

VINĪTĀDEVA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE BUDDHIST
MENTALISTIC TREND


A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
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For the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the
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by

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Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

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I dedicate this thesis
to my parents

Reverends Yutetsu and Yoneko Kawamura

P R E F A C E

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Vinītadeva and his

Sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE BUDDHIST MENTALISTIC TREND

1. Origin of the trend

According to the *Nan hai chi kwei nei fa ch'uan*, when I-ch'ing (635-713) visited India, Buddhism was divided into the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna - each of which comprised two movements; in the former case, the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika, and in the latter case, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra.¹

The Mādhyamika, a movement established by Nāgārjuna², was so-called because it emphasized the Middle Path. The Yogācāra, a movement established by Asaṅga (395-470), was also called "Cittamātra" and "Vijñānavāda", because these names reflected its claim that there were no "external physical objects to cause our sensations and perceptions."³

Both the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra established influential schools which maintained unbroken traditions until well into the seventh century. The Mādhyamika movement divided up into those who followed Buddhapālita (470-

¹ Masaaki Hattori and Shunpei Ueyama, *Ninshiki to Chōetsu "Yuishiki"*, Volume 4 of *Bukkyō no Shisō*, Kadokawa Shoten, Tokyo, 1971, p. 11.

² The date of Nāgārjuna varies according to different traditions and writers. Richard Robinson agrees with Ui's dates, 113-213 A.D.; see, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*, the University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1967, p. 21-26. Similar dates are given by P.S. Sastri in his, "Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva" in *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Volume 31, No. 3. p. 193-202.

³ H.V. Guenther, *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, Penguin Books Inc., Baltimore, Maryland, 1971, p. 90.

540) and those who followed Bhāvaviveka (500-570). The system established by Buddhapālita became known as the "Prāsangika" and the lineage was carried on by Candrakīrti (600-650) and Śāntideva (650-760). The system established by Bhāvaviveka was called "Svātantrika" and it was carried on by Śāntirakṣita (725-788) and Kamalāśīla (740-795). The Yogācāra movement divided into those who followed Dignāga (480-540) and those who followed Guṇamati (440-520) and Sthiramati (510-570). The system established by Dignāga became known as the "Sākāravijñānavāda" and this tradition was carried on by Dharmapāla (530-561) and Dharmakīrti (600-660). The system established by Guṇamati and Sthiramati became known as the "Nirākāravijñānavāda."¹

The names "Mādhyamika" and "Yogācāra" are currently used, specifically, as appellations for movements begun by Nāgārjuna and by Asaṅga, but this does not imply that these names came into regular use only after the two movements were established and that the tenets held by these movements were unknown prior to Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. For example, Tsong-kha-pa states:

Therefore, for a long period, while the Hīnayāna was spreading, even the name Mahāyāna was not mentioned. After the Mahāyāna

¹ Susumu Yamaguchi *et al*, *Bukkyōgaku Josetsu*, Heirakuji Shoten, Kyoto, 1961. See, p. 364 for a discussion on the development of the various schools. For dates of the people discussed, see Chronological Table, p. 4.

was firmly established by Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga established the *cittamātra* system. Although the terms *mādhyamika* and *yogācāra* were in use [prior to these systems], as these trends developed into different philosophical systems, systematic works [pertaining to their respective systems] were produced. As was pointed out before, prior to Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, one could not find authority or authoritative sayings for the Mahāyāna.¹


Of the two Mahāyāna systems prevalent in India, it is the Yogācāra which is of concern here. The basic tenets of the Yogācāra from which it developed into a specific system can be found in sūtras such as the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, the *Avatamsakasūtra*, and the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*.

With the exception of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, there are no Sanskrit editions which agree in total with either the Chinese or Tibetan versions². Even the *Laṅka* has discrepancies between the various Chinese and Tibetan versions.

¹ Tsong-kha-pa, *Yid dang kun gzhi 'i dka' ba'i gnas rgya cher 'grel ba*, fol. 3a.

² It may be preferable to use the term "version" rather than "translation" to describe the texts available in the Chinese and Tibetan languages, because, although they may bear Sanskrit titles according to an established tradition, this fact does not necessarily indicate that all texts in Chinese or Tibetan are of Indian origin. The outmoded tradition that Chinese and Tibetan texts are somehow literal and lexical translations of the *original* Sanskrit texts, that they are crutches to be used when one does not understand one or the other of the languages, or that they are sources from which *faithful* restorations of the Sanskrit can be made, is a naive belief and one which must be rejected. Each tradition has interpreted the texts variously according to their cultural background. The fact that the so-called "New Translation" which rose in both China and Tibet, is characterized by its literal and lexical style (and as a consequence unintelligible not only to the common man in those countries, but often even perplexing to the specialists) is no ground for concluding that all texts in Chinese and Tibetan have their origin in India.

Chronological Table



At best only piecemeal fragments can be found. This fact raises an intriguing question as to whether the Buddhist Yogācāra movement really had its beginning in India. Tradition states that Asaṅga went to Tuṣita Heaven where he received the five basic Yogācāra texts from Maitreya. It is possible to interpret this tradition to mean that Asaṅga went to some other location - possibly Central Asia - where he learned about what he later systematized into the Yogācāra movement. The idea that the Yogācāra may have had its roots outside of India demands more attention than it has been given in the past. Although such a research would be intriguing and indigenous Tibetan texts would throw much light on this subject, it may necessitate re-writing portions of the Mahāyāna Buddhist history.¹ It is not the scope of the present thesis, unfortunately, to deal with such interesting possibilities, but the conclusion of H.V. Guenther's research is worthy of mention. He states:

There are many other points that show that a very important development in the history of Buddhism took place and that it is represented by rNyingma philosophy. I would even be so bold as to say that once these points become known we shall have to revise and rewrite the whole history of Buddhist thought. This should not be a matter of regret, but rather another step on the road to knowledge through a better understanding of Buddhism.²

¹ For a comprehensive study made on this subject, see H.V. Guenther's article, "Early Forms of Tibetan Buddhism" in *Crystal Mirror*, Vol. III, Dharma Publishing, Emeryville, California, 1974, p. 80-92.

² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

The *Avataṃsakasūtra* has been described as a text which relates the philosophical basis for the Yogācāra movement, whereas, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* relates the experiential or psychological aspect.¹ This may be a very convenient way of making distinctions between various texts, but when Buddhist texts are seen from this perspective and given absolute value on account of it, then we end up in idle speculations which, as has been proven over and again in India, force Buddhism to its grave. By the seventh or eighth century A.D., Buddhism in India was swallowed up, like a frog by a snake, into the existing Hindu system - Śaṅkara's Vedānta. Only the Logic Schools of Buddhism remained, and these, like the legs of the frog, struggled to bring back to life a system which had no other destiny but death. Vinītadeva's commentaries on Buddhist logic and on other psychological texts only verify this fact.

In India, therefore, the Yogācāra system was moving towards its inevitable end, whereas, in Tibet, the rNying-ma-pas, who respected Padmasambhava as the founder, would continue to advance the Yogācāra movement through the works of people such as Vimalamitra, Vairocana, Rong zom chos kyi bzang po (11th C.), kLong chen rab 'byams pa (1308-63), 'Jigs med gling pa (1729-83), and Mi pham 'jam dbyangs rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1845-1912).

¹ M. Hattori and S. Ueyama, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

The *Avataṃsakasūtra* is, however, an important text for the Yogācāra movement, because it emphasizes the importance of the mind (*sems*) from which the three levels of existence (*kham gsum*) arise. A system which discusses the significance of the mind from such a perspective is called "Mentalism"; therefore, Buddhist Mentalism is not an "idealism" as understood in Western philosophical systems. The division between the mind and the body made in Western philosophy is a concept foreign to Buddhism, because in Buddhist Mentalism, although both the body and mind are considered to be *mental*, this fact does not mean the the body is an "idea". Thus, to call the Yogācāra movement a "Buddhist Idealism" misses the mark, and consequently, such a claim only creates confusion which completely obscures the relationship between the mind (*sems*) and the perceptual operations (*rnam par shes pa*) and between the mind and 'awareness *qua* sensa' (*rnam par rig pa*).

Furthermore, the claim that certain sūtras deal exclusively with one or another philosophical or psychological idea can render the whole Yogācāra movement meaningless. For example, in his introduction to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, Suzuki says:

Further, the Yogācāra upholds the theory of Vijñapti-mātra and not that of Cittamātra, which belongs to the *Laṅkā*, *Avataṃsaka*, and *Awakening of Faith*.¹

¹ D.T. Suzuki, *The Lankavatara Sutra*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, (First Edition, 1932), 1959 reprint, p. xl.

If this statement is taken to be accurate, then how are we to understand Vasubandhu when he says:

In the Mahāyāna, the three levels of existence are established as mere 'awareness qua sensa' (*viññaptimātra*), because the sūtra states, "Oh Sons of the Victorious One! the three levels of existence are merely mental (*cittamātra*)."¹

This quotation taken from Vasubandhu's autocommentary to the *Viṃśatikā* uses the words *viññaptimātra* and *cittamātra* synonymously. The statement, "*citta*, *viññāna*, and *manas* are synonyms" appears often in various sūtras². If we took Suzuki's point of view, then we would have to conclude that Vasubandhu was trying to establish two systems in this one statement. But this would only indicate that one did not understand Vasubandhu. Further, in the *Viṃśatikā*, Vasubandhu emphasizes the workings of the mind, and in the *Triṃśikā*, he tries to show how, through the workings of the mind, everything significant is merely sensa. The relationship between the *Viṃśatikā* and the *Triṃśikā* can be understood if we accept the fact that, at least in its early development, the Buddhist Mentalistic movement was a method of training the mind (*ie. yogācāra*) and that it was not until much later

¹ Mahāyāne traidhātukaṃ viññaptimātraṃ vyavasthāpyate | cittamātraṃ bho jinaputrā yaduta traidhātukaṃ iti sūtrāt | See, S. Lévi, *Viññaptimātra-tāsiddhi, Viṃśatikā (La vingtaine) et Triṃśikā (La trentaine)*, Paris, 1925, p. 3.

² cittam manas ca viññānaṃ lakṣaṇārthaṃ prakalpyate | abhinna-lakṣaṇā hy astau na lakṣyā na ca lakṣaṇam | 104 || see, B. Nanjio, *The Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, Otani University Press, Kyoto, 1956 p. 46,

that hair-splitting controversies took place. This means, as S. Yamakami has pointed out very early, that the term *yoga* "denotes that those *practitioners* of *Yoga* had arrived at the theory of *ālayavijñāna* by experience."¹

Thus, the Buddhist Mentalistic trend is a movement which gives the method by which one can become competent in training one's *mind*. From its early establishment as a movement by Asaṅga to its systematization by Vasubandhu, it has emphasized the importance of 'awareness *qua* *sensa*'. This line of thought was adopted by Sthiramati in the sixth century and reflowered in the eighth century through the works of Vinītadeva. However, it could not have been very much alive, since, judging from Vinītadeva's subcommentary on the *Vimśatikā* and the *Trimśikā*, we find very little which is new.

In order to place Vinītadeva in a historical context, I will discuss three people in the Buddhist Mentalistic trend who have contributed its development: 1. Asaṅga, because he established the movement in India, 2. Vasubandhu, because it was he who systematized the movement, and 3. Sthiramati, because it was he who wrote a commentary to Vasubandhu's *Trimśikā*.

¹ S. Yamakami, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, University of Calcutta, 1912, p. 210.

2. Asaṅga

Asaṅga established the Yogācāra as a movement in India, but texts on which the movement depended were extant prior to him. Five of those texts have been attributed to Maitreya by both the Tibetan and Chinese traditions. However, although the two traditions agree in number, they differ over what texts comprise the five.

The five given by Tāranātha¹ agree with the five given by Buston, and therefore, we can conclude that the Tibetans were in agreement with each other as to what comprised the five texts. According to Buston, the five are:

The works of the Lord Maitreya are: -

- The *Sūtrālaṅkāra*
- " *Madhyānta-vibhanga*
- " *Dharma-dharmatā-vibhanga*
- " *Uttaratantra*.

Some authorities say, that the first two of these four (treatises) belong to the Abhidharma Code, the latter two - to the Sūtra Code, and the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* - to the Vinaya Code. I however see no reason (for such a classification).

The *Sūtrālaṅkāra* contains an exposition of all the Mahāyānistic Doctrines in abridged form: -

The *Madhyānta-vibhanga*. *Anta* - "extremity", - means the extremities of Realism and Nihilism, or otherwise, those of Eternalism and Materialism. *Madhya* - "the middle", - is the middle way shunning both these extremities. The Treatise, as it gives an analysis (*vibhanga*) of both these points, is called *Madhyānta-vibhanga*....

The *Dharma-dharmatā-vibhanga*. "Dharma" are the elements of existence, that belong to the phenomenal world and are influenced by defiling agencies. "Dharmatā" is the true essence of all the elements - Nirvāṇa. The work, being an investigation of these two principles, bears the name *Dharma-dharmatā-vibhanga*. The *Uttaratantra* is called so, because it is the highest (*uttara*) of the

¹ D. Chattopadhyaya, ed. *Tāranātha History of Buddhism in India*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1970, p. 159.

series (*tantra*) of the Mahāyānistic teachings, - it consequently contains the highest of Doctrines. Otherwise *uttara* may signify "latest". (The *Uttara-tantra* is in this case called so) as it is an interpretation of the latest teaching of the Mahāyāna..... Having adjoined (to those four works) the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* (mentioned before) we shall have all the 5 treatises of Maitreya.¹

The Chinese tradition attributes the following five works to Maitreya:²

1. *Yü chia lun*,
2. *Fên pieh yü chia lun* (This text has been quoted, but is non-existent),
3. *Ta ch'eng chuang yen ching lun sung* (This text corresponds to the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*),
4. *Pien chung pien lun sung* (This text corresponds to the *Madhyāntavibhanga*), and
5. *Chin kuang pan jo lun sung*.

Among the modern scholars, Ui gives a partially different list of five:³

1. *Chin kuan pan jo ching lun* - 77 verses,
2. *Chung pien fên pieh lun sung* (This text corresponds to the *Madhyāntavibhanga*),
3. *Ta ch'êng chuang yen ching lun sung* (This text corresponds to the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*),
4. *Hsien kuan chuang yen lun sung*, and
5. *Fa fa hsing fên pieh lun* (only the portions written in sūtra style. This text corresponds to the *Dharma-dharmatā-vibhanga*)

From the above statements, it is clear that various opinions prevail as to what comprise the five works. Maitreya, a well known figure in Buddhist philosophy, is still a

¹ E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston*, Heidelberg, 1931, i, 53-4.

² R. Yamada, *Bongo Butten no Sho Bunken*, Heirakuji Shoten, Kyoto, 1959, p. 125

³ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

controversial person. Scholars have not come to any conclusion whether Maitreya was a Bodhisattva or whether there really existed a person with the name 'Maitreya'. Those who make a distinction have reserved the name 'Maitreya' to designate the Bodhisattva, while they give the name 'Maitreyanātha' to the historical person. Scholars such as Yamaguchi and Lamotte claim that Maitreya is a Bodhisattva and could not be a real person in history, whereas, Ui says that unless Maitreya was a real person, Asaṅga could not have obtained the basic texts.

Ui's claim¹ is made in the course of criticizing Lamotte's preface to Yamaguchi's book, *Seshin no Jōgōron*. In his preface, Lamotte says:

Les auteurs modernes qui font de Maitreya ou de Maitreyanātha, comme ils l'appellent, un personnage historique, méconnaissent, semble-t-il, le rôle véritable joué par le grand bodhisattva dans la religion bouddhique.²

To this, Ui replies that although it may be acceptable that Asaṅga, through his spiritual powers, received the Mahāyāna teachings from Maitreya, to take the stand that this was a historical fact, as Yamaguchi and Lamotte claim, is rather naive. It is more feasible, according to Ui, to say that there was a person, Maitreyanātha, who transmitted the Mahāyāna teachings to Asaṅga.

¹ H. Ui, "Miroku Bosattsu to Miroku Ronshi" in the *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. 1. No. 1, Tokyo, 1952, p. 96-102.

² S. Yamaguchi, *Seshin no Jōgōron*, Hozokan, Kyoto, 1951, *Préface*, p. 5.

Ui's argument in favor of a historical person, Maitreya-nātha, relies on the fact that he accepts, as does Bendall in his *Catalogue of Buddhist Manuscripts*¹, the *Hsien kuan chuang yen lun sung* (the verses of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*) to be a work by Maitreya. The Tibetan tradition, as we have seen, acknowledges this also, but the Chinese tradition does not. The fact that the Tibetan historians accept this is problematic, because according to the index of the *Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition*² not even one text bearing the title, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* is attributed to Maitreya.

What comprises the five texts is a problem which will have to remain unanswered until future study; however, about the problem of Maitreya who was the future Buddha or a Maitreya who was a historical person, the present author proposes the following solution, but with reserve.

First, a Maitreya who is referred to as the 'future Buddha' in the Buddhist texts cannot be denied; therefore, a Maitreya who was a Bodhisattva will have to be accepted. Also, it is accepted practice to regard Asaṅga as the person who obtained the Mahāyāna teachings from Maitreya. About this second view, we can divide the opinions into two camps. The first camp comprises those who claim, as did Ui, that a teaching cannot be obtained from an 'ethereal' person, and therefore,

¹ H. Ui, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

² *Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition*, D.T. Suzuki editor, Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1961 (henceforward *P.ed.*,) Vols. 165-8. See also, E. Conze, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Serie Orientale Roma VI, Roma, 1954; E. Obermiller, *Analysis of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Luzac & Co., London, 1933.

requires a historical person. The second camp, which we may term a 'mystic' camp, comprises those, like Yamaguchi and Lamotte, whose claim implies that Asaṅga obtained the teachings through a spiritual revelation. Those of the first camp reserve the name *Maitreyanātha* for the historical person. Those of the second camp claim the name *Maitreya* for the future Buddha.

Both camps require a re-examination and the problem need not be as perplexing as it seems, if the following ideas could be accepted. The word *Maitreya* can refer either to the Bodhisattva - the future Buddha or to a historical person - the teacher of Asaṅga. The problem lies in the word *Maitreyanātha*.

The writer of the present thesis proposes that *Maitreyanātha* is not a proper name, but a title of respect. This interpretation is possible if we understand the term *Maitreyanātha* to function as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, which in Sanskrit functions as an adjective of a substantive either present or implied. The term *nātha* has, among others, the possible meanings 'lord', 'master', or 'protector'¹. Therefore, the term *Maitreyanātha* would yield the meaning, '....whose protector was Maitreya'.

The relationship between the adjective *Maitreyanātha* and the substantive *Asaṅga* (which is implied in this case)

¹ P.K. Gode & C.G. Karve, editors, *Apte's The Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary*, 3 Volumes, Prasad Prakashan, Poona, 1958, Vol. II, p. 886b.

would yield the meaning 'Asaṅga whose protector was Maitreya'. If this be acceptable, then the term *Maitreyanātha* seems to be a term better used to refer to oneself than to some other person. Therefore, Asaṅga probably styled himself *Maitreyanātha* to show that his teacher was Maitreya and to show his respect for his teacher. Later, Maitreya who was the human teacher of Asaṅga became identified with the future Buddha bearing the same name.¹

Asaṅga, who thus styled himself 'Maitreyanātha', was born of a woman of the Brāhmaṇa caste. According to the Tibetan historians, he was born as the first of two sons to Prasannaśīlā² (or Prakāśaśīlā³, according to another source) as a result of her union with a Kṣatriya. The second son, Vasubandhu, was born as a result of her union with a Brāhmaṇa.⁴ About this, Wayman writes:

....he was one of three brother - sons of a Brāhmaṇa of Kauśīkā clan - all named Vasubandhu. The oldest son was or became distinguished from the others by the name Asaṅga, the youngest by the name Viriñcivasta, the middle son keeping the name Vasubandhu.⁵

¹ H.V. Guenther & L.S. Kawamura, *Mind in Buddhist Psychology*, Dharma Press, Emeryville, California, 1975, p. 4, nt. 4.

² E. Obermiller, *Buston's History of Buddhism*, ii, 137.

³ D. Chattopadhyaya, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

⁴ E. Obermiller, *Ibid.*, ii, 137.

⁵ A. Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript*, University of California Press, 1961, p. 23.

He was born in Gāndhāra region, in the city of Puruṣa-pura, the modern Peshāwar.¹ He was active around the fourth or fifth century A.D.² Traditional historical accounts say that he was a person possessing the qualifications for becoming a Bodhisattva. When he went to Maitreya to receive the Mahāyāna teaching, it is said that he took up his abode in a cave of a mountain, the Kukkuṭapādapārvata³, in order to win favor with Maitreya. After remaining there for twelve (some accounts three) years without success, he left the cave full of grief.

As he was about to go away, he saw a dog; the lower part of its body was eaten by worms, but the upper part (was still free) and it was barking and biting. (Asaṅga) became full of Commiseration and, seeing that if he were to remove the worms, the latter would perish and if not, - the dog would die, he became resolved to cut flesh from his body and remove (the worms) by attracting them with it. Accordingly, he went to the town called Acinta and, having pledged his mendicant's staff, obtained a golden knife. (With this) he cut off flesh from his body. Then thinking that if he would take (the worms) with his hand, they would nevertheless perish, he shut his eyes and was about to take them off with his tongue. (At that moment) - the dog disappeared, and he beheld Maitreya, full of light. (And thus did he address him):

O my father, my unique refuge,
I have exerted myself in a hundred different ways,
But nevertheless no result was to be seen.
Wherefore have the rain-cloud and the might of the ocean
Come only now when, tormented by violent pain,
I am no longer thirsting?

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

² M.Hattori and S. Ueyama, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Alex Wayman, *op. cit.*, p.25, dates him to 375-430; H. Sakurabe and S. Ueyama, *Sonzai no Bunseki*, "Abhidharma", Volume 2 of *Bukkyō no Shisō*, Kadokawa Shoten, Tokyo, 1973, p. 274, date him to 390-480. I follow Sakurabe and Ueyama.

³ According to A. Chattopadhyaya, *op. cit.*, p. 156, nt. 41, "the mountain was called Gurupāda because Kaśyapa lived there" and p. 27, nt. 9, "Gurupāda, which was the other name of Kukkuṭapāda". According to Mochizuki, *Bukkyō Daijiten*, Vol. 1, p. 842-43, the mountain is midway between Buddhagaya and Bihar, at the present day Kurkihār, a site important for Pāla period (9-12C) bronze art pieces (see, *2500 Years of Buddhism*, edited by P.V. Bapat, Government of India, 1956, p. 284-5).

With such efforts have I tried to propitiate (thee), but not even a sigh did appear. Scant is therefore thy Commiseration. - In such a way did he reproach (Maitreya). The Venerable One said: -

Though the king of the gods sends down rain,

A bad seed is unable to grow.

Though the Buddhas may appear (in this world)

He who is unworthy cannot partake of the bliss.

I was here from the very beginning, but thou couldst not see me, owing to thy won obscurations. Now as great Commiseration has become originated in thee, thou hast got purified and canst now behold me. (In order to see) that this is really so, raise me up on thy shoulder and show me (to the people) - Asaṅga did so, and as Maitreya could not be perceived (by anyone else, Asaṅga) believed (that his words were true).

Now what is thy desire - (asked Maitreya). Asaṅga replied - I am searching for instructions, how to expound the Mahāyānist Doctrine. - Then take hold of my robes, - said (Maitreya) and they rose up to the Tuṣita heavens.¹

The above quotation points to a very fundamental theme found in Buddhist literature: (*viz.*) the entry into one's spiritual maturation lies in a vision "which is both a summons and an anticipation of what is to be won."² Incidents of such visions occur often in Buddhism. Naropa, for example, had twelve such visions which finally brought him into contact with his teacher, Tilopa.³ Therefore, it is not at all unusual for Asaṅga to meet his teacher Maitreya by such means.

Having thus met his teacher and having received the five basic Yogācāra texts, Asaṅga wrote commentaries to them and produced works of his own. In the Tibetan Tripiṭaka⁴ and in the Chinese Tripiṭaka⁵ we find the following works:

¹ E. Obermiller, *Buston's History of Buddhism*, ii, 138-39.

² H.V. Guenther, *Life and Teaching of Naropa*, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. x.

³ *Ibid.*, p. x.

⁴ *P. ed.*, 168 volumes.

⁵ *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, Tokyo, 1960, 85 volumes.

1. *Chos kyi sku la gnas pa'i yon tan thun mong ma yin pa la bstod pa*, Vol. 46, No. 2007.
2. *Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i sgub thabs*. Vol. 81, No. 4372.
3. *'phags pa byams pa'i sgrub thabs*. Vol. 81, No. 4471.
4. *'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa* (*Aryasamdhinirmocanasūtrabhāṣya*) Vol. 104, No. 5481.
5. *Sangs rgyas rjes su dran pa'i 'grel pa*. Vol. 104, No. 5482.
6. *Chos rjes su dran pa'i 'grel pa*. Vol. 104, No. 5483.
7. *dge 'dun rjes su dran pa'i 'grel pa*. Vol. 104, No. 5484.
8. *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa* (*Mahāyānottaratantraśāstravyākhyā*). Vol. 108, No. 5526.
9. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa (Yogācārabhūmi)*. Vol. 109, No. 5536. This text corresponds to the *Yü chia shih ti lun*, Chüan 1-20; 34; and parts of 50, *Taishō* Vol. 30, No. 1579.
10. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa las nyan thos kyi sa (Śrāvakaabhūmi)*. Vol. 110, No. 5537. This text corresponds to the *Yü chia shih ti lun*, chüan 21-34 with portions of chüan 34 missing. *Taishō* Vol. 30, No. 1579.
11. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa las byang chub sems dpa'i sa (Bodhisattvabhūmi)*. Vol. 110, No. 5538. This text corresponds to the *Yü chia shih ti lun*, chüan 35-50 with portions of chüan 50 missing. *Taishō* Vol. 30, No. 1579.
12. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba*, Vol. 110, No. 5539. This text corresponds to the *Yü chia shih ti lun*, chüan 51-80. *Taishō* Vol. 30, No. 1579.
13. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa las gzhi bsdu ba*. Vol. 111, No. 5540. This text corresponds to the *Yü chia shih ti lun*, chüan 85-98. *Taishō* Vol. 30, No. 1579.

14. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa las 'dul ba bsdud ba.*
Vol. 111, No. 5541. This text corresponds to the
Yü chia shih ti lun, Chüan 99-100, *Taishō* Vol. 30,
No. 1579.
15. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa las rnam grangs bsdu ba.*
Vol. 111, No. 5542. This text corresponds to the
Yü chia shih ti lun, Chüan 83-84. *Taishō* Vol. 30,
No. 1579.
16. *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa las rnam par bshad pa bsdu ba.*
Vol. 111, No. 5543. This text corresponds to the
Yü chia shih ti lun, Chüan 81-82. *Taishō* Vol. 30,
No. 1579.
17. *Theg pa chen po bsdus pa (Mahāyānasamgrahāśāstra)*
Vol. 112, No. 5549. This text corresponds to the
Shê ta ch'êng lun, *Taishō* Vol. 31, No. 1594.
18. *Chos mngon pa kun las btus pa (Abhidharmasamuccaya).*
Vol. 112, No. 1605. This text corresponds to the *Ta*
ch'êng a p'i ta mo chi lun, *Taishō* Vol. 31, No. 1605.
19. *Hsien yang shêng chiao lun*, *Taishō* Vol. 31, No. 1602.
20. *Ta ch'êng chuang yen ching lun (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra).*
Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1604.
21. *Hsien yang shêng chiao lun sung*, *Taishō* Vol. 31, No.
1603.

The 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa theg pa chen po mdo (*Āryasaṃdhinirmocanamahāyānasūtra*) has been considered to be the basic āgama from which Asaṅga derived his Yogācāra movement; especially the function of the ālayavijñāna. The 'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa (No. 4 above) is his commentary to it. E. Lamotte has edited the sūtra in Tibetan and has added extensive footnotes in Sanskrit. He has also rendered the sūtra into French.¹

¹ Étienne Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocanasūtra, L'explication des Mystères, Texte Tibétain*, Bureaux du Recueil, Louvain, 1935.

The Tibetan tradition seems to treat the *Yogācārabhūmi* differently from the Chinese tradition in that the former seems to have taken the chapter divisions of the Chinese as separate texts. The *Yogācārabhūmi* with its various divisions according to the Tibetan tradition, or without its various divisions as the Chinese tradition has it, is encyclopedic in nature and covers the whole spectrum of Buddhism - both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

On the basis of the doctrinal distinctions between the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahīśāsaka, as pointed out by Masuda¹ Alex Wayman gives arguments in favor of Asaṅga's early adherence to the Hīnayāna, particularly to the Mahīśāsaka school.² The fact that the *Yogācārabhūmi* contains a large section on the *śrāvakabhūmi* alludes to Asaṅga's interest in the Hīnayāna. Alex Wayman states:

Hence, when Asaṅga devotes a large section of his *Yogācārabhūmi* to the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and another large section to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, he is not explaining two antithetical paths. The two passages quoted above show why Asaṅga is just as devoted to the writing of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* as he is to that of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Furthermore, those passages justify the attention paid in the foregoing discussion of Asaṅga's Hīnayāna school to doctrines of the Mahīśāsakas. It does not follow that because Asaṅga was "converted" to the Mahāyāna he thereby forgot or rejected his former views.³

¹ Masuda, *Origin and Doctrine of Early Indian Buddhist School*, Leipzig, 1925, p. 182.

² Alex Wayman, *op.cit.* p. 26.

³ *Ibid.* p. 29.

Also, as I have pointed out previously, when one considers that at this stage the Yogācāra is still faithful to *yoga*, the Śrāvaka stage, the pratyekabuddha stage, and the Bodhisattva stage are not antagonistic stages, but necessary stages for one's mental growth. Therefore, when Asaṅga devotes a great deal of time to the Śrāvaka stage, this is because the stage of a pious listener is very important. Because Asaṅga wanted to show the intricate workings of meditation, the *Yogācārabhūmi* took on its encyclopedic size. It must have been almost overwhelming to Vasubandhu, because it is reported that before becoming "converted" to the Mahāyāna, when Vasubandhu heard the content of these works, he slanderously said:

Alas, Asaṅga, residing in the forest,
Has practiced meditation for twelve years.
Without having attained anything by this meditation,
He has founded a system so difficult and burdensome,
That it can be carried only by an elephant!¹

Because the *Yogācārabhūmi* was such a bulky work, there must have been requests for a more precise presentation of the subject matter contained therein. The *Mahāyānasamgrahasāstra* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* are therefore considered to be summaries of the content of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

Of these, the *Mahāyānasamgrahasāstra* is a compendium of the Mahāyāna Yogācāra movement. Almost one-half of the volume

¹ E. Obermiller, *op cit.* ii, 143.

is devoted to a discussion of the *ālayavijñāna* (substratum awareness) and the *trīlakṣaṇa* (three specific constituent principles of everything knowable). Also, Asaṅga devotes equal energy to the three learnings (*bslab pa gsum*), thus giving this text a balance between what we might call the psychological foundation for the Yogācāra movement and what we might call the devotional or practice aspect. In other words, here practice is grounded in theory and theory gives the basis for practice.

When Asaṅga introduced the Yogācāra into India, the philosophical foundation of the Hīnayāna *Abhidharma* was probably the *Abhidharmakośa* expounded by Vasubandhu. In order to show the difference between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna *Abhidharma*, Asaṅga produced the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*. This text is like a dictionary of Mahāyāna terms. It does differ from the contents of the *Abhidharmakośa* - especially in the manner that it groups or categorizes the various terms. As Mi-pham has pointed out in his *mkhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo zhes bya ba'i bstan chos* (fol. 2b), the manner in which the 'bras gzugs, for example, are counted as eleven differ in both texts.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* has been preserved in Sanskrit through Pralhad Pradhan's edition¹. In his introduction, Pradhan points out similarities between this text and Sthiramati's commentary to Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*.

¹ Pralhad Pradhan, *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga*, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, 1950.

One further point must be made about Asaṅga's work. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* according to the Chinese tradition is a work written by Asaṅga, but the Tibetan tradition considers it to be Vasubandhu's work. In the past, there has been a confusion between this text and another called *Ta chuang yen ching lun* (*Taishō*, Vol. 1V, No. 201), but it is now clear that the latter was written by Aśvaghōṣa.¹

Ui, in his introduction to his study and Japanese rendition of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* claims that its verses are by Maitreya and the commentary is by Vasubandhu, because Asaṅga merely listened to Maitreya and then passed on what he had learned to Vasubandhu. Ui's rather weak argument in favor of Vasubandhu's authorship makes it difficult to reconcile the Tibetan tradition. Although Ui argues in favor of Vasubandhu as the author of this text, in the colophon where he shows the author of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, he writes 造無着,² composed by Asaṅga! This is confusing to say the least.

S. Lévi attributes the work to Asaṅga in both his Sanskrit edition, *Asaṅga - Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, Paris, 1907 and his French rendition, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, Exposé de Doctrine du Grand Véhicule, Tome II*, Paris, 1911. The usual formula "....written by is finished" cannot be found in the Sanskrit text.

¹ R. Yamada, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

² H. Ui, *Daijō Shōgōn Kyōron Kenkyū*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1956, p. 39.

These texts attributed to Asaṅga are very lengthy,
deal with both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna thoughts, and on the
whole,^{are}/not very systematic. As a consequence, much confusion
arose as to what the Yogācāra movement was all about; there-
fore, because the movement started by Asaṅga became system-
atized by Vasubandhu, we must consider his contributions
next.

3. Vasubandhu

That Vasubandhu was born of a Kauśika woman has been stated previously. He was the younger brother of Asaṅga. At the beginning of his career, he studied the Hinayana doctrine and was an adherent of the Sarvāstivāda. It was probably at this time that he composed the *Abhidharmakośa*.

Accounts of Vasubandhu's life are recorded in both the Tibetan and Chinese traditions. The former of those is represented by Bu-ston and Taranatha, and the latter can be found in the *Ta t'ang hsi yü chi* (*Taishō*, Vol. 51 No. 2087) and in the *Ta t'ang ta tz'ü ên szū san tsang fa shih chuan* (*Taishō* Vol. 50, No. 2053).

According to the Chinese tradition, Vasubandhu meets Asaṅga in Ayodhyā, where Asaṅga was explaining the *Daśa-bhūmikasūtra*. It is said that upon hearing the Buddha's deep intention as expounded upon by Asaṅga, Vasubandhu decided, then and there, to follow the Mahāyāna path. Thereupon, Vasubandhu, reflecting on his previous acts, realized that were it not for his tongue, he could not have slandered the Mahāyāna teachings. He decided to cut off his tongue, and just as he was about to do so, Asaṅga stopped him by saying, "In the past, you have criticized the Mahāyāna teachings. Now, with the very same tongue, you must expound and extol the Mahāyāna. A person who has no tongue can never expound on the Buddha's teachings." Hearing these words, Vasubandhu vowed to make an earnest effort to study the Mahāyāna, and for ten

years he remained in Ayodhyā composing many commentaries on the Mahāyāna teachings.

The Tibetan texts agree with the above account, except that they differ in their views of Vasubandhu's birth.

Tāranātha says:

According to some in Tibet, he was a twin brother of ārya Asaṅga. I find others calling him 'a brother by faith'. But the Indian scholars do not say so.

His father was a brāhmaṇa versed in the three Vedas. He was born the year after ācārya ārya Asaṅga's ordination. The two ācārya-s were real brothers, because they were born of the same mother.¹

Bu-ston says:

....At that time a woman of the Brāhmaṇa caste called Prasannaḥilā had the following thought:-- Three times have foes brought harm to the Abhidharma which is the foundation of the Teaching, and no one who would be able to expound it can be found. I, being a woman, am likewise incapable of doing it. But, if I give birth to sons, I will make of them propagators (of the Doctrine). Accordingly, from her union with Kṣatriya (a son named) Asaṅga, and, (later on) from another union with Brāhmaṇa, (a second son named) Vasubandhu were born.²

However it may have been that Vasubandhu was born into the world, there is a historical problem about the person, Vasubandhu, which I would like to discuss shortly. But first,

¹ D. Chattopadhyaya, *op cit.* p. 167

² E. Obermiller, *op cit.* ii, 137.

I would like to list the following dates for Vasubandhu to which various scholars subscribe¹.

B. Shiina	A.D. 270
N. Peri	350
H. Ui	320-400
U. Ogiwara	390-470
S. Lévi	4th or 5th C.
J. Takakusu	420-500
E. Maeda	422
S. Mochizuki	433-533
H. Sakurabe	400-480

Which one, or whether any one, of the above dates is the correct one is difficult to determine. Subsequent research has made it possible to discount Shiina's dates. The only thing which we can say with certainty at this time is that Vasubandhu was a late contemporary of, or came later than, Asaṅga.

The problem of how many Vasubandhus there were, probably originates from the fact that three sons born to Prasannaśīlā (see p. 15) were all named Vasubandhu and the fact that P'u-kuang, who worked for twenty years with Hsüan-tsang, makes reference to two Vasubandhus in his *Chü shê lun chi*².

¹ This table is adapted from Jōshō Kudo's on p. 8, *Seshin Kyōgaku no Taiketeki Kenkyū*, Nagata Bunshōdō, Kyoto, 1955. In this thesis, I follow Sakurabe's dates. See H. Sakurabe and S. Ueyama, *op. cit.*, p.274.

² Takakusu et Watanabe, *Hōbōgirin, Fascicule Annexe*, Maison Franco-Japonaise, Tokyo, 1931, p. 135. For the text, see *Taishō*, Vol. XLI, No. 1821.

Frauwallner has tackled the above problem and concludes that there were two Vasubandhus. He states:

A careful examination of the information on the life and dates of Vasubandhu shows that there were two persons of this name, an elder and a younger one. The elder Vasubandhu is the brother of Asaṅga, the head of the Yogācāra school. The younger Vasubandhu is the author of the *Abhidharmakośa*. The discrimination between these two persons eliminates all the seeming contradictions of the tradition, because the apparently contradictory elements distribute themselves partly on the younger and partly on the elder Vasubandhu. If we distribute this information on the two persons, allowing to each of them only that which really belongs to him, we reach the following picture.

Vasubandhu the elder was probably born about the year 320 A.D. Wonderful legends became soon attached to his activity in favour of Mahāyāna. He died before his brother Asaṅga, possibly about 380 A.D.

Vasubandhu the younger was born about 400 A.D. The tradition has nothing to say about his birth place and origin. We know only that Buddhmitra was his teacher. The first work, through which Vasubandhu the younger became famous, was the *Paramārthasaptatikā* in which he confuted the Saṃkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin, who had defeated his teacher Buddhmitra in a disputation. But his chief work was the *Abhidharmakośa*, in which he gave to the dogmatic of the Sarvāstivāda its definite form. He died around the year 480 A.D. in Ayodhyā, at the age of 80 years.¹

¹ E. Frauwallner, *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu*, Serie Orientale Roma III, Roma, 1951, p. 54-56.

Alex Wayman and Akira Hirakawa disagree with Frauwallner's conclusion. Hirakawa claims that Vasubandhu the younger and Vasubandhu the elder are the same person. He states:

We assume, however, that Vasubandhu the younger and Vasubandhu the elder are one and the same person, because Vasubandhu was related to Dignāga who belonged to the Yogācāra School, and the date of Vasubandhu the elder who also belonged to the Yogācāra School is, according to Frauwallner 320-380, which is too far apart from the date of Dignāga.¹

but Hirakawa is not discarding the possibility that two persons named Vasubandhu did in fact exist; and later on he talks about this very possibility. Wayman also accepts a two Vasubandhu theory, but, like Hirakawa, he is not referring to the same two persons as Frauwallner. Wayman states:

Two Vasubandhus can be distinguished in "significant contrast" of doctrine. The Vasubandhu who was Asaṅga's brother developed a school of Buddhist idealist philosophy, usually called Vijñaptimātra ('representation only') or Cittamātra ('mind only'). There was an earlier Vasubandhu who belonged to the Mādhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy, founded by Nāgārjuna.²

Thus, Wayman and Frauwallner disagree with each other as to who the earlier and later Vasubandhus were, but they are

¹ A. Hirakawa, *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (P. Pradhan Edition), Part One, Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese, Daizō Shuppan Kabushikikaisha, Tokyo, 1973, p. III.

² A. Wayman, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

in agreement with each other in so far as they both accept two Vasubandhus. They also agree that one of the Vasubandus was Asaṅga's brother who developed the Vijñaptimātra or the Cittamātra school. However, they differ in that Frauwallner concludes that Vasubandhu the elder who was Asaṅga's brother developed the Vijñaptimātra school, whereas, Wayman concludes that it was Vasubandhu the younger. For Wayman, Vasubandhu the elder was a Mādhyamikan.

I do not feel competent to express any conclusive opinions on these scholars' views, but what is of prime importance as far as this thesis is concerned has been established by all three scholars. That is, whether we take Frauwallner's view, Wayman's view, or Hirakawa's view, there is no doubt that

1. there existed a person named Vasubandhu,
2. there was a Vasubandhu who was a brother of Asaṅga,
3. there was a Vasubandhu who developed the Vijñapti-mātra school, and
4. the Vasubandhu who fulfills the above three mentioned points, is one and the same person.

It is possible, on the basis of the four above mentioned points, to shed some light upon the problem posed by Frauwallner as to who the author of the *Vimśatikā* and the *Trimśikā* was, but first it may be helpful to list the works attributed to Vasubandhu in both the Tibetan and Chinese Canons.

1. *dkon mchog gsum gyi bstod pa*.
Vol. 46, No. 2037.
2. *'phags pa sgo drug pa'i gzungs kyi rnam par bshad pa*.
Vol. 79, No. 3518. [Same as Vol. 104, No. 5489].

3. *yon tan bdun yongs su brjod pa'i gtam.*
Vol. 103, No. 5420.
4. *tshul khrims kyi gtam.*
Vol. 103, No. 5421.
5. *tshogs kyi gtam.*
Vol. 103, No. 5422.
6. *'dod pa'i yon tan rnam pa lnga'i nyes dmigs bshad pa.*
Vol. 103, No. 5436.
7. *yon tan bdun bstan pa'i gtam.*
Vol. 103, No. 5462.
8. *sangs rgyas su dran pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa.*
Vol. 104, No. 5487.
9. *tshigs su bcad pa bcig pa'i bshad pa.*
Vol. 104, No. 5488.
10. *'phags pa sgo drug pa'i gzungs kyi rnam par bshad pa.*
Vol. 104, No. 5489. [Same as Vol. 79, No 3518]
11. *'phags pa chos bzhi pa'i rnam par bshad pa*
Vol. 104. No. 5490.
12. *'phags pa ga ya mgo'i ri zhes by ba'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa.* Vol. 104, No. 5492. This text corresponds to the *Wên shu shih li p'u sa wên p'u t'i ching lun*, *Taishō*, Vol. 26, No. 1531.
13. *rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par dbye ba bshad pa.* Vol. 104, No. 5496.
14. *'phags pa sa bcu'i rnam par bshad pa.*
Vol. 104, No. 5516. This text corresponds to the *shih ti ching lun*, *Taishō*, Vol. 26, No. 1522.
15. *'phags pa bzang po spyod pa'i smon lam gyi 'grel pa.*
Vol. 105, No. 5516.
16. *mdo sde'i rgyan gyi bshad pa (Sūtrālamkārabhāṣya)*
Vol. 108, No. 5527. This text corresponds to the *Ta ch'êng chuang yen ching lun*, *Taishō* Vol. 31, No. 1604.
17. *dbus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa.*
Vol. 108, No. 5528. This text corresponds to the *Chung pien fên pieh lun*, *Taishō* Vol. 31, No. 1599 and the *Pien chung fên lun*, *Taishō* Vol. 31, No. 1600.

18. *chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa* (Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅgavṛtti). Vol. 108, No. 5529.
19. *theg pa chen po bsdus pa'i 'grel pa* (Mahāyānasamgraha-sāstrabhāṣya). Vol. 112, No. 5551. This text corresponds with the *Shê ta ch'êng lun shih*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1595, the *Shê ta ch'êng lun shih lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1596, and the *Shê ta ch'êng lun shih*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1597.
20. *don gsang pa rnam par phye ba bsdus te bshad pa*. Vol. 113, No. 5553. This text is a commentary on the first chapter and parts of the second chapter of the *theg pa chen po bsdus pa*.
21. *chos mngon pa kun las btus pa'i bshad pa*. Vol. 113, No. 5554. The Tibetan tradition attributes this work to rgyal ba'i sras - Jinaputra.
22. *sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa* (Trīṃśikākārikā) Vol. 113, No. 5556. This text corresponds to the *Wei shih san shih lun sung*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1586.
23. *nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa* (Vīmśatikākārikā). Vol. 113, No. 5557.
24. *nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa* (Vīmśatikāvṛtti). Vol. 113, No. 5558. This text corresponds to the *Wei shih êrh shih lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1590, the *Wei shih lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1588, and the *Ta ch'êng wei shih lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1589.
25. *rang bzhin gsum nges par bstan pa* (Trisvabhāvanirdeśa). Vol. 113, No. 5559.
26. *phung po lnga'i rab tu byed pa* (Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa). Vol. 113, No. 5560. This text corresponds to the *Ta ch'êng wu yün lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1612.
27. *rnam par bshad pa'i rigs pa'i mdo sde'i dum bu brgya* Vol. 113, No. 5561.
28. *rnam par bshad pa'i rigs pa*. Vol. 113, No. 5562.
29. *las grub pa'i rab tu byed pa* (Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa). Vol. 113, No. 5563. This text corresponds to the *yeh ch'eng chiu lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1608, and the *Ta ch'êng ch'eng yeh lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1609.

30. *theg pa chen po'i chos brgya gsal ba'i sgo'i bstan bcos*. Vol. 113, No. 5564. This text is translated from the Chinese text, *Ta ch'êng pê fa ming mên lun*, Taisho Vol. 31. No. 1614.
31. *chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi thig le'ur byas pa* (*Abhidharmakośakārikā*). Vol. 115, No. 5590. This text corresponds to the *A p'i ta mo chü shê lun pên sung*, Taishō Vol. 29, No. 1560.
32. *chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa* (*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*). Vol. 115, No. 5591. This text corresponds to the *A p'i ta mo chü shê lun*, Taishō Vol. 29, No. 1558, and the *A p'i ta mo chü shê shih lun*, Taishō Vol. 29, No. 1559.
33. *bstan bcos thigs su bcad pa bsdus pa zhes bya ba*. Vol. 119, No. 5603.
34. *tshigs su bcad pa'i don bsdus pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos*. Vol. 119, No. 5604.
35. Vol. 129, No. 5663 is the same as No. 5420, Vol. 103.
36. Vol. 129, No. 5664 is the same as No. 5421, Vol. 103.
37. Vol. 129, No. 5466 is the same as No. 5422, Vol. 103.
38. Vol. 129, No. 5680 is the same as No. 5436, Vol. 103.
40. *Lu mên chiao shou hsi ting lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1607.
41. *Hsien yang shêng chiao lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1602.
42. *Fu hsing lun*, Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1610.
43. *Chih kuan mên lun sung*, Taishō Vol. 32, No. 1655.
44. *Fa p'u t'i hsin ching lun*, Taishō Vol. 32, No. 1659.
45. *Shih ti ching lun*, Taishō Vol. 26, No. 1522.

There are many other works in the Chinese Canon dealing with such subjects as, the *Dhāraṇī* [Vol. 21, No. 1361], the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* [Vol. 25, Nos. 1511, 1512, and 1513], the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* [Vol. 26, Nos. 1519, 1520, and 1526], the *Nirvāṇasūtra* [Vol. 26, Nos. 1524, 1527, and 1528],

an exposition of the First turning of the Wheel of the Dharma [Vol. 26, No. 1533], making a total of fifty-nine works listed in the Canons.

The problem of authorship of some of the above mentioned works is still unsolved. For example, No. 21, the *chos mngon pa kun las btus pa'i bshad pa* (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*) has been listed under Asaṅga (see, No. 18 under Asaṅga) and the Tibetan tradition attributes the work to Jinaputra. Also, No. 16, the *mdo sde'i rgyan gyi bshad pa* (*Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya*), according to Sylvain Lévi, is Asaṅga's work, but according to H. Ui, it belongs to Vasubandhu. No. 18, the *chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa*, is a very important work, but it was never rendered into Chinese. If one should investigate these texts in more detail, there will certainly be new problems occurring.

What is important to know from the list of Vasubandhu's work, as far as this thesis is concerned, is the fact that the *sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa* (No. 22) is included.

Now, in returning to Frauwallner's question, it is indeed fortunate, that four years after Frauwallner wrote:

....And still, not all questions are yet solved. Above all, there is a large quantity of works, which go under the name of Vasubandhu, and which we have not mentioned in our discussion. It is of the highest importance to determine, who of the two Vasubandhus was the author of each single work because among them we find some that were of fundamental importance of the development of Indian philosophy. I shall mention only the

Vimśatikā and *Trimśikā Vijnaptimātratāsiddhi*. But the accounts of the life of Vasubandhu either do not give any information at all about these works, or mention them in passages where the two Vasubandhus are confused with each other, as e.g. at the close of Paramārtha's biography, so that we cannot draw any conclusion about them.¹

Yuki produced his comprehensive study on Vasubandhu's *Vimśatikā* and *Trimśikā* which I will summarize here.

Yuki begins his discussion² by pointing out that although Vasubandhu does not mention the names of the five paths (*lam lnga*) in his *Trimśikākārikā*, judging from the contents of the last five verses (*ie.* Nos. 26-30) and from the fact that Sthiramati, in his commentary, refers to a Yogin, who, on the Path of Insight (*mthong lam*), has overcome the subject-object dichotomy, there is no doubt that in these five verses, Vasubandhu wanted to talk about the five paths. Yuki also notices that the number five is no absolute number in relation to the path, because in many other texts, such as those attributed to Maitreya and Asaṅga, the path is discussed in terms of levels of practices comprising many paths. Now, the task for Yuki becomes one of finding texts which not only talk about the five paths, but also those

¹ E. Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

² R. Yuki, *Seshin Yuishiki no Kenkyū*, Aoyama Shoin, 1955, p. 332-334.

about
 which talk/them within a *viññaptimātratā* framework. At
 least two texts having the necessary conditions can be found.
 The first one is the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, the verses of
 which are attributed to Maitreya, and the second one is the
theg pa chen po bsodus pa, attributed to Asaṅga. Vasubandhu
 has written commentaries (see, Vasubandhu's works, No. 16
 and 19) to both texts.

In the sixth chapter of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, there
 are five verses (Nos. 6-10; Lévi ed. p. 23-24) which are
 quoted in the *theg pa chen po bsodus pa*. The verses read:

byang chub sems dpa' bsod nams ye shes kyi /
mtha' yas pha rol tshogs rnams legs pa sags nas /
chos la sems pa shin tu rnam nges phyi /
don gyis rnam pa brjod pa'i rgyu can rtogs // 6 //

From having properly accumulated the benefits
 And the deep perfection born of Wisdom, a Bodhisattva
 In order to be intent on life's meaning,
 Must realize the intention behind the word. // 6 //

de yis brjod pa tsam du don rig nas /
der snang sems tsam la ni yang dag gnas /
de nas chos dbyings gnyis kyi mtshan nyid dang /
bral be mngon sum nyid du rtogs par 'gyur // 7 //

From knowing that meanings are limited to words alone,
 He accepts properly [whatever] appears in his
 [consciousness] as nothing but mind.
 Then he understand, through immediate apprehension
 alone,
 That true spirituality is free of two
 characteristics. // 7 //

sems las gzhan med par ni blos rig nas /
des nas sems kyang med pa nyid du rtogs /
blo dang ldan pas gnyis mo med rig nas /
de mi ldan pa'i chos kyi dbyings la gnas // 8 //

Having intellectually understood that besides the
mind nothing [meaningful] exists,
He comes to an awareness that even the mind has
no [absolutel] existence.
From realizing that the two [i.e. subject and object]
do not exist,
The Bodhisattva dwells in the *evidence of being*
which is free of the two. // 8 //

blo dang ldan pa'i mi rtogs¹ ye shes stobs /
rtag tu kun nas mnyam par song ba yis /
de la brten pa'i nyes tshogs tshang tshig dag /
dug sman chen pos dug bzhin sel bar byed // 9 //

The unshakable force of the Bodhisattva's non-
discursive awareness born of Wisdom,
Which has continually operated *in equilibrio* from
beginningless time,
Removes the thickly intertwined accumulations of
evil from him,
Just as poison [is removed] by a strong antivenin. // 9 //

thugs pas gsungs pa'i dam chos legs gzhas pa /
rtsa ba'i chos kyi dbyings la blo gros gzhas /
dran rgyu rtog pa tsam rig bstan pa dag /
myur du yon tan rgya mtsho'i pha rol la 'gro // 10 //

Those who, as expounded by the Buddha, properly
become absorbed in the sublime doctrine,
Who understand the fundamental *evidence of being*,

1. Read *rtog pa*: See, Sthiramati's *Sūtrālaṅkāravṛttibhāṣya*, Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Vol. 108, 236-5-7; 'byang chub sems dpa' rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes kyi dug sman chen po ltar sgrib pa'i dug sel to zhes bya bar sbyar ro //

Who are aware that selectiveness alone is the
cause of attentiveness,
Will quickly cross over to the [other] shore of
the ocean of learning. // 10 //

From the content of these verses, one can easily infer that the *Vijñaptimātra* system is talked about, but it is more difficult to adapt these verses to the five paths. It is from Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* preserved in the Chinese Canon [*Taiśhō*, Vol. 31, No. 1595, Paramārtha's rendition, and *Taiśhō*, Vol. 31, No. 1596, Dharmagupta's rendition] that we find out that the first of these five verses is an explanation of the Path of Accumulation (*tshogs lam*), the second is of the Path of Linking up (*sbyor lam*), the third is of the Path of Insight (*mtshong lam*), the fourth is of the Path of Developing the Vision (*spyod lam*), and the fifth is of the Path of No more learning (*mi slabs lam*).

