

*Sept. 1994*

**Taras Polataiko**

**EXHIBITION STATEMENT**

This exhibition presents one of three bodies of work which evolved during three years of my work in the M.F.A. program.

These three years offered a formidable challenge to my self-perception and further sensitized me towards my place in a broader cultural milieu, my (re)positioning as an artist, and my own experience in my work. The work presented in this exhibition reflects an uncertainty, or displaced certainty towards my place and identity as an artist and as an immigrant, thus operating as a reflection, or perhaps refraction of my relocation from one cultural environment to another. In fact, these sensibilities I am attempting to describe lack cultural/ideological innocence, making me doubtful about the possibility of finality for such notions as "irreversible difference" or "true identity", the latter constructed on the basis of firm (op)position. I am attempting to interrogate the positioning of the artist/"author" vis-a-vis the artwork and its public, thus problematising the ownership of the "message" conveyed by the "authorized" artwork.

In this essay I am not going to explain particular artworks, but rather try to explicate some of the thinking which occasioned the work presented in this exhibition. I regard this investigation as an attempt to address the problems of representation and identity (historic-cultural as well as personal) rooted in the European tradition of visual/textual communication. My position in this investigation is that of someone who finds both the notion of a fixed identity and the possibility of discovering this identity "within" a particular individual or group mythical. It is this mythos which both occasions and is the occasion for my work.

My understanding is that any attempt to discover "true identity" is simultaneously mutated by the process of discovery/representation itself, whether by "self" or by "others". Basically it comes to the following: if there is a possibility to discover "true identity", somebody will do it for others and thus forge their identities. One of the questions I propose is "Who is looking (speaking, interpreting) at whom?". Who is "Narcissus" looking at?

#### Communication through art

My interest is in investigating the codes of communication rather than those of expression. The model of communication, founded on a trinity of Author, Medium and Viewer sets up a division which never sees the overlap or contamination between the three presumably isolable functions. To accept such a model is to assert the possibility of an author's or viewer's control over the medium and, hence, to declare the priority of some factors of the process of communication (author, viewer) over others (medium). Such a model of communication seems to become increasingly problematic due to the proliferation of communicational networks (TV, computer technology, mass-produced printed messages, etc.). The problem lies in the impossibility to determine the (op)positions of a binary model of communication, based on such polarities as transmitter/receiver, subject/object, etc. Such a model presupposes a reliability of the subjects of communication and denies the potential of the information itself to take over.

That is to say, that dialectical model of communication asserts itself at the expense of the information. Namely, it arrests information in the tight space between the author and the viewer, thus reducing information to a perfectly controllable message. (Such a harnessing of media seems to be more and more problematic in the era of software. The more real the TV mimesis becomes, the more problematic it is to distinguish the reality of life. More and more, life looks suspiciously like a TV serial, and TV documentaries effectively seduce a viewer's sense of "reality" with their "eye(I)-witness", didactically convincing presentations. There is also a new brand of documentary, "more honest" than the former in its realisation of its fictitiousness - the docudrama. Its honesty lies in the fact that it completely ignores a viewer's anxiety about setting apart fiction from "what really happened".)

As a practising artist I attempt to explore the possibilities of communication through the art object without arresting the "meaning" within the space limited by the fixed opposition of the author and the viewer, and thus to question the definability of the positions of both. I attempt not to nail the meaning down by assigning a privileged position to the author/viewer at the expense of the medium. I aim at achieving a situation which does not restrain a potential of "meaning" for the sake of protection of the privileged (op)position author/viewer. My attempt is to present a combination of representational signs (image, text, context, viewer, author) in such a way that the potential meaning(s) of the presentation would problematise the restrictive linearity of dialectical logocentrism, and thus emphasise the always present

alterability of meaning inherent in the very appearance of the discourse (image, text, "object", "painting", "context" as a metasign, etc). It is an attempt to present an illusion of meaning not wanting to let itself happen and, simultaneously, an illusion of space devoid of meaning.

