Searle's theory of intentionality : providing the foundation for a naturalized theory of consciousness
Lehan, Vanessa Dawn
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My goal in this dissertation is to show that Searle’s theory of Intentionality is worth far more than it is generally given credit for. I defend Searle’s theory of Intentionality by addressing the main criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other popular accounts of Intentionality. I argue that a major benefit of Searle’s theory is that it provides a solution to both Putnam’s underdetermination problem and the “particularity problem” that face internalism, arguing against Dretske’s claim that the problem of particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bach’s claim that Searle’s solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful. I also defend Searle’s theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I argue that Thompson and Dretske’s arguments about mistaken cases of perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searle’s theory. In the conclusion of my thesis I address the motivation for my defense of Searle’s theory of Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.
DegreeMaster of Arts (M.A.)
CommitteeMackenzie, Patrick; Kelly, Ivan W.; Dwyer, Philip; Crossley, David
Copyright DateAugust 2005