their spirituality on three points: adoration, action, and adherence. The activities of these reformers were reflected in the number of communities they established and encouraged. Among those that were established or introduced to France at this time were the Sisters of the Visitation, the Daughters of Charity, the Ursulines, Carmelites, Lazarists, and Oratorians. No less important were the women who worked with these men.\(^{52}\) Some were to found the congregations that worked in education, welfare, and health.\(^{53}\) Others, such as Barbe Acarie,\(^{54}\) used salons to introduce the views of the reformers to élite society. Acarie later retired to the Carmelite convent at Pontoise where she assumed the name Marie de l’Incarnation.\(^{55}\)

The work of the reformers was inhibited by several factors. One great obstacle was the lack of knowledge.\(^{56}\) This was not due simply to illiteracy, although this was obviously
a factor, but it was compounded by the reliance of the majority of the population on community tradition. Adherence to tradition provided stability, but it could also degenerate into inertia. Yet these traditions were the means of maintaining authority as well; by reshaping them, the reformers risked other changes. By their attempt to correct behaviours and observances of religious expression, the cycle of belief, tradition, and authority was disturbed. These reform movements had an influence on Du Bosc specifically because a tentative genealogy can be traced from the fifteenth-century religious classic, *On the Imitation of Christ* (c 1418) through to de Sales’ *Introduction à la vie dévote* (1608) and thence to Du Bosc’s writing on women, in so far as there is a progressive movement away from traditional communitarianism to a focus upon the significance of the individual.\(^{57}\)

A second and momentous development occurred in the general process of educational methods. The motivation for increased literacy and the need to establish schools was prompted not only by the direction of the various hierarchies (religious, political and social) but by the desire of the people.\(^{54}\) The extent of this impulse is apparent in the growth of the numbers of lay teachers and in the establishment of both male and female religious teaching orders.\(^{59}\)

The efforts of the Counter Reformation to preserve and assert the doctrines of the faith were enhanced by the establishment of the Society of Jesus. *The Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius Loyola, aimed at personal spiritual growth, quickly became a classic. Intended primarily as a handbook for retreat masters, it was also used privately. An equally important aspect of Jesuit influence was the establishment of the colleges throughout Europe, conducted according to their *Ratio studiorum*.\(^{60}\)

France, however, was less receptive to the Jesuits than Spain had been. The Ignatian tradition of religious reform in Spain recognized the possibility of varying states of consciousness and of interior formation, and relegated the body to the control of the will. French spirituality focussed on “reconciling the whole being with a contemplated ideal.”\(^{61}\) In the Spanish form of this spirituality one is faced with the renunciation of self; in the
French form, the effacement of self. That is, the Spanish form was much more rigorous than was the French.

The debate over the relative merits of reason and revelation was further complicated by the question of the acquisition and efficacy of grace, which in turn determined the individual’s salvation. The question provoked what has been called “the Augustinian moment,” and for a hundred years religious debate focused on the issue that had moved both Luther and Calvin: predestination and justification. This debate is pivotal to this discussion and illustrative of the historical pluralism that existed within the Church. The struggle to defend or condemn Jansenist and anti-Jansenist theologies is effectively a continuation of the debate initiated by the early Church Fathers, especially St. Augustine with the Pelagian heresy. The varieties of interpretation reflect the varieties of heresy in Church history. The debate had more recently emerged in the challenge offered by the Protestant reformers, by the casuistry of the Jesuits and by the development of Jansenism.

Much of Du Bosc’s writing in the realm of the spiritual and the intellectual has to do with Jansenism. All of his writing, from 1647 when he entered the debate up to 1663, was concerned with Jansenism and with the merit of the sacraments, as channels of grace, circumscribed by the institutional Church. His concerns were primarily the maintenance of order, both theological and social, and the encouragement of a calm environment whereby reconciliation of the conflicting views could be reached.

If one judges by this later work, Du Bosc turned completely away from the exploration of alternative philosophies based on a higher or more comprehensive reduction of sects, to the defence of Christianity founded on individual development, revelation and respectful regard for tradition. As indicated above, his primary concern after 1643 was with the polemics of Jansenism.

The source of French Jansenism was not simply the theological work of Jansen, nor was Jansenism concerned only with theology. In the first instance, the debate was centred on a fine point of theology which had occupied theologians since the early sixteenth-century,
although historical sources for the argument are found in the Manicheans and the Gnostics. The central impetus of Jansenism was to reject the integration of nature and grace and the importance of free human will in favour of the overriding influence of grace. According to Jansen, by virtue of the fall (original sin) human beings have lost all self-mastery and all sense of the moral or religious value of human actions. The will is therefore determined and sinful in all its actions and every effort to virtue (by ascetic practice) or to theory (by philosophy) can only be “splendid vices” since the human being is at the mercy of passionate desire. Conversely, redemption is not a restoration of human nature or of inner being but a “slavery to Christ” which is not mediated by human assent, but effective only by being absolutely irresistible. Jansenism therefore raised again the question of justification by faith alone, and Jansen himself presented his doctrine in the guise of a rigorous interpretation of Augustine’s thought. However, if the ability to accept or reject God is overridden by grace, free will is effectively denied. Consequently, these beliefs echoed the predestinationism of Calvin and of the Catholic theologian Baius, who had already been condemned as a heretic, rather than the supposedly authentic thought of Augustine himself.

The formal Jansenist debate was triggered by the publication of Augustinus by Cornelius Jansen in 1640. The Jesuits of Louvain had failed to suppress publication originally for reasons theological as well as political. Movement against the work in France came from another quarter. Had it been an isolated work it would likely have been accepted without controversy and remained in relative obscurity. The fact that it was published during a debate within the French Church on laxism, that it was supported by a powerful and articulate clique, and that it was opposed by the Society of Jesus all gave it a very different life.

These several concurrent elements were centred around Saint-Cyran, a key individual in the development of French Jansenism. He studied in Paris and was a friend of Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres. Their early correspondence, and Saint-Cyran’s early
publications, are grounded in current humanist approaches, and place much emphasis on the tradition of the Church.\textsuperscript{76} By 1625 Saint-Cyran was well established in Paris, having accepted the position of aumônier honoraire to Marie de Médicis and the friendships of Vincent de Paul, Mère Angélique Arnauld and Pierre Bérulle. Orcibal identifies Bérulle as the primary shaper of Saint-Cyran’s religious sensibilities in the capacity of spiritual advisor. In a series of daily conferences Bérulle and Saint-Cyran explored the place of humanism and the philosophy joining

\[... \text{la nostalgie de l’Eglise primitive et de la théologie des Pères, la glorification de l’épiscopat et de l’ordre sacerdotal qui en émane, une ascèse sévère, mais pénétrée d’ “optimisme extatique”...}\textsuperscript{77}

Saint-Cyran naturally became involved with the laxism debate and from early in his career his rigorous approach to observances is evident.\textsuperscript{78}

Angélique de Sainte-Magdeleine’s reform of the Cistercian convent at Port Royal\textsuperscript{79} pre-dated the appearance of Jansenism. Initially the reform of Port-Royal was applauded and aided by many. St. François de Sales was for a time Mère Angélique’s confessor. Cardinal Bérulle’s successor at the Oratory, Condren,\textsuperscript{80} assisted Angélique’s sister Jeanne in the composition of Chapelet du saint-sacrement, a prayer book for use by the nuns. Saint-Cyran’s defense of the Chapelet was a natural alignment between two individuals who sought to reform abuses among the clergy and the laity. However, despite protestations of orthodoxy, the Jansenists were branded by some as heretics.\textsuperscript{81}

Although it is seen most often as a religious debate, there is a crucial link between theology and philosophy and consequently politics, for the effects of Jansenism and the ethic that it created went far beyond the religious realm and entered into the formation of le monde. Jean Delumeau describes Jansenism as a “radical pessimism... [that] ... necessarily results in moral relativism, criticism of the law and the contestation of authority.”\textsuperscript{82} Richard Golden defines Jansenists by their rather extreme ascetical traits, including their excessive moral rigour and the rejection of Renaissance Humanism.\textsuperscript{83} Perhaps Paul Benichou
is even more accurate in his observation that Jansenism, by threatening the channels of grace, also threatened the stability of authority.\textsuperscript{84} If nature and the practice of religion are subsumed under the overriding influence of grace, so that the sacraments and the precepts of the Church are not efficacious by themselves but only if the minister and participants form a part of the exclusive elect of God, then the visible Church may be said to have lost its authority for the external, visible signs of grace (i.e. its teaching, the sacraments, etc) and for its claim to be a universal Church open for all.

The \textit{Augustinus}, then, was seen as a challenge not only to the foundations and practice of religion, but it had ethical and political implications as well. Throughout 1641 there was a growing interest in Augustinian theology as interpreted by Baius and Jansen and through re-publication of the \textit{Augustinus}. Jansenism was inspired as much by the asceticism of Saint-Cyran as by the theology of Jansen. The association of Saint-Cyran with Jansen and the suspicion that Jansen was the author of \textit{Mars Gallicus}, an anonymous pamphlet critical of Richelieu’s stance in the Thirty Years War, motivated Richelieu to take action.\textsuperscript{85} Richelieu had been sympathetic to Saint-Cyran. His sympathy gave way to suspicion, a stance continued by Mazarin. This suspicion was also motivated by the Jansenist association with the \textit{dévot} faction, which advocated a Hapsburg alignment in the Thirty Years War.\textsuperscript{86} In 1638 Saint-Cyran was imprisoned for his part in the publication of \textit{De la sainte virginité}, as was Sequenot, the author. The oratory and Port Royal were threatened and the \textit{solitaires} scattered.\textsuperscript{87}

The Cardinal’s committee to examine the \textit{Augustinus} reported negatively. Alphonse le Moine was then appointed to lecture against it, and Isaac Habert\textsuperscript{88} to preach against it from the pulpit of Notre-Dame.\textsuperscript{89} Jansenism was also repudiated by others: Vincent de Paul, John Eudes, and Olier.\textsuperscript{90} In March 1643 the Archbishop of Paris, awaiting formal publication of the Papal Bull on the subject, banned all discussion of Jansen’s work.

In the fall of 1643 the Papal Bull \textit{In eminentis} condemned the work specifically although no copy was forwarded to Paris until December. The Parlement of Paris, because
of its role in registering laws, was in some measure responsible for the delay. Alignments of factions were complex: anti-papal Gallicanism, anti-hierarchical Richerism, 91 and anti-royal parlementarism, 92 versus ultramontanist, molinist, and royalist. 93 The alignment of some parlementaires and some members of the Sorbonne with the Jansenist cause is the foundation of the Parlement-Jansenist understanding of the Fronde.

This delay in 1643 afforded Antoine Arnauld the opportunity to contest the authority of the Papal Bull itself. When it was finally received, the sympathy of many Parlementaires toward Jansenism delayed its registration. In August 1643, after the deaths of Richelieu and Saint-Cyran, the debate was fuelled again by the publication of Arnauld's De la Fréquente Communion. In this work he argued that frequent receipt of the sacraments, especially the eucharist, is insufficient if there is no internal transformation and no attempt made to amend sinful behaviours. This constituted a direct attack on the efficacy of the sacraments and on the ability of the priesthood. The Council of Trent had determined that the sacraments were effective despite the state of the priest administering them, and as channels of grace always beneficial to the individual receiving them. Arnauld, by placing the condition of amendment on the sacraments, questioned their uniform efficacy.

In November Mazarin was persuaded by several prelates to call an Assembly of the Clergy, which approved the work to the joy of Arnaud's many supporters at the Sorbonne. However, after the authenticity of the papal bull was assured and registered in the Parlement of Paris, the preface to the work was condemned by Nicholas Cornet, 94 Syndic of the Sorbonne, and later by Rome. The Sorbonne in this instance supported Vatican policy and condemned the Parlement. This does not indicate a general animosity between the Sorbonne and the Parlement. They were, for example, allied against papal authority in defense of Gallicanism. 95 Arnauld, after Saint-Cyran's death, came to be the leading defender of Jansenism and provided the enemies of Saint-Cyran and Jansen with a focus. 96

The shift from the individual beliefs of Jansen, supported and adopted by a circle of friends such as Saint-Cyran and Arnauld, to a general movement occurred over a relatively
short period. The movement became a "lightning rod" for a variety of sympathies coalesced into a single, amorphous mass. The movement emerged at the same time as the support of Saint-Cyran for the reform of Port Royal, as the involvement and connections with the Arnauld family grew, and as the support afforded by the solitaires developed.

This debate then holds many clues to the whole question of authority and its relationship to tradition and belief, and has ramifications extending beyond religious sensibilities. To see only Jansenists and anti-Jansenists as sole protagonists and antagonists is simplistic. Historians have connected Jansenists with an emerging democratic and essentially Protestant ideal broached by the Fronde of the noblesse de robe, though this view has also been questioned. Jansenists have also been seen as primarily an anti-Jesuit faction and therefore the focus of Gallican sympathies by the clerical Fronde. While each of these views is true in a fashion, the understanding of grace as a defining element in the perception of authority is clearly a pivotal issue in the whole question, for central to the debate is the question of the influence of the Jansenist understanding of grace.

The largest body of Du Bosc's work was concerned with the Jansenist debate. To analyze the presentation of his ideas, his works will be discussed chronologically to determine the context in which they were written. There is much redundancy in these works. They all stress repeatedly the necessity of serenity in discussion, of charity to those who disagree, and respect for the tradition of the Church. However, perhaps because of the gravity of the subject, these works are generally much better organized than his earlier writings and develop their points in a more orderly fashion.

Du Bosc's first contribution to the Jansenist debate, L'Eucharistie Paisible ou La Paix des Scavans, was published in 1647 and deals with many of the same questions discussed in Arnauld's De la Fréquente Communion, such as the historical practice and judgements of earlier councils and popes. It contains an épistre dedicated to Mazarin — "mon modele et protecteur" — which is typically effusive, followed by a preface. The book itself is divided into two parts, both of which emphasize, against the Jansenist position, the impor-
tance of the sacramental practices of the Church as channels of grace and the complementarity of the inner and external aspects of sacramental practice. The first part deals with historical practices of the Church, the efficacy of the sacraments, and the authority of the Church; the second part deals with preparation for communion, private and public penitence, and the question of the delay of absolution and communion after penitence. Appended to the work is Du Bosc’s translation of Augustine’s *Epistle to Janarius* on frequent communion.

In this book Du Bosc attempts to clarify the debate surrounding the reception of the sacraments of communion and confession. Rather than taking one side over another, he clearly intends to reconcile the two parties and so end a growing rift which he describes as disturbing the “repos des consciences par cette estrange diversité de sentiments.” He repeatedly stresses the need for charity and clarity in these examinations without any hint of reproach, “la Vérité estant comme elle est & Maistresse & Médiatrice des Scavans.”

In the preface he begins to examine the difficulties in approaching the problem, and the necessity of choosing a method that treats both positions in the debate equitably. He takes as his models Jerome, Augustine, and Cyprian, all of whom were engaged in similar debates. He distinguishes between the essence (*intérieure et fondamentale*) and the expression of the sacrament. He is careful in making this distinction: the practice and teachings of Church Councils through the ages have changed expression, but the essence, he asserts, is founded in Christ and is unchanging. This essence is the covenant between redeemer and redeemed, which in Church practice becomes a practical *means* for salvation, accessible to all the faithful, of the confirming or strengthening power of grace. Citing Corinthians and the Council of Trent, he presents these two facets of the problem, the internal unchangeable essence and the adaptive external expression.