### Dominant (op)position

My understanding is that even highly revisionist contemporary discourses often ground their arguments in a reductive legacy of Logocentric Reason and, particularly, in Marxian dialectics of social development. The spectre of Marxism is still haunting Europe (and North America) in the revamped clothes of new discourses.

Any discourse which attempts to impose itself on the complex reciprocity of the social in the shape of the "struggle of the opposites"- for instance, in that of the dichotomy dominant/marginalised - implies the need for the latter to empower itself. More precisely, the implication is that the "marginalised" must undergo a process of empowerment until it assumes enough power to pass its unfortunate status onto its successor. That is to say that the logic of dialectical development guarantees the everlasting existence of the "Marginalised" and, therefore, an everlasting marginalisation. This is also to say that discourse based on social dialectics needs its "Marginalised" in order to maintain the logic of "dialectical development".

Perhaps, this was a secret understanding which Soviet Marxist

theory came to after the end of its Revolutionary incarnation and subsequent extermination of the dominant class. In order to be in accordance with "The Laws of Dialectical Development", it had two options: Either to begin an emergency search for the new "Marginalised", thus admitting that the objective of the Revolution ("equality in the classless society") had not been achieved (a self-referential trompe l'oeil invented for the purposes of seducing the "marginalised"), but more importantly, opening the door to a rival revolutionary candidate through the very admission of new "marginality"; or to proclaim the Revolution a successful embodiment of the idea of a "society without class antagonisms" and, therefore, to admit its own uselessness and, accordingly, the end of "The Laws of Dialectical Development".

Dialectical thought made a non-dialectical choice not to make a choice, and not being able to deal with its own legacy transcended the dialectical distinction between theory and reality<sup>1</sup>, admitting its status as a theory-fiction unable to distinguish itself from its referent. This socio-theoretical implosion unleashed what Platonic inspired linear reductivism long harnessed, a semiotic mutant of sorts: the signifier as signified (referent). This mutation assured the eternal reflectivity and

---

<sup>1</sup>Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: "Consciousness does not determine life: life determines consciousness".

(The German Ideology)

(4,4)

"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness".

(A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy)

(4,4)

reversibility of appearances, actualising the codes (magical) which ruled the pre-Christian world of ritualistic societies. These codes subverted the linearity of cause and effect by making signifier and signified reversible, turning them into reciprocal appearances. It is this spell of reflective appearance that kills Narcissus and yet makes him undying. It is the same semiotics of spell that reappears for a moment in Perseus' shield, "reciprocating" Medusa's deadly gaze, or that which kept the Tepekhuans in fear of being photographed by a European photographer, encouraging their belief that his "image-taking" would rob them of their souls and turn their lives into nothing but misery<sup>2</sup>. It is the same representational reciprocity that subverted the restraints of dialectical causality and marked the beginning of a new post-historic, post-revolutionary (1917) era in Eastern Europe, thus reasserting the all-absorbing rule of the ritual over the linearity of social and economic "developments".

Curtailed for centuries between the dialectical oppositions of reality and mimesis, Ritual revenged itself by turning them into two mirrors opposing each other, thus "satisfying" their contradictory desires to divide its domain. It is their everlasting reflectivity in each other that ensures that the non-existent and therefore undying Ritual of Representation could endlessly reflect

---

<sup>2</sup> J.G.Frazer: "Mexican Tepekhuans experienced a mortal fear in front of the photographic camera; it took five days to talk them into posing. When they finally agreed they had a look of those sentenced to death before execution. They were convinced that by taking pictures the photographer could take away their souls and swallow them afterwards. The Tepekhuans claimed that when he will take their photographs to his country, they all will either die or experience some misery" (5,188).

upon itself in the mirror always already inhabited by two binary mutants: the real fiction and its twin - the fictitious reality.

### Artist as a Politician: In the Shadow of the Monument

"Artist as a Politician: In the Shadow of the Monument" was a site-specific public art project which took place at Spadina Crescent and 24th Street from Oct.10 - 15, 1992. The following excerpt from the Star Phoenix article "Artist Casts Himself as Civic Monument" (Oct.6, 1992) briefly frames the project:

It's street theatre. It's performance art. It's a political statement.

