

BOURGEOIS LETTERS:
LANGUAGE PLANNING
AS AN AVENUE OF
SOCIAL ENGINEERING
IN UKRAINE (1919-1938)

A Thesis Submitted to the College of
Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Master's Degree Program
in the Department of Languages and Linguistics
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon

By

Nataliya Dvorak

© Copyright Nataliya Dvorak, July 2011. All rights reserved.

PERMISSION TO USE

In presenting this thesis/dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master's degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis/dissertation in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis/dissertation work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis/dissertation or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis/dissertation.

DISCLAIMER

Reference in this thesis/dissertation to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the University of Saskatchewan. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not state or reflect those of the University of Saskatchewan, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis/dissertation in whole or part should be addressed to:

Head of the Department of Languages and Linguistics
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A5
Canada

OR

Dean
College of Graduate Studies and Research
University of Saskatchewan
107 Administration Place
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A2
Canada

Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES	iii
LIST OF FIGURES	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1 UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORY OF UKRAINE	8
CHAPTER 2 SELECTION.....	28
CHAPTER 3 CODIFICATION	35
3.1. Codification of the Ukrainian Language during the Years of Independence (1917-1919).....	35
3.2. Codification in Soviet Ukraine before and during Ukranianization	48
3.3. Codification of Ukrainian during the Post-Ukranianization Period (1933-1938).....	59
CHAPTER 4 ELABORATION	68
4.1. Elaboration during Ukraine’s independence (1917-1919) and pre-korenizatsiya (1919-1923)	68
4.2. Elaboration during Ukrainianization.....	71
4.3. The Spread of Ukrainian into the Areas of Publishing and Education	74
4.4. The Spread of Ukrainian to Specialized Areas	80
4.5. Communist Party of Bolsheviks Putting down Roots in Ukraine.....	86
4.6. Literature and Theatre.....	87
4.7. Post-Ukrainianization Elaboration.....	89
4.8. Ukrainianization and Soviet Social Engineers	92
CHAPTER 5 SECURING ACCEPTANCE	94
CONCLUSIONS.....	134
WORKS CITED	141

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Work on codification of the Ukrainian language in the first half of 1919.....	36
Table 3.2 Comparison of spelling in the use of ‘r’ and ‘r,’ recommended by the <i>Most Essential Rules 1918, Major Rules 1919, and the Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976.</i>	39
Table 3.3 Comparison of spelling using soft or hard ‘л,’ recommended by the <i>Most Essential Rules 1918, Major Rules 1919 and the Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976.</i>	42
Table 3.4 Individuals participating in the work of Orthographic Commissions from 1919-1925. These lists are not exhaustive.	51

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1 Poster, “ <i>Ukraine is Free!</i> ”	63
Figure 5.1 Population Loss in Ukraine in 1929-1933.....	122
Figure 5.2 Death Record Issued in Ukraine in 1932 shows that the original cause of death stated as “starvation” was changed to “unknown cause.”	127

ABSTRACT

At present, the Ukrainian population in Ukraine, and Ukrainian émigrés abroad are using two different orthographical systems. The issue, which of the two codes of Ukrainian can be considered legitimate standard Ukrainian, is the subject of many emotionally charged debates in Ukraine and within the Ukrainian community in the West. This research focused on the events, processes, and politics that had led to the emergence of the two orthographic codes of Ukrainian, as well as on the social engineering efforts that had accompanied each stage of language planning. Books and publications on the history of Ukraine, language planning and government policies in Ukraine, Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union have been examined alongside with the theory of types of social engineering to reveal how government policies reflected on selection, codification, elaboration and securing acceptance stages of language planning. Outcome of the study of political impact on standard Ukrainian may be of interest to scholars researching language planning in the context of bilingual societies and political power. It may be used to explain to students of Ukrainian how the differences between the orthographies used in the West and in Ukraine came into existence. Awareness and understanding of the historical roots and political context of the development of the existing standards of Ukrainian may assist individuals involved in and effected by this polarizing issue to find shared concepts, and begin appreciating the existing diversity of the language.

INTRODUCTION

In a multilingual society, languages inevitably influence and transform each other. The dynamics of change become more complex if one of the languages holds a dominant status. Ethnic identity is generally communicated through language; in societies where one culture occupies a dominant position, minority groups that speak languages other than the dominant one are perceived as distinct and separate and, therefore, as a threat to the dominant culture. Substratum languages are affected both by their affiliation with the dominant language and by the socio-economic relationship of speech communities. If the social and cultural hierarchies remain unresolved, the substratum languages tend to ideologize into the national identity symbol of a subjugated group and, ultimately, become a political tool and battlefield for liberation movements.

The social institutions of a dominant culture take various measures to assimilate substratum groups. Through various official acts they may forbid the use of oppressed languages. For example, in France, the 1539 *Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts* prohibited “*the use of local dialects in all legal ordinances [which] was a key move in the imposition of the French language*” in the city of Villers-Cotterêts (qtd. in Joseph 46, Joseph 61, Schiffman 83-84). In Tasmania, practically every speaker of the local language was killed (Holmes 56). In Ukraine, after the Bolshevik military troops occupied Kyiv in 1918, general Muraviov passed an order to shoot everyone who spoke a “nationalistic language” (Ukrainian), in the streets of Kyiv (qtd. in Lytvyn 228, Solchanyk 64-65). People in power have theoretically limitless tools at their disposal that allow them to preserve their control over conquered nations, and they do not hesitate to use them if their domination is threatened. A dominant social group can assimilate the oppressed linguistic community by using the standard variety of the substratum language if the

superstratum and substratum languages belong to the same linguistic group and therefore have similarities in their vocabulary, phonetics, and grammatical structures. They are able to erode and, ultimately, destroy the substratum language by making it similar to the superstratum language.

At all stages of its history, Ukrainian language development reflects the complex history of the relationship between Russian and Ukrainian people. Russia's efforts to retain Ukraine as a territory within its borders were partially driven by the apprehension of losing Ukraine as a province because this meant the origin of the Russian language and national identity would have to be found outside the country^{1 2}(Ryabchuk 262-263). Moreover, the idea of Ukraine's independence from Russia presented a greater threat to the Russian empire than the separation of any other group; this is because nations not related to Russia as closely as Ukraine ethnically, culturally, or religiously, could perceive Ukraine's sovereignty as a strong liberation call. Therefore, the authorities of tsarist Russia, and later the Soviet government, engaged all possible oppressive political mechanisms to prevent any conditions that would allow a liberation movement in Ukraine. One of the tools used by both Imperialists and Soviets to destroy Ukraine as a separate nation was the development of a standard variety of the Ukrainian language; during Soviet times, this facilitated the assimilation of Ukrainian people into the notion of the russified New Soviet Man. The intensive Ukrainian language development from 1919 to 1938 reflects the Soviet national policies geared at non-Russian ethnic groups—this was the empire's self-serving

¹ Kyiv, founded in the mid fifth century, is the capital of Ukraine and was also the capital of the Eastern European Slavic State, Kyivan Rus' (IX-XIII centuries) between 878, when Oleg (Helgi), Varangian (Viking) Prince of Novgorod seized Kyiv and made it the chief Varangian base, and 1240, when Kyiv was destroyed during the Mongol invasion led by Batu Khan. 1240 is considered as the end of Kyivan Rus'. Kyivan Rus' became the foundation of the Ukrainian, Russian, and Bilorussian national identities. There are heated scholarly, political, and historical debates about which modern countries can legitimately claim the legacy of Kyivan Rus' as their inheritance (Lieven 13-16, Wilson 17).