Du Bosc integrates, in this first contribution to theology, various understandings of authority. His sources are the council edicts and scripture, which one expects, but he also cites contemporary practices. In this he is infusing the current tradition with an older
authority that articulates belief. Du Bosc’s culture was the sum of these three things (tradition, authority and belief) and the challenge of Arnauld’s *De la Fréquente communion* had disrupted the cycle. Because Du Bosc believed that grace, the indication of God’s approval, had shaped and maintained the Church and state, the challenge needed to be countered.

Several important themes emerge throughout the book. One is Du Bosc’s belief in the importance of unity. He points to the Jewish practice of teaching the history of their faith as well as the practice, and how this has held them together as a people. He cites scripture (1 Corinthians 1), the Council of Trent (Session 13, Ch. 8), and then points to the danger of disunity. Stemming from this is his concern for “[le] vulgaire et les âmes simples,” and his fear of scandal in the Church. This scandal includes not only blatant animosity between factions but impious behaviour as well. In Du Bosc’s eyes scandal was a terrifying breach in the stability of the whole of society. The rules that had evolved over time that dictated behaviours were rules authorized by accepted tradition. Scandal and upheaval were a breach of these rules. Quite simply, then, the authority of the Church was enough to ensure certainty.

Du Bosc first presents the problem, often reducing it to the definition of particular words. This is followed by an exposition of the implications of one understanding or another. He concludes with a summation of a variety of writers’ views on the subject. Implicit in the work is an understanding that these concerns and debates ought to be dealt with by the savants, and the beliefs and practice of the faithful allowed to continue as always.

Book One examines past traditions concerning the Eucharist. Daily communion, common in Eastern Christianity, was later popularized in the West. Using Augustine as a touchstone for his argument, Du Bosc is able to justify either frequent or infrequent communion. The daily communicant is expressing confidence in God’s love and the efficacy of grace to aid him in his daily trials. The monthly or annual communicant is expressing respect for the sacrament. Both stances are based on honour for the sacrament itself. To resolve this apparent paradox, Du Bosc cites Monica’s104 scruples and Ambrose’s response: when in Rome one should do as the Romans; when in Milan, follow their local obser-
vances. The reasoning for this is to prevent scandal — to prevent that disunity which is injurious to the Church. Again, as in previous works, Du Bosc develops a middle course between extremes in order to permit a certain flexibility of interpretation and practice.

As a rule for discerning appropriate practice Du Bosc, again citing Augustine, establishes three rules: there are those practices expressly commanded by scripture, those that are universal and unchanging, and those that vary by time and place. It is apparent to Du Bosc that, as the world changes, so too must the expression of the Church, and although the councils vary in their rulings, daily communion has generally been held to be the ideal. Du Bosc, then, citing Augustine and weighing the rulings of the councils, is able to present both frequent and less frequent communion as acceptable.

This conclusion is upheld in Book Two, but here the implications of the decision are examined. If “... l'Eucharistie est comme le centre de la societé Chrestienne”\textsuperscript{105} and the fount of all that is desirable, i.e., the fount of grace, abstinence can only damage the mystical union of Christ and the Church.\textsuperscript{106} Du Bosc does not unconditionally support frequent communion, however, but recommends that individuals experience both, examine their conscience, and then submit the decision to the wisdom of their spiritual director.

Book Three reviews the authority of the Church Fathers on the subject. Although there is merit in abstinence, according to the Fathers, there is also positive benefit in daily communion. Abstinence can lead to fear, and eventual abandonment of the sacraments. Conversely, frequent communion can only strengthen the will and one's joy in the faith.

Part Two of \textit{L'Eucharistie} deals with penance and preparation. In Book One of this section Du Bosc distinguishes two sorts of preparation, without which one may approach the altar in a state of sin. By \textit{précepte} one fulfils duty; this is considered necessary and sufficient. By \textit{conseil} one goes beyond the necessary, and this is considered “exquis et éminent.”\textsuperscript{107} Being in a state of mortal sin is \textit{indigne}, though Du Bosc does not elaborate on what is or is not a venial or mortal sin, because he says the subject is too large. He directs readers rather to find a spiritual counsellor. One must be aware of what a state of sin is and
what a state of grace is. Tradition and practice have never denied the Eucharist to those in a state of venial sin; using the analogy of water falling drop by drop, however, he stresses the importance of confessing venial sins as well. The best way of avoiding sin is the Eucharist itself, for it is food to nourish and medicine to heal. But there is a danger here too, for if the Eucharist be used only to obviate sin, its true purpose, to celebrate and grow in grace, will then be lost. Here again the traditional organic image of grace as the principle of growth, organization and development of the soul’s life, which we have seen above in *Le Philosophe indiffergent*, is to the forefront of Du Bosc’s presentation.

There is also a warning of the palpable presence of the devil. Because disputes of this nature often encourage indulgence rather than penitence, vigilance might be dropped. Some will fall prey to righteousness and become overly scrupulous, others to laxity or resignation to a sinful state, both of which states can lead to sinfulness. Here Du Bosc refers to the perceived danger of laxism. The Council of Trent’s acceptance of different senses of grace was a counter to the challenge to Catholicism. The contradictions in accepting both Thomism and a less rigid understanding of grace later developed into conflict. Molinism, named after Molina, a Spanish Jesuit, was a doctrine that allowed for the cooperation of mankind with God, but was akin to the pelagian view of free will once declared heretical. The Jesuits, espousing casuistry, were often accused of this heresy.\(^{108}\) In Du Bosc’s view the temperance of the councils, specifically Trent, is to be heeded:

> Prenons donc garde à fuir ces extremitez dangereuses, pour marcher dans *cette voye du milieu*, que tant de grands personnages nous ont tracée, nous avertissant de marcher *entre la crainte et l’esperance*, pour fuir l’extremité de la presomption, aussi bien que celle du desespoir: afin de nous tenir dans une route temperée, qui n’affecte ny trop de rigueur ny trop de douceur.\(^{109}\)

In Book Two the practice of public or private penitence is examined, and again the historical practice is traced. The Church Fathers are cited and the problem reduced to the question of whether the practice is expressly commanded by scripture and by universal practice, or whether it is adaptable to particular times and places. In Du Bosc’s assessment,
neither the form of penance is specifically articulated in scripture, nor is it universal and unchanging, and so falls into the third category identified by Augustine, i.e., practices that may vary depending upon locale and century.

Congruent to public or private penitence is the question of fasting before communion. His view is that anything damaging to the individual or to the Church as a whole — such as sanctimoniousness, righteousness, or superstition — is to be avoided. Du Bosc counters the criticism that the modern Church is decadent with the observation that though penance is now private it is no less austere for being so.

Book Four is an examination of delayed absolution. Du Bosc proposes to examine early Church practices and to compare them with present practices, which points to a resolution of difficulties by determining the historical and actual state of the question. When grave sins such as murder were known, absolution was often delayed in order to be certain that the sinner had amended his life. Du Bosc, however, explains this variation in practice with the variations for the preparation for and frequency of communion. He points to the example of Christ, who “... donna l’Absolution sans aucun delay....”\textsuperscript{110} He also points to the Council of Trent, which defined the essentials (matière) of the sacrament as contrition, confession, and satisfaction, all of which precede expression (forme). Only then is true absolution granted.

There are conditions and situations in which a confessor or spiritual director may delay absolution, such as in the case of a heinous crime, although Du Bosc does not specify which crimes might fall into this category. He cautions spiritual directors to consider all aspects of each case and to be aware of the enormity and consequence of their decisions.

Throughout the work Du Bosc is aware of the distinction between intent and practice, and of the dangers of both laxity and rigour. He attempts to steer a path between the Jansenist and the Molinist view to calm the growing debate. He frequently stresses the need for charity and for attention to individual circumstances. Consequently, he strives, as in previous works, to strike a happy balance between the need for purity of heart and
intention and the proper observance of ordinary practices and rituals. The sacramental life of the Church, therefore, is manifested in the practice of the sacraments and the following of précepte and conseil requires the performance of both form and matter, i.e., internal essence and external expression. In Du Bosc’s view, this is neither a mindless manipulation of merely external channels of grace nor the usurpation of natural practices by an overriding grace, but an integral expression of nature and grace accessible to everyone, not simply to the divine elect of Jansenism. L’Eucharistie paisible, therefore, argues against the supernaturalism of Jansenism for a more traditional understanding based upon common Church practice and upon the necessity that the normal channels of grace be accessible to everyone, not as a slavish observance but rather as intelligent and discerning cooperative performance.

Following the publication of L’Eucharistie paisible, in the context of many other works and a much larger debate, the question of Jansenism was dealt with formally on 1 July 1649. On that day Nicholas Cornet presented seven propositions to the Faculty of Theology for examination. Of these only five were formally recognized as coming from the Augustinus. The subsequent condemnation of these five propositions was protested by the Parlement de Paris.111 They were then referred to the Holy See and were eventually condemned by Innocent X’s bull Cum occasione, 31 May, 1653.

The second of Du Bosc’s major works against Jansenism, Jesus Christ mort pour tous, published in 1651 in support of Cornet’s view, directly addresses Jansen’s understanding of the redemptive quality of the death of Christ and the extent of salvation. In this work one can see much more clearly what Du Bosc took to be at stake in the Jansenist controversy. The centre of his problem lies in Jansen’s rejection of the real possibility of redemption for all human beings (regardless of time, place, or belief), his supposition of a restricted notion of grace without reference to nature, and his attribution of this doctrine to no less an authority than Augustine. According to Jansen, it is the (correct) opinion of Augustine that “Jesus Christ n’est nullement mort pour les Infideles, ou pour ceux qui ne
Du Bosc, by contrast, as a means of demonstrating that Augustine’s view is not that of Jansen, examines a work attributed to an early Church Father, Prosper, *De la vocation de tous les Gentiles*, which addressed the Pelagian controversy, and which was supported by the Councils of Orange and Trent. Following Augustine’s example, Prosper had defended the Church’s position on the need to integrate nature and grace against the Pelagians, who had denied the need for internal grace altogether and “... vouloient que la Nature devancât la Grace de la Redemption, et que le principe de salut fût en l’homme.” Characteristically, Du Bosc charts a middle course between the extremes of Jansenism (which espouses an exclusivist grace) and Pelagianism (which holds primarily to nature). He argues that Jansen holds a simplistic notion of grace which admits of no distinctions and thus rejects the Council’s distinction between ‘sufficient’ and ‘efficacious’ redemption or grace. The grace of redemption, according to Du Bosc, is ‘sufficient’ for all, but its ‘efficacy’ depends upon the cooperation and free choice of those held ‘captive.’ In other words, Jansen excludes the point of view of nature and instead bases his interpretation of St. Paul’s words “que Dieu veut que tous soient sauvéz” upon a more restricted notion of “tous” and consequently upon a too narrow focus of God’s will. According to Du Bosc, “tous” can be understood in (at least) two major different ways. In one understanding it signifies “totalité *Geometrique,*” i.e. not all human beings but only “toute sorte d’hommes, c’est à dire, des hommes de tous pays, de tous ages, et de toutes conditions” such as the Elect and the Predestined. On the other understanding, “tous” signifies “Totalité *Arithmetique*” i.e., every individual without exception. What he calls “sufficient” grace or redemption is sufficient for everyone “without exception.” In other words, God freely wills to save everyone “selon la Totalité Arithmetique.” “Efficacious” grace, however, depends also upon the free cooperative will of the individual, and thus efficacious grace is only actualized for the “elect” according to the “totalité geometrique” (thus preserving individual freedom). Consequently, Du Bosc characteristically rejects both Jansenism and Pelagianism by showing that both positions need fuller articulation in terms of each other.
He goes on to argue that a more considered view must go further still, since the “sufficient” grace “for all” of Christ’s redemption cannot just be a sort of generalized arithmetic notion which covers everyone, but must include a definite will of God to save all and more individual subdivision as, for example, in the case of “infidel children.” Sufficient grace in this case, Du Bosc argues, must include both a general universal grace “to touch their parents’ hearts” as well as a special efficacious grace to work through individual circumstances, as in the case of a stranger giving baptism. To God’s sufficient grace, therefore, must be added an individual and specific efficacious element, which according to the argument does not take away the freedom of the individual. Effectively, Du Bosc argues that Christ died for all, though not all will be saved.

At this stage of his career, then, Du Bosc clearly remains true to the basic principles of his earlier works, particularly those of _Le Philosophe indifferent_. The central sentiments permeating the discussion are those of God’s unrestricted love and of the freedom of human election “... il n’y a nulle exception pour personne en cette charité du Sauveur, ...” but there is also a hint of something a little less flexible in what Du Bosc in the middle of the work calls, following Prosper, the three “Maximes ... sur le sujet de la Grace.” The first maxim is “que Dieu veut que tous les hommes soient sauvé, & qu’ils parviennent à sa connaissance.” The second is that they do not come to the knowledge of God nor to the possession of salvation “par le merite de la Nature, mais bien par le secours de la Grace.” And the third is that “il faut adorer la profondeur des jugements de Dieu, & ne pas vouloir penetrer trop curieusement pourquoi il ne sauve pas tous les hommes, encore qu’il les veuille tous sauver.” According to Du Bosc these are “comme trois fondements inébranlables de la Theologie de la Grace.” However, while one may respect the Augustinian injunction not to subject the mystery of grace and free election to overmuch _curiositas_, nonetheless the naked appeal to authority in the third maxim is relatively clear, for Du Bosc argues that these maxims, based on Prosper and Augustine themselves, “pacify all the disputes” since they speak authoritatively both for the age of Prosper as well as for
our own and are rooted anyway by Prosper in "l'authorité même de l’Apôtre."129 Reason and doctrine, it would appear, take us only so far; apostolic authority provides "une decision plus authentique."130

The publication of the bull Cum Occasione on 31 May 1653 introduced a new phase in the debate. To counteract any independent rulings of the French bishops, a royal edict was circulated ordering publication of the bull in the dioceses of France. The argument had grown to encompass more than the correctness of the propositions themselves and whether or not they were, in fact, contained in the Augustinus of Jansen. It also included the numerous, often anonymous, books and pamphlets of which Du Bosc’s are a part. The attack on the propositions in 1654 by the Jesuit François Annat131 and his statement that they were from the Augustinus sparked the controversy anew. Letters and pamphlets were published by both parties.

_Le Triomphe de S. Augustin, et la Deliverance de sa doctrine. Ou l’on voit condamnation des cinq Propositions des Jansenistes: avec la Refutation de leur Manifeste à trois sens, fabriqué pour éluder l’authorité du S. Siege_ (1649), is a collection of pertinent documents gathered by Du Bosc, that set the condemnation of Jansenism into perspective. The work is dedicated to the King and appeals to him to continue his battle against heresy and the defence of the Church.

Du Bosc had assembled these documents and by reprinting them together enabled readers to follow the debate. These include a submission made by Sorbonne theologians and the response of Innocent X, as well as a letter from the bishops of France to the pope asking for his judgment in the matter. His response to them and to the king, the declaration of the king, a letter from the bishops confirming their receipt and agreement of the Pope’s judgement, and finally the Sorbonne’s confirmation of the Pope’s, the king’s and their own assertions of agreement in the face of the Jansenist heresy are also included. The body of the work is devoted to reiterating the arguments presented earlier by Du Bosc. It appeared that the debate had finally been settled by the ruling of the Vatican, by the unity
of the French bishops and by the declaration of the crown.