It's Taras Polataiko posing as a civic monument.

Inspired by a recent newspaper photograph of Gov. Gen. Ray Hnatyshyn examining a sculpture in his image, Polataiko plans to set himself up as a living statue. He'll position himself adjacent to the larger-than-life representation of Hnatyshyn, erected last month at 24th Street and Spadina Crescent.

It was an attempt to investigate the status of art as a socio-cultural phenomenon, more particularly, an attempt to question the distinction between "aesthetics" and "politics", and the finality of the concept of "frame" for "art"<sup>3</sup>. Considering that oppositions

---

<sup>3</sup> Jacques Derrida: "When Kant replies to our question 'What is frame?' by saying it's a **parergon**, a hybrid of outside and inside, but a hybrid which is not a mixture or a half-measure, an outside which is called to the inside of the inside in order to constitute it as an inside; and when he gives as examples of the **parergon**, alongside the frame, clothing and column, we ask to see, we say to ourselves that there are 'great difficulties' here, and that the choice of examples, and their association, is not self-evident" (3, 63).

Jacques Derrida: "The whole analytic of aesthetic judgment forever assumes that one can distinguish rigorously between the intrinsic and the extrinsic. Aesthetic judgement **must** properly bear upon intrinsic beauty, not on finery and surrounds" (3, 69).



are never in a position of equality (one is always dominant and the other marginalised), one can see that a discrimination between the aesthetic and the political effectively yields the power to the latter, thus regearing metaphysics from the an inverted universe, ruled by the reciprocity of appearances, myths and unchangeable rituals, towards one of development, economy and production. Hence, the deritualisation of society by means of singling "art" out of the Ritual, a self-deceptive Platonic/Iconoclastic undertaking, is achieved through the dialectical marginalisation of art into mimesis, thus creating a "reality" out of everything that is not mimesis, thereby deauthorising this latter. Singling "art" out of the Ritual and "framing" it is an imposition of the develop/mental schema of cause and effect, reducing art's sphere of influence to that of a "sublime" entertainment (or entertainment by the "sublime"), and shrinking the artist's role from a Shaman to a clown.

The assignment of a substitute position to art (mimesis) is a gain of authoritative status by the new born "real", political and economic.

Singling the "political" out of art is simultaneously a singling of "art" out of politics. A depolitisation of art is simultaneously a deritualisation of politics, a distinction which marks the birth of the "rational" (and "irrational") and of the desire to determine, thus the (r)evolution of "historical" developments instead of a seductive reciprocity of the ritual. It is the anchoring of the political in the controlled safety of the rational by means of "framing" art that makes both "development"

and "production" possible, which is to say that "framing" art is a police function of a dialectics aimed at harnessing the seductive powers of mimesis, in order to prevent mimesis from subverting the logic of causality. Such a "rationalization" ensures the safety of "Progress", "Development", and, above all, "Production".

By watchfully guarding arrested "art" inside the frame assigned to it by the Platonic/Iconoclastic tradition, the "political" attempts to assert its "reality". This is the understanding responsible for my attempt to present a situation which would reveal the imaginary nature of such distinctions as art/life, aesthetic/political, elitist/vernacular, etc. This is the reason for my reluctance to label the action as either an "artistic" or a "political" statement. This is an attempt to present a situation which demonstrates that there is no "outside" to art; a situation where the categories of aesthetic/political, art/life, metaphorical/literal, etc. are not in opposition to each other, and where the difference between them becomes undecidable; a situation where all the "categories" mutate into each other, none of them in opposition (not even in any fixed position), but in the process of an endless reciprocity of significations with their potential implications. It is a situation where the terrorist discrimination between real and artifice mutates itself into the reversible world of real artifice in artificial reality. Call this a post-historic Ritual of Representation.