Although there are discrepancies between the various renditions, both Chinese and Tibetan, with regard to how these five verses fit into the scheme of the five paths, there is no doubt that the five verses refer to the five paths. This is to say, although there are various interpretations (which *pāda*-s belong to which path), the five verses, in essence, cover the contents of the five paths. Therefore, although Vasubandhu does not indicate in the verses themselves that these verses in the *Trimśikā* are explanations of the five paths, when one compares the five verses of the *Trimśikā*

with those of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* quoted in the *theg pa chen po bsdus pa* which in turn was commented upon by Vasubandhu, it becomes very clear that the five verses of the *Triṃśikākārikā* (Nos. 26-30) agree with Vasubandhu's understanding of the five paths. Therefore, there is every indication that Vasubandhu was the author of the *Triṃśikākārikā*. This concludes Yuki's comment and I have taken the liberty to summarize his discussion here, because his conclusion is important in establishing the historical line to which Vinītadeva as a Buddhist Mentalist belonged.

However, there still remains the question as to why Vasubandhu wrote his own commentary to the *Viṃśatikā*, but did not for the *Triṃśikākārikā*. Some scholars claim that he did not do so, because he was on in years when he wrote it. This does not seem to be a very good reason, because if he were able to compose it, he certainly was capable of writing a commentary on it. Further, through this text, Vasubandhu introduced a new idea of 'transformation' (*gyur*) into the Buddhist Mentalistic trend. When we compare the contents of the *Triṃśikākārikā* with those of the *theg pa chen po bsdus pa*, we find almost a parallel structure. We know that Vasubandhu wrote a commentary on the latter, and therefore, it is probable that he summarized the contents of the latter in writing the former. Sthiramati, wrote his commentary on the *Triṃśikākārikā*, because in all probability, by his time, interest in the Buddhist Mentalistic trend had faded into newer and deeper interest of the Indian Pandits in the field of logic.

4. Sthiramati

Just at the turn of the fifth century A.D., under the patronage of the vast Gupta court (320-550¹), a great center of Buddhist learning was established at Nālandā. Tibetan historians inform us that Vasubandhu spent the latter part of his life there. Buddhist learning at Nālandā around the sixth century was highlighted by the study of the Buddhist Mentalistic trend. At the beginning of the sixth century, Guṇamati (440-520), who resided at Nālandā, moved from there to Valabhī in Kāthiāwār and together with his disciple, Sthiramati (510-570), succeeded in making Buddhist studies flourish in that part of India.² Dharmapāla, at this time, was active in Nālandā. Dharmapāla and Sthiramati interpreted Asaṅga-Vasubandhu's Yogācāra differently, and this difference in interpretation emphasized the difference between the later developments of the Buddhist Mentalistic trends according to Sanskrit and Chinese sources.³

As to how Sthiramati was born into this world, the two main Tibetan historians of Buddhism (Bu-ston and Tāranātha)

¹ A.L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India*, Grove Press, New York, 1954, pp. 63-67.

² M. Hattori and S. Ueyama, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

³ H. Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Shi*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1932, p. 450.

agree with each other except for minor differences. Bu-ston, however, gives additional information beyond Taranatha, therefore, I shall quote his account of Sthiramati's birth here. He says:

At the time when the teacher Vasubandhu resided in Bhāgavīhara, sitting in a brazen tub filled with oil and reading aloud the 80 divisions of the *Ṣaṭasāhasrikā*, a dove was constantly listening to him. Finally, this dove died and was reborn in Daṇḍakāranya as the son of a *Ḍudra*.

Immediately after he was born, he asked:- Where is my teacher? - Who is thy teacher?, - was the question: - Vasubandhu, he said. Thereupon the father, having inquired from the merchants who were going to Central India, came to know that Vasubandhu was residing there.¹

In terms of determining whether or not Vasubandhu was truly Sthiramati's teacher, we cannot accept this account as having historical merit. Although Sthiramati could have been a *very* late contemporary of Vasubandhu, he was not, in all probability, a direct disciple of the latter. The fact that the Tibetan tradition accounts for Vasubandhu as Sthiramati's teacher is one of respect.

Sthiramati who, according to the same Tibetan source, mastered the *Tripitaka* (the three baskets of learning) very early in his life, was a scholar of both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna *Abhidharma*. Through his success in defeating

¹ Obermiller, *Bu-ston History of Buddhism*, ii, 147.

tīrtikas (non-Buddhists) like Viṣṭapāla and others, he became famous as the Master of Debates. He is said to have surpassed his teacher, Vasubandhu, in *Abhidharma* learning. Unfortunately, these Tibetan historians do not suggest any dates for Sthiramati. Scholars, however, have given their views as to when Sthiramati was active, and the following are some of their views.

M. Hattori gives the dates 510-570 (*Bukkyo no Shisō* 4, *Ninshiki to Choetsu "Yuishiki"*, p. 22); Tāranātha (D. Chattopadhyaya, *op. cit.*, p. 177) states that Sthiramati was a contemporary of Dignāga and a teacher to Chandragomi (p. 201); S. Yamaguchi says 470-550 (*Bukkyo Gakku Josetsu*, p. 364); from the *Index to the Abhidharma kośabhāṣya* (Preface, p. III) we learn that Frauwallner "assumes the date of Sthiramati is 510-570 A.D."; Ui gives 470-550 (*Yuishiki Sanjuju Shakuron*, p. 162); and in the *Ta t'ang ta tz'u ên szū san ts'ang fa shi ch'uan*¹, it is stated that Hsüan-tsang (602 - 664) studied various scriptures, both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna according to the interpretation of the Bodhisattva Sthiramati.

From the above account, we can accept the dates given by Hattori and Frauwallner as Sthiramati's dates. This is so, especially in the light of current research². For example,

¹ *Taishō*, Vol. 50, No. 2053, *chūan* 4; 又從安慧菩薩學聲明大小乘論

² M. Hattori, "Dignāga's Criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka Theory" in *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (JIBS)*, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1968, p. 722.

Y. Kajiyama states that Frauwallner's dates for Sthiramati are most appropriate. In his work, *Shōben, Anne, Gohō*¹, Kajiyama discusses the relationship of Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati, and Dharmapāla and concludes that all three lived in the same period. Both Bhāvaviveka and Sthiramati who died in the year 570 were predeceased by Dharmapāla who died in 561.

As discussed by Kajiyama, because, in his work, *Ta ch'êng chung kuan shih lun* (Taishō, Vol. 30, No. 1567) Sthiramati criticizes Bhāvaviveka's *dBu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes pa sgron ma* (*Prajñāpradīpa*, P.ed., Vol. 95, No. 1567), we can conclude that Sthiramati's ideas differed from those of Bhāvaviveka. This difference is discussed by Avalokitavrata in his *Shes rab sgrom ma'i rgya cher 'grel pa* (*Prajñāpradīpa-tīkā*, P.ed., Vol. 96, No. 5259). Dharmapāla also criticizes Bhāvaviveka's view that the claim 'dependent origination has no birth' is not a contradiction. This fact can be observed in Dharmapāla's *Ta ch'êng kuang pê shih lun* (Taishō, Vol. 30, No. 1571, *chüan* 4). That Dharmapāla criticized Bhāvaviveka's position of the two negations in logic, can be determined by comparing the *Ta ch'êng kuang pê shih lun*, the *Prajñāpradīpa*, and the *Ta ch'êng chang chên lun* (Taishō, Vol. 30, No. 1578). On the basis of the above observations, Kajiyama concludes that Bhāvaviveka was active prior to either Sthiramati or Dharmapāla.

¹ Y. Kajiyama, "Shōben, Anne, Gohō" in the *Mikkyo Bunka*, No. 64-65, p. 145-59.

Scholars differ in their opinions about the value and authenticity of the *Ch'eng wei shih lun*. Ui, for example, feels that the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* was composed to provide Dharmapāla with an opportunity to write down interpretations of the Yogācāra which were tainted by his own rationalization. As a consequence, Ui feels that one could strip the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* of everything related to the *Trimśikā* and still come out with an intelligible text of Dharmapāla's thoughts which, essentially, have nothing to do with the *Trimśikā*. In other words, Ui considers Dharmapāla's commentary unworthy of its name. However, if one should remove the ideas of the *Trimśikā* from Sthiramati's commentary, one would have nothing left.¹

In contrast to this, Fukaura says that the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* is the text for those who wish to gain an understanding of the deep and profound meaning hidden in texts such as the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The reason is that there is no other commentary which compares to the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* in its depth, because the body of the commentary presents a deep and profound theory in accordance with logical methods².

¹ H. Ui, *Anne Gohō, Yuishiki Sanjūjū Shakuron*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1952, p. 165 f.

² S. Fukaura, *Yuishiki Gaku Kenkyū*, Vol. 2, Nagata Bunshōdō, Kyoto, 1954, p. 93.

In K'uei-chi's *Ch'eng wei shih lun shu chi*¹ (*Taishō*, Vol. 43, No. 1830), Sthiramati is counted as one of the ten great commentators of Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikākārikā*. The ten commentators are: 1) Dharmapāla, 2) Sthiramati, 3) Cittrabhāṇa, 4) Nanda, 5) Guṇamati, 6) Jinamitra, 7) Jñānacandra, 8) Bandhuśrī, 9) Śuddhacandra, and 10) Jinaputra. It is said that Hsüan-tsang, the founder of the Fa-hsiang School in China, translated all ten commentaries in accordance with Dharmapāla's interpretation of the Indian Yogācāra movement. His fruit of translation became the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (*Taishō*, Vol. 31, No. 1585). It is said that after his accomplishment, Hsüan-tsang proceeded to destroy all ten commentaries as he saw no use for them any longer.

From the above account, it is obvious that Hsüan-tsang was a follower of Dharmapāla and Fukaura is sympathetic to Hsüan-tsang's work. The controversy between Ui's views and those of Fukaura is not something which began in recent times. Ever since Paramārtha (499-569) established the Shē-lun School and Hsüan-tsang established the Fa-hsiang School, this controversy has existed in China, and we find a similar controversy in India in Vinītadeva's works². However, until S. Levi discovered the Sanskrit manuscript of Sthiramati's *Triṃśikā Vijñaptibhāṣya* in Nepal in 1922, there was no authoritative text, as scholars considered anything outside

¹ Wei Tat, *Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun, Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness*, Dai Nippon Printing Co., (H.K.) Ltd., Hong Kong, 1973, p. LIII.

² See, *dmigs pa'i brtag pa'i 'grel bshad*, P.ed., Vol. 138, No. 5739.

of Sanskrit only helpful crutches, and therefore, when Lévi discovered the Sanskrit manuscript, scholars throughout the world were overjoyed. In expressing his joy, Lévi says:

Le Rāj-Guru y apportait les manuscrits les plus rares de sa collection personnelle que je ne pouvais être admis à visiter chez lui; l'opinion publique eût été scandalisée de voir un *mleccha*, un étranger barbare, profaner le foyer d'un aussi saint personnage. C'est dans une de nos premières séances que j'eus l'émotion de reconnaître, parmi les feuillets étalés, un manuscrit d'aspect ancien qui s'achevait sur cette indication :

*triṃśikā vijñapti bhāṣyam samāptam || kṛtir ācārya Sthiramateḥ.*¹

Thus, with this discovery, Sthiramati "saved the day" so to speak, and scholars throughout the world began to study this text. As it was when Sthiramati reintroduced the Yogācāra movement in India, so too, his commentary revitalized the study of the Yogācāra movement in the modern world. However, until the study made by Yamaguchi and Nozawa², Vinītadeva's subcommentary almost lay hidden in the Tibetan canons. The text was known to E. Teramoto when he made a Japanese rendition of Sthiramati's text from the Tibetan³. Since Lévi's discovery, Sthiramati's commentary has been rendered into Japanese five times, into French two times, and into German, once.⁴

¹ S. Lévi, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Viṃśatikā (La Vingtaine) et Triṃśikā (La Trentaine)*, Paris, 1925, p. xiii.

² S. Yamaguchi & S. Nozawa, *Seshin Yuishiki no Gentenkaimai*, Kyoto, 1953.

³ E. Teramoto, *Sthiramati Triṃśikā Vijñapti Bhāṣyam*, Kyoto, 1933.

⁴ For a complete list of works, see Appendix I.

Among the works attributed to Sthīramatī are:

1. *rgyan dam pa sna tshogs pa rim par phye ba bkod pa.*
Vol. 77, No. 3485 (Same as No. 4154, Vol. 83).
2. *skabs 'grel bye brag rnam par bshad pa.*
Vol. 83, No. 4752.
3. *byang chub sems kyi ljon shing.*
Vol. 83, No. 4753.
4. *rgyan dam pa sna tshogs pa rim par phye ba bkod pa.*
Vol. 83, No. 4154 (Same as No. 3485, Vol. 77).
5. *'phags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa chen po chos kyi
rnams grangs le'u stong phrga brgya pa las 'od srungs
kyi le'u'i rgya cher 'grel pa.*
Vol. 105, No. 5510. This text corresponds to the
Ta pao chi ching lun, *Taishō*, Vol. 26, No. 1523.
6. *mdo sde rgyan gyi 'grel bshad (sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya).*
Vol. 108, No. 5531.
7. *bdus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel bshad
(Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā).* Vol. 109, No. 5534.
8. *mngon pa chos kun nas btus pa'i rnam par bshad pa.*
Vol. 113, No. 5555. This text corresponds to the
Ta ch'êng a p'i ta mo tsan chi lun, *Taishō*, Vol. 31,
No. 1606.
9. *sum cu pa'i bshad pa (Trīṃśikābhāṣya).*
Vol. 113, No. 5565.
10. *phung po lnga'i rab tu byed pa bye brag tu bshad pa.*
Vol. 114, No. 5567. This text corresponds to the
Ta ch'êng kuang wu yün lun, *Taishō* Vol. 31, No. 1613.
11. *chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa'i rgya cher 'grel
pa don gyi de kho na nyid.* Vol. 146-47, No. 5875.
This text corresponds to the *chü shê lun shih i shu*,
Taishō Vol. 29, No. 1561.
12. *Ta ch'êng chung kuan shih lun*, *Taishō* Vol. 30, No.
1567.

APPENDIX ONE

Some
Titles of Works Written in Chinese
(In Part I, Introduction)

Taisho

Volume No.

- 54 [No. 2125] 南海寄歸內法傳
30 [No. 1579] 瑜伽師地論
31 [No. 1594] 攝大乘論本
31 [No. 1605] 大乘阿毘達磨集論
31 [No. 1602] 顯揚聖教論
31 [No. 1604] 大乘莊嚴經論
31 [No. 1603] 顯揚聖教論頌
4 [No. 201] 大莊嚴經論
41 [No. 2087] 大唐西域記
50 [No. 2053] 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳
41 [No. 1821] 俱舍論記
26 [No. 1531] 文殊師利菩薩問菩提經論
26 [No. 1522] 十地經論
31 [No. 1599] 中邊分別論
31 [No. 1600] 辯中邊論
31 [No. 1595] 攝大乘論釋
31 [No. 1596] 攝大乘論釋論
31 [No. 1597] 攝大乘論釋
31 [No. 1586] 唯識三十頌
31 [No. 1588] 唯識論
31 [No. 1589] 大乘唯識論
31 [No. 1590] 唯識二十論
31 [No. 1612] 大乘五蘊論

- 31 [No. 1608] 業成就論
- 31 [No. 1609] 大乘成業論
- 31 [No. 1614] 大乘百法明門論
- 29 [No. 1560] 阿毘達磨俱舍論本頌
- 29 [No. 1558] 阿毘達磨俱舍論
- 29 [No. 1559] 阿毘達磨俱舍釋論
- 31 [No. 1607] 六門教授習定論
- 31 [No. 1602] 顯揚聖教論
- 31 [No. 1610] 佛性論
- 32 [No. 1655] 止觀門論頌
- 32 [No. 1659] 發菩提心經論
- 26 [No. 1522] 十地經論
- 31 [No. 1606] 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論
- 31 [No. 1613] 大乘廣五蘊論
- 29 [No. 1561] 俱舍論實義疏
- 30 [No. 1567] 大乘中觀釋論
- 26 [No. 1523] 大寶積經論
- 30 [No. 1571] 大乘廣百論釋論
- 30 [No. 1578] 大乘掌珍論
- 43 [No. 1830] 成唯識論述記
- 31 [No. 1585] 成唯識論

PART TWO

VINĪTADEVA AND HIS

SUM CU PA 'I 'GREL BSHAD

CHAPTER II

VINĪTADEVA, TEACHER AND WRITER

Vinītadeva, the main figure of my study, is unfortunately a difficult person to date. The reason is, outside of the texts attributed to him, very little is known about his personal life. By collecting bits and pieces of information scattered about in various texts, a somewhat clearer picture of Vinītadeva's dates can be obtained, although it would still be difficult to determine his dates with accuracy.

According to Tāranātha, there was a period in the eastern part of India - in the five regions - when this region was without a king after the last king of the Candra dynasty. During this period, there lived a *siddharāja* Sahajalalita and Vinītadeva, the *ācārya* of Śrī Nālandā. Tāranātha also informs us that Vinītadeva composed commentaries on the seven treatises on logic.¹

The above account points out three salient features related to Vinītadeva. First, he was a contemporary of Sahajalalita, but since we do not know exactly when he lived, this information does not help us date Vinītadeva. Secondly, Vinītadeva was a teacher at Nālandā; this indicates that Vinītadeva must have been a person of some learning. Thirdly, we learn that Vinītadeva's interest was inclined towards texts on logic.

¹ Chattopadhyaya, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

Bu-ston gives the same information, but adds that Śaṅkarānanda was Vinītadeva's contemporary.¹ This additional information still does not help us to date Vinītadeva, because we have no clear idea when Śaṅkarānanda lived.

Among the modern scholars, Th. Stcherbatsky, perhaps the earliest one to date Vinītadeva, has stated² that he had discussed the problem of Vinītadeva's dates in his *Teoriya Poznaniya i Logika po Ucheniya Pozdneiskh Buddhistov* (St. Petersburg, 1903), a work unfortunately not available to the writer of this thesis.

Vidhyabhusana, in his *History of Indian Logic*, dates Vinītadeva to 700 A.D.³

E. Lamotte, in making reference to a newer classification of the earlier Buddhist schools, makes the following statement:

Cette nouvelle répartition fut adaptée aux traditions et habitudes indiennes par le sarvāstivādin Vinītadeva (IX^e siècle) et d'autres chroniqueurs anonymes.⁴

¹ E. Obermiller, *Bu-ston, History of Buddhism*, ii, 155.

² H.C. Gupta, ed., *Papers of Th Stcherbatsky*, Indian Studies Past & Present, Calcutta, 1969, p. 75.

³ S.C. Vidhyabhusana, *History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta, 1921, p. 320.

⁴ E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, Louvain, 1958, p. 606.

From the above, we learn that Vinītadeva was a Sarvāstivādin and that he lived in the ninth century. This date differs from the opinions of most scholars. Unfortunately, Lamotte gives no information as to how he derived the date he proposes. That Vinītadeva was a Sarvastivadin seems to be in agreement with the *Blue Annals*¹, as he is listed there among the many scholars who belonged to the line of Abhidharma scholars. However, this last information does not necessitate that Vinītadeva was a Sarvāstivādin, because there are two Abhidharmas, the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna.

Jean Naudou, who has collected the information given by Tāranātha, by Stcherbatsky, and that derived from the *Blue Annals* and from Vinītadeva's works, states:

Vinītadeva appartient, d'après Stcherbatsky, à l'"école philologique", qui s'attache à l'interprétation littérale de Dharmakīrti. L'auteur des *Annales bleues* le place dans la filiation du Pramāṇavārttika, entre Śakyabodhi et le second Dharmakīrti, et il est considéré par Tāranātha comme antérieur à Haribhadra: il appartiendrait à la génération suivant la mort du premier Dharmakīrti. Ces indications, bien que très vagues, concordent de manière suffisante pour qu'on puisse assigner Vinītadeva au VIII^e siècle, plus précisément sans doute à la première moitié de ce siècle, et peut-être aux alentours de l'an 700.

....Vinītadeva est...aussi un spécialiste des problèmes disciplinaires, et il est connu des auteurs modernes à ce double titre.

¹ George N. Roerich, *The Blue Annals, Part 1*, Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1949, p. 346.

Il a également rédigé deux ouvrages d'*Abhidharma*, qui n'ont guère jusqu'à présent bénéficié de l'attention des indianistes, mais le situent bien dans la descendance des Saṅghadāsa et des Sthiramati:¹

Naudou gives us a fair amount of information, but there are some basic problems which must be clarified before the information can be useful. One such problem, which is beyond the scope of the present thesis but which must be pointed out, is the problem about two Dharmakīrtis. We know that Dharmakīrti, the logician, belongs to the period 600-660, so that Dharmakīrti, the logician, must be the first Dharmakīrti. From Naudou's account, since Vinītadeva comes in between the two Dharmakīrtis, the later Dharmakīrti would have to be either a contemporary or later than Dharmottara (750-810²). Dharmottara is the person who attacked "Vinītadeva his predecessor in the work of commenting upon the Nyāya-bindhu and a follower of the first school, the school of literal interpretation."³ Naudou's account of Haribhadra is of little help to date Vinītadeva, because we do not know Haribhadra's dates. Naudou's account adds other information, viz., Vinītadeva was learned in the Vinaya (discipline) texts, he was versed in both the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, and he was a descendant of Saṅghadāsa and Sthiramati.

¹ J. Naudou, *Les Bouddhistes Kaśmīriens au Moyen Age*, Presses Universitaires des France, Paris, 1968, p. 61-62.

² Sakurabe and Ueyama, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

³ Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, 1, Mouton & Co., The Hague, 1958, p. 40.

The school of logic to which Vinītadeva belonged was not that of the Kashmirian logicians, but the school initiated by Devandrabuddhi - a school of "philological interpretation." This fact is attested to by M. Gangopadhyaya, when he says, "It is perhaps one of the reasons that makes his (Vinītadeva's) work appear to us to be full of verbal repetitions."¹

On the basis of the above information and the statement to follow, we can now come to some conclusive remarks about Vinītadeva's dates. But first, it will be helpful to take a look at Vinītadeva's statement in his *dmigs pa'i brtag pa'i 'grel bshad*. He states:

|| *phyis ni zhar la | nang gi ngo bo'i shes bya ni |* | *phyi rol ltar snang gang yin te |* | *don yin shes bya ba 'dis nang gi len par byed de |* | *re zhing 'di ni spyi'i don yin no |* | *yan lag gi don brjod par bya ste |* | *gang dag mig la sogs pa'i rnām par shes pa shes bya ba ni rgol ba ril gyis dmigs pa phyi rol gyi don yin par ma 'dod pa ni ma yin pas de'i phyir gang dag ces bya ba smos so |* | *dbang po gang dag la mig la sogs pa yod pa de dag ni mig la sogs pa ste |* | *sogs pa smos pas ni rna ba la sogs pa yid la thug pa'i bar gzung ngo |* | *'di ltar yid kyang phyi rol gyi dmigs pa can du 'dod pa nyid de |* | *de'i phyir de'i dmigs pa yang 'dir tshar gcig tu dgag par bya'o |* | *de gzhang las ci zhig bya ste |* | *bstan bcos byed pa gang gis na re bzhang par bya ba de'i yul logs shig tu 'gog par ni mi byed do |* | *de'i phyir slob dpon chos skyong ran gi 'grel bshad las |* | *yid kyi rnām par shes pa'i dmigs pa bzhang pa'i phyir mang po zhig smos pa gang yin de ni de nyid shes grang |* | *bdag gis ni de'i bśam pa zab pa'i phyir mi rig go ||*²

¹ M. Gangopadhyaya, *Vinītadeva's Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, Indian Studies Past & Present, Calcutta, 1971, Preface.

² P.ed. Vol. 138, No. 5739, p. 46.3.1-3.5.

The above quotation can be rendered into English as follows:

Although it will be discussed later, [Dignāga's] statement,

The facticity of [anything] knowable which is an
internal [perceptual operation]

Is whatever appears [in cognition] as if it were
an external [reality].

That is the object [of cognition].

makes our claim in a general way. I must explain the words of the commentary. [Dignāga's] statement, "Those who...perceptual operation....." means all those opponents who claim that an objective reference [in cognition] is a [real] object; therefore, [Dignāga] says, "Those who". Whichever sensory organ has the eyes and so on [as its organ of perception] are the eyes and so on, and if the words "so on" mean that everything from the auditory [perceptual operation] up to and including the mental [perceptual operation] has an object, then even the mental perceptual operation would have to have an external [object] as its objective reference. Therefore, in this context, even the objective reference of that [mental perceptual operation] must be rejected. The writer of the commentary [Dignāga] makes no comment as to how one might go about rejecting the object of that [mental perceptual operation]; therefore, Dharmapāla, in his own commentary, gives a long explanation in order to establish an objective reference of a perceptual operation, but whatever he has said, he alone understands. I am unable to understand it, because it is too profound!

From the above statement, we can draw the following conclusions: 1) Vinītadeva was a follower of Dignāga's view of logic and 2) he was not sympathetic towards Dharmapāla's (530-561) point of view. This indicates that Vinītadeva lived later than or at the same time as Dignāga and Dharmapāla. We can discount the fact that he lived earlier,

because we know Dignāga's dates to be 480-540 and Dharmapāla's dates to be 530-561.¹ Dharmakīrti, on whose text Vinītadeva wrote commentaries, has been accepted as living between the years 600-660². So Vinītadeva could not have been before the year 600. The Tibetan tradition that Dharmakīrti was Vinītadeva's teacher and that the latter was Dharmottara's teacher³ may be a "half-truth". We cannot accept this tradition completely, because that would mean that Vinītadeva lived for more than 100 years at the least, on the basis of our knowledge of Dharmottara's dates (750-810). To sum up what we have now established: Vinītadeva's dates must be somewhere between the years 600 and 810. Let us try to narrow those dates down to a more reasonable limit.

The Tibetan historians give us the impression that Vinītadeva was quite brilliant, as he understood both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Abhidharma. Certainly, it is difficult to conclude this on the basis of his extant commentaries which apparently do not add anything which had not been already set forth by his predecessors. On the other hand, Vinītadeva may have displayed his talents orally rather than in his publications, and by his power of lucid analysis rather than by striking originality of thought.

¹ Sakurabe and Ueyama, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

² *Ibid.*, p. 276.

³ E. Obermiller, *op. cit.*, ii, 155.

Now, let us take a look at the teacher - student relationship. In view of the fact that Vinītadeva has regarded Dharmakīrti's works highly - a fact displayed by the numbers of Dharmakīrti's texts he has commented upon - it is highly probable that Dharmakīrti had a personal interest in Vinītadeva, but it was probably at a time very near the end of the former's life. If we accept Vinītadeva to be more than average intelligence, he could have learned a great deal at a very young age (as the writer of this thesis knows of one who started studying Chinese and Sanskrit at the early age of 10 and who was reading both of those languages in a very short time). A reasonable age for Vinītadeva to be when Dharmakīrti died would be 15 years old. If we could surmise this, then Vinītadeva would have been born in the year 645.

Now if we accept Th. Stcherbatsky's statement that Dharmottara disagreed with Vinītadeva's ideas about logic, then it could be the case that Vinītadeva was the teacher to the former, but on the basis of Vinītadeva's scholarship, Dharmottara was probably of a different school of logic. This fact is attested to by D. Malvania who writes:

The second school consists of those commentators that have analysed the views of Dharmakīrti purely on philosophical basis. This school was initiated by Dharmottara.....¹

¹ Dalsukhbhai Malvania, *Dharmottarapradīpa*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, A.S. Altekar, editor, Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1955, p. xviii.

On the basis of the above fact, we can disregard the Tibetan tradition that Vinītadeva was Dharmottara's teacher.

If we can accept the date 645 for Vinītadeva's birth and assume that he lived for 70 years, which seems to be a reasonable life span, then he would have died in the year 715. This would put Vinītadeva within 35 years of Dharmottara's birth. As most modern scholars agree on the date 700 for Vinītadeva's date, the approximate dates 645-715 are still in harmony with them. Although the proposed dates are not based on concrete evidence, they seem to be reasonable, and therefore, until a more detailed study can be made, the present writer assumes Vinītadeva's dates to have been around 645-715.

In the Tibetan Canon are listed the following works attributed to Vinītadeva:

1. *rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad*. Vol. 113, No. 5516.
2. *sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad*. Vol. 114, No. 5571.
3. *'dul ba la stod pa'i tshig gi rnam par bshad pa*. Vol. 122, No. 5613. This text is the same as No. 5638, Vol. 127, which is a commentary on the *'dul ba stod pa* Vol. 127, No. 5637.
4. *'dul ba rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig rnam par bshad pa*. Vol. 122-23, No. 5616. This text is a commentary on the *'dul ba rnam par byed pa*. Vol. 42-3, No. 1032.
5. *thigs le'ur byas pa sum brgya pa'i rnam par bshad pa*. Vol. 127, No. 5628.
6. Vol. 127, No. 5638, same as No. 5613, Vol. 122.
7. *gzhung tha dad pa rim par klag pa'i 'khor lo las sde pa tha dad pa bstan pa bsdu pa*. Vol. 127, No. 5641. This text has been translated in parts by Rockhill in *The Life of the Buddha*, London, 1884 (p. 181-193); by Lin Li-kouang, *Journal Asiatique*, Paris, 1949 (p. 185); and by André Bareau, *Journal Asiatique*, Paris, 1954 (p. 192-200).

8. *rgyud gzhan grub pa'i 'grel bshad*. Vol. 136, No. 5724.
This is a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa*, Vol. 130, No. 5716.
Complete text translated in *Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky*.
9. *rigs pa'i tshigs pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa*. Vol. 137, No. 5729.
This is a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *rigs pa'i tshigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa*, Vol. 130, No. 5711.
It has been rendered into Sanskrit and into English by M. Gangopadhyaya (*op. cit.*). Portions of it has been rendered into English by Th. Stcherbatsky (*Buddhist Logic II*, p. 349-52).
10. *gtan tshigs kyi thigs pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa*. Vol. 137, No. 5733. This is a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *gtan tshigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa*, Vol. 130, No. 5712.
11. *'brel pa brtag pa'i rgya cher bshad pa*. Vol. 137, No. 5735.
This is a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *'brel pa brtag pa'i rab tu byed pa*.
12. *rtsod pa'i rigs pa'i 'grel pa*. Vol. 137, No. 5737. This is a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *rtsod pa'i rigs zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa*, Vol. 130, No. 5715.
13. *dmigs pa'i brtag pa'i 'grel bshad*. Vol. 138, No. 5739. This is a commentary on Dignāga's *dmigs pa'i brtag pa*, Vol. 130, No. 5703.

About Vinītadeva's works, M. Gangopadhyaya wrote, "In the *bstan-'gyur* are attributed to him twelve commentaries, mostly on the works of Dharmakīrti, but no original works."¹ Gangopadhyaya must have overlooked the text *bzhug tha dad pa rim par klag pa'i 'khor lo las sde pa tha dad pa bstan pa bsdus pa* (No. 7 above). This text is well known as one of three similar works dealing with the Early Buddhist Schools which have been the object of study for scholars such as A. Bareau² and J. Masuda³.

¹ M. Gangopadhyaya, *op. cit.*, Preface.

² A. Bareau, "Trois traités sur les Sectes Bouddiques attribués à Vasumitra, Bhavya et Vinītadeva" in *Journal Asiatique*, 1959, p. 229-66.

³ J. Masuda, *Origin and Doctrine of Early Indian Buddhist Schools*, Verlag der Asia Major, Leipzig, 1925.

Also, it is highly probable that Vinītadeva composed the *tshig le'ur byas pa sum brgya pa'i rnam par bshad pa* (No. 5 above) in view of the fact that a text bearing the title, *tshig le'ur byas pa sum brgya pa* does not appear in either the Chinese or Tibetan Canons. Therefore, we can assume that out of the twelve works attributed to Vinītadeva, at least two were composed by him and the remaining ones were commentaries on other works.

The only original source for Vinītadeva's works is the Tibetan Canon. None of his works can be found in Chinese. The only ones found in Sanskrit are those which have been reconstructed from the Tibetan. However, we would have to assume that at least the *rigs pa'i tshigs pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa* (No. 9 above) must have existed in Sanskrit, because we know that Dharmottara's *Dharmottarapradīpa* in which Vinītadeva is criticized, exists in Sanskrit. This claim assumes that Dharmottara, as was often the case with worthy Indian Pandits, did not know Tibetan. He would have had, therefore, to have read Vinītadeva's commentary in Sanskrit.

Reference to either Vinītadeva or his works is rarely found in other texts. We have seen one example in Dharmottara's criticism. Another, and perhaps the only other, example can be found in the *grub mtha' rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mehog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skongs zhes bya la las le'u bcu pa sems tsam pa'i skabs kyi 'grel pa* (fols. 52a and 56a) by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648-1722).

From the above discussion, we can derive the following information about Vinītadeva's life:

1. he was a teacher at Nālandā,
2. as a logician, he followed the school of philological interpretation,
3. as a master of the Vinaya texts, he followed the Sarvāstivāda school,
4. he was learned in both the lower and higher Abhidharma texts,
5. his works were probably not very popular,
6. although two texts attributed to him are commentaries on works composed by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, he was probably not known for those works, and
7. he contributed very little to the further development of the Buddhist Mentalistic trend.

The *sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad*, which is a commentary on the *Triṃśikākārikā* and the *Triṃśikābhāṣya*, can be attributed to Vinītadeva on the basis of a colophon which appears at the end of the text and which reads: "The *sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad* composed by Vinītadeva is finished." Although the *sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad* is a text written in Tibetan, in view of the fact that it is, at the present time, the *only* medium by which one can know what Vinītadeva's views of and what his contribution to the Indian Buddhist Mentalistic trend might have been, in the present thesis, it is accepted not only as *the* source for determining his contribution to, but also as a faithful, albeit an interpretative representation of the Indian Buddhist Mentalistic trend. However, before going into a study of this text attributed to Vinītadeva, it may be of benefit to examine Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikākārikā* first.

CHAPTER III

SUM CU PA'I TSHIG LE'UR BYAS PA

Buddhist texts have one thing in common. They are an attempt to express 'experience'. 'Experience' constitutes what is usually termed 'life' (or 'life's process') and what loses its existential status when expressed in such usual ways. This is to say, as soon as 'experience' is put on a level of language - whether it be verbal or non-verbal - *that which* the medium is trying to express, loses its dynamic aspect. To express it in another way; bringing 'experience' to a level of discursive thinking (which by its very nature is partial) moves, as it were, 'experience' away from itself. Therefore, language - the medium of discursive thinking - instead of bringing 'experience' into focus, has the danger of moving the observer away from the observed.

But still, it is through language that one must communicate. When language is used to express the fact that 'language limits experience', this means that language becomes a convenient tool to express one's ideas, but caution should be exercised not to make 'language' an end in itself.

Buddhist ideas are difficult to express through the use of words or actions, because more often than not, the perceiver of the sound or action superimposes a concept on 'reality' - *ie.* the perceiver makes language an end in itself. In other words, the 'mind' - best described as 'a

dividedness of man against himself' - is forever conjecturing false notions or beliefs about 'reality', and in so doing, it conceives an 'Enlightenment' beyond the dichotomizing activity of the 'mind'. This is not a negative quality, however, because, as sGam-po-pa has said:

For those whose outlook is not changed by^a philosophical endeavor, there is dichotomy..... those who use dichotomy do not despair over Samsāra.¹

sGam-po-pa's statement points to a very important aspect of an 'Enlightenment attitude'. When the historical Buddha, for example, gained 'Enlightenment', he did not go out immediately and relate his experience. Tradition has it that "while he was thus hesitating, Brahma and other gods came and begged him to preach the Dharma which would show mankind the way to salvation."² In this context, "Brahma and other gods" do not point to the pantheon of the Hindu gods, but, as all levels of existences are of the 'mind', these terms point to various levels of meditation.³ The Buddha, therefore, going through meditation again, resolved his own 'dividedness' and entered the world of 'discursive thoughts'. The impetus behind this act can be understood as an indication of 'the growth and unfolding of man's being'.⁴

¹ H.V. Guenther, *The Life and Teaching of Naropa*, p. 240, nt. 3.

² P. Bapat, Editor, *2500 Years of Buddhism*, p. 23.

³ R. Sakaki, *Mahāvvyutpatti*, Shingonshū Kyoto Daigaku, 1916, p. 219-20.

⁴ H.V. Guenther, *La Maitre Spirituel en Tibet*, Hermes, Paris, 1966/67 p. 228.

'Experience' is a mere label for this 'growth and unfolding' which is man in the immediacy of the observer and the observed; and it is to 'immediacy' that we must focus our attention. 'Immediacy' implies that 'experience' is not a series of developing points which imply a space and time concept. About this, Lama Mi-pham has said:

*gnas lugs la chos gang yang sngar 'gag pa med la | da ltar
 skye ba'ang med | ma 'ongs na 'bhyung bar 'gyur ba yang med
 de dus gsum mnyam pa nyid du rtogs na dus la yang dag par
 mkhas pa zhes bya ste de la dgongs nas dus gsum dang | bsam
 gyis mi khyab pa'i dus bstan te bzhir gsung pa yang shes par
 'gyur la | phyogs rnams kyang dus de dang 'dra bar btags pa
 tsam du shes par 'gyur zhing gnas lugs mnyams pa nyid khongs
 su chud par 'gyur ro || ¹*

which may be rendered into English as follows:

We speak about someone as 'one who knows time properly' when he knows the immediacy of the three times - i.e. he knows that in the qualitative mode of anything, there is no-thing which has become extinguished in the past, no-thing which is being born in the present, and no-thing which will be produced in the future. By reflecting on this [statement] we can know three [kinds of] time and, by explaining [another] time which is not determined by concepts, we may even talk about a fourth time, but you should know that the qualitative mode of anything is immediacy because space, just like time, is nothing but a logical construct.

Lama Mi-pham introduces a fourth time which is a means to show that the 'emotive charge' of an experience lies in the experiencing. This immediacy of experiencing has been termed *rnam par rig pa tsam* (*vijñaptimātra*) by the Buddhist Mentalists. Therefore, when Vasubandhu states:

¹ Mi-pham, *mkhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos*, fol. 34a.

| rnam par shes par gyur pa 'di |
 | rnam rtog yin te de yis gang |
 | rnam brtags de med des na 'di |
 | thams cad rnam par rig pa tsam |¹

which, rendered into English, means:

This transformation of a perceptual operation
 Is discursive discrimination and whatever is conceived
 By it, is non-existent; therefore, this [means]
 Everything is merely *rnam par rig pa*.

he is essentially pointing to the immediacy of experience of
 which Calvin O. Schrag states:

....experience in its primitive presence lies beyond any conflict
 between theory and practice, subject and object, intellect and
 will. It is with this notion of experience in its primitive
 presence that philosophical reflection begins, projecting as its
 peculiar task the penetration of experience with lucidity. Phil-
 osophy, in one of its central functions, thus becomes the elucida-
 tion of experience. This experience, as we have indicated, is
 presented in a strikingly ambiguous manner, as a multifaceted
 complex of living relationships and intentionalities of thought.²

Because, ordinarily, people do not realize the nature of
 their experience, they suppose that their own state of being
 and the entities of reality which figure in their experiences
 have an ontological and factual status of their own. This
 is due to the fact that when the constituents of an experience
 are 'labelled' by giving them a name, they *mysteriously* take

¹ *P. ed.*, Vol. 113, No. 5556, p. 233.2.7 (Verse 17).

² Calvin O. Schrag, *Experience and Being, Prolegomena to a Future Ontology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1969, p. 4.

on an ontological status. For example, if I were to make the statement, "A table is here", the table (which has no table-ness about it such that it is a table *a fortiori*) turns into a table *a fortiori*. This is expressed vividly in Lewis Carroll's novel, *Alice in Wonderland*, when he describes the 'grin' which stayed on even after the cat had gone. The 'grin' which has no reality beyond the cat, is perceived even after the cat has gone. When one realizes that such a 'grin'¹ is nothing more than a logical fiction, then any idea of an ontological status that the grin may have produced is shattered, and one beholds reality for what it is. Therefore, the *Sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa* (*Triṃśikākārikā*) is a text which relates 'reality as it is' and 'reality for what it stands'.

1. The Contents of the *Sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*

Experience presupposes an existential Being. The supposition that experience can be meaningful *outside of* or *over and above* a particular existential Being, is nothing more than a logical fiction. In other words, awareness never takes place in a vacuum and awareness presupposes a mind (*sems*) which is a 'capacity to experience'. Therefore, a discussion on 'experience' or 'awareness' demands a clarification of what constitutes an 'awareness' or 'experience'.

¹ It seems that A.C. McDermott's "stomach" was too full of Mādhyamika concepts to allow even a taste of honey to enter! See, "Asaṅga's Defence of Ālayavijñāna" in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Holland, 1973, pp. 167-74.

It is from this basic reflection that Vasubandhu begins his discussion on the text, and thus, at the outset, he sets up the human situation of being *in* the world and being *of* the world. To be *in* the world and to be *of* the world means that one is in a 'multifaceted complex of living relationships and intentionalities of thought'. The 'intentionalities of thought' is developed in verses 2 through 19, and the 'complex of living relationships' is developed in verses 20 through 25. From verse 26 through 30, Vasubandhu elucidates the practice of the way (*lam*) by which one can be *in* the world and *of* the world in a real way. The first verse sets the stage.

The above divisions of the thirty verses which comprise Vasubandhu's text, the *Sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, is an outline, and as such, it is merely an overview. Although the implication of each verse will be given as the present thesis is developed, it may be helpful to have this general overview. But before going into that discussion, a few words to indicate which edition of the text is under consideration here, is in order. For the present discussion, text No. 5556 found in Volume 113 of the *Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition*, edited by D.T. Suzuki, has been selected. The present writer is aware of S. Lévi's Sanskrit edition, but as this thesis is focused on Vinītadeva whose *Sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad* (See, No. 2 , p. 56) can be found only in the Tibetan, the above mentioned verse text has been selected. Reference to Lévi's edition will be made when necessary.

Sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa

The thirty verses

|| 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la 'tshal lo ||

Homage to Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta !

1. The three transformations

| bdag dang chos su nye 'dogs pa |
| sna tshogs dag ni gang 'byung ba |
| de ni rnam par shes par gyur |
| gyur pa de yang rnam gsum ste || 1 ||
| rnam par smin dang ngar sems dang |
| yul la rnam par rig pa'o || 2 a,b ||

The various figurative expression about the self

And the entities of reality occur

In the transformation of a perceptual operation.

That transformation is of three kinds: (1)

An actualized state; an ego-centered mind;

And a cognition of epistemological objects. (2 a,b)

1.1 An actualized state

| de la kun gzhi rnam shes ni |
| rnam smin sa bon thams cad pa || 2 ||
| de ni len pa dag dang gnas |
| rnam par rig pa mi rig te |
| rtag tu reg dang yid byed dang |
| tshor dang 'du shes sems pa ldan || 3 ||
| de la tshor be btang snyoms te |
| de ni ma bsgribs lung ma bstan |
| reg la sogs yang de bzhin no |
| de ni gyun 'bab chu ba bzhin || 4 ||
| dgra bcom nyid na de ldog go || 5a ||

Of those, the substratum awareness is

An actualized state [and] all the seeds. (2)

It is an indeterminate awareness

Of appropriation and of a basis.

It is always accompanied by rapport, ego-centric demand,
Feeling, conceptualization, and directionality of mind. (3)

Therein, feeling is indifferent.

[existentially]
It is/uncompromised and [ethically] neutral.

Rapport and the rest are the same.

It flows like a river. (4)

It reverts only in a stage of an Arhat. (5a)

1.2 An ego-centered mind

| de la gnas te rab 'byung zhing |
| de la dmigs pa yid ces bya |
| rnam shes ngar sems bdag nyid can || 5 ||
| bsgribs la lung du ma bstan pa'i |
| nyon mongs bzhi dang rtag tu 'grogs |
| bdag tu lta dang bdag tu rmongs |
| bdag rgyal bdag chags 'du shes pa || 6 ||
| gang du skyes pa de'i 'o gzhan |
| reg sogs kyang de dgra bcom med |
| 'dog pa'i snyoms par 'jug la med |
| 'jig rten 'das pa'i lam na'ang med || 7 ||
| 'di ni gyur pa gnyis pa'o |

The perceptual operation called 'intellect', which
Comes forth taking that as its basis and objective reference,
Is an identity experience of an ego-centered mind. (5)

It is compromised but [ethically] neutral.

It is always associated with the four emotions.

Any concept [such as] the belief in a self,
Preoccupation with the self, pride over oneself, and (6)

Attachment to the self, belongs to the intellect.

Even the others such as rapport are non-existent

In an Arhat; they are non-existent when one enters

Meditative-concentration wherein all afflictions are removed;

And they are non-existent on the Transworldly path. (7)

This is the second transformation.

1.3 A cognition of epistemological objects

| *gsum pa yul rnam drug po la* |
| *dmigs pa gang yin de dag ste* |
| *dge ba dang mi dge gnyi ga min* || 8 ||
| *kun tu 'gro dang bye brag nges* |
| *sems las byung ba dge ba dang* |
| *de bzhin nyon mongs nye nyon mongs* |

The third is any cognition of

The six epistemological objects.

It is positive, negative, and neutral. (8)

The omnipresent ones, the object determining ones,

The positive mental events, and in the same way,

The basic emotions and the proximate factors of instability.

1.3.1 The five omnipresent ones

| *tshor ba gsum dang de mtshung ldang* || 9 ||
| *dang po'i reg pa la sogs dang* || 10 a ||

Rapport and so on are the first

Which are co-present and together with the three feelings. (10 a)

1.3.2 The five object determining ones

| *'dun mos dran dang beas pa dang* |
| *ting nge 'dzin blo bye brag nges* || 10 b,c ||

Interest, intensified interest, attentiveness,

Intense concentration, appreciative discrimination are object determining. (10)

1.3.3 The eleven positive mental events

| *dad dang ngo tsha khrel yod dang* || ||
| *ma chags la sogs gsum brtson 'grus* |
| *shing tu byangs dang bag yod beas* |
| *rnam mi 'chi dge*

Confidence, self respect, decorum (10 d)

Three beginning with non-attachment, diligence,

Alertness, having concern,

Non-violence are positive.

1.3.4. Six basic emotions

| *nyon mongs ni* |
| 'dod chags khong khro gti mug dang || 11 ||
| *nga rgyal lta ba the tshoms so* |

The basic emotions are

Cupidity-attachment, anger, bewilderment error, (11)
Arrogance, opinionatedness, and indecision.

1.3.5. Twenty proximate factors of instability

| *khro dang khon du 'dzin pa dang* |
| 'chab dang tshig dang phra dog dang |
| *ser sna dang ni sgyur bcas dang* || 12 ||
| *gYo rgyags rnam 'tshe ngo tsha med* |
| *khrel med rmugs dang rgod pa dang* |
| *ma dad pa dang le lo dang* |
| *bag med pa dang brjed ngags dang* || 13 ||
| *rnam gYeng shes bzhin ma yin dang* |

Indignation, resentment, and

Slyness-concealment, spite, jealousy, and

Avarice which is together with deceit, and (12)

Dishonesty, mental inflation, malice, shamelessness, and

Lack of a sense of propriety, gloominess, ebullience, and

A lack of trust, and laziness,

Unconcern, and forgetfulness, (13)

Inattentiveness, and desultoriness

1.3.6. [Indeterminate mental events]

| 'gyod dang gnyid kyang de bzhin te |
| *rtog pa dang ni dpyod pa'o* |
| *nye ba'i nyon mongs gnyis rnam gnyis* || 14 ||

Even worry and drowsiness, and in the same manner,

Selectiveness and discursiveness;

The [last] two proximate factors of instability are two. (14)

2. The relationship between the substratum awareness
and the five perceptual operations

| *lnga rnams rtsa ba'i rnām shes las* |
| *ji lta'i rkyen las 'byung ba ni* |
| *rnām shes lhan cig 'am ma yin* |
| *tshul rlabs rnams ji bzhin no* || 15 ||

The way in which the five [perceptual operations] arise
From the fundamental perceptual operation in accordance with
Their appropriate conditions, as either one or many
Perceptual operations, is like the waves and water. (15)

3. The relationship between the substratum awareness
and the intellect

| *yid kyi rnām shes 'byung ba ni* |
| *rtag tu'o 'du shes med pa dang* |
| *snyoms par 'jug pa rnams gnyis dang* |
| *sems med gnyid dang brgyal ma gtogs* || 16 ||

The intellect operates at all times;
Exceptions are: induced unconsciousness,
The two kinds of meditative states,
Deep sleep and unconscious stupor. (16)

4. Definition of *rnām par rig pa*

| *rnām par shes par gyur pa 'di* |
| *rnām rtog yin te de yis gang* |
| *rnām brtags de med des na 'di* |
| *thams cad rnām par rig pa tsam* || 17 ||
| *rnām shes sa bon thams cad pa* |
| *phan tshun dag gi dbang gis na* |
| *de lta de ltar 'gyur bar 'gro* |
| *des ni rnām rtog de de skye* || 18 ||
| *las kyi bag chags 'dzin gnyis kyi* |
| *bag chags bcas snga ma yis* |
| *rnām par smin pa zad na gzhan* |
| *rnām smin skyed pa de yin no* || 19 ||

This transformation of a perceptual operation is
 Discursive discrimination and whatever is conceived
 By it is non-existent; therefore, this [means]
 Everything is merely 'awareness *qua* *sensa*'. (17)
 When the perceptual operations and container of all seeds
 Mutually influence each other,
 They go this way or that way; therefore,
 This or that discursive discrimination is produced. (18)
 That [substratum awareness] is that which is produced as
 Another actualized state when a previous actualized state,
 Containing the tendencies of acts and the tendencies of
 The two kinds of apprehensions, become extinguished. (19)

5. The three specific constitutive principles
of reality

| *nam par rtog pa gang gang gis* |
 | *ngos po gang gang nam brtags pa* |
 | *de nyid kun tu brtags pa yi* |
 | *ngo bo nyid med de med do* || 20 ||
 | *gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid* |
 | *nam rtog yin te rkyen las byung* |
 | *grub ni de la snga ma po* |
 | *rtag tu med par 'gyur ba gang* || 21 ||
 | *de phyir de nyid gzhan dbang las* |
 | *gzhan min gzhan ma yin pa'ang min* |
 | *mi rtag pa sogs bzhin du brjod* |
 | *de ma mthong bar de mi mthong* || 22 ||

Only that which is conceived of as this or that
 By this or that discursive discrimination has
 The facticity of the notional conceptual
 And that is non-existent. (20)
 The facticity of the relative is discursive discrimination
 And it comes from various causal factors.
 The ideally absolute is that which is
 Always devoid of the former. (21)

Therefore, only that is neither other than nor
 Not other than the relative. It is explained as
 'Impermanence and so on'. When that [ideally absolute] has
 Not been realized, then that [relative] is not realized. (22)

6. The three negative facticities

| ngo bo nyid ni rnams gsum gyis |
 | ngo be nyid med rnams gsum la |
 | dgongs nas chos rnams thams cad kyi |
 | ngo bo med pa bstan pa yin || 23 ||
 | dang po pa ni mtshan nyid kyi |
 | ngo bo nyid med gzhan pa yang |
 | de ni rang nyid mi 'byung bas |
 | ngo bo nyid med gzhan yin no || 24 ||
 | chos kyi don gyi dam pa'ang de |
 | 'di ltar de bzhin nyid kyang de |
 | dus rnams kun na'ang de bzhin nyid |
 | de nyid rnams par rig pa tsam || 25 ||

It is explained that all the entities of reality
 Is without facticity because

The three specific constitutive principles of
 Reality imply the three negative facticities. (23)

The first is without facticity due to [its]
 Specific characteristic. The next one is without
 Facticity because it does not have an existence
 Of its own. There is another. (24)

It is the absolute significance of reality.