By 1655, however, the situation, rather than being tranquil, was now an open controversy. Du Bosc published *De la vraye retraction des sectaires, et de leurs sectateurs. Ou la soumission pretendue des Jansenists, dans les deux lettres de M. Arnauld*, in an attempt to reinforce the authorized position of the Church. In September of the same year Mazarin again summoned an Assemblée-Particulière to deal with the issue. The result was the Formulary.\(^{132}\) The response of Pope Alexander VII in 1656 was *ad sanctum*, an affirmation of *Cum occasione*. The Formulary, to be signed by all religious, affirmed Rome’s decision, but despite royal support it was not truly successful until 1661.

Du Bosc’s view, expressed in *De la vraye retraction*, is in keeping with Mazarin’s. It is interesting to observe that he is now much more supportive than before of discipline within the Church and, by implication, within the state. He argues that these institutions, both safeguards of what is divinely appointed and channels of grace, are above all to be maintained and respected. The work is dedicated to Alexander VII, who had commended Du Bosc’s anti-Jansenist writings,\(^ {133}\) and it opens with a letter to the Pope outlining Du Bosc’s reasons for writing. Essentially a defence of papal authority, the work continues to champion peace within the Church; Du Bosc argues that neither the submission of the Jansenists nor the letters of Arnauld are true submissions. The Jansenists claimed that the five propositions condemned by the Pope were not contained in Jansen’s text and therefore the *Augustinus* itself was not heretical. The corollary was that Papal condemnation of Jansenism was therefore not valid. This argument, which has come to be known as *fait et droit* (i.e. because of the contention that the Pope may be in the *right* (*droit*) in his condemnation of the five propositions but wrong in the *fact* (*fait*) of their presence in Jansen’s work), had ramifications beyond the current debate. Du Bosc, who recognized the discomfort of Arnauld and his associates with their rebellious status, called for a detailed, written submission similar to that proffered by the Pelagians.

The danger of disunity in the Church is at the centre of Du Bosc’s concern, and is, in
his view, such that all strength — doctrine, papal authority and conciliar authority — must be directed against it. The implications were social as well, and in some respects the Jansenists of France parallel the English Puritans. In both cases, conscience was given greater weight than obedience to authority. If they were capable of questioning the pope’s judgement, other authorities might be questioned as well. In their humility they were prideful. As Sedgewick writes:

... [Jansenism’s] essence consisted of a profound personal religious experience that altered the life of each person who came to be known as a Jansenist and, consequently, his or her attitude toward the world. The precise dimensions of this experience are, of course, impossible to measure, but its effects are readily apparent.134

The independence of thought and action that resulted from this experience were not borne lightly by Cardinal Mazarin or Louis XIV.

_De la vraye retraction_ is an attempt to demonstrate that Arnauld’s two letters are a false submission to legitimate authority, and Du Bosc makes specific reference to them. The work is divided into four parts dealing with the following subjects: what a true acquiescence would be, the principles that underlie discipline within the Church, Augustine’s views regarding restructions with reference to _précepte_ and _conseil_, and the manner of retraction that would satisfy all.

Du Bosc calls for the Jansenists to admit their error specifically rather than continuing to claim there are only “erreurs supposées et chimériques” and therefore no errors to recant — which is, effectively, a judgement of the judges. The Jansenists’ insistence that these views are not included in the _Augustinus_, and that therefore the _Augustinus_ itself is not condemned, Du Bosc regards as facile. He agrees that one can question the judgement if either ignorance or injustice are evident, but this is not the case. A clear statement has been made by both the bishops of France and the Pope. This false reasoning and convoluted logic are, in Du Bosc’s view, simply a means of avoiding the Papal censure.

It is apparent to Du Bosc that Jansen’s work has been condemned as heretical, that the
Jansenists have not acquiesced, and that these false submissions of Arnauld may cause “de grands desordres et de grands scandales.”135 As in his earlier works, this fear of scandal and disunity is apparent. Du Bosc’s tone is one of outrage that the Jansenists — and Arnauld specifically — question the legitimacy and authority of the bishops and the Pope.

Part Two of De la vraye retraction is an examination of the means by which heretics have recanted in the past and of the importance of doctrinal purity. Du Bosc distinguishes between the leaders of the movement and those who have followed them. Many Jansenists chose the route of passive resistance and simply held their peace. On 4 November 1655, Arnauld’s doctrine was laid before a commission of the Sorbonne. The debates had reached such a level of chaos and their implications appeared so profound that on 20 December 1655 Séguiere136 entered the chamber to impose order by his presence. The quarrel was no longer simply a theological discussion, but a matter of Church and social discipline.

The Jansenist practice of writing anonymously, together with the sympathy and support of Blaise Pascal, combined to produce a series of delightful works, the Lettres provinciales, the first being issued in 23 January 1656. Pascal was able to articulate the essence of Jansenism in a popular mode though in no way weakening it. Viewing man’s fundamental weakness as the need for divertissement, he proposed in the Lettres a duality in mankind: to live in sin or in grace.137 By means of the language of religion Pascal’s views on politics were intended to “illuminate and convert the worldly.”138 The unity he advocated was spiritually based on the concept of the “Body of Christ” — the community of all believers, but without the dominant political expression and protection of the state.

The Lettres introduced the debate to a wider audience and, through hyperbole, reduced its nuances. It was moved from the pulpit and the classroom to the salon, and thus became entertainment. Rather than focussing on droit, Pascal chose to focus on fait, and on Jesuit casuistry. This was no longer the style noble of the scholars but rather satirical dialogue of the salon.139 That the Lettres themselves made a mockery of the debate was
taken as a great insult by the anti-Jansenists. Perhaps the fact that they were so well written and engaged the public so thoroughly offended them as much, for the anti-Jansenists had no one in their camp of comparable calibre. However, despite the early efforts of Pascal, a month after the publication of the first letter, February 15, 1656, Arnauld was expelled from the Sorbonne.

*L'Église outragée par les Novateurs condamnez et opiniâtres,* published by Du Bosc in 1657, is an indication of how deeply the insult was felt. Du Bosc in this work moves from conciliation to outrage, as the title makes obvious. In Du Bosc’s view, the Jansenists have moved beyond the possibility of reconciliation and discipline is the only option left. The opening letter to Mazarin states in specific terms the links that Du Bosc sees between the religious and secular hierarchical structures. He stresses the interconnectedness of the two and the importance of presenting a united front in the face of challenges. Significantly, in a context of increasing emphasis upon authority, he questions the loyalty of the Jansenists not only to the faith but to the state as well:

Et certainement, MONSEIGNEUR, lors qu'on a renoncé au devoir d'un vray Fidele, ne renonce-t-on pas aussi facilement au devoir d'un vray Sujet? Et n'est-il pas à craindre, que ceux qui ont si peu de vérité respect pour l'authorité spirituelle, n'en ayent pas d'avantage pour l'authorité Royale?"\(^{140}\)

With the same effusive praise as in earlier letters, Du Bosc ranks Mazarin with Charlemagne and Constantine as one of the great defenders of the Church.

The following letter, addressed to the Assemblée du Clergé, commends them on their action against the Jansenists and their defense of the “amateurs de la verité.” Du Bosc outlines the plan of the text, stating that its purpose is not a general condemnation of one individual, though there are numerous citations of Arnauld's *Douzieme Lettre,* a defense of Jansenist doctrines. The principal Jansenist sin in his eyes is disobedience and effrontery in questioning the Bishops’ examination of the *Augustinus.* He calls for a humble, clear, and specific retraction.
In Chapter One Du Bosc defines his view of the current situation and warns against the ever-present danger presented by this silent but unrepentant group. In Chapter Two he examines the distinction between *fait* and *droit*. There is agreement among the Pope and bishops that the errors are all contained in Jansen’s work, and that it is heretical; resistance, therefore, is rebellion. Each of the subsequent chapters is devoted to a specific error of the Jansenists. The tone is one of injury that the Jansenists should rank their interpretation of scripture and tradition higher than that of the Assemblée du Clergé, the theologians and the Holy See. All their offenses may be considered under three aspects:

... le premier est de leur Omission, volontaire et affectée; le second, de leurs demeurirs si manifestes; le troisieme, de leur Opiniatreté dans l’erreur, et de leur impénitence.¹⁴¹

To support his views he cites the *Relation des déliberations du Clergé de France*, the correspondence of Alexander VII on the subject, and the judgement of the Sorbonne. As in his earlier works, his concern for scandal is great. The disunity of the Church poses a danger to society as a whole. It might be argued that Du Bosc, along with many of his contemporaries, was simply incapable of tolerating diversity of belief. However, his earlier works reveal an appreciation, as we have seen, for paganism and Judaism, as well as a genuine impetus to recognize the potentially universal nature of Christianity against narrow sectarianism. Yet in this apparent universalism we may also discern part of the weakness of Du Bosc’s view. A vision may be potentially universal as long as its foundations are not threatened. But when its life-force is threatened, its earlier flexibility may be exchanged for rigidity; what was earlier the primary free integration of grace and nature becomes in *L’Eglise outragée* the primacy of authority, a monolith in both Church and State. If, as has been argued, the defining element of Du Bosc’s understanding of authority is the notion of grace reflected at each level of society, and empowering the true diversity of the life of that society, then the questioning rejection of the channels of grace poses a threat to the whole culture. Authority exists to protect these channels, for
... l’Authorité ne semble donnée aux Prelats que pour estre le rempart de la verité; la conservation de celle-cy, est comme le fruit et la fin de l’autre.\textsuperscript{142}

It is apparent that the dangers Du Bosc sees to both Church and state in this resistance are linked. By challenging the authority of the Church to circumscribe belief, the Jansenists are also questioning secular authority. The cycle of authority, belief and tradition, each essential to the whole, is challenged because the validity of the channels of grace, the animating factor, has been questioned in favour of a much more restrictive notion of grace which bears no direct relation to the nature and practices of ordinary people both within the Church and even outside it. All Du Bosc’s writing to this point had emphasized the capacity of grace in all its different meanings from gracefulness of gesture and the infused grace of the good moral life, to the grace and love of God which illuminates and articulates the whole of nature. Under the severe threat of Jansenism, however, the lofty ideal of rising above sectarianism, developed in \textit{Le Philosophe indifferent}, begins to betray its particularist character and is unable to rise above the opposition between Jansenism and Pelagianism (as in \textit{Jesus Christ mort pour tous}). Du Bosc, however inevitably, enters into direct confrontation with the Jansenists. It is at this point that the flexibility of nature animated by grace gives way to a rigid authoritarianism, which looks to the modern reader of \textit{L’Eglise outragée} increasingly like the dead letter of the law. At any rate, conspicuous in this work is the absence of the former understanding and the insistence instead on the notion of authority alone. The final two chapters (XXVI – XXVII) of the work make this abundantly clear. Three considerations “oblige” the Pope and the Bishops to take strong action:

... le saint Pere et les Esveques sont obligez d’esteindre les restes de cette Heresie pour trois considerations tres notables. La premiere regarde l’authorité mesme; la seconde touche l’interêt de la verité, la troisième regarde la paix et la tranquillité de leurs troupeaux.\textsuperscript{143}

In the first case, Du Bosc reaffirms Prospers’ judgement that there is no longer time for learned disputation, but only authoritative action (“l’effort de l’authorité”).\textsuperscript{144} In the second
case, sacerdotal judgement must be maintained “non seulement pour l’interest de leur autorité, mais pour l’interest de la verité mesme”\textsuperscript{145} for authority has been given to the prelates only for them to be “the rampart of truth” and human sophistry can only find its limits in “l’autorité de l’Eglise.”\textsuperscript{146} and in the third case, authority must be maintained, if not for the\textit{Savants} and \textit{Sectaires} at least for the \textit{Sectateurs}. In this manner, authority seems to become Du Bosc’s overriding concern and the work concludes with a new principal charge against the Jansenists. All the evidence compels us to remark, Du Bosc concludes, “le dangereux estat où ils s’ont [sic] encore, en violant si ouvertement l’autorité du saint Pere & des Evesques.”\textsuperscript{147}

In 1661 Louis XIV had assumed personal control of the crown. He renewed the Formulary of 1657 that required all clerics to agree that Jansenism was a heresy. The Grands Vicaires de Paris, in an attempt to moderate the Formulary, issued a \textit{mandement} that allowed the reservation of conscience by distinction between \textit{fait} and \textit{droit}. This was nullified by Louis through an Order in Council which demanded that no distinction be made between \textit{fait} and \textit{droit}.	extsuperscript{148} The Formulary was further enforced when the Archbishop of Paris placed the Abbey of Port-Royal under interdict. The reform of Port Royal by Mère Angélique went far beyond that advocated by the Council of Trent or François de Sales, and this was perceived as resistance to the authority of both King and Archbishop. The austerity and single-minded pursuit of the sisters’ vocation made them suspect. Their initial rejection of the Formulary made them more than suspect and their resistance was seen as resistance to the crown as well as to the Pope.\textsuperscript{149}

There had been other turmoil during these years as well.\textsuperscript{150} Though not specifically Jansenist, the Parisian curés published a series of critical letters, \textit{Écrits des curés de Paris contre la Politique et la Morale des Jésuites} (1658–59). These were a reaction to both the government and the Society of Jesus.\textsuperscript{151} This is a small indication of how ideas were manipulated to support factions. The basic argument concerning grace was co-opted by many factions: Parlement, the curés, and the Crown. Each used it to
bolster its authority in defense of its control of grace.

Du Bosc continued to struggle with the ideas and the popularity of the Jansenists in *La découverte d’une nouvelle hérésie cachée sous la negation du fait de Jansenius et colorée de deux Equivoques*. Published in 1662, the work again calls for charity in the Jansenist debate, and addresses the Jansenists' continuing denial of their heresy. The image of "sophistic knots" recalling the image of the Gordian knot is used throughout; since to use the apostolic sword, Du Bosc fears, would damage the faith, he tries through a long and detailed analysis to loosen the knot.

Du Bosc attempts to demonstrate that the denial of *fait* is also a denial of *droit*, for on both counts the Jansenists challenged the rulings of authority. If one asks whether false doctrine is contained in the *Augustinus*, the question addresses *fait*. If one asks directly whether the doctrine of Jansenism is heretical, the *fait* and the *droit* are united. But the Jansenists, specifically Arnauld, have separated these to avoid being called to account.

The conclusion of Chapter Twenty-five makes it clear that the various of sources, of authorities, and ways of discernment are each integral to any conclusion:


As a consequence, the condemnation of Jansenism is inevitable on grounds of spurious doctrine, usurpation of authority, and lack of clarity. Du Bosc does, however, urge the Jansenists to retract; he directs them to his own work, *De la vraye retraction*, and assures them of the charity with which they will be received. But as in the case of *L’Eglise outragée* the work is nonetheless primarily polemic, demonstrating how Jansenist "opinion" serves "à blesser la verité, à éluder l’autorité, à dechirer l’unité, ...".

Du Bosc’s last work dealing specifically with the Jansenist controversy was *Le pacificateur apostolique qui montre comme les jansénistes, en pensant sauver la doctrine*
de Jansenius, se sont engagez à la condamner, conformément aux constitutions et au formulaire (1663). The book is a response to anonymous criticism that La Découverte had engendered. There are no new arguments or approaches taken in this work. The tone remains injured, and the argument is now the usual argument from authority, that the Jansenists are being flagrantly disobeident and thus compounding their stupidity with malice. He bases his argument on the constitution of the pope regarding the five propositions and on theological reasoning. After the minute detail with which he has treated all his subjects, he concludes by reducing the argument first to four maxims, then to only one: that the five propositions are heretical, and therefore any who hold to them are also heretical.