The success of this project can be measured by the extent to which a mimetic potential of art is realised, blurring the distinction between art and politics. It is precisely the mimetic

potential of art that collapses this carefully guarded boarder. This is what infuriates the fundamentalist Right, which seeks the protection of its ownership of the "political". The realisation of the inability of a linear (real) "political" vocabulary to appropriate the mutated(ing) Moebian significations of mimesis causes the despair of the fundamentalist, creating a blind desire to accuse anyways ("Artist's Protest Inappropriate", Star Phoenix, Oct.22, 1992: Alderman Chernetsky's "inappropriation" of "artist's protest"). The prospect of sharing the political arena with any lazy bum artist who does not even need to speak in order to make his point annoys the fundamentalist to such an extent that he would be prepared to punish the scoundrel even at the cost of a transgression of both The Canadian Immigration Law and The Charter of Rights. (A lawmaker publicly promoting a disregard for the Law when his interests as a lawmaker do not coincide with it is an act which effectively undermines the credibility of both the lawmaker and the Law: see again SP.22/10/1992, the hypocritical agony of the disreputed "political" before its evanescence in its own mimesis.)

#### **Real art: problems of representation**

What is it that made it possible for Europe to turn the rest of the world into the source of the influx of capital? Some would say that it is technological advancement, others will get even more particular and reduce the problem to the mere fact of the successful appropriation and application of the recipe for gun powder. Both assumptions seem to be valid as merely instrumental

factors aiding the European imperial states in their colonial endeavours. However, there seems to be something much more fundamental than technological superiority at stake, namely, the metaphysical foundations of European imperial culture itself, responsible for the idea of progress.

Having written that, I realise that my interpretation is itself an attempt to divide phenomena into essential (metaphysical) and secondary (instrumental), and furthers the dichotomy of cause and effect<sup>4</sup>. The very nature of such an imposed division is rooted in oppositional (dialectical) thinking<sup>5</sup>. I would like to focus on one particular opposition: real and not real (fake, fiction, interpretation, simulation, etc.). The implications of this dichotomy are similar to those of others such as truth/not truth (lie), original/reproduction, valid/invalid etc. The principle of

---

<sup>4</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche: "Cause and effect: such duplicity, probably, exists nowhere; in reality we face a continuum, from which we snatch two or three pieces, as we perceive movement itself only in isolated points, therefore we do not see it but conclude to it" (7, v.1, 479).

"Belief in cause and effect is rooted in the strongest of all instincts: the instinct of revenge" (7, v.1, 732).

"Cause and effect. Prior to the effect its cause is believed to be different than after it" (7, v.1, 614).

<sup>5</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche: "philosophers ... all simultaneously make great and virtuous noise every time, when the problem of truth is considered... They all simultaneously pretend to be people, who, supposedly, came to their opinions and discovered them by means of self-development of cool, pure, divinely careless dialectics (as opposed to mystics of all categories, who are more honest and more dull,- these talk about "inspiration"),- in fact they defend some biased proposition by juggling the facts" (7, v.2, 243).

"Antithesis is a narrow wicket through which the error most readily gets to the truth" (7, v.1, 340).

reality is what is at stake here. It is probably the most fundamental of all founding principles in the kingdom of Eurocentrism, and the one which is most responsible for the world order we have now. I am going to make an attempt to trace the changes in European metaphysics as related to the above mentioned principle, using mythology and painting as examples. I am going to view painting as a reflection of the dominant mythology of the periods described below.

An important shift took place in European metaphysics with the decline of pagan polytheism and the ascension of Christian monotheism. The notion of the real gains a new meaning, as does the notion of faith. In fact, the institution of faith was invented by Christianity in order to prove the non/reality of its invisible God and to validate His permanent absence. If one absence (God exists but is invisible) wants to become present (real), it must imply a necessity for another absence (faith), whose purpose will be to validate the former absence. In the pagan world order there is simply no necessity for faith; relationships with gods do not depend on the amount of faith invested:

Without a psychological or metaphysical foundation, the rule has no grounding in belief. One neither believes nor disbelieves a rule - one observes it. The diffuse sphere of belief, the need for credibility that encompasses the real, is dissolved. (1,133)

There is one striking similarity between Christian history and Greek mythology though, the one between Iconoclasm and the myth of Orpheus. Both Orpheus and the Iconoclasts understood that the real can only exist as absence, that the real cannot be represented without losing its authority. Actually, what they understood was

that the real was only possible as imaginary. A belated understanding of this idea cost Orpheus his beloved wife, and the Iconoclasts' understanding of it made them want to destroy the images of their God: it was the realisation of the absence of boundaries between reality and fiction - the idea of simulated truth<sup>6</sup>.