² Moscow, the capital of Russia, was founded five centuries later than Kyiv, by Yuri Dolgorukii during his rule between 1149-1157 (Wilson 13).

endeavor. These national policies permeated all four avenues of language planning: (1) selection of a dialect for the standard variety; (2) codification (corpus planning), which is the development and standardization of language rules; (3) elaboration, the extension of language functions into new areas; and (4) securing acceptance of the new standard variety by means of language status planning (Holmes 102). An analysis of the planning processes undertaken by the Russian and later Soviet governments with respect to Ukrainian will demonstrate the devastating impact of Russia's political position on the Ukrainian language. Soviet government language policies were aimed at engineering sociolinguistic conditions that would eradicate the Ukrainian language and, therefore, help retain Ukraine within the geographical borders and political domain of Russia. Since "language planning is undertaken by those who are in a position of power" (qtd. in Williams 221) and "the distinctive traits of standard languages reflect a cultural intervention against the normal development of language" (qtd. in Joseph 19), an examination of the history and details of language reform in Ukraine undertaken in 1919-1938 will reveal the true mandates of the Soviet government.

The history and socio-economic processes of both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union are complex and conflict-ridden as a result of the challenges and fears of colonial powers struggling to preserve their conquests. Both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union stretched over vast territories inhabited by various ethno-linguistic and religious groups; their respective governments resorted to ruthless oppression of the indigenous populations and engaged vicious colonization policies. Both regimes have been characterized by scholars as authoritarian and totalitarian. Authoritarian systems are keen on halting the freedom of speech and public gatherings, prohibiting the formation of independent political groups and enforcing the censorship of information (Kojder 216). Totalitarian regimes exercise controls over all aspects of

a country's social life and expect citizens to blindly embrace state ideology. The state often engineers the consent of citizens by imposing and controlling conditions that would trigger such consent (Alexander, Schmidt 2-3). For example, a continuity of oppressive policies between Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union can be observed by examining Joseph Stalin's history and his time in power. During the times of Imperial Russia, before the Bolshevik revolution and creation of the Soviet Union, Stalin was put in prison and personally experienced Imperial Russia's harsh oppression of criminals and revolutionaries. Stalin, in turn, resorted to terror and mass killings during his reign. Therefore, it appears that he merely used the techniques he experienced himself—it is possible he may have drawn on his personal experience to support his tyranny and censorship. Tsars and emperors, such as Ivan the Terrible, Catherine the Great, Peter the Great, and other Russian monarchs introduced punitive measures and silenced freedom of expression (xi-xvi Bliss Eaton). Tsar Ivan Grozny was glorified during the years of Stalin; Grozny's system of *oprichnina* was given a positive image in order to justify the killings and terror inflicted by Soviet power (Perrie 112-113). Scholars observed similarities in promoting of vigilance against internal and external enemies, reign of terror, mass killings and rhetoric of loyalty in the times of Ivan Grozny and Stalin (Nezhyvyj 184, Perrie 123-124).

According to modern Western, Ukrainian and Russian scholars, historians, and political science experts, the Soviet Union was a totalitarian country. Official Soviet literature and mass media, as well as the discourses of a few modern pro-Russian neo-communist groups, however, paint a different picture. From the onset of Bolshevik power in 1917 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, all stages of Soviet history embody affirmative actions, deportations, imprisonment, and massacres. The Soviet regime controlled education, literature, art, and press in order to manufacture “social consent through mass indoctrination” (qtd. in Rees *Stalinism...*

46). Colonial and totalitarian powers often resort to social engineering to achieve their goals and to camouflage their intentions. One can observe a lengthy series of large-scale projects requiring an abundance of committed human resources for their successful outcome. The endeavors of the Soviet state are instances of social engineering called to induce collective action and ensure its success.

There are four types of social engineering: sociotechnics proper, self-made social engineering, quackish social engineering, and “dark” social engineering (Podgórecki 26-29). Sociotechnics proper is an efficient social action that is based on an accepted system of values, supported by a body of scientifically verified theses used to formulate recommendations, develop methods to achieve goals, and evaluate results (Podgórecki 26, 54-55). Self-made social engineering relies on verified professional knowledge but consists of a number of bureaucratic directives with no scientific measures to evaluate efficiency (Podgórecki 26-28, 55). Quackish social engineering is boastfully pretentious in its recommendations since it appeals to one’s emotions and involves ideologies (Podgórecki 27). Dark social engineering takes place when the authorities engage in activities that are harmful for people. (Podgórecki 27, 52). This is the form of social engineering seen in Soviet Ukraine, given the high number of human casualties. However, Ukrainian language planning undertaken between 1919 and 1938 does reveal features of all four types of social engineering defined above.

The Soviet regime established in Ukraine after the country’s short-lived periods of independence in 1917-1919 resulted in the most massive social experiment of the 20th century (Lytvyn 219-239). Building the Soviet state was an attempt to build a new utopian country. The Bolshevik government aimed to destroy the pre-revolution administrative, political, judicial, and social structures and establish a new type of community that would operate according to the

preconceived ideas and visions of Bolshevism. However, as the Soviet society progressed through the various stages of its development, from time to time, new circumstances of a political and economic nature and new personalities in power introduced changes to the policies and amended the social projects and plans to reflect new visions. People were the objects of efforts to design a new society, which was supposed to be comprised of a new type of individual, namely the New Soviet Man. On the other hand, people were treated as the subjects, the designers, and the implementers of the social engineering endeavors. The government realized that, on its own, the removal of old social structures would not secure the acceptance of a new way of life. The public's values and traditions had to be eradicated and replaced with a new set of morals and beliefs. In the process of social engineering, "human beings serve as raw material" (qtd. in Alexander, Schmidt 1); similarly, language was the material employed by advocates of social change with the purpose of molding the public's standpoints according to the requirements of an artificially constructed Soviet society. Language not only absorbed and reflected the social change, it was subjected to modifications and transformations—as a result, it was deceptively sculpted to produce the image needed by the Soviet power.

The Bolsheviks had a superior social system in mind; however, when utopia, power, and the masses are combined, the result sways to adverse and harmful outcomes, since "dark sociotechnics flourishes, as a rule, in autocratic and totalitarian states" (qtd. in Podgórecki 55). The Soviet authorities did not invent anti-Ukrainian language policies. Rather, they adopted the mission of destroying any features of Ukraine as a separate and independent culture and nation from Tsarist Russia. However, Soviet policies towards Ukraine, including language policies, were part of a larger undertaking of engineering a new social order—a socialist society—and

creating the New Soviet Man to populate the Soviet state (Csaba 114). Language development was designed to contribute to this mission.

Soviet propaganda, censorship, and policies of intimidation were all aimed at destroying traditional values and beliefs and replacing them with the Communist ideology. The Soviet authorities were aware of the challenges associated with the acceptance of Soviet social order by the population. After abolishing *korenizatsiya*, which was a policy originally instituted to gain local support, the Soviet government turned to brutal methods of subjugation in Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasants were perceived by the Soviet state as members of alien social classes; they were, therefore, subjected to imprisonment, exiles, and executions. The mass starvation engineered by the Soviet government in rural Ukraine in 1932-1933 reinforced Soviet power through the eradication of the Ukrainian rural population and the subsequent relocation of Russians and other ethnic groups to Ukraine. Accordingly, a special government agency, the All-Union Migration Committee, was created to manage the migration of ethnic groups within the country (Nezhyvyj 183-184). Migrants from other parts of the Soviet Union brought Russian into Ukraine as their first language, or *lingua franca*. The ethnic and linguistic composition of Ukraine changed as a result of famine, deportations, and killings. The attitude of Ukrainian society was also altered: as a result of their fear, people accepted and followed any policies imposed by the government, including language policies.

