Corporate Social Responsibility and Compensational Incentives

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Date
2015-09-29Author
Yang, Feiyi
Type
ThesisDegree Level
MastersMetadata
Show full item recordAbstract
We construct a measure of CEO concern for non-equity stakeholders based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, and we investigate how such incentives affect firm leverage and cash holding. In general, we find that non-equity stakeholder incentives decrease leverage and increase cash holding, after controlling for CEO managerial incentives and other firm characteristics. Our findings suggest that corporate social responsibility benefit non-equity stakeholders, which may come at the expense of shareholders.
Degree
Master of Science (M.Sc.)Department
Edwards School of BusinessProgram
FinanceSupervisor
Maung, Min; Wilson, CraigCommittee
Yang, Fan; Zhang, Ying; Mamun, AbdullahCopyright Date
August 2015Subject
Managerial incentives
Corporate social responsibility
Shareholder interests
Non-equity stakeholder