INTRA-PARTY CAUCUSES AND
N.D.P. LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN 1989

A Thesis Submitted to the College of
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in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
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in the Department of Political Studies
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By
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ABSTRACT

The Canadian party of democratic socialism, the New Democratic Party (NDP), following the lead of its predecessor, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), has exhibited some characteristics which have distinguished it from its principal political competitors, the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties. Some of those characteristics are identified by this study which focuses upon the process through which delegates assemble in biennial conventions, and the emergence of advocacy caucuses within the NDP.

Delegate entitlement in the NDP is based upon party membership rather than the equality of constituencies. This study explores the consequences of that principle and offers some comparisons to the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties.

The modern and somewhat informal existence of numerous advocacy caucuses offers mute evidence of a desire on the part of the party to embrace organised interests. The extent to which advocacy caucuses are able to influence the agenda of the party is less clear. This study examines the relationship between delegate attendance of the Women's and Labour caucuses and candidate support across four ballots. Data from the 1989 NDP convention suggest that, with respect to the selection of a leader, there exists a positive relationship between delegate attendance of the meetings of some caucuses and candidate support across four ballots.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The goal of completing the requirements of a Master of Arts degree within twelve months seemed, in September of 1991, a bit elusive. The faculty of the Department of Political Studies, my colleagues, and my friends provided a lot of support and encouragement which certainly contributed to the realization of this goal.

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I am particularly indebted to Professor Keith Archer at the University of Calgary. His outstanding example and his frequent words of encouragement throughout my undergraduate years were (and are) deeply appreciated, and contributed much to my decision to study political science. I am especially grateful for his generosity in allowing me access to the data set he created from the 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study and for providing copies of his written material arising therefrom.

Lucy Ladouceur at the federal office of the New Democratic Party was very helpful in providing information and in responding to my enquiries, for which I am grateful.

The final production and printing of this document would not have been possible without the technical genius of my friend Bob Harvey, who devoted a considerable amount of his time to correcting inadequacies caused by my computer illiteracy. My friends Glen Horton and Gens Hellquist of GLHS were kind enough to permit the use of their computer and laser printer. I thank them from the bottom of my heart!

Of course, it goes without saying that responsibility for the material, the analyses and the interpretations contained herein remains mine.

N.R.T.
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
July, 1992
for my father,

R. Graeme Thomlinson

whose life-long love of politics
and continuing interest in the world around him
inspired me
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................... iii

DEDICATION ......................................................................................................... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... v

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................ vi

1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1

2 THE PARTY ....................................................................................................... 3

3 THE DELEGATES ............................................................................................. 25

4 THE CONVENTION .......................................................................................... 46

5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 61

ENDNOTES ......................................................................................................... 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................. 73
LIST OF TABLES

2.1 Results of the 1971 NDP leadership election ................................. 14

2.2 Results of the 1975 NDP leadership election .................................. 17

3.1 Delegate entitlement and registration
by delegate category ......................................................... 27

3.2 Delegate entitlement and registration
by affiliated organisation .................................................. 30

3.3 Delegate entitlement and registration for
constituency and youth by province and territory ......................... 34

3.4 Delegate entitlement and registration for
constituency and youth by region ......................................... 35

3.5 Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and
New Democratic Party delegate registrations
by region .............................................................................. 37

3.6 Selected demographic characteristics
by delegate status ................................................................ 41

3.7 Size of delegate selection meetings
by Province or region .......................................................... 43

3.8 Constituency delegate selections in the
Liberal, Progressive Conservative and
New Democratic Parties ......................................................... 44

4.1 Delegate attendance of
provincial/territorial caucuses .................................................. 49

4.2 1989 NDP Leadership Election Results
(A) Actual .............................................................................. 50
(B) Survey ............................................................................. 51
4.3 Female delegate support for Audrey McLaughlin
by attendance of Women's Caucus
(A) First Ballot ......................................................... 53
(B) Second Ballot ...................................................... 53
(C) Third Ballot ....................................................... 54
(D) Fourth Ballot ...................................................... 54

4.4 Union delegate support
by attendance of Labour Caucus
(A) First Ballot ......................................................... 57
(B) Second Ballot ...................................................... 58
(C) Third Ballot ....................................................... 58
(D) Fourth Ballot ...................................................... 58
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The principal purpose of this study is to examine, in a major political party at the federal level in Canada, the relationship between delegate attendance of intra-party caucus meetings and support for leadership candidates. More specifically, this study involves the 1989 biennial convention of the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the election of Audrey McLaughlin as the fourth leader of that party.

Several factors combine to make the 1989 biennial convention of the NDP worthy of study. The fact that it culminated in the election of the first woman to lead a national Canadian political party should certainly be enough to kindle academic curiosity, but there are other aspects of the election of Audrey McLaughlin which are equally deserving of attention.

Because it took four ballots for McLaughlin to obtain the support of an absolute majority of voting delegates, this convention offers an ideal opportunity to examine the role of organised interests or advocacy caucuses within the NDP in electing a party leader. This study will report on an examination of the relationship between selected caucus attendance and candidate support on each of the ballots. Particular attention will be given to the Women's Caucus and the Labour Caucus.

The phenomenon of organised interests (caucuses) within political parties and the effect of those caucuses upon the leadership selection process have not yet been the subject of much academic interest and study. It is hoped that this thesis will provide some new insight into this understudied area. While the examination is restricted to one convention of one party, it will add to the available body of knowledge and may thus afford material for future comparisons with the conventions of other parties.

The thesis consists of five chapters, the first of which is this brief introduction. The second chapter places the 1989 biennial convention of the party in an historical context. It examines first the tradition of leadership selection in the CCF/NDP, and
second, the means by which interests have been aggregated within the CCF/NDP since its inception, with emphasis on the involvement of organised interests. An effort is also made to depict the mood of the party as its delegates gathered in Winnipeg in December of 1989.

The third chapter offers a profile of the delegates who attended the convention. This delegate profile seeks to determine the demographics of the delegate body generally, and emphasises such factors as age, sex, income, province or region of origin, and connection to constituency or affiliated organisation. Party records have been accessed to determine the delegate entitlement of constituency associations and affiliated organisations and the extent to which those entitlements were fulfilled. The remaining data have been extracted from the 1989 New Democratic Party Leadership Convention Study conducted by Professor Keith Archer of the University of Calgary. In total, 2435 delegates registered at the 1989 convention. The federal office of the NDP provided Professor Archer with address labels for 2291 delegates (they had no current address for the remainder), and 39 were returned as undeliverable; thus, 2252 questionnaires were delivered and 1060 were completed and returned for a response rate of 47%.

In the fourth chapter of this study, the actual results of the four ballots, as tabulated by the Party, are compared with the results obtained in the Convention Study, thus establishing the accuracy of the Study. In the case of both the Women's and the Labour caucuses, this chapter tests the hypothesis that there exists a relationship between caucus attendance and candidate support through four ballots. It compares the candidate preferences of delegates across four ballots with their attendance of the meetings of those caucuses. Finally, the chapter offers a brief examination of the provincial and territorial caucuses, the Women's Caucus and the Labour Caucus.

The final chapter consists of the conclusions made possible by the investigation.
Chapter 2

THE PARTY

The December 2, 1989 election of Audrey McLaughlin as the fourth National Leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP) represented, in several respects, the end of an era. With her election, McLaughlin became the first woman to lead the NDP and indeed the first woman to lead any major Canadian political party at the national level. The convention also marked the first time that the party or its predecessor, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), ventured beyond the ranks of its experienced parliamentarians to elect a leader. Finally, the election of McLaughlin was seen in many circles as a re-assertion of the guiding principles of the party. To understand the factors which resulted in this election, it is first necessary to examine the tradition of leadership selection in the CCF/NDP, as well as the means by which interests, particularly organised interests, have been aggregated within the party since its inception.

This examination will consist of two parts. In the first, an explanation of the changing leadership of the CCF/NDP will be offered. The second, which is written from a position as a participant observer, will involve a more detailed examination of the period during which the party was led by Edward Broadbent because the events of this period influenced the mood of the delegates who assembled in Winnipeg to elect his successor. This chapter will demonstrate that the development of the party and its leadership has entailed a gradual but continuous evolution, the most noticeable theme of which has been a struggle between pragmatism and idealism.

The Regina convention of 1933 has been popularly viewed as the beginning of democratic socialism in Canada, but in fact, as early as 1874, independent labour candidates "began seeking and occasionally winning election to Parliament and provincial legislatures."\(^1\)
Two events were pivotal in the early development of a Canadian political vehicle for social democratic thought. These were the adoption, in 1918 by the British Labour Party, of a programme for parliamentary socialism, and the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike. Without examining in detail the causes and effects of these events, it can be noted that the significance of both for the development of democratic socialism in Canada lay mainly in their effect on such individuals as James Shaver Woodsworth, who would later be instrumental in the formation of the CCF. The 1918 action by the British Labour Party was significant because of its acceptance as a model by Woodsworth who, in embracing the British ideal, totally rejected the prominent alternative -- Lenin's 1917 revolution.  

The impact of the Winnipeg General Strike was more lasting, at least partly because its eventual resolution involved a swift and ruthless suppression by authorities; a suppression which further strengthened the conviction of many that there was a distinctly unhealthy collusion between the economically powerful of Canadian society and the leaders of government. The involvement of Woodsworth in the strike was mainly restricted to speaking at rallies and assisting in the publication of the Strike Bulletin, a daily publication whose existence was threatened by the arrest of its organisers. During the strike, Woodsworth was himself arrested, and was charged with seditious libel for quoting from the Bible: 

\[
\text{Woe unto them that decree unrighteous decrees, and that write grievousness which they have prescribed; to turn aside the needy from judgement, and to take away the right from the poor of my people, that widows may be their prey and that they may rob the fatherless. (Isaiah 10:1-2)}
\]

In the wake of the First World War, with the divisions of society created thereby; in the wake of the Winnipeg General Strike, with the resultant emergence of class consciousness; and with the influence of the rural population in Canada under attack, a
series of electoral upsets occurred which gave democratic socialists cause for optimism. In 1919, the United Farmers of Ontario formed a government, to be followed by the United Farmers of Alberta in 1921 and the United Farmers of Manitoba in 1922. The federal election of 1921 saw a minority Liberal government formed, and the election of 65 Progressives, who were primarily an offshoot of the successful United Farmer provincial organisations. While not specifically democratic socialist in character, these parties shared much with the fledgling democratic socialist movement, not the least of which was a lively distrust of entrenched financial interests and the existing political parties. Some analysts believe that the rural strength of the United Farmers' movement also reflects a general reluctance to recognise the emerging class divisions of Canadian society. The legacy of this position may have been one factor influencing the inclusive thrust of the CCF.

Woodsworth's background, his point of view, and his connection with the strike were responsible for his election, in the general election of 1921, as Member of Parliament for Winnipeg Centre, a seat that he held until his death in 1942. Although popular lore has often left the impression that Woodsworth was among the sixty-five Progressive members who were elected, it must be emphasised that he was one of four independent members elected in 1921 and that he represented the Independent Labour Party of Manitoba. Another independent farm-labour candidate, William Irvine, was sent to Parliament by the Alberta constituency of Calgary East.

During the 1920s, Woodsworth, Irvine, and other advocates of the democratic left travelled and spoke across the country, but with little success. Organised labour was fighting both internal battles and an external enemy, the "Company Union." Farmers' movements, on the other hand, were experiencing difficulty in keeping and attracting members since, toward the end of the decade, there were relatively high prices for farm commodities.
Finally however, in Calgary in August of 1932, representatives of farm groups, some representatives of organised labour, and the western labour parties united to propose "a co-operative commonwealth in which the basic principle regulating production, distribution and exchange will be the supplying of human needs instead of the making of profits." It is significant that this initiative involved representatives of existing organisations and not merely individuals interested in the formation of a new political vehicle.

