

CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT:
THE CCF AND THE CANADIAN CONGRESS OF LABOUR
IN SASKATCHEWAN, 1944-1956

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine CCF-CCL relations in the Saskatchewan public service during the early years of the government of Tommy Douglas. While much has been written about the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL), both as separate organizations and as political 'allies', little has been said about their relations in Saskatchewan. Yet, the CCF formed the government in Saskatchewan for five consecutive terms between 1944 and 1964, and it was in this agrarian province that the true test of the CCF-CCL relationship occurred. Saskatchewan was the one location where unions that supported the CCF were faced with a social democratic government which was also their employer. The difficulty the two sides encountered while trying to reconcile industrial relations with their political relations forms the subject of this study.

PREFACE

For the past few years I have been supported by funds provided by the College of Graduate Studies and Research, the Department of History, and the Douglas-Coldwell Foundation. I am grateful to those who have read this thesis and who helped in the research and preparation of it. My thanks to the members of my committee: J.R. Miller, Bill Waiser, and Professor Wetzel (and Mary Hallett and Brian Hogan), and especially to my supervisor, Professor T.D. Regehr for his patient guidance, encouragement and support.

For their co-operation and assistance in permitting me to see the files and records of their organizations, I would like to thank the officers of the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, the Canadian Labour Congress, and the Saskatchewan New Democratic Party. In addition, I am grateful to Dr. Carlyle King and the family of David Lewis for access to their papers. To the staff of the Saskatchewan Archives Board and the Public Archives of Canada, especially Darcy Hande and Peter DeLottinville, my thanks for their unfailing assistance while I examined large amounts of valuable material. I am deeply indebted to Bill Davies, 'Hub' Elkin, and Clarence Lyons for graciously accepting me into their homes while I pestered them for hours about the provincial labour movement. I am equally indebted to Bob Mitchell for arranging these interviews.

Departmental Assistant Jackie Fraser deserves kudos for her magic with computers and friendly assistance to graduate students, and Glen Makahonuk of Special Collections at the University of Saskatchewan Archives deserves special mention for his generosity in sharing his time and research into Saskatchewan labour history. As well, my thanks to Robin Wylie and Mike Cottrell for their useful comments on my ideas. Special thanks are extended to Ivo Lambi for his guidance and friendship through the past years.

To my brother Ross, who always encouraged me, my thanks for his support; and to my wife Evelle, for putting up with me, my love.

ABBREVIATIONS

AFL - American Federation of Labour
CAEU - Canadian Airline Employees Union (CCL)
CBRE - Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees (CCL)
CCF - Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
CCL - Canadian Congress of Labour
CIO - Congress of Industrial Organizations
CLC - Canadian Labour Congress
CWA - Communications Workers of America (CCL)
EAPB - Economic Advisory and Planning Board
EUEU - Electrical Utilities Employees Union (CCL)
IBEW - International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (TLC)
IDIA - Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907
IWA - International Woodworkers of America (CCL)
LRB - Labour Relations Board
MLA - Member of the Legislative Assembly (Sask.)
MPP - Member of the Provincial Parliament (Ont.)
OWIU - Oil Workers International Union (CCL)
PAC - Political Action Committee (CCL-PAC)
PC 1003 - The Wartime Labour Relations Regulations
RWDSU - Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union (CCL)
SCSA - Saskatchewan Civil Servants Association (TLC)
SFL - Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (CCL)
SGA - Saskatchewan Government Airways
SGIO - Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office
SIEU - Saskatchewan Insurance Employees Union (CCL)
SPC - Saskatchewan Power Corporation
STC - Saskatchewan Transportation Company
TLC - Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (AFL)
UCSC - United Civil Servants of America (CCL)
UMWA - United Mine Workers of America (CCL)
UPWA - United Packinghouse Workers of America (CCL)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis discusses the major developments in the often strained relations between public service unions and the provincial government in Saskatchewan. It is restricted to relations between the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), Saskatchewan Section, and unions in the provincial public service affiliated with the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) because the new industrial relations system was created largely for their benefit, and their performance was important to the success of the CCF's industrialization and social welfare policies. In addition, the CCL as a national labour organization had endorsed the CCF as the 'political arm' of labour, and it was hoped that developments in Saskatchewan would inspire increased union support for the party in Ontario. The thesis therefore examines labour relations in Saskatchewan crown corporations from 1944 to 1956 with reference to the role of the CCF as the 'benefactor' and as the employer of labour; and the response of labour as employees and political supporters of the CCF.¹

Elected to office in June, 1944, the Saskatchewan CCF were well-aware that their 'beach-head' of socialism was extremely important to the fortunes of the party elsewhere, as everywhere but in Saskatchewan the party was dependent upon labour support. The provincial party was dependent, of

course, upon rural votes, but it could not resolve the farmers' main grievances, prices and oligopoly exploitation, which fell within the purview of the Dominion Government. The national party, on the other hand, could not act on the farmers' behalf without forming the government in Ottawa, and they needed labour's support in Ontario if they were to be successful.

The Canadian Congress of Labour co-operated with the CCF at the national and provincial levels to develop a broader organizational base, and although these efforts proved unsuccessful in Ontario, the political 'alliance' forged between the CCF and CCL at the national level informed the motives of the leaders of the party and industrial union movement, and help to explain their actions regarding industrial relations in Saskatchewan.²

The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (Saskatchewan Section) was a collection of agrarian reformers, radical trade unionists, and Christian idealists. Its ideology expressed the farmers' traditional demands for farm security, democratic government, and anti-monopoly populism; the Christian tradition of the 'social gospel'; and the Fabian socialism of unions interested in labour reform and a higher standard of living. In Saskatchewan, the CCF advocated a planned economy, socialized health services, improved labour legislation, social ownership of utilities and natural resources, and co-operative production and

distribution based upon human needs rather than profits.³

A small but militant labour organization, the CCL in Saskatchewan were the 'vanguard' of the provincial working class, and they repeatedly clashed with the social democratic CCF which represented an agrarian petit-bourgeois class of independent commodity producers.⁴ The national CCL may have endorsed the CCF as labour's 'political arm', but in Saskatchewan the local unions approached the government as they would any other employer and their militancy caused friction with the CCF, alienating farmers, party members, and government bureaucrats. Once they acquired the power to protect themselves they built strong unions and bargained aggressively for improved wages and working conditions. Their first priority was trade unionism, and they were not easily persuaded to subordinate their economic goals to political considerations.

Among other things, the Saskatchewan CCF was a farmers' party and the government reflected the views of the rural community, which throughout this period underwent changes as farm operations became larger and more mechanized. Farmers became more like businessmen in the generally prosperous post-war years, and their earlier radicalism declined as they gained a measure of economic security under the CCF. They came to resent their labour allies as a threat to their new found security, and because the provincial government could not raise farm incomes they were loath to see unions,

especially in the public service, gain wage increases while their incomes fluctuated.

Although the government repeatedly stressed its desire to be a 'model' employer, its industrial relations practices differed little from those of a private employer, and the traditional antagonism of the labour-capital conflict was reproduced in the 'co-operative commonwealth'. Wages remained the central issue in virtually all disputes, and the CCF twice approached Congress with a 'social contract' covering wages, grievances and negotiations problems in the crown corporations.

The 'social contract' was in essence a call for voluntary wage restraint, and the government had a good deal less trouble convincing Congress leaders in Ottawa of the need for co-operation, than it had with local unions which were more concerned with the regulation of wages through collective bargaining. The interests of provincial and national trade unionists diverged when local unions rejected the 'social contract', and Congress leaders had to intervene frequently to prevent strikes, encourage co-operation, and repair damages to CCF-CCL relations caused by repeated industrial relations conflict.

Frequent labour relations problems in the crown corporations did not always erupt into open conflict, but were symptomatic of the conflict of interests between an overwhelmingly agrarian political party and the militant

union movement. Although there were many disputes between the government and its unions, there were only four strikes in government industries in the twelve years from 1944 to 1956. Three strikes involved CCL unions; two were 'wildcat' strikes and the other a wage strike.⁵ The clash of interests should not be overstated, however, as the new industrial relations system earned the CCF the consistent political support of the majority of the provincial labour movement.

Collective bargaining problems did not alienate labour's political support from the CCF because expanded employment opportunities existed with the growth in public ownership, and the benefits of socialized medicine, better access to education, and the new collective bargaining system directly affected workers and their families. The labour movement, especially the CCL, was reluctant to see the benefits of the CCF government lost, and workers defended the new status quo in every provincial election because they feared a return of the Liberals would mean the elimination or drastic curtailment of the industrial relations system and the emerging welfare state. Thus, prior to provincial elections, industrial relations problems receded into the background as labour showed its gratitude for the CCF's reforms.

The conflict generated in bargaining disputes was not easily overcome. Both sides expected the other to be

understanding, supportive, and generous in their industrial relations, but conflict between the CCF's declared intentions to be a 'model' employer and their actual practices fed union militancy; and the aggressive posture of union negotiators contrasted with their political support of the party. In addition to its role as an employer, the government remained the regulator of the industrial relations framework, but it could not successfully mediate disputes with its own employees because it would not compel itself to compromise, even where it was not a threat to their economic interests. In addition, personal conflict between provincial CCF and CCL leaders added an element of mistrust to their relationship, and relations deteriorated as they struggled over the profits of public industry.

The story of relations between the CCL and the CCF is structured as follows: Chapter II briefly discusses the effects of depression and war on the provincial labour force, and the impact of Mackenzie King's industrial relations policies on the labour movement in Saskatchewan. Chapter III outlines the CCF's policies regarding incomes and unions in government operations, while Chapter IV examines the CCF's major legacy to the provincial labour movement - the Trade Union Act. Chapters V through VII deal with CCL-CCF relations in each of the three consecutive terms the CCF served as government from 1944 to 1956. Chapter V discusses the emerging problems in their

relationship from 1944 to 1948; Chapter VI covers the period 1948-1952 in which the government tried to gain union support for a 'social contract'; and Chapter VII examines relations from 1952 to 1956 in the aftermath of the CCF's failure to convince unions to support their incomes policy. Finally, Chapter VII provides a brief conclusion to the study of union-government relations in Saskatchewan from 1944 to 1956. Endnotes can be found at the end of each chapter.

1. 'Public service' refers to all provincial government employees. 'Civil service' refers to the white-collar public servants organized into the SCSA-TLC. CCL workers were public employees organized for the most part within the crown corporations. The Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLC) unions are excluded because, with one notable exception, they were for the most part outside of the public service, and were therefore not as important to the financial success of the CCF's plans. Moreover, while the TLC was officially 'neutral' regarding politics, it had a long-standing relationship with the older parties, especially with the Liberals, and it was suspicious of the CCF because the latter was closely associated with its union rival, the CCL. The thesis ends in 1956 because in that year the TLC and CCL buried their differences and merged to form the Canadian Labour Congress. The subsequent merger of the provincial labour movement changed the nature of unionism in Saskatchewan and opened a new page in its history.

2. Union support for the Saskatchewan CCF contrasted with the 'poor' showing of the Ontario party, which remained far from the levers of power. The Ontario CCF lacked the effective party organization evident in Saskatchewan, and the continual struggles between the CCF and communists within the labour movement did not induce workers to favour one or the other of the socialist alternatives. Furthermore, Mackenzie King's welfare and labour reforms dulled the CCF's platform, and the post-war prosperity evident in Ontario especially, produced political complacency among unionists more concerned with 'bread and butter' issues of collective bargaining than with political philosophies. Moreover, the Ontario party could not offer workers much more than what they had already gained through their own efforts, and the widely-publicized strikes in government-owned industries in Saskatchewan may have suggested to Ontario workers that the CCF in power was not altogether different from other employers. The passage of collective bargaining legislation in Ontario and a federal labour code, and the emergence of the Rand Formula of union security (though in all cases inferior to Saskatchewan laws) reflected the success of the labour movement in forcing concessions from governments and employers in the immediate post-war period. Nevertheless, the electoral fortunes of the Ontario party, and particularly of the national CCF, were of the utmost concern to the Congress, and they worked closely with the CCF towards the goal of forming social democratic governments.

3. The best treatment of the Saskatchewan CCF remains Seymour Lipset's, Agrarian Socialism, (Berkeley, 1971). See also: Hoffman, G., "The Saskatchewan Farmer-Labour Party, 1932-1934: How Radical Was Its Origin?", Saskatchewan History,

28(2) 1975; Young, W.D., "M.J. Coldwell, the Making of a Social Democrat", Journal of Canadian Studies, IX (3) August 1974; and, Brennan, J.W., (ed.), "Building the Co-operative Commonwealth", Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada, (Regina, 1985)

4. See: Lipset, op.cit., Introduction, p.xv and xx-xxi; and MacPherson, C.B., Democracy in Alberta, (Toronto, 1962), Ch.VII

5. The wage strike occurred in the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office in 1948, and the 'wildcat' strikes erupted in the box factory in 1947 and the Saskatchewan Government Airways in 1951. A fourth strike in government industry involved the the TLC-affiliated bus drivers in the Saskatchewan Transportation Company (STC) in 1953. On the STC strike, see: Public Archives of Canada (hereafter, PAC), Department of Labour Files, Strike and Lockout Series, RG27, Vol.500, Strike #83, for newspaper accounts of pickets in Prince Albert wearing "Vote Diefenbaker" signs as an expression of their dissatisfaction with the CCF.

CHAPTER II

MACKENZIE KING AND LABOUR IN SASKATCHEWAN

When the CCF were elected to office on 15 June 1944, they inherited an impoverished, unindustrialized, overwhelmingly agrarian province. Prosperity depended upon two uncontrollable factors affecting the production of wheat, "crop yields (in a hazardous climate) and world marketing conditions (in a speculative trade)...".¹ The depression had hit hard in Saskatchewan as it was accompanied by a prolonged drought, and the province had been forced to maintain relief, on occasion, for more than one-half the population. Conditions "were nothing short of disastrous" during the depression, and the provincial government acquired an enormous debt supplying raw materials and operating costs for the wheat economy merely to maintain it in production.²

When the drought lifted in 1939 and wheat prices slowly began to rise, the rehabilitation of farming commenced. If the agricultural recovery did not completely satisfy farmers' demands for higher prices, it allowed them the opportunity to leave the 'relief' rolls and address the accumulated problems of seed and tax liens, mortgage debts and farm foreclosures. The relative prosperity of the war years, however, did not produce security of tenure for

farmers, and in their agitation for higher prices they were joined by the CCF, which had spent a decade refining its political platform to attract the rural vote. The party had dropped its land socialization policy in favour of security of title, and restricted its nationalization policies to monopolies and public utilities. In addition, the CCF promised to stop foreclosures, to force banks to restructure debts, and to order a debt moratorium, if necessary. While the party offered farmers a programme of economic security, increased social services, and improvements to the 'rural way of life', they concentrated their efforts during the war on the farmers' struggle for increased prices. However, unless the CCF were to form the national government, the provincial party could not effectively act on the farmers' main grievances, and to capture parliamentary power the CCF needed the support of Canadian labour.

The provincial labour movement represented a minority of urban workers within a largely rural population.³ The agricultural economy engaged a larger proportion of the labour force than elsewhere in Canada, while also providing the least employment in manufacturing, mining or forestry.⁴ Urban employment varied according to the fluctuations of the wheat economy as the cities were primarily distribution centres for the rural agricultural community. Forwarding, retailing and the service industries were the mainstay of the cities which had little commercial or industrial

activity independent of agriculture. Railway transportation and the wholesale trade absorbed the energies of the greater part of the urban population, and those industries which did develop were closely connected to the agricultural life of the province.⁵ Union recognition and collective bargaining only occurred where workers were successful in asserting their collective power. Thus, unions of railway workers and of building trades workers were predominant within the labour movement.

During the depression, the cities were hard pressed to deal effectively with the "enforced emigration" of unskilled labour from the drought-stricken "rural slums".⁶ The outlook for alternative employment in the cities was bleak; unemployment was high - over twenty per cent in 1933 - wages were low, and working conditions 'poor'.⁷ Union membership declined by one-third between 1930 and 1934, and even the railway unions, traditionally with the largest and most stable membership, suffered from the effects of the depression.⁸ As it was for workers elsewhere in Canada, the 'dirty thirties' was a time of weakness, and it was not until the depression began to ease that union organization recovered from its losses.

As the drought lifted and the provincial economy recovered, unemployment declined to less than ten per cent, and by 1939, union membership had recovered from a depression low of approximately 6500, to an unprecedented

10,254. When the war began union membership decreased owing to enlistment, but as the war economy further reduced unemployment membership grew, surpassing the 11,000 mark in 1943.⁹ Yet, this achievement did not alter the fact that the province ranked second last in union membership, ahead of Prince Edward Island. Indeed, Hamilton and Quebec City each had more unionists than were in the whole of Saskatchewan.¹⁰

The economy of the family farm produced a paternalistic employer attitude similar in view to the 'small town' merchant class which was primarily concerned with immediate profits. The paternalism was based upon an ideology of independence and self-reliance, and found expression in the 'master and servant' relationship of the farmer-employer and the 'hired hand'.¹¹ This relationship was reinforced by the provincial government, long dominated by the Liberal party, which proved reluctant to grant labour's requests, and equally hesitant about enforcing the legislation that was passed. Provincial labour legislation administered by the Bureau of Labour dealt mainly with workers' safety and the protection of wages, and there was little legislation dealing with employer-employee relations.¹²

Like other provinces, Saskatchewan relied upon the Dominion government to regulate disputes between employees and workers, and Mackenzie King's Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907, (IDIA) was the dominant piece of

labour legislation affecting union organization and collective bargaining.¹³ The Act provided for the compulsory investigation and conciliation of labour disputes in 'essential' public industries where those disputes threatened to erupt in a strike or lockout. The IDIA prohibited work stoppages until an ad hoc conciliation board had investigated the dispute, reported on it, and a further two-week "cooling-off" period had elapsed. The process was lengthy but board recommendations were not binding and the Act relied upon publicity to persuade the recalcitrant side to abide by the findings. King believed that because de facto recognition and collective bargaining occurred while the board sat, that this would lead to voluntary employer acceptance of union recognition and collective bargaining. However, without compulsion employers had no reason to continue to negotiate with unions after the conciliation process had ended. The essential element of the IDIA was delay, and this invariably worked to the advantage of the employer who wished to resist unionization by allowing the opportunity to hire a more compliant labour force. The 'cooling off' period often became a 'heating up' period, and the strike remained the best weapon labour had to resolve disputes.

Union recognition was not guaranteed under the Act, and support for collective bargaining was incidental to the formal investigation and conciliation of labour disputes.

The policy of delay of work stoppages and the lack of an enforceable award exhausted and frustrated unions. The IDIA did not prevent strikes; it merely delayed them, and it proved to be an effective obstacle to union recognition and collective bargaining.¹⁴

In contrast to the Canadian emphasis on investigation and conciliation of disputes, which remained unaltered until late in the Second World War, the "New Deal" response of American legislators to the depression included a policy which guaranteed union 'rights'. The role of the American government under the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 1935, was to make the process of union recognition and collective bargaining compulsory, and allow it to work unimpeded, with only incidental assistance from conciliation. At the core of the Wagner Act was the right to organize and bargain collectively, which was guaranteed by an administrative board (the National Labor Relations Board) empowered to certify unions, investigate charges of unfair labour practices, and order employers to comply with the law. The Wagner Act was a stimulus to union organization and industrial unionism in particular received a tremendous boost.¹⁵

Pressed by the Canadian labour movement, the provinces began to experiment with their own 'New Deal' legislation. However, the adoption of Wagner Act principles into provincial statutes was not accompanied with the necessary

administrative machinery for the enforcement of union 'rights'. The new provincial laws were therefore completely without effect, and the IDIA dispute settlement policy remained intact.¹⁶

In Saskatchewan, the first provincial response to the "New Deal" was the passage of the Industrial Standards Act, 1937, which allowed employers and employees within designated geographic 'zones' to meet in a conference and set a schedule regulating wages, hours and working conditions covering the 'zone'.¹⁷ In effect, the conference would reach a 'collective agreement' which would, if it met with the government's approval, become law. The Act proved to be difficult to enforce or administer, and it hindered unionization by producing apathy among workers who saw their wages set by law.¹⁸

The provincial labour movement called for a Saskatchewan Wagner Act, but when the government introduced a draft trade union bill in 1938, "there was an immediate howl raised by labour in all centres."¹⁹ There were no guarantees of union recognition or collective bargaining, 'company unions' were allowed, if not encouraged, by the bill, and employers could resort to some intimidation of employees.²⁰ At best the bill was 'window dressing', at worst it was a step backwards in industrial relations. Despite labour demands for alterations, the bill was passed as The Freedom of Trade Union Association Act, 1938.²¹

When the Second World War began, the federal government extended the jurisdiction of the IDIA to cover the vast majority of Canadian industry. Together with subsequent orders-in-council which imposed wage controls and government supervised strike votes, an ad hoc industrial relations system was created that continued to ignore the central problems of union recognition and collective bargaining. An order-in-council recommending but not compelling recognition and bargaining was not enough to convince employers to make concessions to the labour movement. The ad hoc emergency industrial relations system did not prevent industrial unrest, and the weakness of the IDIA became evident during the war when full employment conditions strengthened unionization drives.²² As the system fumbled along during the war an unprecedented number of strikes occurred, mostly dealing with union security, which disrupted the war economy and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the IDIA.²³

The provincial labour movement became increasingly disappointed with the government's record in labour matters. They complained about the lack of labour representation on boards and committees affecting them, particularly the Workmens' Compensation Board, and they demanded improved labour legislation and a department of labour.²⁴ Responding to increased demands of the labour movement, a private members' bill was introduced from the government benches which promised union recognition and

collective bargaining. Bill 51 was designed to repeal both the IDIA and the Freedom of Trade Union Association Act, and provide instead for union certification and compulsory collective bargaining. Compulsory conciliation and delay were carried over from the IDIA, but labour enthusiastically welcomed its trade union 'rights'. The Liberal Government, however, was not solidly behind the bill, and it was referred to the Select Standing Committee on Law Amendments, where employer opposition forced a commission of inquiry.

Chaired by Chief Justice W.M. Martin, a former Liberal Premier of the province, the Commission on Employer-Employee Relations toured Saskatchewan in the summer of 1943 accumulating evidence from employers, labour and the public. The Report of the Martin Commission was a disappointment for the labour movement for it rejected compulsory collective bargaining and endorsed the IDIA, especially its conciliation procedures. The Report recommended the province await changes at the federal level where a similar investigation was proceeding, and adopt a uniform policy.²⁵

The provincial labour movement did not have to wait long for changes in labour legislation. In an effort to end the extraordinary labour unrest and restore order to the war economy, and as a response to the rise in popularity of the CCF (and its apparent growing connections with organized labour), the federal Liberal Government in early 1944 passed

an order-in-council that temporarily suspended the IDIA and introduced a modified version of the Wagner Act principles. PC 1003, The Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, appeared to 'guarantee', at least on a temporary basis while the war lasted, union recognition and collective bargaining.²⁶

In Saskatchewan, the provincial Liberal Government passed The Labour Relations Act, 1944, which was essentially enabling legislation applying PC 1003 to all industry in the province.²⁷ Although the labour movement did not greet the Act with the same enthusiasm as it had Bill 51, they accepted it graciously as "half a loaf was better than no bread at all."²⁸

In reality, PC 1003 was designed to compel union recognition but not collective bargaining. Certification procedures were difficult, conciliation remained a lengthy process, and enforcement provisions were lacking. The Regulations created a Wartime Labour Relations Board (WLRB) that was empowered to certify bargaining agents and investigate charges of unfair labour practices, though few such practices were outlined. The strongest provisions of PC 1003 related to compulsory conciliation and delay of strike action which were carried over from the IDIA with an additional step added.²⁹

The lack of a remedy for the refusal to bargain was a serious defect in PC 1003, and King's order-in-council represented 'collective bargaining if necessary, but not

necessarily collective bargaining'. PC 1003 did reduce labour unrest, however, as it eliminated many recognition disputes, and while collective agreements were reached between unions and employers, this represents employer acquiescence to the temporary nature of PC 1003, and the fact employers could not afford to lose production during a period of economic expansion. Moreover, because the tight labour market increased the power of labour, employers could not as easily resort to wholesale firings of a militant workforce. Thus, although PC 1003 reduced industrial unrest, it was only a temporary measure, and did not provide for real union security and collective bargaining.

However deficient PC 1003 was in practice, it marked an advance for unions and appeared to point in the way of a national labour code, a long standing demand of organized labour. The granting of union recognition brought about a sharp decrease in strike activity and restored a semblance of order to the war economy, but it was not a stimulus to union organization because gains in membership occurred before its passage. Provisions for collective bargaining were weak, and it would take the re-emergence of militant strike action following the end of the war for labour to achieve more favourable trade union legislation.³⁰

Adding to the unrest caused by the federal government's wartime restrictions on labour was a new, enthusiastic and militant industrial union organization, the Canadian

Congress of Labour (CCL). The CCL was created in 1940 when the All-Canadian Congress of Labour, led by Aaron Mosher and the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees (CBRE), merged with the growing industrial unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Owing to the tight labour market, the CCL were aggressively and successfully organizing workers in the mass production industries.³¹ In Saskatchewan, the merger brought together the CBRE, United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), and United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) locals. By 1944, the CCL represented close to 4000 workers, or about twenty per cent of the organized labour force in the province.³²

The provincial labour movement was not satisfied with the temporary concessions granted by the Liberals, and the emergence of the CCL heralded a qualitative change in its composition. The young and aggressive CCL organizers added a militant voice to the cries of the provincial TLC for improvements to the industrial relations system. While there are many reasons for the defeat of the Patterson Government and the election of the CCF, the new mood of the labour movement, radicalized by its experiences of depression and war, was certainly a factor in the cities.³³

Until the war, the CCF did not have an appeal for labour as the party devoted its energies to modifying its platform to please farmers. During the war, the provincial party began to interest labour when it produced a platform

which included union recognition, collective bargaining, consultation, and legislative reform. Full employment in peace-time was a declared goal of the CCF, and housing and medical programmes, along with increased pensions and a higher minimum wage were promised.³⁴ Although the CCF did not elaborate upon their labour platform, it appealed strongly to workers for it addressed many of their concerns.

The Party's general appeal for the "unity" of the "producing classes" against their common enemies was attractive to farmers and workers who had the common bonds of the human misery of the depression on which to forge closer ties.³⁵ Farmers tended to sympathize with workers and unionists at that time because they realized that they were exploited by some of the same 'big interests'. Moreover, some agriculturalists had trade union experience in the 'old country', while many younger trade unionists retained strong family ties with the land. In addition, farm organizations had often copied the forms and framework of democratic unionism in their economic and political struggles.

Both farmers and labour were attracted to the CCF during the war because the party offered the opportunity for them to redress their immediate grievances and reform society in their interests. The state was conceived as an "instrument of the community" based upon popular consent for agreed upon 'social ends',³⁶ and the CCF successfully

garnered the support of farmers and workers because they tied farm and union 'security' to a platform of socialized health and welfare services, public ownership and a planned economy.

Saskatchewan underwent a period of rapid economic expansion from 1938 to 1945. Urbanization and the mechanization of agriculture accelerated during the war as demands for labour and produce increased. These trends continued into the post-war period, and the expansion of farm size and the decline in farm population meant that by 1951 less than one-half of the labour force was engaged in agriculture.³⁷

Persistent urbanization and rural depopulation complicated the expensive task of providing services to a sparsely populated province.³⁸ In addition, as farms grew larger and more capital intensive, farmers became more 'business-like' and their earlier radicalism subsided as they gained a measure of economic security under the CCF. The increasing conservatism of rural Saskatchewan reflected the farmers' position as competitive producers, and it acted as a brake on the CCF's industrial relations policies in the crown corporations by reinforcing the government's drive for profits.

1. Government of Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book II, Recommendations, p.100

2. IBID., Book I, Canada: 1867-1939, p.169

3. See: Appendix II Organized Labour and the Saskatchewan Labour Force, and Appendix III Changes in the Labour Force

4. Province of Saskatchewan, A Submission by the Government of Saskatchewan, To the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, (Canada, 1937), p.170

5. The predominant industries included: flour and grist mills, creameries and cheese factories, slaughtering and meat-packing, breweries and bakeries. Banking and professional services, printing and publishing, laundries and barbers, hotels and restaurants, and other services could be found in varying degrees in the cities and towns, large and small, in the province. Retailers and wholesalers, drug stores and government institutions were found in the larger centres, which shared with the smaller towns automotive and farm implement establishments, lumber yards and blacksmithing, or small foundries and machine shops. Chain grocers and department stores replaced the general store in the larger cities, though in the small towns the general store survived. Province of Saskatchewan, A Submission...., op.cit., p.164-165

6. IBID., p.198

7. Government of Canada, The Canada YearBook, 1939, (Ottawa, 1939), p.803

8. See: Government of Canada, Department of Labour, Labour Organization in Canada, Annual Reports for 1929 to 1939 From 1930 to 1934 union membership declined by 32.3 %, but it recovered from 1935 to 1940 by 29.2 %, See: Appendix I Trade Union Membership in Saskatchewan, and Appendix III Changes in the Labour Force

9. See: Appendix I, Trade Union Membership in Saskatchewan

10. Canada, Department of Labour, Report of the Department of Labour, for the year ending March 31, 1944

11. Pentland, H.C., A Study of the Changing Social, Economic, and Political Background of the Canadian System of Industrial Relations, (Ottawa, 1968), p.22-23 and 26-28

12. Cherwinski, W.J.C., "Organized Labour in Saskatchewan: The TLC Years 1905-1945", PhD dissertation, Alberta, 1972, Ch.VIII

13. Industrial relations in Canada are controlled by both federal and provincial governments. The Courts have interpreted the British North America Act, 1867 to assign the major role in labour relations to the provinces, leaving the federal government with a limited jurisdiction. The division of powers contained in sections 91 and 92 does not refer to the labour question in any way. The predominant labour legislation in Canada from 1907 to 1925 was Mackenzie King's Industrial Disputes Investigation Act which was applied to all public utilities and coal mines. This system of federal intervention into labour disputes was challenged in the courts in 1925 (Toronto Electric Commissioners versus Snyder) and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled the Act ultra vires because Parliament had infringed upon the exclusive authority of the provinces to legislate on matters involving property and civil rights (section 92.13). The federal government was left with a limited jurisdiction, except in emergency cases such as a war. The Dominion Government amended the Act to make it conform to the ruling in the Snyder case, but a "permissive" clause was inserted to allow provinces to voluntarily apply the Act within their jurisdictions, and most of the provinces, including Saskatchewan, passed the necessary enabling legislation. A Supreme Court decision in 1950 restricted the powers of governments to delegate legislative authority, and the provinces were then in the position to develop their own systems.

14. For an excellent analysis of the development of King's industrial relations system, See: Craven, P., 'An Impartial Umpire', Industrial Relations and the Canadian State 1900-1911, (Toronto, 1980). From his experiences at the turn of the century, Mackenzie King developed a distinctive approach to industrial relations which was embodied in the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907 (IDIA). The IDIA governed federal and provincial labour relations until 1944 when it was modified by the adoption of the American example of union certification and administrative enforcement of union recognition and collective bargaining.

15. On the Wagner Act, See: Bernstein, I., The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, (Berkeley, 1950); and by the same author, Turbulent Years, A History of the American Worker, 1933-1941, (Boston, 1970)

16. See: Woods, H.D., Labour Policy in Canada, (Toronto, 1973), Ch. III for the inadequacy of provincial labour legislation. Another piece of 'window dressing' was passed by parliament in 1939 when the Criminal Code was amended to place the 'crime' of interference on employers. Section

509A made it an offence for employers to dismiss workers for the "sole reason" of union activity, or to force employees to abstain from joining unions. However, the legal right to organize was not enough to overcome employer resistance, and it became almost impossible to enforce the law because the "sole reason" was difficult to prove under criminal court rules of evidence. Moreover, judges were generally unsympathetic to the labour movement and the small penalty imposed on employer violations was insufficient to ensure future compliance, and there was no recourse for a wrongfully dismissed employee to seek reinstatement.

17. The Industrial Standards Act, 1937, Statutes of Saskatchewan (SS) 1937, cap.90

18. Cherwinski, op.cit., p.286-287

19. IBID., p.287

20. IBID., p.289 Collective bargaining refers to the determination of the terms and conditions under which employees work. Collective bargaining replaced individual bargaining in which the employer had a decided advantage over the employee, and it provided a balance to employer power as individual negotiations were replaced by group bargaining. For genuine collective bargaining to take place, workers must be free to organize into unions without interference from the employer, these unions must be recognized by the employer as the bargaining 'agency' for workers, and employers had to bargain in 'good faith' in an effort to reach an agreement. Prior to the Second World War, union recognition and collective bargaining only occurred where workers were strong enough to force employers to accept the principles.

21. SS 1938, cap.87

22. The IDIA failed to distinguish between the various types of labour disputes. Recognition disputes could not be settled by conciliation because recognition lasted only so long as the board sat. Disputes over the application or interpretation of agreements could not be resolved by compromise because the issues generally were whether or not the agreement had been respected. Negotiation disputes could only be settled if the two sides were willing to compromise, and the lack of enforceable awards often negated the process. Nevertheless, the IDIA approached all disputes in the same manner. For a good account of how the ad hoc wartime industrial relations system affected workers, see: MacDowell, L.S., 'Remember Kirkland Lake', (Toronto, 1983)

23. See: Jamieson, S.M., Times of Trouble, (Ottawa, 1968), Ch.VI

24. Cherwinski, p.290

25. Saskatchewan, Report of the Commission on Employer-Employee Relations (Bill No. 51-1943), December 1, 1943

26. On Mackenzie King's move to the 'left' which undercut CCF support in Ontario, See: Pickersgill, J.W., The Mackenzie King Record, Volume I, p.569-572 and p.596-601.

27. SS 1944, cap.95

28. Saskatchewan Archives Board, T.C. Douglas Papers (hereafter, SAB-TCD), Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements, C.C. Williams, The Trade Union Act, 1944, General Statement, p.2

29. Obstacles remained in the path to certification as the Regulations did not deal with 'company unions', a common employer practice designed to thwart bona fide organizing drives, and the WLRB had no powers to determine if in fact such organizations even existed. Under PC 1003 a union had to demonstrate that a majority of employees affected by unionization were in favour of it. Organizers and supporters could not sign up workers on company time for fear of dismissal, and the Regulations included no provisions regarding the reinstatement of workers fired for union activity or support. In small plants, employer discrimination and intimidation was often quite effective in preventing timid employees from signing union cards. In larger plants, where there were many shifts and where workers lived in widely scattered areas, the task of organizing was often more difficult. Moreover, if a union could demonstrate majority support, employers could appeal the WLRB order to the courts where delays, expenses and a hostile judiciary could mean the collapse of the nascent union local.

