TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS AND ANTI-POVERTY POLICYMAKING IN GHANA:

AN IDEATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

The influence of transnational actors (TNAs) on the policy process in most sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries is widely acknowledged. Yet, studies examining this phenomenon focus mainly on the imposition of policy conditionality and under explore other mechanisms such as ideational processes, which mediate the relationship between national and transnational actors. Focusing on two poverty alleviation policies implemented in Ghana – Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP), and Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) –, this study draws on the Transnational Policy Process (TPP) Framework to explore the ideational mechanisms that were instrumental in the development of these two social policies. In order to do so, qualitative case study research methods involving interviews and document reviews are used. This thesis argues that policymaking is multi-causal, which means that focusing exclusively on conditionalities without accounting for the role of ideational and other factors obscure our understanding of the policy process in developing countries. By examining the policy process in Ghana, this study ascertains that, beyond imposition of policies through conditionalities, TNAs also deploy other mechanisms that are mainly ideational in nature. Ideational channels include conferences, field trips, technical cooperation, training and capacity building, as well as collaboration with civil society organizations. Beyond these, TNAs use their memberships in policy structures, such as Ghana's cross-sectoral planning groups (CSPGs) and sector working groups (SWGs) as a crucial platform to purvey policy innovations. Additionally, in some cases, the mechanisms are also coupled to improve effectiveness. The study also shows the mediating role of national institutions and contexts more generally, a role that makes the adoption of new policy ideas a necessary part of the policy process. Moreover, there is an indication that using ideational

mechanisms promotes a sense of policy ownership among national policymakers who actively

participate in shaping policies in partnership with transnational actors.

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for His mercy endures for ever. I Chronicles 16:33

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List of Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AG	Attorney General
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ARPS	Aborigines Right Protection Society
AU	African Union
CAQDAs	Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis
CASA	Citizens Assessment of Structural Adjustment
CCTs	Conditional Cash Transfers
CDD-Ghana	Ghana Center for Democratic Development
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CG	Consultative Group
CGM	Consultative Group Meeting
CLIC	Community LEAP Implementation Committee
CPC-UNC	The Carolina Population Center – University of North Carolina
CPP	Convention Peoples Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSPGs	Cross Sectoral Planning Groups
CSPS	Center for Social Policy Studies
DAC	Development Assistant Committee
DFID	Department for International Development, United Kingdom
DLIC	District LEAP Implementation Committee
DPs	Development Partners
DSA	Debt Sustainability Analysis
DSW	Department of Social Welfare
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EPRI	Economic Policy Research Institute
ER/SAPs	Economic Recovery and Structural Adjustment Programmes
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment

G-7	Group of Seven advanced economies' finance ministers and central bank governors. Members include: United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Italy, France and Germany.
G-8	Group of Eight advanced economies (Comprising United States, Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Russia and the EU)
GCB	Ghana Commercial Bank
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNA	Ghana News Agency
GoG	Government of Ghana
GPPP	Ghana Political Parties Programme
GPRS	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GPRS II	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
GTUC	Ghana Trades Union Congress
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
IDA	International Development Association
IDEG	Institute of Democratic Governance
IDTs	International Development Targets
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOs	International Organisations
IPC	International Poverty Center
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ISD	Information Services Department
ISP	Institutional Strengthening Programme
ISSER	Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research
LEAP	Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDBS	Multi-donor Budget Support
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDS	Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (Brazil)
MESW	Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare

MMDAs	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
MMYE	Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment
MOFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MoGCSP	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection
MPs	Members of Parliament
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NEF	National Economic Forum
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NHIL	National Health Insurance Levy
NLC	National Liberation Council
NLCM	Norm Life Cycle Model
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
NSPS	National Social Protection Strategy
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OVCs	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PDA	Preventive Detention Act
PGRF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PMG	Policy Management Group
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	People's National Party
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
PSIA	Poverty and Social Impact Analysis
SA	South Africa
SAPRI	Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative
SAPRIN	Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SILICs	Severely Indebted Low Income Countries

SMC	Supreme Military Council
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSNIT	Social Security and National Insurance Trust
SWGs	Sector Working Groups
TNAs	Transnational Actors
TOR	Tema Oil Refinery
TPP	Transnational Policy Process
UG	University of Ghana
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
V&E SWG	Vulnerability and Exclusion Sector Working Group
VAT	Value Added Tax
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Chapter I: Introduction Transnational Actors and Policymaking in Sub-Saharan Africa

A.   Introduction

In the contemporary era, transnational actors (TNAs), defined here as a category of actors comprising organisations (multilateral, bilateral and civil society) and individuals seeking to influence policies beyond national borders, are increasingly recognized as significant policy actors in the national policymaking process of most countries. Such perception is accentuated by the evolution of a globalised policy context featuring multiple actors and different levels of policymaking. Simultaneously, policy scholars' interest in how TNAs impact national policies has also intensified. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the heightening of TNAs involvement in the policy process dates back to the 1980s with the implementation of structural adjustment and economic recovery policies. Interestingly, the prerequisite for reform, which characterised conditional assistance to most African governments at this time that triggered momentous policy shifts in various countries across the continent, has remained the primary explanatory factor , if not the only reference point, when issues of transnational influence in national policies are discussed (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b; Adejumobi, 2004; Aina, Chachage, & Annan-Yao, 2004)**.** Yet, research in other contexts has demonstrated that besides imposing polices, TNAs also promote policy learning by sharing information targeted at shaping the preferences of policymakers with the possibility of reforms or policy innovation (Weyland, 2005a; 2008; Orenstein, 2008).

The primary focus on imposition of policy, however, restricts rich analyses of transnational actors' influence in the policy processes of SSA countries. This study consequently adds another dimension to transnational-national actors' policy interaction in the African context by studying other mechanisms through which TNAs interact and influence policymaking in Ghana. An

examination of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) and the Livelihood

Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) using Orenstein's Transnational Policy Process (TPP)

framework indicates that TNAs couple various mechanisms in their interaction with national

policy actors. Additionally, they build partnerships with both governmental and non-

governmental actors in the policy process. The GPRS is Ghana's version of the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) directed poverty reduction strategy papers

(PRSPs). With a focus on poverty reduction, the PRSP outlines structural, economic and social

policies and programmes, which indicate how debt relief is to be utilized. But LEAP is a poverty

reduction programme comprising regular conditional and unconditional cash transfer to targeted

groups.

B.   Scholarly Context

With the emergence of a more globalised social policy process, shaped by both local and

international actors and factors, there has been a growing interest in the study of how TNAs

shape the development of national policies. Principally, as it relates to the definition of the

institutional position of various actors, TNAs are non-formal actors. As such, of interest to the

scholarship on TNAs and policymaking is how actors located outside national political systems

could influence national policymaking. In pursuing this line of inquiry, scholarship, particularly

as it relates to the SSA context, has depicted conditionalities as the main mechanism of

transnational policy influence. Such research focuses on structural or material explanations,

which suggest that the disparities of power between developing countries and TNAs are

fundamental to transnational policy roles. In this sense, international organisations such as WB

and IMF, which are more powerful than developing countries, facilitate the imposition of policy

conditionalities, which developing countries are subject to, particularly during periods of economic crisis. For instance, the adoption of the economic recovery and structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s has been cited as an ostensive example of transnational policy imposition through conditionality (Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1991; Aina, Chachage, & Annan-Yao, 2004; Ndulu, 2008).

Yet, contrary to the view implied in such studies that policy conditionalities are the main or only drivers of national policy change, other studies (Kanbur, 2000; Woods, 2006a), point out that conditionalities are not always adhered to. The suggestion by Kanbur (2000) and Woods (2006a), coupled with the seemingly global convergence of policy ideas in policy areas such as poverty eradication and pension reforms, suggest that there are mechanisms other than conditionalities through which TNAs can influence public policy in SSA countries.

Other studies of how TNAs influence policy in developing countries show that in addition to policy imposition, TNAs also use ideational mechanisms to shape policies in developing countries (Ndulu, 2008; Orenstein, 2008; Béland & Orenstein, 2010; Kpessa & Béland, 2011). Ideational studies argue that policy actions in this vein, are the consequence of the interpretation that policymakers have of their world mediated by ideational processes, which are defined as "causal beliefs" (Béland & Cox, 2011, p. 3) or "practices, symbols, norms, grammars, models, beliefs, ideas and/or identities that carry meanings about the world" (Parsons, 2007, p. 96). Such studies acknowledge that ideas are critical in the policy development process. Beyond informing particular definitions of policy problems (Béland & Cox, 2011) ideas underlie policy change (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2002; Campbell, 2004; Béland, 2007; Béland & Orenstein, 2010; Béland & Orenstein, 2013) and shape policy development by acting independently of, or by interacting

with, political institutions and material factors (Bleich, 2002; Orenstein, 2008). Furthermore, ideational studies acknowledge the instrumental role of agents in the transmission of ideas (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Orenstein, 2008). Such agents, acting as policy or "norm entrepreneurs," spread policy ideas from one country to another by acting as "proposal actors" using channels such as conference and seminar presentations, publications, as well as partnerships with governmental and non-governmental actors and technical assistance to propagate their policy ideas and proposals (Béland & Orenstein, 2010).

C.   Problem Definition and Research Questions

Studies on how TNAs shape policy in SSA have mostly assumed conditionalities as the main mechanism of influence to the neglect of ideational factors. Yet, as suggested above, conditionalities are sometimes not adhered to, or countries may reform policies or implement new ideas without them being imposed by external actors. Consequently, ideational research has provided alternative views on how TNAs influence policies in developing countries. Such studies identify other instruments such as seminars and conference presentations, technical assistance, and field trips, which are deployed in order to shape policies in developing countries. However, most of the studies exploring how TNAs influence public policy beyond conditionality have focused on the emergence of specific policies or programmes such as pension reforms (Orenstein, 2008; Kpessa & Béland, 2011), global norms such as poverty reduction (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2009), or the interaction between domestic non-governmental organisations and TNAs (Porter, 2003), without explicitly accounting for how TNAs help shape the policy preferences of policymakers within the policy process.

Of interest to this study, therefore, is identifying how TNAs influence policy beyond conditionality in Ghana by employing ideational analysis using Orenstein's Transnational Policy Process (TPP) framework as a starting point (Orenstein, 2008). This framework accounts for TNAs influence across transnational and national arenas by suggesting that, at the international level, TNAs' influence straddles three stages: policy development, policy transfer, and policy implementation. Policy development includes the creation of new problem definitions and programmes by transnational policy networks and also supporting their implementation in a "laboratory" country. The outcome of this first experiment set the ball rolling for that policy idea to be diffused internationally using various platforms such as conferences and workshops. Subsequently, support is provided for the implementation of this idea in various countries. The international process intertwines with the national level reform process, which comprises commitment building (securing governmental support for new policy ideas), coalition building (including pursuing a process to win public and legislative support), and support for reform implementation. Besides, the model starts from the assumption that TNAs are dynamic policy actors combining two or more mechanisms such as resource leveraging (conditionalities) and norms teaching (ideational) process to facilitate policy change.

The TPP framework was used in the study of pension reforms, with a primary focus on Eastern Europe and Latin America (Orenstein, 2008). By using it here to study TNAs in Ghana's policymaking process, particularly as it relates to anti-poverty policies such as LEAP and GPRS I and GPRS II, this study extends the existing TPP framework. Poverty alleviation policies in Ghana were chosen because poverty is one of the main issues that Africa grapples with today. Although Ghana and a few other countries in SSA have attained the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty rates, Africa is still the poorest continent on the

planet and the results of the other MDGs are much less positive. Focusing on how TNAs and national actors interact in the policy process could offer valuable lessons for effective policymaking in SSA countries, which will in the long-term promote poverty alleviation. Consequently, the study provides an alternative perspective by which TNAs influence policies in SSA countries, beyond the imposition of policy conditionalities. This interest dovetails the general trend in ideational studies, which is about explaining how and when ideas matter (Béland & Cox, 2011). Furthermore, while imposition studies portray TNAs influence in the policy process as emanating from their structural position in relation to developing countries, ideational studies posit a typically more congenial policy learning and transfer atmosphere without denying the potential importance of leveraging and conditionalities. Ideational studies also reverse the notion, particularly in the case of SSA, that policy ideas always move from the global North to the South by positing that policy proposals could emanate from any part of the world and be diffused to other parts.

The main objective of this research, therefore, is to provide an ideational perspective on how TNAs influence national policymaking and, consequently, policy development in SSA using as case studies recent anti-poverty policies implemented in Ghana. In selecting Ghana, I considered characteristics shared by most sub-Saharan African countries including partnership with TNAs particularly, international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the WB, the IMF, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), towards the provision of technical and financial support. Besides, Ghana, like other countries in the region, is currently intensifying its efforts with regard to poverty reduction. This shift in policy or intensification of efforts was heralded by the United Nations member countries' decision contained in the Millennium Declaration to reduce the

number of extreme poor by 50 percent by 2015. Consequently, about half of SSA countries have joined the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative that gives debt relief to enhance social spending outlined in a country prepared Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Moreover, Ghana's political stability since the country's return to multiparty democracy in 1993 presents consistent information on TNA activities in the country enabling an in-depth study of TNAs involvement in policymaking in Ghana. For the purpose stated here, the following research questions will guide the process of inquiry.

- Why and how are TNAs involved in Ghana's policymaking process?

- How exactly do TNAs influence policy development in Ghana? Which mechanisms do they use?

- Which of the two main sets of causal mechanisms – imposition and ideational – better accounts for TNAs influence in the Ghanaian policy process?

D.   Contribution of the Thesis

In addition to extending the ideational perspective by incorporating the Ghanaian case of pursuing two anti-poverty policies, the research will also make a contribution to the TPP framework posited by Orenstein (2008) in his study of pension reforms. As this study will show in later chapters, even in cases where it seems that the main mechanism used by TNAs in shaping policies is conditionality, other mechanisms are at play concurrently. This is the case with Ghana's adoption of the HIPC initiative and, consequently, the GPRS. While the GPRS is a requirement attached to the HIPCs initiative, the lead up to the decision to join the initiative (an IFI debt relief initiative) featured various ideational tactics, particularly, developing frames that

promote the desirability of the initiative based on existing economic conditions. This shows that the international and the national phases of the policy reform process, as outlined by the TPP framework, cannot be neatly separated. Meanwhile, LEAP, though not a form of conditionality, saw the active involvement of TNAs from the conception of the programme to its implementation through study trips, conferences, and partnerships with government ministries and civil society actors for exchange of knowledge and support.

Furthermore, Ghana's case illustrates that CSOs are important in the policy reform process. They occupy a middle ground between TNAs and governmental actors, and partner with either of them to advance their own perceived interests. In some cases, TNAs have pushed CSOs to pursue a particular reform agenda, while in other cases CSOs have used TNAs' leverage as a way of pressuring government to meet their interests. For instance, although not completely satisfied with the extent of participation in the GPRS process, some CSOs in Ghana acknowledged that their recognition in the policy process by governmental actors was a consequence of TNAs campaigning on their behalf. The dynamics are quite diverse, as shown in this study. CSOs acknowledge that, when it comes to shaping policies, their voices are drowned by more powerful actors like TNAs, which is why they align with TNAs in some cases to promote particular preferences. Similarly, TNAs motivated by the desire to promote local policy ownership have sought to empower CSOs to become active participants in the policy process. The accounts of the dynamic relationship between TNAs and CSOs in the transnational policy process extends Orenstein's (2008) framework, which pays no direct attention to CSOs.

Similarly, the transfer of policy ideas is intertwined with adaptation or what Campbell (2004) calls translation (See also (Czarniawska, 2012)). As such, policies learned from other contexts

are not necessarily implemented in their entirety in another country, without consideration of national institutions and values. It is therefore noteworthy that national actors and institutions mediate the design of new policies, even those promoted by powerful TNAs. Adaptation of learned policies promotes acceptance of the policy and facilitates implementation in a particular country.

E.   Plan of Thesis

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II provides a broad overview of policymaking in Ghana by examining the actors, processes and institutions in the policy process from the pre-independence to the post-independence era in Ghana. While this examination shows that TNAs have been part of the policy process even before independence, their relationship in the past was not as intricate as it is today. The discussion also identifies economic crisis as the main culprit, motivating political leaders to seek help from external actors and such crisis also enhances the influence of TNAs. Although economic crises have served as the immediate catalyst for leaders to source for help, such crises have been preceded by political and social crises, which have in turn been influenced by the economic situation. In some of those instances, there have been significant turnarounds such as under the leadership of Gen. I. K. Acheampong in the 1970s and Flt. Lt J. J. Rawlings in the early 1980s. For instance, at the beginning of his rule, Gen. Acheampong unilaterally repudiated selected debts owed to some IFIs and other foreign companies in Ghana, but with the 1973 oil shock, he sought assistance from the IMF. The continued effects of the oil shock, coupled with drought and famine resulted in extensive price controls and increased government deficit. Consequently, when these strategies could not ameliorate the crisis, the statist oriented leader announced the beginning of a liberal regime by the end of 1977 (Hutchful, 2002).

Chapter III reviews existing explanations of how TNAs are involved in the policy process of various countries. These explanations are organised along the four logics of explanation – structural, ideational, institutional and psychological – as identified by Parsons (2007). Here existing analytical perspectives are examined and their strengths and weaknesses explored. Based on this examination, the analytical framework – the Transnational Policy Process framework – that guides this research is laid out. As this framework shows, TNA influence in the policy process spans the transnational and national policy spaces. The framework also shows that policy actors are dynamic, sometimes combining structural and ideational mechanisms in a bid to effectively shape national policy. Chapter IV subsequently describes the research design. This methodology chapter outlines the rationale for pursuing a qualitative case study and briefly introduces the cases to be explored in this research. It includes how data was generated through semi-structured interviews of purposively selected policy actors in Ghana. Using the computer programme Nvivo, the generated data was transcribed and analysed through process tracing of the factors that accounted for the outcome of the GPRS and LEAP policy development processes.

Chapters V and VI are the empirical chapters of this dissertation. The former accounts for TNAs influence in the policymaking process of the GPRS, while the latter describes how TNAs were involved in the policymaking process of LEAP. As these two chapters indicate, TNAs are significant actors in Ghana's policymaking process. They employ multiple strategies, including structural and ideational to shape policies. Additionally, it is shown here that their institutional position as members of the cross sectoral planning groups (CSPGs) and sector working groups (SWGs) in Ghana's policy process connects them to the formal policy arena, where policy proposals can be shared. The discussion also shows that TNAs are effective when they back their

policy ideas with resources. Finally, Chapter VII summarises what has been learnt through this

study and draws implications for policymaking theory and practice in developing countries.

Chapter II: Overview of the Policymaking in Ghana: Actors, Institutions and Processes

A.   Introduction

To provide a better understanding of how transnational actors (TNAs) influence policymaking in contemporary Ghana, it is imperative to appreciate their changing roles over the years. As the discussion below indicates, TNAs influence in policymaking has fluctuated from a period of less prominence to one where they are acknowledged to be significant actors in policymaking. The examination is categorised into three major historical phases of policymaking in Ghana, comprising pre-independence, independence, and post-independence. Each of these three phases is unique, as a result of the dynamic nature of the policy environment, which is derived from the multiplicity of factors and actors that shape the policy process (Dror, 1968; Sabatier, 2007; Anderson, 2011).

In this chapter, I look at the trajectory of policymaking in Ghana over the course of three periods: pre-independence, independence and post-independence. The next section examines the transformation of the policy environment in all three periods with the post-independence era divided into the period from 1966 to 1992 and from 1993 until now, that is, the Fourth Republic. Basically, the chapter entails an account of the main policy actors, the institutions that shape actors' behaviours and the policy processes in each of the three identified periods. At the same time, the chapter maps the transformations of the involvement of TNAs in Ghana's domestic policymaking over time. It also demonstrates the dynamism of the policy process and how various actors move in and out of it, and how some gain prominence in the course of the policy development process propped up by events at the national and/or international level. It illustrates

how political turbulence and socio-economic crisis have interacted to eventually open up national policymaking to increased involvement of TNAs.

B. The Trajectory of Ghana's Policy Environment

1. Pre-Independence

Named Gold Coast by the Portuguese because of the abundance of gold in her land, pre-independence Ghana's policy environment was characterised by contacts between the existing indigenous political institutions and modern institutions introduced by Europeans. Two distinct phases can be identified as part of the pre-independence era, namely, pre-colonial and colonial. Having diverse characteristics, the pre-colonial period gradually transformed into the colonial era due to the cumulative effects of various internal and external forces. Therefore, the pre-independence period presented an environment characterised initially by the sole existence of traditional political institutions underpinned by customs and values that gave way to a duality of political institutions marked by the simultaneous existence of the traditional and modern political institutions, a feature which has become part of Ghana's political system.

Political authority within indigenous states resided in the chieftaincy and or the priestly institution with a governmental system elaborately built from the smallest collective unit of that society – the family – all the way up to the paramount chief or chief priest (Ward, 1967; Apter, 1972). The leader's legitimacy was derived from the king making process and leadership conduct, which was expected to promote the good of the community. The chief, who was the political head is assisted by a council of elders comparable to a modern day council of state, in the decision making process. Although vested with extensive judicial and executive powers, the political head did not expressly make rules, since legislation was derived from custom (Owusu-Ansah, 1994). In another vein, the pre-colonial period is also described as one of wars motivated

by the desire to expand territory. Such activities not only benefited the traditional state territorially, but it also accumulated wealth as the state collects tributes from vassals and tax trade along their trade routes (Claridge, 1915; Bourret, 1960).

Initially, contact with Africa by various European powers was the offshoot of their interest in exploration and trade. Such desires were informed, first, by the quest for gold and other luxury goods; second, the "discovery" of the New World and the resultant need for labour that underpinned the slave trade, and then the renewed force of imperialism consequently, resulted in the colonization of various African territories (Bourret, 1960; Ward, 1967). In the case of Ghana, the Portuguese were the first to have traded on the Gold Coast in 1471, but there were other Europeans such as the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and the British.

To attain a superior position in their trade with the natives, the various European groups competed with each other. However, by mid-19th Century, the British emerged as the main traders on the coast after other traders were conquered, and willingly abandoned their forts or sold them to the British, when the slave trade was abolished. Likewise, the constant wars among natives and against Europeans, coupled with the unimpressive trade benefits also presented the British government with a problem, and so they considered abandoning the Gold Coast in the early 19th Century (Kimble, 1963; Metcalfe, 1964; Ward, 1967). But, most British merchants were unwilling to leave so the Crown gave them permission to remain and maintain the British forts. In 1844 the British crown resumed control of the colony, and signed a treaty with some Fante states on the coast, which became known as the Bond of 1844. The bond sought to clarify the relations between British authorities and Ghanaian traditional chiefs and granted formal judicial authority to the British and legalised their relations with natives.

This agreement marked the beginning of a process that resulted in the formal colonization of various territories that constitute today's Ghana. Although the treaty did not give formal political authority over the coastal states to the British, they nevertheless expanded their authority over these states based on the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843, which "empowered the Crown to exercise any jurisdiction it might have in a foreign country in as full a manner as if that country had been acquired by conquest or cession" (Padmore, 1953; Ward, 1967, p. 195).

Having secured control over the coastal states, the British extended their political authority over the Asante through conquest and the northern territories by establishing a protectorate. By the first decade of the 20th Century this process was complete, with the British exercising political authority over the Gold Coast, which at the time comprised the coastal states, Asante and the northern territories. To these three territories was added the Trans-Volta Togoland at the end of WW1, a territory that belonged to Germany prior to the war but subsequently became a trust territory of the British and French as a consequence of the 1918 German defeat (Bourret, 1960; Ghana Information Services, 1968). The Trans-Volta-Togoland became a British mandated territory at the end of WW1 and then a Trust Territory under the control of the United Kingdom after WW2.

The institutions fundamental to the administration of the British colony were the judicial system established after the Bond of 1844, and the Legislative and Executive Councils established in the late 19th Century. The councils were purely advisory and mostly comprised Europeans representing various trading interests, the governor, and others appointed by the Crown until 1889, when the first native was appointed (Bennion, 1962; Apter, 1972). With the superimposition of British political authority over existing (native) institutions, traditional political power vested in the chief was negatively affected through the cumulative effect of

various legislative instruments enacted from the late 19th Century, including the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance (1883), the Chiefs Ordinance (1904), the Native Administration Ordinance (1927), and the Native Administration Treasuries Ordinance (1939) (Padmore, 1953; Bennion, 1962; Odotei, 2008). These gradually weakened traditional political authority and, at the same time, strengthened modern political authority exercised by the British who "were free to dabble in tribal palaver, intrigue between the chiefs and their councillors, and make themselves 'king-makers'." (Padmore, 1953, p. 95).

It must be noted that, although the British ruled through the chiefs, by a policy known as indirect rule, this did not grant chiefs the authority they wielded prior to the establishment of the colonial authority. According to Apter (1972, p. 130), since traditional authority was "...deriving effective legitimacy at least in part from the British source....traditional authority was weakened." Moreover, the colonial government relations with indigenous states were informed by a legislative admonition to the colonial authorities to mould the customs of the country to conform to the principles of British common law (Danquah, 1957; Crooks, 2013, p. 296). Consequently, colonial authorities neglected the traditions, mores, and values of the native inhabitants of Gold Coast. For instance, the British established chieftaincy authority where none existed previously, as in the case of the Frafra (Apter, 1972; Odotei, 2008). The negative effects of European rule led to dissatisfaction and subsequently contestation, initially by traditional leaders and then by the educated elite. Emerging in the mid-19th century, such contestation gained momentum after the beginning of the 20th Century.

In a bid seemingly to legitimise their rule and authority, consecutive colonial governments tried systematically to include traditional rulers and the educated elites as members of the legislative and executive councils. Notwithstanding these efforts towards inclusion, there was a continuous

challenge to colonial rule. Traditional rulers joined with educated elites to contest colonial rule, pressing for the inclusion of the colonised in the administration of the country (Graham, 1971). Consequently some natives were included in the colonial governing system (executive and legislative councils), and as such the educated elites and traditional rulers were seemingly satisfied in the short term. Subsequent constitutional reforms further increased the number of natives on the executive and legislative councils of the Gold Coast colony. At the time, the assumption was that with these changes, the colonised would be placated, thereby paring down their demands for self-government.

Although progressive constitutional reforms, which over time, increased the number of the colonised on the governing councils, appeased some sections of the Gold Coast society, dramatic post-WW2 changes, occurring both externally and internally, renewed the campaign against colonial rule. This campaign gradually advanced the colony toward the attainment of independence in 1957. The factors central to this push for self-government are now examined.

Externally, in 1945, the promulgation of the UN Charter, which called for respect of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, served to embolden local actors in their call for self-government (United Nations [UN], 1945). In addition, most individuals, particularly those who were part of the contingent that fought alongside the British during the war, were politically emboldened as the perceived superiority and invincibility of the colonizers vanished with the common war experiences (Metcalfe, 1964; Apter, 1972). Furthermore, political development in other parts of the world, such as the attainment of independence by India, Burma and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), strengthened the resolve of the local intelligentsia to demand self-government (Metcalfe, 1964). Moreover, the election of the Labour Party in Britain in 1945 also facilitated

the granting of independence. This postwar British election was significant because there were "influential people in the Labour Party who were ready to press for reform in Africa....they were in favour of decolonization and they were against policies of repression." (Davidson, 1974, pp. 44, 75).

Additionally, from the mid-1940s, the internal Gold Coast environment experienced new dynamics, whose repercussions had a long-term impact on the colony (Padmore, 1953; Bourret, 1960; Austin, 1964; Bretton, 1966; Ward, 1967; Ghana Information Services, 1968; Apter, 1972). To begin with, most of the social and political groups formed prior to the 1940s had not explicitly demanded independence. For instance, the Fante Confederation was formed in 1868 to counter Asante invasions when the chiefs thought the British would no longer be there to protect them. Also, the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) was formed to protest some bills such as the Crown Land Bill (1876) and the Land Bill (1897), which sought to invest Gold Coast lands in the British crown. Primarily, earlier political demands were for inclusion in the administration and for changes in legislation, and not for independence. However, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) formed in 1947 and 1949 respectively, both aimed at self-government (Padmore, 1953; Austin, 1964). Rising on the back of general dissatisfaction with the colonial administration, which resulted in riots and workers strikes, the CPP led the country to independence in 1957 (Padmore, 1953; Bourret, 1960; Metcalfe, 1964; Ward, 1967).

2. Independence

At independence in 1957, Ghana was bequeathed a British political model, which is a parliamentary democracy with features that included free elections, fusion of the legislative and

executive branches of government, and some measure of autonomy to the regions per the provisions in the new Constitution. This document vested executive power in the British queen, a power which was to be exercised directly by the Queen or indirectly through her representative, the Governor General. Additionally, it provided for a cabinet of eight members to be drawn from Parliament to provide "general direction and control of the Government of Ghana and who shall be collectively responsible to Parliament." (Metcalfe, 1964, p. 730) The law-making power was vested in Parliament, of which the Queen or her representative was a member. Although under colonial rule, chiefs partook in the administration through indirect rule and as members of the traditional authority, and the executive and legislative councils, this changed with independence in 1957. Motivated by the drive to unite the nation, the new Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah, used his political power to limit the chief's power, except for a provision in section 63 sub-sections (2) of the new Constitution, which provided for the establishment of a regional house of chiefs (Metcalfe, 1964; Rathbone, 2000a; Rathbone, 2000b). Therefore, modern political institutions overlay traditional institutions, which have now retreated to the indigenous state level. However, the norms, customs, values and mores associated with such institutions and their traditional communities still fundamentally influenced action.

It is significant to note that at this period, although the country had a significant number of educated elites compared to other emerging nations in SSA, it lacked the needed indigenous human resources to build a new nation (Killick, 2010). Consequently, although the president desired to completely 'Africanise' the public service, this could not be done in haste because foreign (mainly British) experts working within the central government machinery were needed to complement local capacity in administering the country. For instance, economist W. Arthur Lewis served as an economic policy advisor to Nkrumah from the 1950s (Mohan J. , 1967;

Grischow, 2011); in 1955 Ghana also had a community development expert named F. H. Hilliard; E. G. Johnson, technical advisor from Britain's Ministry of Labor, was employed from July 1961 to assist with Ghana's rehabilitation programme (Grischow, 2011); and in 1963, the World Bank sponsored a conference of experts including Albert O. Hirchman, Nicholas Kaldor, Arthur Lewis, Dudley Seers, K. N. Raj and Walter Birmingham, to examine and advise Ghana concerning its seven-year development plan. There were also British expatriates in the civil service and in the armed forces (Rooney, 1988). During these period, policies were to some extent shaped by these British experts and others invited by the president. At the same time, Ghana's economy was dominated by private interests most of which were foreign (Mohan J. , 1967).

Moreover, the exposure of Kwame Nkrumah to various development ideas during his stay in America and United Kingdom influenced most of his policies and in some instances, the experts he invited. Ahead of his return to Ghana, Nkrumah had consolidated his position as a leftist and an avowed critic of imperialism through his association with George Padmore, Ras Makonnen and W. E. DuBois (Jones, 1976; Rooney, 1988). As noted above, the disparity between his views and beliefs concerning decolonisation, and those of the other leaders of the UGCC, the party he first joined, led to the rift among its leaders, which resulted in Nkrumah's resignation and formation of the CPP in 1949 (Nkrumah, 1961; Rooney, 1988).

