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ABSTRACT

This thesis continues the discussion of the role of interests and values as determinants of Canadian foreign policy by examining closely their treatment in the Martin government’s 2005 foreign policy statement, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (RPIW)*. The purpose of the thesis is to capture the expression and interplay of interests and values within *RPIW* vis-à-vis past foreign policy expressions. It begins by presenting a literature review of selected works by Denis Stairs, Jennifer Welsh, Kim Richard Nossal and Cranford Pratt, which will reveal the state of the discourse on the role of interests and values in Canadian foreign policy. It proceeds with a textual analysis of *RPIW: Overview*, comparing its structure and content to those which appear in *Canada in the World* (1995), *Competitiveness and Security* (1985) and *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (1970).

This textual analysis ends with the conclusion that *RPIW* not only incorporates past criticisms by Denis Stairs and Kim Richard Nossal, but also seems to embrace the interests-driven, values-based orientation put forward by Jennifer Welsh in *At Home in the World*. However, as the thesis moves on to a comparison of *RPIW: Overview* and *RPIW: Development*, the thesis exposes the fact that in *RPIW: Development*, the interests-based, values-driven approach seems to have been abandoned in favour of policies, such as the section titled “Good Governance,” that use values as policy drivers in and of themselves. The thesis concludes that development, despite the Martin government’s deliberate efforts in *RPIW*, appears to be a consistently altruistic, values-driven exercise. If aid effectiveness has any hope of being strengthened, it must be done under both an acknowledgement of the altruistic character of the development enterprise, as well as careful thought as to what the desired outcome of Canadian development policy ought to be.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td><em>Competitiveness and Security</em>, the Mulroney government’s 1985 foreign policy statement</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the literature in the field of Canadian foreign policy has been preoccupied with the question of what role interests and values have in shaping policy. Works by Kim Richard Nossal, Denis Stairs, Jennifer Welsh, Cranford Pratt and others have examined the question from a variety of angles, and have each put forward their criticisms and prescriptions for change.

The debate about the role of interests and values in foreign policy reached a crescendo in the mid-1990s with the publication of Canada in the World (CW), the foreign policy statement issued by the government of Jean Chretien in 1995. The main criticism of this document was that it identified values as foreign policy goals in and of themselves. Kim Richard Nossal attacked the document, claiming that it encouraged “…the idea that the objective of our foreign policy is to show others in the world the superior virtue of the “Canadian way.” He saw this approach as an illiberal, un-Canadian and, ultimately, flawed policy that “…discourages Canadians from thinking about the hard choices that have to be made about defending and protecting their country’s interests in a world where others are trying to create the world they want.”

The debate over the role of values and interests in Canadian foreign policy waned over the following decade but resurfaced in 2005 with the publication by the government of Paul Martin of a new foreign policy document entitled Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (RPIW). Among other purposes, this document sought

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3 Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview. Her Majesty
to address the criticisms of Nossal and others, explicitly bringing interests back to the forefront of Canadian foreign policy while acknowledging a role for values at the base.

The purpose of the thesis is to continue the discussion of the role of interests and values as determinants of Canadian foreign policy by examining closely their treatment in the Martin government’s RPIW. The document appeared to accept the notion that values, when turned into policy objectives themselves, represent inadequate, impossible drivers of policy, and that a values-reflecting, interests-driven policy project can be the only coherent foundation for effective foreign policy. Yet upon closer inspection one finds that the document remains, in certain respects, still susceptible to Nossal’s criticism. Notably in the section of RPIW entitled RPIW: Development, the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law continue to be viewed as objectives for Canadian foreign policy makers, driving the policy forward instead of undergirding it. From such a finding the thesis raises the question of whether the values-reflecting, interests-driven policy framework is adequate for understanding the determinants of Canadian foreign policy.

Chapter two is a literature review, designed to capture the debate that has unfolded among scholars regarding the role of values and interests in Canadian foreign policy. Kim Richard Nossal and Denis Stairs first drew attention to the dangers of a values-as-goals approach to foreign policy, as set forth in the 1995 foreign policy document CW. The issue was subsequently taken up by Jennifer Welsh who, when consulted by the Martin government during the drafting of RPIW, proposed that Canada’s foreign policy in the new century should be values-based and interests-driven. The literature review concludes by citing an alternative, and possibly more viable, framework for understanding the role of values and interests in Canadian foreign policy, found in Cranford Pratt’s advocacy of “humane internationalism”.

the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005.
Chapter three compares *RPIW* with three previous official foreign policy statements, namely *Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC)*,\(^4\) published in 1970; the 1985 foreign policy review, *Competitiveness and Security (CS)*;\(^5\) and the 1995 review, *Canada in the World (CW)*.\(^6\) This chapter will compare the structure and content of *RPIW* with each of the three previous statements, and will shed some light on the way interests and values have been articulated over the previous 35 years. This will, in turn, prepare the reader for a close examination of the section in *RPIW* dedicated to development, in which an interests-driven, values-based approach seems to break down.

Although the authors of *RPIW* sought to consciously avoid articulating values as goals, my analysis of *RPIW: Development* in chapter four reveals a development document that would seem to fall back into the values-as-goals approach in 1995’s *CW*. In many sections of *RPIW: Development*, the chosen three values seem tempered by the comparatively clear expressions of interest, but in a few key areas, a values-projection project seems unavoidable. The thesis pays particular attention to the example of the goal of good governance promulgated in *RPIW: Development*. The call for good governance is an unmistakable call for intervention at a fundamental level, requiring real changes in target countries, and is a good example of unchanged values-as-objectives. Another example can be found in its support for increased multilateralism, which appears again to be a goal in and of itself.

Although this thesis is designed to provide an account of how *RPIW*, notably within *RPIW: Development*, fails to deliver an interests-based, values-driven development policy, the


analyses below must lead to the question of whether or not development is an inherently altruistic, interventionist exercise. Chapter five will come to the conclusion that, despite powerful arguments that values as development policy goals are inefficient, illiberal and doomed to failure, and despite the creation of a comprehensive foreign policy document that explicitly espouses these criticisms, the Martin government’s failure to extend the interests-driven, values-based approach to RPIW: Development represents a strong indication that development must be different.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Debate on the sometimes-conflicting roles of interests and values has particular significance for scholars of Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA). Strains within the debate have focused on specific ODA policy issues, such as the use of tied aid. However, the true core of this debate is found in the works of those who examine the nature of the continually shifting relationship between values and interests within ODA policy, and who are concerned with what constitutes the most effective mix of the two. For the purposes of this thesis, the writings of Kim Richard Nossal, Denis Stairs, Jennifer Welsh and Cranford Pratt, all of whom focus their work on ODA, will be of central importance.

Denis Stairs

Although they tend not to be as prescriptive as the works of the other authors discussed below, works by Denis Stairs capture an important facet of the interests and values debate. In his 2003 piece for *International Journal*, Stairs introduced a series of articles designed to advise newly installed Prime Minister Paul Martin, and in so doing, articulates a number of important criticisms of past policy.

Stairs begins by offering his readers an overview of Canada’s current international position, including the shifting security relationship between Canada and the United States that arose after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as well as the general effect America’s post–Cold War unilateralism has had on the international community as a whole. It soon becomes clear that Stairs has a pragmatic orientation, and his analysis of Canada’s position vis-à-vis the United States calls for the maintenance of healthy Canada-US relations as Canada’s top diplomatic priority:
For some, this [priority] is an unhappy thought. It smacks of subordination. At one time, academics of critical disposition would have described such a relationship as neo-colonial. Perhaps it is, but whether it is or not, there is a sense in which the issue is no longer a matter of political choice at home.1

Stairs’ pragmatic orientation extends to the question of values and interests in Canadian foreign policy. In language that is markedly blunt, he continues his analysis of the current Canadian aid practice:

The inflated claims that are imbedded in the rhetoric of declaratory policy escalate further in response to weakening performance on the one hand and intensifying interest group pressures on the other. The vocabulary of values—always a cheap concoction—assumes a greater prominence. The premise is that it will warm the mood and cool the criticism. The spinning of tales—tales not false, perhaps, but certainly canted—becomes an increasingly valued and admired art as the policy establishment struggles to bridge the gap between what well-intentioned Canadians think and what the government really is doing.2

When Stairs examines the current policy, he sees disappointing outcomes, possibly, he seems to hint, born of unrealistic goals. Worse yet, he sees in the policy troubling government attempts to hide these outcomes from Canadians by using empty rhetoric to deflect criticism of deficient policy outcomes.

However disparaging his critique, Stairs is ultimately concerned with how the incoming prime minister will respond to these pressing policy questions, and he quickly shifts the focus of his article toward what the new administration ought to do to address these concerns. Although it is unclear whether Stairs shares the complaints of those who favour the expansion of Canada’s development projects, it is clear that he firmly believes that our expectations of Canada’s involvement in the developing world ought to be lowered and our priorities streamlined:

2 Ibid., 489–90.
The grandiose and self-serving rhetoric so common now in our foreign policy pronunciamentos could be quietly abandoned in favour of more honest (and hence, much more cautious) accounts of what is likely to be feasible in the real world of social engineering abroad, both generally and in terms of policies suited particularly to Canada … No one ought to be allowed—ever—to assert that attaching transformational conditions—economic, social, or political—to the allocation of Canadian development assistance is an effective mechanism to encourage fundamental economic, social or political change. Such simple-minded argumentation, rooted in single-variable explanatory propositions, cannot withstand careful scrutiny. It can, however, gravely corrode the public’s understanding of the complexity of the issues involved and what their long-term resolution will entail.3

Whatever one’s epistemological orientation, Stairs’ criticism strikes at a troubling disconnect between the rhetoric within Canada’s aid policy and the reality on the ground. Like many others, he makes an appeal for the setting of realistic goals within more specialized policy areas, focusing our aid resources in a few areas and locations where we can be expected to have a long-term developmental impact.

But what of interests and values? Stairs seems to suggest that values are merely window dressing, and appear in declarative policy mostly to disguise and distract. However valid this may be as a criticism of the existing policy, he leaves us wondering whether or not he envisions a role for values within any effective policy. In “Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy,” also written in 2003, he presents his “unabashedly subjective assertions with which other observers are almost certain to disagree,”4 and suggests that Canadians’ rhetorical displays may merely be a symptom of declining influence, musing that “an ostentatious claim to superior virtue can be the last refuge of the impotent.”5

In the latter article, Stairs critiques the 1995 foreign policy statement, CW. He identifies security, prosperity, and values and culture as Ottawa’s chosen three pillars, a list of policy

3 Ibid., 491–492.
4 Stairs, Denis, “Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in International Journal. vol. LVIII, no. 2 (Spring 2003). Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 239.
5 Ibid., 240.
drivers he considers fairly honest and reasonable. However, he finds immediate cause for concern in passages related to the third pillar. In their exhortations of reputed Canadian bilingual/multiculturalist-democratic virtue abroad, echoed in the media by many non-governmental organizations of the day, Stairs sees an astonishing level of presumptive arrogance. The propagation of the idea that “Canadians think more virtuously than others, and hence that others should be encouraged to think more like Canadians,”6 is not only absurdly egoist, but potentially dangerous when applied to a country’s foreign policy.

Stairs raises three issues. The first, that Canada’s foreign policy ought to ensure that Canadians’ cultural achievements are put on display abroad, is the most instrumental and innocuous of the issues, and receives little criticism from Stairs. The second issue, however, is one he finds much more problematic, and is in his view responsible for “clutter[ing] up the intellectual premises”7 on which serious policy rests. For some reason, the notion that Canadian policy should be based upon Canadian values has caught on within the Canadian public, and has been echoed by a receptive government. On the surface, such a notion seems obvious, for who would call for a policy that reflects un-Canadian values? For Stairs, it is nowhere near that simple, and the ambiguity of the concept of values itself feeds into the troubling gap between rhetoric and real policy outcomes.

