

Only Pleasing Themselves: The United Nations' Internationalization of Jerusalem, 1947-54

A Thesis Submitted to the
College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts
In the Department of History
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon

By

Harris Ford

Copyright © Harris Ford, August 2021. All Rights Reserved
Unless otherwise noted, copyright of the material belongs to the author

Permission to Use

In presenting this thesis/dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis/dissertation in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis/dissertation work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis/dissertation or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis/dissertation.

Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis/dissertation in whole or part should be addressed to:

Head of the Department of History
Room 619, Arts Building
University of Saskatchewan
9 Campus Drive
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada
S7N 5A5

OR

Dean
College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
University of Saskatchewan
116 Thorvaldson Building, 110 Science Place
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5C9 Canada

Abstract

As the British mandate in Palestine ended in mid-May 1948, responsibility for the territory shifted to the newly-formed United Nations. With tensions between Zionist settler Jews and Indigenous Arab Palestinians at an apex, the international organization sought to engender peace by implementing an internationalization of the Holy City of Jerusalem and its environs. This MA thesis examines the United Nations' vision of internationalization and the supranational sovereignty it imagined for itself over Jerusalem, as well as local Palestinian, Jordanian, and Israeli residents within the city. Notwithstanding the creation of a commission, local consultations, international conferences, and two draft statutes, the UN plan to internationalize the area encompassing the Holy City failed by the mid-1950s. This examination reveals that the plan to internationalize Jerusalem failed because it only pleased the United Nations.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the committee members, Dr. Martha Smith and Dr. Jim Handy, for thoughtful and challenging guidance throughout this process, as well as the external examiner Dr. Martin Gaal. And to John and Olivia Bird, for believing in me when it mattered most. Furthermore, a huge thank you to the entire history faculty at the University of Saskatchewan both during this degree and throughout my undergrad studies for sharing knowledge and accepting me into this beautiful discipline.

To our small but mighty cohort. Kristen Hartung, for your constant reminders of why we chose to embark on this degree, and for being there to share in all things Palestinian Studies when motivation waned and a laugh was needed. Richard Oware, for challenging me to be a better historian, as well as a better person beyond academia, and for your unabashed excitement about things I so often take for granted. Thank you both for being amazing colleagues, and more importantly, even better friends.

Finally, thank you to my supervisor, Maurice Jr. Labelle. Not only have you been a mentor in my academic life, but also in my personal one too, and I am incredibly grateful for your contributions in both facets. I would not be where I am today without you.

Table of Contents

Permission to Use	i
Abstract	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: The Beginnings of Internationalization: How the United Nations got to Resolution 194	25
Chapter 2: “An Inquest on Failure”: The United Nations Efforts to Internationalize Jerusalem through the Palestine Conciliation Commission	47
Chapter 3: Fading into Obscurity: The Jerusalem Question after the Palestine Conciliation Commission	76
Conclusion	95
Bibliography	98

Only Pleasing Themselves: The United Nations' Internationalization of Jerusalem, 1947-54

The plan was not working. Despite numerous attempts by the United Nations to internationalize the city of Jerusalem, the urban center remained out of the organization's grasp.¹ As its Trusteeship Council drafted a statute for the Holy City, Iraq's Muhammad Fadhel al-Jamali cautioned the international organization. UN efforts, al-Jamali warned, were problematic, as they were "based upon [the] assumption to seek new solutions acceptable to occupying powers."² While not speaking for Palestinians, he critiqued the Western-centered premise that undergirded UN involvement and outlined its ramifications as seen by a decolonizing Arab world. al-Jamali feared the United Nations acted as a bedfellow of Zionism, the political arm of the Israeli state, and that such an alliance proved to be detrimental for peace in the Mashriq.³ The tireless efforts of UN officials to enforce the General Assembly's mediation ideal in Israel/Palestine, he declared, "tried [to] please all groups but none [are] pleased."⁴

But, in this case, even the occupying powers were dissatisfied. Surprisingly perhaps, Israel's Moshe Sharett agreed in principle with the Iraqi permanent representative. Iraq and Israel remained at war with each other with no armistice in place following the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49. Having witnessed three years of indecisiveness and incompetence, Sharett was fed up with UN efforts. In its most recent iteration, the United Nations replaced the Palestine

¹ While "internationalize" and "internationalization" are rather clunky terms, I employ them because that was the language the United Nations used in discussions at the time.

² Incoming Cablegram, 6 January 1950, from Geneva, Switzerland, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *United Nations Archives* [cited hereafter as UNA].

³ "Can United Nations Force Statute?" *Mideast Mirror*, 16 April 1950. Page 8. "Mashriq" is the Arabic word for "East," which designates the eastern part of the Arab world and encompasses the region known in Eurocentric geographic nomenclature as the "Middle East."

⁴ Incoming Cablegram from Geneva, 6 January 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, UNA.

Conciliation Commission (PCC) with the Trusteeship Council as it struggled to control day-to-day life in the Holy City. Initial Israeli support for the UN internationalization plan slowly ebbed out of fashion as failure after failure gripped its proclaimed peace initiative. Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs summed up his opinions bluntly in a May 1950 report to the Trusteeship Council. Should the United Nations continue to press its agenda, Sharett warned, "the city is to become like a diver whose air line is cut."⁵

Sharett and al-Jamali reached similar conclusions concerning the UN plan to make Jerusalem a permanent international zone rather than a part of the partition of British Palestine between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The plan had significant flaws, and the newest installment was more continuity than reconstruction.⁶ What the United Nations missed, or more precisely ignored, was rather important: in the existing international system, anchored in the gradual universalization of the Westphalian nation-state model, the supranational body had no legal right to place Jerusalem under its administration.⁷ Legal sovereignty concerning Jerusalem was in flux following the transfer of the League of Nations-sanctioned mandate over Palestine from Britain to the United Nations in mid-1947.⁸ Despite occupying roles as the mandatory power over Palestine since 1922, none of the supervising authorities formally held legal sovereignty over the Holy City.⁹ Territorial sovereignty, in the planned case of an internationalized Jerusalem,

⁵ Draft of Memorandum to be Presented by the Government of Israel to the Seventh Session, United Nations Trusteeship Council on the Question of Jerusalem, May 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0008, *UNA*.

⁶ Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 10.

⁷ Legal Opinions, Undated, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0008, *UNA*.

⁸ League of Nations Mandate for Palestine (12 August 1922), Nineteenth Session of the Council, Thirteenth Meeting, Held at St. James' Palace, London. See also: Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 199.

⁹ Henry Cattán, "The Status of Jerusalem under International Law and United Nations Resolutions," *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 10, No. 3 (1981): 8-9; and Dieter Grimm, translated by Belinda Cooper, *Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 84-86.

belonged to the United Nations; Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians in the Holy City would be the direct subjects of UN authority, headquartered in Lake Success, New York. Municipal sovereignty, in other words, would rest with the international organization, not its member nation-states, let alone non-members.¹⁰ The proposed internationalization of Jerusalem, under the auspices of a supranational organization in the late 1940s and early 1950s, perpetuated the disenfranchisement of local self-determinations and represented an imperial challenge to the nationalization of sovereignties deeply embedded in an emerging era of global decolonization.¹¹

This thesis examines the United Nations' attempt to internationalize Jerusalem from its decision to partition Palestine until its abandonment of the "Jerusalem question" in the early 1950s. Passed in late November 1947, UN General Assembly Resolution 181 infamously partitioned Palestine between non-Palestinians. Understandably, emphasis has been predominantly placed on its call to establish two separate "Arab" and "Jewish" zones in the region. What often falls of out sight, however, is that Resolution 181 also partitioned a third part of Palestine to the United Nations. This forgotten portion called for the creation of an indefinite "international" zone, a *corpus seperatum* (separated body), in and around Jerusalem and the surrounding Holy Sites, to be governed by UN officialdom.¹² The United Nations' mandate, as per Resolution 181, and its subsequent official belief viewed the separation of Jerusalem from Israel and Jordan (the state that governed and claimed sovereignty over the West Bank), let alone Palestinians, as an important dimension in establishing a so-called everlasting peace in

¹⁰ Despite the central role of Israel, Palestine, Jordan and Egypt in the discussions around Jerusalem, all four nations became UN members at different times, if at all. Egypt was an initial member in 1945; Israel received Member status in 1949 after many deliberations; and Transjordan did not receive official status until 1955. Palestine has never received Member status.

¹¹ Christopher J. Bickerton, "State-Building: Exporting State Failure," in Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Conliffe and Alexander Gourevich, eds. *Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations* (London: University College London Press, 2007), 96.

¹² UN Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine, Part III. 29 November 1947. A/RES/181 (II).

Palestine/Israel. Corpus seperatum, in this case, entailed that the United Nations appoint its own governor, provide “law and order,” and guarantee protection of the Holy Places, among other responsibilities.¹³ Rather than being a temporary occupying power as UN member states had been in places like Germany and Korea in the wake of World War II, the internationalization plan rendered the United Nations as the pseudo-municipal sovereign with no expiration date. When it came to Jerusalem, this particular arrangement did not please Palestinians, Israelis, or other neighboring non-Palestinian Arabs. This thesis argues that, during the period under study, it only pleased UN officials.

By focusing on the details and subsequent failure of the United Nations’ so-called internationalization of Jerusalem, the thesis makes two key contributions. First, a detailed examination of the formal planning of a corpus seperatum in the area of Jerusalem adds to the scholarly demystification that the United Nations was a global body above empire-making during its early existence.¹⁴ Although the signing of the United Nations Charter in the autumn of 1945 was heralded by its adherents as a liberatory moment of change to the international order, the Charter’s vague terminology and theoretical tensions provided ample space for imperial ways of being to continue.¹⁵ According to contemporary international law, sovereignty—that is, the authority to govern—rested with the government controlling a defined territory. As part of a partitioned space and under an UN-invented process of internationalization, Jerusalem

¹³ The Protection of the City of Jerusalem and its Inhabitants, 20 May 1948, AG-020 fonds, S-0159-0001-0005, *UNA*.

¹⁴ Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 178. For further examples of the early United Nations, see: John Quigley, *The International Diplomacy of Israel’s Founders: Deception at the United Nations in the Quest for Palestine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); and Ellen Jenny Ravndal, “‘The First Major Test’: The UN Secretary-General and the Palestine Problem, 1947-9,” *The International History Review* Vol. 38, No. 1 (2016): 198-199.

¹⁵ Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 190; Paul Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World,” *American Historical Review* (2011).

represented something relatively unseen in modern-era global affairs: a defined land under the direct and persistent sovereignty of a supranational body, rather than one or many of its members.¹⁶ Put simply, the United Nations would control Jerusalem without any right to do so.

This thesis utilizes the concepts “imperial” and “colonial” to signify two interrelated—yet importantly distinct—modes of domination. “Imperial” signifies a way of being that buttresses empire’s structure of human inequality in the world. Individuals, groups, governments, and organizations—like the United Nations—are imperial by thinking, speaking, behaving, and interacting in ways that dehumanize, exploit, disregard, and disable for self-serving political, social, economic, and cultural benefits.¹⁷ Broadly speaking, “imperial” ways of being invoke and exceptionalize ideas of human difference—based on categories of analysis like race, gender, class, and sexuality—to empower oneself and downgrade the manufactured “other” in a relational way.¹⁸ In short, imperial ways of being promote, enhance, and foster difference to further demarcate the categorization of those with power and those without.

“Imperial” ways of being differ from the concept of “colonial” as being “imperial” does not require a formal relationship between “colonizer” and “colonized” determined by territorial control and political subjugation. “Imperial” differences are invoked in both formal and informal

¹⁶ The only other instance of UN tinkering in international sovereignty affairs at this juncture was in Trieste in the immediate aftermath of World War II, although the global disparity of importance between the two cities should not go unnoted. Danzig was declared an autonomous region with help of the League of Nations following World War I and the Treaty of Versailles’ recommendation, again without the same gusto pursued in relation to Jerusalem. For examples of these moments, see: Glenda Sluga, *The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 143; Elizabeth M. Clark, “Borderland of the Mind: The Free City of Danzig and the Sovereignty Question,” *German Politics and Society* Vol. 35, No 2 (2017): 25-26; and Ralph Wilde, “From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration,” *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 95, No. 3 (2001): 602-605. What’s more, Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations at this time, compared Jerusalem to Trieste in response to “further strengthening of the United Nations.” Trygve Lie, “Introduction to the Third Annual Report, 5 July 1948,” in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds. *Public Papers of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Volume I* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 156.

¹⁷ Robert H.J. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001): 27.

¹⁸ Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1350.

situations accompanying a relational structure of empire and its diverse political, social, economic, and cultural operations of imperialism.¹⁹ “Colonial,” for its part, is a particular kind of imperial mode of oppression anchored in the formal conquest and administration of foreign lands.²⁰ Settler colonialism, as in the case of Zionism, represents a distinct subset of “colonial” because its practice both conquers foreign lands and seeks to eliminate the latter’s Indigenous population while simultaneously aiming to “indigenize” the settler population.²¹ In service to a greater structure of empire, “colonial” operations dispossess colonized peoples without the genocidal intentions of settler colonialism. In this thesis, I characterize the United Nations as “imperial” when it historically acted in ways that brokered inequalities between the international organization and Jerusalemites that empowered the former in the domains of foreign relations and international politics. Conversely, the United Nations was “colonial” when it sought to directly administer the territorial space in and around the city of Jerusalem, control the local population, and subjugate Jerusalemites to its political authority via disenfranchisement.

The terms “local” and “sovereignty” are two other crucial components in need of clarification. “Local,” for the context of this thesis, refers to communities in and around the municipality of Jerusalem. Arab, Palestinian, and non-settler Jewish and Christian peoples fall under this umbrella of “local.” The word is used in contrast to the internationalism inherent in the United Nations—both in practice and action in Jerusalem—as well as to demarcate the gulf between a global project and its smaller, more regional impact in the areas surrounding the Holy City. “Local,” then, is an antonym to the global found at the United Nations. The other term is

¹⁹ Ibid., 1349.

²⁰ Young, *Postcolonialism*, 21.

²¹ Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” *Journal of Genocide Research* Vol. 8, No. 4 (2006): 388 and 401; and Lorenzo Veracini, “The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 42, No. 2 (2013): 35.

“sovereignty,” which runs through this thesis as a pseudo-synonym for governance, or the right to govern the city of Jerusalem. By referring to “sovereignty,” I evoke tensions between global and local as the first attempted to assume control over the second without legitimate consent. UN commissions, such as the PCC, artificially created the structures of governance (or in this case, attempted to create) to artificially install a desired sovereignty fitting its mandate.²² The friction between acceptable and desired control played out through questions of legitimate sovereignty between aspirant local governing bodies and equally-aspirant imperially-minded non-local entities, such as the United Nations.²³ By defying local sovereignty, the United Nations, under the direction of “colonizer” member states like the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Britain, engaged in imperial actions. These four terms—imperial, colonial, local, and sovereignty—are therefore interconnected and crucial for understanding how the United Nations operated in Jerusalem.

Despite a lack of UN involvement in international territorial administration prior to Jerusalem, there were antecedent attempts globally for such governmental structures. European colonial powers had previously fueled ideas of so-called internationalization, even if unsuccessful, to enforce a regime upon a region without much consent from local populations. The island of Crete was governed by six European powers from 1897-1898, primarily to squash jealously and frenetic land-grabs in the wake of the Ottoman empire’s military defeats.²⁴ A border dispute between Colombia and Peru led to a three-member commission governing the region of Leticia in 1932, but the town of barely 3,000 people was returned to Colombia the

²² Lori Allen, “Determining Emotions and the Burden of Proof in Investigative Commissions to Palestine,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol. 59, No. 2 (2017): 393.

²³ Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1370.

²⁴ Méir Ydit, *Internationalised Territories: From the “Free City of Cracow” to the “Free City of Berlin”* (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1961), 28. This “Board of Ambassadors” consisted of Austro-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia.

following year.²⁵ Pre-UN internationalization efforts attempted to mitigate still-rampant colonial aspirations and promote a putative peace amongst Western imperial nations.²⁶

Internationalization, then, was the prerogative of Western countries to prevent further conflicts between each other, rather than the stated desires of local peoples in the internationalized zones.

The United Nations, against the “principle of equal rights and self-determination” outlined in its Charter, established itself as “a force for world order” from the onset.²⁷ Its proclaimed reform of the international system coincided with the gradual disintegration of a Western imperial system based on formal rule over overseas colonies, alongside the perceived dangers of independence movements and global decolonization more broadly.²⁸ National struggles for liberation in Palestine and elsewhere became increasingly internationalized, as the UN General Assembly became the main stage where the status of colonized territories was scrutinized. A litany of quandaries surrounding the issue of sovereignty, such as the role of a local population in determining how a country, region, or city should be run, became *l’ordre du jour* at the United Nations.²⁹ Committed in principle to phasing out imperial rule everywhere around the globe, UN initiatives took on the responsibility of overseeing “transfers of power” *in between* imperial metropolises and colonies.³⁰ The United Nations’ caretaker role in such decolonizing processes of in-between-ness granted it *an imagined supranational authority*

²⁵ Ibid., 61-62. This League of Nations initiative included of a member from Brazil, Spain, and the United States.

²⁶ Antony Anghie, “Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations,” *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* Vol. 34, No. 2 (2002): 515.

²⁷ Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945. San Francisco, California. Article 1; and Article 77, Point A; and Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 64-65.

²⁸ Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 99.

²⁹ Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 60; Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1378 and 1381; and Bickerton, *Politics without Sovereignty*, 96.

³⁰ “Transfer of power” is a trope of decolonization used to describe the perceived unilateral progression of empire’s end. This misconception was held into the 1990s in scholarship surrounding decolonization. For a critique of the idea, see Yoav Di-Capua, “Arab Existentialism: A Lost Chapter in the Intellectual History of Decolonization,” *American Historical Review* Vol. 17, No. 4 (2012): 1062.

subjected to the will of the sum of its membership parts.³¹ As the case study of the internationalization of Jerusalem reveals, imperial cooperation amid leading member states overpowered the international organization's proclaimed commitment to the principle of self-determination.³²

The Eurocentrism of both international law and the concept of sovereignty facilitated imperial continuity both at the United Nations and in Jerusalem in the late 1940s. Despite a change in name and structure, the carryover from the League of Nations to the United Nations was vast, especially early in the latter's tenure.³³ Based on the British imperial model, the League of Nations' sanctioned mandate system served as the natural and logical basis for the United Nations to work from.³⁴ The League created mandates to act as a new form of imperialism contorted around the growing language of self-determination powered by national liberation movements in colonies, and the United Nations adapted this into the Trusteeship Council to continue broadcasting an image of benevolence.³⁵

From its onset, the United Nations stood behind the mandate system in Palestine. According to the UN, the imperial way of being in Palestine was not the problem, but rather the British empire's inadequacy and coercion were to blame for the lack of sustained peace.³⁶ What

³¹ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 102.

³² Đura Ninčić, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 126; and Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 100 and 178.

³³ Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 21, 71, and 81; and Jessica Lynne Pearson, "Defending Empire at the United Nations: The Politics of International Colonial Oversight in the Era of Decolonization," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 45, No. 3 (2017): 528.

³⁴ Leland M. Goodrich, "From League of Nations to United Nations," *International Organization* Vol. 1, No. 1 (1947): 20; Francis B. Sayre, "Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System," *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 42, No. 2 (1948): 265; Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 357; and Anghie, *The Making of International Law*, 199.

³⁵ Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 10 and 62; and Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 393.

³⁶ Noura Erakat, "The UN Statehood Bid: Palestine's Flirtation with Multilateralism," in Karim Makdisi and Vijay Prashad, eds. *Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), 96.

remained following Palestine's shift from Britain to the United Nations in 1947, therefore, was an imperial notion of tutelage.³⁷ Under the guise of assistance and in the language of hopeful eventualities, the UN operated with "domination that masqueraded as trusteeship."³⁸ The legacy of imperial tutelage, I argue, is exemplified in the United Nations' failed attempt to internationalize the city of Jerusalem and its environs.

This thesis's second main contribution reveals how early UN actions in Jerusalem helped lay the flawed foundations scaffolding the so-called peace process between Arabs and Jews in the Mashriq. By way of problematizing the United Nations' concept of internationalization, it adds to a growing body of scholarship critiquing the historical peace process between Palestinians, Israelis, and Arabs—devised, led, and mediated by Western actors—as being unsound.³⁹ By meddling with multi-national sovereignties and contradicting its commitment to the idea of self-determination so vital to its own Charter, the United Nations managed to not only fail in internationalizing Jerusalem, but it also sowed formidable distrust with Israel, Palestinian leadership, Jordan, and other Arab countries.⁴⁰ Thereafter, the international organization was not viewed as a legitimate mediator in the peace processes in part because of its imperial approach to the Jerusalem area during the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Early UN involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts unearths the problematic nature of the historical peace process. The botched partition plan, rendered moot nearly from its inception, transformed the United Nations from a body of aspirant policy-formers

³⁷ Anghie, *The Making of International Law*, 116.

³⁸ Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 82; and Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1373.

³⁹ Seth Anziska, *Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Nasser H. Aruri, *Dishonest Broker: The U.S. Role in Israel and Palestine* (Boston: South End Press, 2003); Rashad Khalidi, *Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2013); and Salim Yaqub, *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.—Middle East Relations in the 1970s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

⁴⁰ Andrew Gilmour, "The Role of the UN Secretary-General: A Historical Assessment," in Makdisi and Prashad, eds., *Land of Blue Helmets*, 23.

to an assortment of administrators scrambling for some semblance of peace.⁴¹ As the United Nations looked to gain control, it set the peace process on a tainted track. A major part of the issue, I argue, was that the United Nations considered the conflict between Arabs and Jews as a matter of conciliation, not reconciliation. The idea of conciliation in UN imaginations implied that the involved factions never peacefully coexisted, and that conflict was inevitable or even unavoidable.⁴² With the introduction of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, a peacemaking and pacification pursuit, the United Nations was not actively striving toward a reunion of the two sides, at least not in name. Through the process of partition, the United Nations enforced a form of conflict resolution which had not yielded many positive results prior, and has been met with historical contempt since.⁴³

The failed UN plan to internationalize Jerusalem was indeed a case of reconciliation, rather than conciliation, because it unfolded in a context whereby those involved sought to reconcile pre-existing political and cultural differences, even if there was no tangible acceptance of this previously peaceful life in Palestine by the United Nations. This initiative was launched in order to re-establish Arab-Jewish relations to an age of coexistence, predating the European-constructed ideology of Zionism, its arrival in Palestine, and the Arab resistance against dispossessions and forced relocations.⁴⁴ That said, this historical case study is a unique form of reconciliation, as the established ways of approaching the topic have been through re-righting the wrongs of national programs such as Residential Schools in Canada or Apartheid in South

⁴¹ Arie M. Dubnov and Laura Robson, "Drawing the Line, Writing Beyond It: Toward a Transnational History of Partitions," in Arie M. Dubnov and Laura Robson, eds. *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), 13.

⁴² Michelle U. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); and Ussama Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the Making of the Modern Arab World* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019), 3-6.

⁴³ Dubnov and Robson, *Partitions*, 27.

⁴⁴ Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*, 22.

Africa.⁴⁵ These have been well-established, cognizant, and clearly-stated historical re-righting objectives from governmental bodies in charge, which the United Nations efforts were not. And yet the overall goal—that of a return to peace in Palestine—is indeed a reconciliatory effort akin to the more globally recognizable examples. By writing conciliation into the commission’s name, however, the United Nations signalled a viewing of Palestine’s history not unlike the institutions that preceded it. The omission of the two-letter prefix indicated that the United Nations viewed its actions as a novel contribution to the region rather than a return to pre-Western intrusion realities in Palestine. This error in nomenclature, and in the historical viewing of Zionist-Palestinian tensions as inevitable, ever-lasting conflicts, set a problematic course for efforts in Israel/Palestine to the detriment of Palestinians, Israelis, and the United Nations itself.

Contrary to the popular perceptions of perpetual and eternal conflict, Muslims, Jews, and Christians lived in relative congruity within Ottoman Palestine prior to Western encroachments. Religious diversity in Palestine was more a source of strength than weakness, despite established discriminatory practices toward non-Muslims.⁴⁶ Supplemental taxation, harsher legislation, and the like notwithstanding, Jews and Christians practiced a reasonably high level of religious autonomy and local self-governance for the time under Ottoman Muslim rule.⁴⁷ Yet during its Tanzimat reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman empire internally altered ruling mechanisms to better mimic the perceived progress of its European counterparts.⁴⁸ Its tendency

⁴⁵ John E. Drabinski, “Reconciliation and Founding Wounds,” *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* Vol. 4, No. 1 (2013): 118; Marwan Darweish, Carol Rank, and Sarah Giles, *Peacebuilding and Reconciliation: Contemporary Themes and Challenges* (London: Pluto Press, 2012); and Bashir Bashir and Will Kymlicka, eds. *The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 74-80.

⁴⁶ Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*, 28.

⁴⁷ Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*, 9.

⁴⁸ Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” *The American Historical Review* Vol. 107, No. 3 (2002): 779; Yelda Demirag, “Pan-Ideologies in the Ottoman Empire Against the West: From Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism,” *The Turkish Yearbook* Vol. XXXVI (2005): 144; and Anyur Erdogan, “The Sending Students Abroad in the Period of Tanzimat and the Effects on Ottoman Modernization,” *Sosyoloji Dergisi*, Vol. 3. No. 20 (2010).

toward comparative leniency fell victim to a greater Turkification of myriad non-Turkish cultures under the Ottoman imperial umbrella of centralization.⁴⁹ Tanzimat moved cities like Jerusalem away from a semblance of autonomy, and instead subjected these urban centers to broader imperial backdrops.

Amid its numerous centralization reforms, Tanzimat initiatives transformed the millet system—an eighteenth-century governing instrument applied to regions of the empire that functioned in essence as sovereign communities.⁵⁰ While far from a beacon of acceptance, the millet system granted a relatively safe space for various Abrahamic denominations to live in the same city and to serve as intermediaries between the Ottoman metropole, its diverse subjects, and foreigners throughout the empire.⁵¹ With its abolishment, the late Ottoman empire promoted an ideology of religious pluralism that was more egalitarian while keeping unequal imperial relationships intact. Through this imagery of inclusivity, the non-Muslim and Arab majorities in Palestine joined emerging Ottoman conversations concerning imperial citizenry, which reflected a form of nationalism and provided distance from the prospect of secession haunting the empire in peripheries elsewhere.⁵²

A legally-binding decree known as the Status Quo uniquely governed the Ottoman area of Jerusalem. As noted by the United Nations in April 1949, this “*modus vivendi*” (a way of living) was created to ensure a peaceful state in the Holy Places.⁵³ Instituted by Ottoman Sultan Osman III in 1757, this *firman* (royal decree) legislated free access to the Holy Places and its

⁴⁹ Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*, 57.

