Becoming Green Citizens and Other Subjects:
Community Forests in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala

By

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ABSTRACT

Between 1987 and 1990, Guatemalan state policy in the Petén turned from felling trees in the name of progress to guarding them from progress in the name of biodiversity. What was at stake in this transformation was not simply protecting nature, but also the rebirth of images and narratives of the nation surrounding Guatemala's fragile transition to formal democracy and precarious movement towards peace. These new national narratives were integral to the creation of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve in 1990. This thesis explores the history of the rise of the state's policy of community forest concessions in the Multiple Use Zone of the reserve as a shift from the prohibitive mechanisms of the law to the participatory mechanisms of governmentality. This history serves as a prism to address the literature on democratic transition in Guatemala and democratic theory in general by applying the concepts of governmentality to the construction of citizenship and nation building. A *campesino* movement, the Association of Community Forests of the Petén, that arose during the process contested the exclusionary practices of the state, including representations of *campesinos* as nature's destroyers, and lobbied the state for community forest concessions. Through the processes of participation in the awarding of concessions and in the incorporation of sustainable forestry practices, *campesinos* became citizen-agents even while this agency was tied to practices of subjectification. At the regional level, the incorporation of the demands of *campesinos* was also a mechanism to produce a population that would govern itself, avert large-scale reform, and stabilize the meaning of the 1996 Peace Accords. In the village of Uaxactún, resistances to governmental intervention and the negotiation of new relationships with the state by the villagers reveal how governmentality is not something simply imposed by the state, but rather constituted out of an on-going process of resistance, contestation, and negotiation. The construction of a citizenry of "nature's defenders" through the mechanisms of governmentality also produced a new series of exclusions of migrants. These exclusions point out the limitations of governmentality, and resistances point towards *how* citizens might be made more democratically.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For My Parents

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACOFOP   Association of Community Forests of the Petén (Asociación de
           Comunidades Forestales del Petén)
AIMPE   Association of Timber Industries of the Petén, (Asociación de Industriales
           de la Madera del Petén)
APG   Journalists' Association of Guatemala (Asociación de Periodistas de
           Guatemala)
ARCAS   Association of Wildlife Rescue and Conservation (Asociación de Rescate y
           Conservacion de Vida Silvestre)
ASC   Civil Society Assembly (Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil)
ASOREMA   Association of Natural Resource and Environmental Non-Governmental
           Organizations (Asociación de Organizaciones no Gubernamentales de los
           Recursos Naturales y el Medio Ambiente)
CACIF   Council of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations
           (Cámara de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y
           Financieras)
CCF   Forestry Consultation Committee (Comite Consultivo Forestal)
CECON   Conservation Studies Centre (Centro de Estudios de Conservación) CI
CI   Conservation International
CICAFOC   Coordinator of Indigenous and Campesino Community Agroforestry
           (Coordinadora Indígena Campesina de Agroforestería Comunitaria)
CONAMA   National Environmental Commission (Comisión Nacional del Medio
           Ambiente)
CONAP   National Council of Protected Areas (Consejo Nacional de Àreas
           Protegidas)
CONCOFOP   Council of Community Forests of the Petén (Consejo de Comunidades
           Forestales del Petén)
CONIC   National Campesino and Indigenous Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional
           Indígena y Campesina)
COOCHICLE Integrated Chicle, Timber, and Environmental Commercialization
           Cooperative, R.L. (Cooperativa Integral de la Comericialización de Chicle,
           Madera y Medio Ambiente R.L.)
FAR   Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes)
FRG   Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemlateco)
FLASCO   Faculty of Latin American Social Sciences (Facutad Latinoamericana de
           Ciencias Sociales)
FUNDAECO   Foundation for Eco-Development and Conservation (Fundación para el
           Ecodessarrollo y la Conservación)
FYDEP   National Enterprise for Promotion and Economic Development of the Petén
           (Empresa Nacional de Fomento y Desarrollo Económico del Petén)
IDEADS   Institute of Environmental Law and Sustainable Development (Instituto de
           Derecho Ambiental and Desarrollo Sustentable)
INTA   National Institute for Agrarian Transformation (Instituto Nacional de
           Transformación Agraria)
MAGA   Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food, (Ministerio de Agricultura,
           Ganadería, y Alimentación)
MBR   Mayan Biosphere Reserve (Reserva de la Biosfera Maya)
MUZ   Multiple Use Zone (Zona de Usos Múltiples)
MINUGUA   United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (Misión de Verificación
           de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala)
NTFPs   Non-Timber Forest Products
NPV   Foundation Nature for Life (Fundación Naturaleza Para La Vida)
PAFG   Forestry Action Plan for Guatemala (Plan Acción Forestal para Guatemala)
PAN   National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional)

PNLT	Laguna del Tigre National Park (Parque Nacional Laguna del Tigre)
PNSL	Sierra de Lacadón National Park (Parque Nacional del Sierra de Lacadón)
OMYC	Conservation and Management Organization, Uaxactún (Organización Manejo y Conservación, Uaxactún)
ONCA	National Organization for the Conservation and the Environment (Organización Nacional Para La Conservación y el Ambiente)
SEGEPLAN	General Secretary of the National Council of Economic Planning (Secretaría General del Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica)
SUCHILMA	Chicleros and Lumberers of the Petén Union (Sindacto de Cicleros y Madederos del Peten)
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
UNEPET	Executing Unit of the Integrated Development Plan of the Petén (Unidad Ejecutora del Plan de Desarrollo Integrado de Petén)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UCP	Campesino Union of the Petén (Unión Campesina Petenera)
UICN	International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
URNG	National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca)
USAC	San Carlos University (Universidad de San Carlos)
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

FIGURES

INTRODUCTION
"EL MUNDO DEL MISTERIO VERDE"[1]
HISTORY AND THEORY IN THE PETÉN

"All for the Forest, the Forest for All"
-Association of Community Forests of the Petén

". . . its story is similar to that of scores of countries whose
efforts to build a national culture ran headlong into the realities
of economic dependency, ethnic division, and class struggle.
Guatemalans today live with the consequences of that clash – a
society dealing with the aftermath of nearly four decades of
state terror and one of the most unequal distributions of wealth
in the hemisphere."
-Greg Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala*

In Flores, the regional centre of the department of the Petén, I spent several
sweltering weeks meeting with *campesino* leaders of the Association of Community Forests
of the Petén (ACOFOP), state officials from the National Council of Protected Areas
(CONAP), and various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) while getting accustomed
to the eclectic taste of DEET, sweat, and tortillas before heading to the village of Uaxactún.
In a somewhat terrifying journey (for a gringa), I made my way in the teeming bus to the
village of Uaxactún located in the Multiple Use Zone of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve. As I
settled into the village and began to visit members of the community, I was struck by the
nearly ritualistic tale of the "Lost Gringos" that Uaxactuneros individually felt compelled to
tell me.[2] Although, like most tales, the story has several variations, the general thrust is as
follows: There was a group of gringos visiting the archaeological ruins of Tikal, when they
spotted a bird. Intrigued, they followed the bird deeper and deeper into the forest. Yet,
before they could realize their mistake, the gringos had lost their bearings, leaving them
alone and lost in the jungle. As night fell, they became cold, wet, hungry, and afraid. Not

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[1] The title, "The Mysterious Green World," comes from Virgilio Rodríquez Macal's novel, *El Mundo del Misterio Verde, "* set in El Petén about a Q'echi' whose eyes turn green from so much looking at and admiring of the forest. Virgilio Rodríquez Macal, *El Mundo Del Misterio Verde* (Guatemala: Piedra Santa, 2002 [1956]).

[2] In Spanish, the phrase "perdido" or "lost" has a second meaning which connotes being morally or socially lost with particular reference in protestant communities to being a drunkard or sexually promiscuous. Although I do not think Uaxactuneros necessarily intended this second meaning, it highlights many representations of North American "gringos," especially women, as sexually available and morally questionable. It may highlight the sense in the community that if one spends too much time in the forest alone they may become "perdido" in the social and moral sense of the word.

knowing which trees bear edible fruit, and which ones give water, nor how to tell the direction by the stars, the gringos wandered deeper and deeper into the forest. But as luck would have it, the lost gringos were discovered by a group of *xateros* (people that harvest *xate* palm fronds) who brought them to their camp where they ate and drank. The next morning the *xateros* brought the gringos back to their hotel. The gringos were so happy to be saved by the *xateros* that they rewarded the *xateros* with a large monetary sum (in most accounts a thousand American dollars).

In recounting this tale, villagers may simply have intended to warn me of the dangers of wandering too far into the forest, or they may also have been articulating something more subtle, but equally important. The stories, I suggest, also illustrate the complex relationships among knowledge and power, as well as identity and memory. In telling this story, Uaxactuneros illustrate how local knowledges including knowledge of the environment and unofficial maps, are sometimes more important than the kinds of knowledge associated with tourists, or even historians. In the context of the environmental regulations around resource use, where scientific forms of knowledge are often used in arguments to alter local patterns of resource use and to make Uaxactuneros subject to governmental intervention, the valuation of local, unofficial maps and knowledges is also a reclamation of the right to define the truth of their worlds.

This story is also involved in negotiating identities in relation to other people, including gringa historians, by granting people certain roles in the narrative such as hero, villain or victim. It might be said that this ritualistic story is a collective memory, not a commemoration of typical national heroes or of independence, but one in which, even for just a moment, the traditional roles of heroes in the stories of modern progress were reversed. For once, local peoples rather than the state, capital, "Europe", or "America" played the part of heroes in this alternative narrative and local knowledge and unofficial maps were involved in the salvation of these conventional heroes of modern progress.

This thesis, like the story of the "Lost Gringos" and following some scholars of social history, history from below, the new cultural history, and postcolonial accounts, will bring into question the grand narrative of progress by altering the perspective and/or by problematizing the use of binary language and teleological or other assumptions. Following scholars who have attempted to reinsert the histories and perspectives of marginalized persons, women, or subalterns in the narratives of nation-building, for example, this thesis explores how *campesinos* contested and negotiated, appropriated and misappropriated, new national environmental narratives in Guatemala as well as the kinds of governmental intervention they engendered in the context of community forest concessions in the Mayan

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Biosphere Reserve.[3] While asserting the agency of the marginalized people as legitimate historical actors, this account also illustrates how this agency was bounded to subjectifying practices of government which sought to regulate, control, and produce good citizens. This account therefore attempts to balance the notion of *campesinos* as agents who creatively appropriated and misappropriated new national environment narratives with the notion that they were also subjects of these same discourses and relations of governance.

The materials for this thesis were gathered during a four-month research period in the Petén using a combination of oral interviews, participant observation, and archival material. For a full discussion of research methodology see Appendix One. In keeping with the spirit of oral history, this thesis also attempts to embrace the messiness of memory and popular narratives in ways that recognize that the boundaries between the past and present are often fuzzy. Although memory may be filtered through the mirrors of the present, I do not think that archival material necessarily provides the historian with a more faithful or objective version of the past. At the very least, through oral history, accounts that might otherwise never have been written down become accessible to the historian. As Uaxactuneros' story of the "Lost Gringos" illustrates, there may be as much to be said about *how* the past is understood or known as what might have happened.

PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

When I originally set out to study the history of community forest concessions in the Petén, I was interested in exploring "competing visions of sustainable development." From what I knew of the history of concessions, they were an example of the intimate relationship between the conflict over the meanings of nature (wilderness, resource, national heritage, etc.) and the conflict over the means of resource extraction (agriculture, forestry, petroleum extraction, nature preserves, archaeology, etc.). As might be expected for a neophyte to the discipline of history, this project, however, also afforded an immense learning opportunity. What I began to appreciate was how these conflicts over meanings and means were also

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[3] In the Latin American context the most influential work inserting peasants as historical participants in constructing and contesting nationalist, and alternative nationalist discourses is the work of Florencia Mallon, and in the Guatemalan context with Indigneous leaders, Greg Grandin. See Greg Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2000), Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). The Indian Subaltern Studies Collective has also been a source of inspiration for new historiographies of peasant resistance and nation-building. See Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Delhi: Oxford, 1983)., Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., *Selected Subaltern Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

wrapped up in historical questions proper that involved the legacy of a 36-year civil war, the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords, and the negotiation of citizenship, ethnicity and new inclusions and exclusions in nation-building projects. What otherwise would have been very loose signifiers such as "nature", "resource use", and "conservation", in fact, could be better understood from their historical context. This is my attempt to place the history of community forest concessions in the much broader context of nation-state formation and democratization in post-revolutionary Guatemala, so as to allow the concession process to provide a window into these same processes.

In this broader context, this thesis understands that "competing visions of sustainable development" were as much about articulating new national narratives and overcoming a crisis of how to govern in Guatemala following the end to the brutal counter-insurgency war, as they were about defining the meanings and means of nature. This included defining the proper conduct of the population in relationship to the state and the environment through giving the world a meaning, an order, and a structure. One state solution to this need to govern, this thesis argues, resided in the state's policy of community forest concessions in the MBR that involved a shift from the prohibitory mechanisms of the law to the incorporation of *campesinos* in the management of resources.

Moreover, this thesis argues that through the hegemonic process of incorporating the population in state management plans, community forest concessions became both sites of governance in which a good citizenry of nature's defenders was to be produced, controlled, and regulated, and sites of democratization in which those citizens would creatively contest and negotiate, appropriate and misappropriate conservation and participatory democratic discourses and environmental narratives. The title for this thesis, "Becoming Green Citizens and Other Subjects," which I have adapted from Barbara Cruikshank, is suggestive of this double movement in which *campesinos*, through their participation in environmental and national discourses, become citizens and agents, but also subjects of and subjected to these same discourses. In other words, this thesis argues that the interests, wills, and self-knowledge of *campesinos*, were shaped through discipline and regulation in the techniques of government, as well as enlisted in the articulation and contestation of these same forms of government and environmental narratives. Even as the *campesinos* became citizens or agents in nation-building projects, their identities and self-knowledge were tied to control by the state.

This thesis attempts to understand democracy and conservation as constitutive discourses and everyday practices of participation involved in the construction of environmental citizens with not only new places in the nation, but with new political subjectivities and particular ways of thinking, acting and being democratically. My emphasis on democracy as a constitutive discourse and as an everyday practice of conflict

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and contestation over meanings, policies, and material inequities, attempts to transcend the binaries that tend to polarize historical materialism and the new cultural politics and cement the binaries between material/discursive, constructed/essential, and class/culture.[4] Although my position originated in the cultural politics of difference, through the process of researching and writing, I have become more attuned to the subtle ways in which this "post" theoretical movement can sever the links between culture and material inequities. Instead, I hope to partake in a move that both seeks to abandon the unitary subject that suppressed diversity, and also to bring to light very real struggles for livelihood and access to resources.

By asking *how* environmental citizens are constructed through community forest concessions and struggles over access to resources, this thesis explores new exclusionary practices including how questions of race and class are articulated in relationship to environmental preservation. At the regional level, community forest concessions, this thesis argues, were a clear attempt by the state to close the meaning of the 1996 Peace Accords as limited reform and to halt a series of national park invasions that were making demands for agrarian reform. In the village of Uaxactún, new "inner exclusions" attempt to replace multiple-place identities of migrants with the singular place-bound and national identities. Moreover, migrants, especially indigenous migrants, are excluded from participating in the new village concession, resulting in hardened boundaries of belonging and non-belonging. By illustrating how the techniques of government create citizens through these new exclusions this thesis argues that we can begin to ask how these same citizens might be made more democratically. The response, this thesis tentatively concludes, resides in the resistances to governmentality by Uaxactuneros and in the rumours of indigenous migrants arriving in the village. Present in their absence, silenced and invisible, the indigenous migrant of these rumours offers the promise of the expansion of the democracy.

GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY IN THE PETÉN

Guatemalans and foreigners alike, in both popular and official discourse, talk about the Petén as geographically and historically "isolated" and "separate" from the troubled past of Guatemala, from the invasive forces of modernity and the fluid circuits of global capital. Both the geographical isolation between the Yucatán to the North and Guatemala's highlands to South, and the lowland tropical topography, have facilitated this sense of cultural and

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[4] See for example, Gilbert M. Joseph, ed., *Reclaiming the Political in Latin American History: Essays from the North* (London and Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), Florencia E. Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994).

[5] By *campesinos*, I am referring to rural peoples whether they dedicate themselves to agriculture, paid labour, or harvesting timber resources.

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geographical distance from the national centre. (For a map see Figure 1). The Petén is also geographically immense, and since 1882 when boundary disputes were settled with Mexico, the Petén has spanned approximately 36,000 hectares of land or nearly one-third of Guatemala's total surface area. Until the mid-1960s the area was also sparsely populated. In 1964, for example, the population of the department was approximately 25,000 people of whom 45 percent lived in rural villages.

A sparce population and distinct geography created the sense among Guatemalans and academics that the Petén was a vast, empty space. The trope of "isolation" reiterated and repeated in popular and official stories of the Petén, also had the effect of constructing the Petén as outside of historical formation and, thus, not just an empty space, but also a blank slate. Histories of Guatemala often repeat this same message. Indeed, only a very few works talk at any length about the Petén and there is only one book length study of the department by Norman Schwartz.[6] Although Schwartz's study of the Petén attempts to introduce discontinuity and change, in the end, he suggests that "despite many changes a Petenero magically transported forward from the early eighteenth century would feel reasonably at home in modern Petén, up to about 1970 at least."[7] It is precisely these images asserting that little of significance changed in the Petén until the 1970s that make it outside of or exempt from the history of the rest of Guatemala. Because of this imagination of the Petén as empty of history it can also become a fantasy space where dreams and goals can be projected.[8] As the Petén is emptied by the ostensible absence of history, it also becomes part of the historical imagination where the unfolding, yet unfinished, narrative of Guatemalan history

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[6] I am referring to post-conquest works, not studies of ancient Mayan civilizations. For works that contain some chapters on the Petén see William J. Griffith, *Empires in the Wilderness* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), Thomas Melville and Marjorie Melville, *Guatemala: The Politics of Land Ownership* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), Victor Perera, *Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). For the only book length study of the Petén see Norman B. Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990). See also Various Authors, *Nuevas Perspectivas De Desarrollo Sostenible En Petén* (Guatemala: FLASCO, 2000).
[7] Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala* 1.
[8] The relationship between fantasy space and an empty surface is exemplified by understanding that fantasy is not a scene in which desire is fulfilled, but on the contrary, a scene that realizes or stages the desire. The fundamental point of fantasy is that desire is not something given in advance, but something that is constructed. Fantasy coordinates the subject's desire, locks it to a specific object, and locates the position the subject assumes in it. As Slavoj Žižek suggests, "fantasy space functions as an empty surface, as a kind of screen for the projection of desires: the fascinating presence of its positive contents does nothing but fill out a certain emptiness." Slavoj Žižek, *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture* (Cambridge Massachusets: MIT Press, 1991) 12.

Figure 1. Map of Guatemala
       Provided by the University of California, Santa Barbara.
    *Uaxactún

and future promises of nationhood can be projected. Far from existing outside of Guatemalan history as told from other parts of the nation, the Petén is integral to it, because it is a frontier that represents the limit of the modern nation[9], and a privileged site for historical inquiry into the competing fantasies of the idealized imagery of nationhood.[10]

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[9] There is no doubt that the concept of "modernity" runs into a certain impetus to totalization or inversely is used so loosely that it becomes drained of any analytical meaning or utility. That said, in the context when I use "modern" or "modernity" to describe a concept or situation, unless I qualify it

This thesis deals with the creation of the MBR in 1990 and explores it as an episode in which nationalist fantasies were constructed across the space of the Petén. But, this is not the first time the Petén was used as a nationalist instrument. To help understand this historic context, I will very briefly mention two previous historic episodes: the first is shortly following Central American independence in 1821 and the second occurs on the wake of a usurped revolution in 1954.

The uncertainty and internal disruption that erupted in the wake of Central American Federation and Mexican independence from Spain in 1821, the ensuing competition for power between Conservative and Liberal factions, fortified the desire to re-establish order and the need to struggle for progress.[11] Constituted around the trope of a "lack" of political modernity, these dreams repeated the colonial desire to replicate the history of Europe in Latin America.[12] As Bradford Burns has suggested, "Latin Americans believed Europe to be the focal point of history, regarding their own histories as extensions of European history . . . The question was not whether to Europeanize but how."[13] One attempt to Europeanize and consolidate the state was carried out by Mariano Gálvez, a radical Liberal, who was installed as governor in Guatemala in 1831. Drawing on the intellectual inspiration of eighteenth

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with another reference, I refer to the myriad techniques in which social relations become disembedded from local economic relations and the individual and population are constructed as abstract entities. See for example, Karl Polyani, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Octagon Books, 1975 [1944]). and Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality,* ed. Colin Gordon, Graham Burchell, and Peter Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[10] The construction of the Petén as fantasy space outside of historical formation may also be part of orientalized images of the tropics, or what some authors have called "tropicality." Following Edward Said's *Orientalism,* these authors have explored how the identification of northern temperate regions as the norm, and the tropics as Other – climatically, geographically, and morally -- was involved in the making up of these worlds. This theme has yet to be explored in the context of the Petén. See for example, David Arnold, *The Problem of Nature: Environment, Culture and European Expansion* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996), Candace Slater, *Entangled Edens: Visions of the Amazon* (Berekely: University of California Press, 2001), Nancy Ley Stepan, *Picturing Tropical Nature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).and the special issue, Felix Driver and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, "Constructing the Tropics: Introduction," *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 21, no. 1 (2000).

[11] The Central American, and later Guatemalan state, that formed during the postcolonial period lost both legitimacy and control over the Indigenous populations as the interests of the elites diverged in conflict. During the nineteenth century, thus, Guatemala experienced more than just elite wars for state power, but also popular uprisings, which altered the nature of state governance over the population, including class and racial divisions that had been institutionalized during the period as well as popular struggles over the meaning of nationalism. See for example, Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation,* Carol A. Smith, "Origins of the National Question in Guatemala: A Hypothesis," in *Guatemalan Indians and the State: 1540-1988,* ed. Carol A. Smith (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), Ralph Lee Woodward Jr., "Changes in the Nineteenth-Century Guatemalan State and Its Indian Policies," in *Guatemalan Indians and the State: 1540 -1988,* ed. Carol A.Smith (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).

[12] For a thoughtful postcolonial perspective on how postcolonial countries, and especially Bangladesh, experienced a "lack" of political modernity and how an imaginative "Europe" continues to structure the discipline of history see Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference.*

[13] Of course, there was no single "Europe" to be replicated, but the idea nonetheless prevailed. Bradford Burns, *The Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) 45-46.

century Enlightenment, Gálvez's agenda included restricting the power of the Catholic Church to create a secular state, encouraging European migration by offering colonists favourable terms in the acquisition of land, instituting a new and more viable tax system, rationalizing property-holding by eradicating most communal forms of tenure, and breaking down Indian insularity by using educational and political means to draw them into the Guatemala nation.[14] According to Gálvez, the primary hindrances to economic development were an excess of "empty" lands, reliance on monoculture based in indigo, a lack of infrastructure that would allow the exploitation of isolated areas and most importantly inadequate *campesino* agricultural practices.

By populating the frontier territories of Verapaz, Chiquimula, Totonicapan, and the Petén with a contingent of European settlers who would apply imported capital, skill, and labour to hitherto "unexploited", "virgin" "wilderness", Gálvez hoped to rectify these agricultural problems.[15] By 1834 Gálvez was attempting to induce foreign entrepreneurs to undertake the implementation of massive development and colonization projects, which would become "Wilderness Empires", in return for vast concessions of unclaimed lands, monopolies, special privileges and immunities.[16] In effect, the state was virtually removed from the task of economic and political development. By granting vast resources of the state to businessmen, Gálvez also hoped to secure political sovereignty and territorial integrity by inhibiting illegal logging from Belize. Through these colonization schemes, the dream of the progressive movement from wilderness to civilization would be pursued through the immigration of a select minority of Europeans who would rectify the numerical imbalance between natives and whites, reinforce the control of the latter over the former and Europeanize the country not only in institutions and culture, but also in blood.[17] Thus, the eugenic dreams of nineteenth century Latin America were staged across the space of the Petén. The failure of Gálvez's dream and the later preoccupation of the Guatemalan state with pursuing coffee and banana exports led to a decline in interest in the Petén.

The new generation of Liberals, who came to power with the 1871 revolt of Liberal politicians in the capital, encouraged individual immigration, rather than mass colonization. It was these early coffee regimes of Justo Rufino Barrios (1873-1885) and Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-1920), in particular, that propelled Guatemala into modernity and were involved in constituting the well-known hierarchical and dichotomous identities of Ladino and Indian through liberal reforms that positioned ladinos as intermediaries between Indian

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[14] Jim Handy, *Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984) 45.
[15] Griffith, *Empires in the Wilderness* 282. Emphasis around "wilderness", "virgin", etc. are mine.
[16] Ibid. 283-4.
[17] The principal opponents to the European colonization scheme promoted by Gálvez argued that the establishment of a homogenous immigrant population within the state could upset the distinct cultural heritage of Guatemala and divide the inhabitants leading to widespread internal strife. Ibid. 288.

labourers and white landowners in the coffee economy.[18] During this period, Ladino became defined as non-Indian or non-Mayan, an identity defined by negation.[19] Yet, as the Petén was largely ignored by governmental policy, it became a refuge for exploited, landless and land-poor Indigenous and Ladinos from the highlands. These first waves of migration supported the rise of the production of *chicle,* from the *chico zapote* tree (*Manikara Zapote*), a natural resin base for chewing gum, for export, which dominated the political economy of the Petén from the 1890s to the 1970s.[20] Rumours of astounding wealth available from harvesting *chicle* and freedom from repressive plantation labour also propelled migration, permanent or seasonal, from other parts of Guatemala, as well as Mexico and Belize.[21] In many ways, for migrants fleeing harsh working conditions and landlessness, the Petén remained a fantasy space, reflecting freedom from a coercive state and of riches and vast spaces of land.

The second official attempt to project the national narrative onto the blank slate of the Petén occurred after the abrupt end of the revolutionary period of 1944-54 that marked the end of the "ten years of spring in the land of eternal tyranny." The revolutionary administrations of Juan José Arévalo Bermejo (1945-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1951-1954) instituted reforms beginning with a new constitution that extended suffrage to

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[18] David McCreery, *Rural Guatemala, 1760-1940* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), Finn Stepputat, "Urbanizing the Countryside: Armed Conflict, State Formation, and the Politics of Place in Contemporary Guatemala," in *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State,* ed. Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001).

[19] The identity of Ladino also suggested a unidirectional process of assimilation or acculturation in which Indians were said to move towards becoming Ladinos. With recent Mayan organizing and a valorization of Mayan ethnicity, the identity of Ladino, or lack therein, has become a source of questioning in the nation-building project and discomfort for Ladinos. See Charles Hale, "Mestizaje, Hybridity, and the Cultural Politics of Difference in Post-Revolutionary Central America," *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 2, no. 1 (1996)., Jim Handy, "Democratizing What? Some Reflections on Nation, State, Ethnicity, Modernity, Community and Democracy in Guatemala," *Canadian Journal for Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 27, no. 53 (2002)., Diane M. Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). I capitalize Ladino, Indigenous, and Indian, because I take these identities as political rather than racial categories.

[20] Chicle harvesting took sway after logging in New England depleted previous sources of resin in spruce tree forests. See Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala* 139-40. Juanita Sundberg points out that this connection between forest depletion in North America and extraction in Central America alludes to a relationship between environmental depletion in North America and attention to biophysical environments in Latin America whether in search of raw materials. Juanita R. Sundberg, "Conservation Encounters: Ngos, Local People, and Changing Cultural Landscapes" (Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1999). These processes can just as easily work in the opposite direction. For example, Grove demonstrates that environmental degradation in the colonial centre led to early environmental conservation in the tropical islands, such the French Mauritius. Richard Grove, *Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[21] For example, the common Peténero saying; "El chiclero no pide vuelto" (a chiclero, or person who harvests *chicle,* does not ask for change) is expressive of the image that *chicle* offered riches. To a certain extent *chicle* was a source of riches, but by the 1930s *chicleros* were also subject to debt peonage. The epoch of "oro de blanco" or "white gold" as *chicle* was known, was short lived. This was exacerbated by the development of petroleum derived synthetics in the 1940s that would replace natural resin.

all males over 18 years of age and to all literate women, the legalization of labour unionization, the creation of Guatemala's Institute of Social Security (IGSS), as well as the 1952 Agrarian Reform Law, Decree 900. Facing increasing unrest in the countryside and an impending American invasion, the Guatemalan military failed to back the Arbenz government, causing the revolutionary period to come to an end.[22]

Shortly following the resignation of Jacobo Arbenz and the ascent of Castillo Armas and later Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes to power, a new colonization scheme for the Petén got underway. To alleviate pressures for agrarian reform without upsetting the landed elite, the new administration declared the Petén's development as a "national urgency" in 1958.[23] In 1959, the Congress created the National Enterprise for Promotion and Economic Development of the Petén (FYDEP), an autonomous "dependency of the national executive and a judicial personality in Laws. The chief officer (promoter) is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the National President."[24] FYDEP was invested with authority over all aspects the economy and natural resources in the department with the exception of petroleum and mining. FYDEP's primary objectives included: 1/integrating the Petén into the nation; 2/ the promotion of economic development through the sale of small, medium and large sized properties; 3/ the exploitation of forest resources such as precious timberl and 4/ increasing the production of basic grains (corn and beans). The area north of the parallel 17°10' (roughly 33 percent of the Petén), several small forest reserves in the south, a strip of land running along Petén's southern border, a military zone in the southwest, and a number of archaeological parks were exempt from colonization. The northern reserve above parallel 17°10' was set aside for logging and non-timber forest products concessions. The forest policy of FYDEP had as a principal objective timber extraction of precious species such as mahogany and Spanish cedar. Concessions of approximately 50,000 hectare blocks were granted to several logging companies.

The colonization process, however, was not initiated with force until the late 1960s when the Congress began to place pressure on FYDEP to settle *campesinos* along the Usumacínta and Pasíon Rivers. These plans centred around political efforts to avert the Mexican government's plans to build a hydroelectric damn which would possibly have

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[22] See Jim Handy, *Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict & Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). Other interpretations of the revolution have focused on the revolutionary governments threat to American interests in Guatemala (particularly United Fruit) or the threat of communism. Richard H. Immerman, *The Cia in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Doubleday, 1982). However, both of these works fail to explain why the military failed to support Arbenz at the final moments and do not account for the failure of the revolution *in* Guatemala and especially *in* rural communities.

[23] Handy, *Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala* 191.

[24] Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala* 167.

flooded nearly 1,600 km² of Guatemalan territory. The state's imperative of territorial sovereignty, therefore, coincided with the imperative of constructing a utopian imagery of the Petén through propaganda campaigns. Promises of free land, technological assistance, and infrastructure support were meant to entice the desires of *campesinos* living in the most densely populated areas of Guatemala. According to one *campesino*, "The Petén was very famous. I had never been there, but everyone said that the Petén is the department where there is a great forest, and much land to work, where the agriculture is very good, and where it gives produce. It produces a lot very easily. There is an exaggeration that they mention in the countryside, that portrayed the Petén as the Promised Land, grand and very fertile for agriculture."[25]

Yet, antagonisms developed between FYDEP and the National Institute for Agrarian Transformation (INTA) over the purposes and prospects of colonization. INTA saw colonization as a means of extinguishing pressure to expropriate large landholdings in other parts of the country. *Latin America* reported in June of 1971:

> Land colonization schemes have been favourite instruments of agrarian oppression. In Guatemala, the colonization program seems specifically designed to drain the population pressures existing in the highlands, down into the Atlantic zone so that the latifundias on the Pacific Coast shall remain unaffected by demands for agrarian reform. [26]

As Silvel Elías Gramajo, has suggested, for the central government, colonization represented "the double rationality of giving lands and giving value to sovereignty through nationalist sentimentality, constituting a political medium to stop the constant popular demands that were so common during this era."[27] In contrast, at the regional level FYDEP favoured colonization by Ladinos able to make large capital investments.[28] Colonel Oliverio Cassola, FYDEP's promoter from 1962-69, in his book *Grandezas y Miserias del Petén* stated:

> Let us speak clearly. It is not a question of settling the Petén at any price and thus contaminating from its birth an organism that must remain imperatively healthy in order to communicate its health to the whole country. An example: the illiteracy rate in Petén had been one of the lowest in Guatemala and Central America, but in the last few years it has gone up 22%. The cause? The Kekchí Maya immigrations to the municipality of San Luis . . . We would also clarify that of the 2, 849 immigrants to the Petén, 1,908 were Indians and 941 non-Indians, coefficient of regression, since no matter how much sympathy we may have for the Indian problem, they are not the human contingent that the Petén needs to progress.[29]

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[25] Interview with Marcedonio Cortave, September 28, 2002.

[26] Handy, *Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala* 217.

[27] Silvel Elías Gramajo, "Petén Y Los Retos Para El Desarrollo Sostenible," in *Nuevas Perspectivas De Desarrollo Sostenible En Petén*, ed. Various Authors (Guatemala: FLASCO, 2000), 18.

[28] Ibid., 218.

[29] Cited in Melville and Melville, *Guatemala: The Politics of Land Ownership* 223-24.

For the regional directors in FYDEP, the Petén embodied the future of development in Guatemala, but a future, represented by a capitalist Ladino class that was contingent upon separating itself from the "contaminating" past embodied by a poor landless Indigenous class harboured in the rest of Guatemala. De-legitimizing land claims also required de-politicizing them and spatially separating the Petén from the political tensions and terror that enveloped the rest of the country. As Colonel Casasola suggested: "The Petén is an economic enterprise, not a political one. The government must give out lands to capitalist enterprises so that lands are developed and populated progressively."[30] INTA's and FYDEP's competing aims and goals for development in the Petén were also competing visions of the role of the Petén in the unfolding history of the nation.

By the 1970s, however, the discovery of new resources, profits from cattle grazing, the development of state infrastructures, and, perhaps, most importantly increasing violence in the countryside accelerated controlled colonization as well as spontaneous migration. In 1971, through Presidential Decree 37-71, Agrarian Adjudication, Land Use and Tenure in the Petén, FYDEP was endowed with the responsibility for colonization. At the initiation of the land titling process all but a mere two percent of the land in the Petén belonged to the state. Yet, the central government's aim to populate the Petén with the potentially revolutionary masses would be undermined by FYDEP's own agenda. Indeed, few government lands were granted to poor *campesinos*. It has been estimated only 10 to 15 percent of lower income groups in the Petén had land title by the late 1980s.[31]

In defiance of INTA, FYDEP replicated latifundia style development that plagued the rest of Guatemala by granting *campesinos* 45 hectares of land, while political, military, and other patrons were granted 450 hectares.[32] Although regulations to prevent land speculation were developed and there were limits on the size of large landholdings, FYDEP did not enforce these regulations and tended to privilege large holdings.[33] As various scholars have noted, the colonization process quickly became "politicized, anarchic, and corrupt, and principally benefited governmental officials, military officers, politicians, traditional *finqueros*, bureaucrats, and professionals."[34]

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[30] Cited in Ibid. 221.

[31] Schwartz suggests that most Peteneros believed that the land already belonged to them and they resented being required to purchase land to which they traditionally had access. Norman B. Schwartz, "Colonization of Nothern Guatemala: The Petén," *Journal of Anthropologial Research* 43 (1987): 169.

[32] Gramajo, "Petén Y Los Retos Para El Desarrollo Sostenible," 146-47.

[33] By 1982, an estimated 56 percent of land in the Petén was held by 5 percent of owners. Schwartz, "Colonization of Nothern Guatemala: The Petén." Another study suggests that by 1997, 33 percent of Petén's surface areas held in farms larger than 450 hectares. Charles Clark, "Land Tenure Delegitimation and Social Mobility in Tropical Petén, Guatemala," *Human Organization* 59, no. 4 (2000).

[34] Gramajo, "Petén Y Los Retos Para El Desarrollo Sostenible," 18.

The imagining of the Petén as a frontier in which fantasies of modernity can be written was associated with the idea that the Petén is the place where the Indigenous redress from their *traje*, or traditional clothing, both symbolically and physically as Ladinos.[35] Norman Schwartz notes that "unlike most other regions of Guatemala, in Petén ethnicity is no longer a primary criterion for making economic or (most of the time) political decisions, and outward cultural differences between Indians and Ladinos have largely disappeared."[36] Moreover, Schwartz tell us that "unlike most of the western highlands and southern coast of Guatemala, in Petén relations between the Creole descendants of the Spanish (hereafter simply called Creoles), Ladinos, and Indians are moderate, one reason Peteneros boast Petén is 'democratic, not like the rest of Guatemala.' What goes on elsewhere in the republic does not occur in the Petén."[37] In earlier works Schwartz and Eckhardt suggest that this process of "acculturation" was two-way in which Ladinos adopted Indigenous customs and vice-versa founding a "homogeneous community."[38] In many ways, a sense of national identity was to be forged around the crucible of the frontier. Immigrants from various parts of Guatemala were to be brought together and merged into a composite nationality and fused into a mixed race that would be nationalized, liberated, and democratic.[39] Yet, the ladinization of the Indigenous population does not signal the absence of power, but the always-incomplete workings of modern power. Thus, I suspect, and will discuss in greater detail in other parts of this thesis, that differences were not obliterated in this "mestizaje," but were produced, transformed or, maintained in processes of resistance, contestation and negotiation.

The third instance in which the Petén is transformed into a fantasy space for the projection of nationalist dreams, and the subject of this thesis, emerged with an authoritarian transition to democracy that was born out of a crisis of governmentality and a brutal counter-

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[35] Nearly half of the Petén's population are Ladinos from the Oriente, and the second major ethnic group that has migrated to the Petén are Q'eqhi' from Alta Verapaz and Baja Verapaz and Izabal Departments. The Q'echi' make up approx 20 percent of the migrant population, while immigrants from western Guatemala amount to only 15 percent of migrants.

[36] Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala* 7.

[37] Ibid. 3.

[38] Norman B. Schwartz and K.W. Eckhardt, "Values, Ethnicity, and Acculturation in Peten, Guatemala," *Cultures et Developpement* 11 (1979). This view of two-way acculturation processes, at the time of writing in 1979, would probably have been considered progressive and perhaps radical given the anthropological milieu's focus on the unilateral processes of ladinization of Indigenous peoples or alternatively how Indigenous communities maintained autonomy from an intrusive and homogenizing state. For the process of ladinization see Richard Adams, *Political Changes in Guatemalan Indian Communities: A Symposium* (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1957). For the processes by which communities maintained autonomy see Douglas E. Brintnall, *Revolt against the Dead: The Modernization of a Mayan Community in the Highlands of Guatemala* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1979), Kay B. Warren, *The Symbolism of Subordination: Indian Identity in a Guatemalan Town* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).

[39] The dominant national discourse until the 1980s held the belief that as longs as Indigenous peoples retained a separate, distinct identity, Guatemala could not achieve the status of a modern nation. Greg Grandin provides an illuminating account of how K'iche' elites articulated an alternative nationalism. Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation.* In Mexico and Peru see Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru.*

insurgency war with its scorched-earth attacks on highland villages, and the disappearance of tens of thousands of people. By 1981, a coalition of guerrilla movements that had been growing through the 1970s had achieved momentary support from a substantial number of the Indigenous populations in the countryside. Support in the countryside for guerrilla movements and widespread dissent can also be considered a crisis of governmentality specifically and a crisis governing the conduct of the population so that it might become constituted by good citizens who govern themselves.[40] In reaction to this crisis, the Guatemalan state converted itself into a counterinsurgency state through the period of rural terror, roughly 1980-83, which involved village massacres, selective torture and assassinations of rural leaders, burning of houses and crops in wide swaths, and the displacement of the Indian population of the highlands. Between the regimes of Lucas Garcia (1978-1982) and General Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-1983), a shift from the ideology of counterinsurgency occurred as all out random slaughter gave way to a counterinsurgent strategy of more systematic, yet still brutal, killing zones with elements of pacification through development. The violent and benevolent, destructive and productive character of the counterinsurgency state was born from the army's new consciousness of the causes of insurgency. The 1982 National Plan of Security and Development recognized the causes of subversion were "heterogeneous, based on social justice, political rivalry, unequal development, and the dramas of hunger, unemployment, and poverty; but it can be controlled if we attempt to solve the most pressing human problems."[41] According to the military, the solution was development aimed at the "improvement of the standard of living of the rural population in order to diminish existing contradictions" which would aid in "establishing a nationalist spirit . . . incorporating our different ethnic groups" and stimulating in political society "a new way of thinking, developmentalist, reformist, and nationalist."[42] In short,

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[40] The concept of governmentality, originated from a lecture by Michel Foucualt, and has been used to describe and analyze different historical contexts of liberal government. It harkens to the original meaning of "government" as the arts of guiding and directing the conduct of the population. It will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter. See pages 28-31.

[41] Quoted in Carol A. Smith, "Conclusion: History and Revolution in Guatemala," in *Guatemalan Indians and the State: 1540 -1988*, ed. Carol A. Smith (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 273.

