An Augustinian Defense of the Rational Coherence of Creatio ex nihilo
| dc.contributor.advisor | Liptay, John | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Liptay, John | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Regnier, Daniel | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Moore, Dwayne | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Moshri, Saeed | |
| dc.creator | Brown, Stephen James | |
| dc.creator.orcid | 0000-0002-6070-2747 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-25T14:52:11Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-09-25T14:52:11Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2020-11 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-09-25 | |
| dc.date.submitted | November 2020 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2020-09-25T14:52:11Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo has been by far the dominant Christian view of creation for more than eighteen centuries, rising to prominence long before Augustine’s seminal formulation. Few doctrines are as central to Christianity, as uncontested throughout history, or as difficult to fully comprehend. It has long been challenged by those who deny a creator on the grounds of supposed incoherencies implicit in the notion of a transcendent creator of time and space. The significance of demonstrating that such a view is coherent is that it shows as mistaken one reason for setting aside the God-question; insofar as the conception of God in Augustine’s account is found to be coherent, this clears away one obstacle to raising the question of God’s existence. I explain and defend Augustine’s view in three chapters. In the first chapter I explain Augustine’s conception of creatio ex nihilo, the philosophical context in which the doctrine arose, and show that the doctrine is no less relevant in the modern context. In the second chapter I address arguments made by Julian Wolfe, Adolf Grünbaum, and Graham Oppy that challenge the rational coherence of divine agency in the timeless act of creation. With help from William Lane Craig I find that these challenges are not successful because they – along with Craig's own view – fail to adequately comprehend and consistently apply the concept of God's timelessness developed by Augustine. In the third chapter I address alleged contradictions arising from the timeless nature of God in creatio ex nihilo and God’s relation to the temporal world. I argue that Augustine’s view of God is specially situated to avoid the problem of determinism – as raised by Nelson Pike – that is thought to arise as a result of the existence of an omniscient God. Further, I argue that Pike’s arguments against the coherence of a timeless God possessing abilities of a person do not succeed. Finally, I take up the positive burden of demonstrating that creatio ex nihilo is coherent by showing that the eternal-temporal relational model developed by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann provides one possible way of conceiving and talking of God’s relationship with the temporal world. Notwithstanding objections made by Graham Oppy and Paul Helm, I find that Stump and Kretzmann’s model demonstrates that the idea of a timeless God who relates to the temporal world is coherent and intelligible. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10388/13049 | |
| dc.subject | Augustine | |
| dc.subject | timelessness | |
| dc.subject | eternity | |
| dc.subject | creatio ex nihilo | |
| dc.subject | creation | |
| dc.subject | William Lane Craig | |
| dc.subject | Julian Wolfe | |
| dc.subject | Adolf Grünbaum | |
| dc.subject | Graham Oppy | |
| dc.subject | Nelson Pike | |
| dc.subject | divine foreknowledge | |
| dc.subject | ET-simultaneity | |
| dc.subject | Eleonore Stump | |
| dc.subject | Norman Kretzmann | |
| dc.subject | Paul Helm | |
| dc.title | An Augustinian Defense of the Rational Coherence of Creatio ex nihilo | |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.type.material | text | |
| thesis.degree.department | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Saskatchewan | |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts (M.A.) |