⁵⁰ Justin McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923* (London: Routledge, 1997), 128; and M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 76.

⁵¹ Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*, 33; and Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*, 246.

⁵² Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*, 6-7.

⁵³ The Holy Places, Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat, 8 April 1949, AG-025 fonds, S-0375-0017-0003, UNA.

vicinity to all religious denominations, local and foreign.⁵⁴ Ottoman authorities reaffirmed the Status Quo decree in 1853 under Sultan Abdulmejid I in the wake of European imperial encroachments in the Holy Land.⁵⁵ Attempts to circumvent Ottoman sovereignty in Jerusalem enforced a proliferating sentiment that the Holy City held a special international status in relation to other urban centers in Western imaginations. Representing the only official “international arrangement” concerning the Holy Places, even after the United Nations wrote corpus seperatum into multiple resolutions, the reaffirmation of the Status Quo in 1853 continued official policies of open access while simultaneously fostering greater disdain toward the Ottoman governmentalization of Jerusalem.⁵⁶

The advent of the Zionist movement in the waning years of the nineteenth century fractured the status quo in Ottoman Jerusalem. This European-based nationalist movement sought an exclusive homeland for Jewish peoples. Zionism rapidly set its settler colonial sights on the land of Palestine due to the centrality of Mount Zion and its relevance to the Jewish faith. For many early Zionists, the thought of having Zionism without Zion was impractical.⁵⁷ Mount Zion, located just outside the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem, became a defining feature for the ideological, religious, and geographic legitimacy of the Western settler colonial project. By calling the project “Zionism” there was an intentional territorial claim to both the spirit of Mount Zion, and later, especially after the Balfour Declaration, to the land surrounding the religious and cultural space.

⁵⁴ Marlen Eordegian, “British and Israeli Maintenance of the Status Quo in the Holy Places of Christendom,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 35, No. 2 (2003): 308; and Henry Cattán, *Jerusalem* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1981), 28.

⁵⁵ The Holy Places, Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat, 8 April 1949, *UNA*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Gur Alroey, “‘Zionism without Zion’? Territorialist Ideology and the Zionist Movement, 1882-1956,” *Jewish Social Studies* Vol. 18, No 1 (2011); and Motti Golani, “Zionism Without Zion: The Jerusalem Question, 1947-1949,” *The Journal of Israeli History* Vol. 16, No. 1 (1995).

Palestine became the prime settlement location for Zionist thinkers by the turn of the twentieth century, despite running counter to both Ottoman sovereignty and an internationally-established Status Quo in Jerusalem.⁵⁸ Zionist disregard for the Ottoman frame of relative religious tolerance in Palestine engendered a culture of sectarianism and exacerbated foreign encroachment.⁵⁹ The pluralism of Palestine's religious realities burdened the European creators of the Zionist project, leading to a socially engineered "Arab" versus "Jew" dichotomy against the Ottoman paradigm of intercultural coexistence.⁶⁰

The Balfour Declaration, penned by the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour in November 1917 and influenced by Zionist leadership, called for "the settlement in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."⁶¹ Britain's formal support of Zionism not only opened Palestine to a shade of Western settler colonialism, but also thrust Jerusalem into the role of the principal metropole for Zionist activities. With all other territorial considerations rendered contestable, Jerusalem became *the* center for Zionist-Jewish settlement. Despite no longer being under the auspices of an official empire, Palestine in the League of Nations' mandate system comprised many of the same imperial ways of being had Britain ruled it as a full-fledged empire without international sanction. Collectively, the League, the British mandatory authority, and Zionists viewed Palestine and Palestinians as unfit for nationalism and in need of a Western brand of supposed civilizational progress.⁶² A Zionist Commission arriving in Jerusalem in early 1918 remarked how the revered Old City was anything but a Holy City, simultaneously implying

⁵⁸ Alroey, "Zionism without Zion," 11.

⁵⁹ Makdissi, *Age of Coexistence*, 161.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 163-164; and Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978): 26-27.

⁶¹ "Drafts and Final Text of The Balfour Declaration," in Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Eighth Edition* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2010), 94.

⁶² Anghie, *The Making of International Law*, 185 and 188.

the inferior status of Palestinian Arabs in relation to an exceptionalized status of European Zionist Jews.⁶³

Staying true to Article 22 of the League Charter, Britain saw that “the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations.”⁶⁴ As the mandate in Palestine document explicitly stated, and in following with the Balfour Declaration, the “Mandatory” would assist in establishing “a national home” for Jewish peoples centered in and around Mount Zion, while simultaneously promising not to harm the vague, monolithic, and prejudiced “non-Jewish” communities in Palestine.⁶⁵ Britain and the League’s unabashed support for the Zionist movement signalled to Indigenous Arabs in and around Palestine that the new international regime had begun the processes of migration, displacement, and state-building against the desires of the majority of the local populations, and in direct conflict with the established status quo.⁶⁶ Settler colonialism, as a result, transformed Jerusalem into an imagined place where people could live in lieu of a place where people did live.⁶⁷

The Palestinian population, deeply rooted in and around Jerusalem, was left to contend with an unprecedented influx of European Zionist settlers attempting to uproot, displace, and erase from 1920 onward within an imperial British mandatory structure.⁶⁸ Whereas a distinct

⁶³ Bernard Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City, Third Edition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 87. Chaim Weizmann, leader of the British-sponsored Zionist Commission and later the first President of Israel, called Jerusalem’s Old City “nothing but filth and infection.”

⁶⁴ The Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919. Paris Peace Conference. Palais de Versailles. Paris, France. Article 22. This article was reaffirmed in the opening paragraph of the Mandate for Palestine document, further cementing the problematic language into the proceedings of the League and beyond.

⁶⁵ League of Nations. “Mandate for Palestine,” *Communiqué au Conseil et aux Membres de la Société Genève*, 12 Août 1922, Preamble and Article 2.

⁶⁶ Lauren Banko, “Refugees, Displaced Migrants, and Territorialisation in Interwar Palestine,” *Mashriq & Mahjar* Vol. 5, No. 2 (2018): 2.

⁶⁷ Asher Kaufmann, “Colonial Cartography and the Making of Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria,” in Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 226 and 232.

⁶⁸ Rashad Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 153.

Palestinian nationalist identity was in formation during the late Ottoman period, Zionism ushered in a quick change of thinking and imagining of the self for Palestinian Arabs.⁶⁹ With the express aim of creating a national home for Jewish peoples in Palestine in rapid order, Britain sought to control Palestinians through citizenship rather than liberation.⁷⁰ The British form of citizenship in mandated Palestine discriminated to keep the ninety-three percent Indigenous Arab population from undermining the Balfour Declaration's commitment to Zionism.⁷¹ The formation of a mandatory citizenship never allowed for Palestinian nationalism to be officially recognized or acted upon, let alone form a voice of government or self-representation. Palestinians thus lacked a viable arena to meet politically with the mandatory power, which severely limited the opportunities for any kind of official political formation relating to Palestinian identity.⁷² Indigenous Arabs in Palestine self-identified as Palestinians, but the British government and Zionists intentionally did not view these claims as legitimate.

Indigenous-settler conflicts arose as a result, especially in and around Jerusalem. Deadly strife regularly broke out in the Holy City between 1919-1921 and again in 1929 and 1933. Mounting Palestinian frustrations against a growing Zionist Jewish population (which rose from 10% in 1920 to 31% in 1936) and British imperial rule led to the Arab Revolt of 1936.⁷³ Also known as the First Intifada, this moment resulted in the Peel Commission, which concluded in 1937 that the British mandate had no future in Palestine.⁷⁴ As the British position showed more

⁶⁹ Ibid., 149.

⁷⁰ Mutaz Qafisheh, "Genesis of Citizenship in Palestine and Israel: Palestinian Nationality during the Period 1917-1925," *Journal of the History of International Law* Vol. 11 (2009): 17 and 20.

⁷¹ Lauren Banko, "The Creation of Palestinian Citizenship under an International Mandate: Legislation, Discourses and Practices, 1918-1925," *Citizenship Studies* Vol. 16, No. 5-6 (2012): 642 and 648.

⁷² Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, Third Edition* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 40.

⁷³ Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East: US Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 13.

⁷⁴ Ibid., Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, 101; and David W. Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 111. The Peel Commission was also the first official mention of partition in legal documents.

signs of faltering in the wake of World War II, Zionists violently targeted both British officials and Palestinian nationalists to cement a place in Jerusalem and Palestine more broadly. Zionist militants infamously bombed Jerusalem's King David Hotel in the summer of 1946 as a part of this tactic. Unable to institute peace in Palestine, Britain announced its intentions to fully withdraw and abandon its internationally-sanctioned mandate in the region no later than 1 October 1948.⁷⁵

As Britain retreated with “shame and humiliation,” the United Nations stepped in at the behest of the departing imperial power and established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to determine Palestine's future.⁷⁶ Unlike the Zionists, Palestinian leadership enacted a boycott against UNSCOP because of the perceived inevitability of an unfavorable outcome.⁷⁷ Those Palestinians defying the national boycott met with UNSCOP in an unofficial manner.⁷⁸ As the Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, and Palestinian leadership anticipated, UNSCOP's majority report suggested partition as the means to continue the mandatory responsibilities in Palestine.⁷⁹ A majority of UN members believed the partition of land in Palestine, with an “internationalized” Jerusalem under UN auspices as a vital component, enabled both Palestinian independence and the establishment of a Jewish national home.⁸⁰ The

⁷⁵ Cattán, *Jerusalem*, 37; Quigley, *The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders*, 81; and UN Resolution 181 (II) Part A: Termination of Mandate, Partition, and Independence. 29 November 1947.

⁷⁶ Efraim Karsh, *Palestine Betrayed* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2010), 76.

⁷⁷ Elad Ben-Dror, “The Arab Struggle Against Partition: The International Arena of Summer 1947,” *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 43, No. 2 (2007): 260; and Abdel Razzaq Takriti, “Before BDS: Lineages of Boycott in Palestine,” *Radical History Review* No. 134 (2019): 78.

⁷⁸ This lack of Palestinian unity is discussed in: Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951* (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2006), 25-27; Roysi Eskanazi, “Two-State Solutions Through Arab Eyes,” *Introduction to Palestinian Question* (2016): 2; and Taysir Nashif, “Palestinian Arab and Jewish Leadership in the Mandate Period,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 6, No. 4 (1977): 121.

⁷⁹ The majority report was accepted by the committee members of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay. It was rejected by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, with Australia abstaining from the vote. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report to the General Assembly, Volume 1, 3 September 1947. Preparation of the Report, Point 75. A/364.

⁸⁰ The full relevant quote is as follows: “Only by means of partition can these conflicting national aspirations find substantial expression and qualify both peoples to take their places as independent nations in the international

United Nations, with allusions to the Ottoman Status Quo of 1757, argued that religious pluralism and the centrality of urban Jerusalem within the overarching peace framework justified *corpus seperatum*.⁸¹ UNSCOP also filed a dissenting minority report, tabled by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, rejecting partition in favour of forming a federal state in which Indigenous Palestinians and Zionist settlers governed Palestine together.⁸² This report called for Jerusalem to be “the capital of the independent federal State of Palestine,” while having a United Nations-governed body oversee the protection of and free access to the Holy Sites.⁸³ UNSCOP committee members debated the extent of UN control of Jerusalem and its environs, but not the essence.⁸⁴

Overall, Palestinian Arabs rejected the *corpus seperatum* proposal of the majority report, seeing it as a loss of rights, a means of dispossession, as well as a continuation of problematic “elastic terms” exogenously instituted by the mandate system.⁸⁵ Non-Palestinian Arabs were nearly unanimous in supporting an Arab state of Palestine with Jerusalem as the capital, with something more akin to UNSCOP’s minority report proposal without Zionist presence as the basis of the layout.⁸⁶ Jerusalem, in Arab Mashriq eyes, was a part of the Arab world and Arabs were more than capable of protecting the Holy Sites.⁸⁷ For Zionists, especially early in proceedings before Israel’s creation, the idea of UN protection over Jerusalem and the spirit of

community and in the United Nations.” United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report to the General Assembly, Recommendations (II); and Part III, City of Jerusalem.

⁸¹ Ibid., Part III, City of Jerusalem, Justification, Points 2, 3, and 4.

⁸² Ibid., Chapter VII, Recommendations (III)

⁸³ Ibid., Chapter VII, V. The Holy Places, Religious Interests and Jerusalem. It should also be noted that India, Iran, and Yugoslavia voiced reservations at what the Report calls the “creation of the ‘City of Jerusalem,’” which was penned by the Canadian, Dutch, Peruvian and Swedish representatives. Czechoslovakia, Guatemala and Uruguay initially voiced caution against the *corpus seperatum* plan, but later recanted the trepidations and joined in the majority report’s recommendations. Religious Interests and the Holy Places; The Status of Jerusalem, Point 72.

⁸⁴ Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 29.

⁸⁵ Trusteeship Council, Fortieth Meeting of the Third Part of the Second Session, Lake Success, New York, 29 April 1948, AG-020 fonds, S-0159-0001-0004, *UNA*. Speaking after the passing of the resolution, Palestinian leader Jamal Bey Hussein of the Arab Higher Committee commented that UN presence in Jerusalem, and partition more broadly, was something “we resist and which we shall always resist.”

⁸⁶ Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, 126.

⁸⁷ Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 102-103.

corpus seperatum were not abhorrent as partition realized the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.⁸⁸ Zionists demanded that the Old City fall under the Trusteeship Council's purview, which happened to be the section of the city that UNSCOP's majority report allocated to an "Arab" state to be governed by a non-Palestinian Arab, King Abdullah of Transjordan.⁸⁹ Neither Palestinians, non-Palestinian Arabs, or Zionists met the UN-proposed plan of corpus seperatum fondly, as a continued international presence in the most coveted of urban centers severely limited multiple nationalisms simultaneously.

No study currently exists examining the plan to internationalize the city of Jerusalem from the perspectives of the tasked UN officials. Instead, existing scholarship tends to cite the same handful of secondary sources and relies primarily on the written records of the people involved in the PCC, with diplomats Pablo de Azcarate (UN mediator) and Walter Eytan (Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry) occupying primary source space rather than UN archival materials.⁹⁰ Current historiography focuses more on describing the PCC than conducting a deep analysis of the so-called Jerusalem question at the United Nations.

Given the absence of a history of the failed internationalization of Jerusalem based on UN archival documents, it is unsurprising that the PCC's role as a mediating body during the early Arab-Israeli "peace process" has been overlooked. Only two publications have the PCC as their focus and neither mention Jerusalem with any real fervor. David Forsythe's *United Nation's Peacemaking: Conciliation Commission for Palestine* focuses primarily on the Palestinian refugee aspect of the commission and minimizes Jerusalem's importance to the nascent "peace

⁸⁸ Trusteeship Council, Fortieth Meeting of the Third Part of the Second Session, Lake Success, New York, 29 April 1948. *UNA*.

⁸⁹ Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 252.

⁹⁰ Two slight exceptions are: David P. Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking: The Conciliation Commission of Palestine* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 187-188; and Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

process.” Internationalization is mentioned, as is the partition of the Holy City, yet Forsythe is much more concerned with the refugee portion of the commission.⁹¹ The other work, an article by Stian Johanssen Tiller and Hilde Henriksen Waage, views the PCC through the lens of the United States rather than the United Nations. Again, the Palestinian refugee problem occupies its foreground, with Jerusalem garnering a paragraph of attention in the thirty-five-page work.⁹² The article’s strength is in its description of negotiations between Zionists and Arab delegations, as well as the role the United States attempted—and ultimately failed—to hold throughout the PCC. While not explicitly stated in either of these texts, the implications of Jerusalem’s scholarly omission can be chalked up to the failure of the commission itself. That Jerusalem was to be internationalized, and that such a plan fell out of favour so quickly, lends itself to a brief overview even by the scholars of the commission.

The United Nations’ failed internationalization of Jerusalem has been consigned to commentary as opposed to rigorous study. The best example of thoroughness is Bernard Wasserstein’s work on the city itself. In a chapter titled “Division,” Wasserstein outlines the contested histories surrounding Jerusalem and looks directly at the internationalization discussions occurring under the auspices of the PCC.⁹³ Saadia Touval has a whole chapter on the PCC, but his attention is on the refugee mediation as opposed to the Jerusalem debates. His commentary on Jerusalem is limited to a select few pages.⁹⁴ Touval’s descriptive contributions situate the UN commission in broader peacemaking endeavours and place blame for its failure,

⁹¹ Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking*, 28-29 and 66-69.

⁹² Stian Johanssen Tiller and Hilde Henriksen Waage, “Powerful State: Powerless Mediator: The United States and the Peace Efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 1949-1951,” *The International History Review* Vol. 33, No. 3 (2011): 510-511. Tiller also wrote an MA Thesis on the PCC, albeit with a US focus. Stian Johanssen Tiller, “Defending the UN Agenda: The Peace Effort of the Palestine Conciliation Commission 1949-1951,” MA Thesis in History at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway (2009).

⁹³ Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, 132-179.

⁹⁴ Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 45-47; 85; 96.

pointing to the shortcomings of the Western powers, especially the United States, for the commission “end[ing] in total failure.”⁹⁵ John Quigley sprinkles in discussions about the city among broader discussions of Israel’s early statehood.⁹⁶ Other authors of the city and the early “peace process” make space for UN efforts to internationalize Jerusalem, yet only do so in passing.⁹⁷

This MA thesis is based on the archival collection of the United Nations in New York City. Numerous reports, correspondences, telegrams, and UN meetings provide rich insights into how the international body sought to bring about the internationalization of Jerusalem and the subsequent damage control undertaken after the plan failed to be implemented. This thesis uses previously uncited PCC-specific documents, such as correspondences between mediators, cables from conferences to the upper echelons of the United Nations’ government, Palestinian and Zionist conversations with the commission, and commission progress reports. These PCC archival materials are complemented by official UN resolutions, records of the Trusteeship Council, and minutes of the General Assembly. This thesis thus distinguishes itself from the existing work, which has relied on the latter primary sources and neglected the former.

This MA thesis incorporates important primary documents complementing UN archival research. *The Mideast Mirror*, a Cairo-based information digest, provided Arab perspectives on the UN proceedings pertaining to its plan to internationalize Jerusalem during the period under study. Translated to English, it frequently provided commentary by Arab leaders, political

⁹⁵ Ibid., 76. Touval begins the final paragraph of the PCC chapter by stating: “The commission’s failure can be attributed in large measure to American policies.” Ibid., 104.

⁹⁶ Quigley, *The International Diplomacy of Israel’s Founders*, 77-79; 108; 140.

⁹⁷ Eugene Bovis, *The Jerusalem Question, 1917-1968* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 70-91; and Cattani, *Jerusalem*, 37-38. See also: Randval, “The First Major Test,” 206-207; Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 144-145; and Irene L. Gendzier, *Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine, & the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 260; 280.

officials, and Palestinians on the discussions around Jerusalem and debates surrounding the United Nations' place within the early Arab-Israeli "peace process." The *Mideast Mirror* cites newspapers such as *Falastin* reporting on Palestine, *El Misri* from Cairo, Egypt, and *Al Nasr* out of Damascus, Syria, as well as commentary from Arab deputies, ambassadors, and dignitaries involved in the internationalization discussions. *The Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) further buttresses UN archival materials by providing important insights into the United States' position as an established global actor, emerging ally to Israel, and acting mediation member of the PCC. While this MA thesis focuses on the United Nations, the United States' role in the UN plan to internationalize Jerusalem was integral. Other primary sources consulted include *The Palestine Post*, documents from the United Kingdom and the League of Nations mandate for Palestine, and Papal encyclicals. By including these additional primary sources, I incorporate important voices outside the United Nations bureaucratic arena and show how the attempted internationalization of the Holy City was not limited to the new international organization. The incorporation of non-UN perspectives enriches, complicates, and enhances the historical relevance of Jerusalem in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The layout of the thesis is centered around the establishment, introduction, actions, and demise of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the UN body tasked with planning the internationalization of Jerusalem. Chapter one contextualizes the United Nations' involvement in Jerusalem leading up to the formation of the PCC. This chapter, furthermore, discusses the problematic role of the United Nations' attempts to govern territory through the lens of international sovereignty. Chapter two offers an in-depth look at the work of the commission itself through actions in both Jerusalem and New York. What roles did it occupy? How did it view Jerusalem? Did this view change? How did the commission go about meeting the

antithetical expectations of the international organization's nation-state members? Chapter three analyzes the end of the commission's work concerning Jerusalem and the immediate aftermath at the United Nations. While in official operation into the 1970s, the PCC terminated its mandate in the Holy City in April 1950 when the United Nations transferred Jerusalem to its Trusteeship Council. This chapter examines the demise of the commission, the reintroduction of the Trusteeship Council, and how this transfer affected the United Nations' internationalization plan in Jerusalem.

On paper, the so-called Jerusalem question had a simple solution in UN imaginations. Yet the story was drastically different on the ground, as the failure of UN internationalization indicates. The following pages seek to show how Jerusalem became a microcosm for the United Nations' efforts in Palestine. Furthermore, they aim to nuance the role of Jerusalem in the United Nations' imperial way of being to understand how the ambitions of the international organization were swiftly discarded and discredited by everyone outside the halls of Lake Success.

Chapter 1

The Beginnings of Internationalization: How the United Nations Got to Resolution 194

As Britain retreated from its mandate in Palestine, the “question” of the future of the Holy Land morphed into a UN “problem.” There were many unknowns. What would Jerusalem look like? Who would govern the territory? How would peace be kept? Would Indigenous Palestinians, Zionist settlers, and neighboring non-Palestinian Arabs coexist? With the British departure imminent, the High Commissioner of Palestine gave UNSCOP parting words of wisdom lost on the twenty-three years of previous governance by His Majesty’s Government: “We do our best to be impartial and in this case would much prefer to deal with a constructive future than a destructive past.”⁹⁸

Such was the temperature as the broader “Palestine question” narrowed onto a key aspect of UN mediation efforts in the late 1940s. While Jerusalem was not the sole recipient of attention for the United Nations, internationalization efforts in the city remain a vital chapter in the history of the early Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace processes. Various dioceses, governments, newspapers, and diplomats all faced the end of the British mandate in Palestine with a potential rise of a personal cause and hopes for a much more prosperous future than the sputtering history of recent memory. Jerusalem soon became a central issue. The United Nations made the city key in its imagined peace plan, both in the immediate and the gradual.

⁹⁸ Notes of an Address Given by the High Commissioner of Palestine to the Chairman and Delegates of UNSCOP at an Informal Meeting at Government House, 17 July 1947, AG-021 fonds, S-0504-0004-0008, FALCHI Building, Long Island City Archival Holdings, *UNA*.

This chapter situates the United Nations in historical debates on the future of Jerusalem and explains the backstory of internationalization efforts. UN Resolution 181 partitioned Palestine into three zones: “Arab,” “Jewish,” and “international.” The international zone set Jerusalem and its environs aside for governance from the United Nations itself. An “international regime” was to be established in the first two months after the mandate ended, but no later than 1 October 1948.⁹⁹ By the time October came around, however, Jerusalem was far from being the UN enclave the organization envisaged. By looking at the events leading up to the enactment of UN Resolution 194 in December 1948, which called for the return of Palestinian refugees, the creation of the PCC, and a resolution of the “Jerusalem question,” this chapter argues that the United Nations inherited and promulgated an imperial way of being forged in the interwar period by the collective actions of Western imperial powers.

Early Internationalization Discussions and Sovereignty

Jerusalem’s quasi-international status enacted through the Ottoman Status Quo hardened following World War I. As European powers, primarily Britain, France and Russia, gathered to carve up the remnants of defeated empires, Palestine came up for discussion with Ottoman capitulation in 1918. Importantly, and problematically, these discussions occurred before the empire collapsed and before sovereignty expired. Three events defined the five years after the Great War: the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the Husain-McMahon Correspondence of 1915-16, and the establishment of the League of Nations-led British mandate in 1920.

Sykes-Picot was a clandestine agreement forged between Britain and France in mid-May 1916 to distribute the remnants of the Central powers’ land after World War I. Specific emphasis

⁹⁹ UN Resolution 181, A/RES/181 (II). Part 1, Point 3.

was placed on the Ottoman territories, which remained under Ottoman control until 1918. The agreement spoke of a “brown area,” coincidentally over Jerusalem, which was to “be established [as] an international administration.”¹⁰⁰ Seeing as neither of the two imperial powers wanted to see the city in the hands of the other, internationalizing the region became a method of compromise.¹⁰¹ Consultation with Russia and “other Allies” were pending prior to any conclusions being drawn.¹⁰² Yet it was clear Britain and France saw the Holy Land as a place which defied sovereignty and incumbent conventions of international relations.

Sykes-Picot occurred despite an agreement for post-war land governance already in place. In 1915 Britain struck a separate deal regarding control of Palestinian land with the Hashemite Kingdom in the Hejaz. Known as the Husain-McMahon Correspondence (Husain bin Ali al-Hashimi was the Sharif of Mecca and Henry McMahon was the British High Commissioner in Egypt), the document requested a Hashemite attack on the Ottoman empire in Arabia to open another front in the Allied war effort. In return, Britain promised the recognition of Arab states (specifically in the Hashemite-controlled region of the Hejaz, today a part of Saudi Arabia), and to “guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.”¹⁰³ Once again, Britain advanced that Jerusalem be considered a “special” territory in the region.¹⁰⁴ While not a direct call for Jerusalem’s internationalization, these brief allusions indicated that Britain had eyes on the city and viewed it to be outside the purview of any Arab leader’s full sovereignty, let alone the sovereignty of Indigenous Palestinians.

¹⁰⁰ Sykes-Picot Agreement, Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, Point 2, 16 May 1916.

¹⁰¹ Anne Irfan, “Is Jerusalem International or Palestinian? Rethinking UNGA Resolution 181,” *Jerusalem Quarterly* Vol. 70 (2017): 53-54.

¹⁰² Sykes-Picot Agreement. Point 2.

¹⁰³ Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Ali ibn Hussein, 24 October 1915, The Husain-McMahon Correspondence.; and Winston Churchill, “White Paper of 1922,” in Patrick C.R. Terry, “Britain in Palestine (1917-1948)—Occupation, the Palestine Mandate, and International Law,” *University of Bologna Law Review* Vol. 2, No. 2 (2017): 201.

¹⁰⁴ Lesch, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 55.

