

TAIWANESE IDENTITY AND LANGUAGE EDUCATION

The Role of Race, Ethnicity, Language, Culture
and Nation in the Colonization of Taiwan

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I look at the question of Taiwanese identity by focussing on characteristics that have come to be considered natural human identity attributes worldwide. I look at historical discourses that have depicted and constructed these attributes as essential to the nature of human beings. Biological theory, terminology, modes of classification, and conceptions of human being established in the natural sciences, and imported to the social sciences, have created a general international discursive regime that employs notions of blood relations, lineage, family, nation-ness, race, ethnicity an ongoing constructions and contestations of identity. The discourse on identity as a matter of heritage is echoed in the science of linguistics with the classification of languages into natural family groups. Linguistic group as an identity marker complicates and is complicated by the general discourse on identity also employing “family talk. I try to show that the human being conceived principally as a biological being, became the focus of techniques of population control and institutional *reproduction* of social subjects in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe, especially with mass education, and that this process was replicated in the industrialization and modernization of Taiwan. In Taiwan, as in Europe, techniques of what Michel Foucault calls “biopower” were deployed in the process of strengthening the productive powers of the nation state in the international struggle of the survival of the national fittest. For Foucault the spatial and temporal patterns of interaction these institutional processes employed created the kind of social subject that is a precondition for capitalist expansion.

In addition to the implicit training that modern institutions employ, there are also explicit educational programs that are grounded in scientific and social theories that modern societies propagate in the curricula of public systems of education. The Taiwanese learned that their identities, as Chinese citizens, were determined by blood lineage, that is, by racial association. I will explain that in China and Taiwan these positivistic, essentialist and biological ideas of identity, were picked up from the western biological and social sciences by Chinese intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century. In combination with Confucian ideas on family these ideas were consciously selected by the Nationalist government in Taiwan and employed in the production of a specific form of Chinese citizenry in Taiwan. Reinforcing deeply entrenched discourses on race, long expressed in historical China, these biological and familial conceptions were deployed for political purposes in education programs designed to legitimise the right of the Nationalist government to rule China and then Taiwan.

Finally, the metaphor of biological family that was employed in an understanding of nation-ness in Taiwan has also come to determine thinking about the natural association between languages, nations and races. In the science of linguistics, languages are depicted as having evolved in the same way races do. In these classifications, official national languages, which historically are the dialects of dominant social groups, are determinative of socio-economic class reproduction, being considered the summit to which all speakers of all secondary dialects are compelled to aspire. The question of

language education for identity in Taiwan will be examined in light of these preconceptions, processes and programs.

I show that language, nation and race have tended to be cast in discourse as naturally combined elements that determine identity. As a result of colonial educational processes these identity terms tend to be understood as both natural attributes and, as naturally adhering to each other. Nationalities, national or official languages, constructed races, and constructed ethnicities tend to be combined in a globalized discourse to produce dominant images of certain societies' identities. The English language in Taiwan will be shown to be understood as "a white" language. In colonial discourse nations, races, ethnicities and language types have each been imbued with specific values and statuses. Therefore, dominant images that combine these attributes serve to create intra-national and international human hierarchies. In Taiwan, American English has the potential of raising the status of its learners in the national and international hierarchy toward the high point represented by America as the imperial centre.

In *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991) Bourdieu describes attributes that distinguish groups as different forms of symbolic capital. I want to hold that the nation/social space of Taiwan represents one node within a global network where capitalist forces continue to entrench privilege and power of national and international elites whose place in this hierarchy, whose opportunities for material and social advantages, are determined by the relative statuses of their nations, races, ethnicities and languages. "Black", "brown", "white" and "yellow" people, speakers of specific official languages, or what are considered derivative dialects, are imbued with a matched set of symbolic forms of capital that have come to have specific social values. These help to determine specific life opportunities in different social settings. I focus on two related settings in Taiwan where expressions of different forms of symbolic capital have significance for Taiwanese identity. The first is the struggle between what have come to be understood as two ethnic groups in the latter half of the twentieth century that I will designate as mainlanders and islanders. The second is the context of English language teaching where certain accents and racial distinctions have come to play a part in the promotion of English as an important form of cultural capital. The struggle between the mainlanders and islanders will be shown to have affected relative opportunities for achieving English skills, to continue class stratification in Taiwan, and to further endanger traditional island cultures and languages.

DEDICATION

When I went to Taiwan I had no intention of remaining there for a decade. I would like to dedicate this thesis to the people of Taiwan; for their spontaneity, warmth, hospitality, generosity, and sincerity that made this time fly by. I will be forever grateful for being able to get to know my Taiwanese students, colleagues, friends and for the many anonymous Taiwanese people who always seemed to be taking care of this foreigner and making him feel that their country could also be his. May the Spirit of Independence shine through you always.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Allen Chun

DHGI = “Democracy as Hegemony, Globalization as Indigenisation”

CINE = “The Culture Industry as National Enterprise”

FC = “Fuck Chineseness. On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture, as Identity”

Works by Frank Dikotter

DMC = *The Discourse on Modern China*

RIC = “Racial Identities in China: Context and Meaning”.

CRN = “Culture, Race and Nation: The Formation of National Identity in Twentieth Century China”

Works by Michel Foucault

PR = “Politics and Reason”

AK = *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*

DP = *Discipline and Punish*

FR = *The Foucault Reader*

Works by Dr. Cheng-Feng Shih

EINI = “Ethnic Identity and National Identity: Mainlanders in Taiwan”

SDTC = “A Study of the Development of Taiwanese Consciousness with a Focus on Linguistic and Historical Determination

INTRODUCTION

Reason for Investigation

My interest in Taiwanese social identity stems from the eight years I lived and worked on the island as an English teacher and school administrator. Questions about social and national identity on the island have become a regular feature of public debate due, in part, to the insistence by the Chinese mainland that Taiwan be reunited with it politically. "Is Taiwan a Chinese society?" and "Are the Taiwanese Chinese?" have come to be seen as important questions for the island's people as well as interested foreign observers. I began to have interest in this debate because my work in private and public institutions meant that I was engaged in educational processes, especially the promotion of the English language, that potentially participate in, or influence the construction of social identity in Taiwan. It became more and more clear to me that such a responsibility should be accompanied by a commitment to critical reflection on the role I, and other foreign English teachers, were playing in helping determine the direction Taiwanese society was taking and what the implications of language education were for the question of social identity. It would seem clear that formal education is one of the main contributors to the general process of social identity construction. There are also many other major and minor factors that have a bearing on how the identity of a people is understood and expressed, and this thesis will attempt to understand how some of these factors, along with public education, play a part in that process in Taiwan.

Reflecting on the question of Taiwanese identity, I began to understand the island to be one example of how the question of social identity is related to basic social, political and economic processes globally. Although my hope is that this work can fill out some areas of the debate about the island that will be of use to those interested in these issues, it should also serve as one kind of interpretation of the impact that globalism, capitalism, and neo-colonialism has on questions of social identity in one of its many contemporary guises.

Researcher's Background and Perspective on Taiwan

This study is a part of my attempt to understand my experiences in Taiwan and the meaning of my work there. The experience has given me a perspective on my own identity that I would not have otherwise achieved. The fate of Taiwan remains an ongoing concern for me as I believe, given the time I spent there, that I can reasonably be considered to have taken up something of what it means to be Taiwanese into myself.

Little did I know when I left Canada for a contract to teach English in Taiwan that I was beginning a decade long odyssey of learning about another country and people that would profoundly influence my understanding of what it means to be a Canadian national as well. I had been teaching in a junior high school in northern British Columbia when I received notice that my application to teach in Taichung, in the central region of Taiwan, had been accepted. I spent three years as a teacher and administrator with the organization that recruited me. My time was divided between a high school in the countryside and a bushiban, or cram school, in the heart of Taichung city.

Schooling in Taiwan is a national obsession. Where the real official competition for higher education in Canada starts in senior high school, in Taiwan, intense official academic competition begins with junior high school, and unofficially in primary school.¹

Our high school students came from various places around Taiwan and were drawn to the school for its English program. Many of them had done poorly on their senior high school entrance exams and could not get into the elite high schools that all families in Taiwan hope their children will gain access to. The high schools are tiered, and the best ones are conduits to prestigious post-secondary institutes and the best paying jobs. My students were able to take an alternate route through a private high school specializing in English instruction with half of their day spent with Canadian teachers. The certificate of graduation from a reputable English oriented school such as ours is a coveted asset in the educational market. If it didn't get students into a good Taiwanese university, high TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) scores

¹ My own experiences with the early competitiveness of schooling in Taiwan are confirmed by Wang. (2001, p. 335)

would get them into a foreign university.¹ At least that was the sales pitch. Some of the families had to pay exorbitant fees for extra lessons during the high school period and after graduation, for their children to achieve passing grades. For those who could afford it this was deemed a worthwhile investment.

The bushiban was for younger students, to the age of twelve, who lived in the city. After their regular school hours they were provided with bus service to our cram school where they spent an extra four hours per week studying English with Canadian teachers. In addition to this instruction many of them crammed on other evenings in math or other subjects. When children in Taiwan were not at school they were usually doing homework. We were one of the more prestigious schools in the city. Our reputation was established on the basis of the bachelor of education qualifications of Canadian teachers, the owner's Canadian affiliations and the buses provided citywide with our school name blazoned across them. The clientele at both schools was established or newly upper class Taiwanese families hoping to keep the edge for their children by getting them elite educations. We were just one of dozens of cram schools specializing in English city wide, and one of thousands country wide that continued to spring up at an accelerating rate during the time I lived there from the early to late nineties.

We soon learned that image definitely outweighed substance when it came to elite education in Taiwan. There was no curriculum at either school and little guidance for what should be taught. The main criterion for success was if the students enjoyed the classes and liked the teacher. Without guidance, and without ESL training our staff groped their way to the semblance of a curriculum and sets of methods for teaching English. For the most part this effort was barely recognized by the Taiwanese administration whose goals were mainly image based and financial. The Taiwanese population was clamouring for English instruction with little understanding of what quality instruction entailed. They were easy targets for commercial exploitation by schools such as ours. As teachers we could only try to do our best to give instruction that would warrant the expense these families incurred for their children's education.

¹ For a statistical analysis of the stratified education system in Taiwan, see Wang (2001).

As many foreigners note after some time on the island, the image of quality often takes precedence over substance. Yet as Canadians, as other Western nationals have often confirmed to me as well, our treatment by the Taiwanese was exemplary. In fact it soon became obvious that we were being given extraordinarily good treatment in comparison to that given to local teachers. White American, Canadian, Australian nationals were part of the image being sold as language education in “authentic” English. Although ads for teachers did not specifically request white teachers, applicants were often asked on the telephone about their race, or asked to send photos to verify the candidate’s race. A part of the presumption about hiring from certain countries was that teachers coming from them would be Caucasian. Here’s how two school owners put it:

Parents who don’t understand English will believe the myth that white teachers can teach their kids better English. From a marketing standpoint, it’s understandable why schools would want to hire more white teachers. (Jan 2000, p. 17)

Most Taiwanese parents don’t care much about a teacher’s educational background, as long as they’re white and American. (ibid)

In a comment that can be interpreted negatively or generously Jan relates one mother’s comments: “she likes her children to study with Caucasians to expose them to other people who look different from them.” In this mother’s words:

This will make them more at ease with foreigners and not just stare and stutter in front of them...They will learn about a new culture authentically. And their accents are more natural. (ibid)

Equally qualified and experienced non-Caucasian teachers who did not fit what was conceived to be the authentic Western standard found work more difficult to find and were passed over for less qualified white teachers. If they were hired they had to endure continuous scepticism about their authenticity as “native speakers of English” or found that their contracts were not renewed. They were often replaced by white teachers when these became available. An America born Chinese (called ABC’s in Taiwan) laments:

‘native foreign speakers’ infuriates me. I mean, what do they mean by ‘native’? I’m native, but I know someone like me is not who they are looking for. (ibid)

Few schools bothered to tell families that many non-whites were born and lived in the preferred countries of origin for ‘native’ English speakers. The perception was that nations had associated races and languages.

I soon learned that Taiwan had a population that was distinguished as two main groups, the *wai shen ren*, who arrived with the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1949 and *ben shen ren*, the majority group on the island, most of whom had been there for three hundred years before the KMT arrived. These groups were both considered Chinese, or at least Asian, and therefore of the same race. The other groups on the island were the marginalized aboriginals (*shan ren*) who were considered racially distinct and not Chinese. When I wanted to discuss these “mountain people” most of my Taiwanese associates and students became embarrassed and laughed (a common reaction to embarrassment in Taiwan). In one of my young children’s classes, with five and six year olds, when the topic of aboriginals arose, they proclaimed in broken English, almost unanimously (and this was not easy to get them to do) that the mountain people were “very very bad”, obviously mimicking what they had heard from adults. I quickly learned that “us westerners” had not cornered the market on ethnic and racial prejudice completely. When pressed on the issue school owners usually expressed sympathy for non-white teachers but claimed they were only providing what the market wanted. For them, they claimed, it was just business and not racism. Capitalism, it appears, was preventing serious questioning of racializing in many cases.

We reaped the benefits of being white. This was especially so in our schools where our salaries were around triple what the Taiwanese teachers were paid and where we received many other perks to go with the job. When we got to know those teachers they didn’t hide their bitterness about the discrepancy. Nonetheless they treated us as regular colleagues. On the other hand, we were treated like celebrities by our school owner, and in public we were a spectacle. Every day, at least a few people would try out their spoken English with us, often with comic effect. Very few people in Taichung

could carry on an extended conversation but many people were thrilled at the opportunity to speak to *a live* foreigner, which in the minds of many meant “a real American”. Most often Caucasians were called *mei guo ren*, (Americans) or *wai guo ren*, foreigners (literally: “out country person”) Generally there was an image of foreigners as being free, open and spontaneous. It was also a part of what was being sold in the schools. Learning with Canadian teachers would be more fun than the rote memorization practiced in Taiwanese schools. As I would later learn, the history of Taiwan was one where the image of America, as a land that had attained its freedom and independence, had long been idealized. Compared with the extended history of repression, censorship, secrecy and subjugation in Taiwan, American history, popular movies and music provide an enticing image of spontaneous expression and cultural freedom. Taiwanese people, especially the young, were ravenous for the experience of free America.

American iconography was everywhere. Along with American chain restaurants and retail outlets, American theme cafes, English slogans (often unintentionally comically expressed), T-shirts and jackets, emblazoned with English phrases, American insignia and brand names flash at you unrelentingly as you move down an urban Taiwanese street. “Merry Christmas”, lighted trees and decor adorn bar windows and interiors year round. Taiwan is now a capitalist and consumerist dreamland. Twenty-four hour convenience stores are on every second street corner. There is a curious mix of western popular culture and Chinese nationalistic images. Movies are preceded by the national anthem with associated images of industrial machinery transforming the earth into an urban paradise. The people’s industriousness is depicted as a pre-eminent national quality that seems almost like an apology for the destruction of the environment years of industrial indifference have wrought. There were no images of what remains of Taiwan’s incredible natural beauty.¹ Taiwan is at once a sad spectacle of the ravages of modernity and an example of a people struggling to find their way through the barrage of conflicting images to something that is the authentically Taiwanese. That struggle is

¹ Taiwan was named “Ilha Formosa” or “beautiful island” by the early Dutch explorers. Eighty-five percent of the island is mountainous. The west coast lowlands have been decimated with industrial and urban sprawl.

something that I have come to believe we must all be engaged with, in “our own” societies on a continuous basis. The lessons of Taiwan, I hope to show, can be instructive in that regard. We must all resist the kind of *subjectification* that I will show the Taiwanese have had to endure and at the same time refrain from *objectifying others*, as *essential others*, that our subjectification so easily engenders.

The forces of international capitalism are complicated by the way identities are constructed in local contexts. The accumulation of material and cultural capital in the hands of an elite minority is struggled against in a fight for self-determination by local populations such as Taiwan’s. These struggles that take place at every level of society, are largely determined by the enframement in language that produce representations of individuals’ identities, and their corresponding “qualifications” for doing certain jobs. Therefore questions about appropriate language education need to include questions not only about which languages are learned, but also about the relationships between language learning, social identity, and socio-economic equity. These relationships should be made explicit both at the level of the creation of policy and for the language learners themselves.¹

A Preview of Identity Attributes and Issues:

Looking at each of the attributes normally associated with social identity I offer the following definitions and observations. These are not put forward as working definitions but as a sample to express the range of contested meanings associated with these terms and the way these meanings are dispersed in discourse:

1. Race:

- a) A race is a large population of individuals who have *a significant proportion* of their genes in common and can be distinguished from other races by *their common gene pool*. (my italics). . . Classifications by various authors differ somewhat in detail; subdivision into the three main

¹ For example, Norman Fairclough (1989) advocates CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) for ESL and other learners where they are taught to be able to see through the way discourse subjectively and ideologically positions them. (Chapter 9)

racess, Negroids, Mongoloids, and Caucasoids, is accepted by practically all of the observers.” (Vogel and Motulsky, 1986, p. 62)

- b) No serious biologist believes any more that humanity can be divided into distinct races. In recent years geneticists have shown that there is far greater genetic variation within what we consider to be a race, than there is between races. They have shown too that the distribution of one gene (say that for skin colour) is independent of that for another (say for blood group). As geneticist Steve Jones observes modern biology 'shows that there are no separate groups within humanity (although there are noticeable differences among the peoples of the world'. (Malik, 1996, p. 3)
- c.) Race is a pre-eminently sociohistorical concept. Racial categories and the meaning of race are given concrete expression by the specific historical relations and historical context in which they are embedded. Racial meanings have varied tremendously over time and between different societies. (Omni and Winant, 1998, p.15)

1) Nationness:

- a) In the modern world everyone can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality as he/she ‘has’ a gender. (Anderson, 1983, p. 5)
- b) Nationness is the most universally legitimate value of our time. (Anderson, 1983, p.3)
- c) It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. (Anderson, 1983, p. 6)

2) Ethnicity:

- a) Ethnicity is a multifactorial concept including, but not limited to, cultural constructs, genetic background, ecological specialization, and self-identification. (Crews and Bindon, 1991, p. 42)

In other words anything that divides groups.

- c) The category of ethnicity is a form of social organization, an organizational vehicle which may take on different contents at different times and in various socio-cultural systems...The critical factor for defining the ethnic group therefore becomes the social boundary which defines the group with respect to other groups of the

same order, not the cultural reality within that border. (Schlesinger, 1991, p.153)

The boundary is whatever divides groups.

- d) In the Chinese world, cultural discourse constitutes an appropriate “space of dispersion”, in Michel Foucault’s terms, for understanding how ethnicity (as nationality) is constructed...The self effacing character of cultural discourse, in spite of its obvious authorial nature, is precisely what makes (ethnic) identity appear to be a value free construct, when in actually it is quite the opposite (Chun, 1996, page 115)

2. Culture:

- a) It (culture) is the integrated whole consisting of implements and consumer goods, of constitutional characters for various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs. (Branislaw Malinowski, 1944:36 Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952:83. Cited in Prus, 1997, p.27)
- b) The most current images of culture imply totalising or integrating tendencies, which while seemingly innocent on the surface, nevertheless have served to discourage a more complete acceptance (and development) of a hermeneutic social science. (Prus, 1997, p. 27)
- c) Adorno contends that...culture does not exist in a particular tendency, or in a totality, but in a dialectical structure that can only be unresolvable. He argues that ‘culture’ is an antagonistic concept, and to hold onto this truth the critic must sustain its untotallizable dialectic. (Young, 1995, p. 30)

3. Language:

- a) Saussure understood *langue* as something unitary and homogeneous throughout a society. But *is* there such a thing as ‘a language’ in this unitary and homogeneous sense? It is certainly the case that people talk and act as if there were. (Fairclough, 1989, p. 21)
- b) a language has jokingly been defined as ‘a dialect with an army and navy’, but this is a joke with a serious undercurrent. Modern armies and navies are a feature of the nation state, and so too is the linguistic unification or ‘standardization’ of large politically defined territories which makes talk of ‘English’ or ‘German’ meaningful. (Fairclough 1989, p. 14)

- c) What these claims amount to is the transmutation of standard language into mythical *national languages*. (Fairclough, 1989, p.14)

What these definitions are meant to convey as a preview to the rest of this study are that these identity terms:

1. have normative, or naturalized definitions and uses that posit real differences between people in the world independent of how they may be represented symbolically.
2. cannot be adequately defined and their definitions, or their empirical manifestations are often irrevocably tied to other terms, or empirical forms, to ground their intelligibility. In Derrida's terms, their definitions are referred and *deferred* (Derrida, 1978) to other identity terms. (eg. Mythical languages as *national languages*)
3. tend to represent people who presumably 'have' these attributes as constituting large objectified and homogeneous groups.
4. need to be re-theorized because they are used to ideologically determine and justify specific socio-political conditions and practices.

CHAPTER ONE: A SHORT HISTORY OF TAIWAN

I offer this summary of the twentieth century history of Taiwan as a framework for understanding how *the subjectification* of its people occurred through education and how that subjectification has been resisted. This historical summary, what I refer to as a *mosaic* approach, is offered in order contrast it to an understanding of identity, inspired by the work of Michel Foucault (AK, 1972) Pierre Bourdieu (1991), Norman Fairclough (1989), and Vivienne Burr (1995), that look at identity as a complex, dispersed and contested arena that reductionist sociology and history tend to efface.

A simple approach to understanding the construction of social identity on Taiwan posits that the traditional mode of life on the island has come under the influence of three large cultural formations over the past century. These formations are of Japanese, Chinese, and Western, especially American, origin. Visitors to the island will no doubt encounter aspects of each of these cultures on the island while the exact genesis of how they have come to configure Taiwanese society, to work together in the creation of what might be thought of as its social identity, may remain obscure.

The first kind of history is a classical or conservative account that views history as a continuum of linked events while the other is more radical and controversial, emphasizing discontinuity, irruptions of meaning, and unexpected associations of historical discourses from one area of social life to another. The first kind of history proceeds as though there is a single reality underlying the alternating appearances of a nation or society and holds that there is some continuous identity that remains unchanged from era to era. This conception easily leads to the positing of an essence of a people, society or nation that distinguishes it from others. For Foucault such an underlying unity is an illusion. On the other hand as Foucault notes, with the logic of the nation state there are real activities and programs that are deployed, consciously and unconsciously, that work to normalize and homogenize people in accordance with some idealized image of what that society should be. Rather than assume some essential identity we are looking at ways in which social processes tend to impel populations toward an idealized and normalized understanding of what that society is, or should be.

1.1 The KMT: Colonialism in Official Nationalist Disguise

The modern history of Taiwan is often considered as two phases divided at the year 1949. It was at this point in time that two important social formations that might be thought important for understanding the development of Taiwanese identity came into intimate contact. On the one hand there was the socio-political complex brought to the island by the Nationalists under Chiang Kai Chek after his defeat by the communists on the mainland. This regime is referred to as the "Soong Dynasty" by Sterling Seagraves because of the autocratic role the Soong family played in the fate of China at the time. This elite group, most of whom were educated in America and referred to as "cultural hybrids" by Sterling Seagraves (1985, Chapter 3), manoeuvred its way to power by establishing high-level political and economic connections in the U. S., and successfully solicited military and financial support from America.¹

With this background and these connections in place the Soongs were decisive in the introduction of what might be considered certain American, or at least Western, social and political elements onto the island. The specific socio-political elements introduced to Taiwan by the nationalists and the Soongs, and later, the socio-political direction the island took as a result of the Soong's connections to America, including the direct military and economic cooperation between nationalists and powerful segments of American society, would seem to constitute a central socio-political thread, contributing a distinct American social climate to the island.

The Soongs and many of the KMT were educated in America and they were deployed in the upper echelons of the social and political institutes of Taiwan. The knowledge and practices of those institutes were adapted from western and soviet models. The government itself was based on a Leninist model that considered the

¹ Seagrave's *The Soong Dynasty* (1985) describes patriarch, Charlie Soong's, education at Trinity College and connections to industrialists such as Julian Carr of Durham Tobacco fame. Charlie was sent back to China as a missionary but became a revolutionary instead, helping to bring down the Qing and to found the Republic of China with Sun Yat Sen. His children were American educated and maintained high level connections in government and industry in the U.S.A. (Chapter 1-4)

masses in need of a strong central authority to guide their economic and social development. The nationalists applied iron fisted control over Taiwanese society in politics, commerce, industry, law enforcement, media and education. Sterling Seagrave describes the initial brutality the regime under strongman Chiang Kai Chek displayed soon after their arrival:

During decades of Japanese rule the island had become self-reliant. But after World War II, the allies turned it over to Chiang as a part of a secret agreement made during the Cairo talks. Chiang forced Taiwan to heel. There were massacres; in the first, ten thousand Taiwanese were slain by KMT troops in riots in downtown Taipei. Twenty thousand more were put to death before Chiang was firmly established. Taiwanese leaders who were still alive went underground or slipped out to Tokyo. On an island of such moderate proportions, Chiang's secret police and armed forces were effective in a way they had never been on the mainland (Seagrave, 1985, p. 442)

These local Taiwanese leaders were protesting the confiscation of land, materials and produce and the denial of local participation in decision making. The KMT imposed a severe censorship of political dissent through the intimidation of non-aligned media, political and legal figures and organizations.¹ The nationalists, employing the political and institutional apparatuses bequeathed to them by the Japanese, began the process of making national citizens of the Taiwanese in their own image. The image the KMT as the protector of authentic Chinese-ness in their war against the communists was cultivated in America with the added virtue of being compatible with Christianity.²

The Republican matriarch May-Ling Soong's every word and sentiment were expounded by Henry Luce of *Time* magazine, and other media and political figures, who blithely swallowed this image while they ignored and rebuked everyone who tried draw their attention to the ongoing atrocities first in China, then in Taiwan:

¹ An exemplary first-hand account of the political and social situation in post KMT Taiwan can be found in George Kerr's *Formosa Betrayed* (1965).