Once a union had surmounted the obstacles to certification there was no certainty they would achieve an agreement with their employer. Collective bargaining was not compulsory beyond a thirty day period, and refusal to bargain collectively was not an unfair labour practice. After thirty days negotiations had elapsed the old policy of compulsory conciliation and delay took effect.

30. See: Palmer, B.D., Working-Class Experience, (Toronto, 1983), p.236-245

31. On the rise of the Canadian Congress of Labour, See: Abella, I.M., Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour, (Toronto, 1973); and Horowitz, G., Canadian Labour in Politics, (Toronto, 1968).

32. See: Appendix I Trade Union Membership in Saskatchewan

33. King felt that the Patterson government was "lethargic" and therefore easy prey for Tommy Douglas, who was a more "active" leader with "high ideals". Moreover, King blamed Ontario Premier Mitchell Hepburn for giving the CCF their "big chance" in 1943, which King thought led directly to the Saskatchewan CCF victory in 1944. Cited in, Pickersgill, J.W., and Forster, D.F., The Mackenzie King Record, Volume 2, (Toronto, 1968), p.20

34. Public Archives of Canada (hereafter PAC), Stanley Knowles Papers, Saskatchewan CCF 1943-1966, Correspondence, CCF, Saskatchewan Section, pamphlet, Labour and Urban Security, n.d., (presumably 1944)

35. Lipset, S.M., Agrarian Socialism, (Berkeley, 1971), p.178

36. Rusch, T.A., "The Political Thought of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation", Journal of Politics, 12(3) August 1950

37. See: Appendix II Organized Labour and the Saskatchewan Labour Force

38. IBID.

CHAPTER III

CCF INCOMES POLICY

In average personal income, wage earners in Saskatchewan during the late nineteen-forties and early nineteen-fifties generally ranked fifth in comparison with the other provinces. The provincial labour force as a whole usually ranked fourth or fifth in the nation, though in good crop years it could rise to first, or just as quickly fall to last place during a crop failure.¹ The CCF's desire to strengthen and diversify the provincial economy rested upon the belief that a planned economy would stabilize agriculture and generate far more wealth, on a more equitable basis, than would capitalism. As manager of the provincial economy the CCF represented a 'public interest' in maintaining and expanding the relative prosperity of farmers, and a variety of farm security measures were passed to protect the 'home quarter' and reduce the rural debt load. Seed and fodder banks were established and supplies were stored in good years to prevent drought from once more ravaging the province. In addition, social services were expanded and socialized medical care extended, and a number of projects were initiated which were designed to bring the amenities of modern life to rural Saskatchewan. Included among CCF plans were: rural electrification,

highway upgrading, farm sewage, and municipal road paving programmes. Moreover, it was hoped that industrialization would simultaneously create a manufacturing outlet for agricultural products and an urban industrial population that would consume those products.²

To finance the programmes of industrialization and social services, the CCF embarked upon the socialization of public utilities and the creation or extension of crown corporations. The objectives of the crown corporations were to create profits, wages and revenues, and surpluses were expected to provide revenues for the treasury, wages for workers, and to finance the extension of desirable but unprofitable services to the public at a low cost.³

The provincial government, however, was faced with constitutional restraints on its fiscal powers and it could not therefore manipulate, control or socialize the major financial institutions. These restrictions of the capitalist economy led the CCF Government to conclude that private enterprise would remain the major investor and that consequently the government would have to adopt capitalistic practices in order to compete.⁴ The profit motive underlay CCF industrial policies as surpluses were appropriated for the creation of the 'welfare state'.

The government and its managerial personnel were primarily concerned with efficiency, productivity, and the financial success of public ownership, in order to create a

viable social democratic 'model' for a Canadian CCF state. They wanted a supportive and compliant labour force that would enable them to produce sufficient profits to finance the expansion of the co-operative commonwealth.

Once the CCF had established the framework of the new industrial relations system, it faced the difficult problem of contract negotiations with its own employees. The CCF's wage policy begins with the League for Social Reconstruction which drafted a vague and contradictory policy that made wage determination dependent upon a combination of collective bargaining and state regulation. The state's interest in wages , the League argued, stemmed from the possibility that union demands could interfere with social services or capital development. The League's general principles of wage determination included the needs of workers; the capacity of industry to pay; and the maintenance of fair wage differentials. The policy was carried into the Regina Manifesto where it had an immense potential for conflict if the CCF were elected because unions would have increased power under a social democratic government.⁵

The Regina Manifesto promised labour a variety of reforms. The expansion of socialized industry and public works projects committed the CCF to increased production and employment. Unemployment and social insurance, together with socialized health services promised to alleviate

workers' insecurity under capitalism and to maintain their standard of living. Improved industrial standards legislation and the progressive reduction in the hours of work were offered along with union recognition and collective bargaining as the means by which labour's standard of living would be raised. Yet, the document also mentioned State regulation of wages, almost in passing, and it included a vague reference to "work councils" and "industrial democracy" as part of labour's "right" to participate in the management of industry.⁶

The CCF Government, in fact, rejected 'profit-sharing' and 'democratization' of factories. They feared unions would continuously take on more power if given the opportunity, and would eventually be in the position to "pressure" the government at a later date. Instead, they desired a "new" role for unions in which they would co-operate with management in building the 'co-operative commonwealth'.⁷

The government's first efforts were directed towards increasing productivity, and incentive systems of wage payments and Labour-Management Production Committees (LMPC) were created. Incentive systems, long associated with the 'speed-up' and other forms of exploitation, were rejected outright by local unions. The government believed the LMPC's could persuade workers to accept their "new role in society" because they were designed to provide management

with a forum to present the government's case for its role in defending the 'public interest' and to inform workers of their own role as consumers.⁸ However, these committees met with union indifference and seldom functioned for long in the few instances in which they were employed.

Unionists, on the other hand, expected the government to "lead the way" in paying better wages and to set an example of "ideal" working conditions and labour relations. This was especially important regarding wages, which was the most "basic need" to be met in satisfying labour's desires for a better standard of living.⁹ Workers who had experienced unemployment, depression pay, and wartime wage restrictions, became frustrated with CCF bargaining and complained that the government was slow to begin negotiations, devoted little time to them, and that its negotiators wore government 'reins' on their authority to bargain.

Government industries were not immune to the effects of inflation and wage demands increased making contract talks lengthy and intense as unions struggled to catch up with the rising cost of living. The CCF were pressed by farmers to control labour, and they responded initially by passing a Public Service Act which infringed upon collective agreements and gave wide powers to the Public Service Commissioner to set wages and working conditions.¹⁰ Despite the labour movement's persistent and detailed opposition to

statutory control over collective bargaining in the civil service, the Act was passed, and it was not until 1951 that the government agreed to amend the Act to give precedence to collective agreements over provisions of the Act. Between the formulation and enactment of the Act in 1945-47, and the 1951 amendments, "what developed was a structure that was quite private enterprise oriented..." which became "securely imbedded" in the thinking of government managers and administrators, and among politicians.¹¹

Confronted by militant wage bargaining in the public service, CCF planners created a three-tiered wage structure for workers in government enterprises. The "Minimum" wage was not to be confused with the legal minimum set by legislation, but would be a wage among the better wages; that is, approximately at the general wage level of the community. The 'first charge' on surpluses would be to raise the Minimum wage to the "Fair" wage, which corresponded to wages at the bottom of the cost of living range. "Good" wages corresponded with wages near the top of the cost of living range and would only be paid where there were sufficient surpluses; that is, only in monopoly industries.

The general wage policy adopted by the CCF was that wages would be comparable to the best paid in a comparable industry. It was stressed, however, that wages had to be consistent with the economic structure of the industry, the

operating position of each enterprise, and the relationship of the enterprise, the industry, and the provincial economy.

The basic wage rate was determined by considering the cost of living, the capacity of the industry to pay, and local wage levels in the industry and community. The CCF tried to match wages with the cost of living, but would not allow wages out of proportion with industry or community levels. Between the Fair and the Good wages workers and the public would share the surplus, with employees receiving a diminishing share as they approached the Good wage. Therefore, workers in monopoly industries would not be allowed to receive a wage greatly in excess of the community or industry levels, and surpluses would go to the public with a small incentive retained for employees.¹²

The government also consistently refused to consider CCL wage demands when they felt conflicted with negotiations elsewhere in the public service, and in negotiating with their own unions on an annual basis, the government used wage settlements with the more timid white-collar public servants as the precedent for a uniform treatment of the demands of the more militant blue-collar workers in the CCL.

In addition, they stuck closely to wage determination in relation to wages paid in private industry, irrespective of whether the wages were good or bad, and in the final analysis wages were related to the community level, which

was generally lower than union rates, and which fluctuated according to the vagaries of the agricultural economy. At the best of times, the wage comparison policy kept unions in Saskatchewan a "whisker"¹³ ahead of other jurisdictions, but in periods of acute inflation when workers' wages lagged far behind the cost of living, or when the agricultural economy stagnated and wages were 'frozen', labour unrest, disputes and strikes resulted.

The CCF's incomes policy was designed to maintain existing differentials within the provincial economy. Wage comparisons within the unionized work force were set in the context of agricultural incomes. As the economy expanded, comparisons allowed for marginal increases relative to the prosperity of farmers. When rural incomes suffered, the CCF argued that workers had to shoulder their share of the burden. The planned economy was designed to distribute proportionate shares of prosperity among the 'producers'. When the agricultural economy slowed and wage 'freezes' were instituted by the government, unions argued that the policy was unfair because it hurt them without benefitting the farmers.

By the end of the CCF's first term in office they had created a new industrial relations framework for Saskatchewan, and had formulated a labour policy for crown corporations. The CCF had deviated from the traditional roles of governments and employers when they encouraged

unionization and welcomed collective bargaining, and they expected labour's gratitude to be shown through voluntary wage restraint. As a self-proclaimed 'model' employer, however, the CCF Government was not always "Simon Pure"¹⁴ in its labour relations, and its declaration of 'solidarity' with workers was contradicted by its 'bottom-line' comparable wage policy. The economic fluctuations of inflation and stagnation created militant union demands and farmer hostility to organized labour, and the adversarial collective bargaining system produced bitterness and suspicion between the government and CCL unions.

1. Government of Saskatchewan, Economic Advisory and Planning Board, The Statistical Yearbook, 1947, p.237

2. Rusch, T.A., op.cit.

3. SAB-TCD, R33.4, III, Economic Advisory and Planning Board (hereafter, EAPB), EAPB Directive #1, Methods of Organizing Government Operated Enterprises, March 1946.

4. IBID., Memorandum, Relationship Between Government and Private Enterprise

5. On the League, See: Horn, M., The League for Social Reconstruction, (Toronto, 1980), Ch.5. It is interesting to note that the LSR also called for a system of 'family allowances' to supplement the expected low wages under the 'co-operative commonwealth'

6. Young, W.D., Anatomy of a Party, (Toronto, 1969), Appendix A, The Regina Manifesto, Articles, 3, 14, 8 and 7.

7. SAB-TCD, EAPB, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Subcommittee on Labour Policy in Government Operated Enterprises, 20 May 1946; and IBID., Minutes of the Sixth Meeting, 10 June 1946

8. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements, Memo, W.K. Bryden to Douglas, 4 October 1945, Re: Incentive Systems of Wage Payment; and IBID., Co-ordination of Labour Policy in Government Plants. The one LMPC that was created in the box factory was strictly limited to a "suggestion scheme" on safety and welfare problems, and grievances and collective bargaining questions were "out of order". IBID., EAPB, Minutes of the Fifth Subcommittee Meeting, 27 May 1946; and Sixth Meeting, 10 June 1946. In fact, the committee had no power to act as the final decisions rested with management, and workers complained that their suggestions were ignored.

9. IBID., Minutes of the Sixth Subcommittee Meeting, 10 June 1946

10. The Public Service Act, 1947, SS 1947, cap.4

11. Taped Interview with H.S. (Hub) Elkin, 18 November 1986

12. The discussion of the wage policy in the three preceding paragraphs is found in: SAB-TCD, EAPB, Labour Reports, Memo, Cadbury, G.W., to Douglas 12 August 1947, attached memo, Relations Between Government Industries and Trade Unions

13. Interview with former executive secretary of the SFL,
W.G. (Bill) Davies, 7 June 1986

14. IBID.

CHAPTER IV

THE SASKATCHEWAN TRADE UNION ACT OF 1944

The CCF were elected at a time when governments in Canada were moving towards state intervention to promote union recognition and collective bargaining. Politicians became aware through the increasing conflict in the wartime economy that legislation establishing a rough equilibrium of forces in the labour-capital conflict was necessary if the 'industrial peace' and economic stability were to be achieved. The CCF viewed the industrial relations balance of power as being heavily weighted in favour of employers, and they promised to redress the imbalance and to replace the conflict of interests under capitalism with a 'co-operative commonwealth' in which the profit motive would be supplanted by harmonious employer-employee relations in a system of 'production for use'.¹

The Saskatchewan CCF went further than other jurisdictions in establishing an industrial relations framework which gave encouragement and protection to union organization as a means to counter the superior employer power in the workplace. In accordance with their election promises, and in addition to trade union and collective bargaining legislation, other labour laws were enacted or amended promising better minimum standards relating to

health and safety, vacations, hours of work, and wages. The CCF government even extended full trade union rights to their own public servants and when it expanded public ownership, the government quickly became the largest industrial employer in the province, with a highly skilled, unionized work force organized by the Canadian Congress of Labour.

The CCF enacted or amended labour legislation to the benefit of organized and unorganized labour, and a Department of Labour was created with a Minister of Labour in charge to oversee the effective functioning of the new industrial relations system. The minimum wage was raised to the highest level in the country; the Workmen's Compensation Act was overhauled to increase benefits and provide for labour representation on the Board; the apprenticeship system was rationalized; and various 'industrial standards' legislation was improved and more vigorously enforced. The government introduced two weeks' paid annual vacations for all provincial workers, though the promised enactment of the forty-hour work week (without a reduction in pay) was delayed pending the expiry of the federal government's emergency wartime powers.

Undoubtedly, the most important legislation passed was the Trade Union Act which granted workers union recognition and collective bargaining rights on terms unsurpassed by other jurisdictions "in the democratic capitalist world."²

It was drafted by Andrew Brewin, an Ontario labour lawyer with connections to both the CCF and CCL, who was engaged by the Douglas government on the advice of David Lewis, national secretary of the CCF. The breadth and scope of the legal right to organize reflected Brewin's background in the turbulent labour relations of industrialized Ontario.

Lewis reminded Douglas of the possible favourable repercussions of 'model' labour legislation on the party's fortunes elsewhere, a view reinforced by C.M. (Charlie) Millard, an executive member of the Congress, and a CCF MPP in Ontario. Douglas himself was generally pro-labour in outlook owing to his personal and family experiences, and he approved of the Act. It was passed by the caucus without dissent or much debate once it became clear that farm labour was exempted.³

The Trade Union Act, 1944, repealed the Freedom of Trade Union Association Act and the Labour Relations Act, which applied the IDIA within the province, and substituted an industrial relations system based on the Wagner Act without provision for compulsory conciliation. The purpose of the Act was to protect adequately employee 'rights' to organize into trade unions of their own choosing free from employer interference, in order to enter into collective bargaining agreements regulating conditions of employment. The basic principle was that employees should be free to choose the form of organization without employer inter-

ference, and this was the 'sieve' through which all organizations were strained to protect bona fide trade unionism.⁴

A seven member Labour Relations Board (LRB) was created with an 'impartial' chairman and equal representation from employees, employers and the public. The Board was empowered to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to certify the appropriate trade union representing the majority of workers.⁵

Once certified, the union became the exclusive representative of the employees and the employer was compelled to deal with it. Collective bargaining was defined so that employers were actually forced to deal with the legitimate representatives of the workers and not merely go through the motions. The Act compelled employers to bargain in 'good faith', to put the terms in writing, to sign the agreement, and to deal with the union in adjusting grievances. Failure to do so constituted an unfair labour practice.

In addition, it was compulsory to include maintenance of membership (union security) and dues 'check off' clauses if so requested by the union. These clauses were written into the Act so there would be no dispute as to wording, and failure on the part of the employer to include those provisions as requested by a union constituted an unfair labour practice. Since union security and the dues check

off were the "universal" request of labour at this time it was a foregone conclusion that these provisions of the Act would be included in all collective agreements in the province.⁶

To ensure the law would be obeyed, LRB orders were to be filed with the courts, which made them enforceable as judgments or orders of the court; and disobedience thus became contempt of court. This method of enforcement was more "flexible and formidable" than police court actions, and was remedial, not simply punitive.⁷ The Board had the additional powers to determine the admissibility of evidence before it, and in court cases, to decide for the court whether or not the Board's orders had been complied with.

A number of forms of employer interference in the formation or administration of bona fide trade unionism were outlawed, including "yellow dog" contracts and industrial espionage. One of the most common forms of employer interference was the ubiquitous 'company union'. Such company-dominated organizations were specifically excluded from the definition of a trade union, and they were subject to 'disestablishment' by the Board as an unfair labour practice. Of course, employers were forbidden to discriminate against union supporters, activists or organizers, and the LRB could order the reinstatement with reimbursement of any employee wrongfully dismissed. As a last resort, the Board could apply to the Cabinet for the

appointment of a controller to take over a business where the Board could demonstrate the employer had "wilfully disregarded" Board orders. This section was used late in 1945 when a particularly intransigent employer refused to abide by the Board's decisions certifying a union in his plant. This action by the government, although it was the only time the section was invoked, was a dramatic demonstration to workers of the the CCF's intentions to see labour's new rights enforced.⁸

Finally, in marked contrast to the fundamental policy of compulsory conciliation and delay embodied in the IDIA and PC 1003, the Trade Union Act created an 'elastic' conciliation procedure. Conciliation was treated very briefly and it was left to the Minister of Labour to make the regulations concerning the details. The cumbersome steps to a conciliation board common to King's system were eliminated, and although formal conciliation boards were easily created, the informal conciliation process was far more active and effective, and relatively few boards were created. With the implementation of the Trade Union Act, Saskatchewan became the only jurisdiction in the country without some form of compulsory conciliation or arbitration.⁹

The Trade Union Act effectively guaranteed workers' freedoms to organize and bargain collectively, and it forced anti-union employers to recognize and deal with unions in

Saskatchewan. Brewin knew the Act would be attacked for its 'bias' because it placed numerous stringent restrictions on employer behavior, while defining only two unfair labour practices by unions. Unions were prohibited from striking while a matter was before the Board, and they were forbidden to use intimidation or force in organizing a bargaining unit. Thus, the Act was designed specifically to protect workers. "Employers do not require protection in their relations with employees, as they have generally held the whip hand.", Brewin told the government, and he was quite certain that unions would not abuse their position because they would be well aware that it might invite a 'public opinion' in favour of the withdrawal of the protection afforded them by the Act. Therefore, he concluded, unions would need no other incentive to act responsibly.¹⁰

The powers of the Labour Relations Board became the focus of employer opposition to the Trade Union Act. Despite the stringent measures in the Act designed to thwart employer resistance to unionization, and despite Section 15 which denied appeals of Board orders, the courts made it quite clear that they would review Board decisions. For the Labour Relations Board, the threat of court interference meant they would administer the new rules in a cautious manner regarding legal technicalities. This led to delays in the certification process which upset union organizers, but for Board Chairman W.K. (Ken) Bryden, the delays were

necessary if they were to prevent an endless series of court actions launched by employers. "The Trade Union Act has from the start been viciously opposed by the vested interests", Bryden wrote CCL president A.R. (Aaron) Mosher, "...Moreover, the Courts, as you know, are traditionally on the side of the vested interests, and in Saskatchewan we have an exceptionally biassed and ignorant gang of Judges who are bitterly opposed to the Labour Relations Board." Bryden assured Mosher that the government was prepared to test the Act in the courts, and amend it where necessary. Most court cases involved employer attacks on Board powers relating to unfair labour practices, but despite the opposition of the provincial judiciary, superior courts upheld the powers of the Board, and while appeals of Board decisions were allowed, the substance of the Act was not altered.¹¹

The initial flurry of legislative reform created a new industrial relations framework which greatly increased the power and significance of the provincial industrial union movement. The labour movement responded to the guarantees of the Act with an unprecedented organizing drive, and unionized workers increased from sixteen per cent in 1946 to over twenty-five per cent of the non-agricultural workforce ten years later. Union membership grew dramatically from approximately 11,000 in 1944 to over 42,000 by 1956, with the bulk of organizing taking place during the CCF's first

term in office. From 1944 to 1948, the TLC doubled in size and the CCL grew by over 150 per cent, and although organizational gains slowed after 1948, union membership continued to rise throughout this period.¹²

Representing over one-half the total union membership in Saskatchewan, the TLC continued to be the largest union organization in the province, but the CCL grew rapidly from less than 4000 members in 1944 to nearly 15,000 by 1956. Owing to the CCF's policies of public ownership, which made them the largest industrial employer, government employees constituted roughly one-quarter of all unionized workers in the province. Concentrated in the blue-collar crown corporations, the CCL came to represent about one-half of the provincial public service, and government workers represented approximately forty per cent of their total membership.¹³ Although they represented but one-third of organized labour in the province, the CCL were far more militant than the TLC, and they were involved in forty of the 81 strikes that occurred between 1944 and 1956.¹⁴

Aggressive bargaining by CCL organizers won them few friends in the CCF, and the government became obdurate when facing the militant actions of the unions' chief negotiator, C.G. (Cy) Palmer, CCL Regional Director of Organization in Saskatchewan. A hard-nosed trade unionist and a skilled negotiator, Palmer was a somewhat enigmatic union organizer who was respected by his colleagues and rank-and-file

unionists. To the government, however, Palmer was as disruptive of CCF-CCL relations as the Minister of Labour, C.C. (Charlie) Williams proved to be in the Department of Labour, and like Williams, he was often at the centre of conflict.¹⁵

The industrial union movement had continuous access to the government through direct and indirect means at the local and national levels, and they approached the government annually with briefs on the need for legislative change, or to prevent unwanted changes.¹⁶ Through the Deputy Minister of Labour or the Premier, but not through the Minister of Labour, whose antipathy to the CCL was well-known, they could attempt to influence events surrounding legislation, or disputes and strikes in crown corporations. In addition, through the national leadership of the CCL which had close relations with both the national and provincial CCF, the unions could likewise attempt to resolve legislative or industrial relations conflict. When these avenues of influence proved unproductive, unions tried to influence the provincial party through their direct involvement in it. That they were not more successful within the party was owing partly to labour relations tensions, and partly to personal conflict with the Minister of Labour.

Undoubtedly the Trade Union Act benefitted workers in the province and it was one of the major reasons behind the

continued political support shown the CCF by provincial unionists. The labour movement, however, did not receive all the other favourable legislation promised by the CCF, and one of their highest priorities (and a CCF campaign promise), the forty hour work week, was consistently denied by the government owing to party opposition to it. Following the initial reforms, the two sides remained far apart on legislative matters, and the "hiatus" in labour reform frustrated unionists.¹⁷ In fact, further CCF initiatives on labour reform consisted of threats to introduce compulsory arbitration and to weaken 'union security'. These threats resulted from the central problem facing the government as an employer - wages. Moreover, conflict between CCL representatives and the Minister of Labour cast a shadow over CCL-CCF relations in the province. In fact, before the Trade Union Act was introduced into the Legislature, the CCL clashed with Williams over his appointment and the organization of the civil service. Thus, prior to the implementation of the Trade Union Act, CCL-CCF relations were strained by personal conflict with the Minister of Labour.

1. British Columbia and Ontario passed collective bargaining legislation in 1943 which included compulsory conciliation and a weaker version of the Wagner Act, See: Woods, H.D., Labour Policy in Canada, Ch. III. On the subsequent development of the free collective bargaining system, See: Panitch, L., and Swartz, D., From Consent to Coercion, (Toronto, 1985). For the CCF, See: Young, W.D., Anatomy of a Party, Appendix A, The Regina Manifesto

2. Lipset, S.M., Agrarian Socialism, (Berkeley, 1950), p. 279

3. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements, Lewis to Douglas, 19 July 1944; Brewin to Douglas, 20 September 1944. Millard was anxious to use the legislation at the upcoming national conventions of the TLC and CCL to drum up support for the party. On Tommy Douglas' background and sympathy for labour, See: Shackleton, D.F., Tommy Douglas, (Toronto, 1975), chapters 1-5; and Thomas, L.H., The Making of a Socialist, (Edmonton, 1982), chapters 1-3.

4. The Trade Union Act, 1944, SS 1944, Second Session, Section 3

5. A union could apply for a certification vote by secret ballot if it could demonstrate twenty-five per cent or more support amongst the workers. This requirement prevented employers from playing upon the fears of employees to show open adherence to a union. It also prevented frivolous requests for certification votes as the union had to demonstrate that some real organizational efforts had been made. Under the Act, the majority of employees eligible to vote constituted a quorum, and the majority of those voting would determine the issue.

6. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements, Memorandum on Proposed Labour Legislation, F.A. Brewin, 10 August 1944. Under the maintenance of membership clause, employees not members of the union at the time of the agreement were not forced to join the union, but new employees had to sign up within thirty days. Union security as a condition of employment strengthened the unions by preventing continual employer opposition even after the union had been certified and collective bargaining had taken place. The dues 'check off' freed union officials from the mundane and often difficult task of dues collection, and allowed them to concentrate on bargaining, grievances and organization. There are four main types of union security agreements: the "closed shop", in which employees must be union members to be hired; the "union shop", in which employees are given 30 days to become union members and must thereafter maintain

their membership; the "maintenance of membership", in which union members at the time of the agreement must maintain their membership; and the "agency shop", in which there is no requirement to join the union, but all employees covered by the agreement must pay dues to the union. The Saskatchewan Trade Union Act provision for union security was a compromise between the 'union shop' and 'maintenance of membership'.

7. IBID.

8. The Trade Union Act, 1944, SS 1944, Section 12

9. Woods, H.D., op.cit., Ch.VI

10. Brewin, Memorandum on Proposed Labour Legislation, op.cit.

11. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Legislation, Bryden to Mosher, 4 October 1945. Private employers were opposed to all the legislative initiatives of the CCF in labour matters, including changes to the minimum wage, workmens' compensation, and hours of work laws. Employers favoured PC 1003 and repeatedly demanded that the Trade Union Act be brought in line with it. Throughout this period, employers called for compulsory certification votes, compulsory strike votes and compulsory conciliation. See: IBID., for employer reactions to the Act.

Aaron Mosher (1881-1959) led the largest union of transport workers in the country, the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees (CBRE) from its founding in 1908 until 1952. An exponent of labour nationalism, he helped create the All-Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL) in 1927, and served as its president until the ACCL merged with the Canadian branches of Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) unions in 1940, whereupon he became the first, and only, president of the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL-CIO). Mosher was also a founding member of the CCF in 1932, but the uproar in the TLC-dominated Canadian labour movement caused by his relationship with the new party forced him to relinquish his executive position in the CCF. He nevertheless represented a powerful pro-CCF leader within the the Congress, and was an important figure in the emerging CCF-CCL relations in Saskatchewan.

12. See: Appendix I Trade Union Membership in Saskatchewan, and Appendix II Organized Labour and the Saskatchewan Workforce

13. These figures are estimates based upon provincial Department of Labour Reports, and are intended only to give a rough idea of the distribution of CCL workers in government employment.

14. See: Appendix IV Strikes in Saskatchewan

15. For more on Williams, See: next chapter

16. For the CCL's annual briefs to the government (in which the 40 hour week was a constant priority), See: SAB-Saskatchewan Federation of Labour Records (hereafter, SAB-SFL), Legislative Submissions

17. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986

CHAPTER V
THE TONE IS SET
1944-1948

Relations between the CCF government and the CCL in Saskatchewan began on an ignominious note. Clashes between the Minister of Labour and the industrial unionists left the CCL without much influence within the new Department of Labour, and cost them the opportunity to capture the civil servants as a bargaining unit and thereby challenge the TLC for supremacy within the provincial labour movement. Relations were somewhat strained after this initial confrontation and mutual suspicions prevailed. Once granted the power to protect themselves, the unions in government industries were not averse to using their strength against the government in its role as an employer. Tough government bargaining meant that contract negotiations were long and drawn out affairs, with each side blaming the other for the frustrating delays in settlement.

Militant industrial unionism alienated the CCF's rural electorate who began to view the CCL as greedy and ungrateful, and they pressed the government to control labour. Caught between the conflicting demands of farmers and labour, the government approached Congress for an

understanding on wages and other industrial relations problems.¹ They desired to make their socialism work and they wanted unions to be more sympathetic to their economic problems. The CCF convinced the Congress to agree to a broad outline of a wage policy, but this agreement at the top was not reflected at the bottom where the adversarial collective bargaining system had estranged unions from their employer. Outside assistance was necessary to settle some disputes, and David Lewis and Pat Conroy were often instrumental in achieving agreements. Negotiations became increasingly tense, but attention was diverted by the 1948 election, and collective bargaining problems were delayed until after the campaign.

As Saskatchewan's first Minister of Labour Charlie Williams was involved in the passage of much labour legislation beneficial to provincial workers. The CCF granted a number of reforms but as a former railwayman Williams was most proud of improvements to the Workmens' Compensation laws. On the other hand, his involvement with the Trade Union Act apart from guiding it through the Legislature was negligible, and like many rural Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA's) he may not have understood it.²

Despite the flurry of reforms, Williams was at best a 'passive' labour minister who did not press labour's concerns in Cabinet, and he in fact twice sponsored

compulsory arbitration legislation for unions in public utilities.³ He had difficulty explaining matters in caucus, while in the Legislature he was often easily "harpooned" by the opposition.⁴ Essentially, Williams was prepared to accept the status quo and wanted things in his department to run "quietly and low key", and he apparently did not press for the enforcement of labour laws passed by the government.⁵

The appointment of C.C. (Charlie) Williams as Minister of Labour angered CCL trade unionists in Saskatchewan. Local CCL representatives questioned Williams' ability and opposed him because he was not 'left' enough.⁶ Unfortunately, Premier Douglas had few choices in his caucus for the new ministerial post. Of the forty-seven CCF MLA's, only six men had labour backgrounds, and few had Williams' experience in politics.⁷ He had been a popular mayor of Regina before his election to the Legislature, and had enjoyed considerable support from businessmen who regarded him as an unlikely "threat" to their interests.⁸ At the time of his election, he knew little of the legislative needs of labour, and basically, "was not a radical person."⁹ His pro-labour views, if indeed he had any, favoured the conservative craft unions, and he was suspicious of the militant CCL.

H.S. (Hub) Elkin, one of the leading CCL organizers in the province, complained that Williams' had not been, "near

a union since the last war", and in any event, as a train dispatcher had been closer to management than labour.¹⁰ Williams' pro-AFL-TLC views were known, or at least suspected, by the industrial unionists, which caused them some concern. "It appears", he wrote, "that this man is one of those amiable well-met fellows who doesn't know or do anything, [and] never offends anyone if he can avoid it."¹¹

The appointment of J.H. (Harry) Williams (no relation) as Deputy Minister of Labour only increased their alarm. He had served as Minimum Wage Inspector in the old Bureau of Labour under the former Liberal administration, and had performed, "the government's dirty work" in preventing the CCL from organizing in the province in the late 1930's and early 1940's.¹² The appointments dismayed local CCL unionists who had expected to be rewarded for their political support during the election. In neither case was the labour movement consulted and CCL representatives became bitter when Douglas "sluffed" their complaint onto the advisory committee.¹³

Other ministers shared Williams' distaste for the CCL, and there were rumours they were encouraging the TLC because they feared the more militant industrial unions. Faced with the Williams 'twins', the CCL's initial enthusiasm over the election of a pro-labour government was dampened considerably. Rather than exulting in the CCF's victory, Elkin concluded, "The situation is certainly not good

locally."¹⁴

Angered by the appointments, CCL representatives in the province persuaded Elkin to lead a delegation of industrial unionists to meet with the Premier and Minister of Labour. They launched into a thinly veiled attack on Williams by suggesting a labour minister should have "ability" and "integrity", as well as the support and "confidence" of labour.¹⁵ When Williams enquired whether this meant they did not want him as the Minister, Elkin hesitated, but agreed, adding that Dempster Heming was a more suitable replacement.¹⁶ This meeting, of course, did not produce a ministerial change, but it antagonized Douglas and undoubtedly fed Williams' prejudice against the CCL. The Premier was alarmed at the labour situation, and feared the communists were attempting to drive a "wedge" between the government and the trade union movement.¹⁷

The appointments of the Williams 'twins' disappointed the CCL organizers in Saskatchewan, but in Ottawa, the election of the CCF and the promise of favourable trade union legislation excited the imagination of Congress. National CCL secretary-treasurer, Pat Conroy, had met with Douglas early in July, 1944, and had returned to Ottawa with the impression that the government would actively support their organizing drive within the civil service.¹⁸ To oversee their drive, and to assist in the formation of a provincial federation of industrial unions, Conroy sent Alex

McAuslane, a former coal-miner, and Congress first vice-president in charge of organization.¹⁹ His style and tactics bore the marks of his years in the turbulent coal-fields of western Canada, and his abrasiveness quickly earned him a position as persona non grata with the CCF. He was perhaps an unfortunate choice to be sent to the one area where the most was expected, and he was an unlikely candidate to approach the timid civil servants for unionization.²⁰

When McAuslane arrived in Regina in early August, 1944, armed with the belief that the CCF would actively support the CCL's organizing drive within the civil service, he was puzzled to discover that Williams declared the government neutral on the issue of the unionization of their workers. The CCL had not been neutral politically, and he expected the same treatment from the CCF. Moreover, the Minister of Labour had shocked McAuslane by advising him to direct the CCL's organizing drive away from the civil servants; "which was not a wise thing to have said."²¹

McAuslane had clearly not expected the government to react in this way, and he denounced Williams and warned organizers to beware of the minister and the government. At a conference called to lay the groundwork for a provincial labour federation, McAuslane let it be known where they stood, "Our programme and position in this respect should be made clear to Premier Douglas and the Cabinet, that we in

the CCL that [have] designated ...the CCF as the political arm of labour, should have representation in the Department of Labour."²² He then led another delegation to the government, and again Williams' resignation was demanded, this time much more forcefully. "Nothing could have been better calculated to make future bad relations between the Minister and the CCL ...", lamented Douglas.²³

By instructing the CCL to steer clear of the civil servants, Williams had reacted as a private employer might have, and displayed remarkable insensitivity to the political relationship of the party and industrial unionism. Apparently excluded from the important positions in the Department of Labour, and disillusioned by the fact that they had not even been consulted on the controversial appointments, the CCL eyed the government with some suspicion.