Ideas of internationalization were nearly the exclusive purview of Western powers and served as a test of European colonial enterprises on a new platform.¹⁰⁵ This international form of governance was intentionally muddled to keep imperial rule hidden behind a notion of eventual local self-determination.¹⁰⁶ Britain, France and Italy, along with the United States and Japan, met in April 1920 at San Remo, Italy to discuss the borders of various proposed mandates. European victors gathered with individualistic goals of imperial clout in mind rather than adherence to local sovereignties in Palestine. Britain came to the conference believing the terms of Sykes-Picot were irrelevant given the circumstances of Britain's expulsion of the Ottoman empire and desire for more territory in the Mashriq.¹⁰⁷ Phrased another way, Britain thought it had done more to rid the region of the Ottomans than the other Western powers. As such, it deserved more land as compensation. France, not wanting the territory of Syria slated for French control to evaporate, insisted on Sykes-Picot being upheld whether the region of Palestine was international or British in governance.¹⁰⁸

The mandate in Palestine, and Britain's responsibilities associated with it, were tabled during the week-long conference in northwest Italy. The Italian Prime Minister, Signor Francesco Saverio Nitti, was adamant about the place of Catholicism in the mandate as it pertained to the protection and rights of non-Jewish communities.¹⁰⁹ Nitti later stressed the importance of "the international point of view" and the necessity of having a "civilized" nation at the helm when deciding upon the country charged with protecting Christian interests in

¹⁰⁵ Pederson, *The Guardians*, 360 and 392.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

¹⁰⁷ John T. McTague, Jr., "Anglo-French Negotiations over the Boundaries of Palestine, 1919-1920," *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 11, No. 2 (1982): 101.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 102.

¹⁰⁹ Appendix XIV. Minutes of Palestine Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers held in San Remo at the Villa Devachan—24 April 1920. Minutes Prepared by the British Secretary.

Palestine.¹¹⁰ The following day, the powers agreed that the British mandate did not infringe upon the already-existing rights exercised by non-Jewish peoples in Palestine, especially Western ones, though Muslim interests were not directly mentioned.¹¹¹

These plans had detractors though, most notably Lord George Curzon of Britain. Present at San Remo, Curzon was very cautious about a Jewish state in Palestine, which he thought could lead to large uprisings from the Indigenous Palestinian population.¹¹² He also believed Britain owed the Hashemite family on moral and political grounds following the successful revolt against Ottoman rule as outlined in the Husain-McMahon Correspondence.¹¹³ He cautioned against tying too much of Palestine up in mandates before consulting Emir Feisal of the Hashemites and before considering the potential for animosities to grow with reneged agreements.¹¹⁴ While Jerusalem was not explicitly mentioned, there were allusions to distributing the less desirable Ottoman territories first before diving into the full extent of former Ottoman lands. France wanted to ensure the Hashemites had as little control as possible to safeguard the new territorial holdings in Syria.¹¹⁵ With Britain set to control Palestine, the question of internationalizing the Holy Sites resurfaced as a way for non-British imperial powers to exert nominal control over the region more so than ensuring the rights of local populations.¹¹⁶

From San Remo sprang the British mandate for Palestine. Devised under the leadership of South African General Jan Smuts, mandates were meant to be a form of government for

¹¹⁰ Ibid.; and Enrico Molinaro, *The Holy Places of Jerusalem in Middle East Peace Agreements: The Conflict between Global and State Identities* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 57.

¹¹¹ Appendix XV. Minutes of Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in San Remo at the Villa Devachan—25 April 1920.

¹¹² David Gilmour, “The Unregarded Prophet: Lord Curzon and the Palestine Question,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 25, No. 3 (1996): 65.

¹¹³ Timothy J. Paris, “British Middle East Policy-Making after the First World War: The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools,” *The Historical Journal* Vol. 41, No. 3 (1988): 785.

¹¹⁴ Appendix XV. 25 April, 1920.

¹¹⁵ Efraim Karsh, “How San Remo Birthed the Jewish National Home,” *Middle East Quarterly* (2020): 10.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 12, and Appendix XIV. 24 April 1920.

peoples deemed incapable of self-government, as determined by imperial powers in the League of Nations.¹¹⁷ Jerusalem was included in this so-called guardianship due to the Holy Sites and its perceived strategic nature.¹¹⁸ Codified by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922, the British mandatory power set up in Palestine with Jerusalem under its domain. Articles 13-16 of the declaration dealt with the protection of Holy Places. Article 13 ensured free access to the Holy Sites. Article 14 outlined the creation of a commission to determine claims to Holy Sites. Article 15 spoke to the freedom of religious expression for all faiths. And Article 16 reminded the Mandatory that it was responsible for the supervision of “religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths” throughout Palestine.¹¹⁹ The British mandate, in short, ensured Jerusalem was not the sovereign property of Palestinians, Arabs, or Zionists. Instead, Jerusalem was to be administered indirectly by an international body, the League of Nations, and directed by its British delegate.

The brief mentions of internationalization in Sykes-Picot and Husain-McMahon emerged from the murkiness in the British mandate for Palestine. Allusions to British control of the Holy Places were explicitly written in Article 13, which stated that “All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places...is assumed by the Mandatory.”¹²⁰ The mandate specifically referenced the Balfour declaration as a guiding principle and the desire to see a Jewish national home ran strong through the introductory remarks.¹²¹ This was undertaken, optimistically, with the problematic assumption that no real territorial disputes with Palestinians or Arabs would arise.¹²² With the mandate securing the Holy Places, all was deemed to be relatively secure in Palestine in Western

¹¹⁷ Anghie, *The Making of International Law*, 119.

¹¹⁸ Terry, “Britain in Palestine,” 225.

¹¹⁹ San Remo Convention, Done at London the Twenty-Fourth Day of July, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Two. Articles 13-16.

¹²⁰ Mandate for Palestine, Article 13, Geneva, Switzerland, 12 August 1922.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, Preamble.

¹²² Leonard V. Smith, “Drawing Borders in the Middle East after the Great War: Political Geography and ‘Subject Peoples,’” *First World War Studies* Vol. 7, No. 1 (2016): 13-14.

imaginings. Even after these three events occurred, and with the British mandate fully operational, more internationally-themed discussions continued to grip the future standing of Jerusalem and its environs.

The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, popularly remembered for establishing the borders of the Turkish Republic, further commented on the Holy City and its future. For Jerusalem, this treaty ensured that any pilgrims crossing through the new Republic of Turkey en route to the Holy Sites were allowed access and safe travel, along with sanitary conditions in the country.¹²³ For Indigenous Palestinian Arabs more broadly, the treaty took away the last vestiges of an Ottoman identity and citizenship while finalizing the authority of the League of Nations and its mandatory power.¹²⁴ Sovereignty over Jerusalem was passed to Britain specifically, and the League of Nations more generally, due to the absence of the Ottoman empire as opposed to any real legitimate transfer of sovereign power.¹²⁵ For Britain, Palestine was not a nation.¹²⁶ As such, Palestinians—Muslim, Christian and Jewish—were ineligible for citizenship or sovereign control over a territorial space.¹²⁷ Instead, citizenship and governance rested with the international League of Nations.

The Peel Commission, issued in 1937 and one of the final key acts of the British mandate in Palestine, further outlined Jerusalem's imagined international future. Created to ascertain the prospects of Palestinian Arab and Zionist Jewish cooperation, the Royal Commission touched upon the importance of Jerusalem moving forward for the region.¹²⁸ The Peel Commission

¹²³ Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne, 24 July 1923. From: *The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923*, Vol. II (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924). Article 117.

¹²⁴ Lauren Banko, "The Creation of Palestinian Citizenship," 650.

¹²⁵ Peter Berger, "The Internationalization of Jerusalem," *Jurist* Vol. 10, No. 3 (1950): 367.

¹²⁶ Banko, "The Creation of Palestinian Citizenship," 650.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Neil Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy: Arab-Zionist Negotiations and the End of the Mandate, Volume 2* (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass and Company, 1986), 58.

referenced French preferences from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1915, arguing “Jerusalem and part of Palestine should be reserved for international administration” owing to its “world-wide importance.”¹²⁹ Drawing on notions of Palestinian and Jerusalem exceptionalism, the Peel Commission thought Palestine was different from the other former Ottoman territories under the purview of the mandate system.¹³⁰ Seeing as Peel was constructed to inquire about a path towards peaceful co-existence in Palestine between Palestinians and Zionists, the internationalization of Jerusalem served as a tool to remove a particularly sticky point of contention between the two supposedly irreconcilable foes.¹³¹ The British report concluded by suggesting “a new Mandate,” specifically for the protection of the Holy Places “for all nations.”¹³² The Peel Commission thus served as the principle document delocalizing Jerusalem while partitioning it from Palestinian lands in Western imaginations in the process.¹³³

Whereas the White Paper of 1939, a British retort to its own Peel Commission on the eve of World War II, dealt primarily with Zionist Jewish immigration and Indigenous Palestinian discontent, it also commented on the Holy Places. The White Paper reiterated the international flavour of governance vis-à-vis the Holy Places, claiming there was “no dispute” about this issue for Western powers, especially Britain.¹³⁴ The White Paper clearly communicated that Jerusalem could not be under the sovereign control of Palestinians, Arabs or Zionists, which angered all local parties.¹³⁵ With the Holy Places serving as ample justification, Jerusalem was set aside

¹²⁹ Palestine Royal Commission Report, Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, July 1937, pg.17.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹³¹ Cecilia Albin, “Negotiating Intractable Conflicts: On the Future of Jerusalem,” *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 32, No. 1 (1997): 38.

¹³² Palestine Royal Commission, Report, Printed and Published by his Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, July 1937. Page 394; and Molinaro, *The Holy Places of Jerusalem*, 72.

¹³³ Albin, “Negotiating Intractable Conflicts,” 51.

¹³⁴ British White Paper, 9 November 1938, by His Majesty’s Government, London.

¹³⁵ Lawrence Davidson, *America’s Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001), 139.

from the rest of Palestine. While the British mandatory document was not clear on how the city should be governed, it clearly outlined how Jerusalem should not be governed.

The United Nations and the Future of Jerusalem

The documents, commissions, and conferences of the 1920s and 1930s all guided Jerusalem towards an international status. By the time the United Nations inherited the “Jerusalem question” in the late 1940s, there was an already well-established lineage of internationalization desires passed down from one aspirant imperial power to another. Upon requesting the help of the United Nations on 14 February 1947, Britain placed Palestine into the hands of a new international organization armed with the skillset and desire to take the internationalization cause beyond its disconnected, exploratory stage.¹³⁶ The United Nations created the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to enquire into solutions Britain could not find. Jerusalem remained a key component of the ongoing discussions.

One of the main sources of support for an internationalized Jerusalem in early 1947 came from Christian leaders, both within and beyond Palestine. Writing to UNSCOP with opinions and pleas, these religious leaders saw an opportunity to pander to post-war religious reckonings and make Jerusalem a bastion for an international representation of the Abrahamic faiths. The Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem noted that Jerusalem ought to become wonderful once more, and this necessitated an international flavour to governance.¹³⁷ The Bishop of the Anglican Church in Jerusalem, for his part, opposed internationalization in 1947, but commented that a city governed by a mixture of Arabs and Jews would squash out the Christian minority in the city, as well as

¹³⁶ Ravndal, “The First Major Test,” 417.

¹³⁷ Chief Rabbi H.H. Dushinsky, Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem to Secretary General, 19 November 1947, AG-021 fonds, S-1557-0000-0098, FALCHI Building, Long Island City Archival Holdings, *UNA*.

possible access to the Holy Sites.¹³⁸ Bishop Stewart adapted the Zionist myth “David vs. Goliath,” contending that Palestinian Muslims had ample support from the surrounding Arab countries.¹³⁹ The “very small number of Christians” in Jerusalem, however, might not have religious rights adhered to.¹⁴⁰ Coptic Egyptians wrote to the United Nations as well, asking for a continuation of the Ottoman-era Status Quo and the assurance of access to Jerusalem’s Holy Places.¹⁴¹ Other denominations and respective Bishops wrote to ensure that lakes outside Jerusalem were not going to be subject to Zionist developments, the United Nations recognized the sanctity of the city, and that the standards of Muslim Sultans in the recognition of Christian and Jewish causes be met.¹⁴²

For Palestinian, Arab, and Zionist leaders, the United Nations’ efforts to internationalize Jerusalem came with a myriad of reservations. King Abdullah of Jordan—who as a Hashemite saw his family rule over the Holiest Sites of Islam in the 1920s—believed the Holy Places were subject to Jordanian and Islamic guardianship.¹⁴³ David Ben-Gurion, the future first Prime Minister of Israel, noted in a July 1947 meeting with UN representatives that the focus on

¹³⁸ A Memorandum to the United Nations Organization Special Committee on Palestine, Submitted by The Right Revd. W.H. Stewart, Bishop of the Church of England in Jerusalem, and The Revd. W. Clark-Kerr, Moderator of the Church of Scotland Presbytery of Jerusalem, June 1947, AG-057 fonds, S-0618-0001-0018, *UNA*.

¹³⁹ A Memorandum Submitted to The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry by the Right Rev. W.H. Stewart, D.D., Bishop of the Church of England in Jerusalem, March 1946, AG-057 fonds, S-0618-0001-0018, *UNA*. For more on the David vs. Goliath myth as it pertains to Zionist-Arab relations, see: Shira N. Robinson, *Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel’s Liberal Settler State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 3-4; and Anne de Jong, “Zionist Hegemony, the Settler Colonial Conquest of Palestine and the Problem with Conflict: A Critical Genealogy of the Notion of Binary Conflict,” *Settler Colonial Studies* Vol. 8, No. 3 (2018): 368; 375-377.

¹⁴⁰ A Memorandum Submitted to The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry by the Right Rev. W.H. Stewart, D.D., Bishop of the Church of England in Jerusalem, March 1946. *UNA*.

¹⁴¹ The Coptic Orthodox Patriarch, Jerusalem, to His Lordship E. Sandstrom, Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Jaffa, 15 July 1947, AG-057 fonds, S-0618-0001-0025, *UNA*.

¹⁴² The Church of Scotland Presbytery of Jerusalem has the Honour to Submit the Following Memorandum to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Attached to a Previous Memorandum, 7 August 1946, AG-057 fonds, S-0618-0001-0020, *UNA*; Translation of the Speech by Rabbi Selig Reuben Bengis, President Religious Law Courts, Delivered at the Hearing of the Council of Ashkenazic Jewish Community, Jerusalem before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 16 July 1947, AG-057 fonds, S-0613-0002-0003, *UNA*; and Archbishop of Sebastia Athenagoras, Patriarchal Representative, to The Honourable Chairman and Members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 3 July 1947, AG-057 fonds, S-0613-0002-0010, *UNA*.

¹⁴³ Ilan Pappé, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 31.

Jerusalem was overblown and that “the Holy Places are only a few places in Jerusalem.”¹⁴⁴ For Zionists, Jerusalem could be subject to partition, but losing it entirely ran counter to the myths created in the Zionist settler colonial enterprise.¹⁴⁵ For Arabs, generally, the centuries of religious protection under the Ottomans, as well as Hashemite family lineage of protection in Mecca and Medina, were enough to dampen the intentions of the United Nations.

A voice lacking in these letters to the United Nations are those of Palestinian and Muslim communities. The United Nations archives lack much reference to Islamic denominations, Palestinian Christians, or Indigenous and Sephardic Jews writing the United Nations asking for religious rights or for an internationalized Jerusalem. This could be chalked up to the Palestinian Arab boycott of UNSCOP, but larger issues were at play. On the whole, Zionists and Palestinian Sephardic Jews did not share similar ideologies on the future of Jerusalem or Palestine despite adhering to the same religion.¹⁴⁶ Jamal Bey Hussein, executive member of Palestine’s Arab Higher Committee, noted in April 1948 how Jerusalem was a crucial city for Muslims and questioned why the United Nations was so transfixed by Jerusalem while ignoring many of the other Holy Sites in Palestine, such as Tiberias and Nazareth.¹⁴⁷ For Indigenous Palestinians like Hussein, the UN focus on Jerusalem held international importance, but it meant Zionists would be able to take Palestinian land and that “Arabs are the ones who are losing their country.”¹⁴⁸ Iraqi representative Sayid Awny Khalidy echoed this statement in the same meeting, stating that

¹⁴⁴ Excerpt from Verbatim Record of Twenty-First Meeting (Public) Held at YMCA, Jerusalem, 8 July 1947, AG-021 fonds, S-0504-0004-0009, FALCHI Building, Long Island City Archival Holdings, *UNA*.

¹⁴⁵ Golani, “Zionism without Zion,” 42; and Gil Merom, “Israel’s National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism,” *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 114, No. 3 (1999): 416.

¹⁴⁶ W. Thomas Mallison and Sally V. Mallison, eds., *An International Law Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1979), 10.

¹⁴⁷ Trusteeship Council, Verbatim Record of the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the Third Part of the Second Session, from Lake Success, New York, 28 April 1948, AG-020 fonds, S-0159-0001-0004, *UNA*.

¹⁴⁸ Trusteeship Council, Fortieth Meeting of the Third Part of the Second Session, Lake Success, New York, 29 April 1948. *UNA*.

Arabs were already giving up the most out of any group in the negotiations.¹⁴⁹ Palestinian Christians, writ large, supported Palestinian Muslims in an anti-Zionist approach to proceedings citing fears of Zionist control over the Holy Places.¹⁵⁰ Abdullah Effendi Kardun, the District Officer of the sub-district of Bethlehem, noted how the Status Quo already established by Ottoman decree, and carried forward by the British mandate, ensured that religious structures outside of Jerusalem were safe without internationalization.¹⁵¹ Maronite Christians of neighboring Lebanon, including the patriarch Antione Pierre Arida, told UNSCOP that the Church supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.¹⁵²

Ultimately, UNSCOP's report on 3 September 1947 to the General Assembly promoted partition and a three-state solution in Palestine: an Arab zone, a Jewish zone, and an international zone focused on Jerusalem and governed by the United Nations. Jerusalem would be home to a so-called international government in this iteration of the plan. And while members of UNSCOP debated the extent of internationalization, none outwardly refuted its necessity.¹⁵³ Not once did the UN commission consider granting independence for Palestinians, in Jerusalem or Palestine more broadly, despite the express intent of the mandate system to prepare nations for independence.¹⁵⁴ UN Resolution 181 of 27 November 1947 formally took the whispers of Jerusalem's exceptionality and codified them into a new kind of mandate.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Silvio Ferrari, "The Vatican, the Palestine Question and the Internationalization of Jerusalem," *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali* Vol. 60, No. 4 (1993): 559.

¹⁵¹ Abdullah Effendi Kardun, "The Status Quo in the Church of the Nativity, Bethlehem," in B. Destani ed., *Minorities in the Middle East: Religious Communities in Jerusalem 1843-1974 and Minorities in Israel, Volume 2: 1919-1954* (Chippenham, UK: Antony Rowe Ltd., 2005), 376.

¹⁵² Benny Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 45.

¹⁵³ Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 29.

¹⁵⁴ Mallison and Mallison, *An International Law Analysis*, 12.

Sovereignty Concerns After Resolution 181

Legally defined, sovereignty is the authority to govern a territory, a country, or a city, combining a myriad of separate entities into one cohesive political unit.¹⁵⁵ The United Nations itself defined sovereignty in 1947 as “supreme authority, an authority which is independent of any other earthly authority.”¹⁵⁶ Neither Palestinian, Zionist, or Arab leaders welcomed UN Resolution 181’s internationalization of Jerusalem wholeheartedly. Each party voiced various levels of displeasure with the prospects of the Holy City being removed from an autonomous Palestinian, Jewish, or Arab state, depending on how much sovereignty was being stripped in the negotiations. The sovereignty of the city and the decisions surrounding that sovereignty were not in the hands of its inhabitants. Instead sovereignty resided in the briefcases of diplomats predominantly representing members of Western nation-states.

Zionist documents sent to the United Nations after Resolution 181 provide key insights into how aspirant Zionist leaders in Palestine viewed international encroachments. Abba Eban, a liaison officer to UNSCOP and later Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, wrote a scathing exposé on how the United Nations’ actions regarding Jerusalem were illegal. In discussing sovereignty, Eban noted that “neither sovereignty nor any form of legal authority can be acquired by a mere expression of intention,” which he claimed the General Assembly did with Jerusalem before the latter became the mandatory responsibility of the United Nations in May 1948.¹⁵⁷ Put another way, the United Nations could not just say Jerusalem was under UN jurisdiction. Writing in 1949, Eban again questioned the legitimacy of United Nations sovereignty in the region when

¹⁵⁵ Grimm, *Sovereignty*, 77.

¹⁵⁶ Special Committee on Palestine: Questions of Constitutional and International Law Relevant to the Discussion, Part I, 18 September 1947, AG-021 fonds, S-0504-0004-0009, FALCHI Building, Long Island City Archival Holdings, *UNA*.

¹⁵⁷ Legal Opinions, Delegation of Israel to the United Nations, with Compliments of Mr. A.S. Eban, Undated, AG-022 fonds, S-0618-0002-0007, *UNA*.

declaring no outside international force should speed up negotiations to fit an agenda outside its domain.¹⁵⁸ What Zionists saw were UN attempts to circumvent legal parameters of control by operating under the auspices of a global collection of countries.

Arab leaders and media were equally disgruntled at the early attempts of sovereignty infringement. Dr. Adnan el Atassi, the Syrian representative at the Lausanne Conference, wanted to see the United Nations in merely a supervisory role with sovereignty over Jerusalem falling to both Jordan and Israel.¹⁵⁹ The Arabic press similarly considered Arab sacrifices of sovereignty in the popularly termed “Jerusalem Scheme” to be much higher than what Israel rescinded.¹⁶⁰ “The Western World had disregarded Arab rights,” the newspaper *El-Difaa* concluded, and as such any moves towards internationalization acted against Palestinian and Arab sovereignties.¹⁶¹ As the United Nations settled into the region, Arab interests perceived it as a rival party, not an equal partner.¹⁶² Overall, Arabs who enjoyed relative freedoms under Ottoman rule became reacquainted with a new but familiar international design on Jerusalem. Much like the Zionists, Arabs saw no legal justification for the UN presence in Jerusalem.

Ultimately, the question of sovereignty brought the United Nations’ position in Jerusalem into legal question. While the Westphalian concepts of state sovereignty allowed for such an enterprise to be discussed, empowered by the United Nations, understandings of sovereignty shifted away from the state and instead into a more popular form of self-determination in the

¹⁵⁸ A.S. Eban to Andrew Cordier, 11 August 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0002-0003, *UNA*.

¹⁵⁹ “Lausanne Delegates Leaving, ‘Recess’ During U.N. Palestine Talks.” *Mideast Mirror*, 10 September 1949. Page 7.

¹⁶⁰ “Jerusalem Scheme Criticized, Arab Rights Discarded Says Press.” *Mideast Mirror*, 17 September 1949. Page 19.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Clovis Maksoud, “Diminished Sovereignty, Enhanced Sovereignty: United Nations-Arab League Relations at 50,” *Middle East Journal* Vol. 49, No. 4 (1995): 583.

wake of a burgeoning human rights movement.¹⁶³ Sovereignty, in the beginnings of a UN-orchestrated postcolonial era, was to rest in the hands of people. What the United Nations did was attempt to wrest such a privilege from both Indigenous Palestinians and Zionist settlers.¹⁶⁴

The United Nations' Imagined "Jerusalem Problem"

The United Nations received a precise timeline for the handover of the British mandate in Palestine. Britain relinquished control to the United Nations at midnight on 15 May 1948. The United Nations requested this handover be completed as quickly as possible so it could start wrestling with the issues in earnest, without directly infringing in British affairs.¹⁶⁵ Belying these words was the immense pressure put on the United Nations General Assembly, both internally and externally, to figure out what Jerusalem would look like and, more importantly, how the international organization would exercise sovereignty over the city.

A meeting of the General Assembly on 14 May 1948 recorded panic surrounding Jerusalem and the United Nations' position in relation to gaining sovereignty. Simply put, the United Nations needed to have writing in international law before the expiration of the British mandate to make any legitimate claim to control over the Holy City.¹⁶⁶ The Guatemalan representative, Jorge García Granados, reported this to the General Assembly, which was further promoted by U.S. representative Warren Austin and put to a vote.¹⁶⁷ The ensuing proposed resolution received twenty votes for, fifteen against, and nineteen abstentions: not enough for the

¹⁶³ Antonio F. Perez, "Sovereignty, Freedom, and Civil Society: Toward a New Jerusalem," *Catholic University Law Review* Vol. 45, No 3 (1996): 853.

¹⁶⁴ Cattán, "The Status of Jerusalem," 8.

¹⁶⁵ Ellen Jenny Ravndal, "Exit Britain: British Withdrawal from the Palestine Mandate in the Early Cold War, 1947-1948," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* Vol. 21 (2010): 427.

¹⁶⁶ Legal Opinions, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, and Legal Opinions, Delegation of Israel to the United Nations, with Compliments of Mr. A.S. Eban, Undated. *UNA*.

two-thirds majority needed to codify the resolution.¹⁶⁸ In the eyes of Eban, and in turn international law, the lack of resolution from the United Nations prior to the termination of the British mandate in Palestine meant that there was no legal basis for the international organization to govern Jerusalem.¹⁶⁹ Yet the efforts of the United Nations persisted.

Compounding the difficulties for the United Nations was the creation of the state of Israel on 15 May 1948—the same day the United Nations took charge of the mandate in Palestine. Famously, the United States recognized Israel a mere eleven minutes after its creation.¹⁷⁰ When news reached the U.S. delegation at the United Nations, there was “pandemonium” and a strong sense of disbelief as well as threats from other nations, such as Cuba, to withdraw from the United Nations entirely, though that never came to pass.¹⁷¹ Non-Palestinian Arab personnel were “deeply disappointed,” “shocked,” and responded that the U.S. recognition of Israel “had crushed the hopes of the Arabs.”¹⁷² Britain realized that global endorsements of the Israeli state jeopardized peace in Palestine. As such, it sought to delay the outpouring of support for the new country as best as possible.¹⁷³ The action of recognizing Israel by the United States, while innocent on the surface, impacted political and reconciliatory actions ongoing in Palestine. This

¹⁶⁸ Legal Opinions, Delegation of Israel to the United Nations, with Compliments of Mr. A.S. Eban, Undated. *UNA*. The voting was as follows: In Favour: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Uruguay; Against: Afghanistan, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen; Abstained: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Haiti, India, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Siam, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. Hundred and Thirty-Fifth Plenary Meeting, 14 May 1949, 4:40pm.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; Larry Kletter, “The Sovereignty of Jerusalem in International Law,” *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* Vol. 20, No. 2 (1982): 333.

¹⁷⁰ “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett),” 17 May 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter cited as *FRUS*], The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2. 867N.01/5—1748.

¹⁷¹ “Editorial Note,” 13 June 1974, Dean Rusk speaking to events which occurred on 14 May 1948, *FRUS*. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2. Document 275.

¹⁷² “Editorial Note,” 16 May 1948, *FRUS*. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2. Document 305.