CHAPTER 1 UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORY OF UKRAINE

Ukraine lost its independence in the seventeenth century as a result of concluding intergovernmental treaties³ with Russia, which stipulated Russian military presence in Ukraine with the purpose of joint military actions against outside enemies. Until today, Russia and Ukraine dispute the interpretation of the Treaties and the union of 1654 and whether they were voluntary, coerced, or a deceitful act by Russia (Lieven 17-23, Kappeler 61-69). In the Soviet Union, the voluntary reunion version was the only account allowed. The event was widely celebrated during the 300th (1954) and 325th (1979) anniversaries of the union of 1654. Though the Treaties clearly specified that Ukraine would preserve its political and national autonomy, at the time of signing, there was some opposition to the Treaties in Ukraine (Svarnyk 121). The Russian government did not honor these provisions of the Treaties and began interfering in the internal affairs of the country (Kohut 68-69, Svarnyk 124, Wilson 74). All privileges and structures that existed in Ukraine prior to the union with Russia gradually disappeared and Moscow became the sole administrator of the territory. This made the Ukrainian elite vulnerable to assimilation. Ironically, both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet regime used Ukrainian culture to create a new imperial identity (Wilson 74).

In the years prior to Shevchenko⁴'s depiction of Ukraine's liberation in his poems "Kobzar" (1840) and "Haidamaky" (1841), the creative work of Ukrainian intellectuals, though possessing some ethnic tones, overall fit the streamline of Russian imperialism and contributed to the development of Russian culture and the building of the Russian empire. (Kohut 75, Magosci 361-2). Though Ukrainian-born cultural activists worked on themes interesting for

³ Treaty of Pereiaslav; March Treaties (Lieven 17, Svarnyk 121) (the "Treaties").

⁴ Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), a Ukrainian poet and artist, was born to a family of serfs. Shevchenko is considered to be the founding author of Ukrainian literature and the inspiration for the formation of Ukrainian national identity and for national liberation movements (Hrytsak 182-186).

Russian intellectual life in their works, they were able to supplement their creations with unique features originating from their Ukrainian backgrounds. Such features enriched the emerging imperial culture, which absorbed and appropriated Ukraine's historical past as well as its cultural characteristics. The congregation of lands under the umbrella of the Russian empire brought together a diverse group of people, languages, and religions and, against this backdrop, Russia reaffirmed its distinct Russian ethnicity and identity. The term "Russia" was equivalent to the term "state," rather than a land or an ethnic group, every new addition influenced Russian identity in its own way (Bushkovitch 153). In order to survive, the Empire not only needed to suppress the identities of the ethnic groups under its control, but also to provide them with a myth to fill the void of their destroyed identities. In this respect, Ukraine was an essential element of the process: "many Russians of rank considered Ukraine as the source of Russia's greatness" (qtd. in Borys 52). This is because rather than emerging from a dynasty, unlike other European nations, Russia's identity developed as a result of Ukraine bringing pan-Slavic feature, the common history experienced by people of the ancient Eastern Slavic continuum (Sysyn 141). Since the growth of the Russian culture was enhanced with distinctly different features originating from Ukraine, the boundaries defining Russian imperial identity expanded to incorporate a pan-Slavic element and laid the foundation for a wider platform of Russian nationalism.

Indisputably, Taras Shevchenko made the most prominent impact on the formation of the Ukrainian national idea, language, and culture. Shevchenko was a visionary who influenced generations of Ukrainian political and cultural activists and induced the national rebirth of Ukraine. The Ukrainian working class reveres Shevchenko for his selfless fight for social justice in the search for a national identity. The talented artist and poet was freed from serfdom at the

age of twenty-four as a result of his fortunate encounter with a Ukrainian artist, Ivan Soshenko, in St. Petersburg, where Shevchenko moved with his master. Alongside a group of St. Petersburg artists, Soshenko raised funds to pay for Shevchenko's freedom from serfdom. This independence gave Shevchenko the opportunity to enroll in the Academy of Art in St. Petersburg and he soon became closely associated with several politically progressive circles in St. Petersburg (Hrytsak 183, Shabliovsky 85). Shevchenko wrote in Ukrainian and this choice was not well accepted by some representatives of Russian literary circles due to the existing belief that Russian was the sole language of educated people from Malorussia. Ukrainian was regarded merely as the language for "*Malorussian peasantry and could not have been used for high literature*" (qtd. in Hrytsak 186). Nevertheless, Shevchenko elevated the status of the Ukrainian language to that of art and demonstrated its sufficiency to serve as a medium for multifaceted notions. Shevchenko's importance in the cultural and social statuses of standard Ukrainian centers on his creation of "a paradigm for vernacular-based literary Ukrainian" (qtd. in Bilaniuk 112). The language of Shevchenko's works is rich and natural. He brilliantly communicates complex concepts in an effortless manner, making his narrations easy to comprehend — for this ability, he is regarded a genius.

While Shevchenko has been credited as genial in the area of poetic word and has been recognized as a talented realist painter by his contemporaries and subsequent generations, he has become an icon primarily for his work in rebuilding the idea of Ukraine as a nation. He passionately and bitterly expressed his pain in witnessing the suffering of the oppressed and tormented people of Ukraine. His poetry woke dormant national feelings and gave vision for the future of Ukraine by constructing Ukraine as a nation, a conceptual alternative to a government sanctioned Malorussia (Wilson 90). Shevchenko had colossal power to do so by means of his

literary talent. Under the Imperial and Soviet regimes, both cultural and political ideologies attributed enormous significance and motivating force to Ukrainian language and literature. Language, especially in poetic form, serves to unite people momentarily. One example is the moment when a country's anthem is played (Anderson 181). Shevchenko created numerous poems and passages that became symbolic attributes that unite Ukrainians and give them the feeling of belonging to the same community. However, Shevchenko was also censored and bowdlerized by various groups to channel his power in an attempt to engineer the public's views according to the social mandate of the group seeking to censor the text. Soviet authorities censored Shevchenko's works and published them for their revolutionary content (Wilson 35). An example of such bowdlerization in the West is an omission in print and in singing a line of Shevchenko's poem, *Testament*: "until then I do not know God" to ensure the poet appears faithful to Christianity (Woycenko 11-12). Nevertheless, Shevchenko constructed Ukraine as an idea for his contemporaries and future generations—this idea has guided cohorts of Ukrainian nation builders.

In St. Petersburg, Shevchenko became a member of an underground anti-government organization, the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and St. Methodius (the "Brotherhood")⁵, founded in 1846 by a number of Ukrainian intellectuals (Borys 68, Kappeler 226). The program of the organization synthesized three philosophical standpoints: 1) Panteleimon Kulish⁶ emphasized the importance of activities oriented at national issues; 2) Mykola Kostomarov⁷ promoted panhuman and Christian ideas, and 3) Shevchenko's primary contribution to the agenda was the

⁵ Cyril and Methodius, Orthodox priests that worked to promote Christianity in Kyivan Rus' and developed a Slavic alphabet (Petegyrych 66). The selection of the name for the organization indicates the Christian tendencies of its activities.

⁶ Panteleimon Kulish (1819-1897) – Ukrainian writer, translator, critic, historian, and ethnographer (Shabliovsky 236).

⁷ Mykola Kostomarov (1817-1885) – Ukrainian writer, translator, historian, publicist, folklorist, and professor at the universities of Kyiv and St. Petersburg (Shabliovsky 235).

search for a solution to social problems, the abolition of serfdom, and the education of the working class (Hrytsak 185). In 1847 the police raided the organization and its members were prosecuted. Shevchenko's punishment was especially severe; he was sentenced to serve as a soldier in the army for an indefinite term under strict supervision, and he was prohibited from writing or drawing (Shabliovsky 85).