We aim to replace the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supersede unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine democratic self-government, based upon economic equality, will be possible.

With those brave words serving as a preamble, the founding convention of the CCF, held in Regina in July of 1933, adopted a programme which came to be known as the Regina Manifesto. Some parts of that programme have endured as policy within the CCF/NDP, the best recognised examples of which are probably publicly organised health, hospital, and medical services, and the abolition of the Senate.

A second enduring notion, initially proposed by the founding convention of the CCF, is that the leader should be considered simply one member of a Federal Executive. Heavily influenced by the ideas of group government espoused by Henry Wise Wood, the notions of co-operative fellowship which sprang from British socialism, and the egalitarianism of the Social Gospel Movement, the early CCF made a deliberate effort to avoid the structure and features of the old parties. Initially, the President (leader) was elected at large as was the National Council which then elected the National Executive from among its number. J.S. Woodsworth was elected as the first President, bringing to the office the experience of his twelve years as a Member of Parliament as well as his
many years of organisational experience. Slight changes to this structure were later made, with a move to the direct election of officers by the convention and the election of provincial representatives by provincial conventions, but the leader continues to be considered as one position on the National Executive and therefore continues to be elected, together with all other Executive members, at every national convention.

A third feature of the 1933 convention worthy of note is its enthusiastic embrace of a structure which was never intended or designed to facilitate individual memberships. The national party was, instead, to be a confederation consisting of "... approved provincial organizations which accept the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Programme." It was anticipated that most farm, labour, and other organisations loosely identified with the democratic left would choose to affiliate provincially, creating a national party which would be "... nothing more than the sum of its constituent parts -- the coordinating agency." This structure reflected the desire of Woodsworth and others to preserve the identity of the constituent groups as well as to ensure that the national CCF was not a centralised organisation of a sort similar to that of the Liberal and Conservative parties. On an ideological level, the persistence of the notion that a strong national political force could be fashioned out of the cooperation and affiliation of numerous and diverse autonomous organisations must be noted. On a practical level, however, the idea was, at least initially, much less successful:

In the first ten years of its existence, the CCF was able to secure the formal affiliation on the farm front of only the United Farmers of Alberta, and this connection was presumably to be dissolved as the UFA withdrew from politics. No trade union affiliated with the CCF in the first seven years of its existence.

The wording of various parts of the Regina Manifesto leaves little doubt that the left-wing theorists within the organisation were the dominant force in 1933. Indeed, the
final sentence of the Manifesto could hardly be considered to reflect a pragmatic desire on the part of the authors to form a government in the foreseeable future:

No CCF government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to the establishment in Canada of the Co-operative Commonwealth.16, 17

This may well have marked the beginning of a struggle between pragmatism and idealism which has continued to haunt party leadership and activists alike. The theory of a distinction between "party" and "movement" within the CCF has been extensively developed and commented upon in relevant literature. Walter D. Young (The Anatomy of a Party: the National CCF 1932-61) and Leo Zakuta (A Protest Movement BeCalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF) are two of the most prominent authors to advance this theory. With regard to the question of leadership however, perhaps the best short illustration of the dichotomy comes from Michael Cross, who writes:

The popularities of the social democratic party were amply illustrated in Ottawa. On the one hand was the revered leader, Woodsworth, who tended to the "education-movement" side of the debate. On the other was David Lewis ... Lewis the supreme bureaucrat ... came to represent the practical, political pole of the party spectrum. Power, for him, was the name of the game.18

Alan Whitehorn has taken serious issue with the conclusions of Young, Zakuta, Cross et. al., pointing out that the common perception of Woodsworth and Lewis is not supported by archival evidence.19 Even Whitehorn, however, does not deny the existence of a movement-party distinction within the CCF/NDP; he merely objects to its becoming the standard tool of analysis in explanations of the electoral failure of the federal party. When addressing the question of leadership, however, it may well be suggested that the perception is of more importance than the reality, since it is the perceptions of voting convention delegates which determine the selection of a leader.
By 1937, the failing health of J.S. Woodsworth was recognised by the national 
convention which permitted him to remain as president, but created the office of national 
chairman to relieve him of the pressures of administration. M.J. Coldwell was elected to 
the new position.\textsuperscript{20} When Woodsworth suffered a stroke in 1938, leadership effectively 
passed to Coldwell, although he was not formally made leader until after the death of 
Woodsworth in 1942. Coldwell brought to the position considerable experience as an 
organiser, a Regina alderman, and a Member of Parliament. His ascension to the 
position of leader signalled the passage of control of the party to the hands of a younger 
and more pragmatic generation exemplified by David Lewis and T.C. Douglas. Under 
this leadership, the CCF enjoyed some electoral success: the 1942 defeat of Conservative 
Leader Arthur Meighen in a by-election called specifically to allow him to return to the 
House of Commons from the Senate, the attainment of Official Opposition status in both 
Ontario and British Columbia and, of course, the 1944 CCF provincial victory in 
Saskatchewan. During 1944, a Gallup poll indicated that popular support for the CCF 
exceeded the support of either the Liberals or Conservatives.\textsuperscript{21} As has become rather 
typical, however, such massive pre-election Gallup poll support was not translated into 
seats in the 1945 federal election, and support for the CCF declined steadily thereafter. 
In efforts to reverse this trend, the \textit{Winnipeg Declaration of Principles} was affirmed by 
the 1956 convention. It is a much more moderate document than the Regina Manifesto, 
both in content and in tone.\textsuperscript{22} Needless to say, such moderation was not always viewed 
favourably:

Veteran CCF voters could only wonder whether their cherished party has 
sacrificed its teeth. It was not simply the Regina Manifesto which tied the 
CCF to the thirties; it was the name, the faces, the utterances, the ever­
present righteousness -- the entire image of the party.\textsuperscript{23}

It could be suggested that the "party" was beginning to triumph over the "movement."
Efforts to make the CCF more politically successful were thwarted by the emergence of John Diefenbaker and his electoral triumph of 1958. The CCF caucus was reduced to eight members, with both M.J. Coldwell and Stanley Knowles losing their seats. The caucus narrowly (by one vote) elected Hazen Argue as house leader, but the national convention of the same year retained Coldwell as national leader. Desire for electoral success was becoming stronger and led, at the same convention, to the acceptance by the CCF of an invitation extended by the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) to investigate the formation of a new political party.

It was the intention of the party Executive that the division of leadership between Coldwell as national leader and Argue as house leader would last until the new party was formally launched. When Coldwell announced, prior to the final national convention of the CCF in 1960, that he would not seek the leadership, the national council recommended the creation of the post of "parliamentary leader" as a bridge until the new party could be launched. Although Argue initially assented to this proposal, his caucus rejected it. The convention turned down the council proposal and elected Argue as national leader.

The proposed constitution and programme presented to the founding convention of the NDP in 1961 reflected the determination of its authors to ensure a party firmly in the control of its membership. To this end, they suggested the creation of:

...individual memberships open to everyone in Canada who is willing to accept and abide by the constitution, principles, and programme of the party and is not, or ceases to be, a member or supporter of any other political party. Affiliated memberships shall be open to trade unions, farm groups, co-operatives, and other appropriate organizations which decide, through methods determined by them, to accept the principles, programme, and constitution of the party.

Further proposals included the election of national leader by the national convention, guarantees of French-Canadian representation on the executive, and the creation of a
national council, the supreme governing body between conventions, consisting of members elected at the national convention together with members elected by each provincial party at its provincial convention. It is an arrangement which has remained basically unchanged, with the notable exception of later affirmative action resolutions which guarantee women adequate representation. This early emphasis on control by the members is probably responsible for the persistence of the notion that the leader is merely one cog in a large party machine; a person who articulates policies and directions which have been approved by the membership through its delegates. This is not to suggest that New Democrats do not value their leaders or take the responsibility of leadership selection seriously. They do. It does suggest, however, that the party membership may recognise the correlation between policy formation and electoral success, or the lack thereof. Members are therefore less likely to attach responsibility for the lack of electoral success to the leader.

The founding convention was a triumph of the organisational team headed by David Lewis and Stanley Knowles, who were able to get 1800 delegates to Ottawa, "four times as many as had attended the biggest CCF national convention in history." On August 2, those delegates needed only one ballot to elect T.C. Douglas, the Premier of Saskatchewan, to lead the new party. He received 1391 votes, with current CCF leader Hazen Argue collecting only 380. Douglas brought to the office seventeen years of experience as Premier of the first socialist government in North America as well as seven years of previous experience as a Member of Parliament.

The focus of the party from its formation in 1961 until the election of 1968 was, of necessity, on winning elections and on operating in a series of minority parliaments. Party activists were preoccupied with fighting four general elections as well as a 1962 by-election to allow T.C. Douglas to enter the House following his loss in the 1962 general election. The human and financial resources of the party were stretched to their limit as organisers struggled to build upon the momentum provided by the founding
convention and to ensure that the party appeared to be united behind its leader and its programme. This meant that the early part of the decade was not a time during which diverging opinions were likely to surface.

The election of the Trudeau majority in 1968, however, changed that. Douglas lost his Burnaby riding in the Trudeau sweep, to return to the House of Commons through a February, 1969 by-election held following the death of Colin Cameron (Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands). Re-thinking of policy became possible and, according to some members of the party, necessary. Amidst concern that the party of Woodsworth and Coldwell was drifting to the right came new policy proposals designed, in words credited to newly elected MP Edward Broadbent, to "waffle to the left if it waffled at all."32

A significant number of people within the party wanted several policies examined and new solutions proposed. The group found natural leadership in James Laxer, a graduate student who would later contest the leadership of the national party, Gerald Caplan, who would later become the Federal Secretary, Mel Watkins, a University of Toronto economist, and Ed Broadbent. The group drafted the Manifesto for an Independent Socialist Canada, the primary thrust of which was nationalistic, socialistic economic policy. The language of the Waffle Manifesto, as it soon came to be known, was reminiscent of the Regina Manifesto as it contained assertions such as "capitalism must be replaced by socialism."33 There was immediate and sharp disagreement within the party as to the relative merit of the manifesto. Those who viewed the NDP as a party of principle tended to praise the manifesto as a return to the accurate and proper ideals of a socialist party; those who viewed the NDP as a party of electoral success argued that to accept the Manifesto would be political suicide. Concerted efforts, by several individuals influential in the party, were made to have the authors modify the language of the manifesto prior to its presentation to the federal convention of 1969, but these efforts were rebuffed by most of its supporters.34 Their refusal to modify the structure
however, cost them the support of one of the authors, Ed Broadbent, as well as a number
of other previously supportive members of the party hierarchy. Tommy Douglas
remained somewhat detached from the fray, leading to speculation among the "party"
faction that he had not totally outgrown his "movement" roots. Taken in combination
with his 1968 election defeat, it also accelerated suggestions that it was time for a change
in leadership. David Lewis had acted as parliamentary leader during Douglas' absence
from the House and, even after Douglas was returned to the House in 1969, there was a
perception that "Lewis runs the show and is preaching for a call even now." Within
"the eastern and controlling wing of the party," there was a groundswell of support for
David Lewis, the origins of which have been traced to his son Stephen who, prior to the
1968 election, asked Douglas to resign as leader and allegedly suggested that he name
David Lewis in his place. Stephen Lewis has always maintained that he made the trip
to talk to Douglas "at the direct request of [the Ontario provincial] caucus." Donald
MacDonald, then leader of the Ontario party, has stated, after consulting seven former
members of his caucus, that "absolutely none of them has any recollection of such a
caucus discussion and decision." In any event, Douglas refused to "short-circuit the
democratic process of electing a leader." This left the Lewises to orchestrate the real
opposition to Laxer and his associates from less lofty positions. During the 1969
convention David Lewis fumed on the convention floor about the negative image of the
party and sought to attach blame for that image to the Waffle. The Waffle lost the vote
on the adoption of its manifesto by a vote of 499 to 286, but was successful in winning
seven of the twenty vacant National Council seats. Mel Watkins was elected Vice-
President.

