A Certain and Reasoned Art: 
The Potential of a Dialogic Process for Moral Education; 
Aristotelian and Kantian Perspectives.

A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
Graduate Studies and Research 
University of Saskatchewan 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Educational Administration 

by 

Colin J. Butler 
Fall 1999.

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SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION

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of the requirements for the

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by

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to the memory of M. G. and C. Butler.
Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge the debt I owe to my advisor, Dr. Keith Walker, and the members of my committee who have been unfailingly supportive and helpful in the preparation of this document. This dissertation, however, could not have been completed without the loving encouragement, emotional support, sympathetic advice and practical help provided by my wife.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the advantages that are gained by spending every Thursday evening drinking coffee with a wise man.
So far as moral character is concerned, education has been merely futile, and not even injurious; the real formative power has been original spiritual nature. . . But from this time forth must the education of man be rescued from the hands of this obscure and enigmatical power, and put under the control of a rational art, able to compass its end and in every individual intrusted to it, or at least fully aware when it has not attained it, and therefore knowing that the task is not yet finished. A certain and reasoned art of forming in man a firm and reliable good will, such is the education I propose, and this is its prime characteristic. (Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1977, p.47)
Abstract

At present, two options are available that can lead to a determination of how moral education may be possible in practice. One takes its formulation from the work of Kant, the other stands in the tradition of Aristotle. Kant emphasizes the importance of duty and obligation. In contrast, Aristotle attempts to construct a theory of moral life on the practice of virtue. Both theoretical perspectives have debilitating deficiencies.

A spectrum of moral experience is presented that represents the moral opportunities available to the agent in life experience. The polarities of this spectrum pull most naturally towards either an Aristotelian or a Kantian perspective, although neither perspective is capable of addressing the requirements of the entire spectrum. The Aristotelian perspective is associated with the life of non-dilemmic virtue, undertaken in community, where relational realities and the contextual contingency of moral life is emphasized. The Kantian perspective is associated with dilemmic situations to be resolved by a process of moral reasoning characterized by abstraction, ahistoricity and impartiality.

The central problem of the dissertation acknowledges the antithetical nature of these perspectives, and the dichotomous nature of their philosophical roots. The central task of the dissertation is the establishment of a dialogic process that has the potential to reconcile this dichotomy, and to allow these perspectives to mutually inform and reinforce each other. This task is accomplished by providing responses to a central research question that is accompanied by a series of subsidiary questions. From an analysis of various theories of moral education, Kohlberg’s theory of structural developmentalism is chosen for reformulation as it is informed by the exploration of the requirements of the dialogic process.

To address the research questions, additional spectra are offered to provide an epistemological and ontological basis for a five-step dialogic treatment that combines,
through a developmental climacteric, the Magistral dialogue of Vygotsky and the Socratic dialogue of Bakhtin. The five-step model is comprised of a recursive loop through the four steps of the Magistral dialogue prior to an entrance into a Socratic dialogue.

In this context, the Vygostkyan dialogue is grounded upon a shared “apperceptive mass” that includes historico-cultural artifacts, and common assumptions, beliefs, and principles that underlie virtue behaviour. This is a view of dialogue in which the task is a faithful replication by a listener of the information contained in the speech of the Magister. Each interlocutor is an “insider” to the other’s world. This dialogue is premised on the assumption that dialogue is basically a cooperative enterprise aimed at ever greater agreement. The common apperceptive mass facilitates the development of a shared moral community and epistemological congruence. The child, entering into dialogue, is initiated into a moral community, not self-created, but discovered in the authority of the Magister.

In contrast, the Socratic dialogue of Bakhtin celebrates the distinctiveness of the participants, and contains an explicit rejection of the notion of a shared apperceptive mass as either the ground or goal of communication. For Bakhtin, it is in the struggle with difference and misunderstanding that dialogue and thought are productive, and that productivity is not necessarily measured in consensus or congruence. The Socratic dialogue is an exploration of the full range of possible epistemic communities and serves to enable choice and judgment informed by the polarities of the dialogue, but determined by neither. The dynamism of this expanded dialogic formulation (where dynamism is taken to indicate the potential for cognitive transformational processes) increases as the focus transfers from the standard dialogue of apperceptive mass towards the more liberating arena of dissonant, conflicting voices.
It is shown that the extended dialogue allows the moral agent to access both Kantian and Aristotelian perspectives in a manner not previously possible. The potential of the extended dialogue is further explored by outlining how the process would work in practice. This practical process is paralleled by a series of arguments that satisfies the philosophical issues raised in a rapprochement between the two perspectives. The use of dialogue to address the hiatus that occurs between moral reasoning, moral judgment, and moral action is shown to be compatible with the performance factors that mediate this disjunction.

A theoretical reconciliation of the two polarities is established that makes both available to the moral educator. This theoretical reconciliation, called Dialogically Derived Morality, is comprised of four stages, and arises from a dialogical view of the process of moral development and morality itself. DDM is a process of decentration, and is based on the principle of respect for persons, with agape providing the normative end point. The stages are accompanied by a series of maxims, of increasingly decentered focus, that relate to the developmental stage of the agent. This construction is shown to be conceptually parallel with Kohlberg’s interpretation of his original empirical data, and addresses the requirements of the moral domain in a more complete and satisfactory manner than previous theoretical positions.

DDM, as the outcome of this research, gives the moral educator a developmental process that addresses the deficiencies of programmes of moral education related to either the Aristotelian and Kantian perspectives. Virtue behaviours can now be explored and structured in the light of cognitive developmentalism, while deontological processes of moral reasoning are illuminated by understandings and habits developed in the life of virtue. The implications for the moral educator who uses the dialogic process associated with DDM are considerable. Educators can now initiate children into a life of virtue in a process based upon their cognitive abilities, and be
assured that the acquisition of moral autonomy is structured by a developmental awareness of behaviours grounded in respect for persons.
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Chapter 1
THE PROBLEM
Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation will offer insights in moral education that will underpin a new theoretical position. At present, many theoretical options are available that can lead to a determination of how moral education may be possible in practice. From this range of theoretical perspectives, two have been chosen as the basis for this dissertation. This choice is based on the status of the perspectives themselves, and on the individual ability of each to address differing sections of the spectrum of moral opportunity offered below. The application of moral theory in coping with diverse moral claims depends on situational imperatives, a constellation of psychological states and configural social influences. A comprehensive account of moral action, and an accompanying theory of moral development, must explain how moral reasoning, embodied in cognitive development, and in conjunction with other psychosocial factors, governs a moral agent’s engagement with the moral domain. The two theoretical perspectives chosen have the greatest potential to fulfill these tasks. Other choices may be amenable to the use of dialogue to resolve their dichotomous elements, but, for the purposes of this dissertation, the choice is limited to one standing in the tradition of Aristotle; and the other taking its formulation from the work of Kant.¹

Significant debates in moral philosophy, with bearings on the nature and conduct of moral education, have occurred between philosophers and educationalists standing and Aristotelian and Kantian traditions—in the tradition of an ethics of virtue and an ethics of obligation. Aristotle attempts to construct a theory of moral life on the idea of virtue interpreted in terms of certain natural dispositions towards human well-being as opposed to harm; Kant, in contrast, denies the appropriateness of giving

¹ For a more complete treatment of the theoretical background to moral education, see Butler (1999).
regard to natural dispositions in the determination of moral judgment, and emphasizes instead the importance of duty and obligation, as these are standardly expressed.\(^2\)

Both of these two perspectives contain a central problematic as they stand as tools for the moral educator—the Aristotelian tradition lacks the structure of cognitive development, and the Kantian tradition lacks an affective component.

The term “potential” in the title of this dissertation refers to both the philosophical potential of the use of dialogue as a tool to explore the possible relationship of these two perspectives, and the potential that may be found in dialogue to utilize that relationship at the pedagogic or curricular level for the purposes of moral education in public schools. Dialogue is not to be considered as the methodology or medium of this dissertation.

A spectrum of moral activity is investigated to illustrate the tendency of the traditional perspectives to respond to the valences at the spectrum polarities. The dissertation suggests that a dialogic rather than a dichotomous position can be justified between these two extremities, and that this can be shown to produce a dialogic model upon which a new theoretical position can be built, utilizing an already articulated theory. After analyzing the theoretical positions currently available, using criteria relating to both the educative and moral components, Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmentalist theory will be selected from the analysis as suitable for reformulation. An epistemological and ontological foundation will be established from which the themes of cognition and virtue, generally viewed dichotomously, may be viewed

\(^2\) It would be a distortion, in relation to either Kant or Aristotle, to imply that morality for them is exclusively either a matter of rules or a matter of dispositions. There is in Aristotle, for example, a well-developed account of moral rationality which contains an important place for the observance of rules, and in Kant there is at least one disposition of supreme importance—goodwill. Further, Kant, in his discussion concerning the Doctrine of Virtue, indicates that some ends are also duties, and reveals that the teleological considerations of the perfection of self, and a concern for the happiness of others can be construed as virtues and can be arrived at without recourse to empiricism. The duty to these teleological ends is therefore a product of pure reason and deonto logically binding.
dialogically. Lacking this foundation, the use of the two perspectives within one theoretical framework would be incoherent. The ability of an expanded view of dialogue to both address the spectrum of moral opportunity and the performance factors that mediate between judgment and action is demonstrated, as traditional views of dialogue will be shown to be incapable of satisfying the requirements of the entire spectrum. From this foundation, a new theoretical position is articulated, based on the ability of a dialogic process to meet the requirements of moral education in a more satisfactory and functional manner than previously available.

**Purpose of the Dissertation**

This dissertation analyses contemporary moral educational theorists in order to determine the extent to which present theoretical and methodological positions can be reformulated to address and resolve the present confusion and discord in moral education. This reformulation, based upon critical analysis, and leading to dialogic and integrative constructions, entails a retention of the salient characteristics and strengths of the chosen theoretical position while ensuring isomorphism between the cognitive and behavioural domains. Further, this dissertation will examine the potential of the implications of such a reformulation for the practice of moral educational and addresses the utility of the newly-established understandings for new theory building.

**Background to the dissertation**

This section will provide the background to the area to be covered in the dissertation, describe and define a dialogic process, and introduce the themes of virtue and cognition. The problem concerning the relationship of these two themes to each

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3 Not all theorists have accepted the unreconcilable nature of this dichotomous view. Peters, for example, has offered the notion of "intelligent habits" as a means of resolution. Unfortunately, Peters' formulation is unsatisfactory on various counts, not the least of which is his failure to provide any criteria or framework by which the "intelligence" of the habits may be adjudicated. He suggests that the 'form' of morality, i.e., considerations that are to later function as procedural principles and the 'content' of morality, the passing on of basic rules, should occur simultaneously, with increasing emphasis on the procedural principles. This formulation, however, begs the question rather than answering it.
other and their relationship to a spectrum of moral activity will be explored. This spectrum covers moral activity from social convention to high-cost moral dilemmas. A related series of problems and difficulties arising from the central focus of this dissertation—namely the mutual exclusivity of the two contending positions, outlined above, will be identified, and strategies and arguments put forward to satisfy them.

One of the major goals of schools has always been to affect the values, habits, and social behaviour of students. Indeed, Aristotle believed that the development of good character was the primary purpose of education; this priority of character over intellect has been shared by schools associated with certain religions, by military academies, and by some private schools. Early educators believed that public schools could form the characters of students, and that positive effects on character would ensure that the state could survive the many stresses and strains to which it was subjected. For example, Noah Webster (1969), an early advocate of free public schools, wrote, in On the Education of Youth (1787):

The only practicable method to reform mankind, is to begin with children to banish, if possible, from their company, every low bred, drunken, immoral character. Virtue and vice will not grow together in a great degree, but they will grow where they are planted, and when one has taken root, it is not easily supplant by the other. The great art of correcting mankind consists in prepossessing the mind with good principles. For this reason, society requires that the education of youth should be watched with the most scrupulous attention. Education in great measure, forms the moral characters of men, and morals are the basis of government. Education should therefore be the first care of a legislature: not merely the institution of schools, but the furnishing of them with the best men available for teachers. (p. 31)
Changing conditions, however, have made this view problematic. MacIntyre (1982) has characterized the current historical period as one of moral dissension, while cautioning that this dissension is not to be confused with a pluralism beneath which can be determined an ethical framework, widely adhered to, that provides the basis for a broad consensus on the nature and terms of morality. MacIntyre's (1988) position is that neutral ground is not available from which competing claims of rival traditions can be adjudicated and the relativist position defeated.

As we are able to define neither right nor wrong due to "conceptual incommensurability" (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 47), then moral chaos ensues; society becomes increasingly "schizophrenic" (Chewning, 1984, pp. v, vi), moral standards are abandoned, and the moral life of our communities becomes problematic. As the following sampling shows, a spate of books and essays have been written by contemporary social commentators and theorists with titles that announce a sense of moral decline: The Devaluing of America (William Bennett); The Closing of the American Mind (Alan Bloom); The Spirit of Community: The Reinvention of American Society (Amatai Etzioni); The Demoralization of Society (Gertrude Himmelfarb); and The Declining Character of American Youth (Edward Wynne). This perceived moral decay, in North America and elsewhere, has been attributed to many causes. Among the most prominent and most frequently cited are: changes in the structure of the family; the effects of the culture of the 1960s, with its emphasis on freedom, sex, and drugs; a failure to attend to traditions; a questioning of traditions; the failure of moral education programs in the schools; the dissolution of the traditional triumvirate of family, church and school as sources of moral direction, and the onset of radical individualism. Yet, in the midst of this moral turmoil, parents expect schools to contribute to the moral development of children, and the state, as a general rule, expects educational authorities to comply.
Educational commentators frequently point to the crucial role of educators in the transmission of those moral and spiritual values that are felt to be necessary for the successful integration of the future generation into the moral community of their seniors. Sichel (1988a) concurs:

Teachers are not just facilitators or leaders of moral discussions or Socratic midwives but serve as models for students... teachers influence student morality by the persons they are, how they act, how they relate to a student, and what student behaviour and achievement they expect, as well as the morality they are expected to teach. (p. 225)

Teachers are proclaimed to be the central focus of this endeavour, yet few teachers receive any significant training that would equip them to accomplish this task, even if they knew what the task entailed. Similarly, official rhetoric points to the vital importance of this endeavour, but this rhetoric is not balanced by any formal provision for its completion; nor, in the cases where moral education programs have been implemented, have there been sufficient efforts to provide the discipline with any of the rigour or conceptual coherence that characterizes other curricular components (Burton, 1976).

In sum, there appears to be a dichotomy between the official language and the actual practice of moral education. This is not to doubt the sincerity of the official language, but perhaps it calls into question the confidence the speakers have in the efficacy of the tools they wield to perform the task. In 1973, Chazan and Soltis

---

Wilson (1981) posits a number of conclusions that are relevant here. His research indicated that teachers/educators felt frustrated and hostile about moral education, and were concerned about bridging the gulf between theory and practice (at least those who felt that moral education was within the purview of the school). Teachers were aware of the work of “experts” but noted that “it’s hard to get hold of experts’ ideas.” Teachers referred to themselves as “amateurs” and were uncertain as to what the moral domain included or where its boundaries should be drawn (p. 76). They stated they received little help from their educational leaders.
indicated the origin of this lack of confidence to be rooted in the lack of communication between the moral philosopher and the moral educator:

The philosopher has rarely attempted to speak directly to the central issues of moral education; and the educator has infrequently availed himself of the rich literature in moral philosophy which contains ideas fundamental to an understanding of the moral situation. The result has been that most practical attempts at moral education have been theoretically superficial while technical discussions in moral philosophy have for practical purposes been irrelevant. (p. 2)

Whether or not this "communication" remains as minimal as Chazan and Soltis indicated a generation ago cannot be established by a notable increase in the coherence of moral educational practices. The arena is still characterized by a disjunction between what is said and what is done. Furthermore, there is considerable confusion and discord about what is meant by morality, and what constitutes moral education. Many now argue that traditional forms of moral education, and the inculcation of morality are outmoded and unacceptable.⁵ Even though present and past theories can be criticized, wholesale dismissal of all contending theories of moral education would be unfair and unrealistic. To claim that these theories are useless and provide few informative ideas is to ignore how these diverse ideas can contribute to moral education theory. Sichel (1988a) confirms:

With a theory of moral education, as with any other theoretical and practical educational endeavour, we cannot just sweep the room clean and begin with no furnishings whatsoever. Instead of building a wholly different home and employing an interior decorator... we

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must remember that human beings live in society with cultural, social and political furnishings. . . [A] theory of moral education faces a difficult situation, at the same time that new concepts are needed old concepts cannot be abandoned. What is the way out of this dilemma? As Martin Buber realized, we must walk a narrow ridge to allow older and newer ideas to interact reflexively. (p. 11) [Italics added]

To allow older and newer ideas to interact reflexively, however, requires that linkages must be established between these ideas, and conceptual conduits constructed that allow the power and efficacy of one idea to influence and be influenced by its counterpart. This dissertation will establish these linkages and construct the conceptual conduits that will lead to a new theoretical position. The tool that will be used to establish those linkages is that of dialogue. The potential of a dialogic process to enable the mutually exclusive nature of the two major theoretical positions to influence each other, and to be enriched by the insights and capabilities of the other, is grounded in a constructivist view of understanding and meaning based on the concept that cognitum est in cognoscente per modum cognoscentis (knowledge is in the knower according to the type of knowing).

Statement of the Problem

The field of moral education is characterized by controversy. These disputes are not limited to psychological accounts of the nature of moral development or character formation, but extend to the very definition of educational aims in this area. Arguments surrounding moral education capture the essential quandary for any pluralist democracy attempting to construct a shared civil society.

Recently, these issues have been approached from two perspectives with divergent, though overlapping, interests and differing sets of assumptions. One perspective concerns traditional character educators (Ryan & McLean, 1987) and variants, whose emphasis has been on processes of internalization and self-control that
would ostensibly result in virtuous conduct. A second perspective concerns
cognitivists [and variants (Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989)] whose emphasis has
been on the development of structures of moral reasoning that ostensibly underlie action
choices. These two points of view, one emphasizing non-rational mechanisms of self-
control (virtuous behaviour), and the other emphasizing rationality (in the form of
moral decision-making), are generally considered to be irreconcilable in terms of
underlying philosophical assumptions.

The major claim of this dissertation is that neither teleological virtue theories,
nor deontological cognitive developmentalist theories are, in and of themselves, a
satisfactory basis for moral education, in that they each address only one section of the
spectrum of moral opportunity. The central problem concerns the dichotomous nature
of the two main educative perspectives, and their inability to inform and supplement
each other. A further claim relates to the potential of a dialogic process to satisfy two
issues relating to the realization of the moral self (a framework that allows for the
manifestation and adjudication of virtue behaviours, and the hierarchical integration of
virtue with cognitive development) and to satisfactorily address the entire spectrum of
potential moral experience. The shape of the argument that underlies this claim is set
out in Appendix A, with a test for the coherency of the text of the argument provided in
Appendix B.

**Statement of Subordinate Problems**

Several subordinate, but related problems accrete to the central problem so far
elaborated, and must be addressed in order to facilitate the investigation of the major
claim.

**Problem One.**

For the success of this dissertation, a larger moral theory must first be identified
and evaluated according to a set of criteria. The establishment of the relevant criteria
requires an analysis of the terms “moral” and “education” and the defining
characteristics of each need to be elicited from that analysis. A review of the literature must be undertaken to determine the components of major theoretical positions, so that their salient characteristics are available for critical analysis utilizing the established criteria of “moral” and “education.” The response to this task is found in chapters two and three in which it is established that Kohlberg’s theory of moral development survives the analysis as the theory most able to satisfy the criteria, and with the potential to address the central problem.

**Problem Two**

While Kohlberg’s theory demonstrates the greatest potential usefulness, the limitations of his theory presents certain obstacles. The task presented in this problem is to preserve the essence of Kohlberg’s understanding, and to utilize the potential that this understanding contains to allow the power of Kohlberg’s insights to address the entire spectrum of moral experience rather than being restricted solely to dilemnic morality characterized by processes of moral reasoning leading to moral judgment. The strategy to fulfill this task consists of reformulating Kohlberg’s theory as the antithetical elements present themselves in the course of the dissertation, and to use the tool of dialogue to extend the power of cognitive developmentalism to the Aristotelian or virtuous behaviour pole of the spectrum. Elements of the theory that are rejected in the course of the text are Kohlberg’s contention that all stages of moral development form a hierarchical progression towards a more perfect understanding of justice, and his insistence that the stages of development are to be considered hard stages.

**Problem Three**

As a tool to enable moral education to address the entire spectrum of moral experience, dialogue has certain requirements. The polarities of the spectrum are normally characterized as dichotomous. Any construct that is to simultaneously address both elements of that dichotomy must be so grounded that it can do so without the internal inconsistencies and contradictions that would invalidate its use. To satisfy
these dialogic requirements, and to legitimize the use of dialogue in this manner, epistemological and ontological spectra are offered in chapter four, accompanied by a re-examination of the antithetical nature of deontology and teleology and a resolution of that antithesis, to justify the application of dialogue to the entire spectrum.

**Problem Four**

Once it has been established that the use of dialogue as tool for moral education is justified, the problem exists as to how, in practice, the dialogue is to function. The strategy used to address this problem is explored in chapter five, and lies in the differing characteristics that are to be found along the spectrum of moral experience. At the Aristotelian pole, the task of dialogue is to enculturate and initiate the child into a virtue community. Vygotsky’s insights into the social construction of knowledge and the cultural mediation of understanding make the dialogic process appropriate within the zone of proximal development (ZPD), but unable to address the needs at the Kantian pole. Bakhtin’s formulation of a dialogic process that rejects the apperceptive mass that grounds Vygotsky’s dialogue is amenable to the requirements of the Kantian pole. An extended understanding of dialogue enables the full requirements of the spectrum to be met.

**Problem Five**

Solving the preceding problems legitimizes the use of dialogue, and makes the practical application of dialogue to the end of moral education intelligible, but the performance factors that mediate between moral habituation, moral reasoning, and moral action are still of significance. For the Aristotelian section of the spectrum, these factors are mainly interpersonal, while within the Kantian section they are intrapersonal. Chapter six develops the strategy used to solve the problem of performance factors. Reviewing the field of developmental psychological theories, the writer determines the extent to which a dialogic process is consonant with the development of both inter- and intrapersonal psychological factors within the child.
Significance of the Study

The significance of the study is rooted in the growing societal dissatisfaction that is expressed concerning the moral education of the young, coupled with the inability of present methodological positions to satisfactorily combine philosophical and psychological factors as they relate to moral development. It is experientially verifiable that Kohlbergian programs of moral education are no longer in favour with educational organizations, and the Just Schools Movement has not developed along the lines that its founder had anticipated. If the Kohlbergian project, that has had such a profound impact upon post-war understanding of the possibility of moral development, is not to become of merely theoretical rather than practical interest, then the project must be re-energized. Further, as Wilson has noted, teachers felt disempowered, hostile, frustrated, and incompetent when faced with the requirements of moral education. Any effort to address these feelings by providing coherence must be of significance.

The role of schools in society, while constant in significance, can change over time. If schools are to realize their full potential in addressing the needs of their students, it is condign that moral education become a significant curricular component. For educational leadership to ignore this responsibility is to ignore a pressing societal and individual need. Schools have the potential to become loci of moral force in the community, and to realize this potential means a confirmation of schools as more than opportunities for instrumental skill acquisition. Schools must meet this challenge, and educational leaders must provide the means to do so.

The Scope of the Dissertation

Educational administration is a moral enterprise. The allocation of resources, the adjudication of competing claims within the educational setting and the apprehension of administration as a moral art all underscore this foundational understanding. As such, educational administration is concerned with the entirety of its purview.
Curriculum considerations are predicated upon the appropriateness of materials and programs designed to the needs of the students, as well as the conceptual coherence of the content. Moral education programs deserve no less integrity, but just as the capacities of students may vary in the academic domain, so may the moral capacity of students vary. Unfortunately, there is a class of students for whom even 'remedial' moral education may prove unsuccessful. This dissertation cannot address the needs and requirements of students suffering from mental states that make them incapable of benefiting from exposure to moral education programming. The mentally ill, through social psychopathy, or similar incapacitating phenomena, are not within the scope of this dissertation.

Assumptions

This dissertation is written from a structuralist perspective that comprises the personal bias of the writer, eschews all notions of post-modern pretensions to moral theory, and views the domain of morality to be a rational and comprehensible entity amenable to analysis.⁶

Fundamentally, a structure is an autonomous entity characterized by a system of internal dependencies that interact according to predetermined sets of relationships (Dagenais, 1972). A structure is, therefore, a system of transformations implying lawfulness in its interactions independent of the elements that comprise its components. A structure presupposes a totality that transcends the requirements of its subordinate parts that are subjected to the laws that characterize it. Internal components of the system, while dependent upon the totality, are independent of each other.

Structures, as envisaged, are both conservative and self-regulating, and tend towards the enhancement of the lawfulness of the strictures that characterize them.

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⁶ The writer has not, as Rorty (1989) enjoins, resisted the Parmenidean urge. Nor, while agreeing with Rorty that the customary purposes of language can be frustrated by "mumbles, stumbles, malapropisms, metaphors, tics, seizures, psychotic symptoms, egregious stupidities, strokes of genius and the like" (Rorty, 1989, p. 17) has he abandoned attempts at coherence within an 'old' vocabulary.
From this perspective, theoretical considerations of moral education become amenable to reformulation and transformation provided that the lawfulness of each structural entity is not violated, and the essential natures of such lawfulness are compatible.

The arguments that form the basis of this dissertation are intended to demonstrate such compatibility, and a second major assumption of the dissertation is that such theoretical compatibility will translate into empirically verifiable actuality.

**Two Treatments of Moral Education**

The two treatments of character education and cognitive developmentalism, while divided on basic assumptions, are united in their problematic treatment of virtue and its role in the development of the moral self. Cognitivists discount the role of virtue as the primary genesis of moral behaviour, relying instead upon the motivating force of moral reasoning. In contrast, character education theorists encounter difficulties in the coherent treatment of virtue as the content of moral education.

Researchers working within the cognitive approach have used the term "bag of virtues" (Kohlberg, 1971; Kohlberg, Scharf & Hickey, 1972) to denote what they perceive as two related problems with virtue-based moral theory. The first is centred on relativism—each theorist appears to come up with a considerably different "grab bag" of virtues depending on the varying assumptions about the good life, human functioning and flourishing held by different theorists. The second problem notes that the virtues identified are often not well-defended or grounded in philosophic argument or psychological research, at least not in ways that permit an adequate answer to charges of cultural relativism. To the extent that conceptions of self and the good life can be expected to vary across cultural contexts (and even within cultures), virtue relativism will be a necessary outcome of any attempt to define morality in terms of traits of character.

Virtue theory is the view that the foundation of morality is the development of good character traits, or virtues. Typical virtues include courage, temperance, justice,
prudence, fortitude, liberality, and truthfulness; while vices include cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity. Historically, virtue theory is the oldest normative tradition in Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Greek epic poets and playwrights, such as Homer and Sophocles, indicate the morality of their heroes and antiheroes in terms of their respective virtues and vices. The development of the concepts of agathoi (noble and virtuous) and kakoi (base and ignoble), and the impoverishment of the force of their usage in the city state illustrates this point. Plato believed that an integral part of one's quest for truth was understanding the ideal nature of virtues such as justice, piety, and courage. The earliest and most influential systematic account of virtue theory appears in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, the heart of which is his account of moral virtues in Book Two. There he argues that moral virtues are desire-regulating character traits which are at a mean between more extreme character traits (or vices). For example, in response to the natural emotion of fear, the virtuous character trait of courage should be developed. If an excessive character trait is developed by inappropriately curbing fear, then the vice of rashness is the result. If, on the other extreme, a deficient character trait is developed by insufficiently curbing fear, then the vice of cowardice is the result. The virtue of courage, then, lies at the mean between the excessive extreme of rashness, and the deficient extreme of cowardice. The moral virtues, and not just courage, are to be understood as falling at the mean between two accompanying vices. Aristotle illustrates this with the virtues of temperance, liberality, magnificence, high-mindedness, controlled anger, friendliness, modesty, and righteous indignation. He concludes that it is difficult to live the virtuous life primarily because it is often difficult to find the mean between the extremes.

During the late Greek period, Aristotle’s account of virtue ethics competed with rival moral theories, particularly those offered by Epicureanism and Stoicism. However, by the late Middle Ages, Aristotle’s virtue theory was the definitive account
of morality, especially insofar as it was endorsed by medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. In medieval discussions, the particular virtues described by Aristotle and the ancient Greeks became known as the cardinal virtues. Medieval ethicists added to these the theological virtues which appear in the New Testament: faith, hope, and charity. With the waning of the Middle Ages and the rise of the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, and Enlightenment thought, the influence of Aristotle's virtue ethics declined. Historians of philosophy typically say that virtue ethics was neglected or ignored in the centuries which followed. However, Schneewind (1990) argues that the fate of virtue ethics was not one of neglect, but instead, one of critique, revision, and eventually abandonment in view of newer accounts of moral obligation. In Borradori (1994), MacIntyre restates his position:

{}In After Virtue, I argued that the failure of the Enlightenment project is best understood as a sequel to the wrong-headed rejection, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of what I called the "tradition of virtues." That tradition had its birth first in the transition from older forms of Greek community to the fifth century Athenian polis, and then in the criticism and construction of a theory of the virtues in which Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are the key names. It is a tradition with a shared core conception of virtues. Virtues are those qualities of mind and character without which the goods internal to . . . human practices . . . cannot be achieved. Second, virtues are those qualities without which an individual cannot achieve that life, ordered in terms of those goods, which is best for her or him to achieve; and third, those qualities without which a community cannot flourish and there can be no adequate conception of overall human good. (p. 148)

{}By the 19th century, the "rule" emphasis of moral theories such as utilitarianism supplanted the character trait emphasis of virtue theory. Within the past few decades,
interest in virtue theory has revived, owing, in great part, to seminal writings by Elizabeth Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre, in particular, argues that today there exist only fragments of conflicting moral traditions, and it is necessary to re-establish the goal or meaning of life towards which ethics is directed. This meaning is established in the context of a moral tradition, particularly one which advocates virtuous character traits.

Virtue-centred moralities, as a subset of reflective ethical doctrines, centre on the nature of the agent as a moral decision maker who derives behavioural content through dialectical intuition (Plato), logical analytical processes (Aristotle) or reflection upon natural law (Aquinas). Virtue is variously defined by different theorists, but for the purposes of this dissertation is considered to be a regulating excellence or dynamic of self-control, related to a moral good in the eudaemonic tradition. An agent's pursuit of virtue is seen as good to the extent that it improves human personality or character and contributes to the general good. Virtue makes rational choice possible, and thus makes ethical action possible. As von Wright (1963) indicates, “The path of virtue is never laid out in advance. It is for the man of virtue to determine where it goes in the particular case” (p. 145). Virtue is not some kind of technical goodness or a conventional standard of conduct. Neither is it a psychological faculty analogous to memory, to be trained to the calculation of duty. It is a state of being that frees the human mind for the analysis of moral dilemmas. From such a point of view, virtue is a necessary condition for moral thinking, not a conventional prescription for action. Virtue is not a property of action but of character. To regard the virtues as mere habits, therefore, is to misunderstand their nature. A pattern of conduct that reflects a habitual or routinized performance lacks the requisite element of judgment that characterizes virtue. For example, a person who possesses the virtue of truthfulness is not merely truthful when contractual obligations are invoked, but is truthful when nothing more is involved than the activity of truthfulness itself. Thus, the phrase, “habitation in
virtuous behaviour" refers to the development, in non-dilemmic circumstances, of rational behavioural choice. This choice reflects the integration of prudential thought and the traits of character that increase the likelihood that behaviour will be governed by such thought.

In many virtue-centered accounts, including Aristotle's, virtue is believed to be acquired by habit or practice. Individuals learn the good by doing the good, and thereby gain possession of the intellectual virtue of _phronesis_. Thus, doctrines of virtue have characteristically provided the moral philosophical underpinnings of character education approaches to moral theory.

Aristotle saw justice as unique among the virtues for its "other regarding" aspect, and he gave it a prime place in his moral theory. To the extent that virtue-centred moralities, and by implication traditional character education approaches, situate morality in the development of personality or character, they deflect attention away from important issues of justice and fairness; virtues which cannot be reduced to, or explained, in terms of individual-centered concepts such as "character," "personality," or "self." Nor can they answer questions about how virtues of character such as loyalty and courage are to be applied when they conflict with other-regarding moral concerns such as justice and concern for others' welfare and rights.

Another contentious issue concerns the definition of the core set of virtues deemed to be morally good or praiseworthy, and its cultural universality. The problem of the relativity of any set of moral concepts is, of course, not unique to virtue-centered moralities, as the extensive body of relativistic critiques of Kantian or other non-virtue-based moral theories attests. However, the problem of moral relativism may be especially acute for virtue-based moralities as a result of the tendency in these approaches to define morality in relation to features of character and the self. Aristotle's somewhat alarming depiction of the ideal moral Athenian _in Nichomachean_
Ethics underscores the problematic nature of culturally and contextually contingent ideal moral types as the endpoint of moral development.7

Specific attempts to define the virtues have yielded a considerable amount of variability among philosophers, professional educators, and lay persons. Although some virtues appear to be common to many lists, including such virtues as honesty, justice, wisdom, and courage, other virtues appearing on individual lists have little in common. For example, Hume (cited in Zagzebski, 1996) identifies allegiance, public spirit, perseverance, secrecy, order, and chastity as virtues. Among Asian philosophers (e.g., Confucius), the virtue of filial piety ranks very highly, while Aristotle discusses "magnificence" as a valued trait, along with conversational ability, practical abilities such as the management of money, wit, and aesthetic abilities (Zagzebski, 1996).

Contemporary conceptions of the virtues show similar variability, even as applied within specific social contexts, such as educational settings. Lapsley (1996) contrasts the set of 23 core values endorsed by the Panel on Moral Education formed in 1988 by the American Association for Curriculum Development with the traits of character on which he was evaluated on his high school report card (these include accuracy, promptness, courtesy, self-control, respect for property, effort, attitude, cooperation and preparation) and finds that courtesy was the only value held in common between the two lists.

There is a related danger in attempts to define moral education solely as a virtue-centered approach, and this is the danger of virtue hegemony and its attendant ethnocentrism. Whose virtues are to be promoted and inculcated by state-sponsored initiatives, especially in modern pluralist societies? Character education runs the danger of promoting, under a narrow conception of morality, the inculcation of the dominant culture's perceptions of those virtues deemed worthy, while denigrating or failing to give equal consideration to alternative conceptions. This may be less of a problem for

7 For a critique of virtue-based theories of morality see Helwig, Turiel, and Nucci (1996)
those virtues that pertain to potentially shared or sharable assumptions about how people should treat one another (e.g., justice), but becomes problematic when it extends to prescriptions about the socialization of the self or of values central to conceptions of a putative ideal lifestyle or the good life.

Certain moral values, such as justice and fairness, are likely candidates for cultural universality, and a growing body of research conducted in a variety of cultural settings has supported this claim. Indeed, even relativistic theorists such as Shweder (1990) have now conceded that a morality based on justice and concern for others probably represents a universal moral. Whether more character-based virtues (e.g., courage, marital-fidelity) are culturally universal is a question for future research. And whether there exists a culturally-shared conception of the good life or human flourishing within diverse pluralistic democratic societies such as our own is certainly open to question.

A further problem pertains to how the various virtues are to be coordinated or integrated in individuals' moral behaviour and judgment. This difficulty is related to what has come to be known as the Aristotelian paradox. This paradox was first formulated by Aristotle in Book Two of *Nicomachean Ethics*. Peters (1971) describes the paradox in these terms:

>[G]iven that it is desirable to develop people who conduct themselves rationally, intelligently and with a fair degree of spontaneity, the brute facts of child development reveal that at the most formative years of child development he is incapable of this form of life and impervious to the proper manner of passing it on. (p. 51)

Oakeshott (1962) makes an illuminating and relevant distinction between matters of

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* For example, studies in Brazil (Nucci, Camino, & Sapiro, 1996), India (Bersoff & Miller, 1993, Madden, 1992), The Middle East (Wainryb, 1995; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994), Indonesia (Carey & Ford, 1983), Korea (Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987), Nigeria (Hoilos, Leis, & Turiel, 1987), Zambia (Zimba, 1987).
procedure and matters of substance; between the "language" of a subject (the canons or rules of procedure that permit effective evaluation and subject development) and the "literature" of a subject (the content itself that defines the subject and provides the opportunity for subject proficiency). Fluency in the "language" of moral education allows for evaluation and the development of expertise in the canons of moral discourse. The "literature" of moral education concerns the content of moral behaviour and the substantive issues of moral agency. The "language" of morality is the "why" and "when." The "literature" of morality is the "what" and "how." The Aristotelian paradox notes that, when the child is most liable to form literary habits, s/he is least capable of engaging in the language exercises to inform those habits. When language discourse becomes viable, poor literary choices may obviate its effectiveness. In fact, it may be that acquiring the form of the literature, uninformed by language considerations, may stultify the development of a rational code, or the mastery of the language of activities at a later stage (Peters, 1964). As Aristotle notes:

by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and by habituating ourselves to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. . . . It makes no small difference then whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a great difference or rather all the difference.

(Nichomachean Ethics, Book 2, Chs 3,4)

In the same vein, James (1968) states:

Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic state. . . . Every smallest stroke of virtue or vice leaves its never so little scar. The drunkard Rip Van Winkle excuses himself for every fresh dereliction by saying "I won't count this time!" Well!
he may not count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it, but it is
being counted none the less. Down among the nerve cells and fibres
the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it up to be used
against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is,
in strict scientific literalness, wiped out. (p. 127)

Although simplistically represented, character education presents literature sans
language, and the cognitivists present language sans literature. Both avoid the
Aristotelian paradox, neither resolve it, nor do they either satisfactorily address the
issues that accrete to it—namely, propositional statements concerning universally
acceptable moral understandings that can form a consensual foundation for moral
behaviour, and the application of psychological and cognitive insights to allow for the
integration of these moral understandings to the particular stage of the agent’s
development.

In sum, what is needed is an account of the realization of the moral self that
satisfies two important criteria. First, it should provide a theoretical framework for the
manifestation of virtues that would allow the agent to adjudicate which competing
virtue-honesty against compassion for example, is to be realized in which
circumstances. As an intuitive and common understanding of moral agency accepts
outcomes based upon the abilities of the agent to reason and judge, a second criterion
for such an account is the necessity for the hierarchical integration of virtue to be
structured by the developing cognitive capabilities of the agent.

To satisfy these two criteria, and to resolve the difficulties noted, a schema of
virtuous action needs to be embedded within, and informed by, a larger moral theory.
These issues can be resolved if character-based conceptions of virtue can be embedded
within a framework of morality that acknowledges the developmental nature of moral
agency. Character-based conceptions of virtue reflect the Aristotelian perspective, and
the larger framework reflects the Kantian perspective. These two perspectives are
embodied in the two treatments of moral education already discussed, and it is their inability to inform and strengthen each other that is graphically represented below.

The Spectrum of Moral Activity

In an effort to reconcile the two treatments discussed above, Frankena (1973) made the case for operationalizing reflexive interaction in the task of teaching morality to children. He enjoined programs of instruction he labeled Moral Education X (MEX) and Moral Education Y (MEY), in which MEX was to teach children a process of moral reasoning through the discovery of rules of conduct originating in principled decision making, and MEY was to inculcate in the child the willing commitment to the decisions formulated in MEX.

Whatever the methods in use in MEY, its main concern must not be merely that the individual shall be disposed to act in accordance with certain principles or ideals of right and wrong that have been taught to him in MEX. As the final goal of MEX must be to get across an understanding of the Moral Way and its direction, so the final goal of MEY must be to dispose the individual to follow this Way in spite of contrary temptation, conflicts of duty, or novel situations. (p. 157)

MEX is the formulation of right ideas and MEY is the formation of right habits. Frankena (1973) was prompted to offer these concepts as a response to the necessity of producing virtuous behaviour in succeeding generations. Mindful of Socrates’ reminder that virtuous parents so often have vicious sons, he concludes that “this means that we must not only teach our children the principles but the knowledge of how to apply them” (p. 152). However, Frankena’s position is unsatisfactory. He states:

In saying this, I have been talking as if MEX and MEY are independent programs of education which only meet at the end. And, indeed, they are distinct and must not be confused. But of course,
they are just two aspects or parts of a single process of moral education, which is going on all the time (just as moral education as a whole is an aspect or part of a yet larger single process of total education), and which has a single ideal of which they are components. (1973, p.158)

While the two “aspects” remain distinct and non-integrated, each remains vulnerable to the extinguishing of the other to the detriment of the project. The integration of one with the other may ensure that a “certain and reasoned art” would have a greater likelihood of success than evidenced by Frankena’s (1973) comment that “the motto of moral education must always be that of the Michigan football teams of yesteryear—Punt, pass and pray” (p. 158). Frankena’s notion of a dualism within moral education reflects the central theme of this dissertation, and is both the origin and justification for the spectrum of moral activity shown in Figure 1.

An individual’s moral experience occurs along a spectrum. One end point of the spectrum emerges from the social domains of personal preference and social convention into that of morality, and the spectrum culminates in high-cost, complex moral dilemmas. At the low end of the spectrum of moral activity, no moral dilemmas are extant. Moral activity, at this level, does not consist of processes of moral reasoning to adjudicate competing claims of justice, fairness or any other of the principles traditionally considered to be the foundation of moral reasoning and moral judgment. As the vast majority of an individual’s moral experience is located in this area of the spectrum, moral life would become intolerable if the patterns of behaviour called by Peters (1971) “intelligent habits” were not available to the moral agent. It would be odd indeed if all of an agent’s moral actions could only stem from a complex, often time-consuming and frequently redundant process of moral reasoning. The fact that the day-to-day practices of social interaction take place without any such deliberation points to the utilization of habituated responses to situations noted as
Figure 1. The spectrum of moral activity.

existing within the moral domain. Agents interact with neighbours, spouses, colleagues and strangers and exhibit moral behaviours, or refrain from vicious behaviours, as part of their routine social interaction. The fact that the vast majority of people get through their days without stealing, lying, assaulting or willfully harming others for their own gain, despite opportunities to do so. In fact, people frequently consider the interests of others without great internal debate. This points to the success of habituated behaviour. This may be morality at a low level, but it is morality, and must be encompassed by any coherent notion of moral education.⁹ While this may

⁹ Sichel (1988b) confirms this position when she states, “Moral life is not merely punctuated by a series of discordant dilemmas. . . . Morality must also be judged by the quality of ordinary relationships, the intimate relationships between friends and casual meetings with acquaintances, unexpected encounters with strangers, ordinary business dealings and working with colleagues. Morality in these cases comes upon one unheralded and requires an instantaneous and intuitive response...traced to the character of the agent and thus, in part, to the early educational lessons that are forgotten remnants of the moral agent’s dreamworld” (p. 6).
appear to call for a formalistic process of relativistic socialization, the integrative model shown in chapter four demonstrates that this process can be consonant with cognitive developmentalism, based on the principle of respect for persons. For this section of the spectrum, habituated virtuous behaviour is both necessary and sufficient.

Further along the spectrum of moral activity competing moral claims, and the necessity of adjudicating those claims in the form of moral dilemmas, point to the inadequacy of habituated action as a sole response to the moral situation. A commitment to truth telling or promise keeping is too simplistic to deal with complex situations when all parties appear to have justifiable claims. Such complexity can only be handled by a process of moral reasoning leading to moral judgment. The lack of a significant role for the motivating emotions in cognitive theories (Rich, 1980; Peters, 1971) indicates the inability of cognitive processes alone to stimulate moral action in such circumstances. The agent’s reliance on the habituation to moral action as expressed in virtue behaviours is necessary to complete the dynamic of moral reason and moral action. The agent’s ability to identify the nature of the moral opportunity presenting itself, and his ability to respond appropriately, requires that his consideration be mediated by a “pull” or valency towards one end of the spectrum or the other.

Not only is this spectrum of moral opportunity offered as a representation of the range and nature of potential moral experience, it is also offered as a temporal continuum representing the sequence in which an agent’s moral skills are acquired. Further, the agent’s apprehension of virtuous behaviour must be isomorphic with the cognitive stage that underlies his process of moral reasoning and moral sense-making. It is for this reason that the dualism must be intimately linked by mutually informing processes that ensure such isomorphism.

**The Dialogic Process**

A dialogic process has the potential to liberate these two treatments of moral education, as so far explored, from their natural affinities at the polarities of the
spectrum of moral opportunity, and to allow the mutual informing processes that will characterize the embedding of virtue within a larger and more comprehensive framework of morality.

Despite the ubiquity of the symbol model of communication, where language is seen as a system of symbols that are transmitted from one otherwise-isolated individual to another, many scholars view it as deeply flawed and feel that it misrepresents the true nature of communication, language and the process of understanding. Drawing heavily on the hermeneutic tradition of Gadamer, Heidegger, Buber, and Bakhtin, Stewart has forwarded a conception of communication and understanding that abandons the symbol model in favor of a more subjective, collaborative, and relational approach to communication. It is this conception that founds the dialogic view proposed here. This approach views language as "articulate contact" (Stewart, 1995) and as a process that "has its true being only in dialogue, in coming to an understanding" (Gadamer, 1989, p. 446). This way of understanding communication and language has been influenced by both postmodern criticism of representationalism and post-semiotic critique of language as system, but it is firmly grounded in a world view that both perceives understanding as the distinctive dynamic of being human, and sees this ongoing "process of understanding-via-languaging as the human's way of constituting world" (Stewart, 1996, p. 3).

In defining dialogue as a process by which humans create understanding, Stewart (1995) asserts that "we are not a free-floating cogito who employs reason to connect and disconnect with objects around us, rather, we are situated interpreters, understanders, and sense makers engaged in everyday coping" (p. 109). The understander does not, and could not, cope alone but acts to understand based on relations with others. This is dialogue. "It is not that humans first 'are' and then 'behave in relation to' or 'respond to' the people and things around them" (Stewart, 1995, p. 110). Rather, a person exists and make sense of that existence only through
dialogue (understanding). As Heidegger (1997) writes: "Language is the house of Being. In its home the human dwells" (p. 193).

To reinforce the notion that articulate contact is fundamental to understanding, Gadamer (1989) writes that understanding "remains dependent upon communicative conditions that, as such, reach beyond the merely codified meaning-content of what is said" (p. 21). Echoing Gadamer's claims regarding the fundamental nature of language as contact, Bakhtin (1986) writes that the "true essence of the event of the life of the text always develops on the boundary between two consciousnesses, two subjects" (p. 106). Understanding occurs between two subjects and, consequently, cannot occur without contact. The “two subjects” to which Bakhtin refers, may be constituted of two agents, or an agent and the opportunity for sense making that occurs in the agent’s life experience. As such, a dialogic process takes place between the agent and a spectrum of life experiences. Sense-making is, therefore, a process rather than an event, and, like all processes, is characterized by dynamism as the energy of the substantive forces that shape the process is realized.

The concept of “world” has a central role in dialogic theory. While acknowledging Husserl's description of life-world (Lebenswelt) and Buber's insight that humans do not exist in a subject-object relationship with their world (rather, humans inhabit this coherent sphere), Stewart draws mainly from the hermeneutics of Gadamer. Gadamer views human understanding as worldly in the sense that humans accomplish this understanding situated in a world, rather than as an abstract and theoretical undertaking. Understanding, then, cannot be achieved in isolation from the circumstances that frame it, but arises from “a dynamic process of dialogue” with those circumstances (Stewart, 1995, p. 180). Understanding is a constitutive process because it seeks to produce meaning. Stewart (1995) writes: “To be human is to be an understander, which is to engage in processes of coherence building or sense making, processes that occur communicatively and that enable humans to constitute, maintain,
and develop the worlds we inhabit" (p. 115). The words used do as much to determine the context of their use as the context in which they are used determines their meaning: "The word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant" (Volosinov, 1973, p. 86). Stewart's notion of the development of "the worlds we inhabit" and Volosinov's insight into the dual nature of language combine to constitute the "narrow ridge" of Buber that allows older and newer ideas to interact reflexively.

This chapter has introduced the two perspectives of moral education that have been chosen for this dissertation, and the difficulties each has in addressing the entirety of the spectrum of moral education has been explored. One major and five subordinate problems have been identified and a dialogic process has been offered as a possible means to address the central problem. However, the first subordinate problem requires that the criteria that define the activity of moral education be derived, and that task is undertaken in chapter two.
Chapter 2
THE CONCEPTUAL REQUIREMENTS OF MORAL EDUCATION

To satisfy the task inherent in Problem 1, as noted above (the dichotomous nature of the two main educative perspectives, and their inability to inform and supplement each other) and to begin the investigation into the potential of dialogue, it is necessary to establish the conceptual requirements of moral education in order to deduce the criteria by which a theory may be selected for reformation. These criteria must encompass all significant aspects of moral education, and yet be sufficiently parsimonious to make the project manageable. These criteria will then be used to examine theories of moral education to identify the theoretical positions that will satisfy these minimum requirements. Logically prior to any attempt at reformation, however, is the analysis of the dual component of "moral education;" namely, what it means for a process to be educative, and simultaneously to establish the parameters of the moral domain.

Education

Teaching is an intentional activity. For example, as with imitating there is no particular action called "teaching." An agent may be giving instructions, questioning, correcting, setting an example, activities often associated with teaching, but may not be teaching. For an agent to teach, it is a necessary condition that s/he should bring about learning of some kind (that is, engaging the conscious efforts of the one being taught so that a change in beliefs, knowledge-base, attitudes or skills results).

Given that intention is a logically necessary part of teaching, it follows that the procedures adopted should be consistent with the general conditions required for learning (in particular, they should be such that the subject can consciously adapt to the influence of the agent), and that in specific circumstances, these procedures may be
reasonably expected to promote the learning objectives.\textsuperscript{10}

However, when teaching is set in the context of education, it becomes subject to a much broader range of criteria. In method, content, and manner, teaching that claims to be educative, must satisfy epistemological, ontological, and moral standards. Educative teaching must satisfy specific adequacy criteria. In what follows, teaching shall be referred to only in educative contexts, and as such it is a necessary condition that it promote not merely learning but understanding. Rather than being epiphenomenal, the establishment of understanding is an intentional activity and Crittenden's (1973) typology shows that intention can be viewed as,

1) the awareness the agent has of what he is doing, although he is not acting for a purpose;

2) an internal purpose that is contingently related to the concept of the action;

3) an internal purpose that is logically related to the concept of the action;

4) a purpose that is external to the action, the action being performed as a means to that end.

Peters (1964), in his analysis of the concept of aim, described the features that characterize the use of the word "aim" in ordinary language, and stipulates a meaning that clearly marks it off from the notion of purpose 4). He associated "aim" with what a person is (or must be) trying to do as part of performing a certain action (i.e., intention as in senses 2) and 3) so that questions about aims have to do with promoting a fuller understanding of the nature of the action. The distinction is between acting intentionally as in 2) and 3) and acting for a purpose as in 4). Given that teaching is an intentional activity, the distinction between the senses of intentional in 3) and 4) is crucial. In relation to education, inquiry into aims can be translated in two ways: (1) What must be taking place if the process can be described as educating?

\textsuperscript{10} On the senses of "intentional" referred to in this chapter see Anscombe, 1963; Kenny, 1963; Taylor, 1977.
(2) What extrinsic purposes are being addressed?

The two senses of “aim” can also be applied to the educative endeavour from the perspective of the learner (“Why are you doing this?” “In order to become educated.” “What are you becoming educated for?”). This is the notion that Peters is mainly concerned with in examining the phrase “aims of education.” He concentrates on the achievement aspect rather than the process, and identifies the condition of being an educated person with living a worthwhile life. He then argued that we can ask what one must be trying to achieve in living a worthwhile human life [intention in sense 3], but clearly, we cannot intelligibly ask for an end [purpose in sense 4] beyond living a worthwhile life for which the living of such a life is a means. He concluded that when aim is taken as synonymous with purpose [sense 4], we cannot sensibly talk about the aim of education (Peters, 1964).

MacIntyre (1964) provides an analysis consonant with Peters’ general position. MacIntyre’s somewhat pessimistic outlook concerns the pervasive nature of utilitarian thought, and its endemic and deleterious influence on educational thought. MacIntyre states:

I shall argue that the moral component of our educational system is simply a reflection of the moral content of our society. And so the task of the educator is to attempt to stand against a current which will in fact probably overwhelm him. (p. 1)

The core of his argument lies in the role of utilitarian thought as a final arbiter in the face of conflicting absolute principles:11 “We treat it as an ultimate of moral reasoning that such disagreements cannot be settled” (p. 2). In its dominant role as the “only public criterion for securing agreement on moral and political issues” (p. 2).

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11 MacIntyre (1990) provides a more extensive treatment of this concept in Three Rival Traditions (chapter one)
utilitarianism has (for MacIntyre) become embodied in social life. Further, due to the inadequacy of a utilitarian theory of motives, a means-ends prescriptivity fails to provide a critique of desires and satisfaction, so that production (means) becomes indistinguishable from consumption (ends). MacIntyre traces the progress of a utilitarian Zeitgeist to a hierarchical functionality producing adverse effects both upon individuals and society. Those aspects of life that escape the calculus of utility escape the primary consciousness of the dominant rationality. Education, therefore, becomes commodified by virtue of its extrinsic worth.

Peters' (1964) response to this phenomenon is worth quoting at length.