The Brotherhood of St. Cyril and St. Methodius responded to the conflict between the Russian Empire and intellectuals of Ukrainian origin by developing a model of the Russian federation—a different model of the Russian state, where ethnic groups would have self-governing institutions. As a result the role of Ukraine, ethnicity, and the social conditions of Ukrainian lands came to the fore. The organization put forward a philosophical and political model of a federation functioning on principles of democratic freedoms to include self-governing Slavic republics, in which Ukraine would have an equal position with the other members (Borys 68). Any attempt by members of the Brotherhood to suggest a distinctly separate Ukrainian identity was perceived by the Russian society as national treason. Prominent Russian cultural, intellectual, and liberal activists condemned the activity of the Brotherhood, comparing it to “*political madness*” (qtd. in Hrytsak 186). Even Vissarion Belinsky, a recognized Russian intellectual, a prominent literary critic, a liberal, and a dissenter of the Russian autocracy denounced Kulish and Shevchenko in a rude manner (Luckyj 166, Ohiyenko *Istoriya...*174). This resentfulness was a reflection of Russian imperial ideology. It was partially instigated by the fact that Russian national identity was not completely developed, and therefore was not able to subtly, without resorting to insults, counterweigh the ideas presented by the Brotherhood: weakness leads to defensiveness and makes people aggressive. At the beginning of the 19th century, Russia was “*a state without a national identity*” (qtd. in Hrytsak 186). The gathering of

lands and people made Russia a multinational state before the Russian national identity had been fully formed.

The activity and the fate of the Brotherhood opened a new chapter in relations between Russia and Ukraine. Shevchenko pioneered the development of a new fundamental concept: “*the coexistence of the Ukrainian individual with the empire,*” where a new Ukrainian myth and the imperial myth of St. Petersburg come together (qtd. in Zabuzhko 44-45). From a social engineering perspective, Shevchenko’s own experience and the fate of other Brotherhood members demonstrated the empire’s rules of coexistence: persecution would be used as both a punishment for transgressions against the empire and as a means to instill fear with the hopes of securing the acceptance of imperial ideology. However, when a quackish social engineering agenda uses fear as its tactic, there is potential for backlash and an outcome that is diametrically opposite to the goals of the social engineers: in the eyes of Ukraine, severe punishment rendered members of the Brotherhood martyrs, who, as a result, became motivators for generations to fight for a common cause—Ukrainian statehood before and after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.

Since political and cultural imperialism fears the liberation of conquered nations, it forces the imposition of its language in order to assert its cultural dominance and to assimilate the substrate nations. Prior to 1917, the Russian government tried to attain these goals through its language policy regarding Ukraine. One can trace the attempts of the tsarist government to eradicate the Ukrainian language back to 1720, when a tsar decree instructed the Moscow Collegiums, an institution of the state, to be vigilant about literature in Ukrainian because “there should not be the slightest difference [from Russian]” (qtd. in Shabliovsky 50). Stripping Ukrainian of its peculiarities was a way to de-nationalize the language and its speakers. In 1863, the Minister of Interior, Valuyev, passed an order, which stated that “there has never been, there

is not and there cannot be an independent Little Russian language” (Hrytsak 196, qtd. in Kappeler 256). This order prohibited the printing of both teaching and religious materials in Ukrainian. Since such materials, as a rule, were printed for the working people, the objective of this order was to prevent the spreading of Ukrainian language materials among the lower classes (Hrytsak 196). The government relied on the public’s fear of punishment to ensure that Ukrainian literature would not enter the educational and ecclesiastical streams. Therefore, the Valuyev order, along with numerous subsequent bans could be categorized as attempts of quackish social engineering. At the same time, one can conclude that this was a case of dark social engineering for the Ukrainian culture, since ethnic Ukrainians were marginalized and degraded when their language was removed from the school and the church. The Russian government understood that if allowed, the Ukrainian language could inspire a massive Ukrainian national movement. The language became a target, since it constituted a threat to the territorial integrity of the empire.

Another instance of dark social engineering and the next step in the anti-Ukrainian policy was the establishment of the 1875 special commission, intended to investigate the Ukrainian language issue. The Commission was comprised of the Minister of Interior and Education, the Procurator of the Synod, and the Chief of Police. They concluded that allowing the development of separate literature in Ukrainian would mean laying a foundation for the idea of an independent Ukraine. Based on the commission’s recommendations, in 1876, Alexander II issued the Emsky Order, which prohibited the printing of any books in Ukrainian in the Russian Empire as well as bringing Ukrainian materials from abroad into the country (Hrytsayk 198-199). In 1881 the Minister of Interior lifted the ban for Ukrainian theatre and this became very important for the consolidation of the national spirit, although numerous limitations were

imposed on the repertoire. In order to be allowed to operate, for every play staged in Ukrainian, a theatrical group had to stage a Russian play, engaging the same number of actors. In addition, theatres had to exclude any foreign plays translated into Ukrainian and plays on the subject of the intelligentsia's life in Ukrainian (Hrytsak 199). Since the intelligentsia spoke Russian on the stage of the Ukrainian theatre, this policy helped create an image of the Ukrainian language as that of uneducated peasants. Once again, it emphasized the low status of Ukrainian so that those who spoke it would be ashamed. The Russian government again resorted to quackish social engineering and manipulated human emotions to achieve its imperial goals: the only way for a speaker of Ukrainian to avoid stigma was to speak Russian only. In 1883 Ukrainian theatrical groups were prohibited from performing in the provinces of Kyiv, Volyn, and Podillya (Hrytsak 199). The ban on Ukrainian theatre from key regions demonstrates the fear of the Russian empire that organizations such as theatrical groups, even with their limited repertoire, could become a motivation for liberation.

The oppressive policies of the tsarist government in the second half of the nineteenth century profoundly undermined Ukrainian liberation movements. The authorities viewed the mere appreciation of Ukrainian culture for its aesthetical value as a threat. Ukrainians were arrested, detained, and persecuted for wearing national clothing, speaking Ukrainian, and purchasing Ukrainian books legally printed in the country (Andriewsky 211-212). At the end of the century only approximately a quarter of the descendants of the old Ukrainian elite considered Ukrainian as their first language (Hrytsak 197). The Ukrainian intelligentsia was greatly influenced by Russian liberal political thought. In 1870, as a result of russification and a loss of faith in the possibility of achieving anything through cultural activities, Ukrainian patriots and descendants of the Ukrainian elite joined the ranks of Narodnaya Volya, a Russian revolutionary

organization that participated in Russian revolutionary movements (Majstrenko 5, Hrytsak 197). Those who still had a desire for Ukrainian liberation now believed that social revolution would lead to national freedom. Russian revolutionary movements were under the influence of western European ideas and political parties in Russia organized themselves using European models. Europe started to play an increasingly important role in the formation of Ukrainian self-perception. On the one hand, Ukrainians used westernization as a way of avoiding assimilation into Russian culture and politics (Wilson 98-99). On the other, russification and almost two hundred years of Russian rule resulted in the absorption of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement by Russian liberal groups. Ukrainians were therefore inclined to regard Russian political thought as an intermediary between themselves and Western Europe. (Majstrenko 6-7). European liberal ideas infiltrated Ukraine through the Russian language (Wilson 99).

At the same time, there were individuals and organizations that tried to promote the tradition of working towards Ukrainian independence and adhering to the cultural and ethnic distinctiveness of Ukraine started by Shevchenko and the Brotherhood. Mykhailo Drahomanov, a professor at the University of Kyiv, was a vigorous defender of Ukrainian national rights. His activities led to persecution by the tsarist government and resulted in forced emigration. He appealed to the Europe's progressive intelligentsia in order to draw attention to the prohibition of Ukrainian language and literature in Ukraine. Drahomanov's work as a literary critic and political activist greatly influenced the Ukrainian political movement and evoked heated discussions and protests. Drahomanov revealed new paths for social, educational, and literary work (Shabliovsky 138). Together with political and social groups he participated in Hromada, a South-Western Imperial Geographic Fellowship that was the voice of progressive Ukrainian liberal thought. He developed a political program that incorporated ideas of Ukrainian

autonomy, a combination of national liberation and social revolution, socialism (with an emphasis on personal freedoms), and self-governance on all levels, from the village to the state. He did not accept the Marxist idea of a dictatorship led by one class or party. Drahomanov's position was different from that of Narodnaya Volya: he did not idealize the Russian community and was against terrorism as a means of achieving goals. His principles of humanity and integrity became moral standards for Ukrainian revolutionaries (Hrytsak 198). His influence on political movements and individual activists was so profound that he is regarded as the father of all Ukrainian political parties (Majstrenko 12). At the beginning of the 20th century the degree of national self-consciousness amongst Ukrainians was determined by the national renaissance and national liberation movements of the previous century. The ideas proclaimed by Shevchenko, the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius, and Drahomanov influenced the Ukrainian socialist and non-socialist political groups, including the party, called *Borot'bysty*, which adhered to the position of cooperation with the Bolsheviks and other Soviet-type establishments of social order in Ukraine.