The struggle continued when T.C. Douglas decided to step down as leader: both
elements in the party saw the 1971 convention as their chance to exert influence upon the
future direction of the party. Not surprisingly, after 35 years of party service, David
Lewis decided to seek the leadership and secured the immediate endorsement of much of
the party establishment. James Laxer entered the race on behalf of the Waffle and became an immediate front-runner, eventually facing David Lewis on the final ballot after Frank Howard, John Harney, and Ed Broadbent were eliminated. Although the final ballot delivered 1046 votes to David Lewis and only 612 to James Laxer, the size of his victory did little to lessen the enmity Lewis felt for the Waffle. Table 2.1 provides the actual results of that election.

Table 2.1

Results of the 1971 NDP leadership election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Lewis</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>1046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Laxer</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Harney</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Broadbent</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Howard</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


History records the subsequent decline, "purge," and demise of the Waffle within the party, but it could be fairly suggested that the Waffle represented the first in what would become a series of organised internal interests, or intra-party caucuses.

With the exception of the 1960-61 leadership of Hazen Argue, the leadership of David Lewis was to be the shortest, if arguably one of the most productive, in the history of the CCF/NDP. About one year after his election as leader, Lewis led the party into a general election. Although the party was demoralised from its dealings with the Waffle and other internal irritants, Lewis was able to inject vigour into the campaign by talking endlessly about "Corporate Welfare Bums," in response to new tax measures introduced by then federal finance minister, John Turner.42 When the dust settled after the October
31 election, 31 New Democrats were elected with the party receiving 18.1 per cent of the vote, and Canada receiving a minority government headed by Pierre Trudeau and supported by the NDP.43

David Lewis, nearing the end of his political career, wanted to achieve from the Trudeau government legislation which would place him beside Woodsworth in the perceptions of ordinary Canadians. Desmond Morton, in his book The New Democrats 1961 - 1986: The Politics of Change, describes the events of that term, the legislative achievement of Lewis and his thirty New Democrats, and the efforts of Lewis to manoeuvre Trudeau into such a position that an election could be fought with minimal damage to the NDP. It is not necessary to recount these issues here, but it must be emphasised that this period saw relations between the federal party and its western provincial sections become increasingly strained as a result of various federal initiatives which were perceived as negatively affecting the resource-based economies of the western provinces. Lewis' press secretary, Jean-Guy Carrier has said, "There was incredible pressure on David for the entire two and a half years [sic]. Every day he had to keep on justifying his decision to prop up the Liberals in return for remarkable legislative achievements."44 When the budget was introduced, Lewis attacked and forced the election which took place on July 8, 1974. The results were disastrous for the NDP: Lewis lost his York South riding, and the party won only 16 seats and 16.1 per cent of the total vote, its lowest share since 1963.45 Lewis deflected any feelings of recrimination by swiftly leaving the leadership he had won only three years previously. Only much later did the party (and indeed much of his family) discover that he had fought the entire campaign while suffering from leukemia.46

John Edward Broadbent, one of the few NDP MPs to increase his share of the popular vote in the 1974 election, was quickly named interim leader. Despite having been an MP since 1968 and a leadership candidate in 1971, Broadbent seemed unable to infuse the party with any sort of enthusiasm. The caucus was understandably
demoralised, the promise of gain in Quebec was undercut by support for the Parti Quebecois (which tended to emphasise the provincial nature of much of the social democratic agenda), and Broadbent "had difficulty dealing with the sticky personnel problems that came with the leader's job." Finally, there was a problem of perception. The leadership tradition of the CCF/NDP had involved a combination of intellect, commitment, wit, fiery rhetoric and passion, and Broadbent was seen as decidedly lacking in the latter categories. His biographer, Judy Steed, writes:

What happened, quite simply, was that New Democrats were not happy with Ed’s leadership, he knew it and decided to quit. The party was not emotionally prepared to accept the end of an era -- and the beginning of a new one. They could not quite believe that thirty-eight-year-old Ed Broadbent, who was far from attaining the saintly heights of David Lewis or Tommy Douglas, would replace these icons whose roots stretched back to the founding of the CCF. .. He was not a fiery orator, he wasn't a renowned intellectual, he wasn't a great anything. And he had no powerful allies to fall back on, to pull strings for him.

In January of 1975, Broadbent announced that he would not seek the party leadership at the convention to be held later that year. Sixty days later, after considerable pressure, he reconsidered. Geoffrey Stevens noted, in the Globe and Mail of March 27, 1975, that New Democrats had "approached him not on the basis that he was the least undesirable of an inferior crop of potential leaders, but rather on the basis that they wanted him, Edward Broadbent, as their leader." Among those who approached him were Lewis, Douglas, and the three western NDP premiers. The convention took place in early July in Winnipeg and Broadbent faced BC MLA Rosemary Brown, Saskatchewan MP Lorne Nystrom, former MP John Harney and Douglas Campbell, "a Mississauga taxi-driver, [who] tested even NDP tolerance for eccentricity." Broadbent's campaign was run by Jo-Anne McNevin, a veteran election organiser, and was the most professional of the campaigns. Rosemary Brown surprised observers with
the extent of her support and the efficiency of her organisation. As Harney was eliminated after the second ballot and Nystrom after the third, it also became obvious that Brown was the recipient of many western "movement" votes cast by delegates who were suspicious of Broadbent's "establishment" ties. Once again, the dichotomy of movement and party was evident. On the fourth and final ballot, Broadbent received 984 votes to 658 votes for Brown. Table 2.2 provides the results of that election.

It may be noted parenthetically that the union support which was supposed to guarantee Broadbent early victory did not arrive: only one-third of labour's eligible delegates registered.52

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>BALLOTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Broadbent</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosemary Brown</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorne Nystrom</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Harney</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas Campbell</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There was little bitterness or divisiveness following Broadbent's leadership win. Many delegates saw him as a caretaker leader, "decent, honest, plodding along, holding things together until a more charismatic leader emerged."53 Geoffrey Stevens may have spoken for many when he wrote in the *Globe and Mail*:

He excites almost no one, in the party or outside it, but Ed Broadbent won the leadership because he was the best candidate ... Mr. Broadbent will not find it easy to instil a sense of direction and purpose in his tired and battered party. He will not excite the Canadian people. But he will be a solid, respectable, responsible leader. He will serve his party well.54
Although Rosemary Brown was unable to win the leadership, she was certainly effective in altering the agenda of a party struggling to come to grips with emerging feminism. It has been suggested that Broadbent, as a result of his marriage to Lucille and his strong connection to Kay and C.B. Macpherson, may have had the right instincts to deal with the increasing demands of women for recognition and parity both within the party organisation and as candidates for the party. This may well be true, but the strength of Rosemary Brown's campaign would, in the words of Kay Macpherson, "scare the pants off Ed" and force him to confront feminism.  

Because of the size of the Liberal majority, Parliament was a much more peaceful place than it had been during the previous session. Broadbent used this period to advantage by strengthening his knowledge of party issues, increasing his involvement in the Socialist International, and quietly building his image as a moderate social democrat. His strategy began to show reward, in terms of more favourable press coverage and higher Gallup standings. In the election of 1979, the first under Broadbent's leadership, the party was able to capture eighteen per cent of the popular vote, for twenty six seats (and the balance of power) in the ensuing Parliament.  

Although Prime Minister Clark pledged to "govern as though he had a majority," he was not accorded the privilege for long. This decision reflected primarily the opinion of Broadbent that the NDP could not survive another period of minority government without serious injury. He was able to convince his colleagues, and when the government introduced its budget in December it was summarily defeated. The stage was set for an election on February 18, 1980. Shortly before the election, Geoffrey Stevens identified, in The Globe and Mail, as one of "three pivotal events in the brief history of the New Democratic Party," the election of Broadbent as leader. He suggested that Broadbent had:
... completed the process, begun in 1961, of converting a protest movement into a mainline bourgeois political party, a labour-based party which can vote to break a strike of west-coast grain handlers, a non-militaristic party which can contemplate with equanimity increased defence spending, a reform party which can envisage governing without performing radical surgery on existing social and economic institutions. 57

Despite the Trudeau majority produced by the election of 1980, the NDP garnered almost twenty per cent of the popular vote and increased its representation to thirty two seats, twenty seven of which came from the West.

The battle lines within the NDP began forming almost immediately, based partly upon the resource question of the early 1970s. A second major irritant quickly developed when Broadbent " ... attempted -- unsuccessfully -- to pre-empt any internal party dissension by giving his immediate and unqualified endorsement as federal NDP leader to Prime Minister Trudeau's patriation resolution and entrenched charter of rights." 58 The Vancouver convention of 1981 saw some of the constitutional resentment spill over onto the convention floor with, at one point, Ed Broadbent, Stanley Knowles, Dave Barrett and Tommy Douglas lined up at one microphone and Allan Blakeney, Roy Romanow, Grant Notley, and Lorne Nystrom lined up at the opposing microphone. When Knowles spoke in support of inclusion of a charter of rights, he was followed by former MP John Rodriguez, who attacked Knowles and, in so doing, angered even reformist delegates who showed their displeasure by booing him. It is possible that they also reconsidered their position, for Broadbent's position was substantially upheld. 59 The convention did, however, elect Tony Penikett, the leader of the Yukon party and a Blakeney/Notley ally, as President.

The constitutional debate did not go away. Such vehement advocates of aboriginal, women's and minority rights as Svend Robinson and Ian Waddell continued to struggle to strengthen the provisions of the proposed charter in these areas. Advocates of provincial autonomy such as Grant Notley, Allan Blakeney and Roy Romanow
continued to resist intrusions into provincial jurisdiction. Members of a third faction supported Broadbent on substance and, even if they disagreed with his tactics, did not say so in public. It was also during this time that comments began to be heard about the role of party and parliamentary staff, who seemed to exercise inordinate influence over the formulation of strategy, new ideas and approaches. Illustrative of this problem was Broadbent's invitation to Gerald Caplan to come to Ottawa as federal secretary. Broadbent was able to get his choice ratified by the federal council (by only one vote) but, in the process unseated Cliff Scotton, who was the western favourite.60

The party was in trouble in the polls, in trouble with its choice of staff and in trouble with internal dissent. During the winter of 1982, at the instigation of Alberta NDP leader Grant Notley, several prominent western New Democrats met to "do something about changing the federal NDP agenda."61 The discussions which followed eventually led to the joint release, by Allan Blakeney in Regina and Grant Notley in Edmonton, of a document which came to be called the June 22 Statement. The statement consisted of four main sections. The first argued that public participation in democratic politics requires some decentralisation of political authority. The second was an admission that CCF/NDP had not adequately recognised the extent to which most citizens of Quebec see their National Assembly as the guardian of francophone culture, and as an institution for the economic development of their province. Third, the statement condemned the military mentality of both the Soviet Union and the United States and recommended only defense of the liberties and freedoms for which people have traditionally fought. Finally, the statement singled out economic policy as the focus of a new social contract encompassing government, business and labour.62

The June 22 Statement received wide media attention and became the subject of much discussion among party members. The party establishment, which had proposed its own restatement of principles to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Regina Manifesto, clearly feared an uprising by its western wing. Rumours abounded about
possible challenges to Broadbent's leadership and Notley and Blakeney were branded as "anti-Ontario." Ironcally, although the June 22 Statement was widely seen as an effort to emphasise the goals of the movement, it originated in the only area of the country in which the party had been electorally successful.