[This phenomenon] is yet another way of perpetuating the obnoxious view that education must have some aim beyond itself, that it must have some practical use in the 'outside world' or that it must be some sort of 'investment' which it is worthwhile for a community to spend money on. Presumably the 'outside world' refers to activities like business, government or running a home, which are 'life' in some sense in which devoting oneself to photography, philosophy or painting are not. Education, on this view, is all right (sic) if it helps a man to make money, to get on with his neighbours or his wife; if it can't it must be an ivory-tower eccentricity advocated by egg-heads. Now, while educational activities may contribute to practical ends, it is treason to civilization to see them only under such an aspect. For education is not just a preparation for living in this sense; it is an initiation into a distinctive form of life. . . . One of the diseases of contemporary thought about education is its preoccupation with the practical, with the mechanics of life, to the exclusion of concern about what sort of life is worth living. (p. 87)
The economic and sociological descriptions alluded to by theorists (Peters, 1964; Hare, 1979; McPeck, 1990) are misleading when taken out of context—namely, when divorced from the point of view of participants in the educational process. They are the descriptions of those, external to the enterprise, who point to the “function” of education in social or economic systems. The activities of the educator qua educator elude the analysis. The position is the logical equivalent of declaring the lumber industry to be the genesis, foundational focus, and central theme of sylvan ecosystems.

As a utilitarian translation of educational enterprise is insufficient, it is necessary to replace it with a more satisfying analysis of what is meant by an educative process. The term “education” has frequently been loosely used to describe any process in which a change takes place in the skill, understanding, or knowledge base of a subject. Such a use is unsatisfactory when closely examined.

A variety of models of education are available that divide into two main categories. These models are either predicated upon education as an agent of socialization, or they promote an instrumental vision of education addressing issues external to the process itself. Of the former, the Durkheimian model is the best exemplar and relies upon a mechanistic and cybernetic social response in which a society expresses its needs through its choice of educational goals. These goals are realized and operationalized in society and further refined as their shortcomings are identified. Therefore, there exists no ideal of education that may be considered non-contingent upon the forces of social dynamism that both demand and shape it. Models of the latter kind call upon education as the means to promote reasoning and critical thought (Scriven, 1976; Siegel, 1988), as the maintenance of mental health (Jahoda, 1968; Allinsmith and Goethals, 1980), or as the art of civilization (Newman, 1977).

These two categories concerning the essence and nature of education rely upon the outward manifestations of the results of the educational process, while ignoring (to
a significant extent) the processes undertaken to produce the results. The criteria of ends are assimilated to means. The inadequacy of the subsumption of education to general notions of socialization stems from a failure to distinguish between education and other socializing mechanisms; the inadequacy of the instrumental view is rooted in a fundamental confusion resulting from applying notions of value to education itself rather than to the processes or activities involved in it. This distinction is explicated by Peters (1964) whose position is outlined below.

Education involves the development of desirable states of mind. It would be as logically incomprehensible to use the term to describe as “educational” a process leading to a change that was in no way desirable, as it would be to note that a successful process of improvement had been undertaken and yet no change for the better had been achieved. Further, educational activity is generally thought to be an intentional activity. Individuals intentionally (in sense C as given above) put themselves or others in situations where something conducive to valuable states of mind will be achieved. Peters (1964) noted that this understanding can mistakenly lead to the assimilation of bringing about a desirable state of mind to the more generic and less satisfactory concept of bringing about what is desirable:

This [fundamental confusion] is due to applying these banal ways of conceiving of the promotion of what is valuable to education itself rather than to the processes or activities involved in it. Obviously, enough activities which can form part of the content of education can be viewed as being either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. It is possible to think of science or carpentry, for instance, as being both valuable in themselves and valuable as increasing production or the provision of houses. Thus it is reasonable to ask what the purpose of instructing or of training may be. But it is absurd to ask what is the aim of education. For to call something “educational” is to intimate
that the processes and activities themselves contribute to or involve something that is worthwhile. (p. 92)

Peters’ position rests upon an understanding that intellectual activity is for the sake of right action, but the rightness of that action is not independent of the activity involved in it. Therefore, education is not a concept that marks out any particular type of process such as training or instruction, or activities such as lecturing or demonstrating, but rather it suggests criteria to which these processes or activities must conform. The first of these criteria is that something of value must be passed on. Subsumed within this notion of desirability are the associated considerations of the agent coming to care about the valuable things involved and wishing to achieve the relevant standards that pertain to that which is desired. The second of Peters’ criteria concerns the manner in which the content of the educative process is to be assimilated; the agent must be initiated into the content of the activity or forms of knowledge in a meaningful way. The assimilative process must provoke changes in the agent’s view of himself and the world around him in a manner that relates to Plato’s understanding of education as the turning of the soul’s eye outward in order that that which has been found to be desirable, has come to be cared about, and for which the relevant standards have been achieved, now constantly illuminates and deepens the understanding of the rest of the agent’s life experiences. This criteria identifies the distinction between “knowing how” and “knowing that,” between Oakeshott’s “language” and “literature.” Therefore the term “education” presupposes that one comes to care about the valuable things one is initiated into, and that one is initiated into them in a manner that allows one to “know that” as well as to “know how.” Peter’s final criteria concerns the cognitive component of any educative process. This criteria points to the distinction that must be made between education and training, and education and instruction. As Peters indicates, “To be educated is not to arrive at a destination; it is to have traveled with a different
view.” It is this understanding of education that will form the basis of the educative component of moral education in this dissertation.

The minimal criteria that satisfy the educational component of moral education are, therefore:

1) an intention to produce a desirable state of mind;
2) an intention to pass on something of value;
3) a meaningful initiation into forms of knowledge, and
4) a cognitive component leading to understanding.

For the sake of brevity, these criteria shall be referred to in the analysis as intention, value, knowledge and understanding.

Morality

Ethics is the branch of philosophy that deals with moral concerns. Morality is, therefore, the subject matter of ethics and is dealt with through the discipline of moral philosophy. There is an initial, and crucial, distinction that must be made when attempting to delineate the parameters of the moral component in moral education. It is the distinction that can be established between moralizing and moral philosophizing.

To moralize is to offer judgments about specific behaviours from an established moral paradigm. A tradition of thoughtful moralizing is the technique a creative society uses to energize its moral repertoire and to prevent moral totalitarianism or moral anarchy. This must not be confused with moral philosophizing that is used to engage the general and rational nature of moral concepts, issues and problems. At least three types of thinking can be identified when dealing with morality. First, descriptive empirical inquiry seeks to identify aspects of human nature or human flourishing as these relate to morality, or examines the phenomena of morality through the lens of psychologists, anthropologists, or sociologists. Second, normative thinking seeks to
produce judgments of moral obligation and moral value. Third, meta-ethical thinking
seeks to produce a theory of the meaning and justification for judgments of moral
obligation and moral value.

Chazan and Soltis (1973) divide moral philosophy into two fields. Analytic
moral philosophy is concerned with:

1) the analysis of concepts and terms used in the moral sphere and moral
discussion (e.g., good, evil, right, wrong, value);

2) the analysis of central problems in the moral sphere (e.g., the role of
emotions versus the role of reason, habit versus autonomy, justification versus
intuition); and

3) the delineation of the moral sphere itself.

Synthetic moral philosophy is concerned with the development of systematic answers
to the problems raised by analytical philosophy. It aims at a level of generality that
transcends the particular and the local, and with what justification should be rather than
how it is currently expressed; with what the good is or should be. Synthetic moral
philosophy is rooted in the rational and intensive analysis of meaning rather than in the
critique and tabulation of concepts (Chazan & Soltis, 1973).

For the purposes of this dissertation, the definition of morality encompasses
human activity beyond that of personal preference or social convention. The object of
morality is to “ameliorate the human condition” (Warnock, 1971). The nature of
morality is a complex mixture and interaction of judgments and actions, beliefs and
behaviours centred around human interaction. Morality is the nexus of personal
engagement with, and the valuation and actualization of, principles of behaviour
grounded in criteria that transcend the immediacy of the experience.

The first assumption in such a conception is that morality refers to a complex
interaction of behaviour and intention. This assumption rejects the contentions that
morality consists exclusively of either behaviours in which intention and attitude is
redundant, or is a matter of intention in which subsequent behaviours are deemed secondary. Morality involves behaviour, but is not simply behavioural. As Peters (1964) notes, "by morality we mean at least the intelligent following of rules the point of which is understood" (p.78). Peters' comment obviates the possibility of moral luck. (Moral luck perhaps belongs more to the realm of "Punt, pass and pray" (Frankena, 1973) than to a certain and reasoned art.

In concurrence, Scolnicov (1988) reminds us that in The Republic Plato has Er the Armenian return from the underworld and report to us that the just will have their reward.

Er saw the souls choosing their new lives before returning to the earth. The first to choose was the soul of someone "who had come from Heaven and had lived in his former life in a well-ordered city and had participated in virtue by habit and not by philosophy. (619 C6-D1). But Er also reported that this soul chose "the mightiest of the tyrannies from folly and greed without making a thorough examination" (B8-9). That man was fortunate enough to have lived in a just city and to have had good habits and right opinions put into him. For his just life he was deservedly rewarded. He was also fortunate that he had never been faced with a temptation greater than his fortitude. But it could have happened. The unphilosophical just man lives in perpetual moral danger. There is an uncertainty about the life of opinion that is not merely pragmatic. Even if the naively just man does not falter to the end of his life, this is no more than moral luck, and he is morally below the philosopher. Non-philosophical education is incomplete and imperfect. The philosopher leads a just life not by accident of birth or by orthodoxy but because
he can see why his life is better. But he who lives by opinion cannot have this certainty. (p. 87) [Italics added]

For behaviour to be considered moral, it must be informed by dispositions, intentions, understanding, and motivations that are an indispensable component of, and preconditions for, moral status.

A second assumption concerns the role of principle in the agent's moral choice making. The centrality of principles in moral life means that agents, when making moral choices, are not simply acceding to conventional norms, or notions of correct behaviour in particular situations, but are determining the parameters of their behaviour in all such situations. If, as has been previously offered, morality is concerned with an interrelation of behaviour and intention governed by principled considerations, and intentions are intimately connected to dispositions and motivations, then the role of the agent in determining the criteria that found and guide the relevant principles becomes paramount. In short, the agent must note the justificatory and obligatory nature of moral principles and engage in a process of moral reasoning.

The outcome of such a process is necessarily contingent upon establishing the criteria to guide principle selection. Any conceptualization of morality intended to guide such a selection is, a priori, linked to a theory of moral value. Hamm and Daniels (1979) note:

To ameliorate the human condition through the use of reason logically requires that one posit certain fundamental principles which must be recognized as necessary for the point of morality to be achieved and for moral discourse to be made possible. Generalizability and the principles of justice and equality, for example, are presupposed in what makes a reason a reason. Other principles derive from our awareness of the common fears and values of people, and from our
beliefs about what kind of social arrangements are essential if any social order is to be maintained. (p. 21)

The tradition of moral philosophy is replete with theories of value: from the Platonic notion of the good, to considerations of utility, to Kantian ideas of the relation of the good to the will. It is the use of these axiological choices that grounds the establishment of the criteria that distinguishes one approach to morality from another. Cochrane (1979) establishes such a criterion when he states:

I would argue that respect for persons is the absolute, though formal, first principle of morality. If that is not the bedrock of our concern, then whatever else we are thinking, feeling, and acting it is not moral thinking, feeling, and acting. (p. 77)

In the formulation suggested by Cochrane, the formal and obligatory first principle of morality is the Kantian principle of respect for persons from which flow secondary principles under which this respect is to be expressed. It forms the criterion by which all other principles are selected. Central to such a formulation is the proposition that a process of moral reasoning is a characteristic of moral agency.

Without doubt, moral reasoning leading to moral judgment is the hub around which morality revolves, but this hub only becomes coherent when located within the disposition of the agent. Moral agency does not (as will be shown below) entail an atomistic, disconnected, and unencumbered self. Agents’ predispositions, inclinations and past experiences will all impinge upon both their ability to reason morally and the translation of such reasoning into patterns of action. Straughan (1985) was making this very point when he provided his article “Why Act on Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment?” with the parenthetical subtitle “Or How to Reach Stage 6 and Remain a Bastard.” Simply put, the character of the reasoner is central to the outcome of the reasoning. In summary, the notion of character and disposition cannot be divorced from moral
judgment, and the enterprise of morality that is to be considered as an axiologically
grounded principled response to the exigencies of the human condition.

At the heart of the moral enterprise is the individual, assuming the role of moral
agent, confronting the moral opportunities and requirements of his/her existence. It is
self engaging with non-selves. Cochrane illustrates:

I want to claim that the object of moral education is the morally
autonomous agent, one who does not necessarily conform to the
conventions of a society, nor simply to the urgings of his or her
idiosyncratic inclinations, but to the dictates of moral reason. Such an
agent is capable of generating moral imperatives for action in day-to-
day situations. It is because of the possibility of moral reason that we
can speak of objective constraints on what is morally possible and
objective obligation on what is morally necessary. It is because of
this distinctive element that we can assert the autonomy of ethics
alongside other possible forms of knowledge. Again, it is just this
feature which requires education processes in moral development in
contrast with processes of inculcation such as conditioning and
indoctrination which are compatible with processes of value
socialization. (1979, p. 77)

The fundamental realizations of such an engagement are dependent upon the essential
understanding that colours an individual’s perception of the self/non-self relationships,
and the apprehension of morality to which the individual subscribes. There are two
basic suppositions that are available to the moral agent, and both can be explicated by
referring to the notion of akrasia

Akrasia and moral agency

Akrasia refers to that condition of character in which a knowledge of what is
morally required is insufficient to guarantee appropriate action, and is often translated
as moral weakness. *Akrasia* refers to weakness of willpower or lack of self-control, and is contrasted with *enkrasia*, which refers to that strength of will that allows persons to resist temptation.

The problem of moral weakness is not only among the most ancient and intractable problems of moral philosophy and psychology, but is also one which has considerable significance for the theory and practice of moral education. This is to say, no moral education which enables agents to reason effectively to correct moral conclusions or decisions, but leaves them ill-equipped to act appropriately, can be considered even minimally successful.

The difficulties associated with moral weakness have their original source in the Socratic identification of virtue with knowledge, and are seriously exacerbated by Plato's subsequent dualist separation of the mind and cognition from the sensible realm of body and sense experience. A more recent separation of reason from experience in the moral sphere occurs in Hume's general denial of the motivational power of human reason and his corresponding claim that the springs of moral action must, therefore, be affective rather than rational. This is met by Kant's equally dualistic insistence that moral motives must be entirely untainted by natural inclination and grounded in the nature of reason alone.

A concern with the slippage that occurs between moral judgments and moral deeds has a long history, and has conventionally been expressed as a weakness of moral will. For example, Kohlberg, although he barely touches upon the notion of *akrasia*, attempts to address the issue, and it will be argued that the treatment he does provide is both inadequate and inimical to his theory. This is not to presume that a satisfactory treatment of *akrasia* could not be formulated within the parameters of the theory, merely that Kohlberg has failed to provide such a formulation.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^\text{12}\) Kohlberg (1975), briefly discusses moral behaviour in "The Cognitive Approach to Moral Education" *Phi Delta Kappa* 56, 672-673. Naturally, Kohlberg addresses weakness of will in cognitive terms and provides an explanation that parallels the Socratic treatment of *akrasia*. 
Modern analyses—for example, Hare, 1972; Davidson, 1969; Norwell-Smith, 1963—have failed to resolve the notion of weakness of will in terms that would be compatible with the requirements of Kohlberg's theory. The Socratic denial of *akrasia* is founded on his assertion that for an individual to know the good automatically presumes actions in accord with that good. Socrates is asserting perfect consistency between word and deed, between moral judgment of the good in any situation and actual moral action. Experientially, however, it is well established that this consistency is frequently lacking. Socrates recognizes this problem in *Protagoras*:

> [T]he rest of the world are of the opinion that knowledge is not a powerful, lordly or commanding thing; they do not think of it as actually being anything of that sort at all, but their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be over-mastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain or love, or perhaps, by fear—just as if knowledge were nothing but a slave and might be dragged about by all of these other things. (352B-C)

Rejecting the conventional understand that *akrasia* is caused by emotion, Socrates asserts that it is caused by errors in judgment. The agent who fails to act in accord with the moral knowledge he possesses is, in the Socratic formulation, said to have made a reassessment of his moral knowledge prior to action and thus called into question the validity of that knowledge in the first place. While Kohlberg acknowledges that the initial acquisition of a new moral stage can be characterized by reversion to behaviours more in keeping with the newly abandoned modality of thinking, for such a phenomenon to be frequent mitigates against the notion of stages as a definition of moral reasoning. Indeed, Kohlberg seems to have been among the first to appreciate this difficulty, and his own proposed remedy invoked a need to develop

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13 It is on the basis of this assertion that Kohlberg equates his theory to that of Socrates (Kohlberg 1971, p. 81).
the so-called "ego-strength" of moral agents via cultivation of a range of executive virtues of self-control, perseverance, and patience. Kohlberg's maneuver mirrors Plato's similarly motivated proposal in the Republic to deal with weakness through training of the "spirit," and it fails for much the same reason—namely, the ability of a set of executive dispositions, developed quite independently of moral reason, to be guaranteed to serve its interests (for not all spirited men are good men) if that reason is, in itself, impotent to control non-rational desires and inclinations. The Plato-Kohlberg strategy of importing executive psychological powers to resist moral weakness (construed as failure to obey reason) does not solve the problem, but emphasizes the status of the moral agent as an atomistic isolated and quasi-judicial arbiter of a dispassionate moral calculus.14

Roger Straughan is one of the few educational philosophers to have stressed the centrality of the question of weakness for moral education, having addressed it through an interesting distinction between different reasons for action.15 Basically, Straughan's point is that the very idea of a reason for action is ambiguous between what he calls justificatory and motivational reasons. On his view, the problem of an agent who succumbs to weakness is that whilst he acknowledges that there is a strong justification for acting other than he does, a reason such that acting contrary to it makes his present conduct appear weak, the reason is not currently motivational for him. Unfortunately, either the motivational reason stands in equal competition with the justificatory as a genuine reason, in which case it continues to remain a mystery why the agent fails to act upon that which he takes to have greater rational authority, or it acquires motivational force from its character as a desire or impulse in cognitive guise. In that event, moral reasons once more appear impotent to inspire moral action, and the

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14 Kohlberg's difficulties in this area are shared by others in the cognitivist and dualist tradition and point indirectly to a restricted notion of moral agency. See, Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 79-84.
15 Especially, R. Straughan, (1982), Iought to but...A philosophical approach to the problem of weakness of will in education, (London: Windsor Press).
cognitivist liberal-rational view of moral agency again leans toward a neo-Humean non-cognitivist theory of moral motivation.

All these failures to resolve the problem of moral weakness follow from the larger failure of an essentially dualist-rationalist conception of moral autonomy, (and, hence, moral agency), inherited by Kohlberg, Peters, and others from the Enlightenment, to account for the conceptual complexities of moral agency. To solve the problem of *akrasia*, it is necessary to recognize the extent to which an Aristotelian view of practical reason is incompatible with a Kantian or Kohlbergian foundationalist ethic, and that it is, therefore, not generally to be hoped that any problems of the second (including their inability to account for weakness of will) might be addressed with the consequences of the first, unless the two positions are linked or integrated.

The first respect in which Aristotle differs radically from the dualist philosophers is in his defense of a non-dualist philosophical anthropology. For Aristotle, reason and other cognitive capacities function within a larger economy of human affairs not characterizable independently of social, practical, and affective considerations and implications. The capacities for moral reason, in terms of which Kantians and others aspire to establish the very basic ground rules of moral life, are confined by Aristotle to the more modest role of deliberation within already given frameworks of value. Thus, Aristotle's *phronesis* (that faculty that enables persons to discover the proper course of action in a situation, and prompts their desires to conform to this knowledge) enshrines an "internalist" rather than an "externalist" conception of moral reason; far from expressing some detached and elevated "view from nowhere" (Nagel, 1982) with respect to received values, moral reason is construed as operating for the improvement from the inside of certain projects and dispositions already extant, and is, to that extent, bounded and contextualized by such values.

Another respect in which Aristotle's phronesis can be regarded as "internalist" is that, unlike some later conceptions of practical reason, it acquires status as
knowledge only through direct connection with experience, and, as the point of practical moral deliberation is, for Aristotle, not to acquire mere theoretical knowledge of the good (a cognitivist project) but to achieve goodness, the relevant experience is less a matter of detached empirical observation, and more of successful engagement in personal and interpersonal contexts of human practical life. In short, moral knowledge is a matter of acquiring dispositions more than grasping propositions, and the role of phronesis is to inform or order practical experience in the interests of effective moral agency. In turn, moral success and failure are construed as functions of various sorts of interplay between reason, feeling, and circumstance.

This understanding can be applied to Gilligan’s (1982) contention that an ethic of care requires a reconceptualization of moral agency that departs from the traditional dispassionate and unencumbered individual. Aristotle’s agent (and also Gilligan’s) operates in a society replete with relationships, aspirations, and responsibilities that require a disposition at variance with that of the dualist inspired conception of individual moral autonomy (derived from Kant via Piaget) with a contractarian view of interpersonal obligation, custom made for circumstances of democratic pluralism in which promoting personal choice and freedom and ensuring appropriate individual responsibility to others, by way of respect for the overlapping consensus, are equally commended as urgent social and educational priorities.

A defensible account of virtue is possible to the extent the moral enterprise remains faithful to the overall intent of Aristotle’s account of virtue. Specifically, the account must adhere to the idea of moral knowledge acquisition as a matter of a complex interplay between reason and practical experience. Aristotle (1949) regards effective moral agency as grounded in natural human association such as kinship, friendship, and love, and, hence, is not automatically concerned exclusively with the denial or suppression of affectivity. In contrast to a dualist understanding of moral agency, the Aristotelian agent, rooted in the contingency of his circumstances and
encumbered by the exigencies of those circumstances, draws his moral energy from the phenomenality.\textsuperscript{16} Kant (1960) affirms the grounds of moral agency to be rooted in the dictates of reason and the dispassion of the universal imperative. The Kantian agent draws his moral energy from the noumenal.

Further, the two considerations of moral agency address two very different understandings of the nature of humanity and society. The cognitivist position, specifically Kohlberg’s, draws a conception of individuals as universalizing creatures who make contractual arrangements from involvement with ahistorical conflicts of interest that characterize their roles in society; in other words, the liberal model of society. The impersonality of this construction presents debilitating consequences for the personal and specific. In contrast, a less conservative and more radical apprehension of the role of the individual in society accepts the momentum already in existence in individual relationships and social structures. This view broadens the scope of consideration from distributive justice notions, and the terms and conditions of their actualization in a Rawlsian manner, to enlarge the focus of the enterprise to include already extant both intra- and interpersonal requirements.

A dualist notion of moral agency is less fruitful and more problematic than an Aristotle/Gilligan understanding, and any program of moral education that considers itself to be a certain as well as a reasoned art must include the concept of an encumbered moral agent. The development of morally autonomous agent is frequently cited as the end point of moral education programs, and morally agency is usually referred to in

\textsuperscript{16} Aristotle attempts a more detailed account of the nature of moral shortcoming in Book Seven of the Nicomachean Ethics. To this end, he first identifies three basic types of moral excellence, heroic virtue, virtue, and continence, and three kinds of vice, incontinence, licentiousness, and bestiality, though the major distinction in his account of moral defect is that between incontinence and vice or licentiousness. The distinction between the virtuous and continent is basically between those who have mastered moral virtue to a degree where they no longer experience conflict between right reason and their natural inclinations, and those who, whilst still prey to conflict and temptation, are yet invariably successful in exercising self-control with the aid of right reason. The distinction between the incontinent and vicious, on the other hand, is between the morally weak, who, though they know at some level what is morally better, yet pursue the worse, and the wanton who care little for what is morally better or worse, but simply pursue present pleasures.
terms of autonomy. However, there is a conceptual problem in the nature of autonomy related to moral action. Autonomy can be used as a defence against assertions that the agent has made morally intemperate or inappropriate judgments. For this reason, the notion of tempered autonomy is offered. In other words, the agent is autonomous in reasoning and judgment within the boundaries that are established as delimiting the nature of such reasoning. Indeed, if respect for persons is the bedrock of all moral concerns, then a theory of moral education that permitted reasoning, judgment, and moral action that did not proceed from this basis would be remiss in its duty to provide a moral framework within which the agent is to operate. Against charges of indoctrination, the defence of this position would be that it is not within the general realm of discourse and reasoning that such strictures would be operant, only within the realm of moral discourse and reasoning. As Cochrane states: “It is because of the possibility of moral reason that we can speak of objective constraints on what is morally possible and objective obligation on what is morally necessary” (1979, p. 77).

It would not be considered indoctrinative or unreasonable in other subject areas of the curriculum to delimit the terms of reference of students’ engagement with subject content; in fact, it would be considered inferior pedagogic practice not to do so. Advocating tempered autonomy is merely setting the grammatical foundation for Oakeshott’s language.

Regardless of the formulation of the attributes of moral agency in either the dualist or non-dualist conception of morality, certain abilities and capacities would appear to be a logical requirement of all undertakings in the moral domain. These must, as a minimum, consist of a capacity for moral awareness (Awareness), the ability to reason morally (Reason), the ability to make moral judgments (Judgment), and the ability to undertake moral action and engage in a degree of moral reflection (Action). These abilities and capabilities are consonant with Rest’s (1986) “Four Component
Model of Morality” in which he postulates that four major kinds of psychological processes must have occurred in order that moral behaviour be made manifest.

Rest’s position explicitly denies that moral development or moral behaviour is the result of a single or unitary process. Rather than a linear sequentiality in which each component, upon completion, presages the actualization of the successive components, the model is seen as a complex interaction between the components. Rest introduces the components in a logical framework rather than a temporal sequence. Component 1 is the counterpart to the moral awareness criteria. Rest describes Component 1 as a minimal awareness that:

[S]he/he could do something that could affect the interests, welfare or expectations of other people....We must not underestimate the difficulty in interpreting social situations...even though people sometimes may not “see” things because they are consciously blocking them from recognition. (1986, p. 6)

Component 2 is concerned with the ability of the individual to make decisions following a reasoning process. Rest’s position holds that individual’s seem to have a natural propensity to make such decisions through a process of “moral intuition” and that the central problematic of this component lies in the ability of the individual to justify these moral decisions. Rest considers that the function of the theorist is to “figure out how people make these judgments...to account for the differences in judgments, and to account for the certitude of people in these judgments” (1986, p. 8).

In the reasoning criterion, the interconnectedness of affect and cognition is presupposed to the extent that the schema that underlie the reasoning process are associated with a willingness to prescribe such schema through the decision making process. For example, the association of a person’s reasoning regarding particular forms of social cooperation with the distinctive and prescriptive forms of reciprocity and fairness that accompany them.
Component 3 refers to the complex issue of value choices and the value adjudications that are made that lead to moral judgment. Rest makes reference to the motivating ability of a variety of concepts, the interplay of which may form the basis for judgment following reasoning and decision making. Therefore, moral judgment is not the simple outcome of a process of moral reasoning, but a complex process in which the final judgment forms the nexus of moral reasoning, moral decision making and motivational forces. The judgment criterion, therefore, is not a simple criterion but the result of a complex interaction between cognition, affect and motivation.

Component 4:

involves executing and implementing a play of action. As popular wisdom tells us, good intentions are often a long way from good deeds. Component 4 involves figuring out the sequence of concrete actions, working around imperfections and unexpected difficulties, overcoming fatigue and frustration, resisting distractions and allurements, and keeping sight of the eventual goal. (Rest, 1986, p. 15)

The urge to action implied in Component 3 is made manifest in the series of events that leads to successful realization of the moral judgment. As such, the concept is an encompassing one that makes reference to such sub-concepts as ego-strength, processes of self-regulation, perseverance, resoluteness and competence. As one of the aids to an agent’s successful task completion is a past history of such successes, a degree of moral reflection and retrospective assessment of past moral endeavours is an ancillary component of this criterion.

The minimal criteria that satisfy the moral component of moral education are, therefore:

1) an engagement with moral principles relating to the first principle of respect for persons;
2) factors of moral agency including:
   a) moral awareness,
   b) moral reasoning,
   c) moral judgment,
   d) moral action and moral reflection.

For the sake of brevity, these will be referred to in the analysis as principle, awareness, reasoning, judgment and action.

This chapter has examined the domain of morality and the nature of education. The conceptual requirements have been discovered that underlie the selection of criteria by which a process may be termed educative within the moral domain, as morality is defined in this dissertation. The educative and moral criteria that have been derived in this chapter allow a review of the theories concerning moral education. This review, undertaken in chapter three, allows the selection of a theoretical position that is suitable for a reformulation, within a dialogic process, to address the central problem—that is, the dichotomous nature of the two perspectives under discussion. The review of theoretical positions that follows is undertaken for the purposes of an analysis based on the educative criteria of intention, value, knowledge and understanding, and the moral criteria of principle, awareness, reasoning, judgment and action.
Chapter 3
A REVIEW OF FIVE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MORAL EDUCATION

This chapter will examine various modalities of education concerned with the moral domain. No specific criteria of exclusion or inclusion were employed in selecting the theoretical positions to be investigated, and the selection process merely attempted to identify a broad spectrum of major theoretical approaches that have been put forward to underpin traditional moral educational programmes. The approaches of Durkheim, Wilson, Butts, Kohlberg, and Gilligan will be investigated.

Two tasks are to be accomplished in this chapter. First, each approach will be critiqued concerning issues relating to the criteria of morality and education established in chapter two. The theoretical positions will then be critically analysed to select the position most suitable for reformulation for use in a dialogic process. Second, while each theory provides a needed insight into the entirety of the moral enterprise, none entirely satisfies the needs of the moral educator, and, indeed, all have shortcomings that obviate their ability to address the entirety of the spectrum. Therefore, the strengths and salient weaknesses of each position will be noted in the text, as it is intended that the articulation of a new theoretical position at the culmination of this document will prove capable of capturing the insights and potential of each of the theoretical positions while countering their weaknesses.

All theories of moral development and moral education presuppose a set of underlying assumptions concerning the human nature, the origins and nature of morality, and the relationship between them. These assumptions may be considered both meta-ethical and meta-theoretical in nature. For example, theism deems morality to be God ordained, and that the explications of morality are to be found in varieties of

\[17\] Clearly, these critiques are not exhaustive, and refer only to the ability of the theories to satisfy the moral and educative criteria already established. Table 1 provides a schema of the major elements of the theories not explicated in the text.
sacred texts. It is humankind’s task to operationalize these explanations, and, as the theistic view of humanity usually presumes an inclination to sin combined with an ability to aspire to spiritual and moral elevation, moral status is determined by the congruence between actions and the strictures to be found in such authorities as the Bible, the Torah, or the Koran.

The Moral Theory of Emile Durkheim

Durkheim’s entire framework of moral development and moral education hangs upon the belief that morality is called into being as a result of human social activity, and no valid a priori arguments may be made concerning the objective nature of morality. *The Determination of Moral Facts* yields several insights into Durkheim’s conception of the nature of morality. For example, “The domain of the moral begins where the domain of the social begins,” (Durkheim, 1953, p. 37) and, “[m]orality begins with membership of a group, it is not related to any act which has individual interests alone” (Durkheim, 1953, p. 50). The implied relativist theme is noted and confirmed by:

It is not a simple juxtaposition of individuals who bring an intrinsic morality with them, but rather man is a moral being only because he lives in society, since morality consists in being with a group and varying with this solidarity. Let all social life disappear, and moral life will disappear with it since it would no longer have any objective.

(Durkheim, 1953, p. 52) [Italics added]

“Varying with this solidarity” presupposes variances within limits, otherwise group membership would no longer be viable, and it confirms a pluralistic vision of countervailing and compensatory influences reflecting a dispersal of power within society. Durkheim’s society would therefore appear to be made up of groups of individuals who vary with each other on the individual and group level within set parameters. Exceed those parameters and the level of variance becomes dysfunctional; fail to reach a required level of variance and the social dynamic tends to quiescence.
Durkheim refers to the concept of disfunctionalizing excessive variance only obliquely in his writings, and one is left with supposition that groups or individuals who vary beyond tolerance with the social solidarity are eschewed by that solidarity which displays a self-regulating mechanism designed to optimize variation. This mechanism is, therefore, implied but not elaborated by Durkheim (Lukes, 1973).

For Durkheim, morality is an inherently social phenomenon comprised of social rules and activities, created by social forces and extant only in social circumstances. The social nature of morality is the minimum indispensable attribute for defining the phenomenon. Further, morality is irreducible—that is, it is realized as a self-explanatory reality, comprehensible only in terms of its own entirety, and not explainable as the compensatory aggregate of more basic or primitive individualistic needs or drives. These two characteristics of morality remain constant across Durkheim’s writings and underpin his rejection of both individualistic and psychological approaches to moral development. Durkheim postulates morality as a derivative attribute of the progenitive energizing tensions realized by the actualization of social relationships (Lukes, 1973). Morality and society, thus, form a dynamic dualism in which one aspect calls the other into being as a result of its own iteration, and the dualism is, therefore, coterminous both spatially and temporally.

A presupposed, if not explicated, social homeostasis is the natural result of Durkheim’s theory, although the self-regulating loop is allowed to dysfunction in order to deal with the problem of moral rebellion and non-conformity. In The Determination of Moral Facts, Durkheim deals with the issue of moral figures who seemed to thwart and reject the conventional moral norms of their societies. Durkheim’s explanation underlines a major conceptual flaw in his system of morality. The explanation for recognized moral figures radically at variance with conventional morality is achieved by acknowledging their articulation of societal moral needs as that society would itself articulate them. As Durkheim explains, “Socrates expresses more clearly than his
judges the morality suited to his times.” These figures were then not rebels against society, but rather rebels in the name of that society. Their moral rebellion was not anti-social but rather a precursor to a clearer vision of that society. This explanation has two consequences. First, it allows Durkheim to deny that moral non-conformity is an adherence to a higher moral ideal than is generally extant in society; to allow this supposes an a priori case to be made for the higher ideal and the concept of objective moral ideals is antithetical to the framework of Durkheim’s system of morality. Second, it allows Durkheim to argue that “social morality” is not equivalent to “conventional morality” or to any preponderance of belief characterizing the societal norms. Therefore, the most moral behaviour may sometimes appear anti-social and non-conformist. Durkheim (1953) indicates, “The society that morality bids us desire is not the society as it appears to itself, but the society as it is really becoming” (p. 38).

The importance of “varying with this solidarity” now becomes apparent. The variance, it appears, must be within limits, the lower end of which marks that point below which insufficient tension and dynamism exists to call morality into being, and the upper end of which marks the limit of the feedback loops to retain a degree of dynamic homeostasis. As societies can, apparently, simultaneously not only appear as they are, but somehow articulate expressions of morality reflecting how they wish to become, mechanisms must be operative to enable this to occur.

Durkheim makes his theory more complicated by the introduction of his concept of the dual nature of man. Briefly, he held that there is an individual or personal man as opposed to the social or impersonal man. In *The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions*, Durkheim makes the distinction between sensations and sensory tendencies versus conceptual thought and moral activity. Between the egoistic and personal versus universalized, impersonal conceptual thought. The former composed of mental states that apply only to “ourselves” and to the events of our personal lives, and the other is made up of ideas, sentiments, beliefs and practices that express in us our
membership in society. It is only in the latter that morality can be considered to exist, and, “to constitute this being in each of us is the end of education” (Durkheim, 1960, p. 24). The dualism, thus expressed, is the contrast between the idiographic impulses of our personalities and the nomothetic requirements of our social reality. Education is thus considered to be a mechanism which primarily reinforces in each of us the nomothetic bonds that define us as members of society.

Durkheim attempts to reconcile the Kantian concept of duty and obligation with the teleological motif of morality as an empirically rooted practice reflecting human needs and desires. While rejecting Kant’s a priori metaphysical assumptions, Durkheim accepted his emphasis on morality as authority, as he simultaneously rejected the individualism and hedonistic nature of utilitarianism and embraced the empirical nature of morality tied to outcomes. Durkheim’s morality becomes intelligible as a non-a priori, empirically and socially-rooted system of duties and obligations which reflect desirable and worthy outcomes.

The conventional wisdom of positing a moral ideal and from that deriving moral rules to determine moral behaviour is rejected by Durkheim because of its a priori implications. Rather, he chooses an a posteriori approach which derives moral ideals from the moral facts extant as a subset of socially-generated social facts. The moral ideals are viewed as standards of conduct arising from rules of conduct. Durkheim maintains that they are generalized statements rooted in concrete realities. Moral ideals “are simply the ideals in terms of which society sees itself. They are the elevation and sanctification of moral facts” (Durkheim, 1953, p. 93).

For Durkheim, moral principles are grounded in fact, and function as directives and guides for moral life. They constitute the heart of moral development, but lack the characteristics of universalization and generalizability usually associated with the term. They are not metaphysical notions posited as self-evident from which is derived a framework for abstract moral reasoning leading to moral judgment, the actualization of
which functions as morality, but rather a posteriori discovered creative forces
dominating meaningful moral life.

Durkheim considers that both the procedure used to study the moral domain,
and the skills required to achieve morality, were related to the rational domain. That is,
the facts and truth encountered by reality were amenable to empirical investigations.
Wallwork (1972) notes that, for Durkheim, society and social facts, of which moral
facts are a part, can be understood rationally. There are two consequences of this
assumption. First, morality should not be undertaken in the deductive style of classical
philosophy but rather in an inductive mode in which the particularities of morality are
examined to achieve an encompassing understanding of the morality in toto. Second,
rationality is not only a meta-cognitive activity used to investigate morality, but is a
first-order activity required to become moral (Wallwork, 1972, pp. 192-194).

Clearly, reason, for Durkheim, has a significant, if a posteriori, position.
Individuals must first become moral individuals in a social sense then they can and will,
through the exercise of rational thought, understand the reasons behind their moral
agency. The role of rationality is central to Durkheim’s concepts of moral education
and the teaching of morality. Moral education is seen as the concern for the formation
of habits and the awakening of sentiments and motivational representations aimed at
action. The teaching of morality is the concern for bringing about comprehension and
explanation. Durkheim’s position is best indicated by:

I contest the fact that reflections and the social dimension are both
necessary. There is one which may be absent without morality
ceasing to exist. . . . Even today we do not go so far as to say that for
an act to be moral it must be reflective. . . . To be sure reflection
raises and perfects morality, but it is not the necessary condition for it.
(Durkheim, 1971, pp. 60-61)
Moral action is the central focus of the moral sphere, according to Durkheim, as morality is a system of rules of conduct. Morality is directly expressed by the actions we perform in the social arena, and by acting for the sake of society we reinforce the teleological component of the moral system.

For Durkheim, morality is based upon a justificatory system. However, the justification is not dependent upon the actor’s state of mind, free will, theological state, intention, or philosophical conviction; it is based upon a social ethic. Durkheim denies that individual freedom is in any way compromised in the exercise of social morality.

A person achieves personhood solely because of societal membership, and, therefore, it is an expression of autonomous personhood to reflectively embrace a socially justified course of action. The negative connotation associated with indoctrination is rejected by Durkheim on the grounds that indoctrination is not a necessary evil in the imposition of facts, values and behaviours upon the young, but a positive and necessary good intrinsic to moral education (Moore, 1966, pp. 396-403). Durkheim’s formulation insists that:

education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined.

(Durkheim, 1956, p. 71)

Therefore, education is the methodological socialization of the young with the intent of forming a social being, made up of the mental states and competencies which belong to the individual’s personal lives and which comprises the individual being. Simultaneously, education is to provide a system of beliefs, ideas, behaviours and practices which are expressed, not through our personalities, but through the groups, organizations and interactions which comprise our collective existence.
This socialization process, which is the heart of Durkheim’s moral education, has the intent of producing, from the tabula rasa of the newborn, a new being capable of social integration. In order for this moral new being to be replicated beyond the influences of the original, a supra-moral entity is called into being. For Durkheim, this supra-moral entity is society. Its effects are transmitted through the agency of the moral teacher, whose prime motivating dimension is his own moral authority and stature.

Clearly, Durkheim’s position fails to satisfy educative criteria, and similarly fails to accord to the central criteria of morality as, a priori, founded upon respect for persons. The immediate strength of the position, however, is to be found in the emphasis that is placed upon the integration of the child into the moral reality of community and society. The Aristotelian pole of the spectrum of moral opportunity requires just such an integration, and, while, Durkheim’s insistence that this integration constitutes morality is flawed, it does have utility in its application to at least one section of the spectrum. Durkheim’s contention that personhood is achieved through societal membership, and that it is an expression of autonomous personhood to reflectively embrace a socially justified course of action, resonates with the function of the Vygotskian dialogue to be investigated in chapter four.

The Moral Theory of John Wilson

As all theories of moral development are underpinned by a variety of presuppositions concerning both the nature of man and morality, and the relationship between them, so are all theories of morality rooted in different modalities of investigation. Cognitive-developmentalists theories are based on empirical research into children’s development; Durkheimian sociological theories begin with a rejection of all a priori claims for morality, and values clarification has its origin in educational practice. However, Wilson provides a purely philosophical infrastructure to energize his conception of moral development.
Wilson wishes to present a notion of morality which relates to morality as a
descriptive term with the contrasting cognate of "non-moral." On this usage, the term
describes a set of circumstances about which moral decisions are appropriate. Non-
moral designates sets of circumstances about which moral discussion would be
inappropriate. He further refines the descriptive usage of the term by deriving a
distinction between the descriptive modality when used in the sociological sense, and a
particular subset of human thought and action based not on mores, but on some other
system of logical conceptual classification concerning the extent of the moral domain.
In the sociological sense, it may be applied to a particular set of mores and codes of
behaviour such as, "Victorian morality was based on sexual propriety" with its lack of
approval or prescriptivity. On the second usage, the extent of the moral domain is
determined regardless of any traditional view concerning that domain. This sense of
the term requires that decisions be made concerning the nature of moral content, and the
attitude to be taken towards that content, and these decisions are the subject of the
formative dimension of Wilson's position. The established parameters of the defined
term remains constant over the course of Wilson's writings (Wilson, Williams, &
Sugarman, 1967).

Each individual, therefore, is continually creating his own moral universe in
utilizing rational conceptual tools to define both the parameters and the nature of that
universe. The main concern for Wilson is to posit a concept of morality, and moral
education that could be defined by a procedure for determining and confronting moral
issues, rather than as a set of mores and behavioural cues to be inculcated in the young.
There is an immediate point of contrast between Durkheim and Wilson. For Durkheim,
the process and procedure of morality formation were immaterial because society
articulated the morality and its content. It was only the process of societal change, with
its concomitant change in moral needs that occasioned the articulation of a definite set of
moral behaviours. For Wilson, in contrast, the process and procedure for the
establishment of content are pre-eminent as the content depends upon the utilization of rationality and the acquisition of "moral components" (Wilson, 1973).

Wilson's approach shifts the emphasis from the transmission of specific values and mores to the development of individual inquiry and moral deliberation. It is a direct antithesis to Durkheim's model. For Durkheim, moral facts were absolute and immediately available; for Wilson, moral facts are derivative of rationality and are to be deduced (Wilson, 1985). Durkheim's comment that, "even today we do not go so far as to say that for any act to be moral it must be reflective," delineates the opposing stances on moral reasoning (Durkheim, 1979, pp. 60-61).

For Wilson, reflection is the essence of morality as a series of abilities is developed in individuals that enables them to confront and resolve moral dilemmas without the dictate of some outside force. These abilities are labeled by Wilson as "moral components," and are the core of his approach, which constitutes a commitment to the role of the individual and a rejection of the dominance of social effects in morality (Wilson, 1973).

Wilson's proposition is to penetrate the social and institutional dimension of morality in order to isolate its genuinely individual basis. Wilson's approach is neither anti-social nor asocial; that is, it does not deny the social context of morality (asocial), nor does it diminish the role of reciprocal responsibilities (anti-social) that characterize moral activities. Wilson reinforces his position through the relationship he determines between man and society (Wilson, 1972). For Wilson, the individual rather than society is the progenitor of moral behaviour. Man enters into social contracts for instinctual and pragmatic reasons, and creates societies. Therefore societies are part of morality as preconditions—they are not themselves moral phenomena. They are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition within which morality is produced by the individual through his confrontation with universalizable moral principles.
The first theme of Wilson's position is the supremacy of the autonomous individual. The second major theme is the emphasis that is placed upon morality as a principled act. Wilson is concerned with the development of agents who choose moral behaviour on the basis of reflective encounters within a corpus of overriding and universalizable moral principles. The individual's "moral components" address these principles in two dimensions. First, moral principles are key components of PHIL, a meta-theoretical, and, as will be argued, a meta-ethical, construct underlying the acquisition of further moral components. PHIL is defined variously in several of Wilson's works:

1) The degree to which one can identify with people in the sense of being such that other people's feelings and interests actually count or weigh with one;

2) an attitude of respect/concern for others;

3) regarding other people as equals, thinking that other people's interests count; and

4) "Under PHIL we have to make sense of the area often described in terms such as concern for others, sympathy, fair play, respect for other people -- we have distinguished three sub-components of PHIL; having the concept of person -- PHIL (HC); claiming the concept as a moral principle -- PHIL (CC); and having rule supported feelings, duty or person oriented, PHIL (RSF, DO, PO)(Wilson, 1970, p. 8).

Second, the concept of KRAT refers to the general process of thinking about and deciding on moral issues on the basis of concern for others (PHIL), a sense of feeling for others and one's own interests (EMP), and a level of skill and knowledge related to the issues (GIG). The four categories of PHIL, KRAT, EMP, and GIG with their sub-categories form the basis of Wilson's procedure for the promotion of moral behaviour (Wilson, 1985, pp. 9-35).
Wilson's entire system of moral education operates on the level of principles. The "moral components" which are to be employed are generalizable, non-specific categories which, if utilized, set into motion the principles of operating as a moral being. Wilson contends that these moral components are logical constructs, and that he is engaged in a second-order activity of describing the logic of morality rather than presenting a particular moral theory of the good. He maintains moral neutrality while outlining procedures designed to elicit moral behaviour. He posits a clear and total bifurcation of content and process.

The third theme present in Wilson's approach is the argument against the concept of morality as an expression of feeling or inclination, and a defense of the rationality of moral discourse. Being rational, for Wilson, in the moral sphere means:

1) consistency in the use of language and concepts;
2) the application of generalizable prescriptive statements of principle;
3) the utilization of empirically verifiable facts;
4) the expression of an individual's freely chosen reflection and deliberation, i.e. autonomy and intentionality; and
5) considering options and choices in the light of their implication for the interests of others (Wilson, 1970, pp. 20-31).

Wilson clarifies this by juxtaposing his structure of rational deliberation with, for him, unsatisfactory approaches to modern problem solving. These unsatisfactory approaches include:

1) acceptance of outside authority;
2) reference to ideal moral agents;
3) faith-determinant set of beliefs concerning behaviour;
4) personal preference;
5) basing decisions on parental practices;
6) basing decisions on formative events or experiences; and
7) conventional behaviour (Wilson, 1970, pp. 20-31).

Wilson’s position is revealed as a belief in the existence of an objective non-normative procedure of reasoning that can be applied to moral discourse in the same way that such procedures are applied in scientific investigation. Morality is, for Wilson, not a series of specific responses, reactions or behaviours but rather a generalized approach to problem confrontation. He takes a clear stance that morality is essentially a formal phenomenon, and emphasizes morality as a procedure that could be learned and applied in a broad range of general situations. The process implies a commitment to the unity of knowledge and action -- the moral components of the agent are interrelated and are energized to action by the KRAT component.

Wilson’s position is vulnerable to criticisms on many counts. For the purposes of this investigation, the most salient weakness of Wilson’s position is the lack of moral content in the moral components. While PHIL may be construed to have normative components, this normative content is both obscured and incoherent. However, two areas of focus are valuable. Wilson emphasizes that each individual is in the continual process of creating and maintaining an individual moral reality through reflection, and through the utilization of the moral components. Further, the moral components function as maxims (though devoid of content) that guide moral deliberation. These two factors become salient and valuable when related to Bakhtin’s understanding of dialogue to be investigated in chapter five, and to the formulation of a dialogically derived morality articulated in chapter seven.

Civic Education

Recent renewed interest in civic education, especially in the United States, finds its impetus in the assertion of R. Freeman Butts that “the urge to promote civic education through the schools accelerates in time of crisis or rapid social change,” and its grounding in the nineteenth century work of Horace Mann. Mann, reacting to the

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18 For such a criticism, and critiques of the other theories in this chapter, see Butler (1999).
Jeffersonian reforms, predicated upon the classical tradition of the liberal arts, proposed educational reforms primarily focused on manners and morals to create "a society composed of sober, wise and good men, in which each citizen can participate in the power of governing others" (Butts, 1982, p. 392).

While acknowledging what he terms "historical setbacks," Butts' contention is that schools, specifically in the United States, but inferentially elsewhere, should reclaim their role as civic educator. The debate is liable to both situational and conceptual challenge. In pluralist societies, it may be argued that curricular civics is untenable as lacking consensus as to content, and would constitute a form of cultural imperialism; others would contend that an emancipatory civics is desirable to prevent the perpetuation of an undesirable status quo. In contrast, Butts et al. embrace a universal civic curriculum designed to restore a sense of democratic community and core democratic values.

Central to the preoccupation concerning civic education is the contention that the stability, continuity, reform or even the transformation of the social and political order depends upon the practice of a citizenship that can be learned in schools. That is, the school's creation of the good citizen has been viewed as a means to the creation of the good state and the good society. Seen positively, the schools system's attempt to create citizens is also an attempt to democratize the opportunities of the young to become fully entitled participants within the culture, simultaneously promoting social stability and harmony by the inculcation of emotional responses and intellectual dispositions towards political and social relations. Seen negatively, the process, as Foucault (1977) contends, is a disciplinary and coercive exercise that functions to normalize individuals within the culture, to institute conformity and constrain heterodoxy. For Foucault, civic education formalizes beliefs, expectations, and norms by which students measure the legitimacy of their public actions and their own sense of personhood.
From a review of the literature, three discrete streams of justification for the reform and expansion of civic education in schools are identified. Two of these three streams are fully developed and engage in ongoing debate over the issue. The third is inchoate and poorly represented. First, the 'utility justification' centres upon the utility of civics as an tool of progress, both individually and socially; second, the 'cohesion justification' examines the integrative function of civics. A caveat must be employed in the construction of the two streams of justification for civic education: although the writers discussed fall into the main themes which are discussed, a great deal of writing in this area is generic and tends to cross the artificial parameters of the justifications. The themes to be discussed are intended as an aid to conceptual understanding rather than as definite and concrete limitations on the range of material available.

The Utility Justification for Civic Education

The work of The National Commission on Excellence in Education, published by the U.S Department of Education in 1983, relies upon this justification for its proposed prominent role for civics as an area of curriculum development. The argument is succinct. The restoration of national strength in the arena of international competition, in scientific research, technological achievement, and economic production is of central concern. Defined in terms of perceived national interests, the school's primary task is seen as the production of competent, competitive, independent, yet loyal, citizens who can contribute significantly to the maintenance of the nation's international supremacy. Within this context, it is the task of the citizens to acquire not just skills and knowledge in core subject matters, but also to acquire the range of behaviours and attitudes which will enable them to actualize their skills and knowledge in society. The citizen must be ready to translate his/her sense of self and his/her accomplishments into productive patterns of behaviour within the economy. Good citizens are, thus, characterized in A Nation at Risk, as those who:
by virtue of their own efforts, competently guided, can hope to attain the mature and informed judgment needed to obtain gainful employment and to manage their own lives, thereby serving not only their own interests but also the progress of society itself. (p. 47)

More frighteningly, the writers of the report warn that those who fail to meet these expectations should not expect to be granted full economic and social citizenship:

Individuals who do not possess the levels of skill, literacy and training essential to this new era will be effectively disenfranchised, not simply from the material rewards that accompany competent performance, but also from the chance to participate fully in our national life. (p. 49)

The utility justification for civic education in public schools, at least in America, hinges upon the dual teleology of personal and public benefit. Both loci of benefits are grouped around economic and participatory factors. The individual becomes both economically self-sufficient due to competency and skill acquisition, is socialized towards activities which ensure that self-sufficiency, and is simultaneously empowered to engage in the civic activities of a participatory democracy. The nation receives the benefit of the individual’s economic activity and is assured of stable state reification because of the individual’s socialized participation.

While some scholarly interest has been generated by the appalling poverty of logic and rhetoric in the report, it has been accepted as a genuine and laudatory mission by a wide section of the American educational establishment. "The prescriptions for school improvement do emerge for a powerful ideological consensus with a wide constituency" (Franzosa, 1988, p. 5).

**The Cohesion Justification for Civic Education**

The impetus to action for writers in this stream is provided by empirical evidence that students are not well-informed in the area of social studies, display
ignorance about governmental roles and functions, have trouble identifying political
leaders, cannot describe the process of legislative enactment and lack detailed
knowledge of aspects of their national history. International assessments have reached
similar conclusions about students in other countries. Attitudinal surveys have gathered
data concerning the civic values espoused by students, and on their interest in political
participation (Levine, 1980). High school and college students appear to be more
committed to personal goals and the acquisition of wealth than to social concerns. They
demonstrate limited understanding of democratic values, and admit to being
unconstrained by the canons governing the democratic process. On the other hand,
they are responsive to political slogans or real and imagined threats to national honor
and security (Levine, 1980). The weight which can be given to these findings is
debatable. The history of society is replete with exhortations to the young to aspire to
the ideals and attainments of past generations whose examples are held up to inspire the
sloth, ignorance or apathy of "modern" youth. The famous Socratic plea in this regard
has been apparently apposite at all junctures since its formulation.

The answer to the question "Should schools entertain civics at the heart of their
moral curriculum?" is taken for granted by writers in this area. They take the position
that being a responsible citizen requires a special knowledge of the political and social
system, and that schools are the ideal instruments for the transmission of such
knowledge. This approach, however, is not unaware of the significance of the
questions "What is to count as good citizenship?" "Whose version of civics is to be
activated?" and "Who determines the intent of civic education, and the extent to which it
must be balanced between public knowledge and private cognition?"