² Certain Christian groups supported the KMT financially throughout their rule in China and Taiwan. Chiang himself converted to Christianity in what can easily be understood as a part of the creation of an acceptable image for American consumption (Seagrave, 1985, p. 221)

Luce himself, the child of American missionaries in China, helped to keep the Soongs in power as vestiges of his own lost horizon, symbols of romantic China that had become a figment of his imagination. He provided the distorting lens through which many Americans came to see events in Asia. Scores of influential Americans fell under the Soong spell...(Seagrave, 1985, p. 9)

The KMT provides us with a blatant example of how discourse associated with social identity can be controlled by an authoritative body. Their authoritarian rule provides a limiting case where sheer coercion of one group over another establishes a general stratified framework in a society. While the Taiwanese were not exactly slaves of the Mainlanders, being allowed to pursue small-scale businesses relatively freely while the KMT monopolized the major industrial sectors, their socio-political status as local Taiwanese was severely limited. Wang's statistical analysis of "ethnic" differences in socio-economic mobility concludes that in Taiwan:

In general, educational opportunities correlate highly with family socio-economic background. In Taiwan...socio-economic background also related to ethnicity. Mainlanders tend to be more highly educated than Taiwanese, though this gap has been narrowing. This phenomenon has its roots in the political structure of the 1950's that determined occupations and shaped the educational system. At that time most Taiwanese were farmers, and Mainlanders were given the jobs primarily in public offices or public enterprises, which offered greater economic benefits. The economic inequality consequent to the occupational differences between the groups in turn affected their children's educational opportunities. (Wang, 2001, p.352)

The economic disparity a result of unequal education was further magnified by a prejudiced education policy:

In addition, unequal opportunity structure was reinforced by the government's education policy. Economic planning led to tight controls on entrance into educational institutions, whose students were selected by a rigid system of examinations. The upper classes used their economic resources to help their children pass the examinations, and at the same time, the government heavily subsidised the education of the children of public servants. These

government policies disproportionately benefited Mainlanders.
(ibid)

Initially, establishing themselves through coercion and force, a legacy that later became a part of a counter hegemonic discourse on Taiwanese identity, the KMT with firm control of education and the media undertook a program of legitimising their rule by educating citizens in a manner that emphasized a common identity between mainlanders and islanders as racial and cultural Chinese. KMT rule, as well as that of the Japanese prior to their arrival, could be considered a form of ‘official nationalism’, as described by Anderson. The KMT was a part of what Sterling Seagraves first called “The Soong Dynasty” as it represented a reactionary “official nationalism” that attempted to restore the classical stratification between a ruling elite and the general populace under the guise of an emancipatory nation state.¹ Anderson (1983) describes the pattern established by such ‘official nationalism’ that was perfectly replicated in Taiwan. Once established, official nationalism “began moving all the policy levers: compulsory state controlled primary education, state organized propaganda, official rewriting of history, militarism- and endless affirmations of the identity of the dynasty and nation.” (p. 101) Offering themselves as the guardians of an unquestionably valuable socio-cultural Chinese heritage, the Taiwanese were invited to partake of, educated for, and rewarded for partaking of this vision while being censored, killed, imprisoned, persecuted and punished for engaging in activities considered counter to that vision.

Over the time frame being explored here, from 1949 to the present, there has been a movement within the authoritative structures of Taiwanese society from the use of direct or implied force on the population, the use of coercion, to the use of techniques for achieving popular consensus, or in Chomskian (Herman, 1994) phraselogy "manufactured consent", or in Gramsci's (1985) terms, “hegemony”.

¹ Anderson (1985) notes: “remember that it (official nationalism) developed *after*, and in *reaction to*, the popular nationalist movements proliferating in Europe since 1820. (p.86)

This program included mass education in Mandarin, a focused program of national civics, and the Confucian virtue of filial piety and respect for authority.¹ As Pierre Bourdieu notes, a common language is necessary for a hegemonic program because it allows the ruling class to conjoin peoples under a common categorical framework, providing the impression of unity and equality while maintaining a separation in life possibilities by establishing cultural norms that favour them against the dominated classes. (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 168)

Mainlanders constituted most of what Norman Fairclough (1989) calls the dominant bloc for the better part of fifty years.² Nonetheless, as will become apparent, the imposition of hegemony by this dominant bloc was, at least partly, effectively contested by the ‘native Taiwanese.’

1.2 Japanese Colonialism: The Logic of the Nation State

Prior to the arrival of the KMT Taiwan was a colony of Japan whose colonial rule was modelled on examples from the newly established nations of Europe and the Americas. Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (1983) describes how the project of colonization of Taiwan by the Japanese was modelled on the colonial exploits of the western powers. According to Anderson nations, once established in Europe and the west, supplied a blueprint for emulation in various other parts of the globe such as Indonesia, Japan and China: “the nation became something capable of being consciously aspired to from early on, rather than a slowly sharpening frame of vision.”(p. 67) The application of a western model of colonization, at least in part, was the first significant exposure of Taiwan to certain patterns of social interaction, nationalistic, imperialist and

¹ The details of education in patriotism and filial piety in Taiwanese schools can be found in Chun (2000), Meyer (1988), and Roberta Martin (1982).

² The power of the capitalist class depends also on its ability to control the *state*: Contrary to the view of the state as standing neutrally ‘above’ classes...the state is a key element in maintaining the dominance of the capitalist class, and controlling the working class. This political power is typically not just exercised by capitalists but by an alliance of capitalists and others who see their interests as tied to capital-many professional workers for instance. We can call this *the dominant bloc*. (Fairclough, 1989 p. 32)

industrial, that had their origins outside Asia. Although this period can be considered to have put a uniquely Japanese stamp on the process of colonizing Taiwan, the enculturation of the Taiwanese by the Japanese was also the first conduit for standards of economic, political and social development of “western” origin to influence the island.

Japan's project of making Japanese citizens of the Taiwanese was partly successful through public education including instruction in Japanese. The presumption of the inculcation of Japaneseness would later make the KMT, who understood the Japanese to be their natural enemies, suspicious of the Taiwanese.¹ However, because of the limited opportunities for the Taiwanese to participate at high levels within the social and political structures, an example easily seen as a certain ethnic or racial prejudice practiced by the Japanese against their colonial subjects, the latent sentiments of resistance to rule from afar continued to be fuelled. As Dr. Shih (SDTC) points out the common Japanese language, and Japanese domination of the Hokklo and Hakka groups, who were linguistically distinct, served to unite them into a single group. (p. 9)² In light of this, Taiwanese, although picking up some Japanese cultural characteristics, maintained a distinct identity as a subordinated colonial subjects. From the perspective of the mosaic model of identity construction, we might be led to see Taiwan as partly *Japanese*, through education, and partly *Western*, as a colony of a newly created nation modelled on the European and American blueprints.

The identity of one group, the Taiwanese, is being defined, in part, by virtue of presumed to be well-defined characteristics of another group, the Japanese. Remaining at this level creates many problems such as; how western had the Japanese become? How Japanese were the Japanese? To what degree did Japan exemplify Chinese cultural characteristics as suggested by its Confucian heritage and use of Chinese script? ..and so on. As Foucault (1972) notes, however, the concept of “influence” required by such a model is very imprecise, and of questionable value. It limits us to understanding societies as a great continuous surface of passively interacting elements. It would be

¹Mainlanders tended to treat Taiwanese as Japanese subjects and mistrusted them. This is confirmed by the expression that “Taiwanese brains have been poisoned by the Japanese and therefore need to be re-educated” (Shih, SDTC, p.12)

² Of course they still understood themselves as distinctly Hakka and Hokklo as well.

superfluous to say that this view is wrong. It serves as distraction rather than an insight into how power is distributed by processes and discourses associated with identity. With Bourdieu, although understanding that a social trait, an institutional procedure, a custom, a linguistic homology, or some such detail originated in another cultural milieu, may be interesting, these tendencies need to be seen as signs that are symbolically represented as forms of social prestige, vulgarity, or social difference, in a contested cultural space, and not just as politically neutral and inconsequential transformations.

1.3 The Islanders: The Tradition of Resistance

With the defeat of the Japanese the KMT began to have its *influence* on Taiwan with the military, industrial and social infrastructure left in place by the Japanese. (It seems) the social environment on the island was primed for both the continued application of western models of development begun by the Japanese, which the Nationalists had already internalised on the one hand, and alternatively for a more complete awakening of desire for autonomy on the part of the local Taiwanese. As Benedict Anderson points out, models of local nationalism established around the world were available for the Taiwanese to consider emulating.¹ These models could then be engaged to the legacy of local Taiwanese resistance to foreign rule. One model often evoked for the creation of national independence in Taiwan was that of America. This is ironic because it was American neglect that left the Taiwanese to suffer the brutality of the Nationalist regime under Chiang Kai Chek.²

The control of the discursive and institutional environment of Taiwan by the KMT would seem to be crucial for how Taiwanese social identity developed, not only because it limited the socio-cultural resources that such an identity could be configured from but also because it became the bulwark against which dissenting voices formed their resistance. This resistance has been described as arising out of the cultural formation that was already geographically centred on the island when the nationalists

¹ Dr. Shih (SDTC, p.15) points out that it was not Chinese nationalist designs but Korean independence movement, Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of independence and Irish home rule that were inspirations for the creation of an indigenously ruled Taiwan.

² This is one major theme of Kerr's *Formosa Betrayed*.

retreated there in 1949. For the sake of simplicity it can be designated as "traditional Taiwanese" society.

Traditional Taiwanese society, with historical roots on the mainland, shared many traditional Chinese religious, kinship, and social customs, and a dialect related to those on the mainland. This society has a history of resistance to consecutive foreign intruders with political and economic designs on their beloved island. Dr. Shih (SDTC) a policy analyst in Taiwan, understands love of land as the main factor for how mainlanders and Islanders became distinguished.

The major demarcation between Mainlanders and Taiwanese is actually not based on linguistic difference but on their attachment to the island. The Taiwanese identity was developed in the process of reclamation of the frontier land and in the common experience of subordination to discrimination imposed by subsequent waves of alien rulers. (p. 10)¹

Although language difference may not have been *the reason* for making the distinction, as Dr. Shih (SDTC) points out in this article, it was certainly an essential *marker* of this difference. Furthermore, differences in language competency served to separate the two groups by economic and professional class and should not be understood as only having a symbolic relevance but also as having material consequences. Language would continue to determine difference by the division of labour it created between the two groups. The administration, and running of large monopolies of the country were carried out by mainlanders, who were adept in official Mandarin, and private business and industry was pursued by the Islanders whose competency was in a local language and not in Mandarin. Wang notes how the original disadvantages of the Taiwanese were eventually narrowed:

¹ Dr. Shih (SDTC) helps us to understand one aspect of the identity of the society of Taiwan with reference to the differentiation between the islanders and ruling groups, but this explanation only helps us to see the separation and not the simultaneous process of homogenisation of the people of Taiwan under a single national umbrella.

The strategy by the less educated was to try to escape their class milieu, where possible, and the best path of upward mobility open to them was to become their own boss. These workers in Taiwan lacked other options for two main reasons: the general public widely accepted the educational system successfully distinguished the “capable” from the “incapable”, and the state-controlled labour regime blocked a labour movement from emerging. With these mechanisms in place, the only redress possible for those dissatisfied with unstable employment, low wages, and long working hours is to leave wage employment. As Hill Gates (1987:286) has noted, capitalism “offered a social model of upward mobility based directly on wealth rather than on connections through the state...”....The booming world economy in the 1960’s gave entrepreneurial blue-collar workers, mainly ethnic Taiwanese, a chance to make this move succeed. (Wang, 2001, p. 353)

The real difference between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, Shih (SDTC) says, is the difference between their relationships to the island. The mainlanders are characterized in his article as using the island as a means to an end, as a stopover. It was a source of economic advancement and a military base from which the retaking of China would take place. The islanders, on the other hand, are depicted as being a cultural extension of the physical environment, having lived and worked there for centuries and having no other objective than to develop the local economy and society, and therefore should be more legitimately considered the true citizens of the islands. Many of those who have family that lived on the island before the KMT arrived in 1949 consider themselves to be a living part of the continuing legacy of the political refugees who rejected the rule of the Qing Dynasty and who retreated to form an agriculturally based community in Taiwan over a period of three centuries. Although written historical records of resistance to foreign rule would not have been available to the following generations of Taiwanese, a rich oral tradition can account for their continuing identification as a group. This solidarity has helped them to resist foreign invasion for centuries and they continue to resist foreign designs on the island.

The descendants of these political and economic refugees came under Japanese colonial control in 1895 when the Qing, who had possession of the island for only a short time, granted Taiwan to the Japanese in perpetuity after the Japan-Sino war. This

was an internationally legal agreement that, as of today, has not been replaced by any other legal international consensus despite the departure of the Japanese, the insistence by the mainland that Taiwan is a Chinese province, and American ambivalence.¹ Those advocating independence for Taiwan point out this and other international legal agreements and declarations as support for their claim. Despite the strong legal case, other geopolitical factors conspire to prevent a national identity for Taiwan becoming a reality.²

Although speaking Taiwanese was forbidden in official public gatherings and public schools by the KMT, it continued to be spoken in the family and Taiwanese-run work places. Open and published dissent was out of the question but a narrative of resistance continued privately. For those who identified themselves as local Taiwanese, continuing the narrative of local resistance to foreign occupation, the KMT became seen as one more authoritative shackle to be removed in the march toward social and political freedom.³ Belinda Chang (1997) notes how Taiwanese folk arts and theatre⁴, aspects of which were used to criticise the Japanese colonialists. These were denigrated as low class artistic endeavours and banned by the KMT, became associated with a rising Taiwanese consciousness in the 1980's and are now blossoming. This consciousness represented a desire to reclaim a lost island heritage long suppressed by the two colonial masters. This is a part of what Chang claims is the use of culture:

to fulfil political aims. Culturalism hand-in-hand with nationalism, always invokes culture to create collective consciousness. And in the process of invoking it there emerges a “cultural

¹ See Kerr's *Formosa Betrayed* (1965) for America's changing and ambiguous stance on the political fate of Taiwan during this period.

² See Carolan (2000) for an interpretation of the legal case for Taiwanese independence.

³ The KMT was fittingly referred to as “The Soong Dynasty” by Sterling Seagraves as it represented a reactionary “official nationalism” that attempted to restore the classical stratification between a ruling elite and the general populace under the guise of an emancipatory nation state. Anderson notes “remember that it (official nationalism) developed *after*, and in *reaction to*, the popular nationalist movements proliferating in Europe since 1820. (1985, p.86)

⁴ Chang's (1997) focus is on the history of local Taiwanese theatre form called *gezaixi* that has proven to be a cultural symbol of Taiwaneseeness against the rising tide of “Chineseness” imposed on the islanders by the KMT.

objectification”(Virginia Domiquez (1992)) in which culture is imagined, concretized, then circulated as a symbol of the nation. (Chang, p.119)

The success of the native Taiwanese DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) in the recent elections for the presidency and legislature can be seen as at least a temporary victory adding to the glory of the legacy of resistance. And, in this light, the demands of the CPP on the mainland, with its missiles squarely aimed at Taiwan, constitute the latest chapter in this narrative of the struggle against outside oppressing forces. The success of these stands against regimes with far more military might are in part due to military and political events extrinsic to the island but can also easily be construed as a result of the internal cohesion shown by the group I am provisionally designating as traditional Taiwanese. How clearly this group has been able to distinguish itself from others who make claims of inclusion, as colonial subjects or ethnic comrades, takes on political significance. Over the centuries the legacy of resistance has itself become one of the criteria of this identification and differentiation.

1.4 Global Capitalism: The Modern Problem

Taiwan's economy has rapidly gone from being one based on production, during its colonial period under the Japanese and the early KMT occupation, to being based on consumption, in the past twenty years. This is to follow the trend established with the developed nations. The Taiwanese, largely excluded from political participation until recently, had concentrated on economic gain and their industriousness resulted in the rapid transformation of the economy as they attained relatively substantial disposable incomes. The arrival of modern media meant the Taiwanese were soon subject to an onslaught of advertising that positioned them as consumers. The purchase of expensive cars as a status symbol became commonplace. Mercedes Benz's are ubiquitous in Taiwan. Many Taiwanese fly to Hong Kong and Thailand on conspicuous shopping sprees. Shopping in Taiwan has become a national pastime. As Fairclough notes this process comes with a price:

Capitalism in the process of industrialization and urbanization has fractured traditional cultural ties associated with the extended family, the local or regional or ethnic community, religion and so forth. These ties have been replaced (in some cases) by ties generated by people in their new urban and industrial environments, notably ties of class. (Fairclough, 1989, p. 200)

The nuclear family unit remains strong in Taiwan but new and varied associations are developing in urban settings and the influence of the extended family has waned. Many people bemoan the lack of traditional morality and the increasing suicide and homicide rates. Television watching, especially game shows, soap operas, gossip talk shows, Hong Kong action, American movies, and explicitly sensational news broadcasts have become commonplace. All of this is punctuated by advertising marked with the slick conventions mastered in North America and Europe. Fairclough notes that:

It is on the basis of sheer quantity that advertising is able to achieve its most significant qualitative effects: the constitution of cultural communities to replace those that capitalism has destroyed, and which provide people with needs and values. They *displace* rather than replace: ersatz communities are offered as alternatives to real ones. These communities are called *consumption communities*. The unprecedented degree of impingement of the economy in people's lives...consists in this. (Fairclough, 1989, p. 201)

As elsewhere in the developed world, large numbers of Taiwanese students study business and economics, many travelling abroad to America, England and Australia to get their degrees. According to Shih (STDC) the majority of these "parachute kids" continue to be from mainlander families (p. 8).

Mandarin Chinese has served the business community well in their investments in projects on the mainland. Some Taiwanese analysts warn of the dangers of the growing intimacy of the two economies and the potential for economic manipulation on the part of the People's Republic of China for political ends. The movement of people and goods on and off the island has reached frantic proportions, including the importation of English teachers, especially from Canada, the U.S., and Britain as

Taiwan becomes more fully committed to the process of international trade and capitalism. Traditional Taiwanese language and culture is confronted by the accelerating trend of economic dependencies on foreign trade where Mandarin and the English language, and the inrush of American and Japanese cultural influences, continue to saturate the social environment. It is difficult not to see that the meaning of Taiwanese identity hangs in the balance.

CHAPTER 2: LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, DISCOURSE AND POWER

2.1 Foucault's Philosophy of History Applied to Social Identity

In order to begin thinking about how a society's identity I will begin by looking at Foucault's general philosophical position on the nature of history in the *Archaeology of Knowledge*. I will follow this discussion with Foucault's alternative to conceptions of essential identities, his non-essentialist perspective, where social forces are seen *to subjectivize* individuals through discursive and non-discursive means. For Foucault social change is only possible by disclosing these subjectivizing processes. In order to do this all notions of a sovereign subject with a stable, core identity must be set aside. Just as with the individual, modern society as a whole does not have some distinctive identity but is a complex of institutional practices that subjectivize citizens in various ways. To determine relations of power and open possibilities for social change, these processes must be identified.

I believe it can be shown that implicit in Foucault's philosophical perspective is a specific position on the question of social identity. That is, although Foucault does not explicitly describe it as such, I believe *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) itself can be read as a sustained critique of conservative notions about the meaning of social and historical identity. Foucault's philosophy of history distinguishes 'totalizing histories' from the kind of history he claims to be pursuing, "a general history" with the following points:

He says a totalizing history:

seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, the principal -material or spiritual- of a society, the significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the law that accounts for their cohesion- what is metaphorically called the 'face' of a period. Such a project is linked to two or three hypotheses; it is supposed that between all the events of a well defined spatio-temporal area,

between all the phenomena of which traces have been found, it must be possible to establish a system of homogeneous relations: a network of causality that makes it possible to derive each of them relations of analogy that show how they symbolize one another or how they all express one and the same central core; it is supposed that one and the same historicity operates on economic structures, social institutions, and customs, the inertia of mental attitudes, technical practices, political behaviour, and subjects them all to the same transformation; lastly history itself may be articulated into great units –stages or phases- which contain within themselves their principal of cohesion. (Foucault, 1972, p. 9)

The ‘face’ Foucault refers to in this passage, I believe, is nothing less than what is usually meant by the term “social identity” in reference to a specific spatio-temporal region such as modern Taiwan. Discourse analysis, as Foucault means it, seeks to disclose the mechanisms of power produced in, by, and through discourse that are masked by such ‘totalizing histories’. The implications for those seeking to define the identity of Taiwan in a similar way should be clear. These accounts, ideologically oriented, because they depict as natural that which is constructed, serve to mask the way power is exercised, under the guise of historical or social description. The idea that Taiwanese identity is a product of the confluence of the processes of specific historical phases, the pre-modern, Japanese, and KMT periods, is a description of what Foucault wants to avoid. And yet, how do we manage to begin understanding Taiwan without reference to those phases? With Foucault I believe that such chronological accounts “*cannot be rejected definitely*”. However, they must have their “*aura of truth*”, and “*virtual self-evidence*” dispelled. (AK, p.25) We shouldn’t assume that once such a history is told that the situation of a spatio-temporal region such as Taiwan has been understood completely.

I am further confirmed in my claim that Foucault’s philosophical perspective itself is a rejection of the commonplace notion of how a social identity is created and described with Foucault’s critique of the discipline of the history of ideas. He says :

It is as if it was particularly difficult, in the history of which men retrace their own ideas and their own knowledge, to formulate a general theory of discontinuity, of series, of limits, unities, specific orders, and differentiated autonomies and dependencies. As if

origins, try pushing back further and further the line of antecedents to reconstitute traditions, to follow evolutionary curves, to projecting teleologies...we felt a particular repugnance to conceiving of difference, to describing separations and dispersions, the dissociating of the reassuring form of *the Identical*. (Foucault's capital, my italics) (AK, 1972, p.12)

I want to ask if it isn't the case that this aversion to Otherness, also extends to the maintenance of some clear and distinct idea of social identity, as that which must in some way be understood as self-identical? The insistence on attaining a coherent idea, both of what social identity is theoretically, and how it manifests itself within a specific spatio-temporal context, of determining once and for all the natural lines of separation between in-groups and other groups, and the passion with which such research is pursued in academic circles and in the public media, seems symptomatic of the same inability to shift attention to how our common understandings are simplifications of complicated processes where nothing is as it seems, where identities are in fact, refracted, dispersed, and contradictory. As Foucault says, emphasizing the diachronic register: "It is as if we were afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought" (AK, p.12) I want to add, in the synchronic register: it is as if we are afraid to conceive of the Other in the composition of our social selves.

Foucault claims to be aware of the *source* of this repugnance for *the Other of our time*. He says:

If the history of thought could remain within the locus of uninterrupted continuities, if it could endlessly forge connexions that no analysis could undo without abstraction, if it could weave around everything that men say or do prepare him, and lead him endlessly toward his future, it would provide *a privileged shelter*(my italics), for the sovereignty of consciousness. Continuous history is the correlative of the founding function of *the subject*, (my italics)the guarantee that everything eluded him will be restored to him, the certainty that time will dispense nothing without restoring it to a reconstituted unity, to provide that one day the *subject* (my italics) in the form of a historical consciousness- will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by

difference- and find them in what might be called his abode. (AK, 1972, p.13)

Does the desire for determining a fixed social identity stem from the same source as the desire for maintaining this privileged space of the subject? Doesn't this account for the efficacy of the campaigns for instilling horizontal affiliations between groups within the established political norm of the nation state. Everyone belongs somewhere, within the boundaries of a well-defined fraternity. The clear definition of the social identity of nation or society, no less than, and in conjunction with, the clearly defined identity of the social individual, is considered necessary to assure them their place within the cosmological scheme and an ability to share in its redemptive powers. Benedict Anderson's point about how the nation state has filled the void left with the decline of religions for creating an association of the individual with the eternal, with the nation/family which preceded one's birth and continues after one's death, is supported here.¹ (Anderson, 1983, p. 11) The Chinese myth of the Yellow Emperor, according to Dikotter (CRN, 1996), the claim that there exists an ethnic continuity for the Han Chinese from archaic times to the present was promoted by the PRC as an objective fact in support for the Chinese nation to be conceived as a racial family, is also consistent with this view. (p.3-5)

2.2 Problematizing Culture

I will begin with a criticism of Foucault, albeit a minor one. Foucault, in the same section that he is cautioning against the unreflective use of certain synthetic categories for historical research such as 'tradition' and 'origin', resorts to (what I want to claim)

¹ Anderson (1983) says: "Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes another style of continuity more necessary. What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning...few things were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of a nation. If nation-states are widely conceded to be 'new' and 'historical', the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past and, still more important glide into a limitless future." (p.11)

are the synthetic categories of “civilization” and “culture”¹ These terms need to be problematized, especially if the object of analysis is social identity. Foucault is at pains to advocate the rejection of, or least severe critique of, the application of specific ideas used, unassumingly and reflexively, in much historical and social research. When attempting to describe Taiwan’s social identity in terms of *the origin* of a cultural or social trait, idea, or system and how it combines with *influences*, or is influenced by other social, political or cultural regimes, we are at cross purposes with Foucault’s kind of research and our conclusions will constitute a different order of meaning, more easily grasped but less politically potent than those attained by adhering to a Foucauldian form of discourse analysis.