¹⁷³ Jørgen Jensehaugan, Marte Heian-Engdal and Hilde Henriksen Waage, “Securing the State: From Zionist Ideology to Israeli Statehood,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* Vol. 23 (2012): 296.

move not only signalled to the United Nations that a major ally operated with a separate agenda, but also told Indigenous Palestinians that the promises of previous administrations and the opportunities for self-determination were being discarded.¹⁷⁴ On the grand scale, the admission of a recognized Israel onto the Palestinian landscape signalled a new negotiator at the diplomatic table. Israel quickly moved during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49 to incorporate areas of Jerusalem set aside for international administration into its own territory, hindering United Nations intentions.

Two immediate issues gripped the United Nations' internationalization efforts as it took on the mandatory role in Palestine/Israel: where to hold meetings and how to govern the city. The United Nations seemed much more concerned about where the meetings about Jerusalem took place than the substance of those meetings. The Government House, which served as both the headquarters of the British mandate and the residence of the British High Commissioner, was set aside to house UN operations in Jerusalem.¹⁷⁵ Despite being in the neutral portion of the city, the building's UN occupants showcased imperial continuity to local inhabitants. Logically, holding main discussions between the United Nations and relevant Zionist, Palestinian, and Arab factions meeting in Jerusalem made sense. Yet some UN members were against this idea. Concerned about prestige and safety of UN representatives, the location of Geneva, Switzerland received suggestions along with meetings at UN headquarters at Lake Success by the United States and in Istanbul or Ankara by Turkish personnel.¹⁷⁶ Notwithstanding the controversial assassination of UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in September 1948, the United Nations

¹⁷⁴ John Fletcher-Cooke, "The United Nations and the Birth of Israel 1948," *International Journal* Vol. 28, No. 4 (1973), 629.

¹⁷⁵ Title to Government House, Jerusalem, L. Malania, to Mr. Feller, Legal Department, 10 January 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*; and Mr. H. Courtney Kingstone, to Mr. A. H. Feller, Title to Government House, Jerusalem, 2 February 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

¹⁷⁶ Personal and Confidential, L.M. to Russell, 8 January 1948 [sic], AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

ultimately setup the headquarters of an international administration for Jerusalem inside the Holy City at the Government House.¹⁷⁷

Detractors and confusion remained. Leo Malania, a UN special executive assistant, tried to organize a the initial mediation meeting in Geneva.¹⁷⁸ By March 1949, only sixteen months into the United Nation's official efforts at internationalization, it appeared to UN officials as "though the days of actual headquarters in Jerusalem are numbered."¹⁷⁹ After the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49, the Government House was not accessible to Palestinians or Arabs due to Zionist settler colonialism in the city.¹⁸⁰ Andrew Cordier, the UN Undersecretary, angrily wrote Azcarate a week later, "that there has not been uniformity" in matters of headquarters or even what the United Nations called itself in the region.¹⁸¹ The United Nations remained centered in Jerusalem, but many of the important internationalization discussions took place outside the city in question.

The principle governing aspect of the UN's internationalization efforts in May 1948 rested in the position of Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem. A de facto mayor, this person represented a point of continuity between the League of Nations and the United Nations in administering the daily affairs of the Holy City. Importantly, the United Nations, Zionists, Arabs (though not specifically Palestinians) and the departing British High Commissioner needed to approve the appointment of a municipal commissioner.¹⁸² Cementing an imperial way of being, this four-way confirmation and the lack of Palestinian-specific consultation into the future government of Jerusalem shook confidences in the United Nations even further. The municipal

¹⁷⁷ Title to Government House, Jerusalem, L. Malania, to Mr. Feller, Legal Department, 10 January 1949. *UNA*.

¹⁷⁸ Personal and Confidential, L.M. to Russell, 8 January 1948. *UNA*.

¹⁷⁹ George Barnes to Andrew "Andy" Cordier, from Jerusalem, 7 March 1949. *UNA*.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ A.W. Cordier to Pablo Azcarate, Title of the Conciliation Commission, 15 March 1949. *UNA*.

¹⁸² The Protection of the City of Jerusalem and its Inhabitants, *UNA*.

commissioner represented “the thin edge of the wedge,” according to Jordanian officials, taking the idea of an internationalized Jerusalem and making it a reality.¹⁸³

The United Nations settled on a person from the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) for the post. Initially, the United Nations wanted AFSC Executive Secretary Clarence Pickett to be municipal commissioner, but his ailing health forced him to decline.¹⁸⁴ The next in line, at the behest of Pickett, was Harold Evans, a Quaker lawyer from Philadelphia.¹⁸⁵ Evans never took up the post, however. He made it to Cairo hoping for a cessation of hostilities in Jerusalem, but did not ever assume the mayorship on account of his Quaker morals not agreeing with armoured transfers for safety in the city.¹⁸⁶ This UN position was filled by Pablo de Azcarate, a Spanish diplomat already in Jerusalem on an ad interim basis. Once Evans tenured his resignation in June 1948, the temporary post became permanent. Azcarate occupied the role for eighteen months.¹⁸⁷

The international presence in Jerusalem was not welcomed by its residents. Pamphlets denounced the United Nations’ push towards internationalization.¹⁸⁸ These leaflets, issued by the Zionist Stern Gang, called all UN personnel “spies” and demanded the departure of anyone

¹⁸³ Report of Taylor Shaw, Impressions Gained in Amman Regarding Practicability of Municipal Commissioners Functioning in Jerusalem, 5 June 1948. *UNA*.

¹⁸⁴ Julia E. Branson to Bill, Lou, Comfort, et al, 14 May 1948 in file #162 FS Sect Palestine 1948: Personnel Jerusalem—Municipal Commissioner—Harold Evans, Foreign Service 1948, Country—Palestine (Gaza) series, *American Friends Service Committee Archives* (hereafter cited as AFSCA).

¹⁸⁵ Clarence Pickett, Executive Secretary, to Members of the Board, 17 May 1948 in file #162 FS Sect Palestine 1948: Personnel Jerusalem—Municipal Commissioner—Harold Evans, Foreign Service 1948, Country—Palestine (Gaza) series, *AFSCA*.

¹⁸⁶ Harold Evans to Abdel Rahman Azzam Pacha, in Cairo, 7 June 1948, AG-020 fonds, S-0159-0001-0005, *UNA*; Message from the U.S. Delegation, May 17 1948, AG-020 fonds, S-0159-0001-0004, *UNA*; Harold Evans to Clarence Pickett, 15 June 1948, AG-020 fonds, S-0159-0001-0005, *UNA*.

¹⁸⁷ Press Release, Not Issued, Undated, AG-020 fonds, S-0159-0001-0005, *UNA*; and Pablo de Azcarate, *Mission in Palestine, 1948-1952* (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1966): 49-50.

¹⁸⁸ Walid Khalidi, “Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 27, No. 1 (1997): 8; and Incoming Message, To Vigier—Rhodes, from Deputy Chief of Staff—Haifa, 4 September 1948, AG-022 fonds, S-0616-0019-0001, *UNA*.

attempting to tinker with Israeli sovereignty.¹⁸⁹ King Abdullah of Jordan, who claimed to represent Palestinians and was the de facto voice of the Arab world in UN imaginations, opposed an internationalized Jerusalem.¹⁹⁰ The United Nations, then, did not have enough local support to complete the internationalizing mission of Resolution 181.

United Nation's Path to Resolution 194 and Further Internationalization

By early April 1948, before Israel's establishment, UN members already questioned how much sway Resolution 181 had on the so-called Jerusalem question. Pablo de Azcarate wrote to Ralph Bunche that anyone "familiar with the situation" seemed to agree the resolution was not enough to get United Nations' control of the Holy City.¹⁹¹ Azcarate also mentioned Jerusalem was "obviously a much easier problem" than resolving tensions between Palestinians, Israelis, Arabs, and Western Zionists in toto. In his opinion, peace in Jerusalem ought to be the key priority in securing a truce or a semblance of a wide-sweeping truce.¹⁹² Whispers circulated of temporary Arab cooperation with UN internationalization.¹⁹³ With enough persuasion, UN circles hoped Israelis would follow suit.¹⁹⁴ These optimistic outlooks proved elusive, however, as King Abdullah of Jordan viewed Jerusalem with an expansionist eye rather than a city falling under the administration of the United Nations.¹⁹⁵

¹⁸⁹ Incoming Message, To Vigier—Rhodes, from Deputy Chief of Staff—Haifa, 4 September 1948. *UNA*.

¹⁹⁰ Azcarate to Cordier, 4 October 1949 [referred to as "Azcarate's explanation of Internationalization" for Ralph Bunche to view], AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0002-0002, *UNA*; Question of Palestine, Report of Sub-Committee 1 of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, 2 December 1949, AG-025 fonds, S-0375-0017-0003, *UNA*.

¹⁹¹ Azcarate to Bunche, Handwritten, 1 April 1948, AG-060 fonds, S-0453-0003-0005, *UNA*.

¹⁹² Palestine Commission Advance Group, Memorandum by P. Azcarate, 30 March 1948, AG-060 fonds, S-0453-0003-0005, *UNA*.

¹⁹³ UNations New York, UNPC24, 25 March 1948, AG-060 fonds, S-0453-0003-0005, *UNA*.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 534-535.

The most authoritative voice calling for Jerusalem’s internationalization after Resolution 181’s adoption was Pope Pius XII. Pius XII released a Papal Encyclical on 24 October 1948—well after Resolution 181 and the United Nations takeover—speaking to the fractured nature of Jerusalem. Although there was no direct mention of the United Nations, his message was clear: Jerusalem was a city with a distinct “international character.”¹⁹⁶ The pope called for “international guarantees” of free access to the Holy Places in Jerusalem and Palestine more broadly.¹⁹⁷ The Holy See was a vocal contributor to discussions at the General Assembly, imploring Catholic countries to see the benefits of a Christian-based international regime in Jerusalem.¹⁹⁸ The Catholic Church favoured internationalization over a fractured city where war not only impacted the safety of the Holy Sites, but also pilgrims travelling to Jerusalem.¹⁹⁹ Pius XII released another encyclical in April 1949, carefully choosing his words by stating that a “united effort of nations” was required to bring stability to Jerusalem.²⁰⁰ The internationalization cause did not begin at the Vatican, or by Christianity writ large. Yet Christian denominations recognized the impending struggle in Palestine between Palestinian Muslims and Zionist Jews and sought out the United Nations to be the neutral-but-Christian voice in the conflict.²⁰¹

A key continuation from the British mandate to the United Nations was a proposed special commission through the League of Nations “to study, define and determine the rights and

¹⁹⁶ In *Multiplicibus Curis*, Encyclical of Pope Pius XII on Prayers for Peace in Palestine to the Brethren, the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and other Ordinaries in Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See. 24 October 1948.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Maria Chiara Rioli, “The ‘New Nazis’ or the ‘People of our God?’ Jews and Zionism in the Latin Church of Jerusalem, 1948-1962,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* Vol. 68, No. 1 (2017): 86.

¹⁹⁹ Anthony O’Mahony, “The Vatican, Jerusalem, the State of Israel, Christianity in the Holy Land,” *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* Vol. 5, No. 2 (2005): 127.

²⁰⁰ *Redemptoris Nostri Cruciatu*, Encyclical of Pope Pius XII on the Holy Places in Palestine to the Venerable Brethren the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and other Ordinaries in Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See. 15 April 1949.

²⁰¹ Ferrari, “The Vatican and the Internationalization of Jerusalem,” 566-567.

claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine.”²⁰² This quote was lifted by the United Nations directly from Article 14 of the League of Nations’ mandate for Palestine document from 1922 and served as the anchoring idea for how the United Nations approached mediation in Jerusalem moving forward.²⁰³ No such commission ever materialized through the League of Nations, but the spirit was adopted by the United Nations. Resolution 194, ratified on 11 December 1948, established the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) with visions of continuing pursuits in Jerusalem as outlined in Resolution 181.²⁰⁴ This commission became the touchstone of internationalization efforts from its conception onwards, and was the most serious effort the international organization put into the matter.²⁰⁵ The United Nations worked for seven months on the internationalization aspect of this commission and produced a draft statute for the city, which was never adhered to with any faithfulness.²⁰⁶ Despite its lack of success, the PCC and Resolution 194 more generally stood as further markers of the imperial peacemaking the United Nations engaged in through the efforts of internationalization, and sowed further descent between Palestinians, Arabs, Zionists and Israelis.

²⁰² United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Religious Interests and Holy Places (Draft of Chapter III of the Report of the Committee Prepared by the Secretariat), 20 September 1947.

²⁰³ Mandate for Palestine, Article 14.

²⁰⁴ Votes on the resolution transpired as follows, In Favour: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela; Against: Afghanistan, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialists Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia; Abstained: Bolivia, Burma, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, India, Iran, Mexico.

²⁰⁵ Azcarate to Cordier, 4 October 1949. *UNA*.

²⁰⁶ Semih Baran, Chairman, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, to Dag Hammarskjold, 2 September 1953, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0002-0007, *UNA*.

Chapter 2

“An Inquest on Failure”: The United Nations Efforts to Internationalize Jerusalem through the Palestine Conciliation Commission²⁰⁷

As the United Nations’ efforts towards an internationalized Jerusalem funneled into the Palestine Conciliation Commission, a new era of futile diplomacy emerged. This less-than one-year period saw several conferences bringing Arabs, Israelis, Muslims, and Zionists together for mediation, but resulted in few conclusions beyond mounting frustrations. Conferences in Beirut and Lausanne, along with meetings with Indigenous Palestinians, Arabs and Israelis separately, all attempted to tread a delicate line between impartial and imperial peace-making. This chapter looks at the Palestine Conciliation Commission, its conferences and meetings, as well as its structure, to showcase how the United Nations continued its efforts towards an international Jerusalem.

This chapter argues that the United Nations did not want to make peace with Palestinian, Arab, or Israeli representatives about Jerusalem; instead, what the organization wanted was to have those delegations come to peace with the implementation of an international regime in Jerusalem. The reconciliatory actions of the United Nations concerning Jerusalem were not so much between Palestinians, Israelis, and Arabs, but instead between the coalition of the delegations and the mandate given by the General Assembly. This severely hindered UN abilities to properly undertake tasked mediation. What follows is the story of how the United Nations sought to gain sovereignty over Palestinian land while simultaneously alluding to peace between warring factions in the Mashriq. The decision to make Jerusalem an international enclave, in

²⁰⁷ A.S. Eban to Andrew Cordier, 11 August 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

short, was the desire of the United Nations and no one else; at least not at this initial juncture between December 1948 and September 1949.

General Assembly Resolution 194 was the second installment of UN designs on Jerusalem in just over a year. The brief allusions in Resolution 181 were more concretely laid out in Resolution 194. What the November 1947 resolution called a “Special International Regime” was given greater attentive intention in the December 1948 iteration, stating that “the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding towns and villages...should be accorded special treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control.”²⁰⁸ The new resolution renounced key ideas imbedded in Resolution 181, notably that Jerusalem should be under the sovereign control of the United Nations and eventually governed by the Trusteeship Council, which was essentially the international organization’s successor for the mandate system.²⁰⁹ Resolution 194 gave a clearer path to internationalization from a UN perspective and also solidified the fears of Palestinian, Arab, and Israeli peoples that the organization was set to deny local sovereignty in the Holy City.

The December 1948 resolution aimed to make Jerusalem a United Nations city through the work of a three-country commission. The PCC, also stylized as the Conciliation Commission for Palestine or CCP, applied Resolution 194 to produce “detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem” no later than the fourth regular session of the

²⁰⁸ UN Resolution 181, Part 1, Section A, Point 3; and UN Resolution 194, A/RES/194 (III). Point 8.

²⁰⁹ Hundred and Eighty-Sixth Plenary Meeting, Palestine question – Progress Report of the UN Mediator – GA debate, vote, adoption of resolution 194 (III), designation of UNCCP members – Verbatim record (excerpts). Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Saturday 11 December 1948, at 8.30 p.m. 123. Continuation of the Discussion on the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine: Reports of the First Committee (A/776) and of the Fifth Committee (A/786).

General Assembly in October 1949.²¹⁰ The commission consisted of three UN member countries: Turkey, France, and the United States.

The commission members were decided upon at the 186th Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in Paris on 11 December 1948—the same day Resolution 194 came into force. The Turkish representative was Hussein C. Yalcin, France sent Claude de Boisanger, and the United States charged Mark Ethridge. Joseph Keenan was meant to be the United States' choice, but he stepped down for “personal reasons.”²¹¹ Pablo de Azcarate, who still held the position of ad interim Special Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem, was tapped as the secretariat of the party.²¹² These four men formed the image of conciliation at the conferences and of the United Nations mediation efforts more broadly in Palestine.

The Jerusalem Committee was an important organ created to help the PCC solve the “Jerusalem question,” especially considering the United Nations' lack of presence in the Holy City itself. Founded in March 1949, the Jerusalem Committee consisted of members from Turkey, France, and the United States and reported directly to the PCC.²¹³ With the larger commission tied up in all facets of Resolution 194, the Jerusalem Committee focused solely upon the internationalization of Jerusalem without worrying about other squabbles between parties. Its express mission determined the feasibility and practicality of internationalization, alongside gathering more general details to pass along to the main commission.²¹⁴

Early meetings and discussions concerning the Jerusalem Committee held a tenuous air of optimism. Ethridge deemed the subcommittee had work ahead of it, while Boisanger thought

²¹⁰ UN Resolution 194, Point 7.

²¹¹ Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking*, 30.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 38.

²¹³ Incoming Cable, Azcarate to Secretary General, 22 March 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0004-0004. *UNA*.

²¹⁴ First Progress Report—UNCCP—Report, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine First Progress Report, Jerusalem, 1 March 1949. A/819. Point 5.

it should operate with an eye to more practical endeavours, however difficult or impossible a task that proved to be.²¹⁵ Muhammad Ali Hamade, a representative from Lebanon, noted the Jerusalem Committee's "exceptionally great responsibility," and that its proposals would determine "whether the future brought peace or war."²¹⁶ While the main commission worked on the full scope of the Palestine "problem," the Jerusalem committee could "peck away" at the finer details of placing the Holy City under formal UN sovereignty.²¹⁷ According to Willie Snow Ethridge, the wife of US PCC representative Mark who was present in Jerusalem, "the Jerusalem committee grow[s] haggard by night trying to reach a happy solution, and they exhaust themselves by day interviewing the innumerable heads of the three religions."²¹⁸ This subject of the main commission featured prominently in the actual movements towards internationalization and did hold a number of meetings expressly concerned with Resolution 194's request. Yet Jerusalem was also the purview of the larger commission and featured prominently in its separate discussions.

One key area of consternation was getting the commissioners as well as Palestinians, Arabs, and Israelis together for discussions. In the week preceding the commencement of negotiations, and before any conciliation efforts began, top officials in the United Nations were already questioning the prospects of a successful mediation through the commission on any level. George Barnes, a former UN spokesman and the Deputy Principle Secretary of the PCC, wrote in late January 1949 about his apprehensions surrounding the commissioners and the

²¹⁵ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Summary Record of the Fortieth Meeting, held at the King David Hotel, Jerusalem, 8 April 1949, 10 a.m. A/AC/.25/SR.40.

²¹⁶ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Committee on Jerusalem, Summary Record of the Thirty-Third Meeting between the Committee of Jerusalem and the Delegations of the Arab States. Held in Lausanne on Monday, 20 June 1949. A/AC.25/Com. Jer./SR.33.

²¹⁷ "It Is Deadlock Again," *Mideast Mirror*, 20 August 1949. Page 7.

²¹⁸ Willie Snow Ethridge, *Going to Jerusalem* (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1950), 98.

ability to attain anything noteworthy.²¹⁹ The safety of the commissioners concerned the United Nations given the general disdain of having UN personnel in the city with designs towards an international enclave.²²⁰ Notwithstanding, the commission decided to have the bulk of the staff, and at least some of the meetings, held in Jerusalem.²²¹ And yet, despite Jerusalem being an obvious choice and giving the impression of the United Nations meeting Palestinians, Arabs and Israelis closer to home, the main conferences of the PCC were held outside of the city.

Still, the PCC decided that the commission was to be headquartered in the Holy City. The First Progress Report of the PCC, released on 1 March 1949, stated the Government House in a demilitarized and neutral area of Jerusalem was to be the commission's headquarters.²²² As the PCC declared itself the latest occupant of the former residence of the British High Commissioner for Palestine, it established imperial linkage in Jerusalem with its British mandatory predecessor.²²³ While ultimately taking important conferences outside the city, this first step—and initial optimism—pointed towards the city still holding a primordial place in PCC negotiations despite the deafening calls for Palestinian refugee repatriation. Jerusalem was still not under UN authority—the United Nations merely *resolved* that internationalization and the transfer of sovereignty should occur, as noted in March 1949 by Andrew Cordier, the *de facto*

²¹⁹ George Barnes to Andrew “Andy” Cordier, from Beirut, 31 January 1949, AG-022 fonds, S-0616-0001-0011, *UNA*; Christian E. Burckel, ed. *Who's Who in the United Nations: The Authoritative, Illustrated, Biographical Dictionary of Key Persons Associated with the United Nations* (New York: Christian E. Burckel and Associates, 1951), 35.

²²⁰ Incoming Cablegram, from Rhodes via Tangier 24 January 1949 AG-022 fonds, S-0616-0001-0011, *UNA*.

²²¹ Report for Month of January 1949, Russell Cook, Chief Administrative Officer, to Mr. Carey Seward, Deputy Director, Conference Division, 13 February 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

²²² Lausanne Conference First Political Report (Period 2-12 May 1949), Copy for Secretary General and Mr. Cordier, Undated, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0010, *UNA*.

²²³ “Eventual Talks,” *Mideast Mirror*, 8 April 1950. Page 5; “Sir Alan Takes Leave of Palestine,” *The Palestine Post* Friday, 14 May 1948. Vol. XXIII, No. 6713. Page 1; and Cary David Stanger, “A Haunting Legacy: The Assassination of Count Bernadotte,” *Middle East Journal* Vol. 42, No. 2 (1988): 262

second in command of the United Nations.²²⁴ It was the role of the PCC to transform this intention into a blueprint.

Before all sides met at the diplomatic table, there were internal UN discussions about the legitimacy of the commission and the practical nature of the commissioners. None of the commissioners themselves were well versed in Mashriq history, politics, or peacemaking, and relied heavily on the supporting staff in matters of nuance.²²⁵ For George Barnes, in a letter to Cordier, the hopes of the PCC's success rested solely on Mark Ethridge. "Ethridge... is of a rather different calibre," the deputy-secretary remarked, "and I am pinning lots of hope on him."²²⁶ The United States wielded the most political power of the three countries, and Ethridge inherited that responsibility with his desire for swift gains in mediation and a short temper when the task proved to be more process than progress.²²⁷ Both Yalcin and Boisanger, at least for Barnes, seemed eager to disregard the previous efforts of the United Nations and start anew.²²⁸ Boisanger was seen as a classic diplomat. His PCC appointment gave it legitimacy, but he seemed unconcerned with leading and happily allowed Ethridge and the United States to take the reins.²²⁹ Yalcin was an older journalist who also did not stand in the way of the United States leading the commission.²³⁰ Barnes put in his postscript that Yalcin's two "advisors" were "particularly irritating" and hinted at a general contempt for the Turkish delegation.²³¹ There were even questions about paying the three commissioners the same amount, though equal

²²⁴ Andrew Cordier to Mr. Vladimir A. Wahbeh, in Norfolk, England, 3 March 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

²²⁵ Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 89.

²²⁶ George Barnes to Andrew "Andy" Cordier, from Beirut, 31 January 1949. *UNA*.

²²⁷ Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking*, 37-38.

²²⁸ George Barnes to Andrew "Andy" Cordier, from Beirut, 31 January 1949. *UNA*.

²²⁹ Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking*, 37.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*; and Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 89.

²³¹ George Barnes to Andrew "Andy" Cordier, from Beirut, 31 January 1949. *UNA*.

compensation was ultimately “consider[ed] advisable.”²³² Furthermore, Barnes questioned the role of Azcarate and the Spaniard’s apprehension of bringing component advisors onto the commission for support.²³³ Before the commission met for any mediation efforts, it was clear the United States was the principal player, while France and Turkey took on more quiet supportive roles.

Prior to any conferences, PCC personnel travelled to various capitals around the Mashriq to ascertain what was important to local governments. The commission went, in order, to Cairo, Riyadh, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Tel Aviv, with formal conversations, elegant banquets, and an eye to the future work of the commission.²³⁴ This tour of the Mashriq began just two days after Ethridge arrived in Jerusalem, as the other two commissioners felt the need to wait in Jerusalem and have “social meetings” with Jordanian and Israeli officials in the interim, which excluded Palestinian leadership.²³⁵ A month after his arrival, Ethridge called the internationalization of Jerusalem “a noble ideal” while meetings of Israelis and Jordanians took place behind UN backs in regards to a Jerusalem settlement.²³⁶ Grumblings by Ethridge about the need to show passes when crossing from one portion of Jerusalem to another underpinned the fractured state of the body meant to bring stability to the city and furthered notions that internationalization was a dream long before it was a feasible reality.²³⁷

²³² Incoming Cable, Azcarate in Lausanne to A.W. Cordier, 18 May 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0004-0002, *UNA*.

²³³ George Barnes to Andrew “Andy” Cordier, from Beirut, 31 January 1949. *UNA*.

²³⁴ Azcarate, *Mission in Palestine*, 145.

²³⁵ Incoming Cablegram, Azcarate to SecGen, 28 January 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

²³⁶ “The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State.” *FRUS*, 28 February 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI. 501.BB Palestine/2—849: Telegram; “The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State,” *FRUS*, 7 March 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI. 501.BB Palestine/3—749: Telegram; and Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan*, 534.

²³⁷ Outgoing Cable, Cordier to Cook, 14 February 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0004-0005, *UNA*.

The Beirut Conference

The Palestine Conciliation Commission set out to make quick work of the “Palestine problem” with its first major conference in Beirut, Lebanon. It was seen as “a purely temporary organ” by the commission’s press secretary due to the perceived ease at which the UN plan would be implemented.²³⁸ Lasting from 21 March to 5 April, the meetings were meant to start the proceedings and have tangible conversations with multiple parties instead of shuttling between various cities. The story of the commission, essentially, was a broad Arab insistence on a resolution of the refugee issue and Israeli refusals to make any concessions on the matter of refugees, which stymied all other mediation efforts.²³⁹ Ahmad Shuqayri, a Palestinian representing the Government of Syria and the future first chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, remarked to the commission that “the keys to the country were in Israel’s hands.”²⁴⁰ It was “absolutely out of the question” that a resolution to the Palestinian “problem” could be found without considerable attention to refugees.²⁴¹ Israel refused to repatriate refugees outside of discussions surrounding a broader peace agreement, while the Arabs generally rebuffed broader peace agreements without a refugee resolution.²⁴² Importantly, Ethridge presented a summary of the Israeli position at the conference seeing as the Zionist delegation did not attend the meetings in Beirut.²⁴³ A stalemate arose. When viewed more closely, however, the

²³⁸ L. Malania, to Mr. Feller, Legal Department, Title to Government House, Jerusalem, 10 January 1949, AG-025 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

²³⁹ Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 82.