Douglas arranged for Williams to meet Congress officials in Ottawa in late August in an attempt to reach an understanding. Aware of his minister's anti-CCL views, he contacted David Lewis, national secretary of the CCF, and asked him to meet beforehand with Pat Conroy, "and put him straight on a few things."²⁴ Douglas was angry because the CCL were in a minority position in the labour movement, and few of their unions had affiliated with the party. Their attack on the minister did not help their cause, and made it difficult for him to aid Congress. Moreover, McAuslane

alienated the Premier by his continual reference to the deputy minister as a 'labour rat', and Douglas hoped to have him replaced because he was, "to say the least, tactless and offensive."²⁵

Douglas was not intimidated by McAuslane's tactics, nor was he concerned that McAuslane's hostility would harm the political welfare of the government. "We have a solid basis of support whatever the CCL does ... ", he wrote Lewis.²⁶ If the CCL wanted a "showdown", declared Douglas, they could have it; "with the communists running the show and McAuslane charging about like a bull in a china shop the CCL is well on its way to committing hari kari in Saskatchewan."²⁷ Lewis readily agreed to the Premier's request and also accompanied Williams to the meeting. However, he informed Douglas that while there were communists working for the CCL in Saskatchewan, they were hardly running the show, and that most of the complaints emanated from the CCF's own supporters in the labour movement.²⁸

Lewis sympathized with the Congress, he told Douglas, because the ministers' remarks were, "a very common refrain which union organizers hear sung frequently."²⁹ The resentment in this case was even stronger because it was the 'designated arm of labour' that was singing the tune, and Lewis was not especially sanguine when he viewed the probable future of labour relations in Saskatchewan. Williams had bluntly informed him that he favoured the AFL;

"I would strongly gather that he shows that partiality and that he has given grounds for the CCL people to sense it.", he told Douglas, "In other words his actions and tone ... have contradicted his formal declaration of neutrality." This was bound to lead to conflict, and without the proper (i.e., CCL) support in the Department of Labour the government was likely to have considerable problems in the future. Lewis placed the problem squarely on the shoulders of Charlie Williams, "...I have seldom met a man", he wrote, "less adequately equipped for an important job such as he has. ... I really don't think he has as yet a conception of what the CCF approach to the labor programme is." He emphasized to the Premier that the "tone and attitude" shown to labour organizers, and the government's political commitment to assist in organizing, were in practice, "even more important than the best legislation." The Minister's mistakes, he warned, were "darn hard to overcome and outlive."³⁰

The Congress was not about to complain too vociferously as it was anxious to use the promised trade union legislation during the upcoming national conventions of the CCL and TLC, and Lewis convinced them that the government had to be neutral regarding the unionization of their workers. Congress refused to replace McAuslane but they were not totally pleased with his tactics, and he was ordered to apologize to the Premier.³¹ Their organizers

were ordered not to criticize the government before it had enacted its labour and social programmes; and instructions to adopt a more "businesslike" approach included a warning not to expect the CCF to be partial to them. "The government cannot do our work of organizing", Conroy declared, "they can only provide what we believe to be fit and proper mediums to enable us to do a good job. The government cannot, and must not, be held responsible for work which we in our Congress can do."³²

Mutual suspicions remained and relations were strained by this early conflict.³³ Owing to the mediation of David Lewis, however, the initial controversies were settled, and as the summer turned to fall, the Congress still expected to capture the civil service. The addition of thousands of government workers would mean the CCL could rival the TLC in numbers in the province, a prospect that was naturally exciting for the newer and smaller Congress. Yet the tone was set for future relations between the Congress locals and Charlie Williams, and despite the agreement in Ottawa, relations continued to deteriorate in Saskatchewan.

The organization of the civil service took place in an "atmosphere of great acrimony".³⁴ The Saskatchewan Government Services Association (SGSA) represented the largest bloc of potential unionists in the province and the TLC and CCL competed vigorously for this "prize".³⁵ The SGSA was not a bargaining agency, but a fraternal

organization, and many civil servants were somewhat "perturbed" at having to make a decision to join a union.³⁶ They viewed themselves as white-collar semi-professionals, and were unlikely to be sympathetic to unionism, especially the militant, industrial, blue-collar variety. The CCL, furthermore, were closely and publicly associated with the radical political party that was now their employer.

Government encouragement to the TLC and McAuslane's tactics combined to prevent the CCL seizing the opportunity to certify the civil service as a bargaining unit. McAuslane's first act was to "declare open war" on the Saskatchewan Government Services Association (SGSA) executive, which he attacked as undemocratic.³⁷ When the SGSA called a meeting for the evening of August 31, 1944, to discuss unionization, McAuslane organized his own meeting for the same evening at the same time. In promoting the CCL sponsored meeting, he again attacked the SGSA as undemocratic, and denounced it for not being a bona fide employee organization.

While McAuslane was waving the "big stick", the TLC was offering "friendly assistance" to the SGSA in "warding off the attacks" of the CCL.³⁸ Carl Berg, TLC organizer for western Canada, pledged not to interfere with members' religious or political beliefs, promised lower dues, and vowed not to alter the structure of the SGSA if it affiliated. Berg made "considerable capital" out of the

CCL's political position, and contrasted the TLC's patriotism with the subversive wartime "industrial strife" caused by the CCL.³⁹

The TLC position contrasted with that of McAuslane, who had not performed any organizational work, but who instead attacked the SGSA openly and vigorously, prompting the civil servants to seek, "a safe hiding place from the storm."⁴⁰ Civil servants who knew little about unionism and less about the CCL were easily intimidated by McAuslane's tactics and readily accepted the TLC's message. Under pressure to make a decision, the SGSA altered its constitution to include collective bargaining as one of its goals, and was accepted by the TLC. McAuslane's tactics backfired on the CCL and played into the hands of its rival. Not easily discouraged, he still believed they could win a certification vote and he encouraged the CCL representatives to continue their tireless organizational efforts.

One of the first things McAuslane had done when he arrived in the province was to appoint C.G.(Cy) Palmer as the CCL's Regional Director for Organization for Saskatchewan. Palmer was a newcomer to the CCL and his appointment, "alarmed, disturbed and annoyed" the other CCL representatives. He was an acerbic negotiator, and politically somewhat of a syndicalist, and he did not believe unions should be "beholden" to any political party.⁴¹ However, he was an able organizer and despite

government opposition, successfully organized the telephone workers and the provincial mental hospitals, though these victories did not come easily.

At the North Battleford mental hospital, for example, the local liaison provided to the CCL by Douglas refused to compromise his position by supporting their organizing drive. His instructions from Charlie Williams via the local MLA, Alex Connon, were to aid the TLC-AFL. "There are a number of other instances of double-dealing on the part of the Minister of Labour.", complained McAuslane, "...it is quite obvious that his press statements of neutrality and his continual condemnation of our organization as communistic, have only been a smoke screen to cover up his association with the A.F. of L."⁴² Palmer was nonetheless confident they would overcome the government's opposition, and succeed despite difficulties in organizing the civil service, which was, Palmer alleged, dominated by "Liberal heelers".⁴³ Open sympathy for a union opposed by the Liberal Party was impossible because workers had no guarantee the CCF would be in power forever, "and the Liberal Party is likely to retain a good memory!"⁴⁴ Yet, like McAuslane, Palmer believed workers would support the CCL in a secret ballot, and his success in organizing some government workers appeared to be a harbinger of greater things to come. Palmer approached the Premier asking for recognition of his locals, but Douglas politely refused

until the trade union bill had been passed.

By the opening of the Tenth Legislature, relations appeared calm, but this was owing more to distractions than to any positive improvements. The government was busily engaged in preparations for the upcoming session, while the labour movement was preoccupied with organizing the unorganized. Underneath the calm, the effects of the initial "clash of personalities" still simmered.⁴⁵ Government discrimination in favour of the TLC alienated the CCL unionists further, and the lack of a man on the inside of the Department of Labour increased their sense of isolation.

By December, Palmer had become worried over their lack of further success among the bulk of the civil servants, and he again approached the government hoping to secure recognition for his locals. He hoped they could gain an edge on the TLC by negotiating good contracts, which would demonstrate the superiority of the CCL and convince the reluctant civil servants to join. However, Acting Premier Clarence Fines refused until the Labour Relations Board (LRB) had been created and had determined the bargaining units.

Nevertheless, in early 1945, before the Board had decided the issue of bargaining units, Fines granted the Saskatchewan Civil Service Association (SCSA), as it was now known, the dues "check-off". Granting de facto recognition

before the Labour Relations Board had dealt with the matter was a flagrant violation of the government's declared neutrality. Coming as it did before a federal election, Congress viewed it as "political dynamite". Eamon Park, Director of the CCL's Political Action Committee (PAC), admonished Lewis, "We can't afford to have anyone pointing the finger at the only CCF Government in the country."⁴⁶

Fines' decision enraged the CCL and further embittered them to the government, and renewed calls were made for a man "on the inside" to counter the weight of the TLC within the Department of Labour.⁴⁷ Extremely disappointed with the government, the CCL was resigned to losing the SCSA. McAuslane was undeterred, however, and maintained they could win a certification vote, despite repeated warnings from the CCL representatives on the LRB that all they could count upon were Palmer's modest successes. Stubbornly, McAuslane pressed for a single vote in which the SCSA would be excluded, yet this was exactly what the TLC desired because in a straight two-union vote they would have "snowed under" the CCL.⁴⁸

On the strength of the TLC's submission which demonstrated eighty per cent support from the workers, the Labour Relations Board certified the SCSA-TLC without a vote.⁴⁹ McAuslane's tactics alienated the timid civil servants who affiliated with the TLC, which claimed a 'proper' and 'distant' relationship with the CCF government,

and the vote was a serious blow to the provincial CCL as it ensured the organizational dominance of the TLC in Saskatchewan. McAuslane was furious at the outcome of the vote and Palmer's locals appealed to the Premier, whose intervention, in camera and in public before the Board, resulted in a separate vote for the CCL locals, which won certification. Thus, while Cabinet support for the TLC was also a factor in the TLC's successful bid to 'capture' the civil service, without the support of the Premier the entire group would have gone to the TLC.⁵⁰

Following on the heels of the appointments controversy, the civil service 'fiasco' further estranged the CCL from the government. Without support in the Department of Labour, and with the loss of the civil servants, the CCL appeared in 1945 to be isolated from the government, and they were deeply suspicious of Williams and Fines.

The civil service problem was just one of the many applications that swamped the Labour Relations Board in its initial years. The protection afforded unionism by the Trade Union Act "astounded" the labour movement, and the deluge of certification applications created a backlog.⁵¹ Denied the fruits of their political alliance, the CCL organized in earnest within the government industries that were created or extended by the CCF during their first term in office. By 1948, they had successfully organized workers in Government Telephones and the provincial mental

hospitals; in the brick, leather, wool, box, and sodium sulphate factories; and in the Timber Board, Government Airways, the Insurance Office and the Power Commission.

The CCL unions organized in the crown corporations were directly-chartered locals of the Congress. As such, they were less independent of the Congress leadership than were locals of the major international unions affiliated to the central Congress. Thus, negotiations between the directly-chartered unions in the crown corporations and the government were by the CCL's Regional Director for Organization, Cy Palmer.

Once unions had squeezed through the bottleneck at the LRB, they were faced with a government reluctant to grant wage increases. A number of disputes occurred and increasingly strike threats were heard in negotiations, though only one wage strike actually took place. In the socialized industries, wage strikes were prevented through conciliation and the outside mediation of David Lewis, and especially through the direct intervention of Pat Conroy.

Lengthy negotiations irritated the new unions, and there were grumblings in 1945 that stalled talks were the fault of government officials who appeared to be more powerful and who were successfully blocking progress.⁵² Another irritating situation occurred in the government-owned boot and shoe factory where a "reactionary" plant superintendent attempted to stall certification

procedure by circulating an anti-union petition and threatening to close the plant rather than see it unionized.⁵³ The LRB rectified the situation, and although it was a minor incident, it did not improve the government's image with the CCL. The bottleneck in the LRB, bureaucratic interference, and hard bargaining by the CCF frustrated the unions, and did not dispel the friction between the government and its newly organized industrial workers.

Despite the early problems, the government was quite pleased with its labour relations. W.K.(Ken) Bryden, the new Deputy Minister of Labour and Chairman of the Labour Relations Board, boasted enthusiastically that their union contracts were, "the very best, in the whole of Canada."⁵⁴ The unions did not view their contracts in the same light and the 1946 negotiations were more difficult to settle than the previous year. Tensions increased and each side blamed the other for obstructing settlements.

During the CCF's first term in office, the provincial economy passed through a two year slump owing to a decline in agricultural income.⁵⁵ The situation improved after 1946, and unemployment decreased as the farm economy recovered.⁵⁶ Under wartime controls wages had been exempted from collective bargaining, and the awarding of cost of living bonuses left most workers at or near depression wages.⁵⁷

Wartime wage controls were carried over to the end of

1946, and labour's income had risen, if only slightly, after 1944 as workers in government industries were forced to accept modest cost-of-living bonuses. This nevertheless antagonized farmers, who had seen their income drop, and the government soon felt the stings of complaints from their rural constituency. Douglas was unhappy that the unions appeared ungrateful for their labour legislation, "The Government of Saskatchewan has gone a great deal further than public sentiment in this province would warrant in pushing the organization of its own employees.", he told Conroy, "We have signed agreements ... for which we have received a good deal of criticism because it is considered in some quarters that the terms ... have been altogether too generous."⁵⁸ The long and frustrating negotiations left the unions disenchanted also, and Conroy warned Douglas of the "smouldering discontent" among government workers.⁵⁹

Adding to friction in CCF-CCL relations was the question of the forty hour week, promised by the CCF in 1944, but not implemented despite the repeated demands of both the CCL and TLC. The party had in fact endorsed the forty hour work week (without a reduction in pay) at its 1945 provincial convention, but it was rejected by the caucus during the 1946 session of the Legislature, owing to farmer and employer opposition. The labour movement became quite frustrated and disappointed with the government for its refusal to honour the 'promise'.

Inflation exacerbated wage negotiations in 1947 and a confidential government report on the hours issue recommended approval as it was believed that a reduced work week could be substituted for wage demands, with a substantial savings on labour costs in the long run. It was also argued that the government could escape political embarrassment for its refusal to act on the issue, but the caucus was not convinced, and the forty hour week was again rejected.

Pressed by its rural supporters to control labour, the CCF began an attempt to control wage negotiations in the public service. The government's draft Public Service Act threatened to take wages, seniority and other contractual items out of the realm of collective bargaining. The Act met with considerable CCL and TLC opposition owing to its infringement on collective bargaining, and the wide-ranging and arbitrary powers granted to the Public Service Commissioner regarding the setting of wages and working conditions. The labour movement was given short notice of the government's intention to pass the Act, and it appeared to unionists that the CCF wished to rush through the legislation to prevent their opposition to it. The CCF also brought in wage 'experts' to formulate a wage classification system, which was anathema to trade unions. Had the situation arisen in private industry, Conroy told the Premier, "a work stoppage would have ensued some time

ago."⁶⁰ This attempt to regulate negotiations threatened traditional collective bargaining practices and antagonized the unions. Congress was quite annoyed and Conroy wished the CCF would act as an employer and not as the government and settle wage classifications through negotiations.⁶¹

Once they had established their classification system, the government placed SCSA negotiations ahead of those with the CCL, and had then insisted on "uniformity of treatment".⁶² This only served to strengthen the CCL's resolve to struggle more intensely for better contracts, and it was not long before they decided to learn from their mistakes and attempt another assault on the SCSA. Hoping to build upon a rumoured split in the Association, Conroy instructed Palmer to lay solid organizational groundwork, "so that we may lift the organization bodily into the Congress at the appropriate time."⁶³ Conroy knew the government would not like their approach, but the SCSA "guise" as a trade union was a distinct "menace" to CCL unions because of its low standards.⁶⁴

From 1944 to 1946, inflation had risen only 7.5 per cent under federal price controls. When price controls were lifted and wages restored to collective bargaining, inflation jumped to fifteen per cent in 1947 alone.⁶⁵ For the labour movement, inflation wiped out whatever hopes they had entertained about the post-war recovery, and the result was a strike wave. Government unions were not exempt from

the pressures of inflation and negotiations became increasingly difficult to settle in 1947. Pressed by its rural supporters to control labour, they approached Congress unions through the SFL for an understanding. The government was concerned with the financial performance of the crown companies, distressed by their frustrating labour relations, and unhappy the CCL were not more sympathetic. "We have done so much for labour; we think labour should do more for us."⁶⁶

The government had expected CCL support on labour relations, but instead received opposition. Union organizers tended to treat the government as they would "the most recalcitrant employer" and they were upset that the unions would not make concessions based on the government's general pro-labour position.⁶⁷ The CCF asked the unions to agree to apply "planning" to their relations in an effort to improve negotiations, and they hoped regular discussions would provide a basis for future contract talks in which uniform agreements would make for more co-operation. Essentially the CCF desired to change the adversarial system of bargaining to a new "pattern" which would be more sympathetic to their position.⁶⁸ In essence, it was an attempt at a 'social contract' on wages, and the government expected union support.

The SFL declined the government's initiative because such policy matters were the concern of Congress and the

individual unions involved.⁶⁹ With inflation making negotiations even more difficult, the CCF anxiously approached the Congress for an understanding on labour relations in government industries. Mosher, who was more sympathetic to the CCF than Conroy, urged the secretary-treasurer to travel to Regina to lay the groundwork. In Conroy's view, their unions were merely pursuing the same function as unions throughout the country. "In fact," he wrote SFL executive secretary Bill Davies, "I think it is important that the government be made to understand that the first function of our representatives is to represent the workers."⁷⁰

On June 5, 1947, Conroy arrived in Regina ostensibly on a routine trip into the field. He intended to establish a better liaison with the government as he was a "firm believer" in personal contacts.⁷¹ The next day, as was the "custom", he paid his respects to the government while "passing through" the provincial capital.⁷² At the meeting, he raised the issue of 'poor' wages and also commented unfavourably on the CCF's "employer" attitude, but the two sides agreed to establish a permanent joint committee on labour-management relations in the five competitive government plants.⁷³

The two sides agreed that the first effort was to "streamline negotiations" by drafting a Master Agreement for general terms to be applied in all five contracts.⁷⁴ In

return for Congress agreement, the CCF "committed" itself to the highest wages possible, and agreed to the elimination of wage ranges.⁷⁵ However, the CCF warned improvements in the basic rate could only be achieved in stages. The government stated that wages would be consistent with the cost of living, but this was qualified by the economic peculiarities of each plant, and the relationship of the plant to the industry and to the provincial economy as a whole. The government insisted strongly that their capacity to pay and local wage levels be considered paramount.⁷⁶

Conroy returned to Ottawa believing the discussion had "cleared the air" and he was confident that regular discussions would develop into a "genuine working partnership", and that plans for a Master Agreement would improve negotiations.⁷⁷ The government's Chief Executive Officer in charge of the crown corporations, George Cadbury, was not pleased with the outcome of the June meeting, however. He had expected more sympathy from Congress, but was instead confronted with Conroy's defence of the unions and his comments on the CCF's 'poor' employer attitudes. Don Black, of the Industrial Development Office, visited Conroy in Ottawa to convey Cadbury's extreme dissatisfaction. Conroy countered Black's complaints about Congress representatives with "a few choice observations" on government personnel, after which Black became "apologetic" and asked for Congress help in resolving negotiation

difficulties.⁷⁸ The exchange worried Conroy; "something has gone wrong somewhere", he told Palmer.⁷⁹

The CCF expected sympathy from unions in contract talks simply because the government was generally pro-labour and Cadbury was disappointed that Congress had not renounced its adversarial collective bargaining policy and become more accommodating to the government's position. The CCF's industrial relations system, however, was based on adversarial bargaining, and Cadbury's capitalistic premises for the operation of the crown corporations precluded an easy settlement of their differences. Cadbury had set his expectations too high, considering the opposing interests of unions and management, the suspicions held by the unions about the government's policies, and wage conflict in negotiations which had increased tensions between the two parties.

Cadbury should have been as optimistic as Conroy because the creation of the joint committee showed the unions' willingness to begin co-operation on labour matters. The SFL believed Cadbury to be "prematurely pessimistic" owing to his lack of knowledge on labour relations. "It is no use for Mr. Cadbury to be disappointed because matters have not resolved themselves in a twinkling of an eye.", Davies wrote Conroy.⁸⁰

Before the joint committee could meet again, problems arose in two government plants, and relations took a

downward turn. Competition from large eastern capitalists, outdated machinery, 'poor' marketing and business resistance, plagued the government's attempts to diversify the economy and manufacture provincial resources. As the CCF sought to prove the success of their socialist experiments in industry, their labour policies became a barrier to improved industrial relations. The government's bargaining tactics and resistance to wage increases conflicted with their call for union 'solidarity' and exacerbated tensions in their relations with the CCL.

For the local unions, the June meeting had solved little and their negotiations were merely a "repetition" of what they had already gone through.⁸¹ The woolen mill was a case in point. Before it was closed in 1954 after losing \$800,000, the mill had turned a profit only once, in 1947.⁸² The government was reluctant that year to grant the union's demands for a twenty cent increase on a basic rate of fifty-seven cents per hour.⁸³ The union was adamant and demanded conciliation, and there was talk of strike action.

Although the government's wages compared favourably with the best in the industry, "sweatshop" wages were hardly justifiable by the CCF's fair wage philosophy. Congress contacted the national CCF to explain the situation, and informed Lewis "in confidence" that the union was contemplating strike action. Conroy wished to avoid a strike owing to the political consequences and the

"unpleasantness to the Government, and to the relationship between the CCL and CCF...". He asked the government through Lewis to delay negotiations until he could arrive in Regina to take over the discussions.⁸⁴

Lewis informed Cadbury of the problem and lectured him on the government's substandard wages. He warned Cadbury that the CCF would find it impossible to defend the government anywhere in the country,

...it is recognized throughout Canada, and the CCF has for years hammered on the fact, that the textile industry in this country is one of depressed wages. ... In fact, if you ask any even superficial student of this question in Canada, to name the three lowest paid industries in the country, he would name tobacco, textiles and shoe and leather.⁸⁵

Cadbury, however, did not believe he could convince the "shareholders" to pay much higher wages.⁸⁶ Prices were dropping and he felt the electorate would not long tolerate subsidization. While Conroy successfully negotiated a settlement and prevented open conflict, the dispute reflected a basic weakness in the CCF's wage policy. Comparable wages tended to keep unionized wages low, because the competition was largely unorganized.

While the wage dispute was occurring in the woolen mill, relations in the box factory deteriorated. Wage problems, poor quality goods and inefficient production hindered the performance of the socialized factory. In

twelve years of government operation the factory recorded only three surpluses, the first in 1947. Management was eager to make a profit after the government had confiscated the plant from the reactionary former owner and wages were a "very contentious point" at the factory.⁸⁷ A 'speed-up' had been instituted and the problems of poor resources, old machinery, and an inefficient plant layout were not addressed.

In May, 1947, three employees were fired on charges of poor workmanship, malingering and performing 'work' while on paid sick leave. All were experienced, long-time employees, and despite the union's protests, the company would only reinstate the worker accused of malingering. The union set a deadline for the reinstatement of the other men for Friday, July 25, and when the company ignored their demands, the workers punched in for the morning shift, and then sat down.⁸⁸ A meeting of the factory's Board of Directors was taking place in Prince Albert at the time, and the Chairman, Minister of Natural Resources, J.L. (Joe) Phelps, instructed the manager to order them back to work and to fire those who were not willing. The men refused to comply and were discharged. The union asked Congress for strike authorization so they could set up pickets, and the SFL contemplated a strike fund, but Congress denied both requests because it was not an authorized strike.⁸⁹

Provincial Treasurer Clarence Fines was particularly

upset at the 'wildcat' strike and condemned the workers for engaging in "sabotage" for "political purposes".⁹⁰ The press made much of the government's embarrassment at having been shown to be little better than private employers. The Regina Leader-Post crowed, "...what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander", and newspapers across Canada played up the strike.⁹¹

The rank and file of the union were opposed to arbitration, preferring a complete investigation of plant operations, but Deputy Labour Minister Ken Bryden and SFL executive secretary Bill Davies continued to work for a settlement, and it was finally agreed that the government would call off the lockout if the union would call off the strike. All workers would be reinstated except those three originally discharged, whose case would go to arbitration. Phelps agreed, but at the last minute as Bryden and Davies were preparing to travel to Prince Albert, he reversed himself. Wanting to maximize the CCL's embarrassment at having gone on strike while the CCF were in convention in Saskatoon, Charlie Williams had advised Phelps not to settle on the agreed basis. Williams prohibited Bryden from leaving for the factory and the dispute dragged on over the weekend.⁹²

The dispute was finally settled and work resumed on August 4, with the dismissals referred to arbitration and an outside commission created to investigate the plant's

operations. A labour-management production committee was established in the factory to encourage co-operation, but "Jolting Joe" Phelps declared soon after that he would close the plant within three months if it did not get out of the red.⁹³

The threat of a strike in the woolen mill, and the wildcat strike in the box factory embarrassed the government and annoyed the CCF members. The strike in particular tarnished the government's image as a "model" employer, and the wage dispute further alienated party opinion of labour. The two incidents hindered developments in the joint committee, and when it was reconvened after the box factory had resumed operations, there was considerable discussion over its scope and purpose. Its failure to prevent the two incidents is understandable given that it had met only once, but for further progress to be made in labour relations, the committee would have to expand its scope. Most of the August 6 meeting was spent trying to find a basis for discussion, but they finally agreed to investigate dispute and grievance machinery to prevent the recurrence of public conflict.⁹⁴

The two incidents "very much perturbed" the government. Douglas began to suspect the joint committee was not up to the task it faced, and he pushed for a higher level meeting with Congress in order to re-establish co-operation on a firmer basis.⁹⁵ The Saskatchewan CCF, the national CCF, and

Congress agreed to meet in Toronto in early September, 1947, and the government began to formulate its wage policy which it hoped would be the basis for a 'social contract' with Congress on labour relations in government industry.

Embarrassed by labour turmoil and upset over wage bargaining problems, the government reluctantly decided it was faced with "maintaining its position in Saskatchewan and retaining the good-will of the CCL."⁹⁶ Representing the "public's interest", the CCF had repeatedly clashed with unions that were protecting the interests of their members. This conflict was inevitable, but the CCF hoped, not insurmountable, and they still expected a reasonable degree of understanding from labour on industrial relations problems, given their similar social and political objectives. These objectives, however, were not central to their bargaining relationship in which economic factors were paramount. The CCF's plans for the province were extensive and its industrial relations policies were designed to maximize profits, which clashed with union interests in a higher standard of living.

The government realized that while their wages compared favourably with private industry, "... it could hardly be denied that the wages we pay are, in many cases, difficult to live on."⁹⁷ Their desire for a formula to prevent labour unrest was hindered by these poor wages, which did not reflect favourably on a pro-labour government, and

subsequent negotiation problems precluded rank and file sympathy for the government's position. 'Solidarity' of long-term interests did not satisfy the short-term interests of unions seeking to maintain or increase their members' standard of living. The government continued on with its goal of convincing labour that wages had to conform to the economic circumstances in which the crown companies found themselves. However, it proved easier to persuade Congress than the unions in Saskatchewan that co-operation should prevail.

Before the CCF went east, they attempted to convince the unions, through their representatives on the joint committee, that a general agreement on wage policy was necessary. Warning Palmer that without CCL co-operation the government might introduce a policy unilaterally, Bryden told the Regional Director,

It is suggested that if the Government and the CCL discussed in private their respective problems and objectives regarding wages the result would be a much greater degree of mutual understanding and perhaps even a substantial degree of agreement on fundamental principles of wage policy. This would eliminate the interminable poker playing and resultant friction at present in individual negotiations.⁹⁸

He denied such a wage agreement would interfere in collective bargaining unless it was conceived of as, "a perpetual state of open or covert warfare, and not as a rational process designed to establish a firm basis of good

relations between management and employees."⁹⁹ However, the CCL's previous experiences with the government did not incline the unions to Bryden's position.

Bryden outlined to Palmer the policy of the "Minimum", the "Fair" and the "Good" wage, but emphasized the government's ability to pay would be paramount. The problem was to weigh industry and provincial wage levels and the cost of living, and achieve some type of uniformity within government operations. If the government were to initiate the policy, the problem remained how to distribute the surpluses between the workers and the public. They would grant a "living wage", Bryden assured Palmer, but who was to get the "lion's share" proved contentious. The government would not allow workers to receive wages "out of all proportion to wages paid to other workers in the community ...", and the public would receive an increasing share of the surpluses as contributions to the treasury, or in the form of reduced prices.¹⁰⁰ Palmer rejected the government's proposal which lent urgency to the CCF's upcoming meeting in Toronto.

Wage issues dominated the Toronto meeting as they tried to reach an agreement.¹⁰¹ The government pledged to pay a minimum that would be an adequate living, even if it meant subsidization, which in the case of the troubled crown enterprises was a certainty; and Congress agreed to the division of surpluses giving the public the greater share as

"dividends". The meeting adjourned with an agreement that one CCL organizer be designated to handle all negotiations in government unions, and this task fell to Palmer.¹⁰²

The outcome of the Toronto meeting placed the responsibility for improved relations on the one man who reflected local union opposition to the top-level agreement, and who was implacably opposed to such arrangements in the first place. Palmer cannot be faulted for being a tough negotiator, but he had already rejected the policy decided at the meeting, and the September meeting accomplished little that was of lasting effect. This is not to suggest that Palmer was responsible for the subsequent failure of the wage 'understanding'. He accurately reflected the interests of the local unions he represented, and the rank and file were not interested in the government's wage policy. His acerbic style and hard-headed approach to negotiations only reinforced the conflict between the interests of the unions and their employer. Thus, co-operation at the top was not reflected at the bottom.

Local unionists were loyal to the provincial CCF, but this political support was always secondary to their primary tasks of trade unionism, and it was a good deal easier for the national CCL leaders to arrive at a compromise with the government, than it was for local unions to negotiate a collective agreement with the CCF. Thus, local union interests diverged not only from the government as an

employer, but also from the national Congress as a political supporter of the CCF. Congress hoped to reverse the party's fortunes in the next Ontario provincial election, widely expected in 1948, and they agreed to the Saskatchewan government's concerns because they did not want anything to 'rock the boat' in the meantime.

Pressed by political opponents to make a profit and by farmers to control wages, and armed with the September arrangement, the government prepared to institute its wage principles. While admitting that subsidization was necessary at least temporarily, Cadbury decided that each company would soon have to "stand on its own feet."¹⁰³ This meant the general principle would be that labour costs would have to "conform to the commercial possibilities in each case."¹⁰⁴ Encouraged by the understanding with Congress, the government decided employees in the monopolies would not be entitled to "considerably higher" wages than those in the less profitable enterprises.¹⁰⁵

Contract negotiations in government industries in 1947 proved difficult to settle owing to the rapid rise in the cost of living. Conciliation was often used and unions gained some wage increases, though they remained behind the inflation rate. The government was unhappy with the conciliated settlements, though it recognized the Department of Labour had a responsibility to intervene regardless of the government's role as an employer. After the difficult

1947 negotiations, however, they decided the department was not to intervene without the express consent of the government itself.¹⁰⁶

Thus, as the government entered an election year it appeared to have firmly grasped the reins of labour relations. Cabinet, of course, controlled the distribution of surpluses and the CCF had achieved Congress approval of the broad outlines of their wage policy. Moreover, disputes arising from negotiations were now subject to Cabinet control over the use of conciliation as a means of settlement. Although the government was more comfortable with its labour relations, there had been doubts about labour's political commitment.