At first, the idea that Canadian values ought to drive policy appears to be basic and easy to understand: “Whatever Canadians want, after all, is presumably what they value.”8 And what they want, at the most basic level, is first security, then prosperity, and finally “the comfort that comes from the belief that their behaviour is sufficiently ‘moral’ to allow them to feel free of

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6 Ibid., 242.
7 Ibid., 245.
8 Ibid., 246.
Beyond this level of thought, things get progressively more difficult. Does security depend upon the democratization of other countries, or is security an expression of military might? Does prosperity depend upon liberal economics, or on another approach? Such questions of policy are highly subjective, and the values that are supposed to drive them leave a great deal to be interpreted.

Arguments of policy practice aside, a disturbing implication arises from this use of vaguely-articulated values:

Is it possible that Canadians (within government and without) are deceiving themselves when they say, in reference to foreign policy, that they are acting on the basis of their “values,” implying in the process that this is both distinctive and notable? The corollary of such an implication is that others, less nobly inclined in their politics than Canadians, are pursuing something less, something “base” and self-serving—like their “interests.”

It is this false dichotomy—that values are moral and interests self-serving—that clouds the debate surrounding values and interests. And it is this dichotomy, a notion that appears both explicitly and implicitly within the literature, that reveals a pernicious brand of self-delusion on the part of its articulators.

The self-delusion is easy to spot. It appears every time our “values” are abandoned whenever an incompatible “interest” comes to the fore. It is certainly evident to Stairs, who notes the declining dollar amounts earmarked for Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) over the decades and the corresponding heightened values rhetoric that accompanied the cuts. Canadian politicians know that they can safely reduce our commitment to aid without comment from most of the electorate, and this truth points to a more accurate, if nastier, conception of the Canadian public:

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9 Ibid., 246.
10 Ibid., 248.
[The truth is] that Canadians may care to some degree about helping the citizens of the third world, and the spectacle of their government doing so may offer to those who think of such matters a small measure of psychic reward in the dark hours of a sleepless night. But when push comes to shove, they still care far less about helping the impoverished, the diseased, and the oppressed abroad than about ensuring the delivery of their more cherished public services at home … there is increasing evidence that the government’s comforting rhetoric is in danger of becoming far too successful, so that Canadians are internalizing it and taking it seriously at face value. In short, they are coming to believe what they are told, and in the process are losing their grip.¹¹

This candid assessment takes Stairs to his third issue, namely, “whether Canadians ought actively to propagate - even to proselytize - their putative values abroad.”¹²

This notion that Canadians should project certain values abroad, though not new, has come into fashion in recent years, a move that Stairs views as an abandonment of traditional Canadian diplomatic practice. Whereas Canada was previously hesitant to sermonize and intervene in the affairs of other countries, we now have “value-imperialism of the weak.”¹³ If we set aside the damage such an impotent policy could do to Canada’s diplomatic reputation, the most troubling feature of this kind of policy is the above-mentioned delusion it fosters at home. Stairs invokes the example of multiculturalism, a central expression in the “‘Canadian values’ display”¹⁴ Canada conducts. The implication is that the peace Canada enjoys is somehow engendered by Canadian-style multiculturalist politics, a gift that Canadians can share with less-peacefully-coexisting peoples the world over. Stairs agrees that such a system would be worth propagating—if only it existed in the first place. While we do enjoy a relatively peaceful pluralist existence, Stairs believes this is more a function of our relative abundance of space and resources:

¹¹ Ibid., 250–51.
¹² Ibid., 251–52.
¹³ Ibid., 252.
¹⁴ Ibid., 253.
Canadians can cultivate a peaceful society in the midst of their diversity because they have room for it and because they have the capacity to pay for it. In effect, they buy their way out of the zero-sum games.\textsuperscript{15}

For Stairs, the conclusions are clear. Our political behaviour, from our pluralist politics to our development programs, is a function not of our values, but of our happy circumstances. Merely proselytizing based on what seems to work in Canada cannot have any effect on those systems or governments into which we pour our misguided development energies, and there is nothing in our experience indicating that Canada would be prepared to devote the resources needed for such a monumental effort.

Ultimately, Stairs asserts, “Canadians are very much as others are. They simply live in more fortunate circumstances.”\textsuperscript{16} Accordingly, he calls for a foreign policy that looks honestly at the amount of resources and scope of programming Canada is truly willing to offer, and for Canada’s international development opportunities to be selected with great care. As for the ultimate balance of values and interests, or even whether or not the role the two concepts have in Canadian foreign policy should be re-evaluated, the answer to this question is left for another time or for other authors.

\textbf{Kim Richard Nossal}

One of the most comprehensive articulations of the interests argument can be found in Kim Richard Nossal’s “Mixed Motives Revisited,” published in 1988. This piece offers a broad overview of his position, and establishes Nossal’s statist, realist and liberal orientation. In the article, Nossal questions the orthodox trinity of motives - economic, political and philanthropic - that is often ascribed as determinant of Canada’s foreign policy, and maintains that an approach to foreign aid that holds Canadian interests paramount is the only effective policy strategy. To

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 254 - 55.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 256.
deny the state’s capacity to act as an autonomous political actor, Nossal argues, is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of all international political relationships, and central to this must be an understanding of where Canada’s best interests lie.

Nossal asks, “What accounts for a Canadian development assistance policy that is by all accounts so limited, and so wanting in terms of achieving development objectives for the South?”

His answer - that the existing model overlooks the motives and interests of the donor state - is the key to Nossal’s vision for Canadian ODA. If we operate in a world where states are the primary actors, it naturally follows that the state will use its considerable power to shape its programs so that its own interests prevail. With this in mind, Nossal points to the state’s “substantial material interests in prestige, organizational maintenance and limiting expenditures, and that these motives more accurately account for, and explain, the Canadian government’s interest in, and attachment to, a development assistance programme that is both limited and self-serving.”

A more recent piece by Nossal, entitled “‘The World We Want’? The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals and Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy,” offers more insight into Nossal’s specific criticisms of a values-driven Canadian foreign policy. The article is primarily concerned with the 1995 foreign policy statement, which, he argues, explicitly holds the projection of Canadian values as a primary foreign policy goal. In Nossal’s view, such a project will always be deeply flawed and fundamentally un-Canadian, and represents a radical departure from Canada’s traditionally liberal approach, which maintains that the world is pluralist. While Nossal would never suggest that values have no place in policy, he takes issue with their manifestation as policy objectives in and of themselves; instead of values determining policy,

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18 Ibid., 45.
they became policy objectives of their own, an approach that, in Nossal’s view, created a dangerous disconnect between policy and interests in the 1995 document.

In “‘The World We Want’?,” Nossal presents five criticisms of values-driven policy creation. He argues that the 1995 policy document is philosophically illiberal, neocolonial and hypocritical. He also argues that it is practically impossible to implement, costly and potentially dangerous to Canada’s interests and survival. Canadians are encouraged to ignore the importance of interests in conducting an effective foreign policy; thus the document draws the focus away from the problem of how we defend ourselves and our interests in a world where others are trying to do the same. In Nossal’s view, values still matter, but the best policy drivers are interests; if we can create policy that is driven by interests, while still acknowledging that our interests are informed by our values, we will effectively address a major flaw in the 1995 foreign policy document.

Jennifer Welsh

Despite a few important epistemological differences, Nossal and Welsh arrive at very similar conclusions about the role of values and interests in Canadian foreign policy. In key works, including her 2004 book *At Home in the World*, Welsh promotes the idea of the engagement of individuals and groups in Canada in international affairs, as agents of policy change. But even with these differences, Nossal and Welsh both articulate a interests-driven, values-based view of Canadian policy formation.

Initially, many of Welsh’s works on this subject may seem to downplay interests in favour of the notion that “[a] country’s foreign policy is a reflection of who its people are: What they value, what they seek to change, and what they are willing to stand up for.”19 While it is true

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that Welsh is concerned with the connection between articulating values as Canadians and policy as Canada, it is equally true that she advocates an interests-driven policy for which values provide both a guiding core and a long-term vision.

Welsh expanded upon this idea in “Fulfilling Canada’s Global Promise,” an article that appeared in the issue of Policy Options timed to coincide with the release of RPIW. Through the use of the rhetorical question “If the US is the main object of our external relations, and security is their main subject, does Canada even need a foreign policy at all?” Welsh presents her vision of Canada as “testament to a broader set of political and social objectives” that must be reflected within Canada’s foreign policy.

In rejecting the idea of Canada as a country whose national purpose is “to buy and sell goods and services with other countries,” Welsh argues that if such a characterization were true, Canada would have ceased to be independent from the United States a long time ago. Instead, Welsh posits that “the very existence of Canada, as a political entity that runs east-west, defies the cool rationality of the economists.”

The nature of our 21st century world, she believes, calls for a diversified and robust foreign policy that seeks international collaboration (and in the case of poorer nations, capacity-building) to deliver security and prosperity in Canada and the rest of the world. This includes planning for a world where “future superpowers are firmly embedded in international institutions and have been ‘socialized’ to cooperate with others in the management of common problems.”

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21 Ibid., 57.
22 Ibid., 57.
23 Ibid., 57.
24 Ibid., 57.
Drawing attention to Canada’s immigration and refugee policy and the nature of our “both isolated and exposed”\textsuperscript{25} geography, Welsh calls for an accentuation of Canadian history and national identity in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy.

Central to her argument is the fact that

\[ \text{[p]ublic opinion research reveals that Canada is a country deeply interested in foreign policy, whose citizens are strongly oriented toward taking an active role on the world stage and willing to commit Canadian troops in a wide array of scenarios. As a consequence, Canadians—to a greater degree than Americans—want more spending on overseas development assistance, more engagement with the UN, and more involvement in trade agreements.} \textsuperscript{26} \]

The rest of this passage criticizes Canadian governments for failing to make the spending trade-offs needed to support such programs, as well as their weak support of internationalism. But the most revealing aspect of the above statement for the purposes of this thesis is the significance Welsh attaches to these failures. She suggests that the thrust of Canadian foreign policy may need to be rethought in the face of these new realities. Professional diplomacy, she argues, now competes with other organizations and individuals who have found it necessary to operate globally without government intermediation. Canada as a global entity has come to represent not just our government, but also Canadians, and is

ultimately a network of people and values, which extends beyond the geographical hub of the 49\textsuperscript{th} parallel. While it may be true … that Canada’s influence in the world is declining in terms [of] the traditional categories of federal spending on defence, diplomacy and development, this does not necessarily mean that Canadians are staying at home.\textsuperscript{27}

Unlike Nossal who takes a strictly realist position, Welsh calls upon Canadians to have a part in defining national interests. Yet while framing those interests differently from Nossal, she

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 59.
arrives at some strikingly similar conclusions about what such interests would look like, as well as what role values would have in shaping them.

Similarly, Welsh strikes a balance between values and interests, calling for a core set of values that would serve as the base from which our interests will be formed and, in turn, drive Canadian foreign policy. In her book *At Home in the World*, she envisions a new role for Canada as international model citizen, and presents an idea of foreign policy that is conscious of the roles both values and interests play in its formation. Her steps toward designing a strategic, effective foreign policy call upon Canada to re-examine Canadian core values and to articulate Canadian interests clearly. For Welsh, it is important that Canada “walks the walk” at home and on the international stage, but it is also vital that these values inform the decisions we make and the interests we advance.