An awareness exists that points to a distinction between "citizen-virtue" and
"person-virtue" (a distinction with a long tradition in the literature of the moral domain,
and which may be dimly apprehended, but not explicitly articulated in the cohesion
justification). For civic education to make any claim to utility as a mode of moral
education, it must somehow link and reconcile the duality of citizen-virtue and person-virtue. Little appreciation of how this reconciliation is to take place can be found in the present literature, or even an acknowledgment that the dualism is of import. Fenton (1979) offers a civic education curriculum based on Kohlbergian stages, and posits that an awareness of the invariant cognitive stage sequence will facilitate the learning of units predicated upon the modalities of thinking and cognitive processes operant in each stage. The prime thrust of the curriculum is the accumulation of civic knowledge rather than the activity of moral education. Kohlberg’s stage model is used to provide a more adequate psychological grounding for the process. The link between civic education and moral development is made through the course content, which Fenton indicates should include: the meaning of community, deciding how to organize a community meeting, deciding how to punish rule breakers, choosing decision makers, the decision making process, becoming a member of a community, the aims of the community, and running a community meeting.

While the writer has labeled this approach “the cohesion justification” (because it contains the work of theorists who wish civic education to function as a medium of social stability and integration), it also serves those who insist that civics should be a liberating focus designed to connect to free-will, self-expression, and entertain the notion of social reform. Neither aspect finds the position of the other to be antithetical. The only contentious issue for them is the weight which must be given to the opposing view. The writer has avoided the temptation of considering the work of Rush (1947), Butts (1980, 1982), and Giroux (1980, 1984) as a separate school of thought, in order to contrast it with Coles(1980), and Janowitz (1985) because, although the two attitudes appear to concentrate on two different foci of affect, they are united by adherence to the moral nature of the definition of democracy that drives the utility justification. The question of the nature of democracy lies at the heart of the conceptual underpinnings for the cohesion justification. For these writers, democracy has been
falsely referenced to an existing political system, a form of government and normative ideal. In this formulation, the task of civics is to justify, defend, and guard the state. An alternative reference is offered to display democracy as the critique of centralized and institutionalized power. Democracy, thus, becomes an empowering tool enabling people to think, act, and choose, demonstrating that democracy is at the root of governmental power rather than a consequence of governmental-proscribed rights and privileges. As an actualization of the latter concept, civics becomes an expression of commonality of people and their potential rather than a loyalty to institutions.

The cohesive element in this justificatory posture refers to linkages between people sharing commonalities rather than the stabilization of governmental institutions. When the role of citizenship is defined solely in terms of the state’s need for continuity (which is the prevailing view for most educators), that definition is confined to the legal obligations and rights granted by that state. That is, the determining characteristics of the good citizen becomes consistent with those required for the state’s self-preservation and maintenance. Experientially, it is observable that this phenomena develops mythic and prescriptive dimension and is actively pursued as an end by the organizations of the state. In contrast, when citizenship is defined in reference to the collectivity of the people, it expresses a commitment to the kind of civic activity which depends upon involvement in a collective undertaking to realize the polity envisaged by the citizenry, rather than ritualistic enactments of state-granted rights. This stream enjoins a reification of process rather than a reification of product, and echoes Deweyan assumptions concerning the generation of public philosophy contrasted with the acceptance of social and political reality. Dewey writes:

Inherited political agencies . . . obstruct the organization of new forms of the state which might grow up rapidly were social life more fluid, less precipitated into set political and legal moulds. To form itself, the public has to break existing political forms . . . . By its very nature, a
state is ever something to be scrutinized, investigated, searched for. Almost as soon as its form is stabilized, it needs to be remade. Thus the problem of discovering the state is not a problem of theoretical inquirers engaged solely in surveying institutions which already exist. It is a practical problem of human beings living in association with one another, of mankind generically. (Dewey, 1974, p. 88)

What qualifies as civic education to one may appear as cultural dominance or indoctrination to another. Despite this, however, this perspective is generating curriculum material and enacting its potentials in high schools in the United States, and has become identified as a recognized actor in the ongoing debate over the role and function of civic education.

The use of civic education as either an aspect of moral education, or as a tool to facilitate moral development is problematic. The concept addresses a limited aspect of morality, has little unity in its position, and provides no conceptual base justifying its acceptance as a modality of moral education in school. Only if morality is defined in the most restricted of terms can civic education claim any influence in the moral domain. Its strength lies in the potential for communitarian thought that lies at the heart of the cohesion justification, through which individuals, by means of the activities of a participatory democracy, establish linkages between individuals engaged in common activity based on community. The utility justification, no matter how poorly defended, depends upon the mutuality of personal and public benefit. The individual’s viewpoint is focused simultaneously inwards, to self-interest, and outwards, to the community, and contains a real, if oblique, understanding of decentration.

The Moral Theory of Lawrence Kohlberg

Like the Piagetian work on which it is based, Lawrence Kohlberg’s research in moral development exemplifies the cognitive-developmentalist approach. By analyzing the verbal responses of children to a series of moral dilemmas, Kohlberg specifies a
"first moral structure." Thus, presenting these same and related dilemmas to such subjects at regular intervals through adulthood, Kohlberg concludes that five additional structures occur. His data purportedly shows that the sequence of the six stages is invariant and culturally universal.

Piaget and Kohlberg claim that mature thought emerges through a process of development that is neither direct biological maturation, nor direct learning; but rather a reorganization of psychological structures resulting from organism-environment interactions. These reorganizations define qualitative levels of thought, levels of increased epistemic adequacy. The epistemology supporting this position derives from functionalism or pragmatism; knowledge is equated neither with inner experience nor outer sense-reality, but with a resolved relationship between the organism and environment. Meaning and truth are contingent upon the relationship of the child to the contexts confronted. The values that flow from this position are the values of ethical liberalism, in which both the traditional standards and value-relativism are rejected in favour of ethical universals. Therefore, "[i]t is recognized that these ethical universals are ethical principles formulated and justified by philosophy rather than by the methods of psychology (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1978, p. 146).

This "developmental-philosophic strategy" (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1978, p. 151) attempted to clarify, specify, and justify the concepts of adequacy implicit in the concept of development. It did so through:

1) elaborating a formal psychological cognitive-development theory;

2) elaborating a formal ethical and epistemological theory of truth and worth linked to the psychological theory;

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19 Kohlberg later revised this position in favour of the complementarity thesis formulated after discourse with Habermas. This thesis posits that rather than distinguishing between the two modalities of justification, i.e., philosophical and psychological, these modalities complement and support each other. This thesis bolsters Kohlberg's claim that he had successfully committed the "naturalistic fallacy," and yet allows the distinction between the descriptive and the prescriptive to remain.
3) relating both of these to the facts of development in a specific area; and

4) describing empirical sequences of development worth cultivating.

The consequences of the "developmental-philosophic strategy" form Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral education. Kohlberg’s theory has not remained static since its inception, and Kohlberg increasingly acknowledged the utilitarian principle in articulating the premise that moral development is the process of a development of justice structures. The accommodation of utilitarian tendencies has been made through the agency of 'soft' stages, that are concerned more with the content and function of personality than with cognitive structures (Sullivan, 1977). The Kohlbergian “hard” stages, however, remain the structural core of the theory and form the prime arena for any investigation concerning the philosophical roots of Kohlberg’s theory (Wren, 1990).

All developmental psychologists are interested in behavioural change over the passage of time, but structural psychologists have focused on certain aspects of behaviour that have special significance for an individual’s development. These significant aspects are those that reveal the structure or organization of an individual’s behavioural tendencies. A key attribute of the structural-developmentalist approach is that the development is a process of reordering and restructuring one’s patterns of behaviour and responses to stimuli (Kohlberg, 1981).

Kohlberg’s theory requires an understanding of the term developmental. Development is usually held to mean an activation which moves from an original position to one which offers more opportunity for effective operation, a growth process along natural lines involving differentiation or evolutionary change. Kohlberg’s theory of moral development abandons the traditional dichotomy of cognitive and affective development and considers them as parallel aspects of the structural transformations that take place in the developmental process. Kohlberg states:
The maturationalist’s theory assumes that basic mental structure results from innate patterning. The environmentalist learning theory assumes that basic mental structure results from the patterning or association of events in the outside world. The cognitive-developmental theory assumes that basic mental structure results from an interaction between organismic structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside world, not reflecting either one directly. (1981, p. 59)

Kohlberg relies upon a dialectical doctrine of cognition which supposes that a core of ideas and assumptions are redefined and reorganized as their potentials and implications are operationalized by experience and confronted by their opposites in argument and discourse. These reorganizations and redefinitions represent increasingly sophisticated levels of thought and epistemological adequacy. Cognitions are deemed to be structures or systems of internal relations that determine the manner in which the organism processes information. Events in an individual’s life are believed to be actively processed through these cognitive structures. When a program of reinforcement cannot be adequately processed through the operant cognitive structures, then cognitive dissonance takes place, which Kohlberg (1981) defines as “a dialogue between the child’s cognitive structures and the structures of the environment” (p. 57). This process is a great deal more problematic than is initially indicated, and is, as will be argued later, the location of problematic meta-ethical assumptions requiring critical attention. The invariant Piagetian sequence of cognitive development allows the individual to discover the inadequacies of previously held conceptual positions, and to advance to a further stage more replete with possibilities for understanding the presenting problem. Similarly, for Kohlberg, so do the increasingly sophisticated cognitive structures which come into being enable the individual to identify the inadequacies and inconsistencies of previously held moral positions, and stimulate the
formation of further positions that resonate more harmoniously with the newly
developed cognitive capabilities.

The concept of cognitive stages is at the core of the structuralist or cognitive
developmental theory. For Kohlberg, stages have certain characteristics that form the
framework of his theory of moral development. First, stages imply a qualitative or
modal difference in problem solving. Second, these different modes of thought form
an invariant sequence or order of stage acquisition. Factors may accelerate, halt or
retard the speed of acquisition, but do not change the order in which the stages are
acquired. Third, each stage forms a coherent structural whole; responses given do not
represent a specified level of knowledge or familiarity with task, but rather indicate an
underlying organization of thought. Finally, stages are hierarchical integrations; they
form an invariant order of differentiated structures, each stage stemming from the
previous one, and preparing the individual for the subsequent one. The difficulties
encountered in each stage are resolved in the acquisition of the next (Kohlberg, 1971).

A distinction exists between the interactive structural-hierarchical stages and the
stages conceptualized by Freidians or maturationalists. Maturational stages are
embryonic in nature; they represent a total state of the organism at a given time, and
lead to new stages regardless of experience and the reorganization of previous stages.
Thus, growth and learning become valuable, not for the successful attainment of a new
stage, but for the successful integration of a present stage. Onset of the next stage
occurs regardless of experience. By contrast, in cognitive-developmental theory a stage
is considered a bounded structure, anchored in a sequence of structures, independent of
the total state of the organism, but dependent upon experience for further progression.
This fact allowed Kohlberg to consider his theory developmental in the sense that the
individual progresses through stages characterized not by expanded quantitative factors,
but by factors which expand potentialities.
Kohlberg's conception of stages is linked both to Piaget and to empirical research. Studying 75 American boys through adolescence onward, Kohlberg produced a typological scheme describing general stages of moral thought that can be defined independently of the specific content of particular moral decisions or actions. By posing hypothetical moral dilemmas, Kohlberg elaborated definite and universal levels of the development of moral thought. This typology contains three distinct levels of moral thought, each divided into two stages. Each stage may be considered a unitary and distinct moral philosophy, complete with its own rationale and belief systems. Each level and stage, however, according to Kohlberg, is increasingly capable of resolving dilemmas in a more satisfactory way.

Three levels are initially identified: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. The preconventional, stage one morality is founded upon obedience to rules and authority; obedience for the sake of obedience provides the content of the stage, and acknowledgment of superior power and the desire to avoid punishment is the motivation. Socially, this stage is purely egocentric. No attempt is made to relate two perspectives, and actions are judged in terms of physical consequences regardless of intention. The extreme heteronomy of this stage corresponds to Piaget's early findings in which rules were deemed to have inviolate authority. The second stage of the preconventional level is labeled by Kohlberg, "the stage of individual instrumental purpose and exchange." In this stage, right consists in rule following to meet one's own interests and acknowledging the right of others to do likewise. This stage embraces an individualistic concrete perspective which separates the interests of the individual and authority (Kohlberg, 1981).

The conventional level of moral thought has an initial stage in which both the expectations of others, and the actor's intentions determine the moral validity of action. Kohlberg spoke of a 'good boy-nice girl' orientation of this stage in which behaviour is believed to be moral if it pleases and helps others and is approved by them. The
subsequent stage is identified by a desire for the maintenance of social order. Right behaviour consists of doing one’s duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order. Maintaining the expectations of family, group and nation is perceived as valuable regardless of consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity, but of proactive loyalty which both supports and justifies the social order (Kohlberg, 1981).

It may be seen that the stages to this point are characterized by varying degrees of heteronomy. At the postconventional level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application regardless of the authority of the groups holding these principles, or the individual’s own identification with those groups. The initial stage is defined as a social contract orientation, where right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards that have been critically examined and societally approved. Emphasis is placed upon social utility, with free agreements and contracts forming the binding elements of social obligation. Due weight is given to the procedures for reaching consensus, and an awareness exists of the relativism of personal values and opinions.

The final stage of Kohlberg’s typology of moral development is that of universal ethical principles, in which right is determined by a decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehension, universality and consistency. These principles are ethical and abstract, and can be differentiated from behavioural rules to the extent that exceptions can be argued for rules, while no exceptions can be logically maintained for principles. At this stage, the actor identifies morality as adherence to principle, regardless of circumstance, personality, or authority. Morality, thus, becomes an autonomous response characterized by reciprocity, universality, and equality (Kohlberg, 1981).
**Kohlberg and Virtue**

For Kohlberg, while value relativity represents the naturalistic fallacy, it does not follow that all values have equal stature. His position on the nature of value relativity runs:

The value-relativity position often rests on the logical confusion between matters of fact (there are no standards accepted by all people), and matters of value (there are no standards that all people ought to accept); that is, it represents the naturalistic fallacy.

(Kohlberg, 1981, p. 107)

Kohlberg affirmed the existence of values that transcend preference and are worthy of respect, and predicates them upon an ethical framework. As such, these values represent viable and important comments upon people's ethical orientation. A spectrum of worth is accorded to these values, depending upon the nature of the ethical framework, with the accolade of absolute acceptance and viability accorded to those values that flow from Kohlberg's own formulation of morality. His position on virtue revealed the uniqueness of his understanding of the moral domain.

Kohlberg declares that his position on virtue was one that drew upon a Socratic tradition for realization. He takes up a Socratic idea but restates it in a different form: Virtue is not many, but one, and its name is justice. It will be demonstrated below that his position is actually a grotesque distortion of the positions of both men. Kohlberg's contentions are summarized below:

First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate and culture.

Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.

Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good.

He who knows the good chooses the good.
Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs.

Fifth, the good can then be taught, but its teachers must in a certain sense be philosopher-kings.

Sixth, the reason the good can be taught is because we know it all along, dimly or at a low level, and its teaching is more a calling out than an instruction.

Seventh, the reason we think the good cannot be taught is because the same good is known differently at different levels and direct instruction cannot take place across levels.

Eighth, then the teaching of virtue is the asking of questions and the pointing of the way, not the giving of answers. Moral education is the leading of men upward, not the putting into the mind knowledge that was not there before. (Kohlberg, 1970, p. 58)

These contentions remain essentially unchanged, though reformulated, over the course of Kohlberg's lifetime, and contain the underpinning for all the aspects of his theory of moral development. From Kohlberg's initial formulation of these contentions, the salient characteristics of his theory of moral development can be derived.

Points one and two support the justice-structure form of the Kohlbergian stages. Clearly, Kohlberg understood that, regardless of appearance, the reality of the moral domain is the working out and redeeming of aspects of justice, as issues are articulated between competing claims. All other expressions of moral activity can be subsumed under a sufficiently expansive conceptualization of justice.

Points three and four form the basis of stage acquisition and an invariant sequence based upon cognitive understandings. Knowledge of the good is revealed to us through our own intellectual activities. As cognitive abilities develop sequentially
and hierarchically, then our developing knowledge of the good, (i.e., justice, must follow the same preordained pattern). We may accelerate, retard or halt this acquisition, but we cannot escape the inevitability of the manner in which we do so.

Points five and six are the origin of the concept of cognitive dissonance as the means of stage acquisition. The philosopher-kings must lead us through an increasing awareness of the inadequacy of our understanding concerning moral conflict and the manner in which we address them. The reason process is an elenchic one; moral knowledge—that is, knowledge of the good—is available to us as the knowledge of geometry was available to the slave boy. Instructing the slave boy how to geometrically double the area of the square would have had little educative force. Instructing us in aspects of the good is equally inadequate. True knowledge comes from insight predicated understandings not from rote acceptance of instruction.

Point seven contains two elements: first, we are confused about the good because we fail to appreciate the unity of the good; and second, we are unable to coherently address the various occurrences of the good from one manifestation to the next. Point eight indicates the root of Kohlberg's objection to any other modality of moral education. Rejecting the essentially elenchic nature of moral development in favour of instruction or character development merely reflects an inadequate notion of the manner in which morality is both constituted and articulated.

Kohlberg's objection to the "bag of virtues" approach to moral education is, then, grounded upon an understanding of virtue that is not in accord with his own, rather than an objection to virtue qua virtue. He views moral education based on virtue as deficient in two regards: first, it disregards the foundational nature of cognitive development displayed in stages that both comprises the child's ability to engage in moral discourse, and provides the parameters for that discourse; and second, it is based upon a flawed and incomplete understanding of the nature of virtue.
Kohlberg's objection to the use of virtue (defined as "trait words") is based upon the arbitrariness and vagueness which underlies all efforts to use the positive connotations of ordinary trait terms of personality or character to define standards and values. For Kohlberg, the less we do in attempting to inculcate the virtues the better is our programme of moral education. The arbitrariness of virtue inculcation is based on his contention that virtue words have no descriptive content. For example, he says that "words like honesty are used primarily to praise or blame other people, not to describe cognitively in the scientific sense" (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 75-76). If, as Kohlberg insists, virtue words lack descriptive content, then disagreement over whether a given action manifests one particular character trait rather than another reflects nothing but different appraisals of a given action. Thus, for one person, what is a manifestation of the virtue of integrity is for another a manifestation of stubbornness; what for one is an example of honesty in expressing true feeling towards others is, for yet another, an expression of insensitivity towards the feelings of others (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1978, p. 153). Character education, when viewed solely as the teaching of the virtues, was an arbitrary enterprise for Kohlberg, because it persuades children to adopt specific forms of behaviour, not by enhancing their capacities for rational choice, but by using the praise and blame inherent in the use of virtue and vice words. For Kohlberg, character education did not provide the means for showing why the prescribed behaviour is choice-worthy. He notes that "the observable meaning of a virtue word is relative to a conventional cultural standard that is both psychologically vague and ethically relative" (1978, p.152).

Kohlberg found support for this view in his interpretation of the Hartshorne and May studies whose findings he says "suggest that the most influential factors determining resistance to the temptation to cheat or disobey are situational factors rather than a fixed individual moral character trait of honesty" (1964, p. 386). Two specific findings in the study that allow for this conclusion are:
1) "low predictability of cheating in one situation for cheating in another," and
2) children were not found to be divisible into "cheaters" and "honest" for their
"cheating scores were distributed in bell-curve fashion around an average score of
moderate cheating" (1964, p. 386).

Kohlberg buttresses his contention that virtue words are descriptively empty by
declaring that "one prevalent interpretation of moral character predicated upon virtue ...
is that it is a set of general 'good habits'" (1964, p. 387). Since virtue words describe
character by referring to a person's habits, in ascribing virtue to a person, one would
expect to be able to predict across a variety of situations the responses she would make
to opportunities to exercise moral choice. The finding of low predictability suggested
to Kohlberg that the determinants of behaviour have nothing to do with moral character
as described by traditional virtue words. The preceding does not suggest that Kohlberg
rejects all claims of moral character. To replace the motivating force of virtue he claims
that ego-strength variables correlate well with moral behaviour; that is, variables like
self-control and self-esteem are useful and powerful predictors in areas such as
resistance to cheating.

In so far that terms like "self-control" describe a person's character,
these trait terms describe a person's capacity for moral decision
making rather better than fixed and habituated behaviour traits
putatively associated with virtue. (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 391)

Moral education, declares Kohlberg, is "the leading of men upward, not the
putting into the mind of knowledge that was not there before" (1970, p. 58). In this,
he reflects the Platonic position that the educative process is an ascent from an
inadequate to an adequate cognition, to be understood as a conversion, a complete
restructuring of one's conceptual framework, as demonstrated in the Symposium.
Elements of continuity and conversion reflect the gradual transformation of opinion into
knowledge by enmeshing opinion in the context of reason, and an insightful acceptance of the cogency of reason itself.

On the nature of virtue, however, the Kohlbergian position does not accord to that of Plato. Plato did, indeed, perceive virtue as knowledge and decide that the greatest of the virtues was justice, but justice was to be realized through the harmonious manifestations of other virtues. An isomorphic relationship between the manifestation of harmony in expressing temperance, prudence and fortitude in both the individual and the state was the only way in which men could be led to justice. Kohlberg states:

I will spend little time on my disagreements with Plato except to say that I conceive justice as equality instead of Plato's hierarchy of justice realized as the practice of other subsidiary virtues. (Kohlberg, 1970, p. 58)

Of much more consequence is Kohlberg's misrepresentation of Socrates' position concerning the unity of the virtues. Like the thesis that no one does wrong willingly, the thesis that all the virtues are one has its foundation in the utilitarianism of all the Greek's moral language (Gulley, 1968). This view is the basis of Socrates' contention that "all the virtues are one." Gulley's consideration of the Socratic position is as follows. The Greeks specified the end of human actions as "happiness" (eudaimonia). This was "the good," though the nature of, and the conditions required for, the enjoyment of the good were contentious. Aristotle, for example, posited that happiness was activity in accordance with philosophic wisdom, thereby giving supremacy to sophia, which he considered to be most perfect of all the virtues. Actions were describable as good in so far as they were conducive to the good. A natural development of this was the idea that, since "happiness" or "the good" is a single end of human action, then any specification of it must maintain the unity of all morally good behaviour by specifying a single kind of activity or a single state of character as constituting happiness. On this basis, the various particular virtues earn their status as
virtues in so far as each of them, in situations appropriate to it, is exercised as good
behaviour conducive to a single end. Hence, the particular virtues are to be treated as
means to an end rather than as constitutive elements of that end. Gulley continues:

There were good reasons for this sort of distinction. It satisfied the
Greek inclination to specify happiness in terms of a single activity or
state of character. For it kept out of that specification the variety and
multiplicity of the recognized particular virtues. At the same time it
served to determine the proper application of such recognized virtues
as courage, temperance, and justice by supplying a criterion for their
application in the form of a specification of the common end to which
their exercise should be directed. (Gulley, 1968, p. 152)

We may note that far from supporting Kohlberg's contention that virtue application
both “lacks a standard” other than communal approbation and is “descriptively empty,”
the Socratic position provides very clear criteria for virtue appropriateness and
expression.

In a scheme of this kind, it is easy to see in what sense the particular virtues
may be said to be unified. It is unfortunate that Kohlberg did not increase his
understanding of the Socratic sense of unified virtue, rather than taking a literal and
superficial reading of the position. To appreciate the Socratic nature of unified virtue, it
is necessary to understand that,

1) the virtues have the common characteristic of having the same relation, as
means, to the same single end, and

2) the proper exercise of the virtues—the proper time, manner and object of their
exercise in particular situations, as means to ends rather than “empty descriptors”—is in
each case dependent upon knowing what is the final end of human action. Gulley expands upon this notion with:

We have already noted that Socrates assumes, as Plato and Aristotle do, that the definition of this end is a descriptive specification of what goodness is. In view of this Socratic assumption, and in view of the relation assumed between the particular virtues and a single common end, we can see that the full specification of a particular virtue would include a specification of the end to which the virtue is properly directed. To this extent the definition of a particular virtue is at the same time the definition of any particular virtue. This is the basis for Socrates’ formulation of the doctrine of the unity of the virtues.

(Gulley, 1968, p. 153) [Italics added]

The doctrine goes further in making the virtues equivalent to each other. Socrates’ belief that virtue was knowledge prompted this further step. This thesis assumes that the dominant influence of the intellect is sufficient to convert the whole character to a pattern that excludes acting against knowledge. From this position, Socrates could dismiss, as inessential to the definition of such particular virtues as courage or moderation, any specification of the emotional characteristics which distinguish one virtue from the other, thus leading to a declaration of the equivalence of the virtues.

He considers that this equivalence follows from the proposition that knowing what is the end to which the virtues should be directed in their exercise is not only a necessary but a sufficient condition of

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20 It is of interest that the Socratic contention of the unity of the virtues is comprehensible only in a scheme where the virtues are considered unified in their utility in addressing an end exterior to themselves. When unified virtues are embodied in Kohlberg’s understanding they become problematic in that they are unified in service of their own unification. Socrates can be summarized, “The virtues may be considered unified in that they address an end external to themselves.” The warrant for unification is to be found in the application of the unified virtues to an end. Kohlberg translated this with “The virtues are unified in service of unified virtue.” The circularity of the construction precludes justification. That the many become one is not, in and of itself, justification.
acting in a truly courageous or moderate or just and pious manner in the appropriate circumstances. This is the proposition that knowledge of the good is a sufficient condition of possessing each and all of the virtues. Socrates concludes from this that knowledge of the good is sufficient as a definition of each and all of the virtues. Thus all the virtues are one, for they are equivalent by definition. (Gulley, 1968, p. 154) [Italics added]

Gulley is aware of the misconception that may be built upon this position (as, in fact, Kohlberg misconstrues) because, he warns:

This must not be taken to imply that each of the particular virtues is a different constituent part of virtue as a whole, and that knowledge of all the particular virtues adds up to a complete knowledge of virtue as a whole. For Socrates has devoted a large part of his earlier argument to a criticism of just that view. He has criticized it by attempting to show the equivalence of each of the particular virtues. (Gulley, 1968, p. 155)

A traditional and generic criticism of this Socratic thesis is that by such a heavy reliance upon cognitive areas such as knowledge and opinion, Socrates obviated the necessity of moral character and moral emotion. If this were so, then the Socratic position would be of little utility in attempting to span the entire spectrum of moral experience. In this regard, Gulley notes a “clear air of deliberate paradox making” (1968, p. 163) in the discrepancy between equivalence (based on a requirement of knowledge of the good) and unity (based on their application towards that good). Socrates is no more saying that knowledge of the good is completely definitive of a particular virtue than he would say that “knowledge” is definitive of the good in his thesis that virtue is knowledge. As such, contained within the knowledge of the good will be the knowledge of the required affective posture appropriate to application. As Gulley states:
Yet it would be an exaggeration to say that in putting forward this
doctrine Socrates "did away" with character and feeling. Character
and feeling are linked in moral character as a condition for moral
knowledge, and to have moral knowledge is at the same time to have
all the virtues. (1968, p.165)

It is based upon the preceding analysis that Kohlberg's position was characterized
above as a "grotesque distortion." 21

Kohlberg has provided fundamental insights into the developmental nature of
moral judgment and the acquisition of those stages. The strength of his theory lies both
in its ability to address the dilemmic pole of the spectrum, and the provision of a
schema of cognitive stages within which to locate differentiated structures of moral
reasoning. Its greatest weakness is its limited view of morality that leaves the
Aristotelian pole of the spectrum out of the moral domain.

The Moral Theory of Carol Gilligan

Prior to the two major structuralist developmental theorists, Jean Piaget and
Lawrence Kohlberg, the leading psychological theories of moral development were
behaviorist learning theory and Freudian theory. These latter two views differ from
each other enormously, but share the feature that moral character and judgment was
explained as a set of dispositions molded by external forces. For example, according to
behaviorists, people come to be disposed not to lie because they are reinforced
negatively for lying and positively for telling the truth, all other things being equal. For
Freudians, the mechanism is different, but the structure of explanation is quite similar.
Parents lay down rules, including perhaps a rule against lying. Initially, children are
disposed to obey because they fear a loss of parental love. These parental rules become
subconsciously motivating as part of the super-ego. On both explanations, some
specific moral judgment and character develops only if it is appropriately reinforced or

21 For a more complete, critical view of Kohlberg's theory, see Appendix C.
taught by authoritative parents. The structure and content of the acquired judgment and character depends entirely on external social forces. On these views, moral development is not a matter of drawing forth a potentiality in the child. It is not really a form of development at all.

In 1932, the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget published *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, and in the late 1960s Lawrence Kohlberg published work building on Piaget's theory. What characterized the Piaget/Kohlberg approach was the thesis that moral judgment is acquired developmentally in tandem with the development of other cognitive and intellectual skills. Kohlberg distinguishes six stages of moral development; each stage developing out of the one before.

Gilligan became increasingly dissatisfied with Kohlberg's theory, as she came to believe that, at best, it explains the development of only one moral voice. Kohlberg's initial study concerned young boys, and, while he included girls and women in his later studies, Gilligan contended that his conceptual framework concerned moral themes that are likelier to engage the thinking of boys and young men. An anomaly of Kohlberg's findings is that, while he claims universality for his stage sequence, females rarely reach his higher stages, and many cluster around the third stage of his six-stage sequence.

Gilligan's contention that Kohlbergian notions of moral development ignored or down-graded the feminine moral perspective has not gone unchallenged, reviews of the literature (Walker, 1983) have found little evidence that women score at lower stages on Kohlberg's measure. The minority of studies that have found sex differences have tended to confound gender with variables such as education, occupation, and social class (e.g., in one study, Holstein (1976), nearly all the men had careers in business or were professionals, and the majority of women were homemakers). When occupation and education are controlled, sex differences disappear. Charges of sex bias in Kohlberg's measure, in the sense of a downgrading of women's moral judgment
scores, appear to be unfounded. Gilligan's own claims about gender differences in
care and justice orientations have received, at best, only qualified support. Some
studies (Bebeau & Brabeck, 1989; Friedman, Robinson, & Friedman, 1987; Nunner-
Winkler, 1984) have failed to find gender differences in these moral orientations, and
others have (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Johnston, 1988; Lyons, 1983). Even those
studies that have found gender differences in accordance with Gilligan's expectations
have tended to show that men and women use both orientations, with one or the other
orientation predominant, but neither being exclusively used. Contextual differences in
how care or justice orientations are applied are also found. Johnston (1988) found that
males and females did not differ in the orientations elicited by a dilemma about property
rights, though they did on other dilemmas. Care and justice do not appear to be general
orientations associated with gender and applied irrespective of context; instead,
different situations may pull for each type of consideration. Gilligan came to believe,
however, on the basis of interviews of boys, girls, and young women, that there are, in
fact, two different ways of thinking about morality, two different "themes" or
"voices," one of which, the ethics of care or the ethics of responsibility, does not well
fit into Kohlberg's categories. This voice is based on notions of responsibility and
loyalty to particular individuals in concrete relationships. She calls the contrasting
theme the ethics of rights.

Gilligan observes this different voice to be more characteristic of girls and
young women than boys and young men. But she is careful to say:

The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme.
Its association with women is an empirical observation, and it is
primarily through women's voices that I trace its development. But this
association is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and female
voices are presented here to highlight a distinction between two modes
of thought and to focus a problem of interpretation rather than to represent a generalization about either sex. (1982, p. vi)

Gilligan (1982) describes this different voice, contrasts it with the more orthodox Kohlbergian view of morality and moral development, illustrates these differences in her interviews, and provides a developmental theory of ethical judgment within this different voice:

The psychology of women that has consistently been described as distinctive in its greater orientation toward relationships and interdependence implies a more contextual mode of judgment and a different moral understanding. Given the differences in women's conceptions of self and morality, women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order human experience in terms of different priorities. (1982, p. 22)

Perhaps the most obvious difference between the two different voices, is that they include two different views of the self. One view stresses the fundamental separateness or distinctness of persons. The other view stresses the connectedness or relatedness of persons. The respective views of ethics might then be seen as views about the appropriate relations between persons so conceived. The "ethics of rights," thus, is a conception of the appropriate relations between fundamentally distinct individuals. The ethic of care is a conception of the appropriate relations between persons whose very identity consists, at least partly, in their connectedness to particular others.

Gilligan believes on the basis of her interviews and other research that girls and young women tend to think of their own identity in relational terms, and that boys and young men tend, rather, to think of themselves, in the first instance, as individuals, either as "their own persons" or, at least, as the people they should be. As Chodorow (1978) states, male development entails
a more emphatic individuation and a more defensive firming of
experienced ego boundaries, while girls emerge from this period with
a basis for "empathy" built into their primary definition of self in a
way that boys do not. (p. 84)

Agreeing with Chodorow, Gilligan maintains that, once gender roles are established in
parenting, the two-gendered conceptions of self will tend to reproduce themselves.
Assuming, then, that mothers play a larger role in parenting, the child's relation to the
mother will play a large role in determining sense of self. If gender difference is
socially salient, then mothers will tend to mother males and females differently. They
will tend to separate more from their boys than from their girls. The consequence will
be that boys will develop more of an identity as separate, and will come to experience
relationship as relatively more problematic because of their separation from mother.
Girls, on the other hand, will tend to develop an identity as related to particular others,
and will come to experience separateness and autonomy as relatively more problematic.

On Gilligan's analysis, the ethic of rights involves:

1) the idea of a fair or just system of rules for resolving disputes;
2) both the self and others are conceived in implicitly universal or
general terms. Ethical respect or concern is for the generalized other; it
is not particularized;
3) as a corollary; it aims to be impartial;
4) it expresses the ideal of (equal) concern and respect for all
individuals;
5) recognizes the primacy of universal individual rights.

On the other hand, the ethic of care:

1) is primarily concerned with responsibility-within-relationship,
2) and with nurturing relationship and the particular others to whom
one is related within these relationships.
3) Consequently, ethical issues are to be seen as problems within relationships, and can only adequately be solved, therefore, within the relationship itself.

Gilligan describes development in terms of three modes:
1) egocentric concern with the self,
2) consideration of others, and

For Gilligan, the Kohlbergian framework presupposes a radical individualism which is historically and empirically false. Gilligan's case maintains that, ontologically speaking, the claim that the individual is independent of society is false (humans are essentially social creatures) the kind of Hobbesian "state of nature" or Rawlsian "original position" never in fact took place historically. Moreover, hypothetically or practically the state does, in fact, override the rights of human beings.

Contractarianism also fails to adequately explain the notion of collective rights. For Gilligan, the "state of nature" metaphor is false. However, even as a transcendental concept it is troubled. Baier (1990) argues that impartial Rawls-like moral theories with their emphasis on reciprocal non-interference and justice (construed in terms of equal rights, equal opportunity and free speech) are compatible with psychological, moral, and social impoverishment. She states:

The most obvious point is the challenge to the individualism of the Western tradition, to the fairly entrenched belief in the possibility and desirability of each person pursuing his own good in his own way, constrained only by a minimal formal common good, namely a working legal apparatus that enforces contracts and protects individuals from undue interference by others. Gilligan reminds us that noninterference can, especially for the relatively powerless, such as the very young, amount to neglect, and even between equals can be isolating and
alienating. On her less individualist version of individuality, it becomes defined by responses to dependency and to patterns of interconnection, both chosen and unchosen. (p. 25)

Gilligan is echoed by Benhabib (1992) who emphasizes the radical autonomy presupposed by contract theory. This presents a challenge to the claim that the ethic of justice, as outlined by Rawls and others, is sufficient, and that an ethic of care is supererogatory. Friedman (1990) makes two points worthy of mention here:

First, many of the personal relationships which matter to us do not originate in mutual consent, or with anything that can suitably be represented by the metaphor of a social contract-this is particularly true of most kinship ties. Second, justice does not seem to require that one's kin be treated as exempt from the considerations of justice that are owed to all persons. (p. 28)

In other words, radical autonomy denies the important role of relationships and participation in communities. Rawls' treatment of the necessary conditions for the presence of moral agency fails to incorporate or even acknowledge the kind of contextual, relational, relationship and responsibility-oriented factors Gilligan has identified. Traditional ethical thought aimed to be impersonal to secure impartiality. The moral point of view is disengaged from any particular relationships to particular others, whether to family, friends, or any particular community. This re-examination of the nature of moral agency is the deepest challenge that is posed by Gilligan's work.

Although Gilligan's theory, and feminist perspectives generally, do not address the issue of moral education in terms of the criteria deduced in chapter two, they cannot be discounted as a source of moral enlightenment. Gilligan, and other feminists, have brought to the forefront of the consciousness of moral theorists the fundamental notion that the ahistorical and universal structures of justice and fairness are, in fact, not
universal at all.\textsuperscript{22} The other voice, previously silent, cannot now be ignored, but must be given expression in any comprehensive theory of moral education.

**An Analysis of Theoretical Positions**

This section will analyse the theoretical positions investigated in chapter three using the criteria provided in chapter two. The educative and moral criteria previously deduced -- that is, intention, value, knowledge and understanding as the criteria associated with the educative component, and the fundamental use of principle, awareness, reasoning, judgment, and action and reflection as the criteria pertaining to the moral component, will be applied to each theoretical position. Two theoretical positions will survive the analysis and their differences will be resolved prior to the selection of the cognitive-developmentalist position as a suitable theory with which to address virtue behaviours.

**The Application of the Educative Criteria**

It will be remembered that the intention criterion refers to the production of a desirable state of mind. Clearly, Peters intended the “desirable” component to refer to an intrinsic value to be found in the process of education itself rather than an end extrinsic to the endeavour. As such, a change or improvement is envisaged that stems from the procedural principles that govern the educational process. Such principles involve the perceptions to be developed concerning the relationship of the student and the world inhabited by that student. As Peters indicated, “our main task consists in trying to get them to see the world differently in relation to themselves” (1976, p. 144). This is not to say that the process is to produce social conformity or compliance with societal pressures; rather, it is intended to produce the potential for a critical appraisal of the student’s place in the world. It is on this understanding that the criterion is applied to the theoretical positions on moral education.

\textsuperscript{22} For a review of feminist thought on morality, see Appendix E
As described in chapter two, the criterion value refers to the content of the educational process and relates to the intrinsic value of the issues to which the student is exposed:

They must come to care about the problems there presented like the cogency of arguments, the elegance of proofs and the inevitability of events. But they can only do this from the inside. (Peters, 1964, p.88)

It is important to differentiate between the intrinsic values associated with an engagement with an educational endeavour and the extrinsic values that may accrue as a result of that engagement. This criterion connects to the third criterion “knowledge,” which is the manner that is used to initiate the student into the subject content of the process. It points to the difference between connecting education with educere rather than educare; between notions of “leading out” rather than “stamping in.” Meaningful initiation into the subject matter of the process requires that students understand and voluntarily embrace the standards and internal procedures associated with the specific knowledge being acquired. In a similar manner, the fourth criterion, “understanding,” points out the distinction between an educative process and a training program. As Peters indicates:

We often say of a man that he is highly trained, but not educated. What lies behind this condemnation? It is not that the man has mastered a skill of which we disapprove. . . . It is not that he goes through the moves like a mindless robot. For he may be passionately committed to the skill in question and may exercise it with intelligence and determination. It is rather that he has a very limited conception of what he is doing. He does not see the its connection with anything else, its place in a coherent pattern of life. It is for him an activity which is cognitively adrift. (Peters, 1976, p. 98)
Clearly, understanding requires that the cognitive abilities of the student must be awakened to the totality of the activity and that activity must be related to the totality of the student’s existence. To be labeled educative, a process must locate the activity within a cognitively-based assessment of the student’s life experiences. Rote learning, indoctrination and drill, instruction, and training fail to meet the understanding criterion as they often lack the wider cognitive implication of education.

Despite significant and valuable contributions in the domain of general pedagogy and educational practice, Durkheim’s position on the role of education in the moral domain is problematic. Durkheim makes a distinction between sensation and sensory experiences and conceptual thought, and between the egoistic and personal manifestation of individuality and the ideas, beliefs and sentiments that represents in our membership in society. For Durkheim, the end of education is to constitute this social reflection of ourselves in society. Education is primarily a mechanism of socialization intended to reinforce the nomothetic bonds that society requires for the individual to function within it. This process is justified to the extent that the struggle it represents is the emergence of the desired state of the social self from which develops order, meaning, coherence and morality. Education has the dual intent of not only informing the mental states and competencies that belong to the personal life of the individual, but also to provide a system of beliefs and practices that are to be expressed, not through the individual, but through the collective experiences that form social interaction.

For Durkheim, moral education is the formation of habits and the awakening of sentiments and motivational representations aimed at moral action. While it is maintained that the teaching of morality should be brought about by responding to the child’s natural spirit of inquiry, the child need not engage in reflection on the moral content of the educational process. In practice, the process is clearly indoctrinative.
Clearly, Durkheimian moral educators would claim that the state of mind they intended was desirable, but that the essence of the criterion is found in the nature of the desirability. Peters certainly did not intend his notion of desirability to be limited to "that which the society desires." His rejection of the instrumental view of education as "treason against civilization" underlies the fact that it is the process of education that signifies its desirability rather than its outcome; whereas the Durkheimian views of education are to be deemed desirable purely based on outcome rather than on process. There is nothing in the socialization model that presumes an improvement in the individual beyond the end product of socialization.

A similar criticism disables the Durkheimian model when faced with the value criterion. The content of the Durkheimian process is relative to the social setting in which it is enacted. Knowledge of the social norms and their internalization may, indeed, be valuable and efficacious in the socialization of the individual, but it is not logically consistent that the social norms are valuable independent of their context.

To be initiated into knowledge in a meaningful way, that differentiates between the notion of knowing that and knowing how (the knowledge criterion) and the full exercise of the individual's cognitive function (the understanding criterion), are obviated by Durkheim's contention that:

I contest the fact that reflections and the social dimension are both necessary. There is one which may be absent without morality ceasing to exist. . . . Even today we do not go so far as to say that for an act to be moral it must be reflective. . . . To be sure reflection raises and perfects morality, but it is not the necessary condition for it.

(Durkheim, 1971, pp. 60-61)

Clearly, simple assimilation and absorption of "facts" are sufficient to satisfy Durkheim's requirements. To be initiated into knowledge in full command of the procedural and content related customs of that knowledge, and with a cognitive
component that raises the process from training to education is required to satisfy the third and fourth criteria, and Durkheim's socially-centred model of moral education fails to address either of these. Indoctrination cannot be elevated to education by enjoining that social facts are "things."

Wilson's two-stage model of instruction distinguishes between two types of school-based activities—moral education and preconditions for moral education. Moral education refers to the rational, autonomous moral person he believes it is the duty of schools to produce. The preconditions include concepts such as self-esteem, confidence and sureness of social relationships that are best inculcated through conventional methods of moral socialization. The reliance that Wilson places upon the activities of the moral exemplar of the teacher, and the heavy reliance on what Wilson terms rationality would indicate that his treatment of moral education addresses the "intention" criterion. It is interesting that this is brought about through one of the weaknesses of his theory; namely the putatively formalistic nature of the PHIL category. As has been indicated previously, this formalism does not hold up under analysis, but its undisclosed normative content enables Wilson's position to satisfy the desirability component.

To the extent that Wilson's formalism enables the individual to explore the moral components of PHIL, KRAT, GIG and EMP, as well as their resultant subcomponents, the procedure produces introspective and significant internal debate over the relation of behaviour to moral principle, the role of empathy, moral engagement, and moral commitment. The investigation of this relationship must produce matters of substantive value, comprehended in the fullness of their knowledge context and explored cognitively. Wilson's formalist process, practiced as intended, satisfies the educative criteria.

Civic education provides clear criteria by which to adjudicate the success of the educational process. The production of "a society composed of sober, wise and good
men, in which each citizen can participate in the power of governing others” (Butts, 1982, p. 392) follows the contention that social and political order depends upon the practice of a citizenship that can be learned in schools. However, once again, this is a goal external to the process itself. While civic educators may claim to be in the tradition of Spinoza, who would endorse the practice of democracy as valuable for the opportunities it produces for the individual to advance his own projects, such a justification fails to address the “intention” criterion. The justification offered for civic education hinges upon the dual teleology of personal and public benefit, with both loci of benefits grouped around economic and participatory factors. These are clearly benefits external to the process itself and thus fail to satisfy the “value” criterion. The “knowledge” and “understanding” criteria are, in theory, capable of being satisfied by a programme of civic education, though there is little in the literature that is sufficiently specific to indicate the extent to which these criteria would be satisfied in practice.

Gilligan has provided little in her work to indicate the educative practices that would be appropriate for its realization. Her early work endorsed Kohlberg’s notion of cognitive dissonance as a stimulus to development and moral autonomy. As the educational components of both Gilligan and Kohlberg point to autonomy as an endpoint, and consider the notion of autonomy as a valued end in itself without any external additional benefits to endorse it, both theorists would satisfy the intention criterion. Justice and care must surely be considered as intrinsically valuable, and the initiation into knowledge, though moot as to content, must be considered as a process, if aimed at autonomy, that satisfies the knowledge component. Similarly, the cognitive component, and its emphasis on cognition rather than training, is satisfied by the intention of both theorists to develop autonomously functioning agents.

The Application of the Moral Criteria.

It has been argued that morality is the nexus of personal engagement with principles of behaviour grounded in criteria that transcend the immediacy of the
experience. The fundamental principle has been determined to be one that addresses aespect for persons. The further moral criteria of awareness, reasoning, judgment, and
action and reflection have been outlined. Any theoretical position that fails to conform
to the supremacy of the principle of respect for persons automatically fails to survive
the analysis and must, on that basis, be rejected as a candidate for further examination.
The socially rooted morality of Durkheim, the formalist process of Wilson and morality
based on civic education all fail to demonstrate that they are based on any principle that
requires respect for persons. Gilligan and Kohlberg both fulfill the criteria of morality
as outlined and it is their respective theories that survive the analysis for further
consideration.

The results of this analysis and the central issues addressed by the theories are
presented in Table 1 and Table 2 demonstrates that the positions of both Kohlberg and
Gilligan satisfy the criteria of education and morality as set out in chapter two. Both
positions are developmental and both are based upon a clearly defined set of processes.
The differences between them, however, need to be reconciled in order that a single
moral theory be considered as the background of the dialogic process.

The Justice-Care Debate

For Kohlberg, the basic referent of morality is judgment, rather than a type of
behaviour, emotion, or social institution (Kohlberg, 1981). Kohlberg posits that
considerations of morality are defined by general formal criteria. Morality is defined in
terms of the formal character of a moral judgment rather than in terms of its content.

These formal criteria are only fully met in the most mature state of moral
judgment, a state which Kohlberg defines in terms of Rawls's concept of reflective
equilibrium (Rawls, 1971). Rawls defines reflective equilibrium as a state of complete
impartiality and reversibility. These characteristics are exemplified in the hypothetical
"original position," wherein one is required to choose principles of justice under a "veil
Table 1

An Analysis of Theoretical Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Emile Durkheim</th>
<th>John Wilson</th>
<th>Civic Education</th>
<th>Lawrence Kohlberg</th>
<th>Carol Gilligan</th>
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<p>| Beliefs                | Morality is socially mediated and formed. (Durkheim, 1950)                     | Individual inquiry and moral deliberation precede moral action. (Wilson, 1970, p. 11) | Civic education and civic values are a pre-requisite for citizenship in a republic. (Sichel, 1988) | Morality is rooted in a generalized body of ultimate statements. (Kohlberg, 1981) | ... the so-called objective position which Kohlberg and others espoused within the canon of traditional social science research was blind to the particularities of voice and the inevitable constructions that constitute point of view. (Gilligan, 1982 p. xviii) |
|                        | All morality is encompassed by a system of rules of conduct. (Durkheim, 1953, p. 35) | Morality is discovered by a non-normative process. (Wilson, 1973)              | Civic education stabilizes the state. (Janowitz, 1985)                             | Individuals gain competence in an invariant sequence of stages. (Kohlberg 1981, p. 96) |
|                        | No valid a priori moral principles exist. (Durkheim, 1953, p. 44)               | Morality is inherently social. (Wilson, 1977)                                 | Civic education is the source of moral action within the state. (Rush, 1947)       | Stage acquisition is a cognitive process and is amenable to intervention. (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 53) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Emile Durkheim</th>
<th>John Wilson</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Social mediation</td>
<td>Moral components</td>
<td>Factual and patriotic</td>
<td>Cognitive dissonance</td>
<td>Understanding responsibility and relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards indoctrination</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the teacher</td>
<td>Active moral exemplar</td>
<td>Active process exemplar</td>
<td>Active behavioural exemplar</td>
<td>Active cognitive coach</td>
<td>Active relational exemplar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of moral principles</td>
<td>No single set of moral principles governs human life. (Durkheim, 1961) A posteriori moral principles evolve from moral ideals that represent society's view of itself. (Durkheim, 1956a) Moral ideals are authoritative. (Durkheim, 1971)</td>
<td>Moral principles are universalizable. (Wilson, 1973) Moral principles are overriding and prescriptive. (Wilson, 1973)</td>
<td>Moral principles are rooted in democratic values. (Butts, 1980)</td>
<td>Justice structures are constitutive of morality. (Kohlberg, 1981) Subordinate moral principles are summative and procedural guides. (Kohlberg, 1980)</td>
<td>Principles of care and responsibility based on shared humanity are constitutive of one form of morality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Application of criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral criteria</th>
<th>Emile Durkheim</th>
<th>John Wilson</th>
<th>Civic Education</th>
<th>Lawrence Kohlberg</th>
<th>Carol Gilligan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Respect for persons</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Awareness</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Reasoning</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Judgment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Action</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Reflection</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>Educative criteria</th>
<th>Emile Durkheim</th>
<th>John Wilson</th>
<th>Civic Education</th>
<th>Lawrence Kohlberg</th>
<th>Carol Gilligan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Intention</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Value</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Knowledge</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Understanding</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>

of ignorance” (not knowing one's eventual place in the society nor one's innate talent) prior to the creation of society. Kohlberg maintains that the original position and the veil of ignorance represent the formal criteria of moral judgment: impartiality (veil) and reversibility (original position).

Within the context of moral development, impartiality entails the ability to separate one's self from one's own egocentric needs, retiring to a reflective position wherein one can judge moral claims impartially. In addition, moral judgment requires an empathic response, to take the position of the other and, in that sense, mature moral judgment requires reversibility. Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development is
based upon these formal criteria in the sense that each stage of moral development contains a greater degree or capacity for impartiality, reversibility and decentration.

Kohlberg's formalistic conception of morality is appealing in that it avoids the problem of relativism inherent in conceptions of morality that entail a definition of morality in terms of content, or in terms of the standards of the existing social order. However, Kohlberg's formalism is open to critique on other grounds. For Kohlberg, moral dilemmas are justice dilemmas in the sense that they require judgments of right and duty in situations that involve conflicting claims. In truth, moral judgment seems intuitively to be broader than an abstract consideration of principles of justice (rights and duties). The conception of moral dilemmas as solely justice dilemmas portrays moral judgment as a rational calculation, abstracted from the particularities of their context. However, real life dilemmas involve love, forgiveness, compassion, conflict, struggle, pain, and care, which transcend considerations of fairness per se. This suggests that moral conflicts are embedded in the particularity of complex relationships.

This is precisely the feminist critique of Kohlberg developed by Carol Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982). Gilligan's theory is based upon the distinction between the development of masculine and feminine identity. The development of male identity is critically tied to separation and individuation, since separation from the mother is essential for the development of masculinity. This separation is the basis for all further development in the male, and is illustrated in games where boys develop elaborate rules for the fair adjudication of conflicts (Gilligan 1982). This male trait of separation is at the core of Kohlberg's moral theory, for principled moral judgment is, in part, contingent upon impartiality—a function of separation.

In contrast, Gilligan argues that feminine identity is not dependent upon separation, but is defined in terms of attachment. Consequently, as male development proceeds in terms of separation, female development progresses in terms of connection and relatedness. This female progression is based upon the "ideal of care" in which
caring is "an activity of relationship, of seeing and responding to need, taking care of the world by sustaining the web of connection" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 62). Thus, in Gilligan's view, the moral development of the female tends towards a function of the ethic of care, whereas male moral development tends towards a function of the ethic of justice.

Gilligan posits a theory of female moral development based upon the ethic of care. Moral development for females culminates, not in the realization of justice, but in the "realization that self and other are interdependent and that life, however valuable in itself, can only be sustained by care in relationship" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 127). Thus, female moral development is guided by an ethic of care which is context-specific and founded upon the inherent interdependence existing between individuals.

The Complementarity of Justice and Care

The ethic of justice and the ethic of care appear to be diametrically opposed conceptions of morality and moral development. However, it can be argued that they complement rather than conflict with each other. Firstly, on the highest level of abstraction, the ethic of justice as fairness maintains that there exists a universal obligation to humanity. This obligation is generally conceived in terms of a universal commitment of respect for the inherent dignity of all persons. The ethic of care, on the other hand, maintains that moral obligation is grounded in the particulars of the moral context. In this sense, the ethic of care grounds morality in an ethic of association. The ethic of association maintains that moral responsibility is based in particular human relationships over time, not universal standards. The ethics of rights, therefore, is a conception of the appropriate relations between fundamentally distinct individuals. The ethic of care is a conception of the appropriate relations between persons whose very identity consists, at least partly, in their connectedness to particular others. The Kohlbergian self exists only as the locus and occasion of judgment; the Gilligan self enters into, and is, in fact, an aspect of the judgment.
Ethical obligation emerges out of relationship, and it is care, from the feminist perspective, that is the central emergent property of ethical association. This, then, is the deepest challenge posed by Gilligan's work. The moral point of view is disengaged from any particular relationships to particular others, whether to family, friends, or any particular community. The challenge of the "different voice" to modern orthodoxy in moral philosophy, at least, is that by making impartiality fundamental, it disengages ethical thought from any location situated within relationships to particular others, and thus alienates the moral self from the particular other. Morality, then, becomes an obstacle to genuine relationship, rather than the expression of human relationship.

However, while perceiving the associative quality of morality as essential, the ethic of care is also based upon a universal commitment to our shared humanity. For example, one of Gilligan's subjects maintains that we have a duty to "that giant collection of everybody...the stranger is still another person belonging to that group, people you are connected to by virtue of being another person" (Gilligan, 1982, p.142). Gilligan herself concludes that the essential motivation of an ethic of care is "that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or hurt." (Gilligan, 1982, p.271). These statements suggest that a commitment to our shared humanity in a universal sense, rather than one that is founded upon particular and immediate association, is as basic to the ethic of care as it is to an ethic of justice. The web of relations extends beyond immediate association to include an ontological interdependence.