Nevertheless, Nkrumah was also considered a pragmatist, spurred by his desire for the total liberation of Africa and, subsequently, African Unity (Davidson, 1974). Such pragmatism was displayed through how he approached government and development as a Prime Minister. He noted, "Immediately after Independence, while wishing to proceed on a socialist path of economic and social development, it was considered advisable, in view of the circumstances

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operating at the time, to pursue a shopping list approach...." (Nkrumah, 1973, p. 181) Moreover, Nkrumah reasoned that prior to the 1960s conditions were not ripe for a socialist approach in Ghana. From the 1960s however, when Ghana had become a republic, it is observed that socialism influenced most of the policies of the country. For instance, Nkrumah referred to his government as a "socialist directed government" and the Programme for Work and Happiness and the Seven Year Development Plan had the primary aim of "building a socialist state devoted to the welfare of the masses." (Nkrumah, 1973, pp. 395, 397) Accounting for this, it was noted that Nkrumah's visit to various socialist countries where he observed how developed they were and his discussions with the leaders motivated him to pursue socialist policies (Rooney, 1988; Grischow, 2011). Despite his proclamation of socialism, generally, he did not shy away from the West and private foreign interests (Rooney, 1988; Killick, 2010). For instance, Nkrumah actively courted the West in the building of the Akosombo dam, which was financed jointly by the WB, the US and the UK. Thus, Nkrumah's conception of development though socialism was, according to him, shaped by the specific circumstances which one confronts (Nkrumah, 1967).

In pursuing his vision, Nkrumah sought to manage the multiple and sometimes conflicting interests represented by various groups at independence, particularly the opposition. Although government was initially framed by the 1957 Constitution, this was replaced by a republican constitution in 1960 and the amendments in 1964 made the Ghanaian state a one party state with Nkrumah as its life president. Other legislative instruments, for instance, the Preventive Detention Act (PDA), of 1958 were passed to enhance the position of the Prime Minister and stifle dissenting views. Such constitutional changes and laws were facilitated by majority representation of the government's party in Parliament.

In addition to managing the domestic situation, Nkrumah sought to play a significant role in world affairs through the involvement of such organisations as the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). These served as the main factors that influenced the country's foreign activities. The country was also in the fore front of various initiatives mainly related to African independence and unity such as the Conference of Independent African States and the All African People's Conference (Nkrumah, 1961; Rooney, 1988). Nkrumah's commitment to Africa, outlined in his independence speech on March 6, 1957 pointed out that "Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa." (Nkrumah, 1961, p. 107) With this self-imposed obligation, Ghana contributed troops to the UN in Congo when the Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu sought UN intervention in a conflict that erupted after the country gained independence (Nkrumah, 1961; Cavendish, 2010). Additionally, newly emerging African nations were assisted by Ghana, for instance, an economic assistance package was offered to Guinea at her independence following France's neglect and desertion (Biney, 2008).

Despite her strong international presence, Ghana's economy was weak and vulnerable. Although a top exporter of cocoa and other commodities such as timber and gold, yet Ghana's economy depended extensively on imports (Birmingham, Neustadt, & Omaboe, 1966; Fitch & Oppenheimer, 1966). Consequently, the country's economy was subject to the vicissitudes of the international economic system. The state of the economy coupled with Nkrumah's developmental ambitions depleted the country's resources. Therefore, the government sought help from some IFIs in 1965. However, no agreement was reached, because the First Republic was toppled in a coup d'état in 1966.

3.   Post-Independence: 1966 to the Present

Beginning with the government that was formed after the coup in 1966, this section discusses changes that have taken place and continues to take place in Ghana between 1966 and the present. It also examines the constitutional provisions and the dynamics of politics in the current regime – the Fourth Republic (1993 – present). Until the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1993, Ghana's political environment was unstable, marked by coups and counter-coups interspersed with civilian rule. Cumulatively within a period of about 26 years, from 1966 to 1992, Ghana witnessed seven governments. Of the seven, two – the Second Republic led by Prime Minister Kofi Abrefa Busia and the Third Republic under President Hilla Limann – were civilian administrations, while the remaining five were military governments – the National Liberation Council (NLC), 1966 - 1969; the National Redemption Council or the Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC I), 1972-1978; the Supreme Military Council II (SMC II), 1978-June 1979; the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), June 1979 -September 1979; and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), 1981 -1992. The most enduring regime in the post-independence era is the Fourth Republic, which began in 1993 and has witnessed five elections since the 1992 elections (the next election will be in December, 2016), which ushered in civilian rule. Of the five elections, two (2000, and 2008) resulted in governmental turnovers.

Ghana: The NLC to the PNDC

The NLC, which overthrew Nkrumah in 1966, sought to correct the perceived effects of an overly statist, coercive and corrupt administration or what was described as a system of personal rule (Bretton, 1966; Ninsin, 1989; The Ghanaian Journal, 2011). The economy was described as "mismanaged to a point where bankruptcy stared the nation in the face." (Afrifa, 1967, p. 380) Identified as rightist, the NLC actively courted foreign capital and reduced or severed relations

with the East (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1966; Ray, Ghana, 1986; Austin & Luckham, 1975). Contrary to Nkrumah's unpleasant relations with the WB and the IMF, the NLC negotiated a standby arrangement with the IMF conditional on the pursuance of a rehabilitation programme (Jonah, 1989). The result of Ghana's negotiations with the IMF and the WB was the implementation of liberal policies such as privatisation of state enterprises, removal of price controls and subsidies, and devaluation of the cedi (Ghana's currency) (Jonah, 1989; Callaghy, 1990; Hutchful, 2002; Fosu & Aryeetey, 2008).

Although transnational actor activity characterised Nkrumah's rule, he sought to benefit from both sides of the ideological divide by courting both the East and the West. However, the NLC leaned towards the West. Furthermore, while the WB and the IMF were not key actors prior to 1966, they became critical partners, who provided development finance and through the modalities of such assistance consequently impacted policy. While some actors such as the WB and IMF gained prominence with the change in government, other external actors on whom Nkrumah relied for development support, particularly Russia and China, were expelled (Ghana Information Services, 1966; Keesing's Record of World Events, 1966). Moreover, with the new government, politicians who had gone into exile due to some of the repressive tactics under Nkrumah returned (Austin & Luckham, 1975). For instance, K. A. Gbedemah, Nkrumah's finance minister who for fear of his life went into exile returned and even contested the election that the military government facilitated later on. Furthermore, while Nkrumah sought between 1951 and 1960 to limit the power of the chiefs (traditional authority), the NLC reconciled with them (Ray, 1999).

The NLC abrogated the 1964 Constitution, dissolved Parliament, banned political parties, and instead ruled by fiat "until true democracy based on the popular will of the people, and not on the

will of one man alone, has been fully restored to this country" (Ghana Information Services, 1966; National Liberation Council, 1966, p. 22; Feit, 1968). However, the Judiciary and other public sector agencies were maintained to work with the new administration.

According to its initial proposal at the end of the coup, the NLC facilitated the promulgation of a new constitution and an election in 1969, which ushered in the Second Republic (Ghana Constitutional Commission, 1968; Goldsworthy, 1973; Austin & Luckham, 1975; Gocking, 2005). The new Constitution, attempted to weave aspects of the parliamentary and presidential political systems. Thus, although it provided for the diffusion of power among the various branches of government, the Executive was part of the Legislature in that it provided for the position of a prime minister and a head of state, which shared the executive power and the Cabinet was drawn from Parliament. The Constitution Commission reasoned that the particular conditions of the country and its past experiences informed the fashioning of the new political system, as it indicated, "The constitutions of nations are no more than the reflections of their societies, the problems they have had to grapple with and the attempts they have made at various stages at solving these problems." (Ghana Constitutional Commission, 1968, p. 83 para 308) Subsequent to the election of 1969, Kofi A. Busia became the prime minister, with three members of the NLC constituting themselves into a presidential commission until the election of the Chief Justice Edward Akuffo Addo as president.

Mostly, the newly constituted government pursued a policy of continuity, maintaining most of the appointments made under the NLC regime and even most of their policies. Like their predecessors, the government pursued rightist policies and continued collaborating with the IFIs a relationship established by the NLC (Libby, 1976). According to Libby's account of the relations between the government and the IFIs and other donors, policy making was shaped by

external representatives stationed within various key ministries like the Ministry of Finance and in the Prime Minister's office. For instance, from 1966 to 1970 the IMF had a representative stationed in Accra who was pressuring the government to launch systemic reforms (Rimmer, 1992). Yet, the implementation of economic reforms prescribed by the IFIs and other creditor nations including devaluation of the cedi was followed by a military coup.

The coup that overthrew Busia in 1972 established a military regime, the National Redemption Council (NRC), which initiated policies along the lines of Nkrumah. Severing all links with external actors, it reversed some of the economic measures introduced under the Busia government. The NRC, which was later renamed the Supreme Military Council (SMC), accused the Busia administration of implementing policies that "reduced the real incomes of the military and the public servants", and of granting IFIs and other creditor nations central role in policy making (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, p. 108). Consequently, the state took a central role in the economy, and pursued policies such as 'operation feed yourself,' geared towards capturing the commanding heights of the economy, and self-reliance. Also, the government unilaterally repudiated Ghana's debts contrary to the advice of officials of the Bank of Ghana (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991; Hutchful, 2002).

Initially, the radical stance of the new military regime did not pose any problem due to favourable trade terms for Ghana's main export commodity, cocoa. However, the 1973 oil shock and inflation experienced by most developed nations in the mid-1970s greatly affected Ghana's fortunes. The import bill skyrocketed while, at the same time, the country suffered worsening climatic conditions, which negatively impacted food production and, as a result, increased food prices that the government sought to control using decrees (Hutchful, 2002). Compelled by the worsening economic conditions, the government reformed its statist policies in favour of a more

liberal-oriented approach but, with a palace coup in 1978, Acheampong could not carry through with his plans. The new leader, Lt. General F. W. K. Akuffo, established the Supreme Military Council II (SMC II) regime and invited the IFIs to aid Ghana's economy.

Similar to the initial policies pursued under Busia, an economic stabilisation programme was negotiated, which required government to, among other things, cut its expenditure, raise government revenue, reduce money supply, and devalue the cedi. However, these policies were not generally accepted by the population, because they impacted people's living conditions in a harsh manner, particularly in terms of high inflation and high commodity prices (Rothchild & Gyimah-Boadi, 1986). Therefore, policy reform was followed by workers' strikes that culminated in another military takeover by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the leadership of Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings.

Declaring its central aim as the defense of justice and its entrenchment, the AFRC, which ruled for about four months, occupied itself with what it called "house cleaning exercise" (Rothchild & Gyimah-Boadi, 1986, p. 265; Brydon & Legge, 1996, p. 15). This bloody process, which occurred in the period between the first coup and AFRC's takeover was characterised, by the execution of high profile individuals, particularly former military heads of state and some generals, and others perceived as corrupt (Brydon & Legge, 1996; Boateng, 2001; Reynolds, 2005). In spite of the reported public support for the executions and the insatiable desire by sections of the public to have more people executed, the AFRC halted these actions due to international pressure (Brydon & Legge, 1996). Moreover, the economic distress of the country was blamed on traders and other businesses. As such, price control was strictly enforced and entrepreneurs who refused to sell at the decreed prices had their assets burnt or confiscated, and in some cases, were publicly flogged.

The AFRC, however, continued with the planned return to constitutional rule that had been scheduled under the SMC II. Hence, between June and September 1979, the AFRC supervised the implementation of the new Constitution, and facilitated the election that established the Third Republic. The AFRC handed over power, on the 24th September, 1979, to the elected government of the People's National Party (PNP) led by Hilla Limann. The Third Republican constitution provided for a presidential system of government featuring strict separation of powers, unlike the Second Republic. It also introduced a section titled, Directive Principles of State Policy, which purported to be the fundamental responsibility to which governments in the Third Republic must adhere (Republic of Ghana, 1979). Although its official ideology was Nkrumahism, the PNP was rather a mosaic of different forces and sometimes opposing ideas, a condition which affected economic decision making under the PNP (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).

Ghana, at the beginning of the Third Republic had witnessed the overthrow of two civilian governments by the military. In both instances, the economic situation of the country was bad but, unlike the first one, the second military coup was an immediate response to the implementation of WB and IMF conditionalities that required the adoption of austerity measures. Therefore, the new president, Hilla Limann, inaugurated at a time of continued economic recession, was hesitant to accept and implement IMF and WB policy prescriptions that involved currency devaluation, among other things. However, the finance minister, having worked for the IMF prior to his appointment, favoured the Fund's policies, but this was not popular among members of the governing party. Disagreements within the governing apparatus resulted in a rejection of the 1980/1981 budget and economic policy by Parliament. Hutchful (2002) described the situation created by such disagreements, which stalled any action, as one of "policy

paralysis". In any case, the many problems facing the economy could not be rectified because there was yet again another military intervention led by Flt. Lt. Rawlings on the 31st of December, 1981 to establish the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) (Hutchful, 2002)

It must be noted that when Rawlings took power in 1981, the economic conditions had not improved, and no policy had been put in place to remedy the situation due to the contrasting views between the IMF and the PNP government. Notwithstanding the leftist rhetoric at the beginning of its rule, as the economic conditions of the country further worsened particularly with drought conditions, the repatriation of about one million Ghanaians from Nigeria, limited assistance from socialist nations, and the refusal by Nigeria to supply any crude oil to Ghana, the PNDC approached the IFIs for assistance (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b; Ray, 1986). This resulted in the implementation of economic recovery and structural adjustment programmes (ER/SAPs) under the direction of the IMF and WB. With a positive recommendation from the IMF, other bilateral and multilateral donors gradually increased their support to Ghana (Brydon & Legge, 1996). The ER/SAPs were implemented in phases that sought to address problems covering all aspects of the Ghanaian society. The reforms culminated in the return to constitutional rule in 1993.

The Fourth Republic – 1993 until Now

Unlike the preceding constitutional regimes, the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in 1993 led to enduring political stability. After twenty-one years of existence, the Fourth Republic has witnessed six successful elections, with two resulting in a change of power between an opposition and an incumbent government. The central institution of the Fourth Republic that guides the operations of government is the 1992 Constitution, which established a neo-presidential system of governance within a multiparty democratic system. While there is a separation of powers between the three branches of government, there is a partial fusion of the

executive and the legislature, as the Constitution provides for the appointment of a majority of the government ministers from parliament (Republic of Ghana, 1992).

The partial fusion aims at forestalling the constant rift observed between the Executive and the Legislature in the Third Republic (1979-1981), which have had negative consequences on the governing process (Frempong, 2007). For instance, the rejection of the Executive's programme of reform to streamline institutions such as the Electoral Commission and the Supreme Court, and the 1981/82 economic policy and budget statement by the Legislature (Asare, 2002; Frempong, 2007). Emanating from the constitutionally-established relation between the Executive and the Legislature, the Executive plays the dual role of making and executing laws and policies since some state ministers are also parliamentarians. The Executive's dominance in the policy process is further enhanced as result of some political dynamics witnessed in the Fourth Republic.

The trends observed indicate that the political party from which the Executive president is elected mostly has majority in parliament, thus predisposing it to what has been referred to as 'ultra-majoritarianism' (Ninsin, 2008; 2009). This condition is characterised by the Executive's belligerent use of its "majority party in parliament to drive the legislative process to achieve policy goals regardless of contrary views in and outside parliament, and in spite of its implications for the democratic order" (Ninsin, 2008, p. 54). This tool has been used even on occasions when the opposition in Parliament have staged a walkout as occurred with many bills, such as the bill to increase the rate of Value Added Tax (VAT) in 2013, the Representation of Peoples Amendment bill, and the National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) bill (Boafo-Arthur, 2005; Accra Mail (Ghana), 2006; Adu-Gyamerah, 2007; Ayee, 2009; ISD (Gilbert Ankrah & Richie Osei Asiedu), 2013). Ultra-majoritarianism is bolstered by the principle of party

discipline where activities, particularly voting in the legislative chamber, are shaped by the general position of the party on a policy issue, which directs members to vote in particular ways without the opportunity to dissent. This implies a major determining factor for the adoption of policy will be the predisposition of the executive to particular policy alternatives as explained further below.

While Article 106 of the Constitution begins with the acknowledgement of the lawmaking role of parliament, it proceeds to state some conditions, which must be in place for bills to be introduced in the house. Restrictions worked into the submission of bills have largely tied the hands of MPs initiating private members bills. To begin with, the bill must meet all the criteria outlined in paragraph (a) of Article 108, which declares:

> Parliament shall not, unless the bill is introduced or the motion is introduced by, or on behalf of, the President -

>> (a) proceed upon a bill including an amendment to a bill, that, in the opinion of the person presiding, makes provision for any of the following -

>> (i) the imposition of taxation or the alteration of taxation otherwise than by reduction; or (ii) the imposition of a charge on the Consolidated Fund or other public funds of Ghana or the alteration of any such charge otherwise than by reduction; or (iii) the payment, issue or withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund or other public funds of Ghana of any moneys not charged on the Consolidated Fund or any increase in the amount of that payment, issue or withdrawal; or (iv) the composition or remission of any debt due to the Government of Ghana.

This provision restricts the introduction of any bill that has financial implications for government by a private member except when acting on behalf of the President. Such bills must be accompanied by an explanation or a memorandum profiling the bill, including the principles underlying it, the circumstances such as problems with existing policy that necessitate the new bill and how it will solve those problems. The bills must also be gazetted for a minimum of 14 days before its introduction to Parliament.

Cumulatively, these provisions weakened the ability of parliament to initiate private member bills. Therefore, an option for Parliamentarians and others to get their policies and bills passed is to secure the consent and support of the Executive. Accordingly, Ninsin (2009, p. 43) notes, "…a private bill is more likely to pass through the legislative process if it has the support of the Executive." For instance, the Presidential Transition Bill, 2009 was a collaborative work of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Ghana Political Parties Programme (GPPP) (Ofori-Mensah, 2011). The GPPP is made up of all parties in Parliament; consequently the support for the passing of this bill was unanimous.

Like the 1979 Constitution, chapter six of the new constitution presents the directive principles of state policy, which guides public policy. Article 34(1) states that, " The Directive Principles of State Policy contained in this Chapter shall guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in applying or interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and free society." (Republic of Ghana, 1992) Chapter 6 Article 36 (5) requires the president to produce a document, two years into her or his term, outlining a set of governmental activities planned to address economic and social problems

confronting the country, also this plan of action should cover agricultural and industrial programmes (Republic of Ghana, 1992; Republic of Ghana, 2010).

In fulfillment of this provision, governments over the years prepare and present to Parliament a coordinated programme of economic and social policies, although these documents have been themed differently (Owusu S. A., 2013; Republic of Ghana, 2014). In 1995, the first NDC government of the Fourth Republic, presented to Parliament *Ghana: Vision 2020*, and a medium term development plan derived from it (Republic of Ghana, 1995; 1997). These documents informed policies and other development initiatives until the NPP government was elected in 2000. Subsequently, *Vision 2020* was replaced with NPP's development programme based on the party's manifesto and was presented to Parliament in December 2002. However, this programme was eclipsed by the *Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I),* which was prepared following the decision to join the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative (Republic of Ghana, 2002; Republic of Ghana, 2003; Whitfield & Jones, 2009).

In its second term, the NPP government presented the *Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II)* document to Parliament, a development programme which is largely seen as the NPP's own programme (Republic of Ghana, 2006; Whitfield, 2009). With the alternation of political power in January, 2009, following the December 2008 elections, the new NDC government prepared a coordinated programme for the period 2010 to 2016 titled: *An Agenda for Shared Growth and Accelerated Development for a Better Ghana* (Republic of Ghana, 2010)*.* In planning this comprehensive policy document, the president was assisted by various governmental bodies, including the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), the Cabinet, Cross Sectoral Planning Groups (CSPGs), Ministries, Departments and Agencies

(MDAs), and other experts who may have been invited by the NDPC (Republic of Ghana, 1993). The completed document was then presented to Parliament for approval and likewise shared with Ghana's development partners (DPs) at the annual consultative group (CG) meetings. Subsequently, this document was put into effect by the MDAs.

C.   TNAs and Policymaking

The 1992 Constitution makes provision for Ghana's relation with other countries and international organisations in Articles 40, 73, 74, and 75. These Articles in the Constitution outlines the guiding principles of Ghana's international relations, sending representatives to other countries and the process of ratifying international agreements and treaties. Such relations must be within the established international public law and diplomacy guided by the national interest (Republic of Ghana, 1992). In addition, working with other countries to establish regulations or treaties, which subsequently, affect domestic policies, international development partners are a significant part of Ghana's policy process. Yet, the role of TNAs in the policy process has gone through several transformations, from a limited role in the independence era to a period of increased interaction with the implementation of the economic recovery and structural adjustment programmes (ER/SAPs) in the 1980s. Due to skepticism of foreign interests expressed by Nkrumah, the first president of an independent Ghana, his relationship with TNAs was selective and guided. Political instability between 1966 and 1992 likewise resulted in a fluctuation of the TNAs' relations with government, with some governments more inclined to work with TNAs than others. By 1992, however, TNAs were recognised as an integral part of Ghana's policymaking landscape.

It is noteworthy that ER/SAPs marked the beginning of a closer partnership between Ghana and IFIs, multilateral and bilateral donors, which was further deepened with political

democratisation. Ghana has several programmes with the IFIs, other multilateral international organisations and bilateral donors. Significantly, with the ER/SAPs, the IMF and the WB became prominent actors in Ghana's policy arena until 2010, when this relationship (particularly with the IMF) changed slightly as Ghana moved from a low income to a middle income country status. Yet, worsening economic prospects from mid-2013 again resulted in the negotiation for an IMF support from April 2014. Perhaps the Fourth Republic, more than any of the preceding republics, has also witnessed increased activity at the non-governmental level with the proliferation of both local based and international NGOs (Ohemeng, 2005; Ohemeng & Ayee, 2013).

Comparatively, there is a reduction in the number of programmes the country has negotiated with the IMF. Yet, as a member country, Ghana is still subject to the Article IV consultations conducted by the IMF. Such consultations are a key aspect of the IMF economic surveillance activities, which require member states to submit their economic and financial policies for inspection by IMF officials (IMF, n.d.; 2011). The consultations also serve as a way of bringing international pressure to bear on domestic policy, as IMF officials provide advice to Ghana's government on economic and financial policy consistent with the obligations of IMF states (IMF, n.d.).

Additionally, there is a yearly meeting of the government, multilateral and bilateral partners, and local and international NGOs, called the Consultative Group Meetings (CGMs). Mostly coordinated by the WB it entails the discussion of crucial policy problems confronting a developing country and the decision of development partners (DPs) to provide assistance. In making the decision to assist a country, DPs especially discuss economic policy and the general direction of government policy in dealing with such issues as poverty. Since November 1983,

when the WB organised meetings of multilateral and bilateral donors to raise funds for the then

ailing economy, the CGM has become a regular aspect of Ghana's policy process. During the

2002 CGM, the multi-donor budget support (MDBS) was instituted by nine DPs[1] to provide

budget support to the country (Netherlands Embassy, Staff). The MDBS was finalised with the

government in 2003. MDBS is an arrangement between the GoG and some DPs who provide

financial assistance to support government's policy initiatives as outlined in the GPRS

document, and currently, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA). As

part of this funding mechanism, there is an annual review between GoG and DPs to assess

government progress against established conditions and targets (MOFEP). The outcome of such

assessment and discussion informs DPs financing decisions in the subsequent year.

Other avenues of national and international actor interaction include the sector working groups

SWGs, and CSPGs which are an integral part of policymaking in contemporary Ghana. SWGs

comprised representatives of MDAs, DPs and CSOs in a particular sector who meet regularly to

discuss policy initiatives and deliberate "strategic plans, performance monitoring and

implementation of harmonised projects." (MOFEP Ghana, 2013) Likewise CSPGs engage in a

discussion of policy and comprise representatives of TNAs, CSOs and MDAs.

D.   Conclusion

An examination of Ghana's policy environment has shown the country's environment to be

dynamic. Beginning with pre-colonial governance systems prior to the arrival of Europeans,

Ghana has witnessed multiple systems of rule from a dual system of modern and traditional rule

during colonialism to the gradual domination by modern political institutions from the later part

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[1] The initial members were the African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank. Between 2005 and 2008, two more countries, France and Japan, joined the MDBS group, bringing the number of DPs to 11.

of the colonial period to the Fourth Republic. Post-war Ghana has experienced a Westminster system of government featuring a fusion between the executive and legislative powers from 1951, when Ghana attained internal self-government. There was a break with this system in the 1979 Third Republican Constitution, which provided for a presidential system of government with a separation of the three branches of government. From 1992, Ghana opted for a neo-presidential system of government characterised by a partial fusion of the Executive and Legislative branches of government. Ghana's political history has also been one of turbulence, witnessing four republics and five military regimes since independence. In addition to the arbitrariness that prevailed under military rule, a consequence of such authoritarian regimes has been the recurrent stalling of the development of Ghanaian political institutions. In comparison to the Fourth Republic, which has lasted for over two decades now, the life span of each of Ghana's preceding three republics varied between only two and four years.

In addition to the national dynamics, the international dimension in Ghana's policy process is significant. Beginning with trade, colonialism and then independence followed by membership in various international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Ghana became part of the global policy community. As noted during the independence era bilateral relations were fundamental to Ghana's development efforts, for instance, in the construction of the Volta Dam. Moreover, some of the policies pursued by the independent government led by Nkrumah was significantly influenced by his relations with socialist countries such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Similarly, the public service benefitted from the service of British policy experts and other foreign expatriates.

Relations with TNAs, however, have witnessed variations. While TNAs, particularly the IFIs, influence in shaping policy under Nkrumah was less prominent, this changed gradually after the first coup in 1966. The change came about as a result of the cumulative effect of political turbulence and socio-economic crises in the post-independence period. Such crises resulted in the involvement of international actors after 1966, culminating in 1983 with the adoption of the ER/SAPs. Indeed the ER/SAPs marked the beginning of closer relations with TNAs.

The mechanisms by which TNAs influence Ghana's policy process have been studied in different ways. Despite the availability of various competing explanations – structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological – to elucidate the relationship among national and transnational policy actors in Ghanaian social policy, most studies have been skewed towards structural explanations, a perspective this thesis challenges. The next chapter, therefore, presents a review of the various theoretical perspectives available, to study transnational policy influence. Also, the analytical framework for this study is presented.

Chapter III: Transnational Actors and National Policymaking – Existing Explanations

A.   Introduction

The contemporary national policymaking process is generally acknowledged to be subject to influences from both the internal and the external environment. However, existing studies diverge when it comes to specifying the mechanisms by which external factors, especially transnational actors, impact national policies. For instance, basing their discussions on the disparities of power between international and domestic actors, some studies mostly blame transnational influence in policy on the structural imposition of policy prescriptions attached to development assistance (Galtung, 1971; Amin, 1976; Loxley, 1990). Conversely, institutionalists' studies show how international regimes, conventions and treaties impact national policies, and how such international actors and norms are mediated by national institutions. Such studies maintain that national norms and policies are not wholly replaced by those diffused globally but are translated to "fit" into a particular national and institutional context (Pierson, 1996; Campbell, 2004; Czarniawska, 2012).

Alternatively, ideational mechanisms are deemed to provide explanations of how TNAs interact with the national policy process. This logic suggests that policy decisions are shaped by a process of interpretation filtered by ideational elements. From this perspective, the construction of frames and discourses by policy actors around particular ideational elements such as norms and beliefs, are critical and informs action. Because such frames and discourses provides information to policymakers and are interpreted in a specific manner dependent on the unique features of the national policy environment, such as cultural norms and identities to inform action (Bleich, 2002; Parsons, 2007; Schmidt, 2010; Béland & Orenstein, 2013). Moreover, other

studies point to psychological factors like cognitive shortcuts and heuristics – to explain policy reforms that originate externally (Weyland, 2005a; 2005b; 2008).

In order to appropriately situate this research within a broad scholarly landscape, this chapter reviews the current state of knowledge on the interaction of transnational actors and the national policy process. The examination aims at elucidating what research has been done and what remains to be done in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region generally, and Ghana in particular. Subsequently, the analytical framework for this study is introduced. This study weaves together the Transnational Policy Process (TPP) framework (Orenstein, 2008) and the Norm Life Cycle Model (NLCM) as discussed below (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2009). These frameworks show how international norms and policy ideas can be developed in a particular setting and transferred to other countries using mechanisms such as framing processes, and channels like seminars, workshops, conferences and experts. While focusing on the transnational aspect of the national policy process, as stressed by the two models mentioned above, the study extends the scope of the two above frameworks to incorporate the activities of national non-state actors such as civil society organisations and how these groups interact with transnational actors in pursuing particular policy positions.

In addition, this study also examines how the transnational policy idea purveying and learning activities are aligned and incorporated into the national policy process. In this wise, it is recognised that the institutional positions of TNAs in the policy process is a significant link to policymakers. Although the study is centred on an ideational perspective, the framework adopted in this study is attentive to the ways in which ideas can interact with structural, institutional and psychological factors to shape policy development at both the national and the transnational level.

B.   Existing Perspectives

Various approaches have made postulations about the influence of transnational actors in the national policy process. In his study of how to explain political action, Parsons (2007) outlined two major categories of explanatory factors: the logic of position and the logic of interpretation. The logic of position explains policy decisions as a response to material or human-made constraints and incentives that characterise the policy environment in relation to an actor's position within such a landscape, while the logic of interpretation conceptualizes policy decisions as an interpretive response (to cognitive and affective factors) that states what is doable or desired (Parsons, 2007). These two major explanatory logics are sub-divided into four types of explanation: structural and institutional explanations, under the logic of position, and ideational and psychological explanations, under the logic of interpretation. As shown in Table 1 below:

Table 1 Types of Explanation

	Logic of Position	**Logic of Interpretation**
General	1. Structural Explanations	3. Psychological Explanations
Particular	2. Institutional Explanations	4. Ideational Explanations

Source: Parsons. 2007

The examination of the existing studies on TNAs interaction with the policymaking process in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will be grouped according to the four explanations identified.

Although each of these logical explanation is separately discussed to show how political action can be explained from specific perspectives, it is noted that, they are "abstractly compatible, such that we could imagine a world in which all were operating while we debate how much variants of each contributed to any given action" (Parsons, 2007, p. 3). Furthermore, it is acknowledged

that, in reality, the effect of such logics cannot be neatly distinguished. For instance, it is impossible, except for analytical purposes, to describe a distinctively pure structural effect on policy. The position of this research, in line with Parsons (2007) and other studies (Osabutey, 2008; Béland & Orenstein, 2010; Béland & Orenstein, 2013) is that political action is typically, often multi-causal, such that, in the empirical world, the four logics are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, as the discussion below indicates, the boundaries are fuzzy among these four logics at the empirical level. Consequently, although discussed separately, there are instances of overlap or interaction among the various logics as the empirical chapters demonstrate, a situation that provides rich explanations of human action.

1.   The Structural Perspective

In explaining how transnational actors influence policy in SSA's policy process, the structural logic is mostly posited. From this structural perspective, policy action is a function of policy actors' "position *vis-à-vis* exogenously given 'material' structures like geography, the distribution of wealth, or the distribution of physical power. People's actions vary as their position in a given material landscape varies." (Parsons, 2007, p. 12) This view seemingly assumes the rigidity of structural factors that actors confront and it suggests that actors are generally powerless in the face of such non-manipulable structural constraints in the policy environment. Structures that they are unable to change, define the "identities and interests of actors" (Mahoney & Snyder, 1999, p. 5). Thus, the existence of a particular structure has implications for how policy actors make decisions in specific circumstances.

Noting the unequal power relations among the various actors on the world stage, such structural studies conceive of the international system to be composed of center (strong) states from the wealthy North, and (weak) peripheral states from the Global South (Galtung, 1971; Wallerstein,

1974; 1976; Amin, 1976). Being identified as a strong or a weak state has implications for action, that is, states are constrained by their international position as either peripheral or core to act in particular ways.