It is also [reality] just as it is and

It is [reality] just as it is, at all times.

It alone is 'awareness *qua* sensa'. (25)

7. The five paths

7.1 The path of preparation

| ji srid rnams rig tsam nyid la |
 | rnams par shes pa mi gnas pa |

| 'dzin pa gnyis kyi bag la nyal |
| de srid nam par mi ldog go || 26 ||

So long as [one's] perceptual operations
Are not on [the level of] 'awareness *qua* *sensa*',
[But] lull in the concern of the two apprehensions,
His [awareness] is the kind that will not revert. (26)

7.2. The path of linking up

| 'di dag nam rig tsam nyid ces |
| de snyam du ni dmigs nas su |
| ci yang rung ste mgon 'jug na |
| de ni tsam la mi gnas so || 27 ||

The thought, "This is 'awareness *qua* *sensa*'"
Is an objective constituent; therefore,
A person, who becomes directly involved in whatever
He is confronting, does not stay in that alone. (27)

7.3. The path of insight

| nam zhig shes pas dmigs pa nam |
| mi dmigs de'i tshe na ni |
| nam par rig pa tsam la gnas |
| gzugs ba med pas de 'dzin med || 28 ||

If in a perceptual situation, there is no cognition
Of an objective reference, then [the mind] dwells in
'Awareness *qua* *sensa*', because when an apprehended object
Does not exist, then an apprehending subject could not exist. (28)

7.4. The path of developing the vision

| de ni sems med mi dmigs pa |
| 'jig rten 'das pa'i ye shes de |
| gnas kyang gzhan du gyur pa ste |
| gnas ngan len gnyis spangs pas so || 29 ||

That is 'without a mind'; 'without cognition';
'Transcendental primordial awareness'.
Even [one's] abode becomes different,
Because one is freed from the two degenerating influences. (29)

7.5. The path of no more learning

| de nyid zag med pa dang byings |
| bsam mi khyab dang dge dang brtan |
| de ni bde ba rnam grol sku |
| thob pa chen po'i chos zhes bya || 30 ||

Only that is 'without tainted perceptual objects' and 'unobstructed';

Is 'beyond thought', 'positive', and 'firm'.

That is 'bliss', 'a liberated being';

It is called 'the life of the great Buddha'. (30)

|| sum cu pa'i tshigs le'ur byas pa slob dpon chen po dbyig gnyen mdzad
pa rdzogs so || rgya gang gyi mkhan po Jinamitra dang Śīlendrabodhi dang |
zhu chen gyi lo tsā ba ban de Ye shes sdes bsgyur zhing zhus te gtan
la phab pa'o ||

Here ends the work consisting of thirty verses composed by the great teacher, Vasubandhu. The great masters of India, Jinamitra and Śīlendrabodhi, together with the great translator Ye-she-sde of Zhu-chen [Monastery] have compiled and translated it.

In rendering Vasubandhu's text into English, the writer of this thesis has taken the liberty of adding provisional headings to the text in accordance with what has been considered to have been the subject matter discussed in the thirty verses. The divisions do not always agree with those made by others such as S. Yamaguchi¹ and R. Yuki². A close investigation of this text, however, reveals logical breaks, and therefore, the text has been divided into the following seven topics:

¹ S. Yamaguchi and S. Nozawa, *Sheshin Yuishiki no Genten Kaimei*, Hōzōkan, Kyoto, 1953, p. 140-41.

² Reimon Yuki, *Seshin Yuishiki no Kenkyū*, Aoyama Shōin, Tokyo, 1955, p. 212.

1. The three transformations (Verses 1-14; Chapters IV - VII)
2. The relationship between the substratum awareness and the five perceptual operations (Verse 15; Chapter VIII).
3. The relationship between the substratum awareness and the 'intellect' (Verse 16; Chapter VIII).
4. Definition of 'awareness *qua* sensa' (Verses 1-19; Chapter IX).
5. The three specific constitutive principles of reality (Verses 20-22: Chapter X).
6. The three negative facticities (Verses 23-25; Chapter X).
7. The five paths (Verses 26-30; Chapter XI).

2. Vasubandhu's reasons for writing
the *Sum cu pa'i tshigs le'ur byas pa*

The above mentioned seven topics can be further divided into the following four reasons which can be considered to be the main reasons for Vasubandhu's writing of his text.

The four are:

- a. To establish what determines an experience,
- b. To establish what 'experience' means within the context of the Buddhist Mentalistic trend,
- c. To establish the **reasons for or the logic behind** such a view of reality, and
- d. To establish how one goes about achieving that view.

Therefore, topics 1,2,and 3 can be understood as comprising one unit of thought, topic 4 another, topics 5 and 6 still another, and topic 7 the final unit of thought.

Vasubandhu, himself, gives no reasons for writing his

treatise, whereas, the later commentators, Sthiramati and Vinitadeva, go to great lengths to explain the reasons. Perhaps this is indicative of the fact that during Vasubandhu's time, heretodoxical views were not as prevalent as the period of the later commentators.

Although the relationship that holds between the thirty verses and the later commentaries will become clearer as the present thesis develops, here, it may be helpful to discuss the basis for dividing Vasubandhu's treatise into the above four reasons.

a. To establish what determines an experience

In this section, Vasubandhu attempts to make the statement that a meaningful world is one which evolves from a radiating field. A 'field' as such does not imply an absolute center. This is like talking about a 'magnetic pole' when essentially, a 'magnetic pole' is an abstracted concept of a 'field'. This is to say, although we speak about the 'N-pole' or the 'S-pole' of a magnetic field, any point within the magnetic field has significance only in relation to a point that we have abstracted out of the field. Once we have 'determined' a certain point-instant to be the 'N-pole' for instance, then by moving in one or other direction from it, we can talk about 'having moved off the pole' or 'having moved towards a pole'. However, this implies movement which is parallel with the poles (eg.) \leftrightarrow or $\rightarrow\leftarrow$; but if we move \uparrow or \downarrow , then we do not have a term to describe this movement.

Also, the spot from which we have moved, either the 'S-pole' or the 'N-pole' becomes the very opposite of what it was previously. In other words, expressions such as 'S-pole' or 'N-pole' are significant only in their relatedness. It is in this sense, that 'figurative expressions' become significant, only in so far as they point to some kind of 'relatedness'. Just as 'N-pole' and 'S-pole' are meaningless outside the context of a 'magnetic pole', so too, the terms 'self' and 'entities of reality' are meaningless outside of a particular 'field'. Moreover, just as 'S-pole' and 'N-pole' are not absolute points, 'self' and 'entities of reality' are not absolute realities. This idea has been pointed out by Bertrand Russell in his essay entitled, "Descriptions", in which he states:

Now the proposition that "a so-and-so" has the property ψ is *not* a proposition of the form " ψx ". If it were, "a so-and-so" would have to be identical with x for a suitable x ; and although (in a sense) this may be true in some cases, it is certainly not true in such a case as "a unicorn". It is just this fact, that the statement that a so-and-so has the property ψ is not of the form ψx which makes it possible for "a so-and-so" to be, in a certain clearly definable sense "unreal". The definition is as follows:

The statement that "an object having the property ϕ has the property ψ "

means:

"The joint assertion of ϕx and ψx is not always false."

So far as logic goes, this is the same proposition as might be expressed by "some ϕ 's are ψ 's"; but rhetorically there is a difference, because in the one case there is a suggestion of singularity, and in the other case of plurality. This, however, is not the important point. The important point is that, when rightly analysed, propositions verbally about "a so-and-so" are found to contain no constituent represented by this phrase. And that is why such a proposition can be significant even when there is no such thing as "a so-and-so".¹

¹ Bertrand Russell, "Descriptions" in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, edited by Leonard Linsky, The University of Illinois Press At Urbana, 1952, p. 99.

Therefore, when Vasubandhu talks about 'figurative expressions' which take place in the 'transformation of a perceptual operation', he is trying to say that statements about the 'self' and about the 'entities of reality', although they are statements made in the world, they are not statements *about* the factual world.

Awareness, which never takes place in a vacuum, is the process which brings to light that which is obscure. In other words, awareness brings to light 'experience' which becomes significant in the 'experiencing'. Therefore, it is essential that Vasubandhu show how a dynamic and transient structure (experience), which is without a principle to which it can be reduced, is in fact turned into a concrete and static world. In order to accomplish this, he talks about the 'three transformations of a perceptual operation'.

b. *To establish what 'experience' means within the context of the Buddhist Mentalistic trend*

The three transformations of a perceptual operation, which have been named, 'An actualized state'; 'An ego-centered mind'; and 'A cognition of epistemological objects', can be interpreted to correspond to the following terms:

1. Being,
2. Being, as being something, and
3. Being, as being something concrete.

Nothing more can be added to or subtracted from this complex such that it will be more complete. This indicates that

'experience' is none other than 'experiencing', and 'experiencing' is none other than 'experience'. In this relationship there is still another factor; *ie.* the 'experiencing' is the 'experienced experience' and the 'experienced experience experiencing'. In other words, 'experience' is a term used to show the double function of 'pure subject as pure subject and object' and of 'pure object as object and subject'.

As stated earlier (p. 77), an awareness, which never occurs in a vacuum, is the process which brings to light that which is obscure. We can now add the terms '.... and this presupposes existence'. 'Existence' is an ambiguous term, and therefore, we must clarify what it means in this context. Here, 'existence' means 'the right juncture and the unique occasion, both of which unite in the body'.¹

'Body' means human body, and 'human body' means a particular person as a 'field' - a term which has been discussed already. Thus, 'existence' means an occurrence of awareness as a 'field' which *is* the body wherein the 'right juncture and unique occasion' have met. It is in this 'field' that 1) Being, 2) Being, as being something, and 3) Being, as being something concrete, have their respective significance. In terms of 'experience', 1) 'experiencing' is 'Being'; 2) 'experienced experience' is 'Being, as being something'; and 3) 'experienced experience experiencing' is 'Being,

¹ See, H.V. Guenther's, *The Jewel Ornament of Liberation*, Chapter 2, pp. 14-29, for a detailed discussion of these terms.

as being something concrete'. The threefold complex, which can be called 'the complex of becoming', has been expressed in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature through such expressions as 'that being, this becomes'. In other words, the common view that a 'self' is somehow definable as something having an ontological status such that it is an unique particular unto itself, is here being negated. The reason is that the 'self' so designated, is a concept which points to the dynamic and transient structure.

c. To establish the reasons for and the logic behind such a view of reality

The dynamic and transient structure ceases to be a process when it becomes the object of analysis. This means, when experience is abstracted out of 'experience', it becomes a concept or notion, because reality has, as it were, moved on. However, were it not that the abstracting process was not a structure in itself, then it could not have any reality about it either. The act of abstracting is, however, a dynamic and transient structure, and therefore a reality. The Buddhist Mentalistic trend has to be credited with distinguishing between an act of abstracting an experience out of a process which in itself is a process, and the act of abstracting experience out of a process, thereby bringing the process to an end. This they have accomplished by looking at reality through what is known as 'the three specific constitutive principles of reality'. The relation between the three specific constitutive principles of reality and

the two kinds of abstractions can be illustrated as follows:

- | | | |
|----------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| 1. The notional-conceptual | } | abstraction which stops process. |
| 2. The relative | | |
| 3. The ideally absolute | } | abstraction which is process. |

Of these three, the notional-conceptual is without facticity, because of its specific characteristic of being a 'notion'. The relative implies that reality does not have an existence of its own, and therefore, suggests a negative facticity. The ideally absolute, being the dynamic and transient structure, defies abstraction, but it is an 'ideal' in so far as the subject-object dichotomy is not yet overcome, and it is absolute, because 'there being no object as such, there could not be an apprehending subject'. Because, ordinary people do not realize this, they believe that reality is permanent, pure, devoid of frustrating situations, and has eternality; but in fact, reality is impermanent, impure, frustrating, and devoid of an abiding principle to which it can be reduced.¹

d. *To establish how one goes about achieving that view*

In order to gain a proper view of reality, one must become one who is totally *in* experience. In order to gain this view, there are certain pre-requisites that one must fulfill. However, as there are differences in capacity between various different individuals, there is also a difference in the preparations that these individuals will make. This stage of preparation is termed 'Path of prepara-

¹ Mi-pham, *bShes spring gi mchan 'grel padma dkar po'i phreng ba*, fol. 27.

tion'. The 'linking' phase which follows next, is determined to be one of low, of medium, or of high intensity depending upon the completeness of the preparatory stage. This stage is called the 'path of linking up' because it links what has been learned with further growth which results in a new vision or perspective which enables the beholder to see the intrinsic nature of himself and the universe. This outcome is known as the 'path of insight'. But this 'seeing' has to be kept alive. It is effected by the next phase, the 'path of developing the vision' which is a 'live experience'. This climaxes in the final phase, the 'path of no more learning' in which the individual perceives the world around him as it is intrinsically, as well as perceiving all that constitutes this world as being harmoniously interrelated.

CHAPTER IV

VINĪTADEVA'S SUBCOMMENTARY

Vasubandhu's treatise (discussed in the previous chapter) has been commented upon by Dharmapāla, Sthiramati, and Vinīta-deva. In the present thesis, the term 'subcommentary' is used in the specific sense of 1) Vinītadeva's commentary in contrast to that of either Sthiramati or Dharmapāla, and 2) Vinītadeva's work which comments on both Vasubandhu's treatise and Sthiramati's commentary.

Vinitadeva's subcommentary can be divided into two major parts:

- A. Preamble, and
- B. The subcommentary proper.

The 'preamble' can be divided into:

- 1. The title of the work,
- 2. The section divisions,
- 3. The verses of salutation, and
- 4. The purpose of the treatise.

The last of these has four parts:

- a. To give a correct understanding of the fact that the 'self' and the 'entities of reality' have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced,
- b. To remove 'conflicting emotions' and 'primitive beliefs about reality',
- c. To lead sentient beings to the fruition of 'awareness *qua* sensa', and
- d. To remove the two kinds of partial views.

The 'subcommentary proper' consists of the following seven

topics, each of which will comprise a chapter in this thesis.

The seven topics are:

1. The three transformations (Chapters V, VI, and VII),
2. The relationship between the substratum awareness and the five perceptual operations (Chapter VIII),
3. The relationship between the substratum awareness and the intellect (Chapter VIII),
4. Definition of 'awareness *qua* sensa' (Chapter IX),
5. The three specific constitutive principles of reality (Chapter X),
6. The three negative facticities (Chapter X), and
7. The five paths (Chapter XI).

Each of the seven topics are further divided into smaller divisions, but as they will become evident in the discussions to follow, they will not be given at this time.

A. *Preamble*

1. *The title of the work*

The title of the work is given in both Sanskrit and in Tibetan. In works composed in the Tibetan language, this has been common practice even until very recent times when indigenous Tibetan works are not translations of the Sanskrit.

The title to this work is given as follows:

In Sanskrit - *Trīṃśikāṭīkā*

In Tibetan - *Sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad*

which can be rendered into English as follows:

A subcommentary to the thirty [verses].

2. *The section divisions*

Vinītadeva's text has been divided into five sections (*bam po*). These divisions are arbitrary and have nothing to do with the contents of the text. It seems that in composing texts in *po-ti* style, the loose leaves were divided into equal bundles, perhaps to facilitate transporting them from one place to another or wrapping them in a piece of cloth, a practice which is still observed. Whatever may have been the reasons, Vinītadeva's text is divided into five equal bundles, each comprising one-fifth of the total number of leaves required to complete the work. The section division given here is the first of the five, and therefore Vinītadeva writes:

Section One.

3. *The verses of salutation*

Words of veneration or salutation, which occur in the Buddhist texts in the form of a single sentence or a verse, are words of respect, usually, directed to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, in some cases, even to the composer of a treatise who, respected as an influential spiritual guide, aided in developing the spiritual growth of the commentator.

Here in Vinītadeva's work, we see an example of salutation directed to a Bodhisattva and to the composer of the treatise. Thus, he has words of veneration directed to Mañjuśrī first, and then, words of respect directed to Vasubandhu. He says:

Homage to Mañjuśrī, who was once a prince!

This opening line of veneration is often rendered into English as follows:

Homage to Mañjuśrī, the eternal youth!

This rendition is in accord with various Tibetan commentaries written on the words *gzhon nur gyur pa*, but H.V. Guenther suggests that "This misses the association the Tibetans have when they hear or read these words by which they understand the story of the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī who as King Amba vowed to become a Bodhisattva."¹ Scholars, other than H.V. Guenther, can be credited with having understood the Tibetan commentaries correctly, but only lexically. When this line of salutation is understood through an understanding of Lama Mi-pham's commentary, for example, one can see just what this line of veneration involves. Lama Mi-pham, in his *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla med gyis pa'i zhal lun* (fols. 41b-42a) states:

The words of salutation, "Salutation to 'Jam dpal (Mañjuśrī) who is eternally youthful" has been added by the great translator Ye-she-sde at the beginning of this work which systematizes the sublime teachings in the early spread of Buddhism. Here the word, *'jam pa* (gentle) refers to the tenderness (*thugs*) of whosoever is freed from all discomforting causes when one attains equanimity (*mnyam pa nyid*) and the evidence of being (*chos kyi dbyings*). *dPal* (radiant), which is a readiness to benefit oneself and others, refers to the spontaneity of action which is always and everywhere ready

¹ H.V. Guenther, *The Jewel Ornament of Liberation*, Rider and Company, London, 1959, p. 8, nt. 1.

to go even to the limits of the vast open space [and which] is existential pattern of non-discursive transcending awareness [which] radiates with the splendor of the two kinds of awarenesses. *gzhon nur gyur pa* (eternal youthfulness) is spoken about because, from having joined the group of Bodhisattvas on the tenth level of spirituality, one is freed from old age which is a certainty so long as one remains in saṃsāra [and] one's physical body never grows old. Salutation, therefore, means to bow in responsiveness, with reverence, and in tenderness to any such protector.

Following his salutation to Mañjuśrī, Vinītadeva gives two more verses. From one point of view, these verses can be understood as being commentaries to the preceding words of salutation, and from another, they can be understood as words of veneration to Vasubandhu who wrote the treatise. In this thesis, the verses are taken to be of the latter kind. The verses by Vinītadeva read:

Homage to the sage who has a correct understanding that
The complete person and the entities of reality
have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced,
And who is the embodiment of compassion
By having given up every form of evil.

Homage to the protector of the world, who
In his continuous striving to benefit others,
Becomes accomplished in himself.
The *Thirty Verses* will now be explained.

4. *The purpose of the treatise*

In this section, Vinītadeva outlines the subject matter, to whom the text is directed, its contents, the purpose of the work, and the message contained therein. This seems to be a common practice with Vinītadeva, because the same pattern can be seen in other texts that he has written. Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya in his work, *Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, makes the following observation:

There are certain preliminary conditions - accepted by the authors of *śāstra*-s which must be stated at the outset in order to show that the study of the treatise would be worthwhile..... These conditions are generally accepted to be three in number. But Vinītadeva here interprets Dharmakīrti as showing four such conditions in all - adding an unusual fourth to the usual three.¹

If the number three is normal and Vinītadeva has added an "unusual" fourth in his commentary on the *Nyāyabindhu*, then the five which appear here must be an exception.

From Vinītadeva, we learn that the *subject matter* to be considered is 'non-substantiality' (*bdag med*). The content is the explanation of that fact in terms of the 'complete person' (*gang zag*) and the 'entities of reality' (*chos*). The treatise *is directed to* those who do not realize that or who wrongly understand that. The *purpose* is to explain the fact that the 'complete person' and the 'entities of reality' have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced. The *message* is 'awareness *qua* sensa'.

¹ Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, *Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā*, *Indian Studies Past and Present*, R.D. Press, 1971, p. 80, note 5.

It is dubious whether the Buddha intended to negate an existential state of being in his doctrine of *anātman*. Translators who have rendered this term into English by using such words as 'selflessness', 'non-ego', 'egolessness', 'no self' and others, although lexically correct, have lead many people astray, to say the least. As can be understood through this work *The thirty verses*, the Buddhist Mentalistic trend focuses its attention on the mind (*sems*) and mental events (*sems byung*). The word *sems* (mind), in this context, is not be understood as some entity called 'mind', but must be understood as a motivating force which is both active and reactive. 'Mind' in this sense denotes a process and 'mental events' denotes its manifestation. Ye-shes rgyal-mtshan has differentiated between the 'mind' and 'mental events' as follows:

....the mind as a primary operation is concerned only with the objective reference but not with what the other specific functions perform; a mental event is an awareness which gets involved with this object by way of other specific functions, such as those following the operation that deal with the objective reference.¹

In its operation, the mind plays games and in its folly, it creates a world to which it becomes attached as if that creation were something very concrete. It then takes this 'something very concrete' to be an ontological and factual reality external and separate from itself. The term *bdag med* is used to negate the substance view which results from

¹ H.V. Guenther & L.S. Kawamura, *Mind in Buddhist Psychology*, p. 10.

such mental operations; therefore, it is not a term used to negate an existential state of Being. Although the Buddhist Mentalists can be accused of confusing epistemology and ontology (see, Chapter V), they were not so confused that they thought that because what counts is mental, external objects were also mental.

Now we shall turn to Vinītadeva for his comments on this topic. He says:

This first sentence, "...To those who do not realize and who wrongly understand that the complete person (*gang zag*) and the entities of reality (*chos*) have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced (*bdag med*),..." outlines five topics:

1. The subject matter under consideration (*yuḷ*),
2. To whom it [the treatise] is meant (*'brel pa can*),
3. The content (*brjod par bya ba*),
4. The purpose (*dgos pa*), and
5. The message (*'brel pa*).

Needless to say, it is necessary to state the message, the content, and the purpose of the treatise right at the beginning, because a treatise which lacks a message, a content, and a purpose will not be considered by the listeners (*nyan pa po*) who are concerned with judgmental perception (*rtog pa*). Therefore, in order to catch the attention of those listeners, these must be stated.

1) *The subject matter under consideration* is expressed in the statement, "...the complete person and the entities of reality....."

2) *To whom it [the treatise] is meant* is expressed in the statement, "...to those who do not realize and who wrongly understand....."

3) *The content* is expressed in the statement, "...who wrongly understand that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced....."

4) *The purpose* is expressed in the statement, "...in order to explain....."

5) *The message* is expressed in the statement, "...the treatise in thirty verses which explains 'awareness *qua* sensa'....."

The content: To explain correctly according to logic (*rigs pa*) and instruction (*lung*) that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced.

The purpose: To understand that.

In so far as this treatise accomplishes that purpose, this treatise is the appropriate means (*thabs*) for that purpose, and therefore, the relationship between this treatise and the purpose is one of means and the result which comes about by that means.

The statement, "...to those who do not realize and who wrongly understand..." is a reply to those who ask, "To whom must you explain correctly that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced?"

The statement, "...the complete person and the entities of reality..." is a reply to those who ask, "What is not realized and what is wrongly understood?"

This is just a summary, and [now] a detailed explanation must be given.

- a. *To give a correct understanding of the fact that the 'self' and the 'entities of reality' have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced*

In this section, Vinītadeva gives a folk etymology of the terms *gang zag* (complete person) and *chos* (entities of reality). About the term *gang zag*, Vinītadeva says, "it is that which becomes replinished (*gang*) and then collapses (*zag*).". About the term *chos*, he says, "the entities of reality are spoken about in so far as they take their own facticity."

These explanations are contextually the same as the explanation given to the term 'transformation' (*gyur*) which occurs under the topic *The three transformations* (see, B.l. a, ii). Therein, 'transformation' is defined as "any state attained as a result which is different from the moment of the cause which becomes extinguished the instant it ceases to be a cause." From this definition, we can see that the

'complete person' and the 'entities of reality' gain their existential structure in the process of becoming. In other words, the process of *coming to fruition* gives the 'complete person' and the 'entities of reality' their existential status. Therefore, although the 'complete person' (*gang zag*) is in a sense, an entity of reality (*chos*), the distinction made between these two by the Buddhist Mentalists, distinguishes them from the earlier Sarvāstivādins who reduced everything to a particular existence (*chos*). The fact that Vinītadeva talks about the non-substantiality of both the 'complete person' and the 'entities of reality' marks him as being a follower of the greater career - Mahāyāna.

Vinītadeva divides 'those who wrongly understand' (*log par rtog pa*) into 'those who understand it ambiguously' (*gnis su rtog*) and 'those who misunderstand it' (*phyin ci log*). Vinītadeva, thus expands on Sthiramati's commentary. Of those who wrongly understand, 'those who understand it ambiguously' refers to the Sāmmatīyans¹. According to Vinītadeva's *gzhung tha dad pa rim par klag pa'i 'khor lo las sde pa tha dad pa bstan pa bsdus pa*, the Sāmmatīyans are explained as follows:

The Sāmmatīyans agree with the Kaurukullaka, the [Dharmottara, and the Vātsīpurīya. On the one hand [they claim] that the complete person does not refer to the psycho-physical constituents of the personality, but on the other hand, [they claim] that although

¹ For the Sāmmatīyans, see the *Sāmmatīyanikāyaśāstra*, Taishō, Vol. 32, No. 1649.

[the complete person] is not the psycho-physical constituents of the personality, it is not different from them.¹

Although Vinītadeva does not stipulate to whom the words 'those who misunderstand it' refers, he follows his discussion up with a discussion of the Mādhyamikans; therefore, those words are understood as referring to the Mādhyamikans. As pointed out previously (Chapter I), the Mādhyamikans were divided into two groups - the Prāsangika and the Svātantrika. The Mādhyamikans in this case probably refer to the Prāsangika, because, according to Vinītadeva, their claim is expressed as follows:

"We neither claim that all entities of reality do not exist, nor that they are non-existent as an identity experience of postulations.

Later (see, d. below), Vinītadeva makes reference to the Mādhyamikans again, but there he expresses their claim by the following words:

"....just as the knowable exists contingently but not absolutely, so too, the perceptual operations exist contingently but not absolutely.

This latter claim is, according to K'uei Chi's commentary to Dharmapāla's text, that of the Svātantrika (see, d. below).

¹ P. ed. Vol. 127, No. 5641, p. 258.2.7-8. | 'phags pa kun gyis bkur
ba'i sde pa | sa sgrogs rigs kyi sde dang | srung ba pa'i sde dang |
gnas ma'i bu'i sde 'di gsum yang lta ba mthun te | gang zag ni phung
po rnams kyang ma yin la | phung po ma yin la | phung po rnams las
thar pa tha dad pa yang ma yin no ||

Thus, it is clear that the *Thirty Verses* was undertaken to give a correct understanding of the fact that the 'self' and the 'entities' of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced. This purpose is explained by Vinītadeva as follows:

The terms *gang zag* (*pudgala* - complete person) and *chos rnam* (*dharmāḥ* - entities of reality) in the compound, *gang zag dang chos rnam bdag med pa*, refer to the 'complete person' and the 'entities of reality'.

The 'complete person' [is spoken about in so far as a complete person] is that which becomes replinished (*gang*) and then collapses (*zag*). It becomes replinished because one is forever starting out on actions not done previously. It collapses because the activities engaged in previously have been enjoyed and used up. We speak of the complete person in so far as one goes from one life form to another, over and over again. Again, we speak of the complete person in so far as one goes from one life form to another by actions which, having become full [or fattened up], project one into another life form and which make things come to fulfillment.

The entities of reality (*chos*) are spoken of in so far as they take their own facticity (*rang gi ngo bo*). This means, that which is devoid of an eternal soul (*bdag dang bral ba*) has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced (*bdag med*); and a [psychologically] concrete entity (*dnegos po*) does not have an abiding principle to which it can be

reduced.

The twofold negation of an abiding principle means [that both the complete person and the entities of reality have] no abiding principle to which they can be reduced, and thus, the compound *gang zag dang chos rnams la bdag med pa* means that neither the complete person nor the entities of reality has an abiding principle to which it can be reduced. Therefore, this [twofold negation] means that both the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced.

The compound *ma rtogs pa dang log par rtogs pa rnams* is a compound which means, 'those who do not realize' (*ma rtogs pa*) and 'those who understand wrongly' (*logs par rtogs pa*).

'Those who do not realize' refer to those who do not know that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced.

'Those who understand wrongly' are of two kinds:

1. Because some misunderstand that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced, they are called, 'those who misunderstand' (*phyin ci log*).
2. Others understand that ambiguously (*gnyis su rtogs*), and therefore are called 'those who have doubts' (*the tshom*).

Therefore, the explanation becomes: 'to those who do not know, to those who misunderstand, and to those who have doubts'.

The compound *gang zag dang chos la bdag med pa ma log par bstan pa'i phyir* means, 'In order to explain correctly that both the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced.' The statement, "....because both are to be explained...." is a summary.

Some say that the claim that the complete person has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced, is an error. These Sāmmatīyans (*kun gyis bkruḷ ba*) accept the non-existence of an eternal soul (*bdag med*), but do not accept the fact that the complete person has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced (*gang zag bdag med pa*).

Some say that even the claim that the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced, is an error. These Mādhyamikans (*dbu ma pa*) are famous for saying, "We neither claim that all entities of reality do not exist, nor that they are non-existent as an identity experience of postulations (*brtags pa'i bdag nyid*)."

A correct explanation that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced is undertaken to counteract their [claims]; and therefore, the statement, "....correctly...."

rnam par rig pa'i rab tu byed pa sum cu pa brtsams so means that this treatise consists of thirty verses and is a treatise on 'awareness qua sensa'. It is called *tshig le'ur byas pa sum cu pa* because it consists of thirty verses.- It is called *rnam par rig pa'i rab tu byed pa* because it is a

treatise (*rab tu byed pa*) which clearly defines 'awareness qua sensa' (*rnam par rig pa*). The undertaking of that is the undertaking of the *rnam par rig pa'i rab tu byed pa sum cu pa*, and this means that the *Treatise in thirty verses which comments on 'awareness qua sensa'* is undertaken in order to give a correct explanation of the fact that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced to those who do not know, to those who have doubts, and to those who misunderstand that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced.

b. *To remove 'conflicting emotions' and 'primitive beliefs about reality'*

The Hīnayāna differs from the Mahāyāna. The former claims that liberation is attained when 'conflicting emotions' (*nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa*) are removed, whereas, the latter claims that omniscience (*thams cad mkhyen pa*) is attained when both the 'conflicting emotions' and the 'primitive beliefs about reality' (*shes bya ba'i sgrib pa*) are removed.

sGam-po-pa claims that the Mahāyāna family is superior to either the Śrāvaka or the Pratyekabuddha families, because the Māhayāna family consists of those who have overcome the two veils of 'conflicting emotions' and 'primitive beliefs about reality'.¹

¹ sGam-po-pa, *Dam chos yid bzhin nor bu thar pa rin po che'i rgyan*, fol. 6b-7a. See, H.V. Guenther, *The Jewel Ornament of Liberation*, Rider and Company, London, 1959, p. 6.

Mi-pham, in discussing the superiority of the Mahāyāna from various points of view, has a view pertinent to this context. That is, he discusses the removal of 'conflicting emotions' and the 'primitive beliefs about reality' in terms of the five paths (*lam lnga*). He states:

....Their [ie. the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva] path is called "their career". Because one gradually diminishes one's attachments and controls oneself on a path freed from discursive thoughts by dwelling in ethical behaviors which are fundamental to linking one's learning, one's thinking, and one's habits to appreciative discrimination, one enters the Sublime family of those who have unimpeded knowledge. [Therein, when attachments begin to increase, one becomes disgusted with them immediately. When discursive thoughts begin to arise, one quiets them by fixing one's mind on one's breathing, after having first fixed the mind on its objective reference which is devoid of those activities. [This means] first, one contemplates on the four objects of sustained attentiveness by bringing to mind, over and over again, the topics such as the fact that the body is devoid of an ontological principle; the fact that entities of reality are no-thing in terms of a self which becomes inflated and then collapses; the fact that impermanence is a variety of frustration - all topics dealing with the complete person. After having traversed the Path of accumulation and the Path of linking up by properly bringing forth the four attempts at rejection [and acquisitions], then on the Path of insight, one perceives directly the fact that the complete person is without an ontological principle -- the main concern of the Four Noble Truths. The conflicting emotions are gradually removed as one traverses through the nine stages of a Bodhisattva, one by one. In this way, one removes all conflicting emotions linked to the three levels of existence. Thus he becomes freed from the world of frustrations. In short, on the occasion of the three careers, one practices the thirty seven members of

Enlightenment and attains a goal proper to his career. Then, finally, one reaches the Citadel of an Ārhat.¹

This rather lengthy quotation outlines the whole career of a Buddhist on the path to Enlightenment. In the commentary to follow, Vinītadeva summarizes this view. It is of interest to note that the so-called 'observable qualities which are knowable' in Vinītadeva's commentary is exactly what Mi-pham has explained as the 'four objects of sustained attentiveness'. By relating the two texts, we can see that here, Vinītadeva refers to the Path of accumulation. It is a very good place to start, because, as Mi-pham has pointed out, these five paths are traversed by those in any career - be he a pious listener, a self-styled Buddha, or a Bodhisattva - and each one must begin in a preparatory stage. Let us now turn to Vinītadeva's subcommentary.

The statement, "...the explanation that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why make an exposition that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced?" Here, the exposition that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced, is for the sake of removing conflicting emotions (*nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa*) and the primitive beliefs about reality (*shes bya ba'i sgrib pa*).

¹ Mi-pham, *mkhas pa'i tshul 'jug pa'i sgo zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos*, fol. 76b-77a.

The statement, "...the complete person has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced..." is made for the sake of removing 'conflicting emotions'.

The statement, "...the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced..." is made for the sake of removing 'primitive beliefs about reality'.

The statement, "....both are removed...." summarizes the statement, "....both conflicting emotions and primitive beliefs about reality are removed....."

The statement, "....emotions such as cupidity-attachment (*'dod chags*) come from an opinionated view about the perishable constituents (*'jig tshogs la lta ba*)...." is a reply to those who ask, "How is one to understand the statement, 'the complete person has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced'?" This means, cupidity-attachment and so on come from an opinionated view about the perishable constituents. Therefore, cupidity-attachment and aversion-hatred (*zhe sdang*) rise in those who either agree or disagree with such expressions as "I exist...." or "It is mine...." as the correct view of reality. When opinionated views which take the form "I exist...." or "It is mine...." are removed, then one is freed from cupidity-attachment. Such things as an axe and sandalwood cannot produce attachment or anger in anyone!

If cupidity-attachment and so on are produced from [an opinionated view about] the self, how does one overcome it? Therefore, the reply, "...a thorough comprehension that the complete person has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced...." This means, [because] cupidity-attachment is produced from an opinionated view about the self, a thorough comprehension that the complete person has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced acts as an aid (*gnyen po*) to overcome an opinionated view about the substantiality of a self. Therefore, when one sees (*mtshong*) that the complete person has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced, then one becomes freed from opinionated views about the self. When opinionated views are removed, conflicting emotions, such as cupidity-attachment produced from such opinionated views, are removed in toto. Thus, the explanation that the complete person has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced is for the sake of removing conflicting emotions.

The statement, "...the knowledge that the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced...." is a reply to those who ask, "How are primitive beliefs about reality removed through the explanation that the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced?" This means, knowledge of the fact that the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced, acts as an aid to overcome

primitive beliefs about reality. Therefore, by knowing that the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced, primitive beliefs about reality are removed.

The statement, "...the removal of conflicting emotions and primitive beliefs about reality..." is a reply to those who ask, "What is accomplished by removing conflicting emotions and primitive beliefs about reality?" One removes conflicting emotions such as cupidity-attachment, in order to attain liberation (*thar pa*). One removes primitive beliefs about reality in order to attain omniscience (*thams pa mkhyen pa*).

The statement, "...the removal of conflicting emotions" is a reply to those who ask, "How is one to understand the statement, 'One removes conflicting emotions to attain liberation'?" This means, emotions such as cupidity-attachment hinder one from attaining liberation; thus, when cupidity-attachment and so on are removed, one will attain liberation.

The statement, "....a primitive belief about reality...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is a primitive belief about reality and how does one attain omniscience by removing it?" In this treatise, a primitive belief about reality is understood to be any tendency (*bag chags*) which is partial to (*mngon par zhen pa*) a subject-object dichotomy. It is an unknowing (*mi shes pa*) which, although not emotionally tainted, still prevents (*bar du chad pa*) transcending awareness (*ye-shes*) from operating on everything knowable (*shes bya thams cad*).

When primitive beliefs about reality of the variety just mentioned, are removed, then transcending awareness which is neither impeded (*thogs pa med pa*) nor limited (*chags pa med pa*) by knowledge - either worldly or transworldly - comes forth. Therefore, when primitive beliefs about reality are removed, one attains omniscience.

The words, "all observable qualities" in the statement, "...all observable qualities which are knowable..." refer to impermanence (*mi rtag pa*), frustrations (*sdug bsngal*), the open dimension of reality (*stong pa nyid*), and the [fact that everything is] without an abiding principle to which it can be reduced (*bdag med*). These are called, "all observable qualities which are knowable."

Transcending awareness which is neither impeded nor limited:
In so far as a thing, which exists sometimes but not at other times, depends on some other cause, it is said to be 'limited'. That which exists without depending on some other cause, is said to be 'not limited'. That which exists in some things, but does not exist in other things, is said to be 'impeded'. That which exists in all things, is said to be, 'not impeded'.

The above explanation is one way of pointing out the purpose of this treatise, but there are still other ways.

c. *To lead sentient beings to the fruition of 'awareness qua sensa'*

In this section, Vinītadeva points out a very important aspect of Buddhist psychology. We have seen already (p.78) that an awareness never takes place in a vacuum; however,

caution must be exercised here, because on the surface, the term 'awareness' (*rig pa*) seems to imply a 'subjective' view of reality. To misconstrue the Buddhist Mentalistic trend as a system which disproves the existence of an external world, and therefore is a 'subjective idealism', misses the mark.

An awareness involves the external world as much as it does an internal world. That is to say, the 'external world' is just as much 'internal' as the 'internal world' is 'external'. The followers of the Buddhist Mentalistic trend express this relationship through an analogy. They speak of reality as a 'container' and 'the contents'. Reality as a 'container' is the world in which men relate, and reality as 'the content' refers to the sentient beings. A 'container' is a container only in so far as it has contents. 'The contents' are contents only in so far as they are contained. This relationship (*zung 'jug*) is reality.

If, however, a relation is not understood as a relation, but is taken to be a particular existence, then ideas such as 'subject' and 'objects' arise as independent existences having nothing to do with each other. Due to such ideas, reality becomes divided into its objective and subjective components. The Buddhist Mentalistic trend, therefore, tries to show how this impossible dividedness comes about and then how it can be overcome.

The method by which such dichotomies are overcome and which has been mentioned in passingⁱⁿ the former discussion, is discussed more fully in this section by Vinītadeva. Here, the Path of insight comes into focus, because it is on this path that the dichotomy of subject and object is destroyed. Because in this process of destroying the subject-object^{dichotomy}, the Buddhist Mentalists have laid such emphasis on negating the object of perception that those who were not aware of the intention behind this process, concluded that the Buddhist Mentalists were 'subjective idealists'. There is one other reason for this misconception. Since the tradition of English translators has been nourished in a soil to think 'subjectivism', when they came across terms deeply rooted in psychology and philosophy, and especially in the deeper recess of meditation, they concluded that these terms were all psychological or mental, on the basis that the philosophical implication was 'subjective' because the Buddhist Mentalists negated the 'object'. However, even from the few passages in Vinītadeva's text, we can see that he is not expounding 'subjective idealism'. In this text, he rejects both the apprehending subject and the object apprehended. He does not accept the apprehending subject alone. However, in view of the fact that the Buddhist Mentalist does go to great extent to negate the substance view of an epistemological object, it is not difficult to see how the Buddhist Mentalistic movement could have been misconstrued as a 'subjective idealism'.

The question now may arise as to why the Buddhist Mentalists go to such extent to negate the object. Why did they not simply negate the subject? or for that matter, the whole dichotomy? In his commentary, the *bDus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel bshad*, Sthiramati gives us the answer. He says,

Why do [the Buddhist Mentalists] not establish the non-existence of the 'awareness *qua* sensa' first? [The reply] because the apprehending subject [logically] depends on the object apprehended. If the object is negated, then the reality of the subject is easily negated. If it were vice versa, since the mutual relationship between subject and object could not obtain, reality [itself] would be negated.¹

In this passage, Sthiramati makes it clear that a reality without a 'mind' which can be conscious of it, or to state it in another way, a reality which excludes a 'mind' which orders it, ~~may be accounted~~ for logically, but it could not be 'significant'. A significant reality can be spoken about only in relation to an existential Being. In other words, the Buddhist Mentalist's claim presupposes an existential Being as a pre-requisite to a discussion on 'reality'. This position has been misconstrued to mean that the Buddhist Mentalists are subjective idealists. About this, H.V. Guenther has made the following important observation:

....While idealists of the Western type insist on this conclusion [i.e. all reality must be sensations and hence mental], the Yogācāra

¹ Sthiramati, *bDus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa 'grel bshad*, P. ed., Vol. 109, p. 142.2.2-3.

philosophers thought otherwise. They declared the physical objects must be defined in terms of what can be experienced, but that which can be experienced is not just sensations or mental events. The yellows and blues which are the objects of my immediate and direct awareness, are not the awareness itself, but that of which I am aware. There is no point in saying that not only my awareness but also that of which I am aware is mental. Similarly it is meaningless to assert that the colours which I see are physical. After all, to which physical object do the red spots belong which I see when I get hit on the head? To put it concisely, seeing blues and yellows is doubtless a mental event, as any seeing is; but this does not for a moment imply that what is thus seen is mental or physical. The mental and the physical are special constructs within the field of experience, and another such construct is the relation of externality which makes me believe that things exist as such and external to the observer. Once we appreciate that it is the experience that matters, we will never bring up any questions of things existing unexperienced. The Yogācāra philosophers did not deny that there were things external to the observer, but they disclaimed their independent existence and they objected to their being equated with mind.¹

Thus we can see that the Buddhist Mentalist's denial of the external object was not so much an absolute negation of objects external to the observer, but was a method of emphasizing the fact that it is experience that counts. And experience can and does take place even when external objects are not present; therefore, the Buddhist Mentalist's claim that the view which claims an independent existence of objects must be negated, is summed up in the term *rnam par rig pa*.

¹ H.V. Guenther, *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, p. 16

At this point, it may be in order to explain the reason for rendering the term *rnam par rig pa* into English as 'awareness *qua* *sensa*'. An awareness (*rig pa*) is an awareness in so far as it brings something (*rnam pa*) to light. This something which is brought to light is termed '*sensa*'. '*Sensa*' is however not different from or separate from 'awareness'; therefore, the term *qua* indicates this relationship. The word *qua* is used in the sense of brackets () in the formula $f(x)$. Therefore, if 'experience' is expressed $f(x)$, then f = awareness, () = *qua*, and x = *sensa*. However, we must take care not to interpret this formula in its purely mathematical sense as W. Quine has done when he says, "To be is, purely and simply, to be the value of a variable."¹ For the Buddhist Mentalists, the x does not represent a 'variable' which gains a value, but it *is* a 'value'. The whole formula $f(x)$ represents 'awareness *qua* *sensa*' which points to a total 'experiential field'. In order to gain this understanding, such treatise as the present one is necessary, and therefore, this treatise is undertaken to accomplish that purpose. Let us now turn to Vinītadeva's text.

The statement, "...or again, those who are attached to the complete person and the entities of reality...." explains

¹ Willard V. Quine, "On What There Is", in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, ed. by L. Linsky, The University of Illinois Press, 1952 p. 200.

another purpose. Some of whom we speak, become attached to the entities of reality which are postulated (*brtags pa*) as the psycho-physical constituents of the personality (*phung po*), the individualistic attitudes (*khams*), and the localized fields of sensations (*skye mched*). They take these to be an ontological and factual reality (*rdzas*). Others become attached even to the complete person. Those who are attached to the complete person and the entities of reality do not know the 'awareness *qua sensa*' system for what it stands; therefore, for their sake, it is explained that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced.

In any event, this treatise is undertaken in order to explain that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced, so that, ultimately, these people will understand the 'awareness *qua sensa*' system and the outcome of that understanding.

The terms 'awareness *qua sensa*' in the statement, ".... 'awareness *qua sensa*' and the outcome of that understanding" refer to the mind (*sems*) and mental events (*sems byung*) freed from the [the dichotomy of] an apprehending subject (*'dzin pa*) and an object apprehended (*gzung ba*). The outcome means the spiritual stages (*sa*) beginning with Great Joy (*rab tu dga' ba*). So that, ultimately, these people will understand means, first, they must study commentaries such as the *Sum cu pa* which are appropriate ways (*thabs*) to investigate the apprehending subject and the object apprehended. Then,

from having studied them, one must reflect (*sems*) [on them] by means of intrinsic awareness (*rig pa*). Having contemplated [on them], next, when one begins one's examination of the object apprehended, one must start with sustained attentiveness (*nye bar dran pa*) and continue the practice until [the stage of] patient acceptance (*bzod pa*)¹. Then, from having made an examination of the object apprehended, when one reaches the [stage of the] highest worldly realization (*chos mchog*)², which has the specific characteristic of 'when the apprehended object does not exist, the apprehending subject does not exist', then even the apprehending subject is rejected. Because a Yogin gives up the apprehended object and the apprehending subject in that manner, as he traverses the spirital stages, one by one, beginning with the [stage of] Great Joy, he frees himself of this or that obstacle [which beclouds his] evidence of being (*chos dbyings*). In this manner, he finally gains an understanding of the 'awareness *qua* sensa' system and the understanding which results from it.

¹ The implication is that one must continue one's practice from the Path of Accumulation through the Path of Linking up. See, 'Ba'-ra-ba's *Tibetan Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, Vol. 9, fols. 436-440. See also, H.V. Guenther, *Kindly Bent to Ease Us*, Dharma Publishing, p.241-44.

² See, Mi-pham, *mKhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos*, fol. 59b.

d. *To remove two kinds of partial views*

An Enlightenment attitude is one which steers clear of an biased views. This is made clear in the *Kāśyapaparivarta* which states:

Moreover, Kāśyapa, a correct understanding of the pursuit for life's meaning is the Middle Path. This means:

- a. a pursuit for life's meaning is an open dimension, not because it is fabricated into an open dimension, but because it is itself an open dimension.
- b. a pursuit for life's meaning defies definition, not because it cannot be defined, but because it has nothing to do with definitions.
- c. a pursuit for life's meaning is not intentional, not because it lacks intention, but because it has nothing to do with intentions.
- d. a pursuit for life's meaning is truly unmotivated, not because it lacks motivation, but because it has nothing to do with motives.
- e. a pursuit for life's meaning is not produced, not because there is no production, but because it is not a product.
- f. a pursuit for life's meaning does not occur, not because it is not an occurrence, but because it does not just occur.
- g. a pursuit for life's meaning is without a nature which makes it what it is, not because it lacks a nature, but because it is an essenceless state.

To have a correct understanding of these topics, Oh Kāśyapa, is the Middle Path - the correct understanding of the pursuit for life's meaning.¹

¹ Baron A. von Staël Holstein, *Kāśyapavarivarta*, The Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1926, p. 94.

From the above quotation, we can see that parameters cannot be placed on experience. As soon as experience is reduced to this or that, then it loses its dynamic aspect and becomes limited. Therefore, a view which claims to be the final word about reality is considered to be a 'bias' - an extreme view which limits reality. Regardless of whether the view is positive or negative, nihilistic or eternalistic, there is either an over-evaluation of reality or an under-estimation of it.

The Sārvāstivādins, the eternalists, are those who claim that all entities of reality have a unique and particular existence. This view is refuted as an 'extreme'. The Sārvāstivādins went so far as to say that, that which the eyes perceive are the atoms.

The Prāsangika-Mādhyamikans¹, had a 'double standard' about reality. On the one hand, they claimed a 'higher reality' (*don dam pa*) of which nothing could be said, and on the other hand, they claimed a 'lower reality' (*kun brtags*) which was 'un-reality' because it was a postulation. From K'uei-chi's commentary to the *Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun*, according to Wei Tat, we learn that it was the Svātantrika Mādhyamikans who were under attack here, because K'uei-chi makes the statement, "....as did Master Bhavaviveka and others."

Vinītadeva's discussion is brief, because he deals with this topic again later. He says:

¹ Wei Tat, *Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun*, Dainippon Printing Co., (H.K.) Ltd., Hong Kong, 1973, p. 7

The statement, "....again, like the perceptual operation (*rnam par shes pa*), the knowable (*shes bya*)...." is for the purpose of explaining still another purpose.

Some, who speak about an external reality, say that just as the perceptual operation exists as an ontological and factual reality, so too, the objects [of that perception] exist as an ontological and factual reality.

Some Mādhyamikans are famous for maintaining that just as the knowable exists contingently, but not absolutely, so too, perceptual operations exist contingently, but not absolutely.

Therefore, the purpose for undertaking this treatise is to explain that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced, so that these two kinds of absolute talkers will be negated. The 'two kinds of absolute talkers' refer to those who claim that everything exists and those who claim that everything does not exist, as their final word.

I have [now] completed my discussion on the purpose for undertaking this treatise.

B. The Subcommentary Proper

Under this heading, one would expect to find a discussion of the first of the seven major topics outlined previously (p. 84), but because Vinītadeva discusses questions put forth by other philosophical systems before going into a discussion of the seven major topics, the discussion on those philosophical

questions has been titled *The Subcommentary Proper* as a subsection of the present chapter.

There may be doubts as to whether this subsection can be properly called *The Subcommentary Proper* and as to whether it warrants separation from the seven major topics. In other words, one may question what the previous discussion was about if this discussion falls under *The Subcommentary Proper*, and also, if this is *The Subcommentary Proper*, then why is it not separated into a chapter of its own.

This section has been titled *The Subcommentary Proper* because, unlike the discussion which preceded it, it is with this discussion that Vinītadeva begins, for the first time, his discussion on Vasubandhu's treatise, the *Sum cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*. In other words, this discussion is contextually related to Vasubandhu's treatise. It does not warrant a separate chapter, because just like the subsection of the present chapter, the *Preamble*, this discussion functions as an introduction to the seven major topics. Therefore, although it is contextually related to Vasubandhu's treatise, it is discussed as a subsection of the present chapter.