²⁴⁰ Neil Caplan, *The Lausanne Conference, 1949: A Case Study in Middle East Peacemaking* (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1993), 30; and Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Second Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 166.

²⁴¹ Caplan, *The Lausanne Conference*, 30.

²⁴² Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking*, 44-45.

²⁴³ Caplan, *The Lausanne Conference*, 30.

events at Beirut foreshadowed not only the demise of the PCC, but also the less-than-optimal circumstances surrounding the UN internationalization of Jerusalem.

The decision of the Arab delegations to focus on the repatriation of refugees as opposed to the question of Jerusalem can be attributed to the humanitarian crisis following the Nakba. The Nakba, Arabic for catastrophe, signals both the historical calamity of the creation of the Israeli Zionist state, as well as the continuation of Zionist settler colonialism in Palestine.²⁴⁴ At Israel's inception, roughly 750,000 Indigenous Palestinians were displaced through intentional settler colonialism into neighbouring Arab countries by force.²⁴⁵ There were two issues at play during the PCC conference in Beirut. The first was skepticism on the part of Arabs that Israel was ready to make any reasonable concessions on the issue of refugees, therefore deciding to entrench an unwavering position to ensure both Israel and the United Nations did not forget displaced peoples.²⁴⁶ The second, and arguably more important facet, was that Palestinian refugees were not represented at the conferences by Palestinians, but rather by Arab hosts. These states wanted to resettle Palestinian refugees for humanitarian reasons.²⁴⁷ Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria had a significant responsibility to take care of and represent Palestinians in exile in the aforementioned Arab countries.²⁴⁸ The Jordanian, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Syrian governments advocated for the return of Palestinian refugees with three goals in mind: deny Israel permanence in the region; stamp out the need to care for Palestinian refugees en masse;

²⁴⁴ Anaheed Al-Hardan, "Al-Nakbah in Arab Thought: The Transformation of a Concept," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* Vol. 35, No. 3 (2015): 635.

²⁴⁵ Rashad Khalidi, "The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure," in Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds. *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 15; and Ilana Feldman, "The Humanitarian Condition: Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Living," *Humanity* Vol. 3, No. 2 (2012): 155. This number is heavily debated.

²⁴⁶ Outgoing Cablegram, From Protitch to Azcarate, Lake Success to Geneva, 6 May 1949. *UNA*.

²⁴⁷ Shaul Bartal, "The Palestinian Refugee Problem Resolved," *Middle East Quarterly* Vol. 20, No. 4 (2013): 30; and Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan*, 476.

²⁴⁸ Asaf Romirowsky, "Arab-Palestinian Refugees," *Israel Studies* Vol. 24, No. 2 (2019): 91.

and test the United Nations to see how well it could stand up to Israel and how effective it could be with obstinate mediation. The insistence on the Palestinian refugee issue by Arab delegations was adopted in solidarity against Israeli aggression, but also because the United Nations bought into the notion of a homogenous Arab delegation that spoke for Palestinians when only Indigenous Palestinians truly could.²⁴⁹ Arab delegations could then stand up to Israel while repatriating Palestinian refugees out of the respective countries.

Israel's absence at the Beirut conference was not as nefarious as it may first appear. The Arab League boycott of Israel was in its infancy in March 1949, and Lebanon joined the Arab attempt to halt the economic and territorial expansion of the new Zionist state.²⁵⁰ After Israel became a country, all sea, air, and land entrances of Israeli nationals into Arab territories were barred.²⁵¹ This decision facilitated not only the need for PCC discussions to occur in neutral territory, but also severely interfered with the wider efforts of UN mediation.²⁵² *The Mideast Mirror* posited that the boycott of Israel was an important moment of grappling for Arabs writ large and the United Nations holding meetings in Arab territory with Israel present would have been a de facto recognition of Israel's permanence in the region.²⁵³ The choice of the United Nations to hold the first conference in Beirut, without Israel present—and knowing Israel could not and would not be present—pointed again to internal goals rather than genuine mediation.

²⁴⁹ Bartal, "Palestinian Refugee Problem," 30; and Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Second Edition* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 325.

²⁵⁰ Marwan Iskander, *The Arab Boycott of Israel* (Beirut: Research Center—Palestine Liberation Organization, 1966), 14.

²⁵¹ Gil Feiler, *From Boycott to Economic Cooperation: The Political Economy of the Arab Boycott of Israel* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 27. Lebanon was included in the area that was "untouchable" for Israeli nationals. Ethridge, *Going to Jerusalem*, 262.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, xiv

²⁵³ "U.N. Test for Arab-Jew Relations," *Mideast Mirror*, 3 September 1949. Page 19. The full quote in question reads: "How far can they [Arabs] go in tacitly accepting the presence of Israeli delegations without accustoming themselves to the idea of Israel's permanence in the Middle East?"

While more substantive meetings occurred later in 1949, this initial PCC effort was clear signposting that the United Nations wanted to get Arabs to back away from refugee insistencies before bringing Israel into the picture so discussions of Jerusalem ran more smoothly. In short, the Arab League boycott of Israel provided the PCC a chance to talk Arabs down from the Palestinian refugee dimension in the hopes of making matters specific to Jerusalem more palatable.

The PCC's meeting in Beirut does not receive nearly the same attention as Lausanne in the historical record, both in the UN archives and scholarly works. Nevertheless, the conference saw Arab governments come together in what the United Nations deemed to be a "probing operation."²⁵⁴ Nobody in the United Nations viewed Beirut as the sole effort of its Holy City-specific commission. Even before the countries convened in the Lebanese capital there were talks of holding another meeting at a neutral location in the near future.²⁵⁵ Both Boisanger and Yalcin traveled home after touring capitals in the Mashriq to receive instructions on how to proceed, indicating the influence the member countries of the commission had outside the auspices of the United Nations.²⁵⁶ Some contemporaries thought the conference conceived an "Arab Bloc," or a coalition of Arab states against the United Nations, but Azcarate vehemently refuted this stating how it was Resolution 181 in November 1947 that supposedly caused an Arab Bloc, if there even was one.²⁵⁷ Moshe Shertok, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned the Beirut conference set a problematic precedent for ensuing negotiations between

²⁵⁴ Caplan, *The Lausanne Conference*, 45.

²⁵⁵ George Barnes to Andrew "Andy" Cordier, from Jerusalem, 7 March 1949, AG-022 fonds, S-0616-0001-0011, *UNA*.

²⁵⁶ Incoming Cablegram, from Jerusalem via Tangier, 1 March 1949, AG-022 fonds, S-0616-0001-0011, *UNA*.

²⁵⁷ Azcarate, *Mission in Palestine*, 148.

Arabs and Israelis mediated by the United Nations. The British Ambassador to Iraq argued against a meeting of the major Arab players.²⁵⁸ Still, the meetings went ahead.

Due to broad Arab insistence on resolving the Palestinian refugee problem before discussing any other matters, Jerusalem was a tangential facet of the Beirut conference. A day into the conference, Azcarate cabled the Secretary-General to explain that internationalization as laid out in Resolution 194 might not be practicable.²⁵⁹ Yalcin similarly reported internationalization was impossible due to the Israeli position, no doubt amplified by Beirut's focus on the Palestinian refugee aspect of the commission's duties.²⁶⁰ The second PCC progress report merely noted that the Jerusalem sub-committee "has continued to work actively," which was a veiled statement that little got accomplished in a month of exploration.²⁶¹

The Jerusalem Committee was not viewed favourably by the larger PCC. All three PCC members held differing views on how the sub-committee should proceed. The United States, for instance, suggested joint Israeli-Jordanian sovereignty over the region, while France proposed the creation and promotion of a separate currency spearheaded by the Committee.²⁶² Other ideas included full internationalization complete with UN forces and international citizenship.²⁶³ Lebanon supported the latter idea, stating that "the citizens of Jerusalem would have Jerusalem citizenship, exclusive of any other nationality."²⁶⁴ "Jerusalem citizenship," as envisioned at the time, was to be administered by the United Nations, circumventing any Palestinian, Arab, or

²⁵⁸ Caplan, *The Lausanne Conference*, 27.

²⁵⁹ Incoming Cable, Azcarate to Secretary General, 22 March 1949. *UNA*.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁶¹ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Second Progress Report. A/838. Part B, Point 15.

²⁶² Peter L. Hahn, "Alignment by Coincidence: Israel, the United States, and the Partition of Jerusalem, 1949-1953," *The International History Review* Vol. 21, No. 3 (1999): 671.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ PCC Second Progress Report, Point 23.

Israeli nationalities for people living in the city.²⁶⁵ Ethridge deemed the French proposal of citizenship as “impossible and fantastic,” but worried his opinions would be drowned out by Turkish support and “a distinct pro-Arab bias” from Yalcin.²⁶⁶ Still, negotiations between Palestinians, Arabs, and Israelis were needed before any of these internal musings could be enacted.

Israel’s transfer of political offices to Jerusalem additionally impeded PCC discussions in Beirut regarding internationalization. The moving of Israeli ministries from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem alerted UN authorities, as it ran counter to Resolutions 181 and 194 of an internationalized city.²⁶⁷ Having Israeli ministries located in Jerusalem hindered perceptions of neutrality. Israeli acts of “sovereignty-building” went against the United Nations’ stated aims for the Holy City. They also signalled Israel was not going to concede much in the form of negotiations concerning Jerusalem and that results were far from a foregone conclusion.²⁶⁸

After Beirut’s proceedings, Willie Snow Ethridge remarked how “nothing was settled except that the Arabs would meet with the Israelis somewhere, sometime, to discuss terms for peace. There was no hurry, though.”²⁶⁹ Despite this outlook, the United Nations did have some tangible aspects to hinge hope upon for an eventual internationalization of the city. David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s inaugural Prime Minister, noted how there was a distinct difference between “Jerusalem” and the “Holy Places.”²⁷⁰ Jerusalem was the entire city, and according to Ben-

²⁶⁵ Information Services of the State of Israel, Foreign Press Division, Press Release No. 1, 16 September 1949, AG-025 fonds, S-0375-0017-0003, *UNA*.

²⁶⁶ “Mr. Mark Ethridge to Secretary of State,” 13 April 1949, *FRUS*. 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI. 501.BB Palestine/4-1349: Telegram.

²⁶⁷ Incoming Cablegram, From Beyrouth (Lebanon) via Tangier, 1 April 1949, AG-022 fonds, S-0616-0001-0011, *UNA*.

²⁶⁸ Yossi Katz and Yair Paz, “The Transfer of Government Ministries to Jerusalem, 1948-49: Continuity or Change in the Zionist Attitude to Jerusalem?” *Journal of Israeli History* Vol. 23, No. 2 (2004): 238.

²⁶⁹ Ethridge, *Going to Jerusalem*, 74.

²⁷⁰ Excerpt from Verbatim Record of Twenty-First Meeting (Public) Held at YMCA, Jerusalem, 8 July 1947. *UNA*.

Gurion, the UN was not interested in this broad geographic entity. Instead, what the United Nations wanted through internationalization was the protection of the Holy Places, and some just happened to be in Jerusalem.²⁷¹ This Israeli position was held throughout the PCC discussions, and challenged the United Nations' attempt to wrest sovereignty from the new state.²⁷² Arabs, en bloc, showed at least tentative support for an internationalized Jerusalem even during the Beirut and Lausanne conferences, yet only if such a political structure was promised to be upheld against rising Israeli territorial aggressions.²⁷³ This support was not so much an endorsement of UN plans as it was resistance against Israeli aggressions, with internationalization being a less worse option.

The Lausanne Conference

Opening on 27 April and running until 15 September, the Lausanne conference was the primary contribution of the PCC. Attended by Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, as well as Israel, the conference emerged with a better understanding of how to implement the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Palestinian refugee question continued to loom large over all discussions surrounding Jerusalem. Yet the PCC managed to fulfil the second part of its mandate, albeit methodically.

Importantly, two Palestinians attended the Lausanne conference. Aziz Shehadeh and Nimr al-Hawari were both lawyers in the West Bank who spoke to the situation of Palestinian

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Nazmi Akiman, *The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine*, 30 April 1976. *UNA*; and Gendzier, *Dying to Forget*, 260.

²⁷³ Nazmi Akiman, *The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine*, 30 April 1976. *UNA*; and United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Letter Dated 29 August 1949 Addressed to the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission by the Heads of the Arab Delegations and Transmitting a Memorandum Containing the Replies of the Arab Delegations to the Commission's Questionnaire of 15 August 1949. *A/AC.25/AR/17*.

refugees at Lausanne.²⁷⁴ A notable absence in discussions was the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who despite a considerable Jerusalem-based following did not send any delegates to the PCC meetings until late in the proceedings.²⁷⁵ Al-Hawari and al-Husayni were far from allies, with the former accusing the latter of working with Israel during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947-49.²⁷⁶ The main preoccupations of the Palestinians present, according to Israel, were “property and the reunion of families.”²⁷⁷ The regional politics of Palestinian representation fueled Israel’s preference of making peace with Jordan instead of a stateless Palestinian body, ensuring a nominal role for the Palestinian delegation in Switzerland.²⁷⁸

Following the initial meetings with Arab states in Beirut, the PCC devised the Lausanne Protocol to ensure positive movement in UN negotiations.²⁷⁹ Concerning the Holy City, the Lausanne Protocol provided diplomatic separation of the Palestinian refugee crisis and the “Jerusalem question.” Lauded as a masterstroke of peacemaking, the document did not make any peace; instead, it only served as a piece of paper intending to carry conversations towards peace.

The Lausanne protocol obtained the signatures of Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, Syrian and Israeli delegations ahead of the second PCC meeting, while Palestinians importantly did not sign this document.²⁸⁰ The protocol also included a map marking the geographic partition of Resolution 181, including an internationally set-aside Jerusalem, as the basis for conversation.²⁸¹ The elation of getting signatures on such an agreement did not permeate all facets of the United

²⁷⁴ Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 26.

²⁷⁵ Pappé, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 223.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan*, 493.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 225.

²⁷⁹ Neil Caplan, “A Tale of Two Cities: The Rhodes and Lausanne Conferences, 1949,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 21, No. 2 (1992): 19.

²⁸⁰ Caplan, *The Lausanne Conference*, 52.

²⁸¹ Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 82.

Nations, for it was “not altogether encouraging” because it only set out the basis for discussion rather than an agreement on any particular points.²⁸²

The Arab signees used the protocol’s inclusion of the map of partition as the basis of territorial discussions, including Jerusalem being out of Zionist hands and as evidence to the illegality of Israeli settler colonialism.²⁸³ The PCC used the unabashed desire for Israeli admittance as a member of the United Nations as leverage to get concessions on various talking points, albeit without much reduction of entrenchment.²⁸⁴ In exchange for accepting the PCC terms of negotiations on principle, Israel obtained full UN membership on 11 May 1949.²⁸⁵ Neither Arabs nor Israelis viewed the Lausanne Protocol document fondly. While Jerusalem was discussed in the Swiss city, it was done with considerable consternation towards the United Nations. The multi-pronged discussions coveted by the covenant of Resolution 194 was only the purview of the United Nations, while the peoples attending the meetings did not particularly enjoy the PCC’s forceful mediation. The agreement of cooperation with the UN commission was a vastly different enterprise on paper than it was in practice.²⁸⁶

In general, Arabs and Israelis had differing expectations vis-à-vis Lausanne. Arab delegations thought of the meetings as “a peace conference;” Israel as “exploratory conversations.”²⁸⁷ The United Nations officially referred to Lausanne as “an exchange of views between the Israeli and Arab delegations and itself.”²⁸⁸ Palestinians, Arabs, and Israelis were

²⁸² Lausanne Conference First Political Report (Period 2-12 May 1949), Copy for Secretary General and Mr. Cordier, Undated. *UNA*.

²⁸³ Azcarate, *Mission in Palestine*, 150; and Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 294.

²⁸⁴ Tiller and Waage, “Powerful State,” 510-511.

²⁸⁵ Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, 136-137.

²⁸⁶ Neil Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy: The United Nations, the Great Powers and Middle East Peacemaking, 1948-1954*. London: Routledge, 1997, 52.

²⁸⁷ Lausanne Conference First Political Report (Period 2-12 May 1949), Copy for Secretary General and Mr. Cordier, Undated. *UNA*.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

finally together to talk, but no one agreed on the subject matter. With the Lausanne Protocol in hand, however, the United Nations and the PCC sought to break the deadlock and produce results for the General Assembly.

From the outset, it was clear the PCC was tethered to the General Assembly and the desires of UN member states muddled mediation efforts. Dragoslav Protitch, Principle Director of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, wrote to Azcarate days after Lausanne talks began about inviting the Vatican and Orthodox patriarchs into discussions concerning Jerusalem's future.²⁸⁹ This was championed primarily by Argentina and Greece: two countries that served to benefit from a greater Christian presence in the region.²⁹⁰ Argentina continued pressuring Israel on its Jerusalem stances, demanding that Israeli positions on the Jerusalem question satisfy the Vatican and the Papal encyclicals.²⁹¹ Chaim Weizmann, the President of Israel, spoke broadly by claiming there was "no real incompatibility" between the encyclicals and the "aspirations of the people of Jerusalem."²⁹² Leaders of Western Christian denominations felt the need to speak louder in lieu of the Eastern churches "muzzled under centuries of Muslim domination."²⁹³ Much like the letters received by UNSCOP, the PCC fielded many requests for a larger Christian presence in the Holy City not only from clergy, but also from member states on the General Assembly floor.

On 9 May, the Jerusalem Committee circulated a series of three questions to all delegations at Lausanne in the hopes of having something concrete and workable for the PCC.

²⁸⁹ Outgoing Cablegram, From Protitch to Azcarate, Lausanne, 3 May 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0010, *UNA*.

²⁹⁰ Outgoing Cablegram, From Protitch to Azcarate, Ouchy, Switzerland, 4 May 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0010, *UNA*.

²⁹¹ Outgoing Cablegram, From Protitch to Azcarate, Lake Success, 6 May 1949. *UNA*.

²⁹² United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Committee on Jerusalem, Jerusalem and Holy Places, Chronological Notes 24 April to 15 June 1949, *Palestine Post*, 24 April 1949.

²⁹³ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Letter Dated 20 May 1949, Addressed by the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem to the Conciliation Commission. A/AC.25/NC/21.

The first question asked what measures needed to be taken to ensure the permanence of an international regime. The second pondered if the Holy City should be placed “under exclusive authority” of the United Nations.²⁹⁴ The third question departed from the notion of *corpus seperatum*, asking: “Or would you prefer that Jerusalem area be divided into Jewish and Arab zones in which authority of neighbouring states could be exercised in respect to matters not reserved to exclusive competence of international regime.”²⁹⁵ Only Israel responded directly to these queries, yet both Arab and Israeli delegations submitted separate notes for Jerusalem talks.²⁹⁶ Israel’s proposal affirmed that its transfer of government offices from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem did not go against UN plans if the latter sought to protect the Holy Places in Jerusalem, rather than the city itself. Collectively, Arab states rejected this Israeli position citing Resolution 194 as justification against continued Zionist territorial grabs.²⁹⁷ Jordan’s proposal, specifically, vowed to “preserve full Arab rights in Palestine” and spoke of Abdullah having Arab interests at heart rather than Palestinians.²⁹⁸ The idea that the PCC was even considering granting sovereignty in Jerusalem to individual nations, however vaguely, was a key moment in UN reckonings of both Resolution 181 and 194. While the posing of a question hardly constituted an acceptance of failure, the very fact that such an option was circulated to the delegations simultaneously indicated how idealistic the General Assembly was and how stagnant the talks of internationalization were. Ultimately, Lausanne saw little movement on Jerusalem and next to no momentum carrying the commission towards a report to the General Assembly.

²⁹⁴ Incoming Cable, P. Azcarate in Lausanne to Secretary General, 11 May 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0004-0002, *UNA*.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶ Third Progress Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 14 June 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0010, *UNA*; and Incoming Cable, Azcarate in Lausanne to A.W. Cordier, 26 May 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0004-0002, *UNA*.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁸ Incoming Cablegram, from Amman (Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), 25 April 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0008, *UNA*.

What scant aspects of momentum the PCC achieved came from the work of the Jerusalem Committee. This committee held talks in Jerusalem with leaders of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities to better understand and facilitate discussions at the main negotiation table.²⁹⁹ In a particularly illuminating meeting, the committee heard Arab delegations were “prepared to discuss a scheme” for Jerusalem’s internationalization so long as this was not a precursor to the city becoming Israel’s capital.³⁰⁰ Phillippe Benoist, the chairman of the Jerusalem committee, rallied Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria behind this stance and further homogenized the distinct Arab delegations into a singular entity.³⁰¹ Aside from Jordan, Jerusalem was not a city any of these countries claimed sovereignty over. Jordan, for its part, “confined itself to its own statement.”³⁰² By connecting the Palestinian cause with broader Arab delegations, the United Nations created a binary of Arabs and Israelis unsuccessfully attempting to uncomplicate a terribly complex issue.

Realities in Jerusalem tangibly influenced the Lausanne conference. In an early June meeting, Jordan told the PCC that Israel occupied parts of Jerusalem around the Government House, which was neutral territory.³⁰³ Arab delegations demanded Israel withdraw from the area to stay true to Resolution 194 and to respect the authority of the United Nations.³⁰⁴ Israel refused.³⁰⁵ Still, the Jerusalem Committee continued to work “to exhaust all the means at its

²⁹⁹ Report on Problems Before the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Andrew Cordier and D. Protitch, Principal Director Department of Security Council Affairs, to Trygve Lie, from Paris, 13 June 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0010, *UNA*.

³⁰⁰ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Committee on Jerusalem. Summary Record of the Thirty-Third Meeting Between the Committee of Jerusalem and the Delegations of the Arab States held in Lausanne on Monday, 20 June 1949, 4pm. A/AC.25/Com.Jer./SR.33.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² *Ibid.*

³⁰³ Report on Problems Before the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Andrew Cordier and D. Protitch, Principal Director Department of Security Council Affairs, to Trygve Lie, from Paris, 13 June 1949. *UNA*.

³⁰⁴ Third Progress Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 14 June 1949. *UNA*.

³⁰⁵ Report on Problems Before the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Andrew Cordier and D. Protitch, Principal Director Department of Security Council Affairs, to Trygve Lie, from Paris, 13 June 1949. *UNA*.

disposal” despite the floundering success of the conversations.³⁰⁶ The Arab press bluntly described the meeting’s progress as “the Lausanne Conference drags on.”³⁰⁷

Considering the dearth of meaningful discussions, the PCC paused negotiations at Lausanne. Rumours of an impending failure of the UN commission and a resumption of war was unpalatable to the United Nations and imperiled the PCC.³⁰⁸ The UN commission was most concerned with getting both sides to talk, rather than the substance of those talks.³⁰⁹ These were “most damaging and embarrassing” to the commission.³¹⁰ Despite being halfway through its second conference, the UN internationalization of Jerusalem remained elusive.

Lasting from 1-18 July, the PCC paused discussions at Lausanne. This recess intended to give a breather to all involved, and for the parties to recollect themselves in preparation for more productive talks.³¹¹ Azcarate was against this pause, and stated it was “caused, mainly, by the American Government.”³¹² He also questioned just how united the nations were and the equity found not only in Lausanne, but also Lake Success.³¹³ The recess was not a glowing review of negotiations, and further dampened spirits for more diplomatic discussions upon the resumption of Lausanne.

To the dismay of the PCC, secret talks between Israel and Jordan resumed over Jerusalem and related matters. Buried in a report from the field to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Cordier and Protitch stated that Jordan and Israel came to a private agreement in April 1949 about who was to govern which portions of Jerusalem, with only a small swathe of land around the

³⁰⁶ Third Progress Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 14 June 1949. *UNA*.

³⁰⁷ “Another Week Drags By,” *Mideast Mirror*, 18 June 1949. Page 5.

³⁰⁸ Caplan, *The Lausanne Conference*, 70.

³⁰⁹ Third Progress Report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 14 June 1949. *UNA*.

³¹⁰ Azcarate to Cordier, from Lausanne, 20 June 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

³¹¹ Caplan, *The Lausanne Conference*, 74-75.

³¹² Azcarate to Mr. Cordier, from Lausanne, 1 July 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

³¹³ *Ibid*.

Government House under UN authority.³¹⁴ Given the fractured nature of the Lausanne talks and the lack of meaningful compromise from the United Nations, Israel and Jordan circumvented the international organization and handled mediation bilaterally.³¹⁵ The United Nations' internationalization scheme contravened Israeli-Jordanian interests in the Holy City, and the ability for the two nations to negotiate without UN presence (a lack of Palestinian contributions aside) further demonstrated the unnecessary nature of continued international mediation.³¹⁶

Both Jordan and Israel desired control over Jerusalem, and neither wanted to see the United Nations take land already under Jordanian or Israeli control. There was confidence in both governments that mediation concerning the city could be achieved without UN supervision.³¹⁷ For Ben-Gurion, Jerusalem was the “test case” for other border questions through the United Nations. If internationalization could be defeated, then the territorial questions would be considerably tilted in Israel’s favour.³¹⁸ For Abdullah, his cooperation with Israel came from a belief that the United Nations could not deny Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. If internationalization was implemented, he believed it “would give Jerusalem to the Jews.”³¹⁹ The Jordanian king also had territorial designs for Jerusalem, which generally perturbed Palestinians who thought Abdullah used his status as an Arab to improperly represent Palestinian causes in Jerusalem.³²⁰ Israeli-Jordanian collusion, with Jerusalem as its linchpin, jeopardized UN aspirations in the Holy City.

³¹⁴ Report on Problems Before the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Andrew Cordier and D. Protitch, Principal Director Department of Security Council Affairs, to Trygve Lie, from Paris, 13 June 1949. *UNA*.

³¹⁵ Elad Ben-Dror and Asaf Ziedler, “Israel, Jordan, and their Efforts to Frustrate the United Nations Resolutions to Internationalize Jerusalem,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* Vol. 26, No. 4 (2015): 647.

³¹⁶ Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan*, 511.

³¹⁷ Motti Golani, “Jerusalem’s Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question, 1948-67,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 31, No. 4 (1999): 583.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 536.

³¹⁹ Ben-Dror and Ziedler, “Efforts to Frustrate the United Nations,” 649.

³²⁰ Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan*, 479; Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 107; and Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 319 and 325.