Secondly, it initially appears that the basic orientations of each conception are fundamentally different; the ethic of justice requires separation, while the ethic of care requires attachment. Separation is needed for the development and exercise of impartiality which, in turn, enables a fair, impartial and dispassionate adjudication of moral conflict. Alternately, attachment is necessary for care, because care is based in empathy, and empathy is the recognition of interconnectedness. In other words, the
ethic of care is founded upon reversibility. Without the capacity of reversibility it would be impossible to care. As discussed above, the ethic of justice also entails reversibility.

As Kohlberg and Rawls maintain that justice is a function of reflective equilibrium, then it must, by definition, entail reversibility. Moral development for both ethics is constituted by the enlargement of one's capacity for reversibility; one's capacity for care and fairness respectively are based upon the degree one is capable of identifying with other persons. Thus, one's capacity for both care and fairness is based upon the expansion of one's identity.

Responsiveness is essentially a function of one's capacity to identify with others, whether in terms of their needs (care) or in terms of respect (fairness). Being responsive through a sense of belonging is an ontological foundation of moral obligation and, hence, moral development, and responsiveness is a function of identification. Responsiveness occurs within a relational field. It requires and is constituted by relationship. Responsible relationship implies a mutually permissive interaction that can only occur if there is resonance between the individuals who are in relationship. Resonance, in turn, occurs on the basis of identification. Therefore, if there is no identification, there will be no response and, hence, neither care nor fairness. As one's identification expands or contracts, one's capacity to respond and, thus, to act morally, expands or contracts. This is the essence of reversibility as a moral foundation, and it applies to both care and justice.23

However, there is a difference in construction between the reversibility of care and that of justice. Care entails the embracing of interconnectedness. The expansion of identification here is one of unification with the other—recognizing the web of relationships that literally connect individual identities. Whereas the expansion of

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23 The expansion of identity is ineluctably involved with the process of decentration that characterizes Dialogically Derived Morality to be considered in chapter seven.
identification entailed in justice does not imply interconnection, but it is an identification that recognizes the sameness of interpersonal boundaries that define individuality within a relational field. This identification of the boundaries of others as identical to the boundaries that define our own individuality is the basis of respect, and has its genesis in the Kantian notion of personhood. This kind of identification is a recognition of the reciprocity of the inviolability of private boundaries, and is foundational for an understanding of justice as respect. This notion of responsibility is essentially negative in that it requires a response that prohibits interference (the essence of respect for boundaries); whereas the ethic of care entails a positive conception of responsibility in that it requires a response to help, to provide in order to satisfy a need.

These two kinds of identification and their emergent ethics are not in conflict, but are, in fact, complementary. Moral responsibility entails both respect for the boundaries of other persons as well as responsiveness to their needs. Care devoid of respect is invasive, while respect devoid of care is legalistic. Agents exist in a web of relations which interconnect them, and that interconnection demands that they respond to each other with care. While existing in this web they are also individuals; who are individuated even though interconnected, and this individuated status demands a respect for interpersonal boundaries through impartiality. Thus, it can be argued that both justice and care are necessary and complementary dimensions of morality that are available to the agent depending on the context.

It is this point that Puka (1991) emphasizes in his discussion of type moralities versus universal moralities. He notes:

Practically speaking, Kohlberg’s approach tended to narrow the seemingly legitimate scope of moral research. It excluded research into subjective or personal type moralities, also into type moralities (of culture, class, gender), as opposed to general or social-institutional moralities. (Indeed, Kohlberg’s philosophy hemmed in his own
research). Any attempt by other researchers to broaden the scope in
the field seemingly had to be framed as a challenge to Kohlberg’s
“moral bias” rather than something else of relevance to moral issues.
(p. 374)
Four cardinal assumptions form the moral foundation of Kohlberg’s developmental
theory, as he sees it. They also provide the basis of the major criticisms it has
engendered. These assumptions are:

1) that if morality is relative, it is not feasible to speak of moral development as
opposed to moral change;

2) that an adequate morality must be universal;

3) that a developmental stage sequence may be defined only from the
perspective of an end-point of ultimate adequacy; and

4) that ultimate standard of this end-point is a form of justice reasoning.

These assumptions are open to challenge, and, if assumption 4) is questioned as
merely “philosophical partisanship,” then the notion of a general and universal morality
collapses into a type morality described by Puka.24 From this perspective, Kohlberg’s
critics have been correct in claiming the legitimacy of the “other voices” of different
moralties. Two responses to these concerns are available. A case may be attempted
(as Kohlberg attempts) to demonstrate that the general and universal morality of justice
subsumes and bridges the various type moralities and the viewpoints that are their
bases. For example, Kohlberg would hold that a justice-based morality could ensure

24 Kohlberg’s “philosophical partisanship” may be based upon his own intellectual history.
Kohlberg came to the field of “morals” to encounter relativism. His own personal history (including
reference to the Holocaust), made this position untenable. Kohlberg turned to moral philosophy to
seek sophisticated definitions of moral and non-moral and justified criteria concerning moral reasoning.
He became a philosophical convert partisan who engaged the vision of how morality should be in

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theory

from the perspective of a particular philosophical tradition, and then set up its view as an a
priori standard for moral psychology and development. An alternative course would have been for
Kohlberg to have imported into his thinking the common moral concerns from a variety of rival
traditions. In this case he could have gauged development from the middle or bottom up, rather than
from his idealized end-point. In this scenario, development would have represented an agent’s ability to
address these concerns from various perspectives, including, perhaps, justice and care.
the pursuit and expression of each morality and that its values and interests would be equally respected. Such a position, however, is ultimately untenable unless Kohlberg’s fourth assumption is verified incontrovertibly. Lacking such incontrovertible verification, Kohlberg’s position reduces to a type morality. That is, justice structures, as a necessarily metaphysical foundational dimension of all human moral development may reduce to “justice focus.” All allegedly general moralities may similarly reduce.

The prospect of a variety of type moralities available to the agent makes the notion of “moral development” necessarily more problematic than Kohlberg’s version represents. Personal or subjective values may be moral to varying degrees, but they need not “develop” in the manner of a general or even type morality. They may lack a moral or cognitive theme that remains constant through cognitive transformations. In fact, they may lack the inherent power to develop autonomously through their own processes, as opposed to being shaped by external forces. The developmental picture becomes unfocussed and considerably more “messy” on this view.

There remains the powerful, intuitively responsive Kohlbergian contention that development in the moral and cognitive fields are linked. By viewing Kohlberg’s developmental theory from two perspectives, that of a justice focus, and a cognitive developmental process, one is free to retain the metatheoretical basis of a Kantian understanding of a respect for persons and the cognitive dimension of the theory. These two perspectives enable the justice focus of the theory to be designated a type morality that is as equally available to the agent as a care focus, as well as a variety of other moral foci.25

To extend Peters’ famous dictum, that the palace of reason is entered through the courtyard of habit, one may state that the palace of reason has respect for persons as its entrance hall, and a variety of multi-level towers, one called Justice, others called

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25 This is the basis for the post-climacteric stages of Dialogically Derived Morality examined in chapter seven.
Honesty, Care, Fairness, and so on. The courtyard of habit may lead to the entrance, but the exigencies of the circumstances and the mediation of performance factors direct the agent to the appropriate tower.

A further modification needs to be made to this cognitive-developmental structuralist position before embarking upon an inquiry as to its potential functioning within the dialogic process. Kohlberg (1975) claims to have uncovered and analyzed six distinct and separate stages of moral development and characterizes them as "hard" stages with certain characteristics. "Hard" stages, for Kohlberg, constitute "systems of transformational laws that organize and govern reasoning operations" (1984, p. 36). Kohlberg's position is that these stages are hierarchically differentiated structured wholes that contain and originate qualitatively differing modes of thinking. These "hard" stages, acquired in an invariant sequence, transform and extinguish the characteristics of the previous stage, the contents and modalities of which are no longer available to the agent.

Considerable research, however, fails to convincingly endorse these "hard" stage claims. Even Kohlberg and Colby's longitudinal data have been subject to revisionist interpretation (Fischer, 1983). According to Fischer (1983), more stage inconsistency has been identified than had previously acknowledged. Wozniak (1993) notes:

Different dilemmas produced different modal stage assignments for many subjects and alternate forms of the interview scoring forms produced different stages as well. . . . The moral judgment study, then, does not allow the conclusion that moral development demonstrates a strong form of the structured-whole hypothesis. With substantial variations in task and context, moral behavior indicates considerable variation in stage within an individual to be the norm. (pp. 99-100)
At least ten studies have examined the consistency between stage use on Kohlberg’s tests and on other types of moral dilemma. Three studies appear to support Kohlberg’s homogeneity claims; seven do not. Dilemmas concerning public policy, (Lockwood, 1975) the dilemma of pacifist Israeli soldiers (Linn 1987a) and specific and varied moral conflicts (Walker, De Vries & Trevethan, 1987) all demonstrated consistency of moral judgment. Subjects scored significantly lower on non-Kohlberg dilemmas than on Kohlberg dilemmas in studies concerning sexual relationships (Gilligan, Kohlberg, Lerner & Belenky, 1971), prison issues (Kohlberg, Scharf & Hickey, 1972), relationships in high school (Higgins, Power & Kohlberg, 1984), daycare issue (Linn, 1984), and a physicians strike (Linn, 1987b). Two studies showed that subjects scored significantly higher than their stage acquisition on non-Kohlberg dilemmas in free speech issues (Haan, 1975) and abortion issues (Gilligan & Belenky, 1980). The preponderance of the evidence on structural consistency seems to show that individuals sometimes base their moral judgment on the same stages they score on Kohlberg’s tests, but more frequently base their judgments, at either a higher or lower level, on other structures.⁶⁶ Krebs, Vermuelen, Carpendale & Denton (1991) summarize their research into the homogeneity of moral judgment with:

The model that best fits our data most comfortably assumes (a) that most adults possess a distribution of stage structures - their latest stages and all the stages below it, and (b) that moral issues, dilemmas, situations and contexts differ in their receptiveness or resistance to the stage structures available. Moral judgment is the product of an

⁶⁶ Kohlberg’s attempt to account for this heterogeneity on the basis of “performance” factors is inadequate. Stating that his test measures competence rather than performance in moral judgment is unhelpful. A satisfactory moral theory must explain moral judgment in everyday life and, therefore, focus on performance rather than competence. Kohlberg is almost certainly correct in his appraisal that the discrepancy is due to performance factors, but it is the mediation of these performance factors with the moral competencies of the agent that requires investigation, not simply the measurement of that competence.
interaction between interpretive structures and the interpretivity of the
information they process. (p. 162) [Italics added] 27

The findings of Krebs et al., indicate that the hard stage model of Kohlberg
must be abandoned in favour of a soft stage model. Rest (1986, p. 29) suggests that
the evidence against the concept of hard stages is overwhelming. He considers
development to be "the gradual shifting from the use of lower stages to higher stages."
Rather than asking what stage a subject is in, he suggests that it is more useful to ask,"under what circumstances and does a subject display various organizations of
thinking" (1986, p. 587).

Whether Kohlberg's hard stage contention is correct (on some occasions), or
whether a hard stage model does not adequately reflect reality, is of less importance
than the utility than can be found in a consideration of a soft stage additive-inclusive
model rather than a transformation-displacement model. An additive-inclusive model
would assume that the agent retains the potential of old stage structures after the
acquisition of a higher stage, and, therefore, would account for less structural
consistency than is acknowledged by hard stage theorists.

On a soft stage understanding, performance factors mediate between the
repertoire of modal reasoning choices available to the agent. From the literature, the
exact nature and process of the mediating role of performance factors is not finally
determined, but, clearly, an interaction takes place between the agent, the modal
reasoning structures available to the agent, and the circumstances of the moral
opportunity. The factors that underlie this interaction and form the basis of the
mediation, may be varied. The cognitive level and the aptitude of the agent (Flavell
1992), the affective demands of the context (Levine 1979), the natural pull that the
moral dilemma may have for certain modalities of reasoning (Straughan 1985), and the

27 Note the congruence between "receptivity and 'resistance'" and the notion of valence
introduced in chapter one.
congruence between the dilemma and the agent’s life experiences (Krebs and Van Hesteren, 1994), for example, may lead to less stability in behavioural choice. Epstein and O’Brian (1985) suggest that decision-based behaviour tends to be “situationally specific and unstable at the individual item level” but may be considered “general and stable at the aggregate level” (p. 533). In short, an agent may act consistently across a variety of situations or may act below the assumed level of competence according to the interaction that takes place.  

The theoretical understanding that is envisaged as acting within the dialogic process is, therefore, an interpersonal rather than intrapersonal cognitive developmental position in which additive-inclusive soft stages respond to the context of the moral opportunity with a range of type moralities including justice issues, care responses and others, to determine the moral response.  

The preceding analysis of theoretical positions, and, based on the criteria of moral education, the selection and examination of Kohlberg’s theory has provided a basis upon which the central problem of the dichotomous nature of Kantian or deontological and Aristotelian or teleological positions may be addressed. The potential of a dialogic process to accomplish this cannot be established without determining the requirements of such a process. These requirements are investigated in chapter four.

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28 Krebs et al. (1991) note that subjects who score lower on Kohlberg’s stage measurement are more likely to demonstrate inconsistency in moral judgment than those who score higher. From which it would be reasonable to infer that inconsistency is a natural phenomenon of inexperienced moral judgment, and must be acknowledged and addressed in any conception of moral education.

29 The introduction of intrapersonal developmental factors becomes significant in the application of the dialogue to moral action as discussed in chapter six.
Chapter 4
THE REQUIREMENTS OF A
DIALOGIC PROCESS

As a cognitive-developmental theory of moral development has been chosen as meeting the moral and educative criteria established in chapter two, a means must now be provided by which this theoretical position can be shown to inform, and be informed by, virtuous behaviour. To actualize this mutually informing process is the task of dialogue.

The dialogic process will be the means by which a reformulated cognitive-developmental theory of moral development leads to a new theory of moral development that is able to cover the entirety of the spectrum of moral experience and resolve the central problem of chapter one. By encompassing the Aristotelian and Kantian pole of the spectrum, the new theory of morality, made possible by dialogue, will resolve the dichotomy that characterized the two perspectives. An initial step in the process is to define and explain what is meant by dialogue, expand the notion of dialogue to maximize its utility, and provide a basis for its use across the spectrum of moral experience. The basic issue of the antithetical nature of teleology and deontology as it applies to the polarities of the spectrum will be explored so that teleological or deontological focus becomes a language choice enjoined by contextual demands and agentic ability, rather than a constraint upon moral behaviour.

The Dialogic Process

A dialogic view of moral education, as construed for the purposes of this document, grows out of an understanding of the distinction between dialectics and dialogue. Dialogic theory is founded upon a constructivist view of meaning and understanding as a dynamic process between the agent and the polarities of the agent's life world.

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30 For a brief examination of the dialectical process, see Appendix D
The relationship of the individual to his/her surroundings, and the meanings that can be established with the facts of those surroundings is central to the notion of dialogue. Despite the apparent paradox that facts do not exist outside of language, dialogic theory does not deny the existence of facts. Simple understanding acknowledges that artifacts external to the agent do exist, but dialogic approaches assume that this existence is generated through language and understanding. A fact is considered a fact because it is agreed upon, not because it enjoys a transcendent position over and above everyday existence. Stewart writes, "Whatever truth the affirmation of facticity enjoys is due to coherence and consensus not correspondence" (1995, p. 117).

In denying the validity of the symbol model of language, Stewart writes, "Post-semiotics postulate that persons (subjects) use units of language that signify, symbolize, or somehow represent aspects of the (objective) world" (1995, p. 108). This conceptual move suggests that there are two worlds: one of human relations and one of facticity. However, Heidegger (1977) shows that Being exists in an already-situated world of "everyday coping," "into which we are socialized but that we do not represent in our minds" (cited in Stewart, 1995, p. 109). Simply stated, how agents experience the world is conditioned by whatever world they are a part of. This being the case, there can be no subject-object distinction because agents do not exist simultaneously in two separate worlds: they exist in a coherent sphere which is constituted by and through language. In this sense, understanding is not the result of mediation of pre-existing facts; rather, it is something that is created through language in a unified world. Whereas language theorists who rely on the symbol model claim that words are only labels placed on existing facts, a post-semiotic approach suggests that meaning is negotiated in the space between humans, where communication truly takes place (Madison, 1996). This space, where dialogue takes place, is also where agents experience and establish their reality and make judgments based upon that
reality. Because of this, "language must be viewed not as a finite system of sign-symbols but as an infinite medium of possible meaningfulness" (Madison, 1996, p. 83). This dialogical construction of reality, as a process rather than an event, provides for a processual evaluation of situations as negotiated meaning. As a minimum attribute of a negotiator of meaning, the agent must have available, by means of his cognitive abilities, the capacity to balance interactions between a range of potential meaning-making circumstances—that is, the agent must have the ability to select those interactions that will provide outcomes most congruent with an already established dialogically derived understanding in order to maintain coherency. Gadamer states this cogently, "In all our knowledge of ourselves, and in all our knowledge of the world, we are always already encompassed by the language that is our own and the meanings and judgments we have made" (1976, p. 62).

A process of sense-making and understanding utilizing a dialogic process can now be outlined. Foundational to this process is the rejection of the "language as tool" metaphor linked to the symbol model. Equipped with a system of beliefs and understanding, the agent confronts sense-making opportunities, and attempts to construct further understanding that will be congruent with the already extant belief structures. This engagement is the dialogic equivalent to the first principle of dialectics; the interpenetration of opposing potential understandings reinforce each others' existence as they negate each other as possible candidates for dialogic fulfillment.

In the domain of morality, the moral opportunity is viewed by the agent as simple or complex, dilemmaic or non-dilemmic, familiar or unfamiliar, satisfied by habituated behaviours or unresolved by those behaviours. Each polarity is a potential occasion for moral understanding, and each negates and denies the other. The valence, or "pull" of these polarities and the tension between them is effective in relation to both the cognitive stage of the agent—that is, in relation to the ability of the agent to respond at his/her potential, and to the degree of congruence it displays with the already extant
belief structures of the agent. Thus, the ability of the agent to appropriately create moral understanding is mediated by two factors: the cognitive stage that allows him to appreciate and evaluate the circumstances of the occasion, and his past moral history—that is, the behaviour he has displayed in the past that has been reinforced as appropriate.

In a dialectical process, this reinforcement would take place through negation and double negation. The double negation of the dialectic is not operant in the dialogic process but its function is fulfilled by a process of denegation (Stewart, 1995). Denegation is a key concept in the dialogic process. The double negation of the dialectic provides the dynamism that drives that process beyond a mere reiteration of alternating choices between opposites, and is the precursor to the quantity-quality transformation that underpins the notion of an ascending dialectic. Similarly, denegation provides the mechanism that allows the dialogic process to elevate itself above a similar choice-rejection-choice reaction. Denegation holds the opposing polarities in endless tension while they illuminate each other, and provides access to the now radicalized gulf between them. The double negation of the dialectic provides dynamism involving the polarities: denegation provides choice in the space between the polarities.

The concept is a complicated one that is not amenable to simplistic explanation, but one that is at the heart of a dynamic dialogue. In double negation, opposites are reciprocally constituted through a process in which difference is maintained and identity is secured. Negation, as such, is negated in a higher affirmation that reconciles opposites. Negation reconciles and is penultimate for it always remains in the service of affirmation. When it is effective, negation becomes self-reflexive by negating itself. By contrast, denegation, is a negation that denies itself, thus halting the process of the double negation: the steps from thesis to antithesis formed by the initial negation, and from the antithesis to the synthesis by the resulting double negation are not made as they are made in the dialectical model. To denegate is to unnegate, but unnegation is
itself a form of negation. More precisely, denegation is an unnegation that affirms negation, thereby making neither pole of the spectrum available as the locus of decision making. Denegation entails negation without negation: It allows rejection of both polarities. In the odd play of denegation, nothing remains even: opposites are not reconciled but are held together in their belonging apart. "The complicity of the negatives entailed in denegation issues in neither synthesis nor fragmentation" (Stewart, 1995, p. 203). Denegation serves to enable choice and judgment informed by the polarities, determined by neither, but by the tension extant between them. Understanding and comprehension is thus not an issue of choice between alternatives, but of judgment illuminated by the tension between potential choices because neither of the polarities are now available.

In this strange interplay, the construction of meaning and the development and refinement of understanding that occurs through denegation must take place at a level appropriate to the student. For Vygotsky, the locus of that level was to be found in the zone of proximal development (ZPD), and it is within the ZPD that the initial dialogue takes place.

The Zone of Proximal Development

Having rejected both the view that development precedes learning and that learning and development coincide, Vygotsky proposes a new approach through the notion of the ZPD that attempts to determine not the "actual developmental level" but the "potential developmental level" of the learner. Although the ZPD is often said to be a central concept within Vygotsky's theory of learning and development, its explicit formulation appeared quite late in Vygotsky's writings, and then in two rather different contexts. One version, translated into English as "Interaction between Learning and Development" (chapter four of Mind in Society 1978), has the assessment of children's intellectual abilities and, more specifically, a more dynamic conception of intellectual
potential than that represented by an IQ score, as the immediate context in which the concept of the ZPD is presented.

Vygotsky defines the zone of proximal development as "the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers" (1978, p. 86). In other words, operationally, it is the zone defined by the difference between a child's test performances under two conditions: with and without assistance.

The “actual developmental level” defines what the learner knows and can do at a specific moment, and is traditionally established by means of tasks and tests undertaken independently by the learner. Therefore, the actual level of development captures only those faculties that are fully formed and mature in the learner.31 As a result, Vygotsky claims, it is an inadequate measure of the state of the child’s development. He argues:

The state of development is never defined only by what has matured.
If the gardener decides only to evaluate the matured fruits of the apple tree, he cannot determine the state of his orchard. Maturing trees must also be taken into consideration. The educator, similarly, must not limit his analysis to functions that have matured. He must consider those that are in the process of maturing. (1987, p. 208)

The ZPD, as proposed by Vygotsky (1987), “is the distance between the actual developmental level, as determined by independent problem solving, and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers” (p. 86). The ZPD captures those functions and abilities that have not yet matured, that are in the process of maturing and that can only be accomplished with assistance.

31 The actual level of development may be compared to the results obtained in Kohlbergian testing to establish the level of the agent’s moral reasoning.
The second version occurs in Vygotsky's last major work, *Thinking and Speech* (1987), and is embedded in chapter six, in which he discusses the development of scientific concepts in childhood. Here, the emphasis falls more heavily on instruction and, in particular, on its role in relation to the development of those higher mental functions that are characterized by conscious awareness and volition. In this context, the significance of the ZPD is that it determines the lower and upper bounds of the zone within which instruction should be pitched. "Instruction is only useful when it moves ahead of development" (p. 212), "leading the child to carry out activities that force him to rise above himself" (p. 213). 32

How this is conceived to operate in practice is briefly sketched in a description of the hypothesized processes leading to the child's solving of a test problem involving a causal relationship in the social sciences. Vygotsky (1987) writes:

> The teacher, working with the school child on a given question, explains, informs, inquires, corrects, and forces the child himself to explain. All this work on concepts, the entire process of their formation, is worked out by the child in collaboration with the adult in instruction. Now, [i.e. in the test situation] when the child solves a problem . . . [he] must make independent use of the results of that earlier collaboration. (pp. 215-216)

Written at about the same time, these two expositions have several common features, including the emphasis on learning leading development, and on the role of adult assistance and guidance in enabling the child to do, in collaboration with more expert others, what he or she is not yet able to do alone.

Implicit in Vygotsky's discussion of the "awakening" role of instruction in relation to development, there seems to be an assumption that the development that

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32 In this, Vygotsky echoes the cognitive developmentalist understanding of engaging the agent at a level *above* his actual moral reasoning stage to facilitate the onset of cognitive dissonance.
results from learning can be treated unequivocally as progress. This is most apparent in the chapter on spontaneous and scientific concepts where the mastery of scientific concepts is clearly presented as making possible a higher mode of mental functioning than is possible with spontaneous concepts alone (Vygotsky, 1987). Here, "higher" appears not simply to denote later in the sequence of ontogenetic development, but evaluatively to connote a superior mode of functioning. The same assumption, transferred to the plane of cultural history, can also be seen to underlie the studies conducted by Luria in Central Asia in the 1930s in collaboration with Vygotsky. The presupposition upon which these studies were apparently based was that mastery of the abstract and decontextualized modes of thinking, made possible by the use of scientific concepts would provide a criterion for distinguishing between "primitive" and "advanced" societies (Luria, 1976) and, hence, for the planning of educational interventions designed to bring all societies to the advanced level of intellectual functioning of which they were potentially capable. As Wertsch (1991) and Wertsch and Tulviste (1992) have argued, such a view can be seen as consistent with Vygotsky's evolutionary approach to culture, and also with the revolutionary ideological spirit in which he conceived his task of reconstructing psychology as a basis for emancipatory action and as a more adequate foundation for the study of human behaviour. However, in the decades since his death a number of grounds have arisen for challenging this belief in the universal superiority of scientific rationalism. Three such grounds will be considered that have been increasingly voiced in recent years.

The first issue concerns the assumption of the superiority, in all situations, of thinking based on scientific as opposed to everyday concepts. Habermas (1971), for example, writing from the perspective of social theory, criticizes the increasing hegemony of technical rationality in Western societies, arguing that, although it has a crucial role in contemporary life, technical rationality must be complemented by both practical and critical-emancipatory modes of knowing. A somewhat similar challenge
has come from cultural anthropologists, whose studies of non-Western cultures have led them to reject the view that treats the course of European cultural history as the point of reference for evaluating other cultures. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the ways in which Vygotsky used the terms “primitive” and “advanced” when explaining and comparing the development of mental functions in different contexts justify the term “eurocentrism,” as Wertsch (1991) and Wertsch and Tulviste (1992) have suggested. As Minick (1987) points out, Vygotsky’s theory was itself constantly evolving, as he read and critiqued the work of others and carried out his own research, with the result that his written œuvre is not internally consistent in this respect. Furthermore, as Scribner (1985) shows, Vygotsky was emphatic in rejecting a recapitulationist position. The intellectual development of a child in any contemporary culture through the appropriation of resources already in use in his or her social environment, Vygotsky insists, constitutes a very different kind of development from that which was involved in the gradual creation of these resources over many generations in the phylogenetic development of the species. In fact, Scribner argues:

Vygotsky’s habit of using the term “primitive” when comparing these different situations can best be understood, not as substantively equating them, but as a methodological heuristic that he uses at various points in his theory-building procedure. (1985, p. 133)

A second challenge is based on the primacy given to cognition in much of the Vygotskyan-inspired study of human development, and the consequent neglect of the social, affective and motivational dimensions. However, the responsibility for this imbalance may be due to the cognitive revolution of the 1960s and the central role that the metaphor of the mind as computer has played in recent work in cognitive science. That Vygotsky had a much more comprehensive and balanced conception of development is apparent from the final section of Thinking and Speech. He writes:
Thought has its origins in the motivating sphere of consciousness, a sphere that includes our inclinations and needs, our interests and impulses, and our affect and emotion. . . . A true and complex understanding of another's thought becomes possible only when we discover its real, affective-volitional basis. (1987, p. 282)

The third, and most recent, reevaluation of Vygotsky's account of the ZPD questions the assumption of inevitable progress at the level of ontogenetic development. Since the development of the individual is dependent on the tools and practices that are made available for appropriation in the activities in which he or she participates, it is just as possible for the learner's interpersonal experiences to constrain or even distort his or her development as to enable the development of a socially and emotionally balanced personality (Engestrom, 1996). Clearly, many children do experience appalling deprivation and cruelty at the hands of others and the learned coping strategies and conflicted self-image that result have long-term harmful consequences for themselves and for society at large.

In the light of these important reservations, it is now no longer possible to accept a conception of learning in the ZPD that assumes either a single end in view or a developmental trajectory that is free of contradiction and conflict. Decontextualized rational thinking is not the inevitable apogee of intellectual development, nor is it necessarily optimal in all situations. Here, Tulviste's (1991) emphasis on the heterogeneity of semiotic mediational means is important, as is Wertsch's (1991) metaphor of the tool-kit, from which a selection is made according to the culturally-constructed demands of different activity settings. Gardner's (1983) theory of "multiple intelligences" represents yet another attempt to escape from too narrow a view of intellectual development. But the development that is fostered by learning and teaching in the ZPD is, however, not unidimensionally cognitive. Because the whole person is involved in activity undertaken with others, interaction in the ZPD necessarily
involves all facets of the personality. This is the force of the current emphasis on the ZPD as a site of identity formation, which, in turn, has led to the recognition that an individual's developmental trajectory is rarely, if ever, free of social encounters that may engender inter- as well as intrapersonal conflict and contradiction (Litowitz, 1993).

Instead of viewing development as progress towards some ideal, therefore, there is an increasing tendency to focus on the transformative nature of learning in the ZPD, with an emphasis on diversity rather than on improvement (Cole, 1985; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1991; Mercer, 1995). This conceptualization of learning as transformation is already to be seen, at least embryonically, in Vygotsky’s formulation of the general genetic law of cultural development. Having stated the major proposition that, in development, any function first appears between people and only subsequently within the child, he adds: “it goes without saying that internalization transforms the process itself and changes its structure and functions” (1981, p. 163). However, it could be argued that more is involved than a transformation of the process alone. Whenever an individual engages, with the assistance of one or more others, in tackling and solving a problem that arises in the course of action, there are, potentially, multiple transformations. First, there is a transformation in the individual in terms of his or her capacity to participate more effectively in future actions of a related kind and, hence, a transformation of his or her identity. Second, where the problem demands a novel solution, the invention of new tools and practices or the modification of existing ones transforms the culture's toolkit and its repertoire for problem solving. Third, there is the transformation in the activity setting brought about by the problem solving action which, in turn, opens up further possibilities for action. Finally, to the extent that one or more members of the group has changed the nature of his or her participation, there is also transformation in the social organization of the group and in the ways in which the members relate to each other. These transformations may usually be quite small, and they may not always be positively evaluated by all the participants involved.
Nevertheless, it is such small transformations that, successively and cumulatively, lead to the outcomes of the activities in which they occur and, in the process, contribute to the construction of the development of individual participants, of collaborating groups and, thus, of whole cultures.

Wells (1996) offers the following characterization of the ZPD:

1) The ZPD may apply in any situation in which, while participating in an activity, individuals are in the process of developing mastery of a practice or understanding of a topic.

2) The ZPD is not a context-independent attribute of an individual; rather it is constructed in the interaction between participants in the course of their joint engagement in a particular activity.

3) To teach in the ZPD is to be responsive to the learner’s current goals and stage of development and to provide guidance and assistance that enables him/her to achieve those goals and, at the same time, to increase his/her potential for future participation.

4) To learn in the ZPD does not require that there be a designated teacher; whenever people collaborate in an activity, each can assist the others, and each can learn from the contributions of the others.

5) Some activities have as one of their outcomes the production of an artifact, which may be used as a tool in a subsequent activity. Representations of what has been done or understood are artifacts of this kind; engaging with them can provide an occasion for learning in the ZPD.

6) Learning in the ZPD involves all aspects of the learner and leads to the development of identity as well as of skills and knowledge. For this reason, the affective quality of the interaction between the participants is critical. Learning will be most successful when it is mediated by interaction that expresses mutual respect, trust, and concern.
7) Learning in the ZPD involves multiple transformations: of the participants' potential for future action and of the cognitive structures in terms of which it is organized; of the tools and practices that mediate the activity, and of the social world.

8) Development does not have any predetermined end, or telos; although it is characterized by increasing complexity of organization, this does not, in itself, constitute progress. Progress depends on the dominant values in particular times and places, which are both contested and constantly changing. The ZPD is thus a site of conflict and contradiction as well as of unanimity; the transformations it engenders lead to diversity of outcome which may destroy as well as reproduce existing practices and values. (pp. 119-121)

The foregoing indicates the applicability and potential of the concept of the ZPD as the locus of a dialogic process in moral education as framed in this dissertation. Both cognitive dissonance (as understood by cognitive developmentalists) and the development of character traits through transformational processes (as understood by character educators) are possible within the ZPD.

**Requirements of the Dialogic Process**

Dialogue is intended to enable the moral agent to bridge the polarities of the spectrum of moral experience shown in chapter one, and to provide sense-making opportunities in the areas between these poles through the process of denegation. This spectrum can be replicated to provide corresponding epistemological and ontological spectra (and corresponding polarities) and an agent is, therefore, asked to simultaneously explore positions generally held to be dichotomous. If the “moral schizophrenia,” seen by Chewning (1984), as characterizing modern society is not to be translated into an individual agentic condition, it must be shown that it is epistemologically and ontologically possible for an agent to simultaneously address these positions. In this context, this task must be accomplished successfully for dialogue to be either philosophically sound, or to be pedagogically appropriate. To fail
in this endeavour nullifies any claims that can be made for the potential of dialogue in the role of moral education. For that reason, this section will outline ontological and epistemological positions that can meet the requirements of a dialogic approach to moral education. The general theoretical understanding of Kantianism and Aristotelianism will be discussed as well as the commonalities that can be identified between both perspectives. The conventional antithetical positions of teleology and deontology will be questioned, and an alternative formulation will be presented that provides greater utility for a dialogue as a pedagogic approach. This section provides a philosophical foundation for the dialogue that is necessary before the argument can continue towards a discussion of the dialogue in practice.

**Theoretical Polarities of the Dialogue**

With a Kantian notion of mature autonomous moral agents (together with a Piagetian developmental psychology) to guide their work, cognitive developmentalists focus on moral agency and reasoning about right action. The autonomous agent reasons at a principled level as opposed to developmentally prior egocentric or conventional levels. The singular “moral point of view,” which all fully mature agents can discern through correct reasoning, has to do with certain universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as ends in themselves. Kant’s categorical imperative stands at the summit of Kohlberg’s hierarchy of moral reasoning.

The Kohlbergian/Kantian view is that right action results from right reasoning, and that, for an act to be moral, it must be based on what one thinks. So the aim of moral education is to advance students’ level of moral reasoning, helping them to function at the highest level of which they are developmentally capable. Moral discourse is the fundamental pedagogic technique employed and advanced by those in the Kohlberg tradition. In a Socratic discussion of hypothetical moral dilemmas and real practical questions arising in the life of the classroom, school, or community,
students are challenged to reason clearly to justify action in moral terms, and to develop through the mechanism of cognitive dissonance.

As with an Aristotelian emphasis on virtue, proponents of character education emphasize action as the measure of one's goodness. Though there are notable exceptions, for many who take this perspective, action is judged "good" (virtuous) in terms of a moral heritage that has been handed forward in schooling, by families, by various other institutions in the culture and in the larger public ethos. Character education advocates, such as Bennett (1988) and Wynne (1988), see a moral consensus lying deep in Western culture, a consensus that defines the ideal character and good citizen. Discipline, exposure to good examples and "moral literacy" (knowledge of the moral tradition) are the foci of the moral pedagogy advanced by Bennett. Wynne advocates supervised practice in such character-building activities as peer tutoring, caring for younger children, and taking part in group projects and competitions (Bennett, 1988; Wynne, 1988). Many who advocate these kinds of moral instruction do so from a belief that the young should not have to discover de novo how to act, or what it means to be good or do good. Therefore, because children are dependent beings, it is the moral responsibility of a culture and its institutions to teach them correct action and to integrate them into the moral tradition of their society.

What is at stake for educational leadership in the debate between these two perspectives is the articulation of both the ends and means of moral education. Character educationalists have emphasized purposive inculcation of time-honoured virtues over attention to the agents' motivation or their inner moral lives, to how they understand and think about moral questions or how they judge and make choices as moral agents; cognitive-developmentalists eschew, as indoctrinative and contrary to producing truly moral (autonomous) persons, the training in traditional morality and conforming behaviour advocated by Bennett et al. The latter, in turn, criticize the Kohlbergians for ignoring the real context of daily moral life, the influences of other
moral milieu on moral thought and action, and for giving too little guidance about what is good or bad or right or wrong conduct. The arguments are about form and process versus content, thought versus action, and conformity with the ideals of a tradition versus moral autonomy and freedom from tradition.

This dissertation suggests that it is philosophically possible, and practically fruitful, to leave behind dichotomous thinking and define new foundations for moral education that draw upon both perspectives. What is required is not a Kantian/Aristotelian synthesis, but an accommodation between them; not a melding of the two into one system, but a rapprochement that allows the power and purity of the two perspectives to remain potent and available. To retain both purity and potency, and to enable each perspective to benefit from the insights and strengths of the other by means of the modified dialogic view already outlined, requires epistemological and ontological foundation. The following ontological and epistemological assumptions are offered as a reasonable and appropriate foundation for the dialogue that is envisioned as the pedagogical ground of moral education.

It is not suggested here that these positions are constitutive of the totality of possible and reasonable assumptions concerning the epistemological and ontological reality within a dialogic process. Rather, what is suggested is that these assumptions are the minimum necessary conditions for the dialogue to function in the context that is proposed—that is, in the context of these particular apparently dichotomous polarities. It is argued that these assumptions are both necessary and sufficient, though not exhaustive, and that their necessity is determined by the nature of the polarities they are to address.

**Ontological Assumptions of a Dialogic View**

**Freedom.**

The first ontological assumption concerning a dialogic perspective concerns a confirmation of Kant's observation that being human entails a primordial freedom; it is
this freedom that makes moral agency possible. Kant labels this freedom “spontaneity” and it underlies agentic choice; the choice to make or break promises, to cheat or to refrain from cheating, to be loyal or disloyal. By acting, and understanding the causality of their actions, agents confirm this freedom. This constitutive and positive freedom makes morality both possible and necessary; individuals are moral and must be moral; they can and must act, and choose to act.

An earlier formulation of this contention can be found in Bradley (1962) in which Bradley’s metaphysics supposes a structured conception of morality as an ontological necessity. Within this necessity, morality is conceived as a dialectical process of self-realization. This is not merely a process in which persons engage casually, if and when they are inclined. It is bound up with their very nature as persons, and escapes conscious volition. Neatly encapsulating the requirements of both polarities of the spectrum of morality as introduced in chapter one, Bradley notes; “Neither in me, nor in the world, is what ought to be what is, and what is what ought to be” (1962, p. 313). In response to the question “Why should I be moral?” Bradley responds:

If I am asked why I am to be moral, I can say no more than this, that what I can not doubt is my own being now, and that, since in that being is involved a self, which is to be here and now, and yet in this here and now is not, I therefore cannot doubt that there is an end which I am to make real; and morality, if not equivalent to, is, at all event, included in the making real of myself. The only rational question here is not why? but what? What is the self that I am free to know and will? (1962, p. 84)

To be is to acknowledge the role of freedom in the process of further becoming. To ask whether an agent would wish to realize self is, from this perspective, an
absurdity.\textsuperscript{33}

Despite the contextuality and conditionedness of life, and the external influences on character, agents, in their inner life, locate the freedom to deliberate, decide and function. "Freedom is the basis on which we hold persons accountable for their actions, their characters and their moral lives" (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 24).

Self-directing freedom allows agents to determine consistent courses of action that create a moral character. Creating a moral character, revising it in the light of greater insights into the rational principles that justify and obligate action, confirming and living in accordance to its dictates, is revealed as a task stemming from actualizing the freedom that is the central task of being human. Some agents do this thoughtfully and purposefully; others do not. The consistency and moral quality of the actions that define moral character depend upon the internal and positive dimension of freedom that is the genesis of autonomy. The autonomous moral agent can discern laws which right reason shows to be correct and to which thoughtful persons find they have a duty to conform their acts of spontaneous freedom. In confirming and acknowledging freedom, agents understand themselves not merely as conditioned objects responding to the exigencies of existence, but as self-realizing entities with the responsibility such understanding implies. In taking on a nature that can be called "human," one's freedom necessitates that one chooses and builds a moral personality, decides what rules will govern one's moral life, and decides how to apply those rules in specific circumstances.

Thus, although freedom may be termed primordial and unified in its foundationalism, the agent's actualization of that freedom occurs along a spectrum that displays the moral opportunities available. One has the freedom to build and maintain a moral character within the conditionedness of existence, but also the freedom to become

\textsuperscript{33} Bradley goes on to require, as a moral duty, a social realization of the self, which is, furthermore, only a stage in the realization of the absolute whole that is the ultimate reality.
a reflective self-legislator and creator of moral laws to address dilemmic circumstances. These two iterations of free moral action are integrated to the extent that the rationality that underlies one's moral character in the myriad daily interactions of existence (virtuous behaviour) is reflected in the process of addressing moral dilemmas (moral reasoning.) Similarly, the life of virtue accustoms, motivates, and provides a repertoire of behaviours to the service of moral judgment.

Moral freedom finds expression, however, not in a vacuum, but in a complex environment, and this arena of morality is disclosed in considerations of the belonging and understanding that distinguishes human beings.

**Belonging.**

The human condition, as Arendt (1985) demonstrates, is one of plurality. Being with others is fundamental to living a life that can be recognizably called human. Individuals live in a matrix of webs of relationships comprised of families, friends, neighbourhoods, colleagues and organizations. Within this matrix, the agent lives out both public and private existences. Being fully human, having a world at all, entails being in relationships with others. While it is true that human relationships take many forms, humans find that caring relationships—ones in which there is a mutual reciprocal regard and responsiveness—are those that allow the actualization of the possibilities for flourishing. Belonging is not merely an issue of sharing space with others; it entails a concern, a unifying positive solidarity. This solidarity may be termed "care." To be fully human, then, is to care; to flourish is to imply a fabric of caring relationships in which humans mutually sustain and take responsibility for each other, nourishing each others potential as beings who belong together in a particular world. It is in establishing and sustaining such relationships that agents take responsibility, exercise conscience, and develop both obligations and expectations.

Friere (1970) discusses this notion of belonging as the "vocation" of identification with others, thereby ensuring the establishment of one's own identity.
However, this identification contains the paradox of simultaneously establishing immediate and personal responsiveness and distance and detachment. As previously outlined, the reality of belonging has a dual outcome; one identifies, through belongingness, the reciprocity of the inviolability and sameness of boundaries and, in different circumstances, the interconnectedness and interpenetration of those boundaries. However, the concrete and contextual involves not just those relationships that are of immediate significance, but membership in a moral community. Within such communities of meaning, the young develop, experience moral life, espouse beliefs, and develop the moral character that defines them. It may be one of the great tragedies of modernity that such moral communities of meaning have been eroded and remain unregenerated. Even within the plurality of such communities, the existential notion of belonging may be identified through an awareness of the constructs that are universally endorsed. For example, it would be difficult to envisage such a community that did not endorse honesty, promise-keeping, care of the young, compassion, and a limit on the extent to which one may use others as means to one’s own ends.

Belonging occurs in the formal and the abstract, in the contextual and the concrete, in the personalized and in the depersonalized, in the subjective and in the objective, in the immediacy of the interpenetration of relationship, and in the recognition of the sanctity of individuation. Therefore, belonging may be viewed as occurring from the subjective and concrete to the objective and abstract. To understand this range of belonging is to accept the tension that unites it, and to understand the potential for development that inheres in such a tension. The agent must decide whether circumstances dictate that s/he react as a member of a specific set of relationships, with the special obligations and expectations that involves, or as a dispassionate and non-involved arbitrator based upon the endowment of personhood on others rather than shared intimacy? Further, how is an agent to translate notions of

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34 The fragility of modern moral community is explored in Bellah (1986).
belonging in his/her moral life but through a developing and expanding ability to understand the parameters and requirements of individual personhood in relation to others? The greater the ability to internalize understandings concerning belonging, then the greater is the possibility for moral growth.

**Understanding.**

The third ontological assumption that underlies a dialogic view of Aristotelian and Kantian perspectives lies in the position that it is humankind’s mode of being to understand and to seek further understandings. Understanding is not something possessed but is a constituent element of existing as a person in the world; it is part of the very nature of personhood. To have limited understandings and to seek no others is to be diminished as a human being. Understanding is an ontological process not merely a mental one. That is, we do not derive our understanding merely from percepts, concepts, rules and principles, but most fundamentally from our life experiences as thinking, feeling, willing, and acting imagining beings. Our life journeys may be framed, not only in terms of intellectual curiosity, but in terms of a continual and emergent effort to understand our place in the lived world.

Further, understanding is historical—that is, it is temporally grounded: It always exists in terms of a specific “world.” An agent interprets or sees issues as they present themselves in terms of what is already understood in the context of prior experience. That is, understanding is grounded and shaped by the whole fabric of experience and relationships in which the agent is immersed: a world of particular times, places, persons, and traditions. Possibilities for the future arise from the process of adjusting new understandings into an existing history within which individuals seek to make sense of their own personal history. In a fundamental way, this understanding, reflecting as it does the individual’s grasp of his own history, is constitutive of identity, and to set it aside is to set aside the possibility of interpreting anything, or of constructing a coherent sense of the agent’s life. This understanding develops with
greatest acuity within the environment in which the agent has greatest facility—that is, within the net of relationships that represent the most immediate reflection of belonging and security. Understanding in this arena tends to develop with little conscious effort. The situatedness of everyday occurrences in relationships produces prereflective understanding. As Palmer (1986) states: “We learn, follow and understand certain daily routines without fully considering their purposes, elements, merits and so on, we learn rules of a game or a language and come to use them well, grasping but not examining them” (p. 107). If Palmer’s “rules of a game” are construed as the behaviour that is met with societal approval, and helps to advance an agent’s projects, then Palmer is speaking of virtuous behaviour, albeit an impoverished formulation of virtue. Pre-reflective understanding aids in the immediate, the contextual, and the relational.

Reflective understanding is a more mature, energized, and critical process that is prompted by the dissonance that occurs when an agent’s understanding is incapable of dealing satisfactorily with moral problems. As Ricoeur (1974) indicates in his consideration of the Gadamer-Habermas debate: “We pass our traditions through a screen of critique and doubt” (p. 72). It is reflective understanding that allows an agent to transcend the immediate and the contextual, and to engage the abstract and objective. It is reflective understanding that grounds moral reasoning.

It has been shown that freedom, belonging, and understanding can form an ontological basis upon which a dialogic view and process may be realized. Within that reality, the nature of knowledge, what is to count as knowledge, and how that knowledge is to be accessed must be addressed in order for the agent, within the dialogue, to make coherent progress within the moral enterprise. The epistemological issues raised by these contentions are investigated below.
Epistemological Assumptions of a Dialogic Process

The epistemological assumptions to be offered must not be confused with the previously discussed ontological conditions of understanding. Understanding, as an ontological condition, refers to the general posture that agents adopt towards their lived world. Rather than a passive acceptance of incoherence, humans consistently attempt to form understandings that help them to deal with their realities. On this construction, understanding is a condition of life rather than an epistemological consideration; it refers to an epistemological precondition.

The structure of an epistemology that is suited to a dialogic process can be derived from the logic requirements of such a process when the polarities of the system are Aristotelian and Kantian in nature. The following is offered as an outline of the legitimate truth claims an epistemology must be able to make as the foundation of a dialogic process.

To justify the truth claims of such an epistemology, it must involve foundationalism in which all genuine knowledge claims run logically back to starting points which are finally grounded in immediate apprehension either through reason, or through rationally discerned sense apprehension. Further, it must involve a rational a priorism in which the basic principles of reason are intrinsic to, or characterize, the operation of the knowing mind logically prior to, and independently of, any grounding in sense experience. Only an epistemology which, thus, links the two polarities can make truth claims from within the proposed dialogic process.

The main thrust of such an epistemological formulation must be the claim that all genuinely informative propositions which express a truth claim involve two sorts of basic elements that correspond to the two polarities of the system: principles of reason, characterized by direct or indirect or self-evidence, which are therefore a priori in the sense that these principles have a truth value that is logically prior to, and thus
independent of, the data of empirical experience, and the data or facts, or the fundamental elements of empirical experience. This involves the dual claim that sense knowledge is possible only through the exercise and application of a priori principles of reason to the relevant sense data, and that only through the content of such sense data is it possible for the mind, structured through a priori principles of reason, to know truths about matters of empirical fact. Therefore, no genuine knowledge of factual content is possible without the application of rational principles derived from reason, and no genuine conceptual knowledge is possible without perceptual content derived from experience.

An epistemology that satisfies the requirements and structure outlined above is found in the writings of Stephen Toulmin, and draws on his consideration of the epistemological grounding of stages in psychological development. Toulmin (1971) summarizes the epistemological requirements of a dialogic process with:

While in discussion of intellectual and mental development, one can and should distinguish conceptual issues from empirical issues, they cannot be completely separated or dealt with entirely independently. On the contrary: To grasp the true nature and complexity of “cognition,” “understanding,” or “conceptual thought,” one must be prepared both to analyze our concepts and terminology in the light of new empirical discoveries, and also to restate our empirical questions in the light of better conceptual analysis. (p. 25)

Toulmin is speaking of the epistemological requirements of theoretical position within the parameters of a “new science,” specifically, of the requirements of developmental psychology. What makes his insights particularly apposite is his understanding of the tentative nature of knowledge in a new field, as—for example, when a child attempts

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35 For example, the law of contradiction and other logically necessary truths dependent upon it.

36 Primarily sense data accessible through the various modes of sensory awareness.
“cognition,” or “understanding,” or “conceptual thought,” within the new field of moral agency.

Toulmin’s position is that, while initial incoherence is inevitable, greater coherence is only to be hoped for if “we allow our conceptual insights and our empirical knowledge to cross-fertilize” (1971, p. 26). To keep separate these two aspects of epistemic potential is, says Toulmin, artificial and damaging. As long as neither empirical data nor explanatory categories are adequate, there is no straightforward manner in which to make epistemological progress. For lack of relevant observations, theoretical concepts cannot be rapidly improved; for lack of well-established concepts, it is unclear what further empirical enquiries will be relevant. For the neophyte moral agent, “major advances depend in dealing with both weaknesses simultaneously, so bringing empirical descriptions and explanatory categories into line” (Toulmin, 1971, p. 27).

The notion of a link between the knowledge that can be garnered empirically and the theoretical knowledge of concept and theory formation is applicable to the sense-making that takes place in the dialogic process when the polarities are virtuous behaviour and a process of moral reasoning. Virtue theory has, traditionally, drawn upon empirical sources to ground the virtue behaviours, while moral reasoning requires theoretical considerations as a basis for good outcomes. Toulmin refers to these epistemological polarities as the Baconian and Cartesian simplifications.

The Baconian simplification rests on the doctrine that the activity of collecting and collating facts is, “if not the be-all and end-all, at any rate . . . the begin-all” (Toulmin, 1971, p. 29). This position holds that because a paucity of empirical data precludes generalized knowledge of the subject, then such a generalization, with its concomitant elucidation of laws and principles, will be ensured by a sufficiency of such data. The Cartesian oversimplification rests on the rival doctrine that, as a preface to any other activity, knowledge rests upon formulating clear analyses of ideas about the
subject matter so that the relevant questions may be asked, the relevance of empirical
data collection and description established, and the selected phenomena considered with
certainty and consistency.

Toulmin notes that both oversimplifications contain half-truths that illuminate all
developmental processes. It must be conceded to the Baconian oversimplification that
no development can continue without a supply of empirical evidence to spur inquiry.
(It must, however, be noted that a "phenomenon" is not simply any occurrence within a
domain; it must be a problematic occurrence, and the problematic nature of such
phenomena can only be realized by accessing the conceptual frameworks (albeit
tentative ones) that inform the agent’s apprehension of the empirical world.) The
relation of this understanding to cognitive dissonance is immediate.

Correspondingly, it must be conceded to the Cartesian simplification that clear
and explicit criteria, based on theoretical categorization, are required to handle empirical
data. The caveat concerning the problematic nature of empirical data has its
counterpoint in the Cartesian simplification also; just as no empirical data are self-
describing, so, no theoretical analyses are self-validating. No set of theoretical
categories can prove its own relevance in advance of its proved utility in making
experience more intelligible.

Toulmin’s examination of these two oversimplifications is worth quoting at
length:

[W]e may be tempted to accumulate empirical studies based on the
very minimum of theoretical analysis, assuming that however a child
acts, and however young it is, we can recognize its acts intuitively,
and describe them correctly, in terms familiar from our experience as
adults. This done, we may claim to "find" that the child’s mental life
passes through a uniform succession of “stages,” whose order and
characteristics are matters for empirical study, and empirical study
alone. . .and the laws governing development will be arrived at in a plain Baconian way.

One the other hand, we may be tempted to approach the subject. . .in a Cartesian spirit, assuming that the end point of development is something we already understand “clearly and distinctly” from our familiarity with adult life in advance of detailed study of development-in-progress. This done, we may claim that “stages” . . .are less an expression of the child’s intrinsic “law governed” nature than a projection onto its life history of the complex, socially enforced and rule-structured goals of enculturation. . .Far from having to discover, empirically, what the relations between successive stages are in point of fact, we must now look, to see beforehand, what these relations must be as a matter of conceptual necessity. . .Nobody (surely) would deliberately adopt either of these extreme positions in its pure form. (Toulmin, 1971, p. 30)

Again, while Toulmin is speaking to the requirements of a “new science,” the developing moral agent displays exactly similar requirements. Virtuous behaviour, in its initial iterations, requires empirical observation to confirm conformity to understood virtue. Successive iterations, however, will not move past social conformity into moral behaviour without accessing the conceptual and the theoretical. Similarly, to prompt “thinking about” moral dilemmas, with little access to the everyday world of moral behaviour to act as the content of morality and to inform a developing framework of principles, remains a sterile exercise. One is reminded again of Kilpatrick’s comment that “doing Kohlberg” is like writing Shakespearean criticism without having read Shakespeare.