Acknowledging the undefined character of the Canadian national identity, Welsh argues that Canadians tend to coalesce around a set of guiding values, which she identifies as “democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.” As values go, these three are easy to support, and it would be difficult to find an industrialized country opposed to them. She argues that the greatest challenge comes not in espousing them, but instead in articulating what these values actually mean and require of us. Citing the expanding US mandate vis-à-vis Iraqi democracy as a prime example, she draws attention to the difficulty of defining and differentiating the identified values, and emphasizes the need for a dialogue about how democracy, the rule of law and human rights must fit together.

The ties these values have with each other, she argues, can be complex and lead to conflict. The democratic rise of Adolf Hitler, the primacy of the Canadian courts on same-sex

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marriage, and Russia’s “illiberal democracy” are compelling evidence of the inconsistencies that can arise when these values converge. Upon examination of Canada’s system of governance, it becomes clear that we are governed by

a very particular constellation that combines representative government, an impartial and independent judiciary, and a charter of civil and political rights that are both negative (for example, freedom from cruel treatment) and positive (for example, the right to due process) … we live under a mixed government, not a purely democratic one, [and it] requires careful balancing and fine-tuning. We should be proud of this model, while being very clear about exactly what it entails.29

Many have argued that Canada’s unique expression of democracy, rule of law and human rights is an ideal gift best exported and shared with the developing world. But while it may be the height of condescension to suggest that there are some nations of people who cannot be free, the question of whether or not it is even possible to export democratic institutions remains valid.

Welsh’s observations, with her particular emphasis on Iraq, lead her to conclude that there is something distinctly untenable about the sorts of institutions that are “granted” by others. Accordingly, she observes in younger Canadians a powerful aversion toward the idea that their values ought to be imposed on others, in part because of its association with current US foreign policy, but also because of the rise of pluralism in Canada. Our appreciation of difference, she argues, is what accounts for our success as a country, and should also be the driving force behind Canada as a “model citizen” in the world. Not to be mistaken for a call to inaction, Welsh envisions our attachment to pluralism as a guiding force driving Canadian foreign policy toward facilitation instead of institutional export, a focus she sees as a more effective way of encouraging global peace and stability.

However, it is not enough for Canadians to be clear about what drives and defines us abroad. The second element of Welsh’s foreign policy vision calls upon Canadians to reject the

29 Ibid., 2004, 197.
popular but ill-conceived notion that “while other countries have interests, we have values.”

When Canadians are content to pretend that we are somehow above the world of power politics, we lose the opportunity to engage in any meaningful way with the world in general, preferring instead to sermonize in isolation rather than work toward constructive international collaboration. However, when we are clear about which Canadian interests are being pursued, and always under the cohesive influence of our values, positive and collective action is possible.

By far the most marked point of departure in this work is Welsh’s conception of how interests and values must work in tandem. She rejects the entire idea that interests and values are best regarded as being in a state of competition with each other, “as if the former were selfish and narrow and the latter ethical and internationalist.” Policies formed with a keen sense of the role both interests and values must have will expand a country’s conception of its own national goals and will better reflect the character of today’s globalized international system. She uses a quotation from British Prime Minister Tony Blair to capture this point:

> The critics will say: but how can the world be a community? Nations act in their own self-interest. Of course they do. But what is the lesson of the financial markets, climate change, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation or world trade? It is that our self-interest and our mutual interests are today inextricably woven together.

To Welsh’s thinking, values and interests start to merge as the world’s problems are brought into focus as problems shared by all nations.

The criticisms and visions of Nossal and Welsh clearly had a role in shaping the policy directions taken in each section of RPIW. Its sections on defence, diplomacy, development and commerce, to varying degrees, contain explicit statements to the effect that Canadian foreign policy will be influenced by values, but driven by interests. However, any extension of this

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31 Ibid., 2004, 204.
32 Ibid., 2004, 205.
approach to the area of development raises questions about whether or not such an approach is even possible: with the nature of ODA being rooted in altruistic, humanitarian outcomes that are necessarily outward-looking in scope, can Canadian ODA programs ever escape a degree of values-driven policy? Simply put, is ODA fundamentally different from other Canadian foreign policy areas? In marked contrast to Stairs, Nossal and Welsh, Cranford Pratt answers this question in the affirmative.

Cranford Pratt

Cranford Pratt’s work on Canadian ODA is preoccupied with an analysis of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), tracing the shape and motivating factors of its various aid programs over the decades. In a 1994 volume of essays edited by Pratt, titled *Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal*, he offered his thoughts, on the eve of the 1993 federal election, on the direction in which Canadian ODA was headed. The volume, as a whole, was concerned with enumerating and criticizing the driving forces behind Canadian ODA, ultimately concluding that a mix of “bureaucratic forces with their own designs on the aid expenditures, and the corporate lobbies that wanted to ensure that CIDA served domestic economic interests much more forthrightly”33 had captured control of the CIDA policy formation process, leading to confusion and a general retreat from what Pratt terms ‘humane internationalism.’ While many of the finer details of his analysis are outside of the scope of this thesis, Pratt’s analysis assumes that humane internationalism, that is “[an] acceptance that the industrialized states have ethical obligations relating to global poverty”34 ought to inform Canadian ODA policy.


34 Ibid., 1994, 334.
In the two chapters written by Pratt, titled “Canadian Development Assistance: A Profile” and “Humane Internationalism and Canadian Development Assistance Policies,” it becomes clear that he endorses humane internationalism as the only ethical driver of Canadian ODA policy:

The challenge is to ensure that both CIDA and the government become much more responsive both to the ethical imperative and to Canada’s real and substantial long-term interests, which require what the Winegard Report had urged – a substantial aid program that concentrates on reaching and helping the most destitute nations and people. It is, at heart, an ethical issue and a political challenge.\(^\text{35}\)

It is important to situate the essays in this volume in the context in which they were written. Pratt and the other authors in the volume were writing out of a concern about a possible policy shift caused by the upcoming election. Pratt’s own contributions provided a historical treatment of CIDA policy that went back to 1977:

The year 1977 seemed for most chapters the most appropriate year from which to begin. That year was, or so a number of us argue, a turning point in the history of CIDA: the government began a sustained and successful effort to ensure that CIDA’s policies and programs reinforced and promoted other major public policies which the government valued but that were essentially extraneous to the humanitarian and development objectives that were putatively central to CIDA.\(^\text{36}\)

In the essay “Canadian Development Assistance: A Profile,” Pratt elaborated:

From 1977 on, it became increasingly clear that this objective must share primacy with and, indeed, often yield to foreign policy and commercial objectives. The argument is not that everything suddenly changed in that year, with humanitarian considerations dominating before that date and self-interested national concerns afterwards... Nevertheless, 1977 does mark an important disjuncture in the history of CIDA... from 1977 on, CIDA’s policies were increasingly integrated into overall Canadian foreign policy and into the government’s economic and commercial strategies.\(^\text{37}\)

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 1994, 363.


Pratt was concerned with evaluating CIDA’s on-the-ground policies, while putting forward the idea that Canadian ODA ought to be humanely internationalist, but that it had not necessarily been so in the past. Those parts of Pratt’s analysis that deal with the details of CIDA’s operations before and since 1977 are not relevant to this thesis, which is concerned with the RPIW and its formulation of how Canadian foreign policy ought to be articulated and implemented. Yet Pratt’s long-standing criticism of CIDA and Canadian ODA in general provides an alternative framework for analyzing Canada’s development policy.

In “Ethics and foreign Policy: the case of Canada’s development assistance,” written in 1988, Pratt put forward specific criticisms of the Mulroney government’s response to “For Whose Benefit?”, a report issued by the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT). Referred to as the Winegard Report, this document, in Pratt’s estimation, “strongly reaffirmed a humane international approach to development assistance.”38 He evaluated the government’s response to the Winegard Report in a series of six areas, finally concluding that “the government has not been nearly as responsive to humane internationalist considerations in regard to development assistance as was the committee,”39 who in turn were more in step with popular Canadian sentiment on development. Once again, the particulars of Pratt’s analysis are not as relevant to this thesis as his underlying treatment of Canadian ODA. By way of cataloguing his disappointment with the Mulroney government’s stance on a humane internationalist development policy, Pratt shares his vision of a more just and effective Canadian ODA policy:

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The implications of the argument in this article are disheartening for those who want Canadian policies on development assistance to express fully and uncompromisingly the humane internationalism that is a feature of the Canadian public philosophy. They demonstrate that there has been a consistent resistance to this aspiration within senior policy-making circles in Canada... Ethical considerations have not been totally excluded. Recurrently a political leader will endeavour to secure more ethically responsive policies. As well, sustained pressure by concerned public interest groups can influence policy, especially when what they advocate falls within the humane Internationalist tradition that is part of Canada’s public philosophy.\textsuperscript{40}

It is clear that Pratt not only privileges a humane Internationalist approach to development, but also sees this approach as central to Canadian public philosophy. It is also clear that he perceives a struggle between humane Internationalism and the more starkly national interest-driven policies of the Mulroney government.

In “Competing rationales for Canadian development assistance,” written in 1999, Pratt went on to evaluate \textit{Canada in the World} in light of his perception of the struggle “between those who want to ensure that CIDA is ever more responsive to trade and other foreign policy objectives and those, primarily within CIDA, who want to limit the erosion of CIDA's putative primary focus on helping the poorest peoples and countries.”\textsuperscript{41} To add to the challenges of generating support for his idea of humane Internationalism, Pratt found that Canadian popular opinion had undergone a fundamental, and troubling, shift:

…the 1990s have witnessed a profound shift in the dominant values of Canadian society. Canadians have become less caring towards their own poor and much swifter to blame them for their hardships. Canadian values have moved away from the socially responsible and pragmatically interventionist liberalism that had for decades been their dominant characteristic. As a society, Canadians, or at least their dominant opinion shapers, became increasingly skeptical about the efficiency of government interventions to promote equity and justice and developed instead a remarkable confidence in the social and economic advantages of the unfettered operation of the market, both nationally and internationally.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 1988, 300-301.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 1999, at para 7.
If the prevailing values of Canadians had shifted away from caring about the poor, and if governments continue to be indifferent, could the idea of humane internationalism be said to have any relevance to Canadian development policy at all? This question loomed as Pratt forged ahead with his analysis.

Pratt went on to criticize the idea that security and prosperity, at a very basic level, represented a way of dismissing the unfavoured idea that development ought to be ‘altruistic’ while still preserving a development policy in general:

In discussing development assistance the report [produced by a taskforce involving the International Development Research Centre, the International Institute for sustainable Development and the North-South Institute] impatiently dismisses altruism and concentrates instead on Canada's self-interest. It suggests that it is better to act now in many situations of growing poverty in Third World countries in order to avoid 'the much greater and more frightening cost of providing a remedial response later.' It refers to the goodwill that comes from being a good global citizen and it sees foreign aid as increasing Canada's competitive position. Finally, in discussing how to explain its recommendations to the Canadian public, the report argues that they 'must be related to the ultimate product: greater security for Canadians, the environment, and jobs’… In the immediate aftermath of Canada in the World, deploying a rationale for development assistance based on its contribution to national security and prosperity was defended as tactically shrewd… Realist arguments that effective development assistance lessens the threats to Canada's security from widespread anarchy, international terrorism, and uncontrollable mass migration, it was suggested, were more likely to be persuasive to them than arguments founded on considerations of ethics and human solidarity.43

Pratt countered that such arguments were no substitute for a policy that was rooted in ethics and in humane internationalism:

Abandoning the language of justice and solidarity in favour of that of Canadian security and national interests would mark a significant erosion of our fundamental values as a people, a giving up of any championing of that component of basic Canadian values that stresses sensitivity towards the basic human rights and development needs of the world's poorest. It would, moreover, likely be a retreat to no avail. Relying on arguments of national security is unlikely to win more support for generous aid policies for the poorest. Fear of the poor is, in one guise or another, at the root of the security case for development

assistance as many employ it. However, fear is a vastly less reliable foundation on which to construct humanitarian policies than is empathy and justice. Hostility and anger rather than generosity or solidarity are more frequently the by-products of fear.  

