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SPINOZA’S NOMOLOUS MONISM: A Comparison of Spinoza and Donald Davidson’s Philosophy of Mind

Date

2019-01-11

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

ORCID

0000-0001-5917-1742

Type

Thesis

Degree Level

Masters

Abstract

In this thesis I defend the model of philosophy of mind, which is inspired by my reading of Spinoza`s Ethics. The model bears certain similarities with Donald Davidson's anomalous monism (AM), but is distinct insofar as it can solve problems plaguing Davidson's AM. I achieve this in three chapters. In the first chapter I offer my model for philosophy of mind inspired by my understanding of Spinoza. I claim that the only possible way for creating a coherent model for philosophy of mind out of Spinoza`s theoretical framework is to speculate that, among anything else, Spinoza`s system is an epistemological theory of true causal explanations of the world, which I named nomolous monism (NM). Then I defend Nomolous Monism against alternative interpretations. In the second chapter I bring Davidson to the discussion by identifying his reading of Spinoza`s philosophy of mind with Nomolous Monism. Then I analyze Davidson’s Anomalous Monism and I reply to its possible objections. Finally, in the third chapter I compare Nomolous Monism with Anomalous Monism. I argue that Nomolous Monism has the potential to overcome certain objections plaguing anomalous monism, while also discussing certain advantages that Davidson’s Anomalous Monism possesses.

Description

Keywords

Spinoza, Davidson, Monism, Anomalous Monism, Mind, Epistemology

Citation

Degree

Master of Arts (M.A.)

Department

Philosophy

Program

Philosophy

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DOI

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