When the views of Philosophe indifferent are placed alongside those expressed in Du Bosc's anti-Jansenist writings, it becomes apparent that he has incorporated the conclusions of that earlier work into his later ones, but with significant differences. He no longer uses lengthy descriptive passages to convince his reader, and the scope of his thought tends to be more restricted. In these later works he begins by defining problematic phrases and reduces the argument to essentials. Although he continues to be both convoluted and repetitious, he reduces the scope of his argument to more concentrated effect. As Du Bosc moves through the Jansenist debate, it is clear that he is concerned about several things: the salvation of the souls of the heretics, the peace of the Church, and the stability of the community. Stoic philosophy had emphasized the individual as separate from society. Du Bosc, however, offered a place for the individual within an ordered, unified and, most importantly, sanctified society. This society, essentially and effectively Christian but also open — in Du Bosc's view — to the natural claims of all peoples, was bound by tradition, the authority that expressed that tradition and the culture that it produced.

Du Bosc's theological premises are also consistent with these views, though over time the focus shifts and some of the hidden underpinnings of the argument are more apparent. However, in viewing the whole of his work there is a consistent understanding of
how people ought to address one another, how they ought to function within a Christian society, and how change might be enacted.

In *Le Philosophe indifferent* Du Bosc found the source of heresy in sophistry and affectation. The reverse of these stances, sincerity and integrity, were obviously desirable characteristics. In *L'Eucharistie paisible* he again calls for a simple, amicable solution to the friction within the French Church, citing Ambrose's advice to Monica: when in Rome do as the Romans. *Jesus Christ mort pour tous* in examining the role of grace again identifies desirable characteristics, chief among which is thankful humility: to accept gratefully the gift of grace. The two following works, *Le Triomphe de S. Augustin* and *De la Vray retraction*, are expressions of anger and disappointment. Du Bosc is reacting to the inability of the Jansenists to demonstrate the reasonable response of contrition in the face of the judgement of the Pope. In this instance, the Jansenists, lacking in humility, compound their sin with the insolence of continued opposition. The remaining works, *L'Eglise outrageée, La Découverte*, and finally *Le pacificateur apostolique*, all express his disappointment with the Jansenists' inability to retract and to reconcile with the Assembly of Clergy.

The positive characteristics that Du Bosc advocates — humility, prudence, integrity, sincerity, charity — are those used to describe the mien advocated in *L'Honnesté Femme*, and those which characterize *l'honnête homme*. This ideal permeated social class and political life, and is, in Du Bosc's view, a consummate expression of the Christian in the period. Du Bosc, though obviously offended by the substance of the Jansenist debate, was as much offended by its manner. In his eyes the Jansenists had revealed themselves as dishonourable men. They were vociferous in asserting their views, rather than adapting to the community when necessary. They were vain in placing their judgement ahead of all others. They were deceitful and disrespectful by mocking the process and their opponents. And finally, despite — and because of — their narrow insistence on a sectarian notion of grace, they were, in Du Bosc's eyes, graceless men.
At the same time, however, in the last of those anti-Jansenist writings there is also a demonstrable, but clearly unintended, indication of the shadow of the ideal he espouses, as the integrated comprehensive ideal of graceful behaviour, grounded in a popular philosophical view of the relation between grace and nature, gives way unconsciously under attack to what is effectively its opposite. An unyielding authoritarianism emerges in which the previous freedom of different domains has been eclipsed by a rigid universalism. In its very unconsciousness, I suggest, one may catch a glimpse not only of the values at stake in the period, but of the actual process of transition itself whereby from the Renaissance and through the Ancien Régime and beyond, a noble and commonly shared ideal was susceptible under significant attacks of giving way to its own negative image or shadow as part of the birth of “new” ways of thinking. If this is so, then in the writings of Du Bosc there is the informative imprint not only of the Renaissance ideals which helped to forge the Ancien Régime but also of the contrasting authoritarianism which led to their dismantlement. In Du Bosc himself, therefore, we catch an important glimpse of several of the major faces of the Ancien Régime as well as something of the actual process of transition itself. To a certain extent, undoubtedly, this is a drama which plays itself out in any age and perhaps in every individual to a greater or lesser extent, but Du Bosc’s attempt — both partially successful and yet ultimately frustrated — to hold science and theology, nature and grace, soul and body, together, must nonetheless be taken as peculiarly emblematic of an age which came to witness their conspicuous separation. If Du Bosc is thus representative of a common sensibility in his day, the seeds of the dismantling of that sensibility must be located not only in scepticism, in the new science, and in the attempts to overcome scepticism by new methods (e.g. Descartes), but in that common sensibility itself.155
Endnotes

1. This chapter is not an attempt at religious sociology as identified by Delumeau (From Luther to Voltaire, 131) although some of his prescriptions, such as a sensitivity to contextualizing the views of individuals, have been attended to.


3. "As we shall see, ecstasy creates no void in the soul of the mystic. Apart from whatever mysterious enrichment it may bring to the centre of this soul, it stimulates all the faculties, and thus becomes an historical factor of the first order." Bremond, Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux, I: xxi.

4. Ibid., xviii.

5. Goubert, L'Ancien Régime, 90.

6. Ibid., 90.

7. Although Evennett refers to the conciliar movement of the fifteenth century the understanding he expresses is nonetheless relevant to the seventeenth century for as he remarks this idea of authority "was embedded deep in the subconsciousness of the middle ages" and continued as a "running subconscious query appended to the full-blooded canonist theory of papal sovereignty..." H. Outram Evennett, The Spirit of the Counter-Reformation, ed. John Bossy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) 92.


11. See Chapter Two, 42-46.

12. Gian Pietro Cardinal Caraffa, later Pope Paul IV, was elected between the second and third phase of the Council and sent the Church in a far less conciliatory direction. His death in August 1559 provoked riots of joy. As a Cardinal he was respected and admired; as a pope, he became a fanatical oppressor of any opposition.

13. The nephew of Pius IV, Charles Borromeo after the election of his uncle was quickly made Archbishop of Milan, and later a Cardinal. Rather than abusing his position, he became a model of the reforming bishop and worked ceaselessly in his diocese and as a papal advisor.
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15. The conciliar movement was advocated by laity and by many churchmen. The Bull convocating the Council of Trent is signed by Pope Paul III. See Canons and Decrees of Trent, 1.


17. Canons and Decrees of Trent, Sixth Session, Ch VIII, (34–35); Ch XVI, (42–43).

18. Ibid., Sixth Session, Ch I (30).

19. Ibid., Seventh Session Ch II–IV (55–58); Twenty-fourth Session Ch XIV (204–5).

20. Ibid., Twenty-third Session, Ch I (164–165).

21. Ibid. Seventh Session, Forward (55); Bull of Confirmation (269).

22. Ibid., Fourteenth Session, Ch IV (95); Canon 10 (103).

23. Ibid., Thirteenth Session, Ch IV (75); Canon 2, 4 (79).

24. Pius IV, Giovanni Angelo Medici, (1499–1565) came from a large family, though unlike the Renaissance Popes these were mostly men who were capable. Pius was not a reformer or theologian but an organizer. He was able to reverse the disintegration and espoused reform rather than reaction, unlike his predecessor.

25. Cardinal Giovanni Morone (1509–80) was an able diplomat and negotiated for the Vatican on numerous occasions. He was also imprisoned by Paul IV for unorthodoxy, though he was later made president of the Council of Trent (1563) by Pius IV and was able to guide the Council to a conclusion.


27. Delumeau, From Luther to Voltaire, 13.

28. Ibid., 30, see also Evennett, Spirit of the Counter-Reformation, 89–107, 114.


31. Wolfgang Reinhard, “Reformation and Counter Reformation, and the Early Modern State: A Reassessment,” The Catholic Historical Review (75): 396-398. Reinhard examines the impact of “confessionalization” or the formation of the new churches in their development as distinct homogeneous entities. He posits that the “Old Church” responded to this development, arguing “all churches had to rely to a lesser or greater extent on the support of secular powers.” (original emphasis)

33. Reinhard, "Reformation and Counter Reformation."

34. Tapié, *Age of Louis XIII*, 86.


36. Jan Van Ruysbroeck (1293–1381) was ordained in 1317 and founded a community of canons regular. He is chiefly noted for his mystical writings. He influenced Gerhard Groote and through him Thomas à Kempis. *Ibid.*, 19-20.

37. Thomas à Kempis (1379/80–1471) was born near Dusseldorf and became an Augustinian monk, serving as a copyist. *The Imitation of Christ* is a work of practical intent rather than of philosophical or theological analysis, and has thus reached a vast audience.

38. (Bk I.I.3; Bk I.III.2.) This work demonstrates that mysticism has neither dogma (knowledge by revelation), nor natural theology (reason) nor analogical knowledge as a source. The means is the end: contemplation and meditation are synonymous with direct and immediate intuition and experience of God. The work is part of the mystical tradition of the *devotio moderna*. Although the work had a material impact, it was the mystical impact that has most weight in this discussion. When addressing mysticism the problem of authenticity and objectivity of the experience is obvious. Objectivity requires order and plurality whereas subjectivity is defined by incoherence and a lack of order. The mystical experience is neither, as it is a single unifying experience, where neither order nor disorder have meaning.

39. Teresa of Avila (1515–1582) was born of an aristocratic family and became a Carmelite in 1535. She saw a need for reform within her order and in 1562 was given the authority to begin. Her works, *Life* (1562–65), *The Way of Perfection* (1565), and *The Interior Castle* (1577) are accounts of her experiences; the last gives a systematic description of the contemplative life.

40. John of the Cross (1542–1591) was born in Hontineros near Avila, trained by Jesuits, and became a Carmelite in 1563. Ordained in 1567, he met Teresa of Avila and joined her Discalced Reform. He held the post of prior and First Definitor in the order. His principal works are *Ascent of Mount Carmel* (1582–8) and *Spiritual Canticle* (1578–9).


42. The chapter titles of many of these works are indications of their purpose: "How the Practice of Quiet Teaches the Soul to Rise on the Wings of Love" from the *Ascent of Mount Sion*, Berndino de Laredo (d 1540); "Of the nature of recollection," "Of three ways of silence" from the *Third Spiritual Alphabet*, Francisco de Osuna (d. c. 1541). For translations see *ibid.*, 49, 57.


45. For an analysis of the specific characteristics of Christian Humanism see D’Angers, *L’Humanisme chrétien au XVIIe siècle*, vii–viii; for Du Bosc’s inclusion as a Christian humanist, xvi.

46. The religious book includes liturgical texts, theological studies, mystical works and apologetics. An example of their popularity is seen in the print history of *Miracles de Notre Dame de Liesse*. In six months 36,000 books were produced. See Delumeau, *From Luther to Voltaire*, 40.

47. Dickens, *Counter-Reformation*, 62.

48. “In France of this period, in the ranks of both clergys [regular and secular], in all the congregations of women, and in all classes of society, mystics abound: this is the one outstanding fact, dominating all the rest...” Henri Brémont, *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux*, I: viii.

49. Pierre Cardinal Béruelle (1575–1629) founded the Oratorians in 1611 in emulation of Philip Neri’s foundation in Rome. The Oratorians are secular priests devoted to teaching. Béruelle presented a strong theological basis for reform. His principal theme was Christology: the re-establishment of the centrality of the person of Jesus Christ in both theology and life. In 1623 he published *Grandeurs de Jésus* which influenced Olier, Eudes, and Pascal.

50. Jean-Jacques Olier (1601–1657) was trained in the Jesuit college at Lyon and worked under Vincent de Paul in Paris. He founded a seminary in the Parish of Saint Sulpice in 1648 and formed the Sulpician Order. He was associated with the establishment of Ville Marie (Montreal).

51. Jean Eudes (1601–1680) was an Oratorian for twenty years before founding the order of priests known as the Congregation of Jesus and Mary (the Eudistes), which specialized in preaching missions and running seminaries and the Sisters of Our Lady of Charity. His principal ministry was in Normandy.

52. See Rapley, *The Dévotes*, passim.


54. Madame Acarie (1566–1618), called by Brémont one of the most influential individuals in France, was cousin to Béruelle and married to Pierre Acarie, a former leaguer.

55. She was most active during her lay life and is not to be confused with Marie Guyart, who also assumed the name Marie de l’Incarnation. Guyart was an Ursuline from Tours who arrived in Canada in 1639 to establish an Ursuline Congregation in Quebec.

57. A body of work extending over several centuries, the *devotio moderna* was not only an expression of personal and societal spiritual reform; it also offered an alternative to the traditional monastic and communal focus and asserted the importance of individual prayer and discernment. This refocus on the individual is apparent in the meshing of Christian Humanism with the Tridentine reform which, in turn, gave rise to a body of devotional literature.


59. For statistics in Renaissance Italy regarding the proportion of laymen to clergy and the curriculum followed see Grendler, *Schooling in Renaissance Italy* 3–9, 50. Comparable statistics for France do not exist though an analysis of the curriculum followed in France in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is discussed in Larissa Taylor *Soldiers of Christ: Preaching in Late Medieval and Reformation France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 39-43. On the development of teaching orders see Delumeau, 34-40; Davis, 225-226; Rapley, *passim*.

60. The *Ratio studiorum* was derived from the intent of the *Constitutions* and the experiences of the teachers in the early Jesuit colleges. It was initially drafted in 1585 and formalized in 1599. The *Ratio studiorum* was designed to develop the individual moral integrity of the student. This in ensured the willing cooperation and acceptance of rules that students themselves determined for discipline and student government were placed in the hands of the students as far as possible. It consequently acted to actively discouraged passive acceptance of imposed rules. This approach was extended to intellectual development and presumed of the student: intelligence and able to think independently. Pierre Janelle, *The Catholic Reformation* (Milwaukee: Brusce Publishing Company, 1949) 148-50; A. Lynn Martin, *The Jesuit Mind: The Mentality of an Élite in Early Modern France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 202. Other schools adopted this method as well, such as the Compagnie des Filles de Notre Dame. Rapley, *The Dévote*, 46.


63. Augustinianism views the desire for grace, and consequently salvation, as the voluntary and necessary unity of man’s will and divine intent and identifies an innate evil as a consequence of the fall of Adam and portrays man as absolutely impotent without the efficient grace of God to redeem him.
64. Pelagianism, dating from the fifth century, proposed that the human person naturally possesses the ability of election, and therefore has the freedom and ability for self-motivation as well as for the possibility of rejection of God's grace of his or her own accord. It was rejected in 418 at the Council of Carthage though continued it to reappear. Semi-Pelagianism, which denied inherent guilt, proposed man's propensity to sin, though salvation could be achieved by joint action of God's grace and the action of man's will. It too was rejected at the Synod of Valence and the Synod of Orange, both held in 530.

65. Casuistry is the development, by spiritual advisors and confessors, of the application of moral theology to specific cases of conscience. Dealing with the intricacies of probabilism, it is a legalistic and scrupulous clarification of sin.

66. Cornelius Otto Jansen, theologian, and author of Augustinus (1640). The work, published posthumously, contained an interpretation of St. Augustine's reconciliation of human freedom and efficacious grace. Those using this work as a basis for their discussions were soon known as Jansenists.