In some respects, however, the convention proved anti-climactic. The MacLeods write:

The party faced another East-West wrangle at its 1983 convention in Regina, but at a key moment Douglas stepped forward, and this time spoke -- unmistakably -- for the whole party. It was one of the great speeches of his life, and was remembered after as one of the great moments in the history of the movement. His health was failing, and he knew that he might not have long to live. As soon as he stepped up to the microphones and grasped the lectern, a transformation took place. The Douglas that crowds had cheered hundreds of times stood before the hall. The standing ovation which followed his speech lasted for close to half an hour.64

A compromise resolution was worked out which was accepted by the convention. The value of limited decentralisation was recognised, but the concept of the social contract was considerably diluted. Once again, party solidarity had been salvaged by one of the tremendously respected figures from the party's past. The issues, however, remained, although the profile of the western grievances had been reduced in 1982 with the defeat of Allan Blakeney in Saskatchewan, and was further reduced in 1984 with the tragic death of Grant Notley in Alberta. Dissension was exacerbated in 1983 with the release by Jim Laxer of his critique of NDP economic policy. Laxer had been "rehabilitated" in the party by Broadbent, who had made him Director of Research. With his public release of a document prepared for Broadbent as part of his job, Laxer underlined a growing concern about Broadbent: "I care more about ideas than I do about party loyalties -- If I'd given the report to Ed, it would have been buried."65
When the federal general election was called in 1984, there was a considerable sense of apprehension in the party. Support had reached a low of 9.5 per cent in Gallup polls, donations had slowed, and there was no end to the divisions in sight. Broadbent launched a well-orchestrated campaign against the "Bobbsey twins of Bay Street" and campaigned relentlessly across the country thereafter. By late August, the party had risen to 18 per cent in the polls, and in the election captured 30 seats. Party activists credited the efforts of Ed Broadbent with elevating the status of the party during the campaign, but were often quick to also point out that he must bear much responsibility for its dismal position in the first place.

The 1985 convention saw the election of Marion Dewar, the former Mayor of Ottawa, as President. In a manner reminiscent of the notions of "federation" espoused by the early CCF, Dewar had campaigned on a platform of strengthening links to women's organisations, environmental and peace groups, and other elements of the party's grass roots and, upon her election, began to set in motion much of the machinery which has added to the legitimacy of the caucuses within the party. In so doing, she upset the party bureaucracy, especially federal secretary Dennis Young, who was seen as lacking in organisational ability and unsympathetic to women. Dewar persevered and Young "resigned," allowing a restructuring of the party staff beginning with the hiring of Bill Knight as federal secretary and continuing with the hiring of George Nakitsas, both widely popular moves. At the 1987 convention in Montreal, Dewar was succeeded by Johanna den Hertog who quietly but firmly continued the reforms initiated by Dewar.

The first stage of the Meech Lake Accord -- the June 3, 1987 signing by the Prime Minister and the provincial premiers of a tentative agreement -- caused comparatively little dissent with only Ian Waddell refusing to support it and being stripped of his caucus responsibilities as a result. Concerted efforts were made to expand the support of the party in Quebec and were met with some success according to Gallup polls. In the summer of 1987, Canada-wide support for the NDP reached a high of 44
per cent, and Broadbent's personal popularity easily outstripped that of his rival party leaders. However, this pre-election popularity was not translated into electoral support in the 1988 election. Party activists watched the campaign with dismay as the election quickly became focussed upon the free trade issue, and polarized between John Turner and Brian Mulroney.

With a lead in the polls, and with an issue many New Democrats saw as tailored to their ideas, the federal campaign had seemed destined for a breakthrough. Instead, strategy, which was perceived as originating with the Leader's office and party staff instead of with the Election Planning Committee (EPC), focussed upon a host of other issues. This strategy was based upon polling information which suggested that the credibility of the NDP was strongest when dealing with social policy and other policy areas with which the party has been traditionally identified and weakest when addressing economic issues. Upon the advice of the party's pollster, free trade was initially identified as an economic issue, which allowed the Liberals and John Turner to identify the issue as their own in the collective public mind. When it was later revealed that the pollster who had offered such advice was Vic Fingerhut, based in Washington, D.C., the outrage of party activists was palpable. Suggestions that the EPC had recommended a different (Canadian) pollster surfaced, which served to further aggravate growing feelings of discontent. An amazing 84.4% of 1989 convention delegates believed that "during the 1988 federal election, the NDP should have focussed its campaign on the Free Trade Agreement," while 66.6% believed that "the NDP paid too much attention to pollsters and not enough to principles in the 1988 election campaign."69

A second issue which was the cause of considerable dissent was reaction to the Meech Lake Accord, informally agreed to by First Ministers in 1987. Shortly after the federal election, new provincial governments began to back away from the commitments of their predecessors as provincial legislatures began the ratification process. This thrust the issue back into the forefront of public attention, and caused many New Democrats to
re-examine the unconditional support for the Accord offered by Broadbent and most of the federal party. While little concern was expressed with regard to the "distinct society" clause (only 28.4% of 1989 convention delegates were opposed\textsuperscript{70}), other provisions, or the lack thereof, engendered furious debate. The absence of provisions to recognise the rights of aboriginal people, women and other minorities; the provisions regarding the recognition of future provinces; and the amending formula were attacked. The position of Broadbent and much of the federal party was roundly criticised. Audrey McLaughlin, running in the 1987 Yukon byelection occasioned by the resignation of Erik Nielsen, campaigned on a platform of opposition to the Accord and received dispensation from Ed Broadbent to do so.\textsuperscript{71}

The third issue to cause party dissention was the question of Canada's continued association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Over the previous ten years, much of the party "establishment" had worked toward a softening of the policy which advocates Canadian withdrawal from NATO. During the same period, successive conventions affirmed support for the position of withdrawal. (Only 15.9% of 1989 convention delegates believed that "Canada should remain in NATO.\textsuperscript{72}) When Broadbent, during the 1988 campaign, publicly announced that an NDP government would not, in its first term of office, implement party policy in this regard, many members began to question whether the traditional reliance of the party on membership-driven policy was in danger of disappearing.

The general mood of the party, following the 1988 federal general election, was therefore decidedly truculent. Most members recognised the tremendous contribution of Broadbent to the electoral record of the party, but questioned whether the price paid in terms of grassroots control had been too high. It was, therefore, with mixed emotions that the party accepted the decision of John Edward Broadbent to step down as leader, setting the stage for a new leader to be selected by the December, 1989 convention in Winnipeg.
Chapter 3

THE DELEGATES

On Thursday, November 30, 1989, the biennial convention of the New Democratic Party (NDP) was convened in Winnipeg, Manitoba. This meeting was distinguished from previous conventions of the party held since 1975 by the knowledge that the present leader, Mr. Broadbent, would not seek re-election.

This chapter will first explore the rules of the NDP with respect to the election of leaders and the allocation of delegates. In so doing, it will examine the features of these processes that distinguish the NDP from the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties. Secondly, the chapter will provide a profile of the delegates who assembled in Winnipeg. It will examine the regional origins of the delegate body as well as demographic information such as sex, age, education, income and occupation. Finally, the chapter will briefly examine the actual process by which delegates were elected in their constituencies.

New Democrats have traditionally viewed the position of leader somewhat differently than have supporters of either the Liberal or Progressive Conservative Parties. This stems from the pre-eminent role assigned to party members in the development of policy within the party. Liberals are not unacquainted with policy debate, but their leader is not bound to follow policy developed at convention,\(^1\) while the National Executive of the Progressive Conservative Party has final authority over policy formulation.\(^2\) Within the NDP, however, final control over policy rests with the biennial Convention or, between Conventions, with the federal Council.\(^3\) The primary responsibility of the leader, therefore, is to articulate policy which has been adopted by the party. For this reason, the leader is constitutionally viewed as simply one officer of the party who, like the other members of the executive, must be elected at each convention. It is in this respect that every biennial convention of the party becomes a leadership convention. Arguably, since no incumbent federal leader has ever been
successfully (or even seriously) challenged through this process, it may be suggested that
the formal requirement is of little importance. Yet that conclusion would be suspect,
for as Terry Morley has argued, the fact that the mechanism has not resulted in
substantive challenges "...does not mean that the constitutional arrangement has no
force or effect." There are several reasons unrelated to its procedural effectiveness why
the arrangement has never been seriously utilised. These might include the reluctance of
the party membership to attach responsibility to the leader for any lack of electoral
success, a widespread affection within the party membership for the leader, and an
unwillingness on the part of party members to indulge in public displays of disunity. The
constitutional provision forcing biennial leadership election should, therefore, not be
dismissed or denigrated. For instance, George Perlin has noted that, in the absence of an
adequate leadership review process in the Progressive Conservative party, "Diefenbaker
was able to resist the repeated attempts of his extra-parliamentary party to force him to
resign." The constitutional provisions of the NDP clearly formalise the leader's
responsibility to the extra-parliamentary party and would therefore seem to preclude the
successful resistance, by the leader, of the will of the party membership.

The allocation of delegate entitlement by the NDP differs markedly from that of
the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives in several ways. The NDP has only six
delegate categories, which compare with the eighteen or more delegate classes which
have, at various times, been employed by both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative
parties. The only delegate categories which are not strictly based upon membership
criteria are the two ex officio categories: the members of the party caucus in the federal
Parliament and the members of the Council of the Federal Party. At the 1989
convention, these two groups together accounted for 5.7 per cent of the delegate
entitlement and 6.3 per cent of the registered delegates. (See Table 3.1) This compares
to the 1983 Progressive Conservative leadership convention at which approximately 25
per cent of the total registrations were non-elected ex officio delegates.
councillors, Senators, MP's, nominated candidates, and members of national executives are among those typically eligible for Liberal and Progressive Conservative *ex officio* delegate status.\(^{11}\)

Representation within the NDP is, with the exception of the two *ex officio* categories discussed above, determined strictly by membership criteria. Table 3.1 provides a summary of delegate entitlement and registration for the 1989 national convention by delegate category.

### Table 3.1
Delegate Entitlement and Registration by Delegate Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Entitlement</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Registration as a % of Entitlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliates(^a)</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucus(^b)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Bodies(^c)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituencies(^d)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>1724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth(^e)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3187</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: percentage totals may not add exactly because of rounding

SOURCE: New Democratic Party federal office
- Delegate eligibility summary
- Convention registration data

\(^a\) Consists almost exclusively of trade union locals.

\(^b\) Party records indicate that only 36 of the 43 Members of Parliament registered as delegates, however all were in attendance and were introduced to the convention.

\(^c\) Consists of umbrella organisations such as District Labour Councils, the Canadian Labour Congress, the national offices of national unions and the Canadian offices of international unions.

\(^d\) Party records contain an addition error in the eligibility summary showing the constituency total as 1985 and the resulting total eligibility as 3193.

\(^e\) Consists of those individuals who are twenty five years of age or less and who have been selected as delegates by the Youth Section.
Federal constituencies, which accounted for 62.1 per cent of delegate entitlement and whose representatives accounted for 70.8 per cent of delegate registrations, are entitled to:

one delegate for fifty members or less, one delegate for each additional 50 members or major fraction thereof up to a total of 200 members, and one delegate for each additional 100 members or major fraction thereof.\footnote{12}

The delegate entitlement of the New Democratic Youth Section is determined similarly.\footnote{13} In 1989 this category was eligible to provide 1.9 per cent of the total delegate entitlement and, with an exceptional registration rate of 95 per cent, accounted for 2.3 per cent of convention registrations. It must be noted that these numbers include only those who have actively sought youth credentials. Individuals who are less than twenty-five years of age may seek credentials through the youth section, but also remain eligible to seek credentials as a constituency delegate.

Similarly, individuals who belong to an affiliated organisation or are a part of an affiliated central body may seek credentials through that organisation, but have the option of seeking to represent their constituency through the use of a constituency credential.