Studies assuming this perspective span various fields. Initially, trading and commercial activities were thought to have been determined by this division, which is linked to the effects of the colonial system. Per this division, most developing countries located in the Global South produce and export primary products to feed industries in the developed countries located in the North, while the North exports manufactured goods to the South (Prebischb, 1959). The relationship has developed to such an extent of dependence, with the South depending on the North through the exigencies of globalisation and an interdependent capitalist world. Consequently, Wallerstein (1974) notes that the international division of labor among countries is not only functional but also geographical. This is because most of the peripheral states are located in particular geographical locations, such as Africa and South Asia, with the core states being located in North America, Western Europe, and more recently, Japan and South Korea.

Attention is drawn in such studies to the fact that developed countries hold most of the leadership portfolios of powerful international organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank (WB), the United Nations (UN), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Karns & Mingst, 2004). These leadership positions are said to benefit developed nations that, as a consequence of having majority shares in most international organisations, are board members and also have majority voting rights, which enables them to pursue their political and economic interests around the world, particularly in the Global South (The World Bank Group, 2013). It is noted that the whole international monetary system, and indeed the world economic system at large, is underpinned by the world's economic hegemonic

structure, which is reinforced by the unequal voting rights on the boards of large international organisations (Karns & Mingst, 2004; Woods, 2006a; 2006b). Such positions are deemed to be used to develop and promote particular policy alternatives, which are subsequently diffused in developing countries through the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the WB and the IMF. Although these are institutional positions occupied by developed nations, it is noteworthy that such positions emanate from structural characteristics of being powerful, which is a consequence of their wealth and advancement. This example indicates the difficulty of putting forward a straitjacket explanation of political phenomenon as was alluded to above.

Emanating from these structural and positional differences, studies of policymaking in a developing country context argue that TNAs including multilateral and bilateral agencies, gain access to policy making spaces through conditionalities attached to development assistance (Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1991; Herbst, 1993; Hutchful, 2002; Adejumobi, 2004; Aina, Chachage, & Annan-Yao, 2004; Ndulu, 2008; Adésínà, 2009; Oya & Pons-Vignon, 2010). According to these studies, the trajectories of development in developing countries have been uneven and characterised by a state of political and economic crisis, which necessitates seeking help from external sources. But as weak partners in the global system, these countries receive assistance that mostly comes with conditions attached to it. For instance, it is noted that the economic and political crisis, which most SSA countries suffered in the 1970s, and 1980s precipitated the involvement of TNAs in policy formulation. For instance, gross domestic product (GDP) declined consistently from the beginning of the 1970s in Uganda, collapsing by the 1980s (Bawumia, 1996). In addition to economic shocks, which many SSA countries faced, there were social and political crises as well. In the case of Ghana, political instability persisted with a high rate of turnover, such that between Ghana's independence and 1983, when the

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country implemented the WB and IMF led structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), there had been five coup d'états. Additionally, in the early 1980s, the country suffered one of its worst famines and periods of economic stagnation. This problem was compounded by the repatriation of about a million Ghanaians from Nigeria. The dire circumstances forced the leader who declared himself a leftist to change course upon the insistence of the IFIs, when assistance was sought. Development assistance, thus, comes with conditionalities that take the form of policy prescriptions negotiated with developing countries, mostly prescribing liberal and stabilisation policies, which are tied to aid (Adésínà, 2009; Whitfield & Fraser, 2010; Adésínà, 2011)

In most of SSA, countries that sought assistance from the IFIs such as the WB and the IMF in the 1980s were given similar policy prescriptions, referred to collectively as the 'Washington consensus' and comprised privatisation, devaluation, reduction of government expenditure, and downsizing the public sector (Williamson, 1993; Boafo-Arthur, 1999b; Adésínà, 2009). Such prescriptions were consistent with the general wisdom in development circles at the time, which proposed "broader public service restructuring with emphasis on cost reduction and the retrenchment of government from non-core functions" as fundamental to attaining development and, consequently, poverty reduction (Unsworth, 2007, p. 23). Prior to the 1980s, there were accounts of similar policies being imposed on some developing countries. For instance, in 1966, after the coup and in the 1970s under the Second Republic and the latter part of the rule of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), Ghana was subject to conditions of stabilisation and liberalisation, resulting in policies of labour retrenchment, currency devaluation, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and elimination of price controls (Libby, 1976; Hutchful, 1979; Jonah, 1989; Callaghy, 1990; Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1991; Fosu & Aryeetey, 2008). Like the imposition of the structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, conditional assistance in earlier

periods occurred at a time of economic crisis in most of SSA. In such dire context, coupled with the privileged position of the IFIs and other bilateral partners, most developing countries accepted and implemented the imposed policies *in toto*.

The period of structural adjustment policies followed the Cold War era of aid giving, subject mainly to the rationality of power politics between the East and the West, and aid was given without consideration of governance problems. However, from the structural adjustment phase, a country's good governance record has been a key determining factor of lending and assistance. Consequently, in the contemporary era, developing countries have mostly been subjected to political and "process" conditionalities (UNRISD, 2010, p. 290; Whitfield & Fraser, 2010). These require changes in the process of making policies to give a greater role to civil society in a bid to fulfil the requirement of policy ownership and participation. The continuous change in the modalities of aid delivery suggests dynamism in the operations of most transnational actors (Béland & Orenstein, 2013; Mahon, 2013; 2015). For instance, moving from a period of belief in the virtues of unbridled economic liberal policies in 1980s and1990s, most international organisations have now adopted a position that assumes that the attainment of economic fortunes is spurred on by social policies (Jenson, 2010). The change also witnessed an international drive for national policy ownership, institutionalised in the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* in 2005. However, the drive for national ownership confronts structural challenges emanating from the different positions of transnational and national actors, which makes the process of policy ownership less effective (Seshamani, 2002; 2005; Amoako-Tuffour, 2008).

In spite of the structural constraints, there are instances of countries exerting their policy autonomy. This is the case in Zambia, which agreed to adopt IFI policies and implement conditionality in 1976, only to abandon the programme for a home gown programme in the mid-

1980s (Loxley, 1990). Such reversals, however, were punished by withdrawal of assistance completely or non-release of aid instalments (Loxley, 1990; Kanbur, 2000). Moreover, strong national development agendas have been used as barriers to imposition in the cases of Botswana and Ethiopia (Whitfield & Fraser, 2010). In other instances, instead of outright refusal of unpopular conditionalities, governments have publicised the conditionality, which is usually kept within administrative circles, leading to public outcry, and as a result, withdrawal of the policy from implementation. This was the case in 2007, when Ghana was required to privatise the Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) and the Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) (Whitfield & Jones, 2009; Whitfield, 2010).

While the structural approach assumes the rigidity of the exogenous material factors that shape the actions of policymakers, the reversal of imposed policies and the non-adherence to conditionalities challenge the idea of the non-manipulability of structural obstacles and the lack of power of developing countries confronting international organisations. For instance, in 1992, Ghanaian President, J. J. Rawlings announced a pay rise to civil servants and the military of about 80 percent, which was contrary to agreed policy conditionalities imposed by the WB as part of the SAPs (Kanbur, 2000). Moreover, the Kufuor government, which replaced Rawlings, once again contrary to agreed policy conditionalities, did not privatise the GCB and significantly increased government spending in election years (Killick, 2010).

Power relations between the North and the South can change, and countries that are considered poor and powerless today may become resourceful and gain some power at another time, in the future. For example, China's current position in geopolitics has evolved from a weak to a much stronger position in recent decades. In the case of Botswana mentioned above, although to some extent it was aid dependent in the 1960s, the country built strong institutions, formulated a

national development agenda, and gradually became less dependent external on aid. Therefore, in negotiating aid, that country only signs agreements that promote its national agenda and rejects donor preferences which do not further its national objective (Whitfield & Fraser, 2010).

As suggested by Sen (2004), with regard to globalisation and the interaction among countries, policy influences and the movement of innovations have not always been from the North to the South. Furthermore, the recent cash transfer policies implemented across the developing world were designed by policymakers in the South, contrary to the skepticism expressed by TNAs concerning the efficacy of cash transfers in the developing country context (Hanlon, Barrientos, & Hulme, 2010). As a consequence of the limits of the structural perspective, other explanations have been put forward proposing alternative mechanisms to grasp the transnational policy process.

2.   Institutional Perspective

Whereas the structural perspective posits policymaking as constrained by material factors external to policy actors, over which they have no direct control, and so act within the limits that these factors provide, the institutional perspective grants some control to actors, who are the creators of institutions, which subsequently constrain and empower them in sometimes unpredictable ways (Parsons, 2007). Conceived as formal or informal constraints and opportunities, institutions include rules, embedded norms, conventions, practices, regulations and procedures, which could as well manifest themselves in concrete bodies such as the legislature, the military or the executive (North, 1990; Parsons, 2007). Notwithstanding the constraining effects of institutions on human behaviour, policy actors are also capable of manipulating institutions.

This institutional perspective introduces another dimension to the interaction between TNAs and national actors in policymaking, beyond the disparities in the distribution of power and the rigidity of non-manipulable constraints. Accordingly, this perspective postulates that the involvement of TNAs in policymaking is shaped by institutions located at two levels: the international level and the national level (Risse-Kappen, 1995). Institutions at the national level mediate the influence of international institutions, such that in situations where we expect convergence of policies in a particular area such as welfare or pension restructuring, significant differences are observed (Pierson, 1996; Campbell, 2004; Schultz, 2013). As stated, "...variations in domestic structures account for differences in the policy impact of transnational coalitions and actors." (Risse-Kappen, 1995, p. 33) One feature of the domestic political institutions explored by scholars is the set of decision points or veto players in a particular country (Orenstein, 2008). Explaining the outcomes of decision processes in various countries, Tsebelis (1995; 2002) shows how veto players (actors whose support is needed to adopt a legislation) provided for by existing institutions can result in different policy outcomes across different countries. Consequently, it is argued that, in the transnational process of spreading policy ideas, such ideas are adapted to the local context in a process called translation, which results in differences across countries (Campbell, 2002; Béland, 2009; Czarniawska, 2012). In this sense, domestic institutions are pertinent when accounting for the influence of TNAs, which they filter.

Due to the impact of national institutions in the policy process generally, Schultz (2013) suggests that, during negotiations at the international level resulting in treaties and other bilateral agreements, national policy actors favour positions that can easily be ratified by their legislatures, a view that confirms the significant role of veto players within the policy process. In a study of decision making in Ghana, Ninsin (2009) shows how the institutional framework

provided for by Ghana's neo-presidential system facilitates the legislation of policies once they are favoured by the dominant party in government. This is helped by the partial fusion of the executive and legislative arms of government and is entrenched by what he calls "ultra-majoritarianism", where the executive holds majority in the legislative assembly, a phenomenon observed since the return to constitutional rule in 1993. Admittedly, domestic institutions shape the impact of TNAs on the national policy process, as argued by Evangelista (1995) in a study that compared centralized and decentralized political systems. Although TNAs are not veto players and in domestic affairs have limited political access in a centralized political system (Orenstein, 2008), once their policy proposal is positively accepted by political leaders, it is more likely to be implemented than in a decentralised system where TNAs ideas come up against other organised interests.

Whereas domestic institutions mediate the influence of TNAs in the policy process, it must be noted that states sign various international treaties or protocols, which constrain their subsequent actions. Notwithstanding provisions in some national constitutions for the adaptation of international law or treaty, in some cases these laws could be directly applied without having to go through a legislative process to be applied (Jackson, 1992). In some countries, such as South Africa, there are constitutional provisions to the effect that interpretation of laws should be done to resonate with internationally accepted laws and norms (Jackson, 1992; Hassim, Heywood, & Berger, 2007). Yet, there are different responses to international treaties globally; usually such responses are based on a country's perceived international status. As Krikorian (2012, p. 202) notes in the case of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) settlements and the Canadian and US reaction to its agreements; "While Canadians understood the WTO Agreement to be a treaty and its signatories to be bound by the forces of law, officials in Washington envisioned the WTO

Agreement to be no more than a contract." Perceived as a contract, the US could breach its tenets when it is in their interest to do so, and were willing to address the consequences that follow. Meanwhile, advocacy groups also hold their governments to account in dealing with particular issues such as child labour and climate change, once their leaders have signed such protocols.

While the institutional perspective indicates that contemporary policy actors are constrained by the institutions put in place at an earlier time; it has limitations in fully explaining policy decisions. For instance, when acting within the confines of institutions, policy actors confront an unlevelled playing field, particularly in international circles (Cumbers, MacKinnon, & McMaster, 2003). As noted with WTO rules, some countries like the US could make rules and then break them, whenever it is in their interest to do so, because they are advantaged economically and have political and military might. Furthermore, in their policy choices, actors consider other non-institutional factors such as the availability of resources in selecting one alternative over the other (Béland, 2005). Moreover, it is noted that institutions can fail to provide benchmarks or guides to aid policymakers make particular policy choices (Immergut, 1998). The constraints that confront policymakers, coupled with cognitive and time limitations, result in a decision process informed by bounded rationality (Simon, 1997) and related cognitive shortcuts known as heuristics and framing effects (Weyland, 2005a; 2005b; 2008). Considering all of these, on their own, institutions do not always adequately explain policy action.

3. Psychological Perspective

From this perspective, action is derived from the psychological makeup of actors and their mental processes. Policy action is therefore a consequence of "hard-wired instincts, affective commitments, and/or cognitive shortcuts" (Parsons, 2007, p. 13). Judging the actions produced from the hard-wired mental processes by the virtues of objective rationality, however, some

studies indicate that "people interpret their environment through irrational ways." (Parsons, 2007, p. 134)

In the context of examining how TNAs influence policies, the psychological logic posits that cognitive constraints direct actors to act in particular ways. It does not identify mechanisms by which TNAs influence the policies of developing countries directly; rather, cognitive factors that make ideational or structural mechanisms seemingly effective are discussed. For instance, they attempt to answer the question, why do actors in developing countries accept and actually implement imposed policies despite contrary expectations? Or why do policy actors accept transferred policy ideas or innovations? As such psychological factors mediate or intervene in the process of convening policy ideas from one actor to the next.

The main cognitive factors that mediate TNAs influence of other countries' policy process include human cognitive limitations that make it difficult for decision makers to engage in comprehensive analysis of policy problems and the search for appropriate solutions to them. Decision makers are thus described as bounded in their cognition; consequently, they tend to "learn from foreign experiences and import readily available external models" (Weyland, 2008, p. 291), and use cognitive shortcuts or heuristics. For instance, using the heuristics of availability and representativeness[2] to explain the spread of pension reforms in Latin America, Weyland (2005a; 2005b) argues that the influence of the Chilean model on other Latin American countries was possible due to their geographical and socio-cultural proximity to Chile. He further acknowledged that while the reforms were not imposed through conditionalities as suggested by

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[2]Heuristics of availability "makes people pay disproportionate, excessive attention to especially proximate, vivid, striking and memorable events", and representativeness heuristics, leads people to arrive at hasty judgement of success based on limited amount of data and "emulate a seemingly promising innovation" (Weyland, 2005b, pp. 23-24).

structural arguments, among Latin-American policymakers, there was a desire to conform to the transformations taking place within the region.

Furthermore, drawing from Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984), Weyland (2008) explained significant shifts in public policy in the SSA region using the psychological dynamic of framing, which the theory proposes. Prospect theory claims that, contrary to the assumptions of consistent preferences in the making of rational decisions, preferences of decision makers are inconsistent with objective rationality. Instead of making calculations based on net values, actors tend to frame the situation they confront comparative to their current condition and to interpret the prospects of their decisions as either gains or losses relative to that reference point. Prospect theory proposes that actors tend to be more concerned with situations framed as losses rather than gains, resulting in risky behaviour to avoid loss at all costs. Consequently, applying this theory to explain radical policy shifts in SSA, Weyland (2008) argues that the 1980s economic crisis was interpreted unfavourably, which placed some SSA leaders in a "domain of loss." In other words, those leaders concluded upon assessment of the crisis that it could result in negative political outcomes, such as the possibility of losing power if nothing is done. Compared to their reference point of being powerful and enjoying the goodwill of most people, the loss of power was dreaded. Such an interpretation resulted in risky behaviour, for instance, the willingness of authoritarian regimes to make significant institutional changes prompted by IFIs' policy conditionalities. Accordingly, Weyland argues that "In these dire situations, people refuse to accept a sure loss of limited magnitude and instead prefer a gamble that holds the uncertain promise of avoiding any loss but also carries the risk of a really large loss." (Weyland, 2008, p. 286) For instance, the leader of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) in Ghana, Rawlings, is said to have interpreted the possible outcomes of the

1980 economic crisis as a potential political loss. That is, considering his reference point of having power, the crisis generated fear of losing his political power. Consequently, he was willing to make a complete reversal of his earlier policy approach, jettisoning his socialist stance with the adoption of trade liberalisation in spite of the high political risk associated with it (Herbst, 1993; Weyland, 2008).

Rawlings' decision to seek help from the IFIs and to implement policies that contradicted his expressed political views stood in sharp contrast to rational expectations within the context he found himself in. Historical antecedents show that anytime the country implemented liberalization and stabilisation policies imposed by the IMF and WB in the period preceding 1980s, there was political unrest leading to coup d'états and subsequent loss of power (Chazan, 1983; Hutchful, 2002). Additionally, having come into office by a coup d'état proclaiming socialist ideals, his decision to make a complete U-turn, which could possibly alienate his supporters and jeopardize his reign, is best explained by the hard-wired mental processes of the leader. This example confirms the assumption held by this logic that policymakers in most cases fail to "match clear costs, benefits, and probabilities to a fixed hierarchy of preferences via objective rationality" but rely on their hard-wired mental processes instead (Parsons, 2007, p. 133)

The difficulty associated with the psychological logic is how to convincingly determine what is going on in a policy actor's mind. For instance, in prospect theory analysis, it is challenging to determine just by observation the domain within which policy actors find themselves, and so, most analyses draw implications from the actions of actors and examined them against psychological factors. Consequently, in order to put forward deeper explanations of policy decisions, psychological factors are often combined with other logics such as ideational or

structural ones (Weyland, 2008). According to Parsons (2007), therefore, psychological factors frequently depend on other factors to exert an impact on policy actions. As a result, the effects of hard-wired mental processes can be seen when an individual is located within a particular structural or institutional environment, or when hard-wired mechanisms interact with historically-constructed ideational processes.

4.   Ideational Perspective

Broadly, this perspective argues that policy actions stem from the interpretation of policy discourses through the filters of certain ideational elements including values, policy prescriptions, practices, symbols, shared belief systems, norms, principled beliefs, causal beliefs, ideologies, identities, and broad worldviews that hold particularistic implications for action (Parsons, 2007; Béland & Cox, 2011). These ideational elements are social and intellectual constructions (and not hard-wired mental processes) emanating from thought processes and interlacing with the world through interpretation. Moreover, the interpretation generated by such elements suggests that: causal connections between various factors within a policy environment; provide tools to legitimize or delegitimize existing institutions and policies; serve as blueprints for addressing policy problems, before such blueprints are subsequently institutionalized (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993; Blyth, 2001; 2002; Béland & Cox, 2011).

Drawing from these ideational dimensions, Campbell (1998; 2002; 2004) argues that these elements reside either in the foreground or background of policy debates, and are either cognitive or normative. Based on these characterisations, ideational elements are categorised as policy paradigms (background/cognitive), public sentiments (background/normative), programmes (foreground/cognitive), and frames (foreground/normative). Related to this, Berman (2013) identified the following ideational variables: beliefs, norms and ideologies. These are defined as

follows: *beliefs* are views or opinions that individual political actors have about a specific policy issue; *norms* are beliefs about a policy area held by a group of actors; and *ideologies* are beliefs about political, social and economic life associated with collectives who are committed to these beliefs, which also bind them together (Berman, 2013). Based on this, beliefs emanate from individuals while norms and ideologies emanate from collectives. Consequently, the cognitive and normative debates could emanate from individual beliefs or group norms or ideologies.

Contemporary studies of politics and policymaking recognize the importance of ideational factors as explanatory mechanisms that greatly enhance the analysis of policy actions. In this vein, combining ideas with other explanatory logics brings richness and provides answers in situations where one cannot adequately explain why, for instance, a rational actor orders preferences in a particular way (Blyth, 2002; Campbell, 2004; Parsons, 2007).

Ideational analysis has been applied in vast studies to explain various policy phenomena related to transnational issues and processes. In their study of the emergence of international norms and its diffusion, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) showed how norms are created internationally using platforms provided by international organisations (IOs) and spread through discourses. From their study, they identified that countries adopt such norms because they want to project a positive image of themselves internationally. For instance, countries may adopt a policy or make changes to their policies to project a positive international image. However, in the creation of norms and, in particular, policy ideas, policy entrepreneurs are essential. According to Kingdon (2003), these people are located in various organisations inside and outside government, but they are also linked with policy networks and communities. As policy entrepreneurs, TNAs build norms and policy ideas, create knowledge and subsequently, engage in selling or diffusing such ideas about the world and how to solve particular problems (Skogstad & Schmidt, 2011).

In the process of communicating specific ideas, framing is important (Campbell, 2004; Béland, 2005). Framing in ideational analysis is, however, different from psychological framing where actors, interpreting particular conditions through their hard-wired mental processes, subsequently act in specific ways in line with how a situation is defined. Framing in ideational studies concerns the process of couching a particular policy idea in terms of language that resonates with an actor's values and worldview in order for them to accept it and take particular policy actions (Stone, 2002; Fischer, 2003; Campbell, 2004). From this perspective, ideational framing is typically strategic and political in nature (Béland, 2005).

Studies have shown how the effectiveness of framing is mediated by perceptions of power relations among actors. Analysing the shift from leftist to rightist policy ideals in post-apartheid South Africa (SA), Peet (2002) argues that liberal ideas were constructed in various centers of power located in academia, IOs, and the media. Subsequently, these were transported through discourses to developing countries including SA at various fora where political leaders (some of whom have been trained in the West) of various SSA countries were presented with arguments that supported a liberal perspective. Additionally, such discourses were backed with support such as grants and expertise. Whiles Peet's (2002) analysis stresses the effects of power on the potency of particular frames or how they are perceived and received, like Schmidt (2010; 2011), it also emphasizes that ideas are subject to discourses, involving communication aim at shaping and reshaping ideas in line with societal values and norms, indicating that the process is interactively guided by mutual exchange (Schmidt, 2010; 2011). In this vein, the following three processes – puzzling (generating policy alternatives and new norms), persuasion (using discourses and frames to bastardize existing policies and or introduce alternatives) and powering (powering accounts stress factors which make puzzling and persuasion effective, such as

positions of authority) – have been stressed in a bid to point out the role of policy entrepreneurs such as TNAs in the policy process (Skogstad & Schmidt, 2011).

Furthermore, it has been argued that, contrary to the main perspective in the SSA context, which postulates that TNAs use the imposition of policy through conditionalities as a means of shaping policy, TNAs also deploy their "soft power" through ideational mechanisms that can influence social policy in various SSA countries. In this sense, TNAs act as policy entrepreneurs or partners with other policy actors to spread particular policy ideals through discourse, which frames issues in particular ways to draw SSA policymakers' attention to specific solutions. Thus, both Stone (2002) and Fischer (2003) recognise the nature of language used in the policy community to intentionally communicate particular perspectives, implying that such discourses could be directed to shift attention from one policy problem or solution to another. Thus, discourses and frames have been adopted and used in various avenues such as seminars, conferences, publications, and workshops to communicate policy ideas and through the deployment of experts who, having particular ideas about policy problems, sway policymaking in specific directions (Orenstein, 2008; Béland & Orenstein, 2009; Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2009; Kpessa & Béland, 2011; Béland & Orenstein, 2013; Foli & Béland, 2014).

These studies have pursued the task of showing how the emergence of global values or norms is mediated by concrete mechanisms such as conferences, seminars, workshops, and publications. These mechanisms, which constitute national or global policy discourses, accordingly, could be inundated with particular metaphors or policy ideas about problems such as poverty. Successfully saturating the national or global policy environment with particular policy ideas could predispose policymakers to consider some policy proposals favourably (Hall, 1993; Campbell, 2002; Kingdon, 2003). The policy discourses that characterised conferences and

seminars could be related to what Kingdon refers to as the "policy primeval soup" characterised by the floating of various policy ideas that result in "softening up" where policymakers favour the policy suggestion put forward (Kingdon, 2003, pp. 116, 130). For Campbell (2002) and Hall (1993), policy ideas present in existing policy discourses can become part of "people's taken-for-granted cognitive schema" (Campbell, 2002, p. 32) or worldviews.

In their study, Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2009) assert that the global acceptance of poverty reduction as a desirable policy objective was facilitated by how the problem of poverty was framed and presented at various conferences and seminars convened by the United Nations (UN). They note that series of conferences convened by international organisations like the UN and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) acted (in Kingdon's terms) to "soften up" policymakers to favour the policy norm of eradicating extreme poverty by 50 percent by 2015. Similarly, in his study of pension privatisation, Orenstein (2008) notes that TNAs diffuse policy ideas by acting as proposal actors presenting various policy alternatives to nations in their policy development process. However, he shows that, though TNAs facilitate the spread of policy ideas through conferences, they go beyond just diffusing policy ideas by supporting policy implementation in various countries and by building the capacity of public officials and providing other resources in this direction. Apart from conferences, seminars and workshops, Kpessa and Béland (2011) note that TNAs also station experts within domestic policy arenas as a means of influencing policy development.

The seemingly effective implementation of particular policy ideas in one country could set in motion the spread of those ideas to policymakers in other countries or, at a later date, within the same country, through processes of social learning (Hall, 1993), lesson drawing (Rose, 1991), and translation or adaptation (Campbell, 2004; Czarniawska, 2012). Existing studies

acknowledge the transfer of policy ideas from across time and space and the fundamental role of

local and transnational policy entrepreneurs or actors in facilitating such transfers (Dolowitz &

Marsh, 2000). In his seminal analysis of economic policy reform, Hall (1993) showed how major

shifts in economic worldview occurred in Britain through the interaction of changes in domestic

politics and policy discourses, on one hand, and world economic paradigms, on the other.

According to Rose (1991), when confronted with policy problems, policymakers learn internally

from previous national policies and externally from other countries. The process of lesson

drawing involves policy actors looking into, and deciding on, ways by which a particular

programme pursued elsewhere can be implemented in another country or community. Rose

(1991) indicates that lesson-drawing is not limited to just the transfer of policy ideas but

importantly, it also focuses on an assessment of how adaptable the new policy can be. In a

similar manner, as suggested above, some studies suggest that policymakers engage in

translation that is, combining new policy ideas drawn from other contexts with local ideas or

localising new policy ideas to address new policy problems (Campbell, 2004, p. 65;

Czarniawska, 2012).

Besides such mechanisms, other studies indicate that ideational elements could be used to diffuse

policy ideas by transferring particular ideas to national political leaders and by shaping global

public opinion (Ndulu, 2008), as well as partnering with local non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) (Hearn, 1997; Townsend, Porter, & Mawdsley, 2002; Porter, 2003). Ndulu (2008) notes

that, particularly in the immediate post-independence era, development ideas in various SSA

countries were shaped by Fabian socialists, who transmitted their ideas to SSA through African

students who lived in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, who later became the political leaders of

their respective countries at independence. Particularly in West Africa, in addition to this

influence, leaders recruited economic advisers who subscribed to Fabian socialism. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah's policies from 1951 to 1960 were shaped to a greater extent by the ideas of British Fabian socialist Arthur Lewis (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992; Rimmer, 1992; Hutchful, 2002). Moreover, Ndulu asserts that global opinion leaders could influence "local societal views on acceptable policy choices and governance standards" (Ndulu, 2008, p. 328). Although he did not show how global opinion leaders specifically shape societal views, his examination of the World Values Survey and the Afrobarometer survey shows a strong convergence of values and perceptions about democracy and the desire for the eradication of inequities in society. As significant as this study is in showing the connection between world values and African values, it still remains to be shown how global beliefs and norms become embedded in national values and policy blueprints.

Partnership between international development agencies and local NGOs is identified as a channel for TNAs to access and influence national public policies (Hearn, 1997; Townsend, Porter, & Mawdsley, 2002; Porter, 2003). The partnerships are underpinned by congruence in ideology between the international development agencies and domestic NGOs or civil society organisations (CSOs). For instance, studying Ghana, Porter (2003) shows that most domestic NGOs are funded by various international organisations, who through this relationship, transfer policy ideas to policymakers. Moreover, such partnerships involve policy actors moving from place to place trying to adapt their own views about how to solve a particular policy problem to the context in which they find themselves.

Notwithstanding the benefits of exploring ideational factors in policy studies, this field has been criticized as failing to account for "when and how ideas, norms and culture shape the behavior of political actors and political actors shape ideas, norms and culture" (Berman, 2001, p. 246).

Besides, the issue of the timing of change due to the influence of specific ideas may be difficult to identify. It is clear that, though ideas are important factors fundamental in accounting for policy change, they are most potent under certain institutional and political conditions. In this context, the interaction between ideas and other types of factors or logics identified above is necessary to fully to grasp the policy process and shed better light on particular decisions and outcomes. These remarks are consistent with the work of Parsons (2007), who argues that it is often necessary to systematically and rigorously combine different types of explanations to answer particular research questions.

C.   Analytical Framework

The above discussion indicates the different mechanisms by which TNAs impact the national policy process. Thus far, however, studies of the SSA region have mostly focused on structural explanations, while excluding or downplaying the three other types of factors discussed by Parsons (2007) and summarized above. Meanwhile studies exploring other mechanisms and studying how they may interact are rare as far as the study of SSA is concerned. Aiming to extend the reach of ideational analysis within SSA, this study seeks to explore ideational factors and how they interact with other types of explanatory factors in TNAs involvement in Ghana's national policy process. The ideational focus of this study offers an alternative to the structural explanation bias of most studies on SSA, which stresses imposition and structural inequalities as constraining factors while the other mechanisms are given a minimal role and the agency of national actors is depicted as limited or non-existent. However, while the concept of imposition suggests that policymakers in developing countries have no alternative to the policy prescribed, and are powerless in the face of such forces, studies by Whitfield and Jones (2009), Woods (2006a; 2006b), and Kanbur (2000) indicate that developing countries do not always simply

implement the policy prescriptions imposed from outside by international organisations. In other instances, policy makers in developing countries adopt policies without any direct external pressure. Ghana's recent adoption of the LEAP cash transfer programme and the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) are examples of such policies.

The non-adherence of policymakers to conditionalities and the emergence of new policy norms in developing countries besides imposed policies suggest that there are other possible mechanisms at play when accounting for TNAs involvement in policies in Ghana. It is noteworthy that, while this study pursues an ideational dimension, it is not oblivious to the fact that policy actions are often multi-causal (Parsons, 2007). With this in mind, this research acknowledges the potential interaction of the above four logics of explanation. In this vein, the data collection process sought, in addition to identifying ideational mechanisms, to identify other mechanisms at play in the decision making process in Ghana, which will be discussed in the methodology chapter. The theoretical framework for this study is sketched in the following paragraphs.

Various ideational studies have been conducted around the world to explain the interaction of different categories of actors in the policy development process. This growing body of knowledge has generated interesting analytical frameworks. Pertinent to this study is Finnemore and Sikkink's Norm Life Cycle Model (NLCM) (1998) and Orenstein's Transnational Policy Process (TPP) framework (Orenstein, 2008).

Finnemore and Sikkink's three-stage (norm emergence, norm cascade and internalization) Norms Life Cycle Model was developed to explain how new norms are created and accepted, and to study the interaction of domestic and international norms. A norm's life cycle begins with norm

emergence, which involves norm-building, drawing attention to particular issues through the use of language or framing and making norms popular by the spreading of the norms to other states or countries through socialization. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896), the effective creation of norms is underpinned by "norm entrepreneurs and organisational platforms from which entrepreneurs act." Subsequently, norm-cascade is facilitated by "an active process of international socialization" whereby praise, emulation or ridicule is used to promote adherence to a new norm. In the international environment, "diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral or multilateral, which is reinforced by material sanctions and incentives" may be used (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). The promotion of norms reaches a threshold that moves norm building into the process of cascading that is characterised by the desire of other nations or agencies to imitate or to conform to an accepted way of doing things. This stage then progresses into the final stage of norm internalization, where the norms become widely accepted and taken-for-granted.