67. Manichaeism was an offshoot of Gnosticism. It is distinct in that it stressed the duality of the world. The physical world was dark, the spiritual world was light. The natural extension of this is that the body is seen as evil.

68. Gnosticism was an attempt to mesh Christianity with Greek and Oriental philosophy. Gnostics believed that knowledge, rather than faith, was the key to salvation.

69. Jansen argued that the effect of grace is infallible without affecting the freedom of the will; but the distinction between la grâce suffisante (grace which enables the possibility of doing God's will) and la grâce efficace (the grace to transform will into action) is dependent on le pouvoir prochain (the ability to accept or reject God's will). These understandings, together, give man a level of free will. Walter E. Rex, Pascal's Provincial Letters: An Introduction (Hodder and Stoughton: Liverpool, 1977), 16.


71. Baius (Michel de Bay) (1513–1589) was a professor of Sacred Scripture at Louvain. In 1560 the Sorbonne condemned eighteen of his theses as heretical, questioning his method and conclusions. These dealt with man's original integrity, before the fall of Adam. They also denied the significance, if not the existence of sanctifying grace. His work, in many respects, laid the foundations for Jansen.

72. So at least Du Bosc will argue at length in Jesus Christ mort pour tous.

73. These include, most notably, the Arnauld family and the writer Blaise Pascal.

74. The Jesuits had difficulty establishing themselves in France and were opposed by many French clerics because of what was perceived to be their ultramontane stance,
interference with clerical prerogatives and their criticism of clerical abuses. Martin, 
_The Jesuit Mind_, 207–8.; Dale Van Kley, _The Jansenists and the Expulsion of the 

75. Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abbé de Saint-Cyran, born in 1587 to a wealthy 
bourgeois family, took the tonsure at age ten and received his first prebend at age 14. 
He studied with the Jesuits of Louvain and was associated with Jansen. His role as 
spiritual advisor to Port Royal and his sponsorship of Jansen’s work made him a 
leading figure in the debate.


77. “... nostalgia for the primitive Church and for the theology of the Church Fathers, 
the glorification of the episcopate and the sacred order of which they are the source, 
a severe asceticism though permeated with an “ecstatic optimism”...” _Ibid._, 11.

78. _Ibid._, 18–89. There is also in Saint-Cyran an element of Salesian spirituality, and an 
emphasis on personal prayer and meditation that, joined with Jansen’s rigour, 
contributed to French Jansenism’s final form. For a more detailed discussion of Saint- 
Cyran’s formation see Jean Orcibal, _La Spiritualité de Saint-Cyran avec ses écrits de 

79. Called Mère Angélique, Jacqueline Arnauld (1591–1661) was made abbess of 
Port-Royal at eleven years of age (1602). Her reform of the convent was considered 
excessive.

80. Charles du Bois de Condren (1588–1641) was ordained in 1614 and made a Doctor 
of the Sorbonne in 1615. He succeeded Bérulle as General of the Oratory in 1629. 
He was influential in the foundation of the Company of the Blessed Sacrament and 
an associate of Vincent de Paul and Olier.

81. Alexander Sedgewick, _Jansenism in the Seventeenth Century: Voices from the 
Wilderness_ (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia), 14.

82. Delumeau, _From Luther to Voltaire_, 125.


86. Norman Ravitch, _The Catholic Church and the French Nation 1589–1989_ (London: 
Routledge, 1990) 20; Goldmann, 113.

87. Orcibal, _Saint-Cyran_, 32.

88. Issac Habert, d. 1668, was a prédicateur du Roi, a nephew of François Habert, Bishop 
of Vabres and doctor of the Sorbonne. He wrote Latin poetry and anti-Jansenist 
polemics.
91. Edmond Richer (1559–1631), a syndic of the Sorbonne proposed in the pamphlet *De ecclesiatica et politica potestate libellus* (1611) that priests are successors to the apostles, that councils such the French Assembly of Clergy were superior to the pope, and the sovereign jurisdiction to the bishops. Delumeau, *Luther to Voltaire*. 114; Van Kley, *The Jansenists*, 25.
94. Nicholas Cornet (1592–1663) was a Master of the Collège of Navarre from 1635–43 and again from 1651–1663. Dedicated to teaching and scholarly work, he refused the position of Richelieu's confessor and an archbishopric offered by Mazarin, preferring to remain a member of the Faculty of Theology at the Sorbonne.
97. Paul Benichou says that "... si nous nous demandons donc quel en est le sens, quelle en est la place exacte dans l'histoire de la société française, les difficultés nous arrêtent aussitôt."
   "... if we ask ourselves what is its meaning, what is its exact place in the history of French society, the difficulties stop us short." Benichou, *Morales*, 78.
98. The link that is made in motivation between the Jansenists and the Frondeurs is an example of this confusion of motives. The theory presented by Goldmann and Lefebvre has been disputed by a number of authors. Richard Golden has expanded the dispute to encompass a much larger arena of dissent. See Delumeau, *Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire*, 118–121; and Van Kley, *The Jansenists*, Richard Golden, *The Godly Rebellion*, 100–1.
99. See, for example, the opening words of *Jesus Christ mort pour tous*: "Comme le sujet de la grace est l'unique fondement de toute la Morale Evangelique; Aussi le point de la Redemption generale ... est comme le centre de toute la doctrine de la Grace." 1–2.
   "As the subject of grace is the unique foundation of evangelical Morality, so also the general point of the Redemption is as the centre of the whole doctrine of grace."
100. *L'Eucharistie paisible, ou la paix des savants et le repos des simples, touchant l'usage de la communion et de la pénitence* (Paris: Remy, 1647); *Abrégé du livre intitulé L'Eucharistie paisible touchant l'usage de la pénitence et de la communion* (Paris: Franisum Pit, 1648); *Jesus-Christ mort pour tous que cette proposition bien démêlée peut démêler tout le reste de la controverse sur le sujet de la grace* (Paris: Bertier.

101. Synod of Valence and the Synod of Orange, both held in 530.

102. "... Truth being as it is both mistress and mediator of the learned." *L’Eucharistie Paisible*, unnumbered, 11–12. See also the similar formulations about *mediocrité* in *Le Philosophe indifferent*.


104. Monica, the mother of St. Augustine was a wealthy Alexandrian who spent many years praying for the conversion of her son.

105. "... the Eucharist is so to speak the centre of Christian society." *Ibid.*, 96.

106. *Ibid*.


109. "Let us take care to avoid those dangerous extremes, to walk in the middle way which so many great [men] have shown to us, warning us to walk between fear and hope, to avoid the extremity of presumption as well as that of despair, in order to keep to a moderate way, neither too rigorous nor too mild." *L’Eucharistie paisible*, II 44.


111. The first four were found to be heretical, the last to be simply false. For the text of the propositions see Cognet, *Le Jansénisme*, 50–51.

112. "Jesus Christ did not die for infidels or for those who are not baptized" *Jesus-Christ mort pour tous*, 8–9.

113. "... claimed that nature preceded the Grace of Redemption and that the principle of salvation was in man." *Ibid.*, 37.


117. "all manner of man, that is to say, men of all countries, all ages, and all conditions." *Ibid.*, 31–2.


120. *Ibid*, 111 f.


122. "... no one is excepted from the saviour’s charity..." *Ibid.*, II 349.


124. "that God wills all human beings to be saved and to come to knowledge of him." *Ibid.*, 118.


126. "one must adore the depth of God’s judgement and not wish to penetrate too curiously, why he does not save all men when he wishes to save them all." *Ibid.*


131. François Annat (1590–1670), ordained a Jesuit in 1624, was professor of philosophy at Toulouse and appointed King’s confessor in 1654. He was an active participant in the Jansenist debate and was attacked by Pascal in several of the *Lettres provinciales*. He retired in 1668.

132. The Formulary, the instrument of the Assembly of Clergy, was a condemnation of the five propositions. It recognized the work of Jansen as inspiration for the propositions, if not their specific source. It was imposed on all priests and religious.

133. This letter to Du Bosc from Alexander is referred to in both his obituary and by others in a number of prefaces to his books though there seems to be no extant copy.


135. *De la vraye retraction*, 27.

136. Pierre Séguiier (1588–1672), in 1620 became Maître de Requêtes, in 1633 was named by Richelieu Garde des Sceaux, in 1635 he was named Chancellor. He was a patron of the arts and after Richelieu’s death became protector of the academy, often hosting the meetings in his home, for which it was designed.


140. “And certainly, Monseigneur, when one has renounced the duty of the true believer, could one not as easily renounce one’s duty as a true subject? And is it not to be feared, that those who have so little real respect for spiritual authority might have no more respect for Royal authority?” *L’Église outragée*, unnumbered pages (5).

141. “… the first is their omission, willful and affected, the second is their manifest denials, the third their stubborness in error and their impertinence.” *Ibid.*, 41.

142. “Authority seems to have been given to the prelates only to be the rampart of truth; the conservation of truth is, so to speak, the fruit and goal of authority.” *Ibid.*, 54.

143. “… the Holy Father and the bishops are obligated to extinguish this heresy for three notable reasons. The first concerns authority itself, the second concerns the interest of truth, the third touches the peace and tranquility of their congregation.” *Ibid.*, 53.


145. “not only in the interest of their authority, but in that of the truth itself.” *Ibid.*, 54.


147. “the dangerous state where they are still, by violating so openly the authority of the Holy Father and of the Bishops.” *Ibid.*, 64.


150. Among them are the resistance of the Norman nobles to the crown in 1658, and that of the trésoriers in 1661. Golden, *The Godly Rebellion*, 152.


152. “Because in the matter of faith the point of law is integral to the word of God both written and unwritten, everyone agrees. Thus to offend the law is to offend tradition, scripture, revelation and the infallibility of the Church and as a consequence, to offend the faith and to be heretical.” *La decouverte*, 80.


156. See Appendix A below for further discussions of remaining works.
Conclusion

Epochs tend to be conveniently structured by historians according to internal commonalities and the prominent characteristics of each age as they appear to us to be of importance. Traditional historical approaches have tended to focus for the most part either upon the stellar experiences of a particular age, or by contrast upon social-descriptive history. Typical views of the Ancien Régime, for example, have tended to present a picture of economic, social, and political considerations often to the exclusion of religious considerations; or conversely the Ancien Régime has been presented as an age of conflict in which an Age of Saints gives way to an age typified by the atheistic curé and the sceptical scientist rather than by any common religious, political or social sensibilities. This thesis argues that both of these views of the Ancien Régime are generally either too reductionist or too un informatively descriptive. They leave a large lacuna between the two which needs to be examined, as far as possible, by a method which is capable of linking both views. There is no doubt that in seventeenth-century France, religious sensibilities were important and pervasive. For the historian, however, this leads to a dilemma. If this dimension is, in fact, so important, then it would appear necessary not to reduce it to other forms of explanation. However, a non-reductionist view of seventeenth-century religious sensibilities must also attempt to integrate this sensibility into other social and personal contexts of the day. The problem therefore is this: the historian must somehow be capable of treating religious sensibilities both on their own terms and as an integral function of society; yet at the same time there seems no readily available methodology which could uncover what a religious
sensibility on its own terms might be. This is the central part of the dilemma of this thesis, which has sought to develop a new method partly to bridge the gap left by other historians, and partly to provide a cogent means of delineating, with proper academic sympathy, some of the principal features of part of the religious sensibilities of the age.

My approach has been to study the works of Jacques Du Bosc, a minor figure who enjoyed success and popularity and who was involved in many of the major debates of his day. I have analysed his writings as a means of recapturing some of the salient features of what was an apparently common mentality of his time, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the major contemporary conflicts both as they occurred in his life and as they are consciously or unconsciously reflected in his writings. This is not a straightforward biographical method, but one which seeks to construct a broad intellectual biography with wider insight for the age. It is also partly an attempt to use his works to gauge the sensibility which formed both his life and the society in which he participated.

Du Bosc was neither powerful (he was not a member of the ruling élite) nor powerless (he was a literate, educated member of the clergy). He is to be placed among a body of writers who observed and commented on the issues of the day. The works these writers produced both shaped and reflected society. This intermediate perspective is an appropriate standpoint from which to gauge the mentalité of the times as well as the rationale used to maintain authority. It provides us with an opportunity to view history from the perspective of a man who was in several senses located in the “middle of things:” between power and poverty, church and state, and by sacerdotal ordination vested with the obligation of bridging all the different ‘estates.’ Furthermore, Du Bosc’s works are also appropriate for our purposes because he was an “ordinary” rather than an original thinker and because he was interested in so many of the controversies connected with the issue of authority. Taken together, then, these works provide an effective, representative, and multi-perspectival means of assessing a significant part of the mentalité of the day as well as a prevalent understanding of authority.
The major advantage of this approach is that it can give us a more representative view of the Ancien Régime and its problems than we may find from any other single perspective. This method permits us to link what may appear to be minor and often elusive trends or events to the major, well-known currents of the day. Since the religious dimension plays a major role in Du Bosc’s writings, this dimension can be treated on its own terms as a function of his concern and given the importance it deserves. At the same time this analysis can also be situated appropriately in the broader social-political context of Du Bosc’s own writings. Thus, while the methodological link between Du Bosc and his time is established in the Chapter One, Chapter Two deals with what we know about Du Bosc himself, even if the evidence is somewhat scarce and at times contradictory.

Despite this insufficiency of evidence, what is striking is the fact that his reputation was as double-edged as the intermediate perspective we have taken him to represent. Was he a libertine and renegade or a more traditional, faithful but reflective thinker? Or perhaps a mixture of both at different times of his life and from different points of view? In Chapter Two I reviewed the evidence as a means of providing a broader social background in which to situate Du Bosc. I argued that on the basis of what we know about the Estates, the function of priesthood, and the status of women at this time, no single perspective — social, economic, political, or religious — should be subordinated to any other. A multiperspectival view according to which all of the dimensions functioned together in distinct yet often overlapping ways seems to be the best interpretation of the evidence we have. This would itself suggest that many contemporary views of the Ancien Régime might well reflect twentieth-century preoccupations rather than the real concerns of the people of the seventeenth-century.