[42] Quotations taken from Ibid. As various academics have suggested, the practice of development necessitates the deeper extension of state and non-state institutions into the everyday lives of the poor, and therefore also the incorporation of the countryside into the state through whole sets of governmental apparatus and complex series of knowledges. See for example Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", Depolitization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments : Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998). In the case of sustainable development and national parks see Roderick P. Neumann, *Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California

development would provide the foundations for a "new" modern nation, that would satisfy the historical struggle as Carol Smith and others have suggested, between "Indians and the State," a struggle that has formed both the state and Indigenous communities.[43]

The army sought to govern the bodies of the rural population through fiercely violent discipline and survelliance, while also winning their hearts and minds through self-surveillance, normalization and subjectification.[44] These policies included the establishment of military bases in nearly every town with a population of more than ten thousand, the incorporation of the rural male population between the ages of 18 and 24 into the military, as well as insidious programs aimed to eradicate Indigenous culture. This included a program aimed to teach Indigenous children Spanish. Handy argued that through the "assassination of elders of the native communities, who are the repositories and guardians of their culture, an attempt is being made to stop it from being preserved and handed on to the younger generations."[45] The counter-insurgency campaign was, thus, carried out by a "weak but despotic state that attempted to eradicate the bases for the autonomous Indian community once and for all,"[46] and in doing so forge a stable, prosperous, and unified nation.

In 1982-83, the army also rounded up the remaining Indigenous in the areas of greatest rural unrest (especially the departments of El Quiché and Alta Verapaz) into several dozen "model villages." Dianne Nelson has called these model villages "laboratories of modernity" and Finn Stepputat has called them "sites of governance."[47] The villages were constructed in a grid-like fashion which permitted the state to "see" the movements and actions within the village. Thus, through the containment and fixation of the Indigenous

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Press, 1998). For an exploration in the Guatemalan context see Stepputat, "Urbanizing the Countryside: Armed Conflict, State Formation, and the Politics of Place in Contemporary Guatemala."

[43] Colin Gordon, drawing on Foucault's work on governmentality, has suggested that the state's territorial integrity and security became tied to the well-being of the population in the early modern period such that "[p]rosperity is the necessary condition of the state's own security, and prosperity in itself is nothing if not the capacity to preserve and hold on to, and where possible even enhance a certain global level of existence . . . . Among the objects of law, security is the only one, which embraces the future; subsistence, abundance, equality. . . security implies extension in point of time with respect to all the benefits to which it is applied. Security is, therefore, the principal object." Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in *The Foucualt Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Colin Gordon Graham Burchell, and Peter Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 19.

[44] Jennifer Schirmer develops this argument in greater detail. See Jennifer Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).

[45] Handy, *Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala* 260.

[46] Carol A. Smith, "Introduction: Social Relations in Guatemala over Time and Space," in *Guatemalan Indians and the State: 1540-1988*, ed. Carol A. Smith (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 21.

[47] Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* 96-103, Stepputat, "Urbanizing the Countryside: Armed Conflict, State Formation, and the Politics of Place in Contemporary Guatemala."

[48] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 219.

population in visible and governable places, these localities were to be incorporated into the Ladino nation-state.

Moreover, the military sought to constitute mechanisms of self-surveillance by reorganizing civil society along military lines. Through civil patrols, which numbered close to one million members in the countryside, communities were forcibly organized as paramilitary forces under direct military command. In terms of surveillance, the civil patrols considerably increased the army's capacity to rule. As Finn Stepputat suggests, "This village [Nentón in the department of Huehuetenago] was in principle turned into a disciplinary space, a human panopticon where the villagers themselves undertook the disciplining."[49] Self-surveillance and subject-formation, also formed a "corporate partnership" in which the patrols may be seen as forming both part of the counterinsurgency apparatus and a "comprehensive and controlled" alternative to traditional authority.[50]

By 1985, the counter-insurgency campaign gave way to a formal democracy. In September 1985, Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo (1986-1990) was elected in the first relatively honest elections in thirty years, and unlike presidential elections since 1970, the new president was a civilian. In mid-1985 a new constitution re-established standard political rights on paper, technically returned Guatemala to the rule of law, and legalized the basic institutions of the counter-insurgency campaign (e.g. civil patrols) that blatantly violated those same rights. The precarious transition to formal democracy has been interpreted by scholars with varying degrees of emphasis on the roles of elites, the military, international pressure and popular movements.[51] Scholars tend to agree on some basic

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[49] Handy, "Democratizing What? Some Reflections on Nation, State, Ethnicity, Modernity, Community and Democracy in Guatemala," 51, Stepputat, "Urbanizing the Countryside: Armed Conflict, State Formation, and the Politics of Place in Contemporary Guatemala," 296.

[50] Stepputat, "Urbanizing the Countryside: Armed Conflict, State Formation, and the Politics of Place in Contemporary Guatemala," 297.

[51] For a perspective that emphasizes democratization through elite brokerage see Rachel M. McCleary, *Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End of the Violent Revolution* (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1999). For a more thoughtful account that examines the transition as part of the military's counter-insurgency tactic see Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy*. Susanne Jonas suggests that in cases, such as Guatemala, the distinction between military and civilian rule is not absolute, but relative and both operate under contradictions. She argues, "They have a dual character, reflecting a dialectical balance between popular demands for democracy and the requirements of counterinsurgency, between pressures for a genuine democratic opening and constraints upon that opening." Susanne Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) 172. For a similar perspective see Edelberto Torres-Rivas and Gabriel Aguilera, *Desde El Autoriatarismo a La Paz* (Guatemala: FLASCO, 1998). From another perspective that defines democratization as political participation, Trudeau suggests, "Elites did not move the nation closer to democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s, although they may have perhaps unwittingly, provided an opportunity. Movement toward democracy came from the struggle of the people, not from agreements or pacts among moderate elites." Robert H. Trudeau, *Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle for Democracy* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993) 194. Finally, for a perspective that combines insights from Schrimer, Trudeau, Jonas, and Torres-Rivas, see Miguel Angel Reyes Illescas, *Patrimonialismo Y Participación: Del Control Estatal a La Lucha De Los Pueblos, Guatemala, 1970-1998* (Guatemala: FLASCO, 1998). For a perspective on regime change in Central America that puts greater emphasis on international factors

points: that the formal transition to democracy did not result in the end of the counter-insurgency state, that even though civilians held office the military maintained substantial political power, and that a transition to democracy provided an opening for the inclusion of popular and Indigenous demands.[52] However, most of the scholarship on the transition to democracy is centred around politics in the capital among elites of all kinds whether leaders of popular organizations, international institutions, the military, or the traditional economic leaders of the country. This perspective, with the exception of Schrimer's work, tends to ignore the negotiation of rule within communities and between the communities and the state, and thus, also to underestimate the need to govern the countryside, ensure its prosperity, quell dissent, avert wholesale reform, and most of all obtain national security. All of these necessitated achieving hegemony through the incorporation of some of the demands of political society.[53] The external face of democracy, appealing to international donors, popular organizations, and communities, therefore, enabled the "dual objectives of repression and consolidation, warmaking and statecrafting," not through "naked military rule" which had lost international, national, and local legitimacy, but through "the appropriation of the imagery of the rule of law, of the mechanisms and procedures of electoral democracy, that is perilous to the human rights of Guatemalans. The immersion of a security doctrine within a traditional constitutional order signifies the *structured* and violent denial of human rights and dissent."[54]

In this democratic, yet violent and authoritarian period, the Mayan Biosphere Reserve (MBR) was created across the space of the Petén over the base of FYDEP's old Forest Reserve. Through Decree 5-90, the Mayan Biosphere Reserve was created with an extension of 2,113,000 ha composing 60% of the territory of the Petén, and approximately 19% of Guatemala's territory. National dreams of harmony, healing, and regeneration of what Dianne Nelson has called the "wounded body political" of Quincentennial Guatemala were espoused through the languages of environmental conservation and projected onto the

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see John A. Booth, "Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala within the Central American Context," in *Globalization on the Ground: Postbellum Guatemala Democracy and Development*, ed. Susanne Jonas Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Nelson Amaro (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001).

[52] The violence undoubtly continued even after return to civilian rule. There were more political assassinations in 1987 than in 1985 before Cerezo took office. Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power* 163. These were most often strategic assassinations that attacked specific individuals in order to intimidate the entire constituencies. Moreover, Cerezo had campaigned on a promise not to prosecute army officers for past human rights crimes.

[53] On the expansion of popular and Indigenous organizing in the 1980s and early 1990s see Santiago Bastos and Manuela Camus, *Quebrando El Silencio: Organizaciones Del Pueblo Maya Y Sus Demandas, 1986-1992* (Guatemala: FLASCO, 1996), Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala*, Reyes Illescas, *Patrimonialismo Y Participación: Del Control Estatal a La Lucha De Los Pueblos, Guatemala, 1970-1998*, Trudeau, *Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle for Democracy*, Kay B. Warren, *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[54] Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy* 2.

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landscapes of the Petén. Included in these dreams were ideals of a non-ethnic national identity that would provide a counter to the Pan-Mayan Indigenous movement and its multicultural, multiethnic national discourses. Moreover, the MBR would be a ground in which modes of governmentality first tested and refined in the military's counterinsurgency campaign in model villages and civil patrols would be implemented through community forest concessions. The projection of new national narratives onto the space of the Petén, however, would not go uncontested. This thesis explores the processes of appropriation and misappropriation, contestation and negotiation, by *campesinos* that are all involved in articulating other visions of the nation.[55] It also explores the process of democratization as a negotiation of rule, inclusions-exclusions, within communities and between communities and the state. Although, it will provide an incomplete picture of precarious democratization in Guatemala, it may also illustrate that there is not one single process of democratization or nation-building, but many, local, and regional histories weaving, diverging and converging in time and space. It is to this local context, in the village of Uaxactún, that this thesis now turns.

HISTORY AND MEMORY IN UAXACTÚN

The village of Uaxactún was first founded in the late nineteenth century as a *chicle* camp named Bambonal and later San Leandro. The camp housed *chicleros* and foremen during the chicle season, which lasted roughly from June/July until April at the turn of the century. The *chicle* camp was later "discovered" by the distinguished archaeologist, Sylvannus Morley a researcher with the Carnegie Institute in 1916. Morley renamed the camp Uaxactún or "Eight Rocks" in Maya. Morley returned to Uaxactún in 1921, 1922, and 1924, convinced that Uaxactún was the oldest Maya site. Earnest excavations began in 1926 and continued until 1937. The archaeological sites that surround Uaxactún continue to attract occasional tourists due to its vicinity to the better-known archaeological ruins of Tikal National Park.

A permanent settlement of Uaxactún did not take hold until 1938, when President Jorge Ubico (1930-44) constructed landing strips in important locations throughout the Petén to facilitate the transportation of *chicle* to the south and capture export profits from *chicle* and timber leaving the Petén to Belize. The village was then etched out of the forest along a two-kilometre landing strip. The houses were, and remain, scattered on the edges of the landing strip and surrounded by canopies of forest and archaeological ruins. By facilitating

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[55] Following Florencia Mallon, the exploration of alternative nationalisms challenges theories that view nationalism as an unilinear process and that does not allow for creative agency on the part of subaltern classes. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru.* This perspective is in contrast to that of Hobsbawn's work which suggests that nationalism is an ideology only of the bourgeoisie. Eric Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

transportation of food, supplies, and people, the airstrips also allowed *chicle* contractors to hire large numbers of seasonal migrant *chicleros,* most of whom were Indigenous Q'eqchi's from the coffee growing Cobán region of the Department of Alta Verapaz.[56] Workers from Belize and Mexico were also among those who made the arduous journey to the Petén. Migrants who made the seasonal trek back and forth from the Petén often decided to permanently or semi-permanently settle in Uaxactún due to increasing land scarcity in other parts of the country and to harsh working conditions on the coffee fincas. The migration created an ebb and flow of people moving through the community of Uaxactún; a cycling that moved with the annual *chicle* season, but also one that reflected economic, political, and social changes of the *chicle* industry and other parts of the country.

The *chicle* industry was organized around a system of corporations, *contratistas* (or contractors) and harvesters. The corporations would extend credit to a *contratista* who then would sell to the creditor a stipulated amount of *chicle.* The *contratista* used this credit to set up contracts with harvesters through a system of *enganche* or cash advances, and a *mensualidad* or monthly allowance to the *chicleros'* families. In the field, the *contratista* supplied the worker with food, medicine, and cigarettes, often at inflated prices. *Contratistas* would often make more money on selling medicine and cigarettes to *chicleros* than from *chicle* extraction.[57] At the end of the season, the *contratista* deducted the amount of the *enganche, menusalidad,* and supplies from the chicleros earnings. Until the revolutionary government of 1944-54, many *contratistas* held chicleros in a system of debt peonage, coercing them to return to the forest each season to harvest chicle.[58] This system of *contratistas* from both Uaxactún and other centres in the Petén, local and migrants harvesters linked to outside corporations American Chicle and Wrigley structured complex relations in Uaxactún.

Some Uaxactuneros also recall the development of an agricultural cooperative, called Quetzal that operated during these years. Although I have no archival records, informants suggest that Uaxactún was an agricultural centre for the Petén, and exported mainly corn to other parts of the Petén.[59] Uaxactuneros also report timber harvesting by large concessionaries.

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[56] Alfonso Arrivillaga Cortés, "Chicle, Chicleros, Y Chiclería: Sobre Su Historia En El Petén," (n.d), 4-5.

[57] Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala.* And in the contemporary period, Barbara L. Dugelby, "Chicle Latex Extraction in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve: Behavioral, Institutional, and Ecological Factors Affecting Sustainability" (Doctoral Dissertation, Duke University, 1995).

[58] Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala* 166.

[59] An MA thesis written in April of 1967 did not report the existence of a cooperative, but did highlight the sale of corn to *contratistas* for use elsewhere. Victor M. Urrutia, "Corn Production and Soil Fertility Changes under Shifting Cultivation in Uaxactún, Guatemala" (Master of Science, University of Florida, 1967).

From the 1890s until approximately 1945, *chicle* latex served as the primary base for chewing gum production, at which time it was replaced by petroleum-derived synthetics. A revolutionary government in office and the switch to petroleum-derived synthetics led American companies with operations in the Petén to pull out in 1949. As a result of revolutionary policies in the centre, trade unionists and worker organizers arrived in Uaxactún in 1949 to form a union of *chicleros* and woodcutters, *Chicleros and Lumberers of the Petén Union* (SUCHILMA). The purpose of the organization was to aid in protecting workers and their families against common illnesses and diseases, promote literacy, as well as to offer assistance in responding to accidents and legal affairs.

The exodus of the American *chicle* companies and their replacement by a state agency, the *National Institute for the Promotion of Production* (INFOP), as the sole intermediary between chicle *contratistas* and foreign purchasers opened up credit arrangements and broadened access to contracting. Before the 1950s there were relatively few larger *contratistas* that were required to contract for larger quantities of *chicle*, from 1000 to 1500 quintals.[60] After that date, *contratistas* could contract with INFOP for as little as 50 quintals. By 1960, only 8 years after the creation of INFOP, there were more than one hundred *contratistas* operating in the Petén. However, at the end of the revolution, INFOP was replaced by a Consortium of Chicle Industrialists and by 1962, the *National Enterprise for Promotion and Economic Development of the Petén* (FYDEP) was in control of extending credit to *contratistas,* regulating working conditions in chicle, subsidizing the *chicleros* union, SUCHILMA, and setting production levels. By 1971, FYDEP extended its monopoly control over the industry by becoming the exclusive agent of sale. In order for *contratistas* to obtain credit and to begin operation they must have fulfilled any previous contracts with FYDEP, or in the case of a newcomer, must have the recommendations of two established *contratistas*. This created a system of powerful *contratistas,* who through political influence, personal relations, and bribery, were able to gain access to FYDEP contracts and credit.[61] While smaller *contratistas* made up of mostly upwardly mobile chicleros and foreman persisted, they were subordinate to larger and politically influential *contratistas* in both FYDEP and the Consortium (later rename Itzlandia).

These relations also played out in the dividing up of the forest camps among individual *contratistas*. The roads and sites originally built for logging operations and oil exploration, and the locations of water supply such as a small pond, lake, creek or river determined where chicle camps would be located.[62] Thousands of footpaths and secondary roads that lattice the forest bed served, and continue to serve, as infrastructure for

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[60] The Spanish quintal is equivalent to 100 libras or 101 pounds.
[61] Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala* 158-59.
[62] Cortés, "Chicle, Chicleros, Y Chiclería: Sobre Su Historia En El Petén," 11.

transporting *chicleros* and supplies in and out of the camps. Hundreds of camps were scattered throughout the Petén. Although the forests have never been distributed by FYDEP, the areas became divided up into several regions centred around villages such as Uaxactún, Dos Lagunas, Carmelita, Yaxha, Melchor de Mencos and Libertad. Each of these working regions then "belonged" to certain *contratistas,* each region was then subdivided up into smaller territories. The customary boundaries within working regions were fluid and negotiated by economically powerful *chicle* contractors, who gained control over key areas of the forest through their personal relations and political influence inside and outside of the community. Around these key areas controlled by the local elite *contratistas,* small and medium sized contractors established their camps and territories. These boundaries were not permanently fixed, but negotiated, and occasionally overlapped.[63] Although this system was never legalized, FYDEP and Itzandia recognized it in records of *chicle* contracts and credits.

In Uaxactún this system of measuring and dividing the forest into areas of *de facto* control resulted in the rise of at least two elite *contratistas* as well a few small and medium-sized *contratistas.* As noted by one researcher, the system of *contratistas* in Uaxactún is substantially more inegalitarian than that of other community centres in the Petén.[64] These elite *contratistas* became divided along family lines resulting in long-standing competition among these families. According to Barbara Dugelby, there was at least one elite family in Uaxactún that maintained chicle camps closer to the Mexican border in the Dos Lagunas region.[65] My informants suggested at least one other important, if not equally important family. Dugebly, moreover, suggests that elite *contrastistas* tended to "own" camps at greater distance from the Uaxactún; some informants suggested that this family managed camps closer to Uaxactún.[66] Other smaller and medium-sized *contratistas* would negotiate access to the forest around these larger territories. This system of unofficial, *de facto* control by an elite family invariably resulted in discord when the state attempted to delineate new

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[63] Barbara L. Dugelby, "Governmental and Customary Arrangements Guiding Chicle Latex Extraction in Peten, Guatemala," in *Timber, Tourists, and Temples,* ed. Richard B. Primack, et al. (Washington D.C: Island Press, 1998), 166-67.

[64] Dugelby, "Chicle Latex Extraction in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve: Behavioral, Institutional, and Ecological Factors Affecting Sustainability".

[65] Ibid.

[66] Although I do not have any data to support the claim that this family controlled territories closer to Uaxactún, these arguments are bolstered by lines of unity and division in the community surrounding the concession proposals. The *contratista* family whose territories were located close to the Mexican border were the most adamant opponents to the concession. The second *contratista* family, whose territories may have been closer to Uaxactún, and whose lands would reside within the concession area, were energetic supporters of the concession process. It was also difficult to assess control over territories because one family's control over territories was largely disbanded with the death of patriarch.

boundaries of legal and illegal access to the resources in the map of a community forest concession.[67]

Because of the geographical location and history of the area, Uaxactuneros live and work surrounded by archaeological pieces and ruins, facilitating looting activity. Locally looters are called *huecheros* or *hueches,* a name derived from the Maya Itza word, *huech* or armadillo, an animal who opens holes in the ground. The entire process from start to finish, from looting to dealing, is called *huechería.* Looters, intermediaries and dealers come from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds that overlap with the *chicle* economy. Most *chicle* camps also function as "warehouses" for looted Pre-Columbian artefacts. During the summer months, when *chicleros* are not harvesting *chicle,* these camps double as "looting camps" due to their vicinity to water sources and makeshift shelters.[68]

Looting activities by *chicleros* and professional looters also occurs during the *chicle* season. *Chicleros,* who spend many months of year trekking through the forest, have knowledge of sites and mounds and often engage in sideline activities of looting pre-Columbian artefacts. Besides these independent and often accidental looting activities, *chicle contratistas* often double as *hueche contratistas.* The *hueche contratistas,* often under the guise of chicle activities, organize looting expeditions, contracting out chicleros to loot pre-Columbian artefacts, with the *enganches, mensualidades,* and supplies.[69] Indeed, one elite *contratista* family has an impressive collection of pre-Columbian artefacts.[70]

In the 1960s, two new non-timber forest products (NTFPs) began to be harvested: *xate* and *pimeinta gorda.* The arrival of these products in Uaxactún roughly coincided with both a decrease in *chicle* exports and an increase in migration to the Petén of mainly Ladinos. While population growth had always been slow in Uaxactún, this changed in the 1970s due to increases in overall migration to the Petén and the construction of a road in the community. Historical memory varies greatly in the community as to *who* built the road – some believe loggers built it while others claim that a petroleum company built the road. The market for *xate* began when a Texan flower importer developed a market for green leaves in flower arrangements. In 1960, according to official figures, Petén exported 50 quintals of *xate,* and by 1985, perhaps a many as ten thousand *xateros* collected 11,284

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[67] Dugelby, "Chicle Latex Extraction in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve: Behavioral, Institutional, and Ecological Factors Affecting Sustainability" 139-40, (IDEADS) Instituto de Derecho Ambiental y Desarrollo Sustentable, "Estudio Y Monitoreo De Los Impactos Sociales En Unidades De Manejo Forestal Comunitario De Peten, Guatemala: Caso I. Uaxactún," (Petén, Guatemala: Fundacion Naturaleza Para la Vida (NPV) and Fondo Mundial Para la Naturaleza (WWF), 2002).

[68] Sofía Paredes Maury, "Surviving in the Rainforest: The Realities of Looting in the Rural Villages of El Petén, Guatemala," (Foundation for the Advancement of Mesoamerican Studies, 1997).

[69] Dugelby, "Chicle Latex Extraction in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve: Behavioral, Institutional, and Ecological Factors Affecting Sustainability", Maury, "Surviving in the Rainforest: The Realities of Looting in the Rural Villages of El Petén, Guatemala."

[70] Sofia Maury Paredes, author of the study on looting, aided this family to register (and legalize) their collection. Paredes interview with the author, November 7, 2002.

quintals of *xate* for export. By the early 1990s, *xate* became the most important NTFP exported by Guatemala.[71] These official figures, however, generally grossly underestimate the actual export rates since producers and exporters immensely underreport the amount of *xate* and *pimeinta* they collect and sell overseas to avoid paying municipal and other taxes.[72]

Xate is now exported to the United States, Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands. Florists in the United States use the fronds of *xate* palm as green leaf backdrop for cut flowers. Two types of *xate* are harvested – *jade* palm and *hembra*. *Jade* palm is a dark green species with broad leaflets, while *hembra* is a light green species with thin, delicate leaflets. Unlike *chicle, xate* could be collected year round with peak harvest in April, and did not require long stints in the forest and could be harvested with minimal technology (only a machete). As a result of these factors, according to informants, *xate* harvesting was originally almost exclusively women and children's work. In recent years, high rates of depletion have forced workers to trek deeper into the forest, shifting the gendered nature of the work in favour of the male population. Even though *xateros* may walk for several hours before cutting, unlike *chicleros,* they still return to the community every day. *Xate* can provide a form of "off-season" employment for *chicleros;* however, this is minimal since demand (and prices) for *xate* are lowest during the summer months. Like the *chicle* industry, *xateros* sell their harvest to *contratistas* from the regional centre, Santa Elena, and to *contratistas* in Uaxactún. The elite *chicle contratistas* are not involved in *xate;* this work is left to small and medium-sized contractors.

Pimienta gorda, or allspice, is gathered each year during June, July, and August, during the "off season" for chicle, by coppicing seed-bearing trees and boiling and drying the harvested seeds. Trees can be harvested every six years. Although *pimienta* is an important source of income for the community, it has never reached the employment or income levels of either *xate* or *chicle.* In 1965, the Petén exported 45 quintals of *pimienta* and by 1985 this number had increased to 3037 quintals. During the 1970s, plantations of marijuana in Uaxactún's northern working regions became an important source of export income for the community. During the 1980s, Uaxactuneros were also organized in civil patrols, but claim to have remained a peaceful community avoiding conflicts with either the army or guerrillas.

In interviews, Uaxactuneros remember this period, prior to the creation of the MBR, through a discourse of remoteness that describes the village and its people as spatially and temporally distant from institutions and cultural values of the nation-state. These discourses tend to draw on representations of the village as a frontier that is outside of the law, the

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[71] Sergio Perez et al., "El Xate En El Departmento De Petén," (Santa Elena: Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, Region VIII, Departamento de Vida Silvestre, n.d).

[72] Conrad C.S. Reining et al., "Productos No Maderables De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya, Peten, Guatemala," (Washington, D.C and Flores, Petén, Guatemala: Conservation International and Propeten, 1992), Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala.*

problems of violence, land shortages, and where one could go to "aventuarse." These tales are also of riches, freedom, and "wilderness" frontiersmen, a romance narrative that some commentators have likened to America's Wild West.[73] In these romance narratives of the frontier, *campesinos* appropriate notions of the Petén as apart from or outside of the rest of Guatemala, not to project the official visions of the future of the nation, but to articulate fantasies of freedom from the state.

CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY IN THE PETÉN: MIGRATION, *MESTIZAJE* AND LOCALITIES ON THE MOVE

The construction of a road into Uaxactún, new forms of employment, and increasing land shortages and violence propelled new waves of immigration to Uaxactún by the late 1970s. However, far from resulting in a "homogeneous" community, liberated, and free from ethnic divisions, as illustrated in representations of the "native petenero," lines of difference and division were recreated. Migrants settled themselves into Uaxactún by creating a system of ethnic neighbourhoods where Ladinos and Q'eqchi' separated themselves although the lines among the groups were always blurry.[74] The history of the foundation of Uaxactún, as a migrant and culturally diverse community, suggests that received orthodoxies of the character of Indigenous and rural communities in Guatemala and other parts of Mesoamerica as place bound or as culturally homogenous entities cannot be assumed to apply in the Petén. Although a satisfying treatment of the forms of community in Uaxactún is much beyond the scope of this thesis, in this cursory analysis I hope to point to two processes of community formation in Uaxactún that are of central importance to the history of the community forest concession: the articulation of contingent, multi-place identities and how locality and place can move with people in time and space.[75]

It is commonplace among anthropologists of Indigenous communities in Guatemala, and of Indigenous people, to emphasize the importance of being from a particular place for community formation and Mayan religious and ethnic identities. John Wantanabe, in a detailed and insightful book length study of the Maya village of Santiago Chimaltenago, suggested that "the worldview embedded in the Maya conventions of community involves

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[73] Perera, *Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy* 236-37.
[74] For an exploration of similar ethnic neighbourhood divisions in a different Peténero town see Norman B. Schwartz, "Assimilation and Acculturation: Aspects of Ethnicity in a Guatemalan Town," *Ethnology* 10, no. 4 (1971).
[75] I will explore these two themes through examining the open-ended hegemonic processes of community formation. This hegemonic process of community formation. I understand as a means of achieving consensus over meaning where differences, lines of unity and division, and relations of power are constantly contested, legitimated and redefined. It is this historical contingency that recognizes differences and hierarchies within communities (ethnic, religious, age, gender, class) and enables us to see community as an on-going process, rather than an entity or outcome. See Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru.*

not just viewing the world in particularly Maya ways but doing so from particular Maya places in the company of particularly Maya neighbours" and that "Saint and *witz*, souls and soul-loss, mutual obligations and public recognition – all demonstrate how closely 'being Chimalteco' depends on being in Chimbal."[76] Although Indigenous identity may draw upon being from "here" or being "local" in particular ways, I suggest that migration does not necessarily involve the loss of local ways of interacting with the world or in the loss of Mayan identity.[77] Instead, villagers articulate more than one place-identity, self-identifying as a "Cobanero", "de la Oriente" or "Mexicanos" in particular contexts, and as a "Uaxactúnero" in another, or even both simultaneously.[78] In the context of migration, these same multiple place identities also suggest that there is no clear opposition between being from here and not being from here, but rather these lines may be ambiguous or shifting.[79]

Differences and divisions, both cultural and class, often become erased in descriptions of Uaxactún that enable it to appear as a homogenous petenero community typical of official articulations of *mestizaje*. For example, some researchers have sought to explore the "forest culture" of communities such as Uaxactún through the mythologies, saints, and ghosts that form around this culture, but what is omitted in these descriptions is movement and migration, or how multiple places come into interaction through frontier expansion.[80] Both Norman Schwartz and Sofia Maury Paredes have discussed "the mixture of Pre-Columbian deities and European ghosts that function outside of the morality of

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[76] John M. Watanabe, *Maya Saints and Souls in a Changing World* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992) 16, 215.

[77] See Handy, "Democratizing What? Some Reflections on Nation, State, Ethnicity, Modernity, Community and Democracy in Guatemala," 63. and Orin Starn, *Nightwatch: The Politics of Protest in the Andes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).

[78] By place I refer to the specific geographical spaces where a social group makes its home, gains its subsistence, feels it belongs to and claims as its own. Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1977).

[79] Moreover, these multiple local (or place) identities are engaged in new processes of community formation through the contestation, negotiation, and redefinition of meanings in Uaxactún. Membership in the community is less institutionally ascribed due to birth or marriage, as anthropologist Norman Schwartz contends, but on participating and transforming local meanings and ways of interacting with each other.

[80]When these different "places" do come into interaction they are often treated as acculturation or transculturation that invariably result in a "culturally homogenous population."(Schwartz, 242), rather than how differences might be transformed, but still maintained through the mutual articulation of identities. For example, Schwartz explored differences in "values" of community members in a "Ladino" San Martín (a pseudonym) through a Value-Orientation Schedule. He was attempting to demonstrate that differences in the socialization of Ladinos versus Indigenous peoples (Mayeros) would be reflected in a variation in values as a means to examine acculturation. The predicted value differences were not reflected in the Value Orientation Schedule leading Schwatz to conclude that the socialization processes were not as different but "exaggerated in discussions" (238-239), and that in fact differences between Indigenous people and Ladinos were more perceived than real. He argued, "Despite the persistence of ethnic vocabulary, San Martinero Ladinos have learned from the Mayeros just as the Mayeros have acculturated to the standards of the Ladinos. For example, the Ladinos practice the slash and burn agricultural techniques of the Mayeros, but today those techniques are viewed as part of Ladino culture." (242). Schwartz and Eckhardt, "Values, Ethnicity, and Acculturation in Peten, Guatemala."

society."[81] Included in these are ghosts that in the form of monks, women, dogs, dwarfs, and even the devil himself, haunt the streets and villages and in several cases are related to important historical events. The *Duende*, for example, is a character in the shape of a short man who haunts not only towns, but also the forests and other isolated areas. This *Duende* is, according to Paredes, known as *Alux* in the highlands and is known to play tricks on people and court beautiful girls in Uaxactún; he is very popular in *chiclero* camp folktales and is regarded as an evil spirit. In my own interviews, informants said that the *Duende* was responsible for the disappearance of a camp foreman's daughter as well as blamed for accidents and bad luck. This mixture of highland and European spirits suggests that the forest culture is not only hybrid, but involves the movement of local, cultural places with people and their articulation anew in different contexts. Yet, these studies tend to equate transculturation with homogenization that overshadows both relations of power and culture within the community. By homogenizing culture, differences between Q'eqchi'villagers beliefs of saints, deities, and rituals in relationship to *milpa* and those who do not believe in the same saints tend to get erased.[82] These lines of collective meanings and networks of differences point towards the collision of multiple identifications with place that interact in hybrid and fluid ways in the same geographical space of Uaxactún.

NOTES ON DEMOCRACY, HEGEMONY, AND GOVERNMENTALITY

Recent Guatemalan scholarship on the democratic transition, as well as much of democratic theorizing, tends to measure democracy by either the formal criteria for democracy often narrowly defined as free and fair elections or by the participation (or strength) of civil society in decision-making processes.[83] There is also a third more radical

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[81] Sofía Paredes Maury, "Surviving in the Rainforest: The Realities of Looting in the Rural Villages of El Petén, Guatemala," (Foundation for the Advancement of Mesoamerican Studies, 1997).

[82] Some of these differences may also be interconnected with religious orientation. There are three churches in Uaxactún: one Catholic in which, 43 percent of the inhabitants belong, but whose services are regularly attended by on average three people, the Assembly of God, and the Evangelical Biblical Way which both have large regular attendances and to which approximately 41 percent of the population confessed faith. Instituto de Derecho Ambiental y Desarrollo Sustentable, "Estudio Y Monitoreo De Los Impactos Sociales En Unidades De Manejo Forestal Comunitario De Peten, Guatemala: Caso I. Uaxactún." According to informants, many of these rituals and beliefs have become hidden or secret in recent years because of persecution at the hands of Protestants in the community. According to one informant, although I was not able to confirm the story since due to time constraints, an Indigenous women was killed for being a witch.

[83] The most narrow perspective is largely propagated by the United State government, but other authors, holding somewhat more nuanced perspectives also see elections as the arrival of democracy. See Stefanie Ricardo Roos, "Democracy and Elections in Guatemala," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 21, no. Winter/Spring (1997).Those who measure democracy by participation see Trudeau, *Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle for Democracy*. And in the Petén see Juanita Sundberg, "Conservation and Democratization: Constituting Citizenship in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala," *Political Geography* 22 (2003), Juanita Sundberg, "Conservation as a Site for

perspective that suggests that there is a fundamental contradiction between local Indigenous identities and liberal democracy that makes the construction of a democratic nation difficult in Guatemala.[84] My account will take its starting point at the juncture between the second and third positions through an exploration of how liberal governance attempts to construct national citizens out of local (but not necessarily place-bound) identities and, therefore, how citizens are also subject to power even as they become agents demanding access to resources and participatory spaces in redefinitions of the nation. As stated earlier, I understand democracy both as a constitutive discourse involved in making up what it is possible to think, do, and be democratically, including the construction of citizens, and as an everyday practice in which people participate in making decisions, struggle for access to resources, and contest hegemonic meanings.[85]

What is misleading about accounts of Guatemalan democracy discussed in Trudeau's and Sundberg's work is the separation of the terms of subjectivity, agency, and citizenship from those of subjection, domination and powerlessness in ways that reproduce a citizen/subject dichotomy and obscure the ways in which citizens are made. In these and other democratic theories, what often counts as politics is voting and participation in civil society organization. This view of politics neglects or dismisses the constitution of citizens in the disciplinary, institutional and associational activities of everyday life. Democratic theory then ends up documenting the exclusion of certain subjects from a homogenous sphere of the civil society and from the places of power and citizenship.[86] Moreover, by defining a "lack of political participation in decision-making processes" as a governmental problem, intervention in the spheres of everyday lives of people to "empower" them is made possible. Following Barbara Cruikshank, I suggest instead that we reconsider power along the lines of Foucault and instead of seeing power as the antithesis of freedom in ways that separate the terms of freedom from the terms of repression and domination, the terms of

Democratization in Latin America: Exploring the Contradictions in Guatemala," *Canadian Journal for Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 27, no. 53 (2002).

[84] Handy, "Democratizing What? Some Reflections on Nation, State, Ethnicity, Modernity, Community and Democracy in Guatemala." Guatemalan historiography also tends to deal more with ethnicity issues and contradictions with the state.

[85] Democratic practices, however, should not necessarily be equated with fair elections, a certain level of human rights guarantees, and a nation-state. Rather we can see democratic practices of participation amongst peasant organizations, for example, in feudal and other regimes, including during periods of state-sponsored violent repression. Thus, democracy narrowly defined by some political scientists tends to dismiss democratic practices in other cultures, different historical periods and under unfavourable conditions.

[86] It is important and worthwhile to maintain some distinction between citizens and subjects, between those with access to decision-making channels and those without. However, in discussing "citizens", I do not want to lose the sense that they are also subject to democratic and other discourses, such as environmentalism, nor do I want to suggest that "subjects" are outside of politics or lack agency. Instead, in using these terms, I hope to illustrate how they do not reflect binaries between agency/subjection, power/powerlessness, but how they describe different relations to certain state and non-governmental institutions.

subjectivity from those of subjection, we consider how power produces spaces of freedom and action that are also spaces of control and subjection.[87] Moreover, this perspective allows us to explore the legacies of a state that is simultaneously violent and benevolent, repressive and productive, exclusionary and participatory, etc. If in doing so we begin to ask *how* citizens are made, then, we can also begin to ask, following Handy, how they might be made more democratically.

In order to explore this process of citizenship formation and everyday struggles for democratic inclusion, I position the study of democracy between the work of Michel Foucault on Governmentality to understand the former and Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony to understand the latter. The term governmentality comes from a lecture by Michel Foucault in which he drew attention to all the processes by which the conduct of a population is governed: by institutions and agencies, including the state, by discourses, norms and identities; and by self-regulation, techniques for the disciplining and care of the self.[88] Defining it in general as "the conduct of conduct", Foucault presents government as a more less methodical and rationally reflected "way of doing things", or "art", for acting on the actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide, correct, and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves. Governmentality, thus, is an art of government that is not simply imposed upon the population, but cultivates in its citizens particular political subjectivities so that they govern themselves.

Governmentality is also concerned less with the state, per se, and more with all the mechanisms of government including local institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that are characteristic of neo-liberal regimes and form the complex and contentiousness everyday negotiations between the apparatus of state and citizens-subjects.[89] Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality as the "conduct of conduct" is particularly useful for understanding decentred relationships between the state and its citizens. Governmentality is concerned with the "conduct of conduct" or the myriad ways in

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[87] Barbara Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999).

[88] Michel Foucault, ed., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Other works exploring the notion of Foucault's notion of governmentality include Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, eds., *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999), Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Notions of governmentality have been most widely applied to European and North American contexts.

[89] Governmentality is compatible with a "decentred" perspective on hegemonic politics, advocated by Florencia Mallon as well as Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood. This perspective, like that of governmentality, "decentres" the concepts of politics, nationalisms, and state formation to from the "state" or "nation" and elites to the level of local communities. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru*, Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, *Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity, and Politics in Latin America* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).

which the conduct of an individual is governed by oneself and others. Foucault argued that since the eighteenth century, population became the object of sovereign power and discipline in a new way, so that the growth of the welfare of the population within a given territory, the optimization of capabilities and productivity, became the goals of good government. The goal of good government, in other words, became not simply the exercise of authority over the people within a territory or the ability to discipline and regulate them, but the fostering their prosperity and happiness. This notion is compatible with developmentalism with its links to the intellectual machinery of Enlightenment, and also with environmentalism with its efforts to articulate the proper conduct of the population in relationship to nature.[90]

A focus on the techniques of governmentality that are involved in the construction of citizen-subjects, however, risks treating government as a technical issue imposed by the state.[91] The concept of antagonism in democratic politics as well as resistance and contestation as constitutive dimensions of rule, therefore, must be important analytical elements in the study of hegemonic formations.[92] This perspective draws on Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony as a combination of coercion and consent, that can be defined as "a set of nested, continuous processes through which power and meaning are contested, legitimated, and redefined at all levels of society."[93]

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[90] A series of scholars have explored environmentalism as a form of green governmentality. For a perspective on Environmental Impact Assessments as guiding the conduct of institutions and firms see R. Bartlett, "Ecological Reason in Administration: Environmental Impact Assessment and Administrative Theory," in *Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State,* ed. Robert Paehkle and Douglas Torgersoneds (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1990), Eric Darier, "Environmental Governmentality: The Case of Canada's Green Plan," *Environmental Politics* 5, no. 4 (1996), Eric Darier, "Foucault against Environmental Ethics," in *Discourses of the Environment,* ed. Eric Darier (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments : Agriculture in the Making of Modern India,* Timothy W. Luke, "Environmentality as Green Governmentality," in *Discourses of the Environment,* ed. Eric Darier (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), Paul Rutherford, "The Administration of Life: Eco-Discourse as Intellectual Machinery of Government," *Australian Journal of Communication* 21, no. 3 (1994), Paul Rutherford, "The Entry of Life into History," in *Discourses of the Environment,* ed. Eric Darier (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).

[91] In these cases, the technologies of state agents and institutions often become treated as hegemonic in a narrow sense, the metaphor of the panopticon is literalised, and the objects of governmental technologies become confined to live within ineluctable "iron cages".

[92] O'Malley, Weir, and Shearing raise the issue of resistance as a constitutive dimension of governmentality. They call for more attention to the "messy implementation" of programs and recognition that these are not "written by one hand" but "multivocal, internally contested and thus, in a sense, always in change and often internally contradictory." Pat O'Malley, Lorna Weir, and Clifford Shearing, "Governmentaltiy, Criticism, Politics," *Economy and Society* 26, no. 4 (1997): 512-13.

[93] Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* 6. This is opposed to conceptions of hegemony as false consciousness which reproduces the binary between ideology and truth and notions of power and powerlessness, See for example, James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). It is also slightly different from the notion of hegemony as a "common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting on a social order characterized by domination", because the emphasis more clearly resides on antagonisms. William Roseberry, "Hegemony and the Language of Contention," in *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico,* ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 361..