Clearly, Pratt did not believe an interests-driven development policy could have any enduring usefulness. Furthermore, he believed that the sorts of broadly interests-driven policies arising from CW would mark a radical departure from basic Canadian values.

Can a foreign policy review released by a government fundamentally alter the character of development in such a way? Despite Pratt’s bleak assessment of CW, he did not believe such a sea-change would be so simple, nor so complete. In “Ethical values and Canadian foreign policy: two case studies,” written in 2000, he explored CW in more positive terms:

Nevertheless, [in CW] the humanitarian component within Canada’s aid programme retained a resilience that is not easily explained in either statist or dominant class terms. Even though the aid budget was cut, the humanitarian thrust of its official objectives diffused, and its programmes often focused on narrowly national economic objectives, the impact of ethical values could still be discerned. Substantial amounts of aid still went to very poor countries of little economic or political interest to Canada. A major programme continued in Bangladesh, despite an effort by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to curtail it severely. Meeting the basic needs of the poorest was reaffirmed as a central objective of CIDA policies. The NGO community continued to speak out for older humane internationalist values.

In other words, even in the face of a policy that explicitly endorsed development as a way of ensuring future Canadian security and prosperity, there could be strong variations in foreign and development policy outcomes. Even if an ethical, humane internationalist framework should be rejected by a government, development policy goals could still reflect ethical values. This, coupled with the fact that interested third parties such as NGOs would continue to champion

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humane internationalist policies, ensured that development and humane internationalism would continue to be linked.

**Conclusions**

This chapter demonstrates two divergent ways of thinking about Canadian foreign policy in general, and Canadian development policy in particular. The works of Stairs, Nossal and Welsh represent a synthesis of the interests-values debate into a conception of Canadian foreign policy that calls for that policy to be interests-driven yet values-based. As we will see, this idea has been broadly endorsed within *RPIW*. By contrast, Pratt evaluates Canadian development policy and concludes that it has been confusing, ineffective and potentially unethical.

In the chapters ahead, each of these two approaches to Canadian foreign and development policy provides a useful lens through which to analyze *RPIW*. The above review of the works of Stairs, Nossal and Welsh will inform this analysis. The work of Pratt, however, will give valuable insight into *RPIW*’s shortcomings.
CHAPTER 3
THE MARTIN REVIEW IN CONTEXT: COMPARING RPIW TO ITS PREDECESSORS

In February of 2005, the government of Prime Minister Paul Martin released its much-anticipated foreign policy review. Titled *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (RPIW)*, the review set out a framework for understanding Canadian foreign policy that identified four distinct foreign policy fields, namely, defence, diplomacy, development and commerce. The review began with a lengthy but useful overview that presented the philosophical underpinnings of the policies within these four fields.

*RPIW* bears examination in relation to similar Canadian foreign policy reviews that came before. Accordingly, the analysis that follows below includes references to *Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC)*, published in 1970; the 1985 foreign policy review, *Competitiveness and Security (CS)*; and the 1995 review, *Canada in the World (CW)*. These earlier reviews form an important backdrop for the analysis provided in the thesis because they too discuss interests and values, albeit in frameworks that are neither systematic nor analytically helpful in their own right.

**Structure**

The three earlier reviews present broad foreign policy statements in relatively brief documents, but the structure of *RPIW* is quite different. *RPIW* is, in fact, a collection of documents devoted to the four separate foreign policy fields of defence, diplomacy, development and commerce.

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RPIW begins with an overview, which both serves as an introduction to the four policy documents and establishes the philosophical underpinnings of the 2005 review in general. At 30 pages, plus an additional five-page cover letter from Prime Minister Paul Martin, RPIW: Overview is equal in length to any of the four policy documents, and in the case of the documents on commerce and diplomacy, exceeds their length by several pages.

One of the more striking and immediate features of RPIW: Overview is the long, detailed cover letter from the prime minister. After an initial passage devoted to the need to review foreign policy at the time of writing, the letter introduces the foreign policy fields and important philosophical ideas that the Martin government wished to underscore as important to the policy statements that follow.

The main section of RPIW: Overview begins by outlining the foreign policy context in which Canada must operate, and includes a discussion of Canada’s position as neighbor to the US superpower. In this position, Canada finds itself challenged by both the realities of interdependence and the necessity to develop its own foreign policy. RPIW: Overview takes great care to describe the delicate nature of this challenge, with paragraphs outlining new threats such as terrorist activity, “global institutions under strain”\(^4\) and the new global distribution of power caused by US unilateralism. Next, it describes at length the four foreign policy fields of defence, diplomacy, development and commerce. Discussion follows on the challenges of stabilizing fragile states, combating proliferation and promoting sustainable development.

RPIW: Overview ends with a section on the “new multilateralism,” in which the government acknowledges the roles of power and rules: both attempt to “harness the capacity of

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the powerful and transform it into a responsibility for maintaining global peace and security.”

Canada encourages current and emerging world powers to work towards the establishment of “mechanisms for global governance” such as the G20, with the values-based assumption that “a rules-based and more predictable international system produces better results than one that is dominated by independent and uncoordinated action.”

**Canada in the world**

It is useful to compare *RPIW* to the Chrétien government’s 1995 review, *CW*. In many ways, the newer policy review is an answer to the criticisms of its predecessor made by academics as well as the public. At just over 55 pages, *CW* is conspicuously short and contains a more generalized treatment of Canadian foreign policy. It contains no table of contents, and presents policy in short, captioned, and heavily bullet-pointed sections.

*CW* begins with a five-page executive summary and preface, then an introduction that describes the international context in which Canada is situated. The document defines Canada’s foreign policy objectives as threefold: “the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture.” In the three sections that follow, each of these key objectives is outlined in broad strokes, bringing together policy vectors (such as trade or diplomacy) and specific issues (such as high seas fishing or new financial technologies). Finally, sections on Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy and institutional imperatives (such as improved

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6 Ibid., 27.
7 Ibid., 27.
8 The French edition of *Canada in the World* is slightly longer at 62 pages.
parliamentary consultation and new technologies for the foreign service) appear under the thematic headings “International Assistance”\(^9\) and “The Path Ahead.”\(^10\)

**Competitiveness and security**

Structurally, the 2005 review differs most from the foreign policy review produced by the Mulroney government in 1985, titled *Competitiveness and Security* (*CS*). The latter is a brief, 43-page paper mostly concerned with the international trade issues that dominated Canadian political discourse at the time. After offering a vision of Canada’s “national attributes”\(^11\) by way of introduction, *CS* addresses almost every aspect of Canada’s foreign policy through the lens of trade and international competition.

*CS* contains three main sections. The first, titled “Policy in a Global Context,”\(^12\) presents a brief analysis of the international economic system, including the areas of economic policy cooperation, trade, international debt and international development cooperation, followed by a corollary section on international politics and security, including collective security, arms control, the United Nations and human rights.

The second section, titled “Canada in the World,”\(^13\) is dedicated to the idea that Canadian prosperity and security are inextricably linked to those of the rest of the world. By far the most philosophical of all the sections in *CS*, this section approaches these linkages, as always, through the lens of trade. The trade focus is carried over into a discussion of “Power and Influence,” in which it is argued that Canada’s international influence is an extension of “both national assets and of national will.”\(^14\)

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\(^9\) Ibid., 40.
\(^10\) Ibid., 48.
\(^12\) Ibid., 4.
\(^13\) Ibid., 17.
\(^14\) Ibid., 24.
The third section, titled “Directions for Change,” once again twins international economics with politics and security, this time by presenting a sampling of the various policy directions the Mulroney government prefers to take in both these areas. In terms of structure, the third section mirrors the first quite closely, providing specific policy prescriptions in roughly the same thematic order as the analysis developed in the first section.

Accompanying the main sections of CS are a series of stand-alone, point-form profiles of the various countries and regions with which Canada interacts, including lists of Canada’s imports and exports by country and a country-by-country breakdown of Canada’s ODA program. In addition to these profiles, CS includes 16 tables and graphs, the majority of which elaborate on trade and economic factors such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), import/export imbalances and sector-specific productivity growth. No Canadian government before or since has presented such an array of PowerPoint-style visual aids, tables, graphs and bullet-pointed reference articles within their reviews of foreign policy.

**Foreign policy for Canadians**

*RPIW* has the most in common structurally with the six-booklet review produced by the Trudeau government in 1970, *Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC)*. Although nowhere near as conscious of government sectors as *RPIW*, *FPC* devotes one of its six booklets to international development alone, while the remaining five either deal with entire regions, Canada’s dealings with the United Nations or the general aims of Canada’s foreign policy as a whole. In many ways, the introductory booklet is similar in scope and purpose to *RPIW: Overview*. Each provides an account of the world in which its policy is to be forged, and both are concerned with

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15 Ibid., 29.

* Although the 2005 review does make some use of explanatory “windows” within the text in order to elaborate further on a specific concept (such as multilateralism or the Millennium Development Goals), none approach the quantitative style of those found in the 1985 review.
Canadian interests and their articulation within policy. Similarly, *FPC* and *RPIW*’s respective sections on development represent the only two attempts to separate development from the rest of Canada’s foreign activities, elaborating on development-related policies in stand-alone documents. In the years between these two reviews, no comparable format is to be found.

*FPC*, with its concern to explain the reasons, influences and motivations behind the Trudeau government’s new foreign policy, is an attempt to create a framework of understanding for Canadians. When compared with *RPIW*, it represents a more philosophically rarified treatment of the subject. By contrast, *RPIW* offers content that is more policy-oriented and less concerned with convincing Canadians of the justness of the government’s vision for Canadian foreign policy.

**Content**

As we have seen above, *RPIW* shares striking structural similarities with *FPC*, the Trudeau-era review released in 1970. Both contain similar introductory overviews concerned with the contextual and theoretical underpinnings of the policy that follows.

*RPIW: Overview,* which includes a foreword by Prime Minister Paul Martin, sets the tone for the rest of the review. Within the first few pages, it is easy to identify both the government’s liberal outlook, as well as an early nod to criticisms of past reviews:

There is no contradiction between Canada doing well and Canada doing good. Canada benefits directly when the world is more secure, more prosperous, more healthy, and more protective of the natural environment. If we are to take our responsibilities seriously to ourselves and the Canadian generations to follow, then we must take our responsibilities to the global community seriously as well, not only with noble sentiment and rhetoric - we must also earn and perhaps re-earn our way. This will take effort and it will take dedication.  

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17 Ibid., 2005, ii.
In only a few introductory words, Prime Minister Martin makes two revealing assertions. Firstly, he invokes the liberal belief that the security and prosperity of any nation is linked to that of the developing world. Thus, in the world of development assistance, our seemingly altruistic acts contribute directly to the future prosperity and security of Canada. In effect, Martin aims to convince Canadians that, feelings of philanthropy aside, it is in our best interests to pursue a development assistance program abroad.