My criticism of Foucault speaks to the extreme discipline required for, and the difficulty of adhering to, the suspension *of all* of these categories of thought *simultaneously*. However, and he only makes this point after a persistent caution against relying on any of these ideas, he says:

all these syntheses that are accepted without question....*They must not be rejected definitely* (italics mine) of course, but the tranquillity with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which must be known, and the justification of which must be scrutinized. We must define in what conditions and view of which analysis certain of them are legitimate; and we must indicate which of them can never be accepted in any circumstances....what we must do, in fact is to tear away from them their virtual self-evidence, and to free the problems they pose; to recognize that they are not the tranquil locus on the basis of which other questions (concerning their structure, coherence, systematicity, transformations....(AK, 1972, p.26)

Rather than assume we know what nation, race, ethnicity, and, culture mean we need to ask:

....(What are they? How can they be defined or limited? What distinct type of laws do they obey? What articulations are they capable of? What subgroups do they give rise to? What

¹ The different historical associations and transformations of these terms in Europe are mapped out in Robert Young. (1995, Chapter 2)

phenomena do they reveal in the field of discourse? We must realize, in the end, that they may not be, in the last resort, be what they seem to be at first sight. In short that they require a theory, and that this theory cannot be constructed unless *the field* of the facts of discourse on the basis of which those facts are built up appears in its non-synthetic purity. (ibid)

In this same section, as Foucault is bringing into question the “virtual self evidence” of the modern distinctions between genres of writing, he says:

after all, ‘literature’ and ‘politics’ are recent categories, which can be applied to medieval culture, or even classical culture, only by a retrospective hypothesis, and by the interplay of formal analogies or semantic resemblances...these divisions -whether our own, or contemporary with the discourse under examination- are always themselves reflexive categories, principles of classification, normative rules, institutionalised types; they in turn, are facts of discourse that deserve to be analysed beside others; of course they have complex relations with each other, but they are not intrinsic, autochthonous and universally recognizable characteristics.” (AK, 1972, p.22)

In this case, Foucault at once questions a reflexive categorization, that of accepted genres, and employs another categorization with clearly discernable shifts of meaning within historical discourse, that of culture. To talk of a civilization or a culture, in an unqualified way, is to evoke a discursive object that has been created in the discourses of history, sociology and anthropology as a device to delimit a certain framework for investigation, where in fact, as Foucault has noted in the case of history, there is a dispersed and discontinuous variation of social events and kinds of people. It is “the tranquillity” of the categorizations implied in the word ‘culture’ this work is trying to disturb. It is my contention that the term “culture” is one part of a complex of identity terms that is often employed as an unproblematized given, as some quality that a social group possesses and that defines it in some essential way. In fact a part of the way people are *subjectivized* is through the deployment of discourse that refers to culture as though it were a static and well-understood aspect of their being. The reason, I believe my criticism is a minor one, is the practical impossibility of holding all such categories in suspension simultaneously in a sustained fashion. At the limits of language

it seems some categories must be considered as givens for us to make sensible claims about the dynamic relations of other categories.

The seemingly factual existence of nations makes the idea of nation-ness appear unproblematic, but I believe the material reality of the nation doesn't make it any more real (or unreal) than the reality of culture or race, it conforms to a different but related rational complex. As Anderson notes, nations exist because we believe they do and the reason we believe they do is because we are subjected to the institutional and discursive processes that subtly force that reality upon us.¹ I want to show that these "realities" mutually support each other in discourse and practice and that by analysing them together the aura of their realities can be dispelled.

A part of what I want to show is that the contested understanding of Taiwanese identity is easily constrained by the force of presumed reality imputed to the categories of race, ethnicity, nation and language as natural and unproblematic. I believe, the meanings of these words needs to be understood, not as referring to well defined concepts or phenomenon, but as initially arising out of discourses and institutional practices associated with specific socio-historical conditions, especially with Enlightenment rationality and Imperial colonialism. In this rationality, in nineteenth century scientific discourse, their meanings were *codified* as referring to natural human divisions. However, with a Foucauldian critique that undercuts all claims to objective categorization, the meanings of these terms should be seen as dispersed amongst the multitude of different ways they are used within specific types of discourse. They are human divisions that have become *naturalized* and associated in specific ways that have implications for the stratification of people nationally and internationally. I hope to be able to trace some of the ways they have been employed in discourse to get a sense of their ideological uses. The different ways they are associated and dissociated are reason to suspect that they function to cover over the way dominant groups, defined in each of these categories, maintain their social advantages

I want to disrupt the sense of naturalness afforded to the fundamental categories associated with the identity of a society: *nationality, culture, ethnicity, language group*

¹ In the case of nation-ness in Europe Anderson (1983) points out the important role of universities and schools in the propagation of this "reality". (p. 71)

and *race*, by asking of each the kinds of questions Foucault wants to ask of terms associated with the object of “madness” for instance:

What one must characterize and individualize is the coexistence of these dispersed and heterogeneous statements (on the object of madness); the system that governs their division, the degree to which they depend upon one another, the way they interlock and exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and the play of their location, arrangement and replacement. (AK, 1972, p.34)

Describing how an object of discourse is determined (social identity is an object of discourse for this thesis), Foucault, referring to the example of “madness”, says: “we must map the first surfaces of their emergence: show where these individual differences, which, according to the degrees of rationalization, conceptual codes, and types of disease...may emerge., and then be designated or analysed.” (AK, 1972, p. 34) An analysis of social identity, using Foucault’s analysis of “madness” as provisional guide, should map the surface of emergence of the different types of differentiation that are associated with it. The differentiations this paper focuses on are: nationality, culture, ethnicity, race and language group. Importantly, for the question of Taiwan at hand, Foucault (AK) continues: “These surfaces of emergence are not the same for different societies, at different times, and in different forms of discourse.” (p. 42)

In the same way that “madness” is diffracted in the discourses connected with various kinds of mental disorders and behaviours in different periods of history, the discursive space for the object of social identity will be defined by the way these terms are deployed, especially in scientific and academic discourse in the history of Taiwan.

Social identity, like madness, I am saying, is a general placeholder that different discursive and institutional processes can become associated with. As Foucault (AK, 1972, p.44) notes, various forms of madness have filled out that abstract object in different ways in the history of its use in different institutional settings.

The presumed attributes of nation, race and so on, emerge in different ways, in different theoretical modes, with different relations to institutional practice, from society to society, time to time, and discourse type to discourse type. Therefore considering

discourse on identity in the case of Taiwan, mapping the use of categories associated with social identity is a very different proposition than if it were done in another societal location. Nonetheless, some of the modes of discourse will be nearly identical with those of other societies because the discursive orders can partially overlap from place to place. For example, the institution of the nation and its supporting modes of discourse are fairly homogeneous from society to society. According to Anderson (1983) internationally nation-ness arose rather abruptly and was quickly emulated in a wholesale fashion around the world.¹

The common point of emergence of nationality, as an international standard, came into a relationship with other identity characteristics such as race, and ethnicity in different social contexts in very different ways. For example, Frank Dikotter (DMC, 1992) describes how the category of race emerged and was transformed in China throughout its history.² That discursive field, originally developed in isolation from the discourse on race in Europe, was reinterpreted with the appearance of the social sciences in early twentieth century China. Therefore, the relationship between the discourse on nation and the discourse on race in China and Taiwan is constituted in a different manner than in the West.³ When one considers how social identity in Taiwan is thought about, the distinctions between the geneses of the discourses, the patterns of interaction, interference, substitution and repetition for the discourses in each of these different social contexts must be kept in mind.

I want to avoid thinking of the distinctions between these different sets of interactions as strictly cultural. Designating a discursive complex as Chinese, or American, is too imprecise, draws the discussion into a particular discursive arena that I want to maintain a critical distance from. Because institutional authorities apply schemas borrowed from different times, places and other authoritative sources that are impossible to associate with a single cultural origin. Although those authorities may

¹ Anderson (1983) says: "In effect, by the second decade of the nineteenth century, if not earlier, a 'model' of 'the' independent national state was available for pirating...but precisely because it was by a known model, it imposed certain 'standards' from which too-marked deviations were impermissible". (p.81)

³ See Dikotter (CRN, 1996) for a detailed discussion of the relationship between race and nation in China and Taiwan.

reside within what is reflexively called a single culture or alternatively reside in two or more of such cultures, the cultural distinction can serve to mask the way these interacting discourses, which includes the use of the idea of cultural differentiation itself, are used to differentiate groups. I want to claim that discourse, as Foucault describes it, at least partly, transcends culture, because *culture itself* is a particular kind of differentiation produced through western scientific discursive practices. Only retrospectively, once the distinctions made in discourse become common-place, are *naturalized*, and used within a specific social context in a consistent way, do they (unreflectively) come to be considered to be associated with a specific culture. From the perspective I am taking here such a distinction must draw on criteria that are always already caught up in a web of differentiating categories such as race, ethnicity, culture and language. Robert Young (1995) describes the paradoxical nature of the concept of culture historically:

What is noticeable here is the historical movement whereby the externality of the category against which culture is defined (eg. nature, civilization, low culture, subculture, alternative culture) is gradually turned inwards and becomes a part of culture itself. External or internal, this division into same and other is less a site of contradiction and conflict than culture's founding possibility; like gender, class and race, its willing accomplices, culture's categories are never essentialist, even when they aspire to be so. This is because culture is always a dialectical process, inscribing and expelling its own alterity...it constantly reform(s) itself around conflictual divisions, participating in, and always part of, a complex, hybridised economy that is never at ease with itself. (p.30)

The idea that Taiwan's identity can be understood as a product of the interaction of three cultures becomes rather unintelligible in light of the contradictory nature of the concept of culture itself. In the case of Taiwan the task of determining sources for the way identity is constructed is particularly complex because the statements that define the discursive space within which identity is contested, are made within and between what are might be considered three cultural domains, western, Chinese and Taiwanese. However, because the lines between these domains have been formed within the very

discourse on identity defined by statements associated with such terms as “culture”, and “linguistic group” and associated concepts such as “Western”, “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” I will attempt to suspend these distinctions, using them only provisionally to facilitate the analysis and not as foundations upon which analysis is able to make progress.¹

In the short term, and within a limited social framework, positing an essence of a particular group’s identity may help to improve the material and social status of the particular group. However, by reversing the stratification of dominant/dominated groups, this strategy ultimately continues the predominant mode of how identity itself is understood as something fixed and determinate. Identity continues to be understood uncritically in an essentialist manner. An understanding of the differences between groups, produced out of social, historical, political and economic practices and processes, continues to function as conceptions of natural and objective distinctions rather than as strategic or pragmatic ones. In the case of Taiwan, should the Islanders who were subjugated by the Japanese and KMT, and who now have risen to political prominence, proclaim themselves to be *essentially* different from the mainlanders on the basis of language, culture or ethnicity, I believe they are succumbing to this danger. Chun (DHGI, 2000) explains why an essentialized identity promoted as an alternative to a historically dominant one, in the case of Taiwan, is problematic:

The call for ethnic consciousness as a basis of national solidarity, eventually leading to independence, is a dangerous solution to the

¹ It is the very naturalness of the use of such terms, their apparent facticity that I want to bring into question in this paper by showing how this naturalness has been created, maintained and transformed through discursive and institutional practice. Furthermore, although these distinctions are used in the most off-hand way in both academic and popular circles, when clear definitions are sought for these terms various contradictions and gaps in meaning appear. I hope to show that the enigma of social identity, the struggle to give a definitive answer to the question of social identity, is a function of the fact that the statements associated with these terms create a space of dispersion irreducible to concise definitions and unexplainable by specific historical references. The historical or linguistic contexts, the elucidation of which we might consider sufficient to give precision to the meanings of such terms, always rely on the naturalness with which these terms are used in order to gain a rational foothold.

process of democratisation which runs the risk of creating its own factionalism, each dependent upon the fermenting of “primordial sentiments” for its very survival. While invoking Taiwanese ethnic consciousness is, in one respect, an admirable effort to call attention to the repression of the populace and the need to demystify a past generation of “collective misrepresentation” as Corrigan and Sayer (1985:8) put it, in order to reclaim lost, dormant and suppressed histories and cultural traditions, this passion to “rectify” historical truth also creates an unending pattern of internal colonialism...(p. 19)

In this view, what the Taiwanese should do is to look at how these designations have been used against them and, rather than simply reversing this process, attempt to create a discursive space where identities can be re-evaluated without recourse to objectified divisions. A Foucauldian perspective on identity undercuts all claims to identities based on such purported objective criteria. It does not try to find a more reasonable way of dividing up the world, or making distinctions between individuals or groups, but only attempts to lay bare a level of interaction that can account for the appearance, transformation and dissolution of such categorizations. Those who take his perspective cannot return to the safe ground of understanding themselves under the umbrella of a particular or stable social identity, something that is no doubt empowering within specific social contexts, both psychologically and politically, and therefore not likely to be easily relinquished. Alternatively, Foucault’s critique of identity enhances the possibility of finding common ground on other issues. For example, Chun (DHGI, 2000) says:

demand for just representation invoked by a resurgence of Taiwanese ethnic solidarity can only be a provisional measure to call attention to the actual existence of Taiwan as a nation (regardless of its official designation) and a point of departure for developing other consensus on more important national issues such as economic development, urban congestion and industrial pollution, which transcend resolution along ethnic lines. (AK, 1972, p. 19)

2.3 The Authoritative Creation and Reproduction of Discourse on Identity:

For Foucault the decisive factor for delineating the contours of a specific discursive formation we need to focus on the different institutional authorities¹ that create, reproduce and distribute different discourses in spoken and written texts and that coordinate social practices associated with them. It is through the production and distribution of different kinds of discourse, associated with different institutional practices, that identity differences and associations are created, maintained and contested. In this thesis I will especially focus on educational institutes in the discussion of Taiwanese identity.

In the case of Taiwanese identity, what should be sought are the texts and textual types that have played a role, that can be understood to have established statements, that have contributed to the emergence and transformation of conceptions of social identity in that context. However, the context of Taiwan is only a focal point within a much wider range of authoritative bodies producing texts, and social practices, related to divisions between individuals and groups that may play a part in how the discourse on identity is configured. Of course government authority, the representative of the nation state, is the most obvious modern institutional body to have an influence on how groups become defined. Later I rely on Allen Chun's work to show how the KMT government was decisive for identity construction in Taiwan through the institutional program of Sinicization of the Taiwanese populace. However, this program that served to link national to cultural identity developed in coordination with discourses that preceded their dissemination, and with discourses that entered into the general discursive field on an ongoing basis and these also need to be considered. I will focus on what can loosely be considered two discursive complexes in that regard. One is the scientific and positivistic discourse that Chinese intellectuals deployed in Taiwan, and the other is the historical discourse on race in China.

2.4 Identity, Subject Position and Power

An important concept associated with the question of social authority in Foucault's works is that of subject position. For Foucault the crucial site of understanding how social forces are maintained or transformed is neither the individual person, nor the socially defined group but rather the subject position the producer of a text necessarily occupies in relation to institutional practices and their associated discourses. Any one individual occupies more than one subject position, and according to Foucault their identity, rather than being unitary, "is dispersed" between those subject positions. For Fairclough, Foucault, and Burr subject positions are the sites of the real production of social power. Fairclough (1989) describes the teacher/student relation in these terms:

the teacher and pupil *are what they do*. The discourse types of the classroom set up subject positions for teachers and pupils, and it is only by 'occupying these positions that one becomes a teacher and pupil. Occupying a subject position is essentially a matter of doing or not doing certain things in line with the discursual rights and obligations of teacher and pupil. (p. 38)

Since the power exercised on one individual by another is constrained by normative practices, power must be understood as being produced and deployed *structurally* rather than personally. Individuals are constrained by normative discursive practices when one takes the dominant role over others. Therefore, challenges to domination have to attack the discursive forms through which subject positions are created and maintained. Discourse types and discursive practice are in a dialectical relationship according to Fairclough (1989): "discourse types determine discourse practice, which reproduces discourse types." (p 39) Transformation comes through challenging the way a discourse type is set up. For example, I believe racial, ethnic, national and linguistic categories are employed in national international discourses to position individuals and groups in that discursive arena and it is with these categorizations that I want to focus a critique. When people ask what Taiwan's identity is, they are designating a particular discursive arena within which that kind of a question

is answered in a normatively configured international debate. Race, nation, ethnicity and language are employed in those debates that position different social groups in certain ways. In order to understand those positionings, it is necessary to understand the socio-historical conditions that produced the discourse, to define those positions, and that have *naturalized* them. Identity is a product and not an essence. We need to investigate the processes and practices by which identities are achieved, how they are transformed, the purposes they serve, and who benefits from those constructions.

The way people are positioned by these categories is revealed when an individual occupies two subject positions that are normally held to be mutually exclusive. These examples give us a hint at how these subject positions have become *naturalized*. This is indicative of deep-seated assumptions about who can be what without straining the rational underpinnings of how distinctions are made. For example a Caucasian, no matter how deeply involved in Chinese language and culture will, with few exceptions, still be considered a foreigner in China and Taiwan. This is a function of the discourse on race and its relationship to culture in those places. Another example is that many people are naturally considered to be “Chinese” by themselves and others, as long as they are understood to have ancestry from China, and have what are considered Chinese physical features, despite the fact that they speak no Chinese dialect, have never been to China and have never practiced what are considered to be Chinese customs. Unlike a Canadian with a Ukrainian background, for instance, a “Canadian Chinese” will often be asked: “Where do you come from originally?” The pressure for these individuals to understand themselves as belonging to the group designated as Chinese is enforced by a general conception that distinguishes such individuals by physical features. We have here a preview of the lines of interaction and interference that occur between culture, race and nation in the discourse on social identity during particular types of social interaction. It is the specific kind of interaction that determines the subject positions that are occupied.

2.5 Individual and Group Identity:

What does it mean to talk about the identity of a collective such as a society or nation? Vivien Burr's (1995) *Social Constructivism* is concerned with the way the identities of individuals are built up through their dialectic relationship with discourses that position them in specific ways in particular contexts. For Burr our identities are dispersed amongst these various subject positions that are defined by the types of discourse we engage in. But what of the identity of a society? Responding to the question of whether the primacy for determining individual identity lies with the subject positions discourse defines for individuals, or alternatively, rests at the level of society itself to which the individual conforms, Burr (1995) drawing on Jacques Derrida's work, claims that the individual/society pair are logically inseparable, the one implicitly requiring the unconscious negation of the other to be intelligible as a separate entity.

Rather than thinking of the individual or the society as forming opposite sides of a dichotomy, we should instead think of them as inseparable components of a system, neither of which makes sense without the other...the individual/society system is therefore a unit of study, as neither term refers to something which of itself can be properly understood. (Burr, p .109)

The individual is largely a product of the society he/she has been constructed within, and a society is the effect of the individuals that collectively make it up. Neither is entirely determinative of the other but neither is entirely free of the discursive activities that take place with the other.

Burr (1995) continues:

...the individual /society dichotomy can be thought about as a construction, one way of thinking about the world, but not necessarily a way we have to be committed to. (p.105)

Burr is saying that we conventionally think of individuals as inherently separate self-contained beings but the meanings of our social selves are mediated by the ongoing relations we have with others and the language forms that circulate in 'our societies' that characterize those relations.

Schlesinger (1991) notes that attributing identity to a collectivity is often claimed to be a reification or a hypostatisation that tends to depict the individual as entirely constrained by societal processes. His paper attempts to show how a more dynamic and dialectical understanding of the relationship between collectivities and individuals can be expressed. (p.1) If the collectivity and its individuals are understood as dialectically interacting and mutually defining through the symbolic mediation of different forms of discourse then this problem does not arise. Normative forms of discourse constrain the way language is used, but not absolutely. Agency is constrained by how one has been socialized. Society is a part of who we are and we are not entirely free of its effects. However, in any individual exchange, in the actual use of language, conventions can be challenged. There is a degree of freedom as well. If these conventions are challenged demonstratively or cumulatively, they can be transformed. Therefore, potentially institutional practices and the lines of domination and subjection can be transformed as well.

2.6 Dominant Discourse as the Normalization of a Specific Style.

Dominant discourses build up a dominant representation or image of the society as a whole, while contesting discourses challenge the dominant ones to one degree or another. The dominant images of the society conform most closely to the self-images of the individuals who consciously or unconsciously control it, while the subordinated ones are ones that attempt to edge out that image by replacing it with an alternative that

conforms more closely to the images of those individuals (or subgroups) who contest them. In a sense these can be thought of as conflicts *of style*. Styles of life slowly inculcated through informal and formal education are referred to as a person or groups *habitus* by Bourdieu.¹ Citing Gellner, Schlesinger (1991) tells us that:

the term ‘culture’ is to be used in an ‘anthropological, not a normative sense’ to mean ‘the distinctive *style* of conduct and communication of a given community’ (1983: 92). The basic assumption is the modal form of contemporary society is a nation-state that acts as a ‘political roof’ (legitimator and defender) of its own *high* culture- meaning literacy in a given language sustained by, in particular, a national education program. (p.6)

What’s missing and needs to be inserted here is that the *high style* of the nation-state, which needs to be expanded to include the idea of the dominant bloc referred to earlier, is often, or usually, contested by alternative styles. The range of contesting styles varies from society to society, with some being more homogeneous and others more heterogeneous, depending on their specific histories, especially the degree of control and tolerance exercised by dominant groups. The history of Taiwan is one in which alternative visions of society have been severely repressed and therefore a cultural homogeneity became established. However, as its political life has become more democratic Taiwan has become increasingly subject to competing visions of what kind of society it should become. However, it is my contention that Taiwan is in danger of succumbing to global capitalism as another homogenizing cultural force, equally as powerful, or even more so, than the totalitarian regimes they have suffered under in the twentieth century.

¹ Thompson, in the introduction to Bourdieu (1991) tells us that: “linguistic utterances or expressions are forms of practice and as such, can be understood as the relation between a linguistic habitus and a linguistic market. The linguistic habitus is a subset of the dispositions that comprise the habitus: it is that sub-set of dispositions acquired in the course of learning to speak in particular contexts (the family, the peer group, the school etc. (p. 17)

2.7 Group Formation: Representation and Misrecognition

The establishment of an image of a society implicitly excludes or marginalizes those who do not conform to that image. When the KMT included the Taiwanese, as Chinese citizens, and then made themselves the sole arbitrators of what that meant, the islanders at once became *lesser Chinese* because of their linguistic and cultural distance from the dominant norm insisted on by the Mainlanders. Therefore these categorizations privilege the group that talks and acts like the established dominant image. But how does this dominant image get established? Why isn't it simply rejected by those disadvantaged by it?

For an analysis of the relationship between group formation, discourse and power I turn to Pierre Bourdieu's *Language and Symbolic Power*. For Bourdieu (1991), following Foucault, the establishment of groups that create social hierarchies only involves power if the group formations *are not coerced*. The use of force, in this view, is indicative of a lack of power. For one group to subordinate another without coercion the subordinated group must come to accept the norms advocated by the dominating group as social goods that have been achieved by the dominant class and to be striven for. Because the dominating group has been historically immersed in the cultural and linguistic norms that it promotes as universally beneficial values, it is therefore in a de facto position of advantage if the entire society is convinced of the validity of that image or style. The creation of this conviction is *hegemony* and for Bourdieu the key institutes for establishing it are the family and the school. For Bourdieu group differences are not based on natural differences but are based on the mental representations that groups develop that have been consecrated by an authority powerful enough to exploit a common unarticulated sentiment. Such an authority can ritually "make or unmake groups" in a struggle of representations. For example, Hakka and Hokklo Taiwanese, who were ostensibly two culturally and linguistically distinct groups, have come to be considered as "ethnic Taiwanese" because of common adversaries, the Japanese and the mainland Chinese. In Bourdieu's view it could not have occurred without the articulation of commonness by a respected Taiwanese elite, although exactly who can

be *elite* perhaps needs to be addressed. This oppressive social and political climate in Taiwan created sentiments that were seized upon by those able to articulate them in a way that is intuitively grasped by the group. The inaugural creation of this group is subsequently forgotten and the group is *naturalized*, as if it had always been. The KMT, either consciously or intuitively understanding the role of intellectuals in this process, murdered many of the elite Taiwanese with the first signs of unrest and then went about trying to convince the islanders of their common natures. Bourdieu (1991) says:

struggles over ethnic or regional identity- in other words, over the properties (stigmata or emblems) linked with the origin through the place of origin and its associated durable marks, such as accent- are a particular case of struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the world, and thereby, to make and unmake groups. (p. 221)

The other side of this struggle is the program undertaken by the KMT, as a state authority controlling the major social institutes, to make Chinese citizens out of those who created the new identity of native Taiwanese as a distinct group. As I will try to show, both of these groups employ terms inherited from the natural and social sciences to make claims and counterclaims about the true identities of the island's people.

