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Why the ascriber contextualist solution to the sceptical paradox is unnecessary

dc.contributor.advisorDayton, Ericen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberNeufeld, Ericen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberPfeifer, Karlen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberHudson, Roberten_US
dc.creatorMacDonald, Ian Jamesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-09T18:26:57Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-04T04:57:12Z
dc.date.available2011-09-13T08:00:00Zen_US
dc.date.available2013-01-04T04:57:12Z
dc.date.created2010-07en_US
dc.date.issued2010-07en_US
dc.date.submittedJuly 2010en_US
dc.description.abstractA widely discussed philosophical puzzle in contemporary epistemology is the so-called sceptical “paradox.” Ascriber contextualism has taken centre stage as the anti-sceptical theory that purportedly offers the best solution to the sceptical “paradox.” Ascriber contextualists Stewart Cohen (1988, 1999) and Keith DeRose (1995) advertise their anti-sceptical theory as the one that exclusively explains and solves it. This is false advertising, however. My thesis, which has been greatly influenced by the critical work of Michael Williams (1991) and Duncan Pritchard (2005), is that the generation of the sceptical “paradox” depends on whether the epistemologist is an internalist or externalist about knowledge, and that the ascriber contextualist attempt to solve the sceptical “paradox” rests on a long history of mistakes concerning internalist assumptions made by externalists Fred Dretske (1970) and Robert Nozick (1981). By applying the semantic thesis of ascriber contextualism to epistemology, ascriber contextualists seek to emend the rejection of the closure principle made by these externalists. This rejection came from these externalists mistakenly making internalist assumptions when facing sceptical hypotheses. Unfortunately, ascriber contextualists leave much unfixed, and end up inheriting and suffering from the serious mistake about internalist assumptions that had plagued the epistemologies of these externalists and now infects the ascriber contextualist “solution” to the sceptical “paradox.” With the help of hindsight to examine this history and an appreciation of how the adoption of one of these respective views about knowledge makes all the difference for whether the sceptical “paradox” arises, we come to see that the contextualist “solution” to the sceptical “paradox” is unnecessary.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10388/etd-09092010-182657en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectcontextualismen_US
dc.subjectscepticismen_US
dc.subjectclosureen_US
dc.subjecttrackingen_US
dc.subjectindexicalityen_US
dc.titleWhy the ascriber contextualist solution to the sceptical paradox is unnecessaryen_US
dc.type.genreThesisen_US
dc.type.materialtexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Saskatchewanen_US
thesis.degree.levelMastersen_US
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Arts (M.A.)en_US

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