In order to test this hypothesis, I then turned in Chapter Three to Du Bosc’s major theoretical work, *Le Philosophe indiffergent*. In this work it is strikingly apparent that the most authoritative element for Du Bosc is not simply the specific political, economic, or social structures he addresses, but the animation, articulation and development of these
structures by their openness to grace so that each perspective in itself attains its fullest significance and freedom. In Chapter 3 it becomes clear that for Du Bosc liberty and grace go together, invigorating and unifying every sphere from the sciences to moral integrity to manners and gestures. Far from being eclipsed by the religious dimension, all other structures emerge in their potentiality in the light of God's authorship, i.e. grace. Without grace, virtue is "dead," or simply a skeleton without the flesh and blood of life, as Du Bosc describes the ancient Stoic virtues (see Chapter three, note 60). At the centre of Du Bosc's theory in *Le Philosophe indifferent* is the traditional distinction between creation and engendering and a philosophy of history in light of theology. According to the first distinction, the full and living reality of nature, as created by God, has been tarnished by the Fall, but this *created* nature, directly subject to grace, remains in physical things which are now *engendered* by sexual propagation. Hence, the realm of grace is, for Du Bosc, a real but deeper, implicit force reflected not only in the sacraments, precepts, and teachings of the Church which recall human beings to their original (but persistent) creation, but also in every aspect of society, nature, and history. According to the second distinction (i.e. a philosophy of history), the integral unity of grace and nature is a part of all human history, pagan and judaic, but is completed in Christianity. Consequently, Du Bosc attempts a reduction of sects (that is, partial philosophical and religious viewpoints) in order to show, in the shortcomings of each, the need for a 'hypercritical' or transcendental view of what they have in common, if their debilitating partialities can be relinquished. This is the only part of his major philosophical work which he claims to be original: the reduction of sects by charting a course between the extremes of excess and defect (expressly derived in part from Aristotle's mean of moral excellence in the *Nichomachean Ethics II*) so that partiality or sectarianism can be avoided. Yet he plainly makes this reduction into a universal principle. Aristotle and Aquinas, on the other hand, would certainly hold that the avoidance of extremes applies only in certain ares of knowledge (particular to moral philosophy). According to them, this approach cannot be applied outside of its own specific reference
point without distortion of the whole. However this may be, we may suppose for good reason that the view of the integral relation between nature and grace, developed in the early part of *Le Philosophe indifferent*, can stand as representative of a popular, accessible view in this age. Du Bosc himself bases it on the views of the principal early Church Fathers, as well as, among others, Boethius, Augustine, and Aquinas. Furthermore, this view as presented in *Le Philosophe indifferent* is generally unsophisticated, lacking the theological distinctions between efficacious, sufficient, cooperative, etc. graces which Du Bosc will employ in his later anti-Jansenist writings. The result is a representative picture in which the social, moral and political realms find their integrity and freedom in the religious dimension rather than vice versa — a reversal of the normal modern view. At the same time, in Du Bosc’s unconscious *pars pro toto* stratagem in the reduction of sects we can see indirectly, first, some of the conflicts of his own day (between scepticism, dogmatism, etc..) and, second, the unconscious possibility for later conflict in his own life (i.e., the apparent identification of his own point of view with the hypercritical perspective of his reduction of sects). In Du Bosc’s insistence on the proper method and in his traditional, but creative, use of Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and others, we can also glimpse what he might be reacting against in the scepticism of his own day or in the thought of a Bacon or Descartes.

What is striking in *Le Philosophe indifferent* is how Du Bosc’s theory clearly anticipates the much more sophisticated dialectic of Hegel some one and a half centuries later, and even to a lesser extent the transcendental deduction of Kant a hundred years later and the theory of judgement associated with it. Where Du Bosc attempts to sketch out what a hypercritical, supposedly non-sectarian viewpoint might look like for all spheres of life, Kant will attempt to sketch out the common structure of the human mind as it engages in all the ordinary occupations of daily life.

The theory established in *Le Philosophe indifferent* is also evident with different applications in Du Bosc’s other writings. His works on the *Querelle des femmes*, treated in
Chapter Four, are a significant test case of the general theory, for in *L’Honneste femme* Du Bosc extends the notion of grace explicitly to cover every facet of *le monde*, from the implicit gracefulness of an apparently frivolous gesture or conversation, to the integral gracefulness guiding prudence and charity in moral action. All ordinary action is instinct with creative grace, but each in its own way. Devotion, therefore, is not a matter of separate sanctity or withdrawal from the world, but of a natural spirituality of ordinary action. In this Du Bosc follows and develops the work of De Sales and others. In *La Femme heroïque* he takes this in even more interesting directions, for he insists that grace is not the preserve of the elect, specifically Christians, but rather that it is implicit in the structure of natural pre-Christian heroic feminine action. He proposes this in order to escape the blinkers of sectarian prejudice and examines the phenomenon of human heroism in pagan and Jewish paradigmatic situations so as to determine, as it were, the natural extraordinary quality of ordinary life. Again, if we put this insight alongside his partial anticipation of Kant and Hegel, it is clear that while Du Bosc might be verbose, he is plainly not unintelligent, and this occasional luminous intelligence is a strong indication that one is further justified in regarding him as representative of his age. While mediocre writers might not reflect or illuminate very much at all, verbose, but intelligent writers, on the other hand, are not just fumbling stand-ins at the edge of the debate, but engaged in such a way as to be able to reflect with intelligence the central issues of the day. This accurate reflection is a hallmark of Du Bosc’s writings on women through which we are able to see clearly the larger issues of the day. For example, what is an adequate view of human nature? How is this to be related to conduct and ordinary practice? Who is to be included and can there be a science of manners? How can orthodox religion include what may appear to contradict it? How can there be diversities of opinion, including scepticism and relativism, and yet an adequate notion of truth which can simultaneously take account of nature and yet avoid dogmatism? Is grace radically independent of nature or nature sufficient
to itself? Suitably rephrased, these are some of the questions which I have shown to be at the centre of Du Bosc's concern.

The same tolerance and firm belief in the integrity of nature and grace extend to his early anti-Jansenist works, treated in Chapter Five. Retraction and mercy are always possible if only the irrationality of the opinions expressed can be explained to the Jansenists themselves. Here we move much more directly into the sphere of the structures or channels of grace in the visible Church, i.e. sacraments, preaching, and precepts. Again Du Bosc's reflection of the real issues appears to be highly accurate. Here he was also passionately involved in the defence of the integrity of nature and grace threatened by Jansenism by the effective denial both of nature and its merits and of the universal sufficiency of grace. Within the larger, more theoretical question, the efficiency of the sacraments as practical channels of strengthening grace for all people (particularly ordinary people, i.e., Du Bosc's *les simples*) was also under attack. Consequently, Du Bosc emphasizes the integrity of the sacraments through the corresponding dignities of formal and material expressions (i.e., inner essence and outer expression). Against the Jansenists, he stresses the important practical history of sacramental performance dating back to Apostolic times as a means of showing from Church practice itself that the more restrictive Jansenist notion of grace can not reasonably abolish the material need for the sacraments, since it does not take account of the traditional insistence upon the unity of inner form and outer material expression. Against the corruptions which have led the Jansenists to their extreme position, he urges a similar need: matter should strive to be adequate to form. Again, the integralist theory of *Le Philosophe indifferent* forms the necessary background for understanding the thought even of these early anti-Jansenist works. In the later works, however, what must have seemed to Du Bosc like the sustained fundamentalist irrationalism of the Jansenists plainly led to the disappearance of his earlier flexible integralist view. It is replaced by what I have called its deconstructive image: a rigid universalist authoritarianism, tempered indeed by a characteristic mercifulness, but to which even the peace and tran-
quillity of his earlier hypercritical method in *Le Philosophe indifferent* is, however unconsciously, subordinated.

Are there adequate grounds to demonstrate that such a change of perspective really does take place in Du Bosc’s world? One may well object, of course, that Du Bosc was simply authoritarian from the beginning, but that in the earlier works — depending on the reader’s point of view — this authoritarianism was more or less thinly disguised. However plausible, this is not a tenable view, if we take the works themselves to be relatively definitive in the context of what we know about the age. The early and middle works clearly expound an integralist view in which the possibility of the inclusion of all human beings in redemptive grace depends upon the comprehensive authority of grace itself as the animating principle of the whole created world. In the very late works, under the sustained attack of Jansenism, the emphasis demonstrably shifts from divine creative authority, in which human beings should cooperate, to a rigid authority vested in the structures of religious and political life. In the circumstances, it is thoroughly plausible that such a change should have unconsciously occurred, but the change is of additional significance for the historian, since it seems to reflect accurately one of the major facets of conflict in the constant series of transitions which have been loosely termed the late Renaissance, Ancien Régime, and the Enlightenment and to adumbrate this conflict as itself as a part of the process of transition. This deconstructive shadow, it may reasonably be supposed, accurately represents the inability of traditional understandings not simply to counter new threats but ultimately to tolerate conflicting diversity of opinion. In Du Bosc’s work, the source of this major threat is clearly neither science nor scepticism, for it originates from within the Christian milieu itself. The extreme Christianity of Jansenism immediately provokes the equal and opposite reaction in Du Bosc himself, as flexible universality gives way to a rigid universalist authoritarianism. It is true that many other contributory forces were at work in the process of transition, but surely it must be fundamental to our understanding of Du Bosc’s age that the seeds of dismantlement are to be found primarily in the religious dimension
itself, and indeed, even more poignantly, within a concerted struggle for certain principles (a global understanding of the fundamental rights of all peoples, universal accessibility, etc.), In the modern world may also hold those principles to be fundamental, in whatever different ways, to our own understanding.

If the results of this investigation are sound, then we are compelled to change our modern views of seventeenth-century French history. It is plain that if Du Bosc is representative, then such history cannot be treated independently of the religious dimension, for the simple reason that modern purely secular concerns fail to recognize the significance of what was thought to be most significant at the time. The work of other suitable second or third-stringers of equal potential importance becomes necessary if historians are to bridge the gap between popular history and the history of stellar figures. There are, of course, in Du Bosc's "chains of reasonings" distant echoes of Descartes' method, but upon the results of this thesis it becomes reasonable to assume that in important ways Du Bosc is more truly representative of his age than is Descartes. In Descartes' writings there are insights and distinctions which will inform the thought of all future generations, but there is little accurate "reflection" of the pressing issues of his own day. Du Bosc, by contrast, incorporates past insights to deal with the concerns and dilemmas of his age and provides the modern reader with an effective, intelligent reflection of these pressing issues. And this reflection is perhaps even more telling when it is given unconsciously, as we find both in *Le Philosophe indifférent* and in the anti-Jansenist works.

On the basis of the above, what is Du Bosc's view of authority? It is evident that his view is not primarily political or social or economic or even religious in so far as one single dimension is supposed to dominate the field. Nor does Du Bosc have a single consistent view throughout his life, for in the eighteen-year span which marks the anti-Jansenist works his view of authority, however unconsciously, undergoes a significant change. In *Le Philosophe indifférent* authority is linked to order and organization, but it is not reduced to structure alone. Rather, Du Bosc's integralist view of the relation between grace and na-
ture confirms his understanding that authority is to be understood as the organizing principle inseparable from the natural, intellectual and spiritual spheres which it organizes and develops. Foreign to his understanding is the idea that authority is a form of manipulative control imposed from outside, or that it is a quasi-mystical ecclesiastical force. It does not serve to take away the relative freedom of each different sphere of life nor prey upon the superstitions of simple people. Instead Du Bosc sees authority in this work as a function of the creative “authorship” of God, which permits things to be free and which actually assists in the development of their natural potential by organizing the moral, intellectual, and spiritual lives.

According to this view, grace and authority emerge out of nature and can be grasped more comprehensively by a philosophy of history which recognizes the progressive development of human potential for salvation. Du Bosc’s theory, therefore, effectively proposes that the most accurate and comprehensive understanding of reality yields the clearest insight into the nature of authority. Each item or sphere of nature, as well as each particular detail, is seen most accurately in its widest context, not singly or as an isolated thing or event, but as part of an organic system ordered and organized by a complex nexus of interrelated organizing principles. In other words, the uniqueness of the individual is most clearly grasped in its organized context and Du Bosc’s theory of the avoidance of “too much” and “too little” captures precisely this tension between the choice of the individual and the integral unity of the whole, since the correct balance between the two is simultaneously the right individual choice and yet the “hypercritical” or authoritative measure of reality.

Authority, therefore, must emerge from individual reflective responses and also from an integral connection with reality. On this view, then, authority is a liberating force, founded upon a comprehensive understanding of the authorship of God and expressed by the individual and society in different, relatively independent ways in different contexts. The crucial criterion is this comprehensive understanding, of which, for Du Bosc, individual na-
tures are explicitly or implicitly integral parts. What links these parts to one another in an explicitly organized fashion is that these actions should be performed gracefully and that they should be graceful natural activities. Grace, therefore, is the means by which a comprehensive liberating authority can be effected at every level of natural existence.

At no point in *Le Philosophe indifférent* does Du Bosc link authority to force, manipulation, or the exercise of political power. Nor does his philosophy of history reject the legitimacy of pagan or Jewish views. It is noteworthy by contrast that he is at pains to establish their legitimacy in this context. This reading of Du Bosc’s view of authority is confirmed and conspicuously developed in his contributions to the *Querelle des Femmes*, for in each of his major works in this area he provides concrete examples of the organic comprehensive view he has outlined in *Le Philosophe indifférent*. In each case the lack of rigid prescription or of a rigid hierarchy enables the reader to discern Du Bosc’s primary focus: that is, free, intelligent discernment between the alternatives of appropriate behaviour, whether Christian, Jewish or pagan, a discernment which serves to develop, as Du Bosc puts it, *l’honnêteté* or integral individuality. In *L’Honneste femme*, which focuses on women, the supposedly weaker or less developed half of humanity, the honest woman becomes an icon of the extensiveness of nature and grace, for her life is infused with grace. This is seen both in apparently insignificant details and in the potential for prudential and graceful discernment. Here Du Bosc employs the least able in society in order to validate the emergence of authority not from an abstract hierarchy nor from an apparently superior class or sect (e.g. nobility or ecclesiastical authority) but from the very integrity of women themselves.

In *La Femme héroïque* he goes even further than this by providing, in a pre-Christian context phenomenological evidence of the implicit unity of nature and grace in the more or less heroic actions of archetypal individuals. Authority in this context comes to have a rather new meaning in so far as Du Bosc places it explicitly outside the Christian context in the milieu of natural prudential judgement open to the scrutiny of a rational community.
The reader is again confronted not with absolute judgements but rather with the problem of discerning the appropriate authoritative balance between a range of alternative possibilities. In the very construction of these works, therefore, the nature of authority as an integrative organizing principle which permits freedom in society and individual is confirmed. This notion may well be unduly optimistic, but it is nonetheless rooted in Du Bosc’s belief that both the society and the individual are informed by a universal natural ideal which implies the comprehensive integrity of nature and grace *ab initio*.

The apparent value of this view for Du Bosc is that it is able to incorporate all segments of society and culture providing there is a common understanding of the balance necessary to achieve moral excellence, a recognition of the necessity of grace in achieving this balance and an acceptance of the social, religious, and political structures that ensure the continuance of this development. When Du Bosc turns to the Jansenist debate, which centred on the question of grace however, this necessary balance is lost. In his reaction to the Jansenists the weakness in his position, implicit in some of his work up to that time, is brought into question. The Jansenists challenged the balance of “too little” and “too much” by their intransigence in the face of the Church’s findings regarding the relationship of grace and nature by effectively separating the two. This obviously had profound implications for any universal understanding of authority. Jansenism in Du Bosc’s view, is a particularly insidious form of sectarianism that arises from within the Church itself, and one which Du Bosc had already rejected on philosophical grounds in *Le Philosophe indifférent*.

In the early Jansenist works Du Bosc is able to maintain his position of *indifférence* by situating himself between two opposing sectarian views, Jansenism, on the one hand and Pelagianism, on the other. He attempts to demonstrate that Jansenism’s interpretation of Augustine (i.e. that the authority of grace overrides everything) is neither doctrinally nor historically sound, and that equally the Pelagian position (i.e. that practice and nature are of primary importance) fails to take account of the fundamental principles of grace.
Articulated in *Jesus Christ mort pour tous*, these three principles establish that “God wills all human beings to be saved and that they should come to knowledge of him;” that knowledge of God and the possession of salvation is “by the merit of nature [and] the help of Grace;” and finally that “one must ... not wish to penetrate too curiously, why he does not save everyone when he wishes to save them all.”¹ For Du Bosc, authority consists in bringing the two poles of Jansenism and Pelagianism together in the tradition, teaching, and social practices of the Church. In this early Jansenist period Du Bosc continues to demonstrate considerable flexibility, in so far as he permits a wide variety of practices provided that the essential unity of internal and external expression in sacramentality is preserved. However, the growing conviction that Jansenism threatened to split the already fragile unity of the Church from within prompts Du Bosc to an increasing authoritarianism in the later works.

