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      • HARVEST
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      Corporate governance, firm performance, and executive compensation : evidence from China

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      Thesis_XiangLi.pdf (488.6Kb)
      Date
      2010-04
      Author
      Li, Xiang
      Type
      Thesis
      Degree Level
      Masters
      Metadata
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      Abstract
      This study investigates the relationships among corporate governance mechanism, firm performance, and executive compensation within Chinese publicly listed firms. The corporate governance structure in China is a unique combination of the Anglo-American model and the German system by including a board of director and a supervisory board simultaneously, and has two monitoring organs, independent directors and supervisory board, co-existing. One of the special features of the Chinese publicly listed firms is their close relationship with the government because most of them were converted from state-owned enterprises at the beginning of the market-oriented economic reform in China. Therefore, we attempt to explore the effects of political connections of their ultimate controllers on corporate governance mechanism, on firm performance, and on executive compensation in China. Our findings indicate a dysfunctional corporate governance system in China, which cannot bring improved firm performance but grant executives high compensations. While we take into consideration the political connections, our results show that they deteriorate corporate governance mechanism, but do not result in inferior firm performance. Robustness tests demonstrate a non-linear effect of corporate governance on executive compensation, jointly depending on the status of a firm’s political connection and its ownership structure.
      Degree
      Master of Science (M.Sc.)
      Department
      Finance and Management Science
      Program
      Finance and Management Science
      Supervisor
      Wu, Zhenyu
      Committee
      Wilson, Craig; Tannous, George; Lehar, Alfred; Racine, Marie
      Copyright Date
      April 2010
      URI
      http://hdl.handle.net/10388/etd-04062010-204624
      Subject
      political connections
      executive compensation
      corporate governance
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      • Graduate Theses and Dissertations
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