Secondly, he responds to the popular criticism that past Canadian foreign policy has substituted values-laden rhetoric for expanded program funding. Canada, he asserts, can no longer afford to rest on its reputation as peacekeeper, international mediator and engaged middle power. From such a powerful statement, it would be easy to assume that substantial changes are on the way for Canada’s foreign policy. Indeed, the letter goes on to outline a policy that “will be realistic about Canada’s ability to help others,”18 and will accordingly offer a more targeted, sectoral approach to development that integrates it with defence and diplomacy efforts in parallel areas.

The foreword from the prime minister contains its own stand-alone section called “The New Multilateralism.”19 In this section, Martin outlines five areas in which he intends to push for international action, citing examples of areas the United Nations had once thought to be solely under the authority of individual states. Many of these areas hold particular significance for development, and include both capacity-building and protecting the individual human rights of foreign nationals abroad. This section is best perceived as an extension of the Martin government’s liberal orientation, with its emphasis on security and prosperity. However, paragraphs later, Martin is careful to acknowledge the limits of such an enterprise, in part

18 Ibid., 2005, iv.
because of the government’s commitment to a more selective, targeted and efficient policy. As critics of past policies have pointed out, committing Canada to multilateralism (or any large, values-based idea) as an end in itself would be to commit it to a costly, impossible and possibly dangerous enterprise, taking us further away from the results we hope to achieve in the process. Although the example in this case is Canada’s involvement with multilateral institutions, it is easy to view this argument as a response to general criticisms such as those in Kim Richard Nossal’s “‘The World We Want’?” that deal with the flaws inherent in values-driven policy. It is clear that the authors of _RPIW_ were sensitive to past criticisms of articulated foreign policy goals.

A section within _RPIW: Overview_ titled “The Canadian Approach” provides a clear statement concerning interests and values: “In charting a path forward, Canada’s interests will guide us. They are intimately linked to the character of our society and the values it embodies.” Such a strong endorsement of a values-guided, interests-driven approach to Canadian foreign policy can only mean that the Martin government accepted criticisms of _CW_’s use of values as goals, and that the policies that came from its review would not fall victim to past mistakes. Indeed, the very next paragraph reveals that the Martin government embraced the same set of values outlined by Jennifer Welsh in _At Home in the World_: “Canada’s continued success depends on the joint pursuit of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” Since Welsh was consulted extensively by the Martin government during the writing of this policy statement, it is not surprising that these values appear as guiding principles. Welsh had observed that these three values are easy to support and almost impossible for any Western country to reject.

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20 Ibid., 2005, 4.
21 Ibid., 2005, 4.
What follows the first explicit appearance of these values is a familiar treatment of Canada’s unique attributes, including a commitment to pluralism and minority rights. While Denis Stairs might be critical of the government’s assertion that “[i]n [sic] no circumstances is violence an acceptable means for seeking to effect political change”\(^\text{22}\) in Canada, the picture that the Martin government painted of Canada’s unique history and institutions was explicitly linked to the three values. Clearly, it cannot be said that this foreign policy statement left its guiding principles undefined.

But what of Canada’s interests? There is one definitive statement of Canadian interests several paragraphs after the first appearance of the three values:

> Our fundamental interests - ensuring continued prosperity and security for Canadians - remain the same as they were in 1995 when we last set a strategic course for our international policy. In fact, these are enduring interests. But their precise articulation must flow from an understanding of who we are today and the contemporary context in which we live.\(^\text{23}\)

The above passage hints at the universal nature of these interests. After all, security and prosperity are the two conditions a state pursues to ensure its future existence, and their primacy in any foreign policy calculation will never be questioned. This basic truth about the behaviour of states is as true today as it was in 1995, even if the policies that result are different. It is also true, of course, that if Canada’s interests are defined at their most basic, universal level, as they appear to be in \textit{RPIW}, and if the precise form of those interests within the policy is always subject to contemporary conditions, governments will always have significant leeway when deciding how they drive policy.

As we have seen, the Martin government in \textit{RPIW}, in what seems to have been a response to past criticisms, chose to introduce policy with an explicit commitment to a set of values and

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 2005, 4.
\(^{23}\) Ibid., 2005, 4.
interests. RPIW’s three values - democracy, the rule of law and human rights—are highly accessible and easy to support. Security and prosperity, the standard definition of Canada’s national interests, represent the ultimate goal of any state, and are similarly uncontroversial. In *RPIW: Overview*, we are told that this conception of values and interests will inform all policies in every facet of Canadian foreign policy, and that Canada’s new integrated approach will demand a more efficient, streamlined set of policies.

Accordingly, in each section of *RPIW* we should find a set of results-driven policies that, in their own way, demonstrate both their origin in Canada’s three values and a commitment to furthering our basic interests. Examining the four different and broadly defined foreign policy fields - defence, diplomacy, development and commerce - *RPIW* attempts to present specialized, separate accounts of these fields, and also calls for the integration of the operations of the various departments that administer them in practice. As outlined above, these four accounts are introduced by a foreword that is both philosophical in scope and concerned with putting the policy field in context.

**Competitiveness and security**

Perhaps above all the previous Canadian foreign policy statements, *RPIW* represents a philosophical departure from the Mulroney-era review, *Competitiveness and Security (CS)*,\(^{24}\) Reflecting the dominance of trade issues on Canada’s national agenda, Mulroney’s document framed almost every aspect of Canadian foreign policy in terms of Canada’s public and private sector trade interests.

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Its brief section on development shares this preoccupation:

Canadian understanding of the diversity and complexity of the Third World has deepened and become more sophisticated. So, too, has our appreciation of the interests we have at stake. Trade and investment, immigration, environmental conservation and international peace and security have been added to our original, largely humanitarian, objectives. The prospects for pursuing these interests in the Third World have become increasingly linked to other key items on the international economic agenda—energy, debt and finance, trade and domestic industrial change.25

Beyond the overwhelming emphasis on economic issues, the above statement has several remarkable features. Firstly, Canadian interests such as trade and security have been explicitly linked with the success of Canadian ODA programming. Secondly, this linkage comes with a clear expression of the importance ODA has to Canadian interests in general, beyond its “original” humanitarian objectives. The government appears to be subscribing to the idea that interests drive policy, possibly at the expense of the altruistic or humanitarian motives that are perceived to be the traditional basis for development policy. Still, the universal values affirmed two decades later by Jennifer Welsh in *At Home in the World* are observable. *At Home in the World*’s core Canadian values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law are found in CS in subtle ways:

Structural and political issues are equally important. Many countries lack the appropriate technology, human resources and institutions needed for development, and their cultural and political approaches tend to complicate or inhibit economic and social development. There is growing recognition of the need for fundamental economic policy change.26

Though couched in the language of economic analysis and devoid of explicit prescriptions for political, social and economic change, the above statement suggests that countries like Canada have, in their own national institutions and values, a better system that developing nations would be wise to at least partially adopt.

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25 Ibid., 1985. 9
26 Ibid., 1985. 10.
Canada in the world

*RPIW* has been contrasted most notably with *Canada in the World (CW)*. Like any expression of foreign policy, *CW* is explicitly interested in using Canada’s international influence “to protect and promote Canada’s values and interests in the world.”\(^{27}\) However, its three key objectives are anything but values-based and interests-driven:

In response to Canadians’ aspirations and to meet the challenges of an evolving world, the Government will pursue foreign policy to achieve three key objectives: The promotion of prosperity and employment; The protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and *the projection of Canadian values and culture.*\(^{28}\)

Appearing as the first two key objectives (or “pillars,” as *CW* calls them) of the review are the familiar universal national interests of prosperity and security. However, instead of informing Canadian foreign policy, these values are to be codified and projected abroad as goals unto themselves. *CW* goes on to list “respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the environment”\(^{29}\) as the specific values to be projected, along with the export of the Canadian education system, cultural diversity and other “cultural products and services.”\(^{30}\) The muddled policy that results from this confusion of values-as-goals has been explored at length by Denis Stairs and Kim Richard Nossal, and while three of the four values listed in *CW* are the same basic Canadian values identified by Welsh, their appearance as policy goals has been vigorously criticized.

The projection of values abroad has its own dedicated section within *CW*, and is framed as one of foreign policy’s three objectives. *CW* posits a direct link between Canadian values and Canadian prosperity, and embraces the liberal internationalist idea that “industrialized states …

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\(^{27}\) Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1995. i.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 1995. i. Emphasis added.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 1995. ii.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 1995. iii.
have ethical obligations towards those beyond their borders.”\textsuperscript{31} Accordingly, \textit{CW} assumes there is a clear connection between the security of the world’s most vulnerable citizens and the continuing prosperity and security of Canada. Although this aspect of \textit{CW} has been criticized, some of its statements within certainly resonate with Canadians:

\begin{quote}
Canada is not an island: if the rights of people abroad are not protected, Canadians will ultimately feel the effects at home. They understand that our economic and security interests are served by the widest possible respect for the environment, human rights, participatory government, free markets and the rule of law. Where these are observed, there is a greater prospect of stability and prosperity—where they are not, of uncertainty and poverty. \textit{Their observance, therefore, is both an end in itself and a means to achieving other priority objectives.}\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

From a Canadian point of view, it is hard to disagree with the importance of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. However, \textit{CW} asks Canadians to embrace the idea that in order to be effective internationally, we must actively spread these values to other independent nation-states.

Nowhere does the idea of values-as-goals become as apparent as in the section on development. In it, international assistance programs are promoted as vital to each of the three pillars, and the review outlines a mandate for Canadian aid programming: “to support sustainable development in developing countries, in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world.”\textsuperscript{33} Aid, according to the Chrétien government, has value as an altruistic expression of “Canadians’ desire to help the less fortunate and of their strong sense of social justice,”\textsuperscript{34} but also serves as “an effective means of sharing [our] values with the

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 1995. 34. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 1995. 42.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 1995. 40.
Within *CW*, the slim section on development offers few clues about what will drive the policy. Yet within the brief outline of the government’s six program priorities there is ample evidence of the confusion between interests and values identified by Stairs and Nossal. Alongside fairly clear-cut, self-contained goals, such as the commitment of 25% of Canada’s ODA to basic human needs, there are the values-as-goals Stairs and Nossal deride as illiberal and impossible:

Human rights, democracy, good governance: to increase respect for human rights, including children’s rights; to promote democracy and better governance; and to strengthen both civil society and the security of the individual.\(^{36}\)

These are the same universal values identified by Welsh, but in this case, they are presented as policy goals in and of themselves.

The Martin government was touted as having solved these problems with the winning formula of values-based, interests-driven policy. However sound the thinking may be behind this approach, the idea is hardly revolutionary. The same hierarchy of interests and values can be found in *Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC)*, a statement published 35 years and three foreign policy reviews ago.