CHAPTER THREE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF CHINESENESS

I have chosen Taiwan as the object of this investigation partly because I noted the urgency in the question about social identity there. The fact that Taiwan has functioned as a locally governed territory for 50 years (being a colony of Japan before that), that it seems to meet all of the criteria usually associated with a nation, and that it yet continues to have the designation of nation-ness denied to it by the majority of nations of the world, make it an interesting test case for the question of social identity. The word *Chinese* is commonly associated with nation, race, ethnicity, culture and language and I will focus on this designation in each of these categories separately while at the same time showing how institutional practices and discourses have associated them in different ways. That is, I will try to give some sense of the genealogical construction of Chineseness via its various associations in discourse and practice with these different identity attributes.

3.1 Nation-ness: Political Rationality

3.1.1 Governmentality

The colonization of Taiwan came late in its history. When Japan wrested control of Taiwan it was a new nation rapidly industrialising. The Japanese applied techniques long practiced by the European colonists to the new colony of Taiwan. It was the population's first exposure to an intense program of national governance, to the deployment of a rigorous bureaucratic apparatus, to the mass education of its children, and to the idea of belonging to a national entity. To use Walter Benjamin's phrase, borrowed by Benedict Anderson (1983) as a description of the form of temporality associated with the modern nation state, they were thrown headlong into the "homogeneous empty time" of modernity.¹

¹ It is reasonable to ask what form of temporal consciousness this replaced. Anderson notes that Europe previously was subject to "Messianic Time" (another phrase coined by Benjamin) where eternity was immanent. One might say Taiwanese temporality was

For the exact spatial and temporal arrangements created in the institutional practices of modern national societies in “the west” constitutes a crucial force that *objectified* the human body and determined the way people were *subjectivised*. At a preconscious and pre-critical level, in the routines set out by institutional practices, people *physically* come to reflect the knowledge that is employed in arranging and monitoring their movements and behaviours. Foucault understands the modern state to have a type of rationality that was “reflective and perfectly aware of its specificity” in the doctrines of the reason of the state and the theory of the police. (FR, p.73) In the former case, in accordance with desire to compete with other states, “Knowledge is necessary; precise, and measured knowledge as to the state’s strength...It’s government’s aim is to increase this strength within an extensive and competitive framework.”(FR, p.76). He describes the second function of the modern state, policing, as concerned with all aspects of the citizen’s life, in making the citizen happy and productive, in order to harness him/her toward the goal of the nation state’s increased competitiveness.

The identity of the Taiwanese people must be understood to have developed under this form of rationality, first with the Japanese colonists, then with the KMT. As Paul Ricoeur (1965) notes:

Not underestimating the importance of (different) political regimes, one may say that there is the unfolding of a single experience of mankind and even a unique political technique. The modern State qua State has a universal structure. (p. 273)

In this sense the differences between East and West need to be set aside. I believe the following statement by Foucault (FR, 1984) needs to be applied to every modern nation state:

Political rationality has grown and imposed itself all throughout the history of Western societies...its inevitable effects are both individualization and totalization. Liberation can only come from attacking, not just one of these two effects, but political rationality’s very roots. (p. 85)

tied to the cosmological temporality of ancient China, (hierarchical) the cyclical temporality of Buddhism, and the natural rhythms of the land and sea.

In other words we can't just look to particular institutions or social practices to be free of the imposition of subjectivities by the state apparatus but must also see how state discourse works to produce those subjectivities as well. I will show later that nation state rationality in Taiwan, the improvement of the individual to serve the national ends, was applied in the form of a program that aimed to impose a specific ideal of a Chinese cultural identity on the Taiwanese population by the KMT through educational and other means. This overarching state rationality is one level or dimension of identity that I want to single out in the investigation into what Taiwanese identity could consist in.

3.1.2 Schooling: in service of state rationality

Language learning represents an explicit force for the transformation of social identity and cannot be ignored if we are interested in Taiwanese identity, and I will look at its effects later on. On the other hand, the very process of having children follow the schedules and institutional practices of public school is a *hidden* force in the production of social identity. In *Discipline and Punish* Michel Foucault looks at the way institutional practice works to subjectivize individuals and manage populations. This process is linked to capitalism in that it unleashed the productive forces of the population:

Disciplinary control...is unquestionably linked to the rise of capitalism....'Each makes the other possible and necessary; each provides a model for the other'...without the availability of techniques for subjecting subjects to discipline, including the spatial arrangements necessary and appropriate to the task, the new demands on capitalism would have been stymied. (FR, 1984, p.18)

By precisely controlling the arrangement of bodies in space, by dividing groups into ages, and levels, by establishing certain seating arrangements, setting time-tables, the school, just as other institutes do, creates an environment "where distribution and analysis, supervision and intelligibility are inextricably bound up" (FR, 1984, p.19). Individuals subjected to these regimes, as they are normalized into the routines,

eventually become self-regulating, only needing cues to respond appropriately, and thus tending toward docility. For Foucault, with these modern institutions, the body became a site upon which new forms of knowledge could be applied. For Foucault, the sovereign power over life and death of pre-national political rulers is replaced by the intensive and intrusive forces designed to extract the maximum efficiency from the human body for the development of the strength of the state:

this formidable power of death...now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. (FR,1984, p.259)

The science of biology had established a new view of human beings as an object of physical investigation. Institutional practice, rather than being an explicit scientific theoretical program, extended this understanding in the deployment of a multitude of techniques that served to isolate the body as a unit of social understanding that needed to be harnessed to the ends of social stability and predictability. These knowledges sought to deploy the potentiality of the individual in the most efficient way possible. In Taiwan, as elsewhere, children are divided into grades, and levels. Under a generally military inspired regime, they march in the mornings, sing the anthem and watch the flag raised. They sit in rows and are monitored for correct behaviour. As Sterling Seagraves notes, the discipline of Chinese society was a passionate goal of Chiang Kai Chek's:

Like Mussolini, Chiang was determined to scrub his nation clean, teach the peasants not to spit, and make the trains run on time. Like Hitler, he was determined to get rid of all social and political pervers, and discipline the citizens, even if it took a few severe beatings, Chiang believed that fascism stood on three legs-nationalism, absolute faith in the Maximum leader, and the Spartan militarization of the citizens. (Seagrave, 1985, p. 292)

Taiwanese students wear identical school uniforms and chant phrases in unison as they learn their lessons that until recently were standardized for age levels across the island. As Rabinow (FR, 1984) says of western institutional practices in general:

using diverse procedures, and with highly visible efficiency in each case, the 'subject is objectified by a process of division either within himself or from others' In this process of social objectification and categorization, human beings are given both social and personal identity. (p. 8)

One of the dividing practices Foucault refers to is the process of examinations. Taiwanese education has been intensely examination oriented. Regular weekly and monthly examinations until recently led up to middle school and high school entrance exams that determine placements in the next school and that put the students under extreme stress. Parents' expectations heighten this anxiety. Foucault notes that in Europe examinations became "increasingly a comparison of each and all that made it possible to both measure and judge...the school marked the beginning of a pedagogy that functions as a science. (FR, 1984, p. 198)

The minds, and thus what were taken to be the inherent aptitudes and abilities of the pupils, became objects of study through the examination system as a disciplinary tool for separation and distinction of human types. Although corporal punishment is officially illegal now, many Taiwanese told me they were physically punished for their poor exam results. In one story there was one blow to the hand for each place below the top-scoring student the students achieved. The body is directly disciplined toward normalization in this case. Speaking of military academies in 1763, Foucault (1984) summarizes the effects of the disciplinary functions of the school this way:

The hierarchizing penalty had a double effect. It distributed pupils according to their aptitudes and conduct, that is, according to the use that could be made of them when they left school; it exercised over them a constant pressure to conform to the same model so that they might all be subjected to the 'subordination' docility, attention to studies and the exercising of correct practice of duties and all the parts of discipline' so they might all be like one another. (FR, p. 82)

It is a stereotype that Asian students are group oriented rather than individualistic. With my own high school students it was difficult at first to get them to take risks in the use of their English, the fear of mistake or embarrassment being highly pronounced. In

fact, with time, their increasing spontaneity was clear proof that this stereotype arose out of the conditioning processes of the school system rather than anything to do with being Chinese or Taiwanese. These disciplinary regimes, outside the content of their lessons, must be seen as formative of the Taiwanese sense of self and other, and supply understanding of an important dimension of social identity for the island's people.

3.2 Colonialism and Taiwan

The general institutional management of the population of Taiwan is one aspect, a largely implicit force, that can be seen as important for how Taiwanese social identity, conceptions of self-hood have developed. The content of what was learned in that schooling process is also important. Here, I want to consider classification as a mode of identity construction. I believe the rigidity with which certain classifications are applied in the definition of human types is an impediment to the reinterpretation of Taiwanese culture. The self-evidence of those classifications needs to be disrupted for those new interpretations to arise.

3.2.1 Scientific Thinking in Categorizing Humans

The real differences between individuals and groups, if we consider their biologies, histories, languages and dialects and so on are likely far too numerous to list. When investigating how differences are understood and expressed, then, we are engaged in looking at systems of classification based on a relatively small number of criteria. We pick out those differences that are deemed to be the most important for determining which category to place a person or group within. We pick out differences *somehow* deemed to make a difference. We learn to perceive certain differences and ignore others. Our minds apply systems of classification unconsciously, or semi-consciously. The distinctions we perceive are a result of certain regimes of knowledge that inhere in the discursive practices we have been engaged with on an ongoing basis since childhood.

Once a distinction or set of distinctions has been established in discourse it can become a representation of difference that can be connected to other orders of discourse,

other systems of categorization. For example, conceptions of who can be intelligent, although they may not merit this evaluation or who cannot be, although they do. In this way different systems of categorization link up with one another, building up to a complete representation of the world. Who we perceive ourselves and others to be is a part of that representation because some of the systematic categorization we instantiate is about human beings and therefore reflects back onto us, providing us with a sense of “place” within that represented universe

Because representations of the world are absorbed relatively uniformly, and are produced in language we are able to communicate with each other. Where our respective representations do not correspond with each other there is a potential for disagreement for relatively small differences, and outright misunderstanding in other cases. Cultural misunderstandings, for instance, can be defined as a function of differences in these representations. Yet even between cultures these representations are sufficiently similar for a great deal of effective communication to happen.

With the rising prestige of modern western scientific thinking, building on the notion that the world can be described objectively, classification systems were devised with the presumption that the divisions formulated corresponded to the way the world, in itself, was naturally organized. The divisions made within those systems of classification were deemed approximations of the natural lines of distinction between objects and events “out there”. This regime of knowledge only found its way to Taiwanese society in the twentieth century, first with the Japanese colonists, and then in a more concerted way with western educated Chinese intellectuals associated with the Nationalists who fled to Taiwan from the mainland in the mid twentieth century.

The presumed objective description of the natural world worked well and facilitated more and more refined systems of classification within the natural sciences that allowed scientists to perceive a wondrous number of interacting systems and subsystems. These were considered to be *the real* world processes while common understandings were deemed inferior because they did not see through appearances to the underlying structure of the world.

The creation of these knowledges was applied to technological problems with enormous success. They required an extensive learning program on the part of initiates

who became adept in the languages of their fields. Their talk became unintelligible to the uninitiated.

An *aura of truth* became attached to their investigations and interpreters were required to explain their work to the uninitiated masses. Mass education in Europe was an interpretative enterprise. Popular discourse came to employ the terminology of the new priesthood in ways that, although not really matching the technical expertise the adepts attained, propagated the systems of categorization that these experts had discovered (created). The power of scientific inquiry gave the systems of classification they expressed the status of an immutable truth.

Although the objectivity of scientific discoveries has been challenged increasingly over the past century, its systems of human categorization have been able to persist largely because of service these categorizations render to the maintenance of the social status quo. As I will try to show, the entire structure of the social world, both in the minds of social citizens, the institutional structures and the distribution of material wealth, depends on the maintenance of distinctions that are considered natural. These categorizations persist despite the challenge to these conceptions in contemporary social academic discourse.¹

¹ . Stephen J. Gould (1981) is one voice among a growing chorus who would like to change the perception of the ability of science to disclose objective truth.

I believe that science must be understood as a social phenomenon, a gutsy, human enterprise, not the work of robots programmed to collect pure information. I also present this view as an upbeat for science, not as a gloomy epitaph for a noble hope sacrificed on the altar of human limitations.

Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity. It progresses by hunch, vision, and intuition. Much of its change through time does not record a closer approach to absolute truth, but the alteration of cultural contexts that influence it so strongly. Facts are not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also influences what we see and how we see it. Theories, moreover, are not inexorable inductions from facts. The most creative theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts; the source of imagination is also strongly cultural. This argument, although still anathema to many practicing scientists, would, I think, be accepted by nearly every historian of science. (p.37)

When the natural sciences turned their gaze to human beings the same positivist assumptions about categorization were carried over from the investigation of the natural world. This sentiment is expressed by Hans Georg Gadamer (1975) in the opening lines of *Truth and Method* this way:

The logical self-reflection that accompanied the development of the human sciences in the 19th Century is wholly governed by the model of the natural sciences...The human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) so obviously understand themselves by analogy to the natural sciences that the idealistic echo implied in the idea of Geist (“spirit”) and of a science of Geist fades into the background.....Human science too is concerned with the establishment of similarities, regularities, and conformity to law which would make it possible to predict individual phenomenon and processes. (p. 3)

For natural laws to work they require the categorization of phenomena in a stable and unchanging fashion and this presumption was used to categorize human beings in order to work out regularities in the functioning of societies. The categories of nation, race, ethnicity, and language were routinely employed in the education of national citizens worldwide in a way that made them seem natural and unchallengeable and that purported to explain socio-economic differences.

3.2.2 Dividing the World: Human Differentiation as a Global Discourse

The sciences of anthropology, sociology and linguistics, and geography attempted to replicate the precision and decisiveness of categorization established in the natural sciences. At the same time European explorers and traders continued to encounter societies with people whose appearance and lifestyle appeared to them as very different from their own. These societies offered the curious new opportunities for classification- in this case the classification of human beings. The pretence to objectivity was applied reflexively to new data available in the study of human groups, and natural systems of racial and ethnic classification were developed. Willinsky (1998) for one thinks these historical processes need to be revisited

We need to learn again how five centuries of study, classifying, and ordering humanity within an imperial context gave rise to peculiar and powerful ideas of race, culture, and nation that were, in effect, conceptual instruments that the West used both to divide up, and educate the world. (p. 3)

In the case of China these knowledges were sought after and not imposed by an Imperial power. Rather, they were sought after by the Chinese elite and later imposed on the Chinese populaces because they were presumed to be the key to technological and social advancement. With the decline of the Qing dynasty near the turn of the 19th Century, Chinese intellectuals began to look at the western natural and social sciences as the key to a reorientation of Chinese society that would sweep away what they considered to be the worn out traditions that had led to its technological and social decline. The western scientific pretence for the objective classification of the natural and human worlds found its way to the Middle Kingdom with Western educated Chinese intellectuals such as Sun Yat Sen who became an advocate for Western regimes of learning and politics. For Sun, America provided the most appropriate models for social and political reform in China, and western science constituted the method for the social and material advancement of the new Chinese nation. With the support of Charlie Soong's printing expertise learned in America, and funding from the American religious and industrial sectors, Charlie and Sun printed and distributed cheap western scientific texts, along with bibles, in an attempt to reform Chinese society on the American model. (Seagrave, 1985, p. 60) Their enterprise came to an end with the defeat of the Nationalists, by the communists but it re-emerged with the cultural education of the Taiwanese through mass education on the island of Taiwan.

Foremost the populace learned that they were subjects, whose best interests were to participate in the imperialist designs of their masters. The content of their learning, first in the Japanese language, and then in Mandarin Chinese, was designed to remake them into cultural Japanese and Chinese respectively. These educational regimes were the standard forms of cultural assimilation that colonial and nationalist masters had been employing around the globe with the emergence of new nation states. The concepts of race, culture, ethnicity and language constituted crucial elements of these educational

assimilations. The Taiwanese were learning who they were in the same fashion that different national populations around the globe had done, and they were learning that who they were was scientifically valid.¹ For Hannah Arendt (1951) ideological thinking such as the idea of fixed races is parasitic upon the scientificity. She says: “Ideologies are known for their scientific character....” (p. 468) However, those who advocate this perspective are not really interested in doing authentic science. Echoing Foucault’s understanding of totalising histories, she says:

Ideologies are never interested in the miracle of being. They are historical, concerned with becoming and perishing, with the rise and fall of cultures, even if they try to explain history by some “law of nature.” The word “race” in “racism” does not signify any curiosity about human races as a field of scientific exploration, but it is the “idea” by which the movement of history is explained as one consistent process. (p.469)

As European colonial power extended across the globe along with the education of members of local elites such as Sun Yat Sen, European knowledge established itself as the most important knowledge regime for the social advancements of emerging nations states and the one that should be emulated. One of the first systems of the

¹ An understanding of the Taiwanese population as group state *passively* undergoing cultural reconfiguration should neither be overestimated nor underestimated. The island’s people had a strong reputation for resistance to foreign rule and no new master could take their compliance for granted. A strong narrative of resistance continues to play an important part in the contestation of identity in Taiwan in the contemporary debate. Nonetheless, the daily routine of rote memorization of the curricula devised by the KMT, in the children’s second language, and thus at an unconscious level, must be seen as determinative of what came to be understood as normal and natural categorizations of the natural and human worlds. They learned that they belonged to the national community of Taiwan, that nations were the natural modern expression of the destiny of a people and culture, that they were racially, and culturally Chinese, and that they were the legitimate inheritors of a historical legacy that was five thousand years old. They also learned that the communist regime across the Taiwan Strait ruled there illegitimately and was actively undermining the spirit of Chinese civilization to which they belonged. All of this for a population of fishing and farming communities who had though out there time on the island before the arrival of the Japanese, wanted only to be left to themselves.

classification of human beings in this knowledge regime was classification by race that carried with it this ideological presupposition.

3.3 Discourses on Race: East and West

Race became natural history's great contribution to naming human difference. In the eighteenth century Lineaus had used race to divide up humanity in his grand taxonomy. ...by the tenth edition of his *Systema Naturae*, published in 1758, the number of races had grown to six. (Willinsky, 1998, p.163)

The concept of race, despite a continuous decline in its legitimacy as a valid scientific concept, continues to play a key role for questions of human differentiation globally. Its persistence as a mode of differentiation of human beings in the case of China is a result of the ease with which traditional Chinese elite and folk conceptions of race found support in the scientifically validated conceptions of racial difference adopted by the Chinese elite from European theories. The concept of race had been employed in the west in its colonizing efforts externally and internally and these intellectuals saw it as a potential tool for a program to politically unify the diverse peoples across the dynastic realm.

3.3.1 Racial Difference in the Service of Ideology

Race is associated with biological determinism that depicts groups as having certain fixed physical, social and intellectual features. Stephen J. Gould (1981) suggests why the idea that there are specific inherent and fixed qualities associated with ones biological constitution persists:

Since biological determinism possesses such evident utility for groups in power, one might be excused for suspecting that it also arises in a political context, despite the denials...(of this fact). After all, if the status quo is an extension of nature, then any major change, if possible at all, must inflict an enormous cost <psychological for individuals, or economic for society <in forcing

people into unnatural arrangements. In other words scientific explanations of human beings are potentially ideological. (p. 39)

If the idea of fixed differences based on biology were simply circulated as opinions without a substantial theoretical underpinning they would not likely have any major sociological or political importance. Speaking of racism in Europe, Hannah Arendt (1951) explains the difference between individual opinions and ideological frameworks that employ supposed natural distinctions this way:

An ideology differs from an opinion in that it claims to have the key to history, or the solution for all the “riddles of the universe”, or the intimate knowledge of the hidden laws which are supposed to rule nature and man. Few ideologies have won enough prominence to survive the hard competitive struggle of persuasion, and only two have come out on top and essentially defeated all others, the ideology that interprets history as the an economic struggle of the classes, and the other that interprets history as a natural fight of the races. (p. 159)

These ideologically loaded assumptions are not confined to the intellectual elite but find themselves embedded in what is taken to be the common sense of the common man:

The appeal of both to large masses was so strong that they were able to enlist state support and establish themselves as official national doctrines. But far beyond the boundaries within which race-thinking and class-thinking has developed into obligatory patterns of thought, free public opinion has adopted them to such an extent that not only intellectuals but great masses of people will no longer accept the presentation of past or present facts that is not in agreement with either of these views.....every full fledged ideology has been created, continued, and improved as a political weapon and not as a theoretical doctrine. (ibid)

Arendt's view on ideology roughly corresponds with Bourdieu's. For ideology to work it has to function in naturalized everyday discourse and not as a theory. Bourdieu (1991) describes the ideological nature of making divisions slightly differently than Arendt's more universal definition:

ideologies serve particular interests which they tend to present as universal interests, shared by the group as a whole. The dominant

culture contributes to the real integration of the dominant class (by facilitating the communication between all of its members and by distinguishing them from other classes); it also contributes to the fictitious integration of society as a whole; and thus to apathy (false consciousness) of the dominated classes; and finally it contributes to the legitimation of the established order by establishing distinctions (hierarchies) and legitimating these distinctions. The dominant culture produces this ideological effect by concealing the function of division beneath the function of communication: the culture which unifies (the medium of communication) is also the culture which separates (the instrument of distinction) and which legitimates distinctions by forcing all other cultures (designated as sub-cultures) to define themselves by their distance from the dominant culture. (Bourdieu, 1991, p.167)

The distinctions being made have to be understood as plausible by those being indoctrinated and they need to be legitimized by some authority. In the case of race, its naturalness had been established in both Chinese and European discourse and it was given the stamp of endorsement at the turn of the century by biology and anthropology. The KMT, by including the Taiwanese in the same racial category and teaching them a common language created the illusion of unity when there was in fact division and hierarchy.

The fact that race was finally shown to be a weak scientific classification could not possibly diminish the political momentum it had attained in discourse by those attempting to unify populations under an intelligible category. With little else to draw upon to give a sense of unity to the diverse numbers of people in the vast regions defined in the time of the Chinese Dynasties, race, already established in Europe as a founding political principal, was an obvious choice for both the nationalists and the CCP in twentieth century China. Dikotter (CRN, 2000) says: The nation race “was seen by many nationalists in China as the only concept of transcending gender, class and region to integrate the nation’s subjects into a powerful community.” (p.6)

The application of discourse for ideological ends cannot be completely arbitrary and must employ a multitude of rhetorical devices that connect them up to the general understandings in a plausible way. As Arendt (1951) says, “persuasion is not possible without appeal to either experiences or desires, in other words to

immediate political needs.” (p.159) At the turn of the century, China was in turmoil. Something, or anything that could provide a sense of unity and harmony, in those conditions, would have been attributed a high social value. Race, with the endorsement of the most powerful intellectual episteme in the modern world, science, was an easy choice.¹ Race’s continued use as a legitimate form of human differentiation in China can be attributed to the ideological force that the CCP leadership has applied with its control of education and media and the lack of alternative narratives of identity in the context of China. In Taiwan, as should become apparent, the idea of racial difference is also strong because of the similar control of discourse the KMT was able to maintain.

I want to designate the use of race to distinguish groups as racializing rather than racist. I say this because even societies who do not as overtly use race to stratify groups often racialize and employ racist discourse that continues relatively unchallenged. There is general discourse on human differentiation that has been and continues to be promoted across the globe through education and the media. In Taiwan, where racial struggles have been less pronounced than in America, for instance, and where the population has almost uniformly been considered to belong to one race, these presumed natural hierarchies are not considered a problem as in America. Of course, for the Aborigines of Taiwan they are a problem, but it is one that has been kept out of the minds of the rest of the population quite effectively. Turning the gaze back to the role race plays in western education Willinsky (1998) says:

¹ Stephen J. Gould (1981) points out that once differences are established as natural there is a strong tendency to rank them from best to worst or highest to lowest. The history of race as a result is also the history of racism. While racial hierarchies in the west are often held as private opinions in Taiwan they are unselfconsciously expressed. In informal surveys of my high school students in Taiwan, I asked if they thought peoples from different countries were better or worse than others. Without hesitation I was informed several times that Japanese, Westerners and Chinese were better than Thais, Filipinos and Africans (or blacks) socially and intellectually. There was some variation in the rankings but generally the classification followed a general pattern with certain nationalities/races at the top and others near the bottom. In another survey women were routinely depicted as less intelligent and capable than men, even by the high school girls in my class.

What I found in looking back at today's biology classes is that the presence of the scientific study of race is both obscured and present. It is obscured by a curriculum that fails to acknowledge science's part in making race a fixed point of human difference, even as the weight of those distinctions to which science once lent such credence are still present in the lives of students. (p.163)

Comparing the two societies, what we see is not simply a common racism in each but different forms of racism. In our rush to distance ourselves from the horrendous injustices our societies perpetuated under presumptions of racial difference we continue to obscure the ways these presumptions continue to exist. Willinsky (1998) effectively argues that despite thorough debunking of the whole project of racial classification by Stephen J. Gould in the 1980's that "ha(d) the effect of redeeming science as a whole." that "Gould's critique was not to signal the end of a mismeasured race science." (p. 170) According to Willinsky the discourse on race continues in Western academic discourse largely unnoticed, not as an open acceptance of racial differences corresponding to natural categories but, in this case, as a historical deletion of how race functioned as one of the cornerstones of modern science and one of the main justifications for the excesses of colonial expansion.