Affiliated central bodies that are local in nature, such as District Labour Councils, are entitled to one delegate each while those that are provincial or national in nature, such as Federations of Labour, the Canadian Labour Congress, the national offices of national unions and the Canadian head offices of international unions, are entitled to two delegates each.\footnote{14} Other affiliated organisations are entitled to one delegate for any portion of the first 1,000 of their members and one delegate for each additional 1,000 of their members or major fraction thereof.\footnote{15} In determining the membership number upon which delegate eligibility is calculated, affiliated organisations must deduct from their membership total those members who have notified their organisation of their wish that a per capita payment not be made to the Party on their behalf. Table 3.2 graphically
demonstrates that these two categories combined accounted for 30.3 per cent of delegate entitlement but, because of a combined registration rate of only 51.8 per cent, they produced only 20.5 per cent of actual delegate registrations.
### Table 3.2
Delegate entitlement and registrations
by affiliated organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entitlement #</th>
<th>Entitlement %</th>
<th>Registration #</th>
<th>Registration %</th>
<th>R/E %</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CENTRAL BODIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>District Labour Councils</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>83.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federations of Labour</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>57.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Offices</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>170</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td><strong>AFFILIATES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTWU</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amalgamated Clothing &amp; Textile Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAW</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>85</td>
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<td>Canadian Auto Workers</td>
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<td>CUPE</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.4</td>
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<td>Candian Union of Public Employees</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECWU</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Energy and Chemical Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Association of Machinists</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>71.4</td>
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<td>International Woodworkers of America</td>
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<td>RWDSU</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>70.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retail, Wholesale, &amp; Department Store Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFCW</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Food and Commercial Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URWA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Rubber Workers of America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USWA</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Steel Workers of America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miscellaneous</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>796</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>966</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** percentage totals may not add exactly because of rounding

N=3187 (entitlement)
N=2435 (registration)

**SOURCE:** New Democratic Party federal office
- breakdown of delegate eligibility and-convention registration data
Because the method of delegate allocation employed by the NDP is based upon membership strength, it differs sharply from that of other Canadian political parties. The Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, for example, each award equal convention representation to every federal constituency, regardless of the number of individual party members who reside therein.\textsuperscript{16} The NDP bases its representation on the equality of party membership, therefore constituencies and affiliated organisations are accorded additional representation as their membership increases. In contrast, the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, in granting equal delegate strength to each federal constituency, base their representation on the equality of geographic sub-units, the boundaries of which are loosely based upon the distribution of the total Canadian population. By extension therefore, it can be said that Liberal and Progressive Conservative delegate entitlement is based upon the distribution of the total Canadian population rather than the geographic distribution of party members.

The tenets of "representation by population" suggest that parties should structure their decision-making bodies in such a way as to ensure that the proportion of representation of each electoral sub-unit corresponds to its proportion of the total population under consideration. But "population" may be defined in two ways. The first is in terms of all people living in the electoral sub-unit irrespective of party membership, while the second is in terms of all people living in the electoral sub-unit who are also party members. The NDP has accepted the second option, since to do otherwise would give disproportionate strength to those constituencies in which few members reside. It would also have the effect of devaluing the vote of those members who reside in constituencies which have a large party membership. For example, the 58 party members in the Newfoundland constituency of Bonavista-Trinity-Conception would be given exactly the same number of representatives as the 4,007 members in the Saskatchewan constituency of Mackenzie.\textsuperscript{17}
The question of delegate entitlement is also closely related to the policy function of NDP conventions. Because the convention is the supreme governing body of the party and because policy remains the principal preoccupation of party conventions, it is quite logical that the Party, in determining delegate entitlement, would choose a process similar to that utilised by most corporate and non-profit organisations in their decision-making process. Just as the voting strength of shareholders at the Annual General Meeting of a corporation is determined by the number of shares they hold, the voting strength of a constituency at the biennial convention of the NDP is determined by the number of people on its membership roll.

The delegate allocation formula employed by the NDP has been criticised on the basis that it penalises those areas of the country where the party is weak. Implicit in this criticism is the presumption that increased delegate entitlement would lead to increased participation which would lead to increased support. Even if the causal connection were demonstrated, it requires that the existing formula have the effect of denying participation to individuals from areas with low membership who might, given a different entitlement structure, be allowed to participate. A complete fulfillment of existing delegate entitlement from any area would provide some basis for the suggestion that interest in, and support for, the party in that area had outgrown the participation allowed by the existing representation formula. The fact that areas which have few members are unable to even fulfill the existing entitlements surely calls into question the utility of revising the representation formula to increase entitlement. The problem, in other words, is not lack of entitlement, but lack of participation as measured by actual registration. Registration data from the 1989 NDP convention support this hypothesis. The 75 federal Quebec constituencies were entitled to send a total of 182 delegates to the 1989 convention; however only 65 delegates (35.7% of entitlement) registered. Moreover, fully fifty Quebec constituencies sent no representation at all and an additional
four constituencies sent fewer than 50 per cent of their entitlement. Only 15 constituencies sent the full complement of delegates to which they were entitled. 18

The method by which delegates are allocated in the NDP produces pronounced regional variations in delegate strength. Table 3.3 presents data on the distribution of constituency and youth delegates by province or territory and indicates the total provincial/territorial allotment when these two delegate categories are summed. Each delegate category is further broken down to show the number of delegates to which each group was entitled and the number of delegates from each group who actually registered at the convention. Entitlement and registration are expressed as absolute numbers and as percentages of total entitlement and total registration respectively. Finally, the table indicates the registrations as a percentage of the entitlements for each category. Table 3.4 combines data from Table 3.3 to reflect an arbitrary division of the country into five regions as noted.
Table 3.3
Delegate entitlement and registration for constituency and youth by province and territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY</th>
<th>YOUTH</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entit</td>
<td>Reg</td>
<td>R/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.C.</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alta.</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sask.</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man.</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ont.</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.Q.</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.E.I.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nfld.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.T.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: percentage totals may not add exactly because of rounding
N = 3187 (entitlement)
N = 2435 (registration)

SOURCE: New Democratic Party federal office
- breakdown of delegate eligibility
- convention registration data
Table 3.4
Delegate entitlement and registration for constituency and youth by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>CONSTITUENCY</th>
<th>YOUTH</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entit Reg R/E</td>
<td>Entit Reg R/E</td>
<td>Entit Reg R/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifica</td>
<td>376 11.8 370 15.2 98.4</td>
<td>6 .2 6 .2 100.0</td>
<td>382 12.0 376 15.4 98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prarieb</td>
<td>770 24.1 697 28.6 90.5</td>
<td>27 .8 25 1.0 92.6</td>
<td>797 25.0 722 29.6 90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ont.</td>
<td>545 17.1 510 20.9 93.6</td>
<td>19 .6 19 .8 100.0</td>
<td>564 17.7 529 21.7 93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.Q.</td>
<td>182 5.7 65 2.7 35.7</td>
<td>5 .2 4 .2 80.0</td>
<td>187 5.9 69 2.8 36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanticc</td>
<td>106 3.3 82 3.4 77.4</td>
<td>3 .1 3 .1 100.0</td>
<td>109 3.4 85 3.5 78.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 1979 62.1 1724 70.8 87.1 | 60 1.9 57 2.3 95.0 | 2039 64.0 1781 73.1 87.4

NOTE: percentage totals may not add exactly because of rounding. N=3187 (entitlement) N=2435 (registration)

SOURCE: Derived from Table 3.3

- a Includes British Columbia and Yukon
- b Includes Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Northwest Territories
- c Includes New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 demonstrate the strength of constituency delegates from the West in both potential and actual terms. The Prairie and Pacific Regions combined account for 1146 (57.9%) of the 1979 constituency delegates who were entitled to attend the 1989 convention. A further 545 (27.5%) of the constituency entitlement was from Ontario. Quebec was allocated a 9.2% of constituency delegates, while the Atlantic Region was entitled to 5.4% of constituency delegates. The addition of the youth entitlement to that of the constituencies fails to change the picture to any appreciable
degree. The combined Pacific and Prairie Regions rise to 1179 (57.8%) of the 2039 delegates entitled to attend. The revised figures for Ontario and Quebec are 564 (27.7%) and 187 (9.2%) respectively. The combined entitlement from the Atlantic Region is 109 (5.3%). The actual registrations exacerbate this regional bias: of 1781 registrations, the Pacific and Prairie Regions account for a combined constituency/youth registration of 1098 (61.6%), Ontario for 529 (29.7%), Quebec for 69 (3.9%) and the Atlantic Region for 85 (4.8%). One might expect to discover that those areas closest to the city in which the convention is held would be more likely to be most fully represented. Such a conclusion is only weakly supported by these data. As Table 3.3 clearly demonstrates, the areas with the highest "fill rate" (100%) were Nova Scotia and Yukon which represent the two extremities of the country. The province in which the convention was held, Manitoba, registered 98.9% of its entitlement, but was closely followed by British Columbia (98.4%), Northwest Territories (94.1%) and Ontario (93.8%).

A regional distribution of delegates such as that found at NDP conventions is not likely to occur at conventions of either the Liberal or Progressive Conservative parties. Because constituency delegates to both Liberal and Progressive Conservative conventions are allocated equally to all constituencies, their regional delegate distribution more closely resembles the population distribution in Canada and provides no insight into membership strength by region. This is demonstrated by Table 3.5, which compares registration data from the 1983 Progressive Conservative, the 1984 Liberal, and the 1989 NDP conventions.
Table 3.5
Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic Party delegate registrations by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1983 PC %</th>
<th>1984 Lib %</th>
<th>1989 NDP %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territories</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: columns do not add to 100% because of rounding.

SOURCES: Liberal & PC: John C. Courtney and George Perlin, "The Role of Conventions in the Representation and Accommodation of Regional Cleavages," in Party Democracy in Canada.19

NDP: Table 3.3

Another factor worthy of comment with respect to 1989 NDP delegate attendance is the considerable variation by delegate category in the extent to which entitlements were fulfilled. As Table 3.1 has demonstrated, 95% of eligible Youth were registered. They were followed, in declining order, by constituencies (87.1%), Council (84.9%), Caucus (83.7%), Central Bodies (67%) and Affiliates (48.5%). Clearly, delegates representing affiliated organisations are much less likely to attend party conventions than are those representing constituencies. These data, however, provide an incomplete picture of union and party interaction for, in addition to those delegates who register with affiliate credentials, a substantial number of delegates, while members of a union, register at the convention on credentials other than those allocated to affiliated organisations. Based on 1023 valid responses, the Convention Study reveals that 27.2% of delegates were union members who were not registered through an affiliate credential. This confirms a substantial involvement of union members at the constituency level. More curiously, the Study also revealed that only 10.1% of questionnaire respondents identified themselves as a delegate of an affiliated organisation, as compared to the
20.5% indicated by actual party registration data. This sample bias might be at least partly explained by evidence of differences in educational levels.

There is a widespread perception that delegates to political conventions are not particularly representative of their constituents' sociodemographic characteristics. Delegate bodies, it is often asserted, are dominated by well educated, white, middle class men. According to Perlin, for example, "every study of Liberal and Conservative conventions has found that two-thirds or more of the delegates come from the wealthiest, best-educated and highest-status occupational groups in the Canadian population. Thus, convention politics in the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties is dominated by high-status groups."20 The low proportion of women and youth participating in Liberal and Progressive Conservative conventions has been cause for concern and affirmative action. The Progressive Conservatives require that one third of the delegates from each constituency must be women and one third must be under 30 years of age.21 The Liberal party follows the same practice for young people but has now implemented regulations that require equal numbers of men and women among all delegates selected by constituency associations and youth clubs.22 The problem of gender imbalance among ex officio delegates remains.