That the government was concerned about a potential decline in labour support was evident when their 1946 brief to the SFL included a call for more CCF political activity within the unions.¹⁰⁷ The importance of its political ties to Congress was increased by the tendency of craft unionists not to be 'socialistically' inclined. TLC unions frequently promised to support the CCF but just as often voted Liberal.¹⁰⁸

As the election approached Congress became concerned about an apparent split in the ranks among CCL unionists in the province. Some of the organizers with only Saskatchewan experience were opposed to political action, while those with broader experience favoured it. Congress leaders knew

the party was more than holding its own among "the all important farm vote" and they realized the CCF's rural support benefitted the labour movement by preventing the old parties from mobilizing farmers against workers.¹⁰⁹ They were worried that a poor showing in the upcoming election would reflect on them and alienate farmers, which, "might undo much of the good which this new partnership is now bringing us, both in Saskatchewan, and in the field of Dominion-wide politics."¹¹⁰

Political support from CCL unions in Saskatchewan reflected the tension in labour relations with the government, and some locals refused outright to openly support the CCF. Congress was not hopeful that any drop in CCF electoral strength would be offset by support from unions in government operations which were reluctant to associate themselves too closely with their employer. Most union support was given at arm's length, as they preferred to donate money rather than affiliate to, proselytize for, or become more involved in, the CCF party. When the SFL began organizing Labour Election Committees within unions as part of their campaign efforts, they had to 'soft-pedal' their programme to the government unions in light of their negotiation problems.¹¹¹

Government bargaining practices represented the major obstacle to more union support for the CCF. Armed with the September agreement with Congress, the government's

manoeuvre to place SCSA negotiations ahead of CCL unions and their insistence on uniform contract settlements, became firmly established. As the election drew closer, Douglas warned the CCL of the limits facing the party in granting wage increases. Capitalizing on the SCSA manoeuvre, he again insisted that what one union negotiated would have to be applied, "equally to all government employees ...".¹¹² For example, Telephone workers could not be granted an increase because it would not be in line with the SCSA and would have to be paid in other areas. The CCL rejected government claims that one union would in effect be bargaining for the entire civil service, and they were angry that provisions of an agreement negotiated with the "scab" SCSA would be applied to them.¹¹³ They were dismayed that the government was acting as a powerful private employer might have, dictating to their employees. "I am astounded", complained SFL President Lloyd Gardiner, "at the complete lack of understanding on the part of the Government, with regard to the traditional principles of collective bargaining ...".¹¹⁴

Despite deadlocked negotiations, past grievances and a general adversarial relationship with the government, labour knew their legislative gains were at stake in the upcoming provincial election. The election was seen in terms of the preservation of their gains, and all collective bargaining troubles paled in contrast with the fear of losing the

protection afforded workers by the Trade Union Act (and other favourable labour and social legislation). The problems of the past were temporarily shelved as labour saw the election as a contest between 'us and them', between a generally favourable pro-labour Government and a reactionary employer opposition. The larger question of politics overcame collective bargaining problems. Wage negotiations were restrained, concluded one organizer, "lest any unfavourable attitude towards the government would develop, with the election in the spring, and the Congress Convention resolution calling for support of the Government, any unfavourable attitude would make the job of the Labour Election Committees that much harder."¹¹⁵

The reluctance of government unions to become involved did not hinder the SFL's contribution to the re-election of the CCF. Seven MLA's were re-elected, including four cabinet ministers, in the four major cities where the SFL was involved in publicity, fund-raising and canvassing.¹¹⁶ On election day they helped to get the vote out and worked as returning officers, poll clerks and scrutineers; and in the cities the labour vote was heavy with an 83-96 per cent turnout.¹¹⁷ The CCF were re-elected with 47 per cent of the vote and 31 seats, and while this was less than their showing in 1944, the re-election of the government was a significant victory. "We are breathing a little easier here now", wrote Davies, "[with] the return to power of the

CCF."¹¹⁸ Unfortunately, labour representation in the Legislature was reduced when W.J. Arthurs (Melville) and A.D. Cannon (The Battlefords) were defeated.

However, the CCF also suffered losses in the rural areas where even two cabinet ministers, J. L. Phelps and O.W. Valleau were defeated, and as Congress had feared, some of the CCF's rural supporters blamed labour. Joe Phelps, for example, publicly denounced the party's labour legislation for the drop in support. A post-mortem of the losses conducted by the party showed "overconfidence", "fear of the communist bogey" and, higher school taxes and larger school units as the main contributors to the decline in support. Not one constituency complained of the labour laws.¹¹⁹ Nonetheless, Phelps's comments demonstrated there was more than a little suspicion of labour among the farmers.

Despite the victory and the CCL's part in it, tensions remained between the political 'allies'. The CCF complained vigorously about Palmer's bargaining tactics and his general antipathy to the government, and his "conspicuous" absence from the campaign further annoyed the CCF.¹²⁰ Charlie Millard viewed Palmer with some suspicion and advocated his replacement fearing that the CCL would otherwise, "someday look back rather regretfully."¹²¹ Mosher and Conroy were pleased with Palmer's record in Saskatchewan, and Conroy in particular defended Palmer from the CCF's "hatchet job".¹²²

The Regional Director, Conroy replied to Millard, had "probably produced more friends for the Government than any one person by the excellent contracts he has negotiated, thereby justifying the faith of these people that crown companies can provide good wages and working conditions."¹²³ Thus, Congress reaffirmed their support for Palmer, who reflected local opposition to the government's wage policy and whose militant bargaining tactics were consistently a thorn in the side of the CCF.

The clash over the appointment of the Williams 'twins', and the conflict over the organization of the civil service set the tone for the subsequent relations between the CCL and CCF. Relations which began on the wrong foot deteriorated with each round of negotiations, and disenchantment grew on both sides. Each had expected the other to be more sympathetic, and each blamed the other for the friction accompanying their relations. The CCF, dominated by farmers, represented a 'public interest' that was opposed to the interests of labour, and contract negotiations became increasingly bitter. The development of antagonism, suspicion and frustration marred relations between the government and its industrial workers.

As a political party the CCF appealed to workers, but as an employer, they alienated unions with their hard-line approach to industrial relations. The personalities, attitudes and problems remained despite political

co-operation, and these would reappear in the government's second term when the CCF attempted to enforce its wage policy and gain some control over the adversarial collective bargaining system they had created.

1. "Congress" denotes the Executive Council of the CCL, with headquarters in Ottawa.

2. Williams attended the 1946 Dominion-Provincial Labour Ministers' Conference where the federal Liberal government proposed a new labour code. He applauded the federal proposal even though it fell far short of what the CCF had already enacted. In any event, W.K. Bryden prepared the CCF's position papers for the conference and Williams may not have understood the differences. See: SAB-C.C. Williams Papers, AW 671 (46)

3. After the CCF's first term in office, there was "a bit of a hiatus to put it mildly" on labour legislation. Davies Interview 7 June 1986. The Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (SFL-CCL) pressed consistently every year for a variety of reforms, with the forty-hour week topping the list. After 1945, the only major item passed by the CCF was the ineffectual Equal Pay Act, 1952, which unions viewed negatively as "window dressing" passed on the eve of an election. SAB-SFL, Correspondence, CCL and International Officers, Davies to Eugene Forsey, Research Director, CCL, 19 January 1953

4. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986. Davies likened Williams' expertise in labour matters to a "fish out of water".

5. Taped Interview with former CCL representative, Clarence Lyons, 21 August 1986

6. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986

7. The six labour men were: Charlie Williams (Regina), Jim Arthur (Melville), Alex Connon (North Battleford), Harry Gibbs (Swift Current), Dempster Heming (Moose Jaw), and Art Stone (Saskatoon). They were all railwaymen.

8. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986.

9. IBID.

10. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Organizations and Collective Bargaining Agreements, copy of letter, Hub Elkin to F.W. Dowling, 16 July 1944.

11. IBID. Elkin was born and raised in Moose Jaw, and worked for Swift Canadian for ten years, where he helped to organize the first packinghouse union in the city. In 1942, he was appointed organizer for the United Steelworkers in Moose Jaw. In 1943, he became an International Representative for the United Packinghouse Workers of America, and worked for them in Saskatchewan, Ontario and New Brunswick.

In 1944, he was elected as the first president of the newly created Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (SFL).

12. IBID. Eamon Park, Publicity Director for the CCL's Political Action Committee, also complained to Douglas about this appointment. He granted the Premier the need to have someone to, "tie together the work of the old Bureau of Labour and the new Department, [but] ... J H Williams was definitely tied in with some of the worst deals that the Liberal Government gave the trade union movement. This I can say from my personal experiences when I was in Saskatchewan doing organizational work." IBID., Park to Douglas, February 28, 1945.

13. IBID. Elkin to Dowling, op.cit. The appointment of the Minister was, of course, the prerogative of the government, and as a former TLC unionist Charlie Williams was acceptable to the largest union organization in the province. But on the deputy's position, labour should have been consulted, and J.H. Williams' appointment was admitted by the government to have been "a bit hasty." IBID., T.H. McLeod to David Lewis, 22 July 1944.

14. IBID., Elkin to Dowling, op.cit.

15. IBID., Submission to the Honourable T.C. Douglas by 8 Labour Groups - CCL, July 19, 1944.

16. IBID., Heming was proposed because at the time he "talked left" and appeared to favour industrial unionism. Davies Interview, June 7, 1986. As it turned out, he was even less capable as a legislator than Williams. He in fact became embroiled in a dispute with Bill Davies over the 1952 CCF nomination in Moose Jaw (see next chapter).

17. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, CCF Matters, Labour, Douglas to Lewis, 18 August 1944. Elkin had been worried about the effect on Douglas of the left-wing 'presence' in their delegation to the Premier. Although most of the complaining had come from CCF supporters, the presence of communists such as Jack Toothill, and 'fellow-travellers' such as Glen Thompson, definitely upset Douglas.

18. IBID., Conroy to Douglas, 15 August 1944.

19. Despite his title, McAuslane was actually 'low man on the totem pole' in the CCL. Most organizing occurred through the national and international unions, who were quite powerful in the Congress. These unions used organizing committees such as the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) or the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC). Thus, McAuslane was left in charge of

CCL-chartered unions, which were outside the purview of the large affiliates. In Davies' view, McAuslane's appointment was a "mistake". He acted like "a bull in a china shop", and committed a number of "gaffes". Taped Interview with W.G. (Bill) Davies, June 12, 1986 (Hereafter, Davies Interview, 12 June 1986).

20. This was a curious appointment and helped to further strain relations with the government. Perhaps Conroy owed McAuslane a favour for past services in UMWA, District 18. Conroy was never as pro-CCF as say, Mosher was, and the appointment was perhaps made to keep the CCF at arm's length. In any event, McAuslane has been described as Conroy's "right-hand man". Davies Interview, 7 June 1986.

21. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, CCF Matters, Labour, Lewis to Douglas, 23 August 1944.

22. SAB, Saskatchewan Federation of Labour Records (Hereafter, SAB-SFL), Minutes of the Executive Council, 1944-1954 (Hereafter, Executive Minutes), Minutes of the Conference of Saskatchewan Locals-CCL, 6 August 1944.

23. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, CCF Matters, Labour, Douglas to Lewis, 18 August 1944.

24. IBID.

25. IBID., Douglas wanted him replaced by Harry Chappell, who was a Special Representative of the CCL. Chappell was from Mosher's own union, the CBRE, and was heavily involved in the Manitoba CCF. He was well-known and liked by the Premier.

26. IBID.

27. IBID.

28. IBID., Lewis to Douglas, 23 August 1944.

29. IBID.

30. IBID.

31. IBID., Lewis to Douglas 24 August 1944. Lewis wrote that for "internal reasons" McAuslane would not be recalled. According to Davies, Conroy and McAuslane were "great cronies". This may explain why he was not recalled. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986. At their meeting in July, Douglas had forewarned Conroy that government workers would be given trade union rights. It is doubtful that he 'promised' the civil servants to the CCL. However, Williams, Provincial Treasurer Clarence Fines, and Minister of Education Woodrow

Lloyd had attempted to dissuade CCL organizers from tackling the civil servants.

32.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements, Conroy to Art Langton, 1 September 1944.

33.Davies Interview, 7 June 1986.

34.Davies Interview, 12 June 1986.

35.IBID.

36.IBID.

37.PAC, Co-operative Commonwealth/New Democratic Party Papers (Hereafter, PAC-CCF), Vol.93, T.C. Douglas, 1936-46, T.H. McLeod to Lewis, 15 October 1944.

38.PAC, Canadian Labour Congress Records, Canadian Congress of Labour Series (Hereafter, PAC-CCL), Organizers and Regional Office Correspondence, Vol.148(1), McAuslane, A., Regina Leader-Post, 1 September 1944.

39.IBID.

40.PAC-CCF, Vol.93, T.C. Douglas, 1936-46, McLeod to Lewis, 15 October 1944, p.3.

41.Davies Interview, 7 June 1986. Palmer had worked in government telephones for some time before his appointment by McAuslane. Palmer was a syndicalist in the broad sense that he was prone to take strike action and believed in union control of industry. He did not carry a CCF membership card, which made the party suspicious of his motives. IBID.

42.PAC-CCL, Organizers and Regional Office Correspondence, Vol.148(1), McAuslane, A., McAuslane to Conroy, 25 September 1944, p.2.

43.IBID., Vol.131(36), Palmer, C.G., 1944-52, handwritten letter, Palmer to Conroy, 9 October 1944, p.8. Palmer emphasized the dominance of Liberal appointees in the civil service. After decades of almost continuous Liberal rule it is not surprising that the party had many supporters in important positions in the provincial bureaucracy. See: Reid, E.M., "The Saskatchewan Liberal Machine Before 1929", in Ward, N., and Spafford, D., (ed), Politics in Saskatchewan, (Toronto, 1968)

44. IBID.

45. PAC-CCF, Vol.93, T.C. Douglas, 1936-46, McLeod to D.Lewis, 15 October 1944.

46. PAC-CCF, Vol.72, Trade Union Relations, 1942-7, Park to Lewis, 25 February 1945.

47. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements, Park to Douglas, 28 February 1945.

48. Davies Interview 12 June 1986.

49. IBID.

50. Davies Interview, 12 June 1986. When the workers in the Northern Affairs Branch of the Department of Municipal Affairs applied for certification shortly after this episode, they were denied it by the Board which argued that their jobs were not of sufficiently different kind to justify a separate unit. See: Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Research and Planning Division, Decisions of the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board and Court Cases Arising Therefrom, Volume I, 1945-1954, Queen's Printer, Regina, p.25-27.

51. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986

52. PAC-CCL, Labour Councils and Provincial Federations, Vol.179(16), Saskatchewan SFL, Part 4, 1944-47, Jack Toothill to Mosher, 11 November 1945. This was especially true of the government brickyard at Estevan, and in Dominion Electric, which the government had just purchased as part of its expansion of the power commission.

53. SAB-C.C. Williams Papers, Vol.116f, Correspondence, W.K. Bryden to T.J. Bently, MP, Swift Current, 19 November 1945. One worker was unfairly dismissed after an exchange with the superintendent. The LRB intervened and the worker was reinstated. The workers were reassured of their rights by the Board, and a few weeks later a formal bargaining agreement was reached.

54. IBID., Attached Memo, Bryden to Lewis, 1 October 1945.

55. See: Appendix V Incomes in Saskatchewan

56. See: Appendix VII Unemployment in Saskatchewan

57. Under the War Measures Act, the federal Liberal government passed a number of orders-in-council restricting employer-employee relations, including PC 9384, which denied wage increases, or changes in working conditions that directly or indirectly increased wages (such as paid vacations, group insurance or incentive plans) without the approval of the Wartime Labour Relations Board (WLRB). In Saskatchewan during 1944, over 1800 applications were made to the WLRB regarding wage adjustments, and a further 800 cases involved paid vacations or other changes in working conditions affecting wages. By the spring of 1946, the WLRB had dealt with a further 3000 cases involving wage adjustments. Canada, Department of Labour, Report for the year ending March 31, 1946, p.83 and 106

58. PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.8, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence, 1946-7, 1949. Douglas to Conroy, 20 May 1946.

59. IBID., copy of letter, Conroy to Douglas, 21 June 1946.

60. IBID.

61. SAB-SFL, Correspondence, CCL and International Officers, Conroy to Palmer, 21 June 1946.

62. PAC-CCL, Defunct Locals, Vol.94(12), Civil Servants of Canada, United, Local #2, Weyburn, 1944-9, Part I, J.T. Harbourne to Conroy, 15 March 1948, p.1.

63. PAC-CCL, Organizers and Regional Office Correspondence, Vol.131(36), Palmer, C.G., 1944-52, Conroy to Palmer, 28 October 1946.

64. IBID., Despite adopting collective bargaining into its constitution, the Civil Servants Association continued to bargain with their 'cap in hand', and they were easy 'prey' for the government's negotiators.

65. Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Fourth Annual Report, p.7

66. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Labour Organizations, Memo, M.C. Shumiatcher to Douglas, 22 November 1946, "Re: Relations Between the Canadian Congress of Labour and the Government", p.6

67. IBID., p.7.

68. SAB-J.H. Sturdy Papers, M14, Labour, 1947-53 (2), Brief to SFL Submitted by the Government of Saskatchewan, November 1946.

69. The SFL was the federation of CCL unions in the province. It acted as a lobbying agency on behalf of labour's legislative interest. It was also quite effective as a moderating influence on CCF-CCL industrial relations conflict.

70. SAB-SFL, Correspondence, CCL and International Officers, Conroy to Davies, 8 February 1947.

71. IBID., copy of letter, Conroy to Douglas, 21 June 1946.

72. IBID., Conroy to Davies, 23 May 1947.

73. SAB-SFL, Executive Minutes, 5 June 1947.

74. SAB-SFL, CCL-Joint CCL-Government Advisory Committee, Minutes of Joint Meeting between Representatives of the Government of the Province of Saskatchewan and the CCL, June 6, 1947. The Joint Industrial Relations Committee (JIRC) applied to the box, brick, wool, tannery, and sodium sulphate factories.

75. IBID.

76. IBID.

77. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Organizations, Conroy to Cadbury, 27 June 1947.

78. SAB-SFL, Correspondence, CCL and International Officers, Conroy to Palmer, 2 July 1947.

79. IBID.

80. IBID., Davies to Conroy, 5 July 1947. Conroy blamed the deterioration in relations on Cadbury whose, "superiority and belief that most of the people out here are colonials prevents him reaching a realistic appraisal of what needs to be done." IBID., Conroy to Davies, 11 July 1947

81. PAC-CCF, Vol.67, Advisory, Economic and Planning Board, copy of letter, Glen Thompson to Conroy, 22 July 1947.

82. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Economic Advisory and Planning Board (Hereafter, EAPB), Crown Corporations, Summary of Results of Operations for Crown Corporations, 1945 to 1955. (Hereafter, Summary of Results).

83. PAC-CCF, Vol.67, Advisory, Economic and Planning Board, copy of letter, Glen Thompson to Conroy, 22 July 1947.

84. IBID., Lewis to Cadbury, 25 July 1947.

85. IBID.

86. IBID., Cadbury to Lewis, 28 July 1947.

87. PAC-CCL, Organizers and Regional Office Correspondence, Vol.164 III, Thompson, Glen, Thompson to Conroy, 29 July 1947.

88. IBID.

89. Mosher denied strike authorization, and Conroy reiterated their position after the strike was settled. SAB-SFL, Correspondence, General, Conroy to Davies, 25 August 1947.

90. PAC-Strike and Lockout Series, Microfilm Reel No. T-4088, RG 27 Vol.456, Strike No.138, Box Factory Workers, Prince Albert., Toronto Star, 29 July 1947.

91. IBID., Regina Leader-Post, 31 July 1947.

92. PAC-CCL, Organizers and Regional Office Correspondence, Vol. 164 III, Thompson, Glen, Thompson to Conroy, 29 July 1947, p.4.

93. IBID., Windsor Star, 23 August 1947. Phelps' threat prompted C.S. Davis, solicitor for the former owner, to comment that the Minister had violated the Trade Union Act (i.e., the threat was an unfair labour practice), IBID. The factory, however, was seldom in the black, and it was closed down in 1957 with losses over \$494,000. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, EAPB, Summary of Results, op.cit.

94. SAB-SFL, CCL-Joint CCL-Government Advisory Committee, Minutes of Meeting, 6 August 1947.

95. PAC-CCL, Federal and Provincial Government Correspondence, Vol.198(14), Provincial Governments, Saskatchewan, General, Part III, 1945-53, Douglas to Mosher, 6 August 1947.

96. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, EAPB, Labour Reports, Cadbury to Douglas, Memo, 12 August 1947, Attached Memo, W.K. Bryden, "Relations Between Government Industries and Trade Unions"

97. IBID.

98. SAB-SFL, CCL-Joint CCL-Government Advisory Committee, Bryden to Palmer, 26 August 1947

99. IBID.

100. IBID.

101. The two sides wished to prevent publicity regarding their problems and it was convenient that they could gather before the convening of the British Commonwealth Labour Parties Conference in Toronto. Representing the CCL were A. Mosher, P. Conroy, and Norman Dowd, executive secretary of Congress. Frank Scott, Angus MacInnis and David Lewis represented the national CCF. The contingent from the Saskatchewan government did not include Tommy Douglas, but the CCF were well represented by: C. Fines, Provincial Treasurer; O.W. Valleau, Minister of Social Welfare and Chairman of SGIO; J.T. Douglas, Minister of Highways; J.H. Brockelbank, Minister of Municipal Affairs; and George Cadbury, Chief Executive Officer of the crown corporations' holding company, the Government Finance Office. Alex McAuslane had completed his task in Saskatchewan with the creation of the SFL and he was not invited to the meeting.

102. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Organizations (2), Memo, J.H. Brockelbank, "Meeting With CCL Officials, Toronto, September 5, 1947."

103. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, EAPB, Cabinet Directives, Memo, Cadbury to Douglas, "Labour Policy", 4 November 1947.

104. IBID.

105. IBID., EAPB, November, 1947, "Labour Policy for Crown Corporations".

106. IBID., January, 1948, "Committee on Labour Policy for Government Enterprises".

107. SAB-J.H. Sturdy Papers, M14, Labour, 1947-53 (2), op.cit.

108. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, CCF Matters, Labour, Memo, Attorney General to ALL Ministers, 28 November 1945.

109. PAC-CCL, Organizers and Regional Office Correspondence, Vol. 125(27), Joint Meeting with Saskatchewan Government, 1946-7, Murray Cotterill to Conroy, 2 June 1947, p.2.

110. IBID., p.1

111. Power, Insurance and Telephone locals refused to support the CCL's political action programme, though undoubtedly workers voted for the CCF.

112. SAB-SFL, Correspondence, Executive Members SFL, 1944-54, Douglas to Davies, 5 February 1948.

113. IBID., Gardiner to Davies, 17 February 1948.

114.IBID.

115.PAC-CCL, Defunct Locals, Vol.94(12), Civil Servants of Canada, United, Local #2, Weyburn, 1944-9, Part I, J.T. Harbourne to Conroy, 15 March 1948, p.1

116.Regina, Saskatoon, Moose Jaw and Prince Albert. The four cabinet ministers were Williams and Fines (Regina); J.W. Corman, Attorney General (Moose Jaw); and L.F. McIntosh, Minister of Co-operatives and Co-operative Development (Prince Albert). Also re-elected were Dempster Heming (Moose Jaw) and, Art Stone and Jack Sturdy (Saskatoon).

117.SAB-SFL, Labour Election Committees, 1948, Davies to Conroy, 26 June 1948.

118.IBID.

119.SAB-CCF, Elections, Provincial Results, 1938-48. The results of the survey showed these to be the major causes of reduced support. For examples, see letters to A.O. Smith, CCF Provincial Secretary, from the following constituencies: Hanley, Melfort (where Valleau was defeated), Morse, Qu'Appelle, Woseley, Shellbrook, and the Battlefords. Phelps' constituency, Saltcoats, complained he was always too busy to help with their concerns, especially the poor roads.

120.PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.7(22), Millard, C.H., Correspondence, 1948, Millard to Conroy, 28 June 1948, p.2.

121.IBID. Millard was a partisan CCF'er who was twice elected to the Ontario Legislature, and it was natural for him to be upset at Palmer's bargaining tactics and political behaviour.

122.IBID., Conroy to Millard, 7 July 1948, p.1.

123.IBID., p.2

CHAPTER VI

LABOUR UNREST 1948-1952

Conflict generated by their bargaining relationship was only temporarily postponed by the 1948 election, and political co-operation quickly gave way to old animosities. Following the decline in rural support in the 1948 election, demands were made in the CCF caucus to delete the union security clause from the Trade Union Act and to make strikes in government industries illegal.¹ Before the year was out, a wage strike erupted in a crown corporation, which placed a great strain on union-government relations. On the one hand the government was faced with union militancy, on the other pressed by farmers and party members to control labour and place restrictions on unions. Douglas was faced with twin problems of placating farmers and labour, and alienating either had political repercussions not only in Saskatchewan, but at the national level as well.

Douglas sought to moderate labour unrest and forestall party demands for restrictions on public workers, and following the wage strike a more elaborate social contract was offered to all CCL unions in government service. The joint industrial relations committee was revived as a mechanism of co-operation and preventative dispute settlement, but like its precursor, the new committee was a failure. Wage conflict and labour unrest swamped the

committee and government-union industrial relations did not improve, but rather, deteriorated. Political co-operation, of course, still existed, though by the 1952 provincial election the party was hostile to the CCL's involvement in 'their' politics.

By 1948, the bulk of organizing was complete and the pace of unionization slowed considerably during the CCF's second term in office. The most important gain for the CCL was the acquisition of jurisdiction in the Power corporation after a long struggle with the SCSA. Palmer expected the new locals of the Electrical Utilities Employees Union (EUEU) would have "far-reaching effects" on their plans for further expansion in the civil service.² He hoped to increase the CCL's "prestige" among the SCSA membership, and by achieving better contracts in Power, persuade them to join.³

The downturn in the agricultural economy prior to the outbreak of the Korean War took further steam from organizing drives. As the provincial economy slowed, unemployment rose. Real wages declined from 1947 to 1949, and in 1950 fell below the 1947 level.⁴ As inflation continued to erode working class incomes, wages remained the dominant issue in labour relations. Government wages were often low, and the CCL's persistent struggle to raise incomes clashed repeatedly with the CCF's desire to control costs as it expanded social services and public utilities. Militant bargaining by the CCL was matched by government

intransigence on wages. Neither side would relax its bargaining position, and the result was continuous conflict.

Union concern over inflation, wages and negotiation troubles was best expressed by SFL president Lloyd Gardiner, who was himself a government employee,

We are not afraid of the grim struggle which now looms before us as we find ourselves confronted with a bitter price-wage war on the negotiating front, where new working agreements must be drawn up We realize that negotiations will undoubtedly be tougher, with respect to wages, than ever before, but we are content our position is just⁵

The government also took a dim view of negotiations. Cadbury blamed the unions for industrial relations problems, and complained of their bargaining tactics. Negotiations were troublesome, he argued, because unionists, "having been trained under Capitalism to regard the employer as something of an enemy on whom the greatest possible pressure is to be exerted, tend to apply this same attitude to the government."⁶ Cadbury believed the challenge was to prove the CCF's policy of State intervention brought major benefits to the people and his primary concern was with the balance sheet. Revenues for the treasury and surpluses for corporation expansion took precedence over employee claims for wages, and he began to wonder whether the unions were potentially "detrimental to the welfare of the community at large."⁷

Following the CCF's re-election, Cadbury hoped to develop public ownership under a new pattern, "which would

not only measure up to the criteria of a capitalistic balance sheet, but w[ould] also adopt patterns of human and financial relationship which are superior to those in private industry."⁸ His post-election review of crown corporations showed the overall performance to be quite satisfactory, with the exception of the smaller competitive crown enterprises which were rather unsuccessful. These small attempts to industrialize the province were economically unfeasible and filled with embarrassing labour relations. They tarnished the image of the CCF's record of state intervention in the economy, and he urged the government to close these "problem children".⁹

Provincial Treasurer Clarence Fines agreed with Cadbury's assessment of the troubled secondary manufacturing industries under public ownership.¹⁰ In general he was also pleased with the overall performance of the crown corporations, but his primary consideration was the cost of government services which had increased greatly.¹¹ The government had recorded surpluses in every year since 1944, however, Fines warned,

One word of caution should be given at this time. During the past five years the revenues of the province have been very bouyant. We have had fair crops on the average and have obtained reasonably good prices for our farm products. As long as this condition continues, there will be no difficulty in financing our present program, but if conditions deteriorate either through crop failure or low prices, then the task of financing will become very difficult. We will be placed in the position of having to discontinue some of the

present services or of finding new sources of revenue.¹²

Fines' caution and Cadbury's emphasis on profits added friction to the 1948 negotiations, and Gardiner's prediction of a 'grim struggle' over wages was played out when Cy Palmer "locked horns" with Oakland W. Valleau, Chairman of the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office (SGIO).¹³ The accumulated tensions and suspicions generated by five years of antagonistic industrial relations burst into the open in a bitter three week wage strike in November 1948.

SGIO had been created in 1944 and became the government's "most spectacular" success.¹⁴ Its revenues climbed when compulsory automobile accident insurance was introduced and it provided large surpluses to the treasury. Negotiations between the Saskatchewan Insurance Employees Union (SIEU) and SGIO did not markedly improve wages or working conditions for the poorly paid insurance workers, however, and they had reason to complain that they had never been granted an equitable increase.¹⁵ Whatever wage comparison the government made it was opposed to the interests of the union and clashed with the aims of the CCL.¹⁶

When negotiations opened in the fall of 1948, inflation exacerbated union demands, but SGIO refused to even consider the "very extreme" wage proposal.¹⁷ The company, moreover, refused to make a counter offer, and despite repeated union requests, they, "blankly refused to put anything in

writing."¹⁸ Management considered the demands to be a bargaining tactic designed to force conciliation, wherein the resulting compromise would greatly benefit the workers.¹⁹ The company would not compromise its position by submitting a counter proposal on wages , but insisted the issue be considered on the basis of the prevailing rates in Saskatchewan and in the insurance industry, and in consideration of its financial position. They demanded the union first revise its "absurd" and "ridiculous" proposal, claiming that granting even one-half the demands would force the company out of business.²⁰ This was an "unfortunate" statement given the company's well-known large surplus.²¹

SIEU attempted to force a written counterproposal from the company by threatening to take a strike vote, but SGIO ignored the warning, believing that the union was trying to force a crisis.²² The subsequent stike vote was virtually unanimous, but the company would not alter its position. The government refused to see that it had to bargain in good faith with its employees, and the union struck not only for increased wages and better working conditions for its members, but also to force the company to bargain by its standards.

Mosher did not believe the union's wage demands to be excessive, though he admitted it would be difficult to grant such an increase all at once, and he appealed to Douglas for a generous counter offer. The low wages paid in SGIO

concerned Mosher and he denied wage comparisons with other civil servants was the proper basis for a government offer, given that these wages were in themselves inadequate.²³ Conroy appealed to the Premier to use conciliation to settle the strike, but to no avail. Douglas had already instructed the company not to seek conciliation, and he reminded government negotiators to bear in mind the effects the eventual settlement would have on other negotiations.²⁴ SGIO was ordered not to settle without the government's prior approval, and faced with the CCF's reluctance to compromise, Mosher dispatched Harry Chappell to mediate the end to the strike.²⁵

When Chappell arrived in Regina, he found both sides intransigent. The company refused to budge from its position unless union demands were first modified substantially, which the SIEU refused to do. The company maintained "the rather fallacious position that if they were to submit a counter proposal first it could be construed that the union had won the strike."²⁶ After marathon talks, Chappell managed to squeeze a counter proposal from SGIO and wage modifications from the union. Acting in concert, the two sides exchanged proposals, but management considered that SIEU had not moved far enough, and it awaited a "prolonged" strike.²⁷ Thus, while it had appeared that Chappell had broken the deadlock, talks broke off again.

The strike attracted considerable press coverage across Canada, and newspapers were quick to point to the fallacies of the CCF's 'utopian' labour laws.²⁸ The press coverage embarrassed the pro-labour government, and strained relations between the farmer's party and the CCL. The strike also embarrassed Congress, and Conroy rushed to Regina to take over negotiations. Conroy believed the situation to be little different than any other strike, and his intervention produced a settlement which left the union "very satisfied".²⁹

The strike produced widespread sympathy within the provincial labour movement. The SFL and TLC both publicly urged the government to settle, and CCL labour councils and individual unions supported the SIEU with strike funds and by sending telegrams to the Premier.³⁰ The SFL met in convention while the strike was in progress, and it passed resolutions promising its full support to the SIEU and urging the government to reconsider its bargaining tactics. Conroy, who was in Regina to settle the strike, attempted to calm the mood of the delegates. "I am convinced," he told them, "if another government is elected in this province, not only the trade union legislation, but all other benefits you now have will be deleted or amended ... they will hang your skeleton to a sour apple tree as they did in the U.S.A.".³¹

While urging delegates not to be too hasty in condemning the CCF, he warned them also not to become subordinate to it. "I am not expecting any miracles from the CCF", he told the convention. "It has undoubtedly got some shortcomings The cure is to get into the CCF on a mass basis and do the job which you think it should be doing for you." He was not, however, advocating political action over union interests, and he stressed the CCL's permanent task, "regardless of the government", was to achieve the best contracts possible and improve wages and working conditions. This was, in fact, the best support the unions could give the government, Conroy argued, because improvements in wages and working conditions would mean more "working class" votes for the party.³²

Acting on Conroy's suggestion, CCL staff representatives met shortly after the conclusion of the SGIO strike to discuss labour relations problems with the CCF government. They all encountered difficulties in handling grievances, and in negotiations, particularly in getting the government to begin talks. Moreover, once talks began, government representatives devoted little time to bargaining sessions, which left unions with, "chronic feelings of frustration".³³

The most "outstanding obstacle" during negotiations was that government representatives had no authority to bargain on the merits of the union's case, "but [were] only in the

position of delivering a cut and dried proposition ... from somewhere higher up." These propositions were decided at a meeting remote from the actual negotiations without knowledge of what had transpired, and the union could not argue persuasively because it had no effect on government negotiators who were only following orders.³⁴

CCL representatives were concerned that CCF political promises of high wages were not being fulfilled. The government insisted on introducing or extending wage 'ranges', and their representatives repeatedly attempted to "whittle away" at the contracts.³⁵ In addition, the government attempted to initiate undesirable changes into collective agreements, such as small cost of living bonuses instead of wage increases, incentive plans, and wage settlements lower than Saskatchewan industrial standards.³⁶ All this only served to increase workers' resentment. Furthermore, CCL organizers were frustrated with government bureaucrats, because they consistently ignored union advice on improving production methods. Moreover, they continually tried to "drive a wedge" between the rank and file and the union negotiating committees. "This experience", wrote Palmer, "has been general to every one of our staff representatives."³⁷

The government was faced with another strike involving a Congress union at the same time as the SGIO strike, which further soured the farmer's party on the CCL. On 3 November

1948, a strike erupted in the Estevan - Bienfait coal fields which threatened to create a province-wide coal shortage.³⁸ Douglas was forced to make a deal with the major operator, which had not been struck, in order to achieve a settlement, and end the coal shortages in Regina, Weyburn and Estevan.³⁹ The coal strike angered the party and the government, who were already upset with the SGIO strike.