The NLCM indicates the following. First, it stresses the critical role of actors (norm entrepreneurs) in the building and diffusion of norms. This is corroborated by studies like Kingdon's (2003), who indicated the active role of policy entrepreneurs in creating policy proposals, and matching this to problems that emerge. Second, the model argues that domestic and international norms are closely interwoven. Finally, it posits that norms are not static but dynamic.

Unfortunately, the NLCM takes a very general perspective in its approach, without focusing particularly on TNAs. In addition, although the model argues that norms emerge both from domestic and international environments, it fails to analyze adequately how norm entrepreneurs actively socialize others to accept their preferred policy norms. Furthermore, the framework does

not examine how norm socialization and, consequently, adherence occurs within a national policy environment. Moreover, the NLCM fails to address the issue of actor involvement in norm implementation in specific countries beyond convincing countries to adhere to particular norms.

Due to the above flaws of the Norm Life Cycle Model in relation to the present study, Orenstein's Transnational Policy Process framework seems especially appropriate for it (Orenstein, 2008). Like Finnemore and Sikkink's model, the Orenstein's framework examines how particular policy ideas emerge and are diffused across countries. The framework indicates that the transnational policy process occurs across international and national policy arenas. At the international level, the process comprises: policy development, policy transfer, and implementation, effectively pointing out that transnational actor influence is continuous, throughout each of these stages.

The first stage, policy development, involves the creation of new problem definitions, policy programmes and new norms. Norm creation is undertaken by various TNAs through studies conducted on specific policy issues and by framing of particular issues in ways that draw the attention and support of other actors. For instance, international organisations commit significant resources to research and knowledge creation, popularising and diffusing the results of their research around the world. Also advocacy groups and other actors create norms within their locales. Policy development, therefore, involves a multiplicity of actors promoting new policy ideas across states and governance levels (Orenstein, 2005; 2008). It is noted that during policy development, the countries that first adopt a policy option, or what Orenstein referred to as "laboratory countries," are critical since they provide examples to other countries of the likely consequence of innovative ideas (Orenstein, 2005, p. 179).

Policy development is followed by policy diffusion, where the policy ideas or proposals developed are diffused to other countries, using various means. Broadly, Orenstein (2008) categorises the mechanisms of policy diffusion into norms teaching and resource leveraging. The former category involves ideational mechanisms such as seminars, publications and study trips, and the latter involves structural mechanisms such as conditionalities. From the perspective of this framework, policy norms or ideas could be transmitted without the need for resource leveraging or the use of conditionalities. Like the NLCM, Orenstein acknowledges that policy ideas could also spread by the cascading mechanism where states imitate each other or draw lessons from "laboratory countries" if they confront similar policy problems.

Unlike Finnemore and Sikkink who acknowledged cascade of norms without addressing issues of norm implementation in particular countries, Orenstein posits that the diffusion of policy ideas does not end with policy diffusion but it is followed by policy implementation. Policy implementation is of primary importance, particularly for TNAs in their advocacy role, because it serves as a means of further spreading the norms created. Thus, TNAs provide continual technical and financial assistance towards successful policy implementation.

Regarding successful policy reform, Orenstein (2008) acknowledges that TNAs supplement international level processes as outlined above, with the following activities – commitment building, coalition building and implementation – at the national level. Commitment building comprises strategies such as high level conferences and advisory activities engaged in by TNAs in order to win governmental support for their proposals. The second, coalition building, aims at generating public support and eventually legislative endorsement through public information campaigns, negotiations and technical support. With legislative endorsement, implementation

support is provided to enhance the stability of the reforms. Finally, it must be noted that the international level processes are intertwined with the national level activities.

The pertinence of the TPP framework for this research stems from the following. First, its focus on the interaction of TNAs with the policy process across international and national governance levels is most appropriate for this study. Within national policymaking, the framework proposes that TNAs' influence pervades multiple stages of the policy process. This directly contrasts with formal institutional or veto actors, whose influence is limited to specific stages of the national policy process, such as the legislative realm (Tsebelis, 1995; 2002; Béland & Orenstein, 2009). Second, the framework argues that in creating and spreading new policy norms and ideas, the transnational policy process does not terminate at policy diffusion but extends to policy implementation, which is critical for further diffusion and possible internalization. Finally, the framework combines successfully ideational and structural perspectives in its analysis of the spread of policy ideas and the role of TNAs. Combining these two perspectives emphasise the reality that in most cases, financial resources aid in the spread of ideas. As Orenstein (2008) noted, it is less beneficial to separate these two factors: norms and incentives.

Ideational analysis identifies various variables in explaining policy and policy outcomes. It is thus, important to identify the variables underpinning this study. According to Berman (2013) the variables fundamental to most ideational analysis, are beliefs, norms, culture and ideology. While beliefs are individually held, norms, culture and ideology are held by groups of actors. In a broader sense, by defining TNAs to include "international organisations, transnational non-governmental organisations (NGOs), expert networks and individual policy entrepreneurs," the ideational variables at the heart of the TPP framework includes beliefs, norms, and ideologies held by TNAs, which are spread from place to place. In this vein, Orenstein (2008, p. 4) argues

that TNAs influence policy outcomes in developing countries through the creation and spread of "new policy ideas, norms, metrics, values, and technical expertise." Fundamental to this influence is the supply of information to policymakers who face uncertainty in the context of limited information and cognition. Thus, TNAs conceived of as "proposal actors" in the transnational policy process, engage in the "introduction of intellectual innovations, setting agendas, and defining the range of feasible policy outcomes." (Orenstein, 2000, pp. 11 - 12; 2008)

Primary to TNAs ideational influence is the channels (such as conferences, seminars, publications, and technical expertise) used and the way these new information is presented or communicated. As such, the processes of communicating new policy ideas, and norms to policymakers is as important as the information, thus, framing is an integral aspect of TNAs ideational influence. According to Campbell (2002), framing is way of crafting new policy ideas to promote their legitimacy and acceptance both to other policymakers and the public. For instance, poverty was couched as a global crisis requiring a collective effort as demonstrated through the general acceptance of the MDGs. Consequently, framing underpins TNAs role as proposal actors. Yet, to have significant impact, ideational influence is coupled with others such as material incentives as the TPP framework illustrates.

While the TPP framework will be used in this study to investigate how a policy idea starts internationally and enters the national policy process, it is noted that aspects of the NLCM are incorporated into it. For instance, the policy development stage of the transnational actor model speaks to the issue of creating new norms and problem definitions at the international level. Moreover, norm cascade and policy transfer are akin, in that they are both referring to how policy ideas are spread. It is clear that, while diffusion can be bolstered by the use of diplomatic

praise and ridicule, which the NLCM stresses, this is not the only way; conferences and seminars are other means of policy diffusion.

Additionally, the Transnational Policy Process framework will be extended to examine how TNAs are involved in the policy process domestically. Orenstein (2008) acknowledges that the transnational actor activity pervades the national policy process, but in what ways? The exploration of TNAs activity within the national policy setting will extend the Transnational Policy Process framework as well as enhance our understanding of the spaces that TNAs occupy in the global and national policy process. As the following figure shows, the policy process traverses two levels and involves multiple activities and strategies.

National level: TNAs combine multiple strategies to influence policy including the use of ideational and material factors as well as institutional positions.

Transnational Level: TNAs create new policy proposals and popularise them through seminars, conferences and technical expertise.

Institutional Factors: TNAs position as members of sector working groups and cross sectoral planning committees provides a critical knowledge sharing link to policymakers.

Material incentives financial assistance toward program implementation.

Ideational factors: Creation and Spread of policy relevant information through channels such as conferences, seminars, publications and technical expertise.

The study shows that at the national level TNAs influence involves the interaction of ideational, material and institutional factors.

Figure 1Transnational Policy Process Framework

Furthermore, Orenstein's (2008) framework overemphasizes the role of formal veto players in the policy process, thus neglecting other national actors who are non-veto players, such as interest groups and civil society organisations. The significance of this category of actors for

Ghana emanates from the increasing democratisation of the policy process, the view expressed by research that supports the efficacy of participatory policy making and the emergence of a transnational civil society, which collaborates with national civil society to support particular policy positions through discursive processes (Kpessa & Atuguba, 2013)**.** While extending the Transnational Policy Process framework to include national non-veto players, this study additionally assumes that transnational actors sometimes partner with national non-veto players to push forward particular policy agendas.

D. Conclusion

The review of the literature about how transnational actors influence policies in developing countries, and particularly in SSA, indicates that of the four logics proposed by Parsons (2007), the explanation have been largely skewed in favour of structural mechanisms. As such, the argument has been that policies have been shaped through the imposition of policy conditionality, which is attached to loans. While this explanation holds in some circumstances, it fails to adequately account for policy change and reforms where there is no explicit transnational actor involvement, such as the adoption of cash transfer programmes in some developing countries. Additionally, conditionalities are not always adhered to, suggesting that there are other mechanisms that may explain policy change in situations where political leaders renege on conditionalities imposed by some international financial institutions. Moreover, the structural perspective fails to show how other mechanisms are also deployed by TNAs to spread policy ideas.

Consequently, this study adopts an ideational approach to stress transnational actor impact during the development of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategies (GPRS I & II), which were first implemented in 2003, and the 2007 cash transfer programme (Livelihood Empowerment

Against Poverty (LEAP)) in Ghana, while acknowledging the possible interaction of the four explanatory logics outlined by Parsons (2007) within the policy process. The study adopts Orenstein's Transnational Policy Process framework but with some modifications. First, the scope of the framework is extended beyond the transnational space, which is mostly populated by transnational actors engaged in the process of developing particular policies and transferring them through discursive strategies such as conferences, the use of policy entrepreneurs, and financial support. This study is interested in what happens beyond the transnational space, that is, examining how the transnational and national policy spaces interact to generate policy change. Second, the study examines the role within the policy process of other national actors who are non-veto players, such as interest groups and civil society organisations. This is critical because the policy environment is characterised by both veto and non-veto players; however, as suggested above, Orenstein's framework failed to adequately address the issue of non-veto players in the national policy process.

Moreover, although an ideational study, this research acknowledges that the policy world is multi-causal and that, in delineating particular logics of explanation, one is confronted with the difficulty of empirically distinguishing particular logics as sole explanatory factors when accounting for policy action. Thus, although the study focuses on ideational factors, other factors were identified and their impact on policy reform examined. As indicated in Figure 1 above, in addition to ideational factors, the study identified institutional and structural factors explaining TNAs interaction with the policy process of LEAP and GPRS. The present study, however, did not identify any psychological factors directly present in the TNA policy process, which shaped the outcome of LEAP and GPRS. This may be due to the focus of this research on how TNAs influence policies in developing countries. Teasing out the psychological underpinnings of these

policies will require further exploration of domestic policy actors' response to external policy

influence, perhaps using a behavioural research laboratory, which is beyond the scope of the

current research.

Chapter IV: Methodology

A.   Introduction

Focusing on an ideational view of how TNAs interact with the national policy process demands
an approach that will enable me to examine the processes, and interrogate the actors involved in
shaping policy outcomes. To achieve these purposes and to provide an in-depth understanding of
how TNAs influence the development of public policies in Ghana, the study adopts qualitative
case study research methods of inquiry involving face-to-face interviews with policy makers.
This chapter, describes the nature of this research, the methods of data collection employed, and
how the generated data is analysed.

The first section is a general discussion of qualitative research methods and provides the
rationale for using a qualitative research method, particularly a case-study approach.
Subsequently, the cases selected for analysis are described and justification for their selection
provided. This section provides the background of the cases – GPRS I & II and LEAP –
programmes in Ghana, and is followed by a description of how data was generated for analysis.
The discussion of data generation begins with the process of obtaining ethical clearance, the
recruitment of participants for individual semi-structured interviews, the actual data generation,
particularly as it pertains to interviews conducted in Ghana, and the transcription process.

Next, the method of data analysis is discussed. Data generated from the documents, newspaper
reviews and from the interviews is subjected to thematic (content) analysis using the qualitative
research software NVivo. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on the whole process as it
relates to my expectations and experiences in the field.

B.   Qualitative Research Methods

Qualitative research is defined as an interpretive approach to the study of social phenomena, which aims at attaining in-depth understanding through exploration and description (Walker, 1987; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Rossman & Rallis, 2012). Aside from focusing on interpretation, qualitative research involves the use of multiple interactive and humanistic methods; focuses on context; and is emergent (Creswell, 2007; Rossman & Rallis, 2012). As noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 8), qualitative research (unlike quantitative research) emphasizes the "socially constructed nature of reality," the close relationship among the researcher, the subject of the study, and the contextual factors that structure the research process, and the "value-laden nature of inquiry." Similarly, Walker (1987) describes qualitative research as "inductive, holistic, emic, subjective and process oriented" (1987, p. 51). From these perspectives, a qualitative research is able to delve deeper into the phenomena under study to provide in-depth descriptions and analysis.

For our focus on how ideational mechanisms are deployed in the process of policymaking in Ghana, the qualitative approach is well suited. Ontologically, both the ideational framework and the qualitative research conceive of reality as dynamic, inter-subjective and context dependent. In this sense, how TNAs used ideational mechanisms in the Ghanaian context and how policy actors interpreted this may differ in relation to the convergence of events, circumstances and environment. Consequently, individuals may interpret the factors that influence a particular policy decision differently (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Such diversity can appropriately be captured through the modalities of qualitative research, which enables the study of complex social realities in a rich depth without over-simplification (Merriam, 2002; Silverman, 2010). To attain the depth of knowledge of policy processes and actors, and to explain policy outcomes this research

aims at an intimate knowledge of the research setting, a tenet underlying qualitative research. Although a Ghanaian, I do not seek to superimpose what I know about the context on this research but to learn from the policy actors interviewed in the course of the study.

As noted above, in the generation of knowledge, qualitative research assumes that reality is not predetermined but that, instead, it is socially constructed. However, social construction should be about the perspective of the phenomena or subject being researched, rather than about the investigators' own outlook. Consequently, to generate data, a qualitative study adopts techniques like participant observation, in-depth interviews, document reviews and focus group discussions, among others (Family Health International, 2006; Creswell, 2007; Silverman, 2010). Additionally, there are different approaches to conducting a qualitative study. However, scholars diverge on what these different approaches are. On one hand, Creswell (2007) identified five qualitative research approaches, including narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and case study research. On the other hand, for Ritchie and Lewis (2003), these approaches include ethnography, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, constructivism, and critical theory. Qualitative research is an important approach due to its in-depth focus on the experiences of individual policy actors. This approached is beneficial in generating detailed information on particular policy issues without the simplification that occurs with quantitative approach. Moreover, detailed information enhances comparison among cases (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).

This research is a case study of two anti-poverty policies Ghana adopted in the recent past, that is, between 2001 and 2008. Qualitative case study approach is an in-depth study of a defined phenomenon within its context (Stake, 1995; Merriam, 2002; George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2009). According to George and Bennett (2005, p. 17), such a phenomenon is of scientific

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interest and comprises a "class of events… such as revolutions, types of governmental regimes, kinds of economic systems, or personality types that the investigator chooses to study". For Yin (2009), the phenomenon of interest in a case study could be an individual, some event or entity, including policy decisions, programmes, the implementation process, and organisational change. By seeking answers to questions of how and why, this approach produces detailed explanation of a case. This is because the case study method permits the identification and measurement of the "indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure" and closer examinations of deviant cases discovered in the process of data generation (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19).

The issue of interest to this thesis is how transnational actors impact policy development in developing countries. Focusing on the Ghanaian policy process, two anti-poverty policies (GPRS I & II and LEAP) implemented between 2003 and 2008 will constitute our unit of analysis. By pursuing a case study approach, in addition to categorising concepts relevant to these policies, this thesis provides a detailed examination of causal linkages particularly the intervening variables that link TNAs to the process of Ghana's adoption of these policies (George & Bennett, 2005).

C.   Case Selection

Recognising TNA involvement in the policy process of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), studies of the SSA region in general, and in particular Ghana, such as Boafo-Arthur (1999a; 1999b), Adejumobi (2004), Adesina (2011), Libby (1976)and Aina, Chachage and Annan-Yao (2004) find imposition as the main mechanism of TNA involvement. Whereas the adoption of policies like Structural Adjustment programmes (SAPs) in Ghana and across the SSA region in the 1980s and recently the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative with

its attendant Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) has mostly been attributed to conditionalities, it will be relevant to look at other potential explanations, such as ideational explanations, which are often lacking in the existing literature about Ghana. Specifically, as it relates to other poverty mitigation programmes and policies, there is the recognition in recent times that, in developing countries, policy actors draw lessons from each other to frame solutions unique to their environment through various collaborative platforms such as the South-South Cooperation. Consequently, there is a seemingly general acceptance within SSA of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) as a mechanism of poverty alleviation, a programme that began in Latin America. Ghana is among the first few SSA countries (with Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa and Botswana) to have adopted a cash transfer programme called LEAP[3] (Garcia & Moore, 2012). As suggested in this thesis, unlike the SAPs and the PRSPs, rather than being imposed from the outside, cash transfer programmes implemented in SSA and, more specifically, in Ghana were largely shaped by a learning process among various countries plagued by the problem of poverty.

At the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1993, about 50 percent of the population of Ghana was poor. To address this major problem, various policies were put in place, including the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I), the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) – Ghana's version of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) – and the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP).

1.   GPRS I & II

The GPRS I & II were implemented subsequent to Ghana's decision to join the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative in 2001. These GPRS documents, generally called the PRSPs,

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[3] Since LEAP has both conditional and unconditional aspects, the term Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) will not be applied to it. However, where it refers to LEAP, 'cash transfer' or LEAP will be used.

were required by the WB and IMF from countries deciding to be part of the HIPCs initiative

established in 1996. Consequently, with a final decision to join the HIPCs programme in 2001,

Ghana prepared its own PRSP indicating how the monies saved from the debt relief that would

subsequently accrued to the country through the HIPCs initiative will be used in promoting

social development in general, and poverty reduction in particular (Martin, 2004). It is

noteworthy that, although Ghana qualified for debt relief under the HIPCs initiative in 1999, the

National Democratic Congress (NDC) government ruling at the time, refused to join the

initiative, but the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) 2000 – 2002 was prepared

to enable the country access balance of payment supports from the two IFIs (Ministry of Finance,

Republic of Ghana, 2000; Whitfield, 2010). With the inception of a new government – the New

Patriotic Party (NPP) – in 2001, the decision to be part of the HIPCs initiative was made amidst

skepticism and division in the Ghanaian society emanating from socio-economic and political

considerations.

The HIPCs initiative and PRSPs were designed according to the principles of the Comprehensive

Development Framework (CDF) of the WB and the IMF, comprising a long-term holistic

development plan, results orientation, country ownership, and country-led partnership (The

World Bank, 2003). In developing the policy in Ghana, therefore, participation was considered

essential. Besides consultations held in various regions in the country, there were five core teams

of selected members from civil society, policymakers, and development partners (DPs)

constituted around the major themes of Ghana's PRSP document – Macro-Economic Issues,

Production and Gainful Employment, Human Resource Development and Basic Services,

Vulnerability and Exclusion and Governance (Republic of Ghana, 2003).

2. LEAP

During the process of designing the GPRS II, which spanned 2006-2009, the vulnerability and exclusion team, one of five core teams established during the preparation of the GPRS I in 2002, made proposals for a social protection programme that involved conditional and unconditional cash transfers. The programme, called the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme, was to be piloted for five years from 2008-2012. It targeted orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs), particularly those orphaned through AIDS, the disable and the aged with no means of supporting themselves. LEAP comprised not only conditional and unconditional cash transfers but also complementary services such as healthcare, basic education and skill training. In 2014 the programme was in its seventh year with 72,780 household beneficiaries and it aimed to cover over 150,000 households across the country (Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare, 2012; Ackon, 2014). Unlike the HIPC or GPRS, LEAP is seen generally to be informed by policies implemented in other poorer regions of the world, particularly Latin America.

D. Rationale for Case Selection

The research focuses on the above mentioned anti-poverty policies that Ghana implemented in the 2000s, which seemed to follow on the heels of the heightening world interest in poverty reduction (Noël, 2006). It must be noted that, with the publication in 1990 of the *World Development Report* and the *Human Development Report*, which both focused on human well-being and the plight of the poor called attention to the issue of poverty. The issue was further popularised by the acquiescence among world leaders of the need to eradicate poverty expressed in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which placed poverty eradication on the policy radar of most members of the UN and other governments and non-governmental organisations both local and international. Consequently, it is important to know how such policies are

developed in various countries, particularly within SSA, which remains one of the poorest regions in the world. This is because the policy process could affect the long- term effectiveness of these policies. For instance, engaging citizens in the policy process could empower them not only to support the successful implementation of the policies but also hold governments accountable for agreements reached and promises made, thereby enhancing the governing process in SSA. Thus, a study of TNAs involvement in the policy development process of the GPRS I & II and the LEAP could inform us not only about the mechanisms TNAs employ during such interactions but also about how the characteristics of the policy process may have significant implications for the fate of these policies.

Besides, the choice of Ghana and the decision to assess the potential impact of mechanisms other than policy imposition using the two anti-poverty policies (GPRS and LEAP) are informed by time and resource constraints. Working within the limits of my PhD programme, I had to draw some boundaries for the work in order to be able to cover in-depth the area of my research interest and also be able to use available resources in an efficient way. To some extent, my familiarity with Ghana and its policy environment eased the constraints researchers not familiar with the country may typically encounter.

Moreover, by focusing on Ghana, one country out of the 48 countries of the SSA region, the study envisions the attainment of depth of explanation, which may not be possible if the whole region is focused on (Creswell, 2007). However, some of the results may be applicable to other countries in SSA, since Ghana typifies other SSA countries in the following respects: the economic crises that resulted in the adoption of structural adjustment policies from the late 1970s to the 1980s, the involvement of TNAs in the national policy process, and the persistence of

poverty, which motivates SSA political leaders to search continually for solutions including the adoption of the PRSPs and cash transfer programmes.

E.   Data Generation

Generating data from multiple sources or triangulation is beneficial, in that it helps in reducing errors and enhances rigour in the research process (Flick, 2007). Thus, to generate data for this qualitative study, this research used document and newspaper reviews as well as interviews with policymakers involved in the policy process of the GPRS and LEAP. Prior to the interviews, there was a rigorous review of official reports, newspaper articles, documents and statements on LEAP and GPRS I and II produced by the Government of Ghana (GoG) and by TNAs. These documents were accessed through libraries as well as from the websites of the agencies and the research divisions of international organisations linked to the policies of interest to this study. News articles were accessed through various Ghanaian-based websites such as myjoyonline.com, ghanaweb.com, modernghana.com and the websites of print media houses such as the Graphic Communications Group. Other documents were accessed by direct contact with policy actors during the interviews.

Information generated from those sources were supplemented with other empirical studies on the programmes such as published articles in peer-reviewed journals and other studies conducted by think tanks and research organisations. The initial document and newspaper review was fundamental as it enabled me to come to terms with TNAs role in the policy process in SSA; appreciate what had been done by earlier scholars and what remains to be done; and identify those who were directly involved in the process of policy formulation. By identifying those involved in the development of these policies, an initial list of participants was developed and also areas of interest for discussion during the interview sessions were noted.

Field data generation started with the process of obtaining ethical clearance from the University

of Saskatchewan Ethics Committee. For the first step, the research proposal was submitted to the

committee for review. Subsequent to the initial review, suggestions were made involving

changes to how participants will be contacted and information obtained. With the rectification of

all ethical concerns, an approval certificate was issued by the Ethics Committee. With the initial

information on the actors involved in the process of policy development from my initial

document and newspaper review, specified areas of interest for my work, and the ethical

clearance from the university, I travelled to Ghana in March, 2013, for four months to conduct

interviews. Recruitment letters were sent to the potential participants (policy actors identified

during the initial document reviews) three weeks ahead of the interviews to seek their permission

and also to schedule the date and time of the meeting. The recruitment letter assured participants

that their identity will be protected using pseudonyms (unless they decided otherwise) when the

findings are disseminated, and any information shared with the researcher will be kept in

confidence. Written consent was obtained at the start of each interview session.

Due to the specific focus of this research on GPRS and LEAP, we adopted the purposive

sampling technique to identify participants. Purposive sampling involves the selection of

participants specifically to provide information pertinent to this study (Marshall, 1996; Tansey,

2006; Teddlie & Yu, 2007). Within the purposive sampling framework, Teddlie and Yu (2007)

identified four categories of purposive sampling: sampling to achieve representativeness or

comparability; sampling special or unique cases; sequential sampling and combinations of any of

the other techniques. Because this study focuses on particular policies, selection was geared

towards policy actors who were part of the design and formulation of LEAP and GPRS I and II.

Therefore, participants were selected from the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare

(MESW)[4], the Department of Social Welfare (DSW), the National Development Planning

Commission (NDPC), the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP), Parliament

and civil society. Specifically, the selection of participants was determined by their involvement

in the policy process surrounding the above mentioned social programmes.

Apart from this selection from within a particular category of people, snowballing, which is a

form of sequential sampling, was used to identify participants who may have information

relevant to the study but who were not readily identified, such as individuals who influenced the

design of the programme and other policymakers who may have retired and are no more in active

public service. In all, I interviewed 35 people: three each drawn from the MESW and DSW; two

each from NDPC and MOFEP; four from Parliament; four from the media; six from TNAs; six

from selected CSOs, two from the Center for Social Policy Studies (CSPS) in the University of

Ghana (UG), and three policymakers, who were instrumental in the design and formulation of

the LEAP and the GPRS I & II but are no longer associated with the above mentioned ministries,

departments and agencies due to a change in political leadership or reshuffling of government

officials[5].

Of the two categories of in-depth interviews well suited to qualitative research – semi-structured

and unstructured – the research employed a semi-structured interview approach (Mason, 2002;

Morse & Richards, 2002; Patton, 2002). This approach involved a purposeful discussion with

identified participants guided by a prepared open-ended set of questions, and particular topics

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[4] There have been some changes resulting in a separation of the social welfare function of this ministry from the employment aspect. As a result of restructuring, there currently exist two ministries: the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, and Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection. However, the LEAP programme was initiated by the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare, which is why the research still maintains this name.
[5] These individuals associated with the NPP government though instrumental in the formulation of the policies of interest to this study, lost their official positions when the NPP government was voted out of office at the 2008 elections.

that the interviewer is interested in exploring further. In this process, the interviewer probes further for clarification and the questions do not have to be ordered in the same way from participant to participant. For the purpose of this research, we sought to find out the roles of various actors, particularly TNAs, and how they might have impacted the adoption of LEAP and GPRS I and II in Ghana. Using face-to-face interviews was fundamental to learning about how TNAs interact with Ghana's policy process. Such a strategy is critical in confirming or disproving information obtained from other sources, such as empirical studies, and in recreating the process of policymaking under study (Tansey, 2006). Moreover, semi-structured interviews have the added advantage of allowing the researcher to explore areas of interest and, simultaneously, participants could freely discuss their experiences in the policy process without any constraints that bound them to answer questions in a structured way.

Mostly, the interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes with selected participants who meet the criteria of having participated in the policy development process of LEAP and GPRS, and were willing to be part of the research. Moreover, the interviews were recorded with the permission of participants. The taping of the interviews was to enhance accuracy of information during analysis. Three interviewees were not comfortable with being recorded due to a previous incident in court that had a negative impact. As a consequence of their refusal, detailed notes were taken during the interviews. In addition to the tape recordings, notes were taken during the interview sessions, to serve as a backup in case the recording was faulted in anyway. Subsequently, after four months of data collection, I returned to Saskatoon to complete the transcription of the recorded interviews. Completed interview transcripts were returned for review by participants who indicated they would like to review their transcripts.

Broadly, the data generated were categorised into primary and secondary data, focusing particularly on how TNAs interacted with the policy development process of LEAP and GPRS I and II. Data generated from interviews, official documents, statements, and press releases constituted primary data, while secondary data comprised data generated from existing empirical studies of the policies under consideration or other articles and publications, including newspaper material. Such data constitutes the main basis of analysis in subsequent chapters.

Some difficulties were encountered in the process of data generation. Particularly, regarding the recruitment of participants, although recruitment letters were sent out early, in some cases three weeks before I arrived at the study site, the actual scheduling and meeting only took place after about one month leading to significant delays. Not surprisingly, some participants struggled to recall some details of past events. The initial GPRS process was over a decade old and that of LEAP over six years old; consequently, during the period of the interview, there were some challenges in recalling nitty-gritty details in some situations, which occurred years earlier. While further probing helped in easing this problem, another strategy used was seeking information from alternative sources such as official documents and reports in order to triangulate the data.

F. Data Analysis

As a consequence of this study's inquiry into how TNAs may have shaped the process of policymaking of the LEAP and GPRS I and II, the data generated was subjected to process tracing, an approach to explore within-case analysis. According to George and Bennett (2005, p. 206), process tracing "…attempts to identify the intervening causal processes – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable." This form of analysis aims at generating information that connects the independent and dependent variables. To link these two sides, the intervening causal processes

are essential. Such causal processes comprise particular instances of decision making where individuals or groups engage in negotiations and discussions in order to reach a policy decision (Tansey, 2006). These processes are tools used not only by individuals, but also by groups or agents with "causal capacities" within "specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 137; Falleti, 2006).

In order to map the processes and mechanisms that link the independent variable (TNAs) and the dependent variable (specific policies in Ghana, such as, LEAP and GPRS I and II), historical evidence, government documents, interview transcripts and other sources of data such as newspaper articles were examined (George & Bennett, 2005; Tansey, 2006). The approach of process tracing holds the benefit of enabling this research to identify all the possible causal mechanisms surrounding the adoption of policies, like LEAP and GPRS I and II in Ghana. This approach thus facilitates the delineation of how TNAs impact the development of public policies (George & Bennett, 2005). As a developing country and a former colony, Ghana's policy process is subject to many factors beyond the domestic policy space. To generate all the causal factors, data generated from the document and newspaper reviews and from the interviews were subjected to thematic analysis.

Thematic analysis involves coding data to capture its qualities and then identifying all the configurations within the data towards in-depth comprehension of the phenomena under study. Themes are described as patterns within information, which minimally describes and organizes, and at a maximum interprets various features of the phenomena analyzed (Boyatzis, 1998). As such, themes capture "something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set." (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 82). The data set in this study comprised interview transcripts, official

documents, news articles on the GPRS and LEAP, published articles in journals, and other secondary data forms. Themes developed from the data set relate with the TPP framework formulated in Chapter III of this thesis.

Data from the audio recordings of the interviews were uploaded into NVivo and transcribed. Using the NVivo software, themes generated from the information were coded to reflect the concepts of interest for this study. For example, particular instances where participants expressed thoughts that suggested the mechanisms (e.g., ideational, conditionality, institutional factors) by which TNAs were involved in the policy process and those that directed policy actors to act in particular ways were coded as such. Although the codes were drawn from the framework discussed in the previous chapter, Orenstein's TPP framework, there were other factors at play. Consequently, other concepts which were not considered in the framework, were noted, including the role of civil society actors in the whole process, as well as the interaction of the transnational policy process with the national policy process. The codes involved descriptions, labels or themes and more complex analytical concepts such as ideational strategies, institutional factors, transnational policy development and transfer (Bazeley, 2007).