This subsection, *The Subcommentary Proper*, has the following divisions:

1. A General statement
 - a. A clarification of the words in the verse
 - i. Figurative expression
 - ii. Transformation

- iii. The relationship between 'figurative expressions' and 'transformation'
 - b. Refutation of the two kinds of partial views
 - c. Refutation of the view that an external object is the objective reference of a perceptual operation
 - d. Refutation of the view that an aggregate is the objective reference of a perceptual operation
 - e. Refutation of the view that either an atom or an aggregate of atoms is the objective reference of a perceptual operation
 - f. Refutation of the view that either past or future feelings is the objective reference of a perceptual operation.
 - g. Refutation of the view that figurative expressions are possible when three conditions are met
 - i. Refutation of a concrete reality
 - ii. Refutation of the example
 - 1. Refutation of a generic property as the object of a figurative expression
 - 2. Refutation of a substance as the object of a figurative expression
 - h. Refutation of the view that the object which is figuratively expressed exists as a concrete reality
- 2. The three kinds of transformations
 - a. A general statement
 - b. The specific characteristics of the three transformations
 - i. Transformation as a cause
 - ii. Transformation as an effect
 - iii. Which transformations generate which tendencies?
 - c. The three transformations are distinguished by naming each one

Labels have a tendency to concretize reality. If one should encounter an 'event' for which a name has not yet been given, there immediately arises the desire to categorize it. A 'name', by which categories are created, seems to give an event an ontological status. When an event which has no name is encountered, it leaves one in a state of discomfort. To state the same in another way, when an event gets labelled to be a 'such-and-such', a sense of security or relief is gained in the association one has with a label. Such a process by which reality gets labelled is termed 'figurative expression' (*nye bar 'dogs pa*).

The word 'figurative' implies that what an expression points to is not 'reality as such', and the word 'expression' indicates that what appears (*snang ba*) before the mind has the potential (*bag chags*) to express itself as if it were 'reality as such'. All of this takes place in the transformation of a perceptual operation (*rnam par shes pa gyur*) which is both an active and a reactive response.

What the Buddhist Mentalists attempted to establish was not an affirmation nor a denial of an external world as such, but the fact that a figurative expression (*ie.* a name = a postulate) was nothing more than a logical fiction. In other words, figurative expressions were not expressions *about* reality, but whatever has been experienced as if it were an object (*ie.* the part apprehended as an object in a perceptual operation) is figuratively expressed.

However, ordinary people take what is apprehended as an object in a perceptual situation to be the concrete world. These people think that when words are used to communicate their 'ideas' they also relate^{to} the world which they experience. The problem of communication comes, not so much in using figurative expressions to talk about something, but in believing that these expressions deal directly with reality as such. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* (Lévi edition, Chapter XII, verse 12, p. 87) hints at how figurative expressions function in the following statement:

The statement, "The loss of intrinsic awareness and Enlightenment are the same" truly reveals the true intention [of the Buddha], whether the statement be understood in that manner or as a clarification of conflicting emotions. The 'loss of intrinsic awareness' can be the 'existential state of Enlightenment' because the former is a figurative expression of the latter.

In this subsection, Vinītadeva responds to various philosophical trends which express their views about the object of a figurative expression. In refuting them, one at a time, Vinītadeva concludes that what is figuratively expressed is not the ontological and factual reality, but what is apprehended as an object in a perceptual operation. In other words, the 'self' and the 'entities of reality' which are figuratively expressed are nothing more than logical fictions which are produced from and which in turn produce the experientially initiated potentialities of experience (*bag chags*).

Because the Buddhist Mentalists claim the 'transformation of a perceptual operation' as the basis (*rten*) for figurative

expressions, the opponents are quick to challenge the idea of a basis. The opponents claim that a 'basis' can be a basis only if it has substance. The Buddhist Mentalists claim the 'transformation of a perceptual operation' as the substantial basis of figurative expressions, but by the term 'substantial basis', they do not imply a static entity, but a dynamic process of change which is a process of interdependency. Vinītadeva, being the logician that he was, uses logical arguments to defend his position. His thesis is that some 'point of departure' must be accepted, because, otherwise, nothing could be said. Without a basis of some kind, one falls into the philosophical problem of *reductio ad absurdum*, because anything could be everything. Therefore, the Buddhist Mentalists accept the 'transformation of a perceptual operation' as the substantial basis for figurative expressions.

The above discussion boils down to the following conclusions. What is known in knowledge and what is expressed by expressions are not ontological and factual reality. For example, sound can be considered to be the facticity of an expression, but the sounds which go into making up a word do not relate to what is being expressed by the word. The word, on the other hand, does not give sound its ontological status. The word 'sound' which is a figurative expression for certain combination of wave-lengths, is not the wave-lengths which constitute a sound. The wave-lengths also are not 'some thing', because they do not have an ontological

status of their own. The description of 'sound' which has been attempted here, is a good example of a figurative expression, because having discussed the term 'sound' we do not know any more about sound than the 'idea' that we had of it before we began the discussion. That of which we can be certain, is the fact that we did have an 'idea' which was nothing more than a logical fiction about 'sound'. Because our knowledge, or understanding, of 'sound' is itself a 'logical fiction' about sound, our knowledge is knowledge about these logical fictions. It is not about an ontological and factual reality. The claim of the Buddhist Mentalists was therefore, not one of either affirming or denying external objects, but one of asserting that what is known and what is expressed as knowledge are not the external world. It is in this sense, then, that the Buddhist Mentalists talk about the 'non-existence of an external world'. We can now investigate how Vinitadeva develops this idea in his subcommentary.

1. *A General Statement*

The statement,

The various figurative expressions about

The self and the entities of reality (1 a, b)

is a reply to those who ask, "How can one know that the complete person and the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced?"

The verse is a summary of the statement, "Whatever occurs as the various figurative expressions about the self and figurative expressions about the entities of reality."

The word 'the' is to be contextually related to the word 'whatever'.

The statement, "...in daily life (*'jig rten*) and in scholarly treatises (*bstan bcos*)...." is for the purpose of explaining that these words are missing in the verse. Thus, the statement should read: "The various figurative expressions about the self and about the entities of reality which occur in daily life and in scholarly treatises....."

The statement,

Occur in the transformation of a perceptual operation (lc) is a reply to those who ask, "On what do [figurative expressions] depend?" [A figurative expression occurs in the transformation of a perceptual operation, and] that is the part apprehended as an object (*gzun ba'i cha*) in a perceptual situation (*rnam par shes pa*). The word 'that' is contextually related to 'figurative expressions about the self and about the entities of reality'.

The meaning of the verse is as follows: Figurative expressions about the self or about the entities of reality which occur in daily life and in scholarly treatises occur in the transformation of a perceptual operation [and] that is the part apprehended as an object in a perceptual situation. Figurative expressions are not about an external self or external entities of reality. Therefore, it ought to be known that the complete person and the entities of reality have no

abiding principle to which they can be reduced.

a. *A Clarification of the words in the Verse*

i. *Figurative expression*

The statement, "...by figurative expressions about the self and about the entities of reality..." is for the purpose of clarifying the individual words in the verse.

That by which a 'self' is figuratively expressed, is a figurative expression about the self. Likewise, that by which the entities of reality are figuratively expressed, is a figurative expression about the entities of reality.

The statement, "...moreover..." is for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the word 'figurative expression'. It should be known that a word which figuratively expresses a self is a notion (*brtags pa*) about the self. A word which figuratively expresses the entities of reality is a notion about the entities of reality. 'Figurative expressions', 'notions', and 'propositions' are synonyms, and this is [the limit to which we can] define 'knowledge' (*shes pa*) and expressions (*brjod pa*).

The statement, "...'various' means 'manifold'..." is for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the word 'various'. Expressions such as "The self...." up to expressions such as "The lord...." by which a self is postulated, are the various figurative expressions by which the self is postulated.

The statement, "....the psycho-physical constituents of the personality (*phung po*), the individualistic attitudes (*kham*s), and...." is for the purpose of explaining that the figurative expressions about the entities of reality are also various, but because that is easily understood, it will not be explained.

The statement, "....these two kinds of figurative expressions...." introduces a question put forth by others. [They ask,] "How can it be known that these two kinds of figurative expressions are nothing more than the part apprehended as an object in a perceptual situation and are not figurative expressions about a real (*dn*gos) self and [real] entities of reality?" [They use the word] 'real' in the sense of ultimately real (*don dam pa*).

The statement, "....entities of reality and the self...." is for the purpose of explaining that the self and so on which have been postulated in figurative expressions, are not real objects (*dn*gos *su yul*). Because a self and the entities of reality do not [in fact] exist outside of a transformation of a perceptual operation, the self and the entities of reality which have been postulated in figurative expressions are not real objects.

ii. Transformation

The statement, "....what is transformation?...." is for the purpose of [clarifying the word 'transformation'], because it is confused with the 'transformation' talked about by those

who are confused (*mu stegs can, viz.,* the Saṃkhya). Is 'transformation' to be understood as the Saṃkhya (*grangs can*) claim (*viz.,*) that a thing which exists as a substance, the *prakṛit*, changes into something else, or is it otherwise?

The statement, "...to become different..." is for the purpose of explaining the facticity of 'transformation'. The statement, "...the moment of the cause..." is for the purpose of explaining that the word 'transformation' means 'to become different', but not as claimed by the Saṃkhya system.

'Transformation' is an identity experience (*bdag nyid*) which is different from the moment of the cause which becomes extinguished the moment it ceases to be cause. The explanation comes to this: An effect which is different from the cause is expressed by the term 'transformation'.

iii. *The relationship between 'figurative expressions' and 'transformation'*

The statement, "...When tendencies (*bag chags*) [implanted] by discursive thoughts (*rnam par rtog pa*) about the self and so on mature (*yongs su brtas pa*),..." is for the purpose of explaining how figurative expressions about the self and about the entities of reality occur in a transformation of a perceptual operation, because the facticity of 'transformation' has been explained.

When tendencies [implanted] by discursive thoughts about the self and so on, mature, then discursive thoughts about a sensum (*rnam pa*) [which resembles] a self and so on, comes

forth from the substratum awareness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*). Because the sensum [resembling] a self and so on, is experienced (*rtogs pa*) as if it were something other than the part apprehended as an object in discursive thought, even though an external self does not exist, the self and and so on, have been figuratively expressed from time immemorial. In the same manner, when tendencies [implanted] by discursive thoughts about color and form, mature, then discursive thoughts about the sensa [which resemble] color and form come forth from the substratum awareness. Because the sensa [which resemble] color and form are experienced as if they were something other than the part apprehended as an object in discursive thoughts, even though external color and form do not exist, color and form have been figuratively expressed from time immemorial.

The words, 'tendencies mature' refer to potentials which have the capacity (*nus pa*) to accomplish an effect ('*bras bu*) immediately. The word 'resembles' (*snang ba*) refers to the part apprehended as an object. The statement, "....like a shaggy hair net (*skra shad 'dzings*) of a person suffering from an eye disease (*rab rib can*)...." is an example of that. For example, just like the shaggy hair net - the sensum (*ie.*) the part apprehended as an object - of a person suffering from an eye disease, is figuratively expressed as a 'shaggy hair net', so too, the self and the entities of reality - the sensum, (*ie.*) the part apprehended

as an object [in a perceptual operation - are figuratively expressed as the self and the entities of reality. The words 'shaggy hair net' mean 'a mane' (*skra'i tshogs*).

b. *Refutation of the two kinds of partial views*

The meaning comes to this: [Sthiramati] says, ".... 'figurative expressions' means to figuratively express something where there is nothing...." because [some people] think that the part apprehended as an object [can be figuratively expressed as a self and entities of reality only if] the self and the entities of reality do in fact exist; and therefore, [they think] the self and the entities of reality do in fact exist (*dngos su grub pa*).

The self and the entities of reality are figurative expressions about the part apprehended as an object [in a perceptual situation]. If they [figurative expressions] were about a concrete reality (*dngos su yod*), then why [would they be] figurative expressions? To figuratively express something where there is nothing, is like calling a lazy person (*blun po*) a 'cow' (*ba lan*). Although a lazy person is not a cow, he is figuratively expressed as a 'cow'.

If the so-called 'figurative expressions' are propositions (*'dogs pa*), how could they be about a concrete reality? Therefore, the self and the entities of reality are not the concrete objects of figurative expressions.

The statement, "...because outside of being the facticity of a perceptual operation, a self and the entities of reality do not in fact exist...." is for the purpose of summarizing this topic, because the object of a figurative expression, as a concrete reality, has been negated. Because 'sensa' has been explained in the above manner, outside of the part apprehended as an object in a perceptual situation and [outside of a] perceptual operation, there is no self or entities of reality which have concrete existence. Therefore, the self and the entities of reality are nothing more than logical fictions (*kun brtags*). They do not exist anywhere as an absolute reality. Therefore, the claim of the absolute talkers that the knowable exists as a substance (*rdzas*) just like the perceptual operation, must be rejected.

The statement, "...figurative expressions...." is for the purpose of clarifying the other absolute talkers.

[The opponents]: How could figurative expressions take place without a basis?

[Sthiramati]: Therefore, the transformation of a perceptual operation wherein figurative expressions occur, must be accepted as the substantial basis. If a perceptual operation is a logical fiction just like the knowable, then [even your claim that] it does not exist as an absolute reality could not stand logical critique.

[The opponents]: Why would it not stand logical critique?

[Sthiramati]: Because [then] even a logical fiction would not exist as a reality. If there is no basis (*rten*), then even a logical fiction is not reasonable. If a basis did not exist, then even a logical fiction is not reasonable, because obviously, a proposition is made on the basis that there is something which cannot be doubted (*gnod mi za ba*). Otherwise, there would be [the fallacy of] *reductio ad absurdum*, [and] one could say "everything is everything", because nothing could be certain. Therefore, on what basis could you claim that something is a logical fiction?

The statement, "....no basis...." means everything from 'without a foundation' up to '[without] a reason'.

The writer of the commentary [Sthiramati] states, "....Therefore, the words of the teacher, 'These two kinds of absolute talkers are illogical, and therefore, have to be rejected....' in order to show that [the claim] 'these two kinds of absolute talkers are illogical' is not something he has thought up, but that it is based on the views of the teachers.

The statement, "....Therefore, all things knowable do not have concrete existence, because they are logical fictions...." is for the purpose of explaining his own position, because the absolute talkers have been refuted. If the knowable is nothing more than a facticity of a perceptual operation, then, for the very reason [that the opponents claim] that when an external self or entities of reality do not exist concretely, there is no basis [for

figuratively expressing a self or the entities of reality], according to the very same logic, because everything knowable is nothing more than a logical fiction, it could not exist concretely. If there is no basis, then there is no contingent existence. Therefore, the perceptual operation must be accepted to exist as a substantial basis (*rdzas su yod pa*), because it is 'interdependently existing' (*rten cing 'brel pa 'byung ba*).

The statement, ".... a perceptual operation is 'interdependently existing' means...." is a reply to those who ask, "What does it mean to say that a perceptual operation is 'interdependently existing'?" The fact that a perceptual operation is 'interdependently existing' can be explained only by the word 'transformation'. This is to say, [transformation is] the attainment of an identity experience as an effect which is different from the cause.

c. *Refutation of the view that an external object
is the objective reference of a perceptual
operation*

The statement, "....How can it be known that the sensum of an object (*don gyi rnam pa*) comes forth in a perceptual operation, if external objects (*phyi rol gyi don*) do not exist?..." is for the sake of refuting those who talk about an external object [as the objective reference of a perceptual operation] and of negating the self and the entities of reality as concrete [realities].

The statement, "....external objects...." by the philosopher [Sthiramati] is a reply to those who ask, "How is one to know that the *sensa* of an object, such as color and form, is produced in a perceptual operation, if color and form do not exist in an external object?" An external object, when it produces a *sensum* of a self in a perceptual operation, is certainly a sufficient condition for perception (*dmigs pa'i rkyen*), but it is not considered to be the only necessary determinative condition (*rgyu byed*).

If the sufficient condition was the only necessary determinative condition, then there could be no distinction between it and the necessary condition (*rgyu*), [the conditions which are] simultaneous with it (*de ma thag pa*), and the intrinsic condition (*bdag po'i rkyen*). They would all be lumped together (*rnam par 'jug pa*) as the only necessary determinative condition (*rgyu byed*). If [in the case of visual perception] the external object is claimed to be the only necessary determinative condition, then it could not be distinguished from the others. In other words, [those who believe that an external object exists] consider that in which a single determinate condition exists and that which produces [a perceptual operation] having its own [corresponding] sense datum, to be an object (*yuḷ*) having [those] two qualities (*chos nyid*).

d. *Refutation of the view that an aggregate is the objective reference of a perceptual operation*

The statement, "...the assembly of five perceptual operations have an aggregate (*bsags pa*) for their objective reference...." is a reply to those who ask, "Even if one concludes that an object has two qualities, so what?"

Some claim that the objective reference of the assembly of five perceptual operations is an aggregate, because they [claim that the five perceptual operations] is an awareness of an aggregate which constitutes the *sensum*.

The word 'aggregate' means a conglomerate (*bsdus pa*). Therefore, it is said that this assembly of the five perceptual operations is [a perception of] an appearance of a coarse *sensum*.

The statement, "...therefore, an aggregate does not exist apart from being a mere coming together of parts...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is wrong with an aggregate which constitutes a *sensum*?"

There is no aggregate outside of being a coming together of parts.

Why not?

The statement, "...if the parts are removed...." is a reply. If the parts are removed one at a time, then a cognition (*rnam par shes pa*) of an aggregate which constitutes a *sensum*, could not occur. If in that [aggregate] there should be so much as a material substance (*rdzas*) which can be called 'a coming together', then there should be a know-

ledge (*blo*) of a sensum composed of a coming together even when the parts are removed. But the Ācaryas have said many times that an existence made up of parts will be a hindrance..

The statement, "....therefore, even when an external object does not exist, the sensum constituted of an aggregate is produced in a perceptual operation...." is for the purpose of summarizing the topic, because the substantial existence of an aggregate has been refuted. Although an aggregate does not exist outside of being a coming together of parts, in so far as the sensum constituted of an aggregate is experienced (*myong ba*) in a perceptual situation, the sensum constituted of an aggregate comes forth in a perceptual situation when the tendencies which activate [that cognition] mature, even if an aggregate does not exist as an external object.

e. *Refutation of the view that either an atom or an aggregate of atoms is the objective reference of a perceptual operation*

[Opponents]: Although it has been concluded that a conglomerate does not exist as a substance and it cannot be the objective reference [of a perceptual operation], can a sensum constituted of a conglomerate of atoms (*rdul phra rab*) become the objective reference of that cognition?

Therefore, [Sthiramati] says, "....the aggregate of atoms....." Even a conglomerate of atoms cannot be the objective reference of that perceptual operation.

'Conglomerate' means 'an aggregate'.

[Opponents]: Why can it not be an objective reference?

[Sthiramati] says, "....because atoms do not comprise the sensum of that [perceptual operation]....." The sensum which appears as a coarse sense datum in cognition is not the individual atoms.

[Opponents]: Although the individual atoms may not be the sensum, could not the conglomerate [of atoms] become the sensum?

[Sthiramati] says, "....from atoms not aggregated...." Just as [atoms which are] not aggregated do not exist as a coarse sense datum, even when the atoms aggregate, they neither are the defining characteristic (*mtshan nyid*) of a coarse [sense datum], nor do they have a definable presence (*rang bzhin bye brag*). Therefore, just as individual atoms cannot be the objective reference [of a perceptual operation], in the same way, even those which are aggregated cannot be the objective reference [of a perceptual operation]. This means, whether [atoms] are aggregated or not, they cannot be the objective reference [of a perceptual operation]. The meaning comes to this: Just as atoms which are not aggregated do not constitute a coarse [sense datum], and therefore, cannot be the objective reference [of a perceptual operation], in the same manner, even when they are aggregated, they do not constitute a coarse [sense datum, and therefore cannot be the objective reference of a perceptual situation].

[Opponents]: How then?

[Sthiramati] says, "....whether they be separated and distinct (*tha dad pa*) or aggregated (*'dus pa*) they do not lose their molecular nature (*zlum ril*).

Some claim that a few atoms [related to] each other can be an objective reference. Therefore, [Sthiramati] says, "....individual atoms...." in order to explain their claim.

These people are famous for saying, "We believe that, although individual atoms not related to each other cannot be the object of a sensory organ (*dbang*), when atoms are mutually related (*ltos pa dang bcas pa*) they can be an object of a perceptual organ. But this [claim] is the same as the previous one.

The statement, "....even their...." is for the purpose of explaining that this view cannot endure logical critique. Even those atoms, which according to their view reach the mind (*sems su 'ong*), are neither the defining characteristic nor the definable presence of a coarse [sensus], whether they be mutually related or not. Therefore, because they are indistinguishable, they would be in contact with the sensory organs at all times, or they are not experienced by the sensory organs.

The statement, "....the atoms which are mutually related" is for the purpose of explaining another fault in that. If only atoms mutually related is accepted as the object of a perceptual operation, then whatever distinguishes the sense

datum of a pot (*bum pa*) and a copper pot (*zang bum*), or clay (*rdza ma*) and a saucer (*kham phrol*) could not appear in a perceptual operation, because atoms do not comprise the sense data of a pot and so on. The meaning is as follows: The statement, "....the appearance of a perceptual operation...." is a reply to those who think, "atoms are truly the objective reference of a perceptual operation." Because the sense data such as a pot and clay constitute a subtle sense data (*phra mo'i rnam pa*), they could not be the object of a coarse perceptual operation, because [if they could] that would be over-reasoning (*ha cang thal ba*). If [a subtle sense datum could be the objective reference of a coarse perceptual operation] then the sense datum, as large as [the sense datum] cow, would be the object of a perceptual operation.

Thus, although for the sake of discussion, the existence of atoms has been accepted, they have been negated as the objective reference of a perceptual situation. Now, the statement, "....even atoms...." is for the purpose of explaining that even atoms are not acceptable.

Because even atoms have a this side (*tshu rol*), a that side (*pha rol*), and an upper side (*dpung gi cha*) they do not exist, just like pillars and so on, in an absolute sense. Pillars and so on exist contingently (*btags pa'i yod*). Feelings (*tshor ba*) and so on are not the same.

The statement, "....if...is not accepted...." must be stated just in case someone may say, "That is not reasonable." If a this side, a that side, and an upper side of an atom is not accepted, then, one could not talk about an atom with statements such as "This is the east side", "This is the north side" and so on. If this possibility is negated, then 'east' and 'north' and so on, could not apply to an atom.

[Opponents]: What is wrong with that?

Therefore, [Sthiramati] says, "....just like the perceptual operation...." If different sides of an atom cannot be accepted, then atoms would be formless (*lus med pa*) and could not be an object (*yul na mi gnas pa*), just like the perceptual operation.

The statement, "....if that be the case, because external objects do not exist...." is for the purpose of summarizing the topic, because an object external [to the perceptual operation] has been rejected.

Whatever has been explained as a sense datum cannot be an object external [to the perceptual operation], because color and form which constitute a sense datum of a perceptual operation are produced when tendencies mature. This should be understood like perception in a dream.

f. *Refutation of the view that either past or future feeling is the objective reference of a perceptual operation*

The preceding discussion has rejected the object of the assembly of the five perceptual operations. In order to refute even the object of a mental perceptual operation (*yid kyi rnam par shes pa*), [Sthiramati] says, ".... even feelings....." Feelings and so on belong to the three periods of time; but, undoubtedly, that which has passed away (*'das pa*) and that which has not yet occurred (*ma 'ongs pa*) could not produce a perceptual operation having those qualities as its sense data, because that which has passed away has ceased to be (*'gags pa*) and that which has not yet occurred is not yet produced (*ma skyes pa*). As that which has ceased to be and that which has not yet been produced do not exist as a substance (*rdzas su*), how could they produce a perceptual operation?

From that [discussion] comes the following [ideas]: The statement, "....therefore, even a present [feeling] is not an immediate progenitor of a perceptual operation...." is a reply to those who ask, "Is a present [feeling] the progenitor [of a perceptual operation]?"

Even a present feeling does not produce a perceptual operation having that quality as its own sense datum.

The statement, "because when it is in the process of being born, it is not yet existing...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?" Consider these two positions:

A. a feeling becomes a progenitor when it is being born, and

B. a feeling becomes a progenitor, when it is born.

A. If it is being born, a feeling is not yet existent; therefore, how can it be a progenitor [of a perceptual operation] because it does not yet exist.

B. If it is already born, then the perceptual operation which takes that feeling as its sense datum has already passed away.

Thus, because feelings have nothing to do with [producing a perceptual operation], they are not the progenitors [of a perceptual operation]. From this, it follows that there is nothing which can be the objective reference of even a mental perceptual operation.

This means, because an apprehended object does not exist, even the perceptual operation does not exist as an apprehending subject. The fact that there is no object apprehended and no apprehending subject is defined [by the words,] *the entities of reality have no abiding principle to which they can be reduced.*

The fact that a perceptual operation is 'interdependently existing' is [defined by the words,] *the completed person has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced*, and we speak about a perceptual operation only in so far as it is 'interdependently existing'.

Because the completed person is 'interdependently existing', he is impermanent (*mi rtag pa*). Because [a self]

is simultaneous with and on the same level as a body, to claim a 'self' in that which is impermanent is meaningless.

[Opponents]: Why?

Because if one does not accept [the fact that a 'self'] is 'interdependently existing', then it would be permanent. A permanent [self] could not function to produce positive or negative acts nor reap their fruit, because [permanence] implies 'no change'.

The primitive beliefs about reality (*shes bya*) which relies on a creator god (*lhan cig byed pa*) cannot be accepted because [such a creator] is not a particular [existence]. Therefore, because nothing is accomplished by a fiction (*yongs su brtags pa*) which has no function, the completed person is established as having no abiding principle to which it can be reduced. Because the Ācaryas of old have explained this many times, I shall not discuss it.

g. *Refutation of the view that figurative expressions
are possible when three conditions are met*

The statement, "....but another...." is for the purpose of introducing the views of the Vaiyākaraṇa (*brda sprod pa*).

[Vaiyākaraṇa]: If the self and the entities of reality do not have substantial existence (*dnegos su yod pa*), then the part apprehended as an object in a perceptual operation could not be figuratively expressed. This is to say, figurative expressions occur when three conditions are met, but if even one of those conditions should be neglected, then [a figurative expression] cannot be made.

The statement, "...concrete reality...." is a reply to [Sthiramati's] question, "What are the three?"

[Vaiyākaraṇa] A figurative expression is possible,

1. If a concrete object exists,
2. If there is something which is similar to the concrete object and there is a similarity between the concrete object and that which is similar to it, and
3. If there is [at least] one thing which is similar.

The statement, "...for example, a concrete object, a fire...." is for the purpose of giving an example.

[Vaiyākaraṇa]: The figurative expression, "A young Brahmin is a fire" can be made

1. If a real fire exists,
2. If there is a young Brahmin who is similar to the fire, and
3. If there are qualities - either yellowness or fierceness - which are common to both the fire and the young Brahmin.

i. Refutation of a concrete reality

If the self and the entities of reality which are figuratively expressed in the transformation of a perceptual operation were real [objects], then they would have to be substantially real, but this [argument] is the same as before, and [if they were real objects] they could not be figuratively expressed.

ii. Refutation of the example

The philosopher [Sthiramati] at the very outset, says, "....The figurative expression 'A young Brahmin is a fire'" in order to refute the example.

[Sthiramati]: In this example, "The young Brahmin is a fire", either

1. a generic property (*rigs*) - fireness (*me nyid*), or
2. a substantial fire (*me'i rdzas*)

is figuratively expressed in a young Brahmin. This would mean that either

1. a general [property] of fire (*me'i spyi*), or
2. the specific defining characteristic of a fire itself (*me'i rang gi mtshan nyid*)

is figuratively expressed [in a young Brahmin].

[Vaiyākaraṇa]: What is wrong with that?

[Sthiramati]: "....a figurative expression is not about either of those two...." This means, one cannot figuratively express either one of those two.

1. Refutation of a generic property as the object of a figurative expression

The statement, "....neither yellowness (*ser ba nyid*) nor fierceness (*rno ba nyid*) found in him, belongs to a generic property...." introduces the discussion on the [refutation of the] generic property. Neither yellowness nor fierceness found in a young Brahmin exists as the generic property - fireness, because the generic property of something else cannot be accepted as the yellowness and

fierceness [found in a young Brahmin]. The argument is developed as follows:

[Vaiyākaraṇa]: Can a generic property be figuratively expressed even when common properties (*thun mong gi chos*) do not exist?

[Sthiramati]: "....when common properties do not exist !...." When common properties do not exist, a generic property cannot be figuratively expressed in a young Brahmin.

[Vaiyākaraṇa]: Why not?

[Sthiramati]: "....that would be *reductio ad absurdum*" If one could figuratively express even those things which do not have common properties, then one could figuratively express anything as everything, [and that] would be *reductio ad absurdum*. This means that similarity (*'dra ba*) is basic to figurative expressions. If one can figuratively express [things] even when similarity does not exist, then there would result the [logical fallacy of] *reductio ad absurdum* of saying "anything is everything".

The statement, "....although the generic property *per se* (*rigs chos nyid*) does not possess the two...." introduces another claim for a different basis for figurative expressions.

[Opponents]: Although it has been concluded that the generic property is not the possessor (*chos can*) of fierceness and so on, fierceness and yellowness cannot exist if the generic property - fireness - does not exist. Therefore, because fierceness and yellowness cannot exist if a

generic property does not exist, the generic property - fireness - is figuratively expressed in a young Brahmin. This comes to this: Although it has been concluded that common properties do not exist, relation (*med na mi 'byung*) is, in this case, the mark (*rgyu*) for figurative expression, and therefore, this is not a case of *reductio ad absurdum*.

The terms 'fierceness' and 'yellowness' in the statement "....although the generic property *per se* does not possess the two - fierceness and yellowness...." refer to qualities (*chos*). A generic property is that which possesses these two qualities. Substantial existence (*dnos po*) is its reality (*chos nyid*). That which does not possess the two, is a reality which does not possess the two. Therefore, a reality which does not possess these two qualities would mean the qualities - fierceness and yellowness - do not exist in a generic property.

The statement, "....because fierceness and yellowness are seen in a young Brahmin even when the generic property does not exist...." is for the purpose of explaining that even a relation (*med na mi 'byung*) does not exist. This is to say, fiercenss and yellowness appear (*snang ba*) in a young Brahmin even when the generic property - fireness - does not exist [in him], and therefore, even the relation of the two is unreasonable. When the generic property - fireness - does not exist in a young Brahmin, but [the qualities] yellowness and fierceness exist in him, then how can these two qualities be related to a generic property-fireness?

Just in case another may argue that the two qualities found in a young Brahmin are related to a generic property, [Sthiramati] says, "....relation has nothing to do with figurative expressions....." If it is claimed that the yellowness and the fierceness which are related to a generic property exist in a young Brahmin, then there is no need to figuratively express the generic property in a young Brahmin.

[Opponents]: Why?

[Sthiramati]: "....just like a fire...." Just like the generic property - fireness - exists in a real fire, if that [generic property] existed in a young Brahmin in the same manner, then what would be the purpose of a figurative expression?

This means, if yellowness and fierceness which belong to a generic property existed in a young Brahmin, then you would have to accept the fact that they exist in him, and therefore, because they [already] exist in him, what would be the purpose of a figurative expression about them? Thus the statement "[figurative expression means] to figuratively express something where there is nothing" is logical.

The statement, "....therefore, a generic property cannot be figuratively expressed in a young Brahmin...." is for the purpose of summarizing the topic, because the basis for a figurative expression has been clarified. Because the generic property cannot be accepted as neither the foundation of a figurative expression nor [as that which

possesses] the two qualities, therefore, it is not possible to figuratively express the generic quality in a young Brahmin.

2. *Refutation of a substance as the object of a figurative expression*

The statement, "....even the substance (*rdzas*) cannot be figuratively expressed...." is a reply to those who ask, "Although it has been concluded that a generic property cannot be figuratively expressed, can a substance be figuratively expressed?" Even a real fire cannot be figuratively expressed in a young Brahmin.

[Opponent]: Why not?

[Sthiramati]: "....because there are no common properties...." There are no properties common to both the fire and a young Brahmin.

The statement, "....therefore, the qualities (*yon tan*) - fierceness and [yellowness] of a fire...." is a reply to those who ask, "Are not the qualities yellowness and fierceness common? Why do you say, common properties do not exist?"

The qualities - fierceness and yellowness - are not common to both. We cannot accept that the yellowness and fierceness of a fire is the very same as those of a young Brahmin. Therefore, the yellowness and fierceness of a fire is different from the yellowness and fierceness of a young Brahmin.

The statement, "....therefore, a particular (*bye brag*)

is related to its own substratum (*rang gi gnas*)"

is a reply to those who ask, "How can one know that this is different from this?" The particulars are related to their own substratum and cannot change substratum. A fire is spoken about as 'fierce' because it has the capacity to burn wood. A young Brahmin is spoken about as 'fierce' because he is clever in [all his] actions. In the same way, the quality - yellowness - can be spoken about as being different. That comes to this: The statement, "....if the qualities of a fire did not exist, then it would not be reasonable to figuratively express a young Brahmin as a fire..." is a reply to those who ask, "Is a young brahmin figuratively expressed as a fire on the basis of qualities - yellowness and fierceness - belonging to a young Brahmin?" Because the qualities - yellowness and fierceness - of a young Brahmin are not those of a fire, how could a young Brahmin be figuratively expressed as a fire by qualities belonging to something else? If it is possible, then it would *reductio ad absurdum*.

The statement, "....if you claim that it is reasonable because they are similar to the qualities of the fire...." is for the purpose of explaining that others claim that it is necessary to talk about the similarity of the two.

[Opponents]: Since the two qualities - yellowness and fierceness - are determined according to their own substratum, it may not be possible to figuratively express a young Brahmin as a fire, but a figurative expression can be made, because

[the qualities of a young Brahmin are] similar to the qualities of a fire. This means, because yellowness and fierceness of a fire are similar to the yellowness and fierceness of a young Brahmin, 'similarity' is the basis of figuratively expressing the young Brahmin as a fire, and therefore, it is not a contradiction. The words, 'similar to the qualities' in the statement, 'similar to the qualities of a fire' is considered to be the generic property of the qualities.

The statement, "...even if it is so, because they are similar..." is for the purpose of explaining that this kind of similarity is of no help.

Even if we should accept the fact that qualities are similar, because [similarity, in this case, refers to] those qualities which are similar [in a particular generic quality], although the figurative expression of a quality - either yellowness or fierceness - of a fire as a quality - either yellowness or fierceness - of a young Brahmin, may be possible, it is not possible to figuratively express the young Brahmin as a fire [on this account]. This is to say, a fire is not related to the generic property of qualities. The generic property of qualities are together with qualities, but they are not together with a substance.

The statement, "...Because common properties do not exist in a substance, the substance - fire - cannot be figuratively expressed in a young Brahmin..." is for the purpose of summarizing the topic, because a figurative expression about a substance has been negated.

h. *Refutation of the view that the object which
is figuratively expressed exists as a concrete
reality*

The statement, "....an object exists as a concrete reality...." is for the purpose of negating a concrete reality, because the figurative expression in the example has been negated.

Anyone who says, "A figurative expression is possible if a concrete reality exists" is himself unreasonable. There is no reality of an object.

The statement, "....its facticity is...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it non-existent?" The facticity of a concrete reality (*dn̄gos kyi rang gi ngo bo*) is beyond the domain (*yul las 'das pa*) of either knowledge (*shes pa*) or words (*brjod pa*).

The statement, "....the Lord...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it beyond?" We know and speak about a Lord in so far as he possesses [Lord like] qualities; we do not intuit (*rig pa*) his facticity. The statement, "....the Lord is always appreciated (*rtogs*) [as a Lord] in accordance with his [Lord like] qualities; his facticity is not appreciated...." is a statement made by the philosophical system of the Pāramitāyāna¹ (*pha rol gyi grub pa'i mtha'*). Here the word 'Lord' is used in the sense of a

¹ H.V. Guenther states: "....The language of the Sūtras, which are the basis of Pāramitāyāna, is 'nominal' and propositional inasmuch as that which is stated can be appreciated intellectually with but incidental references to experience. What the Sūtras say can be said again quite intelligibly without, however, having any concern in that to which it pertains." *Treasures on the Tibetan Middle Way*, p. 63.

'word' as the basis for making a distinction, and it belongs to the same categories as 'substance' and so on. The word 'quality' is a particular, and means 'white' and so on.

The meaning comes to this: The statement, "...otherwise, qualities would be meaningless..." is a response to those who think, "Even the facticity of the 'Lord' can be known and can be expressed". If the facticity of the 'Lord' can be known and can be expressed, then why postulate the qualities? If the 'Lord' as a concrete reality cannot be known and cannot be expressed, then [when one] knows the 'Lord', he has the knowledge of the facticity of the qualities, [and] realizes (*rīgs*) that 'qualities' are postulations.

If the facticity of the 'Lord' can be known directly by knowledge and can be expressed with words, then why would qualities [even] be necessary?

The meaning comes to this: The statement, "...apart from knowledge and expressions..." is a response to those who think, "Although the facticity of a lord cannot be known directly by knowledge nor expressed by words, it can be known by some other means." There is no other means, except through ideas (*blo*) and words (*sgra*), by which one can know the facticity of a 'Lord' who is called, "He who is the 'Lord' of him".

The statement, "...therefore....the domain of the facticity of the 'Lord'...." is for the purpose of summarizing the topic, because the fact that there is no way of

knowing the facticity of the 'Lord'.

Because, on the one hand, there is no other way of knowing the facticity of the 'Lord' [except through ideas and by words], and on the other, in view of the fact that [a 'Lord'] cannot [be known] in knowledge nor [expressed] by words, you should get it into your head that a 'fire' [expressed in a figurative expression] is not a real fire.

[Opponents]: Although it has been concluded that a 'fire' [expressed in a figurative expression] is not a real fire, because ideas and words do not relate directly to a substance - fire, doesn't the generic property have an ontological status, because it can be [known] by an idea and [expressed] by a word?

[Sthiramati]: Oh! Even that cannot be a concrete reality. In so far as that [generic property] is defined by the facticity of a sound (*sgra*), it can be known in knowledge and [expressed] by words, but because its facticity cannot be known, how [can you conclude that the generic property] is concrete?

The statement, "...in the same manner, a sound...." is a reply to those who think, "Sound has concrete existence, because both ideas and words relate directly to it." Just as a substance and a generic property cannot¹ be directly

¹ The negation is omitted in the text, but is necessary for meaning here.

[known] in knowledge and [expressed] by words, so too, a sound is not [known] in knowledge and [not expressed] by words. In other words, there is no relation between the facticity of a sound and an expression, because the facticity of a sound is not different from an expression. In so far as difference is the basis for a relation, how could one [establish a relationship]?

Some others claim that wherein there is no relation, an expression could not be understood, and wherein an expression is not understood, there is no knowledge possible. Because these people claim that all knowledge is knowledge by concepts (*rnam par rtog pa*), how could they ever come to an understanding of that which is not directly related to an expression? [For those people], knowledge could never solicit a response (*'dzin*) with regard to [experiences] which are not related to a generic property, a quality, an act (*byed pa*), or even to a facticity of a sound. Therefore, even [their] concepts could not be otherwise.

The statement, "...therefore,..." is for the purpose of summarizing the discussion, because the fact that neither knowledge nor expressions exist has been negated. For the very reason that one cannot know or express a thing directly, for that very reason, the concreteness of an object (*don gyi dngos po*) has been negated, because neither a substance, [a sound,] nor what is expressed by a word exists.

The statement, "....all of these are nothing but notions (*btags pa*)...." is for the purpose of clarifying the [word] 'notions', because the substance [view] has been refuted.

If we accept your [the opponent's] point of view, then we come to the following conclusion. In so far as [we] claim that the concreteness of reality is nothing but a notion, [you] would say that the word 'notion' is that by which one comes to an understanding that a concrete reality does not exist [and that this means] therein there is nothing. [In other words, you would claim] that the word relates to the facticity of a notion that a 'Lord' does not exist, and [the word] is that by which you understand that facticity. But [this would] mean that because [a word] 'Lord' [expresses the] facticity of a notion, [the 'Lord'] can be known through a sound, but if the facticity, of [even] the sound cannot be known, then how can you know the concreteness of that notion?

The statement, "....if the self and the entities of reality do not exist as a concrete reality...." is for the purpose of summarizing the discussion from the very beginning. Your objection, "If the self and entities of reality do not exist concretely, then a figurative expression about the self and about the entities of reality is unreasonable" is itself unreasonable, because a self and the entities of reality [expressed in a figurative expression] are not concrete realities.

Section Two

2. *The three kinds of transformations*

The statement, "...transformation of a perceptual operation...." is for the purpose of discussing [the three kinds of transformation] at length, because the discussion on [the previous] topic has been completed.

a. *A general statement*

The [following] discussion [is for the purpose of] clarifying [what the three transformations are], because the above discussion has not clarified its kind. The statement,

That transformation is of three kinds (1d)

is a reply to those who ask, "What words explain it?" The transformation of a perceptual operation wherein figurative expressions about the self and about the entities of reality occur, is to be understood to be of three kinds.

b. *The specific characteristics of the three transformations*

The statement, "...are distinguished under the topics 'cause' (*rgyu*) and 'effect' (*'bras bu*)...." is for the purpose of explaining the specific characteristics of the three transformations. The three transformations are distinguished as a cause or as an effect.

i. Transformation as a cause

The statement, "....of these, transformation as a cause...." is for the purpose of explaining the first one.

'Transformation as a cause' refers to

1. tendencies which come to maturation (*rnam par smin pa'i bag chags*), and
2. tendencies which are in agreement with their cause (*rgyu mthun pa'i bag chags*)

which are nourished [or fattened] (*rgyas pa*) in the substratum awareness (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*). This means, 'transformation as a cause' is the substratum awareness in which tendencies are nurtured.

According to the chronicles (*lo rgyas*) of the Yogācārins, [tendencies have been interpreted in] three ways:

1. Some say, "Only tendencies which did not exist before, are produced [in the substratum awareness]."
2. Others say, "A tendency which exists at all times [in the substratum awareness] is fattened up by emotionally tainted activities (*kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos*), and when it is completely fattened up, it produces an effect immediately."
3. Others says, "A tendency which has existed [in the substratum awareness] from previous time, is fattened up, but those which have not existed [therein] previously are also produced."

These have not been mentioned by the commentator [Sthiramati].

ii. Transformation as an effect

The statement, "....[transformation] as an effect...." is for the purpose of explaining the second one. An 'effect' is what becomes actualized (*mngon par 'grub pa*) as a substratum awareness which is different from but is in agreement with a tendency which has reached its maturation when the substratum awareness [of a previous moment] is thrown out (*'phangs par gyur pa*) by whatever is in agreement with a previous act.

In the same way, 'transformation as an effect' refers to the outgoing perceptual operations (*'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa*) and the emotionally tainted mind (*nyon mongs pa can gyi yid*) which come forth from the substratum awareness, because tendencies which are in agreement with their cause have gained their maturity. The words, 'have gained their maturity' means a potential produces an effect immediately.

iii. Which transformations generate which tendencies?

The statement, "....the positive and negative outgoing perceptual operations...." is a reply to those who ask, "Which of the three transformations produce which tendencies?" The positive and negative outgoing perceptual operations implant tendencies which mature (*rnam par smin pa'i bag chags*) in the substratum awareness, because they exist (*bsgrub pa*) as an effect which has matured (*rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu*). Moreover, because they exist as positive and negative perceptual operations, they implant tendencies which are in agree-

ment with their cause, and through the strength of those [tendencies coming to maturation], a mind which is of their generic property is produced at this and other moments.

The neutral outgoing perceptual operations and the emotionally tainted mind implant only the tendencies which are in agreement with their cause, because they exist as an effect in agreement with themselves.

c. The three transformations are distinguished by naming each one

The statement, "....the three transformations..." is for the purpose of explaining the reason (*gzhi*) for the verse. Because only the number [i.e. three] has been stated and [because] we do not know their specific differences, in order to explain their specific differences, [Vasubandhu] says,

An actualized state; an ego-centered mind;

And a cognition of epistemological objects. (2 a,b)
in order to explain the three transformations by naming each one. The statement, "....These three transformations...." is for the purpose of clarifying that, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....tendencies of positive and negative acts...." is for the sake of explaining, succinctly, the facticity of those three transformations. An effect which is actualized when tendencies of positive and negative acts mature, is called "An actualized state" (See, Chapter V).

Because an emotionally tainted mind always has the facticity of an ego-centered mind, it is called "An ego-

centered mind (See, Chapter VI).

Any one of the six perceptual operations such as the visual perceptual operation and so on [which perceives] their respective [sense datum] such as color and form which appear (*snang ba*) as if they were epistemological objects, is called "A cognition of epistemological objects" (See, Chapter VII).


The words, "color and form which appear as if they were epistemological objects" refers to the 'sensum' such as color and form of an object.

CHAPTER V

TRANSFORMATION CALLED "AN ACTUALIZED STATE"

The term 'transformation' has been clarified in the previous chapter. Now, in this and the following two chapters, the contents of the 'transformation of a perceptual operation' are discussed.

In Chapter VI, the second 'transformation' will be discussed in terms of the 'intellect', which is 'compromised but ethically neutral'. In Chapter VII, the third 'transformation' will be discussed in terms of the 'six perceptual operations' which, according to the Buddhist Mentalists, go out to and interact with an object thereby, enabling man to create a world-view in the likeness of the external world. Thus, in the Buddhist Mentalistic trend, the mind (*sams*) is considered as an 'eight membered schemata', which in one sense is 'linear' and in another sense 'interacting'. This can be illustrated as follows:



This classification of the mind into eight specific mental operations resulted in aiding the Indian Buddhist Mentalists to account for periods in which the 'conscious level' of the mind seemed inoperative. For example, in refuting the Sautrāntika view of six perceptual operations, Vinītadeva claims that the system of 'six perceptual operations' could not account for the fact that a Yogin not only experiences the 'meditative concentration wherein concepts cease to be' and the 'meditative concentration wherein attitudinal and functional operations are suspended', but when he reverts from these meditative states, he goes on as before without having lost everything he had known before. In order to account for this continuity, the Buddhist Mentalists posit a 'substratum awareness' which functions both as the container of all experientially initiated potentialities of experience and as the source for all experiences in life.

In making a distinction between the two kinds of meditative concentrations mentioned above, Asaṅga gives the following account:

If the emotionally tainted mind (*nyon mongs can gyi yid*) did not exist, then ... we would fall into the problem of not being able to make a distinction between 'meditative concentration wherein concepts cease to be' and 'meditative concentration wherein attitudinal and functional operations are suspended'. The emotionally tainted mind can penetrate 'meditative concentration wherein concepts cease to be' but cannot penetrate 'meditative concentration wherein attitudinal and functional operations are suspended. If it were otherwise, the two could not be distinguished.¹

¹ See, Asaṅga's *Theg pa chen po bsdus pa*, ed. by E. Lamotte, *La Somme du Grand Véhicule*, Tome I, *Versions Tibétaine et Chinoise (Hiuan-tsang)*, Louvain, 1938, p. 5.

From the above account, we can see that Asaṅga's view of the 'substratum awareness' was not as systematically developed as that of Vasubandhu. This can be known from the fact that Asaṅga, by stating that it is the emotionally tainted mind which enables one to distinguish between the two kinds of meditative concentration, brings the term 'emotionally tainted mind' right into his discussion on the 'substratum awareness' and uses it as a synonym for the latter. In Vasubandhu's text, we find a clear distinction between the usage of the terms 'substratum awareness' and 'an emotionally tainted mind'. Therefore, in commenting on Vasubandhu's text, Vinītadeva deals with the 'substratum awareness' as the first 'transformation' and the 'emotionally tainted mind' as the second 'transformation'.

The 'substratum awareness' as an 'actualized state', has two basic defining characteristics;

1. It is an 'awareness' with an indistinct objective reference and sense datum, and
2. It is a 'substratum' in which tendencies which are both active and reactive, are subsumed.

This 'substratum awareness' is divided further into two aspects:

3. It is existentially uncompromised, and
4. It is ethically neutral.

The Buddhist Mentalists in India, and for that matter, the dGe-lugs-pa¹ in Tibet, considered the 'substratum awareness' to function in two ways. That is, in view of the fact that frustrations occur from their own inherent causes which are man's actions (*las*) and his emotions (*nyon mongs*), the 'substratum awareness' as the maturation process which is involved in the infallibility of acts and of emotions and their result, was considered to be the 'substratum awareness' called 'an actualized state'. However, in so far as they also claimed that the 'substratum awareness' was potentially capable of being rid of the 'maturation process', it was considered to be the basis for an Enlightened state. The Buddhist Mentalists distinguished the former state from the latter state by saying that the 'substratum awareness' reverted in the stage of an Arhat'.

Tsong-kha-pa clearly defines this state of an Arhat as the extinction of the maturation process when one attains 'Nirvāṇa in which all emotions are suspended' as claimed by the Hīnayānists, and when one enters the 'Meditative contemplation which is Diamond-like' claimed by the Mahāyānists.²

The 'substratum awareness' is distinguished from the second transformation (*ie.*) the 'ego-centered mind' in so far as it differs from the latter in that it is uncompromised, whereas the 'ego-centered mind' is not.

¹ Tsong-kha-pa, *Yid dang kun gzhi'i rtsa ba*, fol. 7a.

² *Ibid*, fol. 7b.

It is evident that 'Ba'-ra-ba (1310-1391) saw this problem, in view of the fact that he approaches the topic from a Prajñāpāramitā point of view¹. In his discussion, he suggests that although frustrations have their basis in the operation of the 'substratum awareness', because the 'substratum awareness' and 'Enlightenment' are not different, the 'substratum awareness' represents the emotionally tainted aspect of being and the 'transcending awareness' represents the Enlightenment aspect of being. His view of Enlightenment, therefore lies in the unity of the 'substratum awareness' and 'transcending awareness'. He quotes passages which indicate the 'unity of the opposites' from such texts as the *Sor mo phreng ba'i mdo sde* which states:

Oh sons of the Victorious One! The emotions which are [founded on] a loss of intrinsic awareness are the presentational immediacy (*rang bzhin*) of Buddhahood. Why is that so? Because they are the transformed presentational immediacy of Buddhahood.²

In this manner, 'Ba'-ra-ba accomplishes the move from the world of frustration to the world of Enlightenment.

It is the rNying-ma-pas who must be credited with making the single contribution to the development of the Buddhist Mentalistic trend, for it was they who clearly

¹ 'Ba'-ra-ba, *Kun gzhi'i rnam par shes dang ye shes kyi rnam bzhag* in *rJe 'Ba'-ra-ba chen po rgyal mtshan dpal bzang gi bka' 'bum*, Vol. 11, p. 602-637.

² *Ibid.*, p. 607.

distinguished between epistemology and ontology. This fact has been succinctly, yet clearly stated by H.V. Guenther, who states:

The nature of man as a partaker in the absolute is known as his 'constitutional ability to become enlightened' which, as it were, acts as a mediator between man's absolute nature and his individual nature of a conscious and preceptual being. It is this latter nature that is tied up with the *kun gzhi* in as much as 'being a (human) being' is tantamount to 'being compromised'; man is a 'fallen' being, not from the fact that he has committed such and such a sin, but simply because he has 'fallen', 'gone astray' into the world, into the midst of things. More properly speaking, a man *qua* man represents a continuously on going act of 'falling' or going astray. The *kun gzhi* therefore is an '(existentially) compromising' force even when it is still '(ethically) neutral'. It is 'compromising' by the very fact that it forms the basis of the experientially initiated potentialities of experience which operate through every sense and by means of which an individual's animate organism becomes the most immediate actualization of his or her volitional activity and of emotional habits.¹

Kun-mkhyen Klong-chen rab-'byams-pa Dri-med 'od zer (1308 - 1364) who was one of the greatest thinkers of the rNying-ma tradition, writes poetically about the above observation in the following manner:

The foundation for the site of their activity is an
indeterminate stratum of all and everything,
Similar to a mirror. Since its surface, undisturbed by
any (conceptual) division
Allows a cognitive capacity, lucent, but as yet not
conceptually determined and divided as to content,
To rise, it is like the brightness of the mirror.
From this (capacity) there come the five sense
perceptions that apprehend their respective objects
as color-form and so on.
In themselves they are not (conceptually) determined
and (subject-object) divided, but are like the images
in a mirror.
Afterwards come the ego-centered cognitive processes
that widen the gap between the apprehendable
(objects) and the apprehending (subject).

¹ H.V. Guenther, *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, Penguin Books Inc., Baltimore, Maryland, 1972, p. 96-97.

In a series of successive moments there is apprehension and non-apprehension, Conceptualization and non-conceptualization, emotionally toned cognition and mere cognition of content.¹

Quotations like these abound in rNying-ma literature, and in every instance, they point to the importance of the immediacy of experience.

The Indian Mentalistic trend shows signs indicating that they were somewhat aware of the importance of the immediacy of experience, because they posited the 'substratum awareness' which was at the basis of both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa (See Chapter IX). However, because of their confusion between epistemology and ontology, they did not make this very clear.

