SPINOZA’S NOMOLOUS MONISM: A Comparison of Spinoza and Donald Davidson’s Philosophy of Mind
Date
2019-01-11
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
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ORCID
0000-0001-5917-1742
Type
Thesis
Degree Level
Masters
Abstract
In this thesis I defend the model of philosophy of mind, which is inspired by my reading of Spinoza`s Ethics. The model bears certain similarities with Donald Davidson's anomalous monism (AM), but is distinct insofar as it can solve problems plaguing Davidson's AM. I achieve this in three chapters. In the first chapter I offer my model for philosophy of mind inspired by my understanding of Spinoza. I claim that the only possible way for creating a coherent model for philosophy of mind out of Spinoza`s theoretical framework is to speculate that, among anything else, Spinoza`s system is an epistemological theory of true causal explanations of the world, which I named nomolous monism (NM). Then I defend Nomolous Monism against alternative interpretations. In the second chapter I bring Davidson to the discussion by identifying his reading of Spinoza`s philosophy of mind with Nomolous Monism. Then I analyze Davidson’s Anomalous Monism and I reply to its possible objections. Finally, in the third chapter I compare Nomolous Monism with Anomalous Monism. I argue that Nomolous Monism has the potential to overcome certain objections plaguing anomalous monism, while also discussing certain advantages that Davidson’s Anomalous Monism possesses.
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Keywords
Spinoza, Davidson, Monism, Anomalous Monism, Mind, Epistemology
Citation
Degree
Master of Arts (M.A.)
Department
Philosophy
Program
Philosophy