Toulmin’s position is that the Cartesian approach is viable only as an initial step. If persisted in, it collapses into oversimplification. The issue of the logical
priority of the conceptual and the empirical arises not between the totality of conceptual questions concerning the form of morality, and the totality of empirical questions about the content of morality, but always between particular conceptual and empirical questions. There is no issue of logical priority as to the conceptual and the empirical considered as classes of questions, rather there is a dialogic succession with tentative conceptual analyses giving rise to empirical observations that stimulate a revision of the original analyses. It is this assertion that makes this epistemology particularly appropriate for a developmental process. A medical analogy is offered to reinforce this point:

The notion of curing a disease is distinct from (and logically prior to) that of treating it. We can embark on, carry through, and/or evaluate, different methods of treatment only if we have the prior criterion of success provided by the notion of a cure; any specific treatment presupposes some corresponding conception of a cure. Yet does it follow from this that we can analyse the concept cure, finally and definitively, in isolation from all empirical studies of treatment? Quite the reverse is, in fact, the case. At the outset, our understanding of a disease warrants only a rough criterion of what a cure is, and so, what result a cure can aim at; experience of treating the disease allows us to clarify and refine our conception by showing us more clearly the normal course of the disease, and the symptoms that the treatment can realistically aim at remedying. . . At every subsequent stage, however, progressive refinement of our conception of a cure proceeds, pari passu, with the progressive deepening of our understanding of the disease and its treatment. (Toulmin, 1971, p. 34)

[Author's italics]
To reread the preceding extract, substituting the term “form of morality” for cure, and “content of morality” for treatment, is to see the isomorphism of this epistemology and the dialogic process that this dissertation argues for.

Figure 2 describes the ontological and epistemological assumptions of a dialogic process displayed along spectra locating the polarities of the dialogue.

**Aristotle and Kant: Differences and Shared Beliefs**

It must be stressed again that the dialogic polarities under consideration are not intended to represent the pure positions of the two men whose names they bear, but rather the general belief systems that characterize their positions and are reflected in the theorists who write in these traditions. This section is intended to demonstrate that a rapprochement between these two perspectives is philosophically possible as well as dialogically achievable.

Certain differences between Aristotle and Kant are well known: Aristotle asks what is the good for man, what actions help man flourish and produce a happy life. Kant asks what a man should do to realize his moral duty as a free being. Aristotle focuses on the conditions and substance of daily moral life and the application of general rules grasped from experience in a concrete moral order. Kant’s project is precisely to free practical reason from such material conditions, and to found a new order on transcendental principles that can be produced a priori. Aristotle finds activity in conformity with virtue, chosen for the right reasons over a lifetime, to be what constitutes the moral life. He considers intelligence a causal principle as one deliberates and chooses what behaviours are appropriate. The best person, one of practical wisdom (phronesis) consistently reasons correctly, grasping the principles of what is right, and acts to concretize the principles. Such a person is the product of good habits of deliberation and action formed in the community, nurtured by an ethos in which
Freedom
Freedom is not only a condition of the possibility of morality, it also necessitates morality

Freedom to create and maintain a moral character within the conditionedness of existence

Freedom to become an autonomous reflective self-legislator and the creator of moral law

Belonging
Being fully human, and having a world at all, entails relationships with others.

Belonging as a positive solidarity that recognizes the need to nourish the human potential in others

Belonging as a recognition of shared humanity within a plurality of communities.

Understanding
Understanding is not something possessed, but is a constitutive element of existing as a person

Prereflexive concrete understanding centred in the absorption of contextual experience

Reflective understanding of an abstract and ahistorical nature

Developmental Epistemology
One can and should distinguish between conceptual issues and empirical issues. There is no logical priority, rather there is a dialogic succession

Baconian empiricism

Cartesian a priorism

Figure 2. An epistemological and ontological basis for a dialogic process of moral development. Normative criteria are embedded.

In contrast to this inductive approach, Kant eschews empirical practical wisdom and heteronomy. He seeks a moral law via a transcendental deductive approach that defines universally objective rules. The basis of Kantian morality lies in pure practical reason, a priori, which discloses the categorical imperative, one form of which is: “Act
in such a way that the maxim of your action is universalizable.” Only a universal categorical imperative—certainly not a common ethos—can be valid for all and, therefore, command all, asserts Kant. For Kant, practical reason’s function is to produce a good will, a will that that chooses to follow reason and duty, not inclination or desire. The good will, according to Kant, is the only thing good without qualification. It alone, not its consequences, nor ends nor any contingencies of particular circumstances, determines the moral goodness of all actions. The good will’s only motive is duty to obey the moral law. The autonomous person is Kant’s moral person, self-legislating the moral law, dutifully applying and following the law, and acting in accord with the categorical imperative simply out of respect for its truth and force.

Where Kant speaks of the good will determined by reason, acting from duty to follow universal law, Aristotle sees the good person, a human person in a real community, trying to deliberate about what is right in a particular situation as well as in general, in order to be good, live well, and achieve the happiness found in living virtuously. While Kant is devoted to proving human freedom, the autonomy of pure practical reason, and the inadequacy of material principles to furnish a universal principle, Aristotle appreciates and takes into account the community and its standards as concrete representations of, and as a starting point for, the achievement of practical wisdom.

In spite of these differences there are some points on which Aristotle and Kant are in fundamental agreement. First, both understand that becoming moral is a human task. Effort is needed to become good, and mature guidance is needed to construct a moral life. The young require the assistance of a responsible community to become

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37 The other formulation commands us always to treat humanity in oneself and others as an end, never solely as a means, and to follow only the will that could be universally law-giving, in Kant (1978, p. 49)
properly educated and take on a good rather than bad character, or what Kant calls, "moral personality" (Kant, 1984, p. 23).

Further, Kant and Aristotle understand virtue to be fundamental to the development of moral agency, and both see autonomy as self-mastery, through which the moral agent becomes rationally accountable for his or her actions. Their views of moral character and moral maturity inform their notions of the effort and guidance needed in the process of becoming a moral person. Aristotle focuses on the centrality of virtue in this endeavor. We have, he says, the capacity to become virtuous but must practice virtue in order to bring this capacity to fulfillment. Through action one acquires the virtues that guide right action, just as one becomes a good musician or builder through practicing these arts under good teachers. The cultivation of virtuous habits involves leading the young to love virtue and to choose a life of virtuous action. Aristotle offers the table of virtues prized in his time—those based on the Greek understanding of arete, but goes beyond this cultural-specific list when he articulates the virtue of phronesis, the highest practical virtue, which is the habit of deliberating well, reflecting on the circumstances of each situation and developing, over time, good judgment in practical/moral matters.

Thus, while an awareness of the context of moral life is found in Aristotle, he also articulates a virtue that transcends the particular moral community, even though the content of the deliberation, and the understanding brought to that consideration will be culturally bound. The virtue of careful moral deliberation and choice is universal. Aristotle articulates similarly universal virtues in addition to practical wisdom; justice (that we must act in accordance to the dictates of practical wisdom) and moral strength (that we must be steadfast in pursuing justice). Aristotle's person of high moral character (spoudaios) lives the life of virtue, developing insight into the ethical. This person, through moral experience and reflection, grasps the principles that are
embedded in ethical practice, principles that transcend the customs, conventions and mores of the polity, and against which one comes to judge the ethos itself.

The mature moral person for Kant is the autonomous person—the individual who is both author and subject of the moral law. Moral education, then, is education for freedom, in two senses: as self-legislative (autonomous) beings, and as persons able to apply the moral law to situations that arise in daily life. Mental discipline trains the mind to think, preparing it for autonomy, and moral discipline is required to accustom agents to act in accordance with the rules, the reasonableness of which they eventually are able to understand. Character is nurtured by obedience to rules which a child has a “child’s duty” to obey as preparation for the later duties of ethical maturity (Kant, 1960, p. 33).

In Kant’s discussion of education, the development of good character has a central role. Specific virtues must be inculcated in the young because they foster the good character that an autonomous person must have in order to live in accordance to the moral law: steadfastness, truthfulness, promise-keeping, reverence for the rights of others, and egalitarianism. Fortitude—to endure and abstain—is for Kant the supreme virtue, for it is required for willing to live according to duty and the law when passions urge contrary behaviour. Kant specifically addresses certain desirable traits of character that he calls, “the subjective conditions for susceptibility to the concept of duty: conscience, love of others, respect, moral feeling (Kant, 1960, p. 57).

It is not suggested that the differences between Kant and Aristotle (and theorists who are in these traditions) are minimal, but it should be clear that each, though their approaches are from the opposing positions of teleology and deontology, does direct an acknowledgment of a place in moral life (and hence in moral education) for virtue and the development of good character; for freedom to deliberate, choose, judge, and initiate action and for the human ability to grasp and apply the principles of ethical practice. They also both acknowledge not only the individual’s responsibility for
establishing and maintaining a good character and moral life, but also the community's educational responsibility in the process.

Figure 3 indicates the extent to which Kant and Aristotle's moral frameworks diverge, but, more significantly, the extent of their commonality. An examination into the unfolding of a moral life reveals that it develops within a pre-existing moral order. There is a context within which the agent is to construct character and order a moral course, and it is an Aristotelian perspective that addresses this reality. However, a Kantian perspective is required to provide an emphasis on freedom, on the individual as law-giver and creative initiator of action, and to acknowledge the role of a formal and transcending principle in a morally plural world.

These two perspectives, with their natural valence towards certain practices designed to promote autonomy within their domains may be viewed integratively when considered in the light of those practices. The decentering role of cognitive dissonance, as interpreted by Kohlberg in the Kantian tradition, and the decentering practices of habituation into virtuous behaviour within a virtue community, in accordance with the social practices of that community, follow isomorphic developmental trajectories.

Figure 4 illustrates such an integrative model based on decenteration. Decentration on the "Kohlbergian developmentalism" side of the figure follows the Piagetian formulation, and produces three levels of cognition with three accompanying levels of moral development. On the "habituation in virtue" side of the figure the socialization practices follow a similar decentering process originating in power-based coercion. This coercion produces a morality based on external sanction and equates to the morality of immature level judgment based on Kohlbergian level one cognition. Inductive socialization, resulting in a morality based on conformity and approval, is the counterpart to Kohlbergian level two cognition and produces the same conventional morality. The highest form of socialization based on educational processes produces an autonomous morality of empathy and conviction that corresponds to the
Figure 3. Kantian and Aristotelian perspectives.

postconventional morality of Kohlbergian level three cognition. Figure 4 demonstrates that either of the poles of the spectrum, and their accompanying orientations towards moral responses, are capable of producing modalities of moral thought that equate with each other.

Again, it is not a synthesis that is urged for here, but rather a dialogic view that would allow the perspectives to act upon the agent according to the ability of the agent to comprehend them, and the orientation of the agent towards the circumstances. Two simultaneous events are envisaged as occurring within the dialogue. First, the agent attempts to identify the nature of the moral opportunity and, second, the agent attempts to define the principles that ground either the virtuous behaviour required or the process of moral reasoning to be entered into. This process of definition is a developmental
Figure 4. A developmental integrative model of teleologically based virtue habituation and deontologically based cognitive development.

The young and inexperienced may not even be aware of the dilemmic nature of some circumstances, and come to realize them only through a process of decentration.

The key to the process is the event of denegation that has been previously acknowledged as enabling choice and judgment informed by the polarities, determined by neither, but by the tension extant between them. As has been shown, the extremes
of the spectrum shown in chapter one of this dissertation have a natural valence towards each of the two perspectives. Simple non-dilemmic opportunities, situated in the concreteness of the agent’s life-world pulls most strongly to an Aristotelian response of appropriate virtue-behaviours. Complex and high-cost moral dilemmas pull towards a Kantian perspective of moral reasoning and judgment shaped by the strictures of the categorical imperative. While the outcome and course of the dialogic process is determined by the cognitive and psychological abilities that the agent brings to the process, the circumstances that lie between the polarities provide no clear valence, and are the site of the most fruitful educational opportunities. To function as something other than a simple choice mechanism, however, the polarities of the dialogue must be of a sufficiently similar nature that the process of denegation can access the core beliefs of each perspective. A conventional understanding of Aristotelian and Kantian perspectives, despite the commonalities already noted, allow no such similarity and are, in fact, generally considered to be antithetical. A reappraisal of the dichotomous nature of these perspectives will allow an interpenetration of the core beliefs of each perspective and thus facilitate the dialogic process.

An Examination of the Antithetical Nature of

Deontology and Teleology

Ross (1930) has remarked on the “clear antithesis” between ethical systems in which duty is the central virtue, and those in which goods and ends are central. It is an antithesis between those who hold that “right,” “ought” and “duty,” embedded in certain rules, are terms more fundamental to the judgment of what persons do than “good” or “intrinsic good,” and those for whom “good” and “intrinsic good,” embedded in certain ethical principles is the more fundamental concept.

Deontological theories hold that there are ethical propositions of the form: “certain kind of actions would always be right (or wrong) in specified circumstances, no matter what the consequences might be, and these actions are either obligatory (or
prohibited) for all persons.” Teleological theories hold that the rightness (or wrongness) of an action is always determined by its tendency to produce certain consequences which are intrinsically good or bad. This antithesis has generated the debate between those who believe that “right” can be defined in terms of “good” and those who don’t.38

It is argued here that the traditional teleological/deontological distinction does not mark two fundamentally different theories about what is relevant to the rightness of an action, but are simply the same thing expressed in two different languages—the language of “rules” and the language of “ends.”

If the general statement that deontological propositions and teleological evaluations are conceptually indistinguishable, then there must be equilibrium between the constituent components of both perspectives. A successful argument must account for all the elements of each perspective; to the extent that elements of one or the other cannot be accounted for in the formulation of an argument supporting that statement, then the argument is deficient.

The privilege has been claimed for both rules and consequences of being the sole or primary ground of an action’s rightness. The difficulty lies in the ability to separate an action from its consequences with sufficient finality and clarity to support this distinction. Any attempt to specify what a person did involves reference to those action’s consequences, no matter how immediate or direct they may be. To ask an individual what s/he is doing is to prompt a response in which the action and the anticipated consequences tend to be melded together. An agent may declare s/he is helping a friend with his car, and within that statement are contained both a sequence of proposed actions and their anticipated consequences.

Generally, actions and consequences are linked by a series of events in a causal

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38 The terms “deontology” and “teleology” are used for convenience, although the terms “formalism” and “consequentialism” may also be appropriate.
chain. The more remote events in this chain, due to imperfect knowledge, tend to be termed “consequences.” There is, however, nothing that logically distinguishes any of these causally linked events from each other, and they are thematically linked by the intention that began the sequence. For example, the agent who is helping his friend may initiate a series of actions including changing a flat tyre on the friend’s car, lending money to pay for the tow-truck, telephoning a tow-truck, involving other friends to meet him at the garage and advising him as to the best manner in which to address the mechanical failure of his vehicle. All of these are concrete and identifiable actions in a causal sequence and each of them may be logically labeled as a consequence as well as an action. There is a perfectly sensible way of considering changing a tyre on a friend’s car as a consequence as well as an action. It is, after all, as the consequence of prior actions that the tyre is changed. If asked to discuss the help (the consequences) he has received, the friend will certainly point to the changed tire, the presence of the tow-truck and so on, all of which are the actions of the agent. It is the agent’s imperfect knowledge of the more remote events in a casual sequence that has led to the convention of calling the end-actions consequences. If they are sufficiently remote and uncertain they are given the more imprecise label of “goals” or “ends” towards which the actions/consequences are aimed.

General notions of deontology maintain that all consequences whatever are irrelevant to the rightness or wrongness of a particular action, but no such prohibition coheres to the delimitation of morally relevant circumstances. Circumstances are what alter the effect of actions: for example, a deontologist may say that lying is wrong in all circumstances except where such lies would prevent unjustifiable harm, and that all lies that fail to adhere to this maxim are wrong, no matter what the consequences may be. The above claim is contradictory, unless consequences is interpreted to mean

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Note, in contrast, how clearly consequences can be separated from action when attempting to mitigate responsibility. “You upset your friend.” “No, I merely told the truth.”
consequences other than those that consist in unjustifiable harm. But on this interpretation, the claims of the deontologist (no matter what the consequences may be) becomes trivially true. The irrelevance of the consequences, taken to indicate a crucial distinction between deontologists and teleologists becomes emptied of significance because all the events deemed morally relevant are already referred to in the formulation of the rule and in the specification of the circumstances.

The teleological position is similarly misleading for reasons that exactly correspond to those raised against deontology. The morally relevant events referred to by the deontologist in the description of the action and as “specified circumstances” are now called “consequences of the action” by the teleologist, are held forever separate from the action itself, and, hence, comprise an external locus for the moral determinants of the action. At first glance, this appears to lend credence to the claim that teleology provides a justification or explanation that deontology lacks. That is, the teleologist claims that an action is right (or wrong) because of some facts about that kind of action, namely its consequences, while the deontologist claims that some action is right (or wrong) without appealing to any further fact concerning it. In other words, the distinctness of consequences from what they justify appear to give consequences justificatory power. However, to reason this way is to be confused by the action/consequence dualism. To the extent that the deontologist and the teleologist both notice that certain events are “wrong making” it makes little difference whether these events are taken to be part of the action or external to it.\textsuperscript{48}

The teleological position, that the deontologist, by use of the dictum “consequences are irrelevant,” is guaranteed to omit aspects of moral relevance, is unfounded. It is precisely because the deontologist has chosen to use the language of

\textsuperscript{48} A further result of this action/consequence dualism is that the teleologist, by concentrating on consequences held external to the action, may avoid recognition of morally relevant aspects that he allows to remain a part of the action. For example, it is mistaken to say that lying is not wrong unless it has bad consequences. All other things being equal, lying is wrong by definition.
rules rather than the language of ends that whatever is deemed of moral relevance is expressed in terms of moral rules and maxims. If the deontologist is of eccentric moral persuasion, s/he may omit aspects that others may feel relevant, but there could not be anything in the language of deontology that requires her/him to do so. The criteria of inclusion and exclusion lie beyond the terminology of deontology. Equally unfounded is the deontologist claim that by judging an action by its consequences, however they are to be framed, must necessarily omit similarly morally relevant aspects. The logic and language of ends set practically no limits on what may be considered an end, and only the teleologist’s moral opinions set natural limits on what may be counted as a morally relevant effect.

In general, almost any occurrence, or set of occurrences, having a conscious human source, may, at the sole cost of stretching certain conventional ways of speaking, be called either an action or the consequences of an action. The theoretical continuity of a sequence of events, conventionally separated into “action and “consequences,” enables the shift of morally relevant details back and forth between that of “consequences” and “components of an action.” What are called consequences of one kind of action may be made part of the specification of that action, and, thus interpreted, become the content of a possible moral rule. How agents decide to classify the later events in a causal series of events—that is, to speak in the language of rules or the language of ends—is what accounts for the ability to distinguish, and choose between, judging that an action is right or wrong because it has certain consequences, and judging that an action is right or wrong because it is of a certain sort. A result of this freedom is that it is of no moral consequence whether or not a given event is to count as a part of the action or as a consequence of a simpler version of that action. Therefore, agents are free to appeal to rules or consequences to determine the rightness or wrongness of action.
Each of these meta-ethical theoretical positions, in so far as it purports to be reporting information concerning moral reasons that is incompatible with what its terminological component says, is false; and each of the positions, in so far as it fails to imply such an incompatibility, is trivially true.

A potential misunderstanding must be guarded against. It has been argued that to justify an action an agent may appeal to rules or consequences as the morally significant events that comprise the agent’s reason, and these events can be taken to be part of the action, or can instead be taken as the consequence of a less rigourously defined version of that action. It is not maintained that agents are morally obligated to perform actions that have good, or even the best consequences. Stated simply, it may be said that if an action is obligatory, then the morally significant element may be referred to in either the language of rules or the language of ends. But it does not follow that all actions with good, or even the best effects, are obligations, and that all good or best actions can accordingly be reformulated to define corresponding rules of obligation. Morally relevant events can be divided into two classes: those that are obligation generating, and those that are not. Obligation generating events may be formulated either deontologically or teleologically. Non-obligation generating events may not.

The presence of morally significant effects that are of insufficient potency to be obligation generating, and are not liable to translation into a deontological language of rules, is logically consistent. Rules concern only what is obligatory and forbidden, and hence, only the most significant consequences, when made components of expanded versions of the actions, of which otherwise they would be consequences, can be reformulated as moral rules. Consequences that can be translated into rules, must, therefore, be of an equal obligatory stature with rules. Events that lack this stature, that are good, but insufficiently good to produce obligation have, apparently, no deontological equivalent. However, while there are no moral rules that concern actions
that are right but not duties, the notion of imperfect duties is intelligible. Hence, for example, the general obligation to act benevolently, where no given instance of benevolence is a duty, serves as the deontological analogue for consequences that are good, but have insufficient power to generate obligation. Similarly, just as there are actions of such moral strength that, due to their very nature, no moral rule can be formulated to express them as duties, there are actions in the teleological realm for which the negative agentic outcomes outweigh good consequences. Supererogatory duties that cannot be formulated as rules without violating the logical criteria of such rule-making may be construed as the deontological equivalent to heroic virtue in which the cost to the agent is such that the required behaviours are not obligatory.

Toulmin addresses the issue of the deontological and teleological antithesis as follows:

Consider. . .the musty old conundrum over which moral philosophers have battled for so long; namely, whether the “real” analysis of “X is right” is “X is an instance of a rule of action (or maxim, or prima facie obligation)” or “X is the alternative which is of all those open to us is likely to have the best results”.

When we bear in mind the function of ethics, therefore we see that the answer to the philosophers’ question is “Either, depending on the nature of the case.” The question, in other words, falls within the logical limits set by the function of ethics—provided that you are prepared to accept “Either” as an answer. As a matter of history, philosophers have not been so prepared: they have tended to demand an “unequivocal” answer—“The First” or “The Second”, and not “Either”—and to assume that either the “deontological” or “teleological” answer must be “true” or “false”. (1971, pp. 144-145) [Italics added]
Toulmin's answer to the "musty old conundrum" is to bifurcate moral thought, such that within one area of moral reasoning only the "deontological answer" is appropriate, while within another area only the "teleological answer" is appropriate. Such an approach enables the use of either perspective "according to the nature of the case". Where the nature of the case is clearly defined, Toulmin's position is useful, but in cases where the moral agent has difficulty in comprehending the significant moral factors that make up the case, or where the circumstances defining the case may be liable to differing interpretation, the inclusion of both perspectives, as formulated here, will be of greater utility.

The central section of the spectrum of moral activity, previously the arena of alternate theoretical choice, now becomes the arena of deliberation and ascription. On this construction, the significance of denegation is central, because the initial process of negation no longer includes a total rejection of theoretical possibility, but allows each perspective to inform and influence the final moral response; empirical knowledge, through the process of denegation, may now indeed proceed pari passu with theoretical knowledge.

It may be seen that the central problem identified in chapter one is now rendered non-significant. An integrative model was offered that demonstrated that the polarities are each capable of producing moralities that are isomorphic in relation to each other. By providing ontological spectra that give access to both polarities of the spectrum, and by suggesting an epistemology that integrates what Toulmin calls the Baconian and Cartesian oversimplifications, this chapter provides a philosophically sound basis for dialogue to span the spectrum. The mechanics of how that is to happen must be discovered in order that the philosophical basis be realized in practice.
Chapter 5
THE DIALOGUE IN PRACTICE

If, as this dissertation suggests, moral life is experienced along a spectrum as established in chapter one, and the nature of the moral experience changes in relation to its position on that spectrum, then any methodology intended to address the moral development and functioning of the individual must be applicable to all loci to be found on that spectrum. As chapter four has indicated, the epistemological, ontological, and theoretical requirements of a dialogic process can be established to show its applicability to the spectrum of moral experience, but the ability of the dialogue itself in this regard must be similarly established.

Moral education, if it is of to be of more than theoretical interest, is an intensely practical undertaking. How the dialogue is to function in practical terms is important, therefore, not only to demonstrate its potential to span the spectrum of moral opportunity, but also to demonstrate how it is to function in pedagogical terms. It has been established that it is legitimate to use dialogue to address the central issue of moral education as it has been framed in this dissertation—namely, the perceived mutual incompatibility of virtuous behaviour and moral reasoning, but it must be established what kind of dialogue will be appropriate. It will be shown that a traditional Vygostskyan understanding is incapable of functioning across the spectrum. Vygotsky’s formulation must be augmented in order to fulfill the dialogic requirements of the entire spectrum. Only then can the discussion turn to issues concerning the ability of the dialogue to accord with intra-personal factors that concern moral action.

Standard discussions on the difference between Vygotsky and Piaget, for example, place a crucial difference in the proximal locus of cognitive development. For Piaget, individual children construct knowledge through their actions on the world: to understand is to invent. By contrast, the Vygostkyan claim is said to be that understanding is social in origin. There are at least two difficulties with this. First,
Piaget did not deny the co-equal role of the social world in the construction of knowledge. He says that both individual and social are important: “There are no more such things as societies qua beings than there are isolated individuals. There are only relations .... and the combinations formed by them, always incomplete, cannot be taken as permanent substances” (Piaget, 1965, p. 360). And, “there is no longer any need to choose between the primacy of the social or that of the intellect: collective intellect is the social equilibrium resulting from the interplay of the operations that enter into all cooperation” (Piaget, 1970, p. 114). Second, Vygotsky insists on the centrality of the active construction of knowledge. This insistence is reflected in:

Activity and practice: these are the new concepts that have allowed us to consider the function of egocentric speech from a new perspective, to consider it in its completeness ... But we have seen that where the child's egocentric speech is linked to his practical activity, where it is linked to his thinking, things really do operate on his mind and influence it. By the word things, we mean reality. However, what we have in mind is not reality as it is passively reflected in perception or abstractly cognized. We mean reality as it is encountered in practice. (1987, pp. 78-79)

Vygotsky's strong assumptions about the active individual are reflected in his focus on practices such as speaking and thinking, and are the focus of an extended treatment in Zinchenko (1984). One reaction to this complementarity of active individual and active environment is to make co-constructionism the basis of theorizing: there is both an active child and an active environment (Valsiner, 1993; Wozniak, 1993). Central to this discussion, however, is the essential presence of a third factor in the process of co-construction: the accumulated products of prior generations, culture, and the medium within which the two active parties to development interact.
Cultural-historical psychology begins from the assumption of an intimate connection between the special environment that human beings inhabit and the fundamental, distinguishing qualities of human psychological processes. The special quality of the human environment is that it is suffused with the achievements of prior generations in reified form. This notion can be traced back to at least Hegel and Marx (1994) and is found in the writings of many cultural-historical psychologists (Dewey, 1974; Durkheim, 1953; Leontiev, 1981; Luria, 1976; Vygotsky, 1956). For example, John Dewey wrote that:

we live from birth to death in a world of persons and things which is in large measure what it is because of what has been done and transmitted from previous human activities. When this fact is ignored, experience is treated as if it were something which goes on exclusively inside an individual's body and mind. It ought not to be necessary to say that experience does not occur in a vacuum. There are sources outside an individual which give rise to experience.

(Dewey, 1974, p. 39)

The cultural medium is coupled with the assumption that the special mental quality of human beings is their need and ability to mediate their actions through artifacts, and to arrange for the rediscovery and appropriation of these forms of mediation by subsequent generations.

Vygotsky writes, “the central fact about our psychology is the fact of mediation” (1981, p. 166). While language is the central form of mediation, Vygotsky offered a more extensive set of mediational tools, a set that included “various systems for counting; mnemonic techniques; algebraic symbol systems; works of art; writing; schemes, diagrams, maps, and mechanical drawings; all sorts of conventional signs, and so on” (1981, p. 137).
On this view, the development of mind is the interweaving of the biological development of the human body and the appropriation of the cultural, ideal, and material heritages which exist in the present to coordinate people with each other and the physical world (Cole, 1996; Wertsch, 1991). Higher mental functions are culturally mediated; they involve not only a "direct" action on the world, but also an indirect action, one that takes material matter used previously and incorporates it as an aspect of action. In so far as that matter has itself been shaped by prior human practice, it is an artifact, and current action benefits from the mental work that produced the particular form of that matter.

Several implications arise with this view. First, artifacts are recognized as transforming mental functioning in fundamental ways. In Vygotsky's view:

The inclusion of a tool in the process of behavior (a) introduces several new functions connected with the use of the given tool and with its control; (b) abolishes and makes unnecessary several natural processes, whose work is accomplished by the tool; and alters the course and individual features (the intensity, duration, sequence, etc.) of all the mental processes that enter into the composition of the instrumental act, replacing some functions with others (i.e., it re-creates and reorganizes the whole structure of behavior just as a technical tool re-creates the whole structure of labor operations).

(1981, pp. 139-140)

On such a view, artifacts clearly do not serve simply to facilitate mental processes that would otherwise exist. Instead, they fundamentally shape and transform them. A second implication of this general position is that all psychological functions begin, and to a large extent remain, culturally, historically, and institutionally situated and context specific. This follows from the fact that the artifacts which enter into human psychological functions are culturally, historically, and institutionally situated. To be
socioculturally situated when carrying out an action or a thought process is unavoidable.

A third implication of making cultural mediation central to mind and mental development is that the meaning of an action and of a context are not specifiable independent of each other. An analysis of "action in context" requires a relational interpretation of mind; objects and contexts arise together as part of a single bio-social cultural process of development.

Two forms of dialogue are envisaged by Vygotsky: an external dialogue arising from the form of egocentric speech that prepares the transformations of internalization, and is the basis of intramental operations, and an inner dialogue that functions as the opportunity for individualized activities of self-mastery and intrapsychological transformations.

A fundamental reason why Vygotsky could take the self to be the recipient of inner speech and still hold a dialogical view of inner speech follows from a central and very explicit assumption he makes about the relationship between interlocutors in dialogue. According to Vygotsky, what enables dialogue is "the commonality of the interlocutors' apperceptive mass" (1987, p. 269) concerning the matter at hand. This notion that there is a need for common presuppositions among interlocutors is inherent in the given-new distinction (Steiner, 1982) and has been investigated under such rubrics as mutual knowledge (Smith, 1982) and intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979). Therefore, "[w]hen the thoughts and consciousness of the interlocutors are one, the role of speech in the achievement of flawless understanding is reduced to a minimum" (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 269). The common apperceptive mass that guarantees the success

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41 The notion of dialogue traditionally means a purposive exchange between two interlocutors. People are the constitutive elements of dialogue. The function of voice in the dialogue depends upon the intent of the genre of the dialogue. This dissertation calls for voice to be interpreted according to its role. At times, voice may claim the personhood Vygotsky intended in his initial formulation of the dialogic process. At other times, especially in the second of the two genres of dialogue to be explored in this chapter, voice is to be interpreted as representing cognitive position, ideals, understanding, meaning, and the polarities of the various spectra.
of dialogue among interlocutors is, in the case of dialogue with oneself, amplified in
that it refers to the self-certainty that comes with the identity embodied in a single
consciousness: "This shared apperception is complete and absolute in the social
interaction with oneself that takes place in inner speech" (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 274).
The common apperceptive mass is, for Vygotsky, a prior achievement that has reduced
difference to a minimum. Vygotsky's emphasis on this issue underlies his emphasis on
development and on the notion of internalization, which is nothing less than the
acquisition and interiorization of the culturally common apperceptive mass. He
explains:

Where the thoughts of the interlocutors focus on a common subject,
full understanding can be realized with maximal speech abbreviation
and an extremely simplified syntax. Where they do not,
understanding cannot be achieved even through expanded speech.
Thus, two people who attribute different content to the same word or
who have fundamentally different perspectives often fail to achieve
understanding. As Tolstoy says, people who think in original ways
and in isolation find it difficult to understand the thought of others.
They also tend to be particularly attached to their own thought. In
contrast, people who are in close contact can understand mere hints
which Tolstoy called "laconic and clear." They can communicate and
understand the most complex thoughts almost without using words.
(1987, p. 269)

For Vygotsky, the ideal speech situation is one in which the shared "given" is maximal
and misunderstanding is minimized. This is a view of dialogue in which the task is a
faithful replication by a listener of the information contained in the speech of the
speaker. Each interlocutor is an "insider" to the other's world. This requirement is
premised on the assumption that dialogue is basically a cooperative enterprise aimed at
ever greater agreement. Clearly, the applicability of the dialogic process to the virtue end of the spectrum is established. The common apperceptive mass stands in the place of a shared moral community and epistemological congruence. The child, entering into dialogue is receptive to the shared common assumptions, beliefs, and principles that underlie virtue behaviour in the context within which it is to be operant.

The Case for an Extended Notion of Dialogue

Within the Bakhtinian framework, inner speech is structured dialogically in that it always presupposes an addressee. To this extent, Vygotsky and Bakhtin are in agreement. For Bakhtin, moreover, the utterances of inner speech are also permeated with the evaluations of actual and potential addressees (Volosinov, 1973). A theme running through Bakhtinian discussions of dialogue is the distinctiveness of the other. It is the very “otherness” of the other, the fact that the other speaks from a different horizon, that constitutes the enabling condition for the productivity of dialogue. Here, Bakhtin and Vygotsky diverge considerably. Bakhtin (1990) asks:

In what way would it enrich the event if I merged with the other?
What would I myself gain by the other's merging with me? If he did, he would see and know no more than what I see and know myself; he would merely repeat in himself that which characterizes my own life.
Let him rather remain outside of me, for in that position he can see and know what I myself do not see and do not know from my own place, and he can essentially enrich the event of my own life. (p. 87)

This passage constitutes an explicit rejection of the notion of a shared apperceptive mass as either ground or goal of communication. Similarly, a dialogical mind does not itself constitute a common apperceptive mass, but rather a community of different and often conflicting voices that may not be resolved into one comprehensive self.

Dialogical thinking is each voice speaking in anticipation of the answering voice of another. Thus, a very basic difference between the Bakhtinian and Vygotskyan notions
of dialogue hinges on the status of the other and the relationship between self and other.

In Bakhtin's version, the distance and difference of the other is not only always retained but deemed essential.\(^{42}\) It is in the struggle with difference and misunderstanding that dialogue and thought are productive, and that productivity is not necessarily measured in consensus. Vygotsky, on the other hand, emphasizes the need for interlocutors to occupy the same epistemological space, and the role of communication in striving for congruence. This emphasis is entirely consistent with Vygotsky's seminal notion of a region of growth (of nearest or most proximal development) for the child to incorporate the knowledge structure of the culture so that the same epistemological space is occupied and shared by cultural and epistemic compatriots.

For Bakhtin, self-other differences, rather than impeding communication, motivate and generate dialogue. There is, nonetheless, a recognition of a strong need to achieve understanding and legitimization from others. One particularly important instantiation of the other in this regard, is that of the "superaddressee." In addition to the other who is the second person, the interlocutor addressed in any particular instance, there is, Bakhtin suggests, a third person implicit in dialogue. The "superaddressee" stands above the particularity of dialogue as a kind of reference and authority whose "ideally true responsive understanding assume[s] various ideological expressions (God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, science, ideological positions and so forth)" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 126). It can be argued that the notion of the "third person," "third voice," or "super-addressee" is an absolutely essential, though implicit, feature of Vygotsky's ZPD, and is a manifestation of the apperceptive mass. Bakhtin construes the goal of dialogue within the ZPD as not merely the creation of a common apperceptive mass for

\(^{42}\) Note the applicability of this assertion, when voice is disembodied, to the process of denegation.
two isolated interlocutors, but an exploration of the full range of possible epistemic communities. This is to be established, in the Bakhtinian formulation, by the process of denegation that is muted or inoperative in the Vygotskian framework. Denegation serves to enable choice and judgment informed by the polarities of the dialogue, no matter how antithetical, and is determined by neither, but by the tension extant between them. It is within this realm of denegation, outside of the realm of apperceptive mass that the full range of the spectrum can be accessed through an expanded form of Vygotskian dialogue informed by Bakhtinian insights. The dynamism of this expanded dialogic formulation (where dynamism is taken to indicate the potential for cognitive transformational processes) increases as the focus transfers from standard dialogue of apperceptive mass towards the more liberating arena of dissonant, conflicting voices. Figure 5 indicates the application of this notion to spectra already investigated.

Dialogues in the Zone of Proximal Development

It is in Vygotsky's emphasis on the social-interactional origins of individual mental functioning that the notion of dialogue within the ZPD figures most prominently for him. The ZPD serves as a connecting concept in Vygotsky's work, bringing together in a single construct the various strands of his thought pertaining to the sociogenesis of specifically cultural forms of thought (Bruner, 1986; Cole, 1985; Moll, 1994). The ZPD represents, in particular, a concrete and programmatic manifestation of Vygotsky's broader theoretical contention regarding the genetic relationship between interpsychological and intrapsychological functioning.

The emergence of specific cognitive processes is not simply an invariable or self-evident consequence of the opportunity to engage in joint problem-solving with a more capable other. Joint activity with a more competent adult or peer, in other words, is not, in and of itself, a condition sufficient to create a ZPD or to promote independent task mastery. Accordingly, much research on the ZPD attempts to determine the nature and quality of the more competent other's assistance that is most conducive to the
Figure 5. The ascending gradient of dialogical dynamism.


**Dialogical Genres for the ZPD**

To pursue the respective implications of these different perspectives of Vygotsky and Bakhtin, distinctions will be drawn between two dialogical genres relevant to an expanded view of the ZPD. First, a magistral dialogue that is considered the prototypical and "official" dialogical genre of the ZPD (Parmentier, 1994). Second,
a Socratic dialogue that is not founded on a need for consensus and adherence to the 
agenda of the third voice.

**Magistral Dialogue: The Authoritative Other**

For Parmentier (1994), the functioning of the magistral dialogue depends upon 
an asymmetry of interlocutors, based on cultural knowledge and power. This 
asymmetry arises from a third factor, beyond self and other, from which knowledge 
and power flow: a third voice implicit in the dialogue (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Jauss, 
1989). The structure of Vygotsky's ZPD is consistent with the Mediaeval scholastic 
tradition of the magistral dialogue (Sarbin, 1995). A magistral dialogue is characterized 
by a superiority of the first (magistral) voice over the second (novitiate) voice: the 
parent over the child, the teacher over the student, the tutor over the apprentice. The 
maintenance of this asymmetry requires a third voice, an authoritative and institutional 
third party upon which the first voice may draw: "The sacred text, the word of the 
prophet, the received view of science, the democratically constituted government, the 
school curriculum, authority or even rationality itself, are all common enough 
exemplars of the third voice of magistral dialogue" (Sarbin, 1995, p 135).

The magistral dialogue centers itself around a deficit or an absence (*questio*) on 
the part of the second voice (child / pupil / apprentice) which is responded to by the first 
voice (parent / teacher / mentor / tutor) who interprets (*interpretatio*) the third voice in 
the given situation (Jauss, 1989). The third voice might be said to "inhabit," or speak 
through, the first voice as an instance of ventriloquation (Bakhtin, 1981). This may be 
signaled by certain conventions in the discourse of the tutor, such as the use of indirect 
or reported speech to signal the remote source, and authority, of the utterance (Morson 
& Emerson, 1990). The tutor does not act as such in a vacuum but out of a cultural and 
historical context. "In each epoch . . . there are always authoritative utterances that set 
the tone--aesthetic, scientific, ethical, interpretive and journalistic works on which one
relies, to which one refers, which are cited, imitated and followed" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 88).

In the magisterial dialogue, the first and third voices authoritatively formulate meaning in reaction to the perceived deficit in the second voice. The second voice occasions the dialogue but the first and third voices guide the conversation to its proper end. There is, thus, a telos (a developmental end-point, an educational goal, a skill to be acquired, a character to be formed, etc.) implicit in the magisterial dialogue that is given by the third voice. Vygotsky indicates:

In order to transmit some experience or content of consciousness to another person, there is no other path than to ascribe the content to a known class, to a known group of phenomena, and as we know this necessarily requires generalisation. Thus it turns out that social interaction necessarily presupposes generalisation and the development of word and concept meaning, i.e., generalisation becomes possible with the development of social interaction. Thus higher, uniquely human forms of psychological social interaction are possible only because human thinking reflects reality in a generalised way. (Vygotsky, 1956, p. 51)

The levels of generalisation in a child correspond strictly to the levels of development in social interaction and any new level in the child's generalisation signifies a new level in the possibility of social interaction. Vygotsky outlined an ontogenetic progression of generalisation from "unorganised heaps" to "complexes" and then to "concepts." This transition is possible because of the existence of so called "pseudoconcepts" or "concept complexes." One of the most important functions of pseudoconcepts is that they make possible a more advanced form of an adult-child interaction. However, even at this new level genuine agreement about meaning does not exist between child and adult. We are informed:
Although the child agrees with the concept in its outward form, he/she in no way agrees with the adult in the mode of thinking or in the type of intellectual operations that is brought to the pseudoconcept. It is precisely because of this that the meaning of the pseudoconcept takes on great functional significance as a special, two-sided, internally contradictory form of childhood thinking. (Vygotsky, 1956, p. 181)

This “two-sided” nature of adult-child interaction provided the motivating force behind the transition from pseudoconcepts to concepts. Until the child has reached an advanced stage in the mastery of concept meanings, adult-child interaction is asymmetrical in an essential way. Whereas children's understanding of words may be based on relatively simple, context-bound sign-object relationships, adults understand them in terms of a complex system that involves sign-sign relationships. Further progress occurs by mastering fully elaborated meanings embodied in the norms of the adult community. It is explained:

We have seen that the speech of adults around the child, with its constant, determinant meanings, determines the path of the development of children's generalisations, the circle of formations of complexes. The child does not select the meaning for a word. It is given to him in the process of verbal social interaction with adults. The child does not construct his own complexes freely. He finds them already constructed in the process of understanding other's speech. He does not freely select various concrete elements and include them in one or another complex. He receives a group of concrete objects in an already prepared form of generalisation provided by a word....In general, a child does not create his own speech, he masters the existing speech of surrounding adults. (Vygotsky, 1956, pp. 180-181)
Similarly, the child does not create his own virtue, he masters the existing virtue of surrounding adults. In this respect, the process is reflected in an elenchic or maiuetic process that predates the magistral dialogue.

The *elenchus* represents a form of inquiry, therapeutic in nature, that "nurture the soul" so that it becomes better with knowledge and worse with ignorance. "The end result of this process is a "harmony of the soul" in which congruence between word and deed reveals a knowledge state characterized by lack of contradiction and inconsistency" (Burnet, 1929, p 17). Concepts are clarified through examination in which the reference alone is not considered sufficiently strong to form the basis of meaning. This form of conceptual clarification and harmonization with belief systems is consistent with the intent of the magistral dialogue.

The *elenchus* has three demands. First, the statements must be made out of personal conviction. That the statements be made from a commitment to them entails a personal responsibility for them, and for the consequences that flow from them. The *elenchus* is not an examination of disembodied opinions, but of beliefs personally held according to the developmental level of the agent. The *elenchus*, thus, mitigates against idiolecticism in the formation of conceptual systems. The second demand requires consistency, and entails that the beliefs must be checked for coherence and consistency with the rest of the relevant opinions. Third, a demand for definition combining word and sign enables a guarantee of the objective value of the consistency, coherence and commitment previously required.

The quest for definition, allied to the circularity of the *elenchus*, demands an abstract and general configuration of the concept which would justify the use of the term in apparently dissimilar locations and prohibit its use where apparently appropriate. In other words, the elenchic process is one of multiple iterations within an epistemic community, that moves from a commitment to an opinion concerning the probity of a conceptual understanding, to an examination of the consistency of that
understanding and its consequences when related to the rest of the agents' relevant belief system, to a process of definitional refinement and testing in use, returning to a commitment to the examined understanding. As each concept within a domain is examined the process sequentially re-involves all previously examined understandings. For example, an agent may be committed to an understanding of "charity" as "a gift to those less fortunate than the giver." This may be consistent with previously held understandings in this area, but the elenchic process, in which the concept "charity" is tested, will lead to a comprehension that charity may not be restricted to an act of giving, but may in fact be demonstrated in inaction, and can, in fact, be directed at agents more fortunate than the giver. As this new understanding is tested for consistency within the agent's domain of such terms, this will reveal discrepancies with opposite cognates such as vengeance and mercy. These, too, may now be revealed to have manifestation in inaction. As these are subjected to an elenchic process and examined for consistencies, especially in the definitional stage, further refinements may be required to differentiate between the inactive manifestations of mercy and charity, which may, in turn, require a clarification of the concept of forbearance and ultimately lead to a conceptual environment in which the new apprehension of charity is consistent.

The process of elenchus leads, naturally, to understandings that are provisional, contingent, and liable to refinement and change as understandings of greater sophistication and adequacy enter the process. The process, while contingent, can produce a coherent and stable framework of conceptual understandings as the productivity of the magistral dialogue depends upon the appropriate sensitivity to the questio. Nonetheless, the openness of the magistral dialogue is constrained by the authority of the third voice which serves as both a stabilizing and directing force. The first and third voices presume to know where the dialogue is heading. Deviations from the proper trajectory are noted and corrections initiated.
Magistral dialogue is a pedagogical technique for promoting the initiate's acquisition of institutionally constituted cognitive strategies. As such this dialogue affords the means by which scaffolded instruction takes place in the ZPD (Palincsar, 1986). Through elenchic dialogue, the helplessness of the *questio* is replaced by the mediated autonomy of the child's own *interpretatio*. In principle, the magistral dialogue pays obeisance to what Bakhtin called “official monologism.” It assumes the progressive and deterministic trajectory of a traditional growth curve predicated on a set-goal. Significantly, the final phase of the magistral dialogue is the *communio* in which the magistral voice strives to draw the participants together in consensus in the third voice that they now share, jointly striving to create, in essence, Vygotsky's goal of a “shared apperceptive mass.”

It should be noted that Vygotsky was sensitive to the biological constraints on human development and was very concerned to understand the relations among the physical, the neurophysiological, and the cultural constraints of human action (Moll, 1994). Vygotsky provides a focus on the ontogeny of the dialogical imagination lacking in Bakhtin, by placing the child in a concrete apprenticeship within the magistral dialogue of the ZPD. One might even see the ZPD as Vygotsky's quite serious answer to Bakhtin's rhetorical question “And what would I myself gain by the other's merging with me?” The gain for the child is enculturation and initiation into approved forms of understanding and behaviour.

The burgeoning autonomy of the child within the magistral dialogue, however, is empowering, and the child, by cognitive transformations engendered by the dialogic process, may come, by the nature of the dialogue, to find the voices of the dialogue unsatisfying. As cognitive development takes place and expertise in the domain is established this dissatisfaction becomes sufficient to break the cycle of reiterations, and alter the nature of the dialogic exchange. Figure 6 offers a five step mechanism by which this qualitative change occurs.
Figure 6. A five step model of the dialogic progress.

While the process is considered to be an idiosyncratic one in which individual differences and requirements will determine the exact unfolding of the dialogue, certain general processes can be identified. The process has been referred to as "Magistral interpretatio, novitiate questio, communio," in which the novice demonstrates a lack of understanding, the teacher interprets the circumstances surrounding the area of contention, and the two enter into a communion with the environment during which the novice's new understanding is validated (Bakhtin, 1986). Step one begins with the questio, the lack of understanding or capacity to respond to the environment in a manner consonant with the central beliefs of that environment. In accordance with the Vygostkyan tenet that instruction leads development, the novice and tutor pursue the

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43 The terms 'novice' and 'agent' and 'child' are used synonymously and interchangeably.
aim of the dialogue at the cognitive level of the child. Using general Kohlbergian terms, it may be that the novice has to explore the implications of honest behaviour based on Kohlbergian Stage Two understanding.\textsuperscript{44} This exploration, and the implications for the agent in his life world, leads to mastery of this level of response with the assistance of the tutor, and signals entrance into the second stage of the ZPD and step two of the process. In step two the novice continues to acquire a fuller understanding and appreciate greater implications without the direct assistance of the tutor in the process, but the background notion of apperceptive mass continues to reinforce, through the agency of both the first and third voice, the harmony between the general notion of honesty and the virtue community within which the dialogue takes place. The capacity for honesty, based on the cognitive stage of the agent is now seen to be achieved. Step three takes place outside of the ZPD and affords the novice the opportunity to internalize and habituate the practical consequences of the learning that has taken place. The understanding, and the cognitive processes that ground them, becomes an accepted and normalized part of the novice’s repertoire of behaviour. They become what Sichel refers to as the “moral agent’s dream world” (see chapter one).

Step three exists for the same length of time that the agent maintains the cognitive development that grounds it. Step four contains the disintegration of the zone of comfort the agent feels between his behaviours and the cognitive stage that supports them; it is the locus of the Kohlbergian concept of cognitive dissonance. Behaviours, in the case of this example, instances of honesty, become divorced from the cognitive understandings that founded them in steps one and two, and the stimulus/response dynamic that occasions the honesty based activities loses its automatized characteristics. The level of discomfort thus engendered constitutes a further \textit{questio} and the process.

\textsuperscript{44} The novice would not engage in Stage One exploration as this, at the commencement of development, would not require the assistance of a more competent other. The dialogue would therefore, in Kohlbergian terms, commence with Stage 1 at step four of the dialogue.
become recursive through the preceding steps based upon newly emergent cognitive development.

The recursive looping through the first four steps of the process could occur for each virtue behaviour, though it would be reasonable to believe that several virtue behaviours could be encompassed by each iteration of the process. It is possible, however, that particular virtue behaviours may “pull” to different cognitive stages, and, as it is indicated in the literature on soft stage development that the lower the cognitive development, the more likely it is that agents will fail to base behaviours on the highest stage acquired, it cannot be affirmed that the process will be congruent for all virtue behaviours.

Lacking data concerning this process, it cannot be theoretically verified at what point the agent’s dissatisfaction with the magistral process becomes sufficiently energizing to signal the entry in to the second genre of dialogue. It would be reasonable conjecture, however, given the nature of the behaviours, to believe that Kohlbergian stage three acquisition, that of socially sanctioned morality, would signal the end of the recursive loop. It must be emphasized that the magistral dialogue is specifically designed for habituation in virtue behaviours in non-dilemmic situations.

At the early stages of cognitive development, it may be questioned to what extent the novice agent can apprehend, with any coherence or certainty, the nature of moral dilemmas. A young child may understand lying cheating and stealing, but that in no manner suggests that the child is capable of comprehending lying cheating and stealing to prevent greater harm, or in the name of a greater good. The moral landscape reveals its dilemmic dimension only in proportion to the agent’s ability to comprehend it. The revelation and comprehension form a mutually reinforcing dynamic. When the agent can, with a sufficient degree of coherence, focus upon the nature of dilemmas, then the processes of the magistral dialogue become insufficiently satisfying. A threshold or
developmental climacteric is reached that impels the agent into Step 5 of the process, and forms an induction into the second of the dialogic genres.

**Socratic Dialogue: The Questioning Other**

It should be noted that this account of the Socratic dialogue differs from many accounts of “Socratic method” usually associated with certain forms of psychotherapy (e.g., Friedberg and Fidaleo, 1992, Moss, 1992, Overholster, 1994) and outlined above as an elenchic process. A close examination of the Socratic method, as used in these contexts, reveals that what is being promoted is a dialogue in which agents are taught or encouraged to ask the right questions for self discovery. In education, the work of Corsaro (1992) reveals that teachers are often willing to allow children to take a leading role, and to make adjustments to the extent that the children's activities incorporate educational and developmental goals. While these adjustments are typically made with a view to maintaining a magistral dialogue, they may quickly develop into more purely Socratic dialogue.

Dialogue is always open-ended and may be turned at any moment against any participant, including the third voice. The power of dialogue, however, as Foucault (1978) argues, does not simply flow from above, but is distributed and heteronomous, potentially available to all who enter into the discursive practices of a culture. Although the Vygotskian tradition has focused on socialization and enculturation in the ZPD as internalization, contemporary interpretive scholars have emphasized the developing participation in social networks (Corsaro, 1992). The child not only receives a benefit from the ZPD but also enters the dialogical context. For the apprentice there is an “assimilation--more or less creative--of others' words” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 89). The apprentice may “rework and re-accentuate” the words of the other. Eventually, the magistral dialogue becomes transformed into a Socratic dialogue as the pupil takes a more active role in the educational process and children become more sensitive to ambiguity and more skilled at negotiating meaning (Bruner, 1986). If enculturation
were simply a matter of an uncomplicated internalization then the magistral dialogue would simply sharpen, and the productivity of the ZPD would grow with the developing child. Post-enculturational cognition, however, is energized by the enlarging ability of the child to question, with increasing potency, the received view that characterizes the apperceptive mass of the magistral dialogue.

Two important features of the Socratic dialogue are that, first, it is forever suspicious of consensus, and, second, it often eludes the telos of the third voice. It resists the constraints of the scaffold. The questio of the second voice (now a Socratic questioning voice) is not longer so easily silenced by appeals by the first voice to the authority of the third, remembering that the first and third voices now may be the characterizing cognitions and ideologies of the magistral dialogue examined through inner dialogue. Under the increasingly informed apprentice, the voices of the dialogue may become less satisfying, less confident in the negotiation of meaning, “until it finally produces a meaning that is the result of a mutual inquiry, and that emerges out of a knowledge of one's lack of knowledge” (Jauss, 1989, p. 210). Yet, this diminished authority may reflect arguable differences in understanding and an exploration of the limits of received knowledge. The process of denagination diminishes the surety of the exchange and stimulates the exploration of new and less definitive cognitive areas. Moreover, in the Socratic dialogue there is no guarantee of resolution and consensus. Indeed, many of the original Socratic dialogues of Plato end in aporia. For Bakhtin, the Socratic dialogue challenges the centripetal forces of the magistral dialogue with its own centrifugal forces.