The present chapter which deals with the 'substratum awareness' can be divided into the following topics:

A. Substratum Awareness

1. Substratum
2. Awareness
3. An actualized state
4. The seeds of everything

B. The refutation of the Sautrāntika view

C. The substratum awareness as an indeterminate awareness of appropriation and of a basis

1. The substratum awareness as an indeterminate awareness of appropriation
2. The substratum awareness as an indeterminate awareness of a basis

¹ H.V. Guenther, *Kindly Bent to Ease Us*, Dharma Publishing, Calif., 1975 p. 55

D. The substratum awareness is always accompanied by the five omnipresent mental events

1. Rapport
2. Egocentric demand
3. Feeling
4. Conceptualization
5. Motivation

E. Three kinds of feelings

F. The substratum awareness is (existentially) uncompromised and (ethically) neutral

G. Rapport and the rest are on the same level as the substratum awareness

H. Does the substratum awareness function at all times or is it momentary?

I. The stage in which the substratum awareness reverts.

A. Substratum Awareness

The statement, "...When their individual facticity has not been explained...." is for the purpose of explaining the reason for the verse. So long as their individual facticity has not been fully explained, one cannot know [what the three transformations are], therefore, [Vasubandhu] says,

Of those, the substratum awareness is (2 c).

The statement, "...the substratum awareness [which contains] all the seeds is the transformation as an actualized state...." is a summary. The statement, "...of those...." is for the purpose of explaining the words "of those", but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

1. *Substratum*

The statement, "....substratum (*kun gzhi*)...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is this called a 'substratum'?"

'Substratum' refers to the substratum awareness. A perceptual operation which has this name, is the 'transformation as an actualized state'.

The statement, "....it is the seed (*sa bon*) of all emotionally tainted things (*kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos*)...." is a reply to those who ask, "Now then, why is this awareness (*rnam par shes pa*) called 'substratum'?" Because this perceptual operation (*rnam par shes pa*) is the basis for all emotionally tainted things, it is called 'substratum'. The term 'substratum' and the term 'basis' are synonyms.

The statement, "....moreover, in that, everything...." is for the purpose of giving another explanation. Because all entities of reality are contained in this perceptual operation as an effect, this perceptual operation is called 'substratum'. The word 'contained' means anything from 'are linked to' to 'are the same as'. Moreover, because only this perceptual operation functions as the container of all entities of reality as a cause, it is called 'substratum'. The word 'container' has the same meaning as [the word 'contained'] before.

2. *Awareness*

The statement, "....because it functions as a perceptual operation, it is called 'awareness'...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is this called 'awareness'?" Because it

functions as a perceptual operation, it is called 'awareness'.

3. *An actualized state*

The statement, "...levels of existences (*kham*s), [kinds of] beings (*'gro ba*), states of birth (*skye gnas*), and social status (*rigs*) - all of these...." is a reply to those who ask, "Now then, why is the substratum awareness called 'an actualized state'?"

Because the three levels of existences [*i.e.* the world of sensuous desires, the world of form, and the world of no form], the five kinds of beings [*i.e.* the hellish beings, the animals, the spirits, the gods, and the demigods], the four states of birth [*i.e.* born from a womb, oviparous, moisture generated, and spontaneous birth], and social status, such as that of a Brahmin - all of these are produced from the substratum awareness as either positive (*dge ba*) or negative (*mi dge ba*) fruitions, it is called 'an actualized state'.

4. *The seeds of everything*

The statement, "...the seeds of all the entities of reality...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is this called 'all seeds'?" Because this is the place (*gnas*) in which seeds of everything dwell, it is called 'all seeds'.

B. *The refutation of the Sautrāntika view*

The statement, "...if...another substratum awareness" is for the purpose of negating the external [object

of a perceptual operation claimed] by the Sautrāntikas
(*mdo sde pa*) [who claim that] a perceptual operation which
is separate from [and] which does not belong to the out-
going perceptual operations (*'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa*)
is unreasonable.

[Sautrāntikas]: If you claim a another substratum
awareness which does not belong to those [out-going perceptual
operations], then you must explain its objective reference
(*dmigs pa*) and its sense datum (*rnam pa*), because a perceptual
operation which does not have an objective reference and which
does not have a sense datum is unreasonable.

[Vinītadeva]: The philosopher [Sthiramati] says,
"....without an objective reference...." Even I do not
claim that the substratum awareness is without an objective
reference and is without a sense datum, but because the
objective reference and sense datum [of the substratum
awareness] are indistinct (*mi gsal ba*), it is reasonable¹
for it to be separate from the out-going perceptual operations.

The statement, "....the substratum awareness...." is for
the purpose of explaining the reason, since [the Sautrāntikas]
ask, "Why [are the objective reference and sense datum in-
distinct]?" because there could not be a perceptual operation
[wherein] the objective reference and sense datum are in-
distinguishable.

¹ The text has a negation at this point, but the negation
must be removed.

The substratum awareness occurs in two ways:

1. It presents itself (*snang ba*) internally as an appropriation, and
2. It presents itself externally as an indistinct vessel (*yongs su mi gsal ba snod*).

The word 'awareness' means anything from an appearance (*snang ba*) to a sensum (*rnam pa*).

The statement, "....of these, 'internally as an appropriation' is...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is [the meaning of the words,] 'internally as an appropriation'?"

A tendency (*bag chags*) [by which one becomes] attached (*mngon par zhen pa*) to the facticity of a logical fiction, to form [which is the object] of a perceptual organ (*dbang po*) possessed by the basis (*gnas*), and to name [*ie.* feelings, conceptualization, motivating force, and perceptual operations] is 'internal appropriation'.

This means, only those tendencies which are implanted by attachment to a logical fiction are spoken about.

The word 'basis' in the phrase 'possessed by the basis' means the body.

The word 'name' means the four psycho-physical constituents of the personality such as feeling and so on.

C. *The Substratum awareness as an indeterminate awareness of appropriation and of a basis*

The statement, "....because its objective reference is very subtle...." is for the purpose of explaining the basis for only the indeterminate [objective reference], because the facticity of the objective reference has been

explained. Because both the objective reference and the sense datum are very subtle, the substratum awareness is considered to be

....an indeterminate awareness

Of appropriation and of a basis. (3 a,b)

Because [Sthiramati's] commentary gives the compound first and then goes into an explanation of its meaning, in order to explain the compound, I say, [as follows:]

That substratum awareness (*ie.*) wherein there are

1. an indeterminate awareness of appropriation, and
2. an indeterminate awareness of a basis

is understood [to be as the verse states:]

....an indeterminate awareness

Of appropriation and of a basis. (3 a,b).

'Awareness of a basis' means anything from 'a sense datum of a basis' up to 'appearance as a basis'.

1. *The substratum awareness as an indeterminate awareness of appropriation*

The statement, "....'appropriation' means 'that which makes one appropriate'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is [the meaning of the word] 'appropriation'?" Only an 'internal appropriation' has been expressed by the word 'appropriation'.

The statement, "....It is the tendency [implanted] by discursive discrimination about the self and so on...." is for the purpose of explaining that. A tendency

[implanted] by discursive discrimination about the self and a tendency [implanted] by discursive discrimination about the entities of reality such as color and form, are called 'appropriation'.

The statement, "....because it exists...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is that tendency called 'appropriation'?" Because when tendencies exist in that manner, the substratum awareness appropriates the outcome of discursive discrimination about the self and the outcome of discursive discriminations about the entities of reality such as color and form, those tendencies of discursive discrimination about the self and the discursive discriminations about the entities of reality such as color and form, are called 'appropriation'.

From that comes the following meaning: so long as [tendencies] exist, the outcome of whatever has been predicated is appropriated [by the substratum awareness]; therefore, those tendencies are called 'appropriation'.

The statement, "....because the sense datum is not distinguishable [in the form] 'this is this'...." is for the purpose of explaining how the substratum awareness is an indeterminate appropriation, because [the term] 'appropriation' has been explained.

The substratum awareness is called 'an indeterminate appropriation', because whatever has been predicated as 'an appropriation' is not cognized (*mi rig pa*) by the substratum awareness in the manner that the sense datum of a cognition which naturally [distinguishes] this or that

in the form "This is this."

2. *The substratum awareness as an indeterminate awareness of a basis*

The statement, "....moreover, because the basis is appropriated, it is called 'appropriation'...." is for the purpose of explaining the second kind of appropriation. This means, we speak about 'appropriation', because even the basis is appropriated.

The statement, "....'basis' means body...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is a 'basis'?" [This means] a 'basis' pertains only to the body. [But the word] basis can be understood to mean 'the physical aspects' (*gzugs*) and the mental aspects (*min*) of the sensory capacities possessed by the basis. Therefore, 'basis' can be explained as the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality.

The statement, "....'appropriation' means 'clinging'" is a reply to those who ask, "How is a basis appropriated?" 'To appropriate a basis' means to cling [to the body. This is called] 'appropriation', because the attainment [of a bodily form] is together with pleasure. 'Appropriation' is defined by the word 'clinging'; therefore, 'appropriation' is synonymous with 'clinging' and 'being'. From the above, we can derive the following meaning: because the attainment of [bodily form, *ie.*,] the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality is together with pleasure, [we talk about] 'appropriation', 'clinging', and 'being'.

The statement, "....regarding that, there are two kinds of appropriations in view of [world views such as] a world view centered around sensuous desires (*'dod pa'i khams*), a world view centered around form (*gzugs kyi khams*)" is for the purpose of explaining that there are different kinds of 'appropriation of a basis' in view of particular world views.

From the world view centered around sensuous desires and form, [we speak about] 'clinging', because the attainment of [bodily form *ie.*, the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality which are categorized as] 'the physical aspect' and the 'mental aspect', is together with pleasure. This means, in [view of] those [worldly views], the physical aspect and the mental aspect are mutually related like the pole and the tent.

From the world view centered around no-form (*gzugs med pa'i khams*), because attachment to form has been suspended, form cannot come to fruition. Therefore, [in view of this world view, we speak about] 'clinging', because the attainment of the mental aspect (*ie.*,) the four psycho-physical constituents of the personality which are mutually related [to each other] is together with pleasure. This does not, however, mean that form is completely non-existent; form remains as a potential (*bag chags*) which does not mature as form.

The statement, "....because it is not possible to

know that appropriation in the form 'This is....'....." is for the purpose of explaining its 'indeterminateness', because the 'appropriation of a basis' has been explained. It is said to be 'indeterminate' because it is not possible to know that 'appropriation of the basis' in the form "This is....". To say, "This is...." is like taking hold of one's self.

Because the 'indeterminateness' of appropriation has been explained, [now] in order to explain [the words] 'awareness of a basis', [Sthiramati] says, "....'awareness of a basis'...." Here, 'awareness of a basis' means an awareness of a basis (*ie.*,) the world as the container of sentient beings.

The statement, "....moreover, because the objective reference and the sense datum are indistinguishable...." is for the purpose of explaining its indeterminateness. The objective reference and sense datum of that which has been explained as 'an awareness of the basis' are also indistinguishable [in the form "This is...."]; therefore, it is called 'indeterminate'.

The statement, "....if that be the case, then the objective reference and the sense datum of that perceptual operation would be indistinguishable...." is for the purpose of [indicating] the Sautrāntika's objection.

[Sautrāntika]: Who would believe in a perceptual operation whose objective reference and sense datum are indistinguishable? Because a perceptual operation always

occurs as the facticity of a sense datum of an object, if its facticity is non-referential (*rang rig*) then how could its objective reference and sense datum be indistinguishable?

[Sthiramati] says, "....this is claimed by others who talk about consciousness (*rnam par shes pa*)...." in order to establish that this misunderstanding belongs to [those] philosophers. Those people who claim only six kinds of perceptual operations and do not claim the substratum awareness are the others such as the Sautrāntikans who talk about consciousness. How do they account for the fact that, when one enters the meditative concentration wherein attitudinal and functional operations are suspended (*'gog pa'i snyom pa*), or what is the same, when one enters [the eighth level of] liberation and meditative concentration wherein concepts cease to be (*'dus shes med pa*), the objective reference and the sense datum of a mental perceptual operation are indistinguishable? If they should claim that no other perceptual operation exists at that time, then [Sthiramati] replies, "....when one enters meditative concentration wherein...." When one enters meditative concentration wherein attitudinal and functional operations are suspended, then one could not experience (*rtogs pa*) the fact that the perceptual operations have been suspended.

The statement, "....because it contradicts reason and it contradicts the sūtras...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why not?"

If all perceptual operations are suspended when one enters meditative concentration, then when one reverts from that meditative concentration, from what does he revert? The body which possesses the perceptual organ cannot be the seed, because it does not belong to that level. A production without a seed is unreasonable, and this [statement] is reasonable. [The Sautrāntikan claim] contradicts the *Chos byin gyi mdo sde* which states:

perceptual operations are not outside of the body.

D. *The substratum awareness is always accompanied by the five omnipresent mental events*

The statement,

Of those, the substratum awareness is (2c)

is for the purpose of explaining the verse, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement,

It is always accompanied by rapport, ego-centric demand

Feeling, conceptualization, and directionality of mind (3)

is a reply to the question of numbers and of time.

The statement, ".....always....." is for the purpose of explaining the word 'always'. ['Always'] means, so long as a substratum awareness exists, it is always accompanied by the five omnipresent mental events such as rapport and so on.

1. *Rapport*

The statement, "....'rapport' is a feeling...." is for the purpose of clarifying the word 'rapport'. The word 'rapport' is used in the sense of 'feeling'.

The statement, "....of these 'rapport'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'rapport'?" An accurate discrimination of the changes taking place in a sensory organ when the object, the sensory organ, and the perceptual operation come together, is called 'rapport'.

The statement, "....it has the function of providing a basis for feeling...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. 'Rapport' has the function of providing a substantial basis for feeling.

The statement, "....'three' means the sensory organ, the object, and the perceptual operation...." is a reply to those who ask, "What are the three?" The meaning has been explained already.

The statement, "....the relation as a cause and an effect...." is a reply to those who ask, "What does 'come together' mean?" The relation of the three such as the perceptual organ, as a cause and as an effect, is the [meaning of] 'coming together of the three'.

The statement, "....when the three come together...." is for the purpose of explaining how 'rapport' comes about. 'Rapport' is an accurate discrimination of a sense datum as a pleasant experience of an object, the activity of which is experienced as the pleasure which resembles the

activity taking place in a sensory organ which is associated with the feeling of pleasure which occurs when the three come together. The phrase, "which is experienced as the pleasure" has the same meaning as the phrase, "which is associated with the feeling of pleasure."

The statement, "....the sensory organs, by some specific property...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is the activity taking place in a sensory organ?" When a sensory organ has the specific property of providing the basis for pleasure and so on, it is called its activity.

The statement, "....rapport...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is this called 'rapport'?" Because this 'rapport' resembles the changes taking place in the sensory organ, it is in contact with the sensory organ or it is contacted by the activity which resembles [the changes taking place] in the sensory organ; therefore, it is called 'rapport'.

The statement, "....because this 'rapport' resembles the changes taking place in the sensory organ, it is in contact with the sensory organ...." means, just as the sensory organ is associated with an occurrence of pleasure, so too, rapport is associated with the occurrence of pleasure; therefore, because [pleasure] resembles the activities [taking place in the sensory organ], it is simultaneous and on the same level as rapport. 'Rapport' is the accurate discrimination of an object, the activity of which is experienced as pleasure, because that is its

objective reference.

If one claims that the activity [taking place] in the sensory organ cannot be accurately discriminated, because it cannot be an objective reference of rapport, then how can one say that rapport accurately discriminates the changes [taking place] in the sensory organ? Therefore, [Sthiramati] says, "....even if [rapport] is said to be an identity experience in which the activity of an object is accurately discriminated...." Although [rapport] is said to have the facticity of accurately discriminating the activity [taking place] in an object, because it is in contact with the sensory organ due to the similarity of changes or because it is contacted by it, still it is explained as that which accurately discriminates the activity [taking place] in a sensory organ.

The statement, "....its function is to provide a basis for feeling...." is for the purpose of explaining its function, because the facticity of 'rapport' has been explained. Its meaning has been discussed already.

The statement, "....even in the sūtra...." is for the purpose of explaining that its function is explained in the scholarly treatises. The sūtras state:

'Rapport' which is the experience of pleasure and so on, is the motivating force for a pleasureable feeling.

Therefore, its function is to provide a basis for feeling.

In order to make things easy to understand, the function of the mental events is explained here. When the functions of these mental events are talked about, the facticity which determines their uniqueness can be known exactly.¹

2. *Ego-centered demand*

The statement, "....'ego-centered demand' means mental control....." is for the purpose of explaining the second mental event. The statement, "....it is 'control' because it keeps [the mind] controlled...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. The statement, "....it is 'control' because it keeps [the mind] controlled...." is a definition. That by which the mind is made to turn towards its objective reference is called 'an ego-centered demand'. This means, it turns the mind to whatever has been selected out as an object of desire.

The statement, "....it has the function of keeping the mind on its objective reference...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. Its function is to keep the mind on its objective reference.

The statement, "....to keep the mind...." is a reply to those who ask, "How does it keep [the mind on its objective reference]?" 'To keep' means to turn the mind, over and over again, towards only what has become an objective reference of an immediate desire.

¹ Text should be corrected to read: *de blug tu rtog par nus*.

The statement, "....therefore, its function....." is a reply to those who ask, "Is that its function in every instance of ego-centric demand or it is a function of a particular [ego-centric demand]?" Its function is said to have the specific characteristic which determines the continual [reverting] of a mind to a particular objective reference.

Its function is explained in terms of a sustaining power possessed by a specific ego-centric demand; it does not occur in every instance of the mind. This is to say, its function is talked about in reference to only a particular instance of mind, and not to all other instances.

The statement, "....a sustaining power possessed by a specific ego-centric demand...." is defined as the mental control which refers to the [four] sustaining powers¹ of the various meditative concentrations.

3. *Feeling*

The statement, "....'feeling' means to experience...." is for the purpose of explaining the third mental event. 'Feeling' is the facticity of one's experience of a pleasureable object. 'Feeling' is defined as that by which one experiences an object as pleasureable.

¹ For a discussion on the relationship between the four mental controls with the nine phases of meditation and the six sustaining powers, see H.V. Guenther & L.S. Kawamura, *Mind in Buddhist Psychology*, p. 119.

The statement, "....an object is determined to be pleasant...." is for the purpose of explaining its varieties. This is to say, because feeling determines [one's experience] of an object as pleasureable, unpleasureable, or neutral, [feelings] are classified as three kinds according to their distinction as being positive, [negative, or neutral].

The statement, "....some think...." is for the purpose of giving another explanation of it. Some think that 'to experience' means that by it one is made to experience an individual maturation of positive or negative acts.

The statement, "....a pleasant experience is an individual maturation of a positive act...." is for the purpose of explaining which effects are produced by which causes. [The effects] of both positive and negative acts is [understood to be] an effect of a small [positive act] in this [text], but the positive act, which cannot mature into either frustrations or bliss when it is minimal as discussed in the texts of those who accept such a claim, cannot be said to be [an effect] of either one. The rest is easily understood, so I shall not explain it.

In the above discussion, only the maturation of acts resulting from the three kinds of feelings has been explained. The statement, "....this is the substratum awareness...." is for the purpose of explaining a different kind. This is to say, the substratum awareness is an individual maturation of positive or negative acts; there-

fore, in actuality, the individual maturation of positive and negative acts [come] from a neutral [feeling] which is co-present and on the same level as the substratum awareness. Because bliss and frustration come forth as matured positive or negative acts, [we] postulate that [they] are 'actualized states'.

The statement, "....among them, a pleasant experience" is for the purpose of explaining the facticity of bliss and so on. 'Bliss' refers to an experience in which one thinks, "May I never be separated from this." when a feeling that one does not want to be separated from it occurs, and [an experience in which] one thinks, "May this feeling rise again." when the feeling that one one wants to return to it again arises. The opposite is called 'frustration'.

Whether a feeling occurs or subsides, if the feeling of wanting to be separated from it or of wanting to stay with it does not arise, then it is an experience which is neither blissful nor frustrating.

4. Conceptualization

The statement, "....'conceptualization' means to take hold of the defining characteristics of an object...." is for the purpose of explaining the fourth mental event. The statement, "....'object' means objective reference...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. 'Objective reference' is explained by the word 'object'. The specific characteristic of the object is explained by the word 'defining

characteristics'. A necessary condition such as yellow or blue by which an objective reference is categorized, is defined by the word 'cause'.

'To take hold of a specific characteristic' means to make a judgment about an objective reference in the form "This is blue, not yellow."

A solicitation of a response (*'dzin pa*) produced from a necessary condition such as blue or yellow by which [an objective reference is] categorized, is called 'conceptualization'.

5. *Motivation*

The statement, "... 'motivation' means that the mind is put right into a thing...." is for the purpose of explaining the fifth mental event.

'To put the mind right into a thing' is a mental event having the very specific characteristic of making the mind turn towards a thing, and this is called 'motivation'.

'To put the mind right into a thing' means [that this phrase] is used in a causative sense.

'To make the mind turn towards a thing' means anything from 'to move' to 'to make'.

The statement, "...if it is present..." is for the purpose of explaining its facticity from the standpoint of an effect. For example, just as iron is attracted to a powerful magnet, when [motivation] is present, the mind goes directly to its objective reference, and this is

called 'directionality of mind'.

'To go' means 'to move'. In other words, this means 'directionality of mind' is a mental activity which solicits a response from an object through [its] power.

E. *Three kinds of feelings*

The statement,

....*feelings*.... (3 d)

is for the purpose of linking [the discussion] to the verse.

According to the Buddha's teachings, feelings are of three kinds, but why is it¹ that only a general explanation is given about the substratum awareness such that we cannot know what kind of feeling is associated with the substratum awareness? In the same manner, the Buddha's teachings explain four specific qualities such as pleasure, [purity, permanence, and essence which drum up misery] but we do not know which ones are contained in the substratum awareness.

The statement, "... 'therein' means in the substratum awareness...." is for the purpose of clarifying the statement,

Therein, feeling is indifferent (4 a)

but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

¹ Nozawa corrects text to read *tshor ba* instead of *ci'i phyir*, but correction is unwarranted.

Only an indifferent feeling is present in the substratum awareness; there is neither bliss nor frustration.

The statement, "....because the objective reference and the sense datum of both of those are accurately discriminated...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?" This is to say, if the objective reference and sense datum of bliss and frustration are definite (*gsal ba*), but the objective reference and sense datum of the substratum awareness are not, then how could [the substratum awareness] be co-present and on the same level as those two?

The claim of those who say, "because it is accompanied by cupidity and avarice" is a claim not related [to the issue].

Because every instance of bliss and frustration is not¹ co-present and on the same level [as cupidity and avarice], they are not accompanied by cupidity and avarice [all the time]. This means, there are [instances of] bliss which are positive, neutral, or fulfilling. In the same way, even frustrations can be positive or neutral. Since [every instance of bliss and frustration] is not co-present and on the same level as cupidity and avarice, how could every [instance of] bliss and frustration be accompanied by cupidity and avarice?

¹ Text lacks negation here, but negation is essential.

F. *The substratum awareness is (existentially) uncompromised and (ethically) neutral*

The statement,

It is uncompromised and (ethically) neutral (4 b)

is for the purpose of explaining that [the substratum awareness is ethically] neutral. It must be known that the substratum awareness is uncompromised (*ma sgribs*) and [ethically] neutral (*lung du ma bstan*). The word 'it' is contextually related to the substratum awareness, because that is what we are discussing.

The statement, "...by the word 'uncompromised'..." is for the purpose of explaining the effect which has two specific characteristics. The word 'uncompromised' is used in distinction to the word 'compromised'. The word 'neutral' is used in distinction to the words 'positive' and 'negative'.

The substratum awareness is not positive, because it exists even in those who are cut off from the root of positive [qualities]. However, it is not negative either, because negative [qualities] cannot be uncompromised.

The statement, "...on a mental level..." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is this [substratum awareness] uncompromised?" This is to say, [the substratum awareness] is not stained by the proximate factors of instability (*nye ba'i nyon mongs*) which are co-present and on the same level as the [emotionally tainted] mind; therefore, [the substratum awareness] is said to be 'uncompromised'. It is called 'uncompromised' because it does not become turbid and because it is not overcome [by the emotions].

The statement, "....because it is an actualized state" is for the purpose of explaining the reason why it is neutral. This substratum awareness has the facticity of its own maturation; therefore, it is neutral. Because an actualized state is not produced from [another] actualized state, it is called 'neutral'. It is also called 'neutral' because the facticity of a neutral actualized state is neither positive nor negative.

G. Rapport and the rest are on the same level as the substratum awareness

The statement,

Rapport and so on are the same (4 c)

is for the purpose of explaining that rapport and so on [must be explained] so long as the substratum awareness is under investigation.

The statement, "....just as the substratum awareness is, invariably, an actualized state...." is for the purpose of clarifying that, but the meaning has been explained already.

The statement, "....in the same manner, rapport and so on...." is for the purpose of linking [the substratum awareness] with rapport and so on, but since this is easily understood, I shall not explain it.

The statement, "....because it is not reasonable for a thing which is an actualized state [to be] something which does not mature, and for a thing which does not have discernable objective reference and sense datum to have discernable

objective reference and sense datum...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is rapport and so on co-present and on the same level as those belonging to the substratum awareness?" Since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

Those which are co-present and on the same level as rapport and so on, referred to in the statement, "....the others ought to be discussed in the same manner...." are the same ones as those which are co-present and on the same level as rapport [which is] co-present and on the same level as the substratum awareness. Those which are co-present and on the same level as the substratum awareness which is co-present and on the same level as neutral [feelings] are not co-present and on the same level as other feelings [*viz.* the positive and negative ones]. This is to say, those which are co-present and on the same level as the substratum awareness which is [existentially] uncompromised and [ethically] neutral, could not be positive or negative.

H. *Does the substratum awareness function at all times or is it momentary?*

Because it is not clear whether the substratum awareness functions at all times or whether it is momentary, someone asks, "....is the substratum awareness...?" The philosopher [Sthiramati] says, "....it does not persist as one nor is it different...." as a reply to those who ask, "Does the substratum awareness persist continuously throughout the extent of saṃsāra as one and not different, or does it persist throughout the extent of saṃsāra as a flow, passing

from one instant to another?" The substratum awareness does not persist as one and not different, because it persists as instances, but it is not one.

The term 'not different' in the statement, "...as one nor is it different...." includes the meaning of 'similarity' and therefore it is said to be 'one'. The word 'one' is understood variously, and therefore it is said 'not different'. The meaning comes to this: the substratum awareness has the facticity of not breaking down ('*jig pa ma yin*).

The statement, ...

It flows like a river (4d)

is a reply to those who ask, "How does it persist?" The substratum awareness flows like a river.

The statement, "...the word 'it' is to be contextually related to the substratum awareness...." is for the purpose of explaining the substantial basis of that which is 'one and not different', but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "...the word 'flow'...." is for the purpose of explaining the facticity of the flow. [The word] 'flow' (*rgyun*) means that there is a continuity (*rgyun*) between the cause and its effect and nothing comes in between (*bar chad med pa*).

The statement, "...a collection of water...." is for the purpose of explaining its facticity as a river. A river is a collection of water in which there is a continuity between the first and the latter [moments of the] flow.

The statement, "....just like a river....grass...." is for the purpose of explaining the meaning implied in the verse, because each term has been explained. Just as a river flows dragging along grass and so on, in the same manner, the substratum awareness flows uninterruptedly dragging along rapport and so on which are accompanied by tendencies of positive, negative, and neutral acts.

I. The stage in which the substratum awareness reverts.

One must explain when that substratum awareness which persists as a flow reverts, because another asks, ".... When does that which persists as a flow...." The philosopher [Vasubandhu] says,

It reverts only in a stage of an Arhat (5 a)

Because one does not know what an Arhat is, one asks, "What is an Arhat?" The philosopher [Sthiramati] says, ".... one is called an 'Arhat' when he possesses...." An 'Arhat' is one who has some qualities; this is called 'the stage of an Arhat'.

Because another does not know what the [word] 'qualities' mean, one asks, "....by the possession of what qualities, is one called 'an Arhat'?..." Therefore, [Sthiramati] replies, "....knowledge that things are bound to be disappointing...." When one gains the understanding that things are bound to be disappointing and the understanding that nothing is produced, then he is called 'an Arhat'.

The statement, "....then, the substratum awareness...." is a reply to those who ask, "How does that substratum awareness revert?" In the stage of an Arhat, whatever ineptitudes (*gnas ngan len pa*) may be residing in the substratum awareness, are completely removed. Therefore, the substratum awareness reverts, and then, it ceases to be the foundation for the seeds of emotionality. We talk about an Arhat only when the substratum awareness reverts and this means that we talk about an Arhat when one attains an existential state of liberation (*rnam par grol ba'i sku*) or when one attains an authentic state of being (*chos kyi sku*).

The detailed discussion on the transformation called 'an actualized state' has been completed. 'Detailed discussion' means 'investigation'.

CHAPTER VI

AN EGO-CENTERED MIND

The previous chapter discussed the 'substratum awareness' which was existentially uncompromised and ethically neutral. When the 'substratum awareness' falls from that status, it becomes existentially compromised and ethically neutral. This state of a "fallen" substratum awareness is called 'an ego-centered mind'. In this latter stage, the objective reference and sense datum of the intellect becomes clearly defined. This is to say, the operation of the ego-centered mind (*ie.*) the intellect, is such that it takes the 'substratum awareness' as an eternal self. It is for this reason that the intellect is said to be always co-present with and on the same level as the four emotions.

The four emotions are:

1. a belief in a self,
2. a preoccupation with the self,
3. pride in a self, and
4. attachment to a self.

These four emotions correspond closely to the four which are discussed in Asaṅga's *Theg pa chen po bsdu pa*, where he discusses them in relation to the second operation of the intellect. In the above mentioned text, Asaṅga states:

Secondly, the emotionally tainted mind is accompanied by the four emotions [which are]

1. opinionatedness regarding the perishable constituents,
2. egoism,
3. attachment to a self, and
4. a loss of intrinsic awareness.

It is the basis for emotionally tainting the [six] perceptual operations.¹

The four emotions, which are always co-present with and on the same level as the intellect, mentioned by Vinītadeva and by Asaṅga, are four out of the six basic emotions which are discussed in Chapter VII of this present thesis. The six which are discussed there, and the four which are discussed here, are related to each other in the following manner:

	Vinītadeva	Asaṅga
1. cupidity attachment	4	3
2. anger		
3. bewilderment error	2	4
4. arrogance	3	2
5. opinionatedness	1	1
6. indecision		

Therefore, what Vinītadeva calls (1) a belief in a self, corresponds to the basic emotion called (5) opinionatedness, and this corresponds to what Asaṅga calls (1) opinionatedness regarding the perishable constituents. The same relationship holds for the remaining three.

¹ E. Lamotte, *La Somme du Grande Véhicule*, Tome I, p. 5.

The list of six is probably a later development from the list of four which can be found in the texts of earlier Buddhist schools¹. The four are mentioned in the latter context as the reason for which the Buddha did not explain the 'substratum awareness' to the family of pious listeners (*Śrāvaka*). In the above mentioned text of Asaṅga, we find the following passage:

The very profound perceptual operation of appropriation
[Which contains] the seeds for everything, flows like a
river.

I do not explain this to the dull people, in fear that
They will understand it to be an eternal self.²

And again,

When, in order to purify their [perverted views about the] substratum awareness, the meaning of life (*chos*) is explained to those lowly people, who rejoice over the substratum awareness, who relish it, [who believe that they] are produced from it, and who delight in it, we wish that they would listen, but.....³

These quotations make it very clear that the so-called 'intellect' or 'ego-centered mind' is none other than the 'substratum awareness' which has "fallen" from its status of being existentially uncompromised and ethically neutral. The "fallen" state of the 'substratum awareness' has the specific characteristic of being existentially compromised and ethically neutral. It is said to be 'existentially compromised' because it is emotionally

¹ *Ibid.*, Tome II, p. 4*, §6.

² *Ibid.*, Tome I, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, Tome I, p. 7

tainted, and in so far as the 'intellect' has not moved towards anything positive or negative, it is said to be 'ethically neutral'.

Just as the 'substratum awareness' is always accompanied by the five omnipresent mental events, so too, the intellect is always accompanied by the five omnipresent mental events. This indicates that these two - 'substratum awareness' and 'intellect' - are not two 'minds', but are indicators pointing to two possible operations of the 'mind'.

The 'intellect' which is emotionally tainted is said to revert in the stage of an Arhat. A Yogin who enters meditative concentration passes through various stages in meditation which lead him from the world of sensuous desires through the world of forms into the world of no-forms, and in this way, the Yogin reaches the stage of an Arhat. As the Yogin's meditation goes deeper and deeper, the emotions which are associated with each level of existence are gradually removed, but the 'intellect' continues to function even when the Yogin reaches the meditative level of the world of no-form. About this, Asaṅga states:

Because the intellect is emotionally tainted, it is [existentially] compromised and [ethically] neutral, and is always accompanied by the four [basic] emotions. It is [existentially] compromised and [ethically] neutral in accordance with the emotions which prevail in the world of form and the formless world. Although the emotions which prevail in the world of form and the formless world are overcome by the state of calm, the 'intellect' continues to operate at all times.¹

¹ *Ibid.*, Tome I, p. 6.

Vinītadeva's discussion on the topic 'an ego-centered mind' has the following divisions:

- A. An ego-centered mind takes the 'substratum awareness' as its basis and objective reference
- B. An ego-centered mind is called 'intellect'
- C. An ego-centered mind is [existentially] compromised and [ethically] neutral
- D. An ego-centered mind is always accompanied by the four emotions

1. The four emotions

- a. Belief in a self
- b. Preoccupation with a self
- c. Pride in a self
- d. Attachment to a self

2. The four emotions take the 'substratum awareness' as their objective reference

3. A summary

- E. An ego-centered mind is co-present with and on the same level as 'rapport' and so on
- F. The stage in which the emotionally tainted mind reverts

An Ego-centered Mind

The statement, "....Now, an ego-centered mind is the second transformation...." is for the purpose of taking up the second transformation. Because this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement,

....Comes forth taking that... (5 b)

is a reply to those who ask, "What is that?" I will comment

on this shortly.

The statement, "....therein, just as the basis of the perceptual operations such as visual perception...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to the verse. The basis and the objective reference of a visual perceptual operation and the like, are well known, but those of an emotionally tainted mind (*nyon mongs can gyi yid*) are not. A perceptual operation which does not rely on a basis and an objective reference is unreasonable; therefore, the verse

....comes forth taking that....

is quoted in order to explain the basis and the objective reference of that [emotionally tainted mind] and also to give its definition.

A. *An Ego-centered Mind takes the 'substratum awareness' as its basis and objective reference*

The mind (*yid*) which is emotionally tainted, comes forth from the 'substratum awareness' which is its basis and its objective reference. This is a summary of the statement, "....we speak about a 'mind', because it is an identity experience of an ego-centered mind...."

The statement, "....comes forth taking that...." is for the purpose of explaining its contents. The term 'that' is to be contextually related to the [word] 'substratum awareness'.

The statement, "....it is the basis for the tendencies" is a reply to those who ask, "How is a 'substratum awareness' the basis of that?" The substratum awareness is the basis for the tendencies of an emotionally tainted mind;

therefore, it is said that an emotionally tainted mind comes forth from the substratum awareness which is its basis.

The term 'comes forth' means 'comes forth [like] a stream'. This means, that it comes into being as a continuously [flowing stream] from one moment to the next.

The statement, "...moreover, on whatever spiritual level (*sa*) or existential level (*kham*s)...." is for the purpose of explaining this from another point of view. On whatever existential level - whether it be the existential level of the world of sensuous desires or whether it be on the spiritual level, such as the first meditative level - the substratum awareness becomes actualized, it is on that very same level that the emotionally tainted mind is actualized. Because [the emotionally tainted mind] is linked to the substratum awareness which is on a particular spiritual level or on a particular existential level, it is said to come forth taking that [substratum awareness as its basis and as its objective reference].

The statement,

....*taking that as its objective reference....* (5 c)
is for the purpose of explaining its objective reference. The statement, "....making only the substratum awareness its objective reference...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. This is to say, an emotionally tainted mind is co-present with and on the same level as biases such as the belief that the [five] psycho-physical constituents of the personality constitutes an eternal self.

Therefore, [the emotionally tainted mind] takes the substratum awareness as its objective reference in the form "I am...." and "It is mine...."

The statement, by the philosopher [Sthiramati], ".... since it has been established that they are co-present and on the same level, how can you think that they are not together?..." is a reply to those who ask, "How could it be so? It is not logical that a basis becomes its own objective reference. How could an emotionally tainted mind which comes forth from a mind which is its very basis take that as its objective reference? The objective reference is one thing. The basis is another thing. How could the two be one?"

It is written in the scriptures of even those who do not claim an emotionally tainted mind, that as soon as a previous moment ceases to be, a mental perceptual operation [of the next moment] is produced from a mind of its own kind, and in that instant, [the former] is taken to be the objective reference [by the latter moment of perception] wherein the discursive thought "This is" takes place. [[And further,] the mental perceptual operation which comes forth from such [an instant of] mind, takes that very mind as its objective reference. Just as [such a] mental operation takes its own basis as its objective reference, so too, the emotionally tainted mind takes its own basis as its objective reference.

B. *An Ego-centered Mind is called 'Intellect'*

The statement, "....it is a perceptual operation called 'intellect'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is the name of a perceptual operation which takes its own basis as its objective reference?" Since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....having the substratum awareness as its...." is for the purpose of giving a summary, because the meaning of [the individual] words have been explained. The perceptual operation which is called 'intellect' comes forth having the substratum awareness as its basis. The 'substratum awareness' is also its objective reference.

The statement, "....this so-called 'intellect' which takes that as its objective reference...." is for the purpose of explaining the observable qualities of the so-called 'intellect'. The word 'intellect' distinguishes this from the 'substratum awareness' and the 'out-going perceptual operations'.

The statement, "....what is its facticity?..." is for the purpose of clarifying its facticity. The statement,

*Is an identity experience of an ego-centered
mind... (5 d)*

refers to a mind which is constantly obsessed (*rmon sems pa*) with the thought of an 'I' or 'Mine'. This is its facticity.

The statement, "....therefore, since it is an identity experience of an ego-centered mind...." is for the purpose of giving its definition. Because it is an identity

experience of an ego-centered mind, it is called 'intellect'.

The word 'to define' means to define by the rules of logic.

The statement, "....because it is a perceptual operation having a facticity of its own...." is for the purpose of linking this to the verse. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

C. An Ego-centered mind is [existentially] compromised and [ethically] neutral

The statement,

It is compromised but [ethically] neutral

It is always associated with the four emotions (6 a,b)

is for the purpose of clarifying 'when', 'with how many', and 'with which' mental events [the intellect is associated].

The statement, "....It is always associated with the four emotions" is a summary of the statement, "....the emotionally tainted mind, although compromised, is always associated with the emotions which are neutral....."

The statement, "....emotions are of two kinds...." is for the purpose of clarifying the meaning of the word 'emotion'. Since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....the emotions [number] six...." is for the purpose of clarifying how many [emotions there are], but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, ".... is associated with...." is made just in case some may think that it is associated with joy, but its significance has been explained already.

The statement, "....emotions are of two kinds...." is for the purpose of clarifying the words "compromised and neutral", but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....a perceptual operation which is compromised...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it co-present with and on the same level as a compromised, but neutral, [mental event]?" An emotionally tainted mind is [existentially] compromised and [ethically] neutral; therefore, it could not be co-present with and on the same level as those perceptual operations which are compromised and negative.

The statement, "....they are compromised, because they are emotionally tainted...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why are they compromised?" The definition is as follows: for whatever reasons they are compromised, for that very reason they are said to be compromised.

The statement, "....neutral...." is a reply to those who ask, "If [the emotionally tainted mind] is compromised, then why it is neutral?" [The definition is as follows:] for whatever reasons 'neutral' means to be devoid of the positive and negative [mental events], for that very reason, it is called 'neutral'.

The statement, "....'always' means...." is for the purpose of explaining 'when' [the emotionally tainted mind is compromised and neutral]. This is to say, so long as the emotionally tainted mind exists, it is always accompanied by them.

D. *An ego-centered mind is always accompanied by the four emotions*

The statement, "....because by a general description, the particular is not made known, the particular must be described...." is for the purpose of linking this [discussion] to the verse.

1. *The four emotions*

Because the statement, "....the four emotions...." is a general description, the particular is not made known. Therefore, the statement,

Belief in a self, preoccupation with a self (6 c)
is for the purpose of explaining the particular. This is to say, [the emotionally tainted mind] is associated with the four [emotions] (*viz.,*)

1. belief in a self (*bdag tu lta ba*),
2. preoccupation with a self (*bdag tu rmongs pa*),
3. pride in the self (*bdag tu rgyal*), and
4. attachment to a self (*bdag tu chags pa*).

a. *Belief in a self*

The statement, "....to the psycho-physical constituents which are appropriated as constituting the self...." is for the purpose of explaining the biased views about the self. To structure (*'dzin pa*) the psycho-physical constituents of the personality into a self, is [defined as] 'belief in the self'.

The statement, "....biased views about the perishable constituents...." is a synonym which establishes that.

b. Preoccupation with a self

'Preoccupation' is defined as an 'unknowing'. The preoccupation with the sphere of activity (*yul*) of a self, is defined as 'preoccupation with a self'.

c. Pride in a self

What comes forth as an inflated mind about oneself, is called 'pride in a self'. The statement, "...pride in oneself by thinking, 'I am....'...." is meant to be a synonym for establishing that.

d. Attachment to a self

What comes forth as an attachment to a self, is called 'attachment to a self'. The statement, "...joy in oneself" established that.

2. The four emotions take the 'substratum awareness' as their objective reference

The statement, "...when one is preoccupied with the facticity of the substratum awareness...." is a reply to those who ask, "How do these make the substratum awareness their objective reference?" When one does not know that the substratum awareness is impermanent, one takes it as his own self, and thus structures (*'dzin pa*) it into a self, [because] an unknowing is [defined as] 'preoccupation with the self'. A belief in a self is a biased view about the perishable constituents. An inflated mind which is produced on the basis of a biased view about the self is called 'pride in the self' which takes the form 'I am....'

3. A summary

The statement, "....moreover, it is said...." is for the purpose of summarizing what has been discussed. The meaning is as follows: a mind whose specific characteristic is defined as 'egocentricity', is emotionally tainted by the four emotions such as a loss of intrinsic awareness.

The words, 'emotionally tainted' mean, to become afflicted.

The statement, "....the motivating force (*rgyu*) for falling into error...." is for the purpose of establishing the existence of an emotionally tainted mind through reason. This is to say, an emotionally tainted mind is always the motivating force which makes one go astray; therefore, one should get it into one's head that it exists.

The statement, "....when the mind is positive and [when it is] neutral...." is a reply to those who ask, "Of what is 'error' a cause?"

In the case of a positive mind, the motivating force¹, which structures the [belief in a] self, is the thought, 'I have given a gift'. In the case of a neutral mind, the motivating force, which structures [the belief in] a self, is the thought 'I have made a study of the texts'. Therefore, 'motivating force' is defined as the 'error' of thinking that the substratum awareness *is* the self even though it is not.

¹ Text reads *dus*, but must be *rgyu*.

The statement, "....the emotions such as the pre-occupation with the self...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion with the previous verse.

Here, the nine [existential] levels ought to be known to be the world of sensuous desires, the four levels of meditative contemplation, and the four formless levels. The rest is easily understood, so I shall not comment on them.

The statement,

"....belongs to the intellect (7 a)

no matter what level it may be on...." is for the purpose of dispelling doubt. The statement, "....belongs to the intellect no matter what level it may be on...." is for the purpose of explaining that. On whatever existential level or on whatever stage [a mind] may be on, it is associated with the biased views, such as the biased view about the perishable constituents, belonging to that particular existential level or stage.

The statement, "...why is it associated with the four emotions only?..." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to the following verse, but since this is easily understood, I shall not discuss it.

E. An ego-centered mind is co-present with and on the same level as 'rapport' and the rest

The writer of the commentary [Sthiramati] says, "It isn't." The statement,

.... Even the others such as rapport (7 b)

is for the purpose of clarifying that, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The word 'even' is used in the sense of 'also'; therefore, the emotionally tainted mind is not co-present with and on the same level as the [biased views of a] belief in the self and so on only, but it is also co-present with and on the same level as rapport and the others. The statement, "....rapport and the others...." explains the meaning of the words 'rapport and the others'.

The statement, "....the five mental events...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it co-present with and on the same level as rapport and the others?" Because the five such as 'rapport' are considered to be 'omnipresent', for that very reason, they are co-present with and on the same level as every instant of a perceptual operation.

The statement, "....moreover, they...." is for the sake of defining the existential levels and the stage, but the significance [of this] has been explained already.

The statement, "....moreover,..." is for the purpose of giving another explanation. The statement, "....the others such as rapport,..." is for the purpose of distinguishing these from rapport and so on which are co-present with and on the same level as the basic (*rtsa ba*) perceptual operation. This is to say, rapport and so on, which are associated with the basic perceptual operation are [existentially] uncompromised and [ethically] neutral, but those belonging to the intellect, are compromised and neutral, just like the mind.

F. The stage in which the emotionally tainted mind reverts

The statement, "....if that emotionally tainted mind" is for the purpose of linking the discussion to the following verse. If the emotionally tainted mind comes into operation at all times without the distinction of being positive, of having emotions, or of being neutral, then it could not revert; so long as it does not revert, one could not be liberated. Therefore, the philosopher, [Sthiramati] says, "....that's not the case!...." It is not the case that one cannot be liberated, because the emotionally tainted mind is

non-existent

*In an Arhat; non-existent when one enters
Meditative-concentration wherein all afflictions
are removed;*

Non-existent on the Transworldly path. (7)

The statement "....in the stage of an Arhat..." is a reply to those who ask, "Why does it cease in the stage of an Arhat?" This is to say, an Arhat is one who has removed all emotional [afflictions]; therefore, he is one in whom an emotionally tainted mind does not exist. Just as, when one attains the state of an Arhat, one, by means of an uninterrupted path called 'Diamond-like', overcomes the nine kinds of emotions which constitute a possible existence, so in the same manner, by that very same uninterrupted path, the emotionally tainted mind is overcome. Therefore, just

as the emotions are not present in an Arhat, so too, this [emotionally tainted mind] is not present.

The statement, "....freed from any attachments which is without foundation...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it not present in a Non-returner (*phyir mi hong ba*)?" When one enters meditative concentration in which attitudinal and functional operations are suspended and attains a state of meditative concentration in which one is freed from all unfounded attachments, then an emotionally tainted mind is non-existent. This is to say, through the power [attained] on the path, so long as the [Non-returner] remains in that [meditative concentration] they [the emotions] are non-existent.

The statement, "....when one returns from the meditative concentration wherein all afflictions are suspended...." is a reply to those who ask, "From what is that [emotionally tainted mind] produced, when one reverts?" When one returns from meditative concentration wherein attitudinal and functional operations are suspended, at that time, [the emotionally tainted mind] is produced from the substratum awareness, because the tendencies [for its production] are held in that [substratum awareness].

The statement, "....it is non-existent on a Transworldly Path...." is for the purpose of explaining that it is non-existent on a [Transworldly] path, but I have already explained the significance of this.

The statement, "...the word 'Transworldly' is for the sake of distinguishing it from the worldly...." is a reply to those who ask, "Do you speak about a 'Transworldly Path' because the word 'path' is not adequate?" This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "...truly, on a worldly path...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why distinguish it from the worldly path?" The word 'truly' is used in the sense of 'this very'. The meaning is as follows: the emotionally tainted mind is produced only on a worldly path.

The statement, "...the realization (*methong ba*) that there is no abiding principle to which a thing can be reduced" is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it not produced on a worldly path?" This means, the realization that there is no abiding principle to which a thing can be reduced acts as an antidote against [the biased view of] a belief in a self. Therefore, an emotionally tainted mind could not be present on a Transworldly Path. An antidote cannot function against something for which it is not in agreement. Because an antidote cannot function against something which is not in agreement with it, the emotionally tainted mind is inoperative only during the time that one is on a Transworldly path. When one returns from a Transworldly Path, then [the emotionally tainted mind] is produced from the substratum awareness.

The statement,

This is the second transformation (8 a)

is for the purpose of concluding this discussion. This means that the discussion [on the second transformation *ie.* an ego-centered mind] has come to an end.

CHAPTER VII

A COGNITION OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTS

In the last chapter, we saw that the intellect (*yid*) was a term denoting the fact that an ego-centered mind structured the substratum awareness into an eternal self. In this chapter, on the foundation of the biased belief in a self, the other six perceptual operations come into the picture.

When any one or all of the five 'out-going' perceptual operations which, having come into contact with their respective sensory object, send their 'impulses' back to the 'data control center' (*viz.*) the mental perceptual operation, then this 'data control center' in conjunction with the 'intellect', which has structured the substratum awareness into an eternal self, forms a concept out of the data which it has received from the five perceptual operations. If, for the sake of discussion, the 'intellect' had no part of this operation, then the mental operation would merely produce a concept. If, under this condition, we took, for example, a visual perceptual situation, the eyes would receive merely the light waves which would be converted into 'impulses' which are fed to the mental perceptual operation. The mental perceptual operation would then interpret these 'impulses' as some kind of 'concept', (*eg*) a yellow house. The eyes see neither yellow nor house, both of which are concepts. However,

in so far as the 'intellect' is always functioning, the operation described above is only half correct. With the operation of the intellect, the concept 'yellow house' becomes emotionally charged and takes on a new color, (*viz.*) 'my home'. The possessive aspect 'my' results from the operation of the 'intellect' which has already structured the substratum awareness into an eternal self.

Perhaps an analogy of how a radio or a television actually selects one of many possible radio waves out of the air, will aid us in our understanding. The fact that a 'dead set' can do nothing about the radio waves, is like a substratum awareness which has not yet actualized. When a set becomes 'alive', it has the possibility, in accordance with its capacity, to accept the radio waves accurately or haphazardly. A set which receives the waves haphazardly is a set in need of repair. Such a set is like the substratum awareness which has become 'compromised'. The fact that neither the radio or television can select a signal out of the air if it does not have a transmitter of its own built into it, is like the operation of the 'intellect'. The operation of the 'built-in' transmitter which determines the exact frequency to which the radio or television will be tuned, is like the operation of the intellect which determines not only what concepts the mental operation will produce, but also what the eyes, for example, will see. If the 'built-in' transmitter is

not functioning properly, double or even triple 'images' will be received, and the resulting squeal or 'ghosts' will not only be unintelligible, but also frustrating. The intellect which is charged with the four emotions, is like the improperly functioning 'built-in' transmitter. In other words, the 'intellect' on the basis of a substratum awareness which has become compromised, influences the mental operations so that, instead of allowing the other five perceptual operations to accept the world as it is, it forces them to superimpose a logical fiction on the world. The result is frustration.

It is in this particular operation of the mind that the fifty one mental events take their effect. The fifty one mental events listed in the present work constitute one of the five categories that the Abhidharma texts list as accounting for everything knowable in the universe. The five categories are: 1) form, 2) mind, 3) mental events, 4) things which are together with the mind, and 5) the non-composite.¹

The fifty-one mental events are divided into five categories:

1. the five omnipresent mental events, beginning with rapport,

¹ For a discussion on this topic, see A. Hirakawa's 'Preface' in his *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Daizo Shuppan Kabushikikaisha, Tokyo, 1973.

2. the five object determining ones, beginning with interest,
3. the eleven positive ones, beginning with confidence,
4. the six basic emotions, beginning with cupidity attachment, and
5. the twenty-four proximate factors of instability, beginning with indignation.

In most texts, however, the last one is usually divided into two groups, (*viz.*)

5. the twenty proximate factors of instability, beginning with indignation, and
6. the four variables, beginning with selectiveness.