NVivo is a qualitative analysis software that assists with organisation and classification of non-numerical and unstructured data, such as open-ended survey data, audio and video recordings, and text documents. As one of the numerous Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAs) software packages, NVivo allows for the importation of audio, video, and text files from multiple platforms, for instance, a bibliographic database such as Refworks. It makes transcription easy by providing for interface that allows the researcher to listen, manipulate the speed of the audio file and type. Other features that motivated the use of this software in this project is the search and query tool that allows particular instances of a concept to be identified

and analyzed. Accordingly, it has been noted that like other CAQDAs, NVivo promotes "an

accurate and transparent data analysis process whilst also providing a quick and simple way of

counting who said what and when, which in turn, provides a reliable, general picture of the data."

(Welsh, 2002). The programme has the added advantage of guiding the researcher with analysis

and knowledge dissemination.

The strengths of NVivo notwithstanding, there have been concerns that software packages such

as this may direct the research in particular ways, and also make a qualitative analysis seem

quantitative in nature, which it is not. To counter this, an approach that involves the use of both

NVivo and manual data analysis is advocated (Welsh, 2002). Becoming familiar with interview

transcripts by reading them over and over again does facilitate effective coding. To ensure rigour

in the analysis, the study adopted multiple methods and data sources, such as interview as well as

document (official and academic publications) and news item analysis. Also, a written report of

interview transcripts (meanings and interpretations generated from interview data) was discussed

with the research participants for validation. By sending emerging findings to participants, issues

that needed further elaboration and clarification or correction were identified and addressed.

Finally, the research report was also sent for review by my supervisor and peers. It must be noted

that pseudonyms were used based on the preferences of participants, when the report or any

information regarding the interview was disseminated.

G.   Conclusion

This chapter focused on the data generation and analysis procedures. Contextually, this research

is based on a developing country, Ghana. The interest of this research is to explore TNAs

activities in the policy process particularly of the GPRS I & II and LEAP. It has been recognized

that most studies of TNAs in the policy process of SSA have mostly attributed their influence to

the mechanism of imposition through conditionalities. However, this view is challenged by the implementation of policies without any obvious imposition, and the non-adherence of policy conditionalities by political leaders. Such observations necessitate further exploration of how TNAs interact with the policy process in developing countries.

The GPRS and LEAP, the policies of interest to this study presented themselves as obvious choices because the two could provide opportunities for comparison. Emanating from the HIPC process, the GPRS is perceived to be mostly influenced by the mechanism of imposition while the LEAP is conceived of as influenced to a larger extent by the process of policy learning. It is interesting to examine these two policies to find how possibly other mechanisms were involved in the whole policy process. While the choice of Ghana was mainly on the grounds of pragmatism, it compares in a lot of respects with other SSA countries. Similar to majority of SSA countries, Ghana is a developing country confronted with the problem of poverty, consequently, in addition to searching for solutions, in a globalised world the policy process is subject to external influences. Outside influences include global occurrences and TNAs who provide financial and technical support to SSA and in the process also impact policies. Besides these, most countries in SSA, like Ghana, joined the HIPCs initiative of the World Bank and are also experimenting with the cash transfer programmes.

As a consequence of the fluidity of the policy process and the roles of actors in the process, qualitative case study approach was found to be suitable for this research. While allowing the generation of information from the research participants' perspective, the flexibility of the semi-structured interviews also allowed participants to delve into various significant aspects of their roles in the policy process. The nature of the interviews allows for further probing as and when it became necessary. As a case study, this method allowed detailed examination of Ghana's policy

process, particularly as it relates with GPRS and LEAP. In order to identify all the casual

mechanisms in the process of policymaking, the strategy of process tracing was beneficial. In the

process of data generation, therefore, the various mechanisms or causal factors that affected

policy actions were explored. To enhance rigour, triangulation was used. For instance, in

addition to interviews, historical records and other documents – both primary and secondary –

were reviewed, as well as news articles from several websites and print media. The analysis of

data involved the use of NVivo and thematic analysis. As a qualitative data analysis software,

NVivo provides a platform for working with unstructured data such as data generated from semi-

structured interviews. It enhances the development of themes through its coding mechanism and

also facilitates interrogation of data to expose connections.

Chapter V: TNAs and Policymaking in Ghana - The Case of Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS)

A. Introduction

This study's research set out to explore the means by which transnational actors (TNAs) are involved in Ghana's policy process, with an emphasis on the ideational mechanisms by which TNAs interacted with the process of adopting the following two anti-poverty policies: the *Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I)* and the *Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II)* policy frameworks, and the *Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)*. In order to generate information in this regard, interviews were conducted over the course of four months in Ghana. Additionally, official documents, research publications and newspaper articles were reviewed.

This chapter and the next explore the reasons why Ghana adopted the above policies and how TNAs were involved and possibly shaped the adoption and enactment process. In this regard, this chapter concerns itself with Ghana's adoption and implementation of the GPRS I and II. The discussion here indicates that the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were required by multilateral agencies as part of the HIPC initiative which Ghana joined in early 2001. While existing studies mostly point to the imposition of policies (structural explanation) as the main mechanism through which TNAs influence policy in developing countries, the discussion here shows that TNAs as well used other mechanisms (including ideational and institutional ones) to shape Ghana's adoption of the HIPC and, subsequently, the GPRS.

The first section of the chapter describes the evolution of the GPRS and explores why and how the policy was adopted from the perspective of policymakers (interviewees), and official documents and statements such as parliamentary (Hansard) debates and press statements. These

sources are also supplemented with news items. The second section explores how TNAs shaped the policy process of the poverty reduction strategy under consideration, focusing on ideational processes and other mechanisms at play. Subsequently, the information from the above sections is analysed using the Transnational Policy Process (TPP) framework, presented and other studies of the role transnational actors in national policymaking. This analysis informs the discussion formulated in the conclusion of the chapter on how the Ghanaian case deviates and or aligns with existing scholarship on TNAs involvement in the policy process of developing countries.

B.   Evolution of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

Following a period of debt crisis and economic decline in most parts of the developing world from the 1970s to the 1980s, economic recovery and structural adjustment programmes (ER/SAPs) were promoted mainly by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) with the support of creditor nations to halt economic decline and promote growth through the implementation of market friendly policies (World Bank, 1994). These policies, however, had adverse economic and social effects, particularly on the very poor, which heightened local and international advocacy for the policies to be changed. The late 1980s and the 1990s witnessed a growing number of demonstrations, protests and advocacy activities mostly criticising the implemented ER/SAPs in developing countries, and calling for changes to these programmes and the processes by which change was brought about. Various groups encompassing religious and non-religious organisations, united by their campaign against the debt crises affecting developing countries, were formed in Northern countries such as the US and the United Kingdom (UK), and also in Southern countries such as Peru, Nigeria, Uganda and Ecuador (Donnelly, 2000; Pettifor, 2000). For instance, in the late 1990s, various CSOs from over 40 countries including Christian Aid, Oxfam, Eurodad, and Catholic Relief came together to form the Jubilee 2000 to campaign

for the cancellation of poor countries' debts and the reform and/or removal of loan

conditionalities that had worsened both the economic and social conditions of developing

countries (Kirby, 1999; Donnelly, 2000; Pettifor, 2000). The campaign was linked to a biblical

prophecy, which declares freedom for the suffering in the year of jubilee.

In addition to advocacy, studies were conducted by various local and international NGOs such as

the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) whuch published a Report in 1987 titled

Adjustment with a Human Face (UNICEF, 1987). Through its assessment of the macroeconomic

policies adopted by most developing countries as part of the ER/SAPs, the Report indicated that

the poor were the most directly affected by these policies. Considering this, they called for

targeted programmes to relieve the burden of the poor (Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1987).

Similarly, workshops and conferences aimed at publicising the impacts of the policy on the

vulnerable and the poor were organised. One of such conferences, the 1988 Khartoum

International Conference on the Human Dimensions of Africa's Economic Recovery and

Development, reached a consensus – the *Khartoum Declaration* – that pointed out the negative

effects of structural adjustment policies on various populations. This declaration argued that the

aim of development effort is to improve the human condition; thus, any recovery policy that

worsens this condition should be rejected. According to this document, "…these programmes –

whether nationally conceived or in collaboration with the World Bank, the International

Monetary Fund and the donor community – are rendering the fabric of the African society

irrelevant. Rather than improving the human condition, some Structural Adjustment programmes

have aggravated it because they are incomplete, mechanistic and of too short a time perspective."

(United Nations ECA & ECOSOC, 1988, p. 8)

These global activities initiated jointly by international governmental and non-governmental agencies and local CSOs all over the world had major impacts on the policies of some TNAs, particularly the WB and IMF, which subsequently influenced TNAs' relationship with developing countries (Britwum, Jonah, & Tay, 2001; Armah, 2008). Working with some United Nations (UN) agencies and the African Development Bank (AfDB), the WB introduced social dimensions as one of the factors to be considered in subsequent adjustment programmes (African Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, & The World Bank, 1990; Hutchful, 1994; Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV), 2004). This approach sought to provide targeted policies to alleviate the impact of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on the vulnerable and on the poor. Moreover, the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) and the Citizens Assessment of Structural Adjustment (CASA) were jointly launched by the World Bank (WB), civil society actors, and governments of some selected countries[6] (Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), 2002). SAPRI sought to assess SAPs in various countries from the perspective of civil society and to provide avenues through which civil society will actively contribute to national policymaking by making suggestions for reform.

In addition to the above, particularly in the case of promoting a favourable outlook of the WB regarding poverty in the developing world and the engagement of civil society in decision-making, it is significant to note the impact the presidency of James D. Wolfensohn had on the whole process. He became president of the WB in July, 1995. His tenure, between 1995 and 2005, is described by the WB as a decade dedicated to poverty eradication and inclusive

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[6] Selected countries engaged in SAPRI and CASA are Bangladesh, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Hungary, Mali, Uganda and Zimbabwe; and Mexico, Philippines, Canada respectively (SAPRIN Secretariat, 2005).

policymaking (World Bank, n.d.). The WB commitment to poverty reduction through a holistic development approach and participatory policymaking is seen in the various initiatives that were rolled out by the Bank during that period, including the HIPCs initiative introduced in 1996, the 1999 Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) initiated in the same year.

In 1996, the IMF and WB jointly launched the HIPC Initiative with the main objective of reducing "external debt positions of some low-income countries to sustainable levels – that is, to levels that enable them to meet their current and future external debt-service obligations in full, without recourse to debt rescheduling or accumulation of arrears, and without compromising growth." (International Monetary Fund, 2003, p. 287) The initiative was launched shortly after the publication of the *World Debt Tables 1994-95*, which identified a group of 32 SSA countries as severely indebted low income countries (SILICs) (The World Bank, 1994). According to the report, this group of countries found the management of their external debt problematic, which negatively impacted their socio-economic development. Subsequently, 41 countries were identified as potential HIPCs, comprising all the SILICs, and nine other low income countries[7] (Claessens, Detragiache, Kanbur, & Wickbam, 1996; Esquivel, B., & Sachs, 1998). It is noteworthy that most of the heavily indebted countries were in Africa, implying that poverty reduction is a major policy issue on the continent.

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[7] Current list of HIPCs include: Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, DR. Congo, Rep. of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia (International Monetary Fund, 2014).

Four months prior to the adoption of the HIPCs initiative, the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established seven measureable and easily assessable international development targets (IDTs) (Development Assistance Committee [DAC], 1996). These goals were supported by various TNAs who incorporated them into their operations. In June 2000, four international organisations - WB, IMF, UN and the OECD - collectively assessed the state of poverty in the world and established new directions towards its eradication in a report, *A Better World for All,* which was presented at various forums in the course of the year, such as the G-8 summit in July 2000 and the OECD conference in Paris in the same year (Department of Public Information, 2000). Accordingly, the organisations described the worsening plight of the poor, and indicated that the state of the problems that confront the world required a holistic approach to policy and partnership to surmount (IMF, OECD, UN, & WB, 2000). The IDTs subsequently metamorphosed into the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), an outcome of the United Nations Millennium Development Summit in the year 2000 (White & Black, 2004; Development Assistance Committee [DAC], 1996). The establishment of the MDGs made poverty a topical issue globally and thus, the HIPCs initiative became one of the tools used by the IFIs to alleviate poverty.

To qualify for debt relief under the HIPC initiative, a country's debt situation, evaluated after a debt sustainability analysis (DSA), should be deemed unsustainable. The DSA is conducted only after the following steps have been undertaken by the developing country concerned: first, the establishment of an economic programme aimed at structural reform with the assistance of IMF and WB; second, obtaining, on concessional terms, a flow-reschedule agreement from the Paris Club creditors and from other private creditors and non-Paris Club members to support the structural reform programme adopted; third, submitting an application to selected creditors to be

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considered for the forgiveness of official development assistance (ODA) debt, and; finally

seeking new financing on concessional terms (Esquivel, B., & Sachs, 1998). Generally, the

outcome of the assessment of the total debt burden (debt sustainability analysis) of a debtor

country may produce one of the following results for a debtor country: the debt situation is

sustainable (ineligible for HIPCs), unsustainable (eligible for HIPCs) or, in the third case, it is

not entirely clear whether the situation is sustainable or not, and this may result in a repeat of the

assessment process. Subsequent to the assessment, debtor nations eligible for HIPC must

establish a track record of strong policy performance through the implementation of structural

reform programmes with the guidance of the IMF and WB for three years. At the end of the third

year, HIPCs receive an 80 percent reduction in their overall debt from the Paris Club, with the

expectation that HIPCs would continue with prudent policies towards attaining debt

sustainability (Claessens, Detragiache, Kanbur, & Wickbam, 1996; Esquivel, B., & Sachs, 1998).

The initiative was reformed in 1999, to link debt relief to poverty reduction and social policies.

With the reform, countries qualifying for debt relief need to prepare PRSPs outlining how debt

relief will be used in providing social services (International Monetary Fund, 2014). Not only did

the Bank reform the HIPCs initiative, but there was also a shift in the perspective of the Bank

regarding pursuing development in its partner countries. In January 1999, the president of the

WB presented to the board, management and staff of the WB Group a new framework to guide

their development operations (Wolfensohn, 1999a). Called the Comprehensive Development

Framework (CDF), this new framework envisioned a holistic development process that would

bring together the two sides of every development effort; the economic, and the structural,

physical and human aspects. As Wolfensohn, (1999b, p. 7) stated in an address to the WB board,

"Our aim was simple: to bring the social and the structural aspects of development together with

the macroeconomic and the financial so as to establish a much more balanced and effective approach. To bring the players together so as to leverage all our activities. To work with the broad development community – the United Nations, the European Union, the bilaterals, the regional development banks, civil society, and the private sector – to build a new generation of genuine partnerships."

Additionally, recognising that the process of facilitating development involves various actors, and that sometimes such a process is essentially initiated by actors external to a country, the CDF called for governmental leadership and ownership with all other actors playing a supportive role. Likewise, the development process would strive for inclusiveness and transparency. Generally, the CDF principles comprised: "a long-term vision and strategy – a prerequisite for sustainable development; enhanced country ownership of development goals and actions; more strategic partnership among stakeholders; and accountability for development results." (The World Bank, 2000, p. 7). The CDF was piloted in 13 developing countries, including Bolivia, Ghana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, the West Bank and Gaza. Following the CDF, the *Consultations with the Poor* project was developed to take into account the principles of the CDF and with the objective of generating material to inform the World Development Report 2000/01 on poverty and development. The *Consultations with the Poor* were built on the rationalisation that the participation of the poor is fundamental to developing any poverty eradicating programme of worth (Narayan, Chambers, Shah, & Petesch, 1999; Wolfensohn, 1999b; Narayan, Chambers, Kaul, & Petesch, 2000).

As noted above, the reform of the HIPCs initiative required countries to prepare a PRSP indicating how debt relief will be channelled into social development towards poverty reduction.

The preparation of the PRSP document is underpinned by the CDF principles per a consensus reached between the WB and the IMF. According to the president of the WB, "we have reached an historic agreement with the International Monetary Fund to have a common Poverty Reduction Strategy developed with our client governments. We will take a balanced approach, linking macroeconomic and financial parameters with the human, structural, and social aspects, in one document that will guide the programmes of each institution " (Wolfensohn, 1999, p. 8). Consequently, HIPCs designed their poverty reduction strategies with two considerations in mind: making the process participatory as well as conceptualising development activities holistically. Importantly, the decision to link debt relief to poverty reduction was reached subsequent to various conferences and meetings of development practitioners, where agreement was reached on the issue. For instance, section VII of the communique issued by G-8 leaders at a summit in Cologne and reinforced by G-7 ministers of finance proposed the Koln Debt Initiative, "which is designed to provide deeper, broader and faster debt relief through major changes to the HIPCs framework. The central objective of this initiative is to provide a greater focus on poverty reduction by releasing resources for investment in health, education and social needs" (G7 Finance Ministers, 1999; G8, 1999).

The following sub-sections discuss Ghana's decision to join the HIPCs initiative, and subsequently, the preparation of the PRSPs as required by the IFIs.

1.   To Be or Not To Be: Ghana Declaring Herself HIPC

In 2001, the New Patriotic Party's (NPP) presidential candidate, John Agyekum Kufuor, was inaugurated as the second president in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Kufuor's victory was won on the platform of change. Subsequently, there were high expectations of the new government. It is

noteworthy that this alternation in power was the first of its kind after the country once again became a constitutional democracy in 1993. Immediately preceding this period, Ghana was under the rule of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), a military government led by Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings. Under his leadership and through the nudging of some TNAs such as the WB, IMF and other bilateral partners, the country implemented economic and political reforms, including structural adjustment and democratisation in 1993, which established Ghana's Fourth Republic. Rawlings led the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government for two four-year terms from 1993 to 2000. Towards the end of its second term, the NDC government confronted some economic problems for which an assessment by the IMF suggested the country should join the HIPCs initiative for relief. However, Ghana did not join the HIPCs initiative in spite of the economic challenges the country experienced in 1999 and 2000, such as an increase of about 200 percent in the price of oil, a shortage in expected external assistance and significant fall in the world prices of cocoa and gold, two of the country's major exports (IMF & IDA, 2002).

Explaining the government's decision, the finance minister at the time proffered "…it was an election year, you don't declare HIPC in an election year. Being blunt, I don't think that to explain what HIPC was to the people within that short period was feasible. You can imagine what the headlines read…" (Indv_002, 2013). Furthermore, the former minister indicated that they in turn proposed an alternative policy which they envisaged could be effective in dealing with the issues at hand; because they felt joining the HIPCs initiative was going to cost the nation in many respects. Accordingly he notes, "we did not want to forgo things like….you know, we used to have one hundred million a year from the Japanese, it was going to go. We were going to lose the ability to borrow more." Similarly, at a seminar held in 2002, it was noted

that the decision not to join HIPC was seen as a rational response of the NDC government, in the sense that the benefits associated with HIPC for the country at that time were low compared to the costs of joining the initiative (Oduro, 2002). Notwithstanding the economic conditions, Ghana did not declare itself HIPC but the process was initiated with the design of the I-PRSP enabling the country to benefit from the poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) of the IMF until it was voted out of office in the December 2000 elections.

In January 2001, when the new president, John Kufuor, took over, he felt the economic conditions of the nation clearly signalled that the country was HIPC. In his first sessional address to Parliament, Kufuor said, "The legacy we have inherited on the economic front is daunting. Mismanagement, mass unemployment, low wages, high cost of living, a rapidly depreciating currency, a colossal national debt, high dependency on foreign aid as well as declining educational and health opportunities, extensive corruption in public life, a cowed and demoralised private sector, hopelessness and despair - this is the legacy of the last two decades." (Republic of Ghana, Feb., 2001). This was collaborated by a minister of state under the Kufuor administration, who indicated that Ghana did not become HIPC just by deciding to be part of the initiative, "Ghana is heavily indebted and a poor country. It is a fact of life. If you look at the statistics, it is there….It is not the act of raising your hand that makes you HIPC. Ghana is heavily indebted and poor already." (Republic of Ghana, 2001). The debt situation was dismal, which affected government spending in other areas (MP_003, 2013; MP_004, 2013). In alignment with the above justification, a publication of the Bank of Ghana on the HIPCs initiative noted that the country's crisis is "partly due to high debt service requirements that affected the budget of the government and impacted negatively on the balance of payments" (Bank of Ghana, 2005, p. 3). Consequently, Kufuor, continued in his sessional address that his

government is prepared to take any measure to deal with the dire economic circumstances that the nation confronts, including taking advantage of the HIPCs Initiative (Republic of Ghana, Feb., 2001). The announcement was formally made in March 2001 when the Minister of Finance submitted to Parliament for approval the government's budget and fiscal policy.

The decision to join the initiative was explained to have been necessitated by the inefficiencies of state management attributed to the Rawlings led government between 1993 and 2000. Accordingly, the new president and his ministers of state, and the NPP MPs, blamed the decision to join HIPC on the previous government. For instance, the central regional minister Mr. Edumadze, during a tour of the region, indicated that the economy that the new government inherited was in dire need of economic reform and assistance if it can bring any form of development to Ghanaians (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2001). As noted in the above excerpt from the sessional address, the president noted that the economy was in shambles and, as a result, any viable solution was fair game (Buabeng, 2001). However, the NDC responded to these assertions, denying the NPP's claim of a tattered economy and criticising the decision to join the HIPCs initiative as something that would destroy the image of Ghana and thus, affect business fortunes. In a parliamentary discussion, an NDC MP, Hon. Mike Hammah, responded to the decision to join HIPC in this way,

> What it means if you are going HIPC, is that, you are tarnishing Ghana's image on the international market. Ghana will be wearing a credit risk tag by joining HIPC. We are portraying to the whole world that our economy is bankrupt; it is tired and it is unproductive. This is what it means and in such a situation it is very difficult to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Nobody would want to do business with somebody who is broke (Republic of Ghana, Mar., 2001)

To counter this, the NPP tried to show that if the NDC perceived HIPC as tarnishing the image of Ghana, by tagging it as poor, they were mistaken, because the country's image was badly damaged under their rule and now needed to be saved through an acknowledgement of the facts on the ground.

Arguments in favour of the need to take advantage of the HIPCs initiative were not limited to the new government, as the international community and civil society were also engaged in framing the desirability of policy reform. Between January and March 2001, various actions and public statements were made in support of poverty reduction and the HIPC initiative by the various foreign missions represented in Ghana presumably to influence the final decision on whether or not to join the initiative. In some cases, representatives of international organisations with offices located abroad visited Ghana to bring messages of goodwill and support to the nation in general, and the president in particular. During a visit to Ghana in January 2001, Canada's Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa, announced the cancellation of Ghana's debt owed to Canada with immediate effect and urged other creditor nations to follow suit, although complete cancellation would not take place until the implementation of the poverty reduction strategy (Business News, 2001).

It is interesting to note that debt cancellation, which is associated with the HIPCs initiative, was started even before Ghana made any decision on the issue. Similarly, WB president Wolfensohn sent a letter to President Kufuor assuring him of his support. According to Wolfensohn, "I want to assure you that the World Bank will be ready to support you in the months and years to come, and we look forward to a close and productive relationship with you" (Ghana News Agency, 2001). Moreover, the British Secretary of State for International Development, Ms. Clare Short, spent the latter part of February 2001 in Ghana, making presentations in support of the HIPCs

initiative and responding to concerns that people have through various media platforms (Ghana News Agency, 2001). Additionally, she pledged increased British assistance to Ghana if the country chose to join the HIPC club (Cameron, 2001).

In the Ghanaian case, most foreign and transnational actors were in support of HIPC but not Japan, one of Ghana's major bilateral partners. Japan's stance on the initiative was a deciding factor for Ghana in 1999, when it is was determined by the IMF that the country qualified to join the initiative but she decided not to join. In an interview, a former Ghanaian minister of finance indicated that the government did not join the HIPCs initiative that year because it was going to result in the withdrawal of an annual loan facility of about 100 million USD that it receives from Japan (Indv_002, 2013). This to him was critical because as he noted, "We were going to lose the ability to borrow more and the HIPC's position , was that everybody was writing off debt to us, there was no new thing coming in… so the Ministry of Finance, we did not like the fact that we were going to lose resources." In line with the views expressed by the former minister, the Japanese ambassador to Ghana in 2001, Mr. Hiromu Nitta, in response to the criticisms that Japan was against HIPC, said in an interview with the Ghana News Agency (GNA) that though his country supported the initiative, they do not give loan to HIPCs (Ghana News Agency, 2001).

Britain took an opposing side to Japan on the question of the HIPCs initiative in Ghana and this was portrayed through British public statements. Addressing a public lecture in February 2001 on a British government white paper titled *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor,* Ms. Clare Short, Britain's Secretary of State for International Development, outlined the benefits that Ghana stood to gain from becoming HIPC and urged the country to

adopt the initiative. The position of these two bilateral partners was captured in this newspaper headline, "Ghana: Japan, UK, Draw Battle Lines over Ghana" (Cameron, 2001). Besides, the Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC), other CSOs and some political parties were skeptical of the HIPCs initiative and, thus, proposed that the government should call for a national debate (Obeng, 2001). While no such debate was organised, public speeches and the media space more generally became the contest grounds for various actors, including TNAs and civil society.

Formal announcement of the decision to join HIPC was made during the presentation of the *2001 Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana* by Yaw Osafo-Maafo, the Minister of Finance subsequent to cabinet decision on the issue. Accordingly the minister declared, "In view of the debt trap in which we find ourselves, debt sustainability analysis [DSA] carried out on Ghana and our inability otherwise to raise enough revenue from our own resources or attract external inflow beyond the presently committed levels, His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Ghana, has decided that Ghana should take advantage of the HIPCs initiative immediately." (Republic of Ghana, 2001) Although the decision on whether or not to become a HIPC was an executive decision subject to parliamentary approval, the decision was embedded in the budget statement. Consequently, the motion before the house was not whether or not Ghana should join the HIPCs initiative but a motion for the approval of the 2001 budget and financial policy, which was approved subsequently. It must be noted that one of the factors on which the President based his decision was the DSA conducted jointly by officials of the Government of Ghana (GoG), IMF and the WB (IMF & WB, 2001).

Significantly, while the public deliberation on whether or not Ghana should join the HIPCs initiative was ongoing, there was another form of deliberation going on, which was between the

newly elected government and the staff of the IMF and WB. Between November 2000 and May 2001, there were three missions to Ghana, to review the country's programme with the Fund and also to conduct Article IV[8] consultations. The first mission took place under the previous government, the second from February 21 to March 7, 2001, and the third was from May 9 to 24, 2001, under the new government. During the missions, IMF and WB staff held discussions with the President, Mr. Kufuor, the Minister of Finance, Hon. Osafo-Maafo, the Governor of the Bank of Ghana, Dr. Duffour, the Cabinet, and senior officials directly in charge of economic and financial matters (International Monetary Fund, 2001). At the end of these missions, a preliminary document on Ghana's eligibility for the HIPCs initiative was written outlining what needs to be done, which was subsequently approved by the boards of the IMF and WB (IMF & WB, 2001). These missions assessed the state of the economy, what went well, what did not, remedial, and future steps. Notwithstanding the fact that other missions were conducted after these three, the second was noteworthy in that, it coincided with the final decision to join the HIPCs initiative. As the Finance Minister noted, the DSA conducted during these missions was a key factor in Ghana's decision (Republic of Ghana , 2001).

2.   Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

To reach completion point in the HIPC process, Ghana needed to undertake the following four main activities (IMF & WB, 2001, p. 13). First, the country had to prepare a PRSP through a participatory approach, and then implement it satisfactorily for at least one year. Simultaneously, the monitoring of poverty had to be enhanced. Second, the country had to maintain macroeconomic stability by implementing the PRGF programme administered by the IMF.

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[8] Article IV consultations is one of the mechanisms of IMF surveillance of its member states. This consultation is provided for in Article IV of IMF's articles of agreement. The country consultations entail an examination of the country's economic and financial developments and related policies with the government and central bank officials (IMF, n.d.).

Third, Ghana needed to streamline public expenditure management, including enhancing surveillance and control of expenditure. Finally, Ghana needed to address problems associated with the social sectors and engage in structural reforms. The social sectors focused on education and health. Specifically, Ghana was to address problems of inequities in education indicated in gender and regional disparities through improved expenditure allocation to the deprived sectors. Similarly, in health, GoG had to put in place new interventions (or expand existing ones) to reduce the prevalence of diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, guinea worm, and HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, the structural reforms proposed included: increasing to 70 percent the producers' share of the export price of cocoa; further liberalising the external market; and implementing an automatic price adjustment mechanism to attain full cost recovery in the petroleum, electricity and water sectors. This section focuses on the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP).

Subsequent to the declaration of a HIPC status, as noted above Ghana was required to prepare a PRSP. Fortunately for the new government, the previous government, though did not declare Ghana HIPC contrary to the outcome of DSA conducted in 1999, prepared an Interim PRSP (I-PRSP) (Republic of Ghana, 2000). Based on a decision made by the boards of the WB and the IMF, the I-PRSP was considered a suitable framework on which to build the new PRSP (IMF & WB, 2001; IMF & IDA, 2002). Thus, the NPP government built the first PRSP on the existing I-PRSP, which enabled the government to get the document ready within a relatively short period of time (MP_001, 2013). In addition to the I-PRSP, to assist the government agencies prepare the PRSP, the WB and IMF made templates of expectations available to them for adaptation to the Ghanaian context (Kwawukume, 2013).

Adhering to the condition of designing the PRSP through a participatory approach, various fora were created to enable civil society, government and DPs discuss the PRSP and to make inputs. Beginning in the year 2000, under the NDC government, there was a meeting of all actors including local and international groups and government agencies whose activities directly impact the poor. This meeting of stakeholders discussed the changing dimensions of poverty in Ghana and arrived at the five thematic areas to further inform poverty reduction efforts. These areas are macro-economy, production and gainful employment; human resource development and basic services, vulnerability and exclusion, and governance (Republic of Ghana, 2003; IMF & IDA, 2002). The GPRS process was subsequently launched under the leadership of the GoG, with inputs from other stakeholders who were consulted by the GoG. Five core teams or cross sectoral planning groups (CSPGs) working on each of the thematic areas were established, with each team comprising of representatives from government ministries, department and agencies (MDAs), civil society, DPs or donor community, some private individuals and a consultant sponsored by one of the lead development partners (Republic of Ghana, 2003; Aryeetey & Peretz, 2005).

The CSPGs drafted the document and presented it for comments and inputs at a harmonisation workshop of all five teams, civil society, DPs and MDAs organised in March 2001. Subsequently, community meetings were held in all the regions to "disseminate information on the GPRS process, to obtain community perceptions on poverty, to ascertain from respondents the priorities for poverty reduction; and to find out from respondents, the obstacles to poverty reduction" (Republic of Ghana, 2003, p. 6). This was followed by a review and prioritisation at the National Economic Dialogue (NED) of development stakeholders in Ghana. In July 2001, five working groups of DPs reviewed the draft document and made comments for review.

Similarly, CSOs and MPs were also consulted for their views on the draft document. Consultations with MDAs involved linking the poverty reduction strategy with the medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) outlined in the budget. Cabinet then reviewed all the estimates contained in the budget document and the priority areas for GPRS, and then this was submitted to Parliament for approval. These processes and consultations culminated in the first draft of a costed PRSP in early 2002. However, there have been criticisms that the participatory process was superficial since civil society actors were not involved in the actual drafting but were presented with draft documents after they had been written. It was suggested that this situation was the result of the timelines that the government had to meet. As an interviewee stated,

> There were few workshops which were organised but at that time the situation was a bit precarious so there wasn't too much time for broad consultations to be undertaken. Because we needed to bring out the programme, the PRSP document by the end of 2001 and so as to qualify for that facility by 2002 and we needed the money. So, there wasn't much consultations and I would not say there wasn't at all, you know there were some consultations, the government did consult among itself. But it was a decision taken primarily by the Executive (MP_001, 2013).