Another setback struck the PCC during its Lausanne recess in early July: the resignation of U.S. representative Mark Ethridge. Finding his replacement proved difficult. Paul Porter was shoulder-tapped by U.S. president Harry Truman.³²¹ Porter had no background in Palestinian politics, had not been kept abreast of any of the recent developments, and possessed no real desire to even participate in the negotiations.³²² His delayed arrival stalled the work of the PCC emerging from its recess.³²³ Ultimately, Porter's priority was to support the U.S. government, not the United Nations.³²⁴ His initial report to the U.S. government outlined that "Preliminary impressions leave me dubious as to prospect of important changes of attitude as result [of the] recess."³²⁵ From his perspective, "We [the United States] may be forced to take initiative and I want instructions as specific as possible."³²⁶ Such thinking paralleled internal UN conversations that success at Lausanne was "primarily on Washington and London," rather than on the actual pertinent Swiss negotiations.³²⁷ The United Nations was continuing to hang hopes upon some of its equitable members rising above the others. As negotiations began anew, there was little notable change regarding the UN internationalization of Jerusalem or the tactics employed to garner results.

The tone of the Lausanne meeting shifted after its three-week break. Azcarate mused that it may be time "to close this 'general debate'" and shift into "discussions article by article."³²⁸

³²¹ Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking*, 55.

³²² *Ibid.*

³²³ Azcarate to Cordier, 21 July 1949, from Lausanne, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

³²⁴ "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State," 19 July 1949, *FRUS*. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI. 501.BB Palestine/7-1949.

³²⁵ "Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State, 26 July 1949," Lausanne, *FRUS*. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI. 501.BB Palestine/7-2649: Telegram.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ Unknown Sender within the United Nations to Dr. Dragoslav Protitch, Principle Director of the Department of Security Council Affairs, 5 July 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

³²⁸ Note by the Principal Secretary, attached to the letter from Azcarate to Cordier on 21 July 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

The Principle Secretary also alluded to the stretched-out nature of the PCC and how the multitude of tasks on the agenda created a paralysis for the commissioners and on the overall movement of meaningful discussion.³²⁹ On 28 July 1949, Azcarate noted to Cordier that, as the United Nations' Municipal Commissioner in Jerusalem, he was "rather in the dark about the constitutional aspects" of the Jerusalem question.³³⁰ He found it impossible to separate Jerusalem from other territorial disputes in Palestine/Israel.³³¹

As Jerusalem slipped from UN grasp, the PCC refocused on the position of Special Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem in the wake of Lausanne's lack of success.³³² In September 1949, the UN Secretary-General appointed an established Colombian diplomat, Alberto Gonzalez Fernandez, as the new de facto mayor for Jerusalem.³³³ To the particular consternation of Israel, the United Nations tasked Gonzalez Fernandez to oversee the implementation of a permanent international regime in Jerusalem—a task still beyond legal UN jurisdiction.³³⁴ The Columbian diplomat, much like Harold Evans sixteen months previously, never took up the post, citing personal reasons and his ailing wife as reasons for spurning "so high a distinction."³³⁵ Lasting only nine days on the job, and never completing any task of note related to the position, Gonzalez Fernandez left the United Nations without a full-time municipal commissioner once again. Released three days after Gonzalez Fernandez's resignation, but

³²⁹ Azcarate to Cordier, from Lausanne, 20 June 1949. *UNA*.

³³⁰ Azcarate to Cordier, from Lausanne, 28 July 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*.

³³¹ *Ibid.*

³³² Taking a very blunt tone after the conference, Willie Snow Ethridge remarked "nothing was accomplished at Lausanne." Ethridge, *Going to Jerusalem*, 263.

³³³ Outgoing Cablegram, Cordier to Mr. Gonzalez Fernandez, 10 September 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*.

³³⁴ Palestine Commission to Appoint United Nations Representative for Jerusalem, Press Release, 24 August 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0003, *UNA*; and Incoming Cable, Mr. Barnes in Lausanne to Mr. Cordier, 10 September 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0004-0002, *UNA*.

³³⁵ "Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State," 29 August 1949, *FRUS*. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI. 501.BB Palestine/9-249: Telegram; and Alberto Gonzalez Fernandez, to Andrew Cordier, 19 September 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*.

obviously written before and unedited, the fourth progress report of the PCC stated: “the Commission is convinced that Dr. Gonzalez Fernandez will receive, on the part of the Arab and Israeli authorities, the assistance necessary for the accomplishment of his task.”³³⁶ Even the United Nations could not keep up to date with its activities.

The PCC’s fourth progress report notably included a draft statute for the Holy City.³³⁷ Meant to complement Gonzalez Fernandez’s appointment, the draft statute stood as the PCC’s lone success.³³⁸ It facilitated internationalization once UN-led negotiations found a “final solution” to territorial questions, at least according to Azcarate.³³⁹ The PCC released the draft instrument on 1 September, receiving immediate backlash from Arabs and Israelis alike.³⁴⁰ *The Palestine Post* reported that, if implemented, the UN instrument would lead to complete and everlasting authority for the international organization in the Holy City. The Jerusalem-based Israeli newspaper simultaneously assured its readers that the draft statute required the approval of the General Assembly before becoming codified.³⁴¹ Israeli diplomat Michael Comay described the UN document on Jerusalem as “one of the gargoyles on the medieval cathedrals” and thus uncomely.³⁴² In a press release on 16 September 1949, Moshe Shertok called the document “its own condemnation.”³⁴³ Eban recognized the PCC’s draft statute was in

³³⁶ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Fourth Progress Report, 22 September 1949, AG-022 fonds, S-0616-0024-0007, *UNA*.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*

³³⁸ Incoming Cable, Mr. Barnes in Lausanne to Mr. Cordier, 10 September 1949. *UNA*.

³³⁹ Strictly Confidential, 1 August, 1949, attached to a letter from Azcarate to Cordier, 16 September 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0002-0002, *UNA*.

³⁴⁰ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Fourth Progress Report, 22 September 1949. *UNA*.

³⁴¹ “PCC Proposes U.N. Supreme Authority over 2-Zoned Jerusalem Area; No Immigration,” *The Palestine Post*, 14 September 1949, AG-025 fonds, S-0375-0017-0003, *UNA*.

³⁴² Hahn, “Alignment by Coincidence,” 671.

³⁴³ Information Services of the State of Israel, Foreign Press Division, Press Release No. 1, 16 September 1949. *UNA*.

communion with Resolution 194, but understood its illusory nature.³⁴⁴ After its release, Israel was “in a very fighting mood against all things ‘internationalization.’”³⁴⁵

What the draft instrument demarcated, in reality, was the presentable work of the PCC to the General Assembly in compliance with the latter’s Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948. As obligated, the PCC presented its suggestions for making Jerusalem a “permanent international regime” and establishing UN authority around the Holy City before the UN organ. The PCC’s draft statute for Jerusalem recommended all decisions pertaining to the governmental structure to be made by and upheld through the General Assembly.³⁴⁶ This disregard for the governmental sovereignty of Palestinians, Arabs, and Israelis engendered remarks from Shertok. The Israeli foreign minister questioned why the PCC held meetings about Jerusalem if it was going to disregard everything said against internationalization and produce an “anachronistic and incongruous” document.³⁴⁷ The PCC’s draft statute also established the United Nations’ “full and permanent authority in Jerusalem.”³⁴⁸ Eban, for his part, asked “how, when, and from whom” UN authority was acquired, let alone the permanence of this self-declared authority.³⁴⁹ In essence, the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations stated that writing control into a resolution or a draft instrument did not give the international organization the authority to govern Jerusalem.³⁵⁰ The lack of legal sovereignty acquisition also rendered the PCC, the conciliation efforts, and the draft instrument moot. The draft instrument, then, was not a product of

³⁴⁴ Eban to Lie, 20 September 1949. *UNA*.

³⁴⁵ Azcarate to Cordier, 4 October 1949 [referred to as “Azcarate’s explanation of Internationalization” for Ralph Bunche to view]. *UNA*.

³⁴⁶ Statute for the City of Jerusalem, Approved by the Trusteeship Council at the Eighty-First Meeting on 4 April 1950. T/592. Articles 6 and 10.

³⁴⁷ Information Services of the State of Israel, Foreign Press Division, Press Release No. 1, 16 September 1949. *UNA*.

³⁴⁸ Trusteeship Council Draft Instrument, 4 April 1950. Preamble.

³⁴⁹ Legal Opinions, Delegation of Israel to the United Nations, with Compliments of Mr. A.S. Eban, Undated. *UNA*.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid*.

diplomatic negotiations, or the fruits from Beirut of Lausanne. Instead, it was the express imperially-inclined approach to peacemaking the United Nations adopted to attain the results it was instructed to produce rather than any real efforts at meaningful mediation.

The United Nations grappled with the concept of internationalization again as the release of the PCC's draft statute engendered a fresh wave of discontent. For the UN, given its mandate in Jerusalem, fulfillment of internationalization requirements necessitated submitting the document to the General Assembly without Arab or Israeli consent.³⁵¹ For Azcarate, the draft statute was meant to "reconcile the establishment of an international regime" in Jerusalem.³⁵² Criticisms voiced by Israelis were done "pour les besoins de la cause" (for the needs of the cause).³⁵³ In other words, the draft statute's intention was to complete a bureaucratic task and appease its draftees at the General Assembly rather than people in the city affected by the words contained within. Ensuing complaints from the delegations were thus shared out of obligation, rather than actual discontent with the UN plan. Such thinking perpetuated a continued skewing of local desires in lieu of UN ones.

Once the PCC submitted its draft statute to the General Assembly, Azcarate privately noted the lack of sovereignty considerations throughout the drafting process of the document. "For tactical reasons," he stated, "the Commission considered wiser not to deal in an open and direct way with the question of sovereignty." It was "obvious" that despite this omission, there was still "respect" for local governments.³⁵⁴ Azcarate added that the UN commission ought to visit the city after five months away to see the changes and understand the realities on the

³⁵¹ Azcarate to Cordier, 4 October 1949 [referred to as "Azcarate's explanation of Internationalization" for Ralph Bunche to view]. *UNA*.

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

ground.³⁵⁵ Combined with the lack of Palestinian, Arab, or Israeli opportunities to comment on the actual draft instrument, the absence from Jerusalem further solidified the notion that the United Nations operated under a self-serving mandate long before a conciliatory one. The members of the PCC did view themselves as representing their respective countries more than the United Nations after all.³⁵⁶

Even with the draft instrument in the hands of the General Assembly, the United Nations was not finished with the internationalization of Jerusalem. Eventually the PCC faded into relative blurriness as other organs of the United Nations took up the Jerusalem cause in its absence.³⁵⁷ The presentation of the draft instrument fulfilled the requirement laid out in paragraph eight of Resolution 194, thus officially closing the PCC's work regarding Jerusalem.³⁵⁸ By 1951, it was already surmised the PCC's efforts were in vain and that "the implementation of that resolution is impossible," referring in part to the internationalization of Jerusalem.³⁵⁹ As the General Assembly got hold of the draft instrument, a whole new array of questions arose about how the UN internationalization of Jerusalem should work.

The few scholars studying the Palestine Conciliation Commission have opined various theories as to why the United Nations mediation efforts failed. Saadia Touval notes errors in tactics, international commission hurdles, U.S. discombobulation, and a lack of talented staff to assist the commission, as well as the difficulties of internationalizing a city and repatriating

³⁵⁵ Pablo de Azcarate, PCC Principal Secretary, to Cordier, 11 September 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0001-0005, *UNA*.

³⁵⁶ Fuad S. Hamzeh, *United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 1948-1967* (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968): 58.

³⁵⁷ The Future Activities of the United Nations in Palestine, Unknown Author, 20 April 1951, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0002-0005, *UNA*; Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, 89.

³⁵⁸ Semih Baran, Chairman, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, to Dag Hammarskjold, 2 September 1953. *UNA*.

³⁵⁹ The Future Activities of the United Nations in Palestine, Unknown Author, 20 April 1951. *UNA*.

refugees as standalone issues.³⁶⁰ Ilan Pappé cites the joint Jordanian-Israeli opposition to internationalization which sunk the commission, limited the scope of discussions, and that the international community, outside of religious figures, did not have much stake in who governed the city.³⁶¹ David Forsythe suggests that the unimaginative approaches and tunnel vision of the top-down mandated requirements hamstrung the commission which never stood a legitimate chance of success.³⁶² Neil Caplan posits four reasons for the demise: confusion arising from three members on the commission rather than one; lack of mobilization from home governments of the commission members; unfit persons chosen to the commission; and tactical errors by the commissioners themselves due to a lack of experience in Mashriq peacemaking.³⁶³

These are all legitimate points to make, and all contributed to the demise of the PCC. Yet these authors omit crucial aspects in their respective analyses: namely, that true consultation with Palestinians, Jordanians, or Israelis never occupied a top priority for anyone within the United Nations machinery. Instead, forceful tactics of mediation were to blame for the lack of success found in the ideas from Lake Success. The PCC was merely another international commission undertaken where hope was dashed soon after conception due to the individualism of the countries comprising the commission.³⁶⁴

Placing fault in individual nations within the United Nations points not only to the Eurocentrism and Western-leaning analysis of historical agency more generally, but also to the fractured state of UN affairs in the early stages of the organization's efforts. Still, the explanations of the authors are a reminder of how dependant the United Nations was on the

³⁶⁰ Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 103.

³⁶¹ Pappé, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 252-254.

³⁶² Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking*, 171.

³⁶³ Caplan, *The Lausanne Conference*, 124-128.

³⁶⁴ Lori Allen, *A History of False Hope: Investigative Commissions in Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021), 29-30.

inequity of its member states, and that the goals of the broader UN infrastructure did not always align with that of its constituent parts. That the PCC engaged in conferences at all was merely a mirage to wider intentions of imperial peacemaking, and placated to perceived correct formalities of conflict resolution. For if it truly valued the contributions voiced during the conferences, plans towards internationalization would have been quickly halted or at the very least drastically altered. Instead, UN persistence on its original ideas indicated that Jerusalem was going to be internationalized regardless of local opinion. And yet, the initiative did not achieve the results the United Nations desired. This setback did not chime the death knell for aspirant internationalization. With more complexity came new ideas of how to enforce a regime onto Jerusalem. While the PCC watched proceedings from afar, the United Nations embarked on recycled quests to save its mandate.

Chapter 3

Fading into Obscurity: The Jerusalem Question after the Palestine Conciliation Commission

In June 1951, well after the Palestine Conciliation Commission fulfilled its duties to the United Nations on the Jerusalem front, Pablo de Azcarate wrote to Andrew Cordier about the commission and its place in conciliatory actions. The creation of the PCC incorrectly impressed that “real peace negotiations” could lead to “real peace.”³⁶⁵ Hamstrung by “utterly outdated resolutions,” the United Nations now tackled the question of Jerusalem from a different angle.³⁶⁶ For Azcarate, this necessitated a “more realistic approach.”³⁶⁷ The commission took an imperial approach to mediation to the double detriment of its chances for success and the UN image in the Mashriq. The United Nations, he surmised, needed to start over.

This chapter situates the continued efforts of the United Nations to internationalize Jerusalem in late 1949 and into the early 1950s, primarily through Resolution 303 and the so-called “Garreau Plan,” named after the President of the Trusteeship Council Roger Garreau. The adoption of UN Resolution 303 in December 1949 was the last main effort of the United Nations to internationalize Jerusalem and the Garreau Plan transferred this task from the PCC to the Trusteeship Council. The United Nations employed the Trusteeship Council to oversee internationalization as the rapidly-changing political situation on the ground in Jerusalem continued to spiral out of the international organization’s depth.

³⁶⁵ Azcarate to Cordier, from Jerusalem, 21 June 1951, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0002-0004, *UNA*.

³⁶⁶ The Future Activities of the United Nations in Palestine, Unknown Author, 20 April 1951. *UNA*.

³⁶⁷ Azcarate to Cordier, from Jerusalem, 21 June 1951. *UNA*.

Responses to the Draft Statute for Jerusalem

The PCC's publication of the Draft Statute for Jerusalem was a crucial moment in the United Nations' plans to internationalize the Holy City. Tensions rose high enough for the PCC to release an official statement on 9 November 1949 responding to criticisms that the internationalization plan was antithetical to the UN charter, rejected local autonomy, and was ultimately undemocratic.³⁶⁸ The PCC's main riposte was deadpan insofar as it undertook "extensive consultation" with local representatives.³⁶⁹ Two articles stood out as particularly problematic. Article 16 explained that the Holy Places were to be "placed under the exclusive control of the commissioner," who in turn received all authority and legitimacy through the General Assembly.³⁷⁰ Local autonomy was absent, and instead placed into UN administrative hands. Article 25, the final installment in the UN instrument, noted how the international organization could amend or revise the clauses set forth if need be, with no reference to consultation with Palestinians, Arabs, or Israelis about potential alternations.³⁷¹ In other words, the United Nations continued its imperial ways of being by enforcing a statute upon the region which had limited consultation in its construction and could be altered without any further direct communication with the parties involved.³⁷²

The demise of the PCC's proposal rested in the commission's insistence on moving away from full internationalization. The PCC's plan involved control over select regions of the city, with a focus on the Holy Places, frustrating UN members calling for full unequivocal

³⁶⁸ Statement by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Regarding its Proposal for an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area, 9 November 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0010, *UNA*.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁰ Proposals for a Permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem Area: Communication from the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to the Secretary-General Transmitting the Text of a Draft Instrument, 12 September 1949. A/973. Article 16.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Article 25.

³⁷² Carsten Stahn, *The Law Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 537.

internationalization and countries who wished to avoid excessive meddling in the city. For full-internationalization supporters, the PCC's plan was too weak and allowed for too much political maneuvering, specifically by Israel and Jordan. For those backing partial internationalization, the blunt rejection of the draft statute by Jordan and Israel—the two countries allotted quasi-sovereignty over sections of the city—caused equal alarm for the plan's longevity.³⁷³

Furthermore, the bickering between member states on the General Assembly floor and accusations of wide-sweeping political machinations hindered any semblance of international unity on the subject and empowered suspicion about whether the United Nations could enact internationalization in and around Jerusalem.³⁷⁴

A report by the United Nations Ad Hoc Political Committee, issued on 7 December 1949, returned to Resolution 181's proposal that Jerusalem and its environs be governed by the Trusteeship Council.³⁷⁵ The reintroduction of the Trusteeship Council was alarming as it was the initial governmental concept forwarded by the United Nations and was antithetical to local desires. This original body of the United Nations served much the same functions as the League of Nations' mandate system. Despite a reworking of the machinery and a different name, the branch had the same imperial purpose.³⁷⁶ More precisely, the Trusteeship Council was responsible for providing "tutelage" to territories deemed not yet ready for independence by a majority of the United Nations' member-states.³⁷⁷ Trygve Lie stated how vital the establishment

³⁷³ Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 107; and Elad Ben-Dror, "'Knight of Internationalization:' U.N. Delegate Charles Malik of Lebanon and U.N. General Assembly Resolution 303 Calling for the Internationalization of Jerusalem," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (2020): 5.

³⁷⁴ Ben-Dror, "'Knight of Internationalization,'" 6.

³⁷⁵ Report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, Fourth Session, Item 18 of the Agenda, 7 December 1949, AG-025 fons, S-0375-0017-0003, *UNA*; and Resolution 181, Part III, A. Special Regime.

³⁷⁶ Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, 64; Goodrich, "From League of Nations to United Nations," 13; and Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations," *Journal of World History* Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008): 259.

³⁷⁷ James N. Murray Jr. *The United Nations Trusteeship System*. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1957): 119; and Graham H. Stuart, *The International City of Tangier* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), 59-60.

of the Trusteeship System was for the overall functionality of the United Nations, and that the international organization “can never be complete without it.”³⁷⁸ In 1945, as the United Nations was in formation, there were invitations for the larger mandatory powers “to place their mandates under the trusteeship system.”³⁷⁹ This novel form of governance disguised as trusteeship gave the appearance that a part of Palestine, and Jerusalem specifically, was being administered in a more humanitarian kind of way.³⁸⁰ Yet the underlying motivation behind trusteeship was to continue the imperial and colonial framework that gripped the Jerusalem project from the outset.

After the PCC submitted its draft statute and called for a permanent international regime to be established in Jerusalem, another vote took place at the United Nations to determine the direction of the Holy City. During this meeting, various delegations questioned the quality of work undertaken by the PCC and how to better prepare Jerusalem for eternal UN governance. Australia thought Resolution 181 should be closer to the heart of the matter. El Salvador vouched for a widening of the geographic scope of the international regime. The Soviet Union, for its part, stated that the Trusteeship Council should produce its own draft statute, “delete” references to Resolution 194, and move closer towards trusteeship.³⁸¹ These discussions demonstrated that the work of the PCC did not curry favour with the broader UN community and the General Assembly set about remedying this situation through another vote. The vote to re-establish the Trusteeship Council as the Administering Authority of Jerusalem, and to draft its future articles of governance, was passed thirty-five to thirteen, with eleven abstentions.³⁸²

³⁷⁸ “Supplementary Oral Report before the General Assembly, 24 October 1946,” in Cordier and Foote, 61.

³⁷⁹ Murray Jr., *Trusteeship System*, 48.

³⁸⁰ Getachow, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 81. A pertinent quote from the same page reads: “Trusteeship had amounted to nothing more than an ideological gloss intended to mask the true aims of imperialism.”

³⁸¹ Report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, Fourth Session, Item 18 of the Agenda, 7 December 1949. *UNA*.

³⁸² *Ibid.* The voting transpired as follows—In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Coast Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,

On 9 December 1949, the United Nations announced its third resolution speaking to the internationalization of Jerusalem in just over two years. UN Resolution 303 called for a new draft statute to be prepared by the Trusteeship Council. The Garreau Plan ignored the work completed by the PCC and the fulfillment of Resolution 194.³⁸³ The December 1949 resolution called for “omitting now inapplicable provisions” and also noted that Resolution 181, the original partition document, should anchor the Trusteeship Council’s efforts.³⁸⁴ Only three countries voted against this resolution: the United Kingdom, the United States, and Israel. Had Jordan been a UN member, it likely would have opposed the motion as well.³⁸⁵

That Resolution 181, not Resolution 194, formed the basis for Resolution 303 was not subject to a glowing review of the PCC.³⁸⁶ In January 1950, Garreau noted the Archbishop of Canterbury’s view that a different plan needed to “break the present deadlock” and find acceptance for an international enclave, which had yet to be achieved.³⁸⁷ In the hopes of avoiding further UN embarrassment, the PCC’s termination was also internally determined because of its “obsolete and unimplementable terms of reference.”³⁸⁸ Even though the United Nations voted to keep the commission active, its role in brokering peace became secondary.³⁸⁹ The PCC, for its part, consigned the fulfillment of its mandated role and saw the enactment of Resolution 303 as

Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen; Against: Chile, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia; Abstained: Canada, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Philippines, Thailand, Venezuela.

³⁸³ Resolution 303 (IV), Palestine: Question of an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and the Protection of the Holy Places. 275th Plenary Meeting, 9 December 1949. Section I, Point 2.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 254.

³⁸⁶ Cattan, “The Status of Jerusalem in International Law,” 8.

³⁸⁷ Question of an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and Protection of the Holy Places: Working Paper Prepared by the President of the Trusteeship Council, 31 January 1950. T/457. II—A New Start.

³⁸⁸ Alternatives of Assembly Action Concerning Palestine Conciliation Commission, Undated, AG-020 fonds, S-0616-0003-0002, *UNA*.

³⁸⁹ Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, 89.

going back to the original UN plan and ignoring its input.³⁹⁰ Its efforts, then, were not accepted, but also not completely in vain. The PCC determined the stance the United Nations did not want to take.

A major voice in the pro-internationalization camp was Lebanon's Charles Malik. Guided by the recently passed Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in which he was a major drafter, the Lebanese diplomat viewed internationalization and the willingness of the United Nations to put pressure on states opposed to the plan as a major test of Resolution 303's differing approach.³⁹¹ Malik was critical of Israel for not only violating the terms of Resolution 194, but also the United Nations for allowing a member-state to defy its intentions.³⁹² Malik called for a showcase for UN strength by tightening its grip on the geopolitical realities in Jerusalem.³⁹³ Malik worked in close tandem with the Vatican and Catholic-leaning Latin American countries as the vote against the PCC's proposal drew near.³⁹⁴ His efforts were instrumental in conjuring up enough international support for Resolution 303 and the re-engagement with Jerusalem from a more total-internationalization lens.³⁹⁵ Both the Vatican and Latin American countries supported a UN proposal placing a Christian governor in the Holy City.³⁹⁶ As Arab countries on the whole saw the potential for resistance against Zionism and welcomed global collaboration and solidarity, more pragmatic diagnoses from the United States and Britain squashed this hope by not committing to the enforcement of any full internationalization against Israeli or Jordanian wishes.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁰ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Sixth Progress Report, for the Period from 9 December 1949 – 8 May 1950, Inclusive, 29 May 1950. A/1255. Part 1, Point 3.

³⁹¹ Ben-Dror, "Knight of Internationalization," 16.

³⁹² Quigley, *The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders*, 121.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Ben-Dror, "Knight of Internationalization," 12-14.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, 171.

³⁹⁷ Ben-Dror, "Knight of Internationalization," 14-15.

The transfer from PCC to the Trusteeship Council did not appease affected parties. The Jordanian government reported to the United Nations that no person affiliated with the organization would be issued visas: a sign the organization was not welcomed in the region, officially or unofficially.³⁹⁸ Israel, for its part, continued threatening to move more governmental offices from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and did not see the United Nations being much of a roadblock.³⁹⁹ Furthermore, Israel reaffirmed its position on the internationalization of Jerusalem, despite UN decision-making.⁴⁰⁰ David Ben-Gurion, in a speech at the Knesset on 5 December 1949, stated: “Jerusalem is the very heart of the State of Israel... Jews will sacrifice themselves for Jerusalem no less than Englishmen for London, Russians for Moscow, or Americans for Washington.”⁴⁰¹ Jerusalem, for Zionists, was definitively Israeli territory.

The Trusteeship Council’s re-emergence onto the Jerusalem scene was met with criticism. Many of these were directed at Roger Garreau. The continued efforts by the United Nations came to be known as the “Garreau Plan.” As President of the Trusteeship Council, Garreau personified UN internationalization efforts in Jerusalem.⁴⁰² From the outset, the Iraqi representative Mohammad Fadhel al-Jamali accused Garreau of trying to “please all groups but none [were] pleased.”⁴⁰³ Various delegations carried al-Jamali’s perspective.⁴⁰⁴ Letters addressed to Garreau wondered whether the United Nations had “the moral and military force” to realize internationalization. Jerusalem could not be “cut up,” according to prominent New York-based

³⁹⁸ Incoming Cablegram, from Jerusalem, 15 December 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*.

³⁹⁹ Incoming Cablegram, From Jerusalem, 13 December 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*.

⁴⁰⁰ Incoming Cablegram, From Jerusalem, 21 December 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*; and Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 62-63.

⁴⁰¹ “Statement by D. Ben-Gurion, 5 December 1949,” in Ruth Lapidoth and Moshe Hirsch, eds. *The Arab-Israeli Conflict and its Resolution: Selected Documents* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 105.

⁴⁰² Olivier Danino, “La France et la Question de Jerusalem, 3 Avril 1949—7 Juin 1967,” *Relations Internationales* No. 122 (2005): 53.

