A New Argument for Ethical Evidentialism
| dc.contributor.author | Zamulinski, Brian | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-30T08:19:10Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-08-30T08:19:10Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024-08-09 | |
| dc.description | This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00769-7 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper contains a new argument for evidentialism as an ethical rather than an epistemic doctrine. The argument relies on new developments in consequentialist thinking. The insights of the proponents of the moral encroachment thesis are used to show that we need higher standards of evidence, and to develop the concept of ethically sufficient evidence. It is demonstrated that prospectivism (subjective consequentialism) supports the contentions that we should not believe without ethically sufficient evidence, that we are permitted to believe when we have it, and that we are obligated to investigate to acquire it. It is argued that we do not have any obligations to believe. The ethical evidentialism argued for here is distinguishable from Clifford’s ethics of belief. Developing the doctrine clarifies some of our moral obligations, makes a positive contribution to prospectivism, and shows that evidentialism is better construed as an ethical doctrine. | |
| dc.description.version | Peer Reviewed | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Zamulinski, B. A New Argument for Ethical Evidentialism. Philosophia (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00769-7 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11406-024-00769-7 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10388/15962 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Springer | |
| dc.subject | Evidentialism | |
| dc.subject | Ethics of Belief | |
| dc.subject | Moral Encroachment Thesis | |
| dc.subject | Prospectivism | |
| dc.subject | Subjective Consequentialism | |
| dc.subject | Sufficient Evidence | |
| dc.title | A New Argument for Ethical Evidentialism | |
| dc.type | Article |