The other in the Socratic dialogue is not conceived exclusively as an expert or more competent other into whose more highly developed cognitive space the apprentice moves in the course of enculturation. On this view, the hierarchically structured relations of expert and novice in the magistral version of the ZPD, with its attendant conceptions of the self-possessed tutor and the child-on-the-way-to-self-possession,
may give way to a relational structure that is characterized by a greater mutuality of question and answer (Palincsar, 1986). This new sphere is conceived not exclusively in terms of unidirectional influence in which the less able apprentice is elevated into the intellectual world of the parent / teacher / tutor, but rather as a encounter of differences that carries the potential for inter-illumination among the voices. It must be remembered that, for Bakhtin, the inner dialogue, construed as internalized egocentric speech, can take place not only with an interlocutor, but with the hypothesized role of the interlocutor taken by non-internalized ideological and conceptual challenges providing the voice. While it is the first and third voices that direct development in the magistral dialogue, in the Socratic dialogue control shifts to a more directive and active questio of the second voice, one that requires a modification of the stance of the first voice, whether manifested in person or theme. Therefore:

[questioning of the first voice may be associated with, resulting from, or leading to, the rejection of the third voice. One common consequence or symptom of this is one form or other of relativism in which all potential authorities are questioned, as a mark of an intellectual maturity. (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 227)]

Traditionally, the magistral dialogue is considered to proceed most clearly when “child effects” are passive and thoroughly anticipated with responsive strategies ready at hand. To the extent that the child’s voice asserts itself in unpredicted and challenging ways, the dialogue becomes Socratic and the opportunity arises for the role of the tutor to be modified. The tutor's stance toward the child may now require an openness not only to the child but also to otherwise previously unquestioned prejudices guiding magistral dialogue in the ZPD. Here the sensitivity is not simply to the limits of the second voice but also to the self-understanding of first voice. The correctness of the tutor's understanding of the third voice may be questioned or the authority of the third voice itself may challenged.
In the formulation considered by this dissertation, however, the magistral dialogue, while genuine, is known beforehand by the first voice to be a precursor to the more dynamic and fruitful Socratic dialogue that is intended to become recursively operant at each developmental climacteric. The cusps of cognitive stages are the occasions for a reiteration of the full dialogic process.

The ideal Socratic dialogue will be guided by an openness to the emerging truth of the given subject matter, and the widening possibilities for truth, and not simply by prepossessed knowledge. Hence, in a Socratic dialogue the conflict of voices may escalate. The Socratic dialogue is a kind of "discursive game" (Lyotard, 1984) that escapes the relatively tidy systematization of the magistral dialogue.

Dialogue has often been viewed as inherently emancipatory and decentering or, in contrast, as essentially a neutral field of communication within which may be discovered many differently valenced contents. Bakhtin and Vygostsky promote rather different views of dialogue and each illuminates different possibilities for the processes of moral education, in combination, however, in the form of an expanded notion of the dialogic process, they enable the moral educator to address the full spectrum of moral experience and response.

It has been shown that an extended notion of the dialogue, philosophically justified and appropriate, has the potential to render moot the central problem of chapter one-namely the dichotomous nature of the two perspectives that most naturally locate at the polarities of the spectrum. However, moral education is not just a question of dialogic technique. The agents are developing individuals with complex patterns of development that may influence their ability to develop as moral agents. It is to be discovered whether the expanded dialogue is compatible with, or in opposition to, the developmental trajectories of the agents.
Chapter 6

THE DIALOGUE AND MORAL ACTION

Morality finds its expression in action, and any satisfactory study of moral development should use moral action as its final criterion of adequacy. Nevertheless, observable behaviour cannot, unaided, be the limit of a description of the moral phenomenon. Moral action, as previously indicated, is a both implicitly and explicitly complex interaction embedded in a variety of feelings, presuppositions, questions, doubts, judgments and decisions. Cognitive developmental theory assumes that moral cognition is a central component in providing unity to the many processes that compose it. From this perspective, the study of the relations between moral judgment and moral action is of primary importance. The function of this chapter is to investigate the potential of a dialogic process to address the complementarity of cognitive structures with the functional relations among processes, from a variety of domains, that lead to moral action.

Most of the recent interest in the domain of morality has centred on analyses of moral cognition. The conspicuous neglect of moral action reflects the rationalistic inclination of many theories of morality, although the mechanism governing the self-regulation of moral action concerns much more than moral thought. Even moral thought itself is not purely an intrapsychic concern. The application of moral principles in coping with diverse moral claims depends on situational imperatives, a constellation of psychological states and configural social influences. A comprehensive account of moral action, and an accompanying theory of moral development, must explain how moral reasoning, embodied in cognitive development, in conjunction with other psychosocial factors, governs a moral agent’s engagement with the moral domain.

The study of moral action may be approach from two differing perspectives. Moral action has been viewed either as the immediate result of action tendencies and their interplay, or as mediated by such cognitive processes as moral definitions, moral
beliefs, or moral reasoning. According to the first view, there are, in each person, a variety of generalized behavioural tendencies, habits or traits that are activated by situational factors. Simultaneously, opposing tendencies and inclinations may be elicited, and the action to be performed is, therefore, a function of the relative strengths of these tendencies and inhibiting or promotional factors to be found in the environment. Regardless of the complexity of the set of antecedent circumstances, the outcome is seen as predictable and objectively determined. Wilson's (1985) evolutionary-genetic theory, in which altruistic and egoistic tendencies are mediated by issues of function and survival, and Milgram's (1974) account of obedience to authority, are examples of this perspective.

According to this view, moral action is essentially non-rational, and differs from morally-neutral activities only in terms of action-content categories. Within this perspective, cognitive functions are assigned the role of mediating between the differing tendencies and providing inputs to the process such as labeling, discriminating, observation, or symbol formation (Hogan 1973). The role of moral reasoning--that is, the comparison of differing criteria for morally correct and incorrect behaviour within this perspective--is viewed either as non-functional, or as a rationalizing and justificatory adjunct to an already decided course of action. As an example of the first role, Dreeman (1992) notes:

Research has shown that verbal moral expressions are influenced mainly by cognitive factors. . .while manifest moral behaviour is mainly a function of social learning. . .Thus while a relation may be expected between verbal moral judgment scores and justification for sharing, there is no empirical basis for predicting that a relation may be obtained between verbal moral judgment as a result of moral reasoning and manifest donation. (p. 187)
When moral reasoning is seen as a rationalizing coherent account of what is already decided upon, then Unamuno (1984) indicates:

[O]ur ethical and philosophical doctrines are, in general, merely the justification, a posteriori, of our conduct and of our actions. What we believe to be the motives for our conduct are usually but the pretext for it. (p. 261)

In contrast to this non-cognitivist approach, a second perspective considers morality as essentially rational—that is, as a response that is derived from understandings and reasons concerning the means to achieve human goals, and the establishing of those goals themselves. The crucial difference between the two perspectives is the role of cognition. Rather than being a means by which goals and the chosen action to meet those goals are instrumentally related, cognition is seen more fundamentally, in the second perspective, as the means to construct moral meaning and adjudicate truth. Any action considered beneficial to mankind in general, or to an individual in particular, would not be considered to be moral if it were to be undertaken under coercion, hypnosis or unconscious motives. Without judgment, any action, no matter how beneficial, is not moral. An apt descriptor for the first perspective is “causality,” for the second perspective, “adjudication.”

Clearly, this dissertation, due to the definition provided in chapter one, rejects the notion of morality expressed by the first perspective. Those who operate within the second perspective, however, face another choice: whether to view the transition from moral cognition to moral action as mediated by consistency, not only within behaviours related to certain character traits, but among collections of traits. Traditionally, this view has grounded the search for moral character as exemplified in the Hartshorne and May (1928) studies, and is more appropriate to character education programs predicated solely upon an habituation in virtue behaviours. Such a position has already been
rejected in chapter one as an incomplete position from which to address the field of moral education.

Alternatively, one may view moral behaviour, not in terms of personality, but in terms of processes. The focus of such a view is not one of consistency among personality traits, but one of functional unity based on interlocking processes that are conceptually and logically linked to the move from moral judgment to moral action. Such processes have been referred to in this dissertation as performance factors, and will be examined in this chapter according to the following set of propositions:45

1) The social construction of moral knowledge is organized in a series of additive-inclusive cognitive structural stages.

2) These cognitive structures interact in a dynamic law-like manner with other internal processes and configural environmental factors.

3) Stages of prosocial development are generally based on parallel processes that display approximate congruence and isomorphism.

4) The interaction of cognitive, affective, ego, and other prosocial developmental factors leads to a tendency for people to engage in structurally isomorphic forms of behaviour.

It has already been demonstrated that the dialogic process is both theoretically and practically compatible with the spectrum of moral opportunity introduced in chapter one, but it must be determined whether the dialogic process, as understood, will be helpful in addressing the performance factors (interlocking processes) that mediate between moral reasoning and moral action.

Kurtines, Mayock, Pollard, Lanza & Carlo (1991) offer a perspective of psychosocial role theory that attempts to address these foundational issues. Psychosocial role theory is grounded in the social constructivist tradition with its

45 For a comprehensive treatment of similar propositions concerning the development of altruism, see Krebs and Van Hesteren (1994).
emphasis on the social construction of reality. Kurtines et al (1991) adopt the view that the development of particular competencies (i.e., sociomoral competencies) are interdependent with, and dependent on, the development of other types of competencies. In short, linguistic, cognitive, communicative, and sociomoral competencies define the interrelated domains of development by which an individual becomes a competent member of a social system. The approach of Kurtines et al. (1991) is characterized by a belief that the development of linguistic, cognitive, communicative, and sociomoral competencies is influenced by both maturational processes (genetically influenced structural changes) and learning processes (the acquisition of processes through conditioning, imitating, identification and modeling). Both maturational and learning processes are seen as essential to the development of competent members of society. Table 3 shows the relationship between the linear development of the performance criteria within each of the various competencies, which are seen to be hierarchical and cumulatively nonreversible, and between the domains of competencies themselves. Moving from left to right in the table, the development of psychosocial competencies in each of the domains during levels 2, 3 and 4 are conceptualized as constituting a horizontal *decalage* within levels, where GOA refers to goal-oriented actions, SGA refers to strategic goal oriented action, and DCA refers to discursive communicative action. Developmental transitions in sociomoral competence are seen, therefore, as dependent upon the development of more underlying communicative competence, which, in turn, is dependent upon the more underlying cognitive competence etc.

The formulation offered by Kurtines et al. (1991) is ultimately unsatisfactory due to its over-reliance on socially-derived a nometic knowledge as the sole criterion of an ideal end point of development. The key insight, however, that prosocial behaviour is intimately linked to cognitive, communicative, and linguistics competencies is useful and informative.
Table 3

Levels of Psychosocial Development by Competencies (Kurtines et al.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
<th>Cognitive</th>
<th>Communicative</th>
<th>Sociomoral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (0-2) Infancy</td>
<td>Preverbal</td>
<td>Sensorimotor</td>
<td>Nonnormative GOA</td>
<td>Premoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (2-7)</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Preoperational</td>
<td>Normative GOA, SOA</td>
<td>Heteronomous (external)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (7-12) Pre-Adolescent</td>
<td>Concrete Operations</td>
<td>Normative GOA, SOA</td>
<td>DCA1</td>
<td>Autonomous (internal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (12+) Adolescence/ Adulthood</td>
<td>Formal Operations</td>
<td>Discursive</td>
<td>DCA-DCA3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical/ Reflective</td>
<td>Critical/ Discursive</td>
<td></td>
<td>Critical (Reflective/ Discursive)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the results of developmental theorists such as Piaget, Loevinger, Maslow, Hoffman, Erikson as interpreted by Blasi, and Gilligan reveals a high degree of correspondence amongst the stages and themes they have developed. There is a tendency for such theorists to align the stages they identify with the hierarchies of others. Snarey, Kohlberg and Noam (1983) note: "nearly all structural theorists, to a greater or lesser degree, have suggested parallels between their own theory and theories of others" (p. 327).

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44 Blasi (1995) reinterprets Erikson's understanding of identity development from the perspective of the self as subject. This perspective, argues Blasi, more accurately reflects Erikson's original insights into the formation of identity that answered the question "Who am I?" without the self-categorization and descriptive frameworks that occlude the psychological reality.
Krebs and Van Hesteren (1994) concur:

Clearly, earlier stage theorists have influenced more recent theorists. Indeed, such influence may be mapped in terms of academic kinship trees: Piaget begat Kohlberg, who begat Damon, Gibbs, Gilligan, Rest and Selman (who as self-respecting offspring are apt to do, have departed to varying degrees from the fold). Eisenberg, Haan and Hoffman married into the cognitive developmental family, with the customary tension among in-laws. Maslow is best viewed as academic Godfather to whom several theorists have appealed for descriptions of their highest stages. (p. 116)

The issue here is not that these theorists display empirical concurrence or structural and functional isomorphism, but that the homologous tendencies towards successful dialogic treatment can be identified. Krebs and Van Hesteren (1994) developed a structurally developmental model of ascending stages of altruism, based (in part) on an analysis of theoretical positions similar to those displayed in Table 4. An outline of this model and minimal descriptions of each stage is found in Table 5 with specific words and phrases from Krebs and Van Hesteren’s descriptions underlined for later consideration. The underlined words characterize the stage within which they are located. They encapsulate the posture of the stageholder towards his/her world and his/her perception of the correct relationship between agency, behaviour and the demands inherent in understandings consonant with that stage.

**Relationship of Dialogic Genre and Stage Understandings**

Previous examinations of dialogic genre has established that the two types of dialogue offered in this dissertation stem from two disparate functions towards which the dialogues are expressed. The magistral and Socratic dialogues address different functions and have different characteristics and requirements. To establish the utility of the dialogue *in toto* as a method of addressing the moral cognition/moral action
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Kurtines</th>
<th>Hoffman</th>
<th>Kohlberg</th>
<th>Erikson/Blasi</th>
<th>Gilligan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 0</td>
<td>Premoral</td>
<td>Global empathy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 0/1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Egocentric empathy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasis on external appearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>Heteronomy Internal</td>
<td>Empathy for another’s feeling</td>
<td>Heteronomy</td>
<td>Instrumental exchange</td>
<td>Emphasis on unity through coherence of social roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2/3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Empathy for another’s general plight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transition from selfishness to responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interpersonal conformity</td>
<td>Identity as a given through self-reflection</td>
<td></td>
<td>Goodness as self sacrifice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3/4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4</td>
<td>Autonomy/ Internal</td>
<td>Social system and conscience</td>
<td>Identity is self-constructed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transition from goodness to truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4/5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 5</td>
<td>Critical-Discursive</td>
<td>Social contract and individual rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Universal ethical principles</td>
<td>Recognition of universal humanity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 7 (?)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Universal love</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4
Contd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Piaget</th>
<th>Maslow</th>
<th>Loevinger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 0</td>
<td>Sensorimotor</td>
<td>Physiological survival</td>
<td>Presocial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 0/1</td>
<td>Pre-operational</td>
<td></td>
<td>Symbiotic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>Safety orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impulsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>Concrete operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-protective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>Early formal operations</td>
<td>Love affection and belonging</td>
<td>Conformist - social role identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3/4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-aware: transition from conformist to conscientious - identity observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4</td>
<td>Full formal operations</td>
<td>Esteem and self-esteem orientation</td>
<td>Conscientious-Management of identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4/5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individualistic transition from conscientious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 5</td>
<td>(Post formal operations)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomous - identity as authenticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-actualization</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 7</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of altruism</td>
<td>Conscientious altruism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undifferentiated affective responsiveness (Stage 0)</td>
<td>Conscientious altruism is oriented towards fulfilling internalized self-defining obligations to assist in maintaining the institutions of one's society even when such obligations may violate the expectations of reference group.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Egocentric accommodation (Stage 1)**
  - Egocentric accommodation is oriented mainly to relieving vicariously experienced distress and to fulfilling safety and effectance needs. External demands of authorities, imitating adults, positive reactions from others, ingratiate oneself to those in power, relieve tension to do what one is supposed to.

- **Instrumental cooperation (Stage 2)**
  - Instrumental cooperation is directed towards doing ones share in concrete exchanges with others. Situationally specific, temporally constrained subjective needs, rule-governed.

- **Mutual altruism (Stage 3)**
  - Mutual altruism is sensitive to the needs of "generalized others" and aimed at fulfilling shared role obligations, avoiding social disapproval, sustaining a good reputation, upholding bonds of friendship, securing one's place in reference groups, conforming and behaving in a socially acceptable manner. Sustain one's conception of oneself as a good person in the eyes of those with whom one identifies.

- **Integrated altruism (Stage 6)**
  - Because the self-other dichotomy is transcended when individuals' sense of self becomes fully integrated with their sense of humanity, the self's interests become integrated with the interests of other. Mutual respect, fairness, impartiality, proactive, Universal self-sacrificial love, ("Stage 7")

  - Universal altruism stems from a cosmic feeling of oneness with the universe, identification with the species, active compassion for a commonwealth of beings, a full sense of responsibility for the welfare and development of all people, especially the disadvantaged. Agape, selfless, transformed.
dynamic, it is necessary to establish the utility of each of the dialogues as they encompass the function for which they are formulated.

**The Magistral Dialogue**

The magistral dialogue is enabled because of an "apperceptive mass" that grounds the common presuppositions between the interlocutors, and allows the acquisition and internalization of the epistemically common understandings that flow from it. The task of the magistral dialogue is the faithful replication in the novice of the information found in the utterances of the first voice of the dialogue based on the asymmetry of the voices; to ensure not just orthodoxy but orthopraxy. The dialogue is characterized by the maintenance of the superiority of the first voice over the second voice through the authority of the third voice; it is the initiation of the novice into the surrounding epistemic world.

If the underlined words and phrases that characterize the first, second and third stages of Krebs and Van Hesteren (1994) developmental model of altruism are re-examined in the light of the functioning of the Magistral dialogue the resonance is immediate.

*External - demands of authorities - imitating adults - positive reactions from others - ingratiating oneself to those in power - relieve tension - to do what one is supposed to - situationally specific - temporally constrained - subjective needs - rule-governed - avoiding social disapproval - sustaining a good reputation - securing one's place in reference groups - conforming and behaving in a socially acceptable manner - to sustain one's conception of oneself as a good person in the eyes of those with whom one identifies.*

All of these terms relate to a subordinate agent attempting to reconcile a deficiency within a relationship of asymmetry. The novice, characterized by the excerpts above, submits to the authoritatively formulated meanings offered by the first voice.
empowered by the authority of the third voice. The inchoate pseudo-concepts of the
novice are refined and reprocessed through the maiuetic practices within the ZPD.

The key construct here is the last of the chosen phases—‘‘to sustain one’s
conception of oneself as a good person in the eyes of those with whom one identifies.’’
Blasi (1983), in his examination of Erikson’s understanding of identity formulation,
makes the point that identity is self-constructed (Stage 4). Prior to this stage, identity is
characterized by self-reflection. The process of identity formation, on Blasi’s
formulation, entails the construction of an internalized ‘‘ideal self,’’ the construction of
an identity most liable to approbation based on the culturally and socially mediated
understandings of an ideal type. Anticipated empathy based guilt helps to reinforce
behaviours explored in the ZPD in accordance with the ideal type developed through the
magistral dialogue. Deviation from ideal type behaviours, no matter how
heteronomously derived, is the occasion of the reinforcement, through empathic based
guilt, of the understandings, dialogically constructed, that underlie the ideal. The
notion of sustaining oneself as a good person in the eyes of those with whom one
identifies is the culmination of a dialogic process that terminates in Krebs and Van
Hesteren Stage 3 altruism.

**The Socratic Dialogue.**

In contrast to the magistral dialogue, the Socratic dialogue eschews consensus
and enculturation as the dialogic endpoint. The *telos*, both explicit and implicit, of the
third voice is ignored. The *questio* of the second voice is no longer satisfied by the
appeals of the first voice to the authority of the third, and there is, therefore, no
guarantee of resolution, as the Socratic dialogue is not premised on the initiation of the
novice into an epistemological and ontological space characterized by a mutuality of
inquiry and solution.

The asymmetry of authority relations that guided the magistral dialogue is
dissolved in the burgeoning autonomy of the second voice and its dynamic interaction
with the full range of epistemic possibilities it is now newly capable of engaging. The process of denegation becomes of primary significance and the polarities of the spectra are examined for the first time as both possible and feasible responses to the inadequacies of the magistral dialogue.

Krebs and Van Hesteren (1994) characterize the final four stages of their model of altruism, Conscientious altruism, Autonomous altruism, Integrated altruism and Universal self-sacrificial love, with the following phrases;

- violate the expectations of reference group - internalized self-defining
- based more in high order principles than in external laws, norms or social conventions - internally held values - more discriminating -
- rendered impartially - integrated - mutual respect - fairness -
- impartiality - proactive - agape - selfless - transformed.

Conscientious altruism must, by definition, entail actions that transcend the immediacy of the contingent and the relational. Conscientiousness usually refers to dutiful diligence in following what is perceived to be the required course of action (in which case one may be conscientiously virtuous or conscientiously vicious), or more particularly, to acting in accord with the dictates of an active conscience. Conscience, to function in the second manner, must have a perception of both right and wrong that is clearly independent of the context. The agent must "violate the expectations of reference group" in order to act within the dictates of conscience. Similarly, autonomous altruism requires that the agent reject the heteronomously derived sanction of the magistral dialogue in favour of an internalized self-defining based more in high order principles than in external laws, norms or social conventions. Integrated altruism is the product of the breakdown of the dichotomy of the self/other dualism and the agent's acceptance of the integration of the interest of the self with the interest of aggregated humanity. This process finds its endpoint in the cosmic awareness of the oneness with the universe and an active compassion for a commonwealth of beings.
The logical requirements of these stages of altruism are systematically unfulfillable within the parameters of a magistral dialogue. The magistral dialogue sees a reference group as the criterion by which action is adjudicated as proper (inconsistent with conscientious altruism). It sees norms, external laws, and social conventions as the normative component of moral behaviour (inconsistent with autonomous altruism). It considers the relationship between the individual, and the agent as contextual and particular (inconsistent with Integrated altruism and Universal self-sacrificial love).

The parameters of the Socratic dialogue, however, with its emphasis on the rejection of the telos of the third voice, and an acceptance of the negotiation rather than the reception of meaning, is clearly the locus of activities that would allow reference group rejection, and the development of autonomy leading to integration and universalism.

To the extent that Krebs and Van Hesteren’s model of developmental altruism is representative of psychological processes that are functionally consistent with the move from moral cognition to moral action, then a dialogic process, consisting of both magistral and Socratic dialogues, demonstrates the potential to be both an appropriate and powerful treatment for the requirements of moral education.

The formulation suggested allows the structure of cognitive development to be reflected in virtuous behaviour generated by the magistral dialogue. Further, the autonomy of the Socratic dialogue is informed and enriched by the habituation in virtue that provides Sichel’s (1988b) “forgotten dreamworld.” The foregoing, while revealing the potential of a dialogic process to address the needs of the moral educator, also leads to the formulation of a theory of moral development and moral practice that is derived from the process of dialogue itself.
Chapter 7

TOWARDS A DIALOGICALLY-BASED MORAL THEORY.

The concepts of obligation and duty—moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—of what is morally right and wrong and of the moral sense of “ought” ought to be jettisoned. . . . It would be a great improvement if, instead of “morally wrong,” one always named a genus such as “untruthful,” “unchaste,” “unjust.” (G.E.M. Anscombe. *Modern Moral Philosophy* 1958, p.177)

The initial examination of the moral education landscape that founded this investigation revealed a central notion around which the study has developed. Neither of the major theoretical streams that were available to the moral educator was sufficiently flexible to address the entire spectrum of moral experience that introduced this dissertation. The central problem concerned the dichotomous nature of the two main educative perspectives, and their inability to inform and supplement each other. Neither virtue theories, nor cognitive developmentalism are, in and of themselves, a satisfactory basis for moral education, in that they individually address only one section of the spectrum of moral opportunity and one of the polarities of the various spectra that followed. In Oakeshott’s (1962) terms, they express either the “language” or the “literature” or morality, and have no innate ability to address the inadequacies of the other. As Cochrane (1979) parodies: “Principles without feelings are empty, just as feelings without principles are blind” (p. 85). Previous attempts to address this reality, such as Peter’s notion of intelligent habits, Frankena’s MEX and MEY, and the theoretical positions examined in chapter three, have, for various reasons, proved to be deficient in one aspect or another. A mechanism needed to be found that would give the moral educator access to both perspectives within one theoretical approach.

An exploration of the potential of a dialogic process has shown that utilizing the tool of dialogue extends and empowers the Kantian pole of the spectrum so that
habituated behaviours can be informed by a deontological perspective while, simultaneously, the behavioural aspects of virtue, rejected by Kohlberg as “content” and by Kant as “inclination” become embedded in a more encompassing theoretical perspective. Combining a Vygotskian approach to dialogue and the apperceptive mass that characterizes it with a Bakhtinian genre of dialogue, labeled respectively magistral and Socratic dialogues, produces a coherent process that satisfies the requirements of the entirety of a spectrum of moral opportunity. A dialogic process, thus, provides an account of the realization of the moral self that satisfies two important criteria. First, it provides a theoretical framework for the manifestation of virtues that allows the agent to adjudicate which competing virtue—honesty against compassion, for example—is to be realized in which circumstances. Further, as an understanding of moral agency accepts outcomes based upon the abilities of the agent to reason and judge, it fulfills the requirement that the hierarchical integration of virtue be structured by the developing cognitive capabilities of the agent.

The potential of dialogue obviates the lack of a cognitive structure within which virtuous practices may take place in the standard formulation of cognitive developmentalism, and provides isomorphism between the agent’s cognitive stage and the virtue behaviour. The dialogic process suggested allows for integration of the agent’s cognitive structures with an understood set of virtue behaviours. The recursive process of the agent through the magistral dialogue prior to the empowered entrance into the Socratic dialogue is predicated upon the increasing cognitive powers demonstrated by the agent. This process ensures that virtue behaviours are temporally consonant with the highest cognitive stage acquired by the agent.

The ontological and epistemological basis for the dialogic process as outlined in chapter four provides conceptual conduits that ensures isomorphism because the epistemological and ontological bases are offered in the form of spectra along which the agent can be located according to both the agent’s self awareness and cognitive stage.
The development of a framework within which competing virtue behaviours may be adjudicated arises from the establishment of a dialogically-based theory of moral development.

When the moral domain is considered to be governed by the spectra that have been examined throughout this dissertation, the potential of a dialogic process to address the requirements of moral education has been established by resolving the subordinate problems arising from the major claim as outlined in chapter one. Those problems required that criteria be deduced in order to select an extant theoretical position suitable for reformulation. The criteria were provided in chapter two and, following a review of a variety of theories, were used to analyse theoretical positions to produce Kohlberg's theory of moral development as suitable for reformulation. An epistemological and ontological basis was provided to justify the use of dialogue, and the practical application of a dialogic process was formulated that was consonant with the structural basis of performance factors. The problems that were posed in chapter one have been addressed to support the major claim. The result has been the development of a rapprochement between two theoretical perspectives that has greater potential than either perspective alone. A new view of morality is, therefore, available to the moral educator.

This view of morality is not derived from a conventional theory of morality or of moral development, despite a conventional definition of morality given in chapter one. Similar to the two perspectives considered, many of the classical moral theories have plausible elements and yet are inconsistent with each other, and their disparate foundations do not lend themselves to a satisfying rapprochement. A new moral theory, emerging from a dialogic model of an ethic of virtue and an ethic of obligation, must take note of the consequences of such a model. It cannot, for example, concentrate solely upon virtuous behaviour and ignore moral reasoning as a method of
resolving moral dilemmas. Further, it must utilize the strengths of the two components of the model.

Virtue theory, as represented by habituated behaviour, has the strength of addressing three specific areas neglected by the ethics of obligation: moral motivation, mediated impartiality, and issues arising such a mediation. Stocker’s (1976) example of moral motivation illustrates the deficiency of moral duty:

You are in the hospital recovering from a long illness. You are both bored and restless, and so you are delighted when Smith arrives to visit. You have a good time chatting with him; his visit is just the tonic you needed. After a time, you tell Smith how much you appreciate his coming: he is really a fine fellow and a good friend to take the time to come all the way across town to see you. But Smith demurs: he protests that he is really only doing his duty. At first, you think Smith is merely being modest, but the more you talk the clearer it becomes that he is speaking the literal truth. He is not visiting you because he wants to, or because he likes you, but only because he thinks it is his duty to “do the right thing” and on this occasion he has decided that it is his duty to visit you—perhaps because he knows of no one who is more in need or is easier to get to. (p. 454)

Motivation stemming from obligation does not satisfy individual needs as addressed in community. As Rachels (1993) comments:

Of course, there is nothing wrong with what Smith did. The problem is with his motive. We value friendship, love, and respect; and we want our relationships with people to be based on mutual regard. Acting from an abstract sense of duty, or from a desire to “do the right thing” is not the same. We would not want to live in a community of people who acted only from such motives, nor would we want to be
such a person. Therefore, theories of ethics that emphasize only right
actions will never provide a completely satisfactory account of moral
life. (p. 173)

Duty serves the abstract and the impartial, and cannot be disregarded by any moral
type, but is unsatisfactory as a motivating force in the particular, the contextual and
the communal. The vast majority of the an agent’s moral life is practiced not in the
abstract and the impartial, but in the relational, the personal, and the immediate.
However, an ethic of obligation provides the tools for the resolution of particular
dilemmic situations that an ethic of virtue can only address in general and non-specific
terms, and must equally be accounted for.

A dialogic perspective on moral education leads naturally to the consideration of
a dialogically-based conception of a moral theory and an accompanying theory of moral
development. Such a theory could be called a Dialogically Derived Morality (DDM).
First of all, a satisfactory theory must be sensitive to the accepted facts of human nature
and human development, and it should be cognizant of the place of humanity in the
interdependent ecologies that form the planetary environment. In this vein, while
Hume noted, “The life of a man is of no greater importance to the universe than the life
of an oyster” (Hume, 1965, p. 301), he also recognized that lives, desires, needs,
plans and hopes are of importance to individuals. Human hubris may be unjustified,
but it is not totally unjustified. Humanity’s cognitive and intellectual capacities and
evolution as a rational species makes morality possible. Because of rationality,
humanity is capable of formulating reasons in favour of one action over another. At the
lowest level, agents are capable of providing reasons why one action is to be preferred,
if only because such an action promotes the agent’s interests, and other actions are
rejected because they frustrate those interests. The consideration of reasons for actions
introduces the factor of deliberation, and the consequent compelling force of actions
based on the result of finding the weightiest reasons for those actions. The origin of
the notion of "ought" is to be found in this fact; if agent's were incapable of articulating reasons, then an agent's actions, like the actions of the lower animals, would stem solely from what Kant labeled "inclinations."

Once morality is considered a matter of acting on reasons, a second factor emerges. One may be consistent or inconsistent in reasoning. One way of being inconsistent in reasoning is to accept a reason as forceful and compelling in one circumstance, and refuse to accept such force and compulsion in another similar circumstance, when no factor can be identified that justifies distinguishing between them. This inconsistency is at the heart of Kant's categorical imperative, and is easily comprehended in cases of sexism and racism. Inconsistencies, such as unjustifiably considering the interests of one race or gender over the interest of another race or gender, are moral offences because they are, at heart, offences against reason. Reason demands that persons receive impartial treatment; that personhood be respected by impartial consideration of interest.\footnote{For a reasoned discussion concerning the inadequacy of impartiality as a normative end, however, see MacLagan (1960).}

As humans have evolved as social creatures, living together in community, needing cooperation and capable of caring about individual and group welfare, there is a symmetry between the requirements of reason. These requirements include impartiality, the requirements of social living-namely, adherence to a set of rules that if, impartially applied serves everyone's interests, and the natural inclination of humanity towards caring for others, at least to a moderate degree. However, there is a continued tension between the requirements of impartiality as a consequence of continued social reality, and particularity as a consequence of personalized social intercourse.

What is established, then, is a tension between moral action as motivated by foundational principles, and by face-to-face situation specific responsibility and
solidarity. Rorty’s descriptions of objectivity and solidarity reflect the poles of this dialogue (Rorty, 1985). Dynamically, within this tension, are discursive moral principles and particular moral obligations, that are wrought simultaneously by the bipolar demands of a foundational respect for persons (associated with Rorty’s objective pole) on the one hand, and by the demand that we take responsibility for our moral decisions by virtue of face-to-face solidarity (associated with Rorty’s pole of solidarity) on the other. Ever situated within this reality, moral discourse acknowledges the tension between universality and community, between objectivity and solidarity. DDM allows the agent to explore and resolve this tension. For Rorty, “the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of one’s community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible” (Rorty, 1985, p. 5). The tension between these polarities is, however, mediated by a commonality that links both of the poles.

The polarities suggested by Rorty are linked by an understanding of mutual obligation. DDM, therefore, has an overt communitarian bias. Parties in moral discourse owe each other a duty of moral justification. To make manifest a respect for another, at any point on any of the spectra offered in this dissertation, requires that the other has a right to understand the basis upon which moral determinations are made. This understanding is based upon a binding (if hypothetical) obligation among beings, capable of being moved by reason and an awareness of the importance of the notion of community and an individual’s natural home in a community, that a mutual concern for the welfare of others is a viable moral orientation. Agents are continually engaged in relations with others similar to themselves who are capable of seeing reasons for and against actions that transcend pleasantness or expediency. A persistent breakdown of moral harmony does not necessarily indicate moral incommensurability as much as a lack of appreciation of the central obligation. Agents develop an increasing capacity to judge actions against principles that could not reasonably be rejected. While statements
such as this, of course, demand that the term “reasonably” do most of the theoretical work, that position is addressed by the already tempered nature of the agent’s autonomy to adjudicate the reasonableness of the principles in question: they must be capable of derivation from the absolute first principle of respect for persons. Thus, between the polarities suggested by Rorty, where moral discourse is energized in dialogue, the agent operates within a climate of obligation, either an obligation based upon a commitment to impartiality at the objective pole, or an obligation based on mutuality at the solidarity pole. At the objective pole, we owe each other the obligation to impartiality and some form of reflective reciprocity. At the solidarity pole we owe each other the obligation to recognize our shared humanity and shared human needs expressed in personal engagement. Throughout, we owe each other the obligation to act in ways that could be easily defended in terms reasonably accepted by all, in other words, in ways that reflect the rational nature of morality.

The post-modern exhortation to resist the Parmenidean urge to seek a basis for, and an explanation of, morality that transcends the contextual and the immediate, has already been rejected by this dissertation, but Rorty’s acknowledgment of the interaction between the demands of objectivity (no matter how envisaged) and solidarity within moral community is appropriate. Moral action is wrought by resolving this tension between objectivity and solidarity, between foundational commitment and face-to-face responsibility, and this resolution is most naturally accomplished in dialogue.

Kant is implicated in this tension in the obvious association of impartiality of consideration of interest with Kant’s respect for persons. The dialogue between solidarity and objectivity which forms the energizing content of the dialogic process is highlighted in the tension between the positions of Kant and Hume. Kant’s project undertakes to base ethical behaviour in reason, in a direct challenge to Hume’s project to base ethics in feeling. This tension between Kant and Hume is reflected in the tension between a principled moral commitment to respect for persons and impartiality
at the objective pole, and a visceral motivation to act by virtue of face-to-face responsibility at the pole of solidarity. Hume denied that reason or rationality could play a role in morality (Hume, 1963). For Hume, moral action is produced by sentiment and not by reason or empirical experience. For the present purposes with respect to the DDM posited here, Hume is located at the pole of solidarity, where moral action is dialogically motivated by the responsibility associated with face-to-face interaction within a community of virtue. For Kant, it is "practical reason," an intuitive rationality, which informs moral decisions and action (1984). His categorical imperative is rationally derived and exists at the level of a foundational and universal moral law. His reference to "the mystery of morality inside me" is a reference to this universal moral law, or conscience. Kant is, thus, situated at the objective or foundational pole of the dialogue, where impartiality of consideration of interest, associated with Kant's respect for persons, functions as a reference with respect to which practices as enhancing or diminishing the dignity of being may be recognized throughout the dialogue.

To this point, DDM appears to be a variant of consequentialist morality, based on a conflict between socialization processes and autonomous principled morality; but in important ways DDM is at variance with utilitarian notions. As rational agents, individuals have free will and the freedom to make and act upon choices. They are free to act upon what they perceive to be right and equally free to act upon what they perceive to be wrong or unreasonable. Thus, agents are responsible for their freely chosen actions and are judged morally good if they choose correctly and morally deficient if they chose wrongly. This responsibility appears to have two consequences. First, it helps to explain why freedom is such a cherished human value. An agent who is denied the right to chose, and to be held responsible for the choice of action, is denied the right to achieve any kind of personal moral worth. Second, the treatment

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48 Note the congruence between this assertion and the treatment of freedom in chapter four.
accorded to individuals may now be mediated by the treatment they have afforded others. Adjusting the treatment of individuals to match how they themselves have chosen to treat others need not devolve into a matter of rewarding friends and punishing enemies, but becomes a matter of treating individuals as responsible moral agents, who, by their own choices, show themselves to be deserving of particular responses. To fail to make this discriminating response is to deny individuals the respect their autonomy deserves as it is revealed through their actions.

Thus far, DDM articulates two separate and apparently contradictory ideas: first, that agents ought to act in such a way as to impartially promote the interests of others; and second, that agents ought to treat others in a way that reflects the way that others have chosen to behave. These ideas are not to be understood as independent of one another. The first establishes a general presumption in favour of the impartial promotion of the interests of others; and the second provides the grounds on which this presumption may be overridden. Thus, the second functions as a qualification of the first, and specifies when an agent may depart from a policy of equality and impartiality. They may be combined into a single principle, derived directly from the absolute first principle of respect for persons. The first principle of DDM is, therefore, a more robust formulation of the familiar Kantian principle, and may be stated as:

*Act always to impartially promote the interests of everyone alike,*

*except when individuals deserve a peculiar response as a result of their past behaviour.*

The appropriate use of the second part of the principle diminishes as the agent progresses through the dialogic process.49 During the initial stages of moral

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49 When neighbour Jones, on the occasion of Smith’s car trouble, refuses Smith a ride to work on the basis that he simply didn’t wish to do so, then Smith is morally correct to refuse to aid Jones in similar circumstances. In fact, Smith is morally obligated to refuse Jones’ request for help. To aid Jones in this circumstance is to deny Jones the opportunity to acknowledge responsibility for his past actions. To aid Jones is not to teach him the lesson of forgiveness and generosity, it is to
development, the desert qualification, may, and indeed should, be used as found to be appropriate. The later stages, however, will afford few occasions when the desert qualification will be found to be applicable.

DDM is a developmental construction of morality and agentic moral development, and accords to the dialogic process that grounds it. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect two major aspects of the developmental process that relate to the two genres of dialogue found in the process. The process of development itself is based on the phenomenon of decentration that grounds the work of both Kohlberg and Piaget, and is considered to be additive/inclusive in nature, disclosing increasingly decentred moral orientations. The stages, once acquired, and their application to the moral life of the agent, are available as moral responses regardless of the development of the agent, although, as will be shown, the activation of these stages is mediated by the maxim related to the highest acquired stage. The stages represent a developmental view of moral response and are acquired sequentially, but may be accessed by the agent regardless of his level of cognitive development. For example, an agent who is sufficiently cognitively developed, and who has explored and constructed a moral awareness through the Socratic dialogue, still lives a life characterized by simple human interaction, despite his newly acquired abilities to address dilemma situations. Such an agent, however, when faced with stage one interactions, brings to those interactions maxim-based constraints that are not available to a similar agent less advanced in development. The construction is, therefore, one of an increasing sophistication of response at all stages based on the understandings garnered at the highest stage of development. Figure 7 shows the relationship of the developmental stages to the
<table>
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**Figure 7.** The relationship of moral stage to dialogic genre.

dialogues.

The magistral dialogue is the locus of the first and second stages of development. The first stage is characterized by what Levinas labels, "face-to-face morality." At this stage, both the neophyte and more developed moral agent engage in the morality of personal relationship and personal contact. Whatever the skills employed by the agent, the maxim that characterizes this stage is the lowest of the four maxims (all of which are backed by the first principle of DDM) and is formulated:

*Act always in such a manner that preserves and enhances personal relationships, unless to do so violates a superior maxim.*

Clearly, the novice agent, when operating at this level, and through the instrument of the magistral dialogue, has no awareness of the greater complexities of moral life, and is governed by the assertoric injunction to "act always in a manner that preserves and enhances personal relationships" under the principle of impartiality and desert. For example, a child, faced with the opportunity to demonstrate honesty in the form of returning lost property to its owner, may do so on the basis that such an action reinforces bonds of friendship and is, in fact, a characteristic of that friendship. If the owner is a stranger and, thus, outside the bonds of friendship, the act can be characterized as initiating a personal relationship.

Recursive journeys through the dialogue will reveal the inadequacy of limited person-to-person morality, and the potential to be found in expanding the moral
horizons to include notions of the moral community. This marks the entry of the agent into the second stage of development where the focus is on community, individual rights, responsibilities within the community and the role of the moral agent in that setting. The maxim that guides action within this stage is formulated:

*Act always in a manner that preserves and enhances the moral community, unless to do so violates a superior maxim.*

The immediate effect of this maxim is to mediate the agents response at the interpersonal level with an awareness that responses in that milieu, while liable to the stricture of the stage one maxim and the requirement of the overarching principle already understood, are further bounded by the requirements of the newly acquired stage. The field of response at the lower stage is thereby limited by the awareness of the requirements of a higher stage. In short, a response at the interpersonal level is no longer acceptable if it violates the requirements of a stage that includes a more decentred notion of moral responsibility. While still characterized by heteronomy, this stage reflects a heteronomy that is mediated by an understanding that morality is not merely the obedience to assertions of proper interpersonal conduct, but by rules of conduct that transcend the immediate and the personal, and as such are liable to increasing scrutiny by the agent. In the first stage, agents are relational within the community; in the second stage, they are relational with the community.

Of course, the moral community in question is the community of virtuous behaviour revealed through the magistral dialogue; it is the community, not constructed by the agent, but the one into which that agent has been initiated as a consequence of dialogue. This stage is the conventional morality stage familiar to many developmental theorists. The response of the previous example is now cast in the light of the expectations of the virtue community. Lost property is returned because “that’s the way we do things here. Good people return lost property, regardless of the relationship between them, because that is the expectation of the community. The
community thinks people are important and this is a way of showing respect for them. Actions like this makes it easy for us to live together.” It must be noted that the response anticipated by Durkheim would be identical except for the fact that the morality of the action, as a DDM response, is grounded in respect for persons, while for Durkheim, the response is moral in virtue of its societal endorsement. DDM is not relativist. Durkheim’s morality is inherently relativist. Similarly, a civics approach would endorse this stage of morality as socially integrative, and would echo the communitarian theme of this stage, but it would be unable to take a novice agent beyond the civic virtue of conformity to integrative behaviours due to its limited understanding of the moral domain.

Recursive iterations of the dialogue, however, reveal the inherent inadequacies of a conventional morality to address the kinds of issues the agent is becoming increasingly cognitively prepared to explore. The climacteric or caesura marked by the entry into the Socratic dialogue is characterized by an awareness that the domain of morality encompasses the abstract and unknown as well as the particular and familiar. The application of the principle of impartial consideration of interest and respect for persons is now to be elevated above the relational and the contextual. The potential of the morality of the Aristotelian pole has been exhausted.

The post-climacteric stage of morality is the morality of abstract personhood, in which individual rights and responsibilities are to be adjudicated with increasing autonomy by the agent, due to the empowering energy of the Socratic dialogue. It is morality as understood at the Kantian pole. These rights and responsibilities are viewed against the backdrop of the rights and responsibilities of abstract others, without the framework of a virtue community to provide the structure within which such adjudication is to occur. It is the beginning of autonomy, and the initial construction of a “view from nowhere.” The maxim governing this stage is:
Act always in a manner that preserves and enhances the rights and responsibilities of all who are affected by your actions, unless to do so violates a superior maxim.

This stage is the stage of moral reasoning using the impartiality and desert principle already familiar to the agent, but which now must be applied to issues of fairness, justice, reciprocity, etc. The content of this stage will be discussed later in this chapter, but it may be initially noted that the agent’s habituation in virtuous responses to moral opportunities provides a repertoire of behaviours from which a possible range of actions may be selected. Clearly, returning lost property to an owner is the right thing to do (all other things being equal) regardless of one’s relationship to that owner, or the strictures of a moral community. It is the right thing to do because it confirms the rights of an individual to his/her property. Although Wilson’s command to reason, utilizing the moral components he provides, would perhaps produce a similar response, and the notion of following maxims at this stage of development is useful, Wilson’s formulation is not guaranteed to produce a normative outcome from such a non-normative process. Habituated virtue, however, has accustomed the agent to certain behaviour, and having those ranges of actions available as a repertoire to call upon facilitates moral reasoning when the outcome is an already familiar result. This is an example of the famous Platonic notion of habituation in certain behaviours in childhood, so that when they are encountered and reasoned about in adulthood they are greeted as familiar acquaintances. Kohlberg’s formulation of moral reasoning based on justice would be applicable here, provided that justice were considered in non-Kohlbergian terms—that is, as not just possessing all the virtues, but also possessing the practical wisdom to decide when and for what purpose they are to be employed. Unfortunately, Kohlberg’s theory ignores the rest of the spectrum and does not allow the agent to acquire a repertoire of virtuous behaviours to reinforce the result of moral reasoning. While purportedly demonstrating the novice’s cognitive structures in
addressing moral dilemmas, Kohlberg’s formulation actually demonstrates how inadequately such attempts are made. The novice’s responses to “quandary ethics” are so inadequate, in fact, that DDM is a qualitatively superior approach, because it provides the agent with responses that are easily understood, the significance of which can be grasped at a level that initiates the agent into the moral domain in a meaningful way. It produces the “forgotten dreamworld” that Sichel (1988b) found so significant.

The final stage of development stemming from progress within the Socratic dialogue is based on the understanding that hubris and unenlightened anthropocentrism leads to unjustifiable moral adjudication. Even viewed in the abstract, humanity lives in a concrete world of finite and exhaustible resources, upon which the very continuing existence of humanity depends. This final process of decentration extends the application of moral interest to the environment itself within which humanity must function. The moral community has extended in this dialogic process from the individual in personal relationship (or potential relationship) to an identifiable moral community, to humanity itself and outward to the place of humanity within a greater sphere. The maxim that governs the morally permissible in this stage is:

Act always in a manner that preserves and enhances the ability of humanity to continue a sustainable existence within as diverse and stable an ecological environment as possible. \(^{58}\)

Moral decisions in this stage are clearly complex. Stage four is virtually a transcendent stage, and, in practice, few agents will be called upon to make such decentred decisions.\(^{51}\) However, the agent has already had experience in the previous stage

\(^{50}\) It is the application of the notion of imperfect duties (see chapter ) to agape, as discussed below, that allows agape to be applied not just to humanity, but to the natural place of humanity within an environment, and the duty of care owed to that environment in the name of humanity.

\(^{51}\) Such decisions are frequently to be made, however, at the individual level. Does one pressure authorities to clearly label genetically engineered foodstuffs? Does one then boycott such foodstuffs? What is the moral responsibility of the consumer concerning tropical hardwoods? To what extent should one consume material developed in monoculture conditions that have negatively affected natural diversity in their place of origin?
where the moral response has been taken from a range of type moralities. Previous
moral response has been characterized by extensive analysis and cognition as the
correct response according to the theme that, for the agent, best expresses the respect
for persons in that particular circumstance. Such analytical powers are required to
energize the agent’s new understanding that the treatment accorded must now be
situated within a view of humanity attempting to sustain a fragile and threatened
environment. Issues such as specism now become significant, and the agent is lead
into a new realm of moral reasoning with only the maxim of the stage, the moral
experience of the previous stages, and his cognitive structures as a guide. There is a
rich opportunity here for discourse concerning the development of a non-
anthropocentric morality. A discourse that is already well-developed and becoming
increasingly apposite.

This initial and cursory examination of the reality of DDM reveals it to have the
potential to achieve the results that the theorists examined in chapter three could expect
from their constructions, and it further appears, thus far, to be able to do so without the
criticisms to which these theorists are vulnerable. The only issue yet to be determined
is the normative end-point that structures the developmental process.

**Respect for Persons and the Development of Agape**

Developmental theories usually posit a final stage of development that
encapsulates the ascending stages in a more complete and satisfying way. Kohlberg’s
contention that stage six acquisition is based on a complete and sophisticated
understanding of justice, while previous stages are more rudimentary representations of
justice, is an example. Kohlberg, in fact, equates moral development in terms of the
structural acquisition of justice competencies based on decentration and increasing
cognitive capacity, and posits a stage seven based on a transcendental universal agape.
DDM makes no such large claims.
Despite the modesty of its claims, however, a normative component for the end-point of development—a component that transcends the content of the process—must be provided to justify the process itself. The major claim of DDM is that it is capable of introducing an agent into the moral domain in a coherent and sensible manner that matches the agent’s understanding of the world, and has the potential to increase that understanding. Although agape is the normative end-point, as is shown below, the defining attribute of a DDM agent is integrity. DDM is neither designed nor intended to produce moral sainthood, only moral competence.

An immediate candidate for such a normative basis is the process of decentration that characterizes DDM. Such centration, however, despite enlarging the view of the agent from the immediate and contextual to the abstract and universal, does not, in and of itself, provide a normative justification. One may question for what normative purpose the moral horizon has been enlarged. Decentration alone is unable to provide a response. The guiding principle of DDM, however, has been the Kantian principle of respect for persons that has also justified the tempering of the autonomy of the emerging moral agent as discussed in chapter one, and it is through an examination of this principle that the normative component is discovered.

The conceptual content concerning the development of agape in this section is drawn in its entirety from the work of MacLagan (1960). MacLagan states simply:

The principle of respect for persons, I believe, cannot be understood except by reference to Agape. It may be that the expression “Agape” and “respect for persons” do not have precisely the same force, that the first signifies something more than the second. . . . But at least it is in Agape, and in nothing less than that, that the principle of respect comes to life and breathes. We use language that we do not properly comprehend, we substitute dead formula for vital conviction, if we speak of it without a realization of this. (p. 207)
MacLagan reminds us that *Agape* has, as its objective correlate, the implicit worth of persons, simply as persons, while a reasonable examination would require that *agape* have this notion of worth as a presupposition not just as an objective correlate. He structures his analysis with the question: “Surely, it is only *because* people matter as such that Agape can correctly said to be the appropriate response to them; and how do we come to in the first instance to see that people matter in this way?” (MacLagan, 1960, p. 207). For MacLagan, two factors are in operation in the development of *agape*. The first is a rational one, and the second is a natural one, or, in Kantian terms, a pathological one.

The rational factor stems from a capacity that MacLagan construes as present in persons by definition—namely, the ability to recognize the legitimacy of claims upon us that run counter to our own wishes. For this capacity to become developed requires nothing more that life experiences that provide opportunities in which the opposition of “I ought” and “I want” is called into being. A secondary condition for this rational factor is called by MacLagan “‘volitional sincerity’—the self-wrought sincerity of ‘practical reason’—in face of the challenge that the difference between wish and obligation offers” (p. 210). This rational factor finds expression in both negative and positive ways that will be introduced below.

The natural factor is provided by the capacity for sympathy which is construed again as a part of human endowment. It is a criterion of personhood, therefore, that an individual have the capacity for the development of sympathy. MacLagan provides a four-part scheme for the development of sympathy, beginning with what he terms “animal sympathy.”

Animal sympathy is a basic acknowledgment of the linkage between individuals in concert. At this stage, the other is not recognized because of individual qualities, but rather there is a “psychological infection” of one individual by another. This is the prerequisite for a functioning psychology of community. Developing out of this animal
sympathy is an emotional identification of an agent with individual others. A characteristic of this stage is the knowledge that others are experiencing-subjects, with experiences one may imaginatively "feel oneself into." This stage is called by MacLagan "passive sympathy," and it is within this stage that empathetic feelings find expression. This critical stage is the locus of important developmental processes during which the other becomes real to the agent as a subject rather than an object—as a fellow being liable to the same distress as the agent, and as vulnerable to the same exigencies.\footnote{52}

Agents are, however, naturally prone to issues of self-concern. While these issues are natural, they become a hindrance to the development of passive sympathy (and, hence, to further sympathy stages) if they become exaggerated and obstruct the realization of the subjectivity of the other. It is at this juncture that the negative aspect of the rational factor becomes crucial. This negative force:

is, primarily, to remove the psychological obstacle to Agape that is created by our natural self-centredness and self-concern. Without the detachment from self that the sincere submission to the authority of duty incorporates any "love" we might have for others would be, at bottom, a function of our subjective constitution, not of our consciousness of the worth or importance of those we love.

(MacLagan, 1960, p. 210)

Once this negative force of the rational factor is operant, however, the agent progresses naturally to the third stage of sympathy. The stage of passive sympathy is described by MacLagan as the "natural matrix of active sympathy" (p. 212), on the basis that it is psychologically impossible to feel genuinely sympathy for someone in the passive mode without having some measure of sympathy in the active mode.

\footnote{52 Cochrane (1979) has suggested that this stage may be the origin of moral imagination (p. 84), in which case, note the applicability of this contention to the discussion of phantasia that follows below.}
In the third stage, the "feeling for others" is translated into practical concern for others. This stage of active sympathy is intimately related to its predecessor, and leads directly to the development of agape. The third stage, while being a naturally occurring development, falls short of agape because it falls short of being moral because it is without principled structure to determine its expression. Agape, for MacLagan, is a reflective, principled (and thereby moral) version of active sympathy. The issue left unresolved, therefore, is to find the mechanism that elevates active sympathy into agape. It is the positive aspect of the rational factor that performs this function. This positive aspect—a lived sense of obligation—translates the other from the natural object of concern into the proper object of concern, and:

correspondingly. . .the concept of worth or moral importance of the other is for the first time operative. The moralized concern for the other, concerned simply in its character as moral, as practical principle, is what I mean by "the principle of respect for persons."

(MacLagan, 1960, p. 216)

The principle of respect for persons and agape are, therefore, identical as far as their objective significance or their practical and directional importance is concerned, but they differ as to their subjective focus. MacLagan (1960) notes:

...although without the warmth of personal sympathy we could have never understood and formulated the claim of persons to our practical respect, once we have done so we can adhere to the principle doggedly, in no merely routine and uncomprehending manner, despite all the vicissitudes of feeling, and even when it would be at least natural to say that our feelings are dead. This would not be Agape, but what should we call it, if not practical respect? (p. 217)
Respect for persons, leading to *agape*, that has guided and formed the moral options of
the agent through the dialogic process of moral education, therefore, constitutes the
normative component of the development that forms the core of DDM.

