The background of Searle's "Background" : motives, anticipations, and problems

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Date
2005-06-29Author
Ross, Paul Douglas
Type
ThesisDegree Level
MastersMetadata
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In this thesis, I discuss John Searle’s account of Intentionality which includes his theory of the Background as something which is necessary, in some sense, to there being such a thing as Intentionality. In chapter one I briefly introduce the notions of both background and normativity. In chapter two, I discuss the motives and initial rationale of Searle’s theory. In chapter three I discuss the philosophers he has had contact with who anticipated the Background. In chapter four I claim that Searle has always been conflicted about his theory and I diagnose the root of his conflict, namely that the original rationale required the Background to be normative in nature, but over time it was additionally conceived neurophysiologically, causally, and thus non-normative in nature. I argue that his conflict is inevitable given the irreducibility of the intentional to the non-intentional, and more generally of the normative to the non-normative.
Degree
Master of Arts (M.A.)Department
PhilosophyProgram
PhilosophySupervisor
Dwyer, PhilipCommittee
Pfeifer, Karl; Mackenzie, Patrick; Kelly, Ivan W.Copyright Date
June 2005Subject
knowing-that
knowing-how
implicature
presupposition
form of life
practice
mental
Wittgenstein
assumption
capacity