The CCF were extremely unhappy with their labour relations with the CCL, and the government, concerned with the "farm vote problem", was fearful of possible rural MLA actions in the upcoming session.⁴⁰ To prevent further conflict in labour relations and to forestall caucus demands for anti-labour action, the government prepared a "new policy".⁴¹

When the SFL arrived to present its Annual Brief to the government, the CCF warned them that unions would not be allowed to become a "new privileged group", and the government again offered workers a 'social contract' on wages.⁴² While reiterating their desire to raise provincial standards of living, the government insisted negotiations be considered in relation to the pattern of agreements "in other similar Government activities", and to end the annual "tussle" over wage bargaining they proposed that talks not begin until the two sides had first arrived at a mutually acceptable statement of joint objectives and procedures.⁴³

For the unions the only hopeful sign in the government's brief was the admission for the first time that it had made mistakes. However, this was couched in terms which left little doubt where the CCF stood,

We have only to look at the sorry mess made of some of our annual negotiations between the government and its employees to realize that we are behaving as if [our] common objectives did not exist. The strike in the [SGIO] was the final act in a long drama of mounting misunderstanding and bitterness. We have been approaching each other like two dogs quarreling over a bone, when it is sometimes doubtful whether the bone legitimately belongs to either of us, but may in fact belong to the people of the Province as a whole.⁴⁴

Essentially, the new policy was a call for the resurrection of the moribund joint committee, and the government requested a 'no strike' pledge in return for resisting demands being made to repeal or modify the Trade Union Act.⁴⁵ While Douglas may have been exaggerating his fears, they were largely real fears. Following the experiences of the SGIO and coal strikes, proposals were made by the party to control labour which included prohibiting strikes in public utilities and establishing "definite" mediation procedures (i.e., compulsory arbitration).⁴⁶

The CCF's Brief was beyond the scope of the SFL in its legislative function, but it aroused the suspicion and anger of the unionists, especially when negotiations were suspended pending an understanding. For all the talk of common interests and responsibilities to the province as a

whole, the CCL was not about to surrender basic trade union rights and principles, particularly the right to strike.⁴⁷ As separate entities, the CCF and CCL had responsibilities to those they represented, which for the unions was to bargain for the best contracts for their members, and to protect and maintain sound trade union principles.

In the discussion which followed the brief, Premier Douglas "lamented" the unions' tendency to bargain as if the CCF were "hard-boiled reactionary big business employers." The reason for this, Chappell explained, was that government representatives frequently made "reactionary statements ... that many hard-boiled employers had quit using years ago." He warned Douglas not to expect to achieve all the "dreams" contained in the brief, and he stressed that the CCL did not intend to become "a slavish appendage of the C.C.F." Moreover, if anything were to be achieved by the revived joint committee, the government would have to change the composition of its delegation, he told Douglas, because unions wanted "to sit opposite somebody who knew the score ... and not some of his people who were pure theorists and who knew none of the realism of the trade union movement."⁴⁸

The Premier subsequently wrote Mosher to explain the brief and the motives behind it. "This strike", he declared, "was the unfortunate symptom of something much more serious than a mere difference of opinion about

wages." The real issue for Douglas was the continual "challenge" laid down by unions to the government's power to maintain its services to the public. There was only one answer to this issue as far as the Premier was concerned,

The citizens of Saskatchewan, including the members of the Trade Unions, can govern through their elected representatives and [in] no other way. ... [T]here can be no opportunity for any group to use their economic or political power to establish a favoured position among their fellows except by consent of the community as a whole expressed through their democratic franchise. That is what the C.C.F. stands for. That is why we have brought in the Trade Union and Co-operative and other Acts, to give the various groups the chance for self-protection against the old vested interests of Capitalism. We did not pass these measures to create a new class of privileged persons.⁴⁹

If there was no forthcoming agreement, Douglas continued, then the CCF was forced to either close down government enterprises or "to restrict the power of the unions and operate under a quite new relationship." The first alternative was undesirable because the party wished to prove its experiments in State intervention successful. The second alternative was "distasteful ... unnecessary and unreasonable", Douglas wrote, "and would have repercussions we would regret as much as you would. But for us it is the lesser evil."⁵⁰

He warned Mosher of the "tremendous pressure" being exerted on the government to control labour, pressure which emanated from those who "have always feared the urban trade union movement." Thus, he continued, without an agreement

he would be left no alternative but to act to control labour or risk alienating the rural CCF movement. At the very least he would be unable to resist CCF attacks on the Trade Union Act which in themselves would affect CCF-CCL relations nationally and hinder their prospects at federal power. Hence, the "national importance" of the matter made it imperative to revive the joint committee and broaden its scope. The response of Congress to this proposal, he concluded, would determine "whether there is to be harmony or continued strife between us."⁵¹ To revive the joint committee, he called for a top-level meeting of representatives from the Saskatchewan Government, the national leaders of the CCL and the national executive of the CCF, to which all sides agreed.

Cadbury prepared the approach taken at the forthcoming Ottawa conference with the Congress. He stated his belief that the State should be a 'model' employer, but argued the unions were demanding special privileges not accorded others in the province. He assumed the unions agreed with the CCF's "Socialist solution", and suggested that this 'solidarity' meant that each side had to relinquish some of their prerogatives. Their common goals, he argued, meant the normal animosity in employer-employee relations was supplanted by "reciprocal responsibilities" in industrial relations. He questioned the CCL's "militant methods" which prevented co-operation, and wanted them to

drop their approach which dealt with the government as they would any other employer. Wages were the central question dividing the two sides, but Cadbury was adamant that their wage comparison policy was the correct approach, and all that was necessary was to devise the correct "machinery" to encourage co-operation in this area.⁵²

In late January, 1949, the CCL and CCF met in Ottawa to discuss industrial relations problems concerning negotiations and wages, and to seek areas of greater co-operation. The conference redefined the social contract and created a new committee, widened in scope to include all CCL unions in government service. Its composition was again set at ten members; five top-level union and management representatives, but there were few assurances that the 'new' committee could act effectively as a means of dispute prevention.⁵³

That the conference dealt with a wide variety of issues reflected the build-up of tensions and frustrations since the last joint committee in the summer of 1947. Congress agreed in principle to a number of government suggestions for developing more co-operation, including incentive plans, labour-management production committees, and labour representation on the Boards of Directors of the crown corporations. Negotiation techniques were discussed and it was agreed that "recriminatory" attitudes in bargaining were counterproductive as they spawned irrelevant discussions

which only prolonged negotiations. It was agreed that counter proposals should be in writing, and that exploratory sessions be encouraged before the contracts expired.⁵⁴

When it came to the government's wage determination policy Congress was respectful, but it did not alter its negotiation policies. The government believed that because they held common objectives that labour would naturally be more co-operative on wages. The government reiterated its commitment to a minimum standard of living, but insisted that subsequent increments were negotiable in comparison to other wage levels, and that this was dependent upon the government's ability to pay.

Congress could agree to this because they were not out to bankrupt their employers, but were only striving to increase their members' standard of living. They did not expect the government to be so belligerent in negotiations and so intransigent on wages, and they too had expected more co-operation, especially on wages. Congress representatives had always treated the government as they would any other employer, but while they bargained strongly, they were fully cognizant of the government's financial position. Militant union bargaining against the government as an employer was in the eyes of the Congress no different than similar action against any other employer. For the Congress, the protection of the interests of their membership was their first priority, but this did not exclude co-operation with

the CCF where this did not conflict with their trade union goals. Thus, when the CCF reiterated its policy of financial responsibility and wage comparisons, Congress could silently nod its approval and agree to refer the issues to the upcoming joint committee.

Much was discussed at the Ottawa conference, but little was resolved. They could agree on the problems and on the need to co-operate to settle them, but the conference did not achieve a definite understanding on the outstanding issues, especially wages. As an advisory body, the committee was excluded from dealing with individual collective bargaining problems, and the central issue, a social contract on wages, could not be addressed directly.

One of the obstacles to the success of the committee was that its composition was essentially the same as in 1947, and two and one-half years of mounting industrial relations problems had sharpened the antagonism between the representatives. Those individuals who had bargained annually in an increasingly hostile relationship, were now asked to meet in a committee and erect a more co-operative relationship. Moreover, the Ottawa understanding was applied to a situation in which there was no guarantee that even if the committee could agree on principles of wage determination, negotiation techniques, or co-operative efforts, that the rank and file would find such an understanding acceptable. The Ottawa agreement was no

agreement at all, and co-operation at the top was not reflected at the bottom.

Before the new committee could be convened, a dispute in SPC threatened to undo the efforts at co-operation. Power workers, despite working in a monopoly industry which produced large surpluses, were among the lowest paid in the entire civil service. Contract talks were prolonged and frustrating for the Electrical Utilities Employees' Union (EUEU), and in early 1949, they asked Congress for authority to hold a strike vote. Conroy denied the vote, fearing the young union would be broken in a strike, and he placed his hopes for a good settlement with the government's conciliator.⁵⁵ However, conciliation failed to produce a settlement and the situation soon became "extremely serious".⁵⁶ Conroy eventually changed his mind and bluntly informed Douglas to settle or he would authorize the strike vote. He told Douglas he would withhold the authorization for a reasonable length of time, but he could not stall the union indefinitely because the workers were anxious to settle.⁵⁷

The CCL's militancy again posed a problem for the government, and demands were made by the conservative right-wing of the CCF's rural constituency for legislation banning strikes in government services. "They are also getting ready to mobilize volunteers to break the strike if it happens", Cadbury warned Lewis, "and to demand police

protection in doing so ... I cannot be sure that the Government would be successful in holding down such a movement as such a large section of the C.C.F. would sympathize with that point of view ...".⁵⁸ The mood of the provincial party, Cadbury stated, placed the interests of the national party behind that of the "political fortunes" of the government, and they were in fact suspicious that the "ultimate" aim of the CCL was to capture the urban CCF and leave the farm movement to play "second fiddle" to an Ontario-based party.⁵⁹ SPC negotiations frustrated the government. "We feel the time has come to say no", Cadbury told Lewis. "We are therefore making all preparations for a strike." The Minister of Labour prepared to introduce legislation to intervene if necessary "in the public interest" to avoid a work stoppage in public utilities. The bill was never introduced, but it reflected the feeling at the time in the party that strikes in public utilities should be prevented.⁶⁰

The repercussions of another open conflict over wages so soon after the SGIO strike was a distinct threat, not only to the joint committee which had yet to meet, but to the national relations between the CCL and CCF. The government retreated this time as it would have likely shouldered the burden of criticism for a weakening, or possibly a break, in the CCF-CCL alliance, as its own supporters would have acted to break the strike.⁶¹ The

possible repercussions were not lost on Congress either, and as preparations were underway to convene the new joint committee, Conroy advised them, "The time has come ... to go slowly in making demands for wage increases, and our unions in Saskatchewan should recognize this fact."⁶²

It was not until early July that the first meeting of the joint committee took place. The agendas drawn up by each side reflected the differences between them. Cadbury's agenda stressed the financial responsibility of a "Socialist Government". The demands of the welfare state and the economics of crown corporations had priority over employee claims for wages, but Cadbury denied this undermined his call for 'solidarity' and co-operation. Rather, he blamed conflict in labour relations, not on government wage policies, but on techniques in handling grievances and contract negotiations.⁶³

The CCL's agenda stressed wages, working conditions, and negotiation problems. "The Committee might well analyze the situation which has developed during the past two years", suggested Palmer, " ... [which in] almost every negotiations have required the entrance of conciliators ... ". This was a serious weakness, and unions wanted an end to the lengthy, costly and frustrating annual talks. The central obstacle to successful negotiation was the government's bargaining stand on wages.⁶⁴

The ensuing two-day discussion revealed the depth of disagreement on the central labour relations issues. While the committee reiterated the list of items discussed at Ottawa, they could not agree on much, and most of the discussion was spent trying to find a basis for discussion. Management rights were raised, and countered by union rights, and the best they could do was to agree to disagree.⁶⁵

Owing to negotiations and conventions, it was difficult to reconvene the committee and it did not meet again for another six months. Discussions in the January, 1950, meeting revealed the gulf had widened. The government continued to press for 'solidarity' (i.e., wage restraint), but the CCL remained concerned with their more immediate problems of grievances and negotiations.⁶⁶ Again much was raised, but little resolved. Each side expected movement from the other, and when no one would make the first gesture, talks again degenerated as each side jealously guarded their rights. Given the difficulties encountered in negotiations it is not surprising the two sides were suspicious of each other when they met in the joint committee. Neither side had altered its bargaining position in contract negotiations, and had no incentive to do so in the committee.

Without a dramatic change in official Congress policy on wage bargaining, or a drastic change in the CCF's wage

policy, the new committee was placed in the impossible position of fostering co-operation in labour relations. The discussions in the committee only served to reinforce the gulf between the employer and its employees. While the government could reach a vague understanding with the Congress, the animosity created in negotiations spilled over into the committee, and failing a complete reversal in bargaining philosophies, the joint committee was doomed to failure.

In the fall of 1949, the government introduced an unofficial wage 'freeze' owing to a decline in agricultural income. In early 1950, Mosher sent Chappell to Saskatchewan to settle negotiations in several crown corporations, which had subsequently become deadlocked. Negotiations in Power were particularly difficult and relations quickly deteriorated.⁶⁷

Negotiations had begun for a new contract in October, 1949, but SPC refused to make a counteroffer on wages and talks had broken off. Informal conciliation was tried on two occasions, but each side clung to their positions and by the end of the year the stalemate persisted. Early in the new year, the company offered to consider adjustments in individual classifications, if the union could justify them, but the union consistently demanded an across-the-board wage increase. After another month of futile negotiation, the two sides jointly applied for a

conciliation board. Charlie Williams denied the request and suggested instead that they use their agreed upon conciliators to form an "informal" board. Faced with little alternative, the two sides agreed to this proposal.⁶⁸

At the same time, the government contemplated amending the union security clause of the Trade Union Act to read as a maintenance of dues clause similar to the Rand Formula.⁶⁹ The proposed amendment was not the brainchild of employers, nor of workers, but emanated solely from the government itself.

When word reached the SFL that cabinet had given its approval to the amendment, the Federation responded quickly to the challenge and Davies led a delegation to the government to present their case.⁷⁰ The SFL also organized a massive campaign which deluged the government with letters, telegrams and telephone calls from unions, labour councils, and Congress, protesting the proposed measure.

The SFL argued the amendment was unnecessary, unjust, and unsound legislation,

The proposed amendment would be hailed by reactionaries from one end of Canada to the other, and beyond, as proof that all their objections to union security were well-founded. They would be able to say that even a government explicitly endorsed by [labour] ... and kept in power by the labour vote ... had been forced to recognize that maintenance of membership with the union shop for new employees was a vicious principle.⁷¹

The clause had been an original feature of the Act, and had been widely acclaimed in Canada by labour "as a charter of

union rights and a notable, indeed a unique, contribution to good labour relations." In fact, Saskatchewan had been free of strikes over the issue of union security, while the rest of the country was frequently beset by such labour turmoil. Moreover, Davies argued, unions would not respond silently to a change in the law; "Workers who have enjoyed the form of union security granted them under the subsection will not, without a struggle, accept anything less."⁷²

Compulsory arbitration for the public service was also being considered by the CCF and this did not escape the SFL's attention.⁷³ An organized effort similar to that opposing changes in union security was mounted, and the SFL included an attack on this issue in its presentation to the government. The entire labour movement condemned the concept of compulsory arbitration, as they believed that neither side would bargain in earnest knowing the ultimate decision was out of their hands, and that this would generate extravagant demands. Moreover, it would not work without enforcement, which raised the question whether the police would be used to keep workers on the job if imposed settlements sparked 'wildcat' rank and file strikes.⁷⁴

Central to the problem was the fact that arbitrators would likely be judges who were inexperienced in labour matters. The only reason compulsory arbitration was ever accepted in disputes arising from contracts was because such

boards operated under the very narrow and precise terms of reference set out in a collective bargaining agreement. In such circumstances, the arbitrator's 'assumptions' were precluded; "It is a totally different matter to ask these gentlemen to decide what is a 'living wage', and how far it should have precedence over low taxes on the real property of people like themselves."⁷⁵ Essentially, the SFL argued that the burden of proof was on the government to show the proposed changes were in fact necessary. Failing this, the SFL wanted the government to leave well enough alone.

Following the SFL's presentation, Douglas replied that it was "unfortunate" labour had acted on information which was not final government policy, but merely an "office memo" which had been "leaked" without authority. However, he subsequently defended the 'memo' by declaring the clause to have meant maintenance of dues only when it was drafted in 1944, and that the intention of the amendment was merely to "clarify" this meaning. However, it is extremely doubtful that Brewin intended the clause to be interpreted in the way the government suggested. The Rand Formula, which closely followed the government's thinking, was not in existence in 1944, and the clause meant what it said, and was not merely a maintenance of dues clause.⁷⁶

The discussion was "brisk and vigorous", but after an hour and a half, Douglas agreed to pull the amendment, though he still desired the unions to eventually

compromise on the issue.⁷⁷ The Premier and Minister of Labour thereafter appealed to Congress and insisted the union's interpretation was contrary to the original intention of the Act. Williams calmly suggested to Conroy that a compromise could easily be reached because "No labour principle is involved ...".⁷⁸ The principle denied by Williams was whether union membership meant anything beyond payment of dues. "Here again of course", wrote Davies, "the Minister sometimes considers trivial the things which are most important ...".⁷⁹

The government's tentative moves to prohibit strikes, introduce compulsory arbitration and apply the Rand Formula, were successfully prevented by the SFL, but this only served to strengthen the government's resolve not to give ground in negotiations, which affected contract talks in SPC.

The informal conciliation board heard the presentations from each side in mid-March. SPC argued that wage comparisons and the cost of living showed no justification for a wage increase. The corporation claimed to have been generous in past settlements, and that the union had not justified its demands. SPC admitted there was no inability to pay, but held that its responsibilities to the province precluded employee claims, "for special privileges as regards wages."⁸⁰

The EUEU argued that the cost-of-living index was an improper "yardstick" because to agree to it would in effect

be declaring that all wages, prior to rise in inflation, were at an adequate level, which the union (and Congress) rejected. The union argued that past settlements on wages had been in fact "scanty", and that to agree to wage comparisons as a guideline would mean the trade union movement would make no progress in raising the standard of living for workers.⁸¹

The Majority Report of the board recommended a general across-the-board increase in wages, but left other contractual problems as they were.⁸² However, SPC rejected the Report, and negotiations were back to square one. The government rejected any retreat from their bargaining position, and instructed the company that any concessions would have to be approved by Cabinet beforehand.⁸³ Anticipating further trouble, the government created a committee to handle publicity regarding the negotiations.⁸⁴

The subsequent government publicity campaign included radio broadcasts, press statements, and the dissemination of the "details" of negotiations and "related material" to their "community contacts" throughout the province.⁸⁵ A press release was issued which argued that falling farm incomes upset the provincial economy and union demands were thus unrealistic, and that the public should not suffer through "militant" strike action.⁸⁶ The press statement explained to farmers that the government was tough but fair, and above all consistent. The statement concluded, "The

Government has a fair wage policy. The advance on wages over the past few years has been in accordance with this, and NOT [sic] a reluctant yielding to Union pressure."⁸⁷

The government's handling of the dispute was a well-orchestrated blunder. Williams' refusal to create a conciliation board, SPC's refusal to accept the recommendations of the 'informal' board, and the press campaign, combined to create an extremely hostile relationship with the CCL representatives. The union requested strike authorization, but this was denied by Congress, and Mosher's instructions were to finalize contracts as quickly as possible, "on a basis which recognized the problems of the Government and the long-run political implications which involve us both." The CCL staff representatives were "rather perturbed" at Mosher's orders because they felt the union's demands were fair and reasonable, and they feared Mosher was forcing them to let the membership down. The situation in power was "particularly critical" because union compromises had been rejected by the corporation, and the membership wanted a strike vote if there was no settlement on the basis of the conciliation board report. Moreover, press statements by both sides had aggravated an already "tense" situation.⁸⁸

The government was faced with a serious problem with the farmers, and Chappell informed Congress that, "literally speaking their hands are tied." The Provincial Council had

been deluged with letters from constituency associations demanding no further wage concessions to organized labour, so that money could be saved and taxes reduced. "The pressure on the Government to 'stop labour' is tremendous," Chappell told Conroy, "and at a recent meeting of the C.C.F. Provincial Council - who, in effect, govern the decisions of the Cabinet - it was made abundantly clear that, in Power particularly, no concessions were to be made, and they were to hold the line at all costs." Chappell believed that Cabinet would have settled reasonably, "but to flaunt themselves in the face of farm opinion, would very probably spell the defeat of the government, and the election of ... a reactionary government that would mean suicide for the labour movement." He warned Mosher that the mood of the party was stiffening against labour, and warned him of party demands for legislation outlawing strikes, "And so the story goes..."⁸⁹

Chappell suggested the CCL soften its stand in negotiations in order to weather the crisis, but that afterwards, they had to organize within the CCF at the constituency level, and try to secure positions on the Provincial Executive and Provincial Council of the party. In this way they would be able to move the government to a "more sound labour policy." All in all, he considered the labour relations situation in Saskatchewan to be "grim".⁹⁰

Conroy expressed sympathy with the power workers, and felt the government's intransigence was a sure sign SPC had a "very weak case".⁹¹ Nevertheless, he urged Palmer to continue to seek a compromise, because he felt a strike in Power would ruin both the CCF and the CCL.⁹² To Mosher the dispute appeared to be a "tempest in a teapot" and he wished both sides would be more diplomatic and co-operative.⁹³ He urged Douglas to settle, but instructed the union to reconsider the government's position. However, neither side would budge, and EUEU again asked Congress for strike authorization, which Mosher rejected outright,

The dispute should be settled on the basis of the best offer from the Corporation and without resort to strike action. A settlement on this basis may not do justice to the workers involved, but we are fully convinced that any other action at this time would be more harmful than helpful to those directly affected and to the whole labour movement in the Province of Saskatchewan.⁹⁴

Subsequently, the union again offered compromises, but the government maintained that wage comparisons with SGIO and SCSA precluded an increase for power workers. In early June, each side again rejected the other's proposals, and it was left to Conroy to settle the contract despite Cadbury's opposition to concessions. Thus, after nine months of bitter and frustrating negotiations, the union got what it wanted. The contract settlement was reached owing to the intervention of Congress, and the government compromised in order to maintain efforts at co-operation in the joint

committee. Farmers were unhappy that the government appeared to have retreated from its position, and they continued to press the CCF to control unions.

Before he left Regina, Conroy drew up a list of suggestions which was basically a rehash of the Ottawa conference, and the government agreed to it in principle, including the provision that they not introduce compulsory arbitration or meddle with union security. That such an understanding had to be agreed to a year after joint consultations had been reinstituted, suggests the gulf between the two sides had widened considerably, and that the joint committee was proving ineffective in fostering co-operation.⁹⁵

Continued labour relations problems upset the government, and Cadbury blamed the unions for the fact negotiations became "running fights all the year". He felt the Trade Union Act, based on the "traditional antagonism" of employer and employee, was not applicable to a pro-labour government, and he expected labour peace because they were "allies in a single cause - the overthrow of vested interest and Capitalism." Yet the reverse occurred, and he blamed unions for using their new found power against the government. The unions, he believed, had over-reached themselves in attacking the government and the result was each side adopted belligerent attitudes in negotiations.⁹⁶

After the settlement of the power dispute, a public utility strike affecting Regina city power workers (EUEU) gave the party and government another reason to fear the possible effects of a public utility strike, and further alienated them from the CCL.⁹⁷ Following the problems in Power, the joint committee met twice before the end of the year. Little progress was made, and the unions emphasized the fact the government should face up to reality and accept that even with a friendly government in office, they could not afford to dispense with their protective weapons, especially the right to strike. Moreover, management under a pro-labour government was not necessarily friendly to workers, as they had found out, and unions had to protect their interests first or become defenceless when an anti-labour party assumed power. "In the foreseeable future," they told the CCF joint committee members, "there will continue to be areas in which there will be union management disagreement, which fact corporation managers must come to accept."⁹⁸

The joint committee continued to meet through 1950 and into 1951, but it had little success in fostering co-operation or preventing conflict. Although wage bargaining was the primary obstacle to greater co-operation, the 1951 'wildcat' strike in Saskatchewan Government Airways (SGA) was in effect, the deathknell for the joint committee. This strike infuriated both the Congress and the

government, and led directly to the cessation of talks on co-operation. After the demise of the joint committee the lines of communication between the government and the CCL were broken.

During the summer of 1951 a wildcat strike erupted in SGA when according to the union the company unfairly dismissed pilot S.H. Millar alleging a poor safety record. The issue for the union was job security and a fair hearing for Millar. The company had not followed the grievance procedure, had not given Millar sufficient notice as required by provincial law, and had not even conducted a proper investigation of the matter.

The Canadian Airline Employees' Union (CAEU) took the grievance to the Board of Directors, who refused their request for a formal Department of Transport (DOT) inquiry into the matter. Instead they conducted their own inquiry board, despite their obvious lack of qualifications, to decide whether Millar's eight crashes were owing to pilot error or flying conditions. The union produced three pilots and three aircraft engineers of high qualifications, who agreed unanimously the crashes were owing to the "operational policies of [the] company, structural failures or hazardous flying conditions ...".⁹⁹ Nonetheless, the Board of Directors concluded the pilot was at fault and refused to reinstate him.

The union met and without consulting Congress decided on a strike vote to force the company to reinstate Millar pending a complete investigation, and the result was virtually unanimous. The company ignored the strike deadline and the workers walked off their jobs on July 5 in a strike that lasted two weeks. While on strike the union rejected the company's offer of arbitration because even if Millar were found innocent, such exoneration would not have validity in the eyes of the DOT or any future employer because the board would not have had competence to decide the issues. Once again, a government initiated press battle inflamed the situation and fed animosities that had developed in the past.¹⁰⁰

In an attempt to settle the strike, Palmer approached William Hill, president of the Prince Albert TLC, and a prominent CCF supporter; and Hill mediated a settlement in which Millar was reinstated pending a DOT investigation. This had been the union's position since the beginning, which the government had rejected, forcing the union out on strike. Conroy was glad the strike had been settled. "...I have never conditioned myself to taking a rigid attitude on controversial matters, and particularly with regard to our relationship with the Government of Saskatchewan, since I believe that based on our experience, our unions can be right just as often as the Government."¹⁰¹

Mosher, however, was angered by the wildcat and he had threatened to denounce the strike publicly, suspend the union and repudiate Palmer.¹⁰² Palmer explained to Congress that he had not informed them of the strike action because he had followed procedures and had notified the government through the joint committee of the likely response of a negative solution to the problem. Moreover, he feared the Congress would deny the request, such as it had in SPC in 1950, which would have crippled the union's negotiating strength, and result in a "dictated" settlement. Not only would this have affected CAEU, he argued, but it would have had "disastrous" effects on the rank and file in CCL government unions, and he reminded Congress that EUEU were again looking at the IBEW-AFL.¹⁰³

Following the settlement, Palmer travelled to Saskatoon to the CCF convention to explain the strike to Douglas and other members of the party, and it appeared to Palmer that he had succeeded in re-establishing friendly relations with the government.¹⁰⁴ However, Douglas was tiring of defending the CCL to his party and it was only his "strong labour sympathies" and the interests of the national CCF which kept him from "giving Palmer and the C.C.L. in this province the tongue lashing that is coming to them. To do so would raise our stock politically in Saskatchewan because most people are fed up with them."¹⁰⁵ He did not publicly confront the CCL because he expected Congress to

remedy the situation, but if they failed to act regarding Palmer, declared Douglas, "then I will not answer for the results as far as C.C.F. - C.C.L. relations are concerned."¹⁰⁶

Others in the government tended to agree with this assessment, and feared Palmer would eventually cause a "rift" between the CCF and CCL,

Several years ago we were in the habit of running to Ottawa with our problems, but never achieved concrete results. For the past two years the line of communication between our government and Ottawa officials of the [CCL] has slowed down to a full stop ... Perhaps the time has come for a definite showdown with the Union, but in view of the serious repercussions which would result, it is a matter which should be embarked upon with the greatest of reluctance.¹⁰⁷

Following the SGA dispute, the government decided not to reconvene another meeting of the joint committee, but to take up the matter of the deteriorating relationship directly with Congress.¹⁰⁸ "It is absurd to suggest", wrote Douglas, "that our difficulties have arisen from the Government's attitude on the matter of wages, hours and conditions of work."¹⁰⁹

However, the hours of work controversy spilled onto the floor of the 1951 CCF convention when a long debate surrounded a resolution advocating the forty hour week. The problem for the labour movement was that if the resolution was defeated, the principle of the reduced work week might be killed in the process. After a two hour debate, the principle but not the practice of the forty hour week was

approved. The resolution was amended so the introduction of the reduced work week would only occur if there was widespread unemployment. Thus, the convention passed the resolution only because it did not have to be implemented, and the principle was approved only because the government did not have to live up to it.

At the Premier's request Mosher stopped in Regina on his way back from the CCL convention in Vancouver, but the Congress president was preoccupied with Conroy's sudden resignation , and the meeting was inconclusive.¹¹⁰ Douglas soon wrote Congress asking for another top level meeting in order to revive and restructure the joint committee, "...I think the situation here is so serious that unless it is dealt with in the course of the next couple of months the repercussions are liable to be unfortunate, both for the Congress and for the C.C.F."¹¹¹

The new secretary-treasurer of Congress, Donald MacDonald, travelled to Regina in February, 1952, where Douglas was most happy to discuss their mutual problems, especially since an election was approaching. Douglas and MacDonald discussed negotiation procedures, CCL-government consultations and political action matters, including CCL candidates in the upcoming election, which Douglas appeared to welcome. The Premier again suggested rekindling the ashes of the joint committee, but nothing was done.¹¹²

Congress had been searching for some time to get greater trade union involvement in the CCF because they felt it would assist them in the industrialized provinces if there was something done about showing the labour movement that they were in fact a part of the CCF and the Government. Moreover, Congress hoped that successful CCL candidates would aid the government in approaching labour matters more sympathetically. Following the Douglas-MacDonald meeting, the CCL decided to become more active in the Saskatchewan party, and two industrial trade unionists, Bill Davies and Clarence Lyons, began organizing to run for the CCF nominations in Moose Jaw and Regina. However, their nominations were defeated.¹¹³

Lyons was urged to run in Regina when a third seat was added, and his campaign supporters included many non-trade unionists.¹¹⁴ The three candidates (Lyons, Henry Baker and Marjorie Cooper) built a huge nominating convention with over 1700 voting delegates.¹¹⁵ Unfortunately, he was 'red-baited' and lost the nomination to Mrs. Marjorie Cooper, who was at the time a public representative on the Labour Relations Board.¹¹⁶

When the incumbent in Moose Jaw, D.H.R. (Dempster) Heming, got wind of Davies' intention, he began a 'smear' campaign to thwart the challenge. He sent out a circular letter to CCF members in which he claimed the CCL were out to assume "dogmatic leadership" of the party. "It is very

evident," he wrote, "that the ultimate intention is for the CCL group to have all the administrative and elective positions in the Government in return for their support."¹¹⁷ Davies had been led to believe Heming welcomed his nomination, however, he was rudely awakened to the facts when he arrived at the nominating meeting to find the hall packed with Heming's supporters. While the incident upset rank and file CCL supporters, Davies worked hard to re-elect Heming.¹¹⁸

MacDonald reacted sharply, as he was surprised at the party's reaction to the CCL nominations, and in particular, he was alarmed at Heming's tactics. He denounced the circular for its "outright lies" and wrote Douglas, "It constitutes one of the most contemptible and malicious documents that has ever been my ill-fortune to encounter." Heming's actions, and the party's 'red-baiting' of Lyons, made it difficult, he warned, to implement PAC and marshall support for the CCF. To MacDonald, their February meeting in which Douglas had appeared to welcome CCL candidates, had "lost all significance."¹¹⁹

Industrial relations problems affected the enthusiasm some workers felt for the CCF. Nevertheless, despite negotiation problems, strikes and the party's anti-CCL mood, many of the leading CCL unionists worked hard to re-elect the CCF. The labour movement, especially the CCL, still saw politics in Saskatchewan as an 'us versus them' proposition,

and the legislated benefits of the 'co-operative commonwealth' far outweighed their economic problems.¹²⁰ Nor was there an alternative politically, except the return to power of an employer dominated opposition party. The June 11 provincial election gave the CCF a "tremendous endorsement" for a third term. The Liberal opposition had been cut from 19 to 11, while CCF seats had risen from 31 to 42, and the four labour representative in the Legislature, all CCF MLA's, were re-elected. The SFL in particular did an "excellent job" in getting trade union support in the election, and the Congress applauded the "untiring efforts" of Davies in this regard.¹²¹

The rights granted to labour by the Trade Union Act earned the CCF the political support of workers. Once granted the power to protect themselves, workers used it to protect themselves from the government, as an employer, when the CCF acted as an old-fashioned capitalist. As labour relations problems deteriorated into open and bitter disputes, the government sought labour's co-operation in preventing further trouble. However, the joint committee excluded the discussion of immediate collective bargaining problems and became a forum where opposing rights were raised. Antagonism developed in their collective bargaining relationship spilled over into the committee, and the issues of union versus management 'rights' revealed the depth of differences between them. Thus, interests and rights

clashed, and when disputes in the former alienated the party sufficiently, the latter were threatened, as in the case of union security and compulsory arbitration.

Essentially the joint committee was a failure. The membership of the committee, drawn from the ranks of negotiators, could not agree when they had spent so much time in contract talks developing bitterness, animosity and suspicion. The government cried 'solidarity' as their slogan for a 'social contract', but bargained like 'hard-boiled reactionaries'. Co-operation was extremely limited, and the joint committee was in fact a forum where each side raised its rights, which the other would acknowledge, but not agree to. Much of what was discussed only reinforced their adversarial roles.¹²²

Ultimately, the Ottawa agreement was no agreement at all. Disputes, strikes, and tough bargaining did little to endear the two sides to one another, and as neither side was willing, nor had any reason to expect compromise to be beneficial to them, little was accomplished. The joint committee failed to respond to the challenge of co-operation and Congress was still directly involved in settling disputes.¹²³ The CCL continued to bargain aggressively for higher wages and the mutual confidence and co-operation that the CCF and Congress expressed to each other at the top was not reflected at the bottom.

Essentially, workers were interested in a rising standard of living, especially since their contracts were consistently eroded by inflation. The CCF on the other hand were pressed to keep costs down and to control labour. In turn, the militant bargaining of the CCL alienated the CCF, which contributed to the government's rigid wage policy. Unions did not relax their "tough bargaining stance", but cannot be faulted for that. In disputes and strikes, press statements and the general buildup of bad feelings did not help collective bargaining or the overall position of organized labour.¹²⁴

With the collapse of the joint committee concept, relations between the CCF and CCL reverted to a more traditional employer-employee basis. The CCF's third term in office was not devoid of industrial relations conflict, and the problems generated by the clash of interests in bargaining would continue after 1952. An additional problem in the worsening relations between the CCF and CCL prior to 1952 centred upon the Department of Labour. The long simmering antagonism between the Minister of Labour and CCL employees in the department further complicated relations. Early in the CCF's third term in office, problems in the Department of Labour arose which threatened relations between the CCL and CCF.