Against models of deliberative democracy or discourse theories of democracy, I will emphasize ones more clearly based on lack of closure and conflict.[94] As Jacques Derrida and Chantal Mouffe have illustrated in different ways, the moment of definition of the "demos", "the people", or the "nation" necessary for democratic politics requires drawing a frontier between "us" and "them", "friends" and "enemies".[95] The free and rational domain of consensus formation portrayed by theorists of deliberative or discourse theories of democracy denies the existence of this moment of drawing a frontier or presents it as something dictated by rationality or morality in ways that make it appear natural or normal. Instead of closing this moment and reducing the multiple identifications of people to one of its many possible forms, this thesis will set out to disclose the moment of definition that lies at the heart of democratic politics. Indeed, once it is realized that citizens are the result of a political construction – including the techniques of governmentality – it is possible to realize that democratic politics does not consist in the moment in which a fully constituted citizenry of people exercises its rule. Citizenship and democracy are indissociable from the very struggle about the definition of who constitutes the people and who is excluded. Chantal Mouffe and other radical democratic theorists have illustrated that citizens are never fully constituted, and can only exist through multiple and competing forms of identifications that take place in a conflictual field of politics. It is this democratic moment where inclusionary practices can unfold, and that must always remain open to new hegemonic articulations. The point, in other words, is to ask *how* citizens are made.

THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis does not follow an easy linear progression in time. The chapters are outlined so that the reader will get a sense of historical movement and narrative, but because this thesis deals with both regional and local histories it has been accordingly divided into chapters to take into account these different spatial contexts. The first substantive chapter, titled "Mapping the Mayan Biosphere Reserve," outlines the history of the creation of the

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[94] The principal proponent of deliberative democracy is Jürgen Habermas. He, alongside many others, have advocated a return to "the original meaning of democracy in terms of the institutionalization of a public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens." Jürgen Habermas, "Three Normative Models of Democracy," in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 23. There are obvious variations among theorists of deliberative democracy, but they general tendency is to foreclose difference and division within this sphere. For an example that attempts to address this differences of class, gender, and ethnicity, see Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[95] Both Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Derrida draw their inspiration from the work of Carl Schmitt. See Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London and New York: Verso, 1997), Chantal Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy," in *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London and New York: Verso, 1999).

MBR and the first few years of its implementation. The chapter sets the stage for subsequent chapters by analyzing new national environmental narratives and the creation of a "map" of the Petén as a Biosphere Reserve with an order, a picture, or a representation that the population needed to be taught. The second half of this chapter discusses the exclusionary and authoritarian implications of these narratives and representations once put into practice in the Reserve. Chapter Three, "Competing Visions of Sustainable Development," begins where Chapter Two left off; the sense that the local population needed to be incorporated into state management plans. This chapter details the rise of the idea of community forest concessions, debates among NGOs, state officials, and *campesinos* around the use of the forest and the role of communities in conservation and the rise of the Association of Community Forests of the Petén (ACOFOP) as a representative body of *campesinos* in regional, national, and international politics. These negotiations, which were an attempt to broaden inclusionary practices, are analyzed for what they can tell us about the construction of environmental citizen-subjects, including race and class relations, and negotiations around the interpretation and implementation of the 1996 Peace Accords. The fourth chapter, "Becoming Nature's Defenders in Uaxactún," takes us back to the beginning of the thesis with the creation of MBR and details the rise of a community forest concession in the village. This chapter explores how internal lines of dissension and division were drawn in the community around the concession, how different sectors of the village negotiated their new relationship with the state and NGOs, and how they appropriated and misappropriated conservation languages and discourse in the performance of identities as nature's defenders. It highlights *how* Uaxactuneros are constructed, disciplined and regulated as good environmental citizens, and the types of exclusions and resistances these forms of governmentality engender. The conclusion brings the thesis up to date highlighting the fickle nature of the Guatemalan state, new nationalisms that undermine participatory channels created with the concession process, and the creation of a new national park that will usurp community forest lands. The history of community forest concessions is far from finished, and I have chosen to reflect this in the thesis.

The weaknesses and omissions of this thesis are many. This thesis, I believe, could have benefited from greater historical detail or a "thick description." In particular, I regret not allowing more room for the voices of *campesinos* and others individuals that I interviewed in lengthy quoted passages. On the other hand, some might suggest that this thesis could have been completed in fewer pages by sticking to the historical narrative, but in my opinion, the analysis is just as important as what actually happened. As it stands, I have not dealt at greater length with issues of class, ethnicity, race, and, most especially, gender. Moreover, perhaps in a reflection of my inexperience, this thesis has tended to expand well beyond the scope of its intended purpose into literature on sustainable development,

democracy in Latin America, social movement theory, and imperial images of tropical nature, that all could not be adequately or explicitly dealt with in the spatial and time constraints given. When possible, I have addressed the relevant literatures, but what was included and excluded in the end involved a judgement call. In all these inadequacies, I hope to find another project that may do greater justice to the history of struggles around community forests in the Petén.

CHAPTER TWO
MAPPING THE MAYAN BIOSPHERE RESERVE:
REMAKING THE STATE IN THE PETÉN

> A brief analysis of the most extensive department of Guatemala
> demonstrates one Petén imagined, and another real: the first refers to the fact
> that 68 percent of the surface area has been declared a protected area by
> decrees emitted in 1989 and 1990 including the Mayan Biosphere Reserve,
> the most extensive in Central America. The real Petén, however, reflects a
> migratory dynamic and current agrarian structure, which during two decades
> has converted the Petén into a refuge and principal destination for poor
> campesinos from all over the country, as an escape valve to avoid the
> traditional blockade to legal land tenure for campesinos.
> -Georg Grünberg, *Nuevas Perspectivas de Desarrollo Sostenible*

Between 1987 and 1990, Guatemalan state mandate in the Petén turned from felling trees in the name of progress, to guarding them from progress in the name of biodiversity. What was at stake in this transformation was not simply the salvaging of nature, but also the rebirth of images and narratives of the nation. Yet, for many Peteneros this inversion in state policy only signalled a new series of laws and regulations which would attempt to radically rearrange nearly every aspect of life from where and what communities could hunt, how they could harvest non-timber forest products (NTFPs) such as *chicle, xate*, and *pimienta*, to family size and migratory patterns. This chapter argues that the state policy of conservation in the Petén focused on the blunt prohibitive mechanisms of the law to impose a new vision, or way of ordering the world according to new national environmental narratives. This policy of state-building failed because it could not make the population see their own interests in these same rules of law. The state's imperative of territorial integrity and security, thus, needed to incorporate the population, setting the stage for a policy of community forest concessions discussed in the following chapter.

The about-face in state policy and the accompanying attempts to radically reorganize life in the Petén has been interpreted by one scholar through the lens of American neo-imperialism in Central America.[1] From this perspective, the MBR, and other protected areas and conservation efforts, represent the continuing power of imperialist nations to shape the postcolonial world. American intervention, it is said, has not disappeared with the end of Guatemala's civil war, but found new forms of justification in the renewal of the ideals of progress and development. American neo-imperialism, moreover, is accompanied by

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[1] Juanita R. Sundberg, "Conservation Encounters: Ngos, Local People, and Changing Cultural Landscapes" (Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1999) 4-5.

cultural imperialism wherein the Petén is a site for the displacement of North American anxieties around "human-land relations" in the context of late capitalism.[2] Framed in this way, however, these arguments construct misleading representations of a homogeneous, reified, entity "America" comprised of a single set of stable anxieties around nature, and a unified Guatemalan nation for which to impress these upon. The fictitious unity of the categories is not only historically inaccurate, but also has the effect of reinforcing the idea that the nation-state is the primary force of our lives and recentres the history of America as the all-powerful historical agent. In addition, this argument appears to reinforce oppositions between the centre-periphery, self-other, colonizer-colonized born in the metaphysical Manicheanism of the imperial enlightenment. These distinctions, written on a binary axis of power, create a series of victimizers and victims. Indeed, once represented as victims in the saga of imperial power, the denial of agency may justify further intervention in order to "save" the weak victims from their maligned oppressors. This critique is also liable to another form of self-defeat, in which the binary oppositions simply invert, rather than transcend dominant notions of power.[3] This critique of neo-imperialism is not only inadequate to the task of describing neo-imperialism, but also unwittingly deploys the very representations and practices that it attempts to surpass and, therefore, is unable to strategically oppose the tenacious legacies of imperialism.

This chapter, and subsequent ones, will readdress the history of the creation of the MBR by differentiating among actors and emphasizing historical context and process through which political subjectivities as "nature's defenders" and citizens are made. In particular, this chapter argues that new environmental narratives articulated by both Guatemalan and American environmentalists were national narratives in that they linked the conservation of resources to re-imagining the Guatemalan nation. In the context of Guatemala's crisis of governmentality, these environmental narratives were among those, like the narratives articulated by the indigenous movement and *campesino* movements, that were debating the future of the nation. This chapter argues that the new environmental narratives drew upon discourses of harmony and healing in the context of a fragile turn to democracy and the opening of peace negotiations. However, even as the narrative turned upon ideas of loss and renewal of Guatemala's bloody past, it erased the memory of violence and land expropriation. The history of the creation of the MBR, therefore, is not reducible to the imposition of "American" ideals of "nature."

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[2] Ibid.

[3] For a critique of the binaries between self-other and the dangers of inversion, see Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London, New York: Routledge, 1994). Bhabha advocates a politics of resistance in the ambivalence of hybridity, undecidability, mimicry, etc. that frustrate attempts to create pure categories. These forms of "conceptual" resistance are useful, but cannot explain the rise and domination of one culture, and the dereliction of another, and thus cannot substitute for social histories of domination and resistance firmly embedded in time and space.

Secondly, these new environmental narratives give certain actors different roles in the stories of environmental decline and desires for national renewal. In particular, these narratives create the conditions for intervention, not on behalf of American environmentalists, but on the part of the state by portraying it as a hero of conservation. The environmental narratives create secondary supporting roles for certain actors – those of good and bad citizens – nature's defenders and nature's destroyers. In the context of the Petén, the native Petenero as a liberated and a non-ethnic identity are allowed to play the role of good citizens and nature's defenders. Migrants and poor *campesinos* from elsewhere in Guatemala are constructed as "ignorant" and "greedy" and generally, a bad citizenry of nature's destroyers. The roles of good and bad citizens in the narrative, moreover, "sanitized" contentious questions of national identity in Guatemala by ignoring the calls of Indigenous activists for a multi-ethnic nation, and by making questions of participation in conservation, and citizenship, appear to be outside of or above ethnic or racial divisions.

The construction of memory and narrative by the environmental movement, once written across the space of the Petén in the form of the MBR, fashioned a divergence between the history of the Petén and the official representations of the Petén, between the reality of life in the Petén and the official map of the MBR. In other words, the narratives made it possible to think of the Petén as if it had an essence or a truth: a structure, with an order, a plan, and a meaning that the population needed to be taught and that had to be realized. [4] The second half of this chapter details the attempt by the state to implement this structure and the failure to make the population acquiesce to these new laws and regulations. The new map of the MBR and the new structure of the Petén failed to become hegemonic through the coercive mechanisms of the law.

ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES, NATIONALIZING NATURE, AND THE STATE

The proliferation of environmental narratives and discourses in Guatemala arose in the late 1970s at the hands of a cluster of young environmental movements composed mainly of upper class Ladinos from Guatemala City and graduates of biology at San Carlos University. Susanne Berger has suggested "the rallying cry of 'Democratization' rather than revolution impelled the emerging movement, allowing for early integration of environmental issues into the national redefinition that was underway."[5] In part this re-definition, to which Berger called attention, consisted of an attempt to re-construct the nation through the

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[4] I am drawing on arguments illustrated in greater detail by Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988)., and Martin Heideggar, "The Age of the World Picture," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).
[5] Susan A. Berger, "Environmentalism in Guatemala: When Fish Have Ears," *Latin American Research Review* 32, no. 2 (1997): 99.

insertion of the environment or "nature" into the performance of the nation as a continuous narrative of national progress.[6] In Guatemala City, environmentalists held meetings to discuss environmental problems and solutions spawning the exchange of ideas where Santiago Billy, an French ecologist living in the Petén, and Jorge Cabrera, a Guatemalan architect, met and first began to draw up proposals for the creation of a Biosphere Reserve in the Petén as early as 1982.[7]

The narratives embodied in two early reports, *Conservation in Guatemala (CG)* and *Biodiversity in Guatemala (BG)*, published in 1984 and 1988 respectively, were instrumental in creating both environmental legislation and the MBR, and therefore, will be of a central focus.[8] These two reports provided the groundwork for environmental legislation and policy and, as such, construct a desire to intervene in order to "protect" the environment. Whether it is through arguments about the loss of biodiversity, the increasing disorder of human-nature relationships, or spiralling population growth, these reports paint a picture of a world in which state intervention in the name of the environment is desirable.

These environmental narratives create worlds inhabited by certain characters: the Guatemalan state, environmentalists, scientists, foreign and domestic capital, non-governmental organizations, *campesinos,* and Indigenous peoples. Each of these characters comes to occupy a position within the narratives – that of hero, victim, or victimizer. The narrative structure then enables the reader to identify with the hero of these narratives, not

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[6] As I was gently reminded during an interview with one of the founders of the Guatemala environmental movement, we must also be careful not to homogenize "environmentalism" in Guatemala, under the rubric of "the" environmental movement. In fact, environmentalism in Guatemala was and remains astonishingly heterogeneous incorporating a diversity of political positions ranging from the Foundation for Eco-Development and Conservation (FUNDAECO) with its anti-military and democratic discourse to deep ecologists, such as Nature's Defenders Foundation, who aligned themselves both politically and financially with Guatemala's elite
[7] Interview with Santiago Billy, October 27, 2002.
[8] James D. Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," (Washington, D.C: Centre for International Development and Environment, World Resources Institute, 1988). James D. Nations and Daniel I. Komer, "Conservation in Guatemala: Final Report: Presented to World Wildlife Fund," (Washingtong, D.C: Centre for Human Ecology, 1984). The astounding degree to which these two reports are either quoted or plagiarized in later documents surrounding the reserve is further evidence of the foundational character of *BG and CG.* The new environmental narratives are also embodied in reports, newspaper articles and editorials, and more recently in popular and academic books. See for example, Collectivo Madre Selva's Friday editorials in the conservative Guatemalan newspaper, *Prensa Libre,* and Filchofo's comic-book style depiction of environmental history in Guatemala, José Manuel Chacón, *Canción Del Grillo* (Guatemala City: Filóchof, 2001)., and recent publications by FLASCO. Needless to say, I cannot pretend to stand above or outside of the narratives described in the following pages. As Jacques Derrida warns, narratives like any other genre constrains those who seek to communicate in its terms as it imposed on them the necessity of speaking in the languages of "conservation" or "the environment". As such, in this case, I am not only concerned with getting the story straight, but understanding the force of the stories or how the "truth" and knowledge are produced in texts. See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997 [1967]).

simply through the realm of facts and reason, but also in the realm of identification, imagination, subjectivity and emotion.[9]

The narratives recorded in *BG* and *CG* were based on a sense of emotional urgency of the binaries between self-other and the dangers of inversion to the matter of conserving natural resources. In order to satisfy this sense of urgency, the narratives attempted to insert conservation into the national narrative of progress and to construct the Guatemalan state as a potential hero of conservation and saviour of the nation. By granting agency, creativity, authority, and power to the state in the pursuit of progress, development and civilization, and denying the agency to others, the narrative asks the reader to identify with the state. Through this narrative and the processes of identification, it is possible to read these texts not simply for what they can tell us about the objects of environmentalism (or colonialism/imperialism) or how they are represented, but how these texts play a part in creating the conditions of intervention in the environment. As Edward Said suggests:

> The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course: but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future – these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in narrative. As one critic suggested, nations themselves *are* narrations. The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them.[10]

Not only did the environmental narratives construct certain roles for different actors, but they became involved in giving that world a meaning, an order, and a structure. It was through defining a truth, or essence, to the world of human-nature relations, against the real world of environmental degradation, that the narratives divided the world into two: one that was an ideal, a representation, and a map; the other that was the reality or the disorder that needed to be transcended. This hierarchical division of the world, thus, made possible a new order in a

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[9] The use of psychoanalysis in historical works has been a widely debated theme. Indeed the universal account of the formation of identity in the works of Freud and Lacan are deeply problematic in relation to a more deeply historical emphasis illustrated by Foucault. Accounts of identity formation in psychoanalysis tend to privilege psychosexual structures over historical and social factors. Instead, I am pursuing a more complex route that entails examining how both the historical identities are produced as the effect of discourses (Foucault's insight) including technologies of the self with understandings of identity formation and articulation as *relational*. As Diana Fuss suggests "identification is the detour through the other that defines the self. This detour through the other follows no predetermined or developmental path, nor does it travel outside of history and culture. Identification names the entry of History and culture in the subject" Diana Fuss, *Identification Papers* (New York: Routledge, 1995) 3. quoted in Diane M. Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) 29. For an exploration of the possible relationships between these theories see Ann Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucualt's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1995).
[10] Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) xiii.

set of rules for governing the conduct of the population, or what I call a green governmentality.

The themes developed first in *Conservation in Guatemala (CG)* are reiterated in a more substantial study published four years later by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Resources Institute, *Biodiversity in Guatemala (BG)*. Because of the overlap between the reports and the considerable influence of *BG*, I will place greater emphasis on the later report, *BG*. The reports begin by presenting a crisis in the environment that requires urgent intervention, and by destabilizing received values and ideals of progress that were beginning to take hold in international conferences and publications such as *Our Common Future*.[11] This crisis of values inverts the binary opposition, which is always also a hierarchy, between nature and humans in the well-known narrative of the onward march of civilization into a narrative of environmental decline. The report repeatedly describes physical environments through the tropes of "wildlands", "unaltered tracts of land", "natural landscapes." Yet, instead of allowing these tropes to signify a set of resources to be "colonized" the meanings are inverted and a new hierarchy is constituted in which unaltered "nature" is more "pure" or "pristine" than humanized "unnatural" landscapes. For example, the *BG* suggests that "as a result of physical, demographic and economic pressures, Guatemala's *natural* environment is being rapidly *altered*," and that, "Biological diversity is best preserved in situ within functioning *natural* ecosystems. The most cost-effective means to accomplish this is through the establishment of an integral system of *wildland* areas which identifies, protects, and manages the full array of *natural* communities, habitats, and species."[12] Narrations of nature as natural ensure that any human "disturbance", including history, politics, or culture, would alter "nature's" pure and timeless character.[13]

This tenuous vision of ecology, replete with the primacy of "undisturbed" nature, enables the movement of environmental concerns to a domain that is both outside of and above politics and history. *CG*, for example, researched in 1983 on the tail of the military's

[11] World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[12] Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," 6. Underline in original, italics is my emphasis.

[13] This conviction that the environment constitutes a bounded community capable of preserving its natural balance as long as humans are able to avoid "disturbing" it is a highly problematic representation of ecology. The philosophy of homeostatic nature is based on the first generation of American ecologists, led by Fredrick Clements, who believed that every ecosystem tended to develop toward a natural climax community. Although these ideas remain cemented in the imagination of the environmental movement, ecologists largely abandoned them in the 1950s. Instead, new science suggests that ecosystems are not balanced, nor predictable, but characterized by chaotic flux. Moreover, there remains virtually no ecosystem "unmanaged" by humans. Indeed, paradoxical language such as "wildlife management" is a legacy of this flawed imagery. For discussion see Daniel B. Botkin, *Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

scorched earth campaign, suggests that conservation goals may be advanced by these war-tactics of terror:

> Progress in the wise use and conservation of Guatemala's impressive natural resources has not been harmed by the country's political troubles. In fact, in an ironic twist of history, the nation's civil strife has at times worked in favour of wildlands conservation. For example, slash-and-burn farmers are hesitant to colonize wilderness areas where firefights have occurred, and the increased control of firearms in rural areas has produced a sudden resurgence in some wildlife populations. [14]

Furthermore, the report negates the existence of violence, displacement and terror that dominated the life of rural Guatemalans:

> Our contacts in Guatemala note that the August, 1983 replacement of the Guatemalan Chief of State has had no negative effect on their work and that they expect no significant changes to occur. ... Even during times when the U.S. press has painted Guatemala as a nation torn by insurgency and civil strife, the actual mood within the vast majority of the country has been one of calm and quiet – an unexpected reality that is disarming to the visitor who enters the country expecting to find a combat zone.[15]

In this formula any type of politics, including violent military repression, can be tolerated as long as the ends of conservation are attained even while negating the role of these very politics in the attainment of conservation.

In contrast, *BG* tends to ignore this political history altogether, perhaps, because Guatemala had made a delicate transition to democracy by the time the report was written. Both reports fail to make any reference to the counter-insurgency campaign, the systematic onslaught not only on Indigenous cultures, but on their subsistence base, the dislocation of populations, the relationship between petroleum exploration and human displacement, or the use of harmful pesticides as a war tactic against guerrilla populations. Furthermore, *BG* marginalizes the state's economic policies by its silence on questions of non-traditional agriculture export production and its links to ever increasing pesticide and herbicide use, the environmental effects of banana plantations, the systematic expropriation of the means of subsistence from rural populations. [16]

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[14] Nations and Komer, "Conservation in Guatemala: Final Report: Presented to World Wildlife Fund," 3-4.

[15] Ibid., 4-5.

[16] Victor Perera, in contrast, suggests that "although the blame for the degradation of Guatemala's tropical forests – and of the environment as a whole – is shared by a wide range of social and economic sectors inside the country and abroad, the bulk of accountability must once again fall on Guatemala's Ladino [military] officer class." Victor Perera, *Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 240-41. Also see Jacobo Vargas Foronda, *Guatemala: Sus Recursos Naturales, El Militarismo, Y El Imperialismo* (Mexico: Claves Latinoamercanas, 1984)., Berger, "Environmentalism in Guatemala: When Fish Have Ears.", Florence Gardner, Yaakov Garb, and Marta Williams, "Guatemala: A Political Ecology," in *Green Paper No. 5* (Berkeley, CA: Environmental Project on Central America (EPOCA), 1990).

These instances of "forgetting" are strategic erasures that make the Guatemalan state (or military) appear to play no role in causing the environmental crisis. The erasure of the state's "war on nature" and economic policy coincides with another erasure of the systematic expropriation of the basis of subsistence, land, from the rural Indigenous population. The all-too bloody history of land expropriation and failed agrarian reform, in fact, is inverted, and suddenly resources are said to be too readily accessible, apparently, resulting in the loss of biodiversity. According to the report, "Easy access to natural resources may have a greater impact on resource depletion than population growth, but the combination of easy access and growth can double the impact of access alone."[17] The authors blame environmental degradation on the "irrational" or "uneducated" behaviour of the population. The assumption that the state plays no role in causing the environmental crisis is central to establishing the fault of another set of actors – *campesinos* (both Indigenous and Ladino).

In establishing the fault of *campesinos*, the narrative recasts the history of environmental degradation as one of moral decay. The report suggests "The destruction of biological diversity and tropical forests is sometimes rationalized as the price of progress, but it results not from progress but from a *lack of understanding* or from *greed*."[18] In the following paragraph the *BG* states, "The nation's tropical forests are being harvested, cleared, and burned at ominous rates, its hillsides converted to farmland."[19] Through the absence of a subject in these statements, the authors implicitly blame *campesinos* and by chain of signification, the report represents *campesinos* as ignorant and greedy. In a reiteration of the earlier report *CG*, the representation of *campesinos* as ignorant "nature's destroyers" is reinforced by construing population growth as the primary factor behind the loss of biodiversity. According to the authors, "Underlying and reinforcing all of the threats to Guatemala's biological diversity is the nation's rapid population growth. The sad truth is that throughout most of Guatemala, rural population growth condemns farm families to perpetual poverty and dooms biological resources to continuing degradation."[20] In apocalyptic visions of population doom, the authors give urgency to the matter by suggesting "The millions who may soon be clearing the forests, polluting the rivers, and altering coastal habitats in Guatemala have already been born."[21]

This image of an ignorant and morally decrepit rural population portrays them as helpless and in need of state intervention to guide the conduct of the population. This is made possible by an "act of taking possession" that involves incessant references to the

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[17] Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," 12.

[18] Ibid., 1. emphasis mine.

[19] Ibid., 2.

[20] Ibid., 11, 62-63, Nations and Komer, "Conservation in Guatemala: Final Report: Presented to World Wildlife Fund," 33.

[21] Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," 13.

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"nation's natural resources", the "nation's biodiversity", the "nation's tropical forests" in which nature is made not only into an abstract possession of the nation, but also into a "tradition" integral to forging a national identity. Through the language of loss in the narrative of modernity, the disappearance of a nationalized nature also becomes the disappearance of a tradition that defines a culturally distinct people. In this narrative, belief, ritual, traditional social structure and a pure unmediated relation to nature are supplanted by reason and rationality. The paradox is that tradition can never be fully supplanted, because modernity exists only in relation to tradition. In an ambivalent embrace modernity both repels "nature" as an unadulterated past, even while it creates it.

This veering between nostalgia for a "undisturbed" nature and impatient progressive reprisal of the "premodern" or "undeveloped" past reveals a temporal anomaly of nationalism which, through the language of loss, turns "nature" into a metonymy for the nation. At the hand of this literary technique the Quetzal, chicle tree, and Ramon tree come to stand in for the nation. *Biodiversity in Guatemala,* thus, attempts to give birth to a new national symbol through the association of Guatemala with teeming arrays of plants and animals in which "Guatemala's ecosystems are among the world's richest...and foremost repositories of biological diversity" and "exceptionally diverse."[22] These national symbols enable national identities that are modern including all the appropriate markers of science, rationality, technology, and organization, but with symbols of "tradition" that distinguish them from other nations. As Jane Collier suggests, "Modern nationalists have to find traditions that distinguish them from other nations without marking them as traditional or backward."[23]

The preservation and management of biodiversity, as a symbol of the nation's tradition, fertility and future, is imperative for making and remaking the imagined community of the nation. Women and nature often operate in parallel discursive frameworks. The case of representational systems around nationalism is one example. Yuval-Davis and Anthias, for example, point to the specific links between women and nations, as biological reproducers of national citizens, as biological "markers" of boundaries between women and national groups; as subjects involved in the cultural transmission of national values; as signs of national differences; and finally, as participants in national struggles.[24] Through these

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[22] Ibid., 15.

[23] Jane Fishburne Collier, *From Duty to Desire: Remaking Families in a Spanish Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) 207.

[24] See N. Yuval-Davis and F. Anthias, "Introduction," in *Women-Nation-State*, ed. N. Yuval-Davis and F. Anthias (London: Macmillian, 1989). Olwig also explores the relationship between women and nature in the framework of nation-building. See Kenneth Olwig, *Landscape, Nature, and the Body Politic: From Britain's Renaissance to America's New World* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002).

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discourses women are tied to the well-being and future of the nation. As a source of the nation's fertility, nature also comes to stand alongside the feminized symbols of procreation and sexuality, as well as the concept of love for nature embedded in scenic landscapes and national symbols. The equivalences between nature/procreation/love also reinforce the conflation between nature as an objective physical environment with ideas of the normal or natural. Operating parallel to the gendered discursive framework, nature is also the subject of fears of loss of tradition, and becomes subject to surveillance and management.

National Parks are integral not only to the preservation of biodiversity, but also to the preservation of the nation. As suggested in *BG*, "Guatemala's declared and proposed wildland areas contain terrestrial and marine landscapes of outstanding beauty. The nation's beaches, volcanic peaks, tropical forests, lakes, archaeological sites, and traditional communities are all components of a valuable natural and cultural diversity . . ."[25] These national symbols foster the "development of sources of regional and national pride [that] have benefits which are not easy to evaluate but which are nonetheless real credits."[26] Moreover, the report goes on to say that:

> Guatemala has many forms of plants and animals that deserve protection because: 1/they are *unique in the world* (various salamanders, toads, fish, snakes, and at least four mammals), 2/ because they have *restricted territories* with small populations (tapirs, jaguars, manatees, monkeys, ocelotes, horned guan, macaws, quetzals, etc), 3/ because they suffer from *aggressive exploitation* at the hands of human communities (mangroves, mahogany, cedar, and various species of fish, shrimp and mollusks), 4/ because they serve as *national symbols* and part of the *nation's cultural heritage* (the quetzal, monja blanca orchid, chicle tree, and breadnut ramon), or 5/ because they remain *unknown* to western science.[27]

Citizens of the nation, then, might gain a sense of a distinct national geography vis-à-vis this "unique" nature composed of "national symbols" enclosed within the national borders.[28]

Like the Swiss Alps, the rolling highlands of Scotland, or the Canadian Rockies, particular landscapes, moreover, become privileged sites of nation building. Teeming with biodiversity and lush tropical forests, threatened by migration and development, the landscape of the Petén becomes privileged in national efforts to preserve the timeless tradition of nature. *BG* states that, "The Department of the Petén contains the largest, *unaltered* tract of humid tropical forests in Guatemala, and one of the largest tracts in Central

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[25] Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," 32.

[26] Ibid., 48.

[27] Ibid., 5. Underline in the original, italics is my emphasis.

[28] For an exploration in other contexts see Anthony D Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), Oliver Zimmer, "In Search of Natural Identity: Alpine Landscape and the Reconstruction of the Swiss Nation.," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40, no. 4 (1998).

America. However, of all forests in the country, the Petén tropical forest is under the most serious pressure from road construction, logging, colonization, and cattle ranching."[29]

In addition to nationalizing particular landscapes, the report also binds the preservation of biodiversity to the prosperity and security of the nation by noting that, "A nation that has conserved its biological diversity and tropical forests is better prepared to provide for the welfare of its citizens than a nation whose biological diversity and tropical forests have been impoverished."[30] In addition, the nation's long term security is tied to prosperity and the preservation of biological diversity. According to the authors of *BG*, "In a nation as dependent on biological resources as is Guatemala, these changes in environment and biological diversity will have serious consequences. The eradication of ecosystems and biodiversity will hamper agricultural development, export earnings, jobs and peoples' health."[31]

When the protection of biodiversity becomes equated with the protection of the nation, as in this report, distinctions between "nature's defenders" and "nature's destroyers", reminiscent of patriotism during war, become distinguishing features between "good" and "bad" citizens. In this way, the narrative leaves room for a series of secondary or supporting roles. Although, the blame for environmental degradation was placed squarely on the shoulders of *campesinos,* a new series of "good citizens" is created.

These "defenders of nature" are found in the frontier where they are a liberated, non-ethnic, and democratic lot of "peteneros" represented by harvesters of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), *xate, chicle, and* allspice.[32] According to the report, *BG,*

> One of the most interesting aspects of the harvest of these three renewable
> resources is that they promote conservation and sustained use of the Petén's
> tropical forest. Knowing that their economic future lies in the sustained use
> of xate, chicle, and allspice, families who harvest these resources are strong
> promoters of forest protection.[33]

These harvesters of NTFPs are both local, or indigenous in the sense of "being naturally from a place," yet they are not equated with any ethnic identity. As the frontier, the Petén is said to be the place where ethnic divisions melded into a consummate national identity with the promise of a common goal of protecting the nation's biodiversity. Yet, this non-ethnic identity is still indigenous, an identity of localness without the connotations of ethnic difference. It is this "indigenity" that Akhil Gupta has discussed as the new "defenders of

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[29] Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," 3. Emphasis mine.
[30] Ibid., 1.
[31] Ibid., 2.
[32] Three types of NTFPs are harvested in the Petén -- chicle latex, a base for chewing gum extracted from the chicle tree *(Maniklara zapota)*, xate palm fronds *(Chamaedorea sp.)* used in ornamental plant arrangements, and pimienata or berries of the allspice tree *(Pimenta dioica)*.
[33] Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," 11.

nature." Because the loss of nature occurs at the hands of modernity, resistance to this loss is found in that which is outside of modernity or that which modernity lacks – indigeneity.[34] Gupta, thus, suggests that:

> As the project of modernity has come under increasing attack, the evaluative scale has shifted: 'tradition' long-conceived as the chief stumbling block to the arduous pilgrimage into consumer heaven, has been increasingly replaced by 'the Indigenous', the alternative, eco-friendly, sustainable space outside, or resistant to modernity.[35]

In Guatemala, Dianne Nelson has explored the ways in which Indigenous organizing is understood, in popular culture, as "a finger in the wound." Therefore, a narrative that casts Indigenous peoples as the key to sustainable futures would risk stirring up ethnic conflicts. Instead, the figure of the "Petenero", local, but not ethnic, are cast as good environmental citizens.

In contrast to the indigenity of peteneros, migrants, especially Indigenous populations from the highlands, constitute "nature's destroyers" in what Juanita Sundberg has called "the migrant-as-culprit" discourse.[36] Migrants, displaced by the violent forces of modernity, the state, and capital, can no longer possess indigenity. Indeed, these binary axes of identity – being from here versus not from here, "nature's defenders" versus "nature's destroyers" – enable the migrant to be cast as historical jetsam, as something out of place, the irrational of history, while "being from here" enables NTFP harvesters to be cast as with roots, an order given birth to by nature, as against history, matter in place.[37] According to the *BG:*

> The Petén is the most rapidly growing area of the country in terms of population, due mostly to in-migration. Coming from different types of ecosystems into a lowland forest, many of these families are at a loss of how to use the region's resources. As a result, they end up destroying the natural resources their new lives are based upon. This pattern of destruction is

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[34] Following Akhil Gupta, I understand indigenity as a term analogous to tradition in that both tradition and indigenity are displaced or transcended by modernity. The crucial difference resides in the valences. As I discussed previously, according to supporters of modernity, tradition is that which has not been sufficiently modernized. Indigenity, by contrast, is that which modernity lacks and refers to modernity's failure. Indegenity, according to the Oxford Dictionary, can be defined as "belonging naturally to a place."

[35] Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments : Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998) 179. Gupta, however, does not account for all the critics of modernity who define tradition through the language of loss. I think that it is possible to argue that the new ecological critics understand nature as a tradition (the language of loss), while employing indigenity as the key to a sustainable future.

[36] Juanita Sundberg, "Ngo Landscapes in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala," *Geographical Review* 88, no. 3 (1999). While Sundberg highlights how migrants are blamed for deforestation, and attempts to refute these arguments based on her own careful research, she does not place this articulation in the wider historical context of ethnicity and nation-building in Guatemala.

[37] For a similar interpretation of self-other representations see Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses* (New York: Routledge, 1993) 159.

illogical for the families themselves and also eradicates future options for
the Petén's resources.[38]

The setting off of non-migrants versus migrants, good versus evil, non-ethnic identities versus ethnic-identities – represents the Edenic narrative of modernity in which harvesters of NTFPs are cast as representative of unsullied Origin, Eden before the Fall, when harmony prevailed. On the other hand, the migrant becomes the sign of the permanent wound inflicted by a violent history – the wound in the body politic. It also reflects arguments of some critics of the Pan-Mayan movement who suggest that leaving one's community results in the irreversible loss of Indigenousness.[39] Moreover, the question of "good" versus "bad" citizens appears to offer value-neutral judgments, the foundation for a national identity that transcends ethnic divisions by appeals to nature as a stable external source of nonhuman values against which human actions can be judged without much ambiguity.[40]

With the supporting roles of nature's defenders and nature's destroyers, the narrative makes the state into a hero when it returns to take the role of the saviour of the nation by preserving biodiversity and promoting security, prosperity, and progress through intervention, surveillance, discipline, and regulation. The narrative develops this role as hero through a series of policies. On a national level some of these policies include:

> 1/ Develop a national strategy on biological diversity and tropical forests, 2/ Establish a national system of 25 priority-protected areas that represent Guatemala's diversity of ecosystems. Place these areas under a single Government of Guatemala institution, 3/Focus development efforts on the sustainable economic development of renewable natural resources, 4/ Focus additional sustainable development efforts on the Department of the Petén, 6/ Emphasize Guatemala's positive potential in the conservation of tropical forests and biological diversity, 8/ Focus on necessary changes in institutional and legislative structure.[41]

The proposal to create a system of 25 priority protected areas may also be seen as a surveillance mechanism making visible "unaltered" nature through a policing network of park guards. The report's focus on sustainable economic development is also a means to discipline and regulate human conduct in relation to nature. In the Petén, the objective is "to conserve the tropical forests and biological diversity of the Department of the Petén in order

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[38] Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," 89.

[39] Kay B. Warren, *Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). See also, Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* 37, 128-36.

[40] As recent scholarship has demonstrated, what counts as "nature" or "natural" is, in fact, constructed; and as I have attempted to illustrate, is embedded in questions of race, class, and gender. As such, nature is hardly external or prior to culture. See for example, Richard Peet and Michael Watts, eds., *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996)., Donna Jeanne Haraway, *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science* (New York: Routledge, 1989).,Noel Castree and Bruce Braun, eds., *Social Nature: Theory, Practice and Politics* (Massachusetts and Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

[41] Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," 18-19.

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to promote economic development based on the sustainable use of forests and other natural resources."[42] The report makes the following recommendations:

> 1/ Establish a network of effective protected areas in the Petén, with adequate personnel and equipment. 2/ Direct agricultural colonization toward non-fragile areas with appropriate soils and water. 3/ Halt the clearing of tropical forest for extensive beef cattle production. 4/ Develop sustainable agro ecosystems and extractive reserves in cooperation with local communities. Encourage alternatives to slash-and-burn agriculture. 5/ Halt government or bilateral agency subsidies to the currently destructive logging industry in the form of road construction, subsidized credit, and laws that promote the export of commercial hardwoods. 6/ Cease the poaching of mahogany and tropical (Spanish) cedar by illegal Mexican logging operations along the Petén's northern border. 7/ Promote the development of sustainable timber production not in primary forests, but in already disturbed secondary growth forests and played-out agricultural lands that can be reforested. Where primary forests are to be logged, activities should ensure both long-term timber production and sustainable production of other forest goods (xate, allspice, chicle, orchids), which can far exceed timber in economic value. 8/ Promote value-added timber based industry only if they focus on secondary growth forests and reforested lands – not on primary forests to be 'mined' for one-time production.[43]

For the resolution of the narrative, the salvation of nature requires state intervention in human-nature relations. Through this resolution, the role of the state as the primary force in our lives, as the ultimate guarantor of freedom, agency, well-being and development, is reaffirmed and made desirable. It is the hero, in contrast to other characters or objects, upon which it acts, and is portrayed as having agency and creativity, capable of giving birth to new creations, able to imagine and form worlds in its own image. These policies are, indeed, founded on the authoritarian ideal that environmental "harmony" should be sought through state control based on the modernist claim that planning is neutral and perfectible.[44] In a mirror of the "balance of nature" mythology, these policies also reflect a modern tendency to seek this "harmony" through appeals to nonhuman nature as the objective measure against which human uses of nature should be judged.[45]

Just as the state is granted a human-like subjectivity, it is constructed in opposition to the Indigenous peoples and *campesinos*. The constitution of Indigenous peoples and *campesinos* as backward, ignorant, or greedy is essential to the construction of the all-powerful, all-knowing state. The plot of the narrative, like that of the colonial narrative,

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[42] Ibid., 89.
[43] Ibid., 89-90.
[44] For a lucid exploration see, James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998).
[45] As previously suggested, these assumptions are called into question by recognizing the dynamism of ecosystems as well as the long history of human presence. See William Cronon, "Introduction: In Search of Nature," in *Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature*, ed. William Cronon (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 25.

derives from imagining the citizens-subject as "a reformed, recognizable Other, *as a subject of difference that is almost the same but not quite.*"[46] The state's journey, as one of a hero, remains that of progress or development of the citizen-subject. The plot narrative, however, always ensures that the citizen-subject never is able to claim the full subjectivity or agency that is reserved for the heroic character. The aim is to not to make further heroes, of equal status, but making objects in the image of the state, who reflect its desires, ambitions, but do not quite achieve them.

This story of a heroic state is also a familiar Edenic tale of original pristine nature lost through culpable human actions and moral decay, "greed" and "ignorance" that results in the Fall and environmental degradation. A return to nature in sustainable development and the preservation of biodiversity offers prosperity, health and happiness similar to the recovery of paradise. Sustainable development, therefore, is a space of regeneration and the renewal of moral values. This tale of paradise lost and paradise regained exhibits a nostalgia for a perfect past and deep fears of continuing loss. As environmental historian William Cronon suggests:

> the role of the narrative is always to project onto actual physical nature one of the most powerful and value-laden fables in the Western intellectual tradition. The myth of Eden describes a perfect landscape, a place so benign and beautiful and good that the imperative to preserve or restore it could be questioned only by those who ally themselves with evil.[47]

By envisioning "undisturbed" nature as similar to paradise, wilderness areas and biodiversity become the locus of an epic struggle between evil civilization and benign nature, which makes all other social, political, and moral concerns trivial.

This Edenic narrative, however, is not simply a refraction of western anxieties around human-land relationships, but instead reflects the undercurrents of the Guatemalan "wounded body politic" as it scrambles to heal and construct harmony through a fragile democracy and the initiation of peace negotiations. In an uneasy paradox, the narrative of loss and renewal turns upon Guatemala's bloody past, while the report erases the memory of this same history.[48] As Lyotard reminds us "a collectivity that takes narrative as its key form of competence has no need to remember its past . . . The narrative's reference may seem to belong to the past, but in reality it is always contemporaneous with the act of recitation."[49]

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[46] Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* 86. Emphasis in the original.

[47] William Cronon, ed., *Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995) 37. See also Candace Slater, "Amazonia as Edenic Narrative," in *Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature*, ed. William Cronon (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995).

[48] The role of the environmental movement in reconstructing the role of the state as the primary enframer of our lives is particularly important in later chapters.

