Contra Chalmers : on consciousness and conceivability
MetadataShow full item record
This thesis presents and evaluates David Chalmers’ argument that the existence of phenomenal conscious experience constitutes a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of a purely materialistic neuroscience. My aim is to defend the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness, and argue that continued research in neuroscience and neurophysiology can result in a successful materialistic or reductive solution to the hard problem of consciousness. My argument against Chalmers is two-fold. First, I challenge Chalmers’ claim that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. And second, I argue that his conceivability argument is implausible.
DegreeMaster of Arts (M.A.)
CommitteeO'Hagan, Emer; Pfeifer, Karl; Dayton, Eric; Kelly, Ivan
Copyright DateJune 2010
philosophy of mind