1. PAC-CCL, 128(25), Saskatchewan Government and Congress Conference 1948-1950, Chappell to Conroy, 21 December 1948, p.4

2. PAC-CCL, Secretary Treasurer's Files, 157, Palmer, C.G., Palmer to Conroy, 2 August 1948.

3. IBID. Prior to 1948, power workers were in the SCSA-TLC. Dissatisfaction with that organization led to an invitation to the IBEW-TLC in the spring of 1948. The CCL, led by Palmer, managed to persuade workers to repudiate the IBEW. The government had supported the SCSA against the CCL since 1945 when the latter first began attempts to organize Power workers. Again in 1948 the government favoured the SCSA over the EUEU-CCL. The jurisdictional dispute eventually resulted in EUEU certification for the entire Power Commission. See: Decisions and Court Cases, op.cit., p.52-55; 278-80; and 355-58. The SCSA feared the EUEU certification would amount to a "green light" for a CCL raid on the entire Association. SAB-SFL, Labour Relations Board, Minutes of the Labour Relations Board, 27 October 1948.

4. Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Seventh Annual Report, 1950, p.7

5. SAB-SFL, Conventions, Minutes of the Fourth Annual SFL Convention, November 23 and 24, 1947, p.1

6. SAB-CCF, Interprovincial Conference, George Cadbury, Briefs, Labour Policy, I, "Some Dangers", 3 December 1947.

7. IBID.

8. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Crown Corporations, Memo, Cadbury to Douglas, 9 August 1948, p.6.

9. IBID., Essentially, the crown corporations fell into three categories: the "experimental and problem" industries (the box, brick, shoe, tannery and woolen factories, and the Fish Board); those companies yet to prove themselves (STC and Government Airways); and the successful operations (SGIO, SGT, SPC and the sodium sulphate factory). The bulk of the government's investment of \$31.5 million (88%) was in the successful ventures, 7% was invested in STC and SGA, and less than 5% was invested in the unsuccessful experiments. IBID.

10. SAB-CCF, Committees, Program 1949, C.M. Fines, Provincial Treasurer, n.d., presumably late 1948 or early 1949. Fines was especially concerned with losses in the shoe and tannery factories, and in the Fish Board. These enterprises were started in "inauspicious" times and they encountered difficulties in acquiring efficient machinery, "It was

equally difficult to get adequate management and as is well known all the original managers failed the government and left a legacy of confusion from which the enterprises have never recovered." IBID. Unions in these and other industries had long complained of poor management and inefficient machinery, but the government had always responded with calls for increased productivity from workers. In any event, by the fall of 1949, the tannery and shoe factories were closed down after losses had totalled \$156,804. SAB-C.M. Fines Papers, Summary of Results, op.cit. The losses in membership suffered by the CCL was more than made up by the expansion in industrial employment in Telephones and Power in particular.

11.IBID. Total costs increased by \$26.9 million, from \$29.8 to \$56.7 million. IBID., p.1. Public service costs had increased from \$5 million to an estimated \$12 million for 1949. IBID., p.2

12.IBID., p.3

13.Davies Interview, 12 June 1986.

14.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, EAPB, Crown Corporations, Memo, Cadbury to Douglas, 9 August 1948, p.3

15.Davies Interview, 7 June 1986

16.PAC, Department of Labour Strike and Lockout Series, Microfilm Reel # T 4097, RG 27 Vol. 467, Strike No. 155, Regina Leader - Post, 27 November 1948, "Insurance office strike continues". SIEU had been certified in 1946, but Palmer complained that negotiations were lengthy owing to "the company 'quibbling' about every point small or large." Wages in the SCSA were viewed poorly by the CCL, and indeed, the SCSA tended to bargain with their 'cap in hand' and would accept whatever the government offered. The government then insisted upon applying the same settlement to CCL unions, which left insurance workers far behind other government employees.

17.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Strikes, unsigned memo on the SGIO strike, "Management Perspective", n.d., presumably 30 November 1948. SIEU asked for what amounted to a 49% increase in wages. IBID. While this was an enormous increase, it was a not uncommon practice in negotiations for unions to demand far more than what they would eventually settle for.

18.SAB-SFL, Strikes, Circular letter, Palmer to All Affiliates, 25 November 1948. Palmer was willing to compromise, and he was quite rightly indignant about the

government's refusal to make a counter offer.

19.The company was suspicious of Palmer. While he was a "clever" man, he bargained as if he were in a steel mill. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986.

20.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Strikes, H.L. Hammond, Secretary of SGIO, to W.H. Turner, President SIEU, 5 November 1948.

21.SAB-SFL, Strikes, Circular letter, Palmer to All Affiliates, 25 November 1948. SGIO's surplus was close to one and a half million dollars. SAB-C.M. Fines Papers, Summary of Results, op.cit.

22.During the 1947 negotiations, the union took a strike vote to force management to continue bargaining, but they achieved little in the end. SGIO insisted that because workers were "green" they could not be paid more, and the union made a "considerable" compromise on wages and working conditions. SAB-SFL, Strikes, Circular letter, Palmer to All affiliates, 23 November 1948.

23.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Strikes, Telegram, Mosher to Douglas, 24 November 1948.

24.IBID., Memo, T.C. Douglas to Cabinet, G.W. Cadbury and O.W.Valleau, Chairman SGIO, 20 November 1948.

25.Initially the union approved 17 out of scope personnel performing "emergency" work, but rumours that SGIO was contracting out work to private adjusters prompted union fears of 'strike-breaking', and SIEU withdrew its approval. Douglas appealed to Mosher, who ordered the reinstatement of 'emergency' work as a conciliatory gesture. IBID., Mosher to Palmer, 24 November 1948.

26.PAC-CCL, 101(3), Defunct Locals, Insurance Employees' Union, Saskatchewan, Regina, 1946-9, Chappell to Mosher, 6 December 1948, p 2. Commented Chappell: "Frankly the whole thing began to look like a Gilbert and Sullivan opera script...". IBID., p 3.

27.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Strikes, "Management Perspective", op.cit., SGIO offered \$14.81 per worker per month, while SIEU reduced its demands from \$53 to \$48. IBID. The company demanded that sealed envelopes be given simultaneously to Bryden, who would then call in each side to reveal the contents. These "dramatics" were designed to 'save face' for the government. PAC-CCL, Defunct Locals, 101(3) Insurance Employee's Union, Saskatchewan, Regina, 1946-9, Chappell to Mosher, 6 December 1948, p.2

28. The most succinct employer view was expressed in an editorial in the Winnipeg Free Press, 2 December 1948, "Saskatchewan Strikes". See also: Regina Leader-Post, 25 November 1948 editorial, "Not to be overlooked"; Toronto Financial Post, 27 November 1948, "Officials Foment Strikes?", quoted the Saskatchewan Employers' Association as blaming provincial Department of Labour officials (i.e., Hub Elkin) for "inciting and supporting" the strike. Generally, the press had a field day 'exposing' the CCF. All papers are to be found in the microfilm series of PAC, Department of Labour, Strike and Lockout Series, Microfilm Reel # T 4097, RG 27 Vol.467, Strike No.155. The strike alarmed some CCF supporters in Saskatchewan, though the vast majority in the party were not critical of the government's position. Elsewhere in Canada, concerns were voiced, and one BC trade unionist wrote Douglas urging a settlement in favour of the workers, "...we still have a long row to hoe before getting a really substantial measure of support from the Trade Union movement in Canada. ... an unsatisfactory settlement of the strike would be a catastrophe ...". SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Strikes, J. O'Brien, Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, Lodge 1040, Vancouver, to Douglas, 26 November 1948. Douglas, however, considered the strike almost "inevitable" and felt the "show-down" would in the long run make for a better permanent understanding. IBID., Douglas to O'Brien, 3 December 1948.

29. PAC, Department of Labour Strike and Lockout Series, op.cit., Regina Leader-Post, 6 December 1948, "Insurance strike settled; staff accepts 35 percent". In fact, SIEU settled for roughly one-third of their demands, which amounted to about a 17% wage increase. This still left them behind rates in the SCSA, however. No further strikes occurred in SGIO as subsequent wage settlements averaged 5-10%. Palmer was prone to exaggerate union wage demands in contract negotiations with the government, but it was his style, more than his demands, which upset government negotiators.

30. However, not all TLC members supported the union. The SCSA criticized the SIEU, while others felt the strike had been created by "left-wingers" out to discredit the government. PAC, Department of Labour, Strike and Lockout Series, op.cit., Regina Leader-Post, 23 November 1948, "TLC deplores strike; quick settlement urged".

31. SAB-SFL, Conventions, Minutes of the Fifth Annual SFL Convention, December 3 and 4, 1948, p 9. He was referring to the Taft-Hartley Act which placed restrictions on unions.

32. IBID., Rough Draft of the Minutes, p 4.

33.PAC-CCL, 125(28), Saskatchewan Government and Congress Conference 1948-1950, Palmer to Conroy, 22 December 1948.

34.IBID., p 1-2.

35.IBID., p 2. Wage differentials were seen as somewhat of a government "mania". IBID. The issue originated in SCSA negotiations, which exasperated the CCL that their wages and working conditions would be dependent upon SCSA, settlements.

36.IBID. Inflation heightened union demands for across-the-board wage increases, and the government's offers of cost-of-living bonuses fell far short of union expectations.

37.IBID.

38.The UMWA and the coal operators had bargained fruitlessly for months, and the latter precipitated the strike by rejecting a conciliation report and walking out of negotiations on 2 November 1948. Repeated attempts by the Department of Labour to conciliate the dispute failed as the companies consistently refused to compromise. The government intervened because of the threatened coal shortages, and Douglas pressed the operators to compromise, at one point threatening to impose a controller. The operators would not consider a settlement, however, without a government agreement for a price increase. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Memo, Bryden to Douglas, 9 December 1948. On the strike see: Makahonuk, G., "Labour Relations and the Saskatchewan Coal Miners' Strike of 1948-1949", Saskatchewan History, Vol.39(1), Winter 1986.

39.The Western Dominion Coal Company provided emergency coal to the communities experiencing shortages. Douglas had arranged such supplies and eventually convinced the company to intervene and force a compromise on the other operators. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Strikes, J.R. Brodie, President, Western Dominion Coal Company, to Douglas, 10 January 1949. For press reaction to the strike see: Regina Leader-Post editorial, "Who fixed coal prices?", 1 February 1949, IBID.

40.PAC-CCL, 128(25), Saskatchewan Government and Congress Conference, Chappell to Conroy, 21 December 1948, p.4

41.IBID., "The Saskatchewan Government Brief to the SFL", 17 December 1948, p 1.

42.IBID., p 2.

43. IBID., p 4.

44. IBID., p 3.

45. IBID.

46. SAB-CCF, Committees, Program 1949, Proposed Program for the C.C.F. - 1949-1952, Labour Legislation, n.d., presumably early 1949.

47. IBID., Chappell to Conroy, 21 December 1948, p 1.

48. IBID., p 3. Chappell urged Conroy to come to Regina and create the new joint committee "on the spot". IBID. However, as in 1947, the committee was planned first in Ontario, and then applied later in Saskatchewan.

49. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Strikes, Douglas to Mosher, 21 December 1948, p 1. Copies were sent to Lewis, Conroy and Coldwell.

50. IBID.

51. IBID. The letter went through three drafts before it was sent. In the second draft, written by Don Black of the Industrial Development Office, this passage read: "...whether there is to be peace, armed neutrality, or war, between us." IBID., Draft of a letter to be sent to Mr. Mosher, 18 December 1948, p 3.

52. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Miscellaneous, Memo, "GWC", n.d., presumably early January, 1949, p.1

53. In response to the failure of the earlier committee, the agreement to reestablish the committee stressed the need for more initiative from both sides to ensure regular meetings and an atmosphere of "good faith". SAB-SFL, CCL, Joint Industrial Relations Committee, National CCF-CCL Conference, January 24-6, 1949, in Ottawa, General Agenda and Conclusions Reached at the Conference Between Representatives of the Government of Saskatchewan and Representatives of the Canadian Congress of Labour., p.2

54. On other specific issues, such as seniority, wage 'ranges', and arbitration clauses in collective agreements, the conference was less successful, and these and other matters were referred to the provincial committee. This co-operation was contingent upon local union approval, which proved not to be forthcoming. Workers were uninterested in incentive plans or production committees, and these were rarely implemented, and did not work well or last long.

Palmer was hostile to the notion of labour representation on the Boards of Directors of Crown Corporations, and in any case, no volunteers came forward from the labour movement, and those unionists approached by the government, such as Bill Davies, politely but firmly refused.

55. PAC-CCL, Secretary-Treasurer's Files, 157, Palmer, Conroy to Palmer, 9 March 1949.

56. IBID., Defunct Locals, 97(8), Electrical Utilities Employees' Union, Conroy to Douglas, 3 April 1949

57. IBID.

58. PAC-CCF, Vol. 67, Advisory, Economic and Planning Board, Cadbury to Lewis, 30 March 1949.

59. IBID., p 3.

60. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Legislation, Memo, Williams to Douglas and All Cabinet Ministers, 16 February 1949. Attached draft Bill, "An Act to provide for Essential Services of Public Utilities", p 1; and IBID., Memo, M.C. Shumiatcher, Counsel to the Government, to Douglas and Williams, 3 March 1949. Shumiatcher argued it would be "undesirable" to enact the legislation at that time, and suggested that if it were ever necessary, they could call an emergency session of the Legislature.

61. PAC-CCL, Defunct Locals, 97(8), Electrical Utilities Employees' Union, SPC News Release, 16 April 1949. A federal election was widely expected in 1949, and the Douglas government did not want to contribute to the national party's problems by provoking unions in Saskatchewan. Workers received a wage increase of \$10-\$25 per month, but this still left them far behind other government workers. Inflation soon eclipsed this modest gain.

62. IBID., Secretary-Treasurer's Files, 157, Palmer, C.G., Conroy to Chappell, 1 June 1949. Chappell was in Saskatchewan to mediate negotiations.

63. SAB-SFL, CCL, Joint Industrial Relations Committee, Proposed Agendas for Government and CCL Industrial Relations Committee, n.d., presumably June, 1949.

64. IBID., p 2.

65. For example, while the government representatives cried 'solidarity', they sought union agreement to management's exclusive prerogative to decide the duties, responsibilities

and qualifications for all jobs or job reclassifications without union input. This provoked an angry union response that they be entitled to at least bargain on the reclassifications. However, the government would not budge and the issue was not resolved.

66.SAB-SFL, CCL, Joint Industrial Relations Committee, JIRC Meeting, January, 1950.

67. PAC-CCL, 125(28), Saskatchewan Government and Congress Conference 1948 - 50, Palmer to Conroy, 27 January 1950.

68.SAB-SFL, SPC 1950, Williams to Tomlinson, General Manager, SPC, copy to Conroy, 13 February 1950. Williams refused the request despite acknowledging the failure of informal conciliation. The Union nominated Bill Davies; the SPC, J.W.W. Graham, and the Union agreed to the corporation's choice of Chairman, V.C. Fowke.

69.For union security, See: Chapter IV, footnote #6

70.PAC-CCL, 125(29), Saskatchewan Government and Proposed Legislation, Davies to Conroy, 1 March 1950. Davies led a delegation which included 16 CCL and 7 TLC trade unionists. It is interesting to note that I.C. Nollett, Minister of Agriculture, supported the unions' views.

71.SAB-SFL, Trade Union Act, SFL Submission to Cabinet on Union Security and Compulsory Arbitration, n.d., presumably 8 March 1950, p 3.

72.IBID., p 2.

73.Williams had broached the subject in a letter to Conroy, and the response of Congress was a swift and emphatic 'no'. PAC-CCL, Secretary-Treasurer's Files, 157, Palmer, C.G., 1950-2, Part I, Williams to Conroy, 11 February 1950

74.SAB-SFL, Trade Union Act, SFL Submission to Cabinet, op.cit., p 4.

75.IBID.

76.PAC-CCL, 125(29), Saskatchewan Government and Proposed Legislation, Davies to Conroy, 10 March 1950. Williams blamed the whole episode on Elkin, now the Deputy Minister, and on Davies. The former was "indiscreet" while the latter violated the "confidence" of Elkin. IBID., Williams to Conroy, 20 March 1950. In fact, Elkin made sure he had the authority to discuss the issue with the SFL in accordance with the government's policy of consulting with labour on matters affecting them. Essentially, the government, and

especially Williams, was embarrassed at the vigorous response of labour, and Williams looked for a "scapegoat". IBID., Davies to Conroy, 29 March 1950. For relations between the Minister of Labour and the CCL, see next chapter.

77.IBID.

78.IBID., Williams to Conroy, 11 March 1950.

79.IBID., Davies to Conroy, 29 March 1950

80.SAB-SFL, SPC 1950, Reply to Brief Submitted by the Union

81.IBID., Reply to SPC's Brief and Exhibit, p 1.

82.IBID., Majority Report 31 March 1950, V.C. Fowke and W.G. Davies, p 3-4. The increase recommended was \$5-\$20 per month, but other union demands, including the 40 hour week, were left to subsequent negotiations. The government's nominee, J.W.W. Graham, rejected across-the-board increases in favour of individually negotiated adjustments in the 75 wage classifications in Power. IBID., Conciliation Report, J.W.W. Graham, p 5.

83.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet Minute 728, 14 April 1950

84.IBID., Cabinet Minute 765, 2 May 1950

85.IBID., Executive Assistant's Files, Crown Corporations, Cabinet Industrial Relations Committee, Minutes, 4 May 1950.

86.SAB-SFL, SPC 1950, SPC Bulletin, "Power Strike--Yes or No?", May 1950, p 2.

87.IBID.

88.PAC -CCL, 125 (31), Saskatchewan Power Corporation and the Electrical Utilities Employees' Union 1950, Chappell to Conroy, 10 May 1950, p 1. The Regina Leader-Post inflamed the situation when it claimed the CCL (i.e., Palmer) was threatening to withdraw its political support from the government unless negotiations were resumed forthwith. SAB-SFL, Strikes, Regina Leader-Post, 28 April 1950, "Electric Union talks stalemated". The story stung Douglas and it represented an obstacle to a settlement until Davies finally convinced the Premier of the malevolent intent of the press. IBID., Davies to Douglas, 15 May 1950.

89.PAC-CCL, 125(31), Saskatchewan Power Corporation and the Electrical Utilities Employees' Union 1950, Chappell to Conroy, 10 May 1950, p 2. Chappell related that Joe Phelps, "...well-known for his reactionary views on organized labour ... has jockeyed the government into a very tough spot ...[through his] ... smoothly operating 'farm machine'." IBID.

90.IBID.

91.IBID., Memo, Conroy to Mosher, 16 May 1950.

92.IBID., Conroy to Palmer, 16 May 1950

93.IBID., Mosher to Palmer, 17 May 1950

94.IBID., Mosher to Palmer, 30 May 1950

95.PAC-CCL, Secretary-Treasurer's Files, 157, Palmer, C.G., 1950-2, Part I, Palmer to Conroy, 15 August 1950. Wage increases of \$5-\$35 per month were granted.

96.SAB-TCD, Executive Assistant's Files, Crown Corporations, Cabinet Industrial Relations Committee, Memo, Cadbury to Douglas, Government - Labour Relations, 9 June 1950

97.See: PAC, Strike and Lockout Series, for this strike.

98.SAB-SFL, CCL, Joint Industrial Relations Committee, JIRC Meeting, 28 December 1950. An example of management attitudes to labour followed the 1950 SPC negotiations, when crown corporation managers were educated on the "basic insecurity" of trade unions which originated in the knowledge they could be "dispensed with", while management was "indispensable". Unions, they were told, existed "upon contract, legal sanction and political support all of which are revocable. ... An inevitable result of the knowledge of this on the part of the union is a feeling of insecurity, and, arising out of that, an assertiveness and a touchiness." Managers were told to "convert" these feelings into usefulness for themselves. SAB-TCD, Ministerial Files, Miscellaneous, SPC, Address of F. Copithorne, CA, Comptroller, SPC, at a Meeting of Managers of Crown Corporations at Regina, Saskatchewan, on October 23, 1950., p 3.

99.SAB-SFL, Strikes, Palmer to Conroy, 26 July 1951.

100.During the strike, the company publicly 'smeared' Millar's reputation as a pilot, yet, while the strike was on, the former owner of the airline offered Millar a job as a pilot. Palmer countered the company's remarks by alleging SGA disregarded safety factors in their operations (i.e.,

long hours and over-loading). The accidents were to skis and floats which suggests overloading, but J.H. Brockelbank called Palmer's statements "far-fetched" and "doubletalk". The publicity generated by the strike again shows how antagonistic the two sides were. Once again, it was the government which initiated the publicity. IBID., Statements on Air Strike By Union Representatives and the Hon. J.H. Brockelbank, The Commonwealth, 18 July 1951, p 3. Millar was ultimately reinstated.

101.PAC-CCL, 125(30), Saskatchewan Government and Correspondence Concerning Government Unions, Conroy to Palmer, 7 August 1951.

102.IBID., Telegram, Mosher to Palmer, 16 July 1951

103.SAB-SFL, Strikes, Palmer to Conroy, 26 July 1951. p 3.

104.IBID., Palmer to Conroy, 23 July 1951. Despite Palmer's explanation, Douglas was not reassured, and viewed the Regional Director as "the perfect enigma." SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, EAPB, Saskatchewan Government Airways Strike 1951, Douglas to M.J. Coldwell, 16 July 1951.

105.IBID., Douglas to Coldwell, 26 July 1951.

106.IBID.

107.IBID., Memo, D.H.F. Black, Director, Industrial Development Office, to Douglas, 1 August 1951.

108.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Premier, Industrial Relations Committee of the Cabinet, Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Industrial Relations Committee, 14 September 1951.

109.IBID., EAPB, Saskatchewan Government Airways Strike 1951, Douglas to Coldwell, 26 July 1951.

110.On Conroy's resignation, See: Abella, I.M., Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour, op.cit., Ch.10

111.PAC-CCL, 198(13), Provincial Governments, Saskatchewan, General, Part II, 1945-53, Douglas to Chappell, Acting Secretary Treasurer, CCL, 2 October 1951

112.PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.8, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence, 1952, MacDonald to Douglas, 7 May 1952, p.2

113.Both Davies and Lyons had been contemplating political careers for some time. Davies and Lyons related that they were probably defeated because they were more progressive than many of the others in the party, and would have been a

thorn in the side of the government. They were defeated, Lyons concluded, "...because we were probably ahead of them in our thinking. ... They preferred to have the docile type, like Charlie Williams and Dempster Heming ... in there." Lyons Interview, 21 August 1986

114. As long as the highly popular Fines and Williams were around there was no purpose in seeking a nomination in Regina.

115. Lyons Interview, 21 August 1986. Douglas supported the idea of having a woman on the government side of the House, but he refrained from endorsing any candidate. Mrs. Douglas campaigned for Mrs. Cooper, and it was generally known that Tommy preferred Cooper. Lyons was not critical of this, but rather, the actions of certain other CCF'ers who opposed his nomination.

116. IBID., Supporters of the anti-CCL group met delegates at the door of the nominating meeting, shook hands with everyone and asked, "Well, are you going to vote for a woman or a communist?" This is not to suggest that Mrs. Cooper was in any way connected with the 'red-baiting', and the unsuccessful candidates did not believe this to be so. Rather, local unionists suspected that it was the work of a small anti-labour clique in the party that was supported, if not directed, by Charlie Williams and Clarence Fines.

117. SAB-SFL, Political Action Committee, D.H.R. Heming to All CCF Members, 15 April 1952.

118. Davies admitted that one factor in the CCL's nomination struggles was the CCF's fear of CCL domination. He stated the whole episode reflected the "petit bourgeois McCarthyism" of the period. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986

119. PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol. 8, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence, 1952, MacDonald to Douglas, 7 May 1952.

120. A similar argument could be made regarding farmers who were the main beneficiaries of the planned economy. That is; despite rural discontent with militant unions, farmers were reluctant to blame the CCF for conceding wage increases in the Power Corporation, for example. During provincial elections, the overall importance of the CCF was uppermost in the minds of farmers and they would not express their displeasure with contract settlements by voting against the government. On the other hand, it appears that their growing antagonism to organized labour may have informed the motives of those anti-labour forces within the party that had worked to prevent CCL unionists from gaining the CCF nominations in Moose Jaw and Regina.

121.SAB-SFL, Conventions, Twelfth Annual Convention, CCL, September 22, 1952, Toronto, Report of PAC, p.21 Lyons believed the "party apparatus" did not want labour too active in the CCF. Because it was a "people's party", the CCF leadership would grant labour some reforms, but it would not go too far and it did not want labour involved in the party. The CCF were afraid labour would become their leaders, and that the party would therefore begin to listen to them instead. They feared labour would supplant them as the party "establishment". Lyons Interview, 21 August 1986

122.According to Davies, "plants of this kind need some pretty good soil and sympathetic treatment; sunshine, TLC..."; unfortunately, he concluded, there were not enough of these ingredients around and the joint committee, "died on the vine." He argued that the government did not show enough "innovation and imagination", so the whole fault for the collapse of the joint committee did not lie with the unions. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986

123.Clarence Lyons complained that the only time Congress officials came to Saskatchewan was when there were problems. "One of the tragic mistakes ... that Congress made, was not involving local people in any and all discussions that they had with the CCF Government. There were all kinds of times when they came in ... had their meetings and left, and we didn't even know they were here. ... We were the ones here that had to do the work ... and if we were going to be effective in doing our work we would have been a lot more effective if we had been involved at all levels of these discussions." Lyons Interview, 21 August 1986

124.Davies Interview, 12 June 1986

CHAPTER VII
RELATIONS 1952-1956

The government's private enterprise orientation, and its reluctance to legislate further gains for the labour movement were reinforced by union rejection of the social contract and the collapse of the joint committee. Relations between the CCF and CCL became more formal, distant and unco-operative, especially after the 'red-baiting' episode, and each side blamed the other for their problems. By the end of 1952, CCF-CCL relations were at their nadir, and labour unrest came to a head in the 1954-55 wage dispute in the Power corporation. Yet, it was not only legislation, wage conflict, or friction with the party that caused the relationship to deteriorate. Rather, underlining CCF-CCL industrial and political problems were relations between the Minister of Labour and local unionists.

Problems within the Department of Labour began early in 1948, when Ken Bryden expressed a desire to return to Ontario and become more actively involved in the CCF party. The SFL immediately began to press for H.S.(Hub) Elkin's appointment as Bryden's successor as Deputy Minister of Labour.¹ They were concerned that the government would appoint Williams' preference, P.W. Haffner, Personnel Director for the City of Regina, and a former active member of the TLC. Certainly Williams opposed Elkin's nomination

because the Minister had not forgotten who had led the 1944 trade union delegation protesting his appointment and demanding his resignation. This confrontation had reinforced Williams' "inherent" opposition to industrial unionism, and left a lasting resentment with him.²

The SFL made quiet representations on Elkin's behalf to Douglas and others in the government, and they urged Congress to make their support known as well. Conroy, however, responded cautiously, as he felt the appointment was directly related to their 'labour loyalty' to the CCF, which in early 1948, was in some doubt.³ The SFL worked hard for the CCF during the provincial election campaign and following the re-election of the Douglas Government they again approached Congress for their support in securing Elkin's appointment. Mosher, however, was personally opposed to such interference and the Federation was left to act alone.⁴

Without the support of Congress, the SFL redoubled its efforts to persuade Douglas and the government of the desirability of Elkin's appointment. Bryden supported Elkin's nomination, which undoubtedly aided his cause, and at the end of March, 1949, Elkin was appointed Deputy Minister of Labour. Perhaps the government felt that such a key appointment would improve relations with the CCL; relations which were in serious trouble following the SGIO and coal strikes. The appointment, in any event, satisfied

a long-standing grievance of the CCL that they had little 'clout' in the Department of Labour. 5

The TLC was naturally upset that their man was not chosen, but it was the Saskatchewan Employer's Association (SEA) which protested most vigorously, denouncing Elkin for his alleged 'bias'.⁶ However, it was not with the TLC nor even with the SEA that Elkin subsequently encountered problems. Rather, his own boss, Charlie Williams, expressed his displeasure with the appointment by isolating Elkin and denying him the prerogatives of the position, and by increasing his campaign to force the more 'aggressive' trade unionists from the department.

Hub Elkin brought to the Department of Labour his experience as an organizer, a conciliator, and an administrator. He was even more persistent and hard-working than Bryden, and he continually sought to advance labour's rights. As Deputy Minister, however, he refused to play Bryden's former role as mediator between the government and its workers, and he studiously avoided intervening in CCF-CCL bargaining disputes which he felt should have settled through 'outside' mediation.⁷ Elkin's refusal to become involved in disputes between the government and its employees did not help his cause with Williams, who was already suspicious and resentful of his new deputy. The situation in the Department of Labour simmered from 1949 to 1952, adding an element of rancour to the increasingly

strained CCF-CCL relations.

Following the deterioration in CCF-CCL relations in 1951, Douglas appeared to relent to Congress' desires to have Williams replaced as labour minister. Donald MacDonald, Pat Conroy's replacement as secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Congress of Labour, met with the Premier in February 1952, when they discussed, among other things, nominations for the upcoming election. CCL hopes had been raised by the Premier's apparent 'promise' to switch the Minister to another post, and the unions, "took everything that Williams threw at them because they did not want to rock the boat before the election."⁸

Williams shared the business-oriented views of the farmer-dominated CCF and was a popular politician, enjoying considerable business support at the polls. He received the largest plurality among MLA's in the 1952 election, which put him in such a strong position in the government that Douglas could not exert the authority he had previously held.

CCL unionists were particularly incensed with Williams' rumoured involvement in rejecting CCL nominations for the CCF 'ticket', where Congress alleged he capitalized on the agricultural background of the cabinet, some members of which were "openly hostile" to the CCL. CCF opposition to CCL party candidates in 1952 affected CCL-PAC strength and support in Saskatchewan, which MacDonald lamented was

"rapidly declining". The CCL's political support for the CCF was likely to continue to deteriorate unless something was done, and make it impossible to organize PAC support for the CCF government in the future. "Some of our unions feel that their interests are being jeopardized", MacDonald stated, "because of our natural reluctance to create any untoward situation which would cause embarrassment to the Government or a rupture in our relationships."⁹

However, June passed and nothing was done, and William's personal handling of the department, especially his personnel practices, led him into quarrels with the labour movement. The CCL considered Elkin capable of running the department, if he was given the chance, and the Minister's actions produced "widespread dissatisfaction".¹⁰ When Williams was not removed from the labour post in 1952, discontent increased amongst CCL unions, who did not feel they would ever receive 'justice' from him.

Williams interfered most in the hiring process where he managed to acquire information on applicants to the department. Successful applicants were often hired, not for their competence, but for their personal loyalty to Williams. Aggressive and dedicated trade unionists, especially, but not exclusively, from the CCL, often encountered "considerable difficulty getting appointments."¹¹ Williams, moreover, appeared to favour his personal appointees including those allegedly "openly hostile to labour."¹²

Elkin endured the machinations of his boss, and struggled with Williams over the prerogatives of a Deputy Minister, but steadily lost ground. Like Elkin, there were other employees in the department who by their actions, annoyed the Minister. This was especially true of employees who applied and enforced the labour laws with consistency and vigour, and those who persistently advocated further labour reforms.¹³ Williams allegedly discriminated against and fired such employees, regardless of their competence, dedication or labour background, and one such case led to Elkin's resignation.

G.L. (Gordon) Quaale, a former carpenter, and a dedicated and effective Industrial Standards Officer, was discharged by Williams ostensibly for an automobile accident. The incident had been reported to the department immediately, Quaale had paid for the damages, and at the time nothing more was said. Close to a year later, in the fall of 1952, Williams fired Quaale, citing the accident as sufficient grounds. The carpenters' locals and TLC councils protested the dismissal as a "direct attack" on labour, and demanded Quaale's immediate reinstatement, and the SFL viewed it as part of Williams' plan to force out, "all except the sycophants and rightwingers."¹⁴

Williams was taken aback that the TLC would criticize him, and he demanded that Quaale "square" the minister with those labour organizations that had protested his dismissal;

yet he did not promise reinstatement.¹⁵ Quaale did not feel obliged to 'square' Williams with anyone, and complained that his dismissal was the result of the Minister's desire to keep certain positions in the department as rewards for his "personal supporters".¹⁶

Quaale was a dedicated department employee who conscientiously applied the labour laws as he believed they had been intended by the CCF. His firing greatly dismayed Elkin, as it was unjust and removed from the department another hardworking, effective defender of labour's rights. Quaale's dismissal led to the resignation of one of the labour department's research assistants, W.A. Beckett, a former electrical utility employee from Saskatoon. Beckett was frustrated that Williams appeared "indifferent, if not hostile to" impartial economic research into labour matters.¹⁷ Moreover, he was incensed that conscientious employees, like himself or Quaale, were "smeared, villified [sic] and in other ways discriminated against", while others in the department worked "openly and dishonestly" against the government's interests but had their mistakes ignored and "their misdemeanors cloaked with Ministerial immunity. The only requirement is that they be loyal to the Minister personally."¹⁸

Following Quaale's dismissal and Beckett's resignation, Williams began to interfere more with Elkin's position. While circumventing the established lines of authority and

directly administering certain branches, Williams communicated little with Elkin, isolated him from Cabinet, and controlled the department personally.¹⁹ Excluded from the hiring process, Elkin was forced to endure subordinates in whom he had no confidence; and forbidden to attend any functions outside the department, including the deputy minister's conferences, he was only allowed to speak at the annual SFL convention.²⁰ Williams exerted as much control as he could over his deputy, and when Elkin, following CCF policy, advised the labour movement of impending legislation, he would often get into 'tangles' with his superior.

The last straw came when the Minister countermanded Elkin's direct orders to the branch heads without even telling him. The incident reflected the powerlessness and increasing frustration of the Deputy Minister; it had in fact, Elkin complained, "practically destroyed the last vestige of prestige and control" he had in the department.²¹ Elkin decided to resign, but was persuaded to remain until the SFL convention in late November. In the meantime, SFL president Lloyd Gardiner met with Elkin to persuade him not to resign.