⁴⁰³ Incoming Cablegram from Geneva, 6 January 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*.

⁴⁰⁴ Danino, “la Question de Jerusalem,” 53.

minister Charles Bridgeman.⁴⁰⁵ Letters from Christian-based leaders also mused that a stronger Christian presence in the Holy City would surely bring peace.⁴⁰⁶

The most direct voice against internationalization in early 1950 came from the American Christian Palestine Committee (ACPC), who vehemently called for a cessation of all intentions towards an UN-governed Holy City. It must be stated that ACPC was a Christian-Zionist organization and a key facet of U.S.-based Protestant support for the Zionist cause. These words, then, came from a desire to see Jerusalem be in Israeli hands.⁴⁰⁷ ACPC members opined that the Holy Places should be the only concern for the United Nations. In their view, both Jordan and Israel would not infringe upon the safety of these sites.⁴⁰⁸ The ACPC letters, moreover, castigated the United Nations' top-down approach for disregarding residents of Jerusalem as well as the individualism of member states.⁴⁰⁹

Various Arab governments and representatives were opportunistically vocal in the first quarter of 1950 as the Trusteeship Council hunkered into position. King Abdullah of Jordan re-engaged with notions of being perceived as the sole representative of Palestinians. While still very much against internationalization, he denounced other Arab governments seeking to undermine his aspirations for the city and vision of Arab-Israeli peace.⁴¹⁰ Abdullah's allusions of being the de facto voice of all Arab peoples echoed those of his father, who initiated the so-

⁴⁰⁵ The Internationalization of Jerusalem and the Christian Population, by Charles T. Bridgeman, New York, 6 January 1950. The Rev. Charles T. Bridgeman, to M. Garreau, President of the Trusteeship Council, 13 January 1950, AG-021 fonds, S-1557-0000-0147, FALCHI Building, Long Island City Archival Holdings, *UNA*.

⁴⁰⁶ American Christian Palestine Committee members, to Mr. Roger Garreau, President of U.N. Trusteeship Council, 18 January 1950, AG-021 fonds, S-1557-0000-0147, FALCHI Building, Long Island City Archival Holdings, *UNA*.

⁴⁰⁷ Caitlin Carenen, "The American Christian Palestine Committee, the Holocaust, and Mainstream Protestant Zionism, 1938-1948," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* Vol. 24, No. 2 (2010): 290; and Amy Weiss, "'Making the Desert Blossom as the Rose:' The American Christian Palestine Committee's 'Children's Memorial Forest' and Postwar Land Acquisition in Palestine," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* Vol. 33, No. 2 (2019): 246.

⁴⁰⁸ American Christian Palestine Committee Members, to Mr. Roger Garreau, President of U.N. Trusteeship Council, 18 January 1950. *UNA*.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*.

⁴¹⁰ Incoming Cable, Fisher, Quimper, to A.W. Cordier, 27 January 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0004-0007, *UNA*; and Incoming Cablegram, From Geneva, 8 February 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*.

called Arab revolt of 1916. Husain ibn Ali, from the Husain-McMahon correspondence of 1915-16, adopted Arab unity as an anti-Ottoman strategy to extend his Hashemite dynasty's own imperial grasp in the Mashriq.⁴¹¹ In the aftermath of World War I and in partial step with the Husain-McMahon correspondence, Britain placed members of the Hashemite family on thrones in its newly formed mandates of Transjordan and Iraq against the will of local majorities.⁴¹²

“Emotion tensions” and the prospects of violence concerned the United Nations. Garreau received a letter on 23 February 1950, warning that if his stance on the Jerusalem was not changed, “he would be shot ‘like a dog.’”⁴¹³ This letter, sent by the Palestine Arab Terrorist Organization, evoked memories of Count Bernadotte's assassination. The letter, which arrived from Egypt, got a prompt response from the Egyptian representative to the Trusteeship Council, who promised to investigate the matter.⁴¹⁴ Israel continued its move of government offices to Jerusalem and named the city its capital in direct defiance of UN resolutions. Meanwhile, Jordan did the same by claiming sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the West Bank.⁴¹⁵ The Trusteeship Council thus responded to amassing pressures with an alternative draft statute for Jerusalem in April 1950. But, much like all other UN efforts, its plan was anything but a well-accepted piece of legislation.

⁴¹¹ Malik R. Dahlan, *The Hijaz: The First Islamic State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 75; and Baruch Kimmerling, “The Formation of Collective Palestinian Identities: The Ottoman and Mandatory Periods,” *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 36, No. 2 (2000): 69.

⁴¹² Hani J. Bawardi, *The Making of Arab Americans: From Syrian Nationalism to U.S. Citizenship* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014):166-167; and Cyrus Schayegh, *The Middle East and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 125.

⁴¹³ L. Malania, Special Assistant to Mr. Cordier, to Mr. A.W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General, Discussion on Jerusalem Estimates in the Advisory Committee, 8 December 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*.

⁴¹⁴ “President of the United Nations Trusteeship Council Threatened by Arab Terrorists,” *Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin* Vol. XVIII, No. 38 (23 February, 1950). New York City.

⁴¹⁵ The Status of Jerusalem: Prepared for, and Under the Guidance of, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, United Nations, New York, 1997. Page 11; Assaf Selzer, “Building the Capital: Thoughts, Plans, and Practice in the Process of Making West Jerusalem the Capital City of the State of Israel, 1948-1967,” *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 57, No. 1 (2021): 61; and Ian S. Lustick, “Yerushalayim and al-Quds: Political Catechism and Political Realities,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 30, No. 1 (2000): 10.

The Trusteeship Council's Draft Statute for Jerusalem

Released on 4 April 1950, the Trusteeship Council's draft statute represented another UN attempt to impose an exogenous international regime upon Jerusalem. Longer and more in depth than its predecessor in September 1949, this iteration made only passing reference to the PCC or Resolution 194. Instead, it used the original partition plan of 1947 as its base.⁴¹⁶ There were notable distinctions aside from the drastic shifts within the UN officialdom. The governor of the city, who was to be appointed by the United Nations, was to only take directives from this most recent statute and from the Trusteeship Council.⁴¹⁷ This allowed the United Nations to appoint a governor for the city, making the governor's overseers a quasi-imperial branch of the organization.⁴¹⁸ The 1950 statute gave Jerusalem a legal personality flowing through the United Nations itself, rather than any inkling of self-determination.⁴¹⁹ Furthermore, it imposed that the United Nations held sway over the city and its residents for ten years, barring any change made by the Trusteeship Council.⁴²⁰ Only after a decade could the local population hold a referendum, but the procedure of that referendum was to be determined by the Trusteeship Council and be subject to alteration.⁴²¹ The April 1950 statute, as evidenced by previous efforts, limited the chances of Jerusalem ever reaching a stage where self-government could have been actively and effectively promoted.⁴²² Even the linkage to trusteeship was dubious. The only way Jerusalem fit the mold of other regions within the Trusteeship Council's purview was that Palestine was once

⁴¹⁶ Proposals for a Permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem Area. A/973.

⁴¹⁷ Draft Statute of 4 April 1950. Article 13.

⁴¹⁸ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Terms of Reference United Nations Representative in Jerusalem, 1 September 1949, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0009, *UNA*.

⁴¹⁹ Stahn, *The Law Practice of International Territorial Administration*, 557.

⁴²⁰ Draft Statute of 4 April 1950, Article 42, Point 1.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, Article 42, Point 2.

⁴²² Stahn, *The Law Practice of International Territorial Administration*, 200.

under the mandate's system. It was as if the United Nations pretended the British mandate still existed, or at the very least still held legitimacy.⁴²³

News of the 1950 statute's release was met with "a sense of unreality," reported the Arab News Agency in Geneva.⁴²⁴ Neither the United Nations nor the members of the Trusteeship Council were positioned to take any realistic action on the ground. Key UN members returned to Lake Success, citing "difficulties" in performing UN-sanctioned duties in Jerusalem.⁴²⁵ The Arab press jabbed the United Nations, claiming the transfer of Jerusalem to the Trusteeship Council was "an evident failure" of one of the PCC's main tasks.⁴²⁶ The Soviet Union, which supported Resolution 303, recanted a week later after recognizing that the 1950 statute went against the desires of local populations.⁴²⁷ This was viewed negatively by both al-Jamali and Ahmed Bey Shokeiry, the Syrian representative on the PCC, as votes of the Soviet satellite states would no longer be in favour of internationalization, severely dwindling chances of its success.⁴²⁸

Israel opposed the 1950 statute, noting how its "impracticability" was on "the minds of every honest member of the Council."⁴²⁹ It released a robust critique of the United Nations in May 1950. Presented at the Seventh Session of the Trusteeship Council, Israel shared misgivings with the United Nations' unwavering determination to deny the citizens of Jerusalem self-determination. Israel's argument against internationalization was twofold. First, global interest in

⁴²³ Ibid., 197.

⁴²⁴ "Sense of Unreality," *Mideast Mirror*, 8 April 1950, Page 7.

⁴²⁵ "Conciliation Commission's Final Bid," *Mideast Mirror*, 8 July 1950. Page 6.

⁴²⁶ "Principles Evaded," *Mideast Mirror*, 15 April 1950, Page 3; and "Palestine Back to U.N.?" *Mideast Mirror*, 22 April 1950. Page 22.

⁴²⁷ Government of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, 19 April 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0008, *UNA*; Russia's Jerusalem Volte-Face," *Mideast Mirror*, 29 April 1950. Page 7; and Gadi Heimann, "Divide and Rule: Israel's Tactics Regarding the Jerusalem Question and America's Response, 1949-1950," *Cold War History* Vol. 17, No. 1 (2017): 25

⁴²⁸ Ibid., "Dr. Jamali on Soviet Actions," *Mideast Mirror*, April 29 1950. Page 8; and Paul Thomas Chamberlain, *The Global Offensive: The United States, The Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15.

⁴²⁹ A.S. Eban, Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, to Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary General, 10 April 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0008, *UNA*.

Jerusalem centered around the Holy Places.⁴³⁰ Israel saw no need to infringe upon the sovereignty of the entire city when only select portions and specific sites were of interest.⁴³¹ Elsewhere, Israel called the 1950 statute “extremist and illusionary.”⁴³² The second, and more problematic facet of its argument, was that internationalization weakened Israel and subjected it to be overwhelmed by neighbouring Arab countries. This “David vs Goliath” myth, integral to Zionist settler colonialism in Palestine, featured in Israeli arguments with the United Nations before. Israeli and global Zionist concerns of the “encirclement by Arab forces” remained well into 1950.⁴³³ Despite the success of Zionist military campaigns in the late 1940s, one pundit vouching for continued U.S. support of Israel claimed that “this does not mean the Arabs will be forever incapable of ganging up effectively.”⁴³⁴

The strongest voice of the broader Arab position on the 1950 statute came from Dr. al-Jamali, the sole delegate from an Arab country to feature on the Trusteeship Council. The Iraqi representative eloquently expressed why Arabs on the whole were in a difficult position vis-à-vis internationalization.⁴³⁵ In speaking with the Baghdad-based newspaper *Al-Zaman*, al-Jamali criticized the United Nations’ approach towards Zionism and claimed the “leniency” shown by the UN members for the Zionist cause made any internationalization attempt “impossible.”⁴³⁶ Later in the article, the representative from Iraq outlined the parameters of his country’s support

⁴³⁰ Draft Memorandum to be Presented by the Government of Israel to the Seventh Session, United Nations Trusteeship Council on the Question of Jerusalem. May 1950. *UNA*.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*.

⁴³² Israel Submits Jerusalem Plan: May 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0003-0008, *UNA*.

⁴³³ Zeev Sternhell, translated by David Maisel, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 135; de Jong, “Zionist Hegemony,” 368; and Draft Memorandum to be Presented by the Government of Israel to the Seventh Session, United Nations Trusteeship Council on the Question of Jerusalem. May 1950. *UNA*.

⁴³⁴ Hal Lehrman, “Gathering Storm in U.S.-Israeli Relations: The Issues Behind the Conflict,” *Commentary* (1949): 318.

⁴³⁵ “Can United Nations Force Statute?” *Mideast Mirror*. Page 8.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*.

for internationalization. Namely, no section of Jerusalem could come under Zionist control; Palestinian Arabs must be able to return to the city; and UN motivations cannot be “a screen for the extension of Zionist influence.”⁴³⁷ Iraq’s support, then, was predicated on and heavily influenced by the desire to see Jerusalem remain Palestinian, or at least Arab, but not Israeli. Iraq even submitted a proposal for the installment of a UN representative to the city to maintain stability as the Trusteeship Council settled into its role.⁴³⁸ The crux of the Iraqi recommendation was that the United Nations could not leave Jerusalem vacant lest Israel take full control of the city.⁴³⁹ If the United Nations guaranteed the Palestinian right of return for refugees, as outlined in Resolution 194, Jerusalem did not have to be an entirely Palestinian or Arab city. Simply, people came before cities.⁴⁴⁰

Voices within the United Nations also expressed opinions of the ever-changing landscape at the advent of the new statute. Writing to the Secretary-General in June 1950, Andrew Cordier and Dragoslav Protitch mused that support for internationalization was strong, but primarily from politically ineffective religious figures and non-state organizations.⁴⁴¹ The two senior members of the UN staff also warned Trygve Lie that the situation in Jerusalem was, on the whole, “orderly.”⁴⁴² Any movements towards internationalization threw such stability into jeopardy. A UN press official, H.A. Fisher, candidly remarked that most people got Jerusalem wrong and failed to grasp the wide-sweeping ramifications of UN involvement in the city for

⁴³⁷ “No Doubt,” *Mideast Mirror*, 15 April 1950. Page 9.

⁴³⁸ Question of an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and Protection of the Holy Places, Statute for Jerusalem, Egypt: Proposal Submitted by the Delegation of Iraq, 81st Meeting, 4 April 1950, AG-021 fonds, S-0504-0004-0003 FALCHI Building, Long Island City Archival Holdings, *UNA*.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*.

⁴⁴⁰ “Jerusalem Refugees Return Plan,” *Mideast Mirror*, 1 April 1950. Page 5.

⁴⁴¹ Report on the Various Organs Dealing with the Palestine Question, to the Secretary-General from A.W. Cordier and D. Protitch, 21 June 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0002-0001, *UNA*.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*

Palestinian, Arab and Israeli paradigms.⁴⁴³ Fisher opined that the popular perception of Arab aggression was not reality; rather, Palestinians fighting for Jerusalem was in opposition to “an act of Zionist aggression.”⁴⁴⁴

The Trusteeship Council’s 1950 statute doubled down on the problematic and pervasive imperialism inherent in the UN plan to internationalize Jerusalem from the outset. What made the Garreau plan even more harmful was its debates being held on the General Assembly floor rather than with delegations affected by the governance of Jerusalem, namely Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Israelis. And when discussions were held with relevant delegations, the feedback was far from complimentary. This reaction should not have come as a surprise. Only in the later stages of proceedings did UN personnel, like Cordier, Protitch, and Fisher, begin to understand the misgivings. The PCC determined that full internationalization was not agreeable with Palestinians, Jordanians, or Israelis. This reality was promptly ignored by the United Nations who shielded its eyes from the unfortunate news, shunned the messenger, and tried again. Stubbornness, however, yielded poor results, and led to a further gulf in trust towards the organization in the Mashriq.

After the Statute and Into Oblivion

The Trusteeship Council’s draft statute of April 1950 was the last serious effort made by the United Nations to enforce internationalization in and around Jerusalem. The intervening months and years saw official and unofficial backpedaling. Years of efforts and numerous resolutions were reduced to little more than a collection of intentions with little affirmative

⁴⁴³ Memorandum from H.A. Fisher, Press Officer to Pablo de Azcarate, 31 July 1950, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0002-0001, *UNA*.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*.

action. While the goal of internationalization faded into obscurity, a few moments stood out as beacons of its demise.

Still a functional member of the United Nations, the PCC wrote to Trygve Lie in September 1950 outlining its stance on the stagnation facing Jerusalem. The PCC stressed its consultation with local authorities and reiterated its conclusion that the United Nations could not—and should not—force full internationalization upon Jerusalem.⁴⁴⁵ The commission thought Arabs, generally, were willing to accept the international enclave on principle, only if such a regime was guaranteed. Conversely, the PCC restated how Israel was against internationalization beyond the protection of specific Holy Places.⁴⁴⁶ The PCC voiced considerable consternation against the directions of 1950 and the ignorance of its own work by the UN, as its efforts were undertaken to “reconcile” the wishes of the General Assembly and the people affected by this decision.⁴⁴⁷ Going back to 1948, it was envisaged that an interstitial “constituent” authority in the city would morph into the “supreme administrative authority” before long.⁴⁴⁸ The PCC, having completed its work and spoken with people in and influenced by the city, attempted in vain to impress the idea that this notion was not tangible—not then, not now, and probably not ever.

Gripped by melancholy, UN officials contemplated lessons learned. A draft supplementary report produced several staggering statements running counter to previous UN actions. Although redacted, there was initial mention of how pressures by the “great powers” to expedite this process had to be challenged “on ground of morality and equity” and that the

⁴⁴⁵ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, General Progress Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2 September 1950, AG-025 fonds, S-0375-0003-0003, *UNA*.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁸ Report of the Working Committee on Jerusalem to the Trusteeship Council, 16 February 1948: Special Charter of the Jerusalem Regime. *UNA*.

United Nations’ “efficacy remains open to the most serious doubts.”⁴⁴⁹ The draft’s unknown author noted the problematic framework of using terminology such as “question” and “problem” as it related to Jerusalem as both implied a solution was akin to scientific trial and error.⁴⁵⁰ The United Nations viewed itself as the missing piece to a puzzle it created. This skewed its perception of what the so-called peace process was, let alone its role in the proceedings. “In Palestine,” the UN draft supplementary report declared, “the United Nations is faced not with a mathematical problem but with a historical process.”⁴⁵¹

Arabs also felt as though the plan for UN internationalization was on its last legs. By 10 June 1950, the Arab press reported that the internationalization idea was “virtually dead” and “a forlorn hope.”⁴⁵² Despite all non-Palestinian Arab countries vying for internationalization aside from Jordan, the latter’s continued exclusion and refusal to meet with the Trusteeship Council to discuss matters hindered the prospects of the idea considerably, especially considering Abdullah’s perceived role as *the* Arab voice in Western imaginations.⁴⁵³ The Arab-based press also alluded to the ease at which newspapers in the United States picked up the Zionist position.⁴⁵⁴ The American Zionist Council and Abba Eban worked both the U.S. government and other non-state actors to keep international support for internationalization at bay.⁴⁵⁵ This was confirmed just a few days later when a vote in the Trusteeship Council recognizing the unimplementable nature of internationalization carried by a count of nine to one, with one

⁴⁴⁹ The Palestine Crisis, Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat (Material for use by the Commission in the Eventuality of its Deciding to Submit a Supplementary Report to the Secretary-General), 4 October 1950, AG-022 fonds, S-0616-0024-0008, *UNA*.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵² “U.N. Decision and Arab States Policy Both Facing Defeat,” *Mideast Mirror*, 10 June 1950. Page 3.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*, Page 4; and Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 109.

⁴⁵⁴ “U.N. Decision and Arab States Policy Both Facing Defeat,” *Mideast Mirror*. Page 4.

⁴⁵⁵ Walter Hixson, *Israel’s Armor: The Israel Lobby and the First Generation of the Palestine Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 71-72.

abstention.⁴⁵⁶ The termination of the 1950 statute, the Garreau Plan, and Resolution 303, remarked Hussein Rouchdy of Syria, “came as no surprise.”⁴⁵⁷ By early 1951, Israel claimed the plan for internationalization had been “put in the waste-paper basket.”⁴⁵⁸ The UN-led idea of internationalization was deemed to be, with helpful hindsight in tow, “impossible” from the outset.⁴⁵⁹

These sentiments were confirmed in December 1950, when a few events pushed the faint chance of internationalization off the precipice. As the General Assembly returned to the so-called Jerusalem question, work began afresh with little enthusiasm.⁴⁶⁰ A Swedish draft resolution aimed to put less pressure on the United Nations in finding a solution to the “Jerusalem question,” which Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria saw as an intentional shirking of responsibilities.⁴⁶¹ Israel, for its part, thought the Swedish resolution was “a fair and practical expression” of the region’s wishes to see the religious sites safeguarded while also ensuring the city remained in local hands.⁴⁶² Jordan’s Tuqan Bey noted how this resolution benefited Israel, “but would give nothing to the Arabs.”⁴⁶³ Ultimately, the Swedish resolution failed to attain the two-thirds majority required to pass.⁴⁶⁴ Thereafter, the United Nations reduced the budget for the “establishment of a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area” by \$8 million through Resolution 468 on 14 December 1950.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁵⁶ “Trusteeship Council Fails,” *Mideast Mirror*, 17 June 1950. Page 5. The vote of objection was Iraq, and the Philippines abstained from voting.

⁴⁵⁷ “Trusteeship Council Fails,” *Mideast Mirror*. Page 6.

⁴⁵⁸ “Contribution Conditional,” *Mideast Mirror*, 3 February 1951. Page 5.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*.

⁴⁶⁰ Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem*, 184.

⁴⁶¹ Yearbook of the United Nations, 31 December 1950, Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York. 1951.I.24. pg.57.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, pg.58.

⁴⁶³ United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Session, Official Records. Ad Hoc Political Committee, 78th Meeting. 12 December 1950. Lake Success, New York.

⁴⁶⁴ Yearbook of the United Nations, pg.62. This was on large part due to the Soviet bloc voting against the motion.

⁴⁶⁵ United Nations Resolution 468. General Assembly Fifth Session. 14 December 1950. A/RES/468(V).

The conclusive unofficial end of internationalization efforts came following the assassination of one of its fiercest opponents. King Abdullah of Jordan was killed outside of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 20 July 1951 by a disgruntled Palestinian.⁴⁶⁶ Political maneuvering and speculations about motive aside, the death of the Jordanian king not only severely altered the political landscape of the country, but also the overall outlook of life in the Mashriq for colonizing forces.⁴⁶⁷ Despite a scheduled meeting between Abdallah and Israeli government officials the following day, the assassination was not thought to be motivated by the Hashemite's cozying up with Zionists; instead, inter-Arab rivalries were most likely to blame.⁴⁶⁸ While the United Nations was torn on whether or not the assassination improved the chances of forcing an enclave onto Jerusalem, Azcarate regarded the assassination as a "severe set-back" for the prospects of success.⁴⁶⁹

The UN plan to internationalize Jerusalem then became dormant. Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen penned a joint complaint in 1953 to the United Nations for not keeping its promise to make Jerusalem an international zone.⁴⁷⁰ In late 1954, these same six countries wrote to the Secretary-General, calling for the resolutions of the late 1940s to actually mean something.⁴⁷¹ Delegations voiced that the sending of ambassadors by UN-member states to Jerusalem, instead of Tel Aviv, disregarded the resolutions penned concerning the city's internationalization.⁴⁷² The United Nations responded with a muted statement that Western states

⁴⁶⁶ Ronen Yitzhak, "The Assassination of King Abdullah: The First Political Assassination in Jordan: Did it Truly Threaten the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan?" *Diplomacy & Statecraft* Vol. 21 (2010): 70.

⁴⁶⁷ "King Abdullah Assassinated," *Mideast Mirror*, 21 July 1951. Page 21.

⁴⁶⁸ Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan*, 606.

⁴⁶⁹ Political Problems Created by King Abdullah's Assassination, sent to Cordier from Azcarate, 26 July 1951, AG-020 fonds, S-0161-0002-0004, *UNA*.

⁴⁷⁰ Text from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Yemen, and of the Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria to the United Nations, 27 July 1953. *UNA*.

⁴⁷¹ Arab Representatives to the Secretary General, 8 November 1954. *UNA*.

⁴⁷² *Ibid*.

who sent ambassadors to Jerusalem did not reflect the stated aims of internationalization, but did little to actually rectify the situation.⁴⁷³

What the waning days of the United Nations' involvement with Jerusalem showed was more continuation than novelty. UN actions maintained an imperial lean. And once there was an inkling the international regime could not just be forced upon the region, the General Assembly quickly moved along to other pursuits. Only the commissions and people directly ordered to deal with Jerusalem had the patience to do anything worthwhile. The rest of the United Nations indicated the truer intentions of the organization: it would be nice to control Jerusalem, but not at the expense of much effort. The PCC determined internationalization would not be accepted by Palestinians, Jordanians, or Israelis. That should have ended the United Nations' involvement. Instead, the organization dismissed the commission, threw out the work completed in the field through various conferences, and reverted back to full internationalization. Jerusalem again transformed into a place of imagination, rather than a lived reality, as it became bogged down in incessant, non-consensual diplomacy which appeased imperialists cosplaying as well-intentioned global overseers.

⁴⁷³ Aide Memoire, 10 November 1954, AG-025 fonds, S-0442-0239-0006, *UNA*.

Conclusion

The United Nations, through its efforts to internationalize Jerusalem, tried to transform the peace process into a peace event. Yet the international organization could not bring about its own brand of imperialism masquerading as reconciliation into the fold. The attempted internationalization of Jerusalem stands not so much as a mistake as an intentional choice to meddle in the early stages of the Israeli-Palestinian and Zionist-Arab conflicts with self-serving aspirations. The goals of the United Nations were not laudable. The attempted practices only sullied these intentions further. “Justice is indivisible and peace is indivisible,” as Mostafa Bey of Egypt noted in late 1951.⁴⁷⁴ And yet, the United Nations managed to divide both in Jerusalem.

Despite setting out for mediation, the United Nations never wanted real consultation. Instead, what the international organization pined for was an acceptance of its mandate and a peaceful transfer from the British empire and the League of Nations to this new international construct of imperial being. The use of the term conciliation in the PCC’s name was as much for dampening hostilities between Palestinians, Arabs and Israelis as it was for decreasing malevolence with the United Nations’ plan to wrest sovereignty from these delegations in Jerusalem. As Jerusalem and the designs to internationalize the city got passed from UN arm to various UN arm, the same reality remained: this was solely a UN initiative.

The internationalization of Jerusalem failed miserably and set a problematic framework for how the Zionist state of Israel, Palestinians, and neighbouring Arab nations conducted peacemaking in the proceeding decades. The United Nations attempted to have a mandate after the mandate system expired—a colony-like enclave in the so-called era of postcolonialism and

⁴⁷⁴ Summary Record of a Meeting Between the Conciliation Commission and the Arab Delegations, Held at the Hotel de Crillion, Paris, on Wednesday 14 November 1951, 4pm. *UNA*.

decolonialization. Internationalization failed not because any one mediator, commissioner, or representative shirked a task. Rather, the initiative failed because it was the purview of only one entity: the United Nations. The notion of imperial tutelage and continued imperial ways of being was not palatable in a supposed post-colonial world. No amount of brute force willed the UN statutes of 1949 and 1950 to be binding, or for Palestinians and Israelis to accept an international regime on a city.