Five hundred years later, the Renaissance witnessed the invention of perspective, which made the truthful imitation of reality possible. The invention of perspective allowed visual representation to challenge the definiteness of the notion of reality more thoroughly than Byzantine iconography managed to. It marked a radical departure from early Christian pictorial representation which made no pretence of belonging to the world of the spectator, but stood in a fictive, divine world of the image represented. The perspective vision of space places the viewer in the centre of the universe and thus passes to him the aura of the real, previously enjoyed exclusively by God. This weakens the sign of God rather seriously, and consequently God loses His significance as a vital sign, becoming a self-referential signifier without any signified other than the viewer's nostalgia for His

- 
- <sup>6</sup> Jean Baudrillard: "...the successive phases of the image:
- it is the reflection of a basic reality
  - it masks and perverts a basic reality
  - it masks the absence of a basic reality
  - it bears no relation to any reality whatever:  
it is its own pure simulacrum" (2, 11).

Friedrich Nietzsche: "The features attributed to "true being" of things are, in fact, the features of not-being, the features indicating nothing: "true world" was built out of the contradiction to the real world - but really, this is, an illusory world, as it is but moral-optical deception" (7, v.2, 571).

turbulent past. In fact, perspective turns God into the vanishing point, "a thing of divine essence" (Pozzo), the ideal and mystical point that will never be represented. The present absence.

The attack on the definiteness of the notion of the real reaches its culmination in trompe l'oeil painting. Trompe l'oeil subverts the real space by seducing the representational vocabulary developed by perspective. Trompe l'oeil painting does not represent anything real. In fact, objects are trying to hide the fact that they themselves are not real so hard that they manage to devoid themselves of referential context and reduce themselves to the status of pure signs, thus becoming totally self-referential. One can say that they represent their ir/reality<sup>7</sup>. The dichotomy reality/illusion completely mutates itself in trompe l'oeil painted architecture. Here the illusion of reality is simultaneously the reality of illusion.

Our century witnessed the rebirth and successive decline of Iconoclasm under the sign of modernist aesthetics. The Cubist

---

<sup>7</sup> Jean Baudrillard: "They attack our sense of reality or functionality and, therefore, our sense of consciousness. They seek out the wrong or reverse side of things, and undermine the world's apparent factuality. This is why the pleasure that they give us, their seductiveness, however small, is radical; for it comes from a radical surprise borne of appearances, from a life prior to the mode of production of the real world."

"Since Machiavelli politicians have perhaps always known that the mastery of a simulated space is at the source of their power, the politics is not a real activity, but a simulated model, whose manifest acts are but actualized impressions..."

A hole in reality, an ironic transfiguration, an exact simulacrum hidden at the heart of reality, and on which the latter depends for its functioning. This is the secret of appearances.

Thus the Pope, the Grand Inquisitor, the great Jesuits and theologians all knew that God did not exist; this was their secret, and the secret of their strength" (1, 65).

crusade against perspective under the banner of the autonomy of the art object in the fine arts and functionality in architecture and design, marked the beginning of the new era of image-fighting in Europe and North America. Under the pressure of rapidly developing mechanical reproduction, based on photographic processes, the new iconoclasts were in search of a shelter for real aesthetic values. The "Autonomy" of the art object was, in fact, an organized and seemingly graceful way of presenting the retreat of a dialectical thinking not able to deal with the proliferation of simulated truths offered by mechanical reproduction<sup>8</sup>. Thus, this defensive project was presented as radical, avant-garde, and even revolutionary. As in former times, iconoclastic despair acquired aggressive forms. The tiny refuge of real art was guarded by the Cerberus of the Greenbergian dichotomy of avant-garde and kitsch. The images were banned. They became a taboo. Once more, they stood on the Modern Iconoclasts' way to the "ultimate truth."