While there is no evidence to suppose that his earlier views have been abandoned, his emphasis and explanations change dramatically, so much so that authority of Church, of state and of society become unconscious equivalents for Du Bosc and the guarantors of cultural well-being. By “unconscious” in this context I mean that in the face of attack, Du Bosc’s earlier theory of *indifférence* is not so much rejected as temporarily eclipsed by the force of circumstances and what he considered to be evident needs of the moment. In other words, where the Jansenists’ notion of authority is predicated entirely on grace and selective redemption, and the Pelagian notion of authority is based more or less exclusively on individual intention and nature, this new phenomenon of authoritarianism in Du Bosc, while related to both extremes, is the product of neither exclusively. It should, rather be viewed as the failure of the integralist view to accommodate any form of dogmatism, for dogmatism is antithetical to the universalism Du Bosc supported. Authoritarianism is not then a hidden agenda of the universalist view but rather the deconstructive shadow of a universalism forced from within to become sectarian, and Du Bosc, for all his allegiance to universalism, cannot avoid the implicit nature of the structures he defends. His condemna-
tion of Jansenism is based on its obstinate rejection of revelation and dogma as interpreted by centuries of tradition, on the Jansenists’ arrogant challenge of the hierarchy, and of their refusal to demonstrate penitence. In this condemnation the discourse of grace is supplanted by the letter of authority. It is noteworthy that in the concluding passages of *De la Vraye Retraction* the word grace does not appear once, while the word authority occurs on virtually every page, and frequently more than once. Du Bosc, by the time of the late Jansenist works (and this is confirmed in the letters to his superiors), has effectively lost his own integralist view in the very attempt to preserve it.

The integrity of the early balance Du Bosc advocated is predicated on what we might call the natural ideal: the *honnête homme*, extended by Du Bosc to include the *l’honnête femme*. The individual served to express and refine the ideal of church, state and society by living a grace-filled life, or as Du Bosc would have it, by living with *honnêteté*. He viewed society as a complex and interrelated organism, with individual behaviours forming family relationships (which were validated sacramentally) and friendships. These relationships in turn were fitted into an estate which allotted particular social responsibilities. Political expression reflected this order and, with a sanctified kingship, society was assured of the maintenance and continuance of this order. The Church, intrinsic to this order (as estate and as an expression of grace and nature) was the legitimate channel of grace. Any challenge to the traditional means of acquisition or the efficacy of grace had become, then, a challenge to the whole. In this chain of cultural certainty, the structures were further confirmed by the tradition of the society and the Church. Thus the maintenance of the whole rested equally on the shoulders of all three: the Church which defined the channels of grace, the secular authority which protected these channels of grace through justice, and the *honnêtes gens* who earned and benefited by the grace, ultimately in salvation.²

By this time, however, Du Bosc was advocating a stance that was fast losing credibility. In the following century the infusion of new knowledge, new understandings of science, discontent with the political *status quo*, and unceasing war would eventually lead to
an overt rejection of grace as a defining element and an equal rejection of the structures sustained by it. The necessity of a different sort of pluralism in religion, politics, and social expression was slowly being accepted by many Frenchmen, and this new pluralism was later openly advocated by Enlightenment thinkers. In this context one may view Du Bosc as a traditional voice raised in the defence of a natural balance between Church and State, a voice which despite its eloquence and persistence was in the process of losing the balance it itself wished to advocate. The emphasis upon authoritarianism and on the identity of the structures of authority which resulted from historical confrontation between the Church and Jansenism poignantly reflects the fact that Du Bosc was unable to maintain and develop the position of the non-sectarian "indifferent" philosopher. This very position in his earlier view, was the focus of his original contribution to the history of philosophical-theological discourse. He was thereby unable to prevent, even in his own intellectual aspirations and practice, the integration of social, political, and religious spheres, founded on an understanding of grace and nature from shifting to accommodate a new defining authority: raison.
Endnotes


2. The way in which Du Bosc understands grace then was mirrored in his understanding of individual behaviour that he idealized in honnêteté. His description of ideal behaviours, evident throughout his work, is predicated upon two precepts. The first precept, informed by traditional Christian belief, is that living in a state of grace was joyful and possible; the second is that this state is not only not antithetical to refined contemporary society, but actually necessary. Du Bosc in his earliest work moves beyond simply identifying the relationship of society and faith: he links the two intimately, in that faith authorizes society when it is lived according to religious precepts. Conversely, religious precepts are given form and expression by the society that espouses them, effectively authorizing religion. The integrity, honesty, and clarity expected of those aspiring to honnêteté was an ideal he advocated and the means by which the truth of man’s role in the universe and his relationship to God might be better defined.

   It has become apparent through this analysis that grace, as it was understood by Du Bosc and his contemporaries, played an integral part in the creation and maintenance of the social, political and religious structures and that it was understood to be intimately linked to authority. It is also apparent that traditional teachings on grace were being seriously challenged during the course of the century. These challenges originated in neo-stoicism, neo-platonism and the dogmatic refinements of Gallican Catholicism, and must further be placed within the context of a shifting social structure. These challenges obviously go far beyond an obscure theological debate, for they are indicative of a larger shift in the intellectual life and, in turn, the social life of seventeenth century France and intimate the developments of the eighteenth century. Du Bosc was a product of his time in belief, education, and manner. He and others continued to defend the several hierarchies as grantors of authority. The defense seemed to be effective in that the crown did maintain and conserve the social and political unity. However, the ultimate failure of Du Bosc and of others is apparent in a rejection of grace as defining element. This becomes clear as the vocabulary of approbation (*grâce, honnête, faveur*) changes through the second half of the seventeenth century. The figure of the honnête homme shifted from being based on the reconciliation of nature and grace, to being socially and intellectually adept, in much the same manner as the honnête femme became the précieuse.
Appendix A

The Formation of Society:
Four Remaining Works

Du Bosc was an advocate of accommodation to the cultural authorities verified by the traditions and beliefs of his age. This is particulary apparent in his advice to women in L'Honnestte Femme, and even to a lesser extent in La Femme heroïque by the exemplary figures he cites. Although these idealized figures, drawn from the classical past and the Old Testament, were bound by different authorities, traditions, and beliefs, they were, nonetheless, admirable because of their devotion to the authority of their society. The characteristics of his own time, evident in L'Honnestte femme and Nouveau Receuil, are also idealized. Du Bosc's description of the nobility and his admonitions regarding education are useful statements of his view of society. At base it is a Christian vision within which there are ranks (as we see in part in Chapter Two). These ranks were, he felt, earned by nobility of purpose and selflessness, characteristics that constituted a grace-filled life (as we see in Chapter Three and Four), as much as they were by lineage. But in these works he is writing in the abstract: a set of ideals to be followed by an unknown reader. To bring these ideals closer to reality and to the realm of daily life it is instructive in an appendix to examine Du Bosc's own engagement with society through a series of works we have not touched upon hitherto and by means of a general comparison between these and earlier works.

The remaining works were written in praise of Du Bosc's superiors, both religious and secular: Consolation à Mgr l'Eminentissme Cardinal Mazarin sur la mort de Madame sa mère,¹ Lettre à Mgr le Cardinal duc Mazarini sur la paix générale, avec le panégyrique

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du Cardinal Richelieu, and Panégyrique du roi sur le sujet de la paix de Rome, ou la magnanimité de Louis XIV est comparée à celle Jules César. The concluding work, which examines a conflict between the Vatican and the Louvre, is especially useful in discerning Du Bosc’s view of authority in both secular and sacred venues. A further work is included in this chapter: Le Martyre du R. P. François Bel. Like the works addressed to women, each of these are guided by marked conventions, yet are useful in furthering the knowledge we have of Du Bosc’s views.

The first work is Le Martyre du R. P. François Bel. This is an account of the life and martyrdom of a French priest in England. Through this idealized account of an untypical life we are able to see Du Bosc’s assessment of individual behaviour measured against the larger perspective of society.

Du Bosc wrote the narrative of events surrounding the martyrdom of François Bel in the winter of 1643–44. It is part biography, part devotional tract, and part hagiography. There is little doubt that Du Bosc saw in the death of his fellow Franciscan an ideal. It seems initially a large leap from formulating behaviours useful to educated and wealthy men and women who are the élite of society to the bloody death of a martyr. If one considers the foundation of both these roles, however, and the expressed end of each, the leap is not so large. The world of the martyr and that of the socialite are one and the same, informed by the same precepts. Each has a role to fulfil and a each is responsible for maintaining a French Christian ethos. Each has a place in the tradition of society: one expressing ideal human behaviour, the other expressing supra-human behaviour. In modern terms a religious fanatic, as Bel could easily be called, is understood to be unbalanced and irrational. To Du Bosc and his contemporaries, a martyr was evidence of the veracity of their belief system, their tradition, and the divine authority that underwrote and maintained it. The very sacrifice of a martyr assures the veracity of authority. It is precisely this non-rational quality that demands the inclusion of grace as a defining element when addressing authority in the seventeenth century. Du Bosc was not proposing that all become martyrs,
only that the courage and devotion of a martyr be recognized as an appropriate model.

Published in 1644, this work has an *Epître* addressed to the Regent, who had a special devotion to Bel and who was in possession of his ashes and bones. This is followed by an *Attestation* by M. de la Madelaine, aumonier to the Comte d’Harcourt, who accompanied d’Harcourt to England during his tenure as ambassador. There he observed d’Harcourt visiting Bel in prison, reading the Office with him, and attending him to his execution. De la Madelaine, wanting someone of the same order “des plus considerez et des plus capables de traitter un si beau sujet,” asked Du Bosc to undertake the task. Chosen because he was “un des plus illustres auteurs et plus fameux de ce siecle,” Du Bosc, along with several others, including the Regent, received a copy of a portrait of Bel in his cell. De la Madelaine also asserted that he checked the manuscript, and all was as he had observed it. These two articles are followed by a letter of approbation from F.S. Le Fort, Gardien of the Grand Couvent of Paris. He also praises the book, and describes how Du Bosc and d’Harcourt met for several hours daily over the course of more than a month.

The plan of the book is chronological, although it is prefaced by a justification of the undertaking and there is an occasional diversion. A simple style was adopted because the content, he believes, provides the grandeur rather than the language or presentation. Du Bosc does maintain a simplicity of language, and though there is a formulaic manner to it, he is able to convey a magisterial progression from Bel’s initial vows in Spain, his special desire for martyrdom, to his discovery and ultimate execution in England. Du Bosc also describes the obligation that knowledge of this history places upon the hearer: to honour Bel’s suffering and to learn from it. In some respects Bel is much closer to the ideals expressed in *La Femme héroïque* than those in *L’Honnête Femme*. Despite his advocacy of moderation, Du Bosc again shows an admiration for extremes in Bel’s decision to choose martyrdom.

The book begins with a short biography of Bel and his special devotion to the Virgin Mary as Queen of the Martyrs, one of the many invocations used to describe her in the
litany of the saints. Born in England, he took the habit on the feast of the Conception of Our Lady in the Spanish Province of the Conception of Our Lady. Twenty years later he entered England on the same feast day; after ministering to recusants for ten years he was sentenced to death on the same feast day.

Denounced by an apostate, he freely admitted his activities. On sentencing he recited the *Te Deum Laudamus* and thanked the judges for their sentence. The time he spent in prison, called by Du Bosc "le Theatre des Vertus," is described as a joyful time. Four Protestant ministers were sent to dispute with him, but he was able to confound them. D'Harcourt attempted to intervene to alleviate his suffering, but he was stopped by Bel. Bel continued to say Mass daily and recited the hours often in the company of d'Harcourt. He prayed for the Queen of England and for d'Harcourt, and these prayers, for d'Harcourt at least, were understood to be especially efficacious:

Et j'ose asseurer que cette bonne volonté de nostre Martyr sera suivie de quelques benedictions particulieres, pour augmenter de jour en jour la prosperité d'un Prince si Chrestien, et pour faire reussir glorieusement tous ses dessins.

His progression to the execution, as recounted by Du Bosc, is reminiscent of Christ's progression to Calvary. From one side came the shouted abuse of the heretical English, from the other the weeping of the Catholics and those moved by his courage and faith.

The vignette that Du Bosc paints of the moments before the execution was bound to capture the imagination of his readers. When Bel arrived at the place of execution he spoke to the assembly: the suffering of the English was all due to their heretical life and if they would return to obedience to Rome all would be well with them. He was then stripped of his secular clothes, beneath which he wore the "petit habit de S. François," an indication of his devotion to a true austerity rather than an external austerity which easily descends to vanity. Du Bosc expresses surprise at the manner of Bel's execution and provides explicit detail: he was first hanged, then his entrails and heart were burnt, his body was decapitated, then quartered; his head was placed on a
pike and carried about the town, and segments of his body were then displayed at the gates to the city.

This chronology is followed by a short analysis of Bel's personality and a treatise on the importance of venerating martyrs, both contemporary and ancient. The kind and distribution of the relics of François Bel are also discussed. The catalogue sounds grisly to modern ears: bloodstained handkerchiefs, hanks of hair clotted with blood, pieces of his tunic, of his cord, vertebrae, and ashes from the fire in which his heart and entrails were burned. De la Madelaine presented relics to the Regent and her daughter Henrietta Maria (through the offices of Madame la Comtesse d'Harcourt) and to a number of highly placed women. Bel gave his breviary with a dedication to d'Harcourt before his death. Numerous copies of the painting commissioned by d'Harcourt before Bel's death were made and distributed. Du Bosc felt the need to justify why Bel was painted in the habit of a French Cordelier rather than a Spanish Recollet. His view is that, though they may have different practices, they are, in effect, members of the same family.

Throughout the work, but especially in chapter fifteen, Bel's major positive traits are recorded. These are divided into his manner, doctrine, morale, and piety. In all respects they are an echo of those admirable qualities of L'Honneste femme. He was

un homme fort resolu, affable, riant, et tout simple, il n'estoit ny taciturne, ny grand parleur, mais assez moderé en toutes choses. Il estoit de fort douce humeur; mais un peu mélancholique.¹³

In this work, and in his writing on women, Du Bosc has defined a rationale for appropriate behaviour that encompasses both Platonic and Christian virtues, as we have seen above. In both works the strength to adopt these characteristics comes from grace, and their earthly end is to acquire grace, the ultimate end being salvation. He recognizes, however, the impact that le monde, secular society, has on the individual as his advice to women attests. He also recognizes that society is shaped by the choices and actions of individuals.
Because a single man such as François Bel is able to face the test of martyrdom, an individual (even a woman), with the support of the confessor and friends, surely has the ability to re-shape contemporary society. Du Bosc recognized this interplay in his works dealing with the community and in the works dealing with the individual. He also cautioned that the interplay between individual and society should not be a cause of distress or dissension. How then was change to be initiated and how was one to incorporate graceful behaviour?