Curiously, the NDP appears to be less conspicuously concerned about gender imbalance than its Liberal and Progressive Conservative counterparts. Constituency associations and affiliated organisations have been urged to send more women and youth to conventions as delegates; however no constitutional amendments have been adopted which would require them to do so. It is possible that this reluctance to exert strong central control over the constituency associations and affiliated organisations may represent a modern manifestation of the initial federal nature of the party in which its component parts were reasonably autonomous.

Another possible explanation for the lack of legislated gender parity at the delegate level involves the recognition that the federal council, because it is the
governing body of the Party between conventions, is the seat of real power within the party. This has caused advocates of equal representation of the sexes to concentrate their energies on achieving gender parity at that level. The constitution now requires that one-half of the federal council members elected by Convention be women\(^2\) and that one-half of the members elected by each provincial or territorial Council of Federal Ridings be women.\(^3\) Women have been particularly successful in Executive elections, as is evidenced by the fact that the last four presidents -- Marion Dewar, Johanna den Hertog, Sandra Mitchell, and Nancy Riche -- have all been women.

Youth representation is also slightly enhanced at this level as each chartered Young New Democrats section is eligible to participate in the selection of council representatives from the Council of Federal Ridings in their province or territory.\(^4\) Moreover, each chartered Young New Democrats section is guaranteed one seat on the federal council, as is the national youth President, Secretary-Treasurer, and two Associate Presidents.\(^5\)

The presence of delegates drawn from and, in some cases, representing unions has left the delegate body at NDP conventions slightly more representative of the party membership in terms of education and occupation, but has further skewed the representation in terms of gender, income, and age. If delegates are separated according to delegate category, as identified by the Convention Study, it becomes quickly apparent that educational levels are generally lower among union delegates, particularly those representing affiliated organisations. Delegates representing affiliated organisations are also more likely to have "blue collar" occupations, although this clearly does not translate into lower income levels. These delegates are, however, much more likely to be male, middle-aged, and middle-class. Table 3.6 provides a summary of these data.

The New Democratic Party is less successful than either the Liberal or Progressive Conservative Party in attracting youth delegates. As is also demonstrated by Table 3.6, only 13.6% of the NDP delegates were under 30 years of age. This situation
can be partly attributed to the delegate allocation process which, instead of guaranteeing youth a fixed percentage of constituency delegates, attempts to promote the Youth section of the party. The situation is exacerbated by the presence of a predominantly middle-aged labour contingent within the party.
Table 3.6
Selected demographic characteristics
by delegate status
(per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non union</th>
<th>union/ NOT affiliate credential</th>
<th>union/ affiliate credential</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 30</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 49</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 60</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 60</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;= High School</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;= 40,000</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,001 - 60,000</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 60,000</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCUPATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small business</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white collar</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blue collar</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homemaker</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployed</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retired</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>student</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study
Three methods of delegate selection are employed by the New Democratic Party. With respect to the Affiliates and Central Bodies, the role of the party is passive. Those organisations are responsible for developing their own method of naming delegates. The party requires only that those who are eventually named as delegates must hold an individual membership in the party in addition to their membership in the affiliated organisation. With respect to the two categories of \textit{ex officio} delegates, the federal Caucus and the federal Council, delegate status is automatic. The final two delegate categories, constituency and youth, select their representatives through an election process. The NDP has deliberately attempted to minimise the possibility of abuses of this elective process in both categories. Since all delegate entitlement is based on membership numbers and since, once a critical mass of 200 members is achieved, delegate entitlement increases at a slower rate (1 delegate per every additional 100 members or major fraction thereof), the costs of obtaining additional delegate positions are high. Moreover, Youth delegate entitlements are also determined solely on the basis of membership numbers within a province or territory. Thus new clubs, unless they are formed by a large contingent of new members, have no effect on delegate entitlement. To further minimise abuse, the party requires that only those memberships sold more than 120 days prior to a convention are eligible to be considered in the formula which establishes delegate entitlement. Finally, in cases where the leadership is contested, leadership candidates are limited to expenditures of $150,000, which effectively precludes them from orchestrating any large-scale membership drives at the constituency level.

At least partly as a result of these factors, most of the delegate selection meetings are not particularly well attended. In fact, as Table 3.7 demonstrates, only 6.1\% of delegates reported being chosen by a meeting attended by more than 100 members. Not surprisingly, an examination of Table 3.7 together with Table 3.3, also suggests a correlation between membership strength and the size of delegate selection meetings.
Table 3.7

Size of delegate selection meeting
by province or region
(per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE/REGION</th>
<th>SIZE OF MEETING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Keith Archer, "Leadership Selection in the New Democratic Party."

R. K. Carty has developed a model of constituency delegate selections which suggests "a path of increasing electoral sophistication involved in the selection process."27 His model is structured to propose, at the simplest stage, an electoral contest for delegate positions which grows more sophisticated as the prospective delegates identify themselves with a particular leadership candidate, group together with like-minded prospective delegates to form a slate (which may be issue-based, candidate-based, or some combination of both) and engage in a battle between opposing slates, referred to by Carty as "Trench Warfare."28 Using data from the 1983 Progressive Conservative and the 1984 Liberal party conventions, Carty demonstrated a declining percentage of delegate involvement at each step as the level of electoral sophistication increased.29 When data from the 1989 NDP convention are added to the model in the form of Table 3.8, it can be readily discerned that a similar pattern exists within the NDP.
The table also highlights some significant ways in which NDP delegate selection differs from that of the Liberal and Progressive Conservative (PC) parties:

1) Whereas 49 per cent of NDP delegate selections were uncontested, only 23 per cent of PC and 25 per cent of Liberal selections were acclaimed.

2) Whereas 48 per cent of PC and 41 per cent of Liberal delegates were identified as supporting a particular candidate at the time of their election, 69 per cent of NDP delegates were elected without any identification of candidate support.

3) Almost 40 per cent of Liberal and PC delegates were elected as part of some sort of slate, compared with only 10 per cent of NDP delegates similarly elected.

4) Only 6 per cent of NDP delegates were part of a "candidate" slate as opposed to 26 and 24 per cent of the respective PC and Liberal delegates.

5) A contest of identified slates (trench warfare) involved only 2 per cent of NDP delegates, but involved 10 and 12 per cent of PC and Liberal delegates respectively.

Table 3.8
Constituency Delegate Selections in the Liberal, Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Parties
(all entries are percentage of constituency delegates meeting criteria)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC '83</th>
<th>LIB '84</th>
<th>NDP '89</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selection contested</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior identification as supporting candidate</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ran as part of a slate</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ran identified and on a slate</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Trench Warfare&quot; (Slate vs. Slate)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Keith Archer, "Leadership Selection in the New Democratic Party
It would seem from these data that the method of delegate selection within the NDP is not particularly influenced by leadership candidate preference, for a substantial majority of delegates were chosen without regard to their preferences in the leadership contest. This suggests that other criteria, such as past service and commitment to the party, may be dominant in the minds of members electing delegates. As Keith Archer has observed, "For delegates who will spend more time at the convention debating policy than choosing a leader, such an approach to delegate selection seems both predictable and appropriate."\(^{30}\)

This chapter has focussed on the significant ways in which conventions of the NDP differ from those of the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties. The role of the leader and the rules by which the leader is elected have been examined, together with the rules governing the allocation of delegates. A regional and sociodemographic profile of the delegates has been provided, as has an examination of the means by which delegates are chosen. This information has highlighted several significant features which distinguish the New Democratic Party in convention from its principal competitors in Canadian politics. In summary, it can be suggested that the NDP places a higher value upon convention policy development than upon leadership selection. This enduring emphasis on policy development has influenced other key aspects of intra-party democracy such as delegate entitlements, delegate selection, and leadership selection.
Chapter 4

THE CONVENTION

In some respects, caucuses may be seen as a modern manifestation of the "movement" side of the party seeking to impose its agenda through more sophisticated means. The phenomenon of organised interests operating within the broader party structure, however, is one with which observers of the CCF/NDP should be quite familiar. As Chapter 2 has shown, the formation of the CCF represented an appeal to organised interests and the adoption of the name "Co-operative Commonwealth Federation" officially recognised their role.

Organised labour has traditionally been the most visible, cohesive, and arguably the most effective of these interests, but it has certainly not been the only force to organise within the NDP. As was also demonstrated in Chapter 2, the Waffle may be seen as the precursor of modern advocacy caucuses, groups which seem destined to play an increasingly key role in both policy formation and leadership selection. Perhaps the most obvious success to date is the women's caucus, which has been instrumental in assuring the passage of affirmative action policy with respect to gender parity on the national executive, the national council, and as party candidates in general elections. Alan Whitehorn goes so far as to state, "The women's caucus is now the most powerful lobby group within the NDP and was a major force in the election of Audrey McLaughlin as Broadbent's successor." This chapter will offer some statistical evidence to substantiate that assertion.

In one sense, organised labour could, and possibly should, be viewed as an internal interest group. However, at least partly because of its position as one of the principal architects of the new party, organised labour has traditionally been regarded, at least internally, as a "section" of the party with a status similar to that enjoyed by provincial and territorial sections. Alone among organised interests, central bodies and other affiliated organisations have long had their rights and entitlements enshrined in the
constitution of the party. In recent years, labour has certainly functioned as a caucus within the party and its success has been highly visible, particularly in terms of policy formation. Labour has long been noted for its ability to marshall its forces effectively when issues of concern are under debate. This chapter will examine the relationship between delegates who were union members attending the Labour Caucus and candidate support across four ballots.

The success of other caucuses has been less visible and has tended to focus primarily on policy formation. One obvious explanation of this is a party structure which, with the notable exceptions of affiliated organisations and central bodies, the Youth Section, and the Council of Federal Ridings for each province or territory, makes no constitutional provision for the existence of any organised group. Caucuses are therefore informally organised, tending to consist only of those delegates who self-identify with the central interest of the caucus and who voluntarily attend any meetings which may be held by such a caucus during convention or council. In general terms, the central interest of each caucus is embodied in its name. The broad interest tends to be narrowed to more specific concerns which are determined by the caucus at its meetings. Each caucus determines the rules and procedures for its own meetings but few have a formal structure which outlasts the convention at which they meet.

Each provincial or territorial section holds council meetings and conventions which govern the affairs of the provincial or territorial party and, while these gatherings provide a limited opportunity for the interaction of caucus activists at a provincial or territorial level, there is no formal representation scheme to facilitate the activities of any caucus at the national level. Labour activists are sometimes able to achieve some national contact through the activities of their union but the party provides no supporting mechanism for such contact. As a result, delegates still attend the Council or Convention representing a federal constituency, the Youth section or an affiliated organisation and so must balance the needs and wishes of that group with their personal support of any
caucus. The practical result is that the potential power of caucuses remains largely untapped, partly because there is not necessarily solidarity within a caucus and partly because there exists no means of enforcing any decisions reached by the meeting.

During the presidencies of Marion Dewar (1985-87) and Johanna den Hertog (1987-89), caucuses became better organised and, as a result, have gained strength and recognition. It is now common, for example, for conventions to schedule time for caucus meetings. It is also now common for the representatives of some caucuses to negotiate openly with convention planning officials and to secure assurances that policy resolutions of particular concern to their caucus will be placed on the agenda in such a way as to guarantee their consideration by one of the plenary sessions of the convention. Once proposed policy has reached the floor, solidarity among caucus members is increasingly evident. Although the caucuses have yet to be recognised constitutionally by the party, their role and function build upon a long tradition of organisations under a single party umbrella.

