Contra Chalmers : on consciousness and conceivability
Date
2010-06
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
ORCID
Type
Degree Level
Masters
Abstract
This thesis presents and evaluates David Chalmers’ argument that the existence of phenomenal conscious experience constitutes a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of a purely materialistic neuroscience. My aim is to defend the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness, and argue that continued research in neuroscience and neurophysiology can result in a successful materialistic or reductive solution to the hard problem of consciousness. My argument against Chalmers is two-fold. First, I challenge Chalmers’ claim that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. And second, I argue that his conceivability argument is implausible.
Description
Keywords
conceivability, consciousness, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, materialism, reductionism, qualia, supervenience, dualism, zombies, logical possibility
Citation
Degree
Master of Arts (M.A.)
Department
Philosophy
Program
Philosophy