The number fifty-one both agree and disagree with other texts dealing with the mental events. For example, the *Phung po lnga'i rab byed* (*Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*, P. ed., Vol. 113, No. 5560), the *Theg pa'i chos brgya gsal ba'i sgo'i bstan chos* (P. ed., Vol. 113, No. 5564 which has been rendered into Tibetan from the Chinese text, the *Ta ch'êng pê fa ming mên lun*, Taisho, Vol. 31, No. 1614), and the *Sems dang sems byung gi tshul gsal bar ston pa blo gsal mgul rgyan* by Ye shes rgyal mtshan (1713-1793), to name only three, agree in number with the present thesis. The *Chos mngon pa kun las btus pa* (P. ed., Vol. 112, No. 5549; Sanskrit text, *Abhidharma Saumuccaya* of Asanga, ed. by Pralhad Pradhan, Santiniketan, 1950) lists fifty-two, and the *Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa*

(P. ed., Vol. 115, No. 5590; *Abhidharmakośakārikā*, in the Index of *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, ed. by Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1913) lists forty-six.

These fifty-one mental events are related to the mind by way of five correlations which according to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* are:

1. alike stuff,
2. alike objective reference,
3. alike fact,
4. alike time, and
5. alike sphere and levels.

'Alike stuff' means that in the entourage of one attitude as the primary factor, there is only one corresponding mental event such as feeling, because two different corresponding events cannot take place.

'Alike object reference' and 'alike fact' means that as the observable quality and its presence can have only one objective reference and as according to this objective reference and observable quality there is either an emotional coloring or not, when mind as the primary factor becomes emotionally tainted, so do the mental events as its entourage. But when the mind becomes such that it is not affected by what otherwise is bound to be disappointing, the mental events as its entourage become such that they are not affected by what otherwise is bound to be disappointing.

'Alike time' means the mind as a primary factor and mental events as its attendants arise, stay, and fade together.

'Alike spheres and levels' means when the mind as the primary factor is on the level of the world of sensuous desires, the mental events belonging to the sphere of form or the sphere of no-form cannot arise as its entourage; and for a mind on the level of 'form', mental events belonging to the world of sensuous desires cannot arise as its entourage. To whichever sphere or level a mind belongs, it is on this sphere also that the mental events as its entourage must belong.

In view of this correlation, the mind and mental events cannot be understood to be different. However, their function or operations are different. To be aware of the mere facticity of an object is the operation of the mind, and on the basis of this objective reference, to become involved with the object by way of other specific functions is said to be the operation of the mental events.

As the central theme of Buddhism can be summed up in the one word 'path', spiritual integration is the indispensable precondition for man realizing his own nature. It is for this reason that the 'positive mental events', as aids to growth, play such a prominent role in the analysis of mind. The obscuring forces (*ie.*) basic emotions and the proximate factors of instability, is termed 'mind', and can be defined as 'a malfunctioning'. It is for this

reason that 'a loss of intrinsic awareness' leads the list of the twelvefold chain of dependent origination. This indicates that it is from 'a loss of intrinsic awareness' that the growing involvement in growth-inhibiting forces lands man in saṃsāra.

The positive mental events and the growth inhibiting forces determine who effectively the 'object determining' mental events can function to produce positive outcomes. dPal-sprul O-rgyan 'Jigs-med chos-kyi dbang-po (b. 1808) has stated that fact succinctly. He says:

In general, the essence of the 'way' is spiritual integration, and in particular, it is spiritual growth which involves the abolition of all that is negative through concentrative efforts whose support are earnest desire, assiduity, intentionality, and critical assessment. [To become involved with what one is going to bring to life, because one trusts in it, is earnest desire; to go about it joyfully, is assiduity; to become single-minded, is concentrative integration; and to examine whether states of depression or ebullience vitiate (this state) is critical assessment.]¹

From the above analysis, it is very obvious why 'confidence' leads the list of the eleven positive mental events. Without 'confidence' nothing positive can result.

¹ *Lam lnga rim bgred tshul dang sa beu'i yon tan thob tshul bye brag tu bshad pa*, in the *Ngagyur Nyingmai Sungrab Series*, Vol. 41, p. 243-44.

The mental events which are discussed in this and other texts, are not, as many scholars may think, merely a list of words; they form an integral part of the 'path' which unfolds as one goes deeper and deeper into one's understanding of how the mind functions.¹

Vinītadeva's discussion on this topic divides into the following heads:

A. The five omnipresent mental events

B. The five object determining mental events

1. Interest
2. Intensified interest
3. Attentiveness
4. Intense concentration
5. Appreciative discrimination

C. The eleven positive mental events

1. Confidence
2. Self respect
3. Decorum
4. Non-attachment
5. Non-hatred
6. Non-deludedness
7. Diligence
8. Alertness
9. Having concern
10. Equanimity
11. Non-violence

¹ Much of the discussion found here is taken from the book, *Mind in Buddhist Psychology*.

D. The six basic emotions

1. Cupidity attachment
2. Anger
3. Bewilderment error
4. Arrogance
 - a. Arrogance
 - b. Excessive arrogance
 - c. Pride in excessive arrogance
 - d. Egoism
 - e. Arrogance of showing off
 - f. Arrogance of thinking small
 - g. Perverted arrogance
5. Opinionatedness
 - a. Opinionatedness about the perishable constituents
 - b. Opinionatedness about the extremes
 - c. Wrong opinions
 - d. Clinging to ideologies
 - e. Clinging to ideologies about ethical behavior and compulsive performance
6. Indecision

E. The twenty-four proximate factors of instability

1. Indignation
2. Resentment
3. Slyness-concealment
4. Spite

5. Jealousy
6. Avarice
7. Deceit
8. Dishonesty
9. Mental inflation
10. Malice
11. Shamelessness
12. A lack of a sense of propriety
13. Gloominess
14. Ebullience
15. A lack of trust
16. Laziness
17. A lack of concern
18. Forgetfulness
19. Desultoriness
20. Inattentiveness

[F. The four variables]

21. Worry
22. Drowsiness
23. Selectiveness
24. Discursiveness

A Cognition of Epistemological Objects

Section Three:

The statement, ".....after the second transformation....." links the discussion to the third transformation. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement,

The third is any cognition of

The six epistemological objects (8 b,c)

is a reply to those who ask, "What is the third one?"

In brief, the third transformation is any cognition of the six epistemological objects.

The statement, "....the third transformation of a perceptual operation...." indicates that [the words, 'transformation of a perceptual operation'] is to be added [to the word 'third' in the verse]; therefore, we must add the words 'transformation of a perceptual operation' to the word 'third'.

The statement, "....'six' means...." is for the purpose of explaining the individual words in the verse, because we must understand the meanings of the individual words before [we can understand] the whole verse, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....again,...." is stated by the commentator [Sthiramati] in order to qualify its status with the statement,

It is positive, negative, and neutral. (8d)

The statement, "....positive and negative...." is for the purpose of clarifying those. The word 'neutral' means 'neither'; the other two are easily understood, so I shall not comment on them.

The statement, "...non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-deludedness...." is for the purpose of explaining the facticity of the positive ones, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The question, "...moreover, with which mental events" is asked, because we neither know what the facticity of the individual mental event is, nor know how many there are.

A. The five omnipresent mental events

The question, "...what are the omnipresent ones?..." is asked, because a question of kind arises with regard to the omnipresent ones. Since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

In order to clarify that, the philosopher [Vasubandhu] says,

Rapport and so on are the first (10 a)

Here, rapport and so on are considered to be the omnipresent ones.

The statement, "...they are the first because they are explained first...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why are the omnipresent ones, first?"

The statement,

The omnipresent ones, (9 a)

clarifies that. Because the omnipresent ones are the first ones discussed in the verse, they are the first.

In so far as these [mental events] are [the same as] those which have been established previously as "....the first one, rapport....", the omnipresent mental events have been discussed already, but [because at that time, the five] such as rapport were not explained [as comprising the five omnipresent mental events, they are now discussed in relation to the present topic].

The statement, "....rapport is the first of these...." is summarized by the statement, "....rapport and so on...." but the meaning has been explained already.

The statement, "....the five [mental] events (*chos*) such as rapport and ego-centric demand...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why are they omnipresent?" This means, the whole group beginning with rapport, is in attendance with every instance of the mind¹; therefore, they are called 'omnipresent'.

The statement, "....they are present in the substratum awareness...." is a reply to those who ask, "How can that be known?" This means, [they are always] present in the substratum awareness, in a emotionally tainted mind, and in the [six] out-going perceptual operations; therefore, they are in attendance with every instance of the mind².

¹ Text reads: *sems can*, but 'P', 'N', and Sthiramati has *sems*.

² The same as the note ¹ above.

B. *The five object determining mental events*

The statement, "....about the object determining ones" connects [the discussion] to the verse.

The statement,

Interest, intensified interest, attentiveness,

Intense concentration, appreciative discrimination

are the object determining ones. (10 b,c)

explain the [five] object determining ones. This means, the five beginning with interest, are the object determining ones.

The statement, "....have specific [sensory objects]...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why are they called 'object determining ones'?" This means, because they [each] have grasped the specification [of the object], they are called 'object determining'. In other words, they grasp the specification of an object; not any thing.

1. *Interest*

The statement, "....of these, interest means...." is a reply to those who ask, "What does 'interest' mean?" 'Interest' is any desire for a thing which is thought about. The term 'think about' means to determine an object to be this or that. This means, there is no interest in something which has not been thought about.

The statement, "....to look at...." is a reply to those who ask, "How does one think about something?" Since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....to look at...." is made in order to explain a synonym for the word 'interest'. An interest which involves a 'looking at' or a 'listening for' is called 'interest' or 'desire'.

The statement, "....it has the function of providing a basis for making a start on assiduous striving...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. This means, it functions to make the mind become involved with an object so as to make a start on assiduous striving.

2.Intensified Interest

The statement, "....'intensified interest' means... to a determined object...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'intensified interest'?" In short, 'intensified interest' is a trust in a thing which seems reasonable.

The statement, "....determined...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it 'determined'?" Because this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....by logic or by trustworthy texts...." is a reply to those who ask, "How is it determined?" A thing decided upon which, according to direct perception, reason, or trustworthy texts, leaves no room for doubt, is called 'determined'.

'Intensified interest' is a determination which takes the form 'This is like this, not like that'. It is a mind which functions on whatever has been determined to be impermanent and so on in the above manner.

The statement, "...it has the function of not being swayed...." explains its function. This means, its function is to prevent one from swaying from a determined thing.

The statement, "...one who has gained this certitude" is a reply to those who ask, "How does that become its function?" This means, one cannot be swayed away from one's own system by other systems; therefore, it has that function.

3. *Attentiveness*

The statement, "... 'attentiveness' means to keep a familiar thing in front of one's mind...." is a reply to those who ask, "What does 'attentiveness' mean?" 'Attentiveness' means not to forget a thing experienced previously and to keep it before the mind.

The statement, "... 'a familiar thing' means 'a thing experienced previously'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a familiar thing'?" Since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "...takes hold of an objective reference" is a reply to those who ask, "Why is attentiveness called 'not forgetting'?" This means, 'attentiveness' is the motivating force (*rgyu*) which keeps the objective reference taken up previously, constantly [before the mind]. Therefore, it is called 'not forgetting'. Because it provides a basis (*rgyu*) for not forgetting, it is called 'not forgetting'.

The statement, "....a thing taken up previously...." explains the facticity of an 'addressing' (*mngon par brjod pa*). 'Addressing' is that which makes [the mind] inspect, over and over again, the observable qualities of the objective reference of a thing taken up previously.

The statement, "....addressing...." explains the basis for determining its meaning, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. Its function is [to provide a basis] for not being swayed from an objective reference. This means, when the mind becomes involved with its objective reference, it cannot be swayed to another objective reference or another sense datum; therefore, 'attentiveness' has the function [of providing a basis] for not being distracted.

4. *Intense concentration*

The statement, "....intense concentration...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'intense concentration'?" 'Intense concentration' means a one-pointedness of mind which stays with whatever is being considered.

The statement, "....a thing under consideration must be understood to be worthy or useless...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it a 'consideration'?" This means, one considers [something] to be worthy or useless.

Calm, joy and others which figure in the Noble Truth of Extinction and in the Noble Truth of the Path, must be considered to be worthy; impermanence and so on, which figure in the Noble Truth of Suffering and in the Noble Truth of the Cause of Suffering, must be considered to be unworthy.¹

'One-pointedness' means [to focus the mind on] a single objective reference.

¹ The Enlightenment of the Buddha was rooted in an intense awareness of what has become known as the 'Four Noble Truths'. These 'Truths' are called variously owing to particular characteristics common to each one. They are:

1. The Truth of Suffering: Impermanence (*mi rtags pa*)
Open dimension of reality (*stong pa*)
No abiding principle (*bdag med*)
2. The Truth of the Cause of Suffering: Sudden birth (*rab tu skye ba*)
Motivating forces (*rgyu*)
Sufficient condition (*rkyen*)
3. The Truth of the Extinction of Suffering: Calm (*zhi ba*)
Joy (*gya nom pa*)
Certitude (*nges par 'byung ba*)
4. The Truth of the Path to the Cessation of Suffering: Reason (*rigs pa*)
Attainment (*sgrub pa*)
Determination (*nges par 'bying ba*)
Path with no interruption (*bar chad med pa 'i lam*)
Path of freedom (*rnam par grol ba 'i lam*)
The root of positive acts produced from having reached the end of the path of intuitive understanding (*mngon par rtog pa 'i lam mtha' las byung ba 'i dge ba 'i rtsa ba*)
The root of positive acts produced from the operations of intuitive understanding (*mngon par rtog pa 'i 'jug las 'byung ba 'i dge ba 'i rtsa ba*)
The root for the attainment of complete Awareness (*zad pa ces thob pa 'i dge ba 'i rtsa ba*).

See, *Mahāvīyutpatti*, ed., by R. Sakaki, pp. 91-92.

The statement, "....its function is to provide a basis for awareness...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. Its function is closely related to awareness, because when the mind enters a state of calm, it gains an awareness of reality just as it is.

5. *Appreciative discrimination*

The statement, "....[the word] '*blo*' is used in the sense of 'appreciative discrimination'....." is a reply to those who ask, "What does the word '*blo*' mean?" The statement, ".....of a thing under consideration...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. 'Appreciative discrimination' means an intense appreciation of a thing under consideration as being worthy, unworthy, or otherwise.

The statement, "....an exact appreciation of a sense datum...." is for the purpose of establishing its kind.

The statement, "....things which seem to have specific and universal characteristics mixed together...." is for the purpose of explaining what is being discriminated.

'An exact appreciation of a sense datum' means to select individual characteristics out of what otherwise seems to have specific and universal characteristics mixed together.

The statement, "....'worthy' means 'proper'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What does the word 'worthy' mean?" The word 'proper' is used as a definition of the word 'worthy'.

The statement, "....moreover, trustworthy treatises...." is for the purpose of clarifying its kind, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....by three kinds of reasons...." is for the purpose of explaining the word 'value'. A thing worthy of value is what results from an intense appreciation of the sense datum of a thing under consideration.

The statement, "....moreover, that which results from learning and...." is for the purpose of explaining its specific [quality], but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....trustworthy teaching...." is for the purpose of explaining the source from which learning results. An understanding which results from trustworthy logical means, is called 'that which results from learning'. That which results from intense concentration, is called 'that which results from application'. A person who uses logic, is a person who is trustworthy.

The statement, "....that which is unworthy...." is for the purpose of stating that a determined mind has the specific quality of not getting involved in unreasonable acts. Meditative contemplation which gets involved in a false reality, is an erroneous meditative practice. The rest is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....an unworthy thing...." is for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the word 'value', but I have explained that already.

The statement, "....attained through birth...." is for the purpose of explaining the third one [(viz.) otherwise]. An understanding of reality which is gained by an awareness which is co-emergent with the understanding gained through one's livelihood, is a worldly convention and is neither worthy nor unworthy. The terms 'gained by birth' means [knowledge] gained by being born; therefore it is called [knowledge] 'gained by birth'. Because that [knowledge] comes as a result of just being present in this world, it is called 'co-emergent'. The term 'value' means anything from 'produced' to 'fabricated'.

The statement, "....This...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. Its function is to provide a basis for avoiding any confusion or doubt. This means, by appreciative discrimination, certainty is gained, because by it, the entities of reality become clearly distinguished. When certainty prevails, there is no room for doubt or confusion.

The statement, "....these five mental events...." is a reply to those who ask, "Are these mental events present together, or do they operate separately?" We speak about them as not rising together in so far as these mental events are mutually different. In so far as that is the case, there is no guarantee that the others will be present when [for example,] the mind becomes interested in something. The others must be understood in the same way.

The terms, 'has been thought about', 'certainty', 'a thing remembered', and 'a thing with which one is acquainted' indicate the fact that their individual epistemological objects are determined. Therefore, there is no interest in something which has* not been thought about. There is no intensified interest in something which has no certainty. There is no attentiveness about a thing which is not remembered. There is neither meditative concentration nor appreciative discrimination about a thing with which one ^{not} is/ acquainted.

Some people think differently, and claim that the five rise together in so far as they are not mutually different. If that be the case, then [the following confusion would result]. Under those circumstances, when the mind becomes interested in something, then intensified interest would be with regard to something which had no certainty about it and when the desire for something in the future arose, there would be no attentiveness [about it], because their activity field is [immediately] experienced. When intensified interest and others arise with regard to a thing with which one is not acquainted, meditative concentration would not be present, because its field of activity is a thing with which one is acquainted. When intensified interest and the others arise with regard to a thing which is not certain, interest would not be present, because its field of activity is with regard to a thing which has certainty. Therefore, how could they claim that the five rise together in so far as they are mutually different?

C. The eleven positive mental events

The statement,

Confidence, self respect, decorum (10 d)

Three beginning with non-attachment, diligence

Alertness, having concern,

Non-violence are positive.

is for the purpose of listing the positive mental events.

The statement, "...are the eleven mental events...."

is for the purpose of clarifying their number, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

1. Confidence

The statement, "...among them, confidence...." is for the purpose of explaining the facticity of confidence.

'Confidence' is a deep conviction about, a lucidity about, and a longing for positive and negative acts, the outcome of things desired and not desired, the four Noble Truths beginning with the Truth of Suffering, and the three Treasures beginning with the Buddha who is perfect. Therefore, confidence is of three kinds.

The statement, "...things which are real can be either of value or....." is for the purpose of explaining the specific object associated with trusting confidence and so on.

Trusting confidence is a deep conviction that only things which are real can be either of value or not.

Lucid confidence is to be clear about things which are real and have value.

Longing confidence is our efforts which produce or which make it possible to attain things which are real and which have value.

The statement, "....a lucid mind...." is for the purpose of clarifying the facticity of lucid confidence. This is to say, 'lucidity' is not associated with a dull mind; therefore, if [the mind] is co-present and on the same level as 'lucidity', it is not dulled by conflicting emotions such as the basic emotions and the proximate factors of instability. In so far as the mind takes its stand on lucidity, it is lucid; therefore, the mind is said to be lucid. 'Turbidities of the mind' refers to tendencies which are emotionally charged.

The statement, "....it has the function of providing a basis for sustained interest...." is for the purpose of clarifying its function. It functions to sustain interest. This means, interest is sustained by a lucid mind which goes out to things which are possible [to accomplish].

2. Self respect

The statement, "....self respect is...." is for the purpose of clarifying the facticity of self respect. This means, 'self respect' means to avoid what is objectionable from having made oneself and the teachings the norm.

The statement, "....despised by people worthy of respect" is a reply to those who ask, "In what manner is it objectionable?" This means, people of respect despise and

do not [act in objectionable ways]; therefore, only evil [acts], whether they can be actualized or not, are said to be 'objectionable'. To despise an objectionable thing which produces dismay and which is despicable, is called 'self respect'.

The statement, "....this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. This means, it functions to prevent one from doing evil acts.

3. *Decorum*

The statement, "....decorum...." is for the purpose of clarifying the facticity of decorum. 'Decorum' means to avoid what is objectionable by making society the standard. This means, one should think, "This is despised by society. If they should find out that I have done such an objectionable thing, they would despise me; therefore, I shall avoid [doing] what is objectionable by avoiding what is not acceptable." The word 'despise' means 'to degrade oneself'. What is not acceptable has been explained in the Sūtras.

The statement, "....moreover, this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function, but the meaning has been explained already.

4. *Non-attachment*

The statement, "....non-attachment...." refers to 'non-attachment' which is a mental event which counteracts attachment.

The statement, "....attachment...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'attachment'?" 'Attachment' means to cling to or to fall in love with the worldly [concerns] and the nice things in life. Its counteragent is non-attachment. Therefore, 'non-attachment' means to be free from, not to run after, and not to fall in love with the worldly [concerns] and the nice things in life, such as elephants and horses.

5. *Non-hatred*

The statement, "....non-hatred...." is for the purpose of explaining 'non-hatred'. 'Non-hatred' means loving kindness which counteracts hatred.

The statement, "....hatred....." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'hatred'?" 'Hatred' is an intention to torment sentient beings, frustrating situations, and the cause of frustrations, such as poison and thorns which cause harm. 'Non-hatred' is explained as the absence of the intention to torment sentient beings, frustrating situations, and the causes of frustrations, because it is the counteragent of hatred.

The statement, "....moreover, this...." is for the purpose of clarifying its function, but it has been stated already.

6. *Non-deludedness*

The statement, "....non-deludedness...." is for the purpose of explaining 'non-deludedness'. 'Non-deludedness' means a real awareness of reality as it is; it counteracts

a deluded state.

The statement, "... 'deludedness' means...the cause and its result...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a deluded state'?" 'Deludedness' means that one does not know [the infallibility] of the cause and its effect.

'Non-deludedness' is understood to be a true awareness, because it is a counteragent against deludedness.

The statement, "...moreover, this...." is for the purpose of clarifying its function, but that has been explained already.

7. Diligence

The statement, "...diligence...." is for the purpose of explaining the facticity of 'diligence'. Although, 'diligence' means a mind which is intent, [it is used in the specific sense of] 'intent on positive acts which counteract laziness'; a mind intent on [becoming] emotionally tainted, is not 'diligence'. Because a mind which is intent on emotionally tainted acts is despicable, it is co-present with laziness and not with diligence. Laziness is characterized by being subjectively oriented and being intent on emotionality.

The statement, "...this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function; its function is to accomplish and complete whatever is positive.

8. Alertness

The statement, "....alertness...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'alertness'?" 'Alertness' is a pliability of mind and body which counteracts sluggishness.

The statement, "....sluggishness...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'sluggishness'?" 'Sluggishness' refers to a mind and body which is not able [to accomplish anything]. Moreover, 'sluggishness' is the seed for all proximate factors of instability.

The statement, "....sluggishness...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?" This means, when one is alert, one is freed from the seeds which produce the proximate factors of instability, because those [seeds produce] sluggishness.

The statement, "....of these, pliability of body...." is a reply to those who ask, "What does 'pliability of body' mean?" 'Pliability of body' means that the body moves with ease to accomplish what it has set out to do. That which allows the body to move [easily] is a positive quality.

The statement, "....pliability of mind...." means a mind which can function [properly]. 'Pliability of mind' is a specific mental event which produces delight and lightness of mind in a Yogin who has properly entered the [four] mental controls. The word 'delight' is used in the sense of 'pleasure' and the word 'lightness' is used in the sense of 'clarity'.

The statement, "....when...has...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?" This means, a mind which is endowed with

this special mental property goes to its objective reference [with ease]; therefore, it is called 'pliability of mind'.

The statement, "....a specific sensation of the body" is a reply to those who ask, "If it is the case that 'alertness' means a specific mental property, then how can one talk about an 'alertness of body'?" When a specific sensation of the body is experienced as pleasureable, then the body becomes alert. The statement, "....when the mind is joyful, the body becomes alert...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?" About this, a Sūtra states,

'When the mind is joyful, the body is alert'.

The statement, "....by its power...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. This means, because alertness has the power to change one's whole life (*gnas gyur*), it functions to remove all of the conflicting emotions.

9. *Having concern*

The statement, "....concern...." is for the purpose of clarifying [the words] 'having concern', but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The question, "....'What is that?'...." is asked, because its facticity cannot be known by merely mentioning its name. The philosopher [Sthiramati] replies, "....it is equanimity....." Here, [the words] 'having concern' is defined [by the word] 'equanimity'.

The philosopher, [Sthiramati] says, "....it alone is positive..." in reply to those who ask for the reason by

saying, "Why is it so?"

Because equanimity alone is positive, it is at the basis of all the positive mental/^{events}explained herein. It cannot be explained in the manner that 'confidence' and the rest are explained. There cannot be another positive mental event over and above the eleven mentioned herein. Therefore, all, without exception, are founded on equanimity, and this fact is expressed by the words 'having concern'.

The reason for its state: If there are eleven positive [mental events], which are co-present with and on the same level as 'equanimity', then ten of them can be explained in the manner [that one gains an understanding of a cow] by taking hold the horn and so on. But 'equanimity' cannot be explained only through its name. Therefore, here, this very fact is expressed by the words 'having concern'.

The statement, "... 'concern' counteracts a state of not being concerned...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'concern'?" The statement, "... 'to have concern' means anything from 'non-attachment' to 'diligence'...." clarifies that.

The words 'having concern' means to counteract negative mental events by removing negative ones on the basis of non-attachment and so on, [which means that] one is not attached to even the habits of practicing positive mental events. Therefore, 'having concern' is said to be the only counteragent against 'not being concerned'. This means, 'concern' is the opposite of 'not being concerned'; there-

fore, it is said to be its opposite.

The statement, "....it...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. It functions to bring to perfection all excellent qualities - both worldly and transworldly.

10. *Equanimity*

The statement, "....'equanimity' means a calm mind...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'equanimity'?" 'Equanimity' is

1. a state of composure attained when the mind is freed from elation and depression,
2. a state in which the mind naturally remains settled, because there is no need to hold it there,
3. a spontaneous mind which is attained when one is not overjoyed with the antidotes against elation and depression and one does not endeavour towards ego-centered demands which pervert everything.

The statement, "....this explanation...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is such an explanation necessary?" This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

1. The statement, "....elation and depression refers to an upset mind...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is a 'calm mind'?" When the mind is elated or depressed, it is called 'unsettled'. When the mind is neither elated nor depressed, because from the very beginning it is neither

elated nor depressed, it is called 'calm'. This is a calm mind.

2. The statement, "....after that...effortlessly...." is for the purpose of explaining the 'settled mind'. The mental state of a Yogin whose mind remains settled without the effort [to keep it settled] after the mind has been made calm, is called 'a settled mind'. At that time, there is the danger that the Yogin may think, "May the evils of elation and depression not arise!" But such a state is common to the 'calmness' attained by a novice, because he [tries to] maintain it for a long time.

3. The statement, "....after that, when [meditative concentration] reaches its highest intensity...." is for the purpose of explaining a 'spontaneous mind'. After that, when meditative concentration reaches its highest intensity, because elation and depression which are not in agreement with that [meditative concentration] are pushed far away, there is no more danger of becoming unsettled. Therefore, the ego-centered demands which turn everything sour and the joy over antidotes against elation and depression are settled effortlessly. This state in which a Yogin stays effortlessly in a spontaneous mind is called 'a spontaneous mind'.

The statement, "....this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. It functions so as not to provide an occasion for either the basic emotions or the proximate factors of instability to arise.

11. *Non-violence*

The statement, "....non-violence is a counteragent against violence...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'non-violence'?" The statement, "....killing them and chaining them up...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. Because not to harm sentient beings by not causing them any harm by means of killing them and chaining them up is a non-malicious act, it is called 'non-violence'. This means, one acts with lovingkindness towards sentient beings.

The statement, "....since it confines pleasure, it is lovingkindness...." is for the purpose of establishing its kind. 'Fortune' means 'happiness'; therefore, the statement means 'to confine happiness'. The word 'confine' is used in the sense of 'giving up'. The statement, "....a person who has lovingkindness...." is a reply to those who ask, "How is one to understand that?" This means, a person who has lovingkindness is pained by all of the frustrations sentient beings face; therefore, through his feeling of lovingkindness, he confines pleasure [in other people].

The statement, "....its function is to make the mind non-malicious...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. It functions to make the mind non-malicious.

The statement, "....the eleven positive mental events have been explained...." is for the purpose of linking the

the discussion to what follows. The meaning is clear.

D. *The six basic emotions*

The statement,

The basic emotions are

Cupidity-attachment, anger, bewilderment error, (11)

Arrogance, opinionatedness, and indecision

is for the purpose of explaining the basic emotions. The statement, "...cupidity-attachment..." is a summary. The meaning is clear.

1. *Cupidity-attachment*

The statement, "...cupidity-attachment..." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'cupidity-attachment'?"

'Cupidity-attachment' means to be overly attached to or to desire a possible existence and the pleasures of life. 'To desire' means [to desire] things in the future. Such acts are called 'overly attached'.

The statement, "...it functions to produce all forms of frustrations..." is for the purpose of explaining its function.

The statement, "...here, frustrations..." is for the purpose of explaining that. Because the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality are co-present with and on the same level as the three kinds of frustrations, they are said to be immersed in frustrations irregardless of whatever existential level they may be found.

Because birth into the three possible levels of exist-

ences and future acts are produced by cupidity-attachment, it is called 'appropriation of a possible existence'.. Because [the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality] are produced by 'appropriation' or have their foundation in that [appropriation], or [because] 'appropriation' is produced from [the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality, these] are called 'psycho-physical constituents of the personality which are appropriated'.

Because the psycho-physical constituents are actualized when one is born into the world of sensuous desire, the world of form, or the world of no-form, 'cupidity-attachment' is said to have the function of producing all forms of frustrations.

2. *Anger*

The statement, "....'anger' is a vindictive attitude towards all sentient beings...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'anger'?" 'Anger' means

1. to be vindictive towards sentient beings,
2. to revile sentient beings, and
3. to want to inflict pain on sentient beings
by killing them or by chaining them up when
they have been captured.

The statement, "....that...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. The statement, "....feeling is pleasant...." is for the purpose of clarifying that, but since this easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....if a vindictive attitude prevails" is a reply to those who ask, "How is one to understand that?" This means, if one is wrathful, then all kinds of frustrations and unhappy states will be produced. When all of these arise, then the mind becomes perturbed. When the mind is perturbed, the body is also perturbed, because it is not separate from [the mind]. Therefore, wherever anger rules, frustrations and dejection accompany it. Evil acts follow closely behind attitudes of hatred; therefore, the function of anger has been described in the above manner.

3. *Bewilderment-error*

The statement, "....'bewilderment-error' is an evil existence...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'bewilderment-error?' 'Bewilderment-error' means a lack of knowledge about evil existences and so on. [To know] that a cause and an effect are interlinked is a correct [understanding], but to desire the effects of pleasure and not the effects of pain, is a perverted [understanding].

The statement, "....it" is for the purpose of explaining its function. The statement, "....identity experience of emotions, acts, and birth...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. The identity experience of emotions, of acts, and of birth, constitutes three proximate factors of instability.

Of these three proximate factors of instability, 'acts'

refers to a motivating force which takes one from one emotional state to another. 'Birth' refers to a later identity experience which results from a former emotion. The way in which [emotions] become the basis for that, is to be understood as follows: If one is bewildered, then the emotions such as perverted knowledge arise, but if one is not bewildered, then this does not happen.

4. *Arrogance*

The statement, "....arrogance...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'arrogance'?" The statement, "....arrogance...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. Every form of arrogance stems from a biased view about the perishable constituents. It has the facticity of an inflated mind.

The statement, "....the psycho-physical constituents" is a reply to those who ask, "Why do you say that every form of arrogance stems from a biased view about the perishable constituents?" This means, from believing that the psycho-physical constituents of the personality is the self or belongs to a self, when one says, "This is me" then such is prudence. If one says, "This is mine" then that is partiality. Because, by thinking in that way, one assumes an aire of superiority and thinks that he is better than others, we say that arrogance stems from a biased view about the perishable constituents.

The statement, "....it...disrespect and frustrations" is for the purpose of explaining its function. It functions to provide a basis for producing disrespect and frustrations.

The statement, "....'disrespect' means...lamas...." is a reply to those who ask, "How is one to understand the term 'disrespect'?" 'Disrespect' is any impolite act or speech which shows contempt towards teachers, such as the lamas and towards other people worthy of respect. 'Contempt' is used in the sense of 'not paying respect'. 'Impolite' means that one does not [pay respect by] standing up and one does not address another properly with [polite] words of welcome.

The statement, "....produces frustrations...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is the meaning of the phrase, 'producing frustrations'?" [The phrase] 'producing frustrations' means to be born into a different life style.

The statement, "....although it cannot be divided, because it has the facticity of a mental inflation,..." is for the purpose of explaining its kind. Although, in so far as arrogance has the facticity of a mental inflation, it cannot be divided [in a technical sense], but we talk about seven kinds [of arrogances] according the specificity of its cause. The statement, "....arrogance, excessive arrogance,..." is for the purpose of explaining its different varieties.

a. *Arrogance*

The statement, "...even though one lacks birth, knowledge, and wealth...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'arrogance'?" 'Arrogance' is a mental inflation in which one thinks, "I am superior to those who are of low status" and "I am equal to those of equal status."

b. *Excessive arrogance*

'Excessive arrogance' is a mental inflation in which one thinks, "I am superior in my acts of charity and ethical behavior, compared to those of equal status." or "I am equal in talent and wealth, compared to those of high birth."

c. *Pride in excessive arrogance*

'Pride in excessive arrogance' is a mental inflation in which one thinks, "I am superior in talent and wealth compared to those who are superior in status."

The above three are related to 'material things'. This means, they are produced on the basis of status and so on. [Without this distinction] they could not be distinguished from 'perverted arrogance'.

Because the first one depends on [the attitude of] belittling, the second one on a feeling of equality, and the third one on a feeling of superiority, the self is praised in particular, and this is their particularity.

'Talent' in this case, means to be well versed in such things as painting.

d. *Egoism*

The statement, "....'egoism'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'egoism'?" 'Egoism' is an ego inflation which result from attachment to the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality which one believes constitute a self or belong to the self, even though, they neither constitute a self nor belong to the self.

e. *Arrogance of showing off*

The statement, "....'arrogance of showing off'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'arrogance of showing off'?" Mental and bodily activities which result from cupidity-attachment, anger, and bewilderment error, are activities belonging to the sphere of man. Meditative contemplation and a state of calm which are counteragents against cupidity-attachment and so on, are called 'heightened states', because they are superior to activities belonging to the sphere of man. A mental inflation in which one thinks, "I have attained a heightened state" even when one has not attained it, is called 'arrogance of showing off'.

f. *Arrogance of thinking small*

The statement, "....'arrogance of thinking small'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is an 'arrogance of thinking small'?" 'Arrogance of thinking small' is a mental inflation in which one thinks, "I am insignificant in status, compared to those of high status."

g. Perverted arrogance

The statement, "....'perverted arrogance'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'perverted arrogance'?" 'Perverted arrogance' is a mental inflation in which one thinks, "I am virtuous" even though one has no virtues.

The statement, "....even though one has no virtues...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it called 'perverted arrogance'?" To break disciplinary rules is not a virtuous act. A person who breaks them, is said to lack virtues. Therefore, although one who thinks, "I am virtuous" even when he lacks the acts of charity, ethical behaviors and others, claims to be virtuous, because there is no truth in his claim, we call it 'perverted'. Although we speak about [the fact that to break disciplinary rules is] not virtuous, only a person who has virtuous qualities can talk about [such claims as being] false.

5. Opinionatedness

The statement, "....'opinionatedness'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'opinionatedness'?" Because 'opinionatedness' is discussed under the topic 'emotions' a general explanation has already been given, but there are five specific ones, such as the biased views about the perishable constituents. Here, we talk about 'views' in the sense of [biased views which] constitute the facticity of emotions, but there are correct views about reality which are not emotionally tainted. They are not discussed here.

The statement, "....although [a biased view] is indistinguishable in so far as it is emotionally tainted and indistinguishable as far as recognizing it [to be different from other biased views],..." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it divided?" Although [a biased view] is indistinguishable in so far as it is emotionally tainted and indistinguishable as far as recognizing it [to be different from other biased views], it is considered to be different in accordance with specific objective references and specific sense data which are mutually different.

a. *Opinionatedness about the perishable constituents*

The statement, "....of these, 'opinionatedness about the perishable constituents'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'opinionatedness about the perishable constituents'?" 'Opinionatedness about the perishable constituents' means to view the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality which have been appropriated as constituting a self or as belonging to a self. The psycho-physical constituents of the personality which have the nature of falling apart, are called 'the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality which have been appropriated'.

b. *Opinionatedness about the extremes*

The statement, "....'opinionatedness about the extremes" is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'opinionatedness

about the extremes'?" 'Opinionatedness about the extremes' means that the 'psycho-physical constituents of the personality' which in the previous one were taken to be objects to be apprehended as a 'I' or 'mine', are now taken to be absolutely eternal or absolutely non-existent. 'Opinionatedness about the extremes' is a biased view which takes its stand on a prior attachment; this means, it is based upon the previous [biased view of] 'opinionatedness about the perishable constituents'.

c. Wrong opinion

The statement, "....'wrong opinion'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'wrong opinion'?"

A biased view in which

1. one denies causes such as charity, sacrifice
burnt offerings, proper and improper acts,
2. one denies effects such as the actualization
of one's goal in this world and in the next
world, and
3. one denies the attainments of the Arhats

is the worst of all biased views. Because it is root of frustrations, it is called 'wrong opinion'.

d. Clinging to ideologies

The statement, "....'clinging to ideologies'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'clinging to ideologies'?" 'Clinging to ideologies' is a biased view in which the five psycho-physical constituents of the personality are taken

to be 'the supreme', 'the sublime', 'the lord' and 'the absolute'. They are [taken to be] 'the supreme', because they are perfect. They are 'the sublime' because there is nothing more superior. They are 'the lord', because there are no others. They are 'the absolute', because none can compare.

e. Clinging to ideologies about ethical behavior and compulsive performances

The statement, "...clinging to ideologies about ethical behavior and compulsive performance..." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'clinging to ideologies about ethical behavior and compulsive performances'?" 'Clinging to ideologies about ethical behavior and compulsive performances' is a biased view in which one takes the five psycho-physical constituents which have been appropriated, to be 'pure', 'liberated', and 'the basis for certainty'. 'To be pure' means that one has washed away the impurities of one's evil acts. 'To be liberated' means that one is freed from the binding chains of emotions. 'To be the basis for certainty' means that one makes Nirvāṇa one's goal.

6. Indecision

The statement, "...indecision..." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'indecision'?" 'Indecision' means to harbour two minds about the cause and its result, about the [four] truths, and about the [three] treasures.

The statement, "...to think variously..." is for the purpose of explaining its kind, but since this is easily

understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....this has a different facticity than appreciative discrimination...." is a reply to those who ask, "If 'to harbour two minds' means to think variously, then would it not mean 'discriminative appreciation'?" 'Appreciative discrimination' has the facticity of intense discrimination. [Indecision] means to to be in doubt; therefore, it is different from 'appreciative discrimination'.

The statement, "....I have finished discussing the six basic emotions...." is for the purpose of linking this [discussion] to what follows, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

E. The twenty four proximate factors of instability

The statement,

Indignation, resentment, and (12b-14a)

is for the purpose of explaining the 'proximate factors of instability'.

The statement,

*The [last] two proximate factors of instability
are two. (14)*

means [of the last four mental events] two [make up one group] and the [last] two [make up another group; hence, the two groups] consisting of two each [make up the four]; therefore, the four are said to make up two groups.

1. *Indignation*

The statement, "... 'indignation'" is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'indignation'?" 'Indignation' is a vindictive attitude when the opportunity to hurt is near at hand. Because 'indignation' is a vindictive attitude, it is not different from anger; it is postulated as a particular state of anger. Therefore, it does not exist alone, it is always related to anger.

The statement, "...when the chance to hurt is near at hand...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a particular state of anger'?" A vindictive attitude towards sentient beings and towards other inanimate objects so long as the opportunity to hurt does not change, is postulated as 'indignation'.

Its function is to provide a basis for killing with a knife.

'Towards sentient beings and towards other inanimate objects' is defined as things which have life to which one is attached and things like poison, weapons, and thorns etc.

'Killing with a knife' means the beginning of error.
'Etc.' means 'killing' and 'chaining' sentient beings.

2. *Resentment*

The statement, "... 'resentment'" is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'resentment'?" 'Resentment' means to not let the mind wander away from such ideas as "Look here, I have overcome my resentment of him, yet he says that I am

angry. Now if, on account of that, I should not consider him [a worthy] person, then I would be just as bad, and I would not be considered to be [a worthy] person either!"

The statement, "....it has the function of providing a basis for intolerance...." is for the purpose of explaining its function.

The statement, "....cannot wait to cause harm...." is for the purpose of explaining the word 'intolerance'. 'Intolerance' means that one wishes to retaliate measure for measure.

The statement, "....this, like anger...." is for the purpose of explaining that this [resentment] is a postulation [of anger]. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

3. *Slyness-concealment*

The statement, "....slyness-concealment...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'slyness-concealment'?"

The statement, "....freed from desire, anger, and fear...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. 'Slyness-concealment' is a state of unresolvedness associated with dullness and stubbornness when, because the time is ripe to give advice, a spiritual friend out of his desire to help ^{one} gives the advice that/should not do what must not be done, or a spiritual friend out of his desire to help says, "You do this!"

The statement, "....'slyness-concealment' is nothing more than an aspect of dullness and stubbornness..." is a reply to those who ask, "How is this associated with dullness and stubbornness?" 'Slyness-concealment' is an unwillingness; therefore, it is associated with dullness and stubbornness.

The statement, "....grief and...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. The statement, "....this is reality...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. This [grief] is the facticity of man and the entities of reality; grief will rise in a person who is unwilling to give up frustrating situations. Grief is always accompanied by unhappiness; therefore, if one is unhappy, one's feelings will not be settled.

4. *Spite*

The statement, "....'spite'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'spite'?" 'Spite' means to rebuke with harsh words. The statement, "....'harsh words'...." is for the purpose of explaining the word 'harsh words'. 'Harsh words' are forceful and slanderous [expressions] used to provoke [others]. 'Forceful' is used in the sense of 'praise'.

The statement, "....the nature of rebuking...." is for the purpose of explaining the word 'rebuke'. Because 'to rebuke' is the facticity of this mental event, it is called 'nature of rebuking'. It takes on its reality by harsh words. Because only this mental event relishes harsh and forceful words, it is explained by the words, "rebuke with harsh words."

The statement, "....this also...anger...." is for the purpose of explaining that this is also a postulation [of anger]. That which precedes indignation and resentment, is the cause for indignation and resentment. The rest is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....this has the function of providing a basis for evil words...." is for the purpose of explaining its function, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....because it is difficult to associate with someone who is spiteful...." is for the purpose of explaining another function. Because it is difficult to associate with someone who is spiteful, 'spite' has the function of not producing a settled feeling.

5. *Jealousy*

The statement, "....'jealousy'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'jealousy'?" The statement, "....overly attached to gain and honour...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. 'Jealousy' is a discontentment produced from an attitude associated with hatred. [It is a state in which one] cannot tolerate the excellences of other people's gain, honour, birth, ethical behavior, and so on, because one is overly attached to one's own gain and honour.

The statement, "....because discontentment permeates the whole body, one is discontented from within...." is for the purpose of explaining its kind, but this is easily under-

stood so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....unhappiness...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. 'Jealousy' is said to have two functions, because it is associated with unhappiness and with what follows.

6. *Avarice*

The statement, "....'avarice'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'avarice'?" 'Avarice' is a mind which is completely structured towards things which are not in harmony with an act of charity.

The statement, "....a thing received...." is for the purpose of explaining the word 'charity'. 'Charity' is a mental act of giving done with either the desire to give up or the desire not to benefit from the teachings, the material things in life, and learning which have been acquired as one's own.

The statement, "....because when [avarice] dominates, there is no act of charity...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is the meaning [of the words,] 'not in harmony with an act of charity'?" This means, when avarice predominates, there is no act of charity; therefore, it is said, "avarice is not in harmony with an act of charity."

The statement, "....because one is attached to gain and honour...." is for the purpose of giving another explanation. 'Avarice' is a mind completely structured towards becoming attached to possessions, honour, and the

necessities of life, and it has the defining characteristic of not wanting to let go.

The statement, "....it...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. The statement, "....not to give up the necessities of life...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. An attachment to the necessities of life over and beyond what is absolutely necessary, is here defined as 'not to give up the necessities of life'.

7. Deceit

The statement, "....'deceit'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'deceit'?" The statement, "....overly attached to possessions and honour...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. 'Deceit' is an act of giving a false appearance of [one's] ethical behaviour, birth, and so on with the intention to deceive others, because one is overly attached to possessions and honour. [Such an act] is defined as 'deceit'.

The statement, "....because this combines both cupidity-attachment and bewilderment error...." is for the purpose of explaining that this is a postulation [of those two]. This means, we speak about it as combining both cupidity-attachment and bewilderment error, because by combining both it displays an unauthentic quality. Just as it was with indignation and the others, [avarice] is merely a postulation, and therefore, it does not exist as an ontological and factual reality.

The statement, "...has the function of providing a basis for evil ways of life...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. It functions as a cause for evil ways of life.

8. *Dishonesty*

The statement, "....'dishonesty'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'dishonesty'?" 'Dishonesty' is a mental state in which one is intent on concealing one's own faults.

The statement, "....the means to conceal one's faults" is a reply to those who ask, "What is the 'means'?" An act of concealing one's fault is the means by which one confuses others in whatever possible way there is.

The statement, "....shifting from one topic to another" is a reply to those who ask, "How are others confused?" 'To confuse others' means to shift from one topic to another, to change one's tone of voice, and to not make things clear. 'Deceit' means to shift from one topic to another; this means, when one is asked a question, one gives an answer which has nothing to do with the question. It is to change one's tone of voice; this means to trick someone by giving them a 'sweet talk'. It is not to make things clear by speaking mystically, saying "I did it!" This means, when something is asked, one speaks in such a way as to not make anything clear.

The statement, "....therefore,..." is for the purpose of making a distinction between 'dishonesty' and 'slyness-concealment'. This means, 'dishonesty' means to change one's tone of voice and to not make things clear, but it does not conceal; therefore, it is different from 'slyness-concealment'. Although 'slyness-concealment' is an unwillingness to make things clear, it does not do so by means [of confusing others]. The statement, "....it does not do so incidently...." means that slyness-concealment does not use means [to confuse others].

The statement, "....it...." is for the purpose of explaining that this is a postulation. From being overly attached to possessions and honour, one is unwilling to disclose one's faults of attachment and bewilderment error; therefore, because ~~dishonesty~~ confuses others, it is postulated only when attachment and bewilderment error predominate.

The statement, "....it...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. The statement, "....correct advice" is for the purpose of clarifying that. This means, ~~dishonesty~~ prevents one from obtaining correct advice about mental control according to the [established] methods; therefore, ~~dishonesty~~ prevents one from obtaining correct advice about mental control according to the [established] methods and this means, the Lamas impart the teachings (*yan ba'i lug*) to those who are not dishonest.

Section Four:

9. *Mental inflation*

The statement, "....'mental inflation'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'mental inflation'?" 'Mental inflation' is the directionality of mind pervaded by the joy of being overly attached to one's possessions which are considered to be one's strength.

The statement, "....status and health...." is a reply to those who ask, "What are 'one's possessions'?" Status and health which are considered to be the only things that count, are called 'one's possessions'.

The statement, "....rapture...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'joy'?" 'Rapture' is a specific kind of joy.

The statement, "....'overly attached'...." is a reply to those who ask, "How is one to understand the words 'overly attached'?" A mind which is overly attached is a mind which has been overcome by the specific kind of joy. This means, a mind which is overpowered by joy is a mind which cannot do anything positive.

The statement, "....it...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. It functions to provide a basis for all the basic emotions and the proximate factors of instability [to arise]. This means, mental inflation produces all of the emotions and the proximate factors of instability.

10. *Malice*

The statement, "....'malice'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'malice'?" The statement, "....in various ways such as by slaying them, by striking them with a chain, by tormenting them...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. Malice is so called because one harms sentient beings in various ways such as by slaying them and by striking them with a chain.

The statement, "....the sentient beings are abused by such acts as slaying them and chaining them...." is a reply to those who ask, "How are they abused?" Since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....since it is associated with anger" is for the purpose of explaining that this is a postulation [of anger]. Malice is associated with anger. The postulation, '[Malice] is a lack of lovingkindness towards sentient beings and it is the intention to be rude' is a synonym for 'malice'.

The statement, "....it has the function of abusing sentient beings...." is for the purpose of explaining its function, but this has been discussed already.

11. *Shamelessness*

The statement, "....'shamelessness' means not to avoid what is objectionable...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'shamelessness'?" The statement, "....even though one is attentive to the fact they are not in accord with...."

is for the purpose of clarifying that. An act performed even though one is attentive to the fact that the desire to act in evil ways is to be avoided and not to be done, and still one goes ahead and does not avoid what is objectionable, such an act is called 'shamelessness'. It is not conducive to realizing self-respect. The terms, 'even though one is attentive' means 'in view of himself'.

12. *A lack of a sense of propriety*

The statement, "....'a lack of a sense of propriety...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a lack of a sense of propriety'?" The statement, "....contrary to societal norms and the treatises....." is for the purpose of clarifying that. 'A lack of a sense of propriety' means that one does not curb evil acts even though one is aware that such acts are contrary to societal norms and the treatises. It is the opposite of decorum.

The statement, "....these two...." is for the purpose of explaining the function of 'shamelessness' and 'a lack of a sense of propriety'. These two provide the foundation for the basic emotions and the proximate factors of instability to arise.

The statement, "....cupidity-attachment and bewilderment error...." is for the purpose of explaining that this is a postulation of those.

'Shamelessness' and 'a lack of a sense of propriety' are postulated only in terms of cupidity-attachment, aversion-hatred, and bewilderment-error which make action useless; therefore, [the two - shamelessness and a lack of a sense of propriety] do not continue on their own. Of these, cupidity-attachment and aversion-hatred cannot occur independently; therefore, they have been explained by the words, "....they are associated with their respective...."

13. *Gloominess*

The statement, "....'gloominess'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'gloominess'?" 'Gloominess' is an inability of the mind to function properly and is a state of heaviness.

The statement, "....'heaviness'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a state of heaviness'?" The content of heaviness is heaviness itself. This is to say, when the mind is heavy, it is dull. 'Heaviness' is a state in which lucidity is pushed far way, because [the mind] cannot discern its objective reference [clearly].

The statement, "....this mental event...." is for the purpose of explaining its function, but its meaning has been discussed already.

The statement, "....it is postulated as an aspect of bewilderment-error...." is for the purpose of explaining that this is a postulation. Since the meaning is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

14. *Ebullience*

The statement, "....'ebullience'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'ebullience'?" 'Ebullience' is an unsettled mind. The statement, "....a settled state is calm...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?" This is to say, 'a settled state' is a calm state and that which is not in agreement with that, is an unsettled state. Because 'ebullience' means to be attentive to chuckle about things laughed at before, to enjoy things which were enjoyed before, and to entertain things which were entertained before, it causes the mind to be unsettled.

Because by its very definition, 'ebullience' is an unsettled state, this unsettled state is called 'ebullience'.

The statement, "....it functions to obstruct calmness" is for the purpose of explaining its function. 'Calmness' means 'integration', and 'ebullience' obstructs that calmness.

15. *A lack of trust*

The statement, "....'a lack of trust'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a lack of trust'?" 'A lack of trust' is a mental event which is not associated with trust.¹ The statement, "....trust...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it not associated with trust?" The meaning has been explained already. The statement, "...a lack of trust is

¹ Negation lacking the text.

opposite to that...." is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....it has the function of providing a basis for laziness...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. The statement, "....because 'a lack of trust' means not to desire positive things...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. This is to say, so long as there is no deep conviction or desire, there will be no desire for anything positive; therefore, it has the function of providing the basis for laziness.

16. *Laziness*

The statement, "....'laziness' is a mind which is unwilling to go out for the positive...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'laziness'?" The statement, "....because laziness which is associated with bewilderment-error, relies on the pleasures of drowsiness, lying down, and not getting up, it is an unwillingness of the mind to go out to the positive acts done by body, mind, and speech" is for the purpose of clarifying that. Laziness which is associated with bewilderment-error, is an unwillingness of the mind to go out to positive acts done by the body and so on, because it relies on the pleasures of drowsiness, lying down, and not getting up.

The statement, "....this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. It functions to obstruct the mind from going out to anything positive.