[49] Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) 22. Paul De Man similarly defines modernity as "the ability to *forget* whatever precedes a present situation." Paul de

Like the military's appropriation of Indigenous culture in what Jennifer Schrimer has called the Sanctioned Maya, this report represents a "politically correct" environmentalism, in which nature is appropriated as tradition for founding national unity and harmony, while it is also sanitized by forgetting the past and erasing the imagery of violence across the landscape, the war on nature and the expropriation of land.[50] Indeed, this appeal to "nature's defenders" in the construction of citizenship also "sanitizes" national identity by appropriating "indigenity" in harvesters of NTFPs as non-ethnic identity. These articulations of environmental concern, thus, are not merely North American anxieties around "human-land relations" in the context of late capitalism, but constitute one set of attempts to reconstruct the nation in Guatemala.

These representations of nature and nation, of good citizens and bad citizens, are written under the scientific signs of truth and objectivity. The great attraction of "nature" in these narratives is that it allows people to ground their moral vision in external reality and to make disputed claims, such as those of ethnicity and nationhood in Guatemala seem innate, essential, eternal, and non-negotiable. This narrative then provides the rules of right and wrong that is the foundation for laws and the formal delimitation of power, as well as the blueprint from which to direct human conduct in relation to nature.[51] This blueprint from which to direct human conduct, or governmentality, moreover, is based one the idea that external nature provides the "truth" or "essence" of the Petén as opposed to the real history of environmental degradation. This division of the world into two: that of the representation with its truth or essence and that of real, has the effect of making it appear as if it had structure, an order, or a plan. In the prescriptive use of scientific knowledge in the pursuit of environmental harmony then this division articulates a hierarchy in which the ideal, the representation, and truth must be taught and realized. In turn, this formal delimitation of power reproduces its own truth.[52] In short, through this fashioning of memory, not only does the new national narrative construct a coherent identity, but also the historical-epistemological conditions are established for the emergence of the environment as an object

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Man, "Literary History and Literary Modernity," *Daedalus* 99, no. Spring (1970): 387. See also Chris Kent, "History: The Discipline of Memory and of Forgetting," *The Structurist* 37/38 (1997).

[50] For the "sanctioned maya" see Chapter One, and Jennifer Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998) 115-17.

[51] There was (and still is) a near universal assumption within environmentalism that scientific ecology provides both a real model of how the world actually is, and a prescriptive model of how humans ought to fit in. Donald Worster, *Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 367, Peter C. van Wyck, *Primitives in the Wilderness* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997) 48.

[52] Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980) 93.

of state policy, and later the construction of environmental citizens through the "environmental mobilization of the population" through these policies. [53]

DESIGNING THE MAYAN BIOSPHERE RESERVE

In early 1990, the body of this new national narrative was written across the landscape of the Petén when the Guatemalan Congress approved the creation of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve, over the base of FYDEP's Forest Reserve. Through Decree 5-90, the Mayan Biosphere Reserve was created with an extension of 2,113,000 hectares comprising 60percent of the territory of the Petén, and approximately 19percent of Guatemala's territory. By August of 1990, funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) led to the approval of the Mayan Biosphere Project (MAYREMA), a project designed by Guatemalan environmentalists and politicians to implement the Reserve. The Reserve was to be part of a three-nation Mayan Peace Park that would later include proposed reserves in the bordering Yucactán Peninsula and in Belize.

Close ties between an environmental movement and the government led to a series of new environmental laws. Architect Jorge Cabrera, brother of Alfonso Cabrera the new head of the National Congress, and ecologist Marco Cerezo Blandón, son of President Cerezo, were instrumental in strengthening the developing environmental legislation. Jorge Cabrera added three articles to the 1985 Constitution as the basis for future environmental legislation in Guatemala. Articles 125, 126, and 127 on the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources, forestation, and water demanded sustainable use of those resources and the passage of future legislation. By December of 1986, Cabrera had almost single-handedly drawn up the Environmental Protection and Improvement Law, and the Protected Areas Law was passed in January of 1989.[54] Each law created a council, respectively National Environmental Council (CONAMA) and National Council for Protected Areas (CONAP), which were dependencies of the executive branch without ministerial powers, and composed of representatives from civil society such as Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF), Journalist Association of Guatemala (APG), Conservation Studies Centre, San Carlos University (CECON/USAC) as well as the NGO, Defensores de la Naturaleza. This legislation would provide the foundations for the birth of environmental governmentality.

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[53] For an examination of the green governmentality and the mobolization of the population through policy papers see Eric Darier, "Environmental Governmentality: The Case of Canada's Green Plan," *Environmental Politics* 5, no. 4 (1996): 594-95.

[54] "Ley De Areas Protegidas," in *Decreto Número 4-89* (1989), "Ley De Protección Y Mejoramiento Del Medio Ambiente," in *Decreto Número 68-86* (1986).

Alongside environmental legislation, the Petén became the locus of concerns surrounding territorial sovereignty, and the extension of the state into hitherto isolated areas. Article 15 of the 1985 Constitution declared the economic integration of the Petén a matter of national urgency. Through mechanisms of the newly established Urban and Rural Development Councils, the central government scheduled FYDEP to be liquidated and its responsibilities transferred to the central government. The proliferation of the state bureaucracies, laws, and institutions in the Petén increased the powers of an expanding and centralizing national government.

Outside of the National Congress, Wilbur Garret, editor and publisher of *The National Geographic*, proposed "La Ruta Maya," an ecotourist project that would save chief archaeological sites in the region, especially in the Petén.[55] These futuristic development utopias were contrasted with corrupt images of contraband, illegal felling of trees, and trafficking of endangered species reported in Guatemalan newspapers, and other magazines such as *The Nation*. In August of 1989, a nationwide publicity campaign and a timely international response prevented the transnational corporation Exxon from drilling exploratory wells within the boundaries of El Ceibal National Park, one of the Petén's classical archaeological sites, as well as an important forest and wildlife reserve.[56] Extensive press coverage of the Exxon negotiations and the problems of illegal logging brought the concepts of "ecology" and "biosphere reserve" into public discourse.

Only a few short months later, the Technical Study for the MBR, required by law for the creation of a new protected area, was completed.[57] The report, repeating in verbatim arguments presented in *Biodiversity in Guatemala*, outlined the basis for a new map of the Petén detailing the latitude and longitude boundaries of the new national parks, and the expansion of existing ones. Dividing the Petén's landscape into protected areas and non-protected areas constructed space as something neutral and abstract, a series of inert frames or containers.[58] The maps created by the Technical Study were also based on mathematical forms of measurements, which constructed the space of the Petén as an abstract, universal space, and one that was knowable to bureaucracies, state-planners, and non-governmental organizations, and therefore also available for appropriation by the state.[59] If as Foucault has suggested, space is always a container of social power, then the re-organization of space

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[55] Victor Perera, "A Forest Dies in Guatemala," *The Nation* (1989): 521.

[56] Ibid.: 523.

[57] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya: Estudio Tecnico," (Guatemala City: 1989).

[58] For a similar discussion see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* 44-46.

[59] See David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Massachusetts and Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) 254, Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* 25-52.

through the map of the MBR was also a reorganization of the framework through which this power is expressed.

These new "scientific" maps overlapped and competed with local forms of measurement based in travel times between places, rather than the distance measures of kilometres; by visual markers such as roads and buildings; as well as by the location of *chicle* camps and villages.[60] These forms of measurement were intimately intertwined with local resource use such as maps of *chicle, xate,* and *pimienta* extraction and land tenure systems. These maps, thus, were grounded in fluid and changing customs, or laws, of resource use.[61] Many different local, unofficial maps and laws proliferated as a multi-layered landscape based on measurements that, as James Scott has suggested in another context, were "decidedly *local, interested, contextual,* and *historically specific.*"[62]

The report justified supplanting existing unofficial land tenure regimes and local maps by representing communities living within these boundaries as aliens or foreigners. The technical report stated that in "the area proposed here as the Mayan Biosphere Reserve, there are no large land tenure problems. The majority of the area of the Reserve falls inside in Forest Reserve 17' 10" established by FYDEP . . . Above 17'10" there are no legal private titles, only invaders."[63] By supplanting local names for the geographical area, the area was remade anew, appropriated, and local alien names were erased. The act of naming, as Stephan Greenblatt has suggested, was also an act of taking possession.[64] In interviews, the architects of the reserve often noted that the MBR would be located in national lands and, therefore, they felt little need to consult local communities on their actions. In the acts of naming and mapping, the MBR was made into the property of a sovereign state, which would then manage it for the nation as a whole.

Belonging to the imagined community of the nation, the MBR found its justification in the laws of the state, rather than in the local, unofficial laws that governed resource use.[65] Effacing local human-nature relations embedded in unofficial maps and laws, the Petén could be made into an empty space, devoid of history and culture, and therefore also a pure fantasy space onto which the narrative of sustainable development could be written. By

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[60] Local versus official and scientific maps are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
[61] See Barbara L. Dugelby, "Chicle Latex Extraction in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve: Behavioral, Institutional, and Ecological Factors Affecting Sustainability" (Doctoral Dissertation, Duke University, 1995). These local maps will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four.
[62] Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* 27.
[63] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya: Estudio Tecnico," 20.
[64] Stephen Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 63.
[65] For a discussion of this process elsewhere see Olwig, *Landscape, Nature, and the Body Politic: From Britain's Renaissance to America's New World* 199-201.

erasing existing political and social landscapes, new forms of political and governmental action on the environment were made possible.[66]

The final map of the MBR was divided up according to Man in the Biosphere regulations laid out by United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO). In this official map there are three different zones –nuclear zones, surrounded by multiple-use zones and buffer zones. [67] (For a map see Figure 2 on the following page.)

The mapping of the MBR enabled this extension of the state through a re-territorialization and redefinition of human-nature relationships according to different zones. In the newly re-defined map, the seven core areas, which cover 800,000 hectares, "[a]re strict conservation areas. The Nuclear Zones (NZ) are the heart of the Biosphere Reserve, with wildlife and archaeological areas strictly protected and maintained free of human intervention. They are places where natural processes, including biological evolution, continue without disturbance, and, for ecological, scientific, and cultural reasons, will be without human establishments and without agricultural or ranching development . . . The strict conservation zones . . . should be a priority activity."[68] The Multiple-Use Zone (MUZ), which consists of another 800,000 hectares, was defined as "the areas that act as a buffer to the nuclear zones, and are destined to different activities and sustainable uses, according to

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[66] Contrary to Juanita Sundberg's claim that the creation of the MBR "involved depolitizing an existing social and political landscape," including local maps, memories and subjectivities, as produced in discursive relations of power cannot be depoliticised. Sundberg, "Ngo Landscapes in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala," 401. My objection to critical theories of "depoliticization" is that they are limited in their potential to imagine forms of resistance because they fail to account for political power beyond the public sphere or the state. Rather than relocating an analysis of politics itself, critical theorists tend to equate politisation with the movement of issues into the public sphere from the "depoliticised" arenas of the family, economy, or bureaucracy. See Barbara Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999) especially pgs 113-25. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, "Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government," *British Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 2 (1992).

[67] This map was not the original one presented to Congress which followed a different zonification scheme from the typical UNESCO scheme. It included: 1) Strict Conservation Zones, or Nuclear Zones 2) Traditional Sustainable Use Zone, which would be "dedicated to the extraction of *xate, pimienta, chicle, mambre* and other wild plants, seeds, woods, fauna that can be harvested and restricted zones to develop traditional agriculture and ranching." 3) Special Use Zone; which would be "dedicated for the activities that are not necessarily related to nature conservation but that have been more or less permanently in the past zones that the economy of the region needs," as well as 4) Recuperation Zone, 5) Cultural and Archaeological Zone. The change in language, from "Traditional Sustainable Use" to a "Buffer Zone," for example, is also a movement from recognition of existing land use to a military language designating a war being waged between "wilderness" and "civilization", between National Parks and what lies beyond. The map also transforms through military metaphors what were hitherto regarded principally as local economic concerns of harvesting non-timber products and logging for example, into national security issues of biodiversity protection and sovereign property rights. This transformation in the names and signs of spatial order also modifies the terms and meanings of sustainable development. Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya: Estudio Tecnico," 27-28.

[68] (CONAP) Consejo Nacional de Áreas Protegidas, "Plan Maestro De La Reserva De La Biósfera Maya," (Flores, Guatemala: CONAP, 1992), 16.

the potential of the resources; constitutes approximately 50 percent of the MBR and is dedicated

Figure 2. Map of the Mayan Biosphere with Zones
Provided by CARE, USAID, CONAP Censo de Población, Base De Datos Sobre
Población, Tierras y Medio Ambiente en la Reserva de la Biosfera Maya.

to the sustainable use of *xate, pimienta, chicle, mimbre* and other wild plants, seeds, woods, fauna and restricted areas for the development of traditional activities and the use of non-renewable resources under strict control."[69] The multiple-use zone remains national lands, and private property is prohibited. The buffer zone covers approximately 500,000 hectares. According to the Master Plan:

> The principal objective of the Buffer Zone is to alleviate pressure on the MBR through the stabilization of appropriate uses of land and natural resources in the area adjacent to the MBR. In this zone they orientate neighbouring communities through environmental education and rural extension programs, toward forms of sustainable use of lands that does not depend on the exploitation of natural resources in the MBR and with this, permits their conservation.[70]

By mapping the reserve into different zones – nuclear, multiple-use, and buffer – each defined by different ecological functions, uses, and management structures, the state sought to redefine and reclassify territory and human-nature relationships according to a new design and the Edenic narrative is reflected in this design. The primary goal of the MBR, "...to yield a harmonious and sustainable development in the region, guaranteeing the

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[69] Ibid., 16-17.
[70] Ibid., 17-18.

stability of the present natural and cultural resources," illustrates this desire to return to harmony.[71] Likewise, the protection of "unaltered" tracts of lands surrounded by buffer and multiple use zones illustrates a desire to protect "pristine nature" from the onward march of maligned civilization in the Edenic narrative. Thus, the map of the MBR comes to contain within it the historical forgetting that enables the state to play the role of hero in the saga of environmental salvation.

The narrative written upon the MBR is, as suggested earlier, founded on the opposition between culture and nature, civilization and wilderness. The nuclear zone is portrayed in opposition to life and nature outside of the MBR in a wilderness-civilization binary. The buffer and multiple-use zones, however, are "in-between" these two poles and are neither "nature", nor "culture", neither "tradition" nor "modern". As Roman Carrera illustrated, in speaking of the multiple-use zone, "Therefore, to change this traditional system to a system, not modern, but different, with community participation was very difficult."[72] These in-between spaces, therefore, are hybrid spaces, which also disrupt the purity of these categories and offer the possibility of contesting the Edenic narrative founded upon them. The processes of contestation, negotiation and resistance are also profoundly democratic practices that offer the possibility of expanding the terrains upon which citizenship, being "nature's defenders" or "nature's destroyers", are determined. Yet, these spaces are also made into the spaces of constructing environmental citizens, of indigenity, the sustainable eco-friendly alternative, which rustles up the possibility of a "return to Eden" and the national ideal of harmony and renewal and debates over how to govern. The multiple use and buffer zones are complex and ambivalent spaces of power and resistance, hybridity and indigenity, democracy and governmentality.

Reclassifying and redefining human-nature relations according to an abstract map slotted population and nature into the containers of different zones, where they can be isolated, enumerated and fixed. The breaking down of the life of both humans and nature into a specific series of functions according to this zoning scheme, whether the biological function of watershed protection, or the economic function of *chicle* harvesting, reduced the Petén to a system of locations and the objects contained there, a framework and what was enframed. This process of determining an exterior and an interior according to the ecological functions, uses and management plans, also created a place from which an individual can observe. Therefore, this breaking of life down into categories makes each zone appear as a picture or as a world with an order, a plan, or a meaning. Each zone of the MBR contains an ideal "order", representation, or a metaphysical structure, which is held up for the measurement of the success of all projects. The illusion of representations like the

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[71] Ibid., 1.
[72] Interview with the author September 17, 2002.

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map, the scientific biodiversity report, and the survey is that they appeared to be without illusion. By promising to represent things faithfully, they allow readers to apprehend an appearance of order thought to emanate from nature itself, rather than from the ordering of appearances in representational practices. This also enabled the initiation of regimes of power and knowledge that at once authorized particular activities and facilitated new forms of governmentality. Similar to the military's model villages, the map of the MBR sought to overcome the crisis of governmentality and the linked problems of visibility, accessibility and ultimately surveillance, discipline and control over territory by giving a legibility to life through a new spatial order. The MBR, thus, was in many ways a type of reflection of the Model Villages, another "laboratory of modernity," where fantasies of a perfected Guatemalan nation could be tested and refined.

LAW AND ORDER IN THE MAYA BIOSPHERE RESERVE

The implementation of this new metaphysical structure signified the execution of a new spatial order and the expansion of state bureaucracies and laws. As Andres Lenhoff, the first Executive Secretary of CONAP, remarked, "Our first job in the Petén will be to make our presence felt. Once we have laid down precedents for a strict protection of the nuclear zones, then we can negotiate with interested parties for a limited exploitation of the secondary areas."[73] The problem of achieving order in the landscape appears simultaneously with the coterminous threat of disorder, which must be contained and controlled. As Hilda Rivera, the first director of CONAP Region VIII (Petén), demonstrates:

> When I entered the Petén to work, the first thing I did was to locate the areas, not of where there was corruption, because at this moment it was not corruption, but *disorder*, where everyone cut wood where they wanted, where everyone extracted the quantity of animals that they wanted, and where everyone did what they wanted, this was the reality. . . so I set-up control districts...[74]

Between May 17 and June 1990, a team of CONAP officials visited a series of communities – El Cruce a Dos Aguadas, Yaxha, Uaxactun, Caoba, Santa Rosa La Zarca – establishing control districts.[75]

The implementation of the reserve and consolidation of governmentality coincided with the state imperative of solidifying national territorial integrity. As part of the justification for the state's claim to sovereign property rights in the MBR, certain environmentalists saw communities inside the MBR as invaders. Yet, as one *campesino*

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[73] Perera, *Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy* 246.

[74] Interview with the author November 2, 2002, emphasis mine.

[75] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Memoria De Labores De La Region Viii Peten, Conap 1991," (Peten, Guatemala: 1991), Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Plan Conap 1990," (1990).

encapsulated, "I wonder who invaded where, the communities or the state . . . it was the state that invaded the territory, because they [the communities] had lived here for many decades, and were not consulted in the creation of the MBR."[76]

The new order based on the higher truth of "biodiversity" or "conservation" also made necessary whole new sets of interventions into the daily lives of people living in the Petén. CONAP personnel proceeded to arrest local people for activities that were made illegal after the reserve was declared. Certain daily activities became infractions or crimes under the new laws.[77] Hunting and logging for domestic purposes were regulated; in certain zones logging, gathering forest products, and slash-and-burn cultivation were forbidden.[78]

Enforcing law and order in the MBR also required confronting the traditional authorities in the Petén – the economic elite, the military and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). In the face of a weak central government, CONAP relied on substantial funding from the German and American governments. With control over financing in foreign hands, CONAP had little room to negotiate with petroleum and forestry industries, large ranchers who wanted access to more land, USAID who thought the reserve should be smaller, but most significantly with military officers who were illegally extracting timber.[79]

In March 1991, the new President Jorge Serrano Elías appointed Antonio Ferraté to head CONAMA. With political backing at the national level, Ferraté began his tenure by revoking all logging concessions inside the MBR.[80] In an attempt to legitimize the state's ability to authorize and prohibit the conduct of loggers and drawing on the new environmental narratives, Ferraté stated, "If we give in to the loggers' demands and grant concessions, thousands of hungry colonists will use the logging roads to slash and burn protected forest for their corn fields. And the cattle ranchers and oil drillers will be right behind them."[81] In June of 1991, these prohibitions were tempered by a report that promised logging concessions would be awarded in 1992 after the finalization of the MBR Master Plan.[82] These promises, however, never materialized, leading some members of The Association of Timber Industries of the Petén (AIMPE) to close operations altogether or to work illegally by paying off military officers and CONAP officials.[83] Two logging firms that

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[76]Marcedonio Cortave, Interview 1 with the author, September 28, 2002.

[77] SEGEPLAN, "Plan De Desarrollo Integrado De Petén: Diagnostic General De Petén," (Santa Elena, Guatemala: 1992), 13.

[78] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Estado De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya, 1996," (Santa Elena, Petén, Guatemala: 1996).

[79] Santiago Billy, Interview with the author, October 27, 2002.

[80] Victor Perera, "Guatemala Guards Its Rain Forests," The Nation (1991): 54., and Santiago Billy Interview with the author, October 27, 2002.

[81] Quoted in Ibid.

[82] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Diagnostico Y Propuesta De Administracion De Recursos Naturales Renovables En Areas Protegidas De Peten," (San Benito, Peten: 1991), 9.

[83] (PAFG) Plan Acción Forestal para Guatemala, "Concesiones Forestales En Gran Escala: Caso Guatemala," (Guatemala, Guatemala: Comisión Centro Américana de Ambiente y Desarrollo, World

were found to be operating illegally in Sierra Lacandon National Park in 1992 continued to carry truck loads of mahogany from the forest for months, despite the fact that there was only one, monitored, point of exit from the Park.[84] It is often reported that illegal loggers and other industrialists, who wanted to open access to timber and land within the MBR, spread rumours in order to encourage the communities to rise up against CONAP.[85]

The Serrano government also sought to bring the military alongside conservation. The new Defence Minister, General Luis Enrique Garcia Mendoza, attempted to halt contraband along the Mexican border by deploying two hundred soldiers and elements of Treasury Police and CONAP resource monitors to patrol the northern border. In March of 1991, the army confiscated 3,500 contraband mahoganies and Spanish cedars near the border, seized vans, bulldozers, and chain saws, and arrested seventy-two Mexican contrabandists.[86] A former governor of the Petén, Abraham Sión Lizama, who allegedly collaborated with the contrabandists, was arrested. The charges were later dropped by a Petén judge. Although the public face of the army supported conservation, the military itself was deeply involved in the contraband in illegal timber and, according to conservationists, sent death threats to CONAP officials.

The state also sought greater control in policing National Park borders as well as the creation of new parks. CONAP recommended "increas[ing] the number of park guards in order to effectively control the area," and the extension of the state into more areas of the Petén through the creation of new control posts, "in order to achieve the incorporation and control of all of the Reserve in the Petén."[87] *The Emergency Protection Program of the Tropical Forest in the Petén* also cited the need for immediate action: "It is urgent to program and implement appropriate mediums to stop the process of destruction of the forests. In the short term these actions must concentrate on the application of existing [environmental] protection and management laws, declare and manage new protected areas, intensify environmental education and consciousness-raising, and reinforce institutions. In the medium and long term, there will have to be established the bases for actions with the objective of the sustainable development of resources."[88]

Wildlife Fund, World Resources Institute, Agencia Finlandesa de Desarrolllo Internacional, 1992), 36.

[84] John Beavers, "Tenure and Forest Exploitation in the Petén and Franja Transversal Del Norte Regions of Guatemala," (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 1994).

[85] Norman B. Schwartz et al., "Socioeconomic Monitoring and Evaluation of Conservation International/Propetén Project in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve,1992-1996," (Washington, D.C: Conservation International and USAID, 1996). Also interviews with various individuals.

[86] Perera, "Guatemala Guards Its Rain Forests," 56.

[87] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Memoria De Labores De La Region Viii Peten, Conap 1991," 44-45.

[88] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Program De Emergencia De Proteccion De La Selva Tropical En Peten," (Santa Elena, Peten: 1991).

In spite of CONAP's conservation efforts and support from the executive branch of the national government, the military and other departments had conflicting opinions on conservation. Indeed, against the will of CONAP officials, the Guatemalan state awarded a new petroleum concession to Basic Resources International in the Laguna del Tigre National Park. This new concession, in violation of the law and regulation governing the Reserve, granted the company exploration and extraction rights to 475,000 acres in Laguna del Tigre. An earlier concession, awarded in 1985 prior to the creation of the Reserve, covered only a small fraction of the National Park, but the new contract covered 55.18 percent of the area.[89] The Guatemalan state, thus, was hardly a homogenous entity with a unified and rational consciousness.[90]

The incoherency of state policies and scattered application of the law, however, while perhaps not achieving the goals and aims of conservation, reproduced distinctions between rich and poor, *campesinos* and elite authorities, modes of inclusion and exclusion. In the words of a *campesino*:

> There were cases in which *campesinos* were jailed to call attention to taking something that was prohibited in the reserve, such as flora and fauna, while *campesinos* watched on some occasions military officers leaving with endangered species or a truck full of timber, and no one said anything. There was the idea among *campesinos* and Indigenous in the area, that the law was for the poor not for the rich.[91]

As Foucault has suggested elsewhere, the mechanisms of the law worked to differentiate among infractions as a general tactic of subjection, and were not necessarily intended to eliminate offences, or to render "docile" those who transgressed the law. The legal system is a way of marking boundaries and modes of exclusion, "of setting forth the limits of tolerance, giving free rein to some, putting pressure on others, or excluding a particular section, of making others useful, of neutralizing certain individuals, and of profiting from others."[92] Through these tactics of legal differentiation, applying the law to some and not to others, class distinctions and modes of inclusion and exclusion were made and remade. Ultimately, the judicial system assigned relatively greater licence to the elite to transgress the law, while *campesinos'* illegalities became a type of delinquency reinforcing hegemonic

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[89] Amy B. Rosenfeld, "Exploración Petrolera En La Selva," in *Trece Maneras De Contemplar Una Selva Tropical: La Reserva De La Biósfera Maya De Guatemala*, ed. James D. Nations and Ingrid Q. Neubauer (Washington, D.C: Conservation International, 1999), 74.

[90] The "state" as an analytical category is all too often treated as if it has a consciousness or rational beyond the individual actors that make up the state apparatus. Perhaps looking at how small, everyday rationales and habits of bureaucracies, politicians, and extension workers engaged in governmentality add up to the larger picture could tell us something more about how hegemony is not monolithic, closed nor uniform.

[91] Marcedonio Cortave; Interview 1 with the author, September 28, 2002.

[92] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 272.

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discourses that excluded *campesinos* from participation in conservation politics, and necessitated ever-greater surveillance and control.

While the state's network of legal mechanisms might produce differentiation, it simultaneously attempts to homogenize and normalize through the same judicial system. The law, therefore, was meant to reform, to rehabilitate, and make law-abiding, nature-defending individuals whose modes of social control rested not on customary and communal authority, but the authority of the state. The authority to govern, therefore, rested on supplanting existing local, unofficial laws for resource use, with a new "order" grounded in a metaphysical structure that provided a position from which to judge human's relationship to nature. This new order, as evidenced by *Biodiversity in Guatemala,* was reliant upon a series of expert knowledges denoting environmental aberration and environmental destruction. These experts, then, come to act as technicians and "normative judges" responsible for the application and development of disciplinary and corrective programs.[93]

Yet, effecting detailed, individualized supervision, it would soon be realized, was beyond the blunt prohibitive capacities of the judicial system, paving the way for governmentalization of the state apparatuses through non-state actors, such as NGOs. In the words of José Roman Carrera, assistant to the first director of CONAP Region VIII (Petén), "In practical terms in the field, it [the MBR] was a map, nothing more . . . In practice, the concept of the MBR, established in the law, was going to fail, because there was no experience in protected areas in Guatemala, much less in the Petén: second, there were certain traditional cultures already established that exploited resources in a *disordered* way: third, there was political *disorder* because there was a transition between old and new institutions and professionals."[94]

Important symbols of CONAP's new authority in the Petén were check points, control posts and laws embedded in an official national, yet locally unrecognized, map of the MBR. As these symbols of authority came to clash with the local everyday reality of human-nature and community relations in the Petén, these symbols also became points of resistance. According to one CONAP technician, "Our position quickly began to form barriers, and conflicts [choque]. At the root of this surged a state of ungovernability. We couldn't enter into many of the communities, we began to see more deforestation, because everyone would rise up and cut down [botar] more forest, there were more forest fires . . . because they [the communities] were angry with the way that we were working....they burnt cars, they burnt control posts, there were kidnappings."[95]

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[93] Ibid. 128-44.
[94] Interview with the author September 17, 2002, emphasis mine.
[95] Erick Cuellar, Interview 1 with the author, August 29, 2002.

In the community of Cruce a Dos Aguadas the imposition of tight regulations virtually shut down the illegal logging operations in the community. Hostility rose against CONAP interference and by 1992 a riot ensued in which the CONAP guard station and employee buildings were burned to the ground, including personal belongings of the CONAP workers, and villagers threatened to destroy a CATIE research facility.[96] In spite of identification and arrest, no charges were pressed against the offending parties. Resistance to law and order in the Petén also took the form of contesting the meanings of the sacred words associated with the MBR – conservation and biodiversity. As one NGO director said, "the word 'conservation' quickly became associated with 'displacement', 'no access to resources', and 'no economic opportunities'".[97]

As violent resistance to state policies abounded it became evident that consolidating governmentality in the Petén required the refinement and the confirmation of an order of sustainable development through which to direct policies and programs and enframe the lives of the population. This refinement of policies would then allow mechanisms for getting the population to govern themselves so that individuals would see their own interest in conserving the nation's resources.

In August of 1990, the German government financed a systematic and long-term development project, the Integrated Development Plan of the Petén.[98] The *Integrated Development Plan of the Petén*, consisted of three lengthy volumes: the General Diagnostic of the Petén, The Territorial Legalization and the Concept of Development, and the Development Program.[99] The report was designed to nuance and clarify the new conservation "order" to be implemented in the Petén by fulfilling the need for detailed knowledge of the population and resources:

> In the Government's decision to establish rational order in a situation of uncontrolled development, in the beginning, it is normal that one does not clearly see the conceptual, administrative, technical knowledge, and financial resource bases needed to execute rational and consistent politics. This is the situation that currently prevails in the Petén . . . In order to be able to begin to establish these conceptual bases, it is necessary to rely on a

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[96] Beavers, "Tenure and Forest Exploitation in the Petén and Franja Transversal Del Norte Regions of Guatemala.", Charles Clark, "Seeking Legitimacy: The Story of Land Tenure in the Petén, Guatemala: Democratic Institutions Awaken Amidst Rapid Deforestation and Spontaneous Colonization" (Post-Graduate Fulbright Scholarship, University of Montana, n/d) 111.

[97] Carlos Soza, Interview 2 with the author, October 17, 2002

[98] SEGEPLAN, "Plan De Desarrollo Integrado De Petén," (Santa Elena, Guatemala: 1992). The project was a joint effort between the Executing Unit of the Integrated Development Plan of the Petén (UNEPET), and the General Secretary of the National Council of Economic Planning (SEGEPLAN). The plan, originally approved in 1985 by the Guatemalan and German governments, was re-packaged with an environmental face.

[99] SEGEPLAN, "Plan De Desarrollo Integrado De Petén: Diagnostic General De Petén.", SEGEPLAN, "Plan De Desarrollo Integrado De Petén: Volume Ii: Plan De Ordenameinto Territorial Y Concepto De Desarrollo," (Santa Elena, Guatemala: 1992), SEGEPLAN, "Plan De Desarrollo Integrado De Petén: Volume Iii: Programa De Desarrollo," (Santa Elena, Guatemala: 1992).

plan that analyzes and summarizes the important factors for the development and design of global, sectoral, and territorial concepts that frame interventions which foster and control this development.[100]

Moreover, the report states that "the principal implication of this affirmation is that the *Integrated Development Plan*, should not only drive and order regional development but also it should re-orientate it, that is to say, to modify its conceptual basis, aims, and methods.[101]

The first volume, therefore, was aimed at gathering information in various themes delineated along the lines of demography and sociology, agriculture and agronomy, the forestry sector, protected areas, infrastructure, institutions and legislation, and the economic activity of diverse sectors.[102] The General Diagnostic, moreover, sought to identify and quantify nature, to categorize resource use and aspects of society, to constructed detailed maps of nature and population, and to define the basis of sustainable resource use according to varied ecological systems, all in order to constitute the basis for interventions in the name of sustainable development. These forms of knowledge, based in appeals to science and objectivity, construct the truth of the Petén and the language through which it could be described. Ultimately, as I will develop in the following chapters, these claims to truth became hardened into essentialized political realities through their role in organizing the allocation of resources, services, and development initiatives.

The second volume, which developed the conceptual basis for the *Integrated Development Plan*, was dependent upon this detailed knowledge to lay out competing models of development with future outcomes. In order to project the future, it gave narrative form to the scientific knowledge developed in Volume I. In constructing an environmental history, the plan pointed to the lack of infrastructure and the rule of law in rural areas, the failure of modern knowledge of agriculture in tropical ecosystems in comparison to Mayan civilization, migrant *campesinos'* lack of knowledge of tropical systems, social and cultural disruption caused by migration, the problem of an environmentally destructive attitude towards nature, and the role of traditional non-timber extraction and forestry in preserving the forest. In particular migration, lack of state presence, and poor governance were said to cause moral decay associated with the Edenic narrative:

> The Department of the Petén's social problems are multiple, but in their majority less acute than in other departments in the country. Their origin is fundamentally a combination between geographical isolation and the massive colonization process undertaken by FYDEP during the decades of the 60s and 70s. While a large part of the original Petenera population was constituted by harvesters and hunters that practiced an extractive and subsistence economy within a large geographical dispersion, but with the

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[100] SEGEPLAN, "Plan De Desarrollo Integrado De Petén: Diagnostic General De Petén," 3.
[101] SEGEPLAN, "Plan De Desarrollo Integrado De Petén: Volume Ii: Plan De Ordenameinto Territorial Y Concepto De Desarrollo," 18.
[102] SEGEPLAN, "Plan De Desarrollo Integrado De Petén: Diagnostic General De Petén," 6.

social and community structure intact, the growing influence of persons from other regions and FYDEP's paternalistic attitudes provoked a growing destabilization of these structures. The consequence was a softening and loss of communal regulations, customs and ethical and moral values.[103]

The Plan, therefore, emphasizes constructing an environmental ethic:

> The form in which human beings manage natural resources reflects attitudes that they have towards these [resources] and their relative location in the value scale that each individual has. It is necessary, therefore, to work on these attitudes and values in such a way that respect for life, the conservation of nature and solidarity occupy more eminent positions on these value scales. The tool for this . . . is education understood in a full sense, as a process conducive to changes in attitude and conduct, and through these . . . a change in values. [104]

Indeed, the new order narrated in these policy papers made it appear as though there was a new set of instructions, which everyone needed to be taught. Remaking state and nation in the Petén required the re-education of its inhabitants. Moreover, it was said that "participation in decision-making should be based on information, or that is to say, informed participation should be promoted. This implies paying attention, efforts, and resources to questions of capacitation in order to process information, as a means to assure effective participation."[105] Thus, state policy sought not simply to enlist the participation of citizens in conservation, but to shape and transform the environmental subjectivity of those citizens.

From this basis, the report developed a series of models that describe the state of development in 2010 under a series of premises in which state interventions, qualitative projections, and quantitative variables influenced regional development. The first scenario, the Model without State Intervention, reflected existing land use in the Petén or a model based on "the absence of planning."[106] In the second scenario, the Consultant and State Intervention Model, non-governmental organizations were given a far-reaching role in extending infrastructure and development programs to rural areas. Emphasis was placed on decentralized development, small-scale agricultural development, and the consolidation of existing secondary and tourist industries. The third model, the Economic Growth model, places emphasis on centralizing development in sub-regional centres, and the active promotion of the secondary and tertiary industries. The report concluded in favour of the second model, but also suggested the need to incorporate the element of promoting secondary and tertiary industry.[107] The Consultant and State Intervention Model set the basis for the plethora of NGOs that streamed into the Petén to take over some government

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[103] SEGEPLAN, "Plan De Desarrollo Integrado De Petén: Volume Ii: Plan De Ordenameinto Territorial Y Concepto De Desarrollo," 14.
[104] Ibid., 17.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid., 55-57.
[107] Ibid., 67.

functions – such as environmental education, management of National Parks, and rural extension services.

While the *Integrated Development Plan* asserted and affirmed the authority of the state in the Petén, resistance to governance by the state and conservation abounded. The movement from disorder to order, from the world of unofficial maps to the structured world of the map, required the incorporation of the population so as to construct a common means of thinking, acting, and being environmentally and democratically. The success of conservation efforts and nation-state building in the Petén depended upon constructing a common and rational environmental consciousness. Increasingly, these pressures gave way to negotiations among the state, NGOs, forestry industry, and communities over the fate of the Multiple Use Zone to be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER THREE
COMPETING VISIONS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY FOREST CONCESSIONS

> "The question is" said Alice, "whether you can make a word
> mean so many different things."   "The question is" said
> Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master – that's all."
> -Lewis Carroll, *Alice in Wonderland*

In 1992, two years following the declaration of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve (MBR), the *Forestry Action Plan for Guatemala* (PAFG) and a new committee created by the National Council for Protected Areas (CONAP), the *Forestry Consultation Committee* (CCF)[1] began to outline a policy framework for granting forest concessions in the multiple use zone (MUZ) of the MBR.[2] The MUZ, according to the design of the MBR, was an area designated to "harmonious and sustainable development."[3] These forestry consultants and state officials were concerned with constructing a detailed internal zonification of the MUZ including forestry concessions, biological corridors, archaeological sites, and small community centres according to different ecological functions and management practices of each area.   In the process, the distinctions between the map and life in the Petén, between representation and reality discussed in the previous chapter, were fashioned into a series of policy goals and objectives.   These plans and procedures would then narrate the movement from traditional resource use to forms of sustainable development, from disorder to the structured order of the map, from local measurements and resource patterns to the abstract spaces of the economy and nation.

Since sustainable development implied a linear path directed toward a goal – conservation and development – it also implied fixing the priorities between "wilderness"

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[1] CCF was made up of Guatemalan and foreign technicians from Conservation International, PAFG, CONAP, an AHT-APESA consultant from the German government who worked on the Integrated Development Plan (SEGEPLAN).

[2] In November of 1992, a meeting in Guatemala City among Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), government officials from Guatemala and other parts of Central America, as well as municipal representatives, the Timber Industry Association of the Petén (AIMPE), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), set some guidelines for future negotiations of forest concessions in the MBR specifically, but also in other parts of Guatemala and Central America. The minutes from the meetings along with various papers presented at the conference are included in the following discussions.

[3] Consejo Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (CONAP), "Plan Maestro De La Reserva De La Biósfera Maya," (Flores, Guatemala: CONAP, 1992), 16-17.

preservation and economic development in a series of long-run and short-run goals. These stages and goals were choices among alternative paths and, therefore, premised upon a unified, rational consciousness and will.. The members of the CCF held that "It should also be remembered that the resources of the MBR constitute a heritage that belongs to all the members of the country, not only a few industries or communities."[4]

While sustainable development was said to be the unified consciousness and will of the nation, in the minds of the forestry consultants it did not emanate naturally from the population. The implementation of the MBR demonstrated that the mechanisms of civil society were imperfect instruments for expressing the national interest of sustainable development. In the body of the report, *Concesiones Forestales a Gran Escala: Caso Guatemala*, PAFG recognized that the army, despite its official role in the Administrative Committee of the MBR and institutional importance in the Petén, continued to neglect its role in patrolling borders and controlling illegal harvesting and sale of timber. As we have seen, this indictment against the military was relatively superficial given the active role the military played in these and other illegal activities. The Ministry of Energy and Minerals was also said to continue to award petroleum concessions according the demands of companies and without consulting either the General Secretary of Economic Planning (SEGEPLAN) or CONAP.[5] Furthermore, the authors noted that the Timber Industry Association of the Petén (AIMPE), members of which were present during the meetings, "has a great deal of influence in some economic sectors of the country, and moreover, relies on, in some cases, political channels that could distort the concession awarding process."[6] As such, particular interests needed to be subsumed within the whole and made consistent with the general interest, and sustainable development first had to be enforced through a system of controls and incentives. In the words of CCF, a concession system was necessary because, "One cannot seek to have confidence in anyone, but instead create a system that contains sufficient incentives and controls so that the forest industry and organized communities manage the forest in a sustainable form, different from what they have done in the past."[7] No longer would the state rely on the blunt prohibitive mechanisms of the law, but would turn to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), management plans, environmental impact

[4] Comité Consultivo Forestal (CCF), "Comentarios Sobre Concessiones De Manejo Forestal Para La Zona De Uso Multiple De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya," (Flores, Guatemala: Consejo Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (CONAP), 1993), 5.

[5] Plan Acción Forestal para Guatemala (PAFG), "Concesiones Forestales En Gran Escala: Caso Guatemala," (Guatemala, Guatemala: Comisión Centro Américana de Ambiente y Desarrollo, World Wildlife Fund, World Resources Institute, Agencia Finlandesa de Desarrolllo Internacional, 1992), 14-17.

[6] Ibid., 36.

[7] (CCF), "Comentarios Sobre Concessiones De Manejo Forestal Para La Zona De Uso Multiple De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya," 2.

assessments, and contracts to effect the detailed, individualized, supervision necessary to construct a green citizenry of nature's defenders.

