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dc.contributor.advisorMaung, Minen_US
dc.contributor.advisorWilson, Craigen_US
dc.creatorRashid, Harunen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-21T12:00:30Z
dc.date.available2014-06-21T12:00:30Z
dc.date.created2013-04en_US
dc.date.issued2014-06-20en_US
dc.date.submittedApril 2013en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10388/ETD-2013-04-1021en_US
dc.description.abstractAbstract: There is an ongoing debate on whether risk-taking incentives align risk-averse managers’ interests with those of shareholders or whether such incentives lead to excessively risky firm and leverage policies. In this study, we shed light on this debate by using CEO risk-taking incentives, measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock return volatility (Vega), and explain how Vega affects firms’ security issuance and repurchase activities. In general, we find that a higher Vega increases (decreases) the likelihood of debt issuance (share issuance) and it decreases (increases) the propensity of debt retirement (share repurchase). However, in high-levered firms, the positive effect of Vega on debt issuance and the negative influence of Vega on debt retirement are diminished. One the other hand, for equity issuance and repurchases, high leverage does not seem to alter the impact of Vega. These findings have three main implications: 1) in general, CEO risk-taking incentives (Vega) do affect the financing decisions of firms by increasing firms’ degree of leverage, (2) when existing leverage is high, CEO risk-taking incentives do not seem to induce CEOs to take excessive financial risks through debt issuance, but such incentives encourage them to continue repurchasing shares that would lead to even higher debt ratios and non-operational risks, and (3) firms with high Vega do not seem to adopt target debt ratios. JEL Classification: G30, G32, J33en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.subjectKey Words: Compensation incentives, risk taking incentives, external financing, capital structureen_US
dc.titleIssuances and Repurchases: An explanation based on CEO risk-taking incentivesen_US
thesis.degree.departmentEdwards School of Businessen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineFinanceen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Saskatchewanen_US
thesis.degree.levelMastersen_US
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Science (M.Sc.)en_US
dc.type.materialtexten_US
dc.type.genreThesisen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberYu, Miaomiaoen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberChance, Donen_US


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