The emergence of provincial and territorial caucuses might be seen as yet another manifestation of ubiquitous Canadian federalism. The Council of Federal Ridings in each province and territory represents a further effort to ensure that provincial and territorial voices are heard at the national level of the party. Although delegates from various provinces and territories have gathered informally at successive national conventions, the importance of these gatherings became increasingly obvious during the divisive policy debates to which Chapter 2 refers. It is hardly coincidental that proposals for the Council of Federal Ridings grew out of the same period. The provincial and territorial caucuses are now attended by a large number of delegates. Indeed, fully 56% of western delegates and over 63% of Quebec delegates attended the meeting(s) of their provincial caucus held during the 1989 convention. Nationally, meetings of provincial and territorial caucuses were attended by nearly one half of delegates. Since western delegates represent about 56% of the delegate total, the potential strength of that caucus
is obvious. Table 4.1 presents data which indicate, by province or territory, caucus attendance and the relative strength of each provincial or territorial delegation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prov/Terr</th>
<th>% of total delegates</th>
<th>ATTENDED CAUCUS</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.C.</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study

The table highlights the potential strength of united provincial and territorial caucuses, particularly if they were to join forces and act with solidarity on a regional basis. The data presented demonstrate the extent to which such bloc voting could influence any voting process, and that would certainly include the election of a leader. As Steven Langdon could certainly attest, bloc voting on a territorial basis did not occur at the 1989 convention, perhaps because neither the campaigns nor the support of the leadership candidates were particularly regional in orientation.

Howard McCurdy and Steven Langdon were the only two eastern candidates, yet their combined vote on the first ballot accounted for only 25.3% of the votes cast.\textsuperscript{3} When McCurdy withdrew following his fifth place first ballot finish, Langdon received 21.5% of votes cast on the second ballot and only 16.3% on the third\textsuperscript{4}, his endorsement by McCurdy notwithstanding.
Had the battle lines been more clearly drawn on a regional basis, or had there been only one western candidate, it is possible that a significant relationship between attendance at geographically based caucuses and delegate support might be discernable. In the case of both Audrey McLaughlin and Dave Barrett however, there is little evidence to suggest any relationship between provincial caucus attendance and voting behaviour.

The 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study provides a picture of candidate support upon which comparisons of candidate support by caucus attendance may be based. Table 4.2 offers a comparison of the actual election results (A) with the results elicited from questionnaire responses (B). This comparison clearly shows the Study to be accurate within a margin of plus or minus five per cent. It is likely that this variance is at least partly caused by the sampling bias discussed in Chapter 3: only 10.1% of questionnaire respondents identified themselves as delegates of an affiliated organisation but, according to actual party registration data, that category represented 20.5% of the delegate body.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2 (A)</th>
<th>1989 NDP Leadership Election Results (Actual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BALLOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLaughlin</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrett</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langdon</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deJong</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCurdy</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waddell</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagasse</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: percentage totals may not add exactly because of rounding

Table 4.2 (B)
1989 NDP Leadership Election Results (Survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BALLOT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLaughlin</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrett</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langdon</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Jong</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCurdy</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waddell</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagasse</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: percentage totals may not add exactly because of rounding

SOURCE: 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study

Using data obtained from the 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study, it is possible to test the hypothesis that, in the case of the Women's Caucus and the Labour Caucus, there exists a positive relationship between caucus attendance and candidate support through four ballots. The voting of female delegates who attended the Women's Caucus is of particular interest since that caucus is widely credited with having been instrumental in the election of Audrey McLaughlin as the first woman to lead a Canadian national political party.

To test the extent to which attendance at the Women's Caucus is a predictor in the election of Audrey McLaughlin, delegates must first be separated on the basis of gender. Because McLaughlin was the eventual winner, and because, as the only woman in the leadership contest she might be expected to receive much of the support of female delegates, those delegates are then separated into two groups: those who supported Audrey McLaughlin and those who did not. Since the test is for a relationship between voting and attendance at the Women's Caucus, female delegates are also separated on the basis of their attendance at the Women's Caucus. The resulting tables group female
delegates according to two variables: their attendance of the Women's Caucus and their support for McLaughlin on each of the four ballots. The numbers in these tables may then be examined to determine whether the variables are independent of each other.

The measure of association used is the chi-square ($X^2$) test of independence. This test is based on the difference between the expected result if the variables were independent of each other (the null hypothesis), and the observed result. If there were no association between Women's Caucus attendance and support for Audrey McLaughlin, the expected result would be that women would support McLaughlin in the same proportion, sampling errors apart, regardless of whether they attended caucus.

The significance level for the test will be five per cent, which simply means that the association will be considered significant if the probability is less than .05 that a value of $X^2$ as large as the one calculated could have arisen by chance from a population in which independence is obtained.

Because the tables to be used for this comparison are two rows by two columns, the test has one degree of freedom. For a significance level of five per cent, the critical value of the chi-square statistic ($X^2_{0.05}$) with one degree of freedom is 3.84. A chi-square statistic which exceeds 3.84 is therefore considered significant.
Table 4.3

Female delegate support for Audrey McLaughlin by attendance of Women's Caucus (percentage in parentheses)

### A. FIRST BALLOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUCUS</th>
<th>McLaughlin</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>81 (56.6)</td>
<td>62 (43.4)</td>
<td>143 (37.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>92 (38.5)</td>
<td>147 (61.5)</td>
<td>239 (62.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>173 (45.3)</td>
<td>209 (54.7)</td>
<td>382 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 11.89435 \]

### B. SECOND BALLOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUCUS</th>
<th>McLaughlin</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>91 (64.5)</td>
<td>50 (35.5)</td>
<td>141 (37.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>108 (45.2)</td>
<td>131 (54.8)</td>
<td>239 (62.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>199 (52.4)</td>
<td>181 (47.6)</td>
<td>380 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 13.31262 \]
### C. THIRD BALLOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUCUS</th>
<th>McLaughlin</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>105 (74.5)</td>
<td>36 (25.5)</td>
<td>141 (37.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>134 (56.5)</td>
<td>103 (43.5)</td>
<td>237 (62.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>239 (63.2)</td>
<td>139 (36.8)</td>
<td>378 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 12.22110 \]

\[ X^2_{.05} = 3.84 \]

### D. FOURTH BALLOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUCUS</th>
<th>McLaughlin</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>117 (84.2)</td>
<td>22 (15.8)</td>
<td>139 (37.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>152 (65.0)</td>
<td>82 (35.0)</td>
<td>234 (62.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>269 (72.1)</td>
<td>104 (27.9)</td>
<td>373 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 16.01226 \]

\[ X^2_{.05} = 3.84 \]

**SOURCE**: 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study

Data presented in the foregoing tables which are of principal interest to this examination may be summarised in three points. The first, and perhaps most obvious conclusion is that, since the value of chi-square exceeds the critical value of 3.84 in all four calculations, the null hypothesis can be rejected. There is evidence of a positive relationship between Women's Caucus attendance by female delegates and their support of Audrey McLaughlin.
Second, although women account for only 35.5% of the total delegate body, and although only 37.4% of women attended the Women's Caucus, McLaughlin was able to finally gain the support of a significant bloc (84.2%) of those women. This compares with the support of 65% of women who did not attend the Women's Caucus and 72.1% of women generally. This suggests that the Women's Caucus was ultimately able to function as a highly cohesive bloc. Because the bloc was aligned with the eventual winner its "success" offers an incentive for other caucuses to become more cohesive in their voting behaviour.

Finally, while the data do highlight the growing solidarity of women across four ballots, they also reveal that less than one half (45.3%) of female delegates supported McLaughlin on the first ballot. Clearly, gender representation was not the only issue at work in the minds of female delegates.

The statistical test offers evidence of a relationship between attendance of Women's Caucus by female delegates and support for Audrey McLaughlin. It does not, however, establish causality. Whether attendance at Women's Caucus caused delegates to support McLaughlin, or support for McLaughlin caused delegates to attend Women's Caucus is a question left open.

With respect to the Labour Caucus, the hypothesis that there exists a relationship between caucus attendance and candidate support may be tested in a similar fashion. Delegates who had little connection to organised labour may be screened out of the examination by one of two methods. The most obvious of these is to control for credential type, thereby producing a sample which consists solely of delegates representing affiliated organisations. The second is to control for union membership, thereby creating a sample which consists of all delegates who have any formal tie to organised labour.

The first method presents some obvious advantages, not the least of which is the fact that 86.4% of such delegates attended the Labour Caucus. For reasons discussed in
Chapter 3, however, this does not present a particularly accurate picture of the influence of organised labour. Moreover, from a statistical perspective, the creation of a sample which consists only of delegates registered with affiliate credentials is seriously problematic in two ways. First, as has been discussed previously, the sample bias of the Convention Study suggests that, as a group, these delegates were disproportionately less likely to complete and return questionnaires. Any conclusions based upon an examination of a sample with such a flaw would, therefore, have to be considered suspect. Second, the sample to be studied would consist of just over 100 delegates and, when distributed throughout the cells of a table, would sometimes result in a cell value of less than five. Since a cell value of at least five is one of the conditions which must be met for the chi-square calculation to be a valid measure of the association of the variables considered, use of this sample would not be valid for this purpose. The sample to be studied, therefore, consists of those delegates who are union members.

The two candidates who ultimately faced each other on the final ballot each enjoyed the support of prominent leaders of organised labour. For example, Bob White of the Canadian Auto Workers and Leo Girard of the United Steelworkers of America both openly supported Audrey McLaughlin. On the other hand, Shirley Carr, the President of the Canadian Labour Congress and a former President of the Canadian Union of Public Employees, supported Dave Barrett, as did Jack Munro of the International Woodworkers of America. The hypothesis being tested is that there exists a relationship between caucus attendance and candidate support, not simply a relationship between caucus attendance and support for the eventual winner. Because the labour leadership was so obviously divided, one might expect delegates who attended the labour caucus to be divided along similar lines. Accordingly, the examination must group union delegates according to those who supported McLaughlin, those who supported Barrett, and those who supported anyone else. Obviously, the third category disappears in the examination of fourth ballot results.
The test used is again the chi-square test of independence. The null hypothesis can be stated as follows: If there were no association between Labour Caucus attendance and union member support for either Audrey McLaughlin or Dave Barrett, the expected result would be that the proportion of support for each of McLaughlin and Barrett would be the same among those who attended the caucus as among those who did not.

For the first three ballots, the tables to be used for this comparison are two rows by three columns and so have two degrees of freedom. This means that the critical value of the chi-square statistic, at a significance level of five per cent ($X^2 .05$) is 5.99. For the final ballot, the table will be two rows by two columns, have one degree of freedom and will therefore have a critical value of the chi-square distribution at a significance level of five per cent ($X^2 .05$) of 3.84. A chi-square statistic which exceeds the critical values 5.99 on the first three ballots and 3.84 on the final ballot is therefore considered significant.

Table 4.4

| Candidate support of delegates who are union members by attendance of Labour Caucus (percentage in parentheses) |

| A. FIRST BALLOT |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUCUS</th>
<th>McLaughlin</th>
<th>Barrett</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29 (17.3)</td>
<td>58 (34.5)</td>
<td>81 (48.2)</td>
<td>168 (44.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>79 (38.0)</td>
<td>31 (14.9)</td>
<td>98 (47.1)</td>
<td>208 (55.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>108 (28.7)</td>
<td>89 (23.7)</td>
<td>179 (47.6)</td>
<td>376 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 29.02687$  

$X^2 .05 = 5.99$
### B. SECOND BALLOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUCUS</th>
<th>McLaughlin</th>
<th>Barrett</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34 (20.1)</td>
<td>69 (40.8)</td>
<td>66 (39.1)</td>
<td>169 (44.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>94 (45.4)</td>
<td>44 (21.3)</td>
<td>69 (33.3)</td>
<td>207 (55.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | 128 (34.0) | 113 (30.1) | 135 (35.9) | 376 (100.0) |

$X^2 = 30.19058$

$X^2_{.05} = 5.99$

### C. THIRD BALLOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUCUS</th>
<th>McLaughlin</th>
<th>Barrett</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>52 (30.8)</td>
<td>83 (49.1)</td>
<td>34 (20.1)</td>
<td>169 (45.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>114 (55.9)</td>
<td>50 (24.5)</td>
<td>40 (19.6)</td>
<td>204 (54.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | 166 (44.5) | 133 (35.7) | 74 (19.8) | 373 (100.0) |

$X^2 = 28.80049$

$X^2_{.05} = 5.99$

### D. FOURTH BALLOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUCUS</th>
<th>McLaughlin</th>
<th>Barrett</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>73 (43.5)</td>
<td>95 (56.5)</td>
<td>168 (45.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>128 (63.7)</td>
<td>73 (36.3)</td>
<td>201 (54.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | 210 (54.5) | 168 (45.5) | 369 (100.0) |

$X^2 = 15.10025$

$X^2_{.05} = 3.84$

SOURCE: 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study
As was the case with the Women's Caucus, a number of points are highlighted by data presented in the foregoing tables. The chi-square calculation greatly exceeds the critical value in all four instances, which again indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected. In other words, Labour Caucus attendance and support for either McLaughlin or Barrett are not independent, but rather there is a positive relationship between the attendance, by delegates who are union members, of the meeting of the Labour Caucus and their support for either McLaughlin or Barrett.