Moreover, even while sustainable development required the participation of the population in the management of resources, it also stood outside the processes of democratic politics, since the one consciousness, both general and rational, could not simply be assumed to exist as an abstract force, inherent to the channels of civil society and state institutions. The incongruency of the state, the personal interests of the private sector, and the need for expert knowledge, legitimized the new bureaucratic role of NGOs. Thus, in the name of the nation and legitimized by its pursuit for the well-being of the population and environment, a series of experts from NGOs would be made to stand above society with the knowledge to define right and wrong and the proper direction of change. However, the political elite composed of AIMPE and the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF) would maintain decision-making powers in the traditional channels of civil society, while NGOs vested with the power of expert knowledge would constantly mitigate these personal interests.[8] The private sector, it was said, "should take part in decision-making in CONAP through their representatives in CACIF, and in the Administrative Committee of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve through AIMPE," while communities and local governments should "be involved in the concession process through the control and exploitation of resources and decision making."[9] While CACIF and AIMPE could be involved in the planning process, communities could only make decisions within the limited domain of established plans. These distinctions between industry and community also became distinctions between citizens and subjects, civil society and community.[10]

As places where distinctions between subjects and citizens were made and remade and where the unified, and rational environmental consciousness was to be produced, this chapter argues that community forest concessions were sites of governmentality and of struggles for democractic expansion. They were spaces involved both in producing citizens and in spaces of contesting the basis of exclusions through conflict over the meaning and

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[8] This forms of exclusion based on the need for "educated" participation, and "expert" knowledge claims were also discussed during an examination of *The Integrated Development Plan* (SEGEPLAN) in Chapter Two.

[9] Memoria Seminario-Taller Sobre Concesiones Forestales en Guatemala, November 10-11, 1992, Guatemala City; p 13-14.

[10] However, I am not suggesting that *campesinos,* as "subjects," were outside of politics, because as Judith Butler points out in a related argument, that "misses the point that the subject is an accomplishment regulated and produced in advance. And as such is fully political; indeed perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself." Citizens and subjects are not so much opposities which tend to be replicated through vocabularies which separate the terms of agency and freedom from the terms of repression and domination, or the terms of subjectivity from subjection. Instead, we can understand the terms as relational terms for describing different ways of producing political actors. Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection* (Standford: Standford University Press, 1997) 12.

means of sustainable development among conservationists, the state, the forestry and petroleum industries, and *campesinos*.[11] These contestations occurred first around the norms for awarding the concessions including reaching a consensus on a scientific model of the forest and its uses which would be contested by ACOFOP, and, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, by villagers in Uaxactún. In the democratic aspect of the concessions, a *campesino* movement, later formalized as the Association of Community Forests of the Petén (ACOFOP), contested the bases of exclusion in formal political practices and in the the languages of conservation and forestry management used in forming environmental narratives. The alternative environmental narratives proffered by ACOFOP were founded on historical memories of the politics of land use and an appeal to egalitarian ideals embedded in the contradictory participatory discourses offered both by conservationists and the Peace Accords. The re-interpretation of environmental history by ACOFOP demonstrates a demand for responsibility in the current environmental crisis that is a clear response to the flight from history evident in mythologies of "nature as natural" and forms of environmentalism which justify any sort of politics so long as the environment is protected.[12] By performing identities as "nature's defenders" and appropriating the norms and languages of conservation, they constituted themselves as good green citizens and inserted themselves into a narrow democratic opening granted by the signing of the Peace Accords in December of 1996, and eventually garnering a formal place within CONAP's advisory board.

Yet, as this chapter seeks to explore, participatory and democratic schemes, such as community forest concessions, worked to correct the deficiencies of citizens such as poverty, ignorance, lack of environmental consciousness, and violence by constructing a common and unified rational and environmental consciousness.[13] This new citizenry of nature's defenders not only contested the exclusionary practices of conservation discourses, but was also enlisted, shaped, and reformed by the "technologies of citizenship." Indeed, when democracy, citizenship, and participation were put forward by *campesinos* and others as solutions to poverty, violence, powerlessness, crime, environmental degradation, and innumerable other problems, they became involved in constituting and regulating citizens.

These technologies of citizenship followed the political rationality of governmentality that promotes individuals ability to govern themselves through autonomy and self-sufficiency. This manner of governing, in contrast to earlier attempts to impose

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[11] The notion of "technologies of citizenship" comes from Barbara Cruikshank's exploration of the mechanisms of constructing and correcting deficiencies of citizens in American welfare programs.
[12] For a full discussion of these environmental philosophies see, for example, William Cronon, ed., *Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995). David Harvey, *Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference* (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
[13] Barbara Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999) 4.

order in the MBR, relied less on institutions, organized violence, or state power, and more on securing the voluntary compliance of its citizens. In this way, these participatory these participatory mechanisms worked to overcome the crisis of governmentality by satisfying the citizens' need for autonomy, self-sufficiency, and freedom and the state's need to govern through visibility, discipline, and control over spaces of resistance.

Yet, the citizenry of nature's defenders were an effect and an instrument of political power, rather than just participants. This illustrates how constructing a set of citizens, a "demos" or a "nation" involves drawing a frontier between us and them. This process of defining these divisions occurred around national park invasions and competing interpretations of the 1996 Peace Accords. The desire of the state to close and control the meaning of the Peace Accords, to halt national park invasions and demands for agrarian reform, and to constitute a non-ethnic basis for citizenship led to the expansion of citizenship to a set of *campesinos*, reformed and rational, environmental defenders and non-ethnic native peteneros, and the exclusion of a radical set of migrant *campesinos* invading national parks. The story of community forest concessions, thus, illustrates the paradox between the liberal notion of equality that pertains to all of humanity and the democratic notion of equality that pertains to the definition of "we" the people.

Designing Forest Concessions

In February of 1994, an external report outlining recommendations for the design and management of forest concessions in the MUZ was presented to CONAP. [15]   The report conducted by Timothy Synott from the Tropical Forestry Management Trust was solicited in order to "promote the objectives of the Multiple Use Zone: to conserve biological resources, reduce deforestation, and promote social and economic development."[16] Similar to other policy papers, this report drew upon national narratives of environmental degradation, discussed in the previous chapter, that blamed migrant colonists for deforestation. However, unlike previous narratives that focused on the blunt prohibitive instruments of law and order, or sought to eliminate human presence from "wilderness" areas, Synott's report followed the SEGEPLAN recommendations that viewed the solution to deforestation in terms of institution building and the need for a decentralized system of incentives and controls.[17]

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[14] Judith Butler, "Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism," in *Contigency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left*, ed. Ernesto Laclau Judith Butler, Slavoj Žižek (London and New York: Verso, 2000), 11.

[15] Timothy Synott, "Concesiones De Manejo Forestal Para La Reserva Biosfera Maya, Petén, Guatemala," (Flores, Guatemala: Tropical Forest Management Trust, 1994).

[16] Ibid., 1.

[17] According to Synott's report, in order to achieve these objectives, "in the face of uncontrolled colonization and the current plunder of the finest timbers and other exportable items, a strong

This system of incentives and controls would include a system of external monitoring and self-supervision, a clear set of norms and responsibilities for CONAP, NGOs, and concessionaries, codified in a 25-year contract between the state and the concessionary. This strategy of sharing rights and responsibilities was aimed at creating a structure in which the user received and perceived a greater advantage in management, production, and conservation, than in destruction or short-term extraction.[18] This form of governing action and directing decision-making through a series of legal norms and codes was also a system of subjectification – of magically transforming nature's destroyers into nature's defenders. Concessionaries were to become "subjects" in the double sense used by Foucault to articulate a form of power that simultaneous subjugates and makes subject to. Through these forms of modern power community concessions would attempt to tie the subjectivity, including conscience, identity, and self-knowledge of the individual, to that individual's subjection, or control by the state.[19] This logic of subjectification – to get concessionaries to reason, to think of long-term interests, and to moralize their actions in relation to the environment – required recruitment rather than force, and most of all, incorporation into state management plans. The art of environmental governmentality needed to be democratic.

Like the earlier works of the CCF, the report sought this integration by dividing potential resource users into two categories: community and industrial. These demarcations between resource users also would constitute a geographical distinction in management units between two distinct models: Community Forestry Management Units and Commercial Forestry Management Units. As will be described in greater detail in Chapter Four, these categories of communities and industries, however, did not simply describe pre-existing groups. Instead, by constructing commonalities among disparate and diverse individuals, people came to occupy these same categories. In the process of constructing these categories, resource users formed recognizable groups and were made available for governing by forming a category that, as Nikolas Rose puts it, "could be used in political arguments and administrative decisions."[20]

However, the divisions between communities and industries were, as indicated earlier, hierarchical. A strong emphasis upon the economic and managerial requirements of potential concessionaries indicated a trend that would favour the experience and economic capabilities of the established forestry industry over communities. By defining potential

management and supervisory presence is needed" (vii), which included decentralized and shared rights, responsibilites, and benefits among users of forest resources. (vii).
[18] Synott, "Concesiones De Manejo Forestal Para La Reserva Biosfera Maya, Petén, Guatemala," 12.
[19] This perspective enables us to see that the subject is both under the authority of another and the author of her or his own actions. In making this formulation, Focault means to undermine the perspetive from which power can be perceived only as the antithesis of freedom.
[20] Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 12.

Community Forestry Management Units as "areas where there are communities with potentially adequate organization to implement forestry management" and potential Commercial Forestry Management Units as "areas where there are not capable communities, where management and protection responsibilities will be implemented by the industrial concessionary," the report gave licence to negate historic rights of access of unqualified candidates.[21] Although communities "with legal figure and functional capacity" would be the preferred candidates for forestry management, these highly malleable conditions and criteria made it easy to deny communities without access to capital, basic education, experience in forest management or a legally recognized community organization.[22] Thus, communities would be offered the recognition of historic land rights only if they would not simply become "nature's defender's" but also embody characteristics of modern rational environmental management. A community soliciting use rights thus had to be bound to a system of rational incentives and controls, organized into formalized networks of civil society, and adopt managerial practices in the name of contributing to the sustainable development of the nation. Even in the act of democratic incorporation, participation was predicated upon moulding oneself to the established authoritarian vision of the national will.

As will be visited in greater detail in Chapter Four, the mechanisms of subjectification through community forest concessions also involved "fixing" communities as stable and governable territorial entities similar to the military's techniques in model villages. In the double meaning of fixed as unmoveable and repaired, community forest concessions were to fasten communities in space and also mend relationships between state and community.[23] This system of forestry concessions would complete a remapping of the MUZ by constructing a system of formal land tenure agreements out of a previous system of fluid usufruct rights that would work to bind people to certain bounded geographical places. This form of discipline performs precisely as Foucault suggests: to "fix and regulate movements,"[24] and to make the population and territory visible and available for governance from outside.[25]

Moreover, these communities were required to develop a system of representation based on a legally recognized Committee, Association, or Society, with a single elected representative designated to solicit the concession. In all cases, the members of the

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[21] Synott, "Concesiones De Manejo Forestal Para La Reserva Biosfera Maya, Petén, Guatemala," 13.
[22] Ibid.
[23] For a similar discussion of the ways in which community forest programs remake community-state relations in Southeast Asia context see Tania Murray Li, "Engaging Simplifications: Community-Based Resource Management, Market Processes and State Agendas in Upland Southeast Asia," *World Development* 30, no. 2 (2002).
[24] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 219.
[25] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998).

community would be represented by the fathers or heads of households in the committee and this committee was required to acquire technical and managerial backing from an NGO to implement the concession. This system of formal representation, thus, unabashedly gendered access to citizenship. In this gendering, not only were divisions between private and public that place women in the invisible spaces of the private sphere hardened, but also these concession norms became involved in the making up of those boundaries. Moreover, alongside the creation of an enumerable population, formal mechanisms of legitimate representation and established leadership eased the means by which the state, non-governmental organizations, and industry could access the community.

These concession norms were also accompanied by modalities of positive intervention, management, and policing that sought to produce "nature's defenders" through modes of subject formation, which would embed ecological modes of thought in the population, while simultaneously constituting nature as an object of knowledge. Governmentalizing nature required detailed knowledge of the environment and the resources available to the population through a Forest Inventory. Once the forest was made into an aggregate, abstract, and mappable object, it could become an independent realm and force in life with its own set of potential effects on the economy and on the nation. This enabled environment protection to become the new aim of government in which the Forest Inventory would provide the basis for the elaboration of a Management Plan and Environmental Impact Assessment. These plans were also to be developed by the community with the expert assistance from an NGO.

These procedures were a form of epistemic policing; both framing the definition of ecological risks and certifying what would count as scientifically acceptable knowledge of the natural world.[26] By incorporating the population into enumerating and codifying resources for the Inventory and in defining what counts as ecological risk according to already delimited criteria, these procedures also worked to embed regulatory and environmental modes of thought and values into the actions of organizations and individuals. According to historian Paul Rutherford, procedures such as Environmental Impact Assessments "promote the implementation of environmental management programmes not simply through direct coercion, but through a governmental rationality that established norms and procedures which channel problem solving in a particular direction, and which stimulate administrative agencies and other social actors to be both innovative and effective in the implement of ecological goals."[27]

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[26] Paul Rutherford, "The Entry of Life into History," in *Discourses of the Environment*, ed. Eric Darier (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 55-60.
[27] Ibid., 57.

Moreover, compliance with the Management Plan and respect for the territorial limits of the concession would be undertaken through mechanisms of self-surveillance of the boundaries of the concession, and through internal and external reviews by the community, consultant NGO and CONAP. These procedures constituted a Foucauldian-like panopticon, a normalizing strategy in which new relations of power came into existence through a cluster of positive norms of self-control and external self-regulation. These positive norms effect a policing of specific practices of the population, through what Foucault describes as a "positive intervention in the behaviour of individuals" which act through "continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism" with the power to "quantify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize,"so as to effect the distribution of normality and abnormality.[28]

This process of inclusion and exclusion delimited the rules upon which a community could legitimately participate and sought to define acceptable ways people could belong to community. In effect, the prohibitions surrounding resource use, including prohibitions on hunting, restrictions in methods of extraction of non-timber and timber products, regulation of quantities extractable, new territorial boundaries, and a strict "closed door" policy to immigration, produce identity along the culturally intelligible grids of a compulsory ideal of becoming "nature's defenders" in a bounded community. These "fixed" communities become hardened into essentialized political realities, through their role in organizing the allocation of economic and other benefits and the ways they construct citizen-subjects.

MODELLING THE NORMAL FOREST

The need for a rational and ordered society paralleled the design of the forestry management plans. Indeed, not only was society to be bounded into organized and enumerable units with formally delineated functional relationships to other distinct entities, the forest was seen and understood as a series of discrete and enumerable trees with particular functions and relationships. Making the forest available for forms of governmental intervention required that it be made scientifically calculable through a series of norms, standards, and models. These forest models are important insofar as they establish a set of discursive norms and regulations for envisioning and interacting with the forest, and de-legitimize or render others impermissible. These forest models become particularly important in local contexts, as will be illustrated in Chapter Four, where the reworking of human-nature relationships takes place.

The intellectual basis for the development of the forestry management plans resided in the concept of sustainable yield. Sustainable yield is the number of trees harvestable in

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[28] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990 [1976]) 144.

any given management unit such that by the time one rotation through the unit is complete, the areas harvested will be ready to be cut again. The resulting forest is what forester's call the "normal forest" which consists of an equal distribution of trees of different ages.

However, much like it is difficult to predict and discuss human interaction with accuracy, it is difficult to determine the optimum rotation period. Rotation periods depend on many factors including adequate knowledge of inventories and growth rates and require calculating a variety of economic, ecological and technological variables that determine at what age and at what rate it is desirable to harvest. Moreover, the "normal forest", like the "normal" community of sustainable resource management, is a model of rational management that imagines the *entire* "working forest" as a single commodity: timber. This makes it difficult to imagine the integration of other forest uses or to take into account competing uses such as the extraction of NTFP's like *chicle* or *xate*, since these would threaten the spatial and temporal plan of the "normal forest." [29] Unable to account for other uses of the forest resources, the author claimed that "the report does not attempt an analysis of the extraction of forest products, but one might emphasize two things: until now the experience of timber production in a controlled and managed form has been and can be perfectly compatible with the production of other forest products such as chicle." [30] Thus, in sustainable yield forestry "the actual tree with its vast number of possible uses was replaced by an abstract tree representing volume of lumber or firewood."[31] As James Scott has elucidated, sustainable yield forestry constitutes a form of high-modernist planning in which an objective, ordered and rational society is to be achieved through scientific management and state control. [33]

Early drafts of Synott's report were circulated among the NGOs working in the MBR. In particular, ecologists from *Conservation International* and its Guatemalan-based partner, *Propetén*, responded with a vehement set of letters to the Tropical Forestry Management Trust, CONAP, and USAID. In these letters, ecologists responded to Synott's "sustained yield forestry," with a "sustainable ecosystems" approach. Instead of considering the forest as a discrete set of trees, ecologists envisioned the forest as an "ecosystem" where sustainability included maintaining the productivity of the totality including the landscape's biophysical connections. [34] Synott's narrow approach to forest management to the exclusion

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[29] Bruce Braun, *The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, Culture, and Power on Canada's West Coast* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 66-67.

[30] Synott, "Concesiones De Manejo Forestal Para La Reserva Biosfera Maya, Petén, Guatemala," 4.

[31] Braun, *The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, Culture, and Power on Canada's West Coast.*

[32] Synott, "Concesiones De Manejo Forestal Para La Reserva Biosfera Maya, Petén, Guatemala."

[33] Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* 12.

[34] As mentioned in Chapter Two, since the early 1980s, many ecologists have questioned whether equilibrium really characterize how nature works. In place of confident assertion about the ordered, self-regulating, and teleological nature of ecosystems, advocates of "dynamic ecology" have placed emphasis on contingency and change.

of NTFP's led *CI* ecologists to restate earlier arguments that "more research is necessary to learn how to log sustainably without damaging nontimber forest species and the natural forest ecosystems over the long-term."[35]

The exclusion of NTFP's in the epistemological framework of "sustainable yield" forestry became an important site of criticism. Researchers from *CI* responded to Synott by asking why the state would grant management rights to commercial and community timber groups, and only rights of access to NTFP harvesters, and not the reverse.[36] Instead of timber management, *CI* ecologists argued that other uses of the forest, which include carefully designed management of NTFPs, medicinals, tourism, and "Maya-style" farming, would be a better way to pursue sustainable development.

These conclusions were based on the research of *CI* ecologists Conrad Reining and Robert Heinzman on NTFPs in the MBR. Their work advocated extractive reserves of NTFPs in the MBR. The authors emphasized the relative lack of biodiversity in the Petén, the history of human presence and resource use in the area. According to Reining and Heinzman:

> the plant diversity of the northern Petén does not approach that of rain forests in the Amazon or Costa Rica . . . Either as a botanical imprint of the Maya, or the result of other factors, one encounters a forest that is high in both density and numbers of marketable species, including *chicle, xate,* and *pimienta,* and dozens of 'secondary' timbers, thatching palms, construction materials, firewood, and medicinal plants. It is as if this is a premanaged forest. As one exporter of nontimber forest products noted: 'Why should I make a plantation? The forests of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve are already planted.'[37]

However, despite their attempts to insert human presence in "premanaged" rainforests, ó their approach did not address change over time and space within these same ecosystems. Instead, these ecosystems, although premanaged, maintained a "homeostasis" in which every organism had a function, and every action a telos. The model of a balanced ecological system was simply extended to contain the "local" practices of nontimber forest harvesters

[35] Conrad C.S. Reining et al., "Productos No Maderables De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya, Peten, Guatemala," (Washington, D.C and Flores, Petén, Guatemala: Conservation International and Propeten, 1992), 115.

[36] In a report by CATIE and CONAP suggested that the norms created from Synotts report were unable to incorporate forest products and wildlife into the scheme because of the application of laws around human-human relationships. According to the report, the norms for concessions do not "incorporate novel elements for the exploitation of wild flora in the areas, on the contrary, they reproduce applicable norms to totally different themes, based in typical human-human relations and rather than human-nature relations which is literally copying State Contract Law [Ley de Contractaciones del Estado] provisions." Elisa Colom de Morán, "Definición Y Analysis Del Marco Legal Para Concesiones De Productos Forestales No Maderables En La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya, Petén, Guatemala," (Turrilba, Costa Rica: Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas and Centro Agronomico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza, 1996), 21.

[37] Reining et al., "Productos No Maderables De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya, Peten, Guatemala," 115.

who, through their indigenity, maintained a supposedly "symbiotic" relationship with nature until the recent waves of migrants. In the words of one member of *CI's* research team, "the extraction of these products has been practiced for at least 30 years in the case of *xate,* and *pimienta,* and more than 90 years in the case of *chicle.* Therefore, these resources are exploited by a well-established forest culture, with considerable knowledge and experience."[38] In short, nature – even with its regimes of disturbance and its "natural," local, human inhabitants – maintains a regulated balance where the sum of any ecosystem was always greater than its parts, and the insertion of timber extraction could disrupt this balance.

Synott responded to these criticisms with allegations that *CI's* conclusions were "outdated" in light of the experiences of community forestry in Quintana Roo. In the field of science, the charge of "outdated" is equivalent to charges of irrational and irresponsible practices. Moreover, according to Synott, emphasis on "traditional" resource uses would not be able to generate sufficient income to finance the protection of the Petén's forests against the onslaught of farmers and loggers, and finance economic development. For Synott appeals to "localness" were equated more with "tradition" or the backwardness that would inevitably inhibit the onward march towards sustainable development. On the other hand, *CI* saw indigenity as the key to maintaining a symbiotic balance between man and nature in which the signs of modernity must be erased. As one forester captured in a pithy statement, "they [CI] did not want to see the logo of CI on a chainsaw or in a sawmill, or to see the logo of CI internationally saying that they were exploiting tropical forests. They wanted the image of conservation, only."[40]

Although these debates might be considered "ideological" or "scientific" according to one's perspective, characterizing them in these terms privileges the search for the ontological truth of the matter over the establishment of a set of discursive norms and regulations for envisioning and interacting with the forest. What was at stake was not so much the establishment of a model, but reaching a consensus regarding the choice of that model. The essential question is not the production of objects, or models of the forest, which can act as a "standard," but the establishment of procedures that will lead to a general agreement regarding the choice of norms and standards. Indeed, what is normalized is not a world of trees, but language itself – its vocabulary, notation, writing, signs, its relation to numbers and diagrams, etc. In so far as the languages and vocabularies that produce the "normal forest" also produce, regulate, and instruct humans' interactions with nature they become mechanisms of establishing hierarchies of relations between them. Thus, at the heart

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[38] Norman B. Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) 291. With the establishment of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve, Schwartz took a position with CI's Guatemalan branch Propetén.

[40] Interview with the author, Mauro Salazar, September 22, 2002.

of these debates is the production of ways of valuing, hierarchizing, human-nature relationships. These debates over language and the use of the forest become particularly important in the context of communities, such as Uaxactún, that historically have harvested NTFPs.

In the midst of unresolved and protracted debates among NGOs in the Petén, CONAP moved ahead with Synott's recommendations and approved the *Norms for Awarding Renewable Natural Resource Extraction and Management Concessions in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve* in March of 1994, only one month after the publication of Synott's report. Without delay, the community of San Miguel la Palotada was awarded the first concession of 7,039 hectares and proceeded with the first harvest that dry season. In response to this apparent opening, another eleven communities in the MUZ, that would later form a representative body CONCOFOP, began to sign agreements with the state to help prevent illegal logging.[41] The process was, however, uneven within the communities. Although San Miguel had been granted a concession, two members refused to join the concession and continued to plant *milpa* in spite of restrictions against *milpa* extraction.[42]

Only a few months later, however, President Serrano staged a self-coup in which he attempted to seize absolute control over the state, dissolve the Congress and suspend the Constitution. The prompt international response and widespread popular resistance coaxed CACIF into an alliance with part of the military and led to the assent of former Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio (1993-1996) to the presidency in June of 1993. Although the self-coup stalled peace negotiations, Ramiro de León Carpio's regime brought a more central role for the United Nations in the peace process through the creation of the United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) and an expansion of the agenda of the Accords.[43] Indeed, the creation of a broad multisectoral forum, the National Petition for

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[41] On April 4 of 1994, 12 communities signed agreements to aid CONAP in an inteventory of forest resources. On April 25, the Department Governor and CONAP sought authorization to care for deforested areas and the communities again signed. On April 28, the commander of the Military Zone 23 denounced the pillaging of timber and declared the military's support for stopping illegal extraction and 11 communities signed this statement.

[42] These resistances to the concession strategy would be repeated more dramatically, in other communities. Members of the neigbouring community, Cruce a Dos Aguadas, organized to resist the concession strategy and apparently burned 2000 hectares of the concession in the hot summer of 1995 in anger against losing harvesting rights within territory they considered should belong to them. In La Pasadita, a largely agricultural community, some members of the community rallied behind the idea of changing the law to allow for recognition of legal land titles within the MBR. One side of the community was content with the proposed agricultural restrictions, the other side wanted private parcels that permit individual exploitation (as are permitted in the buffer zone). The second group barricaded the road for several days threatening to burn any CONAP vehicle that approached. Charles Clark, "Seeking Legitimacy: The Story of Land Tenure in the Petén, Guatemala: Democratic Institutions Awaken Amidst Rapid Deforestation and Spontaneous Colonization" (Post-Graduate Fulbright Scholarship, University of Montana, n/d) 114-15.Similiar types of conflicts abound and will be discussed in the context of Uaxactún in Chapter Four.

[43] See Rachel M. McCleary, "Guatemala's Postwar Prospects," *Journal of Democracy* April (1997).

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Consensus, strengthened the participation of grassroots and popular organizations in national politics and in national dialogue with CACIF. These experiences led Indigenous and grassroots organizers to join other sectors, including small and medium business (but not CACIF), in the Civil Society Assembly (ASC) established by the Framework Accord in 1994.[44] The participation of ASC in the peace negotiations signalled the willingness of the state to allow participation of non-traditional elements of Guatemalan civil society in the negotiations of the Peace Accords. Later that year, CONAP began to strengthen its own institutional agenda including efforts which reflected the themes under negotiation in the peace accords such as decentralization, participation, land tenure security, returned refugees, and the role of the military.[45]

REMAPPING THE MUZ AND CONSTRUCTING ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZENSHIP

With the renewal of the governmental apparatus following the ascendancy of Ramiro de León Carpio to the presidency and the completion of a Rapid Ecological Evaluation[46] of the MBR, NGOs began to draw up proposals for internal zonification schemes for the MUZ based on the principles outlined by the forest concession legislation. Based on maps provided by the Rapid Ecological Evaluation, consultants began to divide the MUZ into new or expanded Nuclear Zones, Biological Corridors, Areas for Natural Resource Extraction, and Special Zones for Exclusion. Each area would be distinguished by a set of characteristics or a system of signs – such as ecologically fragile, low biodiversity, archaeological site – which would determine the plan of the particular area. Along with delimiting the areas into separate worlds, each with their own picture, order, and truth, the space of the MUZ was also marked by a narrative, which gave these worlds an explanatory structure.

The importance of contested narratives in the zoning of the MUZ became evident during a series of meetings among state officials, NGOs, AIMPE, and community leaders concerning the fate of the MUZ. Although an agreement among competing claims of foresters, advocates of NTFPs, and industry was never imminent, a proposal for the zoning of the MUZ conducted by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) attempted to reach a compromise.

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[44] ASC's functions were to make consensus proposals to the negotiating parties and to endorse, or not endorse, accords once they were signed. It was also a diverse group even including representatives of the right-wing Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), headed by General Efraín Ríos Montt, who headed the military dictatorship during the worst phase of the scorched earth counterinsurgency. Susanne Jonas, *Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000) 43-44.

[45] Juan Carlos Godoy and Nidia Alvarez, "Taller De Trabajo: "Planificacion Estratgica E Integracion Institutioncal Para El Manejo De La Rbm"," (Petencito: CONAP, 1994). Participants included NGOs, USAID, CECON, CONAMA, CONAP, INTA, IDAEH, SEGEPLAN

[46] APESA, "Evaluación Ecológica Rápida De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya," (Peten, Guatemala: Apesa/TNC/PBM-USAID., 1994)..

Through three drafts of the proposal it became clear that industrial forest concessions would be favoured over community forest concessions in terms of geographical size, and that overlapping concessions for NTFPs would be awarded.[47] Moreover, reviews solicited by the government and funded by USAID concluded that community-based concessions for timber would require more capital and labour than the communities could be expected to muster even with the aid of NGOs.[48] Despite the uncertain feasibility of the concessions, the report endorsed concessions of between 4,000 and 10,000 hectares. These proposed concessions were, in the end, revealed to be outlandishly small in comparison to the 83,400 hectares that would eventually be awarded to Uaxactún or Carmelita's concession of 64,000 hectares.

The view that environmental governmentality needed to be democratic and to incorporate the population was bolstered by an Evaluation of the Mayan Biosphere Project that widely criticized the strong protectionist focus to the exclusion of people.[49] These calls for participation and agitation among *campesinos* opened spaces within meetings around the fate of the MUZ for *campesino* leaders by the beginning of 1995. Community leaders including Benedin Garcia from Uaxactún, Marcedonio Cortave from Macanché, Carlos Catalan from Carmelita gained a participatory space in conservation politics that enabled them to attend and participate in meetings concerning the fate of the MUZ. Participation in these meetings enabled the *campesinos* to contest not only the means, but also the meanings of sustainable development embedded in the explanatory narratives, which structured both the maps of the Petén. It is worth exploring, at length, the account of one community leader, Marcedino Cortave at of one of these meetings:

> There was an event called "Investment Opportunities in the MUZ of the MBR." It was approximately in 1995, NGOs were invited, the forestry industry, and of course, the state institutions. I will always remember this event, remember like yesterday, because it was a very important event, of course a [historical] marker for the communities, it was one of these days. It was a two day event in Hotel Villa Maya, that was some 15 kilometers from here, and we began to participate, and as the same title says, it was to conduct an analysis of who really had the ability to invest in the MUZ. Sometimes it gives the impression that it was a controversially organized event, because it gave me the impression, that the industry was very well

[47] In the first proposal Industrial concessions were to be granted 243,100 hectares, 83,300 hectares were allocated to Community Concessions, and 285,300 for overlapping intregrated NTFP concessions. By the third proposal, industrial concessions were allocated 255,000 hectares, integrated concessions were collapsed into community forest concessions and allocated 161,500 hectares. Juan Carlos Godoy, "Propuesta De Zonificación Del Area De Uso Multiple De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya. Internal Report Presented to Emma Diaz De Gordillo, Francisco Moscoso, Eric Arellan, Secretaria Ejectuvia Del Consejo Nacional De Areas Protegidas.," (Petén, Guatemala: The Nature Conservancy (TNC, MAYREMA), 1995).

[48] AID/G-CAP, "Environmental Assessment for Forest Concessions: Multiple Use Zone-Maya Biosphere Reserve Project," (USAID Environmental Resource Office and Tropical Reserach and Development, Guatemala, 1995).

[49] C. MacFarland et al., "Evaluation of the Mayan Biosphere Project," (Washington, D.C.: USAID, Management Systems International, 1994).

prepared, that they had knowledge of this event much before, and were very prepared. While the three or four community leaders that went, we went with an old knapsack and notebook to listen to concepts that were difficult to understand. The event was very important, and they began to touch themes, but I remember in detail, one nothing more, but it was a detail that maybe is the most important. The forestry industry brought a video composed of two moments. The first moment showed how the communities, or how the Indigenous campesinos destroy the forest to convert it into agriculture zones, zones completely burnt. What they wanted to demonstrate was that the only thing that communities were capable of was destroying the forests to plant corn and beans, and not even for agriculture, because agriculture is a larger concept. And the second moment in the video showed the forestry industry managing the forest and reforesting. Then, in this video, they showed greenhouses for reforesting mahogany and other species. In other words, it [the film] was specially prepared to demonstrate to the state officials how to parcel out the MUZ . . . in other words to justify why some should be given land, and others should not be given any . . . I became very angry . . .and I began, I and other friends, to argue some doubts that we had, and some things that we were sure of. And one of the things that we said, and I remember this is 'Show us where you have planted these trees that you show in your video. Have you really reforested in the forest extraction concessions that FYDEP awarded you, or are these greenhouses located in your private finca outside of the Reserve?' Although they said they hadn't, we are very sure that this [reforestation] never took place in zones where they had extracted timber, but that they took the saplings where they had land tenure security . . . They extracted timber, during the FYDEP era, they had cut chicle trees without any respect, they had knocked down archaeological sites, and that they had no management plan. And Benedin Garcia said, 'I can take you where, still today, one can find cut timber that they left abandoned . . . and the next year, FYDEP awarded another even richer zone, and then you no longer cared to take out this timber.[50]

By contesting the history of deforestation and the ethical aspects of the conduct of the forestry industry, the *campesino* leaders sought to bring into question the desire, interest, or willingness of the forestry industry to become good environmental citizens and to refute essentialized representations of *campesinos* as nature's destroyers. In doing so, they sought to negotiate the process of zoning of the MUZ and spaces of citizenship.

Within months of the meeting described by Marcedonio Cortave, the *campesinos* formed the Council of Community Forests of the Petén (CONCOFOP) and developed a mechanism to strengthen the participation of communities in the Petén and efforts to strategically negotiate essentialized representations of *campesinos*. From within the offices the Chicleros and Lumberers of the Petén Union (SUCHILMA), campesino leaders began to deliberate on the problems of access to resources and political participation. On November 18, 1995, community leaders from the villages of Uaxactún, Carmelita, La Pasadita, San

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[50] Interview with Marcedonio Cortave, September 22, 2002.

Miguel la Palotada, Zocotzal, EL Caoba, El Remate, Ixlú, Macanché, El Naranjo, Suchitán formed the CONCOFOP in order "to improve the level of living of the people of the communities and to guarantee them sustainability of natural resources equally in the political, economic, social and ecological levels."[51]

With the establishment of CONCOFOP, the campesinos began to publish statements in newspapers, radio, television, and to apply for workshops, look for support from other campesino organizations, and to seek local, national and international recognition. In a self-description, CONCOFOP sought to constitute a role for communities as "citizens" rather than subjects, "Therefore, now one cannot set out to consider community members only as 'subjects' of efforts and attention, but understand them as equal partners because it is they who have utilized . . . the forest resouces located in the areas in which they have influence."[52] This would mean constructing a civil society, in which "the nucleus of decisions to define the use of land are the communities that live there. The fact that they have formed CONCOFOP, expresses that they want to abandon the passive role that they had during the establishment of the MBR, and on the contrary, to convert themselves into active individuals in the administration, commercialization, and management of the forest, and to strengthen their management and negotiation skills." [53]

CONCOFOP's leaders, therefore, began to reach out to communities in MUZ and the Buffer Zone in order to raise the consciousness of the importance of organizing themselves to defend their rights, and to identify and train community leaders in environmental laws.[54] Like other social programs, these efforts to empower communities constituted what Barbara Cruikshank has called "technologies of citizenship" or methods of constituting citizens out of subjects and maximizing political participation. By raising the environmental consciousness of *campesinos*, the act of empowering was also a strategy for constituting and regulating their political subjectivities. These productive aspects of power, which promote, transform and act upon the capacities of *campesinos,* sought to make them into good environmental citizens. By soliciting the active participation of *campesinos* in dozens of meetings and programs, CONCOFOP sought to expand the base of community forest concessions and transform poor *campesinos* into self-sufficient, active, productive, and participatory citizens. These "technologies of citizenship," however well-intentioned, are modes of constituting and regulating citizens, strategies of governing the very subjects whose problems they seek to address.

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[51] (CONCOFOP) Consejo Consultivo de Comunidades Forestales del Peten, "Memoria De La Reunion, 18 De Noviembre De 1995," (San Benito, Peten: 1995).
[52] (CONCOFOP) Consejo Consultivo de Comunidades Forestales del Peten, "Una Descripción Breve Del Movimiento Comunitario Referente a Las Concesiones Forestales," (San Benito, Petén: 1996).
[53] Ibid.
[54] (CONCOFOP) Consejo Consultivo de Comunidades Forestales del Peten, "Estudio De Caso: Conflicto En Recuross Naturales En La Reserva," (San Benito, Petén: n.d).

Alongside the movement towards constructing an army of environmental citizens, CONCOFOP began to appropriate and manipulate the narratives, representations and discourses of sustainable development to articulate an identity as nature's defender's in order to win participatory spaces as citizens. This imagery sought to represent communities as nature's defenders. The cartoon, Figure 3., illustrates this self-representation. In the cartoon officials are showing some tourists an exhibit of one tree remaining in a field of stumps in the year 2001. The caption reads "Let's try to prevent this from happening."

Figure 3: CONCOFOP: "Let's try to prevent this from happening"

Moreover, the leaders of CONCOFOP began to construct alternative environmental narratives in which *campesinos* were made into rational actors and defenders of nature. According to CONCOFOP, "the interests in petenero's forests are strong and diverse. But finally, it is the communities that have conserved the forest for decades, because the extraction of resources gives them their sustenance, their economic base."[55] In making local resource users into nature's best defenders, CONCOFOP adopted an aspect of the concession norms embedded in the idea of long-term incentives to protect resources, and insisted that communities participate not just receive potential benefits. As one leader suggested, "The

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[55] Consejo Consultivo de Comunidades Forestales del Peten, "Una Descripción Breve Del Movimiento Comunitario Referente a Las Concesiones Forestales."

great solution is that one cannot think of conservation without the participation of civil society, and especially the communities. We firmly believe that the communities can manage natural resources when they are given the opportunity. Logically, if they are not given the opportunity, they are going to do illegal activities, because need obligates it. I always say that a campesino does not cut down [botar] the forest because it is fun, but because it is a necessity."[56]

CONCOFOP, thus, became an instrument of government, a form of "civil society" that was not a free autonomous space of voluntary organization, nor one of "social control," but involved in shaping and transforming political subjectivities into governable citizen-subjects. In this way, the *campesino* leaders of CONCOFOP were also "campesino intellectuals" who mediated the relationship between NGOs, state organisms, and *campesinos* and were those who "labored to reproduce and rearticulate local history and memory, to connect community discourses about local identity and memory to constantly shifting patterns of power, solidarity, consensus . . the ones who provided mediation with the outside."[57] CONCOFOP worked to bring together communities with diverse needs, interests and histories, which would vary according to "the time of consolidation in the process of adjudication of concessions and the economic activity that they are decdicated to."[58] Indeed, CONCOFOP took part in "those rearticulatory practices that seek to assume alternative traditions within modernity. These involve the struggles for interpretative power on the part of peasants, women and ethnic, racial, and religious groups."[59] However, efforts to construct spaces of citizenship in the remapping of the MUZ would not be successful until the signing of the Peace Accords in December 1996 fortified participatory democratic discourses, but also set the stage for a new series of political inclusions and exclusions.

PEACE ACCORDS AND NATIONAL PARK INVASIONS: RACE, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP

In mid-1995, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal issued a call for the third presidential election since the democratization process had begun in 1985. The November elections and the January run-off gave the presidency to Álvaro Arzú and the National Advancement Party (PAN) the majority of the seats in the Congress. As Arzú took office, the peace negotiations were reinvigorated, and the Arzú administration made clear their determination to end the armed conflict by visiting the guerrilla commanders in Mexico in February 1996 and by

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[56] Interview 2 with Marcedonio Cortave, October 18 , 2002.
[57] See for example Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) 12-13, 276-309.
[58] Iliana Monterroso, "Conciliando Comunidades Locales, Áreas Protegidas Y Políticas De Conservación," (FLASCO, Guatemala: 2002).
[59] George Yúdice, Juan Flores, and Jean Franco, eds., *On Edge: The Crisis of Contemporary Latin American Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) 23.

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appointing a new peace commission headed by an advisor close to the president who also had ties with the URNG. In response, the guerrillas declared a cessation of offensive military operations in March. In the government's acceptance of the cease-fire, the foundations for accelerating of the peace process were laid.