**The Content of the DDM**

The magistral dialogue has a clear *telos* identified in the authority of the third voice; this
telos is simply the acceptance by the novice of the virtuous understanding of the
community formed around the impartiality and desert principle already described. The
agent enters into a virtue community constructed and maintained by others, not created
by the agent. Inevitably, especially at the inception of the dialogue, the child’s
understanding, and the sense that is made of the behavioural exemplars, are incomplete.
The tendency will be, therefore, for the child to mimic behaviour rather than behave
from sense-making. Such an episode may be of short duration, but need not,
necessarily, be a negative one. In fact, it may be the occasion of development.

MacLagan (1960) makes an appropriate observation:

>[W]hile there may be nothing that can properly be called other-concern
in the absence of empathy, we may none the less act in relation to
others, in a routine way, *as though we were really concerned for*
them, even using the language of concern as we do so. . . . Or it is at
least conceivable that we should be simply imitating a behaviour-
pattern characteristic of our social group and simulating a concern that
we have as yet never genuinely experienced at all. . . . [I]t could be
that such behaviour, though in itself routine and mechanical, “touched
off” our latent capacity for empathy and provided thereby the
condition for its own transformation into an expression of real
concern. (p. 214) [Author’s italics]

The basis of the Socratic dialogue is the dissolution of the power asymmetry that
characterizes the magistral dialogue. As a consequence, the thrust of the dialogue, and,
hence, its thematic focus, belongs increasingly to the second voice. According to the parameters of the moral opportunity, the agent will select a moral theme from which to address situations. This theme may be some aspect of justice, whether distributive, restorative or retributive; it may be some form relating to reflective equilibrium; it may be a manifestation of care. This process may be surmised as having its genesis in the increasing dissatisfaction the agent has felt within the strictures of the magistral dialogue. It parallels the move from passive to active sympathy. Passive sympathy, for MacLagan, leads naturally to active sympathy, but the transformation must surely be predicated upon an increasing dissatisfaction with the role of passive sympathy in moral response. It is reasonable, therefore, to consider that these dissatisfactions—with the constricting role of the magistral dialogue, and with the limits of passive sympathy—reinforce and energize each other, and are, in fact, intimately related. DDM, therefore, provides two key opportunities for the achievement of the normative endpoint of the process.

The key issue in the Socratic dialogue is that it is agentic choice that determines the moral reasoning that will lead to moral action. That choice relates both to Pincoffs’ (1986) assertion that, “there are mutually irreducible types of moral considerations . . . there is no hierarchy with the king consideration at ease on the apex, no one principle system that incorporates all of the moral rules” (pp. 2-3), and Rawls’ (1971) understanding that, “[g]iven the heterogeneity of human selfhood, it is not good for societies or individuals to be subordinate to a single dominant end. Such subordination can only disfigure the self” (p. 554).

The appropriate process, grounded in the Socratic dialogue, is to reason morally by weaving a net (or if fallacies and difficulties are identified, by mending a net). Rational examination allows the agent to compare the joint strength of the woven cords of one set of considerations to the joint strength of alternative sets. The agent must accept that there is no non-aporetic formulaic procedure for such comparisons, and that
the expression of morality must resonate with Bauman’s (1993) acknowledgment of moral responsibility as the “first reality of the self,” and Kant’s (1984) “mystery of morality within me.” The ability to make effective comparisons develops with cultivation and experience, but the polemical point is that there are no moral experts and no formulaic response.

Again, it must be noted that this formulation brings to bear increasing cognitive abilities to the field of virtue behaviour, provides a logical and consistent locus for virtue behaviours in the moral life of the agent, and yet provides content for the cognitive developmental view that is lacking in Kohlberg.

A critical response to this formulation would be that the basis of DDM is one of unrelieved relativism; agents are free to articulate any moral understanding grounded in any fashion they choose. Such a criticism is unjustified. DDM has, as its first principle, Kantian considerations of respect for persons. Indeed, the autonomy of the agent in this regard is considered to be tempered, not absolute, as argued in chapter one. Notwithstanding this tempering of autonomy, Bauman (1993) asserts that relying on moral intuition does not necessarily entail relativism (it is, he contests, the competition among ethical codes for paradigmatic status, and not moral intuition, that gives rise to relativism). Strike and Soltis (1985) take a less decisive position with regard to the origins of moral intuitions, pointing to the commonalities of humanity, particularly at the broad level of intuitions. Strike and Soltis are content with the establishment of “a provisional reflective equilibrium” that is tolerant of social constructivism with respect to intuitional morality: “We can be objective without being certain, and we can be tolerant and open to other points of view without being relativists” (Strike & Soltis, 1985, p. 60). Reflective equilibrium between members of radically different cultures may not be easily attained, but cultures are not so far apart that it is impossible. What is assumed is both a moral and a rational capacity. An
obvious move to check the propriety of moral decision making when lacking a common criterion such as Kohlberg’s justice structures is to invoke the concept of conscience.

Conscience is the source of the deeply held convictions an agent has about the moral status of actions, past, or future. Thus, an agent acts in good conscience when possessed with a sense of certainty that what he does is morally permissible or required; he acts from a guilty or bad conscience if what he does he believes deeply is morally forbidden. In this sense, conscience has rightly been compared to a unique individual voice: it speaks to the individual about the individuals’ conviction of what is held to be of the highest moral importance and urges actions in accord with those convictions. For this reason, conscience is often understood, not only as a privileged source of moral conviction, but also as the seat of moral motivation. Agents act on what conscience urges.

Conscience, however, is fallible: An agent can, even when acting conscientiously, nevertheless be mistaken. An agent can, for that reason, do wrong in good conscience, or right with a guilty one. Thus, conscience is not the capacity for knowing what morality requires. Because conscience is epistemically fallible, no matter how firmly it convinces, agents who want to ensure the justification of their actions must not follow conscience blindly or act without questioning its dictates. Whether the urges of conscience accord to what morality requires depends on whether the content of conscience can win independent warrant, and conscience itself cannot answer that question. For the content of conscience may indeed be nothing but internalized conventional morality, a moral content which, upon examination, may not be adequate. Consequently, the appeal to conscience is not sufficient to justify an action, although a conscientious agent guilty of wrongdoing on independent grounds, is not for that reason a vicious person.
The Warranted Content of Conscience

As has been shown, while conscience is a readily accessible concept for agents to utilize, it is the content of conscience that requires an independent warrant. Such a warrant must be related to the ability of the agent to determine the correct moral action in any circumstance, in other words, to the development of the intellectual virtue of phronesis.

Phronesis is variously translated as moral discernment, practical wisdom, and prudence, will be discussed here as practical reasoning. Aristotle defines phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics as "a true and reasoned state or capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man" (III.3., 1112b11). It is a description of practical reasoning that provides the framework within which a person can decide "What should I do in this situation?" Phronesis is an important part of Aristotle's ethical theory, as it involves the understanding of the "good" for humanity. In fact, Aristotle describes phronesis as an intellectual virtue, as a state which allows the individual who attains it to be able to ascertain what is good for humankind, and then to deliberate about how best to reach that good.

Many writers on practical reasoning discuss the concept as if it were strictly a practical syllogism. Writers have focused on this formal construct and have called it "practical syllogism" or "practical argument." However, the term "practical syllogism" itself is not used by Aristotle (Hardie, 1980, p. 35). What is more plausible is the relation of the practical syllogism or argument to the concept of practical reasoning. Fenstermacher and Richardson suggest that the practical argument is a formal reconstruction of a piece of practical reasoning, but does not replace the actual reasoning that occurs.

The most basic form of the practical syllogism was laid out by Aristotle in De Motu Animalium (Nussbaum, 1978). The form of the argument consists of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion, from those premises. The major premise,
sometimes called the initiating premise, is a propositional expression of the individual's desired end. This is a universal premise, stating a general good to be reached. It is generally considered to be a desire on the part of the individual agent. The next part of the practical syllogism takes into account the individual's perception of the particular situation. Included as the content of the minor premise will be one of a collection of possible alternatives available in the present situation. The minor premise is a belief of the individual about what is possible in this situation, based on perceptions of the situation. The conclusion of this syllogistic argument will be taken here to be a propositional statement about an action to be taken. Acquisition of this intellectual virtue of phronesis, however, may be advanced by utilizing another Aristotelian construct. The Aristotelian concept of phantasia can be profitably utilized to address the development of phronesis.

"Phantasia" is popularly translated as imagination. However, a number of Aristotelian scholars prefer to leave the word untranslated and to delineate the grammatical history of the term which would render it, rather, as closely related to appearances. Aristotle defines phantasia most prominently in De Anima: "Phantasia is that, in virtue of which, we say that a phantasma occurs to us" (III.3, 428a1). Substituting the language of imagination and image, those who have imagination are considered to be people who have the capacity for creating or recognizing images. This, however, does not appear to be the meaning Aristotle assigned to phantasia. Rather, as commentators such as Nussbaum (1978) examine the concept of phantasia, they see in it something more accurately related to appearing. The root verb, phantazo, is translated to mean "to cause to appear" (Schofield, 1979, pp. 103-132). Thus, the terms phantasia and phantasma relate to the terms "appearances," or "what appears." This distinction between thinking of phantasia in terms of images or in terms of appearances lends to distinct views of what the term means in relation to phronesis.
In two different senses of the concept of phantasia, the language of images dominates. In these senses of the term, images are involved in thinking—either through the passive reception of after-images or through the active producing of images. It is in this sense that the image-related version of imagination is received, including such images as hallucinations and dreams. In this sense of phantasia, a sensory encounter with an object or an experience, is later accessed through phantasia as a version of that original sensation.

While this sense of phantasia is important, for discussions of practical reasoning Aristotle turns his attention to phantasia as “the production of mental imagery.” In this sense of the term, phantasia is the active producing of visual images or appearances. As Schofield (1979) writes, “The illustration of phantasia Aristotle gives is of someone producing things before his eyes” (p.273). The question arises, how does the role of actively producing images relate to practical reasoning, to phronesis?

In response, Nussbaum (1978) lays out the final sense of the term phantasia, which puts the focus back on appearances rather than on images and imagination. Nussbaum describes Aristotle as more concerned not with the image itself, but rather with how things “appear” to people (1978, p.119). In the definition Aristotle gives of phantasia: “that in virtue of which we say that a phantasma occurs to us...” she focuses attention on the phrase “occurs to us.” Phantasia is, on this understanding, the capability not only to perceive an appearance, but to perceive it as an appearance of a particular type. Nussbaum extends the definition: “Phantasia is the faculty in virtue of which the animal sees his object as an object of a certain sort.” (1978, p.131). Thus phantasia goes beyond just the perception of an image, to the interpretive power of the individual to interpret that image. Indeed, Aristotle lists phantasia as one of the items that fall under the category of kritika, of being involved in drawing distinctions. This the first sense of phantasia described by Aristotle as “an interpretive mental act in
connection with perception” (DA III.3, 428a1). Thus, this final sense of the term phantasía relates to interpretive power, to the ability to interpret perceptions, to make judgments or distinctions, or involving comparison.

*Phronesis* can tie all of these descriptions of phantasía together in a productive way dealing with action events. Of key importance are two points regarding *phronesis*. First, the selection of the end goal, the major premise as proposed here, is to clearly involve phantasía. Second, the premises of practical reasoning deal with particulars, which is another key role for phantasía. Several authors discuss the role that phantasía plays in helping to produce the image of the end goal, as well as to provide the possibilities for the person who is deciding to act. Frede (1972) discusses how important phantasía is in determining the goal in a situation:

All activities...presuppose that I envisage something as good or bad for me, to be pursued or avoided. The necessary condition of my thinking that something is good or bad, according to Aristotle, is that the soul shall have certain phantasmata: I have to have the image of a future good or bad. (pp. 288-289)

Wiggins (1980) writing from the perspective of *phronesis*, also lays out the necessity of deciding between different ends through examining the particulars of each concrete situation. However, Wiggins writes that when there are multiple possibilities within an individual's practical reasoning, “there are no formal criteria by which to compare the claims of competing syllogisms” (1980, p. 220). *Phantasia* comes into play in two ways here. First, phantasía in the kritika sense provides the comparative framework for allowing such a comparative judgment of “competing syllogisms” (as in the case of comparison in Pincoffs’ construction of moral reasoning). Second, phantasía in the image-producing sense provides the means for individuals to produce in their thinking and reasoning the end good (the product of reasoning when applied to the chosen syllogism). This is where phantasía becomes a part of the practical
syllogistic form. Since desire for a good end is the initiating point of action, desire is involved in every action. Nussbaum (1978) writes, *phantasia* and perception “seem to do two jobs in connection with action: they present to the animal some object of desire and they present the concrete situation as an example of what is or is not desired” (p. 232). In addition, in *phronesis*, the desire is proposed as a way to move the person to think and act. Nussbaum continues:

*Phantasia*, then, is involved in every action; it must “prepare” the desire...It looks as though its job is to present the perceived or thought object to the creature in such a way that it can be moved to act. (1978, p. 233)

The role of *phantasia* in *phronesis* is established, but it can have a further central role in the issue of warranted content of conscience. It is posited here that all individuals, as a part of their humanity, have the natural capacity for, and proclivity towards, reverence. Objects of reverence have, in the past, been the criteria by which agents have adjudicated the propriety of their actions. Lacking such objects of reverence in modern society, (Nietzsche’s proposition that “God is dead” signified the beginning of the process) agents have turned their capacity for reverence inwards, positing the goals and values that they espouse to be definitive moral criteria, and defining morality in those terms. As there is always concurrence between the actions they take and the justifying values they hold, external sources of reference have been eliminated, and any moral action becomes justifiable on the basis of self-referentiality and moral solipsism. A pivotal role for the educator, therefore, is to provide an opportunity for the activation of *phantasia* in the development of the ideal moral self as proposed by Blasi and previously discussed. The formation of an adequate construction of an ideal moral self replaces shifting and problematic values, and provides an opportunity for the internalization of feelings of honor (hypothesized by Aristotle as the natural consequence of the practice of virtue) and the experience of
shame when actions no longer conform to the expectations of the ideal moral self.

*Phantasia* can, therefore, illuminate Bradley's (1962) commentary that:

I cannot doubt . . . my own being now . . . and in that being is
involved a self which is to be here and now, and yet in this here and
now is not, I cannot doubt that there is an end which I am to make real
. . . what is the self that I am to know and will? (p. 84)

*Phantasia* facilitates the process of calling into being the ideal agent by enlarging the
agent's appreciation of the scope and range of the potential of such a self. As Bradley
indicates, such a self is "known" and "willed," the process of "knowing" and "willing"
is enriched by the development of powers of *phantasia*.

To combine the elements so far discussed produces a criterion by which the
content of conscience can be adjudicated. The development of *phronesis*, aided by
*phantasia* provides a tentative moral agenda in particular circumstances; by comparing
the contemplated actions in the light of an active ideal moral self, the agent can
determine the congruence between what has been contemplated, and what accords to a
knowledge of what is morally required based on a conception of the good aided by
*phantasia*. The construct under discussion is usually referred to as integrity, reflecting
the unity of intention, knowledge, moral awareness, moral responsibility, cognition
and action. DDM is now revealed to be the articulation of an ethic of integrity.

An ethic of integrity as applied within a dialogic process is constituted by a
respect for persons and by responsibility for the moral choices. Respect for the dignity
of being is associated with a Kantian deontological ethics at the objective or
foundational pole of the dialogic morality posited here. Responsibility for moral
choices is associated with Hume's visceral morality which is located at the pole of the
dialogue identified by Rorty's notion of solidarity, by Levinas's face-to-face
situationally responsible morality, and by Bauman's moral responsibility to the other.
The potential for moral action is constructed by the tension between objectivity and
solidarity, between foundational commitment and face-to-face responsibility, as the agent strives towards intersubjective agreement and towards a discursively principled morality, in other words, through a process of dialogue. The agent is emotionally motivated by Levinas's and Bauman's face-to-face moral responsibility, by the Rortyan pole of solidarity, and may avoid the consequences of a strong relativism and its carte-blanche morality consequent on a withdrawal of commitment by reference to the opposite and more objective pole, with which is associated the principle of respect for people. Moral action and moral judgment are always aporetically situated in this dialogue, and the agent must be ever mindful of its polarities in the search of a discursively principled morality, dynamically situated on the spectrum which spans the poles of solidarity and objectivity. Conscience spans the spectrum, but defined differently towards each end in terms of the knowledge of the good that forms the major premise of the syllogism of practical reason. Towards the pole of solidarity, conscience is understood in terms of Hume's sentiment, Bauman's and Levinas's face to face responsibility, and Rorty's solidarity, all underpinned by a commitment to impartiality and a teleological rationale. Towards the pole of objectivity, conscience is understood in terms of Kant's respect for persons by virtue of the categorical imperative and deontological force, and in terms of a principled commitment to a respect for persons. Both apprehensions of conscience are consonant with an ethic of integrity, both profit from the combined roles of phantasia and phronesis, and center on the development of an ideal moral self, and both are necessary components in the development of agape.

While an ethic of integrity both celebrates and is constituted by both poles of the dialogue, it is available as a construct to determine the moral worth of actions within each stage of development. Integrity, as a construct independent of the orientation of each stage, provides a more useful check on the agent's moral progress than a hypothesized end-point of development that measures progress in terms of whole stage
acquisition. An instrument capable of measuring the authenticity of a moral action in terms of integrity, would surely be of more use than an instrument that measured moral development solely in cognitive terms. The first would subsume the second. Put bluntly, agents progress cognitively regardless of the hypothesized end-point of cognitive developmentalists; they operate in the moral domain regardless of the adjudication of their actions from the apex of a posited progression towards moral perfection. It is surely more useful to have a means of determining the authenticity of moral commitment and moral responsibility in actual moral practice than a means of measuring moral competence, divorced from action, from the perspective of moral superiority. An agent operating with integrity at any stage of the proposed ethic is superior to an agent who can score higher on a scale of moral competence, but whose actions are inconsistent with his competence.

Implications for practice

The field of moral education is characterized both by controversy as to the content and methodology of moral educational programmes, and an acknowledgment of the urgency of a needed response to societal pressures to maximize the role of the school in addressing issues of morality and ethical behaviours. These disputes are not limited to psychological accounts of the nature of moral development or character formation, but extend to the very definition of educational aims in this area. One central problem has concerned the dichotomous nature of the two main educative perspectives available to the moral educator, and their inability to inform and supplement each other.

This dissertation has focused on the potential of a dialogic process to satisfy two issues that are concerned with the realization of the moral self, and are related to this dichotomy; the development of a framework that allows for the manifestation and adjudication of virtue behaviours, and the hierarchical integration of virtue with cognitive development, thereby satisfactorily addressing the entire spectrum of potential
moral experience. The potential of a dialogic process to satisfy these issues has been demonstrated.

The extent to which Kohlberg's theory of moral development can be reformulated to address and resolve the present confusion and discord in moral education has been demonstrated. This reformulation, supported by dialogic and integrative constructions, entailed a retention of the salient characteristics and strengths of the theory while ensuring isomorphism between the cognitive and behavioural domains. The result of this reformulation, and stemming from the structure of the dialogue, has been the promulgation of DDM.

Traditionally, two pedagogic approaches have been available to the moral educator that are applicable when implementing DDM: a Deweyan approach in which moral education is seen as a product of the environment in which children are exposed to moral issues, and a more formalized curricular approach. In the Deweyan approach, educators are seen as promoting moral development and understanding on a continual basis as a result of their commitment to a moral framework within which to practice pedagogy. The children are immersed in an environment in which all opportunities for education are opportunities for moral education. A curricular approach provides class-time devoted to the notion of moral education which takes its place in the academic mainstream of the school's educational endeavors. It will be shown below that DDM has implications for both perspectives.

DDM is based upon certain retained characteristics of Kohlberg's structural cognitive developmental theory of moral education. Implicit in Kohlberg's theory is an acceptance of deep-structural characteristics contained within moral development. Parallel processes are envisaged in which the child's experience activate metaethical criteria, which not only parallel the deep-structural metaethical characteristics of moral development, but also parallel the metaethical criteria identified and utilized by Kohlberg to determine stage content and the evaluation and determination of stage
acquisition. Kohlberg claims, therefore, that empiricism demonstrates a congruence between all components of actualized metaethical components, indicating a natural phenomena justifying outcomes. While this position is somewhat problematic, (see Appendix C) if DDM is a valid representation of Kohbergian understanding, a congruence should be found between the two positions, varying only in the immediate dissimilarities of their foundational beliefs. Kohlberg’s interpretation of his empirical data is informed by his conviction that stage acquisition is undertaken in terms of increasingly adequate justice structures. DDM may be taken as the increasingly adequate acquisition of relational structures. As the justice focus has already been rejected as the sole valid basis for the articulation of morality, an obvious disjunction occurs between the two theories. It must be remembered, however, that justice structures are Kohlberg’s interpretation of the metaethical criteria elicited by empirical observation. If the stage descriptors of DDM can be shown to be conceptually consonant with the interpretation offered by Kohlberg, then, by extension they can claim consonance with Kohlberg’s original empirical data.

The focus of the first stage of DDM is personal relationship and the maxim that governs the stage is given as:

*Act always in such a manner that preserves and enhances personal relationships, unless to do so violates a superior maxim.*

Kohlberg’s first level of moral development is the preconventional stage and contains two stages: the first stage is often referred to as the “punishment/obedience stage, and the second stage is one of instrumental reciprocity. Morality in the first stage is determined on the basis that an immoral act incurs punishment. It is important to remember that, generally, this is a child’s perception. It would be odd, indeed, if a young child had the cognitive skill to encompass the notion of punishment without a concurrent rupturing of the relationship between child and the individual doing the punishing. In the second stage, the moral status of the action is determined by the
mutuality of benefit realized by the action. The reciprocal nature of the exchange may also be interpreted in terms of the establishing of a relationship if the exchange is undertaken with a stranger, or the reinforcement of an existing relationship. The conceptual underpinnings of Kohlberg’s preconventional level are therefore captured by the first stage of DDM, albeit from the standpoint of personal relationship rather than as suppositional justice structures. The maxim refers to actions that preserve relationship, (a reinterpretation of the punishment avoidance stage one of Kohlberg) and enhance relationship (a reinterpretation of the reciprocal instrumentality of stage two of Kohlberg).

The second stage of DDM is focused on community and the maxim that governs deliberations at this stage is given:

*Act always in a manner that preserves and enhances the moral community, unless to do so violates a superior maxim.*

Kohlberg’s second, or conventional, level of moral development contains the “good boy-nice girl” stage and the “law and order” stage. In the third stage, an individual’s moral judgment is motivated by a need to avoid rejection, disaffection, or disapproval from others. This description is surely captured by the notion of the preservation of the integrity of communal relationships. Similarly, the “law and order” orientation of Kohlberg’s fourth stage, in which actions are adjudicated against considerations of societal rules and obligations that are promulgated for the benefit of all, is captured by the admonition of the second stage of DDM to enhance the community. To enjoin submission to laws and rules promulgated for mutual benefit within society is little different to wishing to enhance community. It would be strange, indeed, if maximizing benefits within society were not understood to be simultaneously enhancing that society.

The third stage of DDM relates to people in general, extraneous to the particular community, and the maxim that governs behaviour is given as:
Act always in a manner that preserves and enhances the rights and responsibilities of all who are affected by your actions, unless to do so violates a superior maxim.

Kohlberg’s post-conventional level contains two stages: the first is one of legalistic orientation in which an individual’s moral judgment is motivated by a respect for the rights of all, based upon their membership in society. The second stage concerns a fully principled universal recognition of the rights of all persons. The foundational principle underlying the normative component of DDM is based on the Kantian notion of respect for persons. As such, to preserve and, more actively, to enhance, the rights of all affected by ones actions, grounded in the principled response of respect for persons, is a more fully articulated response than Kohlberg’s stage five, and conceptually equivalent to stage six. Further, it has the additional advantage of offering agentic choice in the selection of the method of realizing the respect for persons from a range of comprehensible type moralities in the manner suggested by Pincoffs, rather than as the more abstract and difficult notion of justice.

The final stage of DDM relates to an agape-based response to humanity and, through the notion of imperfect duties, to the environment within which that humanity is realized. Kohlberg, similarly hypothesized a transcendental stage seven based on agape, labeled “universal love.” This stage is not fully explored in his writing.

DDM can thus claim equal status with Kohlberg’s theory concerning the empirical evidence that he had available for analysis. The polemical point, however, is that while Kohlberg’s theory and DDM are equally decentering processes, DDM is relationally based, and this has considerable implication for the practice of moral education. Experientially, it can be noted that few schools are engaged in any form of Kohlbergian based moral educational practice. The demise of the “just school movement,” and the conceptual difficulties that are faced by attempting to actualize Kohlbergian practice in an non-Kohlbergian setting—that is, a setting not predicated
upon justice structures identifiable in Kohlbergian terms, has lead to Kohlberg’s work having a greater theoretical than a practical significance. By translating Kohlberg’s metatheoretical assumptions into terms of relationship and a dialogue that allows a structural view of cognitive development to produce mutual illumination between Aristotelian and Kantian perspectives, DDM can be accessible by either of the moral educational practices that introduced this section. A clear advantage over the Kohlbergian construction of moral education lies in the relational basis of DDM. All students at all times are relationally situated in an educational setting. As such, they are more easily integrated into a programme of moral education that is relationally based than into a justice focused construction.

Implications for the Deweyan approach.

Educational administration is a moral enterprise. The allocation of resources, the adjudication of competing claims within the educational setting and the apprehension of administration as a moral art all underscore this foundational understanding. As such, educational administration is concerned with the entirety of its purview. From the perspective of a school administrator, moral education in the Deweyan tradition requires that schools provide a rich environment within which dialogic opportunities can be observed. As a prerequisite and adjunct to a formalized curricular approach, a school administrator and his staff may ensure the following:

1) The creation an environment of trust and mutual respect within the school building. Such an environment is essential if the child is to have any realistic opportunity to express opinion or offer suggestions. An excessively authoritative atmosphere will be reified in relational terms by student/teacher exchanges. While the Magistral dialogue requires an inequity in power relations, that inequity may not be allowed to be so severe that it dampens and extinguishes the interaction that makes dialogue possible. The administrator must make a fine distinction between an
authoritative structure that permits educational efficiency, and an overly authoritarian regime that stultifies and inhibits response, but makes his administrative tasks easier.

2) That all staff feel free to share their own values and beliefs with students (the proviso always being that those values and beliefs are consonant with the Kantian principle of respect for persons.) While they cannot impose their moral behaviours, they also should not appear to be neutral. If students are to be initiated into a virtue community, then such a community must be extant and available for scrutiny.

3) That they are as non-legalistic as possible while still working within the confines of the organization. Moral development is hampered by an overly legalistic environment. When opportunities are available to do so, administrators should always interpret and transmit administrative decisions in terms of reasons that can be related to the moral domain. For example, a prohibition against throwing snowballs in the school yard will offer greater opportunities for dialogue with students if it is couched in terms of harm to others, respect for the safety of others, and a responsibility to care for others, rather than a simple pronouncement that it is a school rule.

4) That they do not protect students from the consequences of their behavior. To excuse kindergarten children for theft on the basis that they were unaware that theft is wrong, is to deny children the chance to grow and investigate the virtue of honesty.

5) That they allow students to solve the problems they face; they must practice the art of selective withdrawal. Many students' visits to the principal's office for the investigation of infractions are mediated by an administrator's formulaic response of determining fault and apportioning punishment. Such visits are prime opportunities for the development of virtue understandings.

6) That they have a staff comprised of teachers who understand, and are in support of, the moral educational efforts that the school has endorsed. The Deweyan approach is the sum total of planned and unplanned activities that coincide with an intentional component to educate. School professionals can make the most of their
opportunities to engage in this process by taking a more proactive position with respect to their contact with students as they examine all their interactions in the light of opportunities for development in the domain of virtue behaviours and moral thought.

7) That they keep parents informed as to the efforts the school is making in this domain and enlist their help in these endeavours.

The climate of a school contributes to moral development to the degree to which it constitutes an environment conducive to more general social and emotional development, and more specifically, a moral environment. In such a climate, students are treated fairly and with respect, and it conveys and enacts, through adult behavior and school policy, a general atmosphere in which morality (as opposed to arbitrary adult authority) is valued. Virtue, and the possibility of moral agency, emerges from the general individual interactions from which students construct their sense of themselves. There is no simplistic model or formula with which an administrator can construct a virtue community to influence his students, and no specific set of experiences that leads to such a community.

**Implications for a curricular perspective**

Educators will acknowledge that there is still much uncertainty about what influences truly effective teaching and learning. Experienced teacher educators know that effective pedagogy, experienced often as moments of enlightenment for both teachers and students, occurs for reasons deeper than can be explained by check lists of teacher and student attributes, background, or techniques. Further, to be effective, pedagogy aims to be deeply personalized, individualistic, modified, and practiced by its adherents in coherent and integrated ways. This position takes account of the role of affect in learning, not only to increase students' sense of well-being in classrooms, but to develop their conceptual understandings of subject content, interpersonal dynamics and the contexts of pedagogy. To undertake a course of moral education based upon
DDM requires that, as a minimum, teachers recognize and embrace a pedagogy that is capable of transcending the orthodox techniques of instruction.

Effective pedagogy for DDM is enhanced by a context in which there is an engagement between thinking and feeling, at personal, interpersonal, and intrapersonal levels. DDM argues for the desirability of teachers to be skilled in ways of empathically recognizing students' feeling states, and skilled in knowing how to create a dynamic between their feeling states and their cognitive awareness. Skilled teachers might well recognize when students are able to articulate their thinking with some fluency, but such teachers are even more skilled when they can recognize the underpinning feelings informing students' articulations. To initiate a student into an epistemic community focused on virtue habituation, the teacher must, of necessity, arouse in the student an affective response that makes such an initiation a possibility. Disciplines that are purely cognitively based have no such an epistemic requirement. In short, the student needs no reciprocal affective response to learn mathematics, but must have such response available to join a community of virtue.

Initially, DDM envisages recursive looping through the first four stages of the Magistral dialogue as each virtue behaviour is investigated, mastered, integrated, deautomatized and reinvestigated at a higher cognitive stage. Such a process requires disclosure, verbalization, discussion, empathic responses and structured occasions for interaction. Certain minimum attributes are required by the teacher to successfully attempt this:

1) The teacher must be conversant with techniques that produce an interactive classroom that can provide the teacher, as well as the students, with opportunities for imaginative explorations of formal and informal texts and human interactions, together with opportunities for self-reflection and cognitive development.

2) The teacher's responsibility is to structure developmental activities which increase the students' awareness and understanding, to provide an adult, responsive,
constructive audience for their work, along with the audiences provided by their peers, and to clarify with them the kinds of thinking, language and assumptions that they may have demonstrated.

3) The teacher needs to be engaged with students some times, and appropriately disengaged at other times, in order to analyze sensitively what is happening in the classroom and what needs restructuring.

4) Such a balanced, demanding role for the teacher requires, at the very least, insight, well-developed personal language skills, empathy, flexibility and a capacity to engage students in undertaking and analyzing knowledge, ideas, issues and classroom interactions.

5) In a dynamic and interactive DDM classroom, the teacher will encourage exploration and self-expression through various symbolic and expressive experiences in the belief that students have the ability and the need to make sense of their world through a range of learning experiences. At the same time the teacher will have a well-developed working model of what constitutes virtue behaviours, and will be able to structure experiences in ways which promote the exploration of those behaviours. The teacher will also model well-integrated, creative examples of virtuous behaviour.

6) The teacher must explore the dynamic between affect and cognition that can enhance learning through a process of modification of prior experiences, and a process of differentiation and integration, depending on the cognitive stage of the learner.

The curricular approach requires that the teacher have available a structured programmatic outline of activities upon which the qualities and abilities listed above may operate. The curriculum writer, therefore, must be conversant with the aims and dynamics of DDM and produce activities and tasks that will enable the dialogue to function. As this curriculum has only a broad definition of curricular content at the level of the Magistral dialogue, the task for the curriculum writer will be a daunting
one. Similarly, the training required by a DDM teacher will require a re-examination of
the usual teacher preparation courses due to the unique pedagogic techniques required.

Implications for future research

Clearly, the account given above is merely an introduction into the practical
implications of DDM as a functioning explanation of moral development and its
concomitant education possibilities. To identify, facilitate, and exploit these
implications will require extensive empirical and conceptual research. An immediate
opportunity for empirical research exists in the recursive loop mechanism of the five-
step dialogic process. A small-scale investigation could soon establish the parameters
of the de-automatization step that triggers the recursive loop. Similarly, empirical
research could remove the conjectural nature of the belief that the children’s journey
through the steps of the dialogue is purely idiosyncratic. It may be that a general
schema of progress can be identified that holds for the majority of children and thereby
facilitate the practical functioning of the dialogue.

While the recursive looping through the first four steps of the process could
occur for each virtue behaviour, it would be reasonable to believe that several virtue
behaviours could be encompassed by each iteration of the process. It is possible,
however, that particular virtue behaviours may “pull” to different cognitive stages, and,
as it is indicated in the literature on soft stage development that the lower the cognitive
development, the more likely it is that agents will fail to base behaviours on the highest
stage acquired, it cannot be affirmed that the process will be congruent for all virtue
behaviours. Empirical research could illuminate the congruence of stage acquisition
across a variety of virtue behaviours.

Without empirical investigation concerning this process, it cannot be
theoretically verified at what point the agent’s dissatisfaction with the magistral process
becomes sufficiently energizing to signal the entry in to the second genre of dialogue.
While it would be reasonable conjecture to believe that Kohlbergian stage three
acquisition, that of socially sanctioned morality, would signal the end of the recursive loop, an empirical investigation would confirm or deny this conjecture.

Research of a purely theoretical nature would also be fruitful. For the Greeks in general, and Aristotle in particular, a life of virtue equated with a life of honour, and it is the role of honour, and its opposite cognate, shame, that would be a fruitful line of research. Honor and shame are powerful and dynamic constructs, but little exists in the theoretical literature to indicate their potential in refining the dialogue. An immediate starting point may be to define in what respects and under what theoretical conditions these two constructs may have a maximal effect upon the psychological stage acquisitions that underpin the developmental work of Krebs and Van Hesteren (1994) and thus be used to mediate between moral reasoning, moral judgment, and moral action.

The following is a list of possible research questions that could guide future research in this area.

1) Empirically, can it be verified that children’s’ understanding of virtue behaviours may be interpreted in relational terms? - One of the claims of DDM is that it captures both polarities of the spectrum, but it has interpreted the spectrum in terms of an increasingly decentered relational focus. It is of primary importance that this interpretation be verified.

2) To what extent does homogeneity/heterogeneity of cohort cognitive development affect verbalized interpretations of virtue? - Classroom teachers are going to be charged with the implementation of DDM. While they will have to have received specialized training, it is of practical import to establish to what extent the homogeneity/heterogeneity of cognitive skills in the classroom will have an impact on classroom activities. If the students are unable to relate to each other in terms of their intersubjective understanding of virtue, then the DDM becomes more problematic in practical terms.
3) Within a longitudinal study, can it be confirmed that students' reactions to dilemmic cases are enriched by habituation in virtue behaviours? - Another claim of DDM is that it allows each of the polarities of the spectrum can reinforce and inform the other. This reinforcement can be verified if question three is answered in the affirmative.

4) Can it be confirmed that, as a result of DDM pedagogy, learners become increasingly independent of external validation, and draw more on their internalized habituation in virtue for autonomous self-validation? - The realization of autonomy is a desired outcome, and the DDM should, theoretically, enhance the development of autonomy. This enhancement is amenable to empirical investigation and will legitimize the DDM as a vehicle for moral education.

5) Do schools that ascribe to DDM have quantitatively superior interpersonal behaviour outcomes? - Empirical investigation can quantitatively verify the positive effect DDM can have on interpersonal interactions.

While this is only a cursory account of possible research activities, the extent that the ideas expressed in this dissertation are valid and theoretically sound, then any future research in this area can be informed by, and inform, a dialogic approach to moral education.

**Conclusion**

To answer Straughan’s famous question, one can score stage six on Kohlberg and remain a real bastard by operating without integrity. Through the use of DDM, integrity provides a guarantee of the “certain” component of the title of this dissertation; the dialogue supplies the “reason” component; the “art” component is realized through the artistry of the moral educator in structuring the process.
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Appendix A

THE ARGUMENTATIVE FORM OF THE MAJOR CLAIM
The methodology employed in this dissertation is generally termed "Philosophical Inquiry". The term is somewhat loose and undefined in the literature, ranging from a formal set of linked syllogisms (Strawson, 1983; Versfeld, 1980) to generalized expository writing (Lauer, 1989; Beck, 1973). However, as Dolmage (1992) states:

The correct theory and the method for study...then is dependent upon the nature of the questions being asked...What is important is that the questions are not twisted so that it will 'fit' a particular research methodology. (p. 351)

What follows is a formulation of the framework and shape of inquiry that culminates in a justificatory process to establish the utility of the framework and the extent to which it meets the required epistemic goals.

Moral philosophy is essentially prescriptive; the moral philosopher offers a critique of an extant position, usually based upon a challenge of the assumptions underlying that position, or the inferences made from those assumptions, or the grounds of those inferences, in order to offer a formulation or claim of greater power, credibility and increased prescriptivity. For example, Kant (1978), in the Critique of Pure Reason, complains:

It still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us...must be accepted on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof. (Kant, 1978, p. 34)

Kant is largely commenting upon the assumptions that underlie the Cartesian legacy of epistemological scepticism. In contrast, Heidegger (1977), in 1927 in the introduction to Being and Time, dramatically redescribes the situation: The "scandal of philosophy" is not that such proofs have yet to be accepted, but that such proofs are expected and
attempted. Both thinkers were challenging the same basic assumptions, but came to contrasting conclusions. Such conclusions rest upon differing notions of meaning and truth. Any philosophical inquiry, therefore, must clarify what is meant by the inquirer by the terms meaning, truth, belief, and the justification of a process of argumentation. Key statements in this dissertation, and the arguments that move from one proposition to another will meet truth and epistemic criteria. The form and nature of those arguments, however, must be established.

Arguments have several kinds of goals, and it is necessary to distinguish between inquiry, and advocacy. While the general methodology of this dissertation is one of philosophical inquiry, the argumentative form is one of advocacy, in which a line of reasoning is designed to support a previous claim. Toulmin (1984) offers a specific analysis of the form of arguments that will be utilized in this chapter to illustrate the general argument of the dissertation.

Toulmin (1984) identifies four main elements to be found in wholly explicit arguments. These are:

1) claims and discoveries;
2) grounds;
3) warrants and rules, and
4) backings.

The claim of an argument is the general "destination" towards which the argument is to be focused and contains the position that must be considered if the argument is held to be successful. The grounds for the argument provides the foundation for the claim. Grounds may comprise experimental observations, matters of common knowledge, statistical data, personal knowledge or previously established claims.\textsuperscript{52} Warrants

\textsuperscript{52} The use of previously established claims is an important element in justifying trains of argument in which one element leads on to the next step in the chain. Clearly, a lengthy regression may be undertaken in which the grounds of sub-claims may be the sub-sub-claim of the regression to the textual material. In this document the regression, for brevity's sake, is limited to sub-claims.
establish that the grounds cited as supporting a claim do, in fact, justify the move from
grounds to claim:

Steps from grounds to claim are “warranted” and take the forms of
laws of nature, legal principles, and statutes, rules of thumb,
ing engineering formulas and so on. But in any practical case, some
appropriate warrant will be needed if the step from grounds to claim is
to be trustworthy. (Toulmin, 1984, p.26)

Warrants themselves cannot be taken wholly on their face value, as other particular
information may be required to support a particular warrant. Backing comprises these
particular data that demonstrate the felicity of the warrant.

Two additional elements are introduced to speak to the strength and conditions
of relevance of the argument and to complete the general form. Qualifiers indicate the
strengths and limitations of claims and show what degree of reliance is to be placed on
the conclusions given the arguments available to support them. Every argument has a
certain strength and the role of the qualifier is to indicate the kind of rational strength to
be attributed to the claim on the basis of its relationship to the grounds, warrants and
backing. Usually, qualifiers take the form of adverbial phrases such as:

- necessarily;
- in all probability;
- plausibly;
- apparently, and
- very likely.

Grammatically, qualifiers can be inserted into the statement “G, so C” to produce
modally qualified statements of the form;

- G, so necessarily C;
- G, so in all probability C;
- G, so plausibly C;
- G, so apparently C, and
- G, so very likely C.

In each case, the addition of the adverbial phrase has the effect of indicating the reliance of the supporting material entitles being placed in the claim C. Qualifying adverbial phrases are, therefore, used in two circumstances. First, in the situation where the grounds, warrants and backing fail to support the claim absolutely hence, “G, so probably C.” Second, in the situation where they support C only under certain conditions. The conditional form is indicated with, “G, so presumably C” or “G, so plausibly C.” The second conditional form relates immediately to the notion of rebuttals. Rebuttals indicate the existence of extraordinary circumstances in which the normal presuppositions supporting the previous elements of the argument are no longer applicable.

As Toulmin notes, once the presence of the required connections between the elements of an argument have been established, a further set of questions can be raised. It may appear that all rationally based arguments are either totally and unconditionally sound or entirely fallacious:

Clearly, in real life, the “warrants” in our arguments do not authorize the steps from particular “grounds” to particular “claims” absolutely. In many situations we have to deal with claims, arguments and trains of reasoning in which reliability is somewhat less than absolute. Only within the abstract realms of pure mathematics can our statements be linked together by relations of “absolute necessity”: in all practical realms, the connections that we have to deal with are more or less qualified and more or less conditional. If we always waited until absolutely rigorous arguments could be constructed before we acted with reasoned confidence we would be overtaken by events before we had an occasion to act. In practice, therefore, it is often reasonable to
base our conclusions on something less than absolutely perfect
evidence. We then put forward our claims, not as being formally
irrefutable, but rather as being practically reliable. (Toulmin, 1984,
p.81)

The full form of the argument and its component elements is demonstrated in
Figure 8. Where a major argument is set out as a connected series of sub-arguments,
Toulmin (1984) indicates:

[W]e can analyze the content of arguments and the assumptions on
which it rests in a way that shows how all its different elements
connect together. In addition to the original argument we shall then
obtain sub-arguments, each of which is linked to the original
argument by way of one or another of the grounds in that argument.

. . .We can set this whole pattern of connection out in the form of a
series of diagrams. (p. 75)

The diagrammatic form of this construction is shown in Figure 9. The full
representation of this formulation for the major claim is shown in Figures 10, 1-4

While the argumentative form of the dissertation is now clear, the content of that
chain of argumentation is still liable to misinterpretation. The meaning, truth and
justification that inheres in the construction of the sentences that form the textual basis
for the arguments must be available for analysis and confirmation. For this reason,
issues of meaning, truth and justification need to be examined so that the text itself is
available for adjudication on these terms. Appendix B contains a coherency test of
validity by means of which the individual textual components of the major claims may
be analysed.
Figure 8. Toulmin's model of argument form.
Figure 9. The diagrammatic representation of arguments and sub-arguments.
The knowledge we have of pedagogy indicates that...

Educational programs will be of maximum efficacy if they accurately reflect the requirements of the situation they are to address.

1. Virtue education alone is an unsatisfactory basis for a moral education programme.
2. Cognitive developmentalism alone is an unsatisfactory basis for a moral education programme.
3. A dialogic process best captures the process of moral understanding through interaction.

The potential of a dialogic process makes it a superior candidate as the basis for a programme of moral education.

So, plausibly

Unless future research indicates contrary conclusions.

Figure 10.1. Argument form of the major claim.
Given the potential range of moral experience...

Sub-backing 1

An education programme should fully capture the extent of its domain

Sub-warrant 1

Virtue education satisfies only a part of moral experience

Sub-grounds 1

So, necessarily

Qualifier

Virtue education alone is an unsatisfactory basis for a moral education programme

Sub-claim 1

Unless virtue education, as presently understood, can be augmented and reformulated.

Rebuttal

Figure 10-2. Argument form of sub-claim 1.
Figure 10-3. Argument form of sub-claim 2.
Given the knowledge available through research into socially constructed understanding...

The nature of morality is a complex mixture and interaction of judgments and actions, beliefs and behaviours centred around human interaction

A comprehensive view of moral understanding must transcend cognition and habituation

So, presumably

Qualifier

Unless the process of understanding is redefined

Rebuttal

A dialogic process best captures the process of moral understanding through interaction

Sub-claim 3

Sub-grounds 3

Sub-warrant 3

Sub-backing 3

Figure 10-4. Argument form of sub-claim 3.
Appendix B

THEORIES OF MEANING, TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION
Wittgenstein on Following a Rule

Wittgenstein (1978) posits that it is natural to think of meaning and understanding in contractual terms, i.e., that to learn the meaning of a word or concept is to gain an understanding that subsequently obliges usage in certain determinate ways. To fail to do so (to follow the rule) is to negate the understanding that has been grasped. As Wittgenstein (1978) states, "we are committed to certain patterns of linguistic usage by the meanings we attach to expressions" (p. 21). For Wittgenstein, there is in our understanding of meaning no rigid advance determination of what is to count as its correct application. The immediate casualty of Wittgenstein's position thus far is any notion of objectivity. Meaning is encased in subjectivity and individuality. Wright (1980) interprets Wittgenstein's position as follows:

[T]he pattern [of application] is, strictly, inaccessible to definitive explanation. For, as Wittgenstein never wearied of reminding himself, no explanation of the use of an expression is proof against misunderstanding: verbal explanations require correct understanding of the vocabulary in which they are couched, and samples are open to an inexhaustible variety of interpretations. So we move towards the idea that understanding an expression is a kind of 'cottoning on': that is, a leap, an inspired guess at the pattern of application which the instructor is trying to get across. (p. 216)

For Wittgenstein, the 'leap' was the result of idiolecticism, with a strong presumption that the idiolectically derived pattern of usage, a kind of "privileged and idiosyncratic access to the character of his own understanding of an expression or concept and the correctness of its application pattern," (Wright, 1980, p.216) comes naturally to us. In sum:

None of us unilaterally can make sense of the idea of correct employment of language and concepts save by reference to the
authority of securable communal assent on the matter: and for the community itself there is no authority, so no standards to meet.

(Wittgenstein, 1978, p. 220)

According to Wright, Wittgenstein’s final reflections are directed against the idea that a determinate practice can be dictated by either personal understanding or by the authority of communal assent. “What one wants to say is: Every sign is capable of interpretation or translation; but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation (or translation). It is the last interpretation” (Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 34) [Italics and parentheses added]. We are clearly to understand that idiolectism leads inevitably to potential incoherence, and is to be avoided (if only partially) by idiosyncratically following linguistic rules of usage. Wittgenstein (1974) explains:

Faced with a disagreement in reactions, there may be little more to be said: and hence, when reason runs out, we may end up by asking "Don't you see?" in the final hope that the other will see what we mean. (p. 67)

To further minimize incoherence, Wittgenstein proposes that we situate our conception of meaning and understanding within a framework of communal practices (the lack of explicit communal standards notwithstanding). The only hope, it appears, is that the answer will, by chance, be affirmative, when we “end[s] up by asking ‘Don’t you see?’”

When Wittgenstein declares every sign capable of interpretation or translation, another avenue of linguistic philosophy is rendered liable to exploration, that of the translation theory of meaning whose proponents (Cassirer, 1950; Haas, 1968; Grava, 1969), expand upon the bleak linguistic landscape mapped by Wittgenstein.

Translation and Reference Theories of Meaning.

The translation theory of meaning, according to Haas (1968), begins with a lexical definition of translation, i.e., “to change into another language, retaining the
sense” which leads to an immediate apprehension of translation as a triadic operation. Haas’ understanding of this triad is shown in Figure 11.

What is cardinal here is the notion of sign as constituted as a relation between two distinct entities: an expression and meaning. The contrast with Wittgenstein’s idiolecticism is immediate. The dualism of the sign (expression-reference) is reinforced by the triadism of the translation process. Meaning becomes independent of language and exists as an almost metaphysical and objective entity. None of the proponents of a translation theory of meaning intend this mystery to be literal, but they point to the potential objectivity of meaning as illustrated by the process. Haas (1968) illustrates this with an example from a translation from German of Goethe’s poem that begins: “Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühmen?” He claims that, rather than being badly translated as: “Knowest thou the land where the lemon blooms?” this is, in fact, a superior translation. Thus: “Kennst du?” is a simple piece of colloquial translation of the second person singular of the verb kennen, to know (in the sense of people and places, rather than wissen, to know intellectually) and would be colloquially translated as “Do you know?” whereas “Knowest thou?” would be unusual and archaic in corresponding contexts. Das Land can be variously translated in a variety of phrases, Stadt und Land, Ausland, von Land zu Land, where the corresponding translation would be country, as in town and country, foreign country, from country to country. However, the translation would be inferior if it were presented, “Do you know the country?” not just because Land may also be translated as land in contexts such as landscape (Landschaft), land of promise (gelobtes Land) or land of my dreams (Land der Träume), but because the poetic meaning of the line would be lost. Similarly, “the lemons are blooming” (die Zitronen blühmen) is rejected in favour of a non-literal “the lemon blooms.” The issue appears to be that the essential poetic meaning of “Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühmen?” is available to the translator as well as a literal
Figure 11. The triadic nature of a translation theory of meaning.

For Haas, the core of meaning lies in denotation or factual reference with
"emotive overtones" and "an aptitude for calling forth certain responses" (1968, p. 88).
The objectivity of meaning in the translation theory is mediated by an understanding
that meaning is not a "psycho-physical" relation, but a crucial relation between the
linguistic and extra-linguistic. Haas explains: the reference theory of meaning, as an
adjunct to the translation theory, involves the dualism of expression and reference in the
comprehension of the concept sign. The reference itself, however, has a referent.
Although the referent constitutes the extralinguistic component of meaning, what an
expression means cannot be found as a separate entity beside the expression, but
transcends it. "It transcends the utterance, as my walking includes and transcends my
legs. What an expression means, is not an object confronting it, any more than
walking is an object confronting my legs" (Haas, 1968, p. 91).

Meaning, Haas concludes, is the work that expressions do, which makes his
analogy of poetry translation much more accessible; the "work" that "Kennst du das
Land wo die Zitronen blühen?" had to do was a great deal more than, "Do you know
the country where the lemons are blooming?" and the understanding of that

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53 Interestingly, Haas fails to note that the import of the familiar second person singular
"Kennst du", as opposed to the formal second person "Kennen Sie," is lost in the translation, because
English has no second person formal/familiar construction.
"extralinguistic" work constituted its meaning. Where Haas differs so profoundly from Wittgenstein, is in the area of idiolecticism; where Wittgenstein uses idiolecticism to point to the universality of incomprehension concerning utterances, Haas diminishes its role to an inclusion within the referent component of meaning, where it is subsumed under the generic "work", and is liable to explication.

The general and vague notion of "work" is paralleled by Cassirer's (1950) discussion of the symbolizandum-symbolizatum process. Cassirer understood that any idea or concept, if it is to be grasped in a discursive form must be processed and interpreted. This interpretation was, for Cassirer (1950), a symbolic process; "Words are sensuous images seen or heard, but they are used with meaning and so they are employed as symbols" (p.50). The symbolic interpretation of meaning equates with Haas' more generic "work". More importantly is Grava's (1969) comments on Cassirer's statement that:

The symbolizing activity of our consciousness is seen at work in the various linguistic forms of expression, but what interests us most is the fact that, as a result of this symbolization, 'symbol' and 'word' (sign) are no longer to be considered as separate entities, but as a structural-functional component of an organized whole - the concept.

(p. 99)

The "transcendency" of meaning offered by Haas, finds its counterpart in Cassirer (1950) with:

It would appear that during the period of search (for meaning) we must have had something before our minds which is not as yet symbolized at all; a symbolizandum which is not yet a symbolizatum, something which is present to the mind, for the time being asymbolically. (p. 103)
It is the journey from symbolizandum to symbolizatum than constitutes both meaning and the analysis of the concept.

The work of the preceding theorists is in the same vein as that of Frege (1978) whose concept of "sense" illuminates the process of meaning construction, adds a required dimension to Wittgenstein's more pessimistic view of understanding and subsumes the "work" of Haas and the symbolic understandings of Cassirer. Wittgenstein's enjoiner that "whereof one may not speak, thereof one must remain silent", would have been reformed by Frege into "whereof one may not speak, thereof one must garner sense"

**Frege on Meaning, Reference and Sense.**

Frege's initial insight was that a sentence, as the smallest linguistic complex which can be used in discourse, plays the primary role in the theory of meaning (Frege, 1978). Hence the meaning of a word is to be given in terms of the contribution it makes to determining what may be communicated by the sentence containing it. Complex sentences in turn may be examined in terms of the 'atomic' sentences of which they are comprised. Frege's second contention was that the notion of truth played a crucial role in the account that can be given of the meaning of a sentence and therefore of any expression contained within that sentence (p. 23). The truth of a sentence depended, for Frege, upon an understanding of the force of the sentence, i.e., the intent of the discussant. Force is thus one aspect of a meaning, to be distinguished from that ingredient of the meanings of the words and concepts which goes to determine the conditions under which the sentence is true. This latter ingredient was, for Frege, sense and to give an account of the sense of an expression, is, therefore, to give a partial account of what a speaker knows when he understands that expression.

Frege indicated that the semantic value of every expression—that is, the feature that must be ascribed to it for it to be considered true, can be determined by associating
with it an extra-linguistic entity. This entity is commonly referred to as the reference (which presupposes a referent). Dummett (1978) summarizes:

[W]hat Frege regarded as one of his fundamental discoveries, that there is a distinction between sense and reference, that is, the sense of an expression cannot consist just in its having whatever reference it has, should be perfectly obvious. (p. 234)

Sense, therefore, constitutes deep structural understandings that are independent of the referent that supports the expression. These understandings, accompanied by the force of the sentence, and a cognizance of the nature and function of the reference comprises meaning. It is with these structural understandings that the analysis of meaning is most concerned, and engaging these understandings, provided that the referent is held communally, is the content of conceptual analysis.