**Foreign policy for Canadians**

Designed as a citizen’s primer on Canada’s foreign policy, *FPC* reads as a more philosophical policy review than *RPIW*, which, with the exception of *RPIW: Overview*, is concerned predominantly with the individual aspects of policy implementation and outcomes. However, deeper philosophical similarities are revealed when one look closely at the two reviews placed side by side.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 1995. 40.
\(^{36}\) Ibid., 1995. 42.
Like all of the policy iterations that came after it, *FPC* operates under the liberal internationalist understanding that the prosperity and security of other nations and their citizens is connected to those of Canada. In the review’s free-standing section on development, Canada’s motivations for maintaining a development policy are expressed through the idea that Canadians are a people who acknowledge the importance of the well-being of the individual person:

One basic value of Canadian society is the importance of the individual person, and of his rights and welfare … [T]his ethic was adopted and translated into the legal and political systems which Canada has inherited. Those systems, imperfect though they may be in practice, are based on the tenet that all individuals in a society have both rights and obligations toward other citizens in that society, because the potential of that society cannot be realized unless the potential of each of its members is also realized. It is the basic assumption on which a democratic system rests.\(^{37}\)

The above statement nicely captures the Trudeau government’s commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law as the motivations behind the policy in general. However, as we see a few paragraphs later, interests have an equal role as motivators:

We could not expect to find the same sympathy for Canadian interest or support for Canadian policies amongst the other nations with which we are associated in the world community if we were unwilling to bear our share of our collective responsibilities … Assistance to the less-developed nations serves Canada’s interest in some other and more immediate respects. It is an important and integral part of the general conduct of Canada’s external relations, particularly with the developing countries … Successful economic development in the less-advanced countries will assist in the expansion of world trade as a whole and provide a growing market for Canadian goods and services.\(^{38}\)

Not only do Canada’s interests lie in the abstract idea of interdependent security and prosperity, but also in a series of more immediate benefits.

Like *FPC*, *RPIW* makes the connection between security and prosperity abroad and at home, as well as the connection between international development and domestic policy.

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\(^{37}\) Canada, External Affairs, International Development: *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada, 1970. 8

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 1970. 9–10.
However, *RPIW* provides a more specific outline of the liberal internationalist vision. The authors clearly want their readers to start thinking about development policy as an important preventative arm of the security policies that one would typically associate with defence and diplomacy. But in the next paragraph, they also see commercial benefits:

> While the primary responsibility for achieving growth and equitable development lies with developing counties themselves, industrialized countries such as Canada have a responsibility not only to increase the flow of development aid, but also to help expand economic opportunities for developing countries … Canada can build on its international experience in supporting development that is sustainable in economic, social and environmental terms.\(^{39}\)

In a few short paragraphs, the government has tied the security and economic facets of foreign policy to development, demonstrating the interconnectivity among their various departments. As we have seen, the idea that these aspects of Canada’s involvement in the world are interconnected is not new, but their formal fusion in a foreign policy statement is an innovation.

In fact, the wealth of specific policy pronouncements in *RPIW* represents a departure from past policy statements, including the philosophically similar *FPC*. The five general policy goals of *RPIW*, outlined above in the section on structure, stand in marked contrast to those offered in *FPC*. In fact, no similar articulation of goals is present in *FPC* at all. *FPC*’s section on development, besides its expressed commitment to the Canadian national interest, offers little in the way of development policy specifics.

But what of the role of interests and values in the Trudeau review’s policy creation process? By way of refuting past preoccupations with influence and international prestige, the authors of *FPC* explain:

> In undertaking this review the Government has been constantly reminded of its need and responsibility to choose carefully aims, objectives and priorities in sufficiently long and broad terms to ensure that essential Canadian interests and values are safeguarded in a world situation where rapid and even radical changes

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 1.
can be anticipated as normal rather than exceptional conditions. Canada, like other states, must act according to how it perceives its aims and interest … In essence, foreign policy is the product of the Government’s progressive definition and pursuit of national aims and interests in the international environment. It is the extension abroad of national policies.”

Although weight is given earlier in the review to the idea of an international moral imperative, 

_FPC_ makes it clear that development policy, like all branches of foreign policy, is best viewed as an extension of the national interest. _FPC_ presents three ideas, characterized as “national aims,” it believes will best lead to the development of policies that serve the national interest:

- Canada must be secure, and continue as an independent political entity;
- Canada and Canadians must enjoy increasing prosperity along the broadest possible terms; and
- Canadians “will see in the life they have and the contribution they make to humanity something worthwhile preserving in identity and purpose.”

_FPC_’s national aims represent a characterization of national interest at its most basic level, presenting a vision that builds first on security, then prosperity (or future security), then a sense of altruistic purpose designed to provide a reason for the continued existence of Canada as a political entity. With these ideas as a guide, the review proposes that practical, interests-driven policy will result.

Within _RPIW_, the expression of interests is even more basic. Simply put, Canada’s interest in development lies in the security it brings within and among nations:

Canadians, who come from every corner of the globe, understand that the life we enjoy in Canada depends increasingly on helping to make the world a better place. Our future is intertwined with that of people around the globe struggling to secure democracy and human rights, to build effective and accountable governance, to improve standards of living, and to sustainably manage their environment. Canadians cannot be safe in an unstable world, or healthy in a sick world; nor can we expect to remain prosperous in a poor world. Failure to achieve significant political, economic, social and environmental progress in the developing world
will have an impact on Canada in terms of both our long-term security and our prosperity.\textsuperscript{43}

Although it is a relatively remote and abstract notion, this perceived connection between Canadian society and society in the developing world represents the link between Canadian interests and the importance of development policy in\textit{RPIW}.

\textit{FPC} includes many explicit expressions of how national interests must drive policy. It also includes a bundle of values that can be said to inform them, a values package that is implicit and always present. Included in Trudeau’s conception of national aims are “preoccupations”\textsuperscript{44} of contemporary Canadians, including national sovereignty, unity and security, personal freedom and parliamentary democracy, multicultural expression, economic growth, human values and humanitarian aspirations.\textsuperscript{45} These preoccupations include interests such as economic growth and sovereignty, but running unmistakably through the list are basic values identified by Welsh, including human rights and the rule of law (\textit{FPC}’s “personal freedom”), democracy and the rule of law (\textit{FPC}’s “parliamentary democracy”), and human rights and democracy (\textit{FPC}’s “humanitarian aspirations”).

With ever-present basic values and a clear role for national interests as policy drivers, \textit{FPC} appears to be the fulfillment of Welsh’s vision for Canadian foreign policy. The goal of Canadian foreign policy is said to be furthering these interests and values:

“Much of Canada’s effort internationally will be directed to bringing about the kinds of situation[s], development, and relationship[s] which will be most favourable to the furtherance of Canadian interests and values … Canada’s foreign policy, like all national policy, derives its content and validity from the degree of relevance it has to national interests and basic aims.”\textsuperscript{46}
It is clear, then, that the Martin government was not the first Canadian government to support an interests-driven, values-based approach. Nevertheless, *RPIW* seems to be more aware than its predecessors of its own philosophical underpinnings. We need look no further than *RPIW: Overview* to discover those underpinnings in explicit terms. It follows, therefore, that we should expect to see the same approach in each of the stand-alone documents that make up *RPIW*. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, in *RPIW: Overview* the Martin government offered an explicit endorsement\(^1\) of the interests-driven, values-based conception of foreign policy championed by Jennifer Welsh in *At Home in the World*. In particular, *RPIW: Overview* embraces the primacy of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as the guiding values on which Canada’s foreign policy must be based. The interests to be pursued throughout *RPIW* are security and prosperity, which Welsh posits as the two most basic aims of a nation-state.

Development has been the one feature of Canadian foreign policy that has consistently been viewed as a values-based exercise, although interests have never been dismissed entirely. The paragraphs below will explore the articulation of the interests-driven, values-based approach in *RPIW: Development*. We will begin by outlining the structure and content of *RPIW: Development*, the stand-alone document that, together with *RPIW: Overview*, *RPIW: Defence*, *RPIW: International Commerce* and *RPIW: Diplomacy*, make up the 2005 foreign policy review. Next, we will examine the treatment of the values-interests dichotomy found in *RPIW: Development* in relation to its treatment in *RPIW: Overview*, in which the dichotomy is spelled out explicitly. Two observations will emerge from this analysis. First of all, it will be clear that the treatment of interests and values does not match the interests-driven, values-based approach promoted by Welsh and adopted *RPIW: Overview*. Secondly, it will be clear that values are observable in *RPIW: Development*, but that interests, even in as broad a sense as they are presented by Welsh, are much harder to see. The reason for the latter, we will argue, is that while the implementation of Canadian development policy does not necessarily reflect altruism,

development is by its very nature an altruistic exercise and thus cannot be driven by interests. In the case of development, foreign policy goals can be defined in terms of values, after all.

**Development: Structure**

Within *RPIW: Development*, the government presents a nine-part account of Canada’s commitment to international development, which is prefaced by a cover letter from Minister of International Cooperation Aileen Carroll. Like the Mulroney-era document, *Competitiveness and Security (CS)*, *RPIW: Development* reads like an executive summary, and makes use of text boxes, graphs, bullet points and illustrations in order to present development policy ideas to the reader. The nine parts vary significantly in length, level of detail and style of prose, appearing as anything from 10 organized, detailed pages to a single fragmented, point-form page.

At 31 pages, *RPIW: Development* is equal in length to *RPIW: Overview*, and is organized in much the same way. Both documents begin with an analysis of the challenges facing Canada, followed by an introduction to the policies and principles developed to address them. The first part of *RPIW: Development* is titled “A World in Transition,” and is concerned with summarizing the current state of development in the world, including both the progress that has been made and the trends that continue to create problems. These trends are listed and summarized, and include uneven development, weak governance, health crises, lack of access to education, demographic pressure, gender inequality and environmental stress. This list is followed by a summary of the steps that will be taken to address these challenges. The steps are discussed under the subheadings “A global partnership for development,” “An integrated national approach to development” and “Enhancing aid effectiveness.”

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3 Ibid., 2005, 5.
In the second part of *RPIW: Development*, titled “The Way Forward,” the finer details of the steps cited above are expanded in a bullet-pointed, executive summary-style page composed of a mix of governing principles, specific government initiatives and detailed spending commitments. A three-page third part titled “A Whole-of-Government Approach to Development” fleshes out a new commitment to policy coherence that is described later in the document.

The fourth part of *RPIW: Development*, titled “A More Strategic Focus,” is the longest and fullest. It is divided into two sections, each devoted to defining a particular way in which the government will “[strengthen] the impact and effectiveness of development cooperation.” The first section affirms Canada’s commitment to greater focus on sectors, which include “five programming sectors and one crosscutting theme.” In this case, the five programming sectors are good governance, improved health outcomes, basic education, private sector development and environmental sustainability. The crosscutting theme, which is pervasive throughout the document, is gender equality. The second section of “A More Strategic Focus” commits Canadian aid to a more focused country concentration, and outlines how this new, streamlined list of donor countries will be selected.

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5 Ibid., 2005, 6.
The selected countries will fall into five categories:

1) Development partners - Countries in this category will receive two-thirds of available bilateral resources;
2) Other ongoing bilateral relationships - Countries in this category will receive one-third of available bilateral resources;
3) Failed and fragile states - These countries share portions of the one-third above;
4) Graduating middle-income countries - Funding will wind down over time; and
5) Other ODA-eligible countries - Funding will wind down, but further assistance will be “available through other channels.”

After presenting this vision of how Canada’s development programs will be run, the fifth part of RPIW: Development, “Working with Multilateral Institutions,” commits Canada to the principles behind a multilateral framework, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs, a set of time-constricted goals and targets agreed upon by developed and developing nations in 2000, serve as the standard against which the Martin government will measure Canada’s development program progress. Intended to be met by 2015, the targets cover eight basic elements of human development:

1) Halving extreme poverty and hunger;
2) Achieving universal primary education;
3) Promoting gender equality;
4) Reducing under-five mortality by two-thirds;
5) Reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters;
6) Reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB;
7) Ensuring environmental sustainability; and
8) Developing a global partnership for development, with targets for aid.