On Earth Day, April 22, 1996, President Arzú made a special visit to the Petén to discuss the principal problems facing conservation efforts in the MBR and to visit the forestry communities of San Miguel la Palotada, Carmelita, Uaxactún and Cooperative Bethel. The poster announcing the arrival of the President to the Petén stated, "The future of the Petén, as well as that of our country, is intimately tied to the rational use that they [the communities] give our natural resources."[60] During the visits to these communities, the President awarded each community a national honor for their efforts to protect and preserve the national resources. These efforts and the special attention to community forests were indicative of a new wave of support for community forest concessions. According to Hilda Rivera, who at the time was the director of the NGO, Agriculture Frontier Program (PFA), the visit was instrumental in attaining final support for the concession process and the inclusion of community forest concessions in the Peace Accords. In an interview she suggested that,

> There was a moment when the Congress of the Republic had doubts that giving concessions of the reserve [to communities] was the response to management of a protected area. And what I did was to bring Congress representatives to the forestry concessions. The doubts were to give land to *campesinos* through the Peace Accords, to give forestry concessions to the communities, so the first person that we brought was President Arzú. On 22 of April 1996, we brought them to the Petén to see the forestry concession, and to familiarize them with the process; we presented people, like Don Marcedonio, and to understand the support that CONAP needed in this moment, because CONAP was dead during this time. By the time he had left, he had named a new Executive Secretary of CONAP and director of the reserve that was Roman Carrera and Rudolfo Cardona.[61]

One month later, after a year of discussion, the Accord on Socio-economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation was signed and endorsed by both CACIF and the social groups represented in the Assembly of Civil Society. Section B., Access to Land and Productive resources, point F outlined the inclusion of community forest concessions in the Peace Accords process. The accord agreed that "by 1999, to have awarded to small and medium *campesinos* legally organized, 100,000 hectares in natural resource management concessions, inside the multiple use area for the purpose of sustainable forestry management, administration of protected areas, ecotourism, protection of watersheds, and other activities

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[60] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Nota Informativa: Apoyo Politico Al Fortalecimiento De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya," (1996).
[61] Interview with the author, November 2, 2002.

compatible with the susainable use of natural resources in these areas."[62] Yet, the inclusion of community forest concessions within the Peace Accords hardly marked a shift in emphasis from industrial to community concessions. The allotment of 100,000 hectares for community concessions, in fact, was a decrease from the zonfication scheme outlined by The Nature Conservancy in 1995.[63]

The signing of the peace accords, in December 1996, heightened expectations that the state would expedite the process of granting concessions and that there would be more aid money available for developing forestry inventories and management plans, but also fears that the state would grant the concession areas to refugees returning from Mexico and not to communities living in the Multiple Use and Buffer Zones of the MBR.[64] Indeed, a letter from Tania Ammour from the CATIE-OLAFO project to Luis Larrazabal, Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food, Peten Guatemala (MAGA) and Juan Carlos Mendez, National Director of PAFG, highlighted use of lands designated for community forest concessions for returned refugees. The communication developed a detailed proposal based in the experiences of CATIE-OLAFO in the development of the community concessions of San Miguel la Palotada and La Pasadita.[65] Thus, the promise of expediating the awarding of community concessions existed alongside a fear that the community forest concessions would become a political mechanism for establishing returned refugee communities. As one informant suggested in relation to the Peace Accords and the zonification of the MUZ, "If you were concerned about the question of equity, you should ask why should they [communities already living in the MBR] have it, and not some village in Alta Verapaz . . . or returned refugees."[66] Instead of the hegemonic discourses surrounding the migrants-as-culprits and place-bounded identities, questions of equity and justice centred around the Peace Accords disrupted and disputed foundational assumptions that concessions must be for *local* communities and industry.

Yet, the inclusion of the community forest concessions in the Peace Accords was highly criticized by a group of conservationists who saw the management of resources by communities as a threat to the environmental integrity of the MBR. In her weekly editorial, Magalí Rey Rosa wrote:

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[62] (MINUGUA) Mision de Verificacion de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala, *Proceso De Negociacion De La Paz En Guatemala* (2001) 312.
[63] Godoy, "Propuesta De Zonificación Del Area De Uso Multiple De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya. Internal Report Presented to Emma Diaz De Gordillo, Francisco Moscoso, Eric Arellan, Secretaria Ejectuvia Del Consejo Nacional De Areas Protegidas.."
[64] (CONCOFOP) Consejo Consultivo de Comunidades Forestales del Peten, "Memorias Del Taller De Informacion Y Planificacion Del Concofop, 18-20 Diciembre 1996," (1996).
[65] CATIE-OLAFO Tania Ammour, "Perfil Proyecto Para El Fortalecimiento De Las Concessions Comunitarias, Peten, Acuerdo De Paz," (Letter To Luis Larrazabal, Vice Ministro de Agricultura, Ganaderia, y Alimentacion, Peten, and Juan Carlos Mendez, Director Nacional, Plan de Accion Forestal para Guatemala: 1997).
[66] Interview with Dr. Henry Tschinkel, of USAID, August 28, 2002.

The authorities that are involved are expected to care – by law – for the reserve, but feel as if their hands are tied – [because] MINUGUA will come and will accuse them of violating human rights, and in this way, we will not be able to carry out the law and no one says anything. Why? It appears that in the Peace Accords, there is a clause that says that 100,000 hectares of land in the multiple use zone will be handed over. It seems that, in order to clear our consciousness of the unequal culture we have maintained for hundreds of years, now we are going to trade in our most valuable resources. But it is a terrible and tragic mistake. Risking that we might be accused of being ecohistoricos – of loving the forests and animals more than our fellow humans – we have to try to clarify certain points: the soils of the Petén, in their great majority, are not apt for the type of agriculture that we practice today in Guatemala. All these people, that arrive – poor and hopeful – looking for a better future within five or six years will be more poor and totally hopeless. And all the rest of Guatemalans, we will have lost our most valuable resource that theoretically belongs to us all.[67]

These associations of *campesinos* with unsustainable agricultural practices and the disbelief that *campesinos*, especially migrants from other departments, could manage resources reverberated among some conservationists in the Petén.

The polemical questions of justice and equity in the Peace Accords were also contained in the state's promises of agrarian reform, decentralization, and increased autonomy of communities. These expectations and extreme land inequality fuelled a series of invasions into national parks and private *fincas* largely orchestrated by the *Campesino Union of the Petén* (UCP). According to the leader of the UCP, María Abregon de Chen, "the situation in El Petén is very sensitive. The local population cannot continue to tolerate the government's acquiescence to wealthy landowners, who are permitted to amass ever greater extensions of land, while poor *campesinos* don't even have a square inch of land to farm . . . We have no choice but to occupy whatever lands are available. Even if the government continues to throw us out by force and burn our houses down, we will still return to scrape out a living on those lands."[68] Similarly, the Indigenous and Campesino National Coordinator (CONIC), in support of the movement, indicated that the *campesinos* "are not invading *fincas* [large estates], but recuperating what was stolen." The task of invading farms and national parks was necessary "because *los finqueros* [elite land owners] and government are not prepared to comply with laws and the peace accords which would benefit the majority."[69] On the other hand, according to some conservationists in the Petén,

[67] Magali Rey Rosa, "Todos Mas Pobres," *Prensa Libre*, 18 de octubre de 1996.
[68] Latin American Data Base, "Guatemala: Land Invasions Affect State-Protected Ecological Zones," *EcoCentral: Central American Economy and Sustainable Development* 2, no. 14 (1997).
[69] Ramón Hernández, "Secretario Ejecutivo De Conap Avala Suspensión De Los Desalojos En Petén," *Prensa Libre*, 5 de abril de 1997.

these land invasions entailed "misinterpretations" of the Peace Accords on behalf of Q'echi' as guaranteeing them right to land in the Petén.[70]

In the Petén, the wave of invasions erupted on March 6, 1997, when 500 armed members of the UCP held hostages including park guards, national police, judicial authorities, and CONAP officials for two days. The action was a direct response to the eviction of 42 families from a settlement known as Santa Amélia in PNLT.[71] During the eviction, CONAP officials had ordered the squatters' huts and installations burned. The hostage-taking ended after a five hours of negotiations and an agreement that the government would halt displacements. This crisis was repeated on March 31, 1997, when 60 armed *campesinos* from the community of Paso Caballos and Buen Samaritano destroyed a biological station and kidnapped 13 technicians from Conservation International's local branch, ProPetén.

These series of national park invasions, and later invasions of *fincas,* spurred the solidification of appropriate categories that would mark the boundaries between good citizens of "nature's defenders" and irresponsible subjects of "nature's destroyers", between non-migrants and migrants, between insiders and outsiders. The construction of these distinctions is most clearly articulated in state officials' and conservationists' attempts to negotiate *and* to resignify the demands made by *campesinos* in the national park invasions. Both conservationists and state officials spun two different interpretations of *campesino* demands, and both were aimed at alleviating their own responsibility and delegitimizing the demands by highlighting their illegality.

The first attempt can be illustrated by an official report published by *CI* on the incident, titled "Conservation Under the Gun." The report reads as follows:

> On a steamy, hot afternoon, March 31, 1997, a small flotilla of boats pulled ashore at CI's biological field station on the San Pedro River in Guatemala. Moments later, the lunch time peace was shattered as 60 heavily armed men poured from the boats and stormed the compound. Within minutes, all seven buildings of the field station CI's base of operations in Laguna del Tigre National Park – were in flames. The raiders were local farmers and boatmen who wanted to open the park to slash-and-burn agriculture. They tied up 13 CI employees and took them downriver at gunpoint, the station crumbling into embers as they pulled away.... [according to CI Chairman and CEO Peter Seligmann] 'This potentially explosive situation threatened one of the biologically richest places on earth,'......It was a group of . . .squatters – reportedly organized by a band of smugglers who trafficked in drugs, tropical birds, and timber from the park – who attacked the CI field station as a way of securing their illegal hold on the park land. The raiders took their hostages from the station to the nearby town of El Naranjo, and presented two demands for CI Guatemala Director Carlos Soza: One, the government must exchange park land for the hostages, and two, CI must abandon its work protecting the

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[70] Norman Schwartz, cited in Leah S. Horowitz, "Encroachment on Protected Areas by Small-Scale Actors: An Examination of the Issues," (Flores, Guatemala: Conservation International, 1997), 43.
[71] Ibid.

park. But instead of reporting the raiders' demands to the local authorities, Soza – who grew up in the Peten – simply reported a case of mass kidnapping. The next day, the hostage-takers saw themselves described not as political leaders but as kidnappers....[72]

While *CI* felt no need to cover its blatant attempts to delegitimize the *campesinos'* demands, another report conducted by a consultant solicited by *CI* speculated that the biological station was targeted because local communities saw it as threat. According to this report, the biological station was a constant reminder of their illegality, and the communities did not want witnesses to their illicit activities who might be inclined to report them to the government.[73] The evidence used to support this claim was that the number of inhabitants in these communities increased during the period prior to the rebuilding of the new biological station. In an interview with one NGO official it was argued that the attacks were facilitated and promoted by the petroleum company, BASIC Resources, working inside PNLT. The informant speculated that BASIC Resources supplied the *campesinos* with guns, in efforts to keep conservationists outside of the National Park enabling them to avoid the enforcement of environmental regulations. Although both of these claims may be partially true, they also tend to diminish the political nature of the invasions and kidnappings. Moreover, *campesino* demands for political change tend to be foreclosed by the potent signifier of "illegality" and "criminal activity" which delegitimizes claims.

State officials' perspective on the invasions, documented by the conservative Guatemalan newspaper, *Prensa Libre*, attempted to resignify the event as a scuffle between Conservation International's local branch, Propetén, and the campesinos who accused the NGOs' assistants of having recently burned down their houses in efforts to make the *campesinos* leave the park. The Vice-Minister of Government, Salvador Gándara Gaitán, according to the newspaper, suggested that the incident did not really involve a kidnapping; rather 13 people were taken hostage by a group of campesinos "angry with Propetén."[74] On the one hand, according to Propetén, the *campesinos* were attempting to secure their illegal hold on the land; on the other hand, according to state officials, the *campesinos* were making demands upon the NGO for better relations. This duality of representations had the effect of freeing both parties from responsibility for negotiating with the *campesinos* and of silencing

[72]Conservation International, "Protecting a Fragile Planet: 1997 Annual Report," (Washington: D.C.: 1997), 14-15.

[73] Horowitz, "Encroachment on Protected Areas by Small-Scale Actors: An Examination of the Issues," 50.

[74] Ramón Hernández, "Tras 48 Horas De Secuestro Invasores Liberan a Trabajadores De Propetén," *Prensa Libre*, 3 de abril 1997.

the political nature of these relations.   Yet, it is also clear that the *campesinos* were demanding the legalization of lands and the extension of national identity cards.[75]

The use of "biodiversity hotspots" and national lands as instruments of political expression was by no means isolated. Only four days later, on April 2 of 1997, and directed by the UCP, 40 large farms were invaded in the Petén along with the national parks Laguna del Tigre, Sierra del Lacadon, Ceibal, Yaxaha in the MBR.[78]   In response, more than 30 conservation organizations, governmental and non-governmental, met to formulate a political response to President Alvaro Arzú.   The demands articulated by the conservationists arose from a feeling that the Peace Accords did not take into account environmental conservation and that it was necessary to construct a governmental policy aimed at protecting national parks in the post-conflict period.   In a communication to the press, the conservationists argued that "those responsible for the implementation of the peace accords, the business directors, the *campesino* movement, the church, and the commanders of the URNG, must respect and support protected areas as integral elements in strategies of equitable and sustainable development in the country."[79]   The conservationists also asked to the government to stop the invasions of protected areas, stating that "it would be tragic and mistaken for the future of Guatemala if the processes of access and historical land claims, repatriation and reinsertion, are done at the cost of natural and cultural protected areas, providers of strategic environmental goods and services for development and, in general, are not apt for agriculture."[80]

The Executive Secretary of CONAP, Rodolfo Cardona, however, largely ignored the pleas of conservationists and *finqueros* and issued a suspension of all displacements from land and farms located in protected areas.[81]   Cardona's action led to a vehement response from Humberto Preti, President of the Agriculture Chamber, demanding the immediate

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[75] Ramón Hernández, "Sesenta Hombres Armados Destruyen Laboratorio Y Secuestran a 13 Técnicos De La Ong Propetén," *Prensa Libre*, 2 de abril de 1997.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Hernández, "Secretario Ejecutivo De Conap Avala Suspensión De Los Desalojos En Petén."
[78] Ramón Hernández, "La Cámara Del Agro Denuncia Invasión De 40 Fincas En Petén," *Prensa Libre*, 3 de abril 1997.
[79] Carlos Canteo, "Conap: Urng Promueve Las Invasiones En Petén," *Siglo Veintiuno*, 3 de abril 1997.
[80] Ramón Hernández, "Ecologistas Piden Al Gobierno Detener Invasiones En Áreas Protegidas Del Petén," *Prensa Libre*, 4 de abril de 1997. The general feeling amongst CONAP and Conservationists that the peace accords were a threat to conservation was illustrated in a meeting on June 30, 1997 that listed the following threats to conservation in the reserve: 1/Human Settlements, 2/Politics including lack of political support and lack of clear definition of politics of development, 3/Lack of application of the law, 4/Advancement of the agricultural frontier, 5/*The peace process*, 6/Population growth, 7/Consciousness 8/Development plans in the MBR, 9/Existing Financial Structure, and 11/ Petroleum and forestry concessions. Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Memorias: Taller Sobre La Planificacion De La Reserva De Biosfera Maya," (Hotel El Gringo Perdido, EL Peten: 1997).
[81] Hernández, "Secretario Ejecutivo De Conap Avala Suspensión De Los Desalojos En Petén."

removal of Cardona from office.[82] The response by the economic elite resulted in an on-going policy of displacements from national parks and *fincas*. On May 14, the UCP responded by taking over the District Prosecuters office in Santa Elena for several hours demanding the resignation of the Crown Prosecuter, Hugo Rolando López, who had ordered several displacements.

In the meantime, CONCOFOP was strengthening its relationship with the state first by obtaining formal legal status as a second-tier association composed of community members.[83] In the process, CONCOFOP changed its name to the Association of Community Forests of the Petén (ACOFOP). In this movement, the state began to bridge new democratic spaces for ACOFOP. On the 23 of April, CONAP invited NGOs and communities represented by ACOFOP to participate in formulating the state policies around community forest concessions. In these meetings, CONAP illustrated a desire to establish the conditions for awarding community concessions at the expense of industrial concessions, the rezoning of the MUZ, and the mechanisms for resolving resource conflicts. Over the next months, the state was simultaneously embarking on a process of displacing communities from the Reserve and fortifying relations with another set of communities involved in concessions.

These relations of inclusion and exclusion played out in increasing tensions between the two *campesino* movements. These tensions resulted in death threats to ACOFOP's community leaders and invasions into the potential concessions of ACOFOP members.[84] In efforts to avoid *"campesino-campesino"* confrontation, the Coordinator of Indigenous and Campesino Community Agroforestry (CICAFOC) organized a meeting between ACOFOP and UCP which involved visits to the respective communities of Uaxactún, a founding member of ACOFOP, and Santa Amelia, a community located inside PNLT, and helicopter flights over deforested and non-deforested areas. During the final day of the meetings, the *campesinos* were asked to develop short, medium, and long-term proposals for protecting and managing natural resources.[85] Like ACOFOPs work with other communities in the MBR, these were clear attempts to transform the environmental consciousness of the population and to construct a citizenry of "nature's defenders."

In light of the state of ungovernablity, the state also began to negotiate with individual communities located in the Laguna del Tigre National Park (PNLT), but refused

[82] Ramón Hernández, "Cámara Del Agro Pide Destitución De Secretario Ejecutivo De Conap," *Prensa Libre*, 6 de abril de 1997.

[83] It is worthwhile noting that the original founders of CONCOFOP did not give up their member status when ACOFOP was created on June 17, 1997. Thus the association is composed not only of communities (whose community forest association President represents them in meetings) but of various individuals as well.

[84] (ACOFOP) Asociación de Comunidades Forestales del Petén, "Asamblea General" (San Benito, Petén, July 27 1997).

[85] CICAFOC, "Informe De Encuentro Entre Asociación De Comunidades Forestales Del Petén, Guatemala Y La Unidad Campesina Del Petén, Guatemala" (28 de Julio a 1 de Agosto 1997).

to negotiate with UCP as an organization. In order to halt further invasions and to silence questions of agrarian reform, the state negotiated a series of agreements with communities in the PNLT, beginning with the community of Paso Caballos that had been involved in the kidnapping and burning of the biological station. By the end of 1997, the state had signed "Agreements of Intention," including the relocation of some families to places outside of the reserve, with five comunities living in PNLT including Santa Amelia, Buen Samaritano, Río Chocop and Santa Rosita.

Although violence continued to erupt throughout the Petén as the state continued its policy of displacement, negotiations betwen CONAP and communities living inside National Parks were underway. On September 10, the Petén's General Attorney, Manuel Barquin Durán, also announced what was becoming a consensus: "There are no alternatives, it must be the state who brings itself close to the communities, and that has them as its allies. With the presence of CONAP, it is possible to technically, rationally, and sustainably manage the reserve's resources."[86] The waves of national park invasions and the need to redefine the role of the National Army in post-war period led to the re-creation of the army as a "Forest Army" to protect the forests of the MBR. This military program, which would include a "Forest School," was designed, according to the Benjamín Godoy Búrbano, chief of Military Zone 23 located in Santa Elena, because "we need a new image, a special character and different training that what we have actually had."[87]

This change in state policy in the Petén was reflected in CONAP's annual report both in terms of how it reflected upon the implementation of the MBR and on how state officials perceived the future of the Reserve. In re-imagining the role of the state in the MBR, the report discussed the initial problems of enforcing the law in the Reserve from the perspective of the need for more participation by the population, rather than better enforcement. The report stated that "CONAP reacted to this situation [illegal activities] by becoming the Reserve's police. This situation originated, in part, in the lack of an integrated administrative vision of Protected Areas that involved communities. The interests of CONAP were opposed to those of communities, or at least this was the image of the insitution principally from the view of the mountains of timber confiscated, but the price that CONAP paid was the total loss of confidence with the *campesino* communities, involved or not in illegal activities."[88] Therefore, the the problem was reframed in the need for decentralization and increased participation, because "the concentration of the most

[86] "Apoyo Campesino Es Crucial Para Proteger Biosfera Maya," *Prensa Libre*, 10 de septiembre de 1997.

[87] Rafael Amado Deras, "Crearán Ejército De Selva Para Proteger Bosques," *Prensa Libre*, 17 de octubre de 1997.

[88] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Presentacion De Avances Obtenidos, Conap Region Viii, 1997," (San Benito, Peten: 1998), 1.

important decisions with the Executive Secretary, far from the reality of Protected Areas, provoked a total loss of support from local leaders, fundamental for the achievement of the stated objectives of the insitution."[89] This decision to decentralize administrative capacities and to increase participation of the communities was also coupled with an agreement with departamental governors to promote a definitive national message that "There is no more land in the Petén." These moves represented the first official recognition that the colonization of the Petén had stopped and that the state would seek alliances with existing communities.[90]

By 1998, state policy had turned clearly to community forest concessions as a mechanism for decentralizing administration, promoting the participation of communities in the MUZ, so that they would "buffer" national park invasions.[91] Indeed, according to CONAP officials, community forest concessions were meant to prevent further national park invasions by blocking entrance into the parks through lands that would now be the responsibility of communities. The newly appointed Executive Secretary of CONAP, who was also a forester and avid supporter of community forest concessions, Juventino Galvez, pointed out that community forest concessions were the only option and "the other side of coin is not to do anything and leave the communities to take what they want, but in this more disorder would be created, and land without utility will bring more invasions and forest fires."[92] By granting legal access to resources to one set of communities, the state hoped to prevent another set of migrants from entering. Framed in the military language of buffer zones and nuclear zones and bolstered by liberal democratic discourses, thus, community forest concessions were mechanisms for playing one set of *campesino* demands for forest concessions against another set of demands for agrarian reform, of dividing the population into citizens and subjects. Community forest concessions would become a mechanism of locating power in the spaces that the citizens controlled and disempowered the spaces of oppositional movements.[93] Moreover, by navigating among competing interpretations of the Peace Accords by conservationists, persons concerned with social justice and land redistribution in Guatemala, movements for agrarian reform, and CONCOFOP, the state was

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[89] Ibid., 2.

[90] Alejandro C. Imbach and Juventino Gálvez, *Análisis Y Perspectivas Del Manejo Forestal En Concesiones Comunitarias, Petén, Guatemala, Informe Técnico No.305* (Turrialba, Costa Rica: CATIE, 1999).

[91] The official strategy for managing the MUZ stated that "The MUZ should function as a buffer to National Parks and Biotopes."Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Estrategia Para La Administración Y Manejo De La Zona De Uso Multiple De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya," (Peten: CONAP, 1998).

[92] Ramón Hernández, "Conseciones En Verde: Conap Busca Otorgar Las Areas Del Usos Multiples De La Biosfera Maya Para Frenar La Deforestación":," *Prensa Libre*, 31 de enero de 1999.

[93] For a similar argument see David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Massachusetts and Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) 235.

able to solidify and stablize the meanings of the Peace Accords as a mechanism of limited reform and narrow democracy.[94]

In short, the community forests concessions constitute the formation of a civil society *through* the exclusion of others and enables the demarcation between those who belong, to the "people", the demos, to the nation, and those who are excluded as invaders, aliens, or foreigners.[95] This moment of closure, which is required by the very process of constituting the "people" or "we", cuts to the very heart of the logic of democracy. Because the identity of a democratic political community requires the possibility of drawing a frontier between "us" and "them", democracy always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion. It is this exclusion through which identity is constituted and through which democratic logic contradicts the universalistic rhetoric of the liberalism with its emphasis on "humanity," and "equality".

Central to this tension between liberalism and democracy is the notion of the abstracted and atomized citizen in which difference – whether gender, "race", sexuality and class – are not recognized.[96] This category of unified, non-ethnically determined citizenry, however, can only be posited as transcending ethnic differences by first producing those

[94] Following Partha Chatterjee, this can be seen as similar to Antonio Gramsci's "passive revolution" in which new claimants of power are unable to fully assault old dominant classes, choose a path in which the demands for a new society are "satistifed in small doses, legally, in a reformist matter" so that the political and economic position of the old feudal classes is not destroyed, agrarian reform is avoided, and the masses are prevented from going through a fundamental social transformation."Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971) 44-120. Like Chatterjee, we can see this "passive revolution" not as a "blocked dialetic" but as part of "a constructed hegemony, effective because it is incomplete and fragmented at the same time because the hegemonic claims are fundamentally contested within the constructed whole." Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) 211-12.

[95] Jacques Derrida, in his provocative book the *Politics of Friendship*, addresses this issue of how democratic politics requires friends-enemies, native-foreigner through the western canon ranging from Aristotle to Carl Schmidt. Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London and New York: Verso, 1997).

[96] In Latin America, this discourse of "sameness" is in part a *mestizaje* discourse of identity "that everyone is really the same underneath – [and that] makes liberatory promises: freedom from the horrors of essentialist racial difference and a unity that acknowledges yet transcends difference." Diane M. Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) 206. These discourses of *mestizaje* are different from those of ladiniziation or *blanqueimento* as cultural or "racial" assimiliation in that cultural difference does not need to be erased in this model. Yet, recent critics have also begun to question the liberatory potential of *mestizaje* according to the historical contexts of its articulation. On the one hand, *mestizaje* can be used to articulate difference and division and a plurality of subjects. On the other hand, it contains the deeply problematic, dominant cultural meanings of *mestizaje* as the defacement arising from biological mixture, a woman's betrayal of her race as original sin, and an assimiliartionist ideology of cultural homogenization. As Florencia Mallon warns, "*mestizaje* also emerges as an official discourse of nation formation, a new claim to authenticity that denies colonial forms of racial/ethnic hierarchy and opression by creating an intermediate subject and interpellating him/her as 'the citizen'." Florencia E. Mallon, "Constructing Mestizaje in Latin America: Authenticity, Marginality, and Gender in the Claiming of National Identities," *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 2, no. 1 (1996): 170.

same differences. As such, differences and hierarchies between Indians and Ladinos produced through the intersection of gender, class and race systems, are both excluded from the discourses of "citizenship" and necessary for it to exist. In this way, the category of "native petenero", who constitutes the ideal environmental citizen, requires the categories of migrants – Indigenous and Ladino – to constitute their identity.

Migrants and non-migrants become fixed, hierarchical categories, through cultural essentialisms of appropriate and inappropriate practices that reinvent racisms. In contrast to the appropriate environmental practices of native peteneros, especially the harvesting of NTFPs, discourses surrounding "migrant-as-culprit" of deforestation suggests that Indigenous and Ladino cultural practices around the environment are inappropriate for the Petén's tropical soils.[97] Further studies, conducted by the director of Propetén, Carlos Soza, suggested that migrants lack enviromental consciousness, and that "the majority of them have migrated to the area and have a tendency to reproduce their original customs where the conditions in the landscape are different."[98] These cultural essentialisms "fix" certain cultural characteristics, such as land use practices, to particular bodies – both Indigenous and Ladino.[99] Moreover, if we, as Paul Gilroy suggests, maintain that race is a political rather than a biological category, this focus on the "distinctive culture" of the marginalized reinvents racisms that are more diffused but still racist.[100] According to Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, "in the current period, it is the signifier of culture, often written on the body, which organizes racism against Indigenous people contributing to the ways in which they are subordinated, excluded, and constituted as 'the ultimate other.'"[101]

The interweaving of racist ideologies that denigrate both migrant Ladinos and Indigenous with liberal conceptions of citizenship is evident in the Petén in popular notions of who belongs, and who does not. Environmental citizenship, thus, offers the basis for a

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[97]For an analysis of narratives of inappropriate environmental practices of migrants see Juanita Sundberg, "Ngo Landscapes in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala," *Geographical Review* 88, no. 3 (1999).

[98] Carlos Soza Manzanero, "Factores Que Inciden En La Conciencia Ecológica De Los Habitantes De La Reserva De La Biósfera Maya En El Departamento De El Petén, Guatemala" (Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 1996) 99.

[99] For evidence that migrants adopt and adapt to different environments see Scott. Atran and David Medin, "Knowledge and Action: Culture Models of Nature and Resource Management in Mesoamerica," in *Environment, Ethics, and Behavior: The Psychology of Environmental Valuation and Degradation*, ed. D. Messick M. Baszerman, A. Tenbrunsel, and K. Wade-Benzoni (San Francisco: New Lexington Press, 1997), Sundberg, "Ngo Landscapes in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala." For a contestation that "traditional" Maya Q'echi' agricultural practices are unsustainable see Nery Macz and Georg Grünberg, *Manual De Comunidades De Petén* (Santa Elena, Petén: CARE Guatemala and Cooperación Austriaca para el Desarrollo, 1999).

[100]Paul Gilroy, *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987) 109, 49. The regulation of gender, sexuality, and class are at the heart of these racial formations, but (unfortunately) much beyond the scope of this project.

[101] Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, *Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity, and Politics in Latin America* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) 40.

non-ethnic identity that, like Latin American discourses of *mestizaje*, suggests "that although the nation suffered a catastrophic origin, *mestizaje* offers the subjugated eugenic promise that through the collective management of life a more fit nation will triumphantly emerge."[102] In this promise of liberation from ethnic divisions and harmonic future, environmental citizens offer to heal the wounds of the national body politic inflicted by indigenous organizing.[103]

The articulation of these identifications, migrant versus native petenero, nature's defenders versus nature's destroyers, illuminate an opposition between the liberal language of equality, which postulates a universality through references to all of "humanity", and the practices of democratic equality which requires the political moment of drawing a frontier between us and them. The articulation between the liberal and democratic can, as Chantal Mouffe suggests, be seen as the locus of a tension that enables the articulation of liberal logic to constantly challenge through references to humanity and the polemic use of human rights the forms of exclusions that are necessarily inscribed in the process of installing those same rights and defining the "people."[104] That these identities are part of a political process of hegemonic articulation, or the constitution of rule through struggle over a definition of the "people", also means that these inclusions-exclusions are up for renegotiation. As will be explored in Chapter Four, these identities can never be fully constituted and can only exist through multiple and competing forms of identifications. Just as the exclusions of *campesinos* from the concession process resulted in "the return to haunt by those predicated upon its absence" forcing a expansion of the democratic process, these new exclusions offer the promise of further contestation of the basis of democracy.[105]

COMMUNITY FOREST CONCESSIONS: RATIONALIZING AND REFORMING CITIZENS

The new hegemony of community forest concessions was most clearly evident in the appointment of Juventino Galvez as the Executive Secretary of CONAP, and Roman Carrera, the regional director of CONAP. Both Galvez and Carrera were educated in forestry and had been long time advocates of the process. The state even began to take an active role, in the words of many NGOs and state officials, of "convincing the communities to accept a concession." As early as June of 1997, the state had begun to revise the norms established in 1994 for awarding concessions in order to facilitate and expedite the awarding process. The crucial difference from previous processes was the inclusion of ACOFOP in

[102] Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* 209.
[103] See Ibid.
[104] Chantal Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy," in *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London and New York: Verso, 1999).
[105] For exploration of the "return to haunt" as an hegemonic process see Butler, "Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism."

revising the norms. By September of 1998, the new norms were approved by CONAP.[106] In contrast to the focus on timber extraction, these new norms incorporated *Integrated Concessions* that included timber and NTFP extraction. Moreover, ACOFOP took a place as a formalized part of civil society as a member of Consultive Council for the Management System of the MUZ of CONAP.

The acts of state "persuasion," participatory discourses, and quickened processing worked and between 1998-2001 nearly all of the concessions were awarded. As previously mentioned the first concession was awarded to San Miguel la Polotada in 1994. Between 1997 and 2000, eight other management units were awarded – two industrial and six community concessions. Another five concessions at the time were in the final processes of being approved and awarded. By 2001, there were a total of 15 concessions (13 community concessions and two industrial) with an extension of 560,000 hectares. (For a map see Figure 4 on the following page) During this time ACOFOP had also grown to incorporate 16 communities and two cooperatives located in the Buffer Zone.

With the expansion of members in ACOFOP and functioning community forest concessions, ACOFOP was granted a position in the Association of Natural Resource and Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ASOREMA). In addition, ACOFOP has been elected alongside one other organization to represent NGOs in CONAP.[107] The same processes that brought ACOFOP a permanent position on CONAPs advisory board alongside NGOs working in the area also saw the expansion of ACOFOP beyond national borders. In 1997, ACOFOP presented proposals in Managua at the Central American Conference on protected areas, as well as Latin American Congress of Protected Areas. In 1998, ACOFOP became part of a delegation of Coordinator of Indigenous and Campesino Community Agroforestry (CICAFOC) to attend a Conference of Donors of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor convened by the World Bank in Paris. Later that year, ACOFOP also attended a Latin American Conference on the causes of deforestation and degradation. These examples form merely a part of an ongoing list of conferences and workshops that began to be part of ACOFOPs participation in a global environmental civil society.

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[106] Comision Tecnica de Concesiones Forestales, "Normas Para El Otorgamiento De Concesiones De Aprovechamiento Y Manejo De Recursos Naturales Renovables En La Zona De Uso Multiple De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya," (Santa Elena: CONAP, 1998). Among the changes that ACOFOP was most instrumental in orchestrating was a change in the community-NGO relationship. In the new relationship, communities would be able to choose the NGO that would provide technical assistance, and they would be allowed to "fire" a NGO if they were unsatisfied. Previously, the NGOs had used the concession norms to argue that they had a permanent relationship with the community. Upsetting the relationship with the NGO could then result in the community breaking their contract with the state.

[107] Marcedonio Cortave, "La Experiencia De Acofop: Un Proceso Arduo De Incidencia Política," (San Benito, Petén: ACOFOP, n/d).

Figure 4. Map of Community Forest Concessions
Provided by the Association of Community Forests of the Petén

While participating in international conferences and global civil society, ACOFOP continued to articulate identities as nature's defenders. Raging forest fires in the dry season of 1998 forced communities' members of ACOFOP to place their bodies between the forest and fire. ACOFOP, then, as an organization utilized satellite imagery of the forest fires to demonstrate that the forest which remained standing were the community forest concession areas. In a vivid imagery, ACOFOP sought to demonstrate in a series of publicity announcements that the communities had physically become nature's defenders. Contrary to national narratives of biodiversity preservation discussed in Chapter Two, the state could no longer assume the potent role of hero in the story, nor was that role granted to conservationists with "expert knowledges," but the agency of the heroic figure was appropriated by *campesinos*. In interviews, many conservationists and state officials admitted that it was this series of events that solidified belief in the ability of *campesinos* to convert themselves into protectors of the forest's resources.

That same year, the Ministry of Energy and Mines granted a series of new petroleum concessions in the MBR. In the August of 1998, overlapping concessions were announced

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in the communities of Uaxactún and Carmelita, while new concessions were granted inside Laguna del Tigre National Park (PNLT).[108] ACOFOP's decision to support the fight against petroleum concessions in a General Assembly and to become a liaison with organizations such as Oil Watch, Amnesty International, and Colectivo Madre Selva, was instrumental in halting plans for oil exploitation in both communities. In public demonstrations, meetings and international communications, ACOFOP again presented the imagery of *campesinos* as potent actors in the defense of nature.[109]

The role of communities in defending nature and halting deforestation was becoming so widely publicized that Conservation International reported:

> The most recent set of images revealed some welcome results – the rate of deforestation is slowing, in both Laguna del Tigre and the overall Reserve. Forest clearing fell from 0.36 percent of the area per year from 1995 to 1997, to just 0.12 percent from 1997 to 1999." 'It's dropping dramatically,' says Carlos Soza, CI's Guatemala director. Driving the improvement, Soza says, is the government's adoption of a policy long advocated by CI – allowing local groups to manage their own sections of the reserve. 'When it was government controlled nobody cared,' says Soza. 'But now they 'own' it themselves and treat it with great respect.'[110]

Even *Conservation International*, who had early shunned the idea of community forest concessions, and Carlos Soza who found *campesinos* "ecologically ignorant," were now promoting them as the harbinger of sustainable development and conservation.

In reciting the effects that community forest concessions have had on conservation and sustainable development, both ACOFOP and advocates of the process have suggested that the concession process not only reduced the number of forest fires and deforestation rates, but resulted in decreased conflicts with the state, halted the advancement of the agricultural frontier, controlled immigration, created and strengthened human capital, led to a change in the attitude of communities from a culture of slash and burn agriculture to a culture of forestry, reduced poverty through development and strengthened organizational capacity, and generated new sources of income linked to the sustainable use of natural resources.[111] For ACOFOP, these achievements included the knowledge of environmental management, of equipment such as Geographical Information Systems, use of machinery for extraction, sawmills, computers and more. Moreover, communities were increasingly becoming equipped to negotiate contracts for the sale of primary materials and for technical

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[108] (ACOFOP) Asociación de Comunidades Forestales del Petén, "2a Asamblea General Ordinaria De Acofop," (San Benito, Peten: 1998).
[109] These experiences will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.
[110] Conservation International, "Focused Energy, Powerful Results: 1999 Annual Report," (Washington, D.C.: 1999).
[111] Juventino Gálvez and Fernando Carrera, "Estado Actual Del Proceso De Concesiones Forestales En La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya, Petén, Guatemala," (Santa Elena: CATIE-CONAP, 1999). Cortave, "La Experiencia De Acofop: Un Proceso Arduo De Incidencia Política."

services. This knowledge of how to be "businessmen" included knowledge of how to resolve conflicts, analyze and make democratic decisions, manage projects, pay taxes, conduct cost-benefit analysis of productive activities, and make investments in community projects.[112]

ACOFOP also facilitates communities in the process of production and commercialization of the products, including the environmental certification of approximately 100,000 hectares of forest under "Sello Verde," through its own Commercialization Office. Through improved marketing, ACOFOP is looking in the direction of self-sufficiency and the need for a new model of sustainable communities that includes ecological as well as technical and financial aspects. In the words of the Executive Director of ACOFOP, Marcedonio Cortave, ACOFOP is working towards opening a forestry school for community members and improving the marketing of timber and NTFPs so that "communities can stop functioning as subsidized concessions under the umbrella of cooperation projects and NGOs."[113] Thus, ACOFOP, like modern nationalists, aimed at "rationalizing and reforming the traditional culture of their people."[114] In undertaking these forms of methods of subjectification, ACOFOP is seeking distance from international funding, independence from NGO "expert" knowledge, and freedom from intrusive state intervention. Indeed, it is through integration into the modern economy, the appropriation of capitalist means of production and the construction of civil society, that ACOFOP seeks to rein in the forms of paternalistic state and NGO intervention and construct a space of autonomy, but one that also enables constructive debate amongst state officials, NGOs, and communities.

ü This story reads like one of the familiar narratives of modernization and the emergence of a "public sphere" governed by its own regularities in such a way that it converges with private interest and public good. Indeed, the story appears to be one in which an enlightened domain of unrestricted and rational discussion of matters of general interest emerges to promote the progressive emancipation of the people.[115] What gets omitted from these comprehensions of modernity is, of course, power, power understood not as the antithesis of freedom and reason, but as the productive effect of relations. More precisely, what gets submerged is the emergence of a political rationality in which power works not *in spite of*, but *through* the construction of free social exchange, and *through* the construction of political subjectivities that are experienced as free will and autonomous agency.

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[112] Cortave, "La Experiencia De Acofop: Un Proceso Arduo De Incidencia Política."

[113] Interview with the author, September 22, 2002.

[114] Partha Chatterjee, "The Nationalist Resolution of the Women's Question," in *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*, ed. Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 237.

[115] See for example Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991).

Secondly, this conception of modernity elides the ways in which this identity of "we", of a definition of the "people" is constituted through an exclusion of "them", the "foreigner". It is these forms of power that produce and regulate citizens and subjects.[116]

It is this construction of environmental citizens as autonomous agents, thinking and acting in their own interest through the systematic redefinition and reordering of the terrains upon which *campesinos* lived, that made possible the state's imperative of governance in the Petén. National park invasions, violent uprisings, demands for agrarian reform, and indigenous claims to nationhood were to be a thing of the past. The story of the Petén could unfold, thus, towards its truth, its essence, set forth in environmental narratives and the map of the Petén described in Chapter Two. What was at stake in this reordering of the social worlds into community forest concessions was the design of institutions, including formations of democracy, so that following in their own self-interest, *campesinos* would do what they ought, and become a good citizenry of nature's defenders. Yet, as will be discussed in the following chapter, this construction of a good citizenry of nature's defenders, including divisions between migrants and native peteneros, would be contested, resisted, and negotiated.

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[116] Graham Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Socierty and Governing 'the System of Natural Liberty'," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Colin Gordon Graham Burchell, and Peter Miller (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Colin Gordon Graham Burchell, and Peter Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).

CHAPTER FOUR
BECOMING NATURE'S DEFENDERS:
FASHIONABLE IDENTITIES AND SUBVERSIVE COMMUNITY

"In my struggles to save the community of Uaxactún and
protect the forest from loggers, I have become another Chico
Mendez"
> - Camila Rodriquez

"Uaxactún should be a model village, a model for all of
Guatemala"
> -Bernado Castro

The formation of a unified civil society of community forest concessions, that was
intended to embody a general and rational will, required bringing together and melding
diverse communities whose perceptions, including interpretations of the concessions,
sustainable development and the Peace Accords varied widely. For some agriculturally based
communities, the process of discussing and awarding concessions brought expectations that
they should be granted legal title to individual parcels of land. For others the granting of a
concession entailed the legalization of previously illegal logging activities and the
implementation of managerial practices. For still other communities such as Uaxactún, it
involved an upheaval of internal hierarchies within the communities, land use practices and
unofficial territorial boundaries governing access to forest resources. As one state official
suggested, "of all the communities Uaxactún was the most complicated." When I queried,
he went on to say, "to break with the traditional scheme was complicated. You see, *chicle* is
a mixture of cultures, of concepts that are very complicated, there is no defined culture, and
there are divisions, because people are from different parts of the country."[1] It is this on-
going process of "complicated" community formation in the hybrid, migratory village of
Uaxactún that I want to explore. In part I ask why it was, and continues to be, such a
"difficult" or "complicated" community for the state or, perhaps, more precisely what it is
about being so unintelligible that also makes Uaxactún so unruly and onerous.