In April 2002, the draft of the GPRS I was presented to the IFIs – IMF and WB – together with other creditors, since they were a major source of financing for the programme, at the Consultative Group (CG) Meetings[9]. Focusing mainly on increased investment in the social

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[9] The CG meeting is mainly a high-level forum between the Government of Ghana and its Development Partners (TNAs), which mostly focuses on an examination of development policy issues the country is facing and partners indication of financial support (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, n.d.). The meeting between the government of Ghana and its development partners has been a part of the country's policy process prior to the formulation of the GPRS. It started as a bi-annual meeting, became an annual meeting and then in addition to the annual meeting a quarterly meeting was added in 1999 called the mini-CG (International Business Publications, 2002).

sectors, the GPRS document estimated that to attain significant reduction in poverty and concurrently decrease vulnerability, would require a donor contribution of $ 8 billion over five years. However, at the CG meeting, the initial strategy document was rejected on the basis of cost, which required further adjustments and cut backs, resulting in a $ 6 billion programme that was rejected again until the programme was down sized to $2 billion over five years (Sachs, 2005; Guder, 2009). Commenting on this, Aryeetey & Peretz (2005, p. 5) noted that "…this initial 2002 GPRS was not properly prioritised and partners, not least the IMF, had a strong say in the production of a revised, prioritised, version eventually adopted by the government, presented to Parliament and endorsed by the boards of the IMF and World Bank in 2003." This shows that, although both the government and DPs agreed on the need for poverty reduction, they differed on the underlying problems that needed to be addressed. Amoako-Tuffour (2008) noted that government regarded physical and social infrastructure as fundamental to poverty alleviation, while DPs stressed on social infrastructure. This resulted in debates between the two partners, signalling the subtle but significant influence DPs had on government prioritising.

In addition to being part of the CSPGs and engaging GoG through the annual and quarterly CG meetings, through the GPRS, in 2003 a financing framework – the multi donor budget support (MDBS) – was established to provide general budget support to Ghana's development and poverty reduction efforts. The GPRS was linked to the budget by aligning the policy priorities outlined in the GPRS to government expenditure; the MDBS provided a means for DPs to commit resources to areas of interest in their operation. As part of the MDBS architecture, Sector Working Groups (SWGs) were formed to provide DPs the opportunity to work within particular sectors of their expertise. SWGs comprise DPs and representative of MDAs from particular sectors; the groups are usually co-chaired by a government representative from a specific sector

and a DP working in a related sector (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, n.d.;

Amoako-Tuffour, 2008; Owusu K. , 2013). The SWGs meet regularly (once every month) to

engage in policy dialogues on specific topics related to their sectors and undertake strategic

planning, performance monitoring and implementation of harmonization agreements.

Accordingly, a government official, Mr. K. Owusu, working with the NDPC indicated, "The

SWG is held once every month normally. For me, NDPC is co-chairing the SWG on monitoring

and evaluation, so, we meet every last Thursday of every month and we have a co-chair on the

DP side. This is where we talk about national M & E system, problems, how we can resolve it,

and things like that" (2013). As Darku (2013) noted, the GPRS process, with the associated

MDBS and SWGs have significantly increased the involvement of TNAs in the design and

implementation of government programmes in Ghana.

As a consequence of the need for approval from the IFIs, and the role that TNAs generally

played in the agenda setting and formulation of the GPRS document, the principle of ownership,

much touted by the development community, has been questioned. The perception among

Ghanaians broadly, and expressed in other studies (Aryeetey & Peretz, 2005; Fraser, 2005;

Whitfield, 2009) is that the IFIs have considerable influence in the policy process of the GPRS,

such that the priorities expressed in the document do not necessarily reflect the priorities of the

national government. Describing TNAs' involvement in the process, one of the officials of the

NDPC said, "…they are integrated into the cross sectoral planning group, they are not sitting

outside waiting for us to finish before they make their inputs. They are part of the process"

(2013). Whitfield (2009) noted that, compared with the NPP government's own comprehensive

development plan, the GPRS was more popular, informed the general policy that guided the

budget, and was referred to by most development partners. The government's own development

plan prepared in the first term was barely mentioned during policy discussions until the second term in office.

Ghana reached HIPC completion point in 2004, having fulfilled all but one of the agreements reached with her development partners, comprising multilateral and bilateral partners, as the basis for attaining complete debt relief from her creditors as shown in <u>Appendix 1</u> (African Development Bank, 2004; IMF & WB, 2004). Between the decision point and the completion point, the GoG formulated various programmes and legislations that were part of the conditions established under the HIPC initiative. These conditionalities included the formulation of the PRSP as discussed above, the legislation of the *Public Procurement Act 2003 – Act 663*, *the Internal Audit Agency Act 2003 – Act 658,* and the *Local Government Services Act, 2003 – Act 656*. Besides these conditionalities, significant shifts were observed in government expenditures, with observed increase in the social sectors of education and health. Additionally, while the GPRS I was informed by the specific conditions discussed with the IFIs on the basis of debt relief, the plan was significantly linked with the MDGs and sought to attain the goals established internationally.

Having been re-elected in 2004, the NPP government formulated and implemented the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), a sequel to the first PRSP. Although with the same acronym, there was a change in name (from Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy to Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy). The change in name indicated a significant shift in focus from an emphasis on anti-poverty policies as provided for in the UN-adopted MDGs to accelerated growth towards the attainment of a middle income status for the country (National Development Planning Commission, 2005). The priorities that this document outlined compared with the

GPRS I seemed to emanate from the political leadership and embodied its aspirations. However, the processes required by TNAs for the formulation of the GPRS I were maintained. For instance, an emphasis was placed on participation in the GPRS II processes. Having acknowledged that the extent of participation in the formulation process of GPRS I was suboptimal, the GPRS II suggested the need to enhance it. Similarly, the CSPGs - comprising representatives of MDAs, CSOs, TNAs and some private individuals, which were designed to coincide with the five broad themes of the GPRS, were maintained. Additionally, the MDBS with the associated SWGs, as well as the annual and quarterly held CG meetings, remained part of the policymaking process.

C.   Transnational Actors and the GPRS

The question of interest in this section, following from the above discussion on the GPRS policy development process, is how TNAs were involved in this process. As indicated in Chapter III, various explanations have been offered on how TNAs engaged in the policy process particularly in developing countries. These explanations are categorised broadly into the logic of position – where TNAs' influence in policymaking is regarded as a function of their position vis-à-vis developing countries and the material constraints and incentives that describe the policy environment – and the logic of interpretation – where policymakers actions are conceived to emanate from interpretive responses to cognitive and affective factors stemming from TNAs activities (Parsons, 2007).

These explanations are subdivided into structural, institutional, ideational and psychological mechanisms; the first two constitute logics of position while the last two are categorised as logics of interpretation (Parsons, 2007). It is noteworthy that empirically there is the interplay of these

mechanisms, which may impact policymakers' decisions and actions (Parsons, 2007; Orenstein, 2008; Béland & Orenstein, 2010; 2013). As such, the Transnational Policy Process framework, the analytical framework used in this study, recognises that two or more factors may be used to better explain policy outcomes. It proposes that TNAs mostly combine ideas and economic incentives to influence policymaking in developing countries. Moreover, it indicates that TNAs' work traverses the international and national levels.

Poverty reduction became central to most international discourses in the 1990s culminating in the establishment of the UN's MDGs at the Millennium Summit in the year 2000. The campaign to end poverty by various TNAs particularly international NGOs were pursued through several venues[10], including conferences, seminars and publications, as well as demonstrations and protests by advocacy groups such as the *Jubilee 2000* campaign against the debt crisis in poor countries. The discourses at these forums consequently resulted in the commitment of various governments and international organisations to the reduction of extreme poverty by 50 percent by the end of 2015. Likewise, the IMF and the WB established some programmes to help in this regard, specifically the HIPCs initiative, which directly addressed the issue of poor countries' debt. Attached to this initiative was a conditionality that required all countries who decided to be part of the initiative to design a PRSP.

Although poverty has been on the agenda of succeeding Ghanaian governments, the immediate factor that triggered the chain of events which led to the formulation and implementation of the GPRS was the economic decline between 2000 and 2001. The dire economic situation at that

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[10] Policy venues here refer to gatherings of policy actors from different backgrounds where policy problems and alternatives are discussed. It is an avenue for creating and sharing discourses. Such spaces allow TNAs to present information on policy alternative that could influence policy action in various countries.

time was characterised by rising national debt, which, in turn, worsened the provision of social services and living conditions generally. Debt unsustainability, affected the country's development budget in the year 2000, necessitating the decision to seek help from the multilateral and bilateral creditors through the HIPCs initiative. The IMF and WB require HIPCs to prepare PRSPs to show how they intend to use the debt relief obtained through the HIPCs initiative, thus, Ghana had to prepare the GPRS policy document. To a number of my interviewees, the formulation and implementation of the GPRS was a result of the country's decision to join the HIPCs initiative put in place by the WB and IMF (MP_001, 2013). As an interviewee puts it, "You know when Ghana decided to subscribe to the HIPCs initiative it became necessary that we prepare the PRSP. The PRSP was a precondition for us to benefit from some relief" (2013). These statements indicate that the formulation and implementation of the GPRS was first and foremost informed by structural mechanisms: the conditionality to prepare a PRSP imposed by the WB and the IMF on any country that joins the HIPCs initiative.

While the preparation of the GPRS was a condition to be fulfilled by Ghana; the lead up to the adoption of the HIPCs initiative witnessed the use of various policy venues and mechanisms that cannot be reduced exclusively to conditionality. International conferences, seminars and campaigns established poverty reduction as a central policy issue, and the HIPCs initiative as one of the key strategies to eradicate poverty. However, given that the NDC government had rejected IFIs proposal for the initiative in 1999, the change in government in 2001 may have presented an opportunity for TNAs to promote the HIPCs initiative again. Policy entrepreneurs, particularly, staff of the IMF and the WB saw the turnover in government as an opportunity to push forward policy ideas that hitherto had not been received favourably by the country. Through congratulatory messages and expressions of support to the new government, TNAs indicated

their willingness to work with the new government to address the difficult economic conditions that the country faced. After the 2000 elections, Ghana witnessed an increased in the number of foreign missions – representatives of multilateral and bilateral agencies – visiting the President. Support was promised conditional on the new government making the choice to commit to poverty reduction through the HIPCs initiative.

In addition to such visits, most diplomats attended public lectures and issued press releases to point out the benefits Ghana stood to gain from the HIPCs initiative. The media space was inundated with statements by some TNAs, including the Department for International Development (DFID), the IMF and the WB, outlining the benefits for Ghana in joining the HIPCs initiative. This move increased the momentum of the new government and generated discussions in the media. As the following news headlines show: "Ghana stands to benefit from HIPC - British Minister" (Ghana News Agency, 2001); "Canada Cancels Ghanaian Debt" (Business News, 2001); "World Bank pledges support for Kufuor's government" (Ghana News Agency, 2001); and "Former US senator pledges to help Kufuor" (CFM, 2001). These were headlines prior to the government's announcement to the effect that the country would become a member of the HIPCs initiative. Together, these activities point towards the participation of foreign countries and TNAs in framing the need for Ghana to adopt the HIPCs initiative and, by extension, the GPRS.

In addition to presenting their own views on the HIPCs initiative and what Ghana could benefit from the initiative, TNAs also used institutional factors to their advantage. For instance, as members of the Consultative Group that mostly comprised development partners of the country, TNAs had access to the president and key ministers like the Minister of Finance. As indicated in

the preceding chapter, the Ghanaian constitution directly tasks the Executive with policymaking. Thus, TNAs sought to engage the President in discussing development issues and possible next steps through mediums like visits and letters. In most cases, the policy idea that the Executive favoured was likely to be approved by Parliament, where the majority supported the President. However, the HIPCs decision did not have to go through parliamentary approval *per se*, so it was basically the call of the Executive. Accordingly, an adviser to the government at that time explained that deliberation among ministers of state and the President over this decision took a long time. Finally, "the President decided that (look) we should take it and so he asked the minster to put it there [in the national budget, as part of the economic policy], so that we can implement it" (MP_004, 2013).

Furthermore, as a member of the International governmental community, Ghana is obliged to ratify agreements reached and decisions made at its meetings. For instance, per the articles of agreement of member states of the IMF, Ghana as a member state agreed to subject her economic and fiscal policy to the copious scrutiny of the international community. This examination is done by the IMF and involves an annual consultation (called the Article IV Consultation) with the political leadership and officials in charge of economic and fiscal policymaking. Acting essentially as a 'referee', the IMF, through its surveillance activities, is able to influence the investment and funding decisions of other countries and development agencies. As a former minister of state put it, "You know the system that those Bretton Woods Institutions use is that you are not only dealing with their programme but also with their consultants. Their programme is what gives you the ability to deal with all of them. So, if you are going to get… assistance, you need aid, you need concessional financing, you can't get this, unless you have got a programme with the fund. That is the first conditionality" (Indv_002,

2013). Essentially, it is this consultation that identified Ghana's debt situation as dire and proposed the HIPCs initiative.

Similarly, as a member of the UN, Ghana not only subscribed to the MDGs but these goals were made the foundation of most of the policies outlined in the PRSP document (Republic of Ghana, 2003; NDPC, 2004). For instance, as the GPRS II document states, "Ghana subscribed voluntarily to the MDGs at the UN as a member of the general comity of nations. But under the HIPC compact these MDGs were transformed into the mandatory framework of domestic economic policy in return for the grant of debt relief" (National Development Planning Commission, 2005, p. iv)

TNAs involvement in the policy process did not end with Ghana's decision to become a HIPC. In formulating the GPRS, the structures that were put in place to draft the GPRS document featured TNAs as major actors. For instance, TNAs were members of the CSPGs and SWGs that outlined the detailed programmes which constituted the final GPRS document. Finally, since part of the programmes was going to be financed by the IMF and WB, these organisations had the mandate of approving the final document. The final GPRS document was rejected at least twice by multilateral and bilateral development partners at CG meetings on the basis of cost. Although both the IMF and the WB on one hand and the Ghanaian government on the other agreed on poverty reduction, they differed significantly on how to how to pursue effective poverty reduction. President Kufuor is said to have included some political priorities from his party's manifesto which some DPs disagreed with considering it more growth-focused rather than poverty reducing (Whitfield, 2005; Whitfield & Jones, 2009). A revised GPRS approved by the

boards of the IMF and WB in 2003, was thus significantly shaped by the IMF's view on what the priorities for poverty reduction should be (Aryeetey & Peretz, 2005).

Likewise, the introduction of the principle of ownership subsequent to advocacy activities by international non-governmental agencies, and its adoption by multilateral agencies such as the WB, had significant impacts on the involvement of civil society actors in the policy process in Ghana. Although the participation of civil society in the design process of the GPRS was a requirement attached to the HIPCs initiative, this transformed the relationship between TNAs and CSOs in Ghana. CSOs felt that TNAs had created or opened a policy space for them to increase their participation in the policy process, and possibly shape national policy. As is noted in the following statement,

> This thing could not have been possible…the fact that we see an increasing space, no, an increasing democratic space for civil society activism did not come from the heavens. It did not drop from the sky, somebody had to say that, 'but your civil society has to be empowered,' so gradually we see an emerging trend where civil society is actively getting itself involved in the way policies are formulated in this country" (Osei-Bimpeh, 2013).

Similarly, Amoako-Tuffour (2008, p. 112) notes that DPs "used their leverage to create spaces for dialogue among CSOs, the GPRS technical team and policymakers." This condition contrasts with the traditional Ghanaian policy process, which is dominated by politicians and bureaucrats, with little or no space for civil society (Ohemeng, 2005; Kpessa, 2011; Takyi-Amoako, 2012; Ohemeng & Ayee, 2013). Consequently, although the change is significant, there are questions about the quality of civil society involvement.

This change has further impacted the relationship between TNAs and CSOs. Conventionally, TNAs have supported the operations of some CSOs in pursuing courses of action that they support. In addition to providing such support, TNAs empower CSOs to engage government in policy dialogue and partner some CSOs to push for policy reforms particularly in the social and governance sectors (Mohan G. , 2002; UN Country Team in Ghana, 2009; Atampugre & Awori, 2011). For instance, DFID's 2007 annual report points out that the Rights and Voice Initiative implemented in Ghana "provide[d] funds and training to civil society organisations to enable them hold their government to account" (DFID, 2007, p. 40). This notwithstanding, CSOs see themselves powerless in the policy process compared with TNAs. In their view, in spite of being involved in the process, CSOs' impact is not significant; TNAs have usurped what should be their role in the policy process, as captured by some of the interviewees, "TNAs call the shots," (Akolgo, 2013), "They have money so, money and ideas go, they definitely have more influence." (Otoo, 2013)

This seems to be an offshoot of the diverse relationship that government maintains with TNAs and CSOs. Unlike CSOs, TNAs may not be heard very often in media circles and on other platforms trying to communicate the need for change yet they seem to have much influence on government decisions. In fact, they tend to have much more information about government policy before civil society, and for that matter, citizens, even get to know of it. Aryeetey & Peretz (2005, p. vi) described this situation by expressing a donor representative's hope that there would be significant transformation in the conduct of government business such that an individual can "first learned of government plans sitting in the public gallery of parliament, rather than at private meetings between government and development partners." Considering their position in the process, CSOs have assumed a middle ground in the policy process, aligning

themselves with TNAs or government as and when they see fit. As expressed in the following statement by a participant, "…there are occasions that we have gone to development partners to say 'our government is not doing this so you have the political clout, so let us see how you can get them to do that,'… development partners have also come to us, like, 'have you not seen this, is there anything you can do?' So they can even support us with some funding to do that thing" (Osei-Bimpeh, 2013).

D. Conclusion

In the light of existing research on transnational actors in the policy process of developing countries, the above discussion shows that TNAs adopt a combination of mechanisms to influence the decision process of Ghanaian policymakers. Even where it seems like a purely structural case as in Ghana's decision to join the club of HIPCs and, consequently, the preparation of the PRSPs, it is more than that. Joining the HIPCs initiative has costs in the form of conditionalities requiring government to introduce economic, social and structural changes, which would be difficult to relay first to public officials and then to citizens. TNAs thus adopted a strategy to incentivise change and communicating this through media platforms to reach a wider audience. The policy was framed as the best for the new government to undertake, considering the economic condition of the country. Additionally, there were promises of support from most members of the transnational community in Ghana. This was important because under the previous government, one of the country's bilateral donors – Japan – significantly influenced the decision not to accede to HIPC.

Besides, as members of the CSPGs and SWGs, TNAs were part of the formulation of the programmes that constituted the final GPRS document. Additionally, they met regularly with

policymakers to assess progress and to provide further guidelines. Moreover, they used their leverage to bring change to the policymaking process by creating space for civil society input.

Compared to the Transnational Policy Process framework, it is observed that debt relief and the introduction of a participatory policy process were advocated internationally by a coalition of international nongovernmental groups. As part of this international campaign, IFIs seemingly in response to the advocacy work of NGOs, introduced the HIPCs initiative and the PRSPs as measures to tackle the problem of debt, poverty and lack of participatory policymaking. These were transferred from the global level into national systems through multilateral and bilateral agencies as conditions attached to loan facilities accessed by developing countries. Thus, loan facilities by the multilateral agencies were used as a ploy to undertake policy changes commensurate with their ideas. But it does not end there because, as the case of Ghana shows, TNAs are also integrated into the policymaking structure through sector working groups, which give them the opportunity to promote particular policy preferences through other mechanisms that are ideational and institutional in nature. The table below shows how these three mechanisms played out in the policy transfer from the international to the national levels with respect to the GPRS.

Table 2 The GPRS and TNAs

Mechanisms	Description
Structural	- Economic decline in year 2000 necessitated the decision to join the HIPCs initiative. - To benefit from the initiative the country was obliged to fulfil the conditionality of formulating and implementing the GPRS. This conditionality was imposed by the IMF/WB.

Ideational	To facilitate decision-making and enhance public support for government's decision: • TNAs provided information on how Ghana stands to benefit from the HIPC, particularly, financially, which can help enhance social development. • They communicated their readiness to help the new administration if it adopts the HIPCs initiative using media platforms. • The media, conferences and seminars were inundated with information about the initiative. Specifically, reasons portraying the initiative as the solution to Ghana's problems.
Institutional	• TNAs are members of the CSPGs and the SWGs along with CSOs, and representatives from MDAs. As members of these consultative groups, TNAs significantly shaped the GPRS document through policy deliberations. • The CGM (an annual gathering of all DPs meeting with the core leaders of the country) had a critical influence in reshaping of the initial GPRS, which was costed at $8bn to one costed at $2bn.

Although the Transnational Policy Process played out in Ghana's adoption of the HIPCs initiative and the GPRS, there was a combination of structural, ideational and institutional mechanisms. As shown in Table 1, not only do TNAs facilitate policy change by attaching policy prescription to loans as a form of conditionality or through ideational venues and mechanisms such as framing, conferences and publications, but they also work within the policy process. Of additional interest with respect to the Ghanaian case is the relationship between TNAs and national CSOs in shaping policy, a factor that is not considered adequately in the TPP framework developed by Orenstein (2008). As shown above, TNAs desire to empower CSOs to hold government accountable, most probably as a consequence of the principle of ownership, the first pillar of the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005*, which aims to promote independent policymaking by developing countries. As defined, ownership requires developing countries to

"set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption" (OECD, n.d.).

In the process of empowering CSOs, a complex relationship ensues which seems to be based on pragmatism from the perspective of both CSOs and TNAs. The relationship between CSOs and official policymakers in the policy process is not always cordial. As such, CSOs form alliances with TNAs who, due to their control over resources that national policy officials desperately need, have some leverage when dealing with these officials. Besides, having signed international conventions such as the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* among others, TNAs want to see the policy process owned by the citizens of the country. This motivation results in the alliance between TNAs and CSOs.

Chapter VI: TNAs and Policymaking in Ghana - The Case of the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)

A.   Introduction

In 2008, Ghana rolled out a cash transfer programme called the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) to support vulnerable and deprived populations through a regular targeted cash transfer, which also links beneficiaries to various government services such as healthcare and education. Being the first of its kind in the country, the announcement of this programme generated debates regarding the real intentions of the government and the likely consequences of this programme on the poor. There were many questions and skepticism surrounding the programme. Prior to LEAP, the only form of cash transfer in Ghana was the old-age pension, which is paid to retired workers in the formal sector (currently, the informal sector is being incorporated) who have contributed to the national pension scheme – Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) – during their working lives. The introduction of LEAP generated public debate and concerns emanating from two main fronts. First, the timing was questioned because it was to be implemented in an election year; and second, as a totally new type of social programme in the Ghanaian context, it was criticised as doling out money to the poor, as a form of public waste. Unlike the GPRS, which was adopted in fulfilment of a conditionality attached to a debt relief programme under the HIPCs initiative, LEAP is largely seen as being internally-driven through a policy learning process.

This chapter focuses on the issues of why and how Ghana came to adopt a cash transfer programme in the form of LEAP, and particularly, how TNAs may have been involved in the whole process. As the discussion here illustrates, there was a renewed imperative, with the establishment of the MDGs, to find effective mechanisms to, particularly, address the issue of

poverty. The world's commitment to poverty reduction established in the MDGs, which resulted in the HIPCs initiative and its poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), likewise underlines the motivation for the implementation of LEAP.

Besides other strategies for poverty reduction, conditional and unconditional cash transfers became popular in the mid-2000, gaining the endorsement of various transnational actors such as the Commission on Africa, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the African Union (AU), International Poverty Center (IPC) and the Department for International Development (DFID). Some of these organisations sponsored pioneering countries to engage in norms teaching through presentations at meetings and conferences, thereby spreading this policy idea to other nations. In Ghana's case, the social grants programme, LEAP, was adopted as a result of multiple factors including conferences organised internally by the University of Ghana's Center for Social Policy Studies (CSPS), lesson drawn from earlier adopters such as Brazil, international and local conventions and legislations, the GPRS II, and UNICEF's pilot of a transfer programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs) in selected districts in Ghana.

This chapter, besides exploring what informed Ghana's decision to design LEAP, like the one preceding it, also addresses the central question at the heart of this research, that is, how TNAs were involved in the policy process. In pursuing such an endeavour, the study is particularly interested in identifying the ideational elements in the interaction among national policy actors and TNAs. The discussion here first focuses on the activities leading to the formulation and implementation of a cash transfer programme – LEAP – as described based on interviews conducted with national and transnational actors involved in the process, official records, news articles and existing scholarly work. This is followed by an examination of the role of TNAs in

the process and subsequently compared with the TPP framework and other studies on the domestic policy involvement of TNAs.

B.   Cash Transfers Gaining Momentum

From the 1990s, some Latin American countries such as Mexico (*Oportunidades*) and Brazil (*Bolsa Familia*) initiated cash transfer schemes to address the problem of deprivation and to facilitate poverty reduction. Gradually, due to their apparent effectiveness these schemes were cited among the most popular mechanisms of poverty reduction around the world and because of their positive outcomes, they were actively promoted by various international agencies, including DFID, UNICEF and AU. Although this form of poverty reduction strategy is new to most African countries, beginning with the Eastern and Southern parts of the continent and spreading to other regions, various African countries are now implementing one form of cash transfer programme or another.

This section addresses the question of how cash transfers became pervasive in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Unlike the GPRS, it must be noted that this strategy of poverty reduction neither began as a multilateral initiative nor was it imposed by IFIs based in the global North. Instead, it started among developing and middle-income countries reinforcing what has been called South-South Cooperation. This form of cooperation is seen as a policy learning arena for developing countries.

The question of the emergence of a popular strategy to reduce poverty must necessarily begin with what necessitated the search for those strategies. Contemporaneously, poverty reduction gained prominence at the global level with the publication of the *World Development Report 2000/1* titled *Attacking Poverty* and the acquiescence of world leaders to the millennium

declaration, which established as its first goal, halving the population living in extreme poverty by 2015 (United Nations, 2000; The World Bank, 2000/2001; Foli & Béland, 2014). Subsequently, regional groupings such as the AU and its New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and several other gatherings of world leaders made poverty reduction one of their foremost issues on the agenda (Noël, 2006; Jenson, 2010; Mkandawire, 2010). For instance, at the Economic Forum in 2005, global leaders, mostly of the corporate world, committed to support poverty reduction. Likewise, the *Make Poverty History Campaign* established in 2005 mobilised governmental and NGOs alike as well as individuals from various sectors, including the entertainment world, to take a stand in support of poverty reduction. As poverty reduction attained prominence through the MDGs and various campaigns, strategies and mechanisms towards poverty reduction were sought and implemented. This was particularly true in the developing world, which is generally characterised by the highest incidence of poverty. One of such strategies are the Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) which began in some Latin American countries (Hanlon, Barrientos, & Hulme, 2010).

Experiencing economic difficulties and worsening conditions of its poor, most Latin American countries introduced CCT programmes for its vulnerable population (Bastagli, 2009). With positive results from this initiative, there were efforts by international organisations to promote learning and spread this policy idea to other developing countries, which all confront poverty (Kakwani, Soares, & Son, 2005). A study by United Nations Development programme's (UNDP) International Poverty Center (IPC) argued that "International development agencies are unanimous in highlighting CCTs as one of the best practices of social protection in Latin America. This support is not only rhetorical, but also practical, as considerable funding has been given to the dissemination of programme experiences, expansion of existing initiatives and

replication of similar programmes elsewhere" (Kakwani, Soares, & Son, 2005, p. 12). At the international level, the World Bank (WB) co-organised three international conferences on CCTs, with Mexico in 2002, Brazil in 2004, and then with Turkey in 2006. The objectives for these conferences centred mainly on promoting learning among implementing countries and the sharing of experience with other countries that are yet to implement CCTs and may have been considering it.

Prominent in this knowledge transfer effort, specifically as it relates to the adoption of LEAP in Ghana, is the cooperation between Africa and Brazil (Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger – MDS – in charge of the implementation of various social protection programmes including Bolsa Familia), facilitated by the DFID and with the support of UNDP's IPC. The genesis of this cooperation goes back to early 2005, when DFID supported officials of MDS from Brazil who visited Nigeria, South Africa and the United Kingdom as a form of technical cooperation aimed at sharing cash transfer experiences, particularly, those of the Brazilian CCT programme – Bolsa Familia (International Poverty Center, n.d.). Subsequently, in January 2006, there was a study trip to Brazil on CCT programmes involving representatives from some African countries, including Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia. In March of the same year, an African intergovernmental conference on social protection, attended by representatives from 13 African countries, Brazil, UN agencies, DPs and NGOs, shared experiences on CCTs. At the end of the deliberations, there was an acknowledgement that without adopting innovative social policy strategies, Africa would miss the MDGs, particularly the first goal of halving poverty. Subsequently, the delegates called for:

"Greater cooperation between African and other countries in the sharing and exchange of information, as well as experiences and action on social protection and cash transfers;

Social transfer programmes, including the social pension and social transfers to vulnerable children, older persons and people with disabilities and households to be a more utilised policy option in African countries….African governments to put together costed national social transfer plans within 2/3 years that are integrated within National Development Plans and within National Budgets, and that development partners can supplement" (African Union, 2006).

Code named *The Livingstone Call for Action,* it emphasised among other things, the implementation of CCTs as part of a broad regional social protection plan.

Cash transfers were considered to hold significant promise for poverty reduction particularly, in Africa. While the AU continued working with some international organisations and countries such as DFID, Brazil and the IPC, the African Commission constituted and chaired by former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, recommended in its first report the implementation in African countries CCTs, inspired by the seeming success of Latin American cash transfer programmes (Commission for Africa, 2005). Meanwhile, DFID and Brazil formally signed a technical cooperation agreement in 2007 and Ghana was the first country to benefit from technical assistance to support the design of her cash transfer programme, the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP). The next section examines Ghana's adoption of its first cash transfer programme, LEAP[11].

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[11] LEAP has both conditional and unconditional aspects, as such, the acronym CCT will not be used in reference to LEAP but the generalized term 'cash transfer' will be used where the need exists.

C. LEAPing Out of Poverty – Conditional and Unconditional Cash Transfer in Ghana

According to Osei-Opare (2013), "…the word LEAP means a lot, it is not simply an acronym for Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty, but also in coming up with the name it was symbolic to say that we really want to move people out of poverty through a more coordinated social intervention. It becomes a conduit to access other complementary social protection interventions…so that people more or less will leap out of poverty." Following the steps of other nations keen on reducing the incidence of poverty, Ghana implemented a cash transfer programme in 2008. Being a new concept in the country's development efforts, one wonders how Ghana came to adopt a cash transfer programme in her efforts to alleviate poverty. As the following analysis shows, Ghana's implementation of a conditional and unconditional cash transfer programme was shaped by diverse factors including, as shown above, the Brazilian experience, mandates of policymakers outlined in the constitution and the GPRS II, political leadership, conferences, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Department of Social Welfare's (DSW) pilot of a social assistance programme, and active norm teaching activities by Brazil, with the support of DFID. These factors and the reaction of the Ghanaian public to the formal announcement of the implementation of LEAP are discussed below.

1. The Decision to Pursue Social Protection through LEAP

The Executive is obligated, according to Ghana's 1992 Constitution, to take steps to protect the poor and vulnerable in the society. Without particularly specifying an exact strategy of social protection, the constitution, in Article 37 sub-section 2(b) and 6 (b) respectively, states as follows: "The state shall enact appropriate laws to ensure… the protection and promotion of all other basic human rights and freedoms, including the rights of the disabled, the aged, children

and other vulnerable groups in development processes" and "The state shall… provide social

assistance to the aged such as will enable them to maintain a decent standard of living" (Republic

of Ghana, 1992). This provision, in addition to other related ones in the constitution, is the

foremost source of various social protection efforts implemented over the years. Mindful of this

obligation, during the design of Ghana's GPRS II, policymakers stated that a comprehensive

social development framework would be drafted, to bring together the existing social welfare

programmes. Furthermore, the framework is to "promote conditional and unconditional cash

transfer systems and other support to displaced workers while they seek employment, to pregnant

and lactating women, and to provide target subsidies to the elderly, pensioners, smallholder

farmers and people with disabilities" (National Development Planning Commission, 2005, p.