The Russian government's 1876 ban on printing books in Ukrainian was lifted in 1905 (Hrytsak 211). At that time Borys Hrinchenko⁸, a Ukrainian writer, prepared a dictionary of the Ukrainian language called *Slovar Ukrayisnskoyi Movy* (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 193, 330-331). The authorities established a special Commission to look into the matter of publishing the dictionary (Plyushch 366-367). The Commission approved the dictionary, which appeared to be an act of government support for the development of the Ukrainian language. However, the approval came with a number of recommendations intended to eliminate some of the unique features of the Ukrainian language and make Ukrainian resemble graphically and phonetically (Chaplenko 164-173). One of the recommendations was to eliminate the use of *i* as indication of the

⁸Borys Hrinchenko (1863-1910) – Ukrainian writer, philologist, translator, folklorist (Shabliovsky 234).

palatalization of consonants before *i* (which was the practice in Ukrainian orthography of the time: *diimu*). The second phase of eliminating *ï*, a letter non-existent in Russian, took place during the language reform of the thirties, when the Orthographic Commission, which intended to promote the assimilation of Ukrainian into Russian, recommended writing *i* instead of *ï* in such words as *героїчний, прозаїк* (Nimchuk 269). Both Imperial Russian agencies and later Soviet authorities modified the Ukrainian language by imposing Russian orthographic norms and letters as standard for Ukrainian.

Before 1917, the Russian government prohibited the use of the Ukrainian alphabet. Though the Ukrainian alphabet is very similar to Russian, it features a number of unique letters. One can conclude that these few letters were viewed by the Russian empire as a manifestation of Ukraine's separate national identity. The Ukrainian alphabet was banned and writers had to transcribe Ukrainian text using the Russian alphabet. This resulted in both the graphical and phonological assimilation of the language. For example, to transcribe a uniquely Ukrainian front-mid sound *и*, the Russian letter *ы* had to be used (Nimchuk 242). However, there is a difference between the sounds *и* and *ы*: the Russian sound is more rounded and higher. This writing system, called *yaryzhka* ('ярижка,' from the name of the letter *ы*, 'єри,' or 'яри'), did not allow for this difference in pronunciation (Nimchuk 242).

The period between 1917 and 1938 involved substantial political, economic, administrative, and social changes in Ukraine. It started during the short-lived 1917-1919 independence, which saw a few changes of government. The struggle between independent Ukraine and the Bolsheviks created two countries within the territory of Ukraine: independent Ukraine with a capital in Kyiv and Donetsk-Kryvorizsk Soviet Republic. The latter was formed with the assistance of military troops sent to Ukraine by the Russian Bolshevik Government and

had its capital in Kharkiv (Lytvyn 228-229, Magocsi *Ukraine...* 199). When the Bolsheviks finally took control of Ukraine in its entirety, the Ukrainian people were forced into the social engineering experiment of building a new society. Every stage of the historical period of 1917 to 1938 impacted the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian language. The Ukrainian language was used to support myths needed by the government to shape the society's beliefs.

The 1917-1919 period of independence demonstrated substantial efforts and achievements in the formation of Ukraine's national identity and the development of the standard Ukrainian language. The first government of independent Ukraine, the *Tsentral'na Rada* (the Central Council), was in power from March 1917 to February 1918. Initially, it was a center for consolidating political and public organizations, but it subsequently became the Parliament that led the Ukrainian liberation movement (Lytvyn 218-224, 226-230). The *Tsentral'na Rada* was the first example of a practical implementation of the idea of Ukrainian statehood. With Mykhailo Hrushevskyj as Chair, and Serhiy Yefremov and Volodymyr Vynnychenko as Deputies, the *Tsentral'na Rada* proclaimed Ukraine's independence and founded the Ukrainian People's Republic in November 1917 as a response to the Bolshevik revolution (Lytvyn 223-224). However, as a result of the indecisiveness and procrastination of the *Tsentral'na Rada* in creating a regular army, the Russian Bolshevik troops were able to seize Kyiv in February 1918 (Lytvyn 219-230). The first period of Russian Bolshevik rule from February to March 1918 was short-lived due to the outcome of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was signed by Germany, Bolshevik Russia, and the Ukrainian People's Republic (Lytvyn 227). The Russian delegation, headed by Leon Trotsky, recognized the sovereignty of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the legitimacy of the Ukrainian delegation in representing the *Tsentral'na Rada* (Lytvyn 227). According to the Treaty terms, Bolshevik troops were to be withdrawn from Ukraine and

German troops were to replace them (Freund 64-74, Kulchytsky *The Phenomenon...* 347, Lytvyn 227).

The second period of the *Tsentral'na Rada* control was from March 7 – April 28, 1918. The *Tsentral'na Rada* returned to Kyiv after German troops took control of the city on March 1, 1918 (Lytvyn 230). However, the population, tired of war and political instability, wanted strong executive power and did not view the *Tsentral'na Rada* as capable of implementing a strong government (Lytvyn 230). The *Hromada* (Ukrainian People's Community), a party formed by landowners and military, articulated an argument for a change of government and engaged German military to implement it (Lytvyn 230). On April 28, 1918, German military commanders disrupted a meeting of the *Tsentral'na Rada* where members were discussing a draft of the Ukrainian constitution and arrested two ministers (Lytvyn 230). The new government, headed by Pavlo Skoropadsky, a descendant of an elite Ukrainian Cossack family and a decorated general of the Russian imperial army, was put to power as a result of this *coup-d'etat* (Lytvyn 230). Skoropadsky was backed by German occupiers, conservative landowners, anti-Bolshevik Russians residing in Kyiv, and those who fled to Kyiv from Bolshevik Russia. The *Tsentral'na Rada* was dismissed, along with its Ministries and land committees, and Hetmanate State was established by an order issued by Skoropadsky on April 30, 1918 (Lytvyn 230-231, Mirchuk 226-227, Wilson 126).

The Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadsky (April 30, 1918 – December 14, 1918) was a controversial period in the history of independent Ukraine. Skoropadsky was elected a Hetman⁹ of Ukraine at an agrarian congress held in Kyiv on April 29, 1918 (Lytvyn 230). Some sources argue that Skoropadsky was backed by the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian party (Lytvyn 230,

⁹ The word 'Hetman' comes from the times of Zaporizhzhya Sich and means 'leader elected by Cossacks' (Wilson 59).

Majstrenko 71). However, according to Andriyevsky, a witness to the events, the election of Skoropadsky took place without the official participation of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian party, since the party, though being right-wing and non-socialist, considered the Ukrainian national interest as a priority (Andriyevsky 13). This party always supported the *Tsentral'na Rada* despite their differences concerning matters of socialism and the socialist revolution. Such support was warranted because the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian party considered the *Tsentral'na Rada* as the principal Ukrainian government body and therefore demanded a compromise from the congress to keep the Central Council in action (Andriyevsky 11, 13-4).