This chapter explores the unruly aspects of constructing abstract, atomized, green-
citizens. In this chapter, I argue that governmentality, in contrast to how it is often described
or understood in the literature, is not monolithic or imposed, but rather governmentality is
constantly constituted and reconstituted through the hegemonic processes of resistance,

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[1] Interview with Francisco Guzman, August 23, 2002.

contestation, and negotiation. The previous chapter explored community forest concessions at the regional level as sites of democracy and governmentality. This chapter, expanding on the earlier argument, explores the construction of a green citizenry through a local history of a community concession in the village of Uaxactún. In this chapter, I explore contradictions between the construction of a civil society of green citizens and local, fluid, and multiple-place identities of community in Uaxactun. It is this contradiction between "unsanitized" community and, modern civil society, that Jim Handy has argued makes liberal democracy so problematic in Guatemala and much of the postcolonial world.[2]

I explore these conflicts between civil society and community as conflits between the state's need to govern through legibility, visibility, and discipline, and the individual's need for autonomy and freedom. In the last chapter, I explored this contradiction by asserting that freedom was not the antithesis of power, and that power operated not in spite of a domain of civil society, but through this domain of freely speaking and thinking citizens. In this chapter, I explore this contradiction through the ways in which governmentality and nationhood are negotiated, contested and resisted. This chapter explores how the "technologies of citizenship" were contested and resisted through the appropriation and misappropriation of new representations of Uaxactuneros as "nature's defenders" and the languages of conservation.[3] Moreover, this chapter argues that not only did Uaxactuneros resist governmentality, but in doing so they enlisted the terms of governmentality in the reconstruction of local maps of resource use, and participated in defining the languages of conservation and the terms of governmentality.

This chapter returns to the beginning of this thesis with the creation of the MBR, detailing the rise of resistances to attempts by the state to impose law and order and the creation of a new social and economic class of "campesino conservation intellectuals." This chapter then follows the narrative of concessions through lines of difference and division, conflict and cooperation in the community around the idea of a community concession and the idea of harvesting a new resource – timber – and the uneasy alliance among villagers against a petroleum concession that solidified consent for a concession. The chapter ends with a discussion of negotiations of the concession norms, including maps of resource use

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[2] Jim Handy, "Democratizing What? Some Reflections on Nation, State, Ethnicity, Modernity, Community and Democracy in Guatemala," *Canadian Journal for Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 27, no. 53 (2002).

[3] Following Judith Butler's work on gender, I focus on the appropriation and misappropriation, citation and recitation of norms as forms of resistance that offer the promise of agency in human creativity rather than a return to the all-knowing humanist subject of consciousness. In these performative acts of identities as "nature's defenders" as well as subversive forms of communication such as rumours, transgressions, memories and forgetting, Uaxactuneros disrupt attempts to make community visible and available for government, and establish a sort of political contestation that subverts, naturalized and normative representations of "sanctioned" communities.

and hardened boundaries of belonging, after the concession was awarded in December of 2000.

CONAP, CONSERVATIONISTS, AND CAMPESINO INTELLECTUALS

In May of 1990, an entourage of CONAP officials arrived in Uaxactún, gathered the villagers in the town centre and announced Uaxactún's new status as part of the MBR. The new map of the Petén and their location in the multiple use zone (MUZ) signalled a new relationship with the state that challenged the ways in which the villagers had distanced themselves from the cultural values and institutions of the state. This new geographical status, the officials informed them, meant that villagers could no longer hunt or gather wood without permission, nor could they expand the existing agricultural area or harvest non-timber forest resources in certain areas. The state officials then constructed barracks where they would maintain a permanent residence, monitoring the activities of villagers in the area. For villagers the new laws and regulations meant that to cut guano (branches used in building houses) or to cut timber they had to travel to Guatemala City for a licence, at an expense that very few could swallow. These prohibitions led villagers to renounce the state and to reject their citizenship and threaten to migrate to Mexico. As one community leader recounted:

> On 19 of July [1990], we approached an open town council in Uaxactún to make our demands to the government. A representative of the governor arrived, the mayor, and a representative of the government who was a member of Congress arrived in Uaxactún, and then in this moment, we declared ourselves against the laws of CONAP and the prohibitions of CONAP and the entire situation and publicly we asked the government to register us in the way that we asked, freely, that they would permit us to pass freely in order to migrate to Mexico. When we renounced [our citizenship] in this way, the government invited us to a meeting to start a dialogue between CONAP and the community. This was how we arrived at agreements with Region Eight [CONAP-Petén]. It was the mediation by the government that they gave the district an agreement to decentralize power to Region Eight so that they could hand out permissions, not licences, but permissions for locals to extract natural resources. In this way, although timber they never gave us, but for a branch of Cedar or Mahogany at least . . .[4]

These encounters between state and community were also fear-laden. According to villagers, a neighbouring community, Dos Lagunas, was disbanded by the military and a few individuals were killed because it was in a highly valued conservation area. This same military threat was felt by many villagers in Uaxactún. According to one villager:

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[4] Benedin Garcia, Interview with the author, September 28, 2002.

I see it as a miracle [that we weren't killed] after what we did, and we have done up to the moment. As I see it, it is because, at least by 1990, Uaxactún was already declared as a community, and if not it would have been removed [from the reserve]. North of Uaxactún there was another community more that was called Dos Lagunas, but since it was of high interest for the government to conserve this area, the military entered there and killed a few people. Others fled to Mexico, one part of the community lives in Uaxactún. It was 1990. . . .Then the community was abandoned for a certain time. In 1992 or 1993, they constructed a CECON [Centre for Conservation Studies, San Carlos University, Guatemala] district and until now they administer the biotope from there. There [where the village once resided] is a camp, a lake, and some houses still standing.[5]

While some villagers remember the removal of Dos Lagunas as a massacre, a conservationist in the area asserted that one person was killed by the military because he/she was suspected of being part of the guerrillas. These discrepancies illustrate the powerful and fear-laden encounters between state and the village, the perception that nature mattered more than people, and that conservation could justify any sort of politics.

This new state presence in the village brought suspicion and fear. It also brought the hope that the state would improve the road into the town, bring safe drinking water, and introduce medicines. While the state offered none of these benefits, the declaration of the reserve created a new form of employment for villagers as park guards or "*guarda-recursos.*" Although I did not obtain official figures of the numbers employed, my informants estimated that six men from the community were originally employed by the state, and more each year after as CONAP increased its presence in other areas of the reserve.

Following in CONAP's footsteps, Uaxactún was bombarded by conservation biologists and NGOs bringing conservation projects, environmental studies, and more job opportunities for locals in the conservation industry as forest guides and as "participants" in conservation projects. By 1993, there were a total of eleven NGOs working in the community.[6] Not only did NGO projects, conservation biology studies, and state presence create new forms of employment which would weaken the *contratistas'* grip on the labour force, but they provided access to a series of narratives and discourses around nature and human-nature relationships. Through these state and non-state actors, some Uaxactuneros became privy to a new series of environmental representations and narratives concerning

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[5] Benedin Garcia, Interview with the author, September 28, 2002.

[6] Included among them were the World Conservation Union (International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, UICN) that operated in Uaxactún between 1990 and 1996, the University of San Carlos from 1991-1996, the Association of Wildlife Rescue and Conservation (ARCAS) from 1993-1996, CARE (1991-1996), Propetén (1991-1996), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) from 1996 to present, and the National Organization for Conservation and Environment (ONCA 1993-1996), and Foundation Nature for Life (NPV) 1996 to present.

biodiversity loss, wilderness preservation, and human-nature relationships. Employment and access to conservation projects signalled the creation of a new economic and social class in the community of individuals with ties to the mechanisms of governmentality embodied in state and non-state organizations and with access to new and powerful conservation discourses. These individuals then had access to knowledge of biology and resource management, different from that of *contratistas*, and had technical training in areas such as the classifications of species, and the calculation of volumes of trees.[7] Following from Antonio Gramsci's notion of "peasant intellectuals" this new relatively elite group of Uaxactuneros can be thought of as "*campesino* conservation intellectuals." I will refer to them as *campesino* intellectuals.

FASHIONING IDENTITY: FROM STRUGGLES AGAINST NATURE TO DEFENDING NATURE

Access to environmental knowledge and technical skills also entailed exposure to national Edenic metanarratives discussed in Chapter Two. While once harvester's of non-timber resources, especially *chicleros,* were portrayed as unlawful and living in struggle with the forest, following the creation of the MBR, the most avid supporters of forest extraction reserves, Conservation International's local branch Propetén, portrayed harvesters of NTFPs, *xate, chicle,* and *pimienta* as an idealized, timeless, forest people living in harmony with the wilderness. Harvesters of NTFPs were said to be of special interest because "they promote conservation and sustained use of the Petén tropical forest. Knowing that their economic future lies in the sustained use of *xate, chicle,* and *pimienta,* families who harvest these resources are strong promoters of forest protection. Equally interesting is the fact that, combined, these renewable resources represent an income of at least US$6 million each year from undegraded tropical forest."[8]

This shift in representational schemes, from being in struggle with nature to becoming nature's defenders, is illustrated most clearly by the work of one anthropologist. In an book published in 1990, the anthropologist suggested that "The *chiclero* is supposed to be dangerous, prodigal, hard drinking, and locked in struggle with the forest. The *milpero* at home in the community is peaceful, prudent, sober, and at one with the forest" and according to local customs, "tapping trees is profane, but making a *milpa* is, if not quite sacred, then at

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[7] These technical skills would also be fortified during the process of soliciting a concession, (developing forestry inventories, management plans, etc), and expanded to other members of the community after the concession was awarded.

[8] James D. Nations et al., "Biodiversity in Guatemala," (Washington, D.C: Centre for International Development and Environment, World Resources Institute, 1988), 54.

least morally safe."[9] This same anthropologist, later in a research position with Propetén, changed his position to align with that of conservationists. In his later work, he claimed that native peteneros relate the forest with community, the home, and family, which "reinforces the sensation that working in the forest is appropriate. In many ways, Peteneros enjoy being in the forest."[10] In this way, harvesters were said to have a "sacred" and loving relationship with the forest. Moreover, harvesters of NTFPs promote these same values in future generations, since "they teach children not to be afraid of insects, nor to squash them automatically, but to carefully remove them from where they are not wanted. They were only afraid of snakes and they kill them if they suspect they are venomous."[11] Likewise, other conservationists stated that harversters' belief in "reciprocity with nature" incites them "to fight for the conservation and regeneration of secondary forest resources."[12]

This imagery places NTFPs harvesters closer to nature, and suggested they have a system of local knowledge about its resources. These "secrets of the forest" developed "through generations of use" constituted a forest culture in which "Peteneros know and can name almost every place and all the plants in the forest, almost as if they assigned it a soul."[13] These narratives portrayed NTFPs harvesters as a homogeneous and harmonic community of forest dwellers naturally rooted to place and close to nature. Accordingly, harvesters of NTFPs were believed to be living according to "the laws of nature," and therefore, these communities appeared to have a natural and authentic relationship with nature.

As discussed in earlier chapters, these same narratives also constructed distinctions between migrants and non-migrants.[14] Barbara Duglebly's doctoral dissertation, cited widely by NGOs, examined the institutional and behavioural aspects affecting the sustainability of the chicle industry in the Petén (and in particular Uaxactún). Combining statistical research on *chicle* tree productivity with interviews with *chicleros*, Duglebly's work highlighted what she perceived as fundamental differences between the migrants and non-migrant *chicleros*. In her dissertation, she suggested that, "Perhaps most interesting is

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[9] Norman B. Schwartz, *Forest Society: A Social History of Peten, Guatemala* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) 224, 181.

[10] Norman B. Schwartz, "Una Perspectiva Antropológia De El Petén De Guatemala," in *Trece Maneras De Contemplar Una Selva Tropical: La Reserva De La Biósfera Maya De Guatemala*, ed. James D. Nations and Ingrid Q. Neubauer (Washington, D.C: Conservation International, 1999), 18.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Conrad Reining and Carlos Soza Manzanero, "Illuminating the Petén's Throne of Gold: The Propetén Experiment in Conservation-Based Development," in *Timber, Tourists, and Temples: Conservation and Development in the Mayan Forest of Belize, Guatemala, Mexico*, ed. Richard Primack, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998), 366, Schwartz, "Una Perspectiva Antropológia De El Petén De Guatemala," 18, 20.

[13] Alfonso Arrivillaga Cortés, "Chicle, Chicleros, Y Chiclería: Sobre Su Historia En El Petén," (n.d), 11, Schwartz, "Una Perspectiva Antropológia De El Petén De Guatemala," 18.

[14] See also, Juanita Sundberg, "Ngo Landscapes in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala," *Geographical Review* 88, no. 3 (1999).

the general impression left by the findings that Peteneros exercise more care than migrants in tapping chicle trees and are more concerned about adhering to local standards of tapping behaviour."[15]   Dugelby goes on to say that, "Local (as opposed to migrant) tappers claim that there is social pressure in camps to tap in a manner that does not <u>fatally</u> injure or overtax the tree.   The majority of local tappers followed in this study often voiced concerns about making sure that a tree was not too small, had rested sufficiently and was not suffering from a previous injury. The general rule among local tappers was that a tree should rest at least four and preferably 6 years before it is tapped again."[16] In contrast to local *chicleros*, "Migrant tappers not only fail to be affected by customary rules regarding the selection of trees for tapping, but are more aggressive tappers in general . . . A statistical test of the proportion of tappable trees remaining in local versus migrant camps after the season supported this perception."[17]

Yet, in discussing migrant versus non-migrant as if they were a priori categories, Dugelby misses the point that the distinction between being from here and not being from here may be messier than statistical data can capture. Certainly there are differences between migrants and non-migrants, and certainly there are a group of *chicleros* who live seasonally in the forests of the Petén, yet these distinctions may be blurred by histories of migration – not just of current seasonal *chicleros,* but by Uaxactuneros who also sometimes migrate. Likewise, it is perhaps logical to suggest that seasonal migrants are less integrated into a system of "customary norms" of resource use, but it is the articulation of these divisions and later recitations of her work that became involved in making up these distinctions, or at least dichotomizing them, and in hardening boundaries.

Moreover, while Dugelby provides evidence that areas where migrants tap tend to be less rich in *chicle,* one might ask whether this is a responsibility of careless *chicleros* or of the camp foreman.   Indeed, it is not *chicleros* who choose the camp site and extraction area, but the camp foremen who are responsible for choosing sites and moving the *chicleros* to a different location. Moreover, chicleros with fewer contacts may not have access to richer areas of the forest. This alternative thesis is bolstered by Dugelby's own evidence that in determining the productivity of a *chicle* tree "the time since last tapping is not as important as the historical (in terms of one or two decades) tapping intensity in a camp."[18] Moreover, these narratives do not simply describe a pre-existing reality, but are involved in the making up of that reality.

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[15] Barbara L. Dugelby, "Chicle Latex Extraction in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve: Behavioral, Institutional, and Ecological Factors Affecting Sustainability" (Doctoral Dissertation, Duke University, 1995) 92.
[16] Ibid. 146. Emphasis in original.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid. 212.

Likewise, state-employed *guarda-recursos* – through intensive training on the new resource regulations, basic conservation biology including the scientific names of plants and animals, and techniques for fighting forest fires – were exposed to narratives that articulated not only how nature "really" works, but defining human-nature relationships. In reflection of the static ecological paradigms articulated by conservationists at the time of the creation of the reserve, *guarda-recursos* were taught that "In nature all natural resources are in equilibrium . . . If this equilibrium is broken, some species of plants and animals disappear, and there is a loss of biological diversity" and that environmental degradation "is any negative change or damage that alters the ecological equilibrium of the ecosystem. Almost always [environmental degradation] is caused by human intervention in nature."[19] For this reason, *guarda-recursos* "understand the importance of caring for special and valuable resources such as those in your protected area" and *guarda-recursos* should feel "proud because they know that their work is important in carrying out CONAP's objectives and, moreover, they form part of a large team of *guarda-recursos* all over the world."[20] In recalling his experiences as a *guarda-recurso* with CONAP, Bernardo Castro, remarked that the experience of being a *guarda-recurso* radically changed the way he thought. He suggested that state officials "taught us that any interaction that we have with natural resources must be to preserve them." These means of incorporating part of the village population into surveillance activities in the reserve, monitoring the natural resources, teaching others the importance of protected areas, enforcing laws, and preventing and controlling forest fires, sought to instil the *desire* in the population to preserve the reserve's natural resources in the name of the nation. If the new map of the MBR, including distinctions between reality and representation, made it appear as if there was a new order that the population had to be taught, it was through this new class of *guarda-recursos* that the state would implement the map and the new order.

In Uaxactún, the new *campesino* intellectuals seized upon these environmental narratives as well as their new ties to NGOs and the state to reinvent Uaxactún's collective memory of resource use, to enunciate identities as "nature's defenders" and to articulate a new place for Uaxactún in the region and the nation through community forest concessions. Yet, *campesino* intellectuals did not need to draw on these representational resources faithfully, rather in reciting narratives and norms, *campesinos* intellectuals would appropriate and misappropriate them in ways that reinscribe meanings in local contexts.

Indeed, identities as nature's defenders are also fashionable identities in the double sense of the word – they are at once in vogue and malleable. Identities as nature's defenders

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[19] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Manual Del Guarda-Recursos," ed. The Nature Conservancy (Guatemala City: 1990), 16, 31.
[20] Ibid., 66.

are, to be more precise, fashionably seductive in that they are the part of the Other that is desired by the West to make itself whole or complete. Indeed, if environmentally destructive regimes are to overcome environmental doom of apocalyptic scale, "nature's defenders" must fill the role of environmental liberators or environmental saviours guiding the way to freedom, liberation, and salvation. As we have seen in the previous chapter, it is this fashionably seductive character of identities as "nature's defenders" that would enable ACOFOP and Uaxactuneros to challenge the state's authority, and to modify the terms of their inclusion in the nation. Yet, these identities are also malleable, unfixed; they can be traditional or modern, in opposition to the state or an ally to the state. Identities as nature's defenders are, thus, loose signifiers, that can be filled by the particular context. Identities as nature's defenders can be modern ones that emphasize science, reason, and nation-state, or traditional identities, such as those portrayed by ecologists, in need of protection from the modern forces of capital and the state. This malleability and seductive character is what enables Uaxactuneros to simultanously make demands upon the state for projects, for recognition, and access to resources, but assert their autonomy, distinctness, and distance from the state. These fluid identities, thus, enable Uaxactuneros to navigate what Michael Taussig has called a "double helix of repulsion and attraction" to the state, reflecting their desire for goods and services and for the power of the state, but also for autonomy and independence, and difference from the state.[21]

COMPETING VISIONS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN UAXACTÚN

The proposal to create a system of forestry concessions signalled state plans to remap the MUZ by constructing a system of formal lease agreements out of a previous system of customary arrangements. In this remapping of the MUZ, official maps with legal boundaries would replace local, unofficial maps embedded in the histories of resource extraction of NTFPs. Instead of forms of measurement based on travel times between places and footpaths through the forest, these new maps would have abstract forms of measurement based on Geographical Information Systems. By replacing a system of negotiated resource use with an abstract map, space was made into an abstract entity, and nature and population were made visible and available for appropriation into the spaces of the nation and economy. In Uaxactún, this process got underway in 1992 when the UICN (World Conservation Union), one of the many NGOs working in Uaxactún, conducted a forestry inventory for

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[21] Michael Taussig, *The Nervous System* (New York: Routeldge, 1992). Cited in Handy, "Democratizing What? Some Reflections on Nation, State, Ethnicity, Modernity, Community and Democracy in Guatemala," 53.

Uaxactún.[22] In an early zoning proposal presented by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) to the state, Uaxactún was scheduled to be granted a concession of a scant 11,000 hectares based on this forestry inventory.[23] This proposed area would leave many *chicle* camps within the boundaries of an expanded system of national parks and biological corridors.

These proposals to demarcate geographical boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that would delimit control over and access to resources divided the village into shifting alliances of opponents and proponents of a forest concession.[24] The concession map of 11,000 hectares drew fierce resistance from the elite families whose traditional areas of influence would reside outside of the concession versus another elite family whose traditional area of influence would mostly fall within the concession area. Shifting communal lines of division emerged around these two prominent families, while the local *campesino* intellectuals fervently argued that a concession was necessary to prevent CONAP from granting timber concessions in the areas surrounding Uaxactún. In efforts to prevent an industrial concession, *campesino* intellectuals, Benedin Garcia, Fernando Quixchan, Diego Arias, and Bernardo Castro from Uaxactún's local development committee, the Committee for Improvement, founded CONCOFOP with other villagers from the MUZ. As Benedin García explained:

> We had for centuries cared for, our ancestors, and now ourselves also for decades and we are now caring for the forest, right. And that the industry was, with our own eyes we had seen them, pillaging the forest, and what was the objective of speaking of conservation, of conserving resources while leaving the village deserted. At this moment, we thought that the government valued the forest more than humanity, and that this brought an indignation to the community and protests. Then, we made declarations and asked for an open town council, and we rose up, and we organized a Pro-Resources Committee, first the Committee for

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[22] The forestry inventory was conducted by Juventino Galvez as part of his forestry training. Galvez would later become the Executive Secretary of CONAP from 1998-1999 in which he would lay the foundations for the awarding of community forest concessions. Indeed, it was during his term that governmental regulations around the concessions were clarified and simplified facilitating the process of awarding concessions. See Chapter Three of this thesis.

[23] Juan Carlos Godoy, "Propuesta De Zonificación Del Area De Uso Multiple De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya. Internal Report Presented to Emma Diaz De Gordillo, Francisco Moscoso, Eric Arellan, Secretaria Ejectuvia Del Consejo Nacional De Areas Protegidas.," (Petén, Guatemala: The Nature Conservancy (TNC, MAYREMA), 1995).

[24] Discerning the shifting alliances of opposition and support for the concession process was extremely difficult due to their highly fluid nature. This difficulty was compounded by the nature of the archival material available. There is a general lack of minutes from early meetings (and informal ones), or when the meetings were recorded people who were opponents, but remained silent during meetings, do not appear in the documentation. Moreover, informants were reluctant to tell me if they had been opposed to the concession and for what reasons. This may be in part because I was perceived as a supporter of community forest concessions through my relation to OMYC (the community concession organization) and ACOFOP. I have tried to avoid the case where the victors tell the history, but in doing so the shifts and alliances that are described here can only ever be an approximation of the actual relations.

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> Improvement, and we began to do the negotiations with the government and the municipality.[25]

Shortly after creating the Pro-Resources Comittee, in efforts to construct a communal consensus, the *campesino* intellectuals submitted an alternative proposal for a concession area to CONAP of 130,000 hectares of land based on claims to *chicle* camps, including lands inside national parks. Equally important, the villagers proposed an *integrated* concession for both timber and non-timber extraction in contrast to the NGO and state emphasis on forestry concessions.[26] The proposal, however, was shortly rejected by CONAP forcing the Committee to resubmit a proposal for 83,588 hectares that did not include lands inside national parks.[27]

The proposal for an integrated concession, including the regulation, taxation, and management of non-timber forest products extracted from within the concession, created a new set of divisions and debate among community members. These schisms were drawn between *contratistas*, who had always controlled the extraction of resources, and *campesino* intellectuals and harvesters intent on breaking the *contratista-xatero* relationship. *Campesino* intellectuals, later aided by a Peruvian economist, were intent on forming a cooperative-like communal warehouse that would purchase *xate* directly from the harvesters and export directly to the United States. The profits from the warehouse would then be returned to the harvesters through higher prices and community development projects. Moreover, the community leaders began to discuss imposing a tax on *contratistas* who brought migrant *xateros* to work in the concession area, and on all *contratistas* from outside of the village who wanted to extract resources in Uaxactún. These actions enraged not only local *contratistas*, but also the intermediaries who bought *xate*. Preliminary attempts to impose the tax and create the warehouse led to assassination attempts on Benedín García, the community's most active and relentless leader, and the murder of one of his family members. Despite these attempts, the warehouse was eventually established, while it has not yet generated the desired outcome.

Inside the community, *contratistas* also opposed the concession by arguing that state imposed regulation was unnecessary because Uaxactuneros had always managed resources

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[25] Interview with Benedin Garcia, September 28, 2002.

[26] M. Manzanero, "Informe De Actividades En La Comunidad De Uaxactun," (Flores, Peten: Propeten, Conservation International, 1996). The only other concessions that had be awarded at the time of soliciting 130,000 hectares were those of San Miguel of 7,000 hectares, and La Pasadita with a concession of almost 19,000 hectares.

[27] In October 1996, state officials convened a village election to determine if there was sufficient community support for the concession. Although the election results indicated that 75 percent were in favour, observers noted that most eligible adults did not participate and that a village consensus regarding the concession did not exist. Roan Balas McNab, "Comparative Impacts of Chicle and Xate Harvests on Wildlife of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala" (MA Thesis, University of Florida, 1998).

sustainably. Moreover, the state, they argued, was unlikely to comply with their commitment to award concessions and due to corruption would not enforce regulations thereafter.[28] In this articulation of identities as nature's defenders, *contratistas* utilized representations of corrupt and inefficient CONAP to defend their autonomy from state and further NGO encroachment. *Campesino* intellectuals, in contrast, articulated counter-visions of sustainable development that drew on debates at the regional level among foresters and ACOFOP to argue that a concession would enable better organization and commercialization (including directly exporting produce) and, thus, higher incomes. *Campesino* intellectuals further argued that management would enable them to recuperate and reforest overharvested areas. This counter-articulation of identities as nature's defenders discovered overharvested resources instead of a tradition of sustainable management practices, and looked towards science and rational planning in alliance with the state and NGOs instead of fending off a corrupt and ineffectual state. As a loose signifier, thus, the identity as nature's defenders could be articulated in competing visions of sustainable development to protect their autonomy from the state and embrace tradition or, alternatively, to challenge local hierarchies and embrace state sanctioned green governmentality.

Likewise, the idea of harvesting a new resource and generating a new source of income for the community through timber extraction highlighted divisions within the community. However, in this instance, villagers engaged in debates between foresters and ecologists both by appropriating and misappropriating scientific knowledge of the forest.[29] Community members, following arguments made by ecologists discussed in Chapter Three, opposed harvesting timber by appealing to NTFP extraction as a benign forest tradition and misappropriated scientifically acceptable knowledge of the forest. Whereas the conservation ecologists have argued that selective harvesting of timber may not be sustainable due to regeneration problems[30] and others have stated that "more research is necessary to learn how to log sustainably without damaging nontimber forest species and the natural forest ecosystems over the long-term",[31] opponents of extracting timber in the community argue an

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[28] Programa Frontera Agrícola, "Informe De Avance Sobre Consultorio Realizada En La Comunidad De Uaxactún, Guatemala," (Flores, Petén: 1997).

[29] That Uaxactuneros appropriate and misappropriate scientific arguments is not a demonstration of the ways in which they "misunderstand" how the environmental "really" works. Instead, my point is that this is an act of appropriating the *power* of science through an erroneous interpretation that is reclaiming the power to create meaning. Indeed, if it was the interpretative power of ecology that structured Edenic narrative and the divergence between the map of the Petén and life in the Petén, then reclaiming "ecology" through an inappropriate appropriation exacts a repossessing of meaning, memory, and history.

[30] R.E Rice, R.E. Gullison, and J.W. Reid, "Can Sustainable Managment Save Tropical Rainforests?," *Scientific American* April (1997).

[31] Conrad C.S. Reining et al., "Productos No Maderables De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya, Peten, Guatemala," (Washington, D.C and Flores, Petén, Guatemala: Conservation International and Propeten, 1992), 115.

even stronger claim: that the extraction of timber will result in irreparable damage to the forest resources. Some villagers misappropriate these conservation languages arguing that, indeed, forest regeneration is impossible and timber is, in fact, a non-renewable resource.

In an alternative version of resource management, these opponents to forestry recite official narratives that portray NTFPs as a source of riches for the community and protection for the forest. In the words of one opponent to forestry:

> For more than 100 years, we have guarded our ruins and protected the forest and wildlife . . . Although the community has had proposals for timber concession and has been pressured by different organizations, we have opposed felling [trees], because we believe that trees are not only a source of life for us, but for the entire world. For this reason we must unite ourselves as good Peteneros and honest Guatemalans to rescue and protect the flora and fauna that is left.[32]

By refashioning scientifically acceptable knowledge of the forest and historical memory, identities as "nature's defenders" are articulated as a means to negotiate the terms of the forestry concessions. Those in favour of harvesting timber, following foresters such as Timothy Synott, see the forest as a new source of income, and look towards their neighbours harvesting timber. Although *xate* and *chicle* have maintained the population, they cite another set of ecologists whose work suggests that *xate* and *chicle* have been over-exploited[33], and that timber would generate new sources of income for the community members.

The shifting alliances of opposition and agreement amongst community members, engaged with debates amongst foresters and ecologists at the regional level. In taking part in these debates, not only did they alter meanings associated with the sciences of forestry and ecology and contribute to reaching a consensus about the norms and languages utilized in establishment of a model of the forest, they did so in particularly *local*, Uaxactúnero ways that contested local hierarchies, reclaimed meaning, historical memory of forest use, and visions of the future in Uaxactún. Through the establishment of norms and languages around the forest that would produce, regulate, and instruct human interactions with nature, they sought to rearticulate scientific paradigms through local relations. In the competing visions of sustainable development within the community, resistance, contestation, and negotiation were constitutive of rule and green governmentality was not simply imposed by conservationists and state officials.

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[32]Antonio Aldeceo taken from a pamphlet for tourists visiting Uaxactún. Translation my own. Field Notes, October 2001.

[33] Dugelby, "Chicle Latex Extraction in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve: Behavioral, Institutional, and Ecological Factors Affecting Sustainability", Reining et al., "Productos No Maderables De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya, Peten, Guatemala."

In the midst of on-going community debates, CONAP threatened to award a forestry concession in Uaxactún's area of influence to a timber company if the community did not reach a prompt consensus. Rumours spread through the community that they would be displaced from the reserve if they did not accept a concession. Tension and anger rose swiftly in the village.[34] At the same time state officials were coercing consent, they had also delayed approval of the solicited area of 83,588 hectares. The concession approval was shelved, according to CONAP officials, due to the political impossibility of granting such a sizeable concession on the heels of the Peace Accords and in the midst of heightened demands for agrarian reform, and relentless *campesino* movements invading National Parks and *fincas* in the Petén. These delays combined with threats led community members to burn down the CONAP kiosk in the village centre in March of 1997. According to a conservationist working closely with the community, the incident was a "reminder that in day-to-day issues, villagers' *de facto* control of the area far outweighs the state's *de jure* claim to proprietorship."[35] Only a few months later, Carlos Catalan, a pro-concession leader from the neighbouring village of Carmelita and one of the co-founders of CONCOFOP, was assassinated by opposing factions within the community. This tremendous loss left local Uaxactunero intellectuals in fear that a similar tragedy would happen in Uaxactún if a consensus could not be reached.

In an effort to resolve tensions around the concession and reach a consensus on timber versus non-timber extraction, Peace Corps volunteer Douglas Schaeffer conducted a study on the economic viability of community forest concessions.[36] The stated objectives of the study were to reduce scepticism among villagers not in favour of the concession by demonstrating economic benefits of employment and income, to estimate the ecological impacts of generating the concession rent, and to incorporate to the greatest extent possible NTFPs in the analysis as a way to minimize any potential negative impacts on the standing forest. The study, however, demonstrated that lease taxes and the high cost of vigilance would increase costs such that timber would have to be harvested at an unsustainable rate. When the results were reported to the community (after being temporarily withheld by the

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[34] The state's use of rumours as a mechanism of coercion, perhaps a guerrilla speech tactic, could be seen as an interesting state appropriation of subaltern forms of communication, even while subalterns are misappropriating languages of ecology and forestry.

[35] McNab, "Comparative Impacts of Chicle and Xate Harvests on Wildlife of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve, Guatemala" 139.

[36] Douglas Schaefer, "La Rentabilidad De Concesiones Comunitarias: Un Modelo Genérico Con Una Aplicación a Uaxactún, Petén," (Flores, Petén: U.S. Peace Corps and Wildlife Conservation Society, 1997). At the time Schaefer's study was conducted no economic viability of the concession model had been conducted leaving many to wonder whether or not community concession would be a economic development tool or, at the very least, financially sustainable.

state) in September of 1997, the conservation *campesino* intellectuals left the concession process nearly abandoned for a period of five months.

In January of 1998, a departmental decree invalidated all citizens groups not formally registered as chartered organizations, thereby nullifying the authority of the Pro-Resources Committee to solicit a concession. Uaxactún leaders responded by forming a Civil Society organization called Conservation and Management Organization, (OMYC). By June of 1998, 118 of Uaxactún's 136 households were registered as members of OMYC. However, many of the villagers became members not due to a conviction in the concession process, but from fear that if they did not become members of OMYC they would not receive benefits from a possible concession. Many villagers also believed that if they did not become members of OMYC their status as legal members of the community would be brought into question and they might face displacement from the community.[37]

At the same time that OMYC was being formed and villagers were lining up to become members, unprecedented forest fires spread across the landscape. The community of Uaxactún headed by OMYC's newly formed vigilance committee took to the task of protecting the solicited concession area as well as the neighbouring El Mirador and Tikal National Parks. In this public performance, Uaxactuneros courageously risked their lives in becoming nature's defenders by literally placing their bodies between the fire and the forest. These public enactments strengthened relationships with conservationists both in Guatemala City and those in the Petén, as well as with state officials.

Despite these public performances as nature's defenders, in August of 1998, overlapping concessions for seismic petroleum exploration were solicited by Perez-Compac Inc., an Argentinean petroleum company; and Basic Resources International, a subsidiary of the American company Union Pacific Resources; in the concession areas of Uaxactún and Carmelita without prior notice to either community.[38] The villagers perceived these overlapping concessions as a threat to their claims to the area. This external challenge to the villagers' control over resources compelled villagers to reach a consensus on the community forest concession.[39] By October 1998, with the support of the majority of the village, for the third time OMYC submitted a concession solicitation to the Guatemalan government.

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[37] These beliefs, largely the result of rumours spread by CONAP and NGOs, continue to permeate the village even after the awarding of the concession. This information was gleaned from interviews with Uaxactuneros. A similar point is mentioned by the authors of (IDEADS) Instituto de Derecho Ambiental y Desarrollo Sustentable, "Estudio Y Monitoreo De Los Impactos Sociales En Unidades De Manejo Forestal Comunitario De Peten, Guatemala: Caso I. Uaxactún," (Petén, Guatemala: Fundacion Naturaleza Para la Vida (NPV) and Fondo Mundial Para la Naturaleza (WWF), 2002).

[38] Ramón Hernández, "Futuro Con Neblina," *Prensa Libre*, 28 de julio de 1998, Ramón Hernández, "Tres Ofretas, Dos Areas," *Prensa Libre*, 1 de septiembre de 1998.

[39] According to Carlos Soza, director of Propetén, the external threat of land invasions, discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, forced a consensus in many of the communities (particularly in

In the concession justification presented to the government, villagers repeated their identities as nature's defenders. Yet, in the repetition official representations of NTFPs harvesters as "forest culture" moved from signifying a source of protection for the forest, to signifying a locally adapted way of life, itself endangered if it was not protected by the state. The formal solicitation to CONAP begins with a "general description" of Uaxactún that emphasizes its character as one of the oldest communities in the Petén with

> [a] culture . . . that is based in the coexistence of community and forest, [and] based in their knowledge of the temporal productivity cycles of the existing biodiversity. Their years of experience have been mixed with the knowledge of Indigenous chicleros that traditionally arrive in the areas, evolutionizing in this way, their forest culture, a culture that will be impossible to reconstruct if its protection is not achieved. For this reason, Uaxactún's struggle is based in the desire to protect their capacity to extract diverse products from the forest, which would be difficult if the only economically viable option for the future is timber.[40]

These representations of Uaxactún as a *mestizaje* forest culture born out of cultural mixing enable Uaxactuneros to assume the dream of cultural *mestizaje* that can be both a liberating force that breaks from the categories of ethnicity and race, and one that is an official discourse of nation formation that denies or erases hierarchies embedded in racial and ethnic categories and creates the new *mestizaje* as a liberated citizen.[41] The protection of this culture, thus, becomes equated with the construction of a liberated nation.

Yet, at the same time that this culture needs the protection of the state, NTFP harvesters are represented as being outside of capitalism. In a solicitation for the concession, Uaxactún is said to have a "subsistence economy" in which "the majority of the community depends on the extraction of *xate, pimienta,* and *chicle* from the forest for subsistence."[42] This misappropriation of sustainable development discourse (villagers do not actually "eat" NTFPs) negates the role of *xate, chicle,* and *pimienta* in the national economy and the international market and enables Uaxactún to appear as somehow outside of, or untouched by, global capitalism.

Carmelita, where Propetén is the technical assistant). I, however, did not find any convincing evidence that this was true in Uaxactún. Instead, Uaxactuneros are adamant that this is a problem that other concessions face, but thankfully, due to their location (surrounded by National Parks and biological corridors) and due to the dearth of water in locations around Uaxactún they have not had this problem.

[40] Sociedad Civil "Organización Manejo y Conservacion" OMYC, "Letter to Minugua," (Santa Elena, Guatemala: 2000), 7-8.

[41] Florencia E. Mallon, "Constructing Mestizaje in Latin America: Authenticity, Marginality, and Gender in the Claiming of National Identities," *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 2, no. 1 (1996). See also Charles Hale, "Mestizaje, Hybridity, and the Cultural Politics of Difference in Post-Revolutionary Central America," *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 2, no. 1 (1996), Carol A. Smith, "Myths, Intellectuals, and Race/Class/Gender Distinctions in the Formation of Latin American Nations," *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 2, no. 1 (1996).

[42] Sociedad Civil "Organización Manejo y Conservacion" OMYC, "Co-Manejo De La Concesion Forestal Comunitaria En Un Area Protegida," (Uaxactun, Peten, Guatemala: 1997), 6.

Yet, these recitations of identities as "nature's defenders," first articulated by conservationists, occur in a different context that allows for generation of new meanings. In the new context of overlapping petroleum concessions, Uaxactuneros shift the meaning of "nature's defenders" from signifying a source of protection for the forest, to signifying a hybrid, if not *mestizo*, culture, outside of capitalism and endangered if it is not protected by the state. This shift in meaning enables the petroleum concession to be represented as potentially endangering the community through the contaminating forces of capitalism. By repeating official narratives of NTFPs anew, villagers demand justice in the very languages of modernization utilized to disenfranchise them.

However, these demands for justice would not be readily forthcoming. In mid-December, Basic Petroleum installed a drilling platform in the soccer field in the centre of the community of Carmelita. Villagers from Carmelita and Uaxactún then petitioned the Guatemalan environmental regulatory agencies, the Ministry of Energy and Mines, and the foreign oil companies operating in the area to attend a meeting. On February 7, Guatemala's Attorney General for Human Rights ruled that the petroleum activities in the MBR violate human rights "each time they disrupt the right to a clean environment, the right of individual dignity, the right of the preservation of the cultural and natural patrimony of the country, and the right to social and economic development."[43] The ruling also affirmed that the violation of the Law of Protected Areas constituted "an administrative tendency detrimental to the citizens of Guatemala, and especially, to the communities neighbouring the ravaged protected areas."[44] Despite this rhetoric, official reaction focused exclusively on one of the nine concessions illegally approved in the MBR, that of contract I-92 in Laguna del Tigre National Park (PNLT). The government failed to address the preoccupations of the communities of Carmelita and Uaxactún.

On February 19, 1999, the military announced two new detachments of Military Base 23 in Carmelita and Uaxactún, while squadrons of "Kabiles," the notorious Guatemalan "elite" unit that used some of the most brutal tactics during the war, were restationed in some of the military bases located near BASIC's refineries and other installations in the Petén.[45] According to Coronel Fabriel Rivas, head of the Military's Department of Information and Popularization, military build-up was part the new role as a "Forest Army" in the post-conflict era, therefore, "As part of the peace accords and the redefinition of the Military in times of peace, we take into consideration the care of the borders including the protection of the environment."[46] The new military detachments were to ensure the safety of the

[43] Cited in Amnesty International, "Petroleum Activities in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve Violate the Rights of Guatemalan Citizens," (Guatemala, Guatemala: 1999).
[44] Cited in Ibid.
[45] Ramón Hernández, "Rechazan Concesión," *Prensa Libre*, 23 de febrero de 1999.
[46] Alberto Ramírez, "Militarizar La Rbm," *Prensa Libre*, 28 de febrero de 1999.

population living in these areas, to control the flow of illegal activities, deforestation, drug trafficking, looting of archaeological pieces, and to patrol the border with Mexico (125 kilometres North of Uaxactún!). When the military officers arrived in Uaxactún and announced that they would set up a base in the village that would house 100 soldiers, the villagers responded by demanding a town council meeting with the General. In the meeting, the villagers unanimously opposed the military base and the intimidation tactics that would bring memories of Guatemala's violent past sharply into the present.