17. *A lack of concern*

The statement, "....'a lack of concern'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a lack of concern'?" When one is overcome by attachment, the mind is unable to turn away from cupidity-attachment and so on, and therefore, it cannot bring forth counteragents against cupidity-attachment and so on. Cupidity-attachment, aversion-hatred, bewilderment-error, and laziness are postulated as 'a lack of concern'.

The statement, "....this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. It is the cause for increasing negative qualities and decreasing positive ones.

18. *Forgetfulness*

The statement, "....'forgetfulness'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'forgetfulness'?" 'Forgetfulness' is attentiveness which is emotionally toned.

The statement, "....this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

19. *Desultoriness*

The statement, "....'desultoriness...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'desultoriness'?" The statement, "....because, by it, the mind is made unstable in various ways...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. It is called 'scattered brain' because the mind is made to run about to many different objective references by it.

The statement, "...with cupidity-attachment, bewilderment-error, and aversion-hatred..." is for the purpose of explaining that this is a postulation. 'Desultoriness' is postulated as that which is associated with cupidity-attachment and so on which lead the mind astray from its objective reference [when one is] in meditative contemplation.

The statement, "....this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. Because a 'scattered mind' is not freed from cupidity-attachment, desultoriness prevents one from becoming free of cupidity-attachment.

20. *Inattentiveness*

The statement, "...inattentiveness..." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'inattentiveness'?" 'Inattentiveness' is an emotionally tainted discriminative appreciation.

The statement, "...acts done by the body, by speech, and by the mind,..." is for the purpose of explaining an emotionally tainted discriminative appreciation. 'An emotionally tainted discriminative appreciation' means to be bodily, verbally, and mentally inattentive to what results from appreciative discrimination.

The statement, "....not to know what is to be done...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. A person who is inattentive does not know what is to be done and what is not to be done; therefore, [inattentiveness] functions to cause one to fall from his status.

[F. *The four variables*]

21. *Worry*

The statement, "....'worry' means to impress upon the mind...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'worry'?" The statement, "....worry due to despicable acts...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. When something which is to be done in a certain manner, is done in some other manner, that is called 'wrong act'. When a despicable act is considered to be the correct way of doing something, then that is something to worry about. 'Worry' refers to a mind which is not pleased with a thing which is at the basis of its misery. This makes an impression on the mind, because that is just the way of mental events.

The statement, "....this...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. A settled mind is an integrated mind; worry obstructs that.

22. *Drowsiness*

The statement, "....'drowsiness'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'drowsiness'?" The statement, "....'to turn' means to turn towards its objective reference" is for the purpose of clarifying that. A force which turns the mind helplessly away from its objective reference is called 'drowsiness'.

The statement, "....the mind which cannot keep control over the body, turns...." is for the purpose of giving another explanation. 'Drowsiness' is a mental act which makes the body lose control of itself helplessly.

The statement, "....draws the mind...." is for the purpose of explaining the word 'draw'. [The word] 'draw' is used in the sense of [for example, visual] perceptual operations ceases when the visual organ [ceases to function].

The expression "....helplessly turns...." is used to distinguish [drowsiness] from meditative concentration. The expression, 'draws' is used to distinguish [drowsiness] from gloominess.

The statement, "....because it is associated with bewilderment-error, it belongs to bewilderment-error...." is for the purpose of explaining that this is a postulation. Its meaning has been explained already.

The statement, "....it has the function of providing the basis for slipping away from what must be done...." is for the purpose of explaining its function. Drowsiness makes actions meaningless.

23. *Selectiveness*

The statement, "....'selectiveness'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'selectiveness'?" We speak about 'selectiveness' as a specific aspect of directionality of mind and of discriminative awareness which selects out a sense datum in the form "What is this?"

The statement, "....mental addressing...." is for the purpose of explaining the words 'mental addressing'. Since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....'an expression' expresses the meaning...." is for the purpose of explaining the facticity of an expression. It is a synonym for [the words,] 'to express what is thought about'.

The statement, "....'a specific aspect of directionality of mind and discriminative awareness'...." is a reply to those who ask, "In what manner does directionality of mind and [discriminative awareness] constitute its facticity?" This is to say, 'directionality of mind' has the facticity of making the mind go everywhere. 'Discriminative awareness' has the facticity of selecting out what is meritorious and what is not. In so far as the mind makes its start under the influence of these two, under certain conditions, (*ie.*) when mind and the directionality of mind are postulated as selectiveness, [then there occur] concepts by postulation (*mngon par mi rtog pa*), and under other conditions, (*ie.*) when the mind and discriminative awareness are postulated as selectiveness, [then there occur] concepts by intuition (*mngon par rtog pa*).

The statement, "....moreover, when directionality of mind and appreciative discrimination...." is for the purpose of giving another explanation. Moreover, when directionality of mind and appreciative discrimination are postulated [as selectiveness], then the mind is left out. This is to say, the function of the mind is determined to be a concept by postulation or a concept by intuition

in accordance with whether it is under the influence of directionality of mind or of appreciative discrimination.

The statement, "....it is a coarse mental operation" is for the purpose of explaining a synonym, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....'coarse' means a rough estimation" is a reply to those who ask, "What is the meaning of 'coarse'?" A rough estimation has the facticity of coarseness. This means, the mind makes a general move towards an object, but it does not select out the particulars of that object.

24. *Discursiveness*

The statement, "....this method...." is for the purpose of explaining another view. The statement, "....discursiveness also...directionality of mind...." is for the purpose of explaining that. This means, 'discursiveness' also has the facticity of the specific aspects of the directionality of mind and discriminative awareness. It is a mental addressing which is attentive to selecting out one thing at a time.

The statement, "....a mental addressing which is attentive to one thing at a time...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is 'discursiveness' defined as 'selecting out one thing at a time'?" This means, discursiveness has the operation of selecting the thing encountered previously [in a more definite way] in the form "This is it!"

Therefore, 'discursiveness' is said to be an exact mental operation.

The statement, "....are the basis for a feeling...." is for the purpose of explaining the function of both. To select something which is in front of one, is the cause for remaining in a feeling. To select something which is desired, is the cause for not remaining with a feeling.

The statement, "....these two are...exact...." is a reply to those who ask, "If these two have the facticity of the directionality of mind and discriminative appreciation, then why are they different?" These two are distinguished in accordance with their operations as a coarse or exact [discrimination].

The statement, "....two consists of two...." is a reply to those who ask, "Just what is meant by the words 'two consists of two'?" The statement "....two consists of two having two...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. This means there are ~~two~~ two [groups] consisting of two [members]. The statement, "....they are...." is a reply to those who ask, "What are the two?" Worry and drowsiness form one group of two. Selectiveness and discursiveness form another group of two.

The statement, ".... these four mental events comprise two kinds, (ie.) emotionally tainted and not emotionally tainted...." is for the purpose of explaining that these consist of two, but since this is easily understood, I

shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....of those,...not doing what is positive...." is a reply to those who ask, "What does it mean to say, 'emotionally tainted' and 'not emotionally tainted'?"

To impress on the mind such thoughts as, "My act of refraining from killing sentient beings and my act of charity are not done properly" is an emotionally tainted worry. The opposite of that is worry which is not emotionally tainted.

Drowsiness is also emotionally tainted. [An emotionally tainted drowsiness] is either co-present with an emotionally tainted mind or is penetrated by an emotionally tainted mind. The opposite of this, is [drowsiness] which is not emotionally tainted.

In the same way, selectiveness which selects a thing immediately present, is not emotionally tainted. [Selectiveness] which selects a desired thing, is emotionally tainted.

In the same way, discursiveness is emotionally tainted when it selects out ways in which one can harm others. Discursiveness is not emotionally tainted when it selects ways in which one can aid others.

The statement, "....of these, worry, drowsiness...." is a reply to those who ask, "Of these, which ones are emotionally toned?" This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....about that, just as the six observable qualities such as color and form, and sound...." is for the purpose of summarizing the topics discussed so far in this treatise.

The term, 'basis' in the phrase, "....basis for a happy mind...." refers to that which is in agreement with a cause. The rest is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

This summary of the topics discussed so far in this treatise was made in order to make things easy to remember and to conclude this discussion.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUBSTRATUM AWARENESS AND THE FIVE PERCEPTUAL OPERATIONS and THE SUBSTRATUM AWARENESS AND THE INTELLECT

The human body wherein the unique occasion (*ie.* life as a human being with its obligation to act in a human way) and the right juncture (*ie.* the conditions for a realization of a real religion)¹ meet, is the source and basis for all experiences. As stated previously (Chapter III), to live is to experience, and to experience means to be alive. An experience which is devoid of life is an imposter, a flower in the sky.

The substratum awareness, as we have already seen, is a term which denotes the basis for experience and which connotes experience as an ongoing process. Hence, it is said to have the dual function of being the 'substratum of being' and the 'process of becoming conscious of something'.²

Although it is a known fact that an experience which has become the object of analysis loses its 'ongoing-ness', the analysis of experience is a necessary step for one to understand 'experience' and to bring 'experience' to the level of discussion. However, it is also a known fact that,

¹ H.V. Guenther, *Treasures on the Tibetan Middle Way*, p. 78, nt. 1, and p. 80, nt. 3; *Kindly Bent to Ease Us*, Chapter One; and *The Jewel Ornament of Liberation*, Chapter 2.

² H.V. Guenther, *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, p. 96.

just like a fish which is lying on a cutting board is not a live fish, so too, an experience which has been pulled out of an ongoing process is a dead experience.

Therefore, in order to understand how an experience takes place, one must make a living experience out of the operations of the mind and mental events. For example, when we encounter 'anger', we notice that 'anger' does not reside in the mind alone. On the contrary, we see and feel very clearly that the whole organism is involved in it. In other words, what has been conveniently termed a 'mental event' is only an indicator pointing to something which involves one's whole being; therefore, we saw in the previous chapter that Vinītadeva conscientiously made it a point to say that the proximate factors of instability were 'postulations' of what were called 'basic emotions'. Further, in so far as those 'mental events' involved the whole organism, the dichotomy between 'subject' and 'object', or to state it in another way, the dichotomy between 'mind' and 'body' is a concept foreign to the Buddhist Mentalists.

The 'intellect' which is essentially a substratum awareness which has become compromised, dictates what the 'outgoing perceptual operations' will perceive. This has been discussed in Chapter V. The 'intellect' was also considered to be the basis for accounting for seemingly unconscious states. It also serves as the similar immediate cause (*de ma thag pa'i rkyen*) in a perceptual situation.

What this points to is the fact that perception is not a simple operation. It is bound up in past actions and feelings, present attitudes, and future expectations - all of which takes place in the present moment. Also, this indicates that what we call 'conscious moments' applies also to what we have termed 'unconscious moments'. For example, the perception which takes place during a dream is certainly as vivid as the one we experience in a 'conscious' moment, but that perception has taken place in what we term 'unconscious' moment. The fact that perception occurred in the 'unconscious' moment can be verified when one regains one's 'conscious' moment, but it is not that the 'dream' was an 'unconscious' event. Further, the fact that things which appeared in the dream solicited responses, just like things which man encounters in an 'awake' state, indicates that external objects, although sufficient conditions for perception, are not necessary conditions. In a dream situation, outside of the mental perceptual operation, even the other perceptual organs become superfluous, for what form, sound, taste, smell, or object is the eyes, ears, tongue, nose, and skin in contact with, during a dream? E. Laszlo has stated this complication involved in a perceptual operation as follows:

The general conclusion emerging from recent experimental works on the psychology of perception is that seeing (hearing, etc.) is not a simple registering of externally induced stimuli, but a complex interactive process whereby relatively underdetermined stimuli are assimilated to cognitive sets derived from the past interactions

of the organism and its environment and thereby endowed with meaning.¹

Vinītadeva's discussion on this topic can be divided into two parts.

- A. The relationship between the substratum awareness and the five perceptual operations, and
- B. The relationship between the substratum awareness and the intellect.

A. *The relationship between the substratum awareness and the five perceptual operations*

The statement, "....this must be considered...." is for the purpose of discussing another topic, because the discussion on the former topic has been completed.

The statement, "....some...." is for the purpose of explaining that there are some who think, "Why is it that, even when a single referential cause (*dmigs pa'i rkyen*) is present, simultaneously, to all five perceptual operations, only one, neither two nor many, cognitions arise from the substratum awareness?"

The statement, "....some think...." is for the purpose of taking up the first possibility. The Sautrāntika claim that there is no similar immediate cause (*de ma thag pa'i rkyen*) from which two or many cognitions can occur simultaneously; therefore, they claim that only one cognition can occur. They think that a single perceptual operation cannot be

¹ E. Laszlo, *Introduction to Systems Philosophy*, Harper Torchbook, 1972, p. 203.

the similar immediate cause for many cognitions which are produced simultaneously as many.

The statement, "....or there is no certainty...." is for the purpose of taking up the second possibility. If there is one condition present, then one cognition occurs; but if there are two or many conditions present, then two or more cognitions occur. This is the same as the first claim.

The philosopher, [Vasubandhu] says,

*The way in which the five [perceptual operations] arise
From the fundamental perceptual operation in accordance with
Their appropriate conditions, as either one or many
Perceptual operations, is like the waves and water. (15)*

The five perceptual operations arise from the fundamental perceptual operation in accordance with their appropriate conditions (*rkyen*); sometimes simultaneously, sometimes in succession. The statement, "....for example, the waves are produced according to conditions...." summarizes this.

Because an understanding of the words comes before an understanding of the verse, the statement, "....'five'...." is for the purpose of explaining the meanings of the words. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....because it is a basis containing the seeds of the five...." is a reply to those who ask, "In what manner is [the substratum awareness] a fundamental perceptual operation, and why is it so called?" The sub-

stratum awareness is the basis which contains the seeds of the five perceptual operations, and accordingly, it makes the beings ('gro ba rnams) appropriate a [particular] life style (skye ba); therefore, the substratum awareness is called 'the fundamental perceptual operation'.

In so far as the life style [is produced] from that, it is the only basis which contains the seeds, and [therefore,] it is the cause [which produces those life styles].

The statement, "....the words, 'according to their condition' mean...." is for the purpose of explaining the fact that [the life styles] are in accord with conditions. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it. The words 'life style' are explained by the words, 'gain an identity'. Knowledge which is simultaneous and in succession is explained by the words 'together or not'.

The statement, "....like the waves...." is a reply to those who ask, "How can it be produced simultaneously and in succession?" This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....For example, Oh Viśālamati...." is a reply to those who ask, "From what is this example taken?" This example was taught by the Buddha after he had addressed Viśālamati [with the words, Oh Viśālamati!]

The word 'stream' is explained by the word 'flow'¹

¹ Text reads: *rgyu*

The word 'exhaustion' is explained by the word 'end'.

The meaning which the sūtra proposes to convey is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....about this, there is a verse...." is for the purpose of establishing the fact that the substratum awareness is very much like a stream.

The perceptual operation which has been appropriated is deep and subtle, and it flows like a stream.

It is also the basis which contains all of the seeds.

Because the substratum awareness must not be taken to be a self by the sentient beings,

I do not expound this to the assembly of sentient beings.¹

It is said to be 'deep', because it is beyond the domain of ordinary people. It is said to be 'subtle', because it is beyond the domain of even the superior beings.

The statement, "....just as a particular perceptual operation is determined by a referential cause (*dmigs pa'i rkyen*)...." is for the purpose of explaining the fact that many perceptual operations occur simultaneously is also established by reason, because an explanation of it, on the basis of scripture, has been given.

A similar immediate cause (*de ma thag pa'i rkyen*) of a visual perceptual operation and so on, does not determine it to be a particular perceptual operation in the manner than a referential cause (*dmigs pa'i rkyen*), i.e., the color and form for a visual perception, sound for an auditory

¹ This verse is found in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, V. 7., Lamotte edition.

perception, etc., determines a visual perceptual operation etc., to be that particular perceptual operation.

This means, when a visual perceptual operation occurs, six perceptual operations function successively as the similar immediate cause. In the same manner, six are considered to be the similar immediate cause of a mental perceptual operation in succession. Therefore, if the referential cause is present, then two or more perceptual operation can occur from a single similar immediate cause, and this would not be a contradiction.

Why? If you do not accept this fact, then what possible reason do you have to say that on the one hand, there certainly is no similar immediate cause [from which many perceptual operations occur], and on the other hand, maintain that even when the referential causes for five [perceptual operations] are present simultaneously [to them], there will be only one, not five, perceptual operations? There is no reason for maintaining that! Therefore, so long as an objective reference is present [as a referential cause], then there may be five perceptions or there may be none.

B. The relationship between the substratum awareness and the intellect

The statement, "....now, the following must be considered...." is for the purpose of discussing a new topic.

The statement,

The intellect operates at all times;

*Exceptions are: induced unconsciousness,
The two kinds of meditative states,
Deep sleep and unconscious stupor. (16)*

The statement, "....the intellect operates at all times; exceptions are induced unconsciousness...." is a summary.

The statement, "....'at all times' means...." is for the purpose of explaining the words in the verse. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....to this general rule....." is for the purpose of showing when the [operation of the] intellect is contrary.

Although, it is [generally] accepted that the intellect functions at all times, exceptions are:

1. induced unconsciousness (*'du shes med pa*),
2. a meditative state which is the practice and attainment of induced unconsciousness (*'du shes med pa'i snyoms pa*),
3. a meditative state in which the suspension of functional and attitudinal operations is attained (*'gog pa'i snyoms pa*),
4. a state of deep sleep (*sems med pa'i gnyid*),
and,
5. a state of unconscious stupor (*sems med pa'i brgyal pa*).

The words *spyir btang ba* means a general rule.

The statement, "....which has...as its objective refer-

ence...." refers to a specific function.

The statement, "....'induced unconsciousness'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'induced unconsciousness'?" Sentient beings who have induced unconsciousness are said to be a specie of gods. The state in which the mind and mental events of those who are born within [the realms of] those [gods] are suspended, is called 'induced unconsciousness'.

To be born within the realms of the gods means that [one enters] a meditative state which is the practice and attainment of induced unconsciousness wherein the desires [on the level] of man have been overcome.

To enter meditative contemplation wherein the desires [on the level] of man have been overcome means to be born into the highest possible existence. A person who has [attained a state of] induced unconsciousness is freed from [conceptual] knowledge, and remains in a state wherein there are no objects [to be appropriated].

The statement, "....the two meditative states are...." is a reply to those who ask, "What are the two meditative states?" This is easily understood, so I shall not explain it.

The statement, "....of these, a meditative state which is the practice and attainment of induced unconsciousness..." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a meditative state which is the practice and attainment of induced unconsciousness'?" In this treatise, 'a meditative state which is the

practice and attainment of induced unconsciousness' is said to mean that a Yogin, by means of mental controls which are co-temperous with a path of liberation, frees himself from the attachments belonging to the first three levels of meditation, although he has not yet freed himself from attachments belonging to the fourth level, [and therefore] he has suspended the mental events which are co-temperous with the mental perceptual operations.

The statement, ".... 'suspended' is spoken about in the sense that this [meditative practice] suspends...." is for the purpose of explaining a [folk] etymology [for this meditative practice], and that is all that can be said.

The statement, "....which are co-temperous with the mental....." is a reply to those who ask, "What is similar to it?" Whatever is in attendance with a mental perceptual operation is suspended, and that is called 'suspended'. The [suspension] is a specific state (*gnas skab*), but it is not, as some may think, a substantial reality (*rdzas*).

The statement, "....that meditative state, moreover... comes after the mind...." is a reply to those who ask, "If even a focused mind (*sems rtse gcig*) from among the [five object] determining [mental events], cannot be called 'a meditative state', then how can the suspension of the mind and mental events be called 'a meditative state'?" A 'meditative practice' is that by which one attains a state which is not associated with [the process in which] a different mind is produced after the [former instance of] mind.

Therefore, the suspension of the mind and mental events is called 'a meditative state'.

The statement, "....a meditative state in which the suspension of functional and attitudinal operations is attained...." is for the purpose of explaining the second [meditative state].

The meditative state in which the suspension of functional and attitudinal operations is attained, is said to mean that a Yogin, by means of mental control which has been programmed (*btang ba*) in the previous [process of] calming down concepts, frees himself from cupidity-attachment which essentially has no field characteristic (*skye mched*), [and therefore,] he has suspended the [attachments which are in] attendance with the mental perceptual operation and the emotionally tainted mind.

The statement, "....calming down concepts...." means that from making the thought, "This is the state of calm" one's primary concern, one later enters into meditative practice.

The statement, "....This also, like the meditative state which^{is} the practice and attainment of induced unconsciousness...." is for the purpose of explaining that this is also a postulation. Just as the meditative state which is the practice and attainment of induced unconsciousness is postulated as a particular state, so too, this is also a postulation of that.

The statement, ".....a state of deep sleep....." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a state of deep sleep'?" While the body is immersed in deep sleep, mental perceptual operations do not occur; therefore, this is [also] called 'consciousless' (*sems med pa*).

The statement, ".....a state of unconscious stupor....." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'a state of unconscious stupor'? and when does it take place?" 'Unconscious stupor' is a figurative expression of an imbalanced body which is:

1. a dissociation of the perceptual operations with their [respective] field when the mental perceptual operation occurs periodically after one has been suddenly struck [on the head with a stick], and
2. an imbalance of the bodily constituents [*ie.*, breath, bile, and phlegm].

The statement, ".....these five situations are exceptions....." is for the purpose of summarizing and concluding the discussion. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, ".....this induced unconsciousness....." is meant to be a question about the mental perceptual operation. The statement, ".....begins to operate on the basis of the substratum awareness....." is a reply to those who ask, "From what does the mental perceptual operation, which was inoperative while the Yogin was in a state of induced unconsciousness, revert?" The mental operation which reverts

from a state of induced unconsciousness, begins to operate on the basis of the substratum awareness. This means that the substratum awareness contains the seeds for all of the perceptual operations.

The statement, "...in the transformation of a perceptual operation..." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to what follows, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

CHAPTER IX

DEFINITION OF 'AWARENESS *QUA* SENSА'

The term 'awareness *qua* sensa' (*rnam par rig pa*) appears five times in Vasubandhu's verse text. The five occurrences can be found in Verse 17, 25, 26, 27, and 28. The occurrence of this term in these particular verses and not in others, indicate that these are strategic points in the development of the Buddhist Mentalistic trend.

The fact that this term occurs for the first time in Verse 17, indicates that the whole of Vasubandhu's discussion up to this point was in anticipation of this goal. However, the goal set up at this point is no final goal, as once the listener gains an understanding of the term in the context of Verse 17, he must move on to the meaning of the term as exemplified in Verse 25, and then in Verse 26 and so on. What this indicates is the fact that when the term 'awareness *qua* sensa' recurrently occurs in various verses, it does not do so with the same meaning. In Verse 17, it is used as a synonym for 'discursive discrimination' which lands us in *saṃsāra*. In Verse 25, it is used as a synonym for 'reality as such'; in Verse 26, it is used as a synonym for 'mind as such' which is different from 'mind' which is obsessed with the dichotomy of subject and object; in Verse 27, it functions as the objective reference for meditative contemplation, and in verse 28, it points to a reality seen from a new perspective based on the fact that the perceiver has gained a new

outlook and hence a new attitude. This indicates that the term 'awareness *qua* *sensa*' is not a static term conducive of merely one interpretation, but is a dynamic term which denotes a varied and different picture in every instance.

This also indicates that words do not relate reality. At best, they are convenient pointers which point the way to a deeper and more meaningful experience. If one remains with the beauty of a moon reflected in water, he will never realize the possibility of the beauty of the moon as such. Certainly the reflection of the moon in water represents the reality of the moon as such, but the moon in the water can never convey the moon as such. So too, although the term 'awareness *qua* *sensa*' represents, in one sense, reality as such, by that term alone, a true picture of reality cannot be obtained.

The world in which we live and experience various things is defined and limited to our openness to accept (or not to accept) all the possibilities present in an experiential situation. This is to say, concepts, which have their basis in discursive discrimination, puts limits on the world which has no limits. For those who wish to expand their awareness, it is essential to see at the very outset that concepts which have no reality of their own are what are believed to be reality. Therefore, the *dBus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa* (*Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*) begins with the statement;

Discursive discrimination having no reality, exists.
Neither subject nor object exist therein.
Therein, exists the open dimension of reality.
In the last, the first exists.¹

This verse presents certain problems which have been the topics for long hours of discussion in the history of Buddhism. One of those problems is with the word 'exists'. In so far as naming something has within it, the inherent danger of giving that something named an ontological status, the word 'exists' has also demanded a substantive content. However, the Buddha, in expressing 'reality', has pointed out three (sometimes counted as four) signs of reality which indicate that 'reality as such' is such that it has no abiding principle to which it can be reduced. The classic three are:

1. everything is frustrating,
2. everything is transient, and
3. a state of calm is a relief.

These three states of reality are not static and absolute. They are merely indicators pointing to the open possibilities which reality presents. Therefore, the second can be understood to be the basis of the first; the first, the basis for the third; and the third, the basis for the realization of the second. This means, that whatever *is*, is by its very nature transient. Still, certain Buddhist philosophical systems, such as the Vaibhāṣika, have tried to 'pin down'

¹ *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*, ed. by G.M. Nagao, p. 17.

a reality to which the three indicators pointed. As a consequence, they claimed:

Ultimately, real was that which...existed as substance (*rdzas yod*), while anything that could be claimed to exhibit substantial existence (*rdzas grub*), though not having existence as substance in itself (which nevertheless might be a constituent of the latter), was considered to be conventionally or empirically real and have nominal existence (*btags yod*).¹

Although the philosophical and logical implications involved in such a claim are taken up by Vinītadeva in the present chapter, the major concern is with 'awareness *qua* sensa'. As pointed out previously (p. 292), this term is not only capable of many interpretations, but can be interpreted differently even within the scope of one text. Here, in this particular context, it is equated with 'discursive discrimination' which is none other than the transformation of an actualized state (*viz.*,) the substratum awareness.

The term, 'discursive discrimination' may sound quite redundant and tautological, but there is a reason for rendering the term *rnam par rtog pa* in that way. The present writer wishes to distinguish 'discursive discrimination' from 'appreciative discrimination', but also wishes to show that these are on the same level; (*ie.*) these are operational terms on the three existential levels. Both are to be distinguished from 'transcending primordial awareness' (*yeshe*) which is beyond the domain of the three levels of

¹ H.V. Guenther, *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, p. 36.

existences. One might say that 'discursive discrimination' is both the cause and result of negative factors, whereas, 'appreciative discrimination' is both the cause and result of positive factors. In so far as 'positive' and 'negative' are still polar values, they function as conditions which brings man to the level of a 'fallen being'; hence, are factors which operate on the level of the emotionally tainted mind. 'Transcending primordial awareness' however is beyond any sense of 'values'; therefore, of it nothing can be said, except that it *is*.

Now, returning to the main trend of thought, in so far as discursive discrimination is a transformation of a perceptual operation, it does not have any reality of its own outside of that transformation; therefore, it is spoken about as 'having no reality'. In so far as nothing can be predicated about a 'non-real', it is said to be devoid of both subject and object. But the state of not being bound to metaperceptual demands is an openness in which reality, as it were, unfolds in front of one's eyes. However, in so far as all of this takes place within the limits of the three levels of existence, the openness is not lasting, and due to the operation of the substratum awareness which is ever ready to pull man off of his 'heightened' status, man, once again, finds himself as a 'fallen being'.

The distinction between the 'substratum awareness' and the other perceptual operations is that the 'substratum aware-

ness' is metaphorically spoken about as the 'container' of seeds (*ie.*) potentials which are ever ready to effect their new outcome. Vinītadeva's discussion on this points to a very important fact; and that is, whatever is an outcome of a positive or negative act, is never outside of the three levels of existence. Therefore, the last line, *In the last, the first exists*, of the above quoted verse from the *dBus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa*, is very significant.

Vinītadeva's discussion on this chapter can be divided into the following heads:

A. Discursive discrimination

1. The facticity of discursive discrimination
2. Refutation of the claim that an external object is the objective reference of discursive discrimination
3. The manner in which discursive discrimination comes forth

B. Two kinds of perceptual operations

1. The substratum awareness is distinguished from the basic principle of the Sāṃkhya system
2. The substratum awareness is the basis for the other perceptual operations
3. The substratum awareness is related to the 'out-going' perceptual operations

C. The two kinds of appropriations

D. The manner in which the substratum awareness comes forth

E. The reasons for the claim that a substratum aware-

ness exists

1. Reasons in accord with the teaching and reason
2. The substratum awareness is the basis for both
saṃsāra and nirvāṇa
 - i. The refutation of the Vaibhāṣika
 - ii. The refutation of the Sautrāntika

A. *Discursive discrimination*

The statement, "....this...." is for the purpose of establishing the proposition, 'The self and the entities of reality do not exist outside of the transformation of a perceptual operation'.

*This transformation of a perceptual operation is
Discursive discrimination, and whatever is conceived
By it, is non-existent.*

Therefore, everything in this life is

.... merely 'awareness qua sensa'.

The statement, "....the three transformations explained previously...." is for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the lines in the verse. The meaning has been explained already.

1. *The facticity of discursive discrimination*

The statement, "....a sense datum which is over-evaluated as an object...." is for the purpose of explaining the facticity of discursive discrimination. The word, 'discursive discrimination' means anything which comes forth as

a sense datum which is over-evaluated as an object (*ie.*) the mind and mental events pertaining to the three levels of existence.

The statement, "....it is said...." is for the purpose of quoting the *dBus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa* (*Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya* I, 8)¹ which states:

The mind and mental events which constitute the
Three levels of existence are logical fictions
having no reality.

The statement, "....three kinds of discursive discriminations...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is the transformation of a perceptual operation explained by the words 'discursive discrimination'?"

There are three kinds of discursive discriminations which appertain to and are co-temperous with the substratum awareness and so on. The world as a container and so on, which constitute the contents of discursive discrimination have no reality. Therefore, the transformation of a perceptual operation is said to be discursive discrimination, and its objective reference has no reality.

2. *Refutation of the claim that an external object is the objective reference of discursive discrimination*

The philosopher [Sthiramati] says, "....a cause...." in reply to those who ask, "How can one know that it does

¹ See. *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*, ed. by G.M. Nagao, p. 20; S. Yamaguchi, *Chu-hen Funbetsu Ron*, p. 8.

not exist?" and "What does it mean to say, 'its objective reference has no reality'?" because these people who talk about an external object are not yet convinced.

A cause, so long it is effective, will produce a result; not otherwise. This is the way of a cause.

A perceptual operation occurs even when there is no object (*ie.*,) as in the case of an illusion. Therefore, because a perceptual operation occurs even if there are no objects, it is self revealing (*kho bos shes pa*). If a perceptual operation depended upon an object, then a perception of an illusion and the like, could not occur, because they are not real objects.

The statement, "....therefore, that which has become extinguished previously...." is for the purpose of explaining a definition of 'perceptual operation' in view of making a summary. This means, a perceptual operation does not depend upon an external object. Therefore, because a perceptual operation is produced from a *sensum* which resembles the one which has become extinguished previously, it is not produced from an external object. Therefore, even if external objects do not exist, a perceptual operation can still occur.

The statement, "....even if the object is not different, those who discursively discriminate it...." is for the purpose of explaining a fault [in their claim], because it was mentioned only incidently before.

According to their tastes, their desires, and their level of being, even a single object appears differently to those who discursively discriminate it.

The statement, "....one...." is a reply to those who ask, "Does this mean that from a single object, many awarenesses come forth?" A single object cannot be [the cause for] a multiple and contrary identity experiences. Therefore, you must get it into your head that the objective reference of discursive discrimination does not exist, because [to think that it does] is an over-evaluated idea.

The statement, "....here...." is for the purpose of summarizing the discussion. The extreme of an over-evaluated idea is negated by the words, 'the object of discursive discrimination does not exist'.

Because [Sthiramati] wishes to negate the extreme of nihilism, he says, "....therefore, everything is merely 'awareness *qua* sensa'.

The statement, "....'therefore' means 'for that reason'...." is for the purpose of clarifying that.

The self and so on, [which have been conceived] by discursive discrimination whose facticity is a transformation, are notions having no reality. Discursive discrimination [however,] exists.¹ Therefore, because the epistemological object (*yul*) does not exist, everything is merely an 'awareness *qua* sensa'.

¹ Nagao, *Ibid.*, p. 17; Yamaguchi, *Ibid.*, p. 2; and Th Stcherbatsky, *Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extreme*, Chapter 1.

The statement, "....everything...." is for the purpose of explaining the lines of the verse. The word 'everything' means the three levels of existence and the non-composite ('*dus ma byas*).

The word, 'merely' is used for the purpose of negating an epistemological object outside of 'awareness *qua* *sensa*'.

The suffix *tsam* (= *skt. 'ka'*) [in the compound, *mātra + ka*] is not used in the sense of 'small' [as in the case of *vr̥ikṣa + ka* = a small tree], nor in the sense of a diminutive [as in the case of *aśva + ka* = a small horse, *ie.*, a pony], nor in the sense of an example [as in the case of *vāid + ka* = relating to the Vedas], nor in the sense of extolling [as in the case of *putra + ka* = a little child, *ie.*, Oh darling!]¹ It is used merely to fill in the metre of the verse.

3. *The manner in which discursive discrimination comes forth*

The statement, "....if everything is merely 'awareness *qua* *sensa*',...." is made in anticipation [that this would be] an opportunity for those who speak about an external object [to retaliate].

¹ The use of the suffix *ka* is outlined by Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, in §§ 1186, 1222; *uka* in § 1180; and *aka* in § 1181. Similar examples to the ones given by Vinītadeva can be found in §§ 1222a and 1222m.

[Opponents]: If everything real is merely 'awareness *qua* sensa', then there could be no creator nor agent other than 'awareness *qua* sensa'. If that be the case, then because 'awareness *qua* sensa' would not be blessed nor created by any kind of creator, you must explain from what the various discursive discriminations are produced.

To them, [Vasubandhu] says,

When the perceptual operation and the container of all seeds (ie.) the substratum awareness,

Mutually influence each other,

They go this way or that way (18 b,c)

therefore, even if a creator or an agent does not exist,

This or that discursive discrimination is produced. (18 d)

The commentator [Sthiramati] explains this verse with the statement, "....therein, all things are produced...." This means, the substratum awareness has the potential to produce everything; [therefore,] it is called 'all of the seeds'.

B. Two kinds of perceptual operations

The statement, "....perceptual operations...." is for the purpose of explaining that one must talk about the two specific [perceptual operations].

There are perceptual operations which do not contain all the seeds; they are called 'out-going perceptual operations'. Therefore, in order to distinguish [the substratum awareness] from those, this is specifically called 'all of the seeds'.

1. *The substratum awareness is distinguished from the basic principle of the Sāṃkhya system*

The statement, "....perceptual operation...." is for the purpose of explaining that one must distinguish [the substratum awareness] from the basic principle (*gtso bo*) which some [systems] claim to be the container of all of the seeds, although it does not belong on the level of a perceptual operation.

The statement, "....because there is a confusion about this one word...." is for the purpose of explaining the above [point] from another point of view.

For example, because there is a possibility of confusing the two words which go into making up the compound 'blue lotus', there is [a grammatical rule which makes one] a qualifier and [the other one] a qualificant. But the word 'all' is not like that. In the same manner, there is a possibility to confuse even one word; therefore, there is a [rule of] qualifier and qualificant; for example, [the word 'substance'] in the phrase 'earth substance' and in the phrase 'water substance'. With regard to the use of one phrase (*viz.*) 'water substance', there can be no confusion about the word 'substance', [but because 'water substance' and 'earth substance' are different, the word,] 'substance' is qualified. In the same way, in this case, there is no confusion about the fact that 'all of seeds' refers to only this 'perceptual operation', but still it is qualified as 'a perceptual operation'.

2. *The substratum awareness is the basis for the other perceptual operations*

The statement,

They go this way or that (18 c)

is for the purpose of explaining a different line of the verse.

'Transformation' is defined as having the defining characteristic of becoming different from a previous [moment]. Its defining characteristic means to attain a situation which has the potential to produce that and the following discursive discrimination.

The statement,

mutually influence each other (18 b)

is explained by the words, "...for example...." When the visual perceptual operation etc., because their power has become actualized, go out [to their respective objective referencel], the substratum awareness functions as the motivating force having that specific power. The transformation of the substratum awareness becomes the motivating force for perceptions such as the visual [perception]. Therefore, for whatever reasons the two operate together, it is for that very reason, that the substratum awareness functions as providing the basis from which

this or that discursive discrimination is produced (18 d)

without having ever been created or blessed by anyone!

3. *The substratum awareness is related to the
'out-going' perceptual operations*

The statement, "....here, in this life...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to what follows.

The perceptual operation which is the basis for everything and the out-going perceptual operations are explained only in view of a present life.

The statement,

*That [substratum awareness] is that which is produced as
Another actualized state when a previous actualized state,
Containing the tendencies of acts and the tendencies of
The two kinds of apprehensions, becomes extinguished. (19)*

is for the purpose of explaining how the future [life] results from a present [life].

When an actualized state called 'substratum awareness' which has been fattened up by previous acts, breaks loose, then a substratum awareness, which is a different actualized state containing the tendencies of acts and the tendencies of the two kinds of appropriations, is produced.

The statement, "....meritorious, unmeritorious,..." is for the purpose of explaining the lines of the verse, by the commentator [Sthiramati]. 'Acts' means 'directionality of mind' which is meritorious, unmeritorious, or neutral.

'Tendencies of acts' refers to potentials in the substratum awareness which have the capacity to produce a future body; (ie.) the acts described above.

C. The two kinds of appropriations

The statement, "....the two appropriations...." is for the purpose of explaining the two appropriations. The two appropriations are:

1. attachment to an appropriated object, and
2. attachment to an appropriating subject.

The statement, "....outside of a perceptual operation....." is for the purpose of explaining the individual facticity of the two.

1. 'Attachment to an appropriated object' means, to be overly attached to an identity experience of an appropriated object as if it existed outside of a perceptual operation.

2. 'Attachment to an appropriating subject' means, whatever has been determined as the appropriating subject (*ie.*) the perceptual operation which structures the apprehended object in the above mentioned manner.

The statement, "....a previous appropriation...." is for the purpose of explaining their tendencies. The tendencies of the two appropriations are the seeds which produce the two appropriations having the [same] generic property as the two former appropriations which program the production of the future ones.

The statement, "....by the specificity of the tendencies of acts....." is for the purpose of explaining precisely the functions of the two appropriations, because their tendencies have been explained.

The different kinds of life and the different kinds of bodily forms of men etc., are attributed to the tendencies of positive acts. The different kinds of life and the different kinds of bodily forms of beings in hell etc., are attributed to the tendencies of negative acts. For example, due to the difference in the variety of seeds, the rice plants are different.

The tendencies of the two appropriations become supporting [conditions] (*lhan cig byed pa*) for all of the functions involved in the production of bodily form which has been propelled by tendencies of acts of its own [kind]. For example, earth and water are supporting conditions when a shoot is produced from a seed.

The statement, "....therefore, not only tendencies of acts...." is for the purpose of concluding the discussion. 'Acts' means tendencies of acts which have been fattened up by the supporting conditions (*ie.*) tendencies of the two appropriations. If the tendencies of the two appropriations were not present, then an actualized state could not be produced from tendencies of acts alone. The statement, "....therefore,...." is for the purpose of explaining this very fact.

D. *The manner in which the substratum awareness comes forth*

The statement, "....when a previous actualized state becomes extinguished...." is for the purpose of explaining

another line of the verse. When an act which has been implanted by a former act, becomes actualized in this moment and reaches the brink of bursting forth, the force of the tendencies of acts which is supported by the tendencies of the two appropriation effects another substratum awareness.¹ Therefore, another actualized state which is not associated with a [former] substratum awareness could not exist.

The statement,

*....when a previous actualized state
.....becomes extinguished.... (19)*

is for the purpose of summing up the discussion with the words of the verse. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

E. *The reasons for the claim that a substratum awareness exists*

1. *Reasons in accord with the teaching and reason*

The statement, "....not associated with the perceptual operations such as visual...." is for the purpose of refuting those Sautrāntikas who talk about an external object.

[Sautrāntikal: If a substratum awareness exists and contains all of the seeds, then you must give the reason.

¹ Text adds: *yongs su dpyad pa las mnam par smin pa*, which does not seem to fit the context.

The philosopher [Sthiramati] says, "....it is established on two accounts...." and continues to say, "....it is obvious, because its existence is established in accord with the teaching and with reason...."

The *Theg pa chen po 'i chos mngon pa 'i mdo* (*Mahāyānābhī-dharmasūtra*) states:

The Bhagavat has explained that [the substratum awareness] has been the ground (*dbyings*) from beginningless time and has been the foundation for all of the emotions. When it exists, then the five levels of beings exist. When it exists, the state of peace (*mya ngan las 'das*) can be attained.

Therefore, the substratum awareness which is the seed of everything exists. A thing which is not associated with the substratum awareness cannot be accepted as the ground from beginningless time nor as the foundation for all of the emotions.

The word 'ground' is used in the sense of 'cause'. 'All of the seeds' means the basis for all things.

The statement, "....if it did not exist...." is for the purpose of explaining [that the existence of the substratum awareness] is in accord with reason. Since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

2. *The substratum awareness is the basis for both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa*

The statement, "....the continuation of saṃsāra...." is for the purpose of explaining the facticity of the

continuation of [saṃsāra] and its cessation.

The continuation of saṃsāra means that one life form is linked with another life form having the same generic quality. The cessation of saṃsāra is a state of being (*dbyings*) which is calm. It can be gained while one still has bodily form (*phung po'i lhag ma dang bcas pa*) or when one no longer has bodily form.

'While one still has bodily form' means, while one is still bound to the [five] psycho-physical constituents. 'When one no longer has bodily form' means, when one is not bound to the [five] psycho-physical constituents. The word 'bound' means 'parts'. Parts are of two kinds - the emotional and the physical. Therefore, it is stated that the emotional part is removed while one still has the physical part. The word 'has' is used in the sense of 'possesses'. For example, the meaning of the word 'possesses' is like a mother donkey who carries the burden of her ten offsprings.

The statement, "....other than the substratum awareness...." is a reply to those who ask, "How is the continuous [flow of saṃsāra] stopped?"

Only the substratum awareness is a perceptual operation which is produced with 'motivating force' as its supporting condition. If a perceptual operation which is produced with 'motivating force' as its supporting condition did not exist, then the continuous [flow of saṃsāra] could not be admitted.

The statement, "....if the substratum awareness is not accepted...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why cannot some other perceptual operation be produced with 'motivating force' as its supporting condition?"

There are some who do not accept a substratum awareness. They claim that the perceptual operation which does not link one moment to the next is produced with 'motivating force' as its supporting condition. Such is the claim of the Vaibhāṣika.

Others claim that the assembly of the six perceptual operations is pervaded by 'motivating force'. Such is the claim of the Sautrāntika.

i. *The refutation of the Vaibhāṣika*

The statement, "....a motivating force...." is for the purpose of discussing the first claim.

[Vaibhāṣika]: A motivating force cannot be accepted as the supporting condition for a perceptual operation which links one life situation to another, because a long time has elapsed since it has become extinguished. Therefore, it could not have substantial existence. Something which does not exist, cannot be accepted as a supporting condition. Therefore, a motivating force cannot be accepted as the supporting condition for a perceptual operation which links one life situation to another.

[Sthiramati] says, "....when one life form is linked to another...." in order to refute that. When one life form is linked to another, many [constituents, *viz.*] name and form [come into] being, not only a perceptual operation. That being the case, there is no reason for you to claim that when one life form is linked to another, [only] a perceptual operation is produced with motivating force as its supporting condition, not name and form. Therefore, you must admit that a motivating force is the supporting condition for name and form also, not only for a perceptual operation.

Now if you should ask, "Is it that you [Yogācārins] do not claim a perceptual operation as the supporting condition for name and form when one life form is linked to another?", then I ask you, "What other name and form has a perceptual operation as its supporting condition? If you cannot accept this, then you must explain what other perception is the supporting condition for name and form."

In anticipation of another criticism, [Sthiramati] says, "....if you say, '[a name and form] of a later time'"

[Opponents]: When one life form is linked to another, the name and form of a later time is produced with a perceptual operation as its supporting condition.

[Sthiramati] asks, "....What is the difference between

[that] and the name and form which links one life form to another?....." What is the difference between the name and form of a later time and the name and form which links one life form to another such that you can say that the later name and form is produced with a perceptual operation as its supporting condition, and the former one is not? Furthermore, how can you say that the prior [name and form] is produced with motivating force as its supporting condition, but the later [name and form] is not?

The statement, "....therefore, motivating force is the supporting condition for name and form, and not only for a perceptual operation...." is for the sake of summarizing the discussion. Because there is no distinction between [the two] name and form, name and form come into being with a motivating force as their supporting condition; therefore, what need is there to postulate another member [to the twelve link dependent origination] (*ie*) perceptual operation which links one life form to another?

The statement, "....therefore, the perceptual operation which links one life to another...." is for the purpose of summarizing the latter claim, but since this is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

ii. *The refutation of the Sautrāntika*

The statement, "....the assembly of the six perceptual operations is pervaded...." is for the purpose of introducing the second claim. This has been discussed already.

The philosopher [Sthiramati] says, "....a perceptual operation...." in reply to the Sautrāntikas who ask, "Why?" because they are not yet convinced. A perceptual operation cannot implant tendencies which come to maturation or tendencies which are in agreement with their cause (See, p. 151) into itself, because it is a contradiction for something to cause itself.

The statement, "....nor do they occur in a future [perceptual operation]...." is a reply to those who many think that they can be implanted into a future [perceptual operation]. Both tendencies cannot be implanted into a perceptual operation which will be produced in the future, because that [perceptual operation] has not yet been produced. Because that has not yet been produced, it cannot exist as a substance¹.

The statement, "....not even the past [perceptual operation]...." is a reply to those who ask, "Can they be implanted when they are being produced?" Because the past perceptual operations which functioned to implant tendencies were momentary, they were already extinct at that time.

The statement, "....when one enters meditative contemplation wherein the mind is negated (*sems med pa'i snyoms pa*) and so on...." is for the purpose of explaining other incidents wherein the tendencies are mistakenly thought to be implanted. When one enters meditative

¹ Text reads: *rjes su*

contemplation wherein the mind is negated, a mind which is pervaded by motivating force could not be present. Therefore, name and form which have a perceptual operation as their supporting condition could not exist. Because name and form do not exist, the six activity fields (*skye mched drug*) all the way up to decay and death (*rga shi*) could not be produced. Therefore, the flow of saṃsāra would come to an end and the sentient beings would be liberated without having put forth any effort.

The statement, "...therefore, motivating force and the other [members of the twelvefold dependent origination] have 'a lack of intrinsic awareness' as their supporting condition...." is for the purpose of stating his own claim in view of making a summary, because the other views have been refuted.

Because the other two views cannot account for the continuous flow of saṃsāra, motivating force and the others have 'a loss of intrinsic awareness' as their supporting condition, and only a substratum awareness which is charged up by them, has motivating force as its supporting condition. The statement, "...when one life form is linked to another with the substratum awareness as its supporting condition, name and form...." is faultless.

The statement, "...the cessation of the flow of saṃsāra.... is for the purpose of explaining that the cessation [of the flow of saṃsāra] cannot be admitted

[If the substratum awareness did not exist]. If the substratum awareness did not exist, then the cessation of the flow of saṃsāra could not be possible.

The statement, "....the cause of saṃsāra...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?" The cause of saṃsāra is man's action and the emotions. Of these two, emotions are the primary causes.

The statement, "....under the influence of emotions" is reply to those who ask, "Why?" Acts are able to draw out a new existence under the influence of emotions; it cannot be otherwise. In the same way, even the new existence which has been drawn out by acts is possible only under the control of the emotions; it cannot be otherwise. Therefore, because only the emotions are the primary causes, they are the cause rooted at the base of the continuous flow of saṃsāra. The continuous flow of saṃsāra can be stopped if they are removed; it cannot be otherwise.

The statement, "....if the substratum awareness does not exist...." is a reply to those who ask, "If that be the case, then what?" If a substratum awareness is not accepted, then the emotions could not be removed.

The philosopher, [Sthiramati] says, "....either emotions with which one is in direct confrontation...." to those who ask, "Why is it not possible?", because they are still not convinced. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....of those, the emotions with which one is in direct confrontation are removed...." is for the purpose of taking up the first possibility. When a Yogin enters on the path of concentrative meditation, he is in direct confrontation with the emotions. Therefore, the claim that the emotions with which one is in direct confrontation are removed, cannot be accepted,

The statement, "....because he dwells on the path of purifying them...." is for the purpose of taking up the second possibility. Because a Yogin dwells on the path of purifying the emotions, they have not been removed in their potential state.

The statement, "....because at that time, nothing but an antidote can be accepted...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?" If the emotions in their potential state are removed by antidotes, then you could not accept anything but antidotes to exist therein.

The statement, "....Why? The mind as such (*sems nyid*) is the antidote...." is made in anticipation of a criticism against the above view. If the mind as such which is the antidote [against the emotions] is considered to be together with the emotions, then that is not reasonable. Only an emotion could be together with the emotions in their potential state. It is not reasonable to have the antidotes present also. This is like saying that it is unreasonable for fragrance to smell itself.

The statement, "....those who have not been purified of their emotions...." is a reply to those who ask, "If one is not purified of one's emotions, then what?" So long as the emotions in their potential state have not been removed, the continuous flow of saṃsāra does not come to an end.

The statement, "....therefore, it must be admitted..." is for the purpose of explaining his own position, in view of making a summary.

If one does not accept the substratum awareness to exist, then since there would be no foundation for the emotions in their potential state, a substratum awareness, wherein the emotions and the proximate factors of instability which arise together with the perceptual operations other than [the substratum awareness] implant their tendencies in order to fatten and nourish their own seeds, must be accepted.

The statement, "....therefore, when the strength of the tendencies reach their peak...." is a reply to those who ask, "If this is accepted, then what?"

When the tendencies, which have been implanted and nourished in the substratum awareness by the emotions and the proximate factors of instability, reach their peak, then in that moment, the emotions and the proximate factors of instability are produced from the 'mind as such' which has gained the specificity of being their cause [and] which has been named 'substratum awareness'. [At this time], the seeds which dwell in the substratum awareness comes forth together with the so named 'substratum awareness' due to [the activity]

of those [emotions and the proximate factors of instability. Those seeds are then] removed by the antidotes against the emotions. Thus, if the substratum awareness exists, the emotions can be removed.

Because, when the seeds of the emotions are removed, the emotions can never come forth again, Nirvāṇa which still has remnants, is attained. After attaining that state, when life which has been propelled by [the strength of] prior acts comes to an end, because then one is no longer linked to another life form, the authentic state of Nirvāṇa which is freed from all remnants, is attained.

The statement, "....even if acts are still present...." is a reply to those who ask, "Even if the emotions have been removed, if acts are still present, then will there not be another birth and a linking up of one life form to another?"

When the emotions have been removed, even if acts are still present, because the concurrent causes [*i.e.* the emotions and the proximate factors of instability] are no longer present, there is no more (re)birth and no more linkings up of one life form with another.

The statement, "....therefore, if the substratum awareness exists...." is for the purpose of stating his own positions, in view of making a summary.

Therefore, when the substratum awareness exists, there is the possibility of the continuous flow of saṃsāra and of its extinction; it cannot be otherwise. Therefore, it must be admitted that the substratum awareness is different from the other perceptual operations such as visual [perceptual operation], and that it alone can be considered to [contain] all of the seeds.

A detailed analysis [of this topic] can be gained from the *Phung po lnga'i bshad sbyar* (See, p. 47) written by Sthiramati.

CHAPTER X

THE THREE SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF REALITY AND THE THREE NEGATIVE FACTICITIES

If the discussions which took place in the previous chapters can be described as the psychological foundation for reality, then the discussion which takes place in the present chapter can be described as the philosophical foundation for reality. However, in so far as reality cannot be divided into various concepts (which nonetheless, pretentiously and presumptuously claim reality to be a 'such and such'), the line between what has been called 'psychology' and what has been called 'philosophy' is only imaginary. Therefore, the present writer does not suggest that by the above distinction, an absolute difference is being stated.

'Reality', which is an ambiguous term, is conducive of multifaceted interpretations, not because of the ambiguity of the term, but because the specific constitutive principles of reality are multifaceted. It is in the latter sense that the term 'awareness *qua* sensa' is interpreted now from yet another point of view.