Multilateralism allows Canada to “remain engaged in countries without a full-scale bilateral program.” The MDGs will “provide the best prospects for an inclusive process to set the rules

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9 Ibid., 23.
10 Ibid., 24.
11 Ibid., 24.
12 Ibid., 25.
14 Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Development.
of international conduct and a forum to promote values important to Canada, including
democracy, human development and social justice.”¹⁵ In other words, the authors of this
document see multilateral action and the MDGs as the best and most efficient way of promoting
Canadian values and interests.

The next two pages, which make up the sixth part of RPIW: Development, titled
“Engaging Canadians in Development,” put forward ideas for involving Canadian citizens in
overseas development, including the continuation of the Canada Corps program and connecting
more of civil society with NGOs, businesses, cooperatives and other organizations with projects
overseas. A seventh, one-page part of RPIW: Development, titled “Leading-Edge Delivery
System,” expounds on aid efficiency and organized delivery systems, and affirms Canada’s
commitment to transparency, accountability, results-based development and other management
principles.¹⁶

Development: Content

RPIW: Development begins with an outline of the international context in which
Canada’s development policy is to be created, and ends with an account of the practical aspects
of service delivery. The introduction to RPIW: Development serves to reiterate the government’s
commitment to the interests and values set out in RPIW: Overview, adding that they intend to
adopt a whole-of-government approach to development. Accordingly, the five general goals of
the policy are as follows:

1) To advance Canada’s chosen values (global citizenship, equity and environmental
   sustainability) and interests (security, prosperity and governance) abroad;
2) To deliver results according to the MDGs;

¹⁵ Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Development.
   Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005. 27.
¹⁶ Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Development.
3) To match Canadian niches with the needs of recipient states;
4) To recognize and address linkages among environmental degradation, poverty and social inequity; and
5) To mobilize Canadians to both dialogue on and participation in Canada’s development strategy.¹⁷

Some of the implications that these stated policy goals have for the articulation of values and interests will be brought into focus below. However, for the purpose of understanding the structure of *RPIW: Development*, the above five points are best seen as common thematic threads that run throughout all of its sections.

The first of the five policy goals is clear, and reiterates the government’s commitment to the values and interests that appear in *RPIW: Overview*. The second, an explicit commitment to the MDGs, includes an implicit endorsement of multilateralism, which is identified later in the document as central to delivering values and interests. The third goal deals with service delivery at a practical level. Up to this point, the policy goals stated in *RPIW: Development* seem to complement each other and work towards a cohesive policy framework. However, the final two goals, as we shall see below, are less helpful in defining the policy.

After introducing the policy goals, *RPIW: Development* turns its attention to characterizing the negative and positive global trends in development. We are introduced to the MDGs and their role in attempting to generate “an unprecedented international consensus on the key problems [of development] and what must be done about them.”¹⁸ By signalling Canada’s intent to work towards the MDGs with most other developed and developing nations, *RPIW: Development* commits Canada to a decidedly multilateralist approach.

The Values-Interests Debate

In *RPIW: Overview*, we observe a clear distinction within the values-interests dichotomy: Canada’s foreign policy ought to be values-based and interest-driven. Those values must be the core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The interests pursued must be security and prosperity, the two most basic aims of a state. The question is, does the dichotomy work for international development? The answer appears to be no.

From the very beginning of *RPIW: Development*, the authors demonstrate their commitment to building on the principles set out in *RPIW: Overview* while making the link between development and Canada’s long-term security and prosperity. Much like Martin’s letter in *RPIW: Overview*, *RPIW: Development* attempts to move past altruism, tying development activities to state security:

While there is a moral imperative to respond to the humanitarian crises that erupt when states degenerate into conflict and chaos, Canadian interests are better served if these can be prevented. This preventative action can take many forms. One of these is long-term development assistance. This assistance helps build public institutions, civil society and accountable political culture, without which peace, security, and development cannot be sustained.19

We are to think of development as not only tied to other foreign policy objectives, but also the basis of Canada’s security policy. However, the document does not contend that the link between development and state interests is the only valid way of looking at development policy:

Canada’s role in development cooperation cannot be defined exclusively on the basis of self-interest. The needs of our development partners, first and foremost in the poorest countries, must be our starting point. Further, the generosity of Canadians, expressed so tangibly in the outpouring of contributions from Canadian individuals, organizations, communities and businesses … is one aspect of the sense of global citizenship in the Canada of the 21st century.20

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19 Ibid., 2005, 1.
20 Ibid., 2005, 1.
Even if we acknowledge the value of development policy in the pursuit of Canadian security and prosperity, there is clearly an aspect of development that remains somewhat selfless. Whether it is in the perceptions of Canadians who contribute to international relief efforts or in the perceived needs of recipient states, the motivations behind many aspects of development cannot be perceived as mere extensions of pure self-interest. Even if we accept a longer view of Canadian interests—that these relatively selfless acts will, in time, contribute to a more stable world and thus future Canadian security and prosperity - the basic motivation is still altruism.

Curiously, an explicit statement of the three Canadian values identified in *RPIW: Overview* - democracy, human rights and the rule of law - does not make an appearance in *RPIW: Development*. Instead, the document sets out five general goals for development. 21 Of these five general goals, the first two are clear departures from the values-based, interests-driven approach endorsed in *RPIW: Overview*.

The first goal is to “advance Canadian values of global citizenship, equity and environmental sustainability, as well as Canadian interests regarding security, prosperity and governance.” 22 This goal ought to give us pause, as it seems to call for the promotion of both Canadian interests and values, an enterprise Nossal and others would deem illiberal and inefficient. It would be even more illiberal and inefficient were the interests of security and prosperity perceived as being based on the cited values themselves. The policy would then clearly be calling for the active promotion of certain values abroad — irrespective of whether most Canadians agree that such values have merit.

Nevertheless, the language of one small introductory paragraph in *RPIW: Development* may not introduce the entire policy framework to the same pitfalls as previous foreign policy

21 Ibid., 2005, 2. Numbering mine, but original list appeared in bulleted point-form.
22 Ibid., 2005, 2.
articulations. In fact, it is doubtful that concepts like global citizenship or environmental stability could be called values at all, in the sense that Welsh explores in *At Home in the World*. While the concepts are certainly ones most Canadians would rate as positive, most do not approach democracy, human rights and the rule of law as principles having universal application. Global citizenship, for example, could be characterized as a very specific expression of democracy, but it is an outgrowth of democracy nonetheless. At this point in the document, it remains to be seen whether or not the government is choosing to allow values to drive policy in place of interests.

Perhaps a more comprehensive picture of the Martin government’s intentions for development can be found in the part of *Development* titled “A More Strategic Focus.” Although *RPIW: Development* includes specific sections on citizen engagement, aid delivery systems and multilateralism, this section explains exactly what *RPIW: Development* considers to be critical to development in general, and its own development policy in particular. It provides the bulk of the actual policy goals included in *RPIW: Development*, and outlines, by sector, those aspects of a society the government believes are important. Thus, in theory, this section provides the best place to find examples of values-based, interests-driven policy in action.

The second general goal in *RPIW: Development* is to “deliver visible, durable impact on the world’s key development challenges as identified in the Millennium Development Goals.” In the section devoted to this goal, the document once again expresses Canada’s commitment to increasing aid effectiveness, in this case by concentrating programming in five sectors they see as working towards the MDGs. In order of appearance, those sectors are good governance,

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23 Ibid., 2005, 11.
24 Ibid., 2005, 2.
health, basic education, private sector development, and environmental sustainability. Gender equality, while not included in this list, is given a greater place of importance as a crosscutting theme that will be a part of the policy surrounding all five sectors.

If Canada’s interests are security and prosperity, and if the development of the world’s poorest countries is critical to realizing these interests in the long-term, then these sectors fit with Canada’s interests so long as the aid is effective and the goals of the programs are realized. In terms of values, each of these sectors ties in with at least one of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Specifically, health and basic education both clearly fit under human rights, and both could also be said to affect the health of democracy in a state. After all, without healthy, educated citizens, active participation becomes impossible. Private sector development is more ambiguous, but fits with Canadian conceptions of democracy, since a vibrant economy is critical to the health of any (liberal) democracy. Environmental stability sounds more ambiguous still at first blush, but the effect that factors such as climate change, land degradation and ground water salination have on the overall economic, social and political health of any community—not to mention the potential direct consequences for other states, including Canada—is such that environmental sustainability fits in with all three values.

However, in terms of problematic implications for the values-based, interests-driven approach in *RPIW: Overview*, the most interesting sector identified is good governance.

**Good Governance**

Good governance, besides having clear linkages to each of the values, expresses the Martin government’s philosophy of development, since the idea of good governance effectively deals with the health and progress of entire societies. Furthermore, the document sees Canada

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and Canadians as having a special capacity for supporting developing countries’ progressions towards good governance:

Canada’s commitment to tolerance and multiculturalism, to a federal system that accommodates diversity, to strong public institutions and to a vibrant civil society, makes Canadians well suited to supporting developing countries’ efforts to improve their governance … Canada corps will mobilize Canadians to promote good governance on two substantive levels. The first is at the level of statehood - such as governments, courts, and elections. The second involves those institutions that underpin any successful society - systems for health, education, justice, social development and environmental sustainability.\(^{26}\)

The above passage is revealing. Besides the initial statements about Canada’s special capacity for tolerance, diversity and multiculturalism—which many critics of past policies might find uncomfortably close to the presumptive arrogance of past conceptions of values\(^{27}\)—notice that those areas where Canadians are suited to deliver aid include three of the four other sectors for whole-of-government development. Health, education and environmental sustainability, which each merit their own sections on pages 12, 14 and 18, respectively, are each thought of as part of good governance, and appear first in the section titled “Promoting Good Governance.”\(^{28}\)

The idea that good governance is the key to effective development receives further support in the choice of five pillars around which the government intends to provide governance programming. The five main pillars are as follows:

1) Democratization;
2) Human rights;
3) The rule of law;
4) Public sector institution and capacity building; and
5) Conflict prevention, peace building and security-sector reform.\(^{29}\)

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 2005, 12–13.
\(^{29}\) Ibid., 2005, 13.
It should be of immediate interest that the first three pillars are the values that are supposed to underpin all foreign policy creation, and that the last aims to enhance the security of developing countries, which, as we have seen, the government contends is critical to our own long-term security and prosperity.

At this point, a problem looms. It should be obvious that, instead of merely providing the core from which interests-driven policy originates, all three of Canada’s core values appear not only as policy drivers, but also as policy goals in and of themselves. This might not be immediately obvious, since the five pillars are introduced as the architecture around which programming is built, which would still constitute values-based, interests-driven policy so long as the programs are effective. And in this case, it could be argued that values-as-policy-drivers might still lead to effective policy, if it were clear that the promotion of those values were critical to effective development.

While it is true that the role of values in this case, especially when paired with such a broad set of interests that are to drive policies, might go beyond what is envisioned by Nossal and Welsh, it does not immediately follow that such a role would lead to ineffective policy. Furthermore, as policy drivers go, most of the values seem relatively self-contained if we understand them as offers we extend to developing countries who, as pledged under the Monterrey Consensus, are interested in taking ownership of their development policies. Under democratization, we pledge to help recipient states to “[strengthen] democratic institutions and practices,” but we intend that to mean that we will provide any capacity-building assistance a recipient state is willing to accept. It is not necessarily our version of democracy that will constitute the end result. Similarly, under rule of law, we intend to “support legal/judicial reform

with a focus on institutions,\textsuperscript{31} but beyond the fact that we assert that all states ought to have a legal system in the first place - and we would be hard-pressed to find any society on earth with no enforced code of conduct whatsoever - our intervention is again limited to what recipient states are willing to accept.