Oil Watch, Witness for Peace in Guatemala, Amnesty International and, of course, ACOFOP, all rallied to the side of Carmelita and Uaxactún. Only a few days later a meeting called "Petroleum Exploitation in the Mayan Biosphere Reserve" was convened among conservationists, the state, petroleum companies, representatives of ACOFOP and villagers from Uaxactún and Carmelita.[47] The meeting place, a military base, was utilized to intimidate protesters and participants alike. Armed soldiers repeatedly asked radical environmental activists and villagers attending the meeting for identification and photos of attendees were taken. Nevertheless, the Flores youth environmentalist group, Clorofila, protested outside the base with posters saying, "No to Petroleum." Villagers from Santa Amelia a community located nearby one of BASIC's operations, armed with sticks and machetes arrived at the meeting, although they were denied entrance. Inside, despite protestation, environmental activists, such as Colectivo Madre Selva were forbidden from speaking, effectively silencing their opposition to petroleum.[48]

At the meeting, one *campesino* was quoted as saying, "If these petroleum explorations become a reality, we will use all of our legal resources to stop it, because the *campesinos* love our department, and we don't want to kill the hen that lays the golden eggs."[49] The Vice-Minister of Energy and Mines, Rodolfo Valenzuelo, responded by stating that the communities were misinformed, because petroleum exploitation would not damage the environment and villages located nearby petroleum activities, like Santa Amelia, were in agreement with petroleum activities. By August 8, 1999, due to opposition by the communities of Uaxactún and Carmelita, Valenzuelo announced that a special commission would examine the two petroleum concessions and that the final decision would be made by President Arzú.[50]

Despite the ambiguity reigning over the fate of the petroleum concession, or perhaps because of it, on December 30, 1999, CONAP awarded OMYC the community forest

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[47] Ramón Hernández, "Rechazan Efectuar Más Explotaciones," *Prensa Libre*, 27 febrero de 1999.

[48] Maglí Rey Rosa, "Selvas Sí, Petróleo No," *Prensa Libre*, marzo 3 de 1999.

[49] Hernández, "Rechazan Efectuar Más Explotaciones."

[50] Ramón Hernández, "Concesión En Manos De Arzú," *Prensa Libre*, 28 agosto de 1999.

concession.[51] After seven years of petitioning the state and three years of struggle within the community, the villagers gathered in CONAP's barracks in the community and collected money to throw a village party in celebration of their achievement.

The coercion of consent by the state in the process of awarding the concession worked not simply by intimidation and violence but also by stirring up the desire, the interest, and the will to participate, to act politically, or to become citizens in the Petén. In doing so, these community forest concession policies worked by getting the villagers to see their own interests in these same control strategies. In violent and benevolent, coercive and participatory state practices, in the productive and repressive aspects of power, Uaxactuneros became citizens as well as subjects of and subject to conservation discourses.

HARDENING BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING AND ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZENSHIP

The establishment of the concession in December 1999 and the election of a new Board of Executives brought into action the norms around the concession including the political obligations that would, as Chatterjee suggests, "rationalize and reform" the peasantry: Environmental Impact Assessments, Management Plans, acts of patrolling the boundaries, and limits upon immigration to the community. As discussed in Chapter Three, the norms around the community forest concessions constructed a Foucauldian panoptican complete with surveillance, documentation, confession, techniques of "pastoral power" and dividing practices.

The implementation of the community forest concession sought to make the population and resources as visible as possible by conducting surveys, census and maps of housing arrangements, patterns of resource use, and population birth and death rates. The visibility produced out of this knowledge of people and resources in Uaxactún enabled the state to monitor changes in the population, including immigration, and changes in resource use through surveillance. By epistemologically "mapping" population and resources through census and inventory, they are also made into abstract entities, visible and available for governance from outside, and ready for integration into the abstract spaces of the nation and economy.[52]

As abstract entities, with their own statistical influences on the economy and nation, the village is also made to appear as spatially fixed entity comprised of "place bound" villagers. For example, according to a census conducted in March 2001, there were 688

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[51] Comision Nacional del Medio Ambiente (CONAMA), "Concesión Forestal De La Sociedad Civil Organización Manejo Y Conservación En La Unidad De Manejo, Uaxactún," in *Resolución No. 581-99/AJP/CSM* (1999).
[52] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998).

inhabitants living in the community of which 524 or 76 percent were "natives" to Uaxactún (or at least second generation).[53] However, this census merely captures the community at a fixed moment in time as if history and movement had stopped altogether.[54] Even in statistical representations that attempt to capture population growth and migration, the population in question remains nameless and thus, the statistical figures can only capture a totality of immigration and emigration, of birth rates and death rates, and so on. The *actual* movements of people out of the village and back again, into the village and gone again, etc. cannot be enumerated. Through this character of anonymity and totality, the village is made to appear as a reified entity, emptied of *living, moving* people, and "imagined, serially, synchronically, and as a self-portrait."[55] The inability of census data to capture "belonging in Uaxactún" is demonstrated by the estimation of a population of approximately 1,500 by the local directors of the community forest concession association, OMYC. This obvious statistical discrepancy (688 inhabitants versus 1,500 inhabitants) suggests that villagers may consider people who live in Uaxactún seasonally and villagers who are currently living outside of the community as community members. This would suggest that membership in Uaxactún continued to be much more fluid than can be captured in state census data.

This census data comes into action shaping identities through the legal requirements that it implies for the village. The concession norms included the provision that the majority of their members must live permanently in the community and the community would be prohibited from accepting new immigrants.[56] As Foucault suggests, this form of discipline aimed to "fix and regulate movements . . . it dissipates compact groupings of individuals

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[53] The census reported 83 Q'eqchí, 33 Mestizos, and 551 Ladinos living in the community. Unlike the previous census conducted in 1998, this census, interestingly, had the category of "mestizo." In the census, individuals are asked to place themselves in an ethnic category which does not allow people to identify themselves as part something, and part something else. This kind of census data, then, as Benedict Anderson and others have suggested, plays a role in not simply describing but shaping the way people identify themselves. Yet, this census, against more homogeneous official representations of the village as a "petenero" community, demonstrates how villagers articulate hybridity and cultural transfusion through difference and division.

[54] To get an indication of how census data may not capture the village of Uaxactún, one can simply draw on some of this same data. For example, in 1991 CONAP registered 638 people living in the community with an "indeterminant number of people that live temporarily in the community", Cesar Vincio Montero Suarez, "Informe De Pps Communidad De Uaxactun," (Flores, Peten: CONAP, 1001). In 1993, a census conducted by an NGO registered 557 people living in the community, and a census conducted by another NGO in 1997 registered 681 inhabitants.

[55] Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World* (London: Verso, 1998) 37.

[56] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Normas Para El Otorgamiento De Concessiones De Aprovechamiento Y Manejo De Recursos Naturales Renovables En La Zona De Uso Multiple De La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya," in *15-98* (1998), Titulo III, 7-12, Steven Gretzinger and José Román Carrera, "Procedimientos Simplificados Para El Otorgamiento De Concessiones Forestales Comunitarias En La Reserva De La Biosfera Maya, Guatemala.," (Santa Elena, Petén: Proyecto CATIE/CONAP, 1994).

wandering about the country in unpredictable ways, it establishes calculated districts."[57] These forms of knowledge-surveillance were coupled with self-surveillance through control posts and the watch out post, El Mirador, built by the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and OMYC.

By fixing Uaxactuneros to the geographical place of "Uaxactún," the concession norms sought to enframe the population by creating boundaries and limits, an inside and an outside and to create a stable and governable entity. By requiring a formal and legitimate population of "Uaxactuneros" bounded to the geographical place, the requirements sought not only to create divisions between inside and outside, but between members and non-members. This rigid classificatory system hardened the boundaries of belonging and non-belonging. The divisions between insiders and outsiders in the concession norms were also understood among villagers as the right to exclude "outside" harvesters of the same resources they planned to manage.[58] The distinctions between inside and outside, being "from here" and "being not from here," being Uaxactúnero and being a migrant, may be primarily about control over and access to resources.

Yet, in the desire for access to land and resources, multi-place identities embedded in histories of migration must, in turn, be purged in favour of a singular identity of "being from here." Whereas many villagers articulate multiple-place identities, such *Cobanero, de la Oriente, Mexicano,* these migrant identities were to be superseded by a singular identity or at the very least a hierarchy among them. This rigid classificatory system hardened the impermissibility of more than one origin or of more than one belonging. A single common form of community had to replace multiple modes of identification that were determined contextually. Charles Taylor has called these forms of exclusion based on demands that citizens adopt a singular identity, "inner exclusion" or the creation of a common identity based on a rigid formula of politics and belonging that refuses to accommodate any alternatives and imperiously demands the subordination of other aspects of citizens' identities.[59]

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[57] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 219.

[58] For organizations, such as SUCHILMA, that traditionally represented the rights of harvesters of *chicle,* and *xate,* as well as loggers without any private claim to the forest, the concession process would create conflicts. Now SUCHILMA's membership was divided between those who were soliciting concessions and seasonal workers from other departments. These divisions over the rights of access to forest resources imperilled SUCHILMA. A review of conflicts between the Law of Chicle and the Law of Protected Areas by Lic. Ricardo Alvarado Ortiega suggested that "chicleros are being excluded from their former role as protectors of the forest; the belief that communities have the right to impede access to forest resources in approved community concessions is incorrect; and that meetings to develop normative standards for regulating forest resources should include SUCHILMA and COOCHILCE, the chicle cooperative within SUCHIMLA." Cited in Cortés, "Chicle, Chicleros, Y Chiclería: Sobre Su Historia En El Petén."

[59] Charles Taylor, "The Dynamics of Democratic Exclusion," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 4 (1998).

This desire to "fix" Uaxactuneros to place and nature, as against migrants, represents the desire for a unitary subject belonging to only one community, defined empirically and even geographically. This vision of a "unified" subject is the desire of a complete self, one that is rational, therefore, unchanging, and able to be joined by a single idea of a common good. The desire for the unified subject is also part of the liberal dream of multiculturalism characterized by an ahistorical multiplicity of discrete and insular cultural identities.[60] Indeed, divided, fragmentary, and shifting subjects confound attempts to construct the dream of a united nation rationally managing its resources. As Benedict Anderson and Partha Chatterjee have illustrated, these forms of bounded, determinate, and enumerable communities are amenable to the imagined community of the nation.[61]

The concession also brought expectations of development, or what Foucault has called "pastoral power" in "salvation meaning health, well-being . . . standard of living, security."[62] These expectations for development initiated by the state included new initiatives for marketing and distribution of products, infrastructure, education programs, vehicles and other resources. As one community leader suggested, "the authorities, the state needs to care for and protect Uaxactún, no one ever worries about the community. The authorities of CONAP never come to see how the community is, they don't worry about the communities . . . Uaxactún is a place that gives taxes for *chicle, xate* and timber to the state, but they do not know that it is a community that needs, that has educational and health needs."[63]

The concession norms, however, sought to instil self-development, wherein the local community organization would take on the role of promoting the well-being of the villagers. Following the awarding of the concession, the role of the town mayor has virtually been extinguished by the concession. According to one study, "The functions of the village mayor have been almost reduced to the resolution of domestic conflicts and disagreements that could escape without sanction; their relationship to the municipality's budget is almost non-existent, and, for example, the village mayor is also the President of the Forest Commission. We find evidence that the function of representation of the village is subordinated by the existence of OMYC."[64] Moreover, as OMYC increasingly took on the role of the representing the community in regional and national affairs, including the

[60] For an excellent critique of multiculturalism see Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London, New York: Routledge, 1994).

[61] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London ; New York: Verso, 1991), Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World*, Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[62] Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983) 214.

[63] Nerría Herrera Pinelo interview with the author October 20, 2002.

[64] Instituto de Derecho Ambiental y Desarrollo Sustentable, "Estudio Y Monitoreo De Los Impactos Sociales En Unidades De Manejo Forestal Comunitario De Peten, Guatemala: Caso I. Uaxactún," 11.

negotiation of the petroleum concession, it came to replace the function of the state in the village. OMYC, likewise, has become the primary tool for development and the general meetings are filled with debates about what should be done with the income generated by the concession – whether to invest in capital, education, higher wages, or reforestation programs for example.

These debates over how best to pursue development in the village illustrate that community forest concessions operate as "technologies of citizenship" or a way for governing the population in ways that promote their autonomy, self-sufficiency, and political engagement. As I have suggested, the actions of the villagers are regulated by the state, but only after the capacity to act as environmentally friendly citizens is instilled. Thus, the concessions constitute a mode of governance that gets citizens to act on their own behalf, to constitute a self-regulating society.

FLUID BOUNDARIES AND SUBVERSIVE COMMUNITY

The negotiation of a new relationship with the state could not completely erase those other conceptualizations of community grounded in local systems of resource use and multiple place identities. As Partha Chatterjee, in a discussion of the Indian context, suggests:

> I do not believe that the imaginative possibilities afforded by the fuzziness of the community have disappeared from the domain of popular political discourse. On the contrary, I suspect that with the great reach of the institutions and processes of the state into the interiors of social life, the state itself is being made sense of in the terms of that other discourse, far removed from the conceptual terms of liberal political theory. The notions of representation and the legitimation of authority, for instance, have taken on a set of meanings in the popular domain of contemporary Indian politics that would be impossible to describe, let alone justify, in the terms of a theory of interest aggregation or of the rationalization of authority.[65]

The creative reconstruction of a space of community incomprehensible to the ordinary logic of liberal political theory and rational politics, although not outside the state, is at the heart of competing visions of sustainable development in the community and the constant negotiation of governmentality including relationships with the state in Uaxactún. It is this unintelligible domain that makes Uaxactún so difficult and complicated, as the CONAP official captured at the beginning of this chapter. In this section, I will explore the ways in which Uaxactuneros may be reconstructing domains of community through misappropriation and mis-citation.

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[65] Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* 225-26.

Shortly after the concession was awarded, the directors of Tikal National Park orchestrated a "*xatero* bust" to bring to light how many *xateros* from Uaxactún were collecting *xate* within the boundaries of Tikal.[66] Through informants, the *guarda-recursos* of Tikal National Park captured a bus load full of *xateros* returning with the harvest at the end of the day. A few days later, the directors of Tikal organized a meeting with OMYC, *xateros*, representatives of the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and CONAP.[67] However, in a meeting convened by the Park directors, the villagers confessed. They pleaded that areas around Uaxactún had been overharvested and even wrote a map demonstrating the areas where they would enter into Tikal National Park. Yet, at the same time that they confessed, they also declared that they were not damaging archaeological sites or ecological systems by harvesting resources. Moreover, they recalled the 1998 forest fires in which Uaxactuneros risked their lives to protect the forest including Tikal Park. The directors of the National Park conceded to let Uaxactuneros harvest in the National Park during limited times and in a controlled fashion. The directors of Tikal offered Uaxactuneros a space in the Visitors Centre for women to sell crafts, to collaborate with villagers in a *xate* reforestation project, including in the technical training in the investigation and production of *xate*. By confessing their wrong-doings and also by reciting identities as nature's defenders, Uaxactuneros did not fully submit to the norms and languages of scientific management as suggested by Foucault's notion of confessional techniques of power.[68] Rather, Uaxactuneros frustrated attempts by archeologists and ecologists to control the norms of resource extraction and they were able to reclaim fluid, shifting boundaries and local maps of resource use. In other similar negotiations, the villagers negotiated access to resources in the neighbouring biological corridor and the industrial concession, La Gloria. Through these negotiations, villagers have negotiated fluid territorial boundaries virtually forming borderless areas of NTFP extraction. In defiance of the need for legibility, legality, and regulation for state forms of governance, the villagers have reconstituted a system of moving, and often overlapping, boundaries of resource use.

These fluid boundaries and the failure of attempts by the state and OMYC to regulate and manage the extraction of NTFPs are illustrative of the creative defiance of rules and regulations in the reconstruction of a domain outside of state monitored environmental management. Outside of management plans, environmental impact assessments, and state surveillance, *xate, chicle,* and *pimienta* extraction are reborn as domains of subject formation

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[66] Interview with Sofia Paredes Maury, November 7, 2002.

[67] Sofia Paredes Maury and Eduardo González Vassaux, "Primera Reunión Sobre Actividades Extractivas En El Parque Nacional Tikal," (Tikal, Petén, Guatemala: Antropolgia e Historia Ministerio de Cultura y Deportes, March 26, 2000).

[68] See Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, Vintage Books ed ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1990).

that eschew the technologies of environmental citizenship. These domains, outside of environmental citizenship, even while OMYC opens spaces of participation in the state through environmental citizenship, is a refusal to act as "nature's defenders" as imagined by environmental managerialism, a refusal to be what the state has attempted to make them. In interviews, many villagers justify their repudiation of these identities by pointing to the environmental narratives that portray them as an original forest culture, outside of (and without need for), state monitoring. This refusal is a kind of resistance strategy directed at the very terms of environmental governmentality.[69]

This spurning of identities as "nature's defenders" as envisioned by environmental governmentality, was also embodied in a form of subversive community that contravenes the hardened boundaries of belonging. During my fieldwork, rumours of migrant Indigenous families living in Uaxactún circulated endlessly.[70] These rumours were often uttered simultaneously with fears that if discovered, the broken concession contract would result in the displacement of the community from the reserve. The anxiety produced around the desire to comply with state regulations and contradictions with multi-place identities constructed in a fluid, indeterminate form of community coalesced around these rumours. Faced with forms of green governmentality that attempted to "fix" Uaxactuneros, the villagers re-embedded these signifiers in narratives of migration and difference. These Indigenous migrant rumours, thus, made the power behind the sign of "being from here" visible and audible, but those circulating these stories remain invisible, evading both detection and authorial presence.[71]

In an interview, a prominent member of the community explained to me that, indeed, migrants living in the community did have a place in the concession. These *xateros* and *chicleros*, he said were "Amigos de Uaxactún," who, although not permanent members of

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[69] As Foucault has suggested, "Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political 'double bind,' which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures." Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermaneutics*, ed. Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 216.

[70] According to the Technical Justification for the concession, since 1990, the community has permitted the entrance of only 20 families into the community. This figure was used to suggest that the community had already made a commitment to closing its doors to immigrants .Sociedad Civil "Organización Manejo y Conservacion" OMYC, "Justificacion Tecnica Solicitud Concesion Forestal Comunitaria De Uaxactun," (Peten: 1998). Since the awarding of the concession, the community has officially expelled one family. Sociedad Civil "Organización Manejo y Conservacion" OMYC, "Letter to Juan Cucul," (Uaxactún, Flores: 2000). However, according to villagers this was after the individual set fire to part of the concession area.

[71] Ranajit Guha has suggested that rumour is a truly subaltern means of communication. It is elusive and transitive, anonymous, and without origin. It belongs to no one and is possessed by everyone. Endless in its circulation, it has no identifiable source. This illegitimacy, Guha suggest, make it accessible to insurgency, while its transitivity makes it a powerful tactic. Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Delhi: Oxford, 1983) 251-77.

Uaxactún, lived in the community a year maybe even two or three. The "Amigos de Uaxactún," he went on, would then be allowed to attend and participate in community meetings around the concession with a voice, but no vote. When I searched through the community's minutes from meetings, statues, and other documents I came across an "Amigos de Uaxactún." Yet what I discovered was a fund for donations from family and friends of a gringo conservationist working in the community. When I asked others, my friend's eloquent solution to hardened boundaries of belonging was revealed to be a fabrication. In this strategic fashioning of the "Amigos de Uaxactún" and in the rumours that circulate endlessly among community members, there lies a place for the representation of a form of hybrid and fluid community, a taboo that nevertheless manages to find a displaced form of representation. As Homi Bhabha observes, this strategy "is a non-repressive form of knowledge that allows for the possibility of simultaneously embracing two contradictory beliefs, one official and one secret, one archaic and one progressive, one that allows the myth of origins and the other that articulates difference and division"[72] In these forms of representation, fashionable identities as nature's defenders coexist alongside subversive forms of community disrupting attempts to construct an fixed, and governable form of community.

In these rumours and strategic fabrications, there also resides the promise of a democratic expansion through a moment in which the determined frontier between them and us that is a part of the construction of a "we", the "demos", is remade, expanded, and perhaps, even rendered fuzzy. It is this struggle, among competing factions, over the definition of "the people", the "Uaxactún," that constitutes the moment of democratic politics. Yet, that these identities are never fully constituted, always becoming, and can exist through multiple and competing forms of identifications makes democracy possible.[73] It is in the return to haunt of the ghostly figure of the Indigenous migrant that a promise for the expansion of democratic politics in the Petén may reside.

Whereas once harvesters of NTFPs were seen to be in a struggle with the forest, and *milperos* were "close to nature," now NTFPs harvesters have become the forest's caretakers. Indeed, Uaxactuneros continue to perform public acts of being "nature's defenders" as evidenced in their award for environmental conservation at the Johannesburg Summit in September of 2002. That sometimes these performances go wrong, are misapplied, or misinvoked, enables the negotiation of identity and the terms of governmentality. By appropriating the very terms in governmentality, including scientific understandings of the forest and territorial borders, Uaxactuneros engage in "subversive resignification" that

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[72] Homi K. Bhabha, "The Other Question," in *Literature, Politics and Theory*, ed. Francis Barker (London: Methuen, 1986), 168.

[73] See Chantal Mouffe, "Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy," in *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London and New York: Verso, 1999), 51-52.

enables them to re-embed meanings in particularly local contexts and to negotiate relations with the state and NGOs. This "politically insurrectionary speech" recognizes that opposition to power must come from within its terms through calls for justice and democracy in the very terms in which one is disenfranchised thereby "reterritorializ[ing] the term from its operation within dominant discourse precisely in order to counter the effects of [one's] marginalization."[74]

These resistances, moreover, enable us to ask the question of how citizens might be made more democratically. For example, whereas "technologies of citizenship" attempted to create abstract, national citizens, Uaxactuneros negotiated these technologies to recreate forms of local community. Whereas governmentality constructed hardened boundaries of belonging and fixed community to place, Uaxactuneros articulated mobile and fluid identities. Whereas the official discourses represented Uaxactuneros as a hybrid but homogenous community, Uaxactuneros articulated hybridity through difference and division. Finally, while the techniques of governmentality concealed the drawing of a democratic frontier between insiders and outsiders, in rumours of indigenous migrants Uaxactuneros articulated their anxieties about these divisions and highlight the possibility of expansion of democracy.

Yet, these resistances, and appropriations, that enabled Uaxactuneros to reconstruct a form of "unsanitized", unintelligible domain of community, have also paradoxically enabled Uaxactuneros to claim a new place in the nation – as a model of sustainable development. On more than one occasion, an informant would point to the towering forest surrounding the community, proclaim it as a source of riches, and comment on how Uaxactún with its commitment to conservation should be a model for all of Guatemala. In these very seductive, fashionable identities as nature's defenders, Uaxactuneros reclaim the world as a picture, with a map, an order and invert the claims to power. Instead of an abstraction or a representation that stands against reality, now the life of the villagers becomes the model, the order, or the ideal.

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[74] Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York and London: Routledge, 1997) 158.

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CONCLUSION
(UN)DEMOCRATIC NATIONALISMS

"CONAP: A Mission for All Guatemalans"

In the subversion of misappropriation, and the quiet spaces of community formation, as well as the provocative political spaces constructed by ACOFOP, *campesinos* engaged in redefining visions of the future of the nation. While the new national narratives born out of the creation of the MBR led to the coercive application democracy was expanded through the hegemonic processes of limited incorporation in community forest concessions. In efforts to read this story against the familiar universalizing story of modern progress, I have attempted to demonstrate how the processes of democratic incoporation of constructing citizens, was also one of subjectification. Indeed, power operates through the construction of a domain of civil society filled with freely speaking and thinking citizen-subjects. We have seen the ways in which these processes of incorporation were limited by the prohibitive mechanisms of the law, by the decentralizing mechanics of liberal forms of government, and by the inevitable exclusions of defining a "Uaxactún", a "nation" and a "we". These same processes of democratic incorporation, were, moreover, limited by state attempts to close the meaning of the Peace Accords and, thus to avert agrarian reform, hinder large-scale alteration of economic and political structures, and to pursue the dream of a non-ethnic citizenry. Yet, these processes are always incomplete. Identities can always be misapplied, misinvoked, and misused, and this enables the negotiation of green governmentality and the possibility of expanding the terrains of democracy. The ghostly figure of the indigenous migrant, invisible but heard in Uaxactún, present in their absence, and a signifier of a more fluid form of community points to how democracy might be expanded.

The democratic processes in Guatemala are fragile and the state is fickle. Processes that have facilitated the inclusion of citizens, albeit defined in particular ways, are easily altered. New priorities and new definitions of "proper" relations with nature and with the nation can be adopted. This can lead to new modes of excluding citizens, and it will foster new struggles to combat these exclusionary processes. Rather than attempting to close the history of community concessions and Uaxactún, this conclusion will end with the uncertainity and indeterminancy as the newly constructed citizens are once again excluded in favour of preserving national moments of inhabitants long since dead.

Only months after Uaxactún had received its concession, archaeologists working in the northern stretches of the MBR in El Mirador-Rio Azul National Park were petitioning CONAP to expand the boundaries of the National Park to include important archaeological sites located within community concessions granted Uaxactún, San Miguel La Palotada, Cruce a la Colorada, Carmelita, San Andres, and industrial concessions Paxbán and La Gloria. The proposals were put forward by archaeologist Dr. Richard Hanson from the University of California, Los Angeles, and director of the Foundation for Anthropological Research and Environmental Studies (FARES) as well as Regional Archaeological Investigation of Northern Petén, Guatemala (RAINPEG). In these proposals, the need for special protection of the archaeological sites was put forward to the government through old systems of representation. Indeed, the proposal represented *campesinos,* not just migrants, as nature's destroyers. According to its authors, "A large number of the members of the villages of Carmelita, Paso Cabollos, Uaxactún, Dos Aguadas, and Pasadita are poorly educated and depend on plunder, pillage of the forest, production of marijuana and other illegal and unproductive activities. We propose to attain funds to implement an environmental education centre . . . ."[1] Likewise, the report's narrative called on the state to take the role of hero in the salvation of cultural heritage and nature. The authors suggested that "the observations of the foundation FARES agree with these pessimistic observations if there is no direct and active intervention by the governments of Guatemala and Mexico. It has been our experience that there are problems with trying to conserve the forest simply because it is a forest . . . *It is an indisputable fact that the best models that we have for the conservation of tropical forests are archaeological parks.*"[2] Moreover, these ancient archaeological parks "will provide national and international pride in the cultural gifts of the Mayan civilization."[3] These representations of nature and nation articulated in a similar fashion at the founding of the MBR, and later contested by communities such as Uaxactún and ACOFOP, were reiterated in the context of archaeological preservation.

CONAP rejected the proposals put forward by Hansen. On August 3, 2000, CONAP responded with a report stating the existence of prior contracts with communities and industry for the management of the reserve while emphasizing that these concessions had engendered positive state-community relations. The report even went to great length to demonstrate that the communities were protecting the forest including evidence provided by satellite images of forest fires in 1998. The report concludes, "The principal justification for the creation of a National Reserve Basin Mirador appears to be the defence of natural and cultural heritage contained within this basin, which is a desirable objective and the activity of

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[1] "Monumento Cultural Cuenca Mirador-Calakmul Guatemala-Mexico," (n/d).
[2] Ibid. Emphasis in original.
[3] Ibid.

forest concessions fills this same objective."[4] Moreover, the report suggests that, "From the archaeological and strict natural resource conservation point of view, the project appears to be beneficial, but under the current conditions and the needs of the populations established in the area; this situation does not appear to be recommendable." By October, Uaxactuneros sent a letter to President Alfonso Portillo stating, "we have heard of the existence of a proposal to establish and EXPAND the Park Mirador-Rio Azul named Basin Mirador, WE FEEL NEGATIVELY AFFECTED by the said Park."[5] The letter went on to explain that there would be social consequences to such an action asking the government to "remember the difficult past when the Mayan Biosphere Reserves was created" and asking, "Do we want to return to the problems?"[6] With little support from either CONAP or communities, the proposal to expand El Mirador Rio-Azul appeared to lie dormant.

In June of 2001, however, the governments of Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama signed an agreement called Plan Puebla Panamá to promote the integration of these Mesoamerican countries through investments in human development, tourism, and greater interconnection through major highways, energy systems, and telecommunications. The stated objectives of the Plan Puebla Panamá are to "promote human and ecological wealth of the Mesoamerican Region within the framework of sustainable development that respects cultural and ethnic diversity. For this, one poses an integrated strategy for the region that promotes joint initiatives and Mesoamerican projects."[7] This objective of integrated regional development would be pursued through a series of individual initiatives that, according to the plan, would work symbiotically to promote sustainable development in the region. These initiative included: 1/Mesoamerican Initiative of Sustainable Development, 2/ Mesoamerican Initiative of Human Development, 3/Mesoamerican Initiative of the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Disasters, 4/Mesoamerican Initiative of the Promotion of Tourism, 5/ Mesoamerican Initiative Facilitation of Commercial Trade, 6/Mesoamerican Initiative of Road Interconnection, 7/Mesoamerican Initiative of Energy Interconnection, 8/Mesoamerican Initiative of Integrated Telecommunications Services.

The signing of the Plan Puebla Panamá opened the door for the Mirador Basin archaeological project, and by December 2001, Dr. Richard Hansen was promoting his project, not to CONAP officials, but to the Executive Secretary of the President, Harris Whitbeck, in charge of Plan Puebla Panamá negotiations and initiatives. In his letter to

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[4] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, "Analisis De La Creacion De La Reserva Nacional Cuenca Del Mirador En La Reserva De Bisofera Maya En El Peten," (San Benito: 2000).
[5] Sociedad Civil "Organización Manejo y Conservacion" OMYC, "Letter to Presidente Lic. Alfonso Portillo," (2000). Emphasis in the original.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, "Plan Puebla-Panamá: Inciativas Y Proyectos Mesoamericanos," (San Salvador, El Salvador: 2001), 3.

Whitbeck, Dr. Hansen discussed the ecological and economic benefits of expanding the Mirador Rio-Azul Park as part of the larger Plan Puebla Panamá tourism initiative, El Mundo Maya. According to Hansen, "[t]here does not exist other sites in all of the Mundo Maya in size and sophistication as the sites in El Mirador, Wakna, Nakbe, Tintal, Naachtun, Y Xulnal." Dr. Hansen was also clear to point out that "to develop these enormous sites of the Mirador basin, the country will have economic benefits that have never been seen."[8]

Just a few months earlier, ACOFOP and other organizations had requested a meeting with the Guatemalan Governor in charge of Plan Puebla Panamá because they had not been consulted or informed about the Plan Puebla Panamá and the tourism project El Mundo Maya.[9] By October of that year, ACOFOP along with Coordinator of Indigenous and Campesino Community Agroforestry (CICAFOP), Conservation International's Propetén, the Environmental Law and Sustainable Development Institute (IDEADS), and Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLASCO) had arranged a forum with key NGO leaders and governmental officials. At the meeting, Harris Withbeck and Isabel Guzmán, the President's delegates for Plan Puebla Panamá, Raúl Castañada from the Ministry of Communication, Adán Regalado, the Governor of the Petén, as well as presentations from representatives of CICAFOP, IDEADS, and others presented various viewpoints and perspectives on Plan Puebla Panamá. When the floor was opened to questions for the presenters, one individual directed a question to Harris Withbeck concerning the contradictory nature of their "participatory" discourse. The individual asked Whitbeck, "You assure us that this has been a highly participative process, but it is not until now that the government comes to the Petén to talk about Plan Puebla Panamá and it has not been your initiative, but ours. How would you propose to promote participation?" Whitbeck responded by stating that, "Officially, this program began on the 15th of June and we have so much to do that we could not consult all of the population. We are working through commissions, we meet once a month and it is only now that we are starting the set process that initiatives have a certain grade of connectedness and advancement."[10] Again and again, participants in the forum continued to ask questions concerning how the government planned to include participation in a regional initiative, such as Plan Puebla Panamá, what legal mechanisms were in place to guarantee the participation of the people, and how the government was planning to confront globalization. One participant cleverly crystalized fears of being left out of development as envisioned by the Plan Puebla Panamá scheme, when he/she asked "What can a poor *campesino* do if they do not have anything to

[8] Richard Hansen, 14 diciembre 2001.Letter to Harris Whitbeck.
[9] (ACOFOP) Asociación de Comunidades Forestales del Petén, Letter, 8 de Agosto del 2001.
[10] "Implicaciones Y Percepciones Del Plan Puebla Panamá En La Región Mesoamericana Y Seminario-Taller Oportunidades, Amenezas Y Propuestas Sobre La Iniciativa Puebla-Panamá" (Santa Elena, Petén, Guatemala, 4 y 5 de octubre del 2001), 35.

export?"[11] In response, Whitback simply stated, "If someone doesn't have anything to export then they should look for something to export." In these questions and responses, it became clear that participation for the government meant working and receiving benefits (or lack therein) from a scheme in which the architecture was already laid out, incorporation of the population entailed creating new forms of employment, and consultation meant informing them of their new roles.[12]

In the next months, ACOFOP along with other Guatemalan organizations such as Tropico Verde and Colectivo Madre Selva began to formulate critiques of the project from their individual perspectives. However, even while they were formulating their responses, it became clear that despite objections from CONAP, Dr. Richard Hansen utilized this plan to exclude ACOFOP and others from decision-making channels, and that the Guatemalan government would go ahead with plans to expand the El Mirador Rio-Azul National Park. On April 18, 2002, without the consultation of CONAP offices, and through Governmental Accord 129-2002, the Congress created the Regional System of Special Protection of Cultural Heritage and expanded the El Mirador Rio-Azul National Park to include between 10 and 100 percent of concessioned forests. In response, each of the individual communities affected by the amplification made an official request to halt the application of the law. The President's Office quickly denied the request because the Governmental Accord legally over-rides the state's contract with the concessionaries. The requests now reside in the Offices of the Constitutional Court and there appears to be no quick or easy resolution in sight.

Yet, plans for Plan Puebla Panamá and El Mirador have spanned a new series of political connections among *campesinos*. Through their mutual opposition to aspects of the Plan Puebla Panamá, including a proposed hydroelectric dam along the Río Usumacinta, new alliances have been sparked among *campesinos* that will potentially be displaced by the flooding, *campesinos* in other Central American countries including Mexico, as well, as with organizations in Guatemala that similarly oppose the Plan Puebla Panamá.[13] Conflict over the meanings of the Peace Accords has reopened in these processes, as both proponent and

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[11] Ibid., 41.

[12] Indeed, the Plan Puebla Panamá report also emphasizes participation, but has not acted on these discourses. The official report suggests that initiatives and projects have a double aim, "one the one side, to promote [regional] integration, and on the other, to strengthen the dialogue among authorities and civil society that consolidates a shared vision of social and economic development." This focus on "participation" is again mentioned in a section on criteria and considerations utilized to identify projects, which must "include the participation of the private sector." Indeed according to the report, "a key element in the formulation of projects and content of the Plan Puebla Panamá is the incorporation of mechanisms of consultation and follow-up . . . such as systems of negotiation, information, diffusion, and consultation." Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, "Plan Puebla-Panamá: Inciativas Y Proyectos Mesoamericanos," 4-5, 5, 6-7.

[13] In August of 2002, The Alliance for Life and Peace of the Petén, was formed. It invovled a plethora of small *campesino* movements in the Petén including ACOFOP and the Petenero Front Against Dams.

opponents of the El Mirador Project, the hydroelectric damn, and Plan Puebla Panamá, use the Accords in their arguments.[14]

In Uaxactún new alliances and divisions were formed around these same issues. El Mundo Maya, for example, has come to Uaxactún with extensive plans to develop "ecotourism" in the village through funding for an all-year paved road to the community, new hotels, a parking lot, and safe drinking water. At the time of my visit, some members of the community saw ecotourism as the solution to the community's problems, while others rejected the development projects such as improved roads because they believed it would jeopardize the long-term sustainability of the community.

In the midst of the democratic closure threatened by the El Mirador Project and the Plan Puebla Panamá, the government launched a new nationwide publicity campaign for the MBR under the title of "CONAP: A Mission for All of Guatemala." Part of this publicity campaign includes brightly coloured posters illuminating various enhanced pictures of the reserve. One poster simply entitled, Maya Biosphere Guatemala,[15] provides rich imagery of a deep blue lake surrounded by lush green forest spanning into the horizon. A monkey hanging from a tree and apparently gazing off into the horizon frames the picture. The caption on the side reads: "The Maya Biosphere provides, according to management zones: Tourism, Pure Air, Archaeological Sites, Xate, Chicle, Pimienta, Timber, Sustainable Agriculture, Medicinal Plants, Unique Flora and Fauna, Community Forests, National Heritage and National Pride." The caption concludes in bold letters, "To Care for It Suits Us."[16] Amidst the stunning images of tropical rainforests and the representative monkey, human presence vanishes to the realm of mitigated symbols, timber, tourism, sustainable agriculture, that represent intervention in the landscape. This imagery, thus, becomes involved in the multitude of daily practices and images that attempt to ground the sense of nation to a common vision of the national geography.

The campaign, although in its initial stages at the time of researching, also involved the creation of a Power Point presentation to be used by CONAP officials in presentations to government officials, schools, and a variety of public forums. Included in the Power Point presentation are quotes from the author Virgilio Rodríguez Macal from his novel, Guayacán such as: "The word is handed over to the eternal murmur of the marvellous forests of the

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[14] For example, Dr. Hansen argues in an official justification for the El Mirador project that, "These sites would also be subject to protection as part of the State's obligations, especially in relation to what is written in the Peace Accords, as Sacred Places with physical evidence of the development of the Mayan culture in our lands." In ACOFOPs arguments to the government, it suggests that "to retract the contracts with the communities, there would exist a non-fulfillment of the Peace Accords."
[15] In this campaign, "Reserve" is dropped from the name Mayan Biosphere Reserve. I was told by one of the architects of the campaign that they thought "Reserve" sounded too restrictive and prohibatory.
[16] My translation is a bit awkward. The actual caption reads "Cuidarla nos Conviene" and could mean "To Care for It, Agrees with Us" with connotations of harmony and mutual benefit.

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Petén, inalienable heritage and certain hope of the future generations of my country."[17] The presentation proposes to answer the question, "Why does it suit us to care for the Mayan Biosphere?" The presentation consists of descriptions of the soils, flora, and fauna of the reserve, the different zones, and threats to the reserve followed by the social, economic, environmental and cultural benefits offered by the reserve. These campaigns and other articulations are grounded in the promise of sustainable development and conservation; the Petén also comes to represent a utopian future. Emerging from the brutality of a 36-year civil war, and healing "the wounded body politic," the Petén provides a hopeful image of regeneration and rebirth for the nation, a return to the Garden of Eden in all its fertility, and abundance. The word *nature* has the same root as *nativity, native,* and *nation.* The idea of nature is also related to the concept of birth. As the philosopher John Passmore explains: "The word 'nature' derives, it should be remembered, from the Latin *nascere,* with such meanings as 'to be born,' to 'come into being.' Its etymology suggests, that is, the embryonic, the potential rather than the actual."[18] The Petén, as a place of "nature," with its promise of the realization of harmony and the rebirth of the nation, is a complementary narrative of healing to the mourning associated with the "wounded body politic."

Yet, these same official nationalisms are articulated along with breaking government contracts with communities, with the foreclosure of participatory mechanisms, and with the potential displacement of people by a hydroelectric dam. These official articulations of nationalism are attempting to displace other visions of the nation. With these undemocratic nationalisms in mind, we must begin to ask *how* citizens are being made – through the technologies of green governmentality – and identify the new lines of inclusion and exclusion that are being drawn. This may also enable us to ask if this abstract, imagined community of the national "we" that seeks a common vision of the national territory must always seek to erase the plethora of local histories, memories and visions of the nation.

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[17] Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas, *Biosfera Maya* (Santa Elena, Peten: Presentacion de PowerPoint, 2002).

[18] Quoted in Kenneth Olwig, *Landscape, Nature, and the Body Politic: From Britain's Renaissance to America's New World* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002) 56.

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INTERVIEWS

Over the course of four months, my research benefited from conversations and formal interviews with *campesino* leaders from the Association of Community Forests of the Petén, Civil Society Conservation and Management Organization, OMYC, Indigenous and Campesino Coordinador in the Petén (CONIC-Petén), Grito de la Selva, from Unión Maya Itza, Bethel, Carmelita, Maya Selva Cooperative, San Andres, La Colorada, Cruce a la Colorada, Arbol Verde, Laborantes del Bosque, Impulsores Suchitecos, Custodios de la Selva, and SUCHILMA. Interviews with key architects of the reserve, such as Jorge Cabrera, Santiago Billy, Hilda Rivera, and José Roman Carrera provided valuable insights into the making of the reserve. Key National Council of Protected Areas (CONAP) in both Guatemala City and the Petén, past and present, such as Juventino Galvez, Noe Ventura, Erick Cuellar, Francisco Guzmán, Hilda Rivera, José Roman Carrera were kind enough to share time in their busy schedules. Directors, past and present, of Non-Governmental Organizations such as Nature for Life (NPV), Propetén, Mother Earth Collective (Colectivo Madre Selva), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), SmartWood, Chemonics, Caan Cash, Centro Maya, and Forestry Action Plan, Guatemala (PAFG) as well as United States Agency for International Development (USAID) officials. Finally, this research could not have been completed

without the many Uaxactuneros who spent their morning or afternoon talking with me, especially Julia Bö and Benedin Garcia, whose knowledge was invaluable and whose efforts made interviews possible in Uaxactún. For interviews with Uaxactuneros, other than leaders of the concession process, I have given pseudonyms to protect their identities. Because their identities are protected, this list does not include people I have given pseudonyms. All titles and positions listed in the bibliography were current positions, unless otherwise indicated, at the time of the interview.

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