3. 3. 2 Discourses on Race in China and Taiwan

Frank Dikotter has taken the question of the construction of race in China head on and his analysis is directly relevant to the case of Taiwan because the PRC justifies including Taiwan in the Chinese nation, in part, because its population is deemed to be of the same race. How race is constructed in discourse on Taiwan is therefore important for how the debate is framed. Dikotter (CRN, 2000) identifies three kinds of nationalism: civic nationalism which is based on the conscious intentions of a society to pursue their goals collectively, cultural nationalism, where there is a presumed traditional history that constitutes a binding force that justifies the collective pursuit of goals, and finally, racial nationalism. Of the latter he says:

Although racial nationalists also represent the nation as a unique entity endowed by cosmology with a particular history and culture they portray it above all as a pseudo-biological entity united by ties of blood. In the conflation of race and culture, racial nationalists represent cultural features as secondary to and derivative of an imagined biological specificity. The individual is first ascribed a membership to the community by virtue of a real or imagined congenital endowment, and only secondarily on the basis of cultural features; national culture is perceived to be a product of racial essence...Cultural nationalists seek to integrate and harmonize notions of tradition and modernity in an evolutionary vision of the community. In contrast, the positing of an immutable biological essence, based on patrilineal lines of descent, allows racial nationalists to explicitly reject tradition and culture and embrace a vision of modernity in an iconoclastic attack on the past while preserving a sense of national uniqueness.These three strategies of nationalism can overlap considerably and even alternate from one to the other ...however cultural and racial nationalism have very much dominated the cultural and political domains in China. (p.2)

Given this description both mainland China and Taiwan could be considered to tend toward racial nationalism. This thesis is supported by the fact that, even through marriage, those deemed non-Chinese cannot become a citizen of either China or Taiwan, although they may become permanent residents. One's race is the final arbiter of the possibility of national inclusion. One must necessarily be of the Chinese race to be a Chinese or Taiwanese citizen.

China uses the idea that the two societies are of the same race as part of the justification for Taiwan's inclusion in greater China. Those advocating Taiwanese independence, rather than deny the notion of common race point to Singapore as an example where a population with the same racial background as China's is an independent country, or that the white races have distinct countries. (Shih, SDTC, p.17) In other words, race is considered a legitimate human category of differentiation but is deemed irrelevant by those who want to deny mainland claims to the island. The glaring omission of a critique of the legitimacy of race as a form of categorization in discourse on identity in Taiwan, when such critique has been readily available for some time, is curious and telling. It means that race can function behind the scenes in the debate. It is curious because the denial of any reality to the notion of race, as Stephen J.

Gould's work has established, would also allow those who wished to be independent of mainland China in Taiwan to undermine one of the major rhetorical strategies China uses for including Taiwan under its national umbrella. Yet this point is never made. This suggests that the reality of racial distinctions is accepted by most politicians and academics and is considered a valid point. We are left wondering what strategic role race plays for those advocating Taiwanese independence. The answer, I suggest has to do with how Taiwanese see themselves in relation to other, non-Chinese Asians on the one hand, and to aboriginal peoples on the other.

One explicit indication that race has played a part in the way social identity came to be understood in Taiwan occurs in this excerpt from Sun Yat Sen's *Three Principles of the People*- required memorization for all Taiwanese students:

Mankind is divided into five races. The yellow and white races are relatively strong and intelligent. Because the other races are feeble and stupid, they are being exterminated by the white race. Only the yellow race competes with the white race. This so called evolution...Among the contemporary races that could be called superior, there are only the yellow and white races. China (ie. belongs to) the yellow race. (cited in CRN, 2000, p. 591)

The other races, it should be noted include the brown, black and red races and they include those in southern Asia, aboriginal peoples, Indians, and Africans. Dikotter (CRN, 2000) points out that Chinese discourse on race is not simply a derivative discourse gleaned from western racializing texts but is part of a continuous and long history of racializing in China that went through several modifications:

Far from being a mere copy or a 'derivative discourse' of a more 'authentic' form of nationalism in the West, narratives of blood and descent in China have always been based on the active reconfiguration of indigenous modes of representation. National identity has been actively reconstructed and endowed with indigenous meanings that are specific to China. Modernizing intellectuals in China drew inspiration from foreign cultural repertoires, appropriated the language of nationalism, invested new ideas with native meanings and nuances, reinterpreted modern political ideologies, reconstructed their cultural heritage, and

finally reinvented their own versions of identity and modernity ¹
(p. 592)

The idea of racial difference already long established in China received a renewed objective vigour with the science of anthropology Chinese intellectuals borrowed from Europe. The idea of the patriarchal kinship relation was extended to an imagined racial family with the aid of a semantic shift and the scientific endorsement of race as a sealed concept of racial difference:

The transition from lineage to this conception of race as a community united by blood ties was enabled by the common semantic source, the signifier *zu*, which referred to the descent group and also to race or kind (a term also of greatest importance to Wang Fuzhi in the 17th century (Dikotter, 291). Republican revolutionaries like Chen Tianhua, Zou Rang and Song Jiaoren were able to manoeuvre within the play of this signifier and, hence, with the emotions it evoked such as filiality. Thus Chen Tianhua pronounced: "The Han race is one big family. The [mythic] Yellow Emperor is the great ancestor, all those who are not of the Han race are not the descendants of the Yellow Emperor, they are exterior families. One should definitely not assist them" (cited in Dikotter, 1994, p. 495) (Duara, 1999, p. 13)

This direct relation between nation and race appears shocking to westerners. Our response, may result, in part, from what we understand to be the *irrational* belief in racial rankings of superiority and inferiority. However, according to Bourdieu, this results from a mental reflex that posits the way social differentiations occur in naturalistic terms. If we want to understand how perceived differences come about we need to attend to the way they enter into the representations of the world, often through discourses endorsed by specific authorities, that people come to accept as appropriate and accurate:

¹ Looking at Chinese terminology Chun (CRN, 2000) tells us: "The conflation of "race", descent and nation has been expressed throughout the twentieth century by the term *minzu* (most often translated as nation-race), signifying both a descent group and cultural community. (p. 595)

One can understand the particular form of struggle over classifications that is constituted by the struggle over the definition of 'regional' or 'ethnic' identity only if one transcends the opposition that science, in order to break away from the preconceptions of spontaneous sociology, must first establish between representation and reality, and only if one includes in the reality, the representation of the reality, or, more precisely, the struggle over representations, in the sense of mental images, but also of social demonstrations whose aim it is to manipulate the mental images (and even in the sense of delegations responsible for organizing the demonstrations that are necessary to modify mental representations). (Bourdieu, 1991 p.221)

In other words if we want to understand what identity in Taiwan is all about, we should resist the temptation to base any of our conclusions on the distinction between those attributes that are real and those that are imagined. Imagined distinctions, and the struggle itself, become aspects of the representations that are employed in discourses to create social effects, to stake out political territory, which in the case of Taiwan, includes the matter of national territory. For Bourdieu mental representations and the supporting material manifestations of those differences are able to consolidate differences that in scientific terms cannot be grounded. The common use of Chinese script, emblems, and images, narratives, public ceremonies, flags and monuments participate in the reaffirmation of Chinese racial unity. They constitute a unique style of display that those considering themselves Chinese, in this case, have come to be able to identify with.

3.3.3 Race and Nation

I believe a case can be made that the application of heredity, in a metaphorical way, has the potential for all nations to be considered virtual racial nations. That is, the discourse on national identity employs *familial* notions that serve to essentialize nationness and to associate certain races with those nationalities. Canada for instance is widely considered internationally to be a "white" country. In Foucault's terms, national differentiation is able to be a *substitute* in discourse for the idea of race. In this view, the imagined national family can play the exact role internationally, as has the idea

biological race historically, and the superiority/inferiority scale that historically functioned within the latter categorization is able to continue to function with the former. Once again, I am not talking about the reality of the situation but the way things are represented in discourse, the way they are *objectified* and further employed in discourse. At least in Taiwan, Canada, America, Australia and England are widely considered to be English and white countries. People who live in those countries, who speak other languages and are of other 'races', are considered to be virtual and not authentic Canadians etc. This is not simply a product of discourses in Taiwan, however, but is a part of a global discourse that has been inherited from Imperialist history.

The emigration of foreign nationals to different countries would seem to suggest this view could not be correct. However, the experience of many new nationals is that they can only nominally be considered Americans or Canadians and that true Americanism and Canadianism, the essence of those designations, is reserved for native-born citizens with particular physical characteristics. The term African American is acknowledgement of this fact in a form of self-identification. According to Willinsky (1998), when asked to describe themselves, many of his students felt compelled to respond "I'm Chinese" even though they were born in Canada. Willinsky (1998) says:

To identify oneself as having been born in Canada while remaining parenthetically Chinese echoes a colonial history that determined whose home Canada was to be, even as imperialism engaged the Chinese of the Diaspora in the business of Empire; it speaks to the barriers imperialism constructed between East and West out of a compound of race, ethnicity, and nationality...(p. 6)

As noted above the firm association of racial and ethnic categories with nationness is not only a western imperial legacy but articulated historically with the essentializing of race in China as well. Important for the case of Taiwan, Chineseness as an essential quality has been reaffirmed in both East and West and its deconstruction in common sense is not likely to be easily accomplished. Yet, with Willinsky, I believe it should be a part of the goal of effective and socially conscious education everywhere.

3. 3.4 All in the Racial Family

The metaphorical association of nations with biological heritage and family are captured in the phrases fatherland, motherland and homeland denoting ‘something to which we are naturally tied.’ (Anderson, 1983, p.6) Anderson goes on to note:

in everything natural there is something unchosen...precisely because such ties are not chosen, they have about them the halo of disinterestedness....the family has traditionally been conceived of as the domain of disinterested love and solidarity. So too, if historians, diplomats, and social scientists are quite at ease with the idea of ‘national interest’ , for most ordinary people of whatever class the whole point of the nation is that it is interestless. Just for that reason it can ask for sacrifices. (p.14)

The idea of the nation race as an extension of the family was promoted in KMT governed education in Taiwan. Dikotter (CRN) points out that the discourse on race in China has been articulated with the patrilineal discourse of Confucianism. This articulation was also made with the Taiwanese nation in public education. As Meyer (1982) points out, in his study of Middle school language texts in Taiwan, the moral value of filial piety in Confucianism occupied a dominant place in the curriculum. (p.227) Unlike in mainland China, ancestor worship was re-established in Taiwan with the departure of the Japanese, and the arrival of the KMT. Shrines for departed, but ever-present ancestors, are prominently situated in many family households, and the burning of “ghost money” for their use in the afterlife is still widely practiced.

The most intense educational efforts were for instilling the virtue of filial piety, followed by that of patriotism. Martin (1982) did a comparison of primary school texts in the study of the socialization of children in Taiwan and China:

The predominant feature of the texts in Taiwan is their emphasis on filial piety- a concept completely absent in the Chinese texts. Model individuals in the Taiwanese texts are defined by their fulfilment of duty to their parents. Patriotism and diligent study are

also heavily emphasized, but they are presented as manifestations of filial piety, the ultimate virtue. (p. 139)

Taiwanese often call close friends or distant relatives mother, sister, brother, father, uncle. The idea of kinship and blood relations goes deep on the island. Chun (FC) tells about how Confucianism was taught in the KMT program for the establishment of a Chinese culture in Taiwan:

Confucianism was invoked here not as a system in itself but as a set of stripped-down ethical values which had a particular role in the service of the state. As a generalized moral philosophy or a kind of social ethics that could easily be translated into secular action, Confucianism here meant for the most part a devotion to filial piety, respect for social authority, and etiquette in everyday behaviour...thus recourse to Confucian tradition, especially its emphasis on filial piety, was actually an attempt to extend feelings of family solidarity to the level of the nation. (p. 6)¹

Yet in Dikotter's (CRN, 1996) final assessment he holds out more hope for Taiwan than for China, to be able shake off the essentialist cloak, as I am claiming should be done everywhere:

In contrast, multiple identities, free choice of ethnicity, ambiguity in group membership are not likely to appear as viable alternatives to more essentialist models of group definition. National identity, it should be stressed, has often led to the rejection of hybridity, fluidity, and heterogeneity in contemporary China. Racial and

¹ Mainland China represents a strongly racial nationalism. In this case race represents *an invitation* to territories that are presumably racially homogeneous with it. The open invitation will appear more tempting as other reasons for unification appear. The lack of a denial of the significance of race suggests that the Taiwanese while perhaps not wanting to unite with mainland China, nonetheless feel compelled to understand themselves as distinguished from other Asian and non-Asian communities under their presumed racial Chineseness. I believe this is a function of the discourse in China and Asia of presumed superiority of Chineseness. Raciality is largely associated with the extensive power Chinese culture has had historically within the contexts other Asian 'races'. For example, many Thais are quick to comment that they have "Chinese blood", that presumably means they participate in this cultural superiority.

cultural nationalism, can nonetheless alternate and even lead to new forms of civic nationalism, as may be the case with Taiwan today. (p. 5)

Without ignoring the fact that race may be a widely accepted categorization in Taiwan and China, to label those societies as ‘racist’ probably obscures more than it reveals. It is to simplify a more complex situation. Without ignoring the force racializing has in those societies, we are in danger of essentializing them once again, this time not as being of a particular race, but as being of a particular kind of nation, one that racializes. It is quite easy for us to understand these classifications in terms of our own history of racializing, which would be mistaken. Furthermore, this classification obscures the way race continues to function in our own societies and the discursive struggles that continue to evolve in China and Taiwan. It is too easy, given an overt moral stand against racism in the western liberal nations to say that those countries that don’t racialize overtly are better than those that do. Rather, I would claim we too continue to racialize, but for historical reasons, we do it differently. I am arguing that the foundations of nationness, while not explicitly racially defined, have a racial dimension that has not been eradicated. It would be presumptuous to claim that my own country of citizenship, Canada, is any closer to being a non-racist society than China or Taiwan is.

What we call racial and ethnic difference have been associated with violence and prejudice throughout the history of Taiwan as elsewhere. The early racial discourse on the mainland may have played a role in the emigrating islanders poor treatment of the indigenous people of the island when they had arrived in the 1600’s. The Japanese considered themselves racially and culturally superior to their colonial Taiwanese subjects. The Taiwanese considered the retreating mainlanders to be of the same general kinship group as themselves and anticipated an equal social and political exchange to take place upon their arrival. The decision not to make Taiwan an American protectorate was taken by America because, after all, the Taiwanese were “their (the KMT’s) people”. When Kerr (1965) suggested that America take Taiwan on as a temporary protectorate he was firmly rebuffed:

It was as if I had suggested withholding food from starving children. The ultimate argument turned on the point of population statistics. The Formosans were of Chinese descent. There were only five million of them. Therefore, no matter what their views might be, they were a very small minority among the total hundreds of millions of Chinese on the mainland. (p. 455)

The expectations of political liberation with the departure of the Japanese and the arrival of those they, and the Americans, considered their natural kin was shattered soon after the KMT took control of the island and began the slaughter of the Taiwanese elite and the repression of the Taiwanese people. Since race was not an available mode of differentiation between the two groups the term *ethnicity* came to be applied as a term that differentiated the mainlanders and Taiwanese. Some exiled Taiwanese countered the claim of Chineseness by denying their blood relations:

One theme used by the exiled group especially angered the Chinese at Taipei, and one suspects that not all Formosans were happy about it. This was the argument that Formosans are not pure Chinese but are a mixed race. Although Nationalist leaders might call the Formosans a "degraded people" when addressing them in anger, for world propaganda purposes the Nationalist claim to "instant reversion" rested on the assertion that the Formosans were Chinese in blood, language, and social institutions. They were members of the Han Race. It was unthinkable that the Formosans should now claim to have Indonesian, Malay, Spanish, Dutch, British, French, and Japanese blood flowing in their veins. Taipei would admit only to the presence of some aborigines of Malay or Indonesian extraction - a mere 150,000 of them - a primitive minority to which the mainland Chinese were bringing cultural salvation. (Kerr, 1965, p. 457)

The idea of mixed race, or ethnic difference as a reason for political distinction was to play on the same epistemological turf as the mainlanders did. The differences between the mainlanders and Taiwanese was decreed by the KMT, to make a difference. The differential was an opportunity to remain the elite class in a new land. The application the term *ethnicity* served to instantiate a difference that was originally grounded in the subjugation of the Taiwanese.

3. 4 Ethnic China: Which one?

The origin of the term “ethnicity” resides in its uses in the social sciences and it is from the scientificity of this term that the presumption of its validity is sustained. This, despite the fact that there is little agreement about what the term refers to. Bourdieu (1991) calls ethnicity a euphemism for race. This is because the term “ethnicity” at once removes the discourse employing it from the biological realm into the cultural, while surreptitiously letting biology, and the sense of objective difference in the back door. Racial discourse is *a prototype* (as is discourse on sexual difference) which all other essentializing discourses activate as they make claims for the natural divisions between individuals and groups. If we can imagine a scale of differences from the most overtly biological at the base to the least explicitly biological, and most social or cultural, at top, the concept of ethnicity is just above that of race. It means something like: *a biologically homogeneous group (or presumed biologically homogeneous group) sharing some sufficient other number of other characteristics including: language, custom, lifestyle, and region, to naturally distinguish them.* Once a group is distinguished ethnically, once the difference *is naturalized*, the representation of the presumed difference between this group and others can be employed in various discourses for political ends. This point is made with the category of ethnicity by Schlesinger (1991) this way:

The category of ethnicity is a form of social organization, an organizational vehicle which may take on different contents at different times and in various sociocultural systems...The critical factor for defining the ethnic group therefore becomes the social boundary which defines the group with respect to other groups of the same order, not the cultural reality within that border. (p. 153)

Although this analysis attempts to antiessentialize the concept of ethnicity - an attempt to denaturalise it and rescue it for continued use in the social sciences, the term continues to function in many forms of discourse as a reference to an enduring essence. Theoretical reorientations do not imply socio-political ones. I would rather make the claim that the distinctions of race and ethnicity, to begin with, are difficult to employ

without ideological implications. The presumption of their scientific validity weighs them down with semantic connotations that make their use as real distinctions dangerous. I am not suggesting we stop referring to how the term have been employed historically. In fact analysis of the historical use of these terms is absolutely necessary for determining the way they have been used as tools to entrench the power of one group over another or to understand how subordinated groups have resisted the status quo. However, to use them as terms that truly distinguish human groups, without qualification, should no longer be considered legitimate.

In the case of Taiwan there are two main ethnic categories that are employed in politicized discourse: Chinese and Taiwanese. Contesting discourses on ethnic difference in Taiwan employ strategies involving all of the other identity terms I have isolated in this paper except that of race. That is, nation, culture and language are all employed with the two terms Taiwanese and Chinese. As stated earlier, the absence of the concept of race in these contesting discourses, I believe, is because the of the presumed facticity of common race. Both groups are unquestioningly designated as racially Chinese or Han. Therefore, the debate functions within the confinements of a representation of Chineseness as a distinction that naturally binds mainland Chinese, overseas Chinese, Singaporean Chinese and Taiwanese Chinese in contraposition to all other groups.

Chun analyses the various uses the concept of “Chineseness” has played in various discourses globally. Various terms have been used to denote different aspects of Chineseness and Chun (FC, 1996) searches for some attribute or quality that might justify the use of a common term, only to conclude that:

In the Chinese world, cultural discourse constitutes an appropriate “space of dispersion” in Foucault’s terms, for understanding how ethnicity (as nationality) is constructed....it involves the authority of statements about shared values embodied in language, ethnicity and custom, as well as shared myths encoded as genres of knowledge, such as history, ideology, and beliefs. In the context of the state, such discourses rarely emanate directly from the people themselves, but are articulated by the state, intellectuals, and other vested interests, all of which claim naturally to speak on behalf of “society as a whole. (p.115)

Chun's investigation finds in the rise of nationalism a force that served to simplify a complicated ethnic situation. This was a part of a global trend that nations undertook to establish their uniqueness as a demonstration of unity and strength. At the turn of the century, beyond the use of a common script, limited mostly to the Confucian adepts, there was no common Chinese culture practiced by what could be considered a unified group.

Prior to the Nationalist Revolution of 1911, there was no cognate notion in Chinese society or nation as a polity whose boundary was synonymous with that of an ethnic group. (p.113)

For Chun (FC, 1996), Chineseness, in the case of China and Taiwan, is an *ethnic* identity construction that developed alongside the establishment of the Chinese and Taiwanese nations. The imagined nation became associated with an imagined singular biological and cultural constitution. The concept of ethnicity, with its scientific credentials, is stretched to the limits of the boundedness of the nation state:

The criteria of traditional practices and material customs applied to distinguish ethnic groups...made the notion of ethnic identity within a cultural taxonomy problematic, especially in the cases of historically known minority groups that had been undergoing a long process of sinicization. In this regard the hard and fast rules characteristic of the boundedness of a modern nation-state ultimately fabricated ethnic divisions that did not exist in the minds and lives of the people themselves, while at the same time made cultural objectification a normative practice in the state's institutional routine. As in the case of Taiwan, history and ethnicity thus combined to produce (a national) identity in which they were, in fact, nothing more than imagined constructions by the state to define the ethos of its own modernity. (p. 118)

Here is an example where the term ethnicity intersects with the discourse on nationness and takes on a new political meaning. It may be argued that this is a misuse of the term, that it deviates from even the loosest scientific definition, but from the perspective of Bourdieu this is simply to insist on an unequivocal and

objective meaning of the term that cannot be sustained. Rather, the term has been used in many different ways for various theoretical and political ends. Its use in Taiwan is only one example of such a use, and in fact its meaning is diffused amongst those uses.

3. 5 Compacting the Sand; Culture in Service of the Nation State Rationality

Allen Chun (FC, 1996) tells us:

When Chinese people wish to talk about themselves as a unified people belonging to a unified culture they refer to themselves as “people of the Han” (Han jen), as belonging to a Han culture that originated in the region of the Han River...but in fact the people consolidated by the Han empire were certainly not ethnically homogeneous....likewise the term Chung Kuo (Middle Kingdom), as well as the concurrent notion of Chineseness as *hua hsia*, predates the Chinese empire, but the centripetal unity emanating from this civilizing centre was something that in pre-dynastic times actually united different polities, occupied by diverse peoples who had inherently different languages, beliefs and practices- in short, different ethnic cultures. If we on the other hand, view China as an unambiguous political entity and Chineseness as a feature shared by ethnic Chinese on the basis of discrete traits and traditions, it is really because we are influenced by a homogeneous notion of culture that is essentially modern, if not national, in origin. (p.113)

The program of establishing a definitive Chinese cultural identity was applied in Taiwan by these same Nationalists as a part of an intensive re-education program. Sun Yat Sen compared the Chinese people to “a dish of loose sand” underscoring his recognition of the lack of coherency that needed to be overcome in the establishment of the modern nation state on the mainland. This project of unifying was deployed in Taiwan. Chun (FC, 1996) says:

Since the very idea of (a national) identity is new, any notion, of culture invoked in this regard, no matter how faithfully they are grounded in the past, have to be constructions by nature. In the end they conform to a new kind of boundedness in order to create the

bonds of horizontal solidarity between equal, autonomous individuals constitutive of the empty, homogeneous social space of the nation in ways that could not have existed in a hierarchical, cosmological past. (p. 114)

Chun shows clearly the new forces at work in the construction of mythical cultures with the rise of the nation state that replaced the old cosmological order. On the international stage the status of nation-ness had already become the pre-eminent political value and those able to establish new nations were bound for the prize of extreme prestige and power. The motives of individuals such as Sun and Chiang were not the same but the goal of nation-ness was the same. A new Chinese nation would put them on the same international playing field as the most powerful social and financial forces in the world. The expression of a population with a unified cultural identity was deemed an essential asset in that arena. In Taiwan, according to Dikotter:

KMT designated itself as the guardian of “traditional Chinese culture”...at the core of this traditional Chinese identity is the concept of hua-hsia. By invoking the sense of (hua) that is rooted in the shared civilization of the first (mythical) dynasty (hsia), hua-hsia is, in essence a code word for both political legitimacy and historical destiny. Specifically, in opposition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), hua hsia represents the metaphorical defence of a traditional past that contrasts with the extreme radicalism of a communist world view. (CRN, 1996, p.116)

Because of its conscious break with the past, the PRC had to rely more heavily on the notion of biological inclusiveness in the expression of the unique social face it presented to the world. Dikotter (CRN, 1996) notes that archaeological projects are enlisted in the service of creating the narrative of a singular historical destiny for the people of China. (p.117) They are constructed as forming an unbroken heritage that dates to the dawn of modern man. On Taiwan, there is a combination of racial and supposed cultural factors placed in the service of the new polity of the nation. This narrative, despite its distance

from the everyday lives of the Taiwanese, has been relentlessly disseminated among the island's people. As Chun (FC, 1996) says:

the fact that the government felt compelled to orchestrate social sentiment through mass movements suggests that culture was hardly something that could be taken for granted. (p.117)

As Gellner points out 'culture' became an important concept for national legitimation of emerging nation states that bounded groups whose life practices and languages were very different:

Culture is no longer the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is now the necessary shared medium, *the life-blood* (my italics), or perhaps the minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and produce. For a given society it must be the one in which they can all breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the same culture. Moreover, it must be great or high (literate, training sustained) culture, and can no longer be a diversified, locally tied, illiterate little culture or tradition.”(cited in Schlesinger, 1991 p.160)¹

The application of regimes of knowledge and institutional practice that homogenize citizens under the combined categories of race, ethnicity, culture and

¹ In a lecture given by Foucault (1988) the rationality of modern nation states is traced to the ancient concept of pastoral leadership. Foucault observes that the idea of pastorship is of Oriental origin. It found expression in ancient Greece city states, was used in Christian Europe in the middle ages, and was finally reinscribed again in programs for policing in the *Reason of State* in modern times, a transformation in which it took on a more scientific and technical form. He says:

the development of power techniques oriented themselves to individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way. If the state is the political form of centralized and centralizing power, let us call pastorship, the individualizing power...the Shepherd gathers together dispersed individuals.” (p. 61)

language serve the rational purposes of the centralized state in its role as a pastoral and policing organ. It situates individuals within a precise matrix of categories of identity. In this respect attempts to challenge some definitive categorization for individuals and groups work in direct opposition to the logic of the nation state.