The Union of Landowners, another agrarian party, backed the coup. This party consisted of prominent Russian and russified Ukrainian landowners who were indifferent or hostile to Ukraine's independence (Mirchuk 230). These two right-wing agrarian non-socialist parties directly opposed each other on the subject of national liberation. Skoropadsky sided with the Union of Landowners, a stronger group, though in his memoirs, Skoropadsky admits that the ideas of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian party were more appealing to him (Mirchuk 230-233). After the *Tsentral'na Rada* was brought back to power as a result of German occupation through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Ukraine could have quickly become merely an occupied territory, which would have had no resemblance to statehood (Lytvyn 231). This situation prompted Skoropadsky to revolt and push the *Tsentral'na Rada* out of power. Skoropadsky's government included many prominent Ukrainian scholars and professionals with high qualifications, including former members of the *Tsentral'na Rada* (Lytvyn 231-233). His government is credited with many achievements, namely forming Ukrainian statehood, building and developing Ukrainian culture and education, and facilitating the ukrainianization of government bodies.

Skoropadsky's alliance with Russia and his attempts to shape a new national identity for Ukraine were founded neither on Ukrainian nor Russian ethnic ideals, but rather on his loyalty to the Ukrainian state (Wilson 127). He wrote that Russia's oppression of Ukraine was a product of the government; therefore, he refused to implicate the Russian masses as the source of this oppression (Wilson 127). While gaining the support of Germans, Russians, and landowners in order to seize power, Skoropadsky positioned himself in a difficult situation. The Russian monarchists and the Union of Landowners, alongside the Russian Bolsheviks, accused him of separatism (Lytvyn 236). The continuation of German support was based on substantial grain and food requisitions imposed by Skoropadsky's government on Ukrainian producers, which triggered opposition by Ukrainian peasantry (Majstrenko 72). His bias towards Russia was evident in his favoritism of Russian political organizations in appointing officials, as well as in the arrests of supporters of Ukrainian independence, and this caused him to be condemned by pro-Ukrainian political groups and Ukrainian peasants (Majstrenko 62-63, Mirchuk 236-237). On November 14, 1918, while looking for a way out, Skoropadsky announced a federated union of Ukraine and Russia and brought an accusation of treason upon himself (Majstrenko 73). This was followed by an anti-Skoropadsky rebellion, headed by a body named the *Dyrektorija* (*Directory*), which comprised of representatives of the Ukrainian social democrat and social revolutionary parties, the *Tsentral'na Rada*, the Railway Association, and the Ukrainian party of socialist-seekers of independence. On December 14, 1918, Skoropadsky resigned his authority to the *Dyrektorija* (Lytvyn 235-236).

The Ukrainian People's Republic was revived under the *Dyrektorija* government (December 14, 1918 - December 5, 1919), and was headed by Vynnychenko, with Symon Petlyura as the Chief of Military forces (Majstrenko 89-90). Later, when Vynnychenko resigned

and emigrated, Petlyura headed the *Dyrektorija*'s struggle against Bolshevik occupation (Lytvyn 237, Mirchuk 266). On December 5, 1919, Petlyura withdrew to Halychyna under the offensive attack of Bolshevik troops (Freund 108). The Polish government recognized the *Dyrektorija* as a legitimate Ukrainian government and supported Petlyura's failed attack on Kyiv in April of 1920 (Lytvyn 239). After the Bolsheviks took over Ukraine, Petlyura headed the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic while in exile (Lytvyn 239). During his tenure, Petlyura actively supported development of Ukrainian culture and art. The *Dyrektorija*, alongside members of the *Tsentral'na Rada* and with representatives from Western Ukrainian political groups, organized a symbolic act of unification of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, two ethnic Ukrainian territories that, for centuries, were split between foreign dominant powers (Lytvyn 244). This event, known as the *Akt Zluky* (Act of Union), took place on January 22, 1919, and was of utmost significance for the formation of Ukraine as a nation (Mirchuk 266-267). The *Akt Zluky* is celebrated in modern Ukraine as a symbol of Sobornist' (Union) of Ukraine; in 1990, to mark the anniversary of the *Akt Zluky*, a human chain spanned across five hundred kilometers to link Kyiv and Lviv (Magosci *Ukraine: An Illustrated History* 304).

Ukraine's independence was not sustained for a long period of time. The Russian Bolshevik government headed by Lenin had no intention to lose Ukraine. At that time, Ukraine produced 70 percent of Russia's coal, 96.7 percent of rolled metal, 81 percent of tin, 90 percent of silver, and 75 percent of cast iron (Lytvyn 226). It was also a large producer of grains and food: in 1909 and 1913, Ukraine's share in Russia's production of wheat was 98%, rye 75%, oats 27%, and sugar 82% (Borys 54-55). Leon Trotsky¹⁰, a leader of the Bolshevik revolution wrote:

¹⁰ Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) – one of the leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution, served as People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs during the early years of Soviet rule (Freund 566-570).

“Remember we have to get Ukraine back to Russia. Without Ukraine there is no Russia. Russia cannot exist without the Ukrainian coal, iron, ore, bread and bacon, the Black Sea; the country will suffocate and the Soviet system will suffocate along, and we will as well” (qtd. in Lytvyn 226). Therefore, in 1918-1919 Moscow sent numerous troops to Ukraine (Lytvyn 236-237). The battlefields of 1918-1919 became the second stage of the imperialistic conquest of Ukraine by Russia.

The Russian Bolsheviks seized power in Ukraine and made appointments to new governing bodies in Ukraine: the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CPBU) and the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Zaitsev 253). Other political parties either disintegrated or joined the ranks of the governing Bolshevik party during the first years of Soviet rule, although they did leave an imprint on the Ukrainian political stage. One of such parties was the party of *Borot’bysty*. In the 1920s, many of the Borot’bysts joined the Bolshevik ranks (Majstrenko 206). The influx of Borot’bysts impacted the Bolshevik party. Borot’bysts brought concepts formulated by Shevchenko, the members of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius, and Drahomanov into the government of Soviet Ukraine and often used those concepts as a basis for formulating policies in the areas of culture and language.

Following six years of war, Ukraine was left in ruins. The policy of War Communism¹¹ added to the country’s destruction and, in combination with the two-year drought of 1921-1923, caused significant famine in southern Ukraine. (Nezhyvyj 71, Zaitsev 254). Other parts of the new Soviet states were also experiencing economic crisis. Lenin realized that the pursuit of War

¹¹ War Communism (1918-1920) was an attempt to introduce a communist-type system of production and distribution by abolishing money, private property, and the free market. Agricultural goods were seized from peasants without any compensation in return, ceasing all production. This period is characterized by mass repressions (Freund 585-588, Reiman 1-2).

Communism would potentially trigger the country's unrest; therefore, in March of 1921, he convinced delegates of the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks to issue orders initiating the New Economic Policy (NEP), a strategically forced political retreat and a restitution of free market principles (Reiman 2, Zaitsev 253). This new policy allowed for free internal trade, transfer of small businesses into leases or private property, foreign investments, and replaced agricultural tax in kind with monetary taxes (Zaitsev 253). The policy also aimed at boosting industrial and agricultural production, thereby improving the economic situation of the country. The NEP (1923-1928) proved to be a successful economic endeavor. It transformed the country entirely and secured its economic stability (Freund 399-403). However, ideologically the Bolsheviks perceived the NEP as a dangerous compromise since it reinstated capitalistic features within the economy. Despite censorship and political persecutions, the years of the NEP were tolerable for intellectual life, compared to the subsequent periods of the first five-year plans or the years following the Second World War, and served to enrich artistic life (Lewis Burgin 34-36, Reiman 3, Terras 79). The dismantling of the NEP resulted from the Bolshevik Party's decision to reassert Bolshevik fundamentals (Rees *Stalin...* 79). The end of the NEP also meant the beginning of oppressive policies towards art, culture, and non-Russian ethnic groups.