Frege’s “sense”, Cassirer’s “symbolizandum-symbolizatum” and Haas’ work combine to roughly equate with the notion of holophrasis explored by Quine, a holistic linguistic philosopher, who disagrees with Frege that for every object (referent) the language contains a singular term referring to it (1992). Holophrasis contends that singular terms may refer to multiple objects and, in certain cases, multiple terms may be required to reference singular referents. Thus “sense,” for Quine, equates with coherence in the light of a confused and shifting linguistic landscape.

To summarize, this section offers an understanding of meaning that denies the pervasive idiolecticism of Wittgenstein in favour of a more useful treatment of idiolecticism found in the symbolically constructed extralinguisticality of Cassirer, supported by the translation theory of Haas, illuminated by Frege’s distinction between meaning and sense. Quine’s notion of holophrasis indicates the caution that must be taken in presuming isomorphism between utterance and the apprehension of meaning. The reader must have an understanding of the “communal assent” given to the vocabulary in use. Where such assent is lacking, the readers must evaluate the “force”
or “sense” that is being attempted and search within their “symbolizandum” for the symbolic interpretation of the extralinguisticality that hinders a literal translation linking sign and reference.

A Theory of Truth

If philosophy is the challenging and replacing of assumptions with propositional statements denoting thought content that is assessable as true or false, then the truth content of such statements is to be found in the propositions themselves rather than in subentential or subpropositional components. A simple notion of truth is to be found in what is generally referred to as the correspondence theory. While a correspondence theory of truth, in which veridical statements are justified by appeals to their correspondence to reality, is plausible as regards empirical and synthetic truths, it is incapable of addressing analytical or a priori truths since there is no very obvious “fact” to which such a truth may correspond. The pursuit of truth is, in practice, the pursuit of the fixation of belief. 54 As the sole object of inquiry is the discovery of truth, it follows that the sole object of inquiry is the attainment of stable beliefs about the subject of the inquiry. Although truth may not be formally definable in terms of belief, they are practically equivalent, that is, the truth forms a set of propositions one is prepared to accept.

The traditionally held position to satisfy this relationship between truth and belief is the notion of justified true belief (JTB) and its relation to knowledge. JTB, however, has been subject to extensive criticism. Gettier (1963), Goldman (1967) and Dretske (1981) offer positions, based upon the justification element of JTB, that call into question the efficacy of the formulation as generally understood. 55 A method of

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54 It is impossible, at least in the writer’s experience, to compose two mutually exclusive lists, one which enumerates propositions held to be indisputably true, and the other to list beliefs.
55 Gettier offers counter-examples to demonstrate that in specific cases all the elements of JTB will still not produce knowledge of the truth; Goldman demands that evidence for justification be causally connected to the state of affairs that establishes truth; Dretske invokes “conclusive reasons” as a fourth element in the triad of justification, truth and belief.
combating these weaknesses is to produce an account of justification that is immune to criticism.

Such an account can be developed by examining the difference between a priori and a posteriori beliefs. Baergen (1995) states that:

a belief is a priori if its justification does not depend in any way upon experience; otherwise it is a posteriori. One might give experience a somewhat different role in defining a priori beliefs: A belief is said to be justified if and only if no experience could lead one to rationally reject the belief. The first characterization of a priori justification was put in terms of how such beliefs are justified; the second was in terms of what could (and could not) prevent such a belief from being justified a priori. (p. 189)

A priori beliefs, often termed analytic beliefs, are explained by Aristotle as the result of an inductive process, while Kant relates them to the structure of the mind and its intuitive relation to the phenomenal. Kant claims that such truths are necessary in order for us have any experience whatsoever. An a priori truth, therefore, once apprehended, is beyond criticism in the JTB formulation. From such a truth, other truths may be derived in a foundational manner, provided that the inferential pattern that supports them is sufficiently strong to establish credence\(^5\). A priori truths may have a more useful role in a coherentist theory of truth.

One important feature of coherence is that it admits of degree; a system of beliefs can be more or less coherent. This is appropriate, given that epistemic justification also admits of degree. Coherency then states that the epistemic status of a

\(^{5}\) It is the nature of the derivational pathways and the difficulty in providing direct connections to each belief that makes foundationalism problematic. If the connection between a basic belief (and a secondary belief is a derivational one, then the basic beliefs will have to contain all the content of the secondary beliefs. (The conclusion of a deductive argument may contain no more information than is to be found in the premises.) Such logical deductions are perfectly truth-preserving, but it is difficult to see how all secondary beliefs can be traced individually or in a linear chain to basic beliefs.
belief relates to the coherence of the system within which the belief is set. A coherent system of beliefs is logically consistent, although logical consistency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a high degree of coherence. A system of high consistency must also contain a high degree of probabilistic consistency (Bonjour, 1985). To ensure a high degree of coherence, elements of a system must not only be logically and probabilistically consistent, but must reinforce one another by means of inferential relations. Inferential relations would allow one member of a belief set to form the premise in a cogent justifying argument for another belief to which it is thus inferentially related. Similarly, the coherence of a set of beliefs is diminished by the presence of “outliers” that seem to have no inferential relationship to other beliefs within the system. Baergen (1995) gives the following summary of the characteristics of a coherence theory of truth:

1) A system of beliefs is highly coherent only if it is logically consistent.

2) A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to its probabilistic consistency.

3) The coherence of the system of beliefs is increased by the presence of inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in proportion to the number and strength of such connections.

4) The coherence of the system is diminished to the extent to which the beliefs it comprises are unconnected to one another by inferential connections, or to the extent to which it is divided into subsystems of beliefs which are unconnected to each other by such connections.

5) The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system (pp. 69-70).

57 One would wish to avoid, however, the conclusion that all beliefs must be justified to the same degree. One would indicate that, while an agent may hold many beliefs in a system, those beliefs may cohere with differing degrees with the system and thus claim differing degrees of epistemic justification.
According to Kidder and Judd (1986) the rationalistic quantitative paradigm depends upon construct, internal and external validities for its primary research evaluation standards, while Guba and Lincoln (1988) offer credibility, transferability, and dependability to reinforce their contention that, despite criticisms, the inquiry process (which would include philosophical inquiry) can have "well developed standards of trustworthiness" (p. 84). They contend that credibility takes the place of internal validity as the standard of truth in the inquiry, that transferability is the counterpart of external validity and answers questions of general applicability, while dependability fulfills the role of reliability and assures consistency.

The key elements of credibility, transferability and dependability can be subsumed under the heading of justification. High levels of epistemic justification assures credibility. Transferability, (in the sense that findings from one inquiry can be transferred to a setting separate from the locus of the inquiry) is satisfied by the universal subject matter of the inquiry, while dependability relates to the degree of epistemic justification claimed by the process. Coherency has been suggested as the justification element of the JTB and will similarly be the focus of epistemic claims in the inquiry as a whole.

Baergen suggests that a form of 'weak foundationalism' can link a priori beliefs with notions of coherence to satisfy epistemic goals. Baergen indicates that a basic set of beliefs - in this case a priori beliefs - can be used to justify a belief system, not through direct derivational or inferential links to secondary beliefs, but through relational links to a coherent set of beliefs. These links are the source of all epistemic justification within the system and the role of the coherent relational set is to reinforce

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58 One may hold two beliefs that are not logically inconsistent, for example, that morality can be taught and that morality is easily learned, but the probability that both are true is not high. Bonjour indicates that such probabilistic inconsistency lowers coherence. It is worth noting that unlike logical inconsistency it is probably impossible to totally avoid probabilistic inconsistency.

59 Baergen (1995) expresses doubts that, due to its reliance on coherence, weak foundationalism may not be a foundational theory of justification at all, but he uses the term for convenience (p. 62).
and add to the level of justification initialized by the basic beliefs. As has been shown, coherence within a belief set contributes to the validity of JTB and, in turn, provides strength to the justification of the system of such beliefs. An inquiry that demonstrates the truth (JTB) of its propositional statements through coherence can also claim a high level of epistemic justification for the inquiry as a whole through the same element.

The key issue in the inquiry is, therefore, the establishment of a set of a priori truths that can connect to a coherent set of derived or inferred beliefs. For example, the following statement is to be found on page 25 of this dissertation, and serves as a ground for a sub-argument in the previous section. "The nature of morality is a complex mixture and interaction of judgments and actions, beliefs and behaviours centred around human interaction." To apply the coherency test for validity to this statement two a priori truths are posited (AP 1, AP 2) with two correspondingly deduced truths (D 1, D 2) which are coherently connected to four propositional beliefs by means of inferential propositions. Inferential propositions have their genesis in a logical extension of the potentialities of the propositional beliefs and a probabilistically consistent exploration of those potentials within the context of the statement. Figure 12 shows schematically the textual arguments that would be offered to support the statement.

Thus:

A priori truth 1 (AP 1) Morality is not a random process

Major premise; Morality is not a random process

Minor premise; Non-random processes entail some form of structure

Conclusion; Morality entails structure

Deductive Truth 1 (D 1) Morality entails structure

A priori truth 2 (AP 2) Morality is concerned with appraisal and judgment

Major premise; Morality is concerned with appraisal and judgment

Minor premise; Appraisal and judgment are cognitive functions
Conclusion; Morality has a cognitive component

Deductive truth 2 (D 2) Morality has a cognitive component

P 1: All activity is motivated

P 2: The affective role in human relationships cannot be denied

P 3: Beliefs in a domain are organized systematically

P 4: Behaviour is characterized by consistency in sets of actions

IP 1: Affect plays a significant role in motivating an individual to action; it may not be the sole motivator, but its presence in motivational thinking is significant. It is reasonable to believe that when activity is motivated by affect, the role of affect as a motivator is strengthened, with consequences for the role of affect in moral action.

IP 2 Emotions tend to be hierarchically structured and systematized according to function. This tendency reinforces their place in the structured activity of morality and makes emotions increasingly accessible as this structural commonality is explored and developed.

IP: The structured actions that comprise behaviour relate to the structure of the moral project. The isomorphism between behaviour activities and moral action tends to maximize with reinforcement and becomes habituated especially when reinforced by P2.

IP 4: Belief systems are related to affect, to cognition and, empirically, to the outcome of previous activities. A systematized belief system reconciles the disparate elements idiosyncratically, and resolves and integrates them within the structural requirements of morality. Cognitive processes are one of the foundations of any belief system and may be in concert with, or in competition with, the affective domain. Belief systems are therefore the locus of a dynamic relationship between affect and cognition.

IP 5: The coherency of the belief system influences the coherence of D 1.

IP 6: The structured development of cognition informs and reinforces the moral enterprise and is the prime factor in the prevention of randomness through its influence
Figure 12. A coherency test for validity.

on P4.

IP 7: Successful actions reinforce the authority of the motivational factors and help to strengthen the tentative organization of behaviours as non-random actions in a response to the requirements of D 1.

IP 8: Judgments based upon cognitive processes motivate actions in circumstances where patterned and habituated behavioural responses are not available and an affective motivator is deficient or inappropriate. An increasing frequency of the cognition/judgment/action response leads to greater proficiency and can produce an affective response to supplement the cognitive process.

IP 9: The repeated success of motivated actions are noted as the successful integration of cognitive and affective motivators into structured behaviours. Actions that fail to achieve success expunge from the belief system the input factors that motivated the action. Belief systems are therefore not static but dynamic as actions either fail to
find a place in behavioural patterns or individually reveal the deficiencies in the motivational processes.

On this basis, coherence is claimed for the statement, "The nature of morality is a complex mixture and interaction of judgments and actions, beliefs and behaviours centred around human interaction." Epistemic justification flows into the system of beliefs by means of the a priori truths, each propositional belief is connected to each other belief and no anomalous beliefs are included to ensure success. Each propositional belief is logically consistent with all other beliefs and no probabilistic inconsistencies are evident. As such, the statement fulfills the requirements that Baergen (1995) demands as a characteristic of both a coherency test of truth, and a test, through weak foundationalism, of epistemic justification.
Appendix C

CRITICISM OF KOHLBERG
Few areas of Kohlberg's theory of moral development have escaped critical attention. Kohlberg's measurement, methodology and interpretation (Gilligan, 1982), structural unity, the invariant sequence of development, increasing cognitive and moral adequacy of the stages (Locke, 1979), cultural universality (Tomlinson, 1985), the relationship between religion and morality, the meaning of autonomy (Petrovich, 1982), the lack of a significant role for the emotions in moral education (Rich, 1980; Peters, 1971), the 'illusion' of Stage 6 (Locke, 1980) and the labeling of students (Bolt and Sullivan, 1980) have all been subjects of scrutiny. Many of them can be included as a collateral consequence of the main area of contention, that of Kohlberg's notion of virtue. This notion pervades at least the 'moral' component of moral development, and while there are critics of the Piagetian roots and foundation of the stage and sequence theory, they, at least, are not directly attributable to the virtue confusion.

Three general areas of criticism will be addressed in this section. First, the difference between logical judgments and moral judgments is explored. The inception of moral thinking and the issues surrounding moral justification and moral judgments will be discussed, and the role of cognitive dissonance viewed from a critical perspective. Second, this section will examine the work of Pincoffs as an example of a critical position, based on virtue, that regards the Kohlberg theory, in its entirety, as spurious and unhelpful. While other theorists would espouse similar positions, Pincoffs' work has been chosen as representative of this genre. Third, this section will survey those critics who, while finding Kohlberg's position on virtue to be flawed, locate the concerns elicited by these criticisms within the context of Kohlberg's theory.

The primary task of a normative ethical theory is to enable persons to make justified moral judgments. Rule theorists suppose that moral rules are required to

** Tomlinson (1985) claims that, far from obviating moral relativism, Kohlberg's theory simply provides an explanation for that relativism.
justify a moral judgment; that a necessary part of the evidence that one must have to make a warranted moral judgment is a moral rule. In contrast, act theorists hold that moral rules are not a required part of the evidence justifying moral judgments falling under them. Rather, justified moral judgments can be made purely on the basis of the relevant particular facts involved in the moral dilemma. General considerations (moral rules) are not required. The identification of the morally relevant facts, while facilitated by moral rules, is logically independent of them. In this regard, rule theorists would agree that making a justified judgment requires knowing the relevant facts involved, but they also believe that knowledge of such particulars is not a sufficient condition for the exercise of moral judgment. For rule theorists morally relevant facts cannot even be identified without reference to a moral rule as it is the existence of the rule which provides the facts with moral relevance. Therefore, in summary, rule theorists find moral judgments are valid when based upon relevant facts, but require an a priori stance concerning the nature of the facts, and consider moral rules to be constitutive in nature encompassing an area of the moral domain and admitting no exceptions. Act theorists find moral judgments justified by appeal to factual claims, and consider the nature of the facts to be an a posteriori generalization concerning factors which have been found relevant in making moral judgments, and consider moral rules to be summative in nature, admitting exceptions due to their a posteriori derivation and serve as summative indicators signposting previously effective postures.

For Kohlberg, a rule theorist, justice structures are constitutive of moral justification (Kohlberg, 1968). Kohlberg, however, treats moral principles in two ways, as summative in the first five stages and as constitutive in stage six. This position is acknowledged by Kohlberg who provided two definitions of moral principles to correspond to the duality. He reasoned that principles are summative in first five stages because moral principles are “a generalized guide to choice,” “a rule or method of choosing between legitimate activities,” “a universalizable or impartial mode
of deciding or judging” (Kohlberg, 1968, pp. 173-174). In the sixth stage, however, he termed the principle a “universalizable prescriptive value of justice” indicating that the content of the principle defined the moral point of view providing it with sufficient internal intrinsic sufficiency to warrant his position (Saltzstein, 1983).

The first presupposition of a cognitive developmentalist position concerns the Deweyan assumption “that man is by nature an active organism.” Thus, a developmental moral psychology would assume, but not have to explain, the existence of an initial stage of morality. A second presupposition is metatheoretical in nature—that is, that objective criteria are available for assessing the philosophical adequacy of each identified cognitive structure as a mode of resolving moral dilemmas and disagreements. Kohlberg adopted a set of metaethical criteria which he believed provided moral philosophers with a neutral basis for determining the better of two competing normative positions. As a result of examining each stage in the light of these purportedly objective criteria, he concluded that each new cognitive structure provided a more adequate method of resolving moral dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1968).

According to Kohlberg, the emergence of each new normative structure is to be explained as a function of transaction between an individual’s present structure and the objective features of the moral dilemmas actually arising in his or her social environment. Kohlberg claims that an individual’s present moral structure determines the form of reasoning used in resolving present moral problems. However, he also claims that individuals sometimes recognize when their own proposed arguments are an inadequate basis for this function. Specifically, Kohlberg’s account grants that it is possible for individuals at stages one through five to deliberate about the objective features of moral dilemmas with a degree of independence of their present moral structure, due to their natural proclivity towards philosophy (Kohlberg, 1978). Through a process in which they encounter and recognize the greater adequacy of alternative proposals, individuals construct new structures of moral norms. A logical
impediment is discovered at this juncture, however, as it is inconsistent to hold that an individual could appreciate particular justifications not yet available to him through his present moral structure. If a given structure were to function as a definition of moral judgment, it would not merely summarize an individual's past moral reasoning, but it would also exhaust the perception of all possible sound moral reasoning. The actor cannot have a superior justification available to him and reject it, as his function as a "natural philosopher" would make this irrational. A nullification of this impediment is required, and its presentation by Kohlberg is outlined below.

Given the assumed hierarchical nature of the cognitive moral stages, the ability of an individual to recognize the superiority of the next stage cannot be explained in terms of the individual’s present moral structure—it does not include the superior structure—rather it would have to be explained in terms of the yet to be constructed new structure the individual is in the process of building. An edifice metaphor clarifies the dilemma; the contents of an unconstructed room are not available for use. Further, one may not stand upon an unconstructed floor to assemble those contents. In fact, the potentiality of an anticipated extra storey upon a building may only be explored by the use of a scaffold external to the building itself, or access to the architect’s original blueprints. Kohlberg offers metaethical criteria, naturally occurring in the actor as the scaffolding. Later, he makes claims as to the provenance of the blueprints. The process whereby an individual can stand apart from his own acquired structure of moral rules and assess whether a particular judgment based on those norms is as warranted as a judgment made on some other basis presupposes sound metaethical criteria. Moreover, the fact that individuals tend to prefer philosophically more adequate arguments over their own spontaneous proposals demonstrates the existence of metaethical criteria which underlie their preferences, and are implicit in their assessment process. This concept energizes the mechanics of cognitive dissonance and subsequent stage acquisition and drives the theory. Kohlberg assumes that some such objective
criteria are operant in an individual’s reconstruction of moral stages, and claims that this process in individuals parallels the objective criteria involved in the system of normative ethics.

Implicit in Kohlberg’s position at this point is an acceptance of deep-structural characteristics contained within moral development. Parallel processes are envisaged in which the actor’s experience in the environment activates his own metaethical criteria, which not only parallel the deep-structural metaethical characteristics of moral development, but also parallel the metaethical criteria identified and utilized by Kohlberg to determine stage content and the evaluation and determination of stage acquisition. Empiricism, therefore, demonstrates a congruence between all components of actualized metaethical components, indicating a natural phenomena justifying outcomes (Kohlberg, 1968). In simplistic terms, the actor, Kohlberg and the iteration of moral development in the environment have, independently, all used the same set of blueprints, or, to exhaust the document metaphor, the same road-map to determine both destination and route. Such a conjunctive phenomena must surely point to the validation of both the process and content of Kohlberg’s theory. Unfortunately, the metaethical criteria offered by Kohlberg at the inception of the process and labeled ‘neutral’ is open to question, as it reflects only one tradition, that of the ethical rule theorist. Kohlberg asks us to accept that ethical rule theory is a naturally endorsed phenomenon.

While this analysis of the theory may appear resonant of the Gilligan criticism, it differs in one important aspect. Essentially, Gilligan critiqued the warrants by which Kohlberg established the justice structures as constitutive of moral content (Gilligan, 1982). The present analysis offers a critique which speaks to the process itself. It is noteworthy that Dewey’s psychological analysis of moral development incorporates a pragmatic metaethics and an ethical act theory—in contrast, Kohlberg’s account is based upon a formalistic metaethics (universalizability, correlativity of rights and duties,
respects for persons.), and an ethical rule theory. As a result of this formalism, Kohlberg portrays the whole of moral development as a quest for the true definition of moral judgment.

Some moral rule theorists reject the sufficiency of a merely formal justification of a proposed set of moral norms, and openly acknowledge that all definitions of morality are liable to a posteriori challenges. The fact that a given normative structure better fulfills formal criteria does not entail that it is the best normative ethical theory, only that it is a better theory. If Kohlberg's theory is only better not best, then it cannot conform to the parallel metaethical criteria he claims is operating at the deep structural level in the case of both individual stage reconstruction and the whole activity of moral philosophy.

A general area of criticism linked to the virtue dilemma is one that holds that not only is Kohlberg wrong in terms of virtue, but wrong in terms of the cognitive developmentalist framework that contains his virtue error. Pincoffs (1986) provides a version of morality fundamentally opposed to all of Kohlberg's contentions, and prefaces his discussion with his position relative to the formation and utility of moral theorizing:

Theories are made to be applied to cases, to provide the principles and procedures by which moral problems can be resolved. I will argue that the structure known as ethical theories are more threats to moral sanity and balance than they are instruments for their attainment. They have these malign characteristics principally because they are by nature reductive. They restrict and warp moral reflection by their insistence that moral considerations are related in some hierarchical order. I will argue that there is no such order. I will hold that there a mutually irreducible types of moral considerations, that there is no hierarchy—with the king consideration at ease on the apex—no one
principle system that incorporates all of the moral rules. This will be unsettling to some of my readers. (pp. 2-3)

Pincoffs rejects, in its entirety, the paradigm of what he terms “quandary” ethics, and identified morality as rational decision making based upon a conception of morality as a “net of moral reasoning.”

Nets are made of interlocking cords strung to points on the periphery; each cord leading to the periphery points to a leading type of moral consideration. One cord leads to the wrongness of injustice, another to the rightness of sympathy, a third to the wrongness of cruelty. Pincoffs (1986) declares:

To reason morally is to weave a net (or if fallacies crop up, to mend a net). To decide rationally is to compare the joint strength of the woven cords of one set of considerations to the joint strength of alternative sets. There is no formula for such comparisons. The ability to make effective comparisons must be cultivated. Some people will develop the kind of practical wisdom that will make their moral judgments especially worthy of respect. Others will not be good at moral reasoning through defects of character or intellect. But the polemical point is that there are no moral experts. (p. 3)

Quandary ethics, says Pincoffs, dispute his two assertions that (a) there is no good reason to believe that the subject of ethics should be confined to the resolution of difficult problems, or (b) the questionable relevance of theory to problem, and the claimed justificatory power of the theories themselves. The “non-stupid” and the “non-pathological” will be perfectly satisfied with a scheme of ethics that can provide a regimen for a healthy moral life rather than a cure for a particular moral illness (1986, p. 17).

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61 Pincoffs made the distinction between ethics as a set of behaviours in the moral domain, and morality as a general consideration of the domain itself.
Pincoffs allows a degree of subjectivity in ethical consideration that would have been repugnant to Kohlberg by arguing that what is correct for one agent in one position may be wrong for another agent in differing circumstances. There is no notion of overarching obligation generating principles in Pincoffs' position, different agents simply operate in different areas of the "moral net." It would be easy to note that Pincoffs himself alludes to distinctly Kohlbergian terms when he uses phrases such as, "will develop the practical wisdom," "abilities will be cultivated" or "good reason must be provided," all of which speak to considerations external to Pincoffs' subjectivist consequentialist arena.

In place of the quandary motif, Pincoffs provides a categorization based on avoidance or attraction towards people based upon their behaviours which in turn demonstrated their ability to manifest virtue (or vice). He provides a taxonomy of virtue in the manner of Aristotle (Figure 13) in which virtue is divided into broad categories of instrumental and non-instrumental, and further divided in accordance to their function within the categories.

The effect in the world of the actualization of a Pincoffs' model of morality as virtue ethics would be of a different order from that world transformed by a Kohlbergian perspective. As situational and subjective ethics, the Pincoffs' model would have a localized and contingent effect. As such, the spread of the effect would be determined by the vigour and the rigour with which Pincoffs' subjects pursued their "regimen for moral health". Consensus formation would limit its effects to within communities of like-minded individuals.

Other theorists would be in conflict with Kohlberg over the nature and role of virtue, even though they did not, explicitly, address the Kohlbergian contentions. Durkheim, for example, held a view of morality as a body of rules sanctioned by society and imposed authoritatively by the social group on the individual. The normative force of morality is thus located solely in the power of social sanction.
Figure 13. Pincoffs' taxonomy of virtue.

While deontologically driven, Durkheim's conceptions of moral education is antithetical to Kohlberg's claims. Other such theoretical positions on moral development can be examined that would differ markedly from Kohlberg. The value clarification approach, for example, denies both the formalism and assumptions of cognitive-developmentalism. It is more useful, however, to restrict an examination of Kohlbergian criticism to those areas concerned with the role of the virtues in moral development.

Criticisms concerning the role of moral emotion, the peculiarly narrow concept of morality as justice conflict, the lack of generality in the theory (Crittenden, 1990) and
other critical approaches can be generally subsumed under the rubric of what can be
termed, the virtue dilemma. These criticisms can be considered as clustered around a
position as outlined by Carr (1991) in his consideration of Aristotle’s understandings of
the role of virtue:

More or less the complete definition given by Aristotle is that: Virtue
is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, the
mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle and
by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would
determine it. It could not be clearer that for Aristotle in so far as the
moral virtues are concerned with the promotion of conduct which
conduces to human happiness or well being, they must involve some
rational judgment or choice with respect to the determination of such
choices or action or conduct. (p. 67)

Aristotle made a distinction between the rationality that formed the basis of scientific or
theoretical inquiry (techne—the disposition by means of which we make things by a
true rule) and the rationality of morality (phronesis—the disposition of practical wisdom
by means of which we gain understandings of our relationships to each other, society,
and the contingencies that shape our behaviours). For Aristotle, moral reasoning was
not any kind of theoretical reflection upon a world of absolute and unchangeable forms
of goodness and justice, because goodness and justice are not objects that exist in the
world (and therefore subject to techne) but exist only in the immediacy of human
relationships, and are of a practical rather than theoretical nature, and therefore subject
to phronesis. This account differs sharply from the purportedly Socratic account of
Kohlberg, and it is within the distinction that can be made between the two that the
origins of a class of Kohlbergian criticism can be found.

Two areas of discrete criticism can be located within the disjunction occasioned
by Kohlberg’s disposition to treat morality as governed by techne rather than phronesis:
the restricted range of morality, and the lack of an affective dimension. Kohlberg (1982) is explicit in his determination that justice concerns were constitutive of morality:

When we move from the role-taking to the resolution of conflicting roles, we arrive at the “principle” of justice. A moral conflict is a conflict between competing aims of men; you versus me; you versus a third person. The precondition for a moral conflict is man’s capacity for role-taking. Most social situations are not moral because there is no conflict between role-taking expectations of one person and another. (p. 192) [Italics added]

Crittendon (1990) takes the position that whatever the importance of role-taking in moral learning, moral conflicts are not confined to conflicts in the domain of justice, or even to conflicts between people. He believes that it is symptomatic of a particular and limited way of thinking about morality to suggest that social situations, in the absence of conflict, are not moral. Justice conceived on a conflictual model has, he decides, expanded to fill the domain of morality, or rather, morality has been contracted into a specific and limited field. His objection is supported by Warnock (1979) who feels that Kohlberg, far from teaching morality, no matter in what limited scope he envisages it, was actually proposing a course of study of morality. She goes so far as to say that “moral lessons” with a syllabus consisting of the discussion and analysis of hypothetical problems and their solutions, or even of actual social problems have their place, and may be valuable and stimulating, but will not function as moral education in the true sense of moving students towards morally superior behaviour. This is attributed, by Warnock, to Kohlberg’s refusal to countenance any virtue-based content for his moral stages and his sole reliance on justice structures as constitutive of morality. Peters (1976) notes trenchantly:
The policeman cannot always be present, and if I am lying in the
gutter after being robbed, it is somewhat otiose to speculate at what
stage the mugger is. My regret must be surely that he had not at least
got a conventional morality instilled in him. (p. 283)

By "conventional morality" Peters is referring to the notion that stages five and six
should be considered as theoretical constructs having little or no empirical support.
Lacking stages five and six, Kohlberg’s theory has no end-point towards which to
progress, and hence Kohlberg’s posited justice structures are without basis, and
should be replaced by a wider virtue perspective that would reinforce the conventional
morality indicated by stages three and four.

Peters (1979) is joined by others (Straughan (1985) ; Bailey (1985); Wilson
(1985); Rich (1985); Spiecker (1990); Lickona (1990)) in criticizing Kohlberg for his
lack of engagement with the affective domain of moral education. Their collective
positions may be summarized as follows. There is a clear distinction between ability
and motivation: between being able to understand a reason or some rational procedure,
and wanting to use it. Wilson (1985) makes the point that understanding a reason as
good involves having some kind of justification for it, but not necessarily an intrinsic
justification. He argues that a child may understand that it is a good reason, but not
really why it is good. Intellectual comprehension can therefore provide a justificatory
background but not a motivation (Wilson, 1985, pp. 228-229). Lickona (1990) notes
the important and reciprocal nature of moral judgment and moral emotion. For
Lickona, moral emotion can lead moral judgment:

Important moral revolutions have been initiated by empathy stemming
from an emotionally loaded experience with previously excluded
groups. Moral judgment and moral feeling have a reciprocal
relationship, they interpenetrate and influence each other in all sorts of
ways. (p. 53)
Peters (1979) noted that Kohlberg's "exaggerated formalism" has prevented him from appreciating the affective component of moral action. He offers the Aristotelian notion of habituation as a mediating variable that will bridge the gulf between moral knowledge and moral action. The moral emotion of altruism was linked to moral action by Spiecker (1990) in the light of the inadequate motivating force of intellectual capacity. Bailey (1985) summarizes:

The main point is the simple one that clearly the cognitive disposition does not always move us to appropriate action. If it did then immoral action would be impossible, since action consists in doing what my judgment tells me not to, or failing to do what my judgment tells me to do. But all of us, at some time or other act immorally—we do what we ought not and we refrain from what ought to be done—even when the ought is determined by our own judgment. What is going on when this happens? Presumably the judgment arising from our cognitive disposition - the moral judgment - is overcome in terms of drive, motivational force, by some stronger disposition, or appetite, sloth, or whatever. (p. 205)

The inadequacy of cognition as a motivational, as opposed to justificatory, element is exaggerated, says Straughan (1985), by linking the cognitive aspect to a formal principle. Straughan's point is that principles, in contrast to moral rules, are generalizations at a highly abstract level which can be called upon to justify a specific course of action; they are essentially justificatory in nature. Moral rules as a prescriptive formulation of virtue, can speak to specific situations, and prescribe courses of action in a motivational manner. By his reliance upon cognition and principle, Kohlberg provides little in the way of motivational force. Foot (1978) states her position baldly:
After an initial period of preoccupation with emotivist and
imperativist analyses of the language of morals, I have come to
believe that a sound moral philosophy should start from a theory of
the virtues and vices. The investigation of the relationship between
virtue and the good, and of the conditions under which virtuous
character can be nurtured now seem to me to be a central task of moral
thought itself. (p. 76)

Rich (1985) contends that Kohlberg's objection to character trait inclusion
could be overcome by the inclusion in stages of character traits that are conceptually and
psychologically appropriate to the stage requirements. As these character traits will
secure a functional role for emotions in moral judgment and moral action, and they
avoid Kohlberg's objection of arbitrariness as they are distinctive of each level, they
will form a rapprochement between the emotions and Kohlberg's theory.

As stated, criticism may be considered to be either destructive or constructive.
Pincoffs on "quandary ethics" provided a criticism intended to obviate the general need
for Kohlbergian considerations. Gilligan's "different voice" sought merely to expand
upon the theoretical basis provided by Kohlberg and in which she participated. As a
constructive criticism, the writer intends his observations to enhance the undoubted
worth of Kohlberg's work and to render it more amenable to general utility, in the
manner suggested by Rich.

In this spirit, two elements of Kohlberg's justifications for rejecting a virtues
based ethic in favour of his "morality is justice" (unified virtue) approach can be linked.
First, returning to Kohlberg's original observations concerning the Hartshorne and
May (1928) studies, reveals two reasons that Kohlberg advances to reject virtue
education: initially, virtue words have no descriptive content, they are merely praise or
censure reactions based upon arbitrary standards, and further, they represent behaviour
induced by habit rather than reasoned judgment. He bases these conclusions on the
inability of Hartshorne and May to adequately predict behaviour, or to make
distinctions between "honest" and "dishonest" students, finding that cheating presented
in a bell-curve distribution around a mean of average cheating behaviours. Second,
Kohlberg's denial that an affective dimension provides the stimulus of movement from
moral reasoning and moral judgment to moral action, must be examined. He locates
such motive power in ego-strength variables such as self-control and self-esteem. A
consideration of the first element may illuminate the second.

Virtue education is undoubtedly intended to inculcate behaviours which will
become character traits. An investigation of the general term "character traits" is
revealing. Consider the three character traits of (a) garrulity (b) honesty and (c)
obedience. Each of these is a distinct character trait in that it can be used to typify the
nature of the person it describes. They differ in that (a) is a habit (b) is a moral virtue
and (c) is a morally ambiguous trait that may or may not have desirable moral
connotations depending upon contingent circumstances.

To apprehend that someone possesses these traits requires the observation of
some manifestation of them in action. The garrulous person talks too much, whereas
"honest" and "obedient" characterize acts as well as persons. Describing garrulity as a
habit, but noting that "honest" and "obedient" are not, marks important differences
between types of character traits and the way in which action can serve as a defining
characteristic. When garrulity is defined as a habit, it shows the repetitive nature of a
singular action,- talking too much. When "honesty" and "obedience" are manifested,
they do not require that the agent be restricted to a single constant activity. What brings
unity to the manifestations of obedience is compliance, and not the activity in which that
compliance is made manifest. What brings unity to the manifestation of honesty is the
realization of all the conceptual connotations that the agent can legitimately bring to that
word. A tentative categorization of character traits may then be that habits are action-
constant and non-habitual traits are action-varied.  
If Kohlberg is correct in viewing moral virtues as habits, then they must be observable as action-constant otherwise they cannot be construed as habitual in any meaningful sense if habitual is to retain its meaning as a recurrent and regular pattern of repeated behaviour. Kohlberg’s contention is demonstrably untrue. An honest person does not invariably engage in singular action-constant behaviour. Honesty may be manifested in diametrically opposed actions: I may both take money out of another person’s bank or deposit that person’s money in the same bank if I am acting as their financial agent. These activities do not label my actions honest, for they could also be the activities of a thoroughly dishonest person. The honesty of my actions is not dependent upon the activity but upon another variable not identifiable in the activity. Similarly, courage, temperance, obedience, and politeness may be construed as action varied and, therefore, cannot be construed as habits.

Kohlberg’s contention that moral virtue must be considered as mere habit is comprehensible only if one single specific activity may be considered to be constitutive of a manifestation of that virtue. Honesty, for example, may be so construed if its definition is limited to “refraining from taking that which does not belong to the agent.” In this case, any activity in which the agents refrain from taking that which is not theirs, would have all the characteristics of an habitual character trait, and Kohlberg’s thesis could obtain. This, however, poses two other problems. First, in the logic of trait ascription, it is permitted to ascribe a trait to a person if, and only if, a single type of activity is observed with sufficient frequency that it becomes a distinguishing characteristic of that person. If a person is frequently talkative or critical or boastful, then it is legitimate to infer that s/he is, in fact, garrulous, critical, and boastful.

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62 Although I have chosen the terms "action constant" and "action varied" to demonstrate the difference between behaviours indicating habituation and those manifesting moral virtue, moral virtue can also be made manifest in inactivity. Forbearance, mercy and charity, can all be realized in inactivity as well as activity. They are clearly moral in nature, can be realized in non-active forms, and yet would still be considered by Kohlberg as mere habits.
person, however, continually and frequently refrains from taking that which is not his/hers, it is not legitimate to infer from the trait to the character. Refraining from taking may be the result of fear, obedience or dull-wittedness rather than honesty: although honest people invariably perform honest actions, this does not inform us of what honest people do when acting honestly. Second, whatever descriptive content virtue words contain they do not get it from informative references to a single type of action. Figure 14 indicates the type of frame of reference required to avoid the Kohlbergian error of considering moral virtue as action-constant habit. Honesty can, therefore, even at cursory examination, reveal eight modalities of expression, each of which is capable of manifestation in a plethora of activities, none of which, in and of themselves, reveal the moral virtue of honesty.

Kohlberg’s contention fails on another level with moral virtues such as honesty. As has been demonstrated, for Kohlberg’s notion of moral virtue as mere habit is to stand, it must do so on a definition of honesty as a single action-constant activity, which has been demonstrated not to be a satisfactory position. Paradoxically, even if accepted, a definition of “refrain from taking” will fail. Thus, if Kohlberg’s consideration of the habitual nature of moral virtue manifestation is valid, then the activity must be made manifest with sufficient frequency that it satisfies whatever measures and standards are employed. Generally, it would be agreed that increasing frequency of observation indicates the firmness of the habituation. If a cigarette is smoked once a week, the firmness of habituation is less than if a cigarette is smoked once an hour. Thus, the honest person must refrain from taking that which is not his/hers with sufficient frequency that it becomes a defining characteristic trait. In the honesty domain, at least, if someone has to visibly and frequently undertake an activity in which s/he refrains from taking that which is not his/hers, it may be questioned to what extent the notion of honesty is firmly implanted in him/her. Similarly, if an agent has to continually and frequently struggle against the temptation to give in to that which
Figure 14. An action-variable consideration of honesty.\textsuperscript{63}
is found to be fearful, (a popular reductivist definition of courage, regardless of
Socrates) then it can hardly be claimed that courage is a defining and secure
characteristic. The activity has not become habituated, the fearful must be met with
courage renewed on each occasion. Although it may be the case for some virtues (for
example benevolence, justice and prudence), frequency of manifestation does not tell
against the weakness of moral character. It is not justifiable on the basis of the
arguments above to regard moral virtue as habit. No moral virtues can be regarded as
habits.

If the preceding arguments are accepted, Kohlberg's inferences on the basis of
the Hartshorne and May studies must be revisited. Kohlberg's use of the finding that
there was very little predictability as to whether a child would cheat or not must be
reconsidered. Such results allowed Kohlberg to infer from a sufficiently high
occurrence of cheating behaviour to the inexistence of honesty in that child. But
Kohlberg wanted to do more because he held that virtue words were descriptively
useless because they do not allow prediction of behaviour across situations.

\textsuperscript{63} It is feasible to take each of the eight modalities proposes in Figure 14 and translate each
of them into an appropriate Kohlberg stage of moral development depending on the requirements of that
stage.
Unfortunately, the only prediction that can be made from the virtue of honesty is the rather uninformative one that there would be a high frequency of honest actions. *But*, if moral virtues are action-variable traits, as is maintained, and the action taken by the child is situation specific, then the descriptive content of virtue words when used to describe a person’s character does not amount to describing what they would tend to do across situations. The Hartshorne and May studies allow the legitimate conclusion that the children were not honest, but not the conclusion that virtue words do not have any descriptive utility in the examination of moral character. Since the virtues are not habits, they do not attempt to describe character by being overt descriptions of frequent behaviour. Moreover, just as the finding of the Hartshorne and May studies do not disestablish the descriptive function of the virtues, neither could they have established that function if the studies had found a high frequency of honest behaviour. Virtues do not share an inference pattern with habits.

The second element to be addressed is Kohlberg’s contention that, rather than virtue and habituation or an affective component as motivating elements linking moral judgment and moral action, ego-strength issues such as self-esteem and self-control are better predictors. Traditionally, virtue is considered to be a barrier between willful emotive impulse and the dictates of moral judgment. For example, for a wealthy person to deposit someone else’s money in their bank account would not call, in any significant way, upon the virtue of honesty, nor would it stand as any significant indicator as to moral character as far as honesty is concerned. The monetary amount may be minor in this frame of reference, and the benefits that would accrue as a result of dishonesty may be minuscule. The situation is otherwise if the wealthy person were to be replaced by an impoverished one. The temptation is proportionally larger and it may require steadfast honesty to perform the action. It is to be noted once again that the action alone is not indicative of the virtue. Two functions are undertaken in the exercise of the virtue of honesty in the latter situation. The impoverished person must first
establish, as a moral judgment and through a process of moral reasoning, that
depositing the money is the right action, and second, the virtue of honesty must be
called upon to help overcome a wrong emotion or desire.

If the exercise of virtue is dependent upon right judgment, then Kohlberg is
certainly wrong in divorcing moral virtue from our capacities to make moral progress
through rational decision making based upon our cognitive competence. Further, to the
extent that the exercise of moral virtue entails, as it certainly does, the ability to
overcome emotion and desire, then it is feasible to construe moral virtue as a form of
self-control: (the term “emotion” is used to signify an affective dimension concerning
action as well as “desire” or “passion”). The virtues are differential in terms of the
specific emotion which needs overcoming; temperance overcomes the excessive desire
for certain pleasures, obedience overcomes the emotion of willfulness, courage
overcomes the emotion of fear, prudence overcomes the emotion of excessive altruism.
Justice, however, is more problematic, lacking a single emotional focus, but in keeping
with Kohlberg’s purportedly Rawlsian notions of justice, if it is to be signified as
“fairness,” then justice requires overcoming exclusive pre-occupation with self-interest.
All of the virtues may be construed as dynamics of self-control or self-affirmation.

As the exercise of moral virtue is certainly esteemed, if not rewarded in the
world, then those who practice virtue are usually held in higher esteem than those who
practice vice. As such, virtuous behaviour may be considered to be a mechanism for
the forming and strengthening of a feeling of moral worth or self-esteem. This
formulation of virtue is certainly in keeping with an Aristotelian position in which
knowledge of the good (Kohlberg’s cognitive dimension of moral judgment) is
insufficient to prompt proper action in the world, and requires the support of an
habituated schema that will become an affective response to moral issues. The irony
exists that, to the extent that Kohlbergian theorists argue the case for ego-strength
elements such as self-control and self-esteem as the link between moral judgment and
moral action, they are arguing for the place of virtue as a central component in any formulation of moral development and education.

Kohlberg's assimilation of virtues to habits has obscured an important dimension of moral education by leading to an unjustified separation of morally relevant cognitive development from the development of the moral virtues. The issue turns upon whether the structural and epistemological requirements of the individual stages determines not only the form of the stage but also the content. Kohlberg's position is that externally derived stage content is irrelevant in the light of justice structures, the writer's position maintains that lacking such content enervates the theory by not enabling subjects to overcome the obscuring force that the emotions have upon judgment. Without the virtues and their development it is difficult to see how appropriate judgments can be acted upon. Conversely, without the development of moral judgment, it is difficult to see how the virtues could ever come to be exercised, because to say a virtue has been exercised requires an appropriate judgment. Moral virtues and moral judgment are indispensable to one another and to the morally educated person. Kohlberg has provided insights into the formation of moral judgment, it remains now to address the appropriate techniques and opportunities by means of which moral virtue can be integrated with moral judgment thereby completing the moral equation.
Appendix D

THE DIALECTIC PROCESS
Dialectics is founded upon the self-generation and tension that exists between polar opposites. As Morgan (1986) states:

Any phenomenon implies and generates its opposite. Day and night, hot and cold, good and evil, life and death, figure and ground, positive and negative are pairs of self-defining opposites. In each case, the existence of one side depends upon the existence of the other. We cannot know what is cold without knowing what is hot. We cannot conceive of day without knowing night. Good defines evil and life defines death. Opposites are intertwined in a state of tension that also defines a state of harmony and wholeness. (p. 255)

In early philosophy, the word dialectic originally signified "investigation by dialogue," instruction by question and answer, as in the heuristic method of Socrates and the dialogues of Plato, in which the tensions between opposing positions led to deeper understanding (Moulton, 1983). Further, the aim of all argumentation being the acquisition of truth or knowledge about reality, and the process of cognition being inseparably bound up with its content or object—that is, with reality, it was natural that the term dialectic should be extended from function to object, from thought to thing; and so, even as early as Plato, it had come to signify the whole science of reality, both as to method and as to content, thus nearly approaching what has been universally known as metaphysics (Littlejohn, 1996). It is, however, not fully synonymous with the latter in the objective sense of the science of real being, abstracting from the thought processes by which this real being is known, but rather in the more subjective sense in which it denotes the study of being in connection with the mind, the science of knowledge in relation to its object, the critical investigation of the origin and validity of knowledge as pursued in epistemology. As the process of reasoning is more fundamental than its oral expression, the term dialectic came to denote primarily the art
of inference or argument. In this sense, it became synonymous with logic. It has always, moreover, connoted special aptitude or acuteness in reasoning.

The term dialectic has both logical and metaphysical meanings in philosophy. In logic, it generally refers to a process of critical reasoning used either for refutation or for the discovery of truth. Although Aristotle claimed that his *Topics* was the first systematic use of the dialectic, he recognized Zeno of Elea, whose famous paradoxes defended the philosophy of Parmenides, as its inventor (Ayers, 1982). Aristotle made a fundamental distinction between a true dialectical process and the eristic dialectic of the Sophists, designed to justify a predetermined position. The Aristotelian dialectic was characterized by a purity intended to guarantee objective truth.

In the 18th century Kant used the term dialectic systematically in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, arranging the four contradictions of pure reason as four sets of theses and antitheses. Thus, Kant describes as "transcendental dialectic" his criticism of the (to him, futile) attempts of speculative human reason to attain knowledge of such ultimate realities as the soul, the universe, and the Deity. Fichte (1977) applied the term synthesis to the third stage of resolving the contradictions in the thesis and antithesis. This triadic concept, which characterizes the usual meaning of the term dialectic today, was advanced and elaborated by Hegel and Marx. For Hegel, the dialectic is a threefold process in which reason is revealed through reality, both rational and spiritual in nature, through which Hegel identifies thought with being and logic with metaphysics. In Marx's theory, known as dialectical materialism, the dialectic describes the material process of reality in general and of society in particular.

The standard modern formulation of the dialectic follows Hegel's triadic construction in which the attributes and potential of a thesis are explored, and through that exploration the opposing antithesis is generated. As the characteristics of the antithesis are made manifest, the tensions inherent between the thesis and the antithesis lead to a synthesis that, in turn, becomes the new thesis of the ascending dialectic.
Engels (1973) provides a useful perspective on the uses of the dialectic as a developmental and revolutionary social change process by means of three principles:

1) the mutual interpenetration (struggle or unity) of opposites;

2) the negation of the negation, and

3) the transformation of quantity into quality.

The first principle accounts for processes of self-generated change whereby phenomena change themselves as a result of tension with their opposites. This principle underpins the concept of contradiction, and is used by Engels to explain the Marxist understanding of the manner in which one social arrangement is inevitably replaced by another. The second principle explains how this change process becomes developmental in that each negation rejects a previous form yet retains an element of that form. The third principle accounts for revolutionary changes, called by Marxists “totality shifts”, that occur when inner contradictions can no longer be accommodated by a process of multiple negations and counter negations and a qualitative change occurs. The dialectic has emerged as a powerful concept, and with modifications, parallels the dialogic process as defined for the purposes of this dissertation.
Appendix E

FEMINIST ETHICS
Traditional Western approaches to ethical theory have attempted to provide some general methodological principle or set of criteria for determining, in individual cases, what is right and wrong. They have usually been ahistorically grounded in *a priori* thought experiments. For example, is this type of action what we would agree to be good or right, obligatory or permitted, wrong or forbidden? The feminist position holds that many classical ethical thinkers did not ask themselves what the function or purpose of formulating ethical theory itself was. Thus, they hardly noticed that the "we" they were consulting was wealthy, leisure class, usually white European men. Marx and Nietzsche, however, assumed that hegemonic ethical codes served the ideological and manipulative function of keeping some social groups in power over others by forcing the second to internalize and act on norms that perpetuated the power of the first.\footnote{However, both Nietzsche and Marx have their own implicit ethical values, although there is a lot of controversy about this claim, some insisting that Marx is a radical historicist who felt that values and the standards for justice were always changing, and others who felt that Marx did retain freedom as a basic universal value.}

Feminist ethics has this in common with Marx and Nietzsche: it does not want to accept any conventional value systems that operate as ideologies to perpetuate the power of a particular group of dominants (men) over the particular group of subordinates (women). Jaggar (1991) points out that one of the main purposes or presuppositions of doing feminist ethics is to unmask conventional value systems or ethical theories which perpetuate male domination. As the divisions between feminists stem in part from the mainstream from which they begin, it is useful to examine these paradigmatic foundations.

The three mainstream theories of the foundations of rights and duties, goods and evils are universalism, including rights theory; communicative or discourse ethics; and communitarianism. Just as there are three mainstream views as to how to ground ethical claims, there are three competing feminist approaches which use these traditional
starting points but come to different conclusions.

Universalism is the view that there exists principles of goodness or obligation relevant in any situation. Theories of justice often start from the a priori basis that there are certain universal human rights or principles of justice which apply to all human societies. John Rawls (1971) has one such theory of justice, and Okin (1989) is a feminist who accepts his starting point, but then insists that his principles ought to be extended to give women and children rights against men in the family, thus breaking down the public/private split that Rawls and others see as a sphere of personal freedom. A second starting point is communicative ethics or discourse theory, as put forward by Habermas (1987). His view is that ethical statements ought to be justified by a process in which those affected could communicate their needs and perspectives, agree on formal equality and reciprocity in the communication, and attempt to get agreement based on the uncoerced force of the best argument presented for resolving the problem. Benhabib (1992) is a feminist ethicist whose position is the closest to Habermas. Jaggar critiqued Habermas's idea of a communicative ethics because it ignores the structural inequalities of some participants (for example, women to men, people of color to whites, lesbians and gays to heterosexuals, uneducated to educated). She maintains that a feminist practical reason was developed in feminist self-help movements in the 1960s and 1970s which used an egalitarian process of incorporating the voices of those structurally oppressed, including an emphasis on consensual process and emotional support (Jaggar, 1991).

Young's (1991) feminist theory of justice starts with a Habermasian emphasis on the importance of a commitment to communication. She expands Habermas' views with the idea that justice is a process value that requires self-determination, or participatory democracy, which are denied by structures of oppression and domination in welfare state capitalist and socialist societies, since they do not allow such self-
determination to anyone except white, wealthy, or elite men. Caucus vetoes, affirmative action and block voting, in addition to effective constitutional protections for women and minorities would have to be put into place before justice could become a reality.

The third starting point for mainstream theory and for some feminist approaches is the communitarian position of Sandel (1982) and MacIntyre (1982). For these thinkers, morality is neither an abstract reasoning process of individual reasoners, as with the universalists, nor a process to be determined in the communicative ethics model. Rather, individuals understand values as intimately connected with their identification with a particular community and the social practices and roles assumed in that community. Thus, rather than define morality as a universalist code which becomes clear through a process of internal reasoning or ideal dialogue, MacIntyre argues that what we ought to do depends on our moral tradition—that is, on the particular historically specific narratives and communities in which we are embedded (for example, the narratives of Christianity, Judaism, or Native American religions). 65

Placed in this communitarian tradition are Noddings (1984) and Ruddick (1989)

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65 MacIntyre maintains that the contemporary context of individualist capitalism nations is morally problematic. According to him, morality was unproblematic for premodern societies since goodness, virtue and duty was what would best achieve the goals embedded in one's social role and social practices, such as husband/wife, father/mother, warrior/peasant. Bureaucratic individualist societies such as modern capitalist societies create a moral problem in that they break the assumed connection between the good for the individual, who is now assumed to be an egoist, and the good for the society or community, which is assumed to be connected somehow to production for profit and the highest GNP.

The breakdown of commitment to communities and the moral traditions embedded in them has created some individuals who are "moral solipsists," like Nietzsche's "great man," Zarathustra, who can accept no external authority. Liberals avoid dealing with this moral problem by insisting that although no agreement can be reached on the good life, we can agree on principles of the right, or justice.

But communitarians like Michael Sandel argues that John Rawls' (1971) project to prioritize justice as abstract an moral principle universally agreed to by individualist selves is untenable, since human selves are not so abstractable from their communities of origin as to be able to make any intelligible choice of the sort Rawls presupposes. Instead, Sandel argues for what he calls a constitutive sense of community in which people share the end of furthering the well-being of the community in a way that creates a mode of self-understanding partly constitutive of each member's identity. Thus, one's values are tied to the values of the community by one's moral sense of self even though one may be critical of certain community opinions or practices. (Sandel, 1982) Sandel's notion of communitarian ethics is reflected in the first two stages of DDM explored in chapter seven.
who attempt to develop a feminist ethic as an alternative to masculine
universalist theories of rights and justice. They appeal to a distinctive woman's ethical
voice which prioritizes concern and ability to care for concrete others, and connect this
voice to the specific virtue of mothering. Since this is women's primary social role in
traditional societies, it would seem they are also communitarians in their insistence on
valuing an already given aspect of most existing communities. They critique male
ethicists who have ignored this feminine moral point of view and demand the
substitution or extension of mainstream ethical thinking to include the feminine voice as
a necessary prelude to the elimination of male domination.

As rhetorical strategies, feminists in all three camps, by insisting on extending
rights talk, communicative ethics and communitarian virtues to include women's
issues, moral skills and priorities, are partially transforming moral values. First, in
extending the sphere of rights to the personal sphere, second, in demanding that female
recipients of state welfare be considered deserving of participation in public policy
decision making, and third, in demanding that men co-parent in order to learn to
prioritize caring in context rather than universalistic principles of justice. In this way,
all feminist ethical approaches have been partially successful in creating a
transformation of the understanding previously developed to explicate the process of
moral judgment.