Chun's (FC, 1996) description is indicative of the discourses promoted and the procedures carried out by the state in this regard:

the production of discourse is an integral part of the state's exercise in legitimation; or as they put it "the state never stops talking"...the rise of the state brought about forms of knowledge that necessitated incessant documentation in the genre of reports, investigations, commissions, and statistics relating to the accountability of its citizens in various domains, such as finance, industry, trade, health, demography, crime, education...etc. The will to knowledge to power ultimately provides the state a basis on which to define and classify spaces, make separations between public and private spheres, demarcate frontiers, standardize language and personal identity and licence the legitimacy of certain activities over others. Culture's institutional link to power then makes all forms of knowledge that contribute to the construction of identity potential hegemonic tools within the state's regime of "disinterested domination"...the fact that cultural narratives differ in different Chinese political contexts is testament to the possibility of different interpretations and political uses of Chineseness. (p.116)

We see clearly here how the presumed scientific category of ethnicity is able to serve specific ideological ends in discourses aligned with state rationality. Chun explores the theoretical implications of cultural identity and concludes that:

cultural identity is less a matter of being than becoming and...as unstable points of identification and suture, they are subject to the continuous play of history, culture and power rather than grounded in the recovery of the past. (p. 128)

Nonetheless, I would add that the establishment of identity is most strongly depicted by those purporting to represent the interests of social groups as some kind of

recovery of tradition, as the search for the essential aspects of who that group are. To reverse the direction of my own analysis somewhat, I would like to ask if tradition should be *rejected definitely*, in the construction of cultural and social identity. If it is rejected doesn't the problem arise that any form of identification can be promoted as equally valid as any other? Rather, I would claim that a complex set of factors need to be accounted for, including narratives of tradition for how identities are expressed and considered plausible. It is out of the scope of this paper but an alternative to both is suggested in Paul Riceour's hermeneutical understanding of the creation, maintenance and transformation of identities. Chun continues:

While it is clear that these multiple identities and other reinscriptions of post-colonial space ...constitute positionings in an ongoing politics of identity, it is equally important to ask what all these positionings really mean....if ethnic identities and cultural discourses are all constructions anyway, why bother to ask how true they are? ...The notion of a cultural based national identity in Taiwan is mostly a post-war creation, and despite recognition of the oppression of authoritarian rule, the illusion of Chineseness forcibly inculcated in these brief decades is still deeply ingrained in the minds of the people, most of whom are ethnic Taiwanese. (p.130)

For Chun (FC, 1996) the specific way culture is used in the construction of national identities is determined by the both the internal dynamics of a society and the geopolitical forces that they are responding to. In the case of Taiwan he says:

In post-war Nationalist Taiwan, the compelling need to redefine national identity in terms of race, language and history, by rallying around the defence of traditional Chinese culture has to be understood in the first instance in reference to its relationship to mainland China as a part of...global concerns. ...it is no coincidence that the invoking of tradition represented an ideologically conservative response to the radical visions of a Communist national polity. (p.122)

In other words, the choice of content for the establishment of a traditional Chinese culture was a strategically employed with the communists in mind. He continues:

The orchestrated if not oppressive way that culture was promoted, defined and then disseminated or imposed upon the populace in effect produced two kinds of response: conformity and resistance. In the long run by making culture conform to the nation and the process making the state the sole voice of cultural authority, the political writing of culture as patriotic fervour combined with nostalgia of an imagined past made responses to culture, the state and cultural authority an all or nothing affair: an attack on one was by definition an attack on the other two. (p.123)

The very forced nature of that program made adherence a relatively all or nothing proposition. Local Taiwanese had already gone through the process of cultural reconfiguration with the Japanese and those old enough to remember were accustomed to the pattern and had developed a repertoire of coping mechanisms to deal with the imposition, even if that meant only having patience and remembering. The bravest of them continued to talk, albeit only within certain social settings.¹

A new question presented itself to the islanders: what is “Taiwanese identity?” and, what should the relationship between that identity and Taiwan as a nation consist in? The question was complicated by the presence of mainlanders and their descendants who had now been established on the island for 50 years. The two groups were by no means entirely segregated, although certain segregating processes were employed on both sides. For example, Taiwanese who owned businesses refused to hire mainlander labour and nepotism and prejudice in government departments largely excluded islanders. The question of Taiwanese identity was

¹ Soon after my arrival on the island in 1990 one of my students, 15 years old, openly proclaimed that he was Taiwanese and refused to speak Mandarin. The sedition law had just recently been deleted but most people were still reluctant to express political opinions openly. Silence had become a habit. What struck me about this particular student was both the strength of his convictions and the fact that he was alone in expressing them. Others like him began to emerge over the decade until the discourse reached a critical mass and then it simply exploded. Remarkably, in the first open presidential elections the local Taiwanese DPP party came to power.

caught between an attempt to think of an authentic cultural past that had been obscured by the cultural programming of the Japanese, and the KMT, and what came to be seen as a society composed of two groups of ethnic Chinese, the mainlanders and the Taiwanese. For me, however, what was really new was the way Taiwan had come to adopt the established conventions of nation-ness and the unconscious adoption of the rationality of the state was a transformation that was at least as significant, and also inseparable, from the question of cultural identity. In other words, whatever reinterpretation of culture might be pursued, employing the designations of Taiwanese-ness or Chineseness, it would have to be pursued in terms of the logic of modern nation-ness. It could never simply be a simple reconstruction of a lost cultural identity but would need to be the configuration of tradition in line with the needs of nation-ness, and even more broadly, the new and growing internationalism that the island has come to embrace.

CHAPTER FOUR: LANGUAGE USE AND IDENTITY

4.1 Compulsory Mandarin

I will now turn to the last of the constellation of identity terms I set out at the beginning of the paper. The learning of languages, in Taiwan as elsewhere, has largely been sectioned off as an economic good unrelated to socio-political concerns. No less than the other terms it has been naturalized and neutralized in discourse as a factor to be personally sought after for determining life possibilities. However, language learning, as Bourdieu's work shows, is central to the *structural* reproduction of socio-economic advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore, the different proficiencies in the ability and right to use and teach different languages has become associated with national and racial categories. The overall identity of an individual or group is constrained by these interacting identity terms.

An understanding of the significance of the imposition of the official language of Mandarin Chinese by the KMT upon their arrival on the island is a crucial factor for understanding how the question of Taiwanese identity has come to be framed. This policy must be seen as central for how the other elements of social identity, nation-ness, race, culture and ethnicity were deployed in discourse thereafter and therefore for how something called Taiwanese identity could come to be understood. Both the learning of Mandarin by the people of Taiwan, and the specific content of the courses taught in that language, established a particular linguistic and cultural complex as the dominant one against which the status and value of all other linguistic and cultural complexes existing on the island would be measured. The Mandarin language, being the language that corresponds most closely to the official literary language of Beijing, is discursively established as the centre of the Chinese linguistic world. Applying the same classification schemes as biology, Hakka, and Hokklo (Taiwanese) languages, as with their cultures in general are considered to be derivations from the main linguistic and cultural trunk rather than historically parallel and equal dialects. Within a discourse that places Mandarin at the centre, other Chinese language cultures are subordinated and so

are their users. Mandarin language and Chinese culture established a baseline official social identity which individuals and groups could either aspire to or challenge. Since the KMT had firm control of mass education, it was able to consecrate an official understanding of what it meant to be Taiwanese as Chinese, to pronounce and project it, and to monitor and guide its development through language and cultural education. This was the intentional deployment of a logic of kinship that combined groups in order to privilege a group and its right to rule over the others.

This process followed a well-established global pattern. The establishment of official languages had already been accomplished with the emergence of many new nation states around the globe when the process was begun on Taiwan. According to Bourdieu the science of linguistics which described language in a way that detached it from the social conditions in which it was established, as an abstract system of signs which represented an inexhaustible treasure that everyone was equally able to draw upon and deploy equally, masked the way official languages, as one among many dialects, gave a decisive socio-economic advantage to groups whose dialect was closest to the official form. Bourdieu (1991) says:

Saussure's *langue*, a code both legislative and communicative which exists and subsists independently of its users ('speaking subjects') and uses. It (*parole*), has in fact all the properties commonly attributed to official language. As opposed to dialect, it has benefited from the institutional conditions necessary for its generalized codification and imposition. Thus known and recognized (more or less completely) throughout the whole jurisdiction of a certain political authority, it helps to reinforce the authority which is the source of its dominance. It does this by ensuring among all members of the 'linguistic community', traditionally defined, since Bloomfield, as a 'group of people who use the same system of linguistic signs, the minimum of communication which is a precondition for economic production and even for symbolic domination.(p. 45)

In view of the work of Bourdieu, when we use the names of different languages to designate an individual or group, names such as Chinese, Taiwanese, or English, we are glossing over a crucial form of social differentiation that has come into being through the social conditions that gave rise to differences in the ability of individuals

and groups to accumulate and employ what he calls cultural capital, where language competency constitutes one form of such capital. By simply designating the population of Taiwan as Mandarin speakers for instance, as part of the overall characterization of Taiwanese identity, the differential competencies in Mandarin, which in part determine material and social prospects, is entirely masked. The deployment of the cultural capital of competency in the dominant language form, in this case standardized Mandarin, allowed the groups most proficient in the highly nuanced use of Mandarin in contexts of an official nature such as politics and education, that is the mainlanders, to accumulate further material and cultural capital. This accumulation was made possible through the attainment of educational credentials, and the further refinement of their abilities to reproduce the dominant competencies in Mandarin. In Bourdieu's understanding, those who did not possess enough symbolic capital, linguistic style being one form of such capital, would be excluded from this cycle of its deployment and further accumulation. It is easy to see how in the absence of corrective measures, that is in a *laissez-faire* environment vis-à-vis culture and material capital, that this capital is concentrated in the hands of those who already possess it, thereby further entrenching the status quo.

However, in the case of Taiwan a complete monopoly did not arise and some explanation is called for. It is certainly true that this situation started out as Bourdieu describes. Dr. Shih (EINI) tells us:

Corrupt Mandarin spoken by the natives had long been ridiculed as Taiwan *Guo Yu* with the intention to humiliate the natives and deprive them of their cultural pride.(p. 3)

Local Taiwanese had little choice, with the threat of violence against open dissent, but to attempt to learn Mandarin. With a certain minimum proficiency in Mandarin, the islanders were able to grasp the distance between their abilities and level of competency required for social and political advancement. In Bourdieu's language the domination of a group by another is only possible through *the recognition of this gap* by the dominated group. For the islanders the establishment of Mandarin as the language of social mobility created the dilemma of either attempting to make up the

difference in linguistic capital through hard work, in no way guaranteeing success, or abandoning any hope of advancement in the official social hierarchy.

The KMT could claim to be exercising rule over a citizenship that was linguistically homogeneous, exemplifying a main factor in the expression of a common *identity*, the reflection of a distinct social face. The KMT control of the media meant that the way this policy disadvantaged the islanders could not be expressed, while the promotion of education as the means to socio-economic advancement was offered as consolation for public discontent. The acceptance of this proposition by the populace meant accepting the process, the daily engagement with a specific language and specific cultural discourse, that would further establish the cultural identity offered by the KMT in the minds of its learners:

The dominant culture produces (an) ideological effect by concealing the function of division beneath the function of communication: the culture which unifies (the medium of communication) is also the culture that separates (the instrument of distinction) and which legitimates distinctions by forcing all other cultures (designated as subcultures) to define themselves by their distance from the dominant culture. (Bourdieu, 1991, p.168)

Bourdieu (1991) cites George Davy on the role of the language teacher in such a process:

He (the primary school teacher) , by virtue of his function, works daily on the faculty of expression of every idea and every emotion: on language. In teaching the same, clear, fixed language to children who know it only very vaguely or who even speak various dialects or patois, he is already inclining them quite naturally to see and feel things in the same way; and he works to build the common consciousness of the nation' (p.49)

Bourdieu is careful to point out that we cannot understand the significance of the role of an official or dominant language form for determining the overall calculus of social differentiation of power by viewing it either as passively accepted or freely chosen, even when initially it has been imposed, as was the case for Mandarin in Taiwan.

It is inscribed, in a practical state, in dispositions which are impalpably inculcated, through a long and slow process of acquisition, by the sanctions of the linguistic market, and which are therefore adjusted, without any cynical calculation or consciously experienced constraint, to the chances of material and symbolic profit which the laws of price formation characteristic of a given market objectively offer to the holders of a given linguistic capital...The distinctiveness of symbolic domination lies precisely in the fact that it assumes, of those who submit to it, an attitude which challenges the usual dichotomy of freedom and constraint...the propensity to reduce the search for causes to a search for responsibilities makes it impossible to see that intimidation, a symbolic violence which is not aware of what it is (to the extent that it implies no act of intimidation, can only be exerted on a person predisposed (in his habitus) to feel it...little by little one has to take into account thereby the whole social structure. (p. 51)

We are not looking for agents of oppression but trying to determine how power in a society is systematically produced in the numerous forms of social interaction where the differences in linguistic competency have specific outcomes for specific individuals and groups. For Bourdieu these sanctions can take the innocuous forms of gestures, glances, ways of looking, standing, or keeping silent.

The power of suggestion which is exerted through things and persons and which, instead of telling the child what he must do, tells him what he is, and thus leads him to become durably what he has to be, is the condition of the effectiveness of all symbolic power that will subsequently be able to operate on the habitus predisposed to respond to them...(Bourdieu, 1991, p. 52)

The education of learners is the continuous subtle imposition of an identity that situates the learner within a social hierarchy: that hierarchy is a function of the relationships between the linguistic competencies of those learners and a standardized dominant language form. The official language that constitutes that dominant form is posited as one of the major attributes, including ethnic makeup, race, and culture that define the identity of a society. It makes up one feature of the face that society presents to the rest of the world. Discourse that glibly describes a country as Chinese, or

English-speaking or even bilingual thereby conceals the internal differentials that determine life prospects of individuals and groups within the logic of official languages. In the case of Taiwan this language was Mandarin but we can expand the domain of investigation to include the international village and shift the focus to the English language.

4.2 The Taiwanese Languages

The imposition of Mandarin was contested by the islanders from the time it was imposed and a continuous low-level form of dissent was nurtured privately. In response to the compulsory use of Mandarin and the prohibition of Taiwanese in official contexts the Islanders refused to hire non-Hoklo and non-Hakka speakers in their businesses and routinely asked strangers to speak Hoklo, Hakka or even Japanese to determine if they were mainlanders and therefore whether they could be trusted. (Shih EINI p. 2) Language was deployed in a counter-hegemonic fashion. For example Shih (SDTC) tells us: “elder Taiwanese elites would communicate with each other in Japanese as a gesture of protesting the Nationalist rule, as the latter resented anything Japanese so much.” (p. 4) ¹

The mainlanders and Taiwanese tended to occupy different socio-economic niches and were able to exploit their linguistic advantages against each other by maintaining monopolies in those respective niches. The Taiwanese refused to hire mainlanders but rather than state this openly asked for fluency in Taiwanese as a requirement. Shih (SDTC) tells us: “Since the Mainlanders are either unwilling to learn Taiwanese or lacked the opportunity to learn it due to residential segregation,

¹ Shih (SDTC) tells us that the use of language as tool of resistance goes back to the early years of KMT rule:

During the Feb. 28 Uprising in 1947 (Chen, 1988), the Taiwanese would stop any stranger and ask him to speak Hoklo. As he may have been Hakka Taiwanese, a second test would follow if he failed: he would consequently be required to speak Japanese and to sing the national anthem of Japan, as few mainlanders were able to speak Japanese. Therefore the basic criterion of being Taiwanese was speaking Hokklo or Hakka, with Japanese as an auxiliary surrogate. (p. 4)

the condition almost excludes them from entering Taiwanese firms.” (p.12) The Taiwanese countered the official imposition of Mandarin as an official language that disadvantaged them with their own unofficial language policy that, as a consolidated trading and manufacturing group, gave them some economic leverage. Therefore, the economic advantage of the mainlanders was reduced. Nonetheless, it is Taiwanese that is the more endangered language. It is declining while Mandarin becomes more entrenched, despite the high number of users of Taiwanese. It is the general lack of concern about this decline that should be of concern to linguistic conservationists. Even with the growing importance of Mandarin and English the continued widespread use of Taiwanese has made its decline a minor political issue.

Although there has been a decline in the abilities of younger generations of Taiwanese to speak Hoklo and Hakka, their uses in non official contexts, at home and in the market place, prevented these languages from coming anywhere near extinction. However, many younger Taiwanese, whose parents spoke Hoklo and Hakka, despite some bravado about the importance of Taiwanese because of the well-known injustices performed against it historically, cannot use the language as effectively as previous generations. Many are at the stage where they can understand but cannot reproduce Hoklo or Hakka in speech or writing. Shih (EINI) tells us:

Currently, the mother tongues of the young generation have become degenerate as everyday life languages, as they neither have formal course nor any incentive to learn them. For those natives who are better educated, they may be fluent in Mandarin, but are awkward in either Hoklo or Hakka...There are even some Natives who perceived that speaking “correct” Mandarin is the minimum criterion for upward mobility and therefore consciously adopt Mandarin exclusively at home, in the hope that their children’s pronunciation will not be marred by their mother tongues. Fortunately, for the Native masses, entangled in the structure of vertical division of labour, Hoklo or Hakka is their main medium of daily communication as long as they swear off any hope to seek a job in government organizations. (p. 3)

With the removal of government censorship and the repeal of the sedition law, long repressed dissatisfaction with the KMT finally found vent in various publications

and in the democratic election of Taiwanese public officials. Shih (SDTC) tells us, in a reversal of fortunes, politicians contesting elections find themselves prevented from being able to give speeches in Mandarin, the crowds proclaiming they don't understand "that language" (of course they did) and therefore they have to cram for Taiwanese and give speeches in the local tongue, often with very poor results. (p. 5) The surprising rise to power of the DPP has resulted in a campaign for strengthening the presence of Hoklo and other native languages on the island. So far this campaign has been of limited effect with only a few hours of Hoklo offered in public school every week and the continued importance of Mandarin the mainstay for educational promotion. It remains doubtful whether the socio-economic advantages of Mandarin and the momentum it has gained as a crucial form of cultural capital can be countered by the sentimental attachment to Taiwanese. It would need to be provided a far larger role in education from primary levels to university, a reform that is not likely to be popular with a people already deeply invested in the acquisition of Mandarin and now with the growing presence of English. In fact Mandarin is becoming further entrenched as the dominant language in Taiwan because it is the standard dialect of Mainland China with whom Taiwan has accelerated cultural and economic ties over the last ten years and English simply continues to be considered an essential language for education and commerce. With these forces in play the continued vitality of 'native' Taiwanese languages remains questionable.

4.3 English as a Foreign/Second/Imperial Language

Finally, the linguistic picture on Taiwan needs to be filled out by looking at the importance of English. Once again, the term English conceals the complexity of language forms that fall under that name. It constitutes another form of linguistic capital, one whose stock is rising steadily in the international market. Its standard forms, especially standardized British and American and Canadian standardized Englishes, are most competently used by the educated and moneyed classes in countries around the world. It is to these competencies that all other speakers of English aspire in order to increase their cultural capital, and in relation to these forms, that their lack of competency is measured. In an ever-widening trend, those in the best position to master

these competencies, both native speakers and those whose first language is other than English, are the ones that have already achieved dominance in the local linguistic and educational markets. Well connected and wealthy non-first language speakers of English are in an even better position to do so than first language English speakers who occupy the lower rungs of the linguistic hierarchies in ‘English speaking’ countries. This is because they have more access to highly educated English speakers as teachers, and are more likely to use English with other internationals in the same socio-economic positions than those who are in the socio-economic lower classes of “English” countries. Their possession of economic capital compensates for whatever deficiencies in English they originally had because it gives their families access to the best schools and teachers for acquisition of educated English forms. As they acquire them their cultural capital increases as well.

Bourdieu’s work with the French education system, a centralized and bureaucratic system that closely mirrors Taiwan’s in those respects, is relevant in this regard. For Bourdieu, despite the explicit condemnation of nepotism as a legitimate mode of socio-economic ascendancy in modern liberal states, family continues to be the site of the reproduction of class differences, but this fact is systematically obscured through the process of public education whose mechanisms of evaluation and promotion are linked to one’s *habitus*, one’s cultural disposition, a part of which is the linguistic heritage bequeathed to a family member. This habitus marks the individual as belonging to a particular social class and is difficult to consciously conceal or transform.

Children from the lower middle class can only acquire with great effort something which is *given* to the children of the cultivated classes. (p. 88)

In Taiwan this distinction originally occurred along ethnic lines. Mainlanders, proficient in Mandarin, had a head start on the Islanders. For the English language, mainlanders are the ones most likely to have had some education abroad, in America, Australia, or England and are the most likely to be able to practice English at home with their children. As noted earlier, the families most likely to have travelled, lived or been educated abroad are the Mainlanders. As Shih (SDTC) notes, some parents have even

taken to speaking Mandarin rather than Taiwanese at home in order not to handicap their children's chances at educational advancement. In addition to difference of access for learning English between social classes for economic reasons, English teachers, ignoring initial socio-economic conditions, often assume differences in language ability reflects real differences in aptitude and intelligence. Especially with poorly trained English teachers, there is the danger that expectations are lowered disproportionately for poor speakers of English or that instruction will focus on the best students in the class. These are often students already getting extra help, who speak English at home, or who have been taught English abroad.

In Taiwan, parents, who are scrambling to get an English education for their children, seem to have an implicit understanding of languages being forms of cultural capital. However, Alistair Pennycooke (DCL) asks: "Does parental demand amount to a sufficient reason for wider provision?...how might such access to English be linked to poverty, inequality, and development....the issue is often one of parents demanding access to the language that inequitably divides, social, educational and economic access." (p. 1) With limited resources the question should be asked: what will not be learned as teaching time is filled with English lessons? At present Taiwanese has only a small place in the public school timetable, about equal to that of English, but it is not likely to be pursued as a subject out of school time, as English most emphatically is.

In Taiwan, education for many children is a full-time job. They finish school and go to the bushiban or cram school to learn English, math or other subjects. When not in class they are often doing homework. Global competition has made them schoolaholics. Pennycook (DCL, 1999) notes that development "almost by definition, seems to imply an upward linear path that is easily conflated with notions of modernization and westernisation" (p.6) He quotes Escobar (1995) who says that "development discourse 'has been the central and most ubiquitous operator of the politics of representation and identity in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America...' who have suffered 'a succession of regimes of representation' that originate in colonialism and continue into the discourse of modernity." (DCL, 1999, p. 4)

Pennycook (DCL, 1999) compares different conceptions of the role of English in relation to development. One is that English is represented as the key to modernization,

and upward mobility for all. “While other languages play a role as “home tongue for lovemaking, religion, verse craft, back chat and inexact topics in general”...English is assumed to be “a medium of communication about what will matter to most of us in what we hope will be the One World of Tomorrow. ” (p.7) It is the language of hi-tech and science. Quoting Ordonez (1999) who speaks of the Philippines, Pennycooke tells us “English...being the language of the ruling system, government, education, business and trade, and diplomacy...fits into the type of education that would conform to the requirements of an export-oriented economy pushed by the IMF- World Bank.”(DCL, 1999, p. 19) In Taiwan, although Taiwanese is now being taught in schools, many are lukewarm about the idea of elevating it to official status. Many say its use at home is adequate. English is almost universally understood as good and necessary to learn in an institutionalised setting .