The NEP coincided with *korenizatsiya* (indigenization), an important period of language and cultural development in Ukraine. The NEP was the political and socio-economic background for cultural development under *korenizatsiya*. Historians posit the official beginning of *korenizatsiya* as 1923, as evidenced by the 1923 proclamation of the Twelfth Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks Congress that Russian great-power chauvinism was dangerous for the preservation of the achievements of the Bolshevik revolution. In response, the

Bolsheviks introduced a policy oriented at the development of native cultures stemming from former Imperial Russia (Zaitsev 257). This policy had a unique impact on the development of the Ukrainian language and the languages of other ethnic groups in Soviet Russia. There is no unified opinion as to why the Bolshevik authorities introduced this policy. At first, it appears that this was a step in demonstrating the Bolsheviks' adherence to an individual's right to self-determination, guided by Lenin's concern about Great Russian chauvinism. In this sense, *korenizatsiya* can be interpreted as a policy of decolonization. However, it can also be viewed as a Bolshevik attempt to lure non-Russian groups to support Bolshevism by favoring cultural and language development (Rees *Stalin...* 82). Consequently, the meaning of this term can be interpreted as indigenization, i.e., putting down roots, or becoming native on a new territory.

Korenizatsiya in Ukraine, known as ukrainianization, was a government policy aimed at fostering greater involvement of Ukrainians in the work of political parties as well as the introduction and use of Ukrainian in administrative matters, education, publishing, and press. In Ukrainian cities, both the Bolsheviks and the Soviets were predominantly supported by the Russian proletariat. Their political ideas were foreign to the other strata of society, particularly to the Ukrainian villagers. In order to put down roots in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks had to make efforts to appear native and gain local support (Zaitsev 259). For this reasons, some Ukrainians viewed *korenizatsiya* as a deception tactic and, therefore, mistrusted Soviet policy. Symon Petlyura expressed this sentiment by calling *korenizatsiya* "a certain tactical ploy by the Bolsheviks" (Bachynskyj 284). Others, however, embraced ukrainianization as an opportunity to work towards a renaissance of Ukrainian culture and language (Bachynskyj 282).

The Russian Bolsheviks faced a difficult situation in Ukraine since the country clearly demonstrated its aspirations towards independence. Therefore, the Russian Bolsheviks realized

the importance and urgency of finding a solution to the problem presented by Ukraine. As early as December 1919, the resolution of the Eighth Conference of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks, “On Soviet Rule in Ukraine,” provided that since Ukrainian culture was oppressed by the tsarist government, it was the duty of all its members to eliminate any “*obstacles to the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture*” (Bondarchuk 272, qtd. in Solchanyk 66). Although the resolution did not specify any practical methods for increasing the prestige of Ukrainian, it demonstrated the possibility of positive change in the overall attitude to the language. This document is arguably a starting point for the development of definite plans for future action. It is suggested that although the authorities had previously officially sanctioned policies reminiscent of *korenizatsiya*, nothing had been accomplished on this front since 1923 (Martin 98). Prior to 1923, however, Ukraine had gone through several important stages of cultural development including language standardization, elaboration, and measures to secure acceptance of the new standard by the population during the years of independence and under Soviet rule.¹²

¹² After the Bolsheviks retreated from Kyiv in March 1918, the Russian Bolshevik government sent military troops to Eastern Ukraine and assisted in the formation of the Soviet Ukrainian government in the city of Kharkiv (Luckyj 166, Lytvyn 228). Donetsk-Kryvorizsk Soviet Republic, sometimes called Ukrainian Public of Councils, was formed in eastern Ukraine and had Kharkiv as its capital. Mykola Skrypnyk, a member of the Soviet (Kharkiv) government, spoke out against the formation of a separatist republic (Lytvyn 228-229, Magocsi *Ukraine...* 199). The government consisted of Ukrainian Communists who were later joined by Borotbists, including some writers (Luckyj 166).

CHAPTER 2 SELECTION

The process of developing a standard language includes four major stages: selection, codification, elaboration, and securing acceptance. Selection is the process of deciding which vernacular to use as a foundation for the development of a standard variety. This decision is based on several rationales, such as the number of speakers of every vernacular, the territories they reside in, how much power each group has in the country, pre-existing writing systems, just to name a few. If the standard language variety has a form that is different from those featured in the other vernaculars, the outcome of selection will be “the suppression of optional variability,” because only one form will enter the standard language (qtd. in Milroy and Milroy 6). The ultimate suppression of non-standard vernaculars might put the speakers of those vernaculars at a disadvantage: after the process of codification is complete the standard forms become ‘correct,’ and forms designated as non-standard become ‘incorrect’ or ‘uneducated,’ causing stigmatization of the users of the vernacular forms. The development of standard variety Ukrainian started during the years of independence and continued through Bolshevik periods of *pre-korenizatsiya*, *korenizatsiya*, and *post-korenizatsiya*.

During the years of independence, the need to unite the nation impacted the selection process. In Ukraine, the selection process was neither conventional nor straightforward because of the historical and political challenges faced by the country. Historically, the Ukrainian language was subjected to oppression and different parts of Ukraine were ruled by different foreign powers. As a result, regional dialects underwent very different developmental processes, as they were influenced by different dominant languages. In 1917, the nation was partitioned between large political players and the population spoke a number of dialects. The period of independence and the *Akt Zluky* brought the idea of Ukrainian unity to the fore of political ambitions, and the Ukrainian government relied on the support of all Ukrainian regions. Giving

preference to one dialect over another for the basis of codification was a dangerous gamble: any choice would incite outraged condemnation by the speakers of the rejected vernaculars, potentially resulting in the withdrawal of their support. Therefore, the linguists chosen for the standardization project faced a challenging task from the outset.

In 1917, Ivan Steshenko, the first Minister of Education of the Central Council and former member and leader of *Hromada*, assigned Ivan Ohiyenko, a professor at Kyiv University, to develop Ukrainian orthographic rules (Nimchuk 250). Some time later, a number of Ukrainian linguists including Ahatanhel Krymskyi, Yevhen Tymchenko, and Mykola Hrunsky joined Ohiyenko's codification project (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 12). The group members understood the history of the Ukrainian language, its regional variability, and the country's need to have a standard language and to engage in the intensive development of a national identity. The protagonist of language standardization must select a variety, which will be used as the basis for the development process. In the course of Ukrainian standardization, selection was not a straightforward undertaking. One can assume that Ohiyenko was not in favor of the conventional selection approach where one vernacular serves as the basis for a standard variety. In the preface to his book, *Essays on the History of the Ukrainian Language System of the Ukrainian Orthography (Essays)*, Ohiyenko suggests that looking at orthography "from the solo position of one specific vernacular" is the root cause of extensive disagreements on the topic of Ukrainian orthography (qtd. in Ohiyenko *Narysy...* VII). Ohiyenko advocated the use of both historical and linguistic analyses of the language as a way to selectively combine elements from various vernaculars into the standard variety, as opposed to selecting only one vernacular for codification purposes. He presented a historical analysis of Ukrainian in the *Essays* and suggested in the preface that the availability and spread of historical linguistic knowledge would

lead to the establishment of “*the very best official academic orthography*” (qtd. in Ohiyenko *Narysy... VIII*).

When Ohiyenko’s group undertook the first codification project, Ukrainian already featured almost fifty different graphizations¹³ developed and used by various authors, scholars, and scholastic groups between 1798 and 1905. The *Essays* catalogue and compare these systems (Ohiyenko *Narysy... 15-22*). However, none of these were sanctioned by any official agency and, moreover, periodic bans of the Ukrainian language hampered their elaboration and acceptance. The catalogue includes the systems used by authors working in Tsarist Russia who represented Eastern and Central Ukrainian dialects as well as systems developed from Western Ukrainian dialects. This indicates that Ohiyenko did not view Western Ukrainian vernaculars as secondary, undeserving of attention, or unfit for codification endeavors, nor did he consider them as candidates for suppression resulting from their rejection as sources of features for standard Ukrainian. According to Ohiyenko, every scholar contributed to Ukrainian orthography, which became an all inclusive creation by the efforts undertaken during the nineteenth century (Ohiyenko *Narysy... 14*). The development of the Ukrainian Orthographic rules undertaken by Ohiyenko and his colleagues involved the selection of features from various dialects and previously developed and used grammar systems, based on their historical and etymological attributes. Selection was done not on the level of vernaculars but on the level of their specific features.