The United Nations inherited an ever-deteriorating international system of governance around the Jerusalem area. The Status Quo of the Ottoman empire operated for over a century and a half before the League of Nations dismantled collective cooperation for its sanctioned mandate in Palestine. In the League of Nations, Jerusalem found a new game: that of more intentional imperial aspirations. When the United Nations entered the scene, ideas transformed into a scheme, and the potential of international governance was fleshed out for permanence.

The United Nations tasked the Palestine Conciliation Commission to fashion this dream into the fabric of reality. Through conferences in Beirut and Lausanne, alongside separate meetings with individual delegations, the commission created a draft statute for the General Assembly. Aided through the efforts of the Jerusalem Committee, the PCC produced detailed instructions for the United Nations to make Jerusalem the permanent international enclave the organization coveted. While ultimately unsavoury for local populations, the United Nations had a roadmap to take it through regions previously lacking any semblance of cartography.

And yet, despite the draft statute of the PCC, the United Nations returned the so-called Jerusalem question to the General Assembly for further deliberation. What the PCC proposed was simply not enough authority to satisfy insatiable UN appetites. Following the PCC draft statute, the United Nations reinstated the Trusteeship Council to make its own plan for

permanent internationalization, which again was strongly rejected by Palestinians, Arabs, and Zionists. Israel continued its settler-colonialism and Arab states soon discovered the dynamics that have plagued negotiations of the so-called peace processes since and into today.

No internationalization plan worked for the United Nations for two reasons. The first was that the organization could not agree on the level of intensity internationalization ought to take. Some clamoured for full and irreversible internationalization, while other member states were satisfied with the protection of the Holy Places. Secondly, and more damningly, was the unequivocal ignoring of local voices. Despite meeting with various delegations over several years, those conferences were done more out of obligation than consultation. Palestinian, Arab, and Israeli voices were collected not for advice or guidance, but so the international organization could say internationalization was achieved after talking to relevant delegations. What was missing was that, during the conferences of 1949, no one aside from the United Nations itself entertained the notion of internationalization with much fervour. Unable to bully the plan to fruition, the United Nations shuffled off its manufactured mortal coil and left a situation in Jerusalem, and Palestine more broadly, still awaiting resolution.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Archival Sources

1948 The Near East, South Asia, and Africa. Volume V, Part 2. Foreign Relations of the United States.

1949 The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI. Foreign Relations of the United States.

Foreign Service 1948, Country—Palestine (Gaza) series. American Friends Service Committee Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

United Nations Department of Political Affairs (1992-Present) fonds, AG-021. United Nations Archives, Long Island City, New York.

United Nations Mediator for Palestine (1948-1949) fonds, AG-022. United Nations Archives, New York City, New York.

United Nations Office for Special Political Affairs (1955-1991) fonds, AG-020. United Nations Archives, New York City, New York.

United Nations Palestine Commission (UNPAC) (1948) fonds, AG-060. United Nations Archives, New York City, New York.

United Nations Registry Section (1946-1979) fonds, AG-025. United Nations Archives, New York City, New York.

United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) (1947) fonds, AG-057. United Nations Archives, New York City, New York.

Government Publications

Appendix XIV. Minutes of Palestine Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers held in San Remo at the Villa Devachan—24 April 1920. Minutes Prepared by the British Secretary.

Appendix XV. Minutes of Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in San Remo at the Villa Devachan—25 April 1920.

British White Paper. 9 November 1938. By His Majesty's Government. London, United Kingdom.

Nineteenth Session of the Council, Thirteenth Meeting, Held at St. James' Palace, London.

Palestine Royal Commission, Report, Printed and Published by his Majesty's Stationary Office, London, July 1937.

San Remo Convention, Done at London the Twenty-Fourth Day of July, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Two.

Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Ali ibn Hussein, 24 October 1915. The Husain-McMahon Correspondence.

Sykes-Picot Agreement, Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon. 15-16 May 1916. WWI Document Archive.

Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne. 24 July 1923. From: The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. II (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924).

Newspapers and Bulletins

“Another Week Drags By.” *Mideast Mirror*. 18 June 1949.

“Can United Nations Force Statute?” *Mideast Mirror*. 16 April 1950.

“Conciliation Commission's Final Bid.” *Mideast Mirror*. 8 July 1950.

“Contribution Conditional.” *Mideast Mirror*. 3 February 1951.

“Dr. Jamali on Soviet Actions.” *Mideast Mirror*. 29 April 1950.

“Eventual Talks.” *Mideast Mirror*. 8 April 1950.

In *Multiplicibus Curis*, Encyclical of Pope Pius XII on Prayers for Peace in Palestine to the Brethren, the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and other Ordinaries in Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See. 24 October 1948.

“Jerusalem Refugees Return Plan.” *Mideast Mirror*. 1 April 1950.

“Jerusalem Scheme Criticized, Arab Rights Discarded Says Press.” *Mideast Mirror*. 17 September 1949.

“King Abdullah Assassinated.” *Mideast Mirror*. 21 July 1951.

“Lausanne Delegates Leaving, ‘Recess’ During U.N. Palestine Talks.” *Mideast Mirror*. 10 September 1949.

“No Doubt.” *Mideast Mirror*. 15 April 1950.

“Palestine Back to U.N.?” *Mideast Mirror*. 22 April 1950.

“President of the United Nations Trusteeship Council Threatened by Arab Terrorists,” *Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin* Vol. XVIII, No. 38 (23 February 1950). New York City.

“Principles Evaded.” *Mideast Mirror*. 15 April 1950.

Redemptoris Nostri Cruciatu, Encyclical of Pope Pius XII on the Holy Places in Palestine to the Venerable Brethren the Patriarchs, Primate, Archbishops, and other Ordinaries in Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See. 15 April 1949.

“Russia’s Jerusalem Volte-Face.” *Mideast Mirror*. 29 April 1950.

“Sense of Unreality.” *Mideast Mirror*. 8 April 1950.

“Sir Alan Takes Leave of Palestine,” *The Palestine Post* Friday, 14 May 1948. Vol. XXIII, No. 6713.

“Trusteeship Council Fails.” *Mideast Mirror*. 17 June 1950.

“U.N. Decision and Arab States Policy Both Facing Defeat.” *Mideast Mirror*. 10 June 1950.

“U.N. Test for Arab-Jew Relations.” *Mideast Mirror*. 3 September 1949.

Primary Publications

Berger, Peter. “The Internationalization of Jerusalem.” *Jurist* Vol. 10, No. 3 (1950): 357-387.

Burckel, Christian E., ed. *Who’s Who in the United Nations: The Authoritative, Illustrated, Biographical Dictionary of Key Persons Associated with the United Nations*. New York: Christian E. Burckel and Associates, 1951.

de Azcarate, Pablo. *Mission in Palestine, 1948-1952*. Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1966.

Ethridge, Willie Snow. *Going to Jerusalem*. New York: The Vanguard Press, 1950.

Goodrich, Leland M. “From League of Nations to United Nations.” *International Organization* Vol. 1, No. 1 (1947): 3-21.

Lehrman, Hal. “Gathering Storm in U.S.-Israeli Relations: The Issues Behind the Conflict.” *Commentary* (1949): 317-328.

Sayre, Francis B. "Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System." *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 42, No. 2 (1948): 263-298.

United Nations/League of Nations Publications and Resolutions

Charter of the United Nations. 25 October 1945. San Francisco.

First Progress Report—UNCCP—Report, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
First Progress Report. Jerusalem. 1 March 1949. A/819.

Hundred and Eighty-Sixth Plenary Meeting, Palestine question—Progress Report of the UN
Mediator—GA debate, vote, adoption of resolution 194 (III), designation of UNCCP
members—Verbatim record (excerpts). Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Saturday
11 December 1948, at 8.30 p.m. 123. Continuation of the Discussion on the Progress
Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine: Reports of the First Committee
(A/776) and of the Fifth Committee (A/786).

League of Nations. "Mandate for Palestine." Communiqué au Conseil et aux Membres de la
Société Genève. 12 Août 1922.

Proposals for a Permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem Area: Communication from
the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to the Secretary-General
Transmitting the Text of a Draft Instrument, 12 September 1949. A/973.

Question of an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and Protection of the Holy Places:
Working Paper Prepared by the President of the Trusteeship Council, 31 January 1950.
T/457.

Resolution 303 (IV), Palestine: Question of an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and
the Protection of the Holy Places. 275th Plenary Meeting. 9 December 1949.

Statute for the City of Jerusalem. Approved by the Trusteeship Council at the Eighty-First
Meeting on 4 April 1950. T/592.

The Covenant of the League of Nations. 28 June 1919. Paris Peace Conference. Palais de
Versailles. Paris, France.

The Status of Jerusalem: Prepared for, and Under the Guidance of, the Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, United Nations, New York,
1997.

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Letter Dated 20 May 1949 Addressed by
the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem to the Conciliation Commission. A/AC.25/NC/21.

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Committee on Jerusalem. Jerusalem and Holy Places, Chronological Notes 24 April to 15 June 1949. *Palestine Post* (Collected and Prepared by the Secretariat).

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Committee on Jerusalem. Summary Record of the Thirty-Third Meeting Between the Committee of Jerusalem and the Delegations of the Arab States held in Lausanne on Monday, 20 June 1949, 4pm. A/AC.25/Com.Jer./SR.33.

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Letter Dated 29 August, 1949 Addressed to the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission by the Heads of the Arab Delegations and Transmitting a Memorandum Containing the Replies of the Arab Delegations to the Commission's Questionnaire of 15 August 1949. A/AC.25/AR/17.

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Second Progress Report. 19 April 1949. A/838.

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Sixth Progress Report, for the Period from 9 December 1949 – 8 May 1950, Inclusive, 29 May 1950. A/1255.

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Summary Record of the Fortieth Meeting, held at the King David Hotel, Jerusalem, on 8 April 1949 at 10 a.m. A/AC/.25/SR.40.

United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Religious Interests and Holy Places (Draft of Chapter III of the Report of the Committee Prepared by the Secretariat), 20 September 1947.

United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report to the General Assembly, Volume 1, 3 September 1947. Preparation of the Report. A/364.

United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Session, Official Records. Ad Hoc Political Committee, 78th Meeting. 12 December 1950. Lake Success, New York.

UN Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine. 29 November 1947. A/RES/181 (II).

UN Resolution 194 (III) 11 December 1949. A/RES/194 (III).

United Nations Resolution 468. General Assembly Fifth Session. 14 December 1950. A/RES/468(V).

Secondary Sources

- Albin, Cecilia. "Negotiating Intractable Conflicts: On the Future of Jerusalem." *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 32, No. 1 (1997): 29-77.
- Al-Hardan, Anaheed. "Al-Nakbah in Arab Thought: The Transformation of a Concept." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* Vol. 35, No. 3 (2015): 622-638.
- Allen, Lori. *A History of False Hope: Investigative Commissions in Palestine*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021.
- Allen, Lori. "Determining Emotions and the Burden of Proof in Investigative Commissions to Palestine." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol. 59, No. 2 (2017): 385-414.
- Alroey, Guy. "'Zionism without Zion'? Territorialist Ideology and the Zionist Movement, 1882-1956." *Jewish Social Studies* Vol. 18, No 1 (2011): 1-32.
- Amrith, Sunil and Glenda Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations." *Journal of World History* Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008): 251-274.
- Anghie, Antony. "Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations." *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* Vol. 34, No. 2 (2002): 513-634.
- Anghie, Antony. *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Anziska, Seth. *Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Aruri, Nasser H. *Dishonest Broker: The U.S. Role in Israel and Palestine*. Boston: South End Press, 2003.
- Banko, Lauren. "Refugees, Displaced Migrants, and Territorialisation in Interwar Palestine." *Mashriq & Mahjar* Vol. 5, No. 2 (2018): 1-30.
- Banko, Lauren. "The Creation of Palestinian Citizenship under an International Mandate: Legislation, Discourses and Practices, 1918-1925." *Citizenship Studies* Vol. 16, No. 5-6 (2012): 641-655.
- Bartal, Shaul. "The Palestinian Refugee Problem Resolved." *Middle East Quarterly* Vol. 20, No. 4 (2013): 29-40.
- Bashir Bashir and Will Kymlicka, eds. *The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

- Bawardi, Hani J. *The Making of Arab Americans: From Syrian Nationalism to U.S. Citizenship*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014.
- Ben-Dror, Elad and Asaf Ziedler, "Israel, Jordan, and their Efforts to Frustrate the United Nations Resolutions to Internationalize Jerusalem." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* Vol. 26, No. 4 (2015): 636-658.
- Ben-Dror, Elad. "'Knight of Internationalization:' U.N. Delegate Charles Malik of Lebanon and U.N. General Assembly Resolution 303 Calling for the Internationalization of Jerusalem." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (2020): 1-17.
- Ben-Dror, Elad. "The Arab Struggle Against Partition: The International Arena of Summer 1947." *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 43, No. 2 (2007): 259-293.
- Bickerton, Christopher J., Philip Conliffe and Alexander Gourevich, eds. *Politics without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations*. London: University College London Press, 2007.
- Bovis, Eugene. *The Jerusalem Question, 1917-1968*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.
- Campos, Michelle U. *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
- Caplan, Neil. "A Tale of Two Cities: The Rhodes and Lausanne Conferences, 1949." *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 21, No. 2 (1992): 5-34.
- Caplan, Neil. *Futile Diplomacy: Arab- Zionist Negotiations and the End of the Mandate, Volume 2*. Abingdon, Frank Cass and Company, 1986.
- Caplan, Neil. *Futile Diplomacy: The United Nations, the Great Powers and Middle East Peacemaking, 1948-1954*. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Caplan, Neil. *The Lausanne Conference, 1949: A Case Study in Middle East Peacemaking*. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1993.
- Carenen, Caitlin. "The American Christian Palestine Committee, the Holocaust, and Mainstream Protestant Zionism, 1938-1948." *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* Vol. 24, No. 2 (2010): 273-296.
- Cattan, Henry. *Jerusalem*. New York: St. Martin's, 1981.
- Cattan, Henry. "The Status of Jerusalem under International Law and United Nations Resolutions." *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 10, No. 3 (1981): 3-15.

- Chamberlain, Paul Thomas. *The Global Offensive: The United States, The Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Clark, Elizabeth M. "Borderland of the Mind: The Free City of Danzig and the Sovereignty Question." *German Politics and Society* Vol. 35, No. 2 (2017): 24-37.
- Cordier, Andrew W., and Wilder Foote, eds. *Public Papers of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Volume I*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
- Dahlan, Malik R. *The Hijaz: The First Islamic State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Danino, Olivier. "La France et la Question de Jerusalem, 3 Avril 1949—7 Juin 1967." *Relations Internationales* No. 122 (2005): 47-62.
- Darweish, Marwan, Carol Rank, and Sarah Giles, *Peacebuilding and Reconciliation: Contemporary Themes and Challenges*. London: Pluto Press, 2012.
- Davidson, Lawrence. *America's Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2001.
- de Jong, Anne. "Zionist Hegemony, the Settler Colonial Conquest of Palestine and the Problem with Conflict: A Critical Genealogy of the Notion of Binary Conflict." *Settler Colonial Studies* Vol. 8, No. 3 (2018): 364-383.
- Demirag, Yelda. "Pan-Ideologies in the Ottoman Empire Against the West: From Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism." *The Turkish Yearbook* Vol. XXXVI (2005): 139-158.
- Destani, B. ed. *Minorities in the Middle East: Religious Communities in Jerusalem 1843-1974 and Minorities in Israel, Volume 2: 1919-1954*. Chippenham, UK: Antony Rowe Ltd., 2005.
- Di-Capua, Yoav. "Arab Existentialism: A Lost Chapter in the Intellectual History of Decolonization." *American Historical Review* Vol. 17, No. 4 (2012): 1061-1091.
- Drabinski, John E. "Reconciliation and Founding Wounds." *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* Vol. 4, No. 1 (2013): 117-132.
- Dubnov, Arie M. and Laura Robson, eds. *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019.
- Eordegian, Marlen. "British and Israeli Maintenance of the Status Quo in the Holy Places of Christendom." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 35, No. 2 (2003): 307-328.

- Erdogan, Anyur. "The Sending Students Abroad in the Period of Tanzimat and the Effects on Ottoman Modernization." *Sosyoloji Dergisi*, Vol. 3. No. 20 (2010): 121-151.
- Eskanazi, Roysi. "Two-State Solutions Through Arab Eyes." *Introduction to Palestinian Question* (2016): 1-6.
- Feiler, Gil. *From Boycott to Economic Cooperation: The Political Economy of the Arab Boycott of Israel*. New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Feldman, Ilana. "The Humanitarian Condition: Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Living." *Humanity* Vol. 3, No. 2 (2012): 155-172.
- Ferrari, Silvio. "The Vatican, the Palestine Question and the Internationalization of Jerusalem." *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali* Vol. 60, No. 4 (1993): 550-568.
- Fletcher-Cooke, John. "The United Nations and the Birth of Israel 1948." *International Journal* Vol. 28, No. 4 (1973): 612-629.
- Forsythe, David P. *United Nations Peacemaking: The Conciliation Commission of Palestine*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.
- Gendzier, Irene L. *Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine, & the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
- Getachew, Adom. *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
- Gilmour, David. "The Unregarded Prophet: Lord Curzon and the Palestine Question." *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 25, No. 3 (1996): 60-68.
- Golani, Motti. "Jerusalem's Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question, 1948-67." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 31, No. 4 (1999): 577-604.
- Golani, Motti. "Zionism Without Zion: The Jerusalem Question, 1947-1949." *The Journal of Israeli History* Vol. 16, No. 1 (1995): 39-52.
- Grimm, Dieter, translated by Belinda Cooper. *Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
- Hahn, Peter L. "Alignment by Coincidence: Israel, the United States, and the Partition of Jerusalem, 1949-1953." *The International History Review* Vol. 21, No. 3 (1999): 665-689.
- Hahn, Peter L. *Caught in the Middle East: US Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

- Hamzeh, Fuad S. *United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 1948-1967*. Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968.
- Hanioglu, M Şükrü. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Heimann, Gadi. "Divide and Rule: Israel's Tactics Regarding the Jerusalem Question and America's Response, 1949-1950." *Cold War History* Vol. 17, No. 1 (2017): 21-38.
- Hixson, Walter. *Israel's Armor: The Israel Lobby and the First Generation of the Palestine Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Irfan, Anne. "Is Jerusalem International or Palestinian? Rethinking UNGA Resolution 181." *Jerusalem Quarterly* Vol. 70 (2017): 52-61.
- Iskander, Marwan. *The Arab Boycott of Israel*. Beirut: Research Center—Palestine Liberation Organization, 1966.
- Jackson, Robert H. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Jensehaugan, Jørgen, Marte Heian-Engdal and Hilde Henriksen Waage, "Securing the State: From Zionist Ideology to Israeli Statehood." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* Vol. 23 (2012): 280-303.
- Karsh, Efraim. "How San Remo Birthed the Jewish National Home." *Middle East Quarterly* (2020): 1-14.
- Karsh, Efraim. *Palestine Betrayed*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2010.
- Katz, Yossi and Yair Paz, "The Transfer of Government Ministries to Jerusalem, 1948-49: Continuity or Change in the Zionist Attitude to Jerusalem?" *Journal of Israeli History* Vol. 23, No. 2 (2004): 232-259.
- Khalidi, Rashad. *Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2013.
- Khalidi, Rashad. *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- Khalidi, Walid. "Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution." *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 27, No. 1 (1997): 5-21.
- Khouri, Fred J. *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, Third Edition*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985.

- Kimmerling, Baruch. "The Formation of Collective Palestinian Identities: The Ottoman and Mandatory Periods." *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 36, No. 2 (2000): 48-81.
- Kletter, Larry. "The Sovereignty of Jerusalem in International Law." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* Vol. 20, No. 2 (1982): 319-364.
- Kramer, Paul. "Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World." *American Historical Review* (2011): 1348-1392.
- Lapidoth, Ruth and Moshe Hirsch, eds. *The Arab-Israeli Conflict and its Resolution: Selected Documents*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992.
- Lauren, Paul Gordan. *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
- Lesch, David W. *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Lustick, Ian S. "Yerushalayim and al-Quds: Political Catechism and Political Realities." *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 30, No. 1 (2000): 5-21.
- Makdisi, Karim and Vijay Prashad, eds. *Land of Blue Helmets: The United Nations and the Arab World*. Oakland: University of California Press, 2017.
- Makdisi, Ussama. *Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the Making of the Modern Arab World*. Oakland: University of California Press, 2019.
- Makdisi, Ussama. "Ottoman Orientalism." *The American Historical Review* Vol. 107, No. 3 (2002): 768-796.
- Maksoud, Clovis. "Diminished Sovereignty, Enhanced Sovereignty: United Nations—Arab League Relations at 50." *Middle East Journal* Vol. 49, No. 4 (1995): 582-594.
- Mallison Thomas W. and Sally V. Mallison. *An International Law Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question*. New York: United Nations Publications, 1979.
- Mazower, Mark. *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- McCarthy, Justin. *The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923*. London: Routledge, 1997.
- McTague, Jr., John T. "Anglo-French Negotiations over the Boundaries of Palestine, 1919-1920." *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 11, No. 2 (1982): 100-112.

- Merom, Gil. "Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism." *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 114, No. 3 (1999): 409-434.
- Molinaro, Enrico. *The Holy Places of Jerusalem in Middle East Peace Agreements: The Conflict between Global and State Identities*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009.
- Morris, Benny. *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.
- Murray, Jr., James N. *The United Nations Trusteeship System*. Urbana, The University of Illinois Press, 1957.
- Nashif, Taysir. "Palestinian Arab and Jewish Leadership in the Mandate Period." *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 6, No. 4 (1977): 113-121.
- Ninčić, Đura. *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
- O'Mahony, Anthony. "The Vatican, Jerusalem, the State of Israel, Christianity in the Holy Land." *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* Vol. 5, No. 2 (2005): 123-146.
- Pappé, Ilan. *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Second Edition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Pappé, Ilan. *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
- Pappé, Ilan. *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951*. New York: I.B. Taurus, 2006.
- Paris, Timothy J. "British Middle East Policy-Making after the First World War: The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools." *The Historical Journal* Vol. 41, No. 3 (1988): 773-793.
- Pearson, Jessica Lynne. "Defending Empire at the United Nations: The Politics of International Colonial Oversight in the Era of Decolonization." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* Vol. 45, No. 3 (2017): 525-549.
- Pedersen, Susan. *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Perez, Antonio F. "Sovereignty, Freedom, and Civil Society: Toward a New Jerusalem." *Catholic University Law Review* Vol. 45, No 3 (1996): 851-860.
- Qafisheh, Mutaz. "Genesis of Citizenship in Palestine and Israel. Palestinian Nationality during the Period 1917-1925." *Journal of the History of International Law* Vol. 11 (2009): 1-36.

- Quigley, John. *The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders: Deception at the United Nations in the Quest for Palestine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Rabinovich, Itamar. *The Road not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Ravndal, Ellen Jenny. "Exit Britain: British Withdrawal from the Palestine Mandate in the Early Cold War, 1947-1948." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* Vol. 21 (2010): 416-433.
- Ravndal, Ellen Jenny. "'The First Major Test': The UN Secretary-General and the Palestine Problem, 1947-9." *The International History Review* Vol. 38, No. 1 (2016): 196-213.
- Rioli, Maria Chiara. "The 'New Nazis' or the 'People of our God?' Jews and Zionism in the Latin Church of Jerusalem, 1948-1962." *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* Vol. 68, No. 1 (2017): 81-107.
- Robinson, Shira N. *Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel's Liberal Settler State*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013.
- Rogan, Eugene L. and Avi Shlaim, eds. *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Romirowsky, Asaf. "Arab-Palestinian Refugees." *Israel Studies* Vol. 24, No. 2 (2019): 91-102.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1978.
- Schayegh, Cyrus and Andrew Arsan, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates*. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Schayegh, Cyrus. *The Middle East and the Making of the Modern World*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017.
- Selzer, Assaf. "Building the Capital: Thoughts, Plans, and Practice in the Process of Making West Jerusalem the Capital City of the State of Israel, 1948-1967." *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 57, No. 1 (2021): 57-71.
- Shlaim, Avi. *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Shlaim, Avi. *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.
- Sluga, Glenda. *The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.

- Smith, Charles D. *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Eighth Edition*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2010.
- Smith, Leonard V. "Drawing Borders in the Middle East after the Great War: Political Geography and 'Subject Peoples.'" *First World War Studies* Vol. 7, No. 1 (2016): 5-21.
- Stahn, Carsten. *The Law Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Stanger, Cary David. "A Haunting Legacy: The Assassination of Count Bernadotte." *Middle East Journal* Vol. 42, No. 2 (1988): 260-272.
- Sternhell, Zeev translated by David Maisel. *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Stuart, Graham H. *The International City of Tangier*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955.
- Takriti, Abdel Razzaq. "Before BDS: Lineages of Boycott in Palestine." *Radical History Review* No. 134 (2019): 58-95.
- Terry, Patrick C.R. "Britain in Palestine (1917-1948)—Occupation, the Palestine Mandate, and International Law." *University of Bologna Law Review* Vol. 2, No. 2 (2017): 187-251.
- Tessler, Mark. *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Second Edition*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009.
- Tiller, Stian Johansen and Hilde Henriksen Waage. "Powerful State: Powerless Mediator: The United States and the Peace Efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 1949-1951." *The International History Review* Vol. 33, No. 3 (2011): 501-524.
- Tiller, Stian Johansen. "Defending the UN Agenda: The Peace Effort of the Palestine Conciliation Commission 1949-1951." MA Thesis in History at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway (2009).
- Touval, Saadia. *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
- Veracini, Lorenzo. "The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation." *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 42, No. 2 (2013): 26-42.
- Wasserstein, Bernard. *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City, Third Edition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

- Weiss, Amy. “‘Making the Desert Blossom as the Rose:’ The American Christian Palestine Committee’s ‘Children’s Memorial Forest’ and Postwar Land Acquisition in Palestine.” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* Vol. 33, No. 2 (2019): 244-264.
- Wilde, Ralph. “From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration.” *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 95, No. 3 (2001): 583-606.
- Wolfe, Patrick. “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” *Journal of Genocide Research* Vol. 8, No. 4 (2006): 387-409.
- Yaqub, Salim. *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.—Middle East Relations in the 1970s*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016.
- Ydit, Méir. *Internationalised Territories: From the “Free City of Cracow” to the “Free City of Berlin.”* Leyden, Netherlands: A.W. Sythoff, 1961.
- Yitzhak, Ronen. “The Assassination of King Abdullah: The First Political Assassination in Jordan: Did it Truly Threaten the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan?” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* Vol. 21 (2010): 68-86.
- Young, Robert H. J. *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001.