The three constitutive principles of reality are the following:

1. the notional conceptual (*kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid*)
2. the relative (*gzhan dbang gi ngo bo nyid*), and
3. the ideally absolute (*yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid*).

Within the Buddhist Mentalistic trend, these three terms are defined differently in different contexts and in different texts. A few examples will aid to clarify this statement.

The *Theg pa chen po bsdus pa* (*Mahāyānasaṃgraha*), which is probably the most comprehensive presentation of the three, devotes a whole chapter to the discussion of these terms, but a few passages will suffice at this time. It states:

Therefore, a Bodhisattva, having first gained an understanding of 'awareness *qua* sensa', then gains an understanding of the specific defining characteristic of the knowable.¹

It goes on to say:

What is the specific defining characteristic of the knowable? In brief, there are three: the notional conceptual, the relative, and ideally absolute.²

Therefore, according that text, reality is everything knowable.

The '*phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa* (*Āryasaṃdhinirmocanasūtra*) states:

There are three specific defining characteristics to the entities of reality which are the foundation from which all positive qualities arise. What are the three? They are the notional conceptual, the relative, and the ideally absolute.³

¹ *Theg pa chen po bsdus pa*, ed. by E. Lamotte, Tome I, p. 53: see also under Asaṅga's works, (p. 19) No. 17.

² *Ibid.*, Tome I, p. 24

³ *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, ed. by E. Lamotte, p. 60; see also under Asaṅga's works, (p. 18) No. 4.

Therefore, according to that text, reality is the foundation from which all positive qualities arise.

The *dBus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa* (*Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*) in its discussion of reality, states:

Three specific constitutive principles of reality constitute the 'Fundamental reality'. The three are: the notional conceptual, the relative, and ideally absolute.¹

Therefore, according to that text, reality has been divided into ten different kinds of which the first is the 'Fundamental reality' and this 'Fundamental reality' comprises the three specific constitutive principles of reality.

From these few quotations, and specifically from the last one, it is evident that the three specific constitutive principles of reality are not merely terms to describe reality, but constitute the very foundation of what is known as 'reality'. Thus, the investigation of the three specific constitutive principles of reality can be seen as the catalytic medium which will enable man to move from his world of 'concepts' to a 'real' experience of reality.

The last chapter brought us to an understanding that reality was merely 'awareness *qua* sensa'. However, that did not mean that one gained an experience of 'reality as it is'. The term 'awareness *qua* sensa' in that context was used to point to the analysis of mind and its attendant

¹ G.M. Nagao, ed., *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*, p. 37; See also under Vasubandhu's works, (p. 31) No. 17.

mental events. Therefore, that analysis pointed to concepts which enabled the reader to come to some understanding of how the mind functioned. The reader, however, did not get a 'real experience' of the mind through that analysis. What he gained was an understanding of the mind, not as the mind in fact functions, but as what the reader expected the mind functions to be. In other words, no matter how 'real' the literature on 'anger' for example, may have been, the 'anger' which was discussed therein was nothing more than a 'tag' or 'label'; therefore, just as a 'tag' informs us what the contents of a certain thing may be but never 'tells' us what that content actually is, so too, 'anger' indicated some kind of a content, but never 'told' us what 'anger' really was. Thus, no matter how deep one's understanding of a subject matter may go, so long as that understanding remains within the limits of discursiveness, it will remain a 'tag' or a 'label' for reality, and the perceiver of that reality will never behold 'reality as it is'. Such is the nature of the notional conceptual.

"The 'relative' refers to certain experiences or 'states' with which everyone of us is familiar, but which our language can only describe by the stimulus which produces these states."¹ In technical Buddhist parlance, it is the very fact that all entities of reality (and this includes the perceiving subject) have significance only in relation to each other. It has

¹ H.V. Guenther, *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, p. 99.

been formulated into the famous dictum:

Because this exists, this becomes;

From the coming into being of this,

This comes into being.

In other words, the 'relative' refers to the whole process of the twelvefold dependent origination which has been expressed by the words, "everything from 'motivating force' all the way up to the whole mass of frustrations is produced with 'a loss of intrinsic awareness' as their supporting condition."¹

The Buddhist Mentalistic trend has always used the example of a rope and a snake to illustrate the relationship between the 'notional conceptual' and the 'relative'. When one is walking along and suddenly realizes that he is about to step on a snake, all of the emotional and physical responses to this situation is immediately brought forth. However, if on closer examination, the traveller should find out that what he thought was a snake was just a rope, then responses appropriate to this discovery come forth. The snake-rope, was a concept superimposed on reality which as it turned out was not what the beholder supposed it to be. However, until this discovery, nothing could have changed his mind. The reality of that 'snake' is often referred to as the 'notional conceptual'. The snake which turned out to be a rope, (*ie.*) the rope which was never anything other than the rope, is referred to as the 'relative'.

¹ E. Lamotte, ed., *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, p. 60.

The traveller who is content with his analysis of the situation and goes his merry way, is said to be one who remains in his world of 'concepts'. The reason for this is that the 'rope' which settled his mind, was nothing in itself. The traveller's contentment came as a result of knowing that it was not a snake; his contentment was not due to a thorough appreciation of what he encountered. This means, the 'rope' in its 'presentational immediacy' was never seen; thus the traveller's contentment was not due to an appreciative discrimination of reality, but due to what he thought reality ought to be.

The further analysis of the 'rope' in its 'presentational immediacy' is known as the 'ideally absolute'. It is an experience of reality as it is.

Because language has inherent in it the danger of turning whatever it expresses into a concrete reality, the Buddhist Mentalists took care not to have this happen to the three specific constitutive principles of reality. Therefore, they introduced the three negative facticities, which properly understood, make it impossible to concretize reality any more.

The negative facticity of the 'notional conceptual' is its 'presentational immediacy' of being nothing in itself. A notion or concept has the facticity of being a logical fiction. Due to that very facticity, it is non-existent, because anyone who is prepared to accept the existence of a logical fiction, must also be prepared to accept 'flowers

in the sky'.

The 'relative' is also non-existent, because it has the facticity of 'dependent origination'. A thing whose existence depends on some other thing, has no absolute existence of its own. Therefore, the 'relative' is said to be 'non-existent'.

The 'ideally absolute' is a state which is devoid of the subject-object dichotomy. When the subject-object dichotomy no longer holds, neither existence nor non-existence can be predicated of it.

Vinītadeva's discussion on this chapter can be divided into the following heads:

- A. The three constitutive principles of reality
 - 1. The notional conceptual
 - 2. The relative
 - 3. The ideally absolute
- B. The three negative facticities
 - 1. The negative facticity of the notional conceptual
 - 2. The negative facticity of the relative
 - 3. The negative facticity of the ideally absolute
- C. Synonyms for the absolute

A. *The three constitutive principles of reality*

Section Five:

The statement, "....if everything is merely 'awareness *qua* sensa'...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to what follows. This is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The philosopher, [Sthiramati] says, "....it is not a contradiction, because the three specific constitutive principles are tenable only when [everything is] 'awareness *qua* sensa'...." Because the three specific constitutive principles of reality are tenable only when [everything is] 'awareness *qua* sensa', they do not contradict the sūtras.

The philosopher, [Vasubandhu] says,

By this or that discursive discrimination (20 a)

in reply to those who, not being fully convinced, ask, "Why?"

1. *The notional conceptual*

Any thing which has been predicated by discursive discrimination is to be understood as the 'notional conceptual', because it does not exist concretely. This statement is a summary.

In order to explain the first line of the verse, the commentator [Sthiramati] says, "....by different propositions about things internal and things external"

Because the different propositions about things conceived by some as internal and by others as external are many, the Venerable [Vasubandhu] says,

By this or that discrimination (20 d)

in order to show that that is the case.

The statement,

Only that which is conceived of as this or that (20 b)

is for the purpose of explaining the second line of the verse. Whatever has been conceived of as external or internal - be it even the Buddha's teachings - is nothing more than a proposition.

The Venerable [Vasubandhu] in anticipation of a criticism against his view, says,

And that is non-existent. (20 d)

in order to give a definition of the 'notional conceptual'. The statement, "....whatever has been conceived...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. Various propositions are made concerning even a single thing, as for instance one's body, depending on one's tastes and desires. For example, even when tigers do not exist, if someone shouts, "A tiger is coming!" then even the bravest and most intelligent people show signs of fear and want to run away.

The statement, "....even a non-existent thing...." is a reply to those who ask, "Do not those signs come forth, because tigers exist in reality?" If a single object cannot

constitute the facticity of many and varied things, the same is true of a non-existent thing.

The statement, "....therefore, all of those...." is for the purpose of summarizing the discussion. Because the objective reference of discursive discrimination does not exist as a concrete reality, everything in this world is nothing more than discursive thought; therefore, the object of discursive discrimination is nothing but a logical fiction.

The statement, "....the sūtras state...." is for the purpose of quoting the sūtras which state:

Color and form do not have absolute existence in the manner that ordinary people cling to them while thinking that they do.

2. *The relative*

The statement, "....immediately after that notional conceptual...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to what follows.

The statement,

The facticity of the relative (21 a)

is a reply to those who ask, "What is that?" It is

discursive discrimination (21 b)

because propositions are made on the basis of that [relative, which is] the mind and mental events.

The 'relative' is dependent on the strength of another, because it comes forth from

various causal factors. (21 b)

The statement, "....in this case, 'discursive discrimination' means....." is a reply to those who ask, "What is being explained by the terms 'discursive discrimination' and the words 'comes forth from causal factors'?"

The words 'in this case' means in this discussion about the specific constitutive principles of reality.

The terms, 'discursive discrimination' explains the 'relative'. The words 'comes forth from causal factors' explains the reason for speaking about the 'relative' in this manner.

The statement, "....'logical fiction'...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is a 'logical fiction'?" 'Logical fiction' refers to the differentiations made about the mind and mental events which operate on the three levels of existences, as positive, negative, or neutral.

The statement, "....it is as stated...." is for the purpose of quoting the *dBus dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa* (*Madhyāntavibhāṅgabhāṣya*) which states:

The mind and mental events which constitute the three levels of existences are logical fictions having no reality.

The term 'discursive discrimination' and the term 'notional conceptual' have the same meaning.

The statement, "...by other causes and supporting conditions...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is

'discursive discrimination' called 'relative'?" The relative is so called because it depends on other causes and supporting conditions. The word 'depends' means 'has come into being' and 'has been produced' [by other causes and supporting conditions]. The statement, "....causes and supporting conditions other than itself...." is for the purpose of clarifying that, but since that is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

3. *The ideally absolute*

The statement, "....the 'relative' has been discussed" is for the purpose of linking the discussion to what follows. The meaning has been explained already.

The statement,

The ideally absolute is that which is

Always devoid of the former. (21 d)

is a reply to those who ask, "What is that?" The ideally absolute is whatever is devoid of both the notional conceptual and the relative.

The statement, "....the ideally absolute does not change....." is a reply to those who ask, "In what manner is it the 'ideally absolute'?" It is the ideally absolute because there is no change therein.

The statement, "....that which...." is for the purpose of explaining the words of the verse. This word 'that which' is to be contextually related to the 'relative'.

The word 'former' is to be contextually related to the 'notional conceptual', because the apprehended object and the apprehending subject are substantially postulated in [the process of] discursive thinking.

The statement, "....imagined...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why are the apprehended object and the apprehending subject the 'notional conceptual'?" The apprehended object and the apprehending subject are said to be 'conceptual', because, although they do not exist, they are nonetheless imagined to be there.

The statement, "....the apprehended object and the apprehending subject...." is for the purpose of making a summary, because the lines of the verses have been discussed. The specific constitutive principle of the ideally absolute is always completely freed from both the relative and the subject-object dichotomy explained earlier.

These three specific constitutive principles of reality [are tenable] only when [everything is] merely 'awareness *qua* sensa'. Therefore, the 'relative' is an identity experience of 'awareness *qua* sensa'. To postulate an apprehended object and an apprehending subject therein, is the notional conceptual. Only that which is completely freed from the subject-object dichotomy is the ideally absolute.

The statement, "....only that...other than the relative" is a reply to those who ask, "Why is the ideally absolute both other than the relative and not other than the relative?"

The statement, "....therefore, only that...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. The ideally absolute is considered to be always freed from the 'notional conceptual' and the 'relative'. 'To be completely free' refers to a true experience (*chos nyid*).

When a true experience is discursively analyzed, it is

....neither other than nor

Not other than the relative. (22 b)

The ideally absolute is a true experience of the relative; therefore, it is not other than the relative. But you should also keep it in mind that it is other than the relative.

The statement, "....if...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?"

[First] the view that the ideally absolute is other than the relative: If we accept this view, the relative could not be an open possibility (*stong*), because it would be a concept. If that be the case, then it would have a different content [than what it is]. The real experience which is what [the ideally absolute] is about, must be retained; just like impermanence is part and parcel of sound.

The statement, "....if it is not other than the relative" is for the purpose of explaining a fault with the second view.

[Secondly] the view that the ideally absolute is not other than the relative: If we accept this view, then the ideally absolute could not be a pure objective reference, because the relative is an identity experience of the emotions. But just as [the emotions] are not the objective reference of the relative, they cannot be the objective reference of the ideally absolute. Why? Because just as when the relative is not the identity experience of the emotions, it is not other than the ideally absolute, in the same manner, it is the same as the ideally absolute.

In this case, the path (*lam*) is explained by the word 'pure'. The statement,

It is explained as 'impermanence' and so on. (22 c)

exemplifies the fact of 'neither identity nor difference'.

The statement, "....for example, impermanence...." is for the purpose of clarifying that.

The statement, "....from motivating force ('*du byed*)" is for the purpose of explaining the fault of [the claim that] impermanence is the same as or different from [the motivating force].

If impermanence is other than the motivating force, then the motivating force would not be impermanent. This would mean that [motivating force] would not be part and parcel of me.

If motivating force etc., were not different from impermanence, then motivating force etc., would be non-existent from the very beginning, just as impermanence is the facticity of [something] that falls apart.

The same logic applies to frustration and the rest. If frustration is other than a motivating force, then a motivating force could not constitute the facticity of frustration. If it is not different, then motivating force would constitute the facticity of only frustration.

The statement, "...if the apprehended object and the apprehending subject do not exist in the relative...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to [the last line of] the verse.

If the apprehended object and the apprehending subject do not exist in the relative as real objects, then how and by what are they appropriated? and even [if you say that] they are not appropriated, then how can one know that they exist [at all]? Therefore, [Vasubandhu] states:

When that [ideally absolute] has not been realized,

Then that [relative] is not realized. (22 d)

This means, so long as the ideally absolute has not been realized, the relative is not realized. The words, 'when that has not been realized' is to be contextually connected to the ideally absolute. The words, 'that is not realized' is to be contextually connected to the relative.

The statement, "....by non-discursive transcending primordial awareness (*'jig rten 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa*)...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why cannot it be realized, when that is not realized?" So long as the ideally absolute, which is to be realized by non-discursive primordial awareness, has not been realized, then the relative is not known, because the relative is the activity field (*spyod yul*) of transcending primordial awareness of a pure world which is attained after transcending primordial awareness [has been attained]. The words 'has not been realized' in the statement, "... 'has not been realized' means 'is not experienced' (*mi rtogs pa*) and 'is not perceived directly' (*mngon sum du ma byas*)...." means 'has not been realized [or seen] with the eyes of the [very] precious appreciative discrimination'.

The words, 'has not been experienced' mean 'has not been cut through with the sword of primordial awareness which is inexhaustive. The words, 'has not been perceived directly' means 'has not been perceived directly with the transcending direct perception'. The latter is an explanation of the former.

The statement, "....because the pure attained after that is the activity field of transcending primordial awareness...." means that we speak about it as 'attained after that', because it is attained after that. The word, 'that' refers to transcending primordial awareness. The

word 'after' is used in the sense of a 'sustaining power' (*stobs*). Because it is both 'pure' and 'of the world', it is called 'a pure world'. It is 'pure', because it is attained through the sustaining power of transcending primordial awareness. It is 'of the world', because it comes forth from the observable qualities of the apprehending subject and the apprehended object. This means, it is attained after that [primordial awareness] and it is a pure world. Therefore, it is stated that the relative is apprehended by primordial awareness of a pure world which is attained through the sustaining power of transcending primordial awareness.

[Some say,] "Those who claim that the relative is the activity field of transcending primordial awareness must not understand the specific defining characteristic of the relative, because [if they did] how could they say on the one hand, that the relative is *discursive* discrimination, and on the other hand, that it is also the activity field of transcending primordial awareness?" And, if on the basis of that understanding, they should ask, "Do you, by using the term 'transcending' wish to explain something different than what the Prāsangika claim, because the Prāsangika distinguish the pure world attained after that [transcending primordial awareness] as different from the the absolute, because that is tenable only as a conventional reality?", then there is nothing wrong with their [understanding].

The statement, "....therefore, when the ideally absolute has not been realized...." is for the purpose of summarizing [the topic]. Because the relative is the activity field of a pure worldly primordial awareness which is attained through the sustaining power of transcending primordial awareness, so long as the ideally absolute has not been realized, it is not realized, but it is not the case that nothing is realized.

The statement, "....the *rnam par mi rtog par 'jug pa'i gzungs* (*Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī*)¹...." is for the purpose of quoting the *rnam par mi rtog par 'jug pa'i gzungs*. It states:

By means of transcending awareness which is attained after that, all of the entities of reality are experienced to be on the same level as an illusion and so on.

This means, the wise ones know that the observable qualities of discursive thought which are seen as an elephant in the case of a tree, of a moon in the case of a moon reflected in water, of water in the case of a mirage, of voice in the case of an echo, and of sentient beings in the case of bodily constituents, do not have concrete existence.

¹ Lévi, in his *Matériaux Pour L'étude du système Viññaptimātra*, p. 117, note 1, states: La *Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī* est conservée en trad. dans le *Kandjour Mdo XI*; le passage cité ici se lit en effet à la page 5, lignes 6-8. Il n'est pas sans intérêt de constater que, dès l'époque de *Sthiramati*, une *dhāraṇī* est comptée parmi les autorités les plus respectables.

In the same way, by means of a pure worldly primordial awareness, one experiences a state which is freed from the observable qualities which appear as the mind and mental events and the apprehended object and the apprehending subject.

Just as an illusion and so on are produced by other supporting conditions, the relative is produced by the sustaining power of other supporting conditions; therefore, [the entities of reality] are spoken about to be on on the same level as an illusion and so on.

The statement, "....therefore, in this case, the entities of reality...." is a reply to those who ask, "So how does that become an explanation of the relative?"

The entities of reality discussed in the above dhāraṇī are tenable in the relative, because according to the Mahāyāna, everything which is described to be an illusion and so on is said so on the basis of the relative; therefore, the relative is said to be appropriated by a pure worldly primordial awareness.

The statement, "....the ideally absolute...." is a reply to those who ask, "In what manner is the absolute 'one'?" The ideally absolute, like open space, is a uniform primordial awareness. We speak about a uniform primordial awareness, because primordial awareness is uniform. The word 'uniform' means 'of one kind'. For example, just as open space is not variegated, and therefore the activity field of a uniform primordial awareness, so too, the ideally

absolute. We speak of 'uniform', because the ideally absolute and primordial awareness are, like the open space, one from the very beginning.

The meaning of that comes to this: the ideally absolute, like open space, is uniform; it is of one kind. Primordial awareness is also uniform; it is of one kind. This explanation is in accord with what has been said previously.

The statement, "...it is as stated...." indicates that the above mentioned dhāraṇī is quoted:

By means of non-discursive transcending primordial awareness, the entities of reality explained above are realized to be just like the sphere of open space.

The statement, "...because only the 'just-this-ness' (*de bzhin nyid*) of the entities of reality which is relative, is realized....." is a reply to those who ask, "How are the entities of reality realized as 'pure'?" Only the 'just-this-ness' of the entities of reality which are spoken about as the 'relative' is realized by transcending primordial awareness.

That 'just-this-ness' is unique like the open space. Because the 'just-this-ness' appertains to the non-existent state of an apprehending object and an apprehending subject (*i.e.*) the mind and mental events, it is not variegated.

B. *The three negative facticities*

The statement, "....if the relative is a substance..." is for the purpose of systematizing the previous [discussion] in view of replying to others who claim that it contradicts the sūtras.

The statement, "....there is no contradiction...." is a reply to those who ask, "If you claim that only the relative is a substance, then how could the sūtras state that all the entities of reality have no facticity, and how could they state that there is neither birth nor extinction?" There is no contradiction.

The statement,

....*The three specific constitutive principles
of reality....* (23 a)

is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it not a contradiction?" The entities of reality are explained to be without facticity, because the three specific constitutive principles of reality such as the relative

imply the three negative facticities. (23 b)

The statement, "....only the three specific constitutive principles of reality...." is for the purpose of explaining that line of the verse, but since that is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The statement, "....because each exists as if it had its individual specific defining characteristic...."

is a reply to those who ask, "If you consider it reasonable for the relative to be a specific constitutive principle of reality, because it exists as a substance, then how do you account for the other two to be the constitutive principles of reality?" In the final analysis, even the third [*i.e.* the ideally absolute] is spoken about as a specific constitutive principle of reality, because it exists in everything as if it had its own specific defining characteristic by which it is said to be what it is.

The statement, "...the three negative facticities" is for the purpose of explaining the names of the three negative facticities. That is easily understood, so I shall not comment on it.

The statement,

....All the entities of reality.... (23 c)

is a reply to those who ask, "What are 'all the entities of reality?'"

*1. The negative facticity of the notional
conceptual*

The statement,

*The first is without facticity due to [its]
specific characteristic.... (24 a)*

is for the purpose of explaining why the three specific constitutive principles of reality are without facticity, because the lines of the [previous] verse has been discussed.

The statement, "....the first is without facticity due to its specific characteristic. The third is absolutely without facticity and it alone is 'just as it is'...." is a summary.

The commentator [Sthiramati] says, "....the first is the specific constitutive principle of the notional conceptual...." in order to clarify that. The notional conceptual is by its specific defining characteristic without facticity. It is without facticity, because irregardless of what one may make of its specific defining characteristic, that defining characteristic is a logical fiction.

The statement, "....the defining characteristic of color and form are color and form...." is for the purpose explaining the defining characteristic of a logical fiction, because it has not been made clear. The statements 'the defining characteristics of color and form are color and form' and 'the defining characteristic of feeling is an experience' aid one to comprehend concrete reality, but they are not the facticity of that in an absolute sense. They are general attributes, but general attributes do not exist as concrete realities. For example, in order to build a house, a carpenter uses a saw and other tools, but neither the carpenter nor the tools which he uses are the specific constitutive principles of that house. In the same way, although color and form are understood to be the defining characteristics in order to comprehend a concrete reality, they are not the specific constitutive principles of a

concrete reality. Therefore, color and so on are the notional conceptual, because they do not have a facticity of their own. Like the flower in the sky, they are without facticity due to their own nature.

2. *The negative facticity of the relative*

The statement, "...the specific constitutive principle of the relative...." is a reply to those who ask, "What is the next one?"

[The relative] is produced by the sustaining power of something else and does not have an existence of its own; therefore, it is without facticity. We speak about it as lacking facticity, because aside from that, it does not have an existence of its own. The word 'existence' is used in the sense of 'a thing produced'.

The statement, "...moreover,...." is for the purpose of explaining that. The relative is not produced in the manner that the observable qualities (sense data) of an apprehended object and an apprehending subject come forth (*śnang ba*); therefore, we speak about it as being without facticity because it is a thing produced. It is explained as 'without facticity', because its facticity [means to be] freed from [such] appearances (*śnang ba*). In this case, the word 'facticity' is used in the sense of 'a thing produced'.

3. *The negative facticity of the ideally absolute*

The statement, "...even the absolute significance of the entities of reality...." is for the purpose of explain-

ing the third negative facticity.

The specific constitutive principle of the ideally absolute is the relative which constitutes the absolute significance of the entities of reality. Because that is the specific constitutive principle of reality which is devoid of an apprehended object and an apprehending subject, it is without facticity.

The statement, "....absolute...." is a reply to those who ask, "Then why is the ideally absolute called 'an absolute?'" It is the 'absolute', because there is nothing superior. It is transcending primordial awareness. Because that is its significance, it is the 'absolute significance'. In this case, the word 'significance' is used in the sense of an objective reference.

The statement, "....moreover, it is like open space...." is for the purpose of giving another explanation. For example, open space is always unified and of one kind, because it is not defiled and does not change. Therefore, we speak about it as the 'absolute significance', because it is both 'absolute' and 'significant'. Because, it is said to be 'pure', it is the 'absolute significance'.

The statement, "....the specific constitutive principle of the ideally absolute...." is for the purpose of explaining it in view of making a summary, because the meaning of the lines [of the vessel] has been explained.

The specific constitutive principle of the ideally absolute is the absolute significance of all the entities of reality which constitute the identity experience of the relative; therefore, the specific constitutive principle of the ideally absolute is said to be absolutely devoid of an absolute significance.

The expression 'true experience of that' is a definition for the fact that the ideally absolute is contextually related to the relative. The ideally absolute is the true experience of the relative; therefore, it is the absolute significance of the relative.

The statement, "....the ideally absolute...." is a reply to those who ask, "If [the ideally absolute] is its significance, then why does it not exist as a concrete reality?"

The ideally absolute is the specific constitutive principle of non-existence; therefore, we speak about it as 'without facticity'. The term 'non-existence' means the open dimension of the relative and it is the open ended facticity of reality.

C. Synonyms for the absolute

The statement, "....Why...by this one name 'absolute significance'....." is for the purpose of tying things together by explaining the remaining parts of the verse. It is meant to be a question, but since that is easily understood, I shall not comment on it.

The philosopher [Sthiramati] says, "....don't say it that way! It is also 'just as it is'...." The words 'just as it is' refers to the ideally absolute - not only the words 'absolute significance'.

The statement, "....also...." is for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the word 'also'. ['Also' means] that one should not express it by that one expression, but must express it with all of the terms which are synonyms for the 'evidence of being' (*chos dbyings*), such as,

1. the open dimension of being (*stong pa nyid*),
2. the real (*yang dag pa'i mtha'*),
3. without defining characteristics (*mtshan ma med*)
4. not-two-ness (*mi gnyis pa nyid*)
5. foundation of non-discursiveness (*mi rtog pa dbyings*)
6. the inexpressible (*brjod du med pa nyid*)
7. non-extinction (*mi 'gag pa*)
8. non-production (*mi skye ba*)
9. the unconditioned (*'dus ma byas*)
10. freed from afflictions (*mya ngan las 'das*)

The statement, "...it is said to be 'just as it is', because it is always 'just-this-ness'...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it called 'just as it is'?"

The statement, "....individual beings...." is for the purpose of clarifying that. Because it exists 'just as it is' in every instance of every individual being, it is said to be 'just-this-ness'. This means, in every instance of every individual - be he a novice or a learned one, the

the mind and mental events are freed from the apprehended object and the apprehending subject. It is an immediacy (*rang bzhin*) which is freed from the apprehended object and the apprehending subject, because it is never swept away by them. It presents itself right in their midst, but never changes. Therefore, it is called 'just-this-ness'. For example, water remains water right in the midst of all of the impurities.

The statement, "....why...just like 'just as it is'...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to what follows.

The philosopher, [Vasubandhu] says,

It alone is 'awareness qua sensa'

in reply to those who ask, "Is 'awareness *qua sensa*' called 'just as it is' in the same manner that the ideally absolute is called 'just as it is', or is 'awareness *qua sensa*' in being different, also different from the ideally absolute?" There is no other way of replying except, "The ideally absolute is 'awareness *qua sensa*'.

The statement, "....because the specific defining characteristic is very pure...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why?" Because a very pure specific defining characteristic is realized by realizing the ideally absolute, only that is 'awareness *qua sensa*'. The statement, "....it is as stated,

Because at that time [the mind] sees only that,

It is a mind which dwells in a name....."¹

¹ See, p. 36-38 of present thesis.

gives the foundation for a very pure specific defining characteristic.

When a Yogin overcomes the apprehended object in [the tentative stages of] warming up and of maximum heat [which figure in the path of linking up], then in the [decisive stage of] acceptance, the mind stays with a name. Because at that time, the apprehended object is given up, [the mind] sees only 'name'. In other words, when the apprehended object is given up, the mind dwells in 'awareness *qua* sensa'. Only this 'awareness *qua* sensa' comes forth as the presentational value (*snang ba*) of color and form, because [the mind] knows that the color and form do not exist as objects.

The word 'name', in this case, means 'awareness *qua* sensa', because 'name' is an expression used to denote the psycho-physical constituents of the personality which do not fall under the category 'physical' (*gzugs*).

When the mind which dwells in 'name' reaches the stage of 'the highest worldly realization', it gets rid of that 'awareness *qua* sensa' which was its objective reference, because when the apprehended object does not exist, the apprehending subject does not exist. The term 'awareness *qua* sensa' refers to the sensum of an apprehending subject.

When the apprehended object and the apprehending subject are both removed in that manner, and one reaches the path of insight, then one, through the sustaining power of meditative practices, comes into rapport with a sphere in which objective references cease to be. This means, one

experiences 'authentic being' (*chos dbyings*).

The word 'rapport' means 'to experience' and 'to perceive directly'. The expression 'through the sustaining power of meditative practices' means meditative practice is its cause.

When one comes to a real experience of 'mind as such', it gradually pervades [the whole being] and thus, one is freed from all of the obscuring factors. He also gains strength which is linked to an integrated mind (*ting nge 'dzin*).

In the above manner, one comes to a realization of a very pure specific defining characteristic. That very pure specific defining characteristic is defined as 'an experience of an authentic being'.

The two verses [which have been taken from the above quotation] have been cited to explain the meaning implied in the discussion. By continuing the discussion on the second verse, the meaning of the words 'to perceive directly' has also been made clear.

CHAPTER XI

THE FIVE PATHS

The five Buddhist paths refer to a continual unfolding of man's potentials. The paths follow a developmental progression through several stages or phases, each involving different references and self images. They begin with a preparatory stage consisting of three levels of intensity, each being a higher development of the former. This indicates that there is a point of view from which any man may begin his spiritual pursuit in accordance with his own capacity.

Whatever 'new knowledge' man may have gained in the previous stage expands into a new perspective in which previous obstacles are gradually overcome. This constitutes a 'linking up' stage which has four gradations. First, there is a 'warming up' to something, then a point where the heat reaches its 'maximum intensity' is reached. At that point, there is an 'acceptance' of the intrinsic nature of the universe, which means that man sees himself and his involvement with and relationship to the world.

This 'insight' fosters joy which gives life to man's actions. The life which unfolds as a result of actions which are in accord with that 'vision' radiates with light.

In brief, when the five Buddhist paths unfolds as the dynamic development of one's potentials, one moves from a life of bewilderment and error to a life of intrinsic awareness which has always been there.

Vinītadeva's discussion on the five paths presupposes a knowledge of how the paths unfold; therefore, he begins right with an application of the paths.

He begins his discussion with an analysis of the proposition "'awareness *qua* sensa' is a state devoid of a subject-object dichotomy." To this, a would be opponent retorts, "If everything is 'awareness *qua* sensa', and neither an apprehended object nor an apprehending subject exists, then how does one account for the fact that ordinary people say, 'I see color and form with my eyes'?"

To this, Vinītadeva replies that such views result from man's attachments, and so long as man will lull in the glory of his own attachments, he will not realize the significance of the whole Mentalistic system.

Thus, by this discussion, Vinītadeva prepares the stage on which a real experience of 'awareness *qua* sensa' takes place.

But, so long as 'awareness *qua* sensa' remains a goal, it does not come forth as a real experience. This means that a 'goal' is a concept, and concepts are never reality. Therefore, a mere regurgitation of appropriate passages from various Buddhist texts may indicate a clarity of concepts, but the Buddhist texts caution against such 'learning' as a substitute for experience, because it is at the foundation of man's frustration.

And therefore, man must go beyond his conceptualized world. But in order to do so, he must first understand how

concepts are generated in the activities of mind and mental events. Therefore, the analysis of the mind and mental events (Chapter VII) is of prime importance in the development of the Buddhist path. However, the mind always has the tendency to concretize things, and even non-existence becomes 'a something'. Once this trap ensnarles its game man becomes bound the horizon of his thoughts. And once that happens, man's potentials are severed from their roots, and once again man falls into the darkness wherein a loss of intrinsic awareness rules.

Therefore, a Yogin, in his meditative practices, realizes this, and does not remain in the sphere of his concepts. He does this by removing anything which may come to his mind, and in so doing he rids himself of anything which may take hold of them. This is expressed by the words, "When the apprehended object no longer exists, the apprehending subject becomes non-existent also." Because this is expressed in the form of a proposition, man may think that he has gained a real experience of the mind-as-such, by comprehending the depth of that statement. It is at this point, that the traditional Indian Buddhist Mentalistic trend and the rNying-ma emphasis on 'existential experience' part company.

We can see this difference by comparing passages from Vinītadeva with those of Klong-chen-pa. One example will suffice. Vinītadeva states:

One experiences the non-existence of an apprehending

subject when a apprehended object does not exist;
one does not experience merely the non-existence of
an apprehended object.

The above statement clearly indicates that Vinītadeva has
fallen prey to the 'concept game'. In contrast to this,
the same idea is expressed by Klong-chen-pa as follows:

Thus, all the concrete things that are there ('appear') as
external objects

Appear in a mind but are not the mind,

Nor are they found anywhere else than in mind.

Although through the power of inveterate tendencies

there seems to be there a duality of subject

and object,

There has never been such a duality in this thereness.

It is like a face and its reflection in a mirror.

Although the face appears there (in the mirror)

it is not there,

Nor has there been a transmission of an observable

quality other than the face.

In the same way as there is distinctly present the

duality (of subject and object) without it

existing as such,

All the various things you should know to behave

in the same way.

As long as they are not critically investigated they

are a source of joy, but if they are critically

investigated they are thoroughly elusive,

And if they are even more critically investigated

they remain utterly beyond any attempt to

express them in words.

Their being or non-being is not observed, nor is there

anything of limitless or non-limitless.¹

Whereas, Klong-chen-pa's statement leaves open the possibility of growth, Vinītadeva's statement is an attempt to conclude and therefore to concretize experience into a final something.

Because the Indian Mentalistic trend emphasized the epistemological aspect of man, they inevitably ended up with a 'concept' of reality. The rNyingmapas must be credited with the move to ontology wherein the 'experience of Being' became emphasized.

Vinītadeva's discussion on the five paths have the following heads:

1. The Path of Preparation,
2. The Path of Linking up,
3. The Path of Insight,
4. The Path of Developing the Vision, and
5. The Path of No more learning.

THE FIVE PATHS

The statement, "....if everything is merely 'awareness qua sensa'...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to what follows by asking a question.

1. The Path of Preparation

The philosopher [Vasubandhu] says,

¹ H.V. Guenther, *Kindly Bent to Ease Us*, pp. 173-174.

So long as [one's] perceptual operations

Are not on [the level of] 'awareness qua sensa (26 ab)

in reply to those who ask, "If everything is merely 'awareness qua sensa' which is freed from an apprehended object and an apprehending subject, then why is it that the majority of the people in this life think that the eyes and so on apprehend color and so on?"

So long as the perceptual operations of those who are attached to this life are not on the level of 'awareness qua sensa',

But lull in the concern of the two apprehensions (26 c)

they will not revert. If they do not revert, then [those people] become overly attached to the idea, 'This is appropriated by this'.

The statement, "...moreover,..." is for the purpose of explaining another aspect of the verse, but its meaning has been explained already.

The philosopher [Sthiramati] says, "...in 'awareness qua sensa'...." in order to explain that. So long as the perceptual operations of a Yogin does not dwell in a real experience of the mind which is called 'awareness qua sensa', but lull in the concern of an apprehended object and an apprehending subject, the tendencies of the two appropriations cannot be removed.

The statement, "...the two appropriations...." is a reply to those who ask, "What are the two appropriations?"

The two appropriations are:

1. an obsession with an apprehended object, and
2. an obsession with an apprehending subject.

The statement, "....to lull in that...." is for the purpose of explaining [the word] 'lull'. 'Lull' refers to ^{are} the two appropriations which/seeds extracted out of the substratum awareness in order to produce two appropriations in the future. It is a synonym for the word 'tendency'.

The statement, "....the specific characteristic of being freed from the two...." is for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the verse, because the meaning of words [in the verse] has been explained.

So long as the mind of a Yogin does not dwell in 'awareness *qua* sensa' which is specifically characterized by being freed from an apprehended object and an apprehending subject, the tendencies of the two appropriations cannot be removed.

The statement, "....in that case, an external objective reference....." is for the purpose of explaining a second interpretation of the verse. That is clarified by what follows. So long as the objective reference concerning an external object has not been given up, the internal objective reference which constitutes the appropriating subject cannot be removed either. Therefore, [the common mortal] who is attached to this life, thinks, "I perceive color etc., with my eyes etc."

2. *The Path of Linking up*

The statement, "....now, the following must be explained...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to what follows by asking a question.

The statement, "....it is not the case....." is a reply to those who ask, "Is it the case that when a Yogin makes 'mind-only' which is freed from an object, his objective reference, he dwells in a real experience of the mind?" One must know that [the mind], in that case, does not dwell in a true experience of the mind. When those [common mortals] perceive a sense object which has been produced by the thought "[This is] 'awareness *qua* sensa'", they come into confrontation with a possible objective reference. When they come into direct confrontation with a possible objective reference, [their minds] do not dwell in 'mind-only', because having rejected all the other possible objective references, they make only 'mind-only' their objective reference. So long as even one possible objective reference - whether it be external or internal - is selected (*rtog pa*), [the mind] cannot dwell in a real experience of the mind.

The statement, "....moreover, one possesses the arrogance of showing off...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to another line of the verse.

The thought, "I have properly understood 'awareness *qua* sensa', because I do not discriminate between an apprehended object or an apprehending subject" of a Yogin, who

bubbles with pride after having simply made a study of the treatises dealing with 'awareness *qua* sensa', is perverted aggrogance which is motivated by such thoughts, because [in essence] those treatises explain training [by which one] overcomes such evil references of meditative practices. The statement,

This is 'awareness qua sensa' (27 a)

is for the purpose of purifying that 'perverted arrogance'.

Because [the mind] is in direct confrontation with an 'awareness *qua* sensa' which it has made its objective reference, it does not dwell in that [experience of 'mind'], but [the mind] is taken in [by a concept, *ie.*] the non-existent state of an apprehended object and an apprehending subject.

The statement, "....this is 'awareness *qua* sensa'...." is a reply to those who ask, "How is that an objective reference?" The thought, "This is 'awareness *qua* sensa'" is already an objective constituent.

The statement, ".... apprehending subject...." is for the purpose of explaining synonyms for that. [The synonyms for that are:] 'to make an apprehending subject a specific defining characteristic', 'to be obsessed with an apprehending subject', and 'to produce its sense datum'.

The word 'direct' means 'directly'; it means 'directly with the mind'. The word 'confrontation' means 'to confront'; it means that the intellect confronts [a thing] just as it has heard it [to be]. In other words, the intellect makes

that 'awareness *qua* sensa' which it has heard to be 'a such and such' its objective reference in the exact manner that it has heard it [to be]; this constitutes the definition for the words 'direct confrontation'.

The statement, "...because the objective references of a Yogin's meditative practice are many...." is for the purpose of explaining another line of the verse.

We speak about 'a possible [objective reference]', because the objective references are manifold. We speak about 'a possible [objective reference]', because even if one is in direct confrontation with the causal aspect of 'awareness *qua* sensa' which has been selected as one's objective reference, [the mind] does not stay with that.

Those who dismiss skeletons and the like, do not understand the subject matter. This is to say, because the subject matter under consideration is about the direct confrontation with anything which can be 'awareness *qua* sensa', if skeletons and the like are going to have any relation to the subject matter, that is because they are figuratively expressed by that. In other words, they appear as the objective constituents of external objects and that is what we are trying to clarify here.

The statement,

...does not stay in that (27 d)

is for the purpose of explaining things which are not on the same level as that [*i.e.* awareness *qua* sensa.] This

means, so long as the objective reference constituted of 'awareness *qua* sensa' has not been removed, 'awareness *qua* sensa' becomes the only objective reference, and the [mind] does not stay in that [alone].

3. *Path of Insight*

The statement, "...when an apprehending subject of a perceptual operation has been removed..." is for the purpose of explaining the meaning of what follows, because some raise questions about it.

The statement, "....

If in a perceptual situation, there is no cognition

Of an objective reference, then..." (28 a,b)

is a reply to those who ask, "Even when one understands that, if [the mind] does not dwell in 'awareness *qua* sensa', because the apprehending subject of a perceptual situation has not been removed, then you must explain when the apprehending subject of a perceptual situation is removed and when the mind dwells in a real experience."

If in a perceptual situation there is no cognition of an objective reference because the objective reference has been completely removed, then the mind stays in 'awareness *qua* sensa'. This is summarized by the statement, "If an apprehended object does not exist, then an apprehending subject is also non-existent."

The philosopher [Sthiramati] says, "....when teachings" in order to explain that in detail. If, when a perceptual operation, which is other than a mind which makes teachings and so on its objective reference, is not in direct confrontation [with an objective reference], because it neither sees it nor is attached to it, (and therefore, [sees the state] devoid of an objective reference from seeing reality properly 'just as it is', effortlessly like a blind man), the mind dwells in a true experience of mind, because the apprehending subject of a perceptual situation has been removed.

Here, the words, 'perceptual situation' mean a confrontation. The words 'apprehending subject' mean a direct confrontation. Therefore, it is said that at that time a direct confrontation with an apprehending subject is removed.

Here, the definition:

When an apprehended object does not exist,

An apprehending subject does not exist. (28 d)

is given in reply to those who ask, "Why is it that the mind dwells in a true experience of mind at that time?"

The statement, "....when an apprehended object exists" is for the purpose of clarifying that. An apprehending subject is tenable when an apprehended object exists, but if an apprehended object does not exist, it cannot be so. Therefore, one experiences the non-existence of an

apprehending subject when an apprehended object does not exist; one does not experience merely the non-existence of an apprehended object.

The statement, "...in that case, that which is to be an objective reference....." is a reply to those who ask, "What is the value of removing the apprehended object and the apprehending subject?"

When the apprehended object and the apprehending subject are removed, because then one does not select either that which is to be an objective reference or that which constitutes an objective reference, a calm transcending primordial awareness is born. Even the inclinations to lull in the attachments to an apprehended object and an apprehending subject are removed; therefore, the mind dwells in a real experience of its own mind which is called 'awareness *qua* sensa'.

That which we speak about as 'calm', because that which is to be an objective reference and that which constitutes an object reference has been equalized, refers to transcending primordial awareness. The words, 'does not directly confront' is defined by the following words: there is no direct confrontation, because that which is to be an objective reference is not selected; in the same manner, there is no direct confrontation, because that which constructs objective references is not selected.

The expression, 'it is calm because they have been equalized' refers to total harmony.

4. *The Path of Developing the vision*

The statement, "....if...*'awareness qua sensa'*...." is for the purpose of linking the discussion to what follows by asking a question.

The philosopher [Vasubandhu] says,

That is 'without mind', 'without cognition' (29 c)

in reply to those who ask, "What is the condition of the mind, when the mind dwells in *'awareness qua sensa'*, after having removed the apprehended object and the apprehending subject?" The above verse is a summary of such terms as:

without a mind (*sems med pa*)

without cognition (*mi dmigs pa*)

transcending primordial awareness (*'jig rten las 'das pa ye shes*)

a change over (*gnas gyur*)

a foundation which does not fail one (*zad pa med pa'i dbyings*)

beyond the reach of thought (*bsam gyis mi khyab*)

the positive (*dge ba*)

a basis (*brten pa*)

bliss (*dbe ba*)

a liberated being (*rnam par grol ba'i sku*), and

an authentic being (*chos kyi sku*).

The commentator, [Sthiramati] says, "....by these two verses [ie. 29 and 30],.... " in order to explain the meaning of the verses. These two verses explain the fact that one gains a favorable outcome by becoming more and more unique on the basis of the Path of Insight of a Yogin who enters the state of *'awareness qua sensa'*.

'Without a mind', 'without cognition', and 'transcending primordial awareness' are [states which are] tenable when one is on the Path of Insight. 'A change over' takes place when one gradually becomes more and more unique. 'The two states of being' are favorable outcomes.

The statement, ".....a mind which appropriates...." is a reply to those who ask, "If 'mind as such' is an experience, then what are 'without a mind' and 'without cognition'?" Because a transcending mind (*'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems*) is not different from the mind which appropriates, it is said to be 'without mind'. Because a transcending mind does not make anything its objective reference, it is said to be 'without cognition'.

The statement, "....because it does not occur among the worldly people...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is it 'transcending'?" Because it never appears among worldly people as a matter of habit or as something with which they are accustomed, nor is it ever experience by them, it is beyond worldly people. It is called 'transcending primordial awareness' because it is beyond worldly people.

The statement, "....on the basis of that...." is for the purpose of explaining [the words], 'a change over'. Because a change over takes place on the basis of transcending primordial awareness, the words, 'a change over' refer only to that fact.

The statement, ".....basis....." is a reply to those who ask, "What is 'basis'?" and "What is 'change'?" In this case, the word 'basis' means the substratum awareness which contains all of the seeds.

When that basis which is the open ended facticity of a degenerating influence (*gnas ngan len*), of an actualized state (*rnam par smin pa*), of a presence of an apprehended object and an apprehending subject (*gzung dang 'dzin pa gnyis su snang ba*) reverts, then gradually and orderly, the open ended facticity of a pliable body (*lus su rung ba*), of an authentic being (*chos sku*), and primordial awareness devoid of the two [*i.e.* subject and object] emerges. That is the meaning of the words, 'a change over'.

When a degenerating influence is reverted, the body becomes pliable. When an actualized state reverts, an authentic being is gained. When the presence of the two reverts, primordial awareness devoid of the two blossoms forth.

The terms, 'the presence of the two' mean the presence of an apprehended object and an apprehending subject. The terms, 'devoid of the two' refer to primordial awareness which is not divided (*mi rtog pa'i ye shes*).

The statement, ".....a change over....." is a reply to those who ask, "How is that attained?"

The philosopher, [Vasubandhu], says,

because one is freed from the two degenerating influences (29 d)

in reply to those who say, "You must explain by the removal of what, that a change over that you have just described takes place." When the two degenerating influences are removed, then that [change over] takes place.

The statement, "....the two are....." is for the purpose of explaining the two. In this case, the two degenerating influences refer to the conflicting emotions which are degenerating forces and the primitive belief about reality which is a degenerating force.

The statement, "....degenerating influences...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is the degenerating influences so called?" 'Degenenerating influences' refer to sluggishness of the body. More accurately speaking, however, degenerating influences are the seeds which produce the conflicting emotions and the primitive belief about reality.

The statement, ".... a change over...." is for the purpose of explaining that in detail.

Some say that a liberated being [is a state which] is attained when the degenerating influences which belong to the family of pious listeners and self styled Buddhas are removed. Some say that a life of the great Buddha is attained when the degenerating influences which belong to the family of the Bodhisattva are removed. One should know that the superiority or inferiority of a change over is determined by the specificity of whether the two obscurations are removed or not.

The statement, "....a verse concerning that...." is for the purpose of explaining that by quoting a verse, [which states]:

One should know that the two obscurations
Constitute the perceptual operation which
appropriates
and that they are chains.

The statement, "....here the two are chained to two
...." is a reply to those who ask, "Whose chains?"

Both families of the pious listeners and of the Bodhisattvas are chained to the substratum awareness by the specificity of primitive beliefs about reality.

The two obscurations are explained by the terms, 'all of the seeds'. The substratum awareness is explained as 'that in which the seeds of the two obscurations are preserved', because the seeds of emotions and the seeds of everything exist therein.

The commentator, [Sthiramati] says, "....two...." in order to explain the words in the verse. The seeds of emotions are chains belonging to the family of pious listeners. The seeds of the two obscurations are chains belonging to the family of the Bodhisattvas. The words, 'seeds of the two obscurations' are explained as 'seeds of everything'.

The statement, "....therefore, they have been conquered
...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is this called,
'obscurations of the Bodhisattva'?" Because when the

two obscurations are removed, one attains omniscience, the two obscurations are said to be chains belonging [to the family of the Bodhisattvas].

5. *The Path of no more learning*

The statement,

Only that is 'without tainted perceptual objects'

and 'unobstructed';

Is 'beyond thought', 'positive', and 'firm'.

That is 'bliss', 'a liberated being';

It is called 'the life of the great Buddha'. (30)

is for the purpose of explaining the last verse, because all of the others have been explained.

The two specificity of a change over are called 'without tainted objects' and 'unobstructed'. It is called 'without tainted objects' (*zag med pa*), because in so far as the two degenerating influences no longer exist, it is freed from all tainted objects. It is called 'unobstructed', because it is the causal factor for the sublime teaching. The word 'unobstructed' is understood to have the meaning 'causal factor' in this case, because it is the cause for all of the sublime teachings.

The statement, "....beyond thought...." is a reply to those who ask, "In what manner is it 'beyond thought'?" Because it is not something one can dispute about, (*ie.*) because the disputors cannot logically establish it to be 'a so and so' or cannot give examples to exemplify it, it is said to be 'beyond thought'.

The statement, "....positive...." is a reply to those who ask, "How is it 'positive'?" It is called 'positive', because it is a pure objective reference, because it is positive, and because it is without tainted objects.

The statement, "....firm...." is a reply to those who ask, "How is it 'firm'?" It is called 'firm', because the Sugata is firm and reliable.

The statement, "....bliss...." is a reply to those who ask, "In what manner is it a 'bliss'?" Impermanence brews frustrations. Because that is permanent, it is called, 'bliss'.

The statement, "....overcoming conflicting emotions" is for the purpose of explaining the various kinds of change overs in view of the various kinds of people. The 'liberated being' of the pious listeners is one kind of change over. Freedom of the body is called 'liberated being' according to the pious listeners, because they attain liberation from merely overcoming conflicting emotions.

'The life of a great Buddha' is a change over having very specific defining characteristics.

The statement, "....by practicing the perfections and [by traversing] the stages..." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is the Buddha called 'an authentic being'?" Because [a Buddha] overcomes both obscurations of conflicting emotions and of a primitive belief about reality by practicing the perfections and [by traversing] the stages and in this way changes over, therefore, we speak about 'the life of the

great Buddha'. This means, [a Buddha] is spoken about as the authentic being, because [he illustrates] the perfection of the perfections and the spiritual stages.

The statement, "...have not completely renounced the world...." is for the purpose of explaining that from another point of view.

The Bodhisattvas who have reached the stage of the change over but who, although not tainted by the evil references of the world, have not completely renounced the world, gain relief from all of the entities of reality; therefore, we speak about [them as] a 'liberated being'. This means, because they make the teaching the foundation [of their lives], they are called 'authentic beings'.

The statement, ".....a great Buddha...." is a reply to those who ask, "Why is the Victorious One called 'a great Buddha'?" The Victorious One is called 'a great Buddha' because the attainments of his body, his speech, and his actions are supreme. This means, because his speech is free of the influences of the emotions and the proximate factors of instability, he is called 'a great Buddha'. He is called 'a great Buddha', because even in worldly situations, he has control [of himself] and speaks properly. The Victorious One never speaks words prompted by the emotions. The Sugata is a great Buddha, because he has proper control over his speech which may be prompted by the emotions. He is 'Highest of the Buddhas'; 'Supreme among the Buddhas'; 'King of the Buddhas'; and 'Lord over

the Buddhas'.

May [all beings] in the world attain Buddhahood,
By whatever wholesome qualities gained by me
In making this commentary on the *Treatise on
Thirty Verses* written by Sthiramati.

Due to the fact that I am ignorant
And because I am not learned, I may have said
Things contrary to the treatise.
May the Wise Ones be patient with me.

It is not so surprising that I,
Who am inexperienced in
Treading through a treatise of this kind,
Should be lost, like a blind man on the path.

[However,] if there should happen to be even
A single drop of truth spoken by thoughts like mine,
Then may it [blossom forth] like the myriad of grains
Which come from even a single seed of a Sala.

This concludes the *Subcommentary on the Thirty Verses*
written by Vinītadeva. The great masters of India, Jina-
mitra, Śīlendrabodhi, and Dānaśīla and the translator
priest, Ye-shes-sdes of Zhu-chen [monastery] have compiled
and rendered it [into Tibetan].

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