40).

However, prior to the formulation of the GPRS II, there was a poverty and social impact analysis

(PSIA) conducted in Ghana by the IMF and WB on the effect of subsidies put in place by the

government to protect poor households from the stress of paying the full cost of utilities, the

outcome of which placed the continuation of subsidies in a balance. The results of the PSIA

indicated that the subsidy system and other programmes implemented with the aim of supporting

vulnerable and poor households were not effective in protecting the poor; as a result, there was

the need for targeted social interventions to address poverty (Coady & Newhouse, 2006; MMYE,

2007; Sultan & Schrofer, 2008; Ablo, 2013; Ofori-Addo, 2013). As one of Ghana's government

officials indicated during an interview, "The whole thing started with the Poverty and Social

Impact Assessment study, conducted at the end of the GPRS I, when they were formulating the

GPRS II. It showed that though Ghana had recorded some economic growth after the long period

of stabilisation, most of the changes and the programmes introduced were actually not getting to

the poor, the poor were still getting poorer" (Ablo, 2013). The results of the PSIA necessitated the search for new social policy mechanisms.

Thus, during the policy dialogue towards the formulation of the GPRS II, the Vulnerability and Exclusion Sector Working Group[12] (V & E SWG) made suggestions for cash transfer programmes in Ghana. The SWG is key in the policy process due to the link between policy ideas and the need for resources to implement the ideas, as Ablo (2013) points out, "…DPs in the sector working group are able to influence DPs inflow into the budget for social protection." Consequently, it was noted regarding the cash transfer programme that it was the area most favoured by the members of the V&E SWG. According to one of the V&E SWG representatives, "DPs are ready to fund particular areas, and not other areas. For instance, I sat in the Vulnerability and Exclusion Sector working group….it's all been about LEAP, and for those of us who work on vulnerability related issues you know that it is cross cutting…" (MDAs_008, 2013)

The discussions of the SWGs on particular areas inform policy recommendations contained in national policy documents such as the GPRS. Talking about the link between the SWGs and the GPRS document, Kwawukume (2013) stated "it is not that the NDPC sat down on their own and wrote the entire document, for sections on health for instance, they invited sector working groups and met with them and had discussions with them and based on the discussions, that particular chapter was written. So, in a way that is the relationship between the strategy and the sector

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[12] The Vulnerability and Exclusion Sector Working Group comprises representatives of UNICEF, WB, DFID, UNDP, World Food Programme (WFP), the Luxembourg Social Trust and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) from the development partner side and from the government side, representatives from social sector ministries including education, health, agriculture, local government and the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MGCSP).

working groups, before preparation, they were meeting during and even after the strategy paper was prepared, the implementation was also done through the sectors."

Drawing from the above, it can be surmised that the proposal for implementation of cash transfers as contained in the GPRS II document, from which the sector ministry drew its directive, was a proposal from a network of local and international agencies working on vulnerability and social exclusion. As an official of the national planning agency who works with the V & E SWG said, "I think that because of the policy dialogue with the sector working groups, at various levels, government have been forced to look at certain priority issues" (MDAs_008, 2013). In a similar vein, and in reference to how the recommendations of the SWGs impacted the work of other agencies, the coordinator of the programme indicated that "the GPRS mandated the then Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare to develop schemes or programmes that will reach out to the vulnerable, the extremely poor and the disadvantaged. And that is how LEAP came about. It even made certain recommendations and specifically mentioned cash transfers, so that is where we took our mandate from to begin to discuss the issue of cash transfers for the extremely poor in Ghana." (Ofori-Addo, 2013)

While the PSIA and GPRS II recommended cash transfers for Ghana, fundamental to the programmes' resilience was the effective political leadership provided by Hon. Akosua Frema Osei-Opare the Deputy Minister of Manpower Youth and Employment (MMYE), in charge of social development, who joined the ministry in 2005. Having worked in academia and with various local civil society and international organisations such as the UN, the Netherland Development Organisation (SNV) and ActionAid-Ghana, she had a wealth of exposure to issues of economic vulnerability and social exclusion, and worked on projects aimed at empowering the powerless in society (Osei-Opare, 2013). The Deputy Minister of MMYE noted that, although

she had previous knowledge of cash transfers as a development practitioner, "my closer, more direct exposure was when I became the Deputy Minister with that responsibility. Then I had the exposure of going to Tunisia and also particularly, Brazil. Those were the key areas or places that I visited and also, because these two programmes were international in nature, you heard about other countries' programmes" (Osei-Opare, 2013). The Deputy Minister also mentioned a conference on social protection organised by University of Ghana's CSPS in 2006 where cash transfers were discussed. Having been bought into the programme, the minister provided strong leadership by facilitating its formulation and implementation.

In addition to the above, a practical example of how cash transfers could look like came in the form of an Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs) support programme initiated by UNICEF and the DSW in 2005 (Tingbani, 2007). In HIV/AIDS prevalent areas such as the Manya Krobo district, traditional authorities like the Krobo Queenmothers Association encouraged the fostering of OVCs based on the idea that a child should belong to a family (CSO_002, 2013). The issue, which UNICEF's programme sought to address, is that some of the caregivers were not registered with the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), which meant the children in their care could not access healthcare (Osei-Opare, 2013; Ofori-Addo, 2013). Therefore, the pilot programme identified caregivers of OVCs in selected districts and paid their health insurance premiums to enable the OVCs and their caregivers have access to healthcare (MMYE, 2007; IOs_001, 2013; Ofori-Addo, 2013). Eligibility and continued support was conditioned on the caregiver obtaining birth certificate for OVCs who were yet to be registered, and ensuring school enrolment and attendance of the OVCs. This programme provided a practical experience of how a cash transfer programme could look like in Ghana.

The experience gained from the implementation of the OVCs support programme, was further

enhanced through several study trips by officials from MMYE[13] to implementing countries in

Africa and in Latin America, facilitated by UNICEF and DFID by way of promoting learning

(Ablo, 2013; Adongo, 2013; Niyuni, 2013; Ofori-Addo, 2013). The inception team included

people from different backgrounds: academicians, CSOs and TNAs particularly from

implementing countries who worked as consultants. DFID, UNICEF, and the WB brought

together technical experts to assist with drafting the social protection strategy (Sultan &

Schrofer, 2008; CSO_003, 2013). Ablo (2013) noted that "DFID came in to support another

dimension of social protection, which is all encompassing. We started looking at cash transfer

programmes. It was then that they supported this trip to Brazil and they gave us the technical

assistance, which enabled us to gather a number of experts - there was one from Turkey, one

from South Africa, Kenya and others - they came together… they were all supported - some

supported by UNICEF, some by DFID to form a team that actually initiated the process of

developing the LEAP." Accordingly, Sultan & Schrofer (2008, p. 305) stated that "the Ministry

of Manpower used DFID funding to design LEAP with the help of experts who had worked on

similar schemes in Brazil, Zambia and South Africa." The drafting of the document also

benefited from existing literature: "The review and analysis of existing interventions and

literature on vulnerability and exclusion and Social Protection formed a major component of the

development of this Strategy" (MMYE, 2007, p. 32).

Technical knowledge was facilitated through agreement between Brazil and Ghana, which was

an extension of the agreement between DFID and Brazil to promote norms teaching. In February

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[13] This sector ministry initiated the process of developing the national social protection strategy (NSPS) of which
LEAP is a part, however, since then the responsibility for the NSPS shifted to the Ministry of Employment and
Social Welfare. Currently, the ministry in charge of NSPS and LEAP is the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social
Protection (MGCSP).

2007, DFID and Brazil signed a formal agreement to promote an Africa-Brazil Cooperation on Social Development, which focused on CCTs. Ghana was the first country to benefit from the technical assistance made available through this agreement. There were three Brazilian missions to Ghana beginning in July 2007 dealing with various aspects of cash transfer programmes, including developing a single registry, monitoring and evaluation, and on conditionalities (IPC, n.d.). Consequently, the design and implementation of Ghana's LEAP programme was based on lessons drawn from Brazil.

LEAP is the flagship programme of Ghana's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS). Its policy document was completed and presented to cabinet in 2007. Two activities brought the new policy to the public's attention. At a *meet-the-press* series in September 2007, the Minister of MMYE Hon. Nana Akomea hinted that the ministry would develop some programmes for implementation by the end of the year, including LEAP (Ghana News Agency, 2007; Nuamah, 2007). In November 2007, the programme was announced as part of the 2008 budget statement (Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, 2007). The announcement at the *meet-the-press* series and the budget presentation popularised the programme and generated opposition, which was particularly based on the suspicion that LEAP was a ploy to buy votes, as its formal implementation would take place in 2008, an election year. The next section explores the political challenges that initially faced LEAP and how policymakers managed to build support for it.

2. Generating Support for LEAP

During the formulation of the LEAP programme, the public was largely unaware of the process, except for some CSOs, which were invited to take part in the process. Thus, the announcement at

the *meet-the-press* and in Parliament triggered widespread challenge to the programme. In the aftermath of the announcement, there were several reactions to the cash transfer programme, mostly expressed through radio call-in programmes and through articles published in the dailies. While some publications indicated support for the programme, a greater percentage of the expressed views were against the programme (Kusoati, 2007; Cudjoe, 2008; Daily Graphic, 2008; Ghana News Agency, 2008; Osabutey, 2008). The following quote from an article featured on Ghanaweb, a source of local Ghanaian news and other information, captured the general sentiment in this way,

> How would you spend 20 billion cedis (about US$2million) annually on the 'poor and vulnerable persons?' One option is to identify an intervention that demands that beneficiaries invest in their future so as to break the cycle of poverty. Another option is to turn the whole pot of money into free cash hand-outs to the poor. There is a great temptation to pick the latter, in particular in an election year (Kusoati, 2007).

Similarly, according to an opposition NDC MP Hon. Mahama Ayariga, LEAP was a "miserable handout meant to recruit more voters" (Public Agenda, 2008).

Once again, the immediate and mostly negative reaction to the programme was a consequence of the timing of its proposed implementation. The government intended to implement LEAP in 2008, which was an election year, as such the true intentions of the government were questioned, and the announcement was greeted with misgivings by the public. However, challenges to the programme did not only come from the public but also from some members of the government itself (Osei-Opare, 2013). While the public questioned the seemingly political rationale behind LEAP, some cabinet members had doubts about its cost effectiveness.

In the face of such scepticism and criticism, the minister in charge of the programme (Hon. Osei-Opare), the sector ministry and its implementing agency decided to counter the negative rhetoric surrounding LEAP with a positive one, using information generated during the policy design process from the scholarly literature, as well as the experiences of foreign countries already implementing CCTs. This campaign first targeted ministries sceptical towards LEAP, particularly the Ministry for Finance. As Hon. Osei-Opare recalled: "We had the Brazil experience, Latin America, Mexico ….and as I said visits that helped us gather the necessary ammunition and in fact, even for the Ministry of Finance, I had to argue with them to see that it would actually contribute to economic growth and not a disincentive" (Osei-Opare, 2013). Additionally, the sector minister Hon. Nana Akomea, in reaction to criticism coming from some MPs, said that "it is not an invention by government but rather an adoption of what has been successfully implemented in other developing countries all over the world" (Public Agenda, 2008). Other officials of the NSPS and LEAP correspondingly used positive evidence about the CCT experience of foreign countries as well as the anticipated benefits of the programme to increase support for it (Ablo, 2013; Adongo, 2013; Niyuni, 2013; Ofori-Addo, 2013). Furthermore, public sensitization workshops were held in various parts of the country to promote LEAP. Overall, claims about the success of CCTs in other countries appeared as the main discursive and ideational resource used in the selling of LEAP to both the general population and reluctant government officials.

Furthermore, to avoid political controversy, the implementation of LEAP was made to look as nonpartisan as possible. The identification and selection of beneficiaries were done using a poverty map developed by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), with the assistance of the members of the district LEAP implementation committee (DLIC) and the community LEAP

implementation committee (CLIC). The members of these two committees were selected from the districts and communities to enhance local ownership. In some cases, the minister and deputies distanced themselves from programme implementation as much as they could. Instead, DPs were encouraged to take part in the actual implementation, for instance by helping to distribute the first cash transfers. As Hon. Osei-Opare said during an interview concerning the first day of cash distribution, "we deliberately didn't go because we didn't want people to distract a very good poverty alleviation policy….If I am present then it is NPP [New Patriotic Party]…But we were committed and our hearts were in, so we decided the first time, we won't go but we asked the donors to go. They distributed themselves to the various points" (Osei-Opare, 2013).

Furthermore *The Transfer Project*[14] of which Ghana is a member provided evidence from other implementing countries to support the effective development of LEAP in Ghana. As a research and learning platform *The Transfer Project*, partners with national governments and civil society particularly in Africa to promote knowledge sharing on CCT implementation (The Carolina Population Center [CPC], UNC, 2010). It is noteworthy that recommendation from research report on the implementation of LEAP conducted by CPC-UNC, a member of the *Transfer Project*, was one of the influencing factors resulting in the upward adjustment of the amount given to LEAP beneficiaries (Handa & Park, 2012). Similarly, the forums provided by the South-South Cooperation logic offered opportunities for learning, which provided partners with tools to bring about policy success.

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[14] Started in 2008, the Transfer Project is a collaborative effort of three main TNAs including UNICEF, Save the Children UK, and Carolina Population Center - University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (CPC-UNC), with support from Food and Agriculture Organisation and DFID.

After the start of the programme, LEAP confronted a major challenge, which threatened its very survival. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) government, which initiated the cash transfer programme, was voted out of office during the 2008 elections, in favour of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government. In Ghana as elsewhere, a change in government is mostly a test for the stability of most programmes initiated by the outgoing government, particularly for LEAP, which encountered so much contestation at its initial stages. Usually, incoming governments review existing programmes, which can lead to their discontinuation or the reduction of their budget leading to their collapse or irrelevance (Mills, 2009). The initiators of LEAP were sceptical of the new government's commitment to the programme.

Yet, in his maiden address to Parliament, the new President Prof. John E. Atta Mills stated, "We will learn as a Nation to add to what is working, and to change course only when it is in the National Interest to do so. We will depart from the practice of undoing the valuable contributions of our predecessors. A house that is constantly rebuilding its foundation is doomed to remain stuck to the foundation level, never to reach completion and decoration, let alone occupation." (Mills, 2009). This declaration suggested it was very likely the programme would be maintained, which is exactly what happened. LEAP not only survived under the NDC government but, in 2012, the benefit levels tripled. The increase came following studies by CPC-UNC, which suggested that, for LEAP to have a higher impact on poverty reduction, the amount transferred should be increased (Handa & Park, 2012).

The next section discusses the role of TNAs in the development process of LEAP while identifying the mechanisms TNAs used to shape the process.

D. Transnational Actors and LEAP in Ghana

The process leading up to the adoption of the cash transfer programme in Ghana was a collaborative effort between local and international actors, mostly through a process of policy teaching and learning using ideational mechanisms. Besides such mechanisms, there were other underlying factors that played critical roles, particularly institutional factors. This section explores how TNAs were involved in the policy development process of LEAP. Although TNAs deployed ideational mechanisms to provide information on poverty reduction program implemented elsewhere, this was only effective through their institutional connection and substantial financial and technical assistance.

While CCTs have been in existence in Latin American countries since the 1990s and have sometimes received the support of IFIs such as the WB, Ghana's adoption of a cash transfer programme can be described as a consequence of lessons drawn through the facilitation of TNAs in Ghana (Rose, 1991). TNAs were active in promoting the idea of cash transfer in Ghana as observed in other developing countries. Pivotal in the sharing of policy experiences among policymakers from Latin America and Africa was the role played by DFID and UNDP's International Poverty Center (IPC), through the formation of the Africa-Brazil Cooperation Programme on Social Development. Although the idea of CCTs as a policy option aimed at fighting poverty had been implemented around the world and CCT experiences already shared at international conferences organised by the WB, in the African case, this collaborative effort between Brazil and Africa, facilitated direct contact between African and Brazilian officials resulting in policy adoption by some African countries, including Ghana. Activities aimed at bringing information on this policy innovation to other countries included study trips,

conferences and seminars. Additionally, technical assistance and publications on this program were provided.

Several study trips were organised as a way of exposing African policymakers to new, CCTs policy ideas. According to a Ghanaian official from the sector ministry, TNAs "…first of all exposed us to what is happening in the world regarding social protection" through study trips to implementing countries (Ablo, 2013). TNAs including DFID and UNICEF were instrumental in organizing these trips, but it is noteworthy that, at a more global level, representatives of implementing countries such as Brazil were also financed to attend AU conferences to share their experiences about social protection, mainly in relationship to the implementation of their CCTs programmes (Adongo, 2013; International Poverty Center, n.d.; Niyuni, 2013; Osei-Opare, 2013). The trips and interaction with implementing countries were complemented with literature on the effectiveness of the programme. Hon. Osei-Opare (2013) noted that the trips and the international literature (some published by DFID) on CCTs effectiveness in fostering economic growth and poverty reduction were not only fundamental to policy design but also aimed at convincing potential sceptics of the programme's potential effectiveness.

In addition to study trips and publications, there were conferences, workshops and seminars that Ghanaian officials attended. These events were organised by different organisations including the WB, AU, and Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI), and they focused on cash transfers and social protection. Interview data stressed the importance of these forums in shaping policymakers' ideas. As an official noted in an interview,

> A number of seminars that the World Bank was organizing, series of them annually
> exposed the ministry to what is actually happening, and they did not do this alone,

UNICEF also came in to support, likewise DFID also came in to assist the process. World Bank staff of the social protection unit - organized programmes that the ministry participated in, in Tunis, also the South-South Cooperation. And a trip was also organized in collaboration with DFID to Brazil to go and see what is happening there. So we were on and on and finally developed a national social protection strategy with this kind of facilitation (Ablo, 2013).

Similarly, the coordinator of LEAP Mr. Ofori-Addo (2013) stated, "I went for training in South Africa in 2006 thereabouts organized by an organisation called EPRI (Economic Policy Research Institute). And they organised a workshop on social transfers. It was a two weeks course, which I participated in to understand what it is before we came and started the design of this programme." Confirming this statement another official said that "Most of us were sent to EPRI in South Africa to go through the course, Designing and Implementing Cash Transfers" (Adongo, 2013).

The facilitation of study trips and conferences occurred concurrently with the drafting of the GPRS II. The final document recommended social protection of the vulnerable through a "conditional and unconditional cash transfer" programme (National Development Planning Commission, 2005, p. 40). It is noteworthy that TNAs are part of the institutional framework underlying the formulation of national policy document in Ghana. As part of CSPGs and SWGs, TNAs make comments and suggestions that inform policy. These groups, as noted from our discussion in the previous section, comprise transnational and national actors, who meet regularly to deliberate on specific subjects or themes. As well, suggestions from these groups informed policy options outlined in national policy documents such as the GPRS and other medium-term policy frameworks. Directly related to the implementation of LEAP are the

activities of the V&E SWG comprising representatives of TNAs such as DFID, UNICEF and WB, CSOs, and government MDAs working with the vulnerable and excluded. This not only brought information on cash transfers as implemented in other places to policymakers, but also provided funding and technical assistance for the design and implementation of LEAP.

Technical assistance provided to Ghana in the design process came from two sources: technical cooperation agreement between DFID and Brazil, and consultants assisting with document design. In 2007, DFID formally signed a technical cooperation agreement with Brazil and, thus, Ghana became the first country to benefit from Brazilian technical cooperation. Brazilian officials from the Ministry of Social Development undertook three missions to Ghana in 2007. In a presentation at a regional expert meeting in Kampala, Uganda, in 2008, a Brazilian official indicated that during the missions, "Brazilian experts contributed to all discussions regarding LEAP and, in addition, voluntarily offered to the Ghanaian officials some documents in which were mentioned some comments and suggestions for the implementation of LEAP" (Ministry of Social Development , 2008). The Brazilian influence is acknowledged as the following statements from the interview data show:

- "You know Brazil is a classic example; the *Bolsa familia*. We picked a lot from that programme" (Osei-Opare, 2013),
- "The Brazilian influence was quite clear. Even though an attempt was made to contextualize our practice here based on culture and everything, the model, the Brazilian model was almost like a copy of what is happening here or the procedure for payment and other things even though there were other lessons from South Africa…" (Doh, 2013)
- "The Brazilian government was a technical advisor to the project. So, I think *bolsa familia* really influenced the idea" (INDV_003, 2013).

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Notwithstanding the Brazilian impact, there was a conscious effort to adapt the programme to the

Ghanaian context (Campbell, 2004; Czarniawska, 2012; INDV_003, 2013; Ofori-Addo, 2013).

Thus, the design of the programme paid particular attention to the environment as stated, "…you

know in every country cash transfer is designed based on the local… We accepted the principle.

We accepted the idea of conditionalities, but in terms of design, we did not really copy *bolsa*

familia or *opportuninades* or any of the others. But we accepted the general understanding and

the philosophy. So, whatever was useful to look at from those systems like the conditionalities,

we did." (INDV_003, 2013). Similarly, regarding attaching conditionalities to the grants, the

national coordinator stated: "I remember at a certain forum, I think it was here in Ghana, the

World Bank was insisting on stern penalties. But we said no, our situation is not like that so we

cannot go by that. We are talking about poverty, and so if you take the money or part of the

money, what are you doing? It means you are punishing the child" (Ofori-Addo, 2013).

Consequently, although the lessons from existing cash transfers were drawn from Latin America,

Ghana adapted the policy to its own policy environment through a process of translation

(Campbell, 2004).

Apart from the technical cooperation facilitated by DFID, the inception team also had a mix of

local and international experts as part of the inception team, which was led by the director of the

Center for Social Policy Studies (CSPS) at the University of Ghana. Furthermore, the

implementing units of the sector ministry were supported with technical assistance to build

capacity to enhance their performance through the Institutional Strengthening Programme (ISP)

with DFID (Handa & Park, 2012; Ablo, 2013). According to Niyuni (2013), various TNAs

worked on different aspects of the programme; for instance, "The World Bank actually basically

looked at targeting, how to be able to make sure you target the right persons…DFID basically

looked at capacity issues, i.e., building the capacity of the staff in various areas, institutional set up and other things and UNICEF is looking at the systems." Moreover, evaluation of the programme has been conducted jointly by the CPC-UNC and Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER), a partnership between a TNA and a local research institution (Handa & Park, 2012).

The examination of the various ways TNAs have been involved in the policy process indicates that TNAs influence policy through ideational mechanisms such as active purveying of information on new policies and technical support activities. Various avenues for such activities include conferences, publications, technical cooperation and study trips (Orenstein, 2008; Béland & Orenstein, 2009; Kpessa & Béland, 2011). However, in the case of LEAP, the ideational transfer process by TNAs was effective due to the institutional connections they had within the general Ghanaian policy process through the SWGs and CSPGs. As Campbell (2004) acknowledges, policy entrepreneurs are both constrained and empowered by institutional arrangements, and having institutional connections is fundamental to driving policy transfer and policy change. Such institutional connections enabled TNAs to bring experiences from other countries to bear in the Ghanaian policy discussions, thereby expanding the solution set policymakers would consider in dealing with national issues. Likewise, the institutional connections serve as a bridge between national veto players and transnational non-veto players, to use Orenstein's (2008) language.

Concerning the role TNAs played in Ghana's process of drawing lessons from abroad, it is noteworthy that not only is the policy idea being learned important, but the role of agency in the whole process is significant to policy adoption (Rose, 1991; Kingdon, 2003; Campbell, 2004; Mahon, 2013; 2015). TNAs communicated the perceived effectiveness of CCT programmes to

Ghanaian officials and policymakers in other developing countries through conferences, where implementing countries shared their experiences, thereby showcasing concrete results on the ground. In this sense, the programme was framed in a way that resonated with officials, providing answers to the problems they were dealing with in their own country. In general, situating experts within the sector ministry served as another way of influencing the programme design process (Kpessa & Béland, 2011).

Moreover, in addition to facilitating propinquity between policymakers and the source of the lesson (Brazil and other implementing countries), TNAs also committed resources to promote lesson drawing and subsequently programme design and implementation indicating a link between resources and ideas. Backing policy ideas with resources is particularly important in developing countries, which have limited resources to deal adequately with each of the multiple policy issues they confront regularly. In some cases, the policy idea is put forward by TNAs, and then there is an indication that support is available for experimentation or pilot projects. This strategy provides motivation among policymakers to try novel policy ideas. Significantly, this links the transfer of policy innovation through ideational means with material factors. In that policymakers are usually more inclined to experiment with a new policy idea if there are available resources to support implementation than if such resources are not available. Accordingly, TNAs commit significant resources to promoting particular policy ideas, for instance sponsoring field trips to facilitate learning. The next section, the conclusion considers how the case of LEAP compares with the framework of the Transnational Policy Process underlying this study.

E.   Conclusion

The examination of Ghana's adoption of LEAP shows a process of policy transfer facilitated by the activities of TNAs. It is significant to note that the process of policy transfer is occurring between countries in the South. As noted in previous chapters, the relationship between TNAs and policy changes in developing countries have mainly been explained through structural reasoning, which assumes direct imposition of policy ideas from the outside, such as was discussed in the previous chapter. Yet, in the case of LEAP, the discussion above shows a combination of ideational and institutional mechanisms bolstered with material incentives such as financial assistance for both lesson drawing and policy implementation. The TPP framework acknowledges that to influence policy, TNAs combine two or more mechanisms (Orenstein, 2008). For instance, the supply of information on policy ideas through conferences and sector groups' discussions (ideational channels) could be supplemented with material incentives such as financial assistance towards reform implementation. Additionally, the framework posits that the influence of TNAs in the policy process is at two levels – transnational and national.

TNAs activities at the transnational level comprise of policy development or norms creation, where new programmatic ideas are developed or popularised. It is noted that at this level, CCTs which began in Latin America, were adopted and given a global platform by multilateral and bilateral organisations such as the WB and DFID, notably through conferences and workshops. Three international conferences on CCTs were organised by the WB in 2002, 2004, and 2006 with cooperation from Mexico, Brazil and Turkey respectively. Additionally, DFID facilitated knowledge transfer collaboration between Brazil and Africa involving meetings with the AU and study trips to implementing countries. The intention of the WB's international conferences on CCTs as well as the Africa-Brazil Cooperation on Social Development was to promote learning

among CCT implementing and non-implementing countries alike. Essentially, this processes served to popularise the CCT model as a new programme (in this case a policy instrument for poverty reduction) created by developing countries. In addition, various studies were conducted to show the effectiveness of this new programmatic idea in dealing with poverty. For instance, DFID's *Social Transfers and Chronic Poverty: Emerging Evidence and Challenges Ahead, 2005;* and *Using Social Transfers to Improve Human Development, 2006* (DFID, 2005; 2006).Subsequent to policy development and the popularisation of this form of social assistance program using platforms provided by international organisations this policy idea was transferred through technical cooperation facilitated by TNAs such as the Africa-Brazil collaboration on social development.

At the national level, various factors combined to make TNAs influence in the policy process of LEAP successful. These factors are institutional, ideational and material. The foremost link between TNAs and national policymakers was afforded by the regular policy deliberations of representatives of DPs, CSOs and MDAs at the CSPGs and SWGs meetings. The group directly tasked with social policy issues is the Vulnerability and Exclusion Sector Working Group (V&E SWG). During their meetings prior to Ghana's adoption of LEAP, as an official indicated during the interviews, TNAs in this group drew attention to cash transfers as a means of reducing poverty and additionally pointed out their willingness to commit resources towards implementation (MDAs_008, 2013). It is noteworthy that this institutional position of TNAs in Ghana facilitated policy transfer. Although conferences and seminars provided an ideational channel for spreading policy ideas, TNAs' position within the national policy process is important in two respects. First, it provided a means of communicating policy innovations to policymakers through the exchange of ideas. Secondly, it linked TNAs directly with formal

actors. In such a position, TNAs were not formal policy actors yet they were directly connected with them because representatives of government MDAs were also members of these groups.

Furthermore, ideas about this programme and how it operated in other countries were provided to policymakers through study trips to countries in Latin America and in Africa such as Brazil, and South Africa respectively. Another avenue that facilitated the communication of information on cash transfers was the use of technical experts. These experts from implementing countries such as Brazil and Turkey served on the inception team of LEAP together with other officials from the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare (MESW) (now Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection) and the Department of Social Welfare (DSW). Missions were undertaken by Brazilian officials to assist Ghanaian officials with the drafting of the LEAP document. Apart from these ideational channels, TNAs supported officials in framing the need for this programme when the idea was contested by the public in various media centers of the country.

The above two factors were complemented with material incentives to support implementation. Various TNAs committed resources towards effective implementation including providing training and capacity building for the members of the MESW and DSW, supplying new equipment including computers to the LEAP programme office, providing resources for study trips, and remuneration for experts working with the MESW and DSW. The table below shows how TNAs influenced the policy process of LEAP beginning with activities at the transnational level and then at the national level.

Table 3TNAs and LEAP

Mechanisms	Description

Institutional	Institutional factors in the policy development process of LEAP: • TNAs membership of the Vulnerability and Exclusion Sector Working Group (V&E SWG) provided a vital connection to government officials. • Discussions at this forum provided an opportunity to share ideas.
Ideational	Ideas on social transfers were communicated through various channels: • Discussions with policymakers at V&E SWG meetings. • Study trips and seminars facilitated by TNAs were significant avenues to learn about this new programmatic ideas. • Foreign experts working on committees together with local officials likewise provided an important link for the transfer of information on cash transfers.
Structural/Material incentives	Material incentives to support implementation of LEAP was provided by TNAs in the form of • financial assistance for acquiring new office equipment • Training and capacity building for staff of DSW and MESW/MoGCSP

In line with Orenstein's (2008) TPP framework, the transnational policy process straddles the transnational and national policy spaces. Moreover, TNAs influence in the national policy process is enhanced by the combination of two or more mechanisms such as institutional connections, ideational factors, and material incentives. While the TPP framework stressed the importance of conferences, seminars and publications as ideational channels through which TNAs influence policies in addition to providing material incentives, the membership of national policy deliberation committees such as the CSPGs and the SWGs promotes TNAs influence. This institutional connection which was not adequately discussed by Orenstein (2008) is fundamental to merging transnational and national level policy activities. Such avenues provide the initial exposure of policymakers to new policy ideas, thereby adding another dimension to the policy transfer stage of the transnational policy process.

Thus, policymakers learned about existing, foreign CCT programmes during discussions with other members of the V&E SWG and through their study trips to implementing countries. In addition to such institutional and ideational factors, TNAs provided other incentives for implementation, including financial and technical assistance. Although Ghana's national government committed resources to the programme, TNAs focused on providing expertise and building the capacity of local policymakers. Moreover, there was a constant exchange between implementing countries through the Africa-Brazil Cooperation, the Transfer Project and the South-South Cooperation initiatives. These avenues, created and sustained with the support of TNAs are critical programme support and further idea sharing avenues. This point to a continuous transnational policy process, which operates through the building of global knowledge networks.