Pennycooke (DCL, 1999) tells us that laissez-faire attitudes to language education espoused by David Crystal (1997), for instance, suggest the use of multiple languages and that a balance can be attained. This is based on the assumption that everyone has the means and time to choose various languages, but “such a view of individual agency and choice fails to account for social, cultural, political and economic forces that compromise and indeed produce such choices” (p.8) which Pennycook, (DCL, 1999) quoting Hanson (1997: 22) thinks leads back to a colonial celebratory mode of thinking: “On it still strides: we can argue what globalisation is until the cows come home – but that globalisation exists is beyond question, with English its accompanist. The accompanist, of course, indispensable for the performance.” (p. 22) For Pennycooke, this suggests nothing but “an uncritical endorsement of capitalism, its science, technology, a modernizing ideology, monolingualism as a norm, ideological globalisation, and internationalisation, transnationalization, the Americanisation and homogenisation of world culture, linguistic and, cultural and media imperialism (p. 274)

Certainly, these dangers are apparent in Taiwan even without English being universally spoken there. However, against the view that all cultures will necessarily succumb to these forces Pennycook reminds us that English is picked up in a variety of ways and that these *performative* differences are a mitigating factor against homogenisation. He quotes Appadurai (1990: 296) who says the “new global cultural

economy has to be understood in terms of existing complex, overlapping, disjunctive order, which cannot any longer be thought of in terms of existing center-periphery models” Therefore “while never losing sight of the very real forces of global capital and media, we need, at the very least, to understand the response to cultural spread and not assume its instant effects.” (p.13) For Pennycook the assumption that everything is transported in whole cloth from the west, without modification, and reciprocation, is to assume a passivity in non-western cultures that speaks of a continued cultural chauvinism. In Taiwan for instance, English is almost deliberately, or at least from an English purist point of view, negligently, publicly “perverted” into weird grammatical and spelling formations. It has been consciously appropriated as a form of art on clothing, and accessories, memorabilia, where little attention to semantic coherence is paid. There is a sense in which English is deconstructed as a form of communication, wresting ownership of it from westerners by appropriating it in another way. Claire Kramsch (1993) calls these appropriations “third spaces” that cannot be understood in the simple terms of imperialism or resistance. Pennycooke warns of thinking of cultures as static, fixed and passive. (DCL, 1999, p.12)

Finally, the idea that languages belong to certain people needs to be restated. First of all, groups are often differentiated by separate means and then linguistic identity becomes attached to these groups. In this work I have focussed on differentiations by race, ethnicity and nation. Languages are easily thought of as belonging to nations, as are races, and therefore languages are too easily thought of as belonging to races as well. I believe the following interviews give some indication that in Taiwan these associations are particularly strong and that the strength of these associations can be explained by the socio-historical discursive relations between nation, culture, race and language I have outlined in this paper.

Pennycook, pointing out the work of Kramsch and Sullivan (1996) hopes for a more empowering understanding of language education as *appropriation*. In the case of Taiwan I have tried to show that language has always been a political tool for both domination and resistance. Kramsch sees resistance happening through “a pedagogy of appropriation, based on the unique privilege of the non-native speaker to poach on the

so called authentic territory of others, and make the language their own.” (p.210)
Pennycook (DCL, 1999) says:

 this syncretic model of cultural interaction works with a version of cultural difference that acknowledges that cultures are heterogeneous, diverse and dynamic; that cultural relations produce hybrid forms; that people actively appropriate cultural forms (rather than accept or reject them); and that the product of such appropriation (heterosis) maybe different from the sum of its original parts. (p.18)

The fact that language attainment is expressed as something that needs to be “poached” reveals the strength of the association of groups with languages. Although I believe Pennycooke’s point is valid, I also think this perspective can obscure the way powerful socio-political and economic forces push societies toward cultural and linguistic homogeneity. I believe both of these tendencies, homogenizing and diffracting forces, need to be kept in mind when considering the nature and import of language education in Taiwan and globally. Neither should be assumed nor neglected.

CHAPTER FIVE: INTERVIEWS

In light of these discussions I would like to look at the responses of the educators I interviewed on the topic of Taiwanese identity and language education.

5.1 Description of Interviews:

I did six interviews with teachers and administrators in Southern Taiwan in an attempt to elicit responses that would give a sense of how questions of language, culture, race and nation were thought of in relation to the question of Taiwanese identity. I decided to include responses of only four of these interviews so that I could compare and contrast them with each other in a reasonable amount of space for this study. They were chosen on the basis of the range of perspectives they represented.

In the interviews I asked each participant twenty-four questions. I have chosen to provide responses to about half of these. The questions were given to the participants in written Mandarin Chinese a day before the interview. They were also given time to reread the questions before answering them. I did not want them to write the answers and return them because I believed giving spoken responses would mean less self-editing. However, because English was a foreign language for them, to make sure they had understood the questions very clearly they were given in written form. There was a Mandarin translator in the room during the interviews but he was called upon very few times as the teachers seemed confident in their understanding and ability to answer the questions. One of the interviews was done entirely in Mandarin and translated. When transcribing the answers, I took the liberty of placing grammatical corrections in parenthesis to facilitate ease of reading. This sometimes included adding a noun or pronoun, correcting a common mistake, where in English it is repeated while in Mandarin it is not. I also sometimes suggested another term or phrase that I thought corresponded to the participant's intent when they used a word that seemed awkward. The original word is left in the transcription with the suggested replacement word in

parentheses. The original phrasing is available by ignoring the parenthesis. In this way the reader may get a different interpretation than the one I felt was most obvious.

The questions were deliberately general and deliberately repeated. They were rephrased with a small shift in meaning in order to give the participant a chance to tackle issues in a general way more than once. Similar questions were spaced so that participants would cycle through the issues and not be confined to one issue completely at a time but would be able to respond to each issue from a slightly different perspective at a different time. My intention was to achieve a more comprehensive statement of their positions on each issue. I believe this worked well. When the participants came to a question similar to a previous one, I believe they responded more spontaneously which was what I was aiming for. I was especially looking for consistencies and inconsistencies in their answers both as individuals and between the participants. For each individual I hoped to be able to find out not only his/her opinion but also how definite or indefinite they were. Because most were speaking English, hesitations were not interpreted as uncertainty about the topic. A Mandarin or Taiwanese interview could have looked at these hesitations as a part of the interpretations. Instead, I therefore had to look solely at the content of their remarks, and some differences in phrasing, to try to determine consistency. There were limitations in the participants' abilities to reproduce a large number of modifying phrases in English that are important for determining consistency or variation in ideas. However, I believe their abilities in English were sufficient for making out some general features of consistency and inconsistency in their answers. Once again, these phrases would be more readily telling in an analysis of their answers in Mandarin or Taiwanese.

I also wanted to know if there were general consistencies or marked inconsistencies from individual to individual. In the interpretations I was not trying to correlate answers to the person's particular position as a male or female, or as an administrator or classroom teacher. The only presumption was that they were all professional educators who would have an interest in the topic and would have given some previous thought to the issues raised. My subjective impression was that they were forthright and desired to express their true opinions. The group was evenly split between two different primary schools in the same part of the same city in southern

Taiwan and is therefore not a randomly selected group for Taiwanese teachers. For Taiwan it is also not statistically significant to any extent. On the other hand, because they were familiar with me as an English teacher and administrator at both schools I hoped that they would feel comfortable and not be intimidated to express their thoughts on the issues. The results in this regard were extremely encouraging as there was little uneasiness or hesitancy to answer on the parts any of the participants. I was also interested in getting these educators to reflect on standard practice and perceptions and their own attitudes to questions of language instruction, culture and race. Finally, I was also interested in the amount of self-reflection each participant gave to the issues and, although there was a range of difference, I was pleasantly surprised at the ease with which the questions were handled despite the use of English rather than Taiwanese or Mandarin indicating an informed understanding of most of the issues. This is hardly surprising given the topical nature of the question of identity in Taiwan.

5.2 : Racial, National and Ethnic Identity

Participants were asked to designate themselves by race, nationality, and ethnicity and their reasons for making those designations. Typically, in their answers they did not distinguish ethnicity and race. Race was conflated with ancestry. Some effort was made to distinguish nationality from the other categories. All of the participants were born in Taiwan and only one of the participants' parents were born outside of Taiwan.

Questions 1-3

Where were you born? Where do your ancestors come from? What is your ethnicity?

What is your nationality? Please give reasons for your answers.

Give a brief definition of: nationality, ethnicity and race if you like.

Does that influence whether you think you are Taiwanese or Chinese? How?

A: I've thought that I'm Taiwanese since I was young. I am sure about this identity because I was born in Taiwan. I'm both Taiwanese and Chinese. Of course according to culture and blood I'm Chinese..the only difference is I am living in Taiwan.

B: Republic of China (Taiwanese). My parents told us from the time we were little. There was no mention of Chinese. According to my lineage (I'm) Taiwanese

C: What I think...its very hard to say this. I always say I am Chinese. I'm Chinese. My nationality is Chinese. Why? I can't give you the answer. I think our government can't answer. I think Chinese is better for me.

D: Nationality is a person who lives in a nations now in Taiwan we say our nationality is ROC butwe can say that we are Chinese. Now we say we are Taiwanese nationality but in (unintelligible)-because our ancestors all came from China we can combine with the mainland we are willing to be Chinese.

Analysis of Answers 1-3:

This range of answers is typical of what I have heard in Taiwan. 'A' talks about feeling as if he/she were Taiwanese but when questions of blood relation and culture come in "of course" Chineseness is evoked. Is he/she saying that he/she is therefore a Chinese who *happens to* live in Taiwan or rather a Taiwanese who *happens to* have Chinese ancestry. This echoes the program of enculturation undertaken by the KMT where Taiwanese were inundated with the 'fact' of their racial and cultural Chineseness. Chineseness is deeper and more profound than Taiwaneseeness which is *ethnically* derivative. B's experience is different, claiming to be exposed mainly to designations as Taiwanese. And in contrast to the others, his/her "lineage" is designated as Taiwanese and not Chinese. C is the only one with a parent from the mainland and his/her Chineseness although "hard to say" habitually says he/she is Chinese. Furthermore there is some exasperation about who really knows why that should be so? Not even the government. While A refers to "blood and culture" as determining their Chinese identity, D refers to nationality, but in two ways: as a Republic of China citizen and as a Taiwanese citizen. This is a common point of contention and confusion in Taiwan. The participant only says "we can say" which indicates the degree of comfort he/she has

with the ambiguity of these designations and finally notes that, without question, because of ancestry Taiwanese are all Chinese.

For me this is typical of my conversations in Taiwan. Although none of these participants has ever been to China and most have no recent ancestors from there, they are quite willing to designate themselves as Chinese, racially or at least through blood relations except B, who I believe comes from a family who deliberately designate themselves as non-Chinese for political reasons. It is impossible that he/she has not been exposed to the idea that Taiwanese are all a branch of the Chinese family as it has been promoted in school and society for the past 50 years. Therefore while the program of Sinicizing appears to have been effective with this group, accepted as plausible, reasonable and significant for them, there remains doubt on the part of participant C, ambiguity for D, hesitation and questioning for C, and outright rejection on the part of participant B. These different approaches and understandings underscore the great diversity of opinions and the degree of ambiguity there is for national, racial and ethnic designations in Taiwan.

Question 4: Nationality: Is your nationality or ethnicity important to you? Why? Why not?

A: Of course nationality is very important. No state, no family. It's not necessary for me to think about where my ancestors are from. Human beings should consider their origins to accord with their country...to cherish and love their homeland.

B: Yes, it is very important. Taiwan is my country. I want it (Taiwanese) to be my nationality.

C: So far it's not very important. Maybe it's not. Not for relationships, for my job, for my family.

D: This is an important question. Some people think they are independent. Many people don't think this way. Example.. I was born in Taiwan but I hope I am Chinese because this was my ancestor's birthplace. If Taiwan and China can combine as one is important to the Taiwanese. Nationality is more important than ancestry because I know nationality is more important. So I believe ancestry is important but nationality is more important.

Analysis of Answers to Question 4 :

It is interesting how the opportunity to respond to this question was taken differently by the participants. A uses it to express nationalist and primordial sentiments. B makes a straightforward political claim for independence. C is very pragmatic and says “so far” this issue isn’t important while no doubt fully realizing the potential for conflict and change the question implies. D’s desires for a unification are freely expressed. The last part of D’s statement is difficult to interpret but by evoking ancestry, when it was not a part of the question, the speaker suggests that ancestry should be considered in the debate on nationality. Nationality, as stated before, is an almost unquestionable modern social and political value. This group represents almost the entire range of feelings on the national question. ‘A’ does not advocate unification but evokes ancestry and homeland. He/she thinks that homeland is not stated and is difficult to guess from their response to the first question. B is pro-independence. C is ambivalent but presumably at this point would accept unification from his/her answer in the first question where he/she naturally designates him/herself as Chinese, and D is straightforwardly for unification despite not being of immediate mainland descent. It should be clear that the lines that separate different individual’s beliefs about unification can hardly be determined by whether they or their parents came over with the KMT. Although in general those advocating independence do not have family that came at mid century, while those who advocate unification do, after 50 years opinions on the island do not follow these lines very strictly anymore. Exact statistical analysis of a large sample group would likely determine this more clearly.

Questions 6, 7: The relationship between Taiwaneseeness and Chineseness

What is the relationship between Taiwanese people and Chinese people on the mainland? Answer in terms of nationality, ethnicity and race?

What does it mean to be Taiwanese? What does it mean to be Chinese?

A: This is a big problem. In my opinion it's connected with politics. I will have more chances to visit the mainland of China. I think that I am also Chinese. Chinese and Taiwanese are not different. We are the same. But on the politics maybe there is some argument about education or citizenship. It's not very important. You must do well in your work...be able to live in Taiwan. This is what is important. Not whether you are Chinese or Taiwanese.

B: We are *Ben Shen Ren* not *Wei Shen Ren*. There is a little conflict between them. We are the same nationality. Maybe someday they will (go) back to (the) mainland. I think they don't really love Taiwan. Their hearts stay in China.

C: Meaning of Taiwanese: Just live in Taiwan. Chinese: same thing.

D: All Taiwanese except native (Aboriginal) Taiwanese all come from China, so appearance is all the same...yellow skin, black eyes and hair. We speak the same language so I would say Taiwanese and Chinese are the same race.

Analysis of Answers 6, 7:

'A' wants to diminish the importance between Chineseness and Taiwaneseeness by emphasizing good citizenship and turning away from mere labels. It is a political question that he/she doesn't offer a response to except to hope to be able to go to the mainland, suggesting that some form of normalization between the two sides of the strait that would allow such practices is what is desired. He/she says he is "also" Chinese, suggesting that first off he/she is Taiwanese and secondly Chinese, putting homeland ahead of ancestry. This clarifies somewhat the question of ordering posed in response to his answer in question 1 where he/she says he is a Chinese "living in Taiwan" that suggested the opposite ordering. B is consistent and now gives a reason for claiming a difference that is a part of the rhetoric for pro-independence espoused by

many in Taiwan. *Wai shen ren* (mainlanders) do not love the land as local Taiwanese do. Comments by A and D would likely be interpreted as evidence for this lack of love for the island. C is trying to be pragmatic but is almost contradicting his/her previous statements. If being called Chinese means living in mainland China, since it is contrasted with Taiwan (this is presumably what he/she means when claiming that Chinese live in China and Taiwanese live in Taiwan) then why call him/herself “Chinese”? By desiring to have clear-cut designations as this answer implies it is no wonder this participant feels exasperated by the profound ambiguity in the question of social identity in Taiwan. D chooses to interpret the question in racial terms and is consistent in using racial unity, along with culture, as reasons for political unification as expressed in the previous answer.

In these responses the participants are fairly consistent. A acknowledges his/her Chineseness but does not commit to national unification. B is against unification and gives reasons why. He/she takes a definitive political stand. C is confused by the ambiguity both about the general question of national and racial identity and their relationships and about his/her own self-designation as someone born in Taiwan but who refers to himself/herself as Chinese. D is pro-unification and provides the reasons of common race and culture for that stand.

5.3 Language Use, Education and Status

In the interviews done with the educators in southern Taiwan all of the respondents thought it was important to learn all of the three languages: Taiwanese, Mandarin and English. Interestingly, there was little enthusiasm about having Taiwanese taught in the schools. Two participants were supportive of the government policy for including Taiwanese in the curriculum but were more interested in the prospects for improving English programs, while two others felt strongly that Taiwanese should remain the spoken language at home and should not be taught in school at all. Speculating somewhat, this may be a result of wanting more space for the English language in the public school curriculum, but it also may have to do with keeping the public and private spheres distinct. This is understandable as the private sphere has long provided a refuge from the machinations of colonial and national infiltration and manipulation of culture. Follow up questioning might help determine this. There was near unanimity on the question of the social status of languages and the opportunities afforded by the learning of each.

Question 9:

Is there a particular status attached to speaking Chinese, Taiwanese and English? What is the relative status given to those who use these three languages? Why do you think this is the case?

A: Most people think if you can speak English you are an upper class person of position and status and education. They will give you the good name “intellectual”. If you can only speak Taiwanese and cannot speak English or Mandarin you are a lower middle class person or peasant. In fact this was the thinking but when we are educated we cannot agree with language classes. Maybe we have strong expectations about language. If you have more than one language you have more chances to do things. You can make unlimited potential for yourself when you look for work. You have a good chance if you can speak more languages than others. Eg. If you are good at English. You can choose an overseas company. If you cannot speak English you cannot. This is the reason

parents pay more attention to studying English than the (mother) language. Parents are cool to study the mother language. Actually in Taiwan English provides a good chance to look for a job in the future.

B: English speakers are high status people. High level of English. Taiwanese belong to low class...not enough education. Mandarin everyone can. But now emphasize Taiwanese. We love our country so we need to speak our language

C: It's (English) very popular. I think learning English in Taiwan. If you can learn English you can show how good you are. Symbolize(s) higher position. Good chance to take a (good) job and (good) salary.

D: (long pause) In usual we say Mandarin and Taiwanese we have no difference but English most people have the confidence. English is the international language...strong culture..if you can speak English the status is higher. In Taiwan most people speak Taiwanese. Only because Mandarin is very popular. In T.V. in public we all can listen to Mandarin except old man and old woman. Except this group we can all speak Mandarin.

Analysis of Answers to Question 9:

English and Mandarin afford high status. Ability in Taiwanese only, is a marker of low social class. Older people did not have an opportunity to learn Mandarin but both Mandarin ability and English ability are indicators of economic class as families with money can afford the best schools for both languages. Although everyone understands Mandarin not everyone is equally competent. English is even more prestigious because it indicates even more access to education than does Mandarin. 'B' consistently advocates the use of the Taiwanese language as an indication of love of the island of Taiwan. Here national independence and the Taiwanese language are being associated.

Question 10 Fairness of the status of different languages:

In another response all the participants considered these language classes as unfair. 'A' suggested that it is "immature" to judge people this way. Nonetheless, respondents made it is clear that being educated in Mandarin, and any English ability, constitute a valuable form of "cultural capital" to use Bourdieu's phrase. One

respondent claimed that it was very unfair that some people in Taiwan had access to English while others did not and wondered how the everyone might gain access to good English instruction equally. When asked about the relationship between language and culture and the potential loss of Taiwanese language and culture, once again the participants were consistent:

5.4 The Problem of the Loss of Taiwanese Language and Tradition

Questions 11, 12

Many young people cannot speak Taiwanese now. Do you think this is a problem? Why? What do you think the causes of this are? What do you think should be done about it, if anything? Do you think that Taiwanese students are in danger of losing traditional values, for example family values or community values, because of foreign influences like movies, magazines, television, and advertising? With your answer in mind what do you think the significance of language education is in determining the values of Taiwanese students? Consider the role of learning Taiwanese, English and Mandarin in your answer.

A: This kind of problem is reflective of the present situation in Taiwan but most people and many parents can't understand it. I am a teacher, I think we now live in an age between traditional and modern times (a tug of war stage). We want to safeguard our tradition, but we can't. Because there are too many pressures from abroad, like movies, songs, books, even the internet. Contemporary adults and youth are not interested in local culture anymore. They like foreign cultures, Western and Japanese styles eg. They adore the Japanese "Hari" group. I means youth are losing their way in a complicated world. At present the government is paying more attention to having students study local culture. There are many teaching programs and activities to get youth to know and cherish our local culture, to value its inherent worth, to understand the value of things we have inherited from our ancestors. I mean not all traditional things are bad. It can help young people to think about their ideas and sense of the world and the sense of their territory and keep a balance between them, not to lose their way in the fashionable world. It is a danger for a person not to know the history of their family=clan=root...it will be difficult for the society, the nation to improve. Once youth lose the sense of traditional values their society will be terrible and hopeless.

B: We are a poor (pathetic?) people...we don't have our own country. We don't have our traditional values...Are we Taiwanese or Chinese...we are confused. We don't have our tradition. Some people love Japanese...we listen to Western news to show our high education and make friends and get more information and knowledge

C: Some problem. Taiwanese culture. If you can use Taiwanese it will be better to understand Taiwanese culture. Like speak English use more than...anytime anywhere. English and Japanese can have this effect.

D: Nowadays in Taiwan the students study many kinds (of language) except (besides) the mother language. The one is English, the other is Mandarin. When we study English we can learn the other culture same time maybe. We can lose our own culture....we don't (without)know(ing) we can lose(it). The international(world) is closer and closer everyday. The world is (becoming) one culture. We will also know the other culture and communicate eas(il)y. More and more we(are) lose(ing) the traditional value(s). Yes, I am convinced we have this problem. The young people learn many(a lot) from America, Europe, other culture(s). If we keep the traditional(ways?) we can learn the other culture(without harm?). We can learn the complete things or learn(things from?) Canada America France, Germany (who) have information and the technology very very fast. We can learn from you. Yes, our values lose some(as well).

Analysis of Answers to Questions 11, 12.

'A' considers the 'tug a war' between modernity and tradition to require a balance. Tradition is equated with family=clan=root, an attitude strongly aligned with the orientation of education on the island from the time of the KMT's arrival. Tradition and a sense of ancestral heritage is considered crucial for ensuring the integrity of Taiwanese society. Safeguarding tradition against the wave of outside influences seems impossible for him/her despite this claim. This pessimism is even more pronounced in the pathos of 'B's comments. The deep felt sense of loss of social grounding is palpable and profound. This is consistent with his/her desire for the reestablishment of a true Taiwanese identity years of cultural overwriting, Chinese nationalist discourses, and industrialization and modernization have buried. Nonetheless, he/she is forward looking and sees English as a vehicle for positive social change. B's pathos is in stark contrast to C who considers the continued use of Taiwanese as a solution to reinvigorating Taiwanese culture, and while acknowledging some problem does not dramatically

express deep concern about the loss of Taiwanese culture. 'D' is forward looking and while acknowledging that traditional values and languages can be lost without the society noticing nonetheless advocates opening up to other cultures, the learning of other languages and learning new technologies. Once again the participants, while agreeing with the problem, frame it in very different ways and have entirely different interpretations of what the loss of Taiwanese culture and language mean for the society of Taiwan. They uniformly think English and internationalism are good things for the people of Taiwan to embrace and this seems to override any desire for a program of Taiwanese cultural reconstruction.

5. 4 The Association of Race, Nation and Language in Choice of Teachers

On the question of race what surprised me was the matter-of-factness, the unselfconsciousness, of racial associations with countries and languages and the naturalness of the association between adequate teaching of English and white teachers. One of the participants seemed to equate whiteness with American or Canadian teachers very strongly, thinking "white skinned teacher" meant American or Canadian teacher. He/she was asked to look at the question again as I wanted the participants to consider the suitability of different "racial types" for teaching English and I needed him/her to understand the distinction to get an adequate response.

Question 18: Do you think skin colour or other factors related to a teacher's appearance affects parents', teachers' or administrators' attitudes about the teachers' suitability as an English teacher?

A: There is a proverb in Chinese "The Buddha needs the golden appearance the people need beautiful clothes= people need good clothes to change their temperament and image. Normally, we get a first impression from a person's appearance. We get a first impression from the foreign teacher from their dress, appearance, facial colour. Of course later you can know them day by day. But at the beginning you don't know them well. Only depend on facial colour, and their way they treat others to judge. In the new semester Dean (name) introduced a foreign teacher to us. He had tanned skin. There were few tan skinned teachers at the university. Both students and parents had difficulty to

accept him so considering that we didn't employ him. But as multiculturalism increases many of these worries will be reduced.

B: Character and personality is more important than where people come from. Appearance ...I don't think (it's) important. Some people think that ability (of non-whites) is not good. Skin colour affects parents' (thinking). We like white people most (more) than black people (for teaching English). Impression of lower person because of where they come from originally.

C: Oh it will a little.

D: Nowadays, in Taiwan the government office..officials... We all have the thinking that if we have the foreign people, because English is the mother language and fluent we like you to teach our students. Parents also know this. Because the best teachers come from America and Canada.

Analysis of Answers to Question 18:

'A' seems to be saying that the first impression will be quite bad for an English teacher if they are not white, although "day by day" this impression can be changed. The non-acceptance of the "tan skinned" teacher corresponds to many situations I witnessed in Taiwan including hiring and firing practices and general happiness on the part of parents and schools with non-Caucasian teachers. 'B' seems to contradict him/her self by saying first that skin colour doesn't matter but notes that really parents and others will think of dark skinned people as "lower". She is also expressing the common assumption that skin colour can determine a person's place of origin, or nationality. 'D' interprets the question as referring to nationality not race, in fact conflating the two. Skin colour truly does leave an impression on the minds of many people in Taiwan. Status as a Caucasian is very high. It is one of the reasons white teachers enjoy living in Taiwan as they receive a relative status much higher than they would normally if they remained at home. Many are working in a well-respected field of education in Taiwan as well, without the qualifications required to teach at home. Indians, Filipinos and Blacks on the other hand, can meet resistance, may be paid less, and must tolerate more criticism from employers if they want to teach English in Taiwan. In a further question about the adequacy of different races for the participants elaborated:

Question 19.

Do you think a fair skinned person is more likely to be accepted as a suitable English teacher than a dark skinned person by Taiwanese parents, students or administrators? Why do you think this is so?

A: If the skin colour is not too dark..the feeling is not too uncomfortable as long as dress and behaviour is not too strange. Basically we can accept them. Taiwanese skin is also very tanned but it is also very important where you are from. If you are from US Canada and other native English countries there is no problem to employ you. But if you are not from a native English speaking country just like the Philippines or other European countries. You will be refused.

D: long pause: I say no! We choose the English teacher that can teach read(ing) and writ(ing) and teach more. (Interviewer rephrases...). Maybe the one reason is that all say the white skin...we say the white skin come from America. Dark skin come from Africa. (laughs) but there are many dark skin in America can speak fluent English.