The superficial abyss of appearances is something unacceptable to an iconoclastic mind. Perhaps the worst nightmare for an Iconoclast would be to find himself between two mirrors, terrified by their endless reflectivity, unable to determine which reflection is primary and which secondary. In this situation, the opposition between "original" and "copy" is always already mutated by the

---

<sup>8</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche: "... stiff as much as well-behaved tartuffism of old Kant, with which he lures us into the secret dialectic passages, leading, or rather seducing us to his 'categorical imperative'..." (7, v.2, 244).



process of representation itself'. Perhaps it is this mysterious power of appearances to absorb the ability to differentiate between real and fictional that causes great iconoclastic uneasiness and despair. Perhaps this is the "real" reason why modernist aesthetics tried to push the image out of the mainstream of Euro-American art so systematically and attempted to impose itself on the rest of the world under the imageless banner of universality.

Imageless art lost its ability to seduce the appearances of reality. It was totally preoccupied with asserting an artificial reality of its own, becoming irrelevant to any other system of representation but its own. Perhaps the realisation of the inability of art, narrowed down to modern iconoclastic dogmas, to deal with a broader range of issues (than the assertion of its own "truths") was an incentive for the patriarchs of Modernism to proclaim its "universality" as a means of validating a decaying discourse. It is impossible, though, to prevent discourse from undermining its own "truth".

All meaningful discourse seeks to end appearances: this is its attraction, and its imposture. It is also an impossible undertaking. Inexorably, discourse is left to its appearances, and thus to the stakes of seduction, thus to its own failure as discourse. But perhaps

---

<sup>9</sup> R.L.Gregory: "Seeing one's own face through a mirror - though one knows it to be in front of the mirror, where one feels it to be - can be described in terms of optics. Or can it? Why doesn't one's knowledge that one's own face is not through, but in front of the mirror serve to correct the error? Again, in a mirror we see ourselves the right way up but left-right reversed - why should this be? Is it due entirely to the optics of mirrors? Do mirrors distinguish between vertical and horizontal? Surely not. It is curious that we look into mirrors throughout our lives and yet may never question why we appear through them, left-right reversed but the right way up! Is the answer to the puzzle - the source of mirror-illusion - in the mirror or is it in ourselves? If it is in ourselves what kind of explanation would be appropriate?" (6, 50).

discourse is secretly tempted by this failure, by the bracketing of its objectives, of its truth effects which become absorbed within a surface that swallows meaning. This is what happens at first, when discourse seduces itself; it is the original form by which discourse becomes absorbed within itself and emptied of its truth in order to better fascinate us: the primitive seduction of language" (1, 54).

Modernist discourse subverts itself in its own rhetoric. Perhaps the most fascinating revelation of the discourse of modernism, in its quest for the truth, and incarnated in the autonomous aesthetic object, is the minimalist empty canvas. The fascinating truth of it is that there is none. Minimalism pays a great price for winning the Holy Iconoclastic war against representation. It exterminates itself by disappearing into the depths of the surface of an empty canvas<sup>10</sup>.

More recent socio-cultural realia present a new period of proliferation of imagery. To the truthless mind of the neo-

---

<sup>10</sup> Jean Baudrillard: "To dispel all appearances so that God's truth could shine forth was the illusion of the Iconoclasts. An illusion because God's truth did not exist, and perhaps secretly they knew it, this being why their failure proceeds from the same intuition as that of adorers of images: one can live only the idea of altered truth. It is the only way to live in conformity with the truth. Otherwise life becomes unbearable (precisely because the truth does not exist). One need not want to dispel appearances (the seduction of images). But if one does, it is imperative that one not succeed lest the absence of the truth become manifest. Or the absence of God, or the Revolution. The Revolution, and in particular its ape-like travesty, Stalinism, lives only by the idea that everything is opposed to it. Stalinism is indestructible because it exists only in order to conceal the non-existence of the Revolution and its truth, and thereby to restore hope. "The people" Rivarol said, "did not want a Revolution, they wanted only its spectacle" because this is the only way to preserve the Revolution's appeal, instead of abolishing it in its truth.