Chapter VII Conclusion: Lessons and Implications

A.   Introduction

Notwithstanding their lack of veto power in national policy processes, transnational actors (TNAs) have significantly shaped policy outcomes in developing countries such as Ghana. To account for this, as indicated above, most studies have appealed to structural explanations, positing the imposition of conditionalities as the main tool that affords TNAs significant leverage in the policy process of developing nations. Yet, the developing world is laden with cases of leaders who either did not follow such policy impositions or adopted policies without external imposition. Consequently, to account for TNAs impact in policymaking beyond the use of conditionalities, this study adopted an ideational perspective, which emphasizes mechanisms such as conference presentations, publications, and field trips that seek to generate positive responses from policymakers, like the adoption of the proposals put forward by international organisations (IOs). Regarding SSA, ideational studies of TNAs in the policy process are limited. This qualitative case study, presents an ideational perspective of how TNAs shaped policies in Ghana using Orenstein's Transnational Policy Process framework. Data was collected through interviews and document reviews and coded using Nvivo to enhance analysis through process tracing.

The study shows that focusing exclusively on conditionalities to the neglect of other factors such as ideas and institutions, which are also important in comprehending TNA interaction in the policy process, overly simplifies and mischaracterises the transnational policy process in developing countries. As this study indicates, TNAs mostly combine mechanisms in order to shape the policy process for effective outcomes. For instance, their proposals and policy ideas

are mostly supported with resources – financial and human. Therefore, while conditionalities are used in facilitating reforms, simultaneously, other mechanisms also come into play. For instance, as a UN member country, Ghana, along with other nations, adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at the *Millennium Summit* of 2000, an action which placed poverty reduction on Ghana's policy agenda. Yet, the decision by the government to adopt the IMF-designed HIPCs initiative, which made debt relief conditional on increase poverty reduction spending, practically enhanced the government's commitment to poverty alleviation-related expenses. Consequently, the ideational impact of the *Millennium Summit* was concretised through conditional policy requirements of designing a poverty reduction strategy document attached to the HIPCs initiative, and these two mechanisms (policy ideas from the Millennium Summit and conditionality attached to the HIPCs initiative) significantly shaped Ghana's focus on social spending in general, and poverty reduction in particular.

Similarly, TNAs recognised that, in addition to financial resources, the policy alternative being introduced must be made appealing to both policymakers and citizens. As such, they use publications, field trips, presentations at conferences and seminars, technical assistance, and partnerships with CSOs as a way to promote their ideas.

Furthermore, institutional connections among TNAs, CSOs and governmental policy actors were instrumental in facilitating the selling of ideas. As part of the processes required for the formulation of the poverty reduction document, various structures were put in place, such as the cross sectoral planning groups (CSPGs) and the sector working groups (SWGs). These groups composed of DPs (representatives of multilateral and bilateral agencies), GoG officials, and CSOs. This institutional space enhanced the propinquity between TNAs and national policymakers, which, in turn, facilitated their influence on the policy process. Their institutional

position also enabled members of the Vulnerability and Exclusion Sector Working Group (V&E SWG), which comprised partners such as UNICEF, DFID, and the WB among others, to bring to the fore policy ideas about cash transfers in the fight to eradicate poverty. This proposal from the V&E SWG was incorporated into the GPRS II and later informed the LEAP programme, a process facilitated by technical collaboration between Ghana and Brazil, study trips to implementing countries, and seminars and workshops, with the support of DFID, UNICEF, and Brazil's Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation (MDS). Being the first of its kind in Ghana, the announcement of this new programme in media circles resulted in challenges to policy implementation, prompting a process of active policy communication by the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare (MESW), through press releases, media interviews, and sensitization workshops.

The position of this research, in line with Parsons (2007), is that the four logics are not mutually exclusive. So how are these logics related? First, structural mechanisms can be used to promote particular policy ideas or specific interpretations of policies. Second, institutions serve as a filtering mechanism that constrains policy action and also defines the roles of actors. For instance, a democratic regime may allow for a greater level of consultation than an authoritarian regime. Finally, the psychological makeup of people influences their perception of policy ideas or propositions.

Although not clearly indicated by the respondents in the course of the interviews, it must be noted that there were psychological factors at play in the interaction between TNAs and national policy actors. Psychological effects are present in transnational interactions with domestic policy actors and present various dimensions and influences in the policy process (Weyland, 2008; 2006). The pertinent question is why do domestic actors accept and implement conditionalities or

other policy innovations spread by TNAs. It is noted that most TNAs, particularly international governmental organisations and IFIs, have prestige in the eyes of developing country officials. This perception stems from TNAs superior financial resources, expertise in various fields, and knowledge generation through research and development. As such, developing country officials tend to have a favourable view of policy suggestions from such organisations. Such perceptions of TNAs interact with existing cognitive biases and limitations that make policy actors boundedly rational to shape the diffusion of policy ideas and proposals.

The subsequent section of this short concluding chapter will discuss the lessons learned from this study. The policy process underlying each of the policies discussed here shows a combination of explanatory mechanisms: for the GPRS, a combination of mainly structural, ideational and institutional mechanisms, while for the LEAP, a combination of ideational and institutional factors. To a large extent, evidence from the cases is consistent with Orenstein's Transnational Policy Process framework. Simultaneously, the cases here show the importance of the adaptation or translation of new policy ideas in order to facilitate their implementation and bring about meaningful change. Moreover, in addition to interacting with formal actors with a view to shape policies in developing countries, TNAs similarly build alliances with CSOs towards the same end something Orenstein neglects in his framework. After this discussion, the policy recommendations as well as the implications of this study for future research on TNAs and policymaking in developing countries is explored as well as the limitations of this study.

B.   The Transnational Policy Process and Policymaking in Ghana

To analyse policymaking in Ghana this study adopted, as a guiding framework, Orenstein's TPP framework (Orenstein, 2008). It described the TNA policy process as an activity that takes place in two spaces – international and national. At the international level, transnational policy actors,

including multilateral and bilateral organisations, international CSOs, and individuals form coalitions or networks to campaign for particular policy reforms across countries. In the case of this study, the issue of concern is poverty alleviation. The process mostly begins with policy development, which involves creating new problem definitions and proposals for reform. Thus, Ghana's adoption of the GPRS began with campaigns by networks of international organisations and NGOs against the worsening social conditions of the poor and the debt burden, through various forums such as the *Jubilee 2000 Campaign*, which was initiated in the late 1990s, and the *Millennium Summit* held in the year 2000, which adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the policy mantra, with a 2015 deadline for the various targets. Along in this campaign, the HIPCs initiative and the GPRS were developed as policy options, with poverty reduction as the central objective. To bridge the international and national policy arenas, the implementation of these initiatives was facilitated by the WB and IMF – through conditionalities attached to debt relief and technical assistance – in various countries. The HIPCs initiative is a debt relief initiative having as one of its conditionalities the preparation of a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) using an inclusive approach to policy making. The HIPCs initiative and the PRSPs came as a package, in which a country's decision to join the HIPCs initiative is invariably a decision to develop a PRSP such as the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) document that served to guide the activities of the state in using debt relief, which accrued from the HIPCs initiative.

However, the transnational policy process is linked with the national-level processes. TNAs' interaction with national policymaking involves three processes, including commitment building (seeking governmental approval for TNAs policy suggestions), coalition building (getting the support of officials towards legislating reforms), and implementation (supporting reform

initiatives). Between November 2000 and May 2001, there were three IMF missions to Ghana to assess the state of the economy and, based on that evaluation, Ghana was declared eligible for HIPC. Between the first (November 2000) and second (between February and March, 2001) missions, an announcement of government's final decision was made during the budget presentations, followed by intense campaign to generate support for HIPC and the GPRS. There were announcements of increased debt relief and or cancellation of debt by some bilateral partners, such as Britain and Canada; the IMF and WB sent letters to pledge their support to the government. For instance, Canada's secretary of state for Latin America and Africa stated that Canada had cancelled all debts owed by Ghana, and would be effected with Ghana's decision to join HIPC (Business News, 2001). Meanwhile, the president of the WB expressed his support in the following statement: "I want to assure you that the World Bank will be ready to support you in the months and years to come, and we look forward to a close and productive relationship with you" (Ghana News Agency, 2001). Furthermore, there was an intense media war between supporters and opponents of the policy. Particularly, one of Ghana's bilateral partners, Britain (represented in Ghana at that time by Ms. Clare Short the secretary of state for International Development), led the campaign for the initiative by addressing seminars and making press statements.

Following cabinet's decision to adopt the HIPCs initiative, various committees were formed comprising representatives of the development partners, CSOs and the government to draft the GPRS document. It is noteworthy that the TNAs insisted on the inclusion of CSOs in the process and supported policy implementation financially and with technical assistance (Amoako-Tuffour, 2008). Similarly, LEAP is a consequence of a transnational effort of implementing countries such as Mexico and Brazil, supported by the WB and DFID, to share their experiences through

conferences and technical cooperation, by so doing, learn from each other and provide support to countries considering this policy alternative. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) were first implemented in Latin America as a strategy of poverty alleviation, which also holds the promise of stimulating the economy. The success of this programme resulted in its spread to other developing countries, particularly in SSA. It is noted that, at the international level, some TNAs such as DFID were actively engaged in supporting implementing countries' policy sharing activities by sponsoring trips to address various conferences, including an AU conference. In Ghana, they sponsored policymakers located in the MESW and the DSW to undertake study trips to implementing countries such as Brazil, and to attend workshops and conferences on social protection and cash transfers. As well, DFID signed a technical cooperation agreement with Brazil in 2007 to support such activities. Consequently, Ghana benefited from Brazilian technical expertise through the DFID-Brazil cooperation. These efforts culminated in Ghana's cash transfer initiative, LEAP. These cases underline the lessons, which are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Based in the forgoing analysis and discussion, we can draw a number of lessons about the role of TNAs in Ghanaian policy-making processes. The first lesson drawn from the study is that in shaping policies in developing countries, TNAs adopt more than one strategy at a time. As the case of the GPRS shows, while at the governmental level, change would have been relatively easy to achieve since the government at the time was new, and the economic conditions were grim, the general public was against any policy suggestions from the IMF and WB, due to the country's negative experience with structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Thus, while the preparation of a poverty reduction strategy document is conditionality attached to the HIPCs facility, TNAs needed to adopt other strategies to get the backing of the public, including press

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statements, addressing various seminars and, in some cases, making promises of debt cancellation or increase, dependent on the outcome of the official decision-making process. In addition, by joining the debate on whether or not to accept the HIPCs initiative and its conditions. TNAs also provided much needed technical assistance, both during the adoption and formulation of the GPRS. Similarly, the idea of a cash transfer programme first emanated from the V&E SWG, of which TNAs were members. This proposal ended up in the second poverty reduction document but programme design was facilitated by TNA's financial contribution towards technical assistance, training of staff from the MESW and the DSW in various parts of the world, and study trips to implementing countries such as Brazil and South Africa.

Secondly, policy transfer by TNAs is coterminous with policy adaptation or translation since policy contexts vary, and to promote the support of the public, new policies must take into account existing institutions (Campbell, 2004). Although Ghana drew significant lessons from other implementing countries, specifically Brazil, with the assistance of TNAs, LEAP was adapted to suit the context. For instance, rather than instituting very strict conditionalities with punitive measures, policymakers gave recalcitrant beneficiaries several opportunities to reform including summons before traditional authorities for reprimand and counselling. As an official of the DSW notes, "I remember at certain forum, I think it was here in Ghana, the World Bank was insisting on stern penalties. But we said no, our situation is not like that so we cannot go by that…" (Ofori-Addo, 2013). Additionally, Ghana's cash transfer programme has both conditional and unconditional aspects: for beneficiaries with the capacity to work and caregivers of OVCs, there are conditionalities; for those without any productive capacity like the aged and some category of People Living with Disability (PLWDs), the programme is unconditional.

It is noted that even for the GPRS where the country received a template from the WB to guide its own design, there were different areas of emphasis and considerations that policymakers had to take into account that were different from those considered in other places. In both cases, therefore, the policies were adapted to suit the context. In this wise, the importance of translation as one of the mechanisms of policy change is all the more demonstrated, though not adequately stressed in the TPP framework (Campbell, 2004; Czarniawska, 2012). Thus, TNAs may transfer policy ideas from one place to the other, however, the original form of the policy is 'distorted' to a certain extent, as adopting countries must consider existing institutions and adapt the new to the old in order to reduce institutional friction and enhance implementation.

Thirdly, TNAs positioning within the national policy arena is critical for effective knowledge transfer, a point alluded to above under the first lesson. It is significant to note that TNAs position within various committees such as the SWGs and the CSPGs facilitated knowledge transfer. These committees make contributions during policy design and formulation, and they are consulted during the policy process to review and make comments on national policies. The TNAs' location within the policy structure shortens the process of getting official attention for particular policy ideas. This is the case because deliberations on policy issues among TNAs, CSOs and governmental actors on such committees create opportunities for putting forward policy ideas. It is noteworthy that within this deliberative environment, official policymakers also become aware of the policies that TNAs are more likely to fund or support (MDAs_008, 2013).

The fourth lesson derived from this study is that the use of ideational mechanisms promotes country-level ownership. Policymakers in Ghana perceived policies such as LEAP, which were the consequence of interaction between national and TNAs in various forums including

conferences, field trips and SWG deliberations, as their own innovation. This contrasts with how policymakers perceive policies emanating from loan conditionalities. For instance, while the GPRS is seen as TNAs-imposed policy by most policymakers interviewed, LEAP was generally viewed as a homegrown policy. This perception stemmed from the fact that, while the idea of a cash transfer was first introduced during a discussion of the SWG on vulnerability and exclusion, TNAs in this group proceeded along paths of facilitating learning and providing support to enable governmental actors to design the policy with support from technical advisors. Policymakers felt they were not constrained to act in particular ways for fear of forfeiting financial assistance, as it was in the case of the GPRS.

Another lesson derived from this study is that, while our focus is on organisations such as multilateral and bilateral agencies, other actors such as governmental, NGO and individual experts, foreign-based universities, as well as research agencies are also significant players in the policy process. In fact, the results of evaluation or research conducted by foreign universities can be instrumental in bringing about change in policy. For instance, a baseline study and programme evaluation conducted by the CPC-UNC was instrumental in the reform of the LEAP adopted in 2012, which increased the stipend to beneficiaries three-fold. The report noted as one of its main conclusions that LEAP's potential for improving human development would be significantly enhanced if "the value of the LEAP transfer were increased by at least three times and preferably four times its current value" (Handa & Park, 2012, p. 19).

The final lesson derived from this study is that, in the transnational policy process, TNAs target official actors and local CSOs similarly. Ghana's case shows TNAs forming partnerships with CSOs to promote acceptance of their policy suggestions. This could be an offshoot of their commitment to the principle of country ownership of policies, contained in the *1999/2000*

Comprehensive Development Framework, and the *Paris Declaration of 2005*. As noted in the case of the preparation of the GPRS, TNAs used their leverage to create policy space for CSOs to be involved in the policy deliberations (Amoako-Tuffour, 2008). This is necessary because, although CSOs need to be part of the national policy process through consultations, they lack leverage and resources. As such, their views are mostly ignored by policymakers in preference of donor-driven policy ideas, which mostly come with resources. Thus, in their alliance, TNAs provide resources and leverage to enable CSOs to take part in policy deliberations, and also to call on government for policy changes, necessarily serving as watchdogs within the policy process. Yet, in other cases, official policymakers also partner with CSOs to challenge policy conditionalities imposed by TNAs.

C.   Conditionalities, Idea Peddling and the Role of CSOs

As the analysis indicates, an explanation of TNAs interaction with the national policy process that focuses solely on one mechanism such as conditionalities would be inadequate to account for transnational policy influence. This is because TNAs involvement in developing countries' policymaking has over the years evolved into an intricate process that combines various strategies and processes, in order to be effective. Besides the desire for effectiveness, changes in the transnational policy process also signifies the dynamism of the process, as it responds to various shifts in perceptions of how TNAs should interact with national policymakers, shifts that emanate from international campaigns or conferences such as the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and the Millennium Summit (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). For instance, particularly following from the 1980s SAPs, there have been constant criticisms of the operations of TNAs such as the IFIs, which imposed a set of uniform neoliberal policy ideas (referred to as the

Washington Consensus) on some ailing African countries, a situation that negatively affected their socio-economic development (Adésínà, 2009; Adejumobi, 2004).

The criticism mostly centers on the lack of involvement of national policymakers in policy design, as these policymakers were constrained through conditionalities attached to loans. In response to this, the 2000s saw the popularisation of various principles to guide aid effectiveness and development policy such as country ownership of policies, which must be designed through a participatory and partnership oriented approach, where development partners and national policymakers together decide on solutions that are suitable for particular environments (Cornwall & Brock, 2005).

Consequently, conditionalities are supported by idea peddling, where TNAs use various means to generate support for particular policy solutions to concrete economic and social problems. Thus, policymakers in developing countries are exposed to trending policy ideas and success stories from similar countries through various conferences, publications, consultants, and field trips. As noted by the discussion in the previous chapters, TNAs active in Ghana, including the WB and DFID, sponsored some DSW and MESW officials in Ghana to attend conferences on social assistance where cash transfers were discussed, and to travel to implementing countries on field trips. Additionally, experts on cash transfers were attached to these governmental agencies to facilitate policy design. Besides, TNAs positioning within various consultative groups where policies are discussed served as avenues for proffering particular views. The above discussion challenges arguments that are based solely on the imposition thesis while neglecting other mechanisms, including ideational ones (Orenstein, 2008).

Another aspect of the above is TNAs' role in promoting particular policy ideas in the absence of conditionalities. Here TNAs engage in norms-teaching in order to share lessons learnt with other countries, yet, as the case of LEAP shows, norms-teaching is reinforced with technical and financial assistance. In this sense, effective idea peddling is linked with the availability of TNA resources, although some countries may adopt policies by drawing lessons from other nations without the direct involvement of TNAs. However, in situations where TNAs are actively promoting some policy proposals in a particular country, supporting these proposals with resources can pay off.

In addition, although from the perspective of the TPP framework, TNAs mainly target state actors toward generating commitment and support for policy ideas at the national level, CSOs are also very important targets in the process of ideational diffusion. Policy decisions may reside in the hands of veto players. Yet, the dynamics of national politics where veto players want to portray themselves as responsive to the needs of citizens makes CSOs key actors in the policy process. Moreover, the shifts in international development policy makes participation of CSOs in the policy process a prerequisite for international support. This has taken different dimensions: both hard and soft. In the first instance, it is required of countries that in the process of preparing PRSPs, to engage citizens through the participatory approach (Wolfensohn, 1999a; 1999b). In the second instance, 'participation' takes on a moral outlook, as governments try to portray themselves in a positive way by involving civil society in decision-making[15].

In the context of shifts in development policy discourse, CSOs have become 'middlemen' in national policymaking between TNAs and national veto players. For TNAs, having allies among

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[15] Examinations of the extent and effectiveness of participation by civil society in the policy process are however, inconclusive (Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Seshamani, 2005; Mohammed, 2013).

CSOs broadens their support base in a particular country. Also, to have local CSOs calling for policy changes similar to those favoured by TNAs likely enhances positive perception of such proposals by national actors. Meanwhile, national veto players see their engagements with CSOs as a way of portraying to TNAs generally, and a country's development partners particularly, how responsive and democratic a government is. Such positive depictions open new doors to funding opportunities and collaboration in the policy process.

Yet, TNAs may succeed only in peddling particular policy ideas around the world but they are limited in shaping how it turns out in a specific country. Thus, the same policy idea manifests itself variedly in different implementing countries, subject to differences in context and policy actors. This suggests that policy transfer across space is in tandem with translation (Campbell, 2002; Béland, 2014). Thus, "When new policy ideas diffuse internationally, they are translated into national practice in unique ways that fit with prevailing national political institutions" (Campbell, 2002, p. 31). Such a perspective, which this study supports, shows that TNAs influence is mediated by existing institutions. As such, although the philosophy underlining reform initiatives may be the same globally, the actual manifestations of the reform vary from country to country. Consequently, even in cases of imposed policies such as the GPRS, which emanated from the HIPCs initiative, different countries take different pathways towards eradicating poverty.

Furthermore, the study shows that ideational processes could result in policy reform even where there is no crisis. Unlike the notion of path dependency, according to which a crisis or another type of shock destabilises a particular policy system resulting in major change, ideational analysis stresses the possibility of meaningful change in the absence of such crisis (Campbell, 2004; Béland & Cox, 2011). While Ghana's decision to accept the HIPCs initiative and its

attendant GPRS was incentivised by economic crisis and facilitated by the change in government, the adoption of LEAP indicates that meaningful policy change can occur outside of a period of crisis.

Change in government in 2001 and the economic crisis that Ghana experienced at the time facilitated the adoption of the HIPC and the GPRS by the NPP government. Even though this government responded favourably to requirements of an IMF programme of economic prudence at this time, later on, in 2008 (an election year), this same government significantly increased spending, contrary to an agreement of economic prudence with the IMF. This implies that, in addition to the other mechanisms discussed above, timing is fundamental to attaining significant influence in the policy process. Consequently, TNAs may make significant impact particularly during periods of governmental alternation, when the new government is desirous of making a positive impression on the international scene. Yet, targeting governmental changes alone may not be sufficient, thus coupling this with ideational mechanisms that aim at propagating policy proposals is likely to influence the perceptions of policymakers, resulting in potential change in a particular country, despite the absence of external crisis or conditionalities.

Moreover, policymakers' perception of policies as foreign or locally initiated is shaped by the mechanism deployed by TNAs during the policy process. While governments accept policy conditionalities during periods of crisis without much difficulty, such policies are mostly considered "foreign" by officials, even when the policies are adapted to the context. However, policies such as LEAP, which were derived from discussions with TNAs, are considered locally-initiated policies, notwithstanding the significant TNA impact in the policy development process. Thus, when TNAs used ideational mechanisms such as knowledge sharing through conferences, field trips and discussion forums like the SWGs, national policymakers see policy innovations as

stemming from their own efforts. In this sense, ideational processes seem to have a positive normative outlook since they empower national policy actors primarily to adopt and adapt a broad policy idea present globally, a situation that helps in formulating it to suit the environment.

D.   Policy Recommendations

In view of the analyses above, the following recommendations are made to guide TNAs and national policy actors in the process of policymaking in a globalised context. To begin with, national policymakers are advised to perceive conferences, field trips and technical cooperation opportunities as an integral part of the policy development process. Here, they can contribute to shaping policy proposals actively instead of being passive recipients of policies transmitted through imposition. There is more global cooperation now than in the past five decades, characterised by meetings by national leaders to find solutions to problems such as poverty and diseases like Ebola. Such gatherings should be seen as outlets for sharing policy experiences and learning to promote development.

Even though in strenuous conditions national policymakers are apt to accept prerequisites of policy reforms in exchange for economic assistance, such modes of influencing policy change are problematic. When policy reforms are imposed by TNAs, they tend to be viewed as foreign and thus, are less likely to be sustained in the long run unless TNAs continually supervise and support policy implementation. Yet continuous supervision may require TNAs to be part of implementing agencies, which is perhaps unfeasible due to institutional and resource constraints. Consequently, for TNAs, the use of norms teaching mechanisms such as conferences, field trips and technical cooperation is recommended. Such ideational strategies enable TNAs to persuade policymakers to generate support for new policy proposals. In such forums, national

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policymakers are also able to contribute to the policy suggestions presented, with a view to adapting them to their own conditions.

Additionally, to facilitate sustainable innovation, technical assistance to national policymakers should target building local capacity to manage policy effectively in the event of foreign technical experts transfer. For instance, local policymakers should be in the lead of policy development supported by foreign experts.

Moreover, to enhance the likelihood of the acceptance of policy suggestions, it is recommended that proposals from TNAs be supported with financial and technical resources. Unique policy ideas totally new to a particular context require resources to encourage policymakers to experiment with it. The reasoning underlying this recommendation is that, at the initial contact with a new policy proposal, policymakers unsure of its outcome may not be willing to commit substantial financial resources to it. Consequently, an offer of initial financial assistance from TNAs would enable national policymakers observe policy outcomes and make further commitments based on such outcomes.

E.   Limitations and Future Research

In order to shape future research on TNAs and policymaking in developing countries, this study has a number of limitations that must be acknowledged. First, this study is a qualitative case study of Ghana's adoption of the GPRS and LEAP between 2001 and 2008. As a research approach, case studies face challenges of selection bias, i.e., in selecting the cases for this study I was torn between selecting other policies such as education policy to provide multiple examples but in the end, the analysis focused on anti-poverty policies in line with the general focus on poverty alleviation in developing countries. Consequently, other studies focusing on how TNAs

shape economic policies in developing countries beyond conditionalities would be a welcome contribution to the field of policy studies.

Second, this empirical study, focusing on Ghana, provides depth of information on how TNAs shape policies beyond conditionalities. As one country out of 48 SSA countries, Ghana has a lot of similarities with many other African countries, such as dependence on external support to fund some country operations, the increasing commitment to fight poverty and membership of the HIPCs initiative. However, regarding other dimensions, Ghana appears different. For instance, Ghana is an open system with a functioning multiparty democracy but other countries in SSA such as Zimbabwe are not. Also while Ghana is a unitary state, Nigerian for instance is a federal state. Therefore, Ghana is not entirely representative of Africa. The implication is that using Ghana as a focus of this study leaves a gap that could be filled by studies that focus on other African countries. Specifically, studying how TNAs operate in other countries across the continent would better inform a generalisation of how ideational mechanisms are applied in SSA.

Another area that could enrich studies of the transnational policy process is the how CSOs interact with TNAs and governmental actors in the policy process. This study used Orenstein (2008) Transnational Policy Process framework, which stressed how TNAs court veto players in order to get their policy ideas adopted. Yet, as this study shows, there is an intricate relationship that exists between TNAs and CSOs, and between CSOs and governmental actors. TNAs speak to governments on behalf of CSOs, and CSOs sometimes campaign against some TNAs activities in developing countries. Further study of this relationship would significantly enrich studies on TNAs involvement in other countries' policy development processes.

In addition to ideational factors, this study's analytical framework identified institutional and structural factors that interacted in the transnational policy process. Psychological factors discussed by Craig Parsons (2007) were not directly analyzed in this thesis but future research could tackle the issue by studying how national veto players respond to TNAs' influence through psychological processes.

F.   Concluding Remarks

This study has underscored the multiplicity of mechanisms by which TNAs interact with national policymakers towards shaping policy decisions and outcomes. Besides the much publicised structural strategies, it argued, ideational mechanisms are equally important. The two cases studied indicated that structural mechanisms such as conditionalities are combined with ideational strategies, including feeding global discourse with particular policy ideas through conferences and publications, and national discourse through public statements made at seminars, press interviews, and at meetings with national leaders such as consultative group meetings between developing countries and their DPs. As the case of Ghana's decision to join the HIPC initiative and consequently to develop the GPRS in 2001 showed, although the preparation of the GPRS policy document was a form of conditionality, to generate support among citizens, there were conscious media campaigns about it launched by both supporters and opponents of the process. While acting as proposal actors, TNAs also combined ideas peddling with financial and technical support provided to interested countries while also building alliances with civil society actors.

Largely, ideational strategies were emphasised as part of the methods used by TNAs to popularise innovations and spread them from place to place. Particularly in generating support for new policies at the national level, ideational strategies such as framing can matter.

Additionally, ideational strategies helped generate a sense of policy ownership among policymakers. Such perception emanated from the collegial nature of such activities like conferences, where policy knowledge is shared and contributed to, as well as from deliberations in an institutional setting where both national and transnational policy actors gather. In the case of Ghana, ideational strategies were seen as promoting collegiality between transnational and national actors, in that both groups of actors learned from each other through systematic policy discussions and ongoing exchanges of ideas.

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Appendices

1. Appendix 1

Ghana: Status of Triggers for the HIPC Floating Completion Point

Triggers	Status
PRSP. Preparation of a full PRSP and satisfactory implementation for at least one year, as evidenced by the joint staff assessment of the country's annual progress report.	The full PRSP was finalized and sent to the IMF and IDA in February 2003 and discussed by the IMF and IDA Boards in May 2003. The 2003 PRSP Annual Progress Report was completed in May 2004 and the Joint Staff Assessment submitted to the Boards in June 2004.
Macroeconomic stability. Continued maintenance of macroeconomic stability as evidenced by satisfactory implementation of the PRGF-supported programme.	A new-three year PRGF arrangement was approved in May 2003 and the first review completed in December 2003. The second review is planned to be completed in June 2004.
Use of budgetary savings. The use of budgetary savings from interim debt service relief have been used in the priority areas and monitored in the framework for poverty reduction expenditures. Information on the use of these savings and on poverty expenditures has been published in time to be considered in a public review of GPRS implementation, as input to the annual progress report on the GPRS. The increase in total spending on these priorities must equal or exceed HIPC relief (less relief used for domestic debt reduction) during the interim period.	The tracking system is in place and HIPC relief is additional to budgetary spending, mostly on basic infrastructure and social sectors. The 2003 PRSP Annual Progress Report provides information on use of the resources and on poverty-related expenditures.

Governance • Procurement reform. Regulatory and oversight body to implement new procurement code has been established.	In December 2003, the Procurement Act was passed by parliament. Members of the Public Procurement Board were appointed by the President and their inauguration is planned for June 2004. The position of Chief Executive of the Secretariat of the Board has already been advertised and selection to fill the position is expected by the end of July 2004. MOEFP has already instructed public procurement bodies to form Entity Tender Committees.
• Internal audit. Operational internal audit capacity has been established through full staffing of existing internal audit positions.	Existing positions are fully staffed, but quality of internal audit remains weak. Internal Audit Act, approved in December 2003, aims to improve quality and management of audit function. Members of the Internal Audit Agency Board were appointed by the President and their inauguration is planned for June 2004. The position of Director General of the IAA has already been advertised and selection to fill the position is expected by the end of July 2004
Public expenditure management • Reports on cash expenditures and commitments by MDAs, classified by function, have been published monthly in the government gazette, following implementation of new reporting system.	New cash management and commitment control system implemented in all ministries by end-December 2003. New reporting system implemented and reports are published in the monthly gazette.
• A computer-based financial management information system to underpin the new expenditure reporting system has been installed on a pilot basis in the Ministry of Finance, CAGD, and at least two key sector ministries.	System has been installed on a pilot basis at the MOF, CAGD and the Accra-based operations of the ministries of health, education, and roads and transport (albeit with partial functionality). The system will be rolled out to another four MDAs by early 2005.

Decentralization of government functions • Devolution of responsibilities to local districts, as evidenced by (i) submission to Parliament of a local service bill to enable the decentralization of human resource management to local authorities; and (ii) development of District Composite Budgets in pilot districts.	Local Government Services Act was passed by parliament in December 2003. District composite budgets prepared in three pilot districts (Dangme East, Dangme West, and Akwapim North).
Education • The primary gross enrollment rates for girls has increased from 72 percent in 2000 to 74 percent.	In the 2002/2003 academic year, the primary gross enrollment rate for girls reached almost 78 percent.
Health • The percentage of households with access to safe water has increased from 40 percent in 2000 to 46 percent in rural areas. • Recurrent health expenditures at district and lower level governments have risen from 42 percent of the total recurrent health budget in 2000 to 45 percent.	Rural water coverage is estimated at 46.4 percent in 2003. Estimated share of recurrent health expenditures at district and lower levels reached 49.6 percent in 2003.
Energy Sector • An automatic price adjustment mechanism has been put in place and implemented monthly to reflect changes in international market prices in local currency in the petroleum sector, and includes all taxes incorporated into the adjustment formula at end-March 2002.	Not attained. Pricing formula was put in place in 2003 but has not been implemented. A new regulatory regime that will give freedom to oil marketing companies to set prices (according to a prescribed formula), and that credibly removes government influence over pricing decisions, will be announced by Cabinet in June 2004. The new regime is expected to become effective on February 15, 2005.

• A strategy for achieving full economic pricing in the electricity sector, including lifeline pricing to ensure affordability for low income users, has been implemented.	Strategy established and implemented since August 2002.

Source: IMF Country Report - Ghana: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - Completion Point Document (IMF & WB, 2004, pp. 6-8)