Analysis of Answers to Question 19:

‘A’ notes the difficulty of “non-native” speakers with darker skin in being accepted. European countries are also singled out. However, I have known “non-native” white teachers of English who have had little problem in their employment as a result of their accents. Filipinos and Indians are interesting cases because technically their accents are no further from “standard British” or “standard American” English than many other forms of English (consider the many London or American dialects), yet they have little opportunity to share their language or teaching expertise in Taiwan. Once again D associates skin colour with nationality and nervously laughs about blacks being associated with Africa. Laughter, it should be noted, often means something different for Taiwanese than for Canadians, for instance. In this case I believe it was indicative of embarrassment and not ridicule.

.
Question 22. Many parents and administrators insist on having light skinned or white skinned foreign teachers? Why?

A: I never have this kind of problem. My daughter's first English teacher is a Filipino who immigrant to US also his English is not standard and his skin is tanned, tanned but the way he taught was so lively and good. Although the tuition fee is high, many students want to be taught by him. My friend introduced this teacher for my daughter since she was four. Now her English is good. Maybe some parents think that the light skinned teacher will teach better but in fact if the teacher really teaches well they can also be accepted by the students and their parents. So the skin colour is not the most important thing. Later on we'll have more and more foreign teachers and the conception of the skin colour will be fainter and fainter.

B: Why white teacher? Because they (Taiwanese people/parents) think they(blacks) are low so (they) want whites. Most suitable accent is American because T.V. and movies(?).

C: But at X school there is a South African teacher. He is black (laughs).

D: This is an old (previous) question. Dark(skin) have some(people) refuse. Not me, (refuse) but the skin...if we have this idea or parents(have it) but many don't have this idea. We are convinced that the skin colour is innate. Not a big question. We are open to receive any kind of people. We can go to another country and see white, yellow, black anyone.

Analysis of Answers to Question 22.

'A's personal experience with his daughter's teacher, I believe, has made an impression on him/her about the suitability of teachers of English and race. 'B' explains again that dark skin is associated with lower class people and the effect of movies for creating the desire for American teachers (likely with white actors and actresses). C laughs (nervously? derogatorily?) about a situation where another school has hired a black English teacher. D distances himself from the common perception of the suitability of certain races for teaching English. Nonetheless when talking of the potential for meeting others abroad he/she uses racial categories.

When it came to the question of the suitability of Taiwanese teachers to teach English; only one participant felt that fluent and qualified Taiwanese teachers would not be suitable to teach English. A and D cite cultural understanding as a reason why Taiwanese teachers, as opposed to Filipinos, for instance, are suitable to teach Taiwanese students English. Cultural familiarity is able to outweigh the stigma of 'non-

nativeness' in this case for determining teacher suitability. It should also be noted that Chinese teachers are not considered 'low status' as is the case for non-white foreigners.

5.5 Questions 21, 23 The Choice of Accents for Teachers of English.

Question 21: Do you think Taiwanese teachers can teach English as well as "native" speakers of English with the same amount of training? What kind of English should students learn? American? Australian? British? Other? Why

A: It's not the same because we are trained in different education systems, conceptions and ideas will be different. Including(thinking about) supply and demand. Mainly we are talking about American accent and style or the British accent (style). The American accent is more formal and standardized..just like Mandarin. In fact we don't care too much about accent. The most important thing is that we can communicate with each other. If you can speak English that's enough. That's excellent but difficult. It's difficult for the Hakka to speak Mandarin. They are different from Ming Nan people Beijing and other provincial people..its not connected to educational quality. Also it doesn't mean Mandarin is good and Hakka is not good. The way you are educated, your attitude are the most important factor. If you find a teacher who can teach you well that's a good teacher.

B: Foreign teacher(s are) is better than Taiwanese (for) elementary (classes). Middle school (students) need Chinese explanation(s) for grammar. Fluent Taiwanese (teachers are) ok. Qualification(s) (are) not as important as heart, love kids and patience. Taiwanese(teachers) are not the best way. (They) cannot teach(English) as well even though(they have) the same qualifications.

C: Anyone is better(OK). But in Taiwan more people are learning American English. Why? (It's) what we learned before. Maybe(we learned it from) it comes from the magazine. They speak American English. That's what we want to learn. They don't know which one is American or British. English they just learn.

D: In general the English teacher from anywhere with the same training can teach well but attitude is important...(to) teach very hard(make an effort) he can teach the students well. What kind is lost would really tell you America is the mainstream...all people...parents would (like to) learn the American English because it is the most popular international language. They have the strong power (The language?people? are powerful).

Analysis of Answers to Questions 21:

‘A’ seems to suggest Bourdieu’s point about language as capital and the values of American and British English in that respect but then retreats to the notion that simple communication is really the most important factor for language learning. Finally, by comparing Mandarin and Hakka ‘A’ seems to be taking an apolitical view of linguistics that all languages are equal. This view implies a laissez faire attitude to the politics of language learning. By making it a personal responsibility, that success depends on “one’s attitude”, ‘A’ avoids the structural aspect of language learning and social differentiations. ‘B’ s response indicates a certain perspective on method where young learners are best taught aurally while middle school requires translation. This probably arises from ‘B’ s focus on high school entrance exams in English that are heavy in grammar questions. Overall ‘B’ seems to think Taiwanese teachers cannot teach English as well as ‘native’ teachers, likely because of accent or general proficiency. ‘C’ points to the historical precedent of American English on the island and the orientation of the mass media to American, using “magazines” as an example. ‘D’ notes the “mainstream” presence of American English and the “strong power” of American culture. It is a norm that is desired to be acquired for the enhancement of one’s own power.

Nationality and Accent

Question 23. What kind of English accent is most suitable for Taiwanese students to learn? For example: British, American, or Australian. Why?

A: I'm not an English education specialist so I don't know too much about it. But I think there are different values between educators about method. The most important thing is effectiveness. Can they make kids feel interested in studying English. It's not important to study an American or British accent or Australian. Maybe American accent is the main trend, also British accent is not bad. But most use the KK alphabet at present. It's from the US not from Britain. Once my daughter studied in England for one month. She liked it because it was formal and standard. Some people choose to study an American accent because it is a super power nation. Maybe I'd choose the British accent because of the first generation of American emigrated from England. Time pass by, the accent(s) changed. If you want to study the British accent will be better...beautiful. I don't know too much about it but everyone who knows English will think that British accent just like Mandarin in China.(is) very excellent

B: Maybe American (accent is the best) because we accept their culture. We get confused by strong accents.

C: If I can learn American English I only can speak American. British (English is) very beautiful. (There is a problem with) British(English) have problem because kids(are) learn (ing to understand) American English but(the British) accent is ok. In my opinion. I know America is the mainstream. Most people like to learn American English.

Analysis of Answers to Question 23:

For 'A' American English is "the trend" but aesthetically British English is beautiful. We can speculate on why it should be perceived in this way but Bourdieu's point about the feminisation of dominant language, in contraposition to the vulgar and course dialects, suggests itself. The comparison of the (standard) British accent to (official) Mandarin, also a dominant language form is telling in this regard. American English is depicted as derivative of British English, suggesting that there is one main

standard to which all others owe their power. The advantage of American English is its association with the powerfulness of the American nation. ‘B’ says “strong accents are confusing, suggesting again that American English doesn’t constitute an accent and that all other Englishes are to be measured by their distance from that standard. ‘C’ compares American and British accents using the criteria of beauty and distribution, each having their own merits. D reiterates how profuse American English has become as a reason that Taiwanese prefer to learn it.

5. 6 Conclusions from Analysis of Interviews:

The consciousness of the status of users of different languages was highly visible with the participants. Although there was some notion that this is unfair and a product of socio-historical conditions, there was nothing in the way of suggesting that Taiwanese or aboriginal languages needed strong intervention for promotion. The inclusion of Taiwanese in the public schools was thought of rather neutrally and even negatively. This perspective is quite curious to me and I guessed it might have something to do with wanting to protect it as a domestic possession. It reflects a particular position described by Pennycook (DCL) and represented by Crystal, who he criticizes, that says that multilingualism is desirable with a common international language of commerce and education and home languages that have non-official functions. Pennycook is critical of this view because it assumes that local languages can resist the colonization of the dominant languages even in the domestic sphere.

What these interviews showed me were tendencies in these groups towards an association of language, nation and race, if not in their own minds at least in the way they characterized the thinking of Taiwanese people in general. These associations were not absolute. There were gestures made toward the idea that the English language could be taught by anyone who was qualified and perhaps more importantly, committed and dedicated to doing a good job. Qualified and committed Taiwanese teachers were preferred over all other ‘non-native’ speakers because of their intimate knowledge of their students. Nonetheless, there is a definite awareness of the accent as an important

factor in the acquisition of English and the association of the 'native' speaker with the standard for English that naturally should be sought out.

CHAPTER SIX: THE ALIENATING CLOAK OF ESSENTIALISM

Although we have the capacity to understand people in many different ways with the application of many different forms of classification a certain system of classification has come to dominate our thinking in a way that limits that flexibility. There is relatively consistent general discourse that has been propagated globally, although not without controversy or contestation, that has come to attain status as the natural and objective classification of human beings. It retains the *aura* of scientific objectivity, even though reputable science no longer adheres to this view, and we carry it around with us like a well-worn cloak. It is a familiar shell that, although usually not always relevant to our immediate activities, it erupts into view when its logic is challenged. It provides a sense of belonging to a greater whole that has a fixed natural structure but it divides us from others who we may have more in common with than we dare to know.

These naturalized self-understandings are not far removed from certain conceptions of religion. This association has been made by many theorists, including Benedict Anderson (1981), to explain the rise and power of nationalism, but I want to extend the religious metaphor, the idea there is some preordained place that is established for each of us in the scheme of the universe, to the other aspects of social identity as well. A part of it is race but it is not limited to that form of categorization. We are told we have a culture, but we experience a wide variety of activities that do not have a single common thread. We are told we speak a particular language, but the modes of use of that language are anything but uniform. We are told we are national citizens, but this association is only maintained under a constant imposition of images and slogans that appear forced and arbitrary. We are told that racism does not exist, but we see it all around us. These categorizations work complementarily. I have tried to show, in turn, as with race, that none of them can be considered essential aspects of individuals or societies and should be strongly questioned whenever they are employed in discourse to justify some social project or policy or understanding of real difference.

The direct logical outcome of thinking of individuals as falling into precise categories is that when a group of people are understood to occupy those categories in

roughly the same way that group comes to be understood as having a distinct social identity. The psychological effect of understanding individuals with the same attributes living in a geographically defined region is the creation of an impression of some idealized individual written large, into the identity of the entire society. Or, rather, the individual more or less fits the pattern established as a norm that constitutes the identity of the society. Therefore, when identity terms applied to individuals are considered essential, so too is there a tendency to consider the identity of the social group to be based on essential qualities.

We are therefore led to speak of English societies, Black societies, and the Taiwanese society as though the term captured something of the essence of that group that corresponds to the way it is composed of individuals of a certain type. As Willinsky says:

Our subjectivity is written and named within historically contingent texts of schools and popular culture. We are as we are named. (Willinsky, 1998, p. 24)

The human world is therefore experienced not as the multidimensional and complicated situation it is but as the mundane substitution of human types. Reflection on the uniqueness of self and other is erased and substituted with the reflex of general categorizations. These stereotypes become imbedded in official and non-official discourses unconsciously.

are not anything as what we have learned to call ourselves. Learning to read ourselves within and against how we are written, too, seems to be a part of the educational project..but learning to read oneself is also about learning to read the other, as we consider how to re-write the learner and the *learned*, perceptions of difference. How are we to overcome the foreignness of the other, if not first finding it in ourselves, as we have made ourselves over in education and were all born foreign (ignorant, poorly spoken, barbaric). Hence we are all foreigners. 'the stranger is within me.' (Julia Kristeva, 1991. Cited in Willinsky, 1998, p. 264)

Because a frame of mind persists that the words, American, Chinese, or Taiwanese need to correspond to some essential common quality in a populace, the exact attributes that should be considered determinative of that society's social identity are debated endlessly in the social sciences and popular discourse. Positions are staked out on how to define identity in terms of some combination of race, ethnicity, and language. One or more may be considered foundational or essential while others are considered derivative. It is my position that these terms work together to give the impression of a common essence but that alone none of them can be established as a rational basis for categorizing human beings in any non-historical, immutable or essential way. As in the case of nation-ness, which is an originally artificial and learned association, they are imagined qualities that mask much more complex linguistic and cultural realities where identities are constantly being negotiated and contested, not only in Taiwan but everywhere.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study I have tried to show that what are normally considered the basic facets of social identity, have become naturalized and strongly associated in discourse on Taiwanese identity. They have become common sense attributes on which the discourse on Taiwan identity is focussed. While not neglecting the way Chineseness, as a single term associated with race, ethnicity, nationality and language has also been contested as an appropriate identification for the Islanders of Taiwan who consider Taiwanese and Chineseness as analytically and historically unique designations, the force of an assumed Chineseness, defined under these categories, remains powerful in Taiwanese society.

I have tried to outline the processes by which the force of this identity thinking became established. The establishment of a national and bureaucratic rationality, first with the Japanese and then with the KMT, which sought to harness the minds and bodies of the populace as a means for creating social stability and economic production at the same time produced national Taiwanese citizens. Nation-ness became a naturalized part of how Taiwanese people came to see themselves, even though, for many, this nation-ness was hoped for but never fully attained in an indigenous form.

Focussing on education, with Foucault, I noted how modern institutes tend to subjectivize populations through regimes of disciplinary power that take the body as an object of technical manipulation and observation. This creates a docile populace that internalises the monitoring gaze. State and institutional practices are therefore implicit forms of learning, perhaps better described as training. Traditional patterns of spatial and temporal consciousness become transformed in these processes and the Taiwanese population entered the modern world through these processes. I argued that this exactly followed the pattern established with capitalism and colonialism that occurred with the emerging European nations.

The presumption of a hierarchy of racial types that was a presumption of colonial exploitation was also repeated in Taiwan. More explicit forms of self-understanding and human distinction were adapted by western trained KMT intellectuals from the discourses on the natural and human sciences and became a part of

the Taiwanese educational curricula as they did across the globe. I claimed that the authority of science endorsed the objective classification of human types in the categories of race, ethnicity and language and that these categories became naturally associated with specific nations through cultural re-education. Certain types were taught to be superior to others. Whites and Han Chinese were depicted as being at the top of the hierarchy. There was deference to the logic of white supremacy with Han Chineseness aspiring to that topmost place.

The association of nation-ness with a presumed homogeneous culture was an explicit and rigorously pursued educational process undertaken by the KMT over a fifty-year period. This process was a blatant example of what had occurred, or was occurring across the globe. National culture was naturalized through discursive means with the school system playing a leading role in that process. The establishment of a Chinese consciousness also has the potential of legitimising the mainland's claim that Taiwan become a province of greater China. The conflation of Chinese race, language and culture were conjoined to become a national norm overtly effacing difference, while those furthest removed from those norms struggled to compete from the margin.

The enforced use of Mandarin as an official language was a major factor for the creation of a specific Chinese identity on the island. The teaching of Mandarin advantaged the mainlanders and established a common mode of communication that facilitated the hegemonic domination of the mainlanders over their Taiwanese compatriots who were deficient in that form of cultural capital. However, the close association of culture, language, and nation with the oppressive activities of the KMT turned them into symbols of the atrocities never forgotten by the families who suffered under them. The Taiwanese managed to raise themselves into a comparable socio-economic position through private enterprise. When socio-political conditions became more democratic a complete political inversion became possible and the pro-Taiwanese DPP came to power.

This political change has opened the debate on Taiwanese identity in a dramatic manner. On the one hand there is a trend that can be seen with indigenous people globally where the question of authentic Taiwaneseness has come to the fore. On the other hand global capitalism has added another layer of class differentiation upon that

already established between mainlanders and islanders. Taiwanese society as a whole has come under pressure and is in danger of becoming just another society of consumption with culture becoming just another commodity to be bought and sold. In the racial hierarchy the path to whiteness, as the constructed international racial summit, passes through what has been constructed as racial, ethnic, linguistic and national Chineseness and the cultural capital of the English language which is associated with that whiteness. The responses from the interviews conducted with Taiwanese teachers indicate the unselfconscious association of the English language, whiteness, and Americanism as an unquestionable good to be attained in an international competitive environment.

Nonetheless, English is able to open Taiwan up to alternative international discourses and cultural spaces that may facilitate the rejection of the corporate world-view. Also, local Taiwanese languages, literature and theatre can possibly act as a cultural brake to the negative aspects of globalism by reorienting Taiwanese society to its local culture. However, as these languages are in decline, their future as a potential cultural force in Taiwan remains in question.

Prescriptively, I believe educational policy should not only attend to which languages are taught in Taiwan, but also to how equally instruction is distributed across the population. This entails considering the social conditions that predispose those who already possess the most cultural and economic capital to be able to continue to remain in positions of domination over those who do not. Instructional methods and policies should be adapted accordingly.

The history of resistance to foreign invasion needs to be readapted to the neo-colonial forms of intrusion the English language and capitalist exploitation represent. There needs to be a critical pedagogy that teaches Taiwanese students to look at the way language education has transformed the Taiwanese cultural landscape and continues to do so. Foreign teachers in Taiwan need to be more aware of their role in the reproduction of a global discourse of white supremacy. If they do teach in Taiwan they should attempt to give their students the means to critically engage contemporary and historical discourses that bear directly upon the question of Taiwanese identity and its relationship the racial differentiation adapted from the history of colonialism. They

should be given the opportunity to understand how whiteness in the form of Englishness and Americanism came to form the linguistic, racial and nationalist apex, and Chineseness and Mandarin came to represent the intermediate step.

APPENDIX 1

Ethics Committee Proposal

1. Supervisor: Verna St. Denis: INEP/Education Foundations, U. of Sask.

Researcher: Edmond G. Tetrault - Master of Education Candidate
Education Foundations Theses Program U. of Sask.

Committee members: Len Findlay: English Department, U. of Sask.
Michael Collins: Continuing Education, U. of Sask.

Anticipated start date: November 1, 2000

Anticipated completion date: December 1, 2000

2. Title of Study: "The Question of Taiwanese Identity
In the Context of Language Education"

3. Abstract: This is research into historical and contemporary aspects of language education in Taiwan and its relationship to concepts of ethnic, linguistic and national identity. This research will try to throw light on the complex relationship between language and identity. The information collected in the interviews will be used to supplement an analysis of historical and contemporary understandings of what can be legitimately called "Taiwanese identity" and how language education plays a part in its determination. Interviews with teachers and administrators in public elementary schools will yield a database of discourse which will be analyzed in light of the historical and theoretical discussion in the thesis. The subjects of this research will be asked questions about the significance of English, Mandarin and Taiwanese language education and its relationship to social and national identity.

4. Funding: The researcher is funding this research.

5. Participants: 6 (six) to 10 (ten) public elementary school teachers and administrators from two elementary schools in Kaohsiung county located in Southern Taiwan. Subjects will be asked by the English program director for their participation in the study, with permission from the school principle. Effort will be made to include an equal number of male and female participants. At least one head of academic studies will be approached to participate in the study.

6. Consent: Consent forms will be distributed and discussed with the subjects before their interview begins. Subjects will

be given the option to decline the interview. Participants will be asked to sign the consent form to signify their understanding of their rights as participants. See attached consent form.

7. Methods/Procedures: The researcher will perform 1 on 1 interviews with the subjects. Interviews will be recorded on cassette tape. The participants will be asked 25 questions and given time to respond in full. Each interview will last from 60 to 90 minutes. The content of tapes will later be transposed to written transcripts. There will be a translator to help with the questions and answers. Subjects will be encouraged to use both English and Mandarin Chinese to clarify their answers.

8. Storage of Data: Cassette tapes and transcripts will be stored in a locked cabinet in the supervisor's office in the Education Building at the University of Saskatchewan.

9. Dissemination of Results: The data will be published in the researcher's thesis and may be published as a journal article and/or as a seminar presentation.

10. Risk or Deception: There is a risk of misunderstanding due to limitations on the proficiency of the researcher in Mandarin and/or due to limitations of the proficiency of the subjects in English. However, consent forms will be translated into Mandarin Chinese and a Chinese translator will be present during the interviews.

11. Confidentiality: The names of the subjects and the participating institutes and information which might be used to identify the participants or institutes shall be kept confidential and will not be published in the thesis.

12. Data and Transcript Release When statements made by the participants may identify them they will be given transcripts of their interviews and will be given the option to withdraw any or all of their responses. They will also be given a data/transcript release form to acknowledge their permission for the publication of their statements as their intended and accurately documented meanings.

13 Debriefing and feedback: Subjects will be given an extensive explanation of the main goals of the research, the conclusions drawn from it and the use the information will be put to. Subjects will be given access to the theses upon its completion and will receive clarification of its content upon their request.

14. Signatures of the applicant(s) and department head.

APPENDIX 2

I understand that participation in interviews with the researcher, Edmond G.Tetrault are entirely voluntary.

I understand that information from the interviews will be used in the publication of the researcher's thesis at the University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada and that it may be presented at public seminars or published as an article in academic journals.

I understand that the content of this interview will be accessible only to the researcher, his supervisor and committee members before publication of the thesis.

I understand that if I decide at any point before, during, or up to the point of the publication of the thesis that the information collected in the interview should not be used for research I may request that it be precluded from publication.

I understand that the researcher will provide me with a transcript of the content of the interview upon my request and that I may have any or all of the content of the interview omitted from publication.

I understand that information pertaining to my identity including my name, address, place of work, or other information that might uniquely identify me as a subject in this research will not be published in the thesis or revealed by the researcher or supervisor. If there is any information in my statements which might personally identify me I understand that I will be asked for my signature on a transcript release form acknowledging my permission to publish that information.

I understand that the information collected in these interviews will be kept in a secure place and that information which might personally identify me as a participant or other information pertaining to my person will not be accessible to individuals other than the researcher and his supervisor before, during, or after the publication of the thesis. I understand that if there is a chance of identifying me as a interviewee that I will be given the opportunity to alter my response or have it deleted before publication of the information.

Signature of Subject:_____

Date:_____

APPENDIX 3

Description of Interview:

The researcher, Gerry Tetrault, will ask you 25 questions about language learning and identity in Taiwan. If you are uncertain about the meaning of the question it can be repeated and/or you may read the script of the question.

In his research the researcher will analyze different sources of information about language education and its relation to social, cultural and national identity in Taiwan. The title of the thesis is “The Question of Taiwanese Identity in the Context of Language Education”. The purpose of this study is to present various kinds discourse which justify specific language education policies in Taiwan including what languages are to be taught, how much time should each language be taught, and who should teach the language. The hypothesis in this research is that how people talk about language education and how they talk about their cultural, ethnic and national identity are related. The conclusions of this research will be to say what that relationship consists in. Furthermore, this research will try to determine how other factors related to social identity such as race, ethnicity, economic and social advantage and disadvantage are talked about when people talk language education policy in Taiwan.

You will be given a copy of the final published version upon your request.

If you have any questions about the goals of this research, the use that will be made of it or the security of the information from the interviews the researcher will answer them for you before, during or after the interview.

APPENDIX 5

Ethics Committee Approval

UNIVERSITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ETHICS IN BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

NAME: V. St. Denis (E.D. Tetrault)
Department of Educational Foundations

BSC#: 2000-162

DATE: November 14, 2000

The University Advisory Committee on Ethics in Behavioural Science Research has reviewed the Application for Ethics Approval for your study "The Question of Taiwanese Identity in the context of Language Education" (00-162).

1. Your study has been APPROVED subject to the following minor modifications:

- The applicant's signature was missing. Please forward a signed copy of the application to the Office of Research Services.
 - Please modify your consent form as follows:
 - a. Indicate that participants will be assigned a pseudonym and will be referred to by this name in the write-up of the study.
 - b. Describe the purposes and objectives of the study.
 - c. Outline the procedure, the length of time the interview will take, and indicate that the interview will be taped.
 - d. State that the participant has the right to withdraw, or to refuse to participate at any time, for any reason, and without penalty of any time. The participant may also refuse to answer individual questions, and may ask that the tape recorder be turned off at any time. Also, if a participant decides at to withdraw, any data that he/she has contributed to that point will be destroyed.
 - e. Describe the measures that will be used to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents (i.e., the use of pseudonyms).
 - f. Provide the names, institutional affiliations, and contact numbers of the researcher and the research supervisor. Also, provide contact information for the Office of Research Services in the event that the participant has any questions about their rights as a participant.
 - g. The participant's signature should acknowledge receipt of a copy of the consent form for their records.
 - h. The consent form should be signed by the researcher also.
 - i. Provide the title of the study.
 - Please provide us with a copy of the Transcript Release form that you will use, prepared as per our guidelines.
2. Please send one copy of your revisions to the Office of Research Services for our records. Please highlight or underline any changes made when resubmitting.
3. The term of this approval is for 5 years.
4. This letter serves as your certificate of approval, effective as of the time that you have completed the requested modifications. If you require a letter of unconditional approval, please so indicate on your reply, and one will be issued to you.
5. Any significant changes to your proposed study should be reported to the Chair for Committee consideration in advance of its implementation.

I wish you a successful and informative study.


Valerie Thompson, Chair
University Advisory Committee
on Ethics in Behavioural Science Research

VT/bk