Friedrich Nietzsche: 'We do not believe that the truth remains true once the veil has been lifted'" (1, 58-59).

iconolater, iconoclastic attempts to break the vicious circle of simulation seem to be naive, sometimes even hypocritical. A new era of image-worshipping begins. The idea of the possibility of truth beyond representation has little interest as anything but another sign the artist can use. The potential such an iconophilic sensibility presents is that of questioning the very mechanics of the image's/icon's functioning in a socio-cultural context. This sensibility is something of a socio-cultural trompe l'oeil brought to life in order to problematise oppressive categorisations. Unlike trompe l'oeil, though, its images do not deal with visual illusions, instead they choose as their target the very elements which go into their functioning as signs responsible for the incarnation of identity.

What is it that killed Narcissus and yet made him undying? Perhaps it is a representational implosion which manifests the reemergence of a semiotic mutant: a politically corrupt signifier, scared of representing The Other and, furthermore, itself (and thus avoiding the creation of an (op)position). It is always already in a mutated form of signifier as signified to ensure that everything works in reverse.

A subject attempting to masturbate in front of the mirror avails himself of anxiety rooted in the impossibility of desire.

Jaques Lacan  
(fals[e] excerpt from *Ecrits*)

#### WORKS CITED:

1. Baudrillard, Jean. Seduction. Montreal: New World Perspective, 1990.
2. Baudrillard, Jean. Simulations. New York: Semiotext(e), 1983.
3. Derrida, Jacques. The Truth in Painting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
4. Eagleton, Terry. Marxism and Literary Criticism. Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976.
5. Frazer, J.G. Zolotaia Vetv. Moskva: Politizdat, 1980.
6. Gregory, R.L. "The Confounded Eye." Illusion in Nature and Art. London: Duckworth, 1973: 49-95.
7. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Sochinenia v Dvukh Tomakh. Moskva: Mysl, 1990.

#### SECONDARY SOURCES:

1. Allen, Woody. Zelig. (Film).
2. Baudrillard, Jean. The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena. London: Verso, 1993.
3. Baudrillard, Jean. Forget Foucault. New York: Semiotext(e), 1987.
4. Baudrillard, Jean. The Evil Demon of Images. Sydney: University of Sydney, Power Institute Publications, 1987.
5. Baudrillard, Jean. Revenge of the Crystal. London: Pluto Press,

- 1990.
6. Bauman, Zygmunt. Intimations of Postmodernity. London-New York: Routledge, 1992.
  7. Berger, John. Ways of Seeing. London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1980.
  8. Blatty, William Peter. The Ninth Configuration. (Film), 1979.
  9. Colacello, Bob. Holy Terror: Andy Warhall Close Up. New York: Harper Collins, 1990.
  10. De Palma, Brian. Body Double. (Film), 1986.
  11. Gane, Mike. Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory. London-New York: Routledge, 1991.
  12. Kroker, Arthur and Cook, David. The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyper-Aesthetics. Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1989.
  13. Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics and the Arts. Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1980.
  14. Milman, Miriam. The Illusion of Reality. Trompe-l'oeil Painting. New York: Rizzoli, 1983.
  15. Milman, Miriam. Trompe-l'oeil Painted Architecture. New York: Rizzoli, 1986.
  16. Norris, Christopher. Deconstruction: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, 1991.
  17. Norris, Christopher & Benjamin, Andrew. "What is Deconstruction?" London: Academy Editions, 1988.
  18. Sacher-Masoch, Leopold von/ Deleuze, Gilles. Masochism. Including Venus in Furs. and Coldness and

19. Zizek, Slavoj. Cruelty. New York: Zone Books, 1989.
- Looking Awry. An Introduction to Jacques  
Lacan Through Popular Culture. Cambridge,  
Massachusetts-London: Massachusetts  
Institute of Technology, 1991.