Elkin reminded Gardiner that he had stayed on until the convention as promised, but he was convinced he would have to resign eventually, and the convention was to be his forum. After much pleading, Gardiner convinced him to

remain within the department, at least temporarily because, notwithstanding his talents as a union representative, he was more useful to the movement within the department, than outside of it.²²

Word of Elkin's impending resignation produced extreme anger within the SFL, and some consternation. Resolutions submitted to the executive for consideration at the convention denounced the Minister's personnel and personal practices in the department, and threatened to discontinue labour support for the CCF.²³ The resolutions reflected a growing movement within the CCL to demand a public denunciation of Williams, and his actions and practices in the department, and to demand a new labour minister.

Chappell warned Douglas that the upcoming SFL convention might speak to the matter in a "hot-headed moment", and he was concerned with the probable political consequences. "The opposition to Williams is bitter and I suspect with some legitimacy;" Chappell told Douglas,

you know as well as I do that this is not new, but what surprises me is that the talk has been confined within the limits of the top CCL representatives. I rather think the Leader Post would give its eye teeth to hear some of the things which were said to me and the fact that the newspapers have got nothing yet betokens an amazing loyalty on the part of the CCL group to the Government.²⁴

The SFL executive was split over the resolutions. Some were in favour of the resolutions being debated and passed, "and let the chips fall where they may." Others, such as Cy

Palmer, thought such action by the smallest section of the labour movement would be a hopeless gesture, and would only serve to rally the TLC to the Minister's side. Davies counselled caution because the inflammatory resolutions would only "isolate" the SFL from the department, the government, and possibly even from Congress. During the discussion, Gardiner telephoned MacDonald, who asked that the SFL "not upset the apple cart", and try to have the resolutions withdrawn, assuring the SFL he would meet Douglas and rectify the situation.²⁵ This did not appease everyone, as such action had been tried in the past without success, yet they feared the consequences of an "open-break".²⁶

Rather than drafting an alternative, and milder resolution, the SFL executive finally agreed the three resolutions should be withdrawn, and that Gardiner would read a prepared statement to a closed session of the convention, which would deal with the issue in general terms. Shortly before lunch on Sunday 23 November 1952, Gardiner called the convention into a closed session, and read his prepared statement. He called on the delegates not to debate the resolutions owing to MacDonald's request that it be deferred until Congress could act. After his statement was completed, he asked the convention to rise and observe a minute of silence on the death of CIO president Phillip Murray. "The silence was impressive.", wrote

Gardiner, "By the time this was over it was 12 noon and I adjourned the convention to dinner. I then breathed a big sigh of relief."²⁷

The SFL had dodged the bullet, but the real test remained. Elkin had only reluctantly agreed to stay on temporarily, and they would have to persuade him to withdraw his resignation, and convince Douglas to remove Williams from his post. A month later, at the end of December, Gardiner anxiously inquired of MacDonald as to the state of the Premier's commitments. He feared some SFL members had had their hopes raised, and were in for a "bitter disappointment".

I very frankly do not hold much faith in Premier Douglas's promises. He is a genuinely fine fellow, but I am sorry to say that I have found that he is prone to understand the other fellow's problem so well that his big and kindly heart speaks instead of his head, and that he therefore sometimes is liable to promise things he hasn't a chance of accomplishing. I don't mean that he intends to mislead or bluff people, for I believe that he really is sincere at the time he is speaking to you. The fact is though, that he later finds that he can't accomplish what he thought he could, and then you go through a period of being put off because he hasn't the time to attend to it. It is then that one begins to find out what a smart politician he is, and you find yourself beginning to wonder, as I have many times, whether or not he was really genuine at all. This is the depth, but following that one sees the great things that this lion-hearted little man is accomplishing for our every-day people against over-whelming odds and the bitter antagonism of powerful interests and you are prone to shake your head and say, 'Gosh, I don't know what to think.'²⁸

In early January, 1953, Gardiner and Davies met

Douglas, showed him the resolutions, presented some of the facts surrounding Elkin's decision to resign, and asked that Williams be replaced. They assured the Premier they wished to avoid publicity which would damage their PAC program and the prestige of the CCF party.²⁹ Douglas suggested that he had contemplated a ministerial change, but that he could not find a suitable replacement. The Premier had spoken to MacDonald on the matter, and had taken it to Cabinet which had refused to accept Elkin's resignation and had criticized Williams for his running of the department.³⁰ As well, Douglas had spoken to Williams privately and felt the minister sincerely wanted a chance to develop 'harmony' in the department. The Premier agreed to appoint a committee of Cabinet to investigate the matter, but only if the SFL agreed to first see Williams, and only if the Minister did nothing. Douglas further suggested that Elkin draft a memo to Williams setting out what prerogatives he required to stay.³¹

Gardiner and Davies reluctantly agreed to meet Williams, which they did that afternoon. They read the resolutions to him and spoke of the rank and file dissatisfaction which was expressed in a demand for a special convention to deal with the issue. Williams reacted by stating that the CCL had always been "after his scalp" ever since 1944, and he pertinently remarked that Elkin had led the delegation.³² The meeting lasted ninety minutes,

but the Minister refused to make concessions, calling the resolutions the work of a "'few extremists'".³³ They reminded Williams that they had kept the resolutions from the floor of the convention, and suggested that had they been 'out to get him', there had been other occasions and "countless ways".³⁴ They informed the Minister that they would be approaching the Premier to create a Cabinet committee to investigate the matter, but Williams warned that the SFL would suffer more than he would if they went to the press. Needless to say, Gardiner and Davies were "extremely disappointed" with the Minister's response.³⁵

Acting on the Premier's suggestion, Elkin sent a memo to Williams dealing with the proper minister - deputy relationship, but Williams refused Elkin's conditions, and the latter referred the matter to Cabinet. As promised, a Cabinet committee was created, and it met with an SFL delegation in late February 1953.³⁶ It was evident to the delegation that the Minister wanted to get into a "brawl" over the contents of the resolutions as Williams immediately launched into a litany of problems between the CCL and the department. The delegation restrained itself until Williams became "particularly repulsive in his remarks and attitudes." When Williams declared that had the resolutions made it to the convention floor, the SFL would have suffered as much as the government, Douglas was "pretty sharp with him", and suggested the SFL should receive

cabinet's appreciation for their efforts.³⁷

However, as the meeting progressed, Douglas retreated from his earlier position, and appeared reluctant to back the SFL. "I got the unhappy impression", wrote Gardiner, "that Mr. Douglas was beginning to cast about for a way of backing away from some of his bold statements."³⁸ Even Bill Davies, the CCF's strongest supporter in the SFL, felt the change in the Premier's attitude was "the most significant thing in the whole meeting ...".³⁹ Williams appeared unrepentant and unconcerned with the bitterness felt in the labour movement over his 'poor' administration of the Department of Labour, and he pressed the SFL to give him copies of the resolutions, presumably, wrote Davies, "for the purpose of stirring things up."⁴⁰

The situation concerned Congress because it appeared the CCF no longer cared for their concerns, and were not prepared to act on the Department of Labour problems.⁴¹ MacDonald visited Douglas whenever he was in Regina, and knew the Premier appreciated the need for good relations in view of their national political relationship and the effect adverse publicity would have. Douglas had admitted to MacDonald that he understood the effects Williams' attitudes and practices had on CCF-CCL relations, and he had promised action up to and including removing the Minister to another post. This had been relayed to the SFL, who held Douglas in "high esteem", and they in turn worked to prevent an open

display of their differences with Williams. However, no action was taken, and Congress sensed their unions in Saskatchewan were "rapidly losing" confidence in the Premier because he had not delivered the promised changes.⁴²

Local CCL unions were indeed becoming worried over relations with the government, and in the spring of 1953 a staff seminar was held to deal with the attitude of CCF members towards labour, the resolutions problems and the Department of Labour, and the government's legislative program. They found themselves in a difficult position, as the general membership was becoming more aware of the situation and were "very resentful" of it.⁴³ The CCL representatives were alarmed at the state of union-government relations, and anxious that Congress and the government reach a definite understanding on their outstanding complaints. "We are convinced we can no longer sit on the lid," they told Congress, and they felt something positive had to be done to "ward off an 'ultimate explosion'."⁴⁴

In the spring of 1953, Douglas also reviewed labour relations in government operations, and blamed unions for not understanding the "financial limits" of crown corporations. He argued that unionists had not recognized that they competed in a capitalistic market, and they were in danger of pricing themselves out of business by making "excessive" wage demands which meant increased subsidies not

long tolerated by the taxpayer. This had occurred, he continued, in the tannery and shoe factories, and in the woolen mill, and was about to befall the box factory.

Blaming wage settlements resulting from conciliation board recommendations, Douglas argued that "trade union organizers ha[d] one standard for Crown Corporations, and another standard for private companies." This was illustrated, he stated, in SGIO where it was the only insurance company organized, and where labour costs were twenty-five per cent higher than their competitors. They could not continue to pay high wages and remain competitive, he declared, and the government was forced either to close its plants or "dig in its heels" and risk continual labour disputes. Had the unions organized its competitors, he concluded, perhaps the government would not be in that position.⁴⁵

Congress could not disagree more. MacDonald replied that their union representatives appreciated the government's problems, sympathized with them, and that they were willing to co-operate without sacrificing their principles or policies. They rejected the Premier's claims that labour costs forced the closure of government plants, and argued that the real problem was that "...these other firms...are paying too little, not that the Crown companies are paying too much." The unions well knew the economic implications of their bargaining positions, and they

understood the various cost factors in production, which included raw materials, equipment, management, and marketing. Therefore, Congress told Douglas, their policies "[we]re not predicated on a superficial analysis of labour costs alone."⁴⁶

For Congress the basic difficulty was not collective bargaining, but "the unsympathetic or hostile attitude of the government."⁴⁷ In particular, Congress complained of the attitude of Charlie Williams and the administrative practices of the Department of Labour, "which have been reflected in almost every aspect of our relationship." The situation had become "acute" , they told Douglas, because CCF MLA's lacked sympathy with labour generally, and with the CCL in particular. This was illustrated by the "open opposition" of the CCF to CCL nominations in 1952, by Government opposition to the SFL's legislative recommendations, and by CCF opposition to CCL personnel.⁴⁸ In all cases, Williams figured prominently.

MacDonald reminded Douglas that he had promised the SFL, on the Premier's assurances, that the Department of Labour problems would be rectified. However, Douglas had not even alluded to the matter in his letter, and as far as Congress was concerned, until the matter was settled, it would be difficult to retain, "even the facade of co-operation and good relationships."⁴⁹

The exchange of views between Douglas and MacDonald did

not resolve the Department of Labour situation and relations remained strained. The SFL believed the outlook for better relations "was not optimistic."⁵⁰ The mood in the SFL was indeed unhappy. Gardiner wrote Davies in October, 1953, complaining of their relations with the government, and vented his anger and disillusionment with their "rabid farmer friends" in the CCF.

... The attitude of this farmer government doesn't seem to have improved towards the CCL and our Federation. I am very frankly becoming very tired of their lip-service friendship. They seem to think that because Tommy Douglas turns on his charm and gives us the treatment with it periodically, we will feel automatically that everything in the garden is lovely, and that we will therefor(sic) stay in line. I am becoming convinced that our CCL political action policy has had only one result as far as the CCL in Sask.(sic) is concerned - - namely a few good husky kicks in the face by these people who can't be blamed for thinking that we have to take their kicks and still come back for more. I believe that our National Policy in this matter has been a serious mistake. It certainly hasn't paid off down east and what does it get us here in the west but abuse by some of these half-baked fascists who feel secure because of the CCL national policy when they kick us around. Oh well, I suppose all we can do is keep on trying, and whenever we do get into their inner sanctums take those opportunities to let it be known in no unmistakable terms that everything in the garden is a long ways from being lovely.⁵¹

Gardiner's comments suggest the depth of frustration felt by the CCL towards both the CCF and Congress. Tension between CCL locals and the government increased in 1954 when Charlie Williams pushed again for the Rand Formula, and the party rejected the forty hour work week.

The 'union security' issue resurfaced early in 1954

when the government threatened to amend the Trade Union Act, "to make clear its intent beyond all shadow of doubt."⁵² The "kernel" of the issue was that dues payment was only one condition of union membership, and that it was up to the unions, their members and constitutions to decide what constituted 'membership'. The SFL felt that unions in North America had only formalized what British workers had done for many years; enforcing union security by refusing to work beside those they distrusted. Ten years had passed since the Act had been enacted, and it had worked well in thousands of cases with few complaints. Although seldom used, the union interpretation of the clause, argued Davies, was of "inestimable importance in maintaining the strength and authority of a union to represent the workers and present a strong front to employers."⁵³

Congress was not happy that the Government was again arguing that the intent of the section was to create the Rand Formula, and it hoped the CCF would not act precipitously and risk the "terrific repercussions" throughout Canada. "If the Legislature had meant 'shall pay dues to Union as a condition of employment'," complained MacDonald, "I credit the members with sufficient intelligence and ability to have said so. In fact, if it had meant that, it would not be necessary now for the Premier to threaten an amendment to say so."⁵⁴

The SFL asked for a full blown top-level conference to

deal with the issue, but the government was not interested. Charlie Williams, in fact, added fuel to the fire by publicly attacking the CCL's interpretation of the clause. He claimed no TLC organizer had ever "abused or wrongly interpreted" the union security clause, but that other organizers had.⁵⁵ Williams' continual pronouncements on the issue made the labour movement very worried that the government had decided to pass the amendment. However, the issue died down by the summer of 1954 as the government came to realize that the amendment would have political repercussions elsewhere. Yet, to the end Williams continued to threaten to replace the clause with the Rand Formula, and at one point, evidently near defeat, he suggested the Trade Union Act be scrapped altogether as unnecessary.⁵⁶

The labour movement, led by the CCL, again tried to gain the forty-hour week at the 1954 CCF convention, and once more it was approved for implementation during a period of high unemployment, but only after a split vote, and only after farm labour was specifically excluded. Thus, despite repeated efforts to achieve the reduced work week through lobbying the government and arguing their case within the party, labour came away empty-handed.

Over the union security issue, the SFL successfully argued for the status quo, and undoubtedly the Premier's pro-labour sympathies, and political loyalty to the national party, played a part in the government's decision to

withdraw the proposed amendment. The failure of labour to acquire the reduced work week and government attempts to weaken union security were owing once again to rural pressure on the government to control labour. Wheat marketing problems led to a decline in farm income and the CCF were pressed to keep costs down while expanding their programs. That union security was raised again reflects a deterioration in labour relations; relations which were further strained by union reaction to the government's 1954 wage 'freeze'. Once again, events surrounding contract negotiations in SPC threatened to result in a decisive break in relations between the CCF and CCL.

Before the re-election of the CCF in 1952, Cy Palmer resigned his position as Regional Director for the CCL in Saskatchewan after helping lead disaffected Power locals from the directly-chartered Electrical Utilities Employees Union (EUEU) to the more militant Oil Workers International Union (OWIU). Discontent within the EUEU locals began with the 1950 contract settlement, which Conroy himself negotiated. Palmer successfully defused the situation, but the 1951 settlement rekindled dissatisfaction with Congress, and a renewed attempt arose to affiliate with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW-TLC).

The lengthy 1951 contract negotiations frustrated the Union and its request for strike authorization was again refused by Congress, who imposed a settlement that the Union

viewed as "peanuts."⁵⁷ It appeared to the Union that Congress was placing its political relationship with the CCF ahead of the concerns of its own directly chartered locals, and they complained that "Something must be done to counteract the whispers going around this province that the CCL is no longer a militant union but is only a tool of the CCF party."⁵⁸ Considerable discussion ensued within the locals about the relative merits of the EUEU versus the IBEW.

Alex McAuslane arrived in the province and persuaded Palmer to organize defections to the more radical OWIU.⁵⁹ The transfer of the locals was carried out quietly without the knowledge of Congress, and Palmer and McAuslane received positions with the International union.⁶⁰ Palmer resigned his position with Congress before he could be fired, and as leader of the OWIU in Saskatchewan he was outside their direct control. This had implications when another wage dispute erupted in SPC in 1954.

Contract negotiations in SPC began in late April, 1954, when the Union presented the Corporation with its proposals which included a demand for a seventeen per cent across-the-board wage increase.⁶¹ The Corporation replied that owing to the worsening general economic conditions in the province their revenue from the rural electrification program had decreased. This jeopardized their plan to expand gas and electric operations because large capital

expenditures were to be made without the benefit of substantial income. Eventually, SPC argued, the expansion would benefit the employees, but in the meantime it needed a "healthy operating statement" in order to acquire sufficient capital to expand.⁶²

It was not until 9 June that wages were discussed. The corporation's negotiator, J.R. Sarsfield, denied Union claims that wages lagged behind the industry norm, and added, "...do not think we can be expected to lead industry in Canada. We cannot...". He argued that the peculiar circumstances of Saskatchewan's agricultural economy were the main determinant of wages, and that the Union was demanding a "more preferred position." Sarsfield denied Union claims that it was subsidizing SPC surpluses at the expense of their wages, "the truth of the matter is, you are asking our customers ... to subsidize industrial wages from agricultural income." He argued that SPC had consistently granted "substantial increases" and that the Union's demands were "astounding" and "unreasonable". Sarsfield argued that wages had risen faster than the cost of living, and that owing to the Corporation's expansion policy, it could not meet the demands. However, Sarsfield claimed, the expansion policy would provide more opportunities for promotion and thus workers stood to gain more in the future than the seventeen per cent wage increase being demanded. Thus, he concluded, there would be no across-the-board wage increase,

but only adjustments of specific categories, if the Union could justify them.⁶³

Negotiations continued through to July with the Corporation holding firm to its position and the Union lowering its demands to a 12 per cent across-the-board increase.⁶⁴ The CCF's rural constituency frequently had been opposed to concessions in wage bargaining in the Power corporation, and the economic slump of 1954 led to more demands for control over labour. The government's own wage comparisons, however, indicated Power workers were "somewhat behind" their colleagues in Saskatchewan and Alberta, and the Cabinet's advisors admitted that the union was "quite conciliatory", and they expected that three per cent would settle it.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, when the provincial Cabinet met on 20 July 1954 to discuss negotiations in Power, it was agreed that the contract "should be negotiated with the understanding that there will be no salary increases except for special adjustments."⁶⁶ Armed with the Cabinet's approval of their position, the Corporation refused to consider the Unions' wage demands, and talks broke off indefinitely.

In the fall of 1954 negotiations became troublesome not only in Power, but in the other government operations as well. A Rust blight affected the 1954 harvest, and in some parts of the province an early snowfall added to the farmers' troubles. Cabinet finally decided that no

across-the-board wage increases would be allowed in the crown corporations or the rest of the civil service.⁶⁷ The SCSA-TLC agreed to the government's wage 'freeze' policy, and signed an agreement "without any fight or argument" which put added pressure on the CCL unions.⁶⁸

The two sides in the Power dispute met in September with the Corporation advising the Union of Cabinet's decision, and suggesting that OWIU either meet with the Cabinet or accept a conciliator. This was entirely unacceptable to the union owing to the "painful" experience of the 'voluntary' conciliation board in the 1950 dispute.⁶⁹ In October, SPC again offered to make "inequity adjustments" on individual categories, but refused the Union's revised demand for eight per cent.⁷⁰ The Union countered with five per cent, but without success. Sarsfield denied Union claims that SPC was not bargaining in good faith, arguing they were merely resisting the union's "unwarranted" demands.⁷¹ The Union refused to accept that SPC had fulfilled its collective bargaining responsibilities. It had tried for six months to reach a settlement, and warned the Corporation to begin bargaining in 'good faith' or face the consequences. "Frankly, our patience is exhausted...".⁷² Talks broke off with each side accusing the other of responsibility for the failure.

A CCL staff meeting on 6 November dealt with the CCL's failure to complete any set of negotiations owing to the

Cabinet's "official decree" barring wage increases.⁷³ The political implications of the wage 'freeze' were evident to CCF trade union supporters and they appealed to Congress for assistance in confronting the government's policy. The Congress executive discussed the problem and MacDonald travelled to Regina and met with Douglas and the Cabinet, but the deadlock remained.⁷⁴

At the SFL's annual convention in late November, 1954, an emergency resolution was passed on the deadlocked negotiations in crown corporations. The resolution condemned the wage 'freeze' as "anti-labour, reactionary, and completely dictatorial", and it called on the government to rescind the decree and restore "free, unrestricted, and realistic collective bargaining."⁷⁵ Douglas, however, denied the government was unfair to its employees in asking them to bear their share of the greatly reduced provincial income owing to the crop failure. "In light of economic prospects for the coming year", he added, "we are simply stating that we cannot give what we haven't got."⁷⁶ He argued that workers had received increases in every year since 1944, but that economic conditions forced the government to instruct their negotiators not to bargain for across-the-board increases. Reduced farm income, he stated, equalled \$2500 per family farm and, "Under present economic conditions no group in the community is entitled to a larger slice of a smaller cake."⁷⁷

The CCL responded to the Premier's press statement with one of their own, in which they argued that while farm income was indeed reduced, the government was at the same time boasting of its record financial surplus. The CCL complained the policy hurt workers without helping the farmers, and was not in line with the CCF's oft-stated goal of maintaining or increasing the purchasing power of farmers and labour.⁷⁸

The SFL took the matter to Cabinet and a long discussion ensued over two days. The convention resolution was read to the Cabinet, but Gardiner cautioned that it was not a general criticism of the CCF's labour and social policies, but only a condemnation of the negative collective bargaining policy which had produced deadlocked negotiations. The SFL argued for a return to normal wage bargaining,

This is a period in Canada, when organized workers are struggling to secure more purchasing power, and to maintain decent conditions of work. It is a period when the employers have mobilized to retrench and to fight unions and social progress. In the general situation, the action of the Government in this Province, particularly because it is the largest Saskatchewan employer of labour, assumes basic significance and importance. Undoubtedly, other employers in the Province will justify their refusal to grant concessions by using the government as an example.⁷⁹

The government would not budge but it did agree to meet with the OWIU following the SFL's brief. Nothing was accomplished, however, as neither side would compromise its position. The OWIU refused to reconvene talks until the

wage issue had been settled, which the government stood firmly against.

Congress denounced the wage 'freeze' as "arbitrary", "ill-advised", and "politically expedient", but denied that the policy was in conflict with their recognition of the CCF as their 'political arm'. The situation was "regrettable" because it negated collective bargaining, and they felt their representatives were quite correct in publicly protesting the policy. However, the Congress was not impressed with the wording of the resolution condemning the 'freeze', and instructed the CCL representatives that, while free collective bargaining should be allowed, they should also consider the government's ability to pay.⁸⁰ Thus, while Congress declared their support for the unions against the 'freeze', they wanted them to be more conciliatory in wage bargaining.

The OWIU as an International Union had complete autonomy in its internal affairs, and Congress could not exercise any authority over the Union or its chief negotiator, Cy Palmer. In addition, owing to the Williams-Elkin feud, and the rejection by union locals of the social contract, the Congress had little influence with the government. The SPC-OWIU dispute threatened to disrupt relations decisively and Congress was helpless to affect the situation.

Over nine months had elapsed since negotiations began

and the union should have been preparing for the 1955-56 contract talks. Without an end in sight, a strike appeared quite likely. CCL unions in other government operations suspended negotiations owing to the freeze, and some trade unionists purportedly called the Trade Union Act a "sham" because the crown corporations were ordered not to negotiate wage increases.⁸¹

At the annual conference of the Saskatchewan-based OWIU locals in Regina in January, 1955, the International promised to support the local against the wage 'freeze', "to the hilt."⁸² Strike action was recommended if there was no settlement of the dispute, and a central strike committee and a strike balloting committee were formed. The conference, however, decided against an immediate strike because it did not want to antagonize public opinion.⁸³

The government responded to this strike threat with threats of compulsory arbitration, but the OWIU were not intimidated, and declared that the CCF would have to pass the legislation before they would react.⁸⁴ Pressed by the public, the CCF were beginning to feel uncomfortable with the idea of a power strike in the dead of winter.⁸⁵ Douglas suspected the union was "bluffing", but if it came to a strike, the government was prepared to act.⁸⁶ He felt Palmer was trying to provoke a quarrel, and blamed him for strike rumours surfacing in the press. Such threats only aroused fears in the public, which led to more pressure on

the government for "legislative action" (i.e., compulsory arbitration).⁸⁷

In Toronto, the national meeting of the Political Action Committee of the Congress (PAC-CCL) convened with Bill Davies, the permanent SFL representative to PAC, insisting upon discussing the situation in Saskatchewan. The government, he felt, was being "obdurate", and he demanded action be taken or they would face "one hell of a dust up".⁸⁸ The dispute, if it erupted into a strike, threatened the national PAC program, and the PAC delegates called upon Congress to effect a reopening of negotiations.⁸⁹ In addition, Davies argued with David Lewis over lunch and convinced him to contact Douglas to get talks going again.⁹⁰

SPC quickly offered to reopen talks, suggesting they were prepared to make a wage proposal if the Union would agree to a two-year contract. The two sides met on 2 February, but the corporation's offer amounted to only a few adjustments in specific categories, and the Union denounced it as "window dressing".⁹¹ The talks wandered over familiar ground, and arguments over which side was subsidizing the other, led nowhere. The Union warned that they were "working against time", and complained the Corporation was "deliberately" trying to force them out by offering "chicken feed".⁹²

The OWIU had altered its position four times and it

expected SPC to begin to bargain in 'good faith', yet the company demanded another Union counterproposal. The Union considered this an attempt by the corporation to "inflame" the situation and continued wrangling over counterproposals and whose turn it was, solved nothing.⁹³ Yet, despite the lack of consensus they agreed to continue talking.

As the deadlock continued the Government became increasingly impatient, and on 8 February, Cabinet authorized Williams to engage lawyers to draft amendments to labour legislation "to meet the threat of a strike of power employees in the Province of Saskatchewan."⁹⁴ The SFL learned that such legislation was being drafted, and that it would include, according to rumour, provisions to decertify unions striking against the law.⁹⁵ The Union would not back down, however, because it would be the equivalent of having the legislation in practice.⁹⁶ Thus, the OWIU went ahead with a strike vote during the first week in March. The result was 89% in favour, and SPC had thirty days in which to reach a settlement or face a strike.⁹⁷

The dispute alarmed the executive of the federal CCF party. They were "deeply disturbed" with the threat of compulsory arbitration. "It would mean the end of the CCF support in the labour movement for years to come ... for example [in] the whole Ontario movement, that is the same thing as saying it would mean the end of the CCF." The Canadian Congress of Labour felt the Saskatchewan government

was somewhat "culpable" in its labour relations, and the national party wanted to "avoid having to go on record as a movement which had, when it was in power, used the weapon of compulsory arbitration." Such legislation, argued CCF national secretary Lorne Ingle, would mean the collapse of PAC support in Ontario and elsewhere, and the CCF would be reduced to "a little rump protest group without either influence or resources." Ingle placed his hopes in the National and International officers of the union, whom he termed as "sympathetic" to socialism, to prevent a "complete breakdown".⁹⁸

Congress could do little to aid the government with the OWIU, but it tried to persuade Douglas not to introduce the legislation. The industrial labour movement had always been opposed to compulsory arbitration because it negated the basic principle of collective bargaining, and failed to avert strikes; "...[I]t is supported principally by only two categories of people," Mosher wrote Douglas, "namely those who are completely unsympathetic towards organized labour and collective bargaining, or those who know little or nothing about either."⁹⁹ Mosher warned that the CCF had often led the fight against such legislation, and that its passage would have "repercussions".¹⁰⁰ Congress was particularly concerned about the 1955 Ontario provincial election, and the effect it would have on PAC. Moreover, he added, it would jeopardize the probable political policy of

the new post-merger labour congress.¹⁰¹

Douglas replied to Congress that it would only be introduced as a "last resort". If negotiations broke down and the union began a strike vote, then the government, Douglas argued, had only three alternatives. They could "accede" to the union's wage demands even though they contravened the government's wage policy; they could proceed with voluntary arbitration; or allow the strike. The Premier did not wish to see the public threatened with the temporary loss of power or heat. "I don't think any government with a sense of responsibility for its people could allow such a thing to happen. It is 25 degrees below zero this morning ... ". Furthermore, he argued, no group of employees had the right to demand "preferred treatment" merely because they worked in a "vital" industry.¹⁰² He preferred to see the dispute settled without a strike through voluntary arbitration, but if talks failed, he told Mosher, "...I can assure you the Government will take all the steps necessary to make a legal strike of power and gas employees impossible."¹⁰³

Douglas was becoming impatient because he wanted the dispute resolved before the Legislature was adjourned.¹⁰⁴ The two sides were still "miles apart" and the Premier wrote to inform Ingle that the legislation was within days of being introduced.¹⁰⁵ Douglas appeared resigned to the inevitable and wrote Ingle so the national party would not

receive "too great a shock when the news breaks in the press."106

Despite the Premier's doom and gloom, a settlement was reached. The union offered a proposal to the Premier in mid-March which laid the basis for the eventual agreement.107 They withdrew the strike threat after Douglas agreed not to introduce compulsory arbitration, and the government agreed to the union's proposal that a specific sum be set aside to deal with the basic wage cost, providing the Union agreed to David Lewis as a mediator.108 As the past national secretary of the CCF he was acceptable to the government, and he was acceptable to the union because he had acted as their legal counsel in Ontario. Mediation began on April 6, and a settlement was reached soon after. The union won an 8.3 per cent wage increase, over two years, across-the-board.109

Although the Power dispute was settled, unions and the government were no less suspicious or bitter towards each other. Neil Reimer, International Vice-President of the OWIU, complained to Congress about the 'right wing' CCF MLA's in the government, and felt there was something "drastically wrong" with the CCF approach to labour relations. "They bargain in a snied [sic] and sarcastic manner" he complained. "[T]he entire line of authority is cumbersome and the actual stories are not properly related to the Cabinet. They act in an unscrupulous manner at the

negotiating table. The Unions obviously do make errors as they do with other employers, but I found it extremely difficult to get down and talk business with them." He very reluctantly concluded the government must have "welcomed" compulsory arbitration for public utilities workers, and had intended to make the OWIU the "goat", but had backed away from fear of committing "political suicide".¹¹⁰

Reimer stated the Union acted out of consideration for CCL policies, and the unionists who were running on the CCF 'ticket' in the upcoming provincial election. They were therefore willing to compromise in order not to embarrass either the Congress or their candidates by forcing the issue and having compulsory arbitration imposed.¹¹¹

Nevertheless, the Power dispute affected SFL-PAC, and it was not as effective thereafter.¹¹² As the 1956 election approached, the SFL had "considerable difficulty" finding a chairman for PAC, and the SFL executive was forced to undertake the task, with R.E. Hale as chairman.¹¹³ At the national level, the TLC and CCL merged into the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) in April 1956. While the SFL-PAC was working for the re-election of the CCF, they received word from the CLC that it was hesitant to endorse their partisan political campaign. The SFL responded angrily in support of the CCF and their PAC program, and Gardiner bluntly informed the CLC that PAC would continue to function. "...[W]e will not tolerate any interference with it."¹¹⁴ The SFL were

faced again with the potential loss of their legislative gains, and they were not about to dissolve their PAC efforts merely to placate the newly merged and officially 'neutral' CLC.

In the 1956 provincial election, the CCF were re-elected with 36 seats. Art Stone and Charlie Williams were returned, but labour representation in the Legislature was reduced when Dempster Heming and Harry Gibbs retired. This was partly offset by the election of Bill Davies, longtime executive secretary of the SFL, as a CCF MLA for Moose Jaw. For the first time the CCL had direct representation in the government caucus, and following Davies' election, a "strong representation" was made to have him appointed Minister of Labour.¹¹⁵ Douglas appeared to be favourable to the suggestion, yet Davies did not get the portfolio. Williams remained popular at the polls, and a change in a ministry usually heralded legislative changes; changes which the CCF would not consider.

Yet, while the election of Davies gave the labour movement, and the CCL in particular, a voice in government, relations did not improve substantially. Despite the CCL's political loyalty to the government, the knowledge each side gained of the other during the years of collective bargaining served to widen a gulf between the interests of labour and the farmer's government. As events unfolded, each side began to lose an appreciation of the other's

problems as they became exclusively concerned with their own economic troubles. Moreover, the gulf generated to 1952 was widened owing to recurrent conflict with the Minister of Labour which kept 'wounds' fresh.

1. Hub Elkin had been elected as the first president of the newly created Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, but left the position in early 1945 to become Chief Executive Officer of the LRB. His duties apart from conciliation matters, were to prepare and process certification and other applications, and to enforce the Trade Union Act. Here he worked closely with both Bill Davies and Ken Bryden in the administration of the new industrial relations system.

2. Elkin had returned to Saskatchewan following the election of the CCF in 1944 and was persuaded to lead the delegation without having any first-hand knowledge of Williams. The incident, recalled Elkin, "didn't exactly get things off to a good start", and in retrospect he felt it had been "a real boner." Over the years, Elkin acquired the impression from Williams that the episode was "sticking in his craw". Elkin Interview, 18 November 1986.

3. SAB-SFL, Correspondence, CCL and International Officers, Conroy to Davies, 3 February 1948.

4. IBID., Mosher to Davies, 27 August 1948.

5. See: SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Labour Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements, Lewis to Douglas, 19 July 1944; Eamon Park to Douglas, 28 February 1945.

6. SAB-SFL, Legislative Submissions, Moose Jaw Times, "Labor, Employers in Furor Over H.S. Elkin Appointment". The SFL responded by commenting that the employers would only be happy with an "armchair philosopher" who held the "employer concept of labour relations." IBID., SFL, Notes, Highlights, and Reports, n.d., (presumably April 1949).

7. This angered the government, and some members, including Williams, wanted him fired. Cabinet upheld Elkin's position, and it is interesting to note that I. Nollett, Minister of Agriculture, was one of his supporters. Elkin Interview, 18 November 1986.

8. PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.8, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence 1952, unsigned letter (presumably Chappell) to Douglas, 31 October 1952. Congress leaders tried hard to persuade Bill Davies, SFL executive-secretary, to take Conroy's place on the national executive, but he turned them down to run for the CCF nomination in Moose Jaw in the 1952 provincial election. See: interviews with Clarence Lyons, Hub Elkin and Davies. Donald MacDonald emerged from District 26 of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), and represented Cape Breton South in the Nova Scotia Legislature as CCF party leader. An organizer for the CCL after 1942, he was Regional Director of Organization for the

Atlantic provinces from 1945 until 1951 when he succeeded Conroy.

9. PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.8, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence 1953, MacDonald to Mosher, p.3, MacDonald stated that owing to CCL-PAC support in the 1948 election, it was felt some CCL candidates should be nominated. This would have served to remove an 'alibi' that Williams could not be switched for lack of a replacement. However, he continued, CCF organizations with the aid of Cabinet Ministers used a "highly developed organizational campaign" to defeat CCL nominations. IBID.

10. Lyons Interview

11. Elkin Interview, 18 November 1986.

12. SAB-SFL, Miscellaneous, Elkin to MacDonald, 3 December 1952.

13. Elkin persistently recommended proposals to the Cabinet, but Williams may have 'sat on them'. Elkin recalled that he heard many stories, years after, that his proposals never went very far owing to Williams' opposition. Elkin Interview, 18 November 1986.

14. SAB-SFL, Miscellaneous, S.R. Cranfield, Business Agent, Provincial Council of Carpenters, to Davies, 20 October 1952; and IBID., Davies to William Hill, President, Prince Albert TLC, 15 October 1952. "A victory for C.C. here would result in not only a right wing administration," wrote Davies, "but one tied to a peculiarly inverted and narrow personality, complicated by an ignorance which resists all helpful efforts to rectify it, probably because of factors best explained by those engaged in the psychiatric sciences." IBID.

15. IBID., Cranfield to Davies, 20 October 1952.

16. IBID., G.L. Quaaale to Williams, 10 November 1952. "I have had considerable experience with labour-management relations," he wrote Williams, "and consider my treatment to be in line with the worst traditions of such relations." Moreover, he continued, the methods which Williams would, "stoop" to achieve his personal desires were a sad reflection "of what organized labour in Saskatchewan can expect from your administration of the legislation which directly concerns them." IBID.

17. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Department of Labour, Miscellaneous, W.A. Beckett to Elkin, 31 October 1952. Beckett's persistent requests for more research annoyed Williams who apparently responded by attacking his "personal

and political integrity". IBID.

18.IBID.

19. In nineteen years as Deputy Minister of Labour, Elkin spoke but once to Cabinet. There was no connection between Elkin and the Cabinet, "None at all. Charlie cut that right off." Elkin Interview, 18 November 1986. According to Elkin, one of William's favourite areas was the censorship division of the Theatres branch, where he got to watch a good many movies.

20. SAB-SFL, Miscellaneous, Elkin to MacDonald, 3 December 1952.

21.IBID.

22. Elkin was dubious and "admitted quite frankly that he hated to let the chance of resigning during the convention pass." PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.8, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence 1952, Gardiner to MacDonald, 29 November 1952.

23.IBID., Three resolutions were sent in which reflected the anger of local unionists to Williams. The resolutions were sponsored by the RWDSU, Saskatchewan Joint Board; the Regina Labour Council - CCL; and the Saskatchewan Sanatorium Employees' Union, Local #2, Prince Albert.

24.IBID., Unsigned letter (presumably Harry Chappell) to Douglas, 31 October 1952. He was particularly concerned with the effects in Manitoba and B.C..

25.IBID., Gardiner to MacDonald, 29 November 1952, p.2

26. Lyons Interview, 21 August 1986. Lyons recalled that some argued that "the surest way of Charlie getting rid of Hub altogether was to have an open break...". IBID.

27. PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.8, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence 1952, Gardiner to MacDonald, 29 November 1952, p.5

28.IBID., Gardiner to MacDonald, 27 December 1952.

29. SAB-SFL, Miscellaneous, Gardiner to MacDonald, 12 January 1953. Two of the sponsors of the resolutions, the Regina Labour Council - CCL, and the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union (RWDSU), performed most of the CCL's political activity in Saskatchewan during elections.

30.IBID.

31.IBID., Report of Meetings on January 7, 1953 in Regina, n.d., (presumably between 7 January and 12 January 1953).

32.IBID., According to Gardiner's report, the Minister several times displayed the feeling he was being "hounded, [and] victimized". At one point Williams allegedly remarked, "...if Jesus himself was Minister with one of the apostles as a deputy there would still be those who thought the department was not being run properly." IBID., Gardiner to MacDonald, 12 January 1953

33.IBID., Report of Meetings on January 7, 1953, op.cit.

34.IBID.

35.IBID.

36.The committee was composed of T.C. Douglas, W.S. Lloyd (Minister of Education), J.H. Sturdy (Minister of Social Welfare), J. Kuziak (Crown Corporations), and I.J. (Toby) Nollett (Minister of Agriculture). They met with the SFL who were represented by: Lloyd Gardiner (president), Bill Davies (executive secretary), R.E. (Bob) Hale (Regional Director of the CCL), W. Smishek (RWDSU), W.H. (Bill) Thompson (Regina Labour Council - CCL), and Howard Conquergood (CCL Representative). Charlie Williams, of course, also attended the meeting.

37.SAB-SFL, Miscellaneous, Gardiner to MacDonald, 1 March 1953.

38.IBID. Gardiner is referring to the 'bold statements' made by the Premier at the January 7 meeting.

39.IBID., Davies to Gardiner, 4 March 1953

40.IBID.

41.IBID., MacDonald to Gardiner, 27 March 1953

42.PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.8, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence 1953, MacDonald to Mosher, 6 October 1953.

43.IBID.

44.IBID., Saskatchewan, General Correspondence, including with Honourable T.C. Douglas, 1953, W.H. Thompson, CCL Representative to Harry Chappell, 21 March 1953. While Charlie Williams was uppermost in the minds of those attending the staff meeting, Hale declined to give "even a partial survey" of their problems, "primarily because it would be an exhaustive task." SAB-SFL, CCL, Joint Industrial Relations Committee, R.E. Hale, Regional Director, CCL, to

MacDonald, 23 March 1953.

45. Quotations from the two preceding paragraphs are found in, IBID., Douglas to MacDonald, 29 April 1953

46. IBID., MacDonald to Douglas, 29 May 1953

47. IBID., Saskatchewan General Correspondence 1953, MacDonald to Mosher, 6 October 1953

48. IBID., MacDonald to Douglas, 29 May 1953, p.3

49. IBID., MacDonald to Mosher, 6 October 1953

50. SAB-SFL, Executive Minutes, 27 June 1953.

51. SAB-SFL, Executive Members, 1944-54, Gardiner to Davies, 12 October 1953

52. PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.9, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence 1954, Douglas to Davies, 29 January 1954. Douglas raised the cases of two employees of the Weyburn Mental Hospital to which the Union (UCSC-CCL) objected. A Dutch immigrant hired as a gardener was placed in a position over a man with greater seniority, and the Union fought the appointment through the grievance machinery. In the other case, the Union alleged the employee, a farmer hired for the winter, was "provocative" and disruptive of the "routine and tenor" of the hospital. IBID., Davies to Douglas, 3 February 1954.

53. IBID., Davies to Douglas, 3 February 1954.

54. IBID., MacDonald to Davies, 9 March 1954.

55. IBID., Hale to Williams, 20 April 1954.

56. IBID., Williams to Hale, 4 June 1954.

57. PAC-CCL, Secretary-Treasurer's Files, 157, Palmer, 1950-2, Part II, Palmer to MacDonald, 7 May 1952, p.3

58. IBID., 125(30), Saskatchewan Government Correspondence Concerning Government Unions, J.T. Harbourne to Conroy, 22 July 1951.

59. After leaving Saskatchewan in 1945, McAuslane continued to work for Congress as an organizer until he resigned from the executive in 1951 in sympathy with his mentor, Pat Conroy. McAuslane subsequently was hired by the OWIU as an organizer and found himself back in Saskatchewan. The OWIU had disaffiliated from the Saskatchewan CCF in 1945. Over

96% of the EU membership signed OWIU cards, and McAuslane and Palmer presented their case to the LRB without the knowledge of Congress. Thus, MacDonald was presented with a fait accompli. PAC-CCL, 131(36), Palmer, C.G., 1944-1952, Notes on EUEU Locals 1-7, D. MacDonald, 9 April 1952.

60. McAuslane became Canadian Director of the OWIU, and Palmer an International Representative. W.F. (Wilf) Lake and J.T. (Jack) Harbourne were persuaded by McAuslane and Palmer to aid the transfer, but when OWIU jobs were dispensed, they were "left out in the cold". They were subsequently fired for their involvement. Davies Interview, 7 June 1986. See also: SAB-SFL, Miscellaneous, Circular letter, R.E. Hale, Acting Regional Director, to All Affiliates, 17 June 1952.

61. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Public Works Department, SPC-Union Negotiations. The union's other concerns were seniority, promotions, vacations, wage 'range' shortening, and upgrading of categories.

62. IBID., J.W. Tomlinson, General Manager, SPC to Palmer, 27 April 1954

63. IBID., Corporation's Submission to the Oil Workers International Union on the Union's Demands of 17% Across the Board Wage Increase, June 9, 1954, p.4

64. IBID., J.R. Sarsfield to All Out of Scope Staff, Progress Bulletin #3, 23 July 1954

65. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Premier, Industrial Relations Committee of Cabinet, Minutes, 8 September 1954, p.1

66. IBID., Cabinet Memo, H.S. Lee to J.A. Darling, 20 July 1954

67. IBID., Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet Minute 5612, 21 September 1954. The imposition of a wage 'freeze' did not prevent Premier Douglas from attending the CCL's national convention later that month. The delegates gave Douglas a standing ovation, after which he gave a speech in which he reviewed the CCF's progress in Saskatchewan since 1944. He stressed CCF labour legislation which had resulted in large increases in union membership in the province, and concluded with a call for adequate purchasing power for workers and farmers. See: SAB-SFL, CCL Conventions, Interim Report of the Fourteenth Convention of the Canadian Congress of Labour, Toronto, September 27 - October 1, 1954, p.2

68. PAC-CCL, Vol.36(13), OWIU of A, Reimer, C., 1954-56, Reimer to MacDonald, 19 August 1955, p.1 The union rejected the government's position that, "all employees should be

treated in like fashion, regardless of occupation or industry in which they were employed." IBID.

69.IBID., Reimer to Douglas, 14 February 1955

70.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Public Works Department, SPC-Union Negotiations, OWIU Negotiating Committee to Sarsfield, 27 October 1954

71.IBID., Sarsfield to McAuslane, 26 October 1954

72.IBID., OWIU Negotiating Committee to Sarfield, 27 October 1954. CCF-MLA Art Stone wrote to J.A. Darling, Minister of Public Works, that the government had forgotten its own policy respecting the right to collective bargaining, and Cabinet was responsible because it tied the hands of the crown corporations by prohibiting wage increases. This, he felt, would leave the CCF open to "political ridicule". IBID., Stone to Darling, 28 October 1954.

73.PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.9, Saskatchewan, General Correspondence 1954-55, Hale to MacDonald, 6 November 1954. Unionists representing the following were in attendance: CWA (SGT), OWIU (SPC), UPWA, RWDSU, CBRE, UCSC (Mental Hospitals), SIEU (SGIO), and IWA (Timber Board). In addition, unions in clay and sodium sulphate operations attended, and the SFL was represented.

74.IBID., Vol.4, CCF, Saskatchewan Government Wage Policy and Relations With CCF 1954-55, Reimer to Douglas, 14 February 1955. The meeting took place 25 November 1954.

75.IBID.

76.IBID., Government Press Release, 30 November 1954. The press release was as recommended by Cabinet that day. See: SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Premier, Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet Minute 5762, 30 November 1954. Douglas denied that there had been a "decree", but stated that the SCSA had agreed to their policy. He declared the government's policy was still to see that labour received its fair share of wealth, adding that labour would get wage increases when crops returned to normal.

77.IBID. The Regina Leader-Post felt Douglas' position was "eminently fair" considering the condition of the economy and management's "right" to determine whether it could afford wage increases. However, the newspaper reminded readers that in private industry, the CCF had consistently supported union charges of unfair labour practices regarding similar wage negotiations. Concluded the Leader-Post, "It is perhaps a matter of whose ox is being gored." IBID.,

Regina Leader-Post clipping dated 4 December 1954.

78.IBID., CCL News Release, 12 December 1954

79.PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.4, CCF, Saskatchewan Government Wage Policy and Relations With CCF 1954-55, Supplement to SFL Brief, 13 December 1954

80.IBID., MacDonald to Hale, 5 January 1955.

81.IBID., Regina Leader-Post, 24 January 1955

82.IBID., Regina Leader-Post, 21 January 1955

83.IBID., Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 20 January 1955

84.IBID., Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 25 January 1955. Both Reimer and Palmer felt the likelihood of compulsory arbitration legislation slim because the CCF, both provincially and nationally, had continually registered their disapproval. Moreover, the entire labour movement was adamantly opposed to it, and the CCF as the 'political arm of labour' would not force the issue. IBID., Regina Leader-Post, 25 January 1955

85.See: letters from Saskatoon businessman Aden Bowman to Douglas denouncing "agitators" and demanding anti-strike legislation; and from one-time SFU official, and long-time CCF supporter, Ove Hansen, demanding "protective" legislation to deal with unions in "vital" industries in the province. Power workers, Hansen declared, should not be allowed to strike but should "negotiate or quit". SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Public Works Department, SPC-Union Negotiations, Bowman to Douglas, 28 January 1955; Hansen to Douglas, 30 January 1955

86.IBID., Douglas to Hansen, 1 February 1955

87.IBID., Douglas to Reimer, 3 February 1955

88.Davies Interview, 7 June 1986.

89.PAC-CCL, 125(30), Saskatchewan Government and Correspondence Concerning Government Unions, Political Action Committee 1955, Report of the Political Action Committee to the Executive Council of the Canadian Congress of Labour, n.d., (presumably 1 February 1955).

90.Davies Interview, 12 June 1986. David Lewis resigned from his position as national secretary of the CCF in 1951 and was practising law in Toronto. His replacement was Lorne Ingle.

91.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Public Works Department, SPC-Union Negotiations, Stenographic Record of SPC-Union Negotiations February 2-3, 1955, p.2. The stenographer was there at the request of Douglas, and over the protests of the Union. The union did not believe the corporation's offer was serious, "We more or less think you had your tongue in your cheek when you gave it to us.", Palmer told Sarsfield. IBID., p.4.

92.IBID., Reimer, p. 8-9. Reimer was not pleased with the corporation's bargaining practices, "The corporation and representatives of the Government took a particularly hostile position with our Union. They advised us that they had more influence in the field than our Executive. They made counterproposals and suggested amendments to our agreement that would have put the Canadian Manufacturers' Assocn.[sic] proposals to shame at the time." PAC-CCL, Vol.36(13), OWIU of A, Reimer, C., 1954-56, Reimer to MacDonald, 19 August 1955, p.1

93.IBID., p.11

94.SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Premier, Cabinet Minutes, Cabinet Minute 5933, 8 February 1955

95.PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.4, CCF, Saskatchewan Government Wage Policy and Relations With CCF 1954-55, Hale to MacDonald, 14 February 1955

96.IBID., Reimer to Douglas, 14 February 1955

97.IBID. The strike vote was 88.8% in favour. PAC-CCL, Vol.36(13), OWIU of A, Reimer, C., 1954-56, Reimer to William Mahoney, Assistant National Director, United Steel Workers of America, 5 April 1955.

98.PAC-CCF, Vol.94, T.C. Douglas 1947-58, Lorne Ingle to Douglas, 14 February 1955

99.PAC-CCL, Accession 80/289, Vol.4, CCF, Saskatchewan Government Wage Policy and Relations With CCF 1954-55, Mosher and MacDonald to Douglas, 21 February 1955

100.IBID.

101.Ingle also raised the issue of the prospective merger of the TLC and CCL. The National CCF, and Congress, were "quite confident" that the new congress would quickly support a PAC program favouring the CCF." This would give the party more support than it had ever had, but the Power dispute, if it resulted in compulsory arbitration, would put a "definite end" to this development. IBID.

102. IBID., Vol.198(15), Provincial Governments, Saskatchewan, General, 1954-57, Douglas to Mosher, 23 February 1955. p.1

103. IBID. The union viewed the government's offer of voluntary arbitration as a "peculiar manoeuvre" considering SPC had refused wage increases owing to the farmer's economic conditions, yet claimed a willingness to arbitrate wages, regardless of the farmers. SAB-SFL, Conventions, OWIU Circular to All SPC Employees, 25 February 1955.

104. Douglas felt Palmer wanted a, " `knock `em down, drag `em out fight'." PAC-CCF, Vol.94, T.C. Douglas 1947-1958, Douglas to Ingle, 7 March 1955

105. IBID., Douglas to Ingle, 28 March 1955.

106. Douglas blamed it all on Palmer who persisted in trying to call the government's `bluff' on compulsory arbitration. "[T]he whole situation has been reduced to a showdown between Palmer and the Government. If the labour movement is so disorganized that Palmer can call the tune then they will have to accept the responsibility for that situation. As far as we are concerned we have either got to exercise the prerogatives of a government or turn our authority over to Palmer and become his accomplice in the blackmail of the entire community." IBID.

107. SAB-TCD, Premier's Files, Public Works Department, SPC-Union Negotiations, Unsigned Memo from Reimer's telephone call to Douglas, 17 March 1955. Reimer offered zero in 1954, and six per cent. spread over two years.

108. The government agreed to set aside \$250,000 for wage adjustments and increases. Lewis agreed to mediate the dispute provided that if the two sides did not settle their differences, he would have the power to pass final and binding recommendations. IBID., Memorandum of Understanding, n.d. (presumably 31 March 1955).

109. SAB-SFL, Executive Minutes, 23 May 1955

110. PAC-CCL, Vol.36(13), OWIU of A, Reimer, C., 1954-56, Reimer to MacDonald, 19 August 1955

111. IBID., Reimer to Mahoney, 5 April 1955

112. Lyons Interview, 21 August 1986

113. SAB-SFL, Executive Minutes, 8 December 1955

114.IBID., Elections, Provincial, Gardiner to Gordon G. Cushing, Executive vice-president CLC, 11 June 1956. The TLC and CCL merged in April of 1956, following similar action in the United States by the AFL and CIO.

115.Davies Interview, 12 June 1986

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Farmers and workers came together during the Depression when their mutual suffering led them to seek joint political action against the 'big interests' they saw as their common exploiters. Rural sympathy for labour was demonstrated by the enactment of the Trade Union Act and the creation of an industrial relations framework that encouraged union organization and collective bargaining. However, the Act was passed by a government inexperienced in labour relations, and it was not until unions began to confront the government as an employer that farmers and the CCF came to understand the new power of organized labour in Saskatchewan.

Union interests in higher wages, better wages and improved working conditions clashed with CCF expectations of labour solidarity on wages and industrial relations. The increasing conservatism of rural Saskatchewan reinforced the private enterprise orientation of the government, and wage conflict educated the farmers' party upon the finer points of collective bargaining. Sympathy for labour's rights and interests evaporated in the annual battles fought in contract negotiations. Farmers and politicians began to view labour as greedy and ungrateful, which spawned demands for

restrictive measures against unions, and further labour reforms were not forthcoming.

Caught between the conflicting demands of labour for higher wages, and of farmers for controls on unions, Douglas responded by offering a social contract on wages. It was designed to reduce union militancy, deflect the anti-labour demands of farmers, and to produce voluntary wage restraint in government industry. The joint committees established to develop union-government co-operation, however, were swept away by bargaining conflict and labour unrest, as CCF-CCL industrial relations exhibited the usual problems found in the labour-capital struggle. The mutual confidence evident when Congress and CCF leaders met to resolve their differences was not reflected in union-government relations at the bottom where strong union bargaining was matched by government obduracy.

Strikes, disputes and conflict in the Department of Labour at times threatened to disrupt CCF-CCL political relations at the national and provincial levels. Union militancy provoked an anti-labour response among some CCF'ers in the province, but the intervention of David Lewis, Pat Conroy and Aaron Mosher resolved the immediate problems. However, these voices of compromise and moderation only prolonged the inevitable quarrels in most cases, and their attempts to encourage union-government co-operation collapsed with the joint committee concept in

1951.

A genuine working partnership was impossible given the irreconcilable interests held by the opposing sides, and political co-operation did not lead to employer-employee harmony. Local unions had little or no political alternative but to support the CCF, and government leaders understood this and acted upon it. This is not to suggest that workers would have deserted the CCF at the polls. Rather, they came to see that the intervention of Congress in provincial disputes was not in their interests when it served only to reinforce the government's bargaining position. Local unions had few quarrels with the CCF as a political party of reform, but as an employer the CCF Government left much to be desired. Unions rejected the social contract because their interests diverged from the government and from Congress headquarters. The political relationship of Congress and CCF leaders deflected local union-government disputes to a level remote from the sources of the conflict. Agreements reached at that level did not treat the causes, but only the symptoms, of industrial relations conflict. In fact, the political relationship between Congress and Government leaders eventually led to local union questioning of the efficacy of Congress policies.

Union-government relations in Saskatchewan from 1944 to 1956 were marked by labour disputes, wage conflict and

confrontations with Cabinet ministers. The struggle between CCL unions and the government was symptomatic of the irreconcilable interests of labour and management. Labour legislation, joint committees and political interests could not reconcile the opposing interests the two sides held, but could only influence industrial relations in the direction of compromise and stability.

As long as industrial relations was a struggle for power, the two sides would be foes. Yet, as this thesis has illustrated, industrial relations opponents can remain political friends. The CCF's labour and social reforms should not be underestimated, for they earned the government the consistent political support of organized workers. However, as David Lewis accurately pointed out to Tommy Douglas in 1944, the Trade Union Act was not enough, and the attitudes and practices of the government prevented closer relations with their unions. It would have taken a great deal more imagination, innovation and power-sharing than the CCF were willing to attempt for industrial relations to have developed along co-operative lines.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP IN SASKATCHEWAN 1930-1956

| Year | Total a. | TLC | CCL | Independent | Others |
|------|----------|-----------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 1930 | 9565 | | | | |
| 1931 | 8962 | | | | |
| 1932 | 7344 | | | | |
| 1933 | 6714 | | | | |
| 1934 | 6478 | | | | |
| 1935 | 6752 | | | | |
| 1936 | 7417 | | | | |
| 1937 | 8010 | | | | |
| 1938 | 9426 | | | | |
| 1939 | 10,254 | | | | |
| 1940 | 8725 | | | | |
| 1941 | 9116 | | | | |
| 1942 | 9715 | | | | |
| 1943 | 11,124 | | | | |
| 1944 | 16,557 | 6996 b. | 3824 b. | | |
| 1945 | 19,290 | 11,546 b. | 5897 b. | | |
| 1946 | 23,895 | 13,691 | 7309 | 2895 | |
| 1947 | 25,593 | 14,768 | 7907 | 2918 | |
| 1948 | 26,940 | 14,750 | 9316 | 2874 | |
| 1949 | 27,509 | 15,273 | 9261 | 2975 | |
| 1950 | 27,690 | 13,718 | 9301 | 4590 | |
| 1951 | 30,326 | 15,734 | 10,117 | 4475 | |
| 1952 | 31,611 | 16,446 | 10,684 | 4481 | |
| 1953 | 34,695 | 18,328 | 11,476 | 4891 | |
| 1954 | 38,754 | 19,967 | 12,927 | 3582 | 2278 |
| 1955 | 40,124 | 20,203 | 13,778 | 3768 | 2375 |
| 1956 | 42,145 | 32,340 c. | 4399 d. | 3127 | 2329 |

SOURCE:

a. - Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Thirtieth Annual Report, 1973

b. - These figures are low estimates taken from certification applications granted by the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board as cited in Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Annual Report, 1944; 1945; and 1946.

c. - Unions affiliated to the Canadian Labour Congress. By comparing earlier Saskatchewan Department of Labour Reports with the post merger findings, the following affiliation figures are arrived at for 1956: TLC - 21,792; CCL - 14,897.

d. - Unions chartered by the Canadian Labour Congress. For example, United Civil Servants of Canada; Saskatchewan Sanatorium Employees' Union; Canadian Hospital Employees' Union; University of Saskatchewan Employees' Union, and Saskatchewan Insurance Employees' Union.

APPENDIX II

ORGANIZED LABOUR AND THE SASKATCHEWAN LABOUR FORCE

| YEAR | Population | Labour Force | Percentage of Population |
|------|------------|--------------|--------------------------|
|------|------------|--------------|--------------------------|

| | | | |
|------|---------|---------|------|
| 1911 | 492,432 | 202,522 | 41.4 |
| 1921 | 757,510 | 266,975 | 35.2 |
| 1931 | 921,785 | 388,911 | 42.2 |
| 1936 | 931,547 | 346,604 | 37.2 |
| 1941 | 895,992 | 315,846 | 35.3 |
| 1946 | 832,688 | 310,486 | 37.2 |
| 1951 | 831,728 | 302,112 | 36.3 |
| 1956 | 880,665 | 308,000 | 34.3 |

| YEAR | Non-Agricultural | %Total Workforce | Organized Labour | % Non-Agric. | %Total WorkForce |
|------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|
| 1931 | 134,439 | 34.6 | 8962 | 6.7 | 2.3 |
| 1936 | 129,389 | 37.3 | 7417 | 5.7 | 2.1 |
| 1941 | 128,430 | 40.7 | 9116 | 7.1 | 2.9 |
| 1946 | 146,521 | 47.2 | 23,895 | 16.3 | 7.7 |
| 1951 | 154,532 | 51.2 | 30,326 | 19.6 | 10.0 |
| 1956 | 164,000 | 53.3 | 42,145 | 25.6 | 13.8 |

| YEAR | Urban Population | Organized Labour | % UrbanPop. |
|------|------------------|------------------|-------------|
| 1946 | 208,872 | 23,895 | 11.4 |
| 1951 | 252,470 | 30,326 | 12.0 |
| 1956 | 322,003 | 42,145 | 13.1 |

SOURCE:

Urquhart, M.C., (ed.), Historical Statistics of Canada, p.14; Government of Saskatchewan, Economic Advisory and Planning Board, The Statistical Yearbook, 1947, p.206-208; and Saskatchewan Economic Review, No.12 September 1958

APPENDIX III

CHANGES IN THE LABOUR FORCE

| YEAR | Total Population | Urban | Rural | Farm | Rural Non-Farm |
|------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|-------------------|
| 1946 | 832,688 | 208,872 | 623,816 | 443,499 | 180,317 |
| 1951 | 831,728 | 252,470 | 579,258 | 389,279 | 180,979 |
| 1956 | 880,665 | 322,003 | 588,662 | 360,651 | 198,011 |

% Change

| | | | | | |
|---------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| 1941-46 | -7.1 | +8.6 | -11.4 | -13.3 | -6.3 |
| 1946-51 | -0.1 | +20.9 | -7.1 | -10.2 | +0.4 |
| 1951-56 | +5.9 | +27.5 | -3.6 | -9.5 | +9.4 |

| YEARS | Population | Non-Agric. Workforce | Union Membership |
|--------------------|------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| % change 1931-1936 | +10.0 | -3.8 | -17.2 |
| % change 1936-1941 | -3.8 | -7.4 | +22.9 |
| % change 1941-1946 | -7.1 | +14.1 | +162.1 |
| % change 1946-1951 | -0.1 | +5.5 | +26.9 |
| % change 1951-1956 | +5.9 | +6.1 | +38.9 |

Organized Labour

| YEAR | Total | TLC | %Total | CCL | %Total |
|------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1946 | 23,895 | 13,691 | 57.3 | 7309 | 30.6 |
| 1951 | 30,326 | 15,734 | 51.9 | 10,117 | 33.4 |
| 1956 | 42,145 | 21,792 | 51.7 | 14,897 | 35.3 |

SOURCE: Government of Saskatchewan, Economic Advisory and Planning Board, Saskatchewan Economic Review, #12 March 1958

APPENDIX IV

STRIKES IN SASKATCHEWAN 1944 - 1956

| Year | Strikes | Workers Involved | Mandays Lost | CCL Unions on Strike |
|------|---------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 1944 | 1 | 48 | 24 | 0 |
| 1945 | 5 | 1310 | 1736 | 3 |
| 1946 | 4 | 108 | 1914 | 2 |
| 1947 | 15 | 1818 | 42,908 | 7 |
| 1948 | 9 | 679 | 12,333 | 4 |
| 1949 | 6 | 425 | 4548 | 4 |
| 1950 | 4 | 197 | 1200 | 2 |
| 1951 | 5 | 216 | 2885 | 4 |
| 1952 | 8 | 1284 | 15,182 | 2 |
| 1953 | 8 | 744 | 18,283 | 3 |
| 1954 | 7 | 529 | 21,808 | 4 |
| 1955 | 3 | 65 | 2329 | 3 |
| 1956 | 6 | 240 | 2932 | 2 |

SOURCE: All figures from Government of Saskatchewan,
Department of Labour, Annual Reports, 1944 to 1956.

APPENDIX V

INCOMES IN SASKATCHEWAN 1941 - 1956

| Year | Cash Income From Farm Products a. (000,000) | Net Farm Income b. (000,000) | Wages and Salaries c. (000,000) |
|------|---|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1941 | 159.7 | 94 | 123 |
| 1942 | 195.4 | 136 | 131 |
| 1943 | 327.4 | 200 | 143 |
| 1944 | 543.2 | 393 | 161 |
| 1945 | 409.6 | 230 | 173 |
| 1946 | 387.6 | 253 | 198 |
| 1947 | 428.5 | 304 | 213 |
| 1948 | 534.0 | 429 | 255 |
| 1949 | 566.1 | 441 | 262 |
| 1950 | 412.5 | 327 | 276 |
| 1951 | 636.2 | 619 | 311 |
| 1952 | 710.1 | 642 | 349 |
| 1953 | 743.4 | 553 | 386 |
| 1954 | 456.6 | 219 | 406 |
| 1955 | 425.0 | 386 | 429 |
| 1956 | 598.0 | 534 | 501 |

SOURCE:

a. - Government of Saskatchewan, Economic Advisory and Planning Board, Saskatchewan Economic Review, # 12, March 1958, p.9

b. - IBID., p.4

c. - IBID.

APPENDIX VI

AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS IN SASKATCHEWAN 1947-1956

| YEAR | A. | B. | C. |
|------|----------|-------|---------|
| 1947 | \$ 35.35 | 84.4 | \$41.88 |
| 1948 | 38.76 | 96.9 | 40.00 |
| 1949 | 41.50 | 100.0 | 41.50 |
| 1950 | 42.86 | 102.2 | 41.94 |
| 1951 | 46.88 | 111.7 | 41.79 |
| 1952 | 50.90 | 112.8 | 45.12 |
| 1953 | 54.77 | 113.1 | 48.43 |
| 1954 | 56.21 | 114.1 | 49.22 |
| 1955 | 58.02 | 114.6 | 50.63 |
| 1956 | 61.66 | 115.8 | 53.25 |

A. - Average Weekly Wages and Salaries

B. - Consumer Price Index for Regina and Saskatoon 1949 = 100

C. - Average Real Weekly Wages

Average weekly wages, and average real weekly wages are an industrial composite. "Real" wages refers to the approximate measure of purchasing power.

SOURCE:

Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Twentieth Annual Report, 1963, p.11

APPENDIX VII

UNEMPLOYMENT IN SASKATCHEWAN 1944-1962

| Year | Non-agricultural Workforce (000) | Unemployed | Unemployment Sask. | Rate Can. |
|------|-------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| 1944 | 139 | 2233 | 1.6% | 1.7% |
| 1945 | 142 | 3105 | 2.2 | 3.0 |
| 1946 | 146 | 6312 | 4.3 | 5.3 |
| 1947 | 148 | 5683 | 3.8 | 3.5 |
| 1948 | 149 | 5267 | 3.5 | 3.6 |
| 1949 | 151 | 6016 | 4.0 | 5.0 |
| 1950 | 152 | 7606 | 5.0 | 6.2 |
| 1951 | 154 | 6571 | 4.3 | 4.5 |
| 1952 | 159 | 5563 | 3.5 | 5.6 |
| 1953 | 163 | 6004 | 3.7 | 6.2 |
| 1954 | 168 | 9049 | 5.4 | 8.3 |
| 1955 | 173 | 11,181 | 6.5 | 7.5 |
| 1956 | 178 | 9865 | 5.5 | 6.3 |
| 1957 | 183 | 11,167 | 6.1 | 8.1 |
| 1958 | 189 | 15,369 | 8.1 | 10.9 |
| 1959 | 194 | 14,320 | 7.4 | 8.8 |
| 1960 | 200 | 15,969 | 8.0 | 10.1 |
| 1961 | 206 | 17,215 | 8.4 | 9.8 |
| 1962 | 212 | 15,781 | 7.4 | 8.5 |

SOURCE:

Government of Saskatchewan, Department of Labour, Nineteenth Annual Report, 1962, p.16

APPENDIX VIII

RESULTS FOR SASKATCHEWAN, ONTARIO AND FEDERAL ELECTIONS
1943-1958PARTY STANDINGS IN SASKATCHEWAN ELECTIONS
1944-1956

| | 1944 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|
| CCF | 47 | 31 | 42 | 36 |
| Liberal | 5 | 19 | 11 | 14 |
| Conservative | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Social Credit | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Other | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 |

PARTY STANDINGS IN ONTARIO ELECTIONS 1943-1955

| | 1943 | 1945 | 1948 | 1951 | 1955 |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| CCF | 34 | 8 | 21 | 2 | 11 |
| Liberal | 15 | 14 | 14 | 8 | 3 |
| Conservative | 38 | 66 | 53 | 79 | 84 |
| LPP | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Ind.Liberal | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

PARTY STANDINGS IN PARLIAMENT 1945-1958

| | 1945 | 1949 | 1953 | 1957 | 1958 |
|---------------|---------|---------|--------|--------|---------|
| CCF | 28(18)* | 13(5) | 23(11) | 25(10) | 8(1) |
| Liberal | 125(2) | 190(14) | 170(5) | 105(4) | 48(0) |
| Conservative | 67(1) | 41(1) | 51(1) | 112(3) | 208(16) |
| Social Credit | 13(0) | 10(0) | 15(0) | 19(0) | 0 |
| Other | 12(0) | 8(0) | 6(0) | 4(0) | 1(0) |

* - Elected from Saskatchewan

SOURCE:

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