If the involvement of values as policy drivers were to end there, it would still be possible to defend the policies in \textit{RPIW} in the face of criticisms such as those put forward by Stairs, Nossal and Welsh. However, the role of values clearly goes beyond that of self-contained policy-driver when we explore the role of human rights in \textit{RPIW: Development}. Although pervasive throughout the document like the other two values, the places where respect for human rights affects policy tend to have far more interventionist implications. Canada pledges that

\begin{quote}
Future programming will include support for the promotion and implementation of human rights, including the rights of women and of children, particularly those affected by conflict, gender-based violence and natural disasters.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

On the surface, this pledge appears no different from the others. However, the concept of universal human rights is unique in that it is considerably more difficult to base policy on its requirements without the result betraying the kind of interventionism rejected by many critics as illiberal. While it can be said that some form of the rule of law is a precondition for human civilization, and that democracy in one of its many manifestations is alien to very few cultures, the type of universal human rights envisioned by the authors of this document is somewhat less likely to be universal among states. This is not to argue that the idea of universal human rights is wrong, or that there are cultures in the world that do not have the capacity for a good human rights record. Widely adopted expressions of support for universal human rights, including the

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 2005, 13.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 2005, 13.
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, belie such an assertion. However, if we are obligated to all women all over the world, we are susceptible to the sorts of illiberal, nebulous, far-reaching and expensive interventions Nossal warns us against. It would also undercut the targeted, goal-oriented approach the Martin government seems to favour in RPIW: Overview. The fact that RPIW: Development espouses a position with the potential to have such broad, interventionist policy implications should be troubling to those who support a values-based, interests-driven approach.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS: IS DEVELOPMENT DIFFERENT?

It is clear that the Martin government’s approach to development, as outlined in *RPIW: Development*, does not reflect the values-based, interests-driven approach set out in *RPIW: Overview*. As always, the core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are easy to see throughout *RPIW: Development*, but in sections like “Good Governance” they appear as policy drivers in place of the basic interests of security and prosperity outlined by Welsh.

Do these observations necessarily mean that *RPIW: Development* fails to address the past criticisms of Stairs, Nossal and others? Perhaps those criticisms miss the mark entirely when it comes to development. If the world’s problems are shared by all nations, as Welsh seems to suggest throughout *At Home in the World*, values and interests will start to merge, and states like Canada will begin to acknowledge that an intervention in the form of development aid is by its very nature an altruistic, interventionist enterprise. In other words, maybe development is different.

This determination runs contrary to the arguments and prescriptions of Kim Richard Nossal and, to a lesser extent, Jennifer Welsh. As we have seen in chapter two, Nossal believes effective foreign policy must be driven by state interests. When he turns his attention to *CW* in “‘The World We Want’? The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals and Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy,” he allows that development will be values-based, but emphasizes that no effective aid policy can come from the use of values as policy drivers. Similarly, Welsh calls for a reexamination of the role both values and interests play in foreign policy formation, although she ultimately, and perhaps weakly, concludes that a mix of interests and values will inform policy not as a projection of values abroad, but as a way of leading by example as a “model
citizen”; either way, this view suggests that Canada ought to be interested in creating a world that looks more like itself.

In *RPIW: Overview*, the Martin government articulates a clear understanding of this mix of interests and values; it seems clear that interests will drive our foreign policy, but that values will inform it. However, as we have seen, this clear articulation does not appear in *RPIW: Development*. How is it that a document ostensibly written with an interests-driven, values-based approach in mind manages to generate the same kinds of interventionist development policies it seeks to reform?

Perhaps development has, and always will, be based on an inalienable, altruistic element of human nature. Although the argument is one he ultimately rejects, Joseph Cropsey captures this idea in “The Right of Foreign Aid.”¹ In this essay, Cropsey attempts to answer the difficult question of whether wealthy nations have a moral duty to extend help to less-developed countries in the form of foreign aid. Within the first two paragraphs of the essay, he asserts that he will separate duty from interest, observing that “…mere duty and interest, as different as another’s benefit is from one’s own, can easily conflict.”² While he is not recognizing a values-interests dichotomy (as other authors discussed in this thesis have done), his observation reveals his endorsement of the idea that the interests of donor and recipient countries may be mutually exclusive. He goes on to explain that

We can never rest easy, nor be united in our policies, if the suspicion exists that what we do for others we do out of duty but against our interest. Moreover, not all men will be satisfied with policies that aim at our advantage but which appear at the same time to violate a duty to benefit other human beings. Because of the possibility that duty and interest will conflict, the grounds of each must be investigated in light of the distinction.³

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² Ibid., 1977, 189.
³ Ibid., 1977, 189-190.
Cropsey’s investigation follows in four parts. First, he explores the idea that the motivation behind aid-giving is found in a sense of compassion for the less fortunate. After a few paragraphs of analysis, he rejects this idea, stating that “bare sympathy or fellow-feeling is an imperfect guide to obligation”\textsuperscript{4} and further that “[r]eason must arbitrate among the sentiments, or else actions become arbitrary.”\textsuperscript{5} Ultimately, “[a] man at the other end of the world cannot and ought not to presume to claim what a parent, a brother, or a child might reasonably expect… [A] duty of universal charity would be to enslave the rational and industrious to the rest.”\textsuperscript{6}

Cropsey moves on to a second question, namely whether the modern scientific project extends an obligation from advanced nations to the problems of developing countries. He argues that “the highest task of man, of mankind as a whole, is to establish its intellectual and technical supremacy in the world by conquering nature.” Instead of the unity of mankind being rooted in sentiment, the common thread would be our status as the top species in nature. However, for similar reasons to his rejection of sentiment, Cropsey dismisses the duty of the more scientifically advanced to the less. He writes that

\begin{quote}
Duty as moral obligation is a bond upon those for whim there exists an “other” that matters. Why does the “other” matter? … if science means the conquest of nature, and knowledge is the power of conquering nature, then the possession of scientific knowledge as such carries with it no duty to improve man’s condition but only a possibility of doing so. Their possession of science does not impose a duty upon the advanced nations to assist others.\textsuperscript{7}
\end{quote}

In this passage, we begin to see that Cropsey draws a clear line between duty, which he consistently finds to be lacking in humans by nature, and interests, which are the true motivators of aid-giving.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 1977, 192.\\
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., 1977, 193.\\
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 1977, 193.\\
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 1977, 198-199.
\end{flushright}
Third, Cropsey turns his attention to whether or not democratic principles dictate a duty towards developing nations. This section comes closest to addressing the values-based way of thinking about foreign policy, as Cropsey explores whether there is “something in the nature of democracy that imposes a duty of universal beneficence upon a democratic nation.”\textsuperscript{8} This is, at its outset, a very expansive way of stating the problem. Cropsey does not allow for the possibility that democratic societies may be responsible in certain situations, or in specific, but limited, ways. For him, the question is whether or not democratic nations have a duty to all disadvantaged people all of the time. As with the two preceding questions, Cropsey finds this idea to be extremely problematic, as “[i]n order to make it possible for us to act toward all men as if our universal principle were in force or had authority among all men, it would be necessary for us to extend our rule over all men or at least to propagate democracy among them universally.”\textsuperscript{9}

This criticism should sound familiar. When the Chrétien government called for the promotion of democracy abroad in \textit{CW}, Nossal condemned the idea as illiberal, potentially costly and dangerous. However, Cropsey’s characterization assumes that, in a world in which nations act according to very different principles, a democratic nation would have to act towards others as if democracy were in force everywhere. For Cropsey, it seems it would not be possible for a development policy to merely be rooted in democratic principles, without attention being paid to ensuring that other countries become democratized.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 1977, 200.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 1977, 202.
After addressing these questions, Cropsey elegantly articulates the opposing view when he writes that the following:

As citizens in a wealthy nation, we learn something from the contempt in which men of means are held who take no pity on the worthy poor that come in their way… how can we exculpate those who surfeit themselves, while under their feet the children of poverty learn the way of brutes in the school of starvation?…

Apparently there is a law of our nature that bids us relieve the sufferings of all things able to suffer, and certainly of our fellow-men wherever they may be. We appear to incline toward a universal charity. ¹⁰

In other words, humans are motivated to act charitably by their reason. But there is another view, put forward by Cranford Pratt, that human motivations may be traced to altruistic impulses. In “Competing rationales for Canadian development assistance,” he explains why this must be acknowledged:

Had humane internationalist motivations been entirely swamped by trade and national security considerations, Bangladesh would not still receive substantial quantities of Canadian bilateral aid; more than 40 per cent of Canadian bilateral aid would not still go to Africa; emphasis would not still be placed on meeting basic human needs; and there would not be within CIDA today a significant effort to ensure that poverty reduction is the common element in all of CIDA’s policies and programmes. ¹¹

Even in the case of an overtly interest-driven policy document like CS, the declarative policy and the implementation imply that values matter. Is this an accident, or is it evidence that, try as a government might, there is no way to avoid development’s essentially altruistic nature?

It is easy to see that Canada has, over the last 35 years, consistently generated altruistic and interventionist development policies. If we accept the evidence and arguments of Pratt and others, this is because we sense a universality across humankind that brings with it a sense of obligation to the citizens of nations less fortunate than our own. Whether this means that Canada should be including among its foreign policy policy goals the propogation of democracy

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¹⁰ Ibid., 1977, 191.
universally remains a question. *RPIW: Development* does propose after all that the promotion of
good governance (no doubt, as in democracy) should be a foreign policy goal for Canada.

It is clear that development does not fit with the interests-driven, values-based framework
put forward in *RPIW: Overview*. However, it is also clear that, if they continue to be written as
they have for the last 39 years, Canadian development policies will continue to be susceptible to
compelling criticisms of their effectiveness. It follows that, if any progress can be made in
incorporating these criticisms, it is up to future Canadian governments - and Canadians in
general - to undertake a serious examination of the reason for, and goals of, Canadian ODA.

It has been argued with some persuasiveness that Canadian development assistance does
not reflect altruism at all. In his 2006 work on the subject, *The White Man’s Burden*, William
Easterly wrote that if Western nations were sincere about effecting change in the developing
world, Western democracies would not structure their aid programs into the sprawling
bureaucracies. Easterly observes:

Rich-country politicians control the foreign aid agencies. To make the
relationship between rich-country politicians and aid bureaucracies more precise,
think of principals and agents… Think of the rich-country politician as the
principal and the aid bureaucrat as the agent… Voters in the rich country and their
representatives are the ones who choose the actions of the foreign aid agency.
They love the Big Plans, the promises of easy solutions, the utopian dreams, the
side benefits for rich-country political or economic interests, all of which hands
the aid agency impossible tasks.¹²

If one were to assume Easterly’s view, Canadian ODA is nothing more than an inefficient
bureaucracy, run by politicians and driven by the incoherent and unreasonable expectations of
voters. Even if such a bleak conception of Canadian ODA is accurate, does it follow that it must
be so?

While a serious examination of foreign aid policy may lead Canadians to conclude that altruism has no place in an effective development aid policy, it may, on the other hand, lead them to recognize that the decades-long persistence of policies that undeniably reflect ethical and humanitarian principles cannot be ignored. In the end, if aid effectiveness has any hope of being strengthened, it must be done under both an acknowledgement of the altruistic character of the development enterprise, as well as careful thought as to what the desired outcome of Canadian development policy ought to be. Without such an honest assessment, we cannot hope to move beyond the justifiably criticized foreign policy statements of the past.
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