The raw percentage data suggest that, as candidates were eliminated, their support was divided between McLaughlin and Barrett as was some support which slipped away from candidates who were perceived as being out of serious contention.

The preceding data also highlight the fact that union members who attended the labour caucus consistently supported Barrett to a proportionately greater extent than did union members who did not attend. The reverse, of course, was true for McLaughlin. Among labour delegates registered on an affiliate credential, this trend is even more apparent. On the first ballot, Barrett received the support of 40.4% of those delegates with affiliate credentials who attended the Labour Caucus, whereas McLaughlin received the support of only 12.4% of the same body. On the final ballot, Barrett received 65.2% compared with 34.8% for McLaughlin. Thus, Barrett was favoured by delegates with ties to organised labour. Moreover, those delegates with the strongest ties (those who registered on an affiliate credential), appear to have supported him in a greater proportion than did union members generally.

About 45% of delegates who were also union members attended the Labour Caucus, which compares favourably with the number of women who attended the Women's Caucus (about 37%) and with the number of delegates who attended their Provincial or Territorial Caucus (about 49%). Based on the results of the Convention Study, an examination of those delegates who registered on affiliate credentials reveals that 86% of them attended the Labour Caucus. The sampling bias of that group
notwithstanding, it is apparent that the Labour Caucus is perceived as very important by a substantial portion of the delegates who are actually representing affiliated organisations at the convention.

This chapter has offered an examination of the provincial and territorial caucuses, the Women's Caucus and the Labour Caucus. By comparing the actual election results with the results obtained from the 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study, the validity of the Study has been emphasised. Data obtained from the Study with respect to voting behaviour and attendance of the Women's and Labour Caucuses were presented in tables which would permit the testing of the hypothesis that there exists a relationship between attendance of those caucuses and candidate support through four ballots. As a result of that examination, it is possible to conclude that a positive relationship exists.
Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

The history of democratic socialism in Canada has produced a series of traditions within the New Democratic Party which have a direct effect on any leadership selection exercise. Of principal importance are two such traditions: the means by which interests are accommodated and aggregated, and the role and function of the leader.

The political vehicle was originally envisaged as an umbrella organisation, the members of which would not be individuals, but existing organisations which embraced the goal of establishing a cooperative commonwealth. The membership of existing organisations largely failed to materialise, but the idea endured with the substitution of provincial and territorial sections for existing autonomous organisations. This was the beginning of an enduring relationship with organised interests. Interests whose organisation is at least partly external to the party have existed throughout the history of the CCF/NDP. If the most enduring example of such an interest is organised labour, the most famous example is surely the Waffle. Advocacy caucuses are merely the most recent manifestation of organised interests within the party.

Part of the fascination of the party with organised interests stems from a lively desire to be connected with the grass roots of society. Another part may originate with the slightly more expedient desire to collect the votes of large, already organised groups of electors. From the other side of the coin, part of the fascination of the interests with the party surely lies in the party structure which provides the collective membership with considerable control over party policy, agenda, and leadership. This relationship, although superficially symbiotic, has produced a struggle between pragmatism and idealism which is evident in all but the most mundane of collective decisions made by the party in convention or council. The distinction between "movement" and "party," although extensively developed in existing literature, is rarely connected to the existence of organised interests.
Although not unrelated to the tradition of accommodating interests, another feature of the CCF/NDP which sets it apart from its principal competitors is its approach to leadership. The party tends to view its leaders as spokespersons for policy which is collectively developed, or at least approved, by the party membership. Because the leader is not responsible for policy formation in the same manner as are the leaders of the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, there tends to be more emphasis on the ability of the leader to articulate effectively and faithfully the policy of the party. Not surprisingly, there is a link between that role of leadership and the existence of the organised interests which are active in policy formation. Moreover, the struggle of idealism and pragmatism, or movement versus party, is often evident in the party's relationship with its leader. Efforts by a leader to move the party into a realm more acceptable to mainstream society are frequently met with fierce resistance within the party. The resistance is often led by organised interests supportive of the policy under consideration.

A third tradition which distinguishes the NDP from its principal competitors is its means of delegate allocation. Delegate entitlement is based completely upon membership in the base unit. In the case of the constituency associations and the youth section it is based upon party membership, while in the case of affiliated organisations it is based membership in that organisation. Increased membership is rewarded with increased representation. This, too, is consistent with the overall view of a party which seeks have control rest with its members, and believes that delegates are supposed to represent those members, and not all of the individuals who happen to live in the constituency.

Because the number of delegates is determined on the basis of membership strength, areas in which the party is well organised tend to be very well represented in the decision making bodies of the party. This phenomenon highlights the potential for advocacy caucuses to more easily appeal to significant groups of delegates. Over half of
the delegates at the 1989 convention, for example, were from western Canada. Intra-party caucuses, whether their central interest is regional or issue-related, that are able to gain the support of those groups of delegates and achieve some degree of cohesion with respect to voting behaviour are likely to be quite successful in influencing the agenda of the party.

Advocacy caucuses are an increasingly integral part of the scenery within the NDP. At the national level, there are at least seven established caucuses representing everything from regional to gay and lesbian issues. Constitutionally, the party does not recognise the existence of the caucuses. Consequently, it does nothing to facilitate any caucus activity between conventions and does little to assist them with convention activity. As a result, caucuses are only informally organised and most meet only during conventions or council meetings. Their proliferation and their success in attracting high delegate attendance must, however, be seen as one sign of their perceived effectiveness.

The potential of caucuses to influence the decisions of the party appears underdeveloped. However, it has been demonstrated that, at least in the case of the Women's and Labour caucuses, there was a positive relationship between caucus attendance and candidate support at the 1989 convention. If this sort of a relationship is statistically discernable with respect to a leadership contest, a similar relationship probably exists with respect to policy issues. Because leadership contests are relatively infrequent, most caucuses have been more oriented toward policy issues. Although certainly beyond the scope of this examination, a study of the relationship between caucus attendance and voting behaviour on policy issues would almost certainly provide some revealing conclusions about the relative effectiveness of intra-party caucuses.

Another phenomenon deserving of study and analysis is the potential for coalition-building between caucuses. Although again beyond the scope of this examination, it seems highly likely that the same delegates may attend the meetings of more than one caucus. A substantial portion of Labour and female delegates, for
example, almost certainly attended their provincial or territorial caucus. Further study in this area might serve to shed additional light on the understudied area of interest group activity within political parties.

This study has made a contribution towards that end by examining the role of two major intra-party caucuses in NDP leadership selection in 1989.
ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

1 The 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study was conducted by Professor Keith Archer of the University of Calgary, through whose generosity the data set has been made available for this project. The study was funded by the Research Grants Committee of the University of Calgary, the President's Fund of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and a general research grant from SSHRC. In addition, either financial or material support, or both, were provided to Professor Archer by Professors John Courtney, Ken Carty and Alan Whitehorn, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary. Research assistance was provided to Professor Archer by Lori Hausegger and Martin Bennett. The federal office of the NDP was of particular help to Professor Archer in the administration of the survey and in providing other information and assistance.

Professor Archer, his assistants or the funding agencies bear no responsibility for the analyses and interpretations contained herein.

Chapter 2


2 Ibid., 10.


5 Zeigler, op. cit., 91.


7 Morton, op. cit., 11-12.

8 Ibid., 12.

10 Henry Wise Wood was active in the Missouri populist movement before moving to Alberta where he became one of the principal organisers of the United Farmers of Alberta. He was President of the UFA when it won power in 1921 but, because he preferred a non-political approach, he declined the leadership.


12 Ibid., 146.

13 Ibid., 141.

14 Ibid., 142.


16 Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, op. cit., 24.

17 The main architect of the *Regina Manifesto* was Frank Underhill, who was a professor at the University of Toronto from 1927 to 1955. Underhill has, however, distanced himself from that statement, saying, "I don't think that our [draft] document had in it that final declaration—that a C.C.F. government would not rest until it had eradicated capitalism from Canada." [Frank Underhill, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1960) xii.]


19 Ibid., 7.

20 Young, op. cit., 162.


24 Young, op. cit., 234-5.


26 Young, op. cit., 237-8.

27 Knowles, op. cit., 71.

28 Ibid., 73-4.


35 McLeod and McLeod, op. cit., 278.

36 Ibid., 275.

37 Bradley, op. cit., 153.
38 McLeod and McLeod, op. cit., 270.

39 Ibid., 270.

40 Bradley, op. cit., 154.

41 McLeod and McLeod, 280.


43 Ibid., 143.


45 Morton, op. cit., 168.

46 Steed, op. cit., 187.

47 Ibid., 192.

48 Ibid., 199-200.

49 Ibid., 204.

50 Morton, op. cit., 171.

51 Ibid., 172.

52 Steed., op. cit., 208.

53 Ibid., 209.

54 Ibid., 208.

55 Ibid., 204.

56 Ibid., 228.
57 Ibid., 238-9.


59 Morton, op. cit., 207.

60 Steed, op. cit., 272.

61 Richards, op. cit., 2.

62 Ibid., 3-5.

63 Steed., op. cit., 273-5.

64 McLeod and McLeod, op. cit., 308.

65 Steed. op. cit., 281.

66 Ibid., 292.

67 Ibid., 296.

68 Ibid., 319.


70 Ibid., 6.3(d) (v202).

71 Alan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992) 208n34.

72 Archer, op. cit., 6.3(a) (v199).
Chapter 3


2 Joseph Wearing, Strained Relations: Canadian Parties and Voters (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart) 194.


8 NDP, Article VI(6).

9 Ibid., Article VI(2).


11 Courtney, Selection of National Party Leaders, 110.

12 NDP, Article VI(3)(1).

13 Ibid., Article VI(7)(1).

14 Ibid., Article VI(5).
15 Ibid., Article VI(4).


18 Ibid.


20 Perlin, 212.

21 Ibid., 204.

22 Ibid., 212.

23 NDP, Article VIII(1)(b).

24 Ibid., Article VIII(1)(d)(iii).

25 Ibid., Article X(4)(f).

26 Ibid., Article VIII(1)(g).


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Archer, 14.
Chapter 4


2 Also Resolutions of the 1987 (Montreal), 1989 (Winnipeg) and 1991 (Halifax) federal conventions.


4 Ibid.

5 For an explanation of the origins and format of the 1989 NDP Leadership Convention Study, refer to Chapter 1 and its endnote.


8 McGhee, op. cit., 558.

9 Ibid.
Archer, Keith. Dataset. New Democratic Party Leadership Convention Study. 1060 respondents to a bilingual questionnaire delivered by mail to 2252 delegates (Response rate of 47%) 200 items. 1989.


Note: originally published in 1950 by University of California Press, Berkeley.