Du Bosc offered in *l'Honneste femme*, *Nouveau recueil* and in *François Bel*, not only patterns of exemplary behaviour but also pragmatic direction. In the first work the reader was directed to develop self-awareness as a measure of ideal Christian behaviour. This is not so different from the traditional examination of conscience before the sacrament of penance, nor the use which Ignatian spirituality makes of imaginative exercises. He advocated in *Nouveau recueil* observing behaviours, assessing motivations and judging them according to this same norm in this series of reflective letters. In each of these cases he was addressing readers who dealt with the vicissitudes of daily life. By recounting of Bel’s martyrdom, a circumstance readers were safe from, he demonstrates the same gauge, Christian behaviour, drawings on the same strength, grace.

In each case Du Bosc is asking the readers to re-make themselves. As a Christian this was a duty: to eradicate sinfulness and turn one’s mind and body to the adoration of God. As a moralist Du Bosc was continuing a tradition that pre-dated Christianity and was renewed in the sixteenth and seventeenth century by Montaigne, Du Vair and by Charron. Du Bosc and others drew from the orientation and vocabulary of these writers. Their language was essentially the language of Christianity and consequently it was virtually impossible to articulate an expression that was outside this perspective.

When Du Bosc uses the words of the classical authors, he like these earlier writers, imbibes them with a specifically Christian understanding. In this period discussions concerned with political or social behaviours were shaped by and based on a religious under-
standing and vocabulary. Ethics, *la morale*, was neither only an abstract study nor simply an intellectual preoccupation, but the guidance for day to day living.

The works examined thus far focus specifically on personal behaviour and choices. We are able to see something of how Du Bosc assumes society ought to work and where value ought to be placed. But given the influence he believes the worthy should have, there are three other works that are useful in further articulating this understanding. These deal with another dimension of social behaviour: the political and ecclesiastical hierarchy. It must be borne in mind that Du Bosc lived in a world which was governed as much by political structures as by social conventions. It is in the extrication of the political from the religious and social that one risks distortion. As argued above, the three are intimately linked in the beliefs of society and by the tradition that authorized those beliefs.

The works that address political structures are neither descriptive nor philosophical and they do not advocate a change in the structures. Each of these is addressed to his superiors, either religious and secular, and though each is an occasion for Du Bosc to assess intrinsic value, he did so cautiously and within the formulaic customs of the genre. Consequently, it is necessary to see beyond the apparent obsequiousness and form that is as much stylistic as truly felt. In Du Bosc’s view different expressions of authority were all, essentially, predicated on a single foundation. These works, dealing with public authority, when compared with the ideal presented in *La Femme Héroïque* indicate how interrelated loyalties to different spheres were rationalized and how conflict was resolved. As a part of the pamphleteering genre, the works were aimed at a much larger and more general readership, and were written to convince the public of the validity of a particular viewpoint. Each is a brief argument for the validity of the actions or stances of their subjects: Richelieu, Mazarin or Louis XIV.

*Consolation à l’eminentissime Cardinal Mazarin sur la mort de Madame sa Mere* was published in 1644 on the death of Mazarin’s mother. *Lettre à Monseigneur le Cardinal Duc Mazarini sur la Paix Générale: Avec de panegyrique du Cardinal Richelieu* was pub-
lished in 1659 on the occasion of the Peace of the Pyrenees. The appended letter to Richelieu was initially published in 1641 and at that time Du Bosc presented a copy of it to each member of the Académie. The two works were reissued together in 1662. In 1664, *Panegyrique du Roi*, Du Bosc’s last work, was published.

*Consolation au Cardinal Mazarin* is both a tribute to the mother and an expression of sympathy to the son. Although there is no *privilège du Roi*, no release from the *aumonier*, nor any approbation from his superiors, the pamphlet is presented on behalf of “notre Ordre.” This work is useful because it describes an idealized relationship between a mother and her son. It was also, perhaps, a means of ingratiating the author and his order with the Cardinal, as a number of the latter’s achievements are emphasised.

Du Bosc points out that the measure of mourning is often as great as the love which was felt, but that it must eventually come to an end. All Europe is at a loss because of Mazarin’s sorrow. Mazarin is especially valued because it was through the Cardinal’s efforts that Europe achieved peace, though Du Bosc is unable to resist a gibe: peace was a necessity for Spain, and an act of generosity for France.

To combat the sadness, Du Bosc offers many of the traditional Christian interpretations of death: that she is not lost but changed, that she would not want her death to be burdensome, that she must surely be in heaven. Failing this, he offers the same advice to Mazarin as he offers to women in mourning: distraction is the wisest course, advice consistent with his earlier observations.

The manner in which sympathy is offered and the means of modulating Mazarin’s mourning reveals much. Du Bosc’s view of where Mazarin’s duty and privilege lie, as well as their purpose, reveals something of how he understands the political and social relationships of his society. To combat the sadness, Du Bosc feels he should focus on the needs of the young monarch, and the success Mazarin has already achieved in his service. The needs of France are far too great for Mazarin to abandon himself to his indulgence. Although all is couched in sympathetic terms, there is an implicit understanding that duty to
parent, to master, and to community override self-concern. Du Bosc is placing the need of the community above that of the individual, for the structures of community and consequently the codes by which they operate are more important than individual suffering. This seems to undermine the value placed on the individual soul and yet the sacrifice of the individual to the needs of the structure is reasonable in Du Bosc's eyes. The structures, after all, do preserve the faith and have been sanctified. Mazarin's mother does not really appear as an individual in Du Bosc's treatment but only as the means of her son's success. She is representative of the lineage and ethic that enabled him to achieve the position he did. She, just as much as he, is praised for the status and power that Mazarin wields.

The letters to Richelieu and Mazarin reprinted in 1662 under the title Lettre à Monseigneur le Cardinal Duc Mazarini sur la Paix Generale: Avec le panegyrique du Cardinal Richelieu, were initially printed independently, eighteen years apart. The style is similar, in that both men are praised in an exuberant fashion. The value of the books is not that they are accurate descriptions of the actions or motives of Richelieu or Mazarin nor were they truly intended to be. Du Bosc, in the process of praising these two statesmen, uses the opportunity to describe the ideal behaviour of a statesman. He is casting the two men in a role of his devising rather than attempting a realistic portrait. As a consequence, we have another means of assessing Du Bosc's ideals and his understanding of authority.

The Panegyrique de Richelieu, first published in 1641, is revealing when put in context. It was published in the year of the rebellion of the Comte de Soissons, after France had entered fully into the Thirty Years War, the year following the publication of Augustinus, and after the 1637 publication of Descartes' Discours de la Méthode. Each of these events marks a challenge of one sort or another to a tenuous stability. In this pamphlet Du Bosc is quick to underscore the importance of this stability and of those who work to maintain it.

The work opens with an extended comparison between Richelieu and Alexander, to the advantage of the former. Richelieu has done more for the true religion than Alexander
for his false gods. Du Bosc condemns those who are critical or questioning of this authority base (revelation and reason). They are condemned as a cause of discord:

... vous avez reduit a l'obeissance, cette Babylone de l'Europe, cet Asyle des factieux, des libertins & des rebelles.

The essence of the Panegyrique is to attribute Richelieu’s success not to a desire to vanquish his enemies but rather to a desire to enforce the law and Du Bosc identifies the appropriate response to those who break the law as either reconcilliation or justified agression. Du Bosc interprets Richelieu’s behaviour in contending with the rebellious factions and plots against the crown, or him personally in his role as first mnister, as an attempt to preserve both the nation of France and the faith of France (“les bons Francois & bons Catholiques tout ensemble.”) Here again the interrelation of political and religious authorities, as in the anti-Jansenist works is already pronounced (even if the precise sense of this interrelation is as yet ambiguous).

The Lettre à Monseigneur le Cardinal Duc Mazarini sur la Paix Générale was first published in 1659. The work was prompted by the Treaty of the Pyrenées and reissued in 1662 after the death of Mazarin. In the Lettre Du Bosc links the work and wisdom of Richelieu and Mazarin, Richelieu for choosing Mazarin to succeed him and Mazarin for being a worthy choice. He gives reasons for Mazarin’s success, and they echo those cited for that of Richelieu: his success was based on the subjugation of his will to that of the Kings.

For Richelieu to have chosen a lesser man, as Augustus did in his choice of Tiberius, would have been sophistry. A successor that was less able than Richelieu would have compared poorly and enhanced the memory of his tenure. Conversely the choice of one unequal to the task would have brought Richelieu’s judgement into disrepute. As well as being cruel to the people of France, that action would have generated a false glory. Mazarin, like Richelieu before him, demonstrated his generosity and his ability to overcome any base desire in the interests of the country. Du Bosc again parallels the interests of the
country with the interests of the church. The battle against heretics is equated with the battle against the enemies of the state; in this he is not original. But neither is he vengeful, for the laurels of the victor are less valuable than the olive branch of the peacemaker, a point already made in his analysis of Thomyris.

Peace was accomplished quickly, to France’s advantage, and sealed by the marriage pact between the two crowns. This was owing, in part, to Mazarin’s ability to deal fairly and in good faith. The work concludes with the elevation of Mazarin over Richelieu: Mazarin was able bring peace whereas Richelieu instigated war.

The final work is Panégyrique du Roy. Written in 1664, this is the last work Du Bosc published and is, coincidentally, a revealing synthesis of his views on the integration of church and state authority. The work was prompted by an event in which Vatican and French authority confronted one another. This affair arose out of the personal animosity between the French ambassador and any who challenged his ambassadorial status, and was exacerbated by a personal affront to Don Mario, nephew to Pope Alexander VII. A series of threatening events quickly followed: a siege of the French embassy by Vatican police, a personal insult to the Ambassador’s wife, the dismissal of the papal nuncio from France, the return of Duc Créqui to France, and the dispatch of French troops to Avignon. Realizing the incident could escalate into war, Pope Alexander agreed upon peace. This was signed at Pisa 12 February, 1664.

Du Bosc published the Panégyrique on February 13, 1664. Because it was an immediate response to this dispute, it is extremely useful in clarifying Du Bosc’s attitude to this relationship. He sees in the conflict between Louis and Alexander the larger conflict of Gallican and Ultramontane parties and the danger that it poses to amicable relations. He praises both parties for the agreement they reached, and stresses the need for continued agreement in the face of challenges to their authority. He also uses the incident to rail against the Jansenists and to demonstrate the danger they pose.

The initial comparison, and one that is referred to throughout the text, is that of Louis
and Caesar. Both were able to place the interests of the state over personal interests. Both were able to conquer their anger despite provocation, and achieve peace. In doing so they demonstrated magnanimity, "la Reine des Vertus."  

This view, set against Du Bosc’s concern to maintain unity of belief within the church, and the integration of church and state, is at the core of all of his works. The work, coming as it did, after the upheaval of the Fronde, early in the reign of Louis XIV, and after the issuing of the Formulary is generally an affirmation of and alignment to the policies of Louis. There are, reservations, however, though very respectfully submitted. Scattered throughout are references to the need to eradicate heresy within the country and to suppress novateurs, though Du Bosc is unclear in his references. He could be referring equally to Jansenists or Huguenots. Generally, the examination of these works tends to confirm the theses of the above chapters: the earlier works present the recognizable ideal of l’honnête homme, informed and guided by prudence and grace in both the private and public arenas. In the later works, however, just as in the anti-Jansenist tracts, there is a pronounced authoritarianism in which the religious and political arenas tend merge. This may in part reflect little more than the fact that these letters were addressed to statesmen who were also churchmen. Nonetheless, in light of the later anti-Jansenist works, it provides some confirmation of a hidden authoritarianism in the earlier, apparently flexible nature and grace doctrine and of the unconscious pars pro toto strategy we indicated in Le Philosophe indifferent in Chapter Three.
Endnotes

4. This is the same Comte d'Harcourt who had employed Nicholas Faret, the author of Honnête homme (1630).
5. “one of the most respected and most capable of working on such a fine subject.” Le martyr du R.P. François Bel religieux cordelier (Camusat et Le Petit, 1644).
6. “one of the most illustrious and most famous authors of the century.” Ibid., viii.
7. Ibid., xi.
8. Ibid., 21.
10. Henrietta Maria, wife of the English King, Charles I, and daughter of Henri IV.
11. “And I dare to assure you that the good will of our martyr will be followed by some special benedictions, to enhance day by day the prosperity of such a Christian prince and to assure the glorious success of all his designs.” Ibid., 19.
12. Ibid., 27.
13. “a very resolute man, affable, happy, and simple, he was neither taciturn nor a great speaker, but rather moderate in all things. He had a sweet disposition, though a little melancholy.” Ibid., 43.
14. “Any serious discussion of the condition humaine had to deal with Christianity, and even those who were most hostile had no other vocabulary to hand for most of the things they wanted to say than that used by Christians.” A.J. Krailshiemer in Studies in Self-interest from Descartes to La Bruyère (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 6. This is also the thesis presented by Febvre in The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century, and more recently in Luria, Territories of Grace: Cultural Change in the Seventeenth Century.
16. Pamphleteering was an effective means of gaining support or condemnation of a movement or individual. These were often anonymous. Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII*, 144.


19. This refers to the French victory at Rocroi (1643) which many see as marking the end of Spanish dominance and the beginnings of the negotiations to end the Thirty Years War. Although the war between France and Spain continued until 1659. Briggs, *Early Modern France*, 131.

20. Peace was desired by Italy France and Spain but was realized for different motives: "...Rome la souhaitant universelle par un principe de Religion, la France par générosité, & l’Espagne par nécessité." *Ibid.*, 15.


24. The same advice is given to Thomyris on the death of her son. See Chapter Three, n 142.


26. "...you have reduced to obedience this Babylon of Europe, this asylum of seditious people, libertines and rebels." *Ibid.*, 10. Du Bosc does not identify specifically which faction he is condemning though by the date of the work he could well be referring to the comte de Soisson’s rebellion. Soissons, exiled in 1636 for his part in a plot directed against Richelieu, raised an army to challenge Louis XIII.


Appendix B

Chronological Bibliography

The Works of Jacques Du Bosc


L’honneste femme, victorieuse des passions. Paris: pour la Compagnie [des libraires du palais], 1645[?].


Jésus-Christ mort pour tous et que cette proposition bien démêlée peut démêler tout le reste de la controverse sur le sujet de la grace. Paris: Bertier, 1651.


Le pacificateur apostolique qui montre comme les jansénistes, en pensant sauver la doctrine de Jansénius, se sont engagez à la condamner, conformément aux constitutions et au formulaire, et cela par un traité de paix solonnel, qu’on peut leur faire exécuter sans aucun délai... Avec un préface qui contient la réfutation de leur dernier livre intitulé "Écrit du pape Clément VIII" qu’ils donné au public contre un ouvrage qui porte pour titre "La Découverte d’un nouvelle hérésie..." Paris: E. Martin, 1663.


Translations by Du Bosc


Translations of Du Bosc

L’HONNESTE FEMME


The ACCOMPLISH 'D Woman. Written originally in French, since made into English by the Honourable, Walter Montague ... with alterations and additions. London: T. Collins and J. Ford, 1671.

The excellent woman described by her true characters and their opposites London: Joseph Watts, 1692. Reissued 1695; attributed to Theophilus Dorrington.

La Donna Onesta ... trasportata dell'idioma Fraceso da M.B. Manin, fatta imprimere... da Elpino Errante, Accademico Ricovrato. Padova: 1742.

The Accomplish 'd Woman. Written in French by M. Du Boscq ... in the year MDCXXX ... Tr. by a gentleman of Cambridge. London: J. Watts, 1753.

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