In January of 1919, the rules were published under the title *Major Rules of Ukrainian Orthography Approved by the Ministry of Public Education for School Use* (Головніші правила українського правопису, ухвалені Міністерством народної освіти для шкільного вжитку); these were later reviewed, supplemented, and officially approved in February 1920 by the

¹³ Graphization is the adoption, development, or modification of writing systems and scripts (Cooper 125)

Ukrainian Academy of Science (Nimchuk 251, Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 13). The preface specified that professor Ivan Ohiyenko was the author of the rules and that the rules covered debatable questions of Ukrainian orthography along with examinations of instances that “*make our orthographic norms different from the orthographic norms of Halychyna*”¹⁴ (“*відрізняють нашу правопис від правопису Галичини*”) (Nimchuk 251). This statement indicates that the rules were created with Central and Eastern Ukraine in mind. Though differences between Ukrainian regional varieties are pointed out, the use of the term ‘*orthographic norms*’ in reference to Halychyna speech denotes the recognition of the achieved level of codification for that variety, as dictated by its separate history of development. In this respect, the two orthographic norms were complementary to one another within Ukrainian culture, rather than antagonistic, as they would be in the case of standard vs. non-standard set-off. The rules prepared by Professor Ohiyenko were based on the results of his analysis of other previously developed systems. He and his colleagues included into the rules only those features that appeared most logical and relevant based on the historical and etymological analysis of the development of Ukrainian (Nimchuk 253). This method deviates from the traditional approach of selecting one vernacular as a basis for the standard, while ignoring features of other vernaculars during codification.

Ohiyenko and his group developed and published the first sets of orthographic norms during the years of Ukraine’s independence. It is possible that Ukraine’s political independence had some impact on the group members on both a personal and professional level. As the developers of a standard language for their new nation, they may have experienced some political influence urging them to take into account the needs of the state. In addition, Professor

¹⁴ Halychyna – or Galicia in English, is a historical region named after the city of Halych in Ukraine. Halychyna included the territories of today’s Ternopil, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions of Ukraine, as well as some territories that are now part of Poland (Magocsi *Ukraine...* 51-52, 210).

Ohiyenko was a member of the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic and understood how the standard would serve the government's political needs. Ukraine's emerging national identity required building blocks that would represent the country's long and glorious history, its rich and elaborate language, and ideas that would unite the nation. After a period of foreign domination, Ukraine found itself to be a battlefield for various political forces, both external and domestic, who were fighting for the ultimate prize—Ukraine itself. These circumstances required a strong message of unity and credibility. By uniting the past collective work of prominent authors and linguists with the specialized linguistic and historical knowledge of the group's members, Ohiyenko and his team were able to make a superlative contribution to the codification project undertaken during the tenure of the *Tsentral'na Rada* and the *Dyrektorija*.

Ohiyenko's approach to selecting the basis for the standard language required consulting historical data and linguistic traditions and systems developed in the past, as well as taking into account the legacy left by previous generations of Ukrainian authors and researchers in the process of codification. This approach fell in line with the government's attempts at engineering a unifying myth for the new country: the standard language was developed with an appreciation of the national cultural heritage, which belonged to all Ukrainian people. Using the nation's history and culture in shaping the standard language added an attribute to the standard that could serve as a link between disparate population groups. Ohiyenko's approach also demonstrated that Ukrainian was on a different developmental level than a language that would require standardization to begin with the selection of only one vernacular. This developmental level was secured by the language systems developed and used between 1798 and 1905, despite government imposition of adverse socio-political conditions. Previously developed writing systems served as a basis for the linguistic framework, which created the perception of a united

nation rather than a mere conglomeration of separate regional groups speaking local vernaculars. This also meant that the Ukrainian civilization did not begin with the proclamation of independence in 1917 but was the product of a long history. Ukraine's distinct history and culture underscored the legitimacy of the country's independence.

Incorporation rather than selection may have been a reflection of the government's mandate to unite the nation, but it also seemed to be in line with Ohiyenko's personal beliefs. Nimchuk argues that there were some personal preferences in the process of selecting norms to include in the standard, but he does not specify whose, nor what type of preferences might have influenced the process (Nimchuk 253). It seems that on a personal level, professor Ohiyenko highly regarded the principles of unity and strived to bring them into his project. Ohiyenko believed that the power of a nation rests in its unity, rather than in variety or contrasts (Zaval'nyuk 111). Professor Ohiyenko was the key organizer of a University in Kam'yanets-Podilsky, a city located on the border of Western and Central-Eastern Ukraine. He considered this location perfect for its symbolic value: the meeting place of two cultures (Zaval'nyuk 111). Ivan Ohiyenko was later ordained as a Ukrainian Orthodox priest, and during the course of his ecclesiastical work in Canada, he was the key organizer of a unity conference for three North American Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in 1960 (Wilson 248). It is possible that the decision to incorporate linguistic features from various dialects and past language systems rather than selecting one specific vernacular for standardization was partially motivated by personal adherence to the ideas of unity and reconciliation. Individuals can have as big an impact on language planning as can organized bodies. Alongside Ohiyenko, the individual that played a significant role in the codification of the Ukrainian orthographic norms was Ahatanhel Krymskyi (Nimchuk 253). Anatanhel Krymskyi, a member of the Orthographic Commissions of Ukraine in

1921 and 1926-1928, included the incorporation approach in the language planning projects of the post-independence period. Krymskyi was part of Ohiyenko's working group in 1917-1919, but also continued working on codification in 1921, and 1926-28, and furthered the tradition of incorporation of regional (including Western) features into standard.

CHAPTER 3 CODIFICATION

3.1. Codification of the Ukrainian Language during the Years of Independence (1917-1919)

Codification is the stage of language planning where a standard set of language norms is developed for use by the target population; it is sometimes referred to as the “corpus planning of a language” (Holmes 102). Codification deals with linguistic forms and is designed to attain linguistic goals (Honberger 28-29). Nevertheless, the ultimate function of a linguistic form can influence the forms selected for inclusion in the standard variety that is being created by the corpus planning process (Cooper 122-123). In this respect, corpus planning goals are not purely linguistic and can be influenced by political agendas. Political inspirations and manipulations had an impact on the Orthographic Codes adopted in Ukraine between 1917 and 1938.

Professor Ohiyenko prepared the first version of Ukrainian orthographic rules in April 29, 1918¹⁵, in his book *Most Essential Rules of the Ukrainian Orthography on the Instruction of the Orthographic Commission. Compiled by Privat-Ass.Prof. I. Ohiyenko.*¹⁶ In April 1918, the Orthographic Commission of the Ministry of Public Education approved these rules (Nimchuk 250). Before granting the approval, members of the Commission held extensive debates and made some changes to the presented version; however, the rules were never disseminated for public use, since the Minister of Education, N. Vasylenko, had not announced them because of a change in government (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 12). Subsequent codification efforts included the publication of the *Most Essential Rules*¹⁷ in the 10th issue of the 1918 magazine *Ukrayins'ka*

¹⁵ The Central Council government was overthrown by Skoropadsky a day earlier, April 28, 1918, and dismissed by the order issued on April 30, 1918.

¹⁶ ‘Найголовніші правила українського правопису. З доручення Правописної комісії склав прив.-доц. І. Огієнко.’

¹⁷ ‘*Most Essential rules of the Ukrainian Orthography. Adopted by the Orthographic Commission of the Ministry of Education on May 24, 1918 in Kyiv*’ (‘Найголовніші правила українського правопису. Ухвалені Правописною комісією при Міністерстві освіти 24 травня 1918 р. в Києві).

Shkola (Ukrainian School) (Nimchuk 250). The following individuals were part of the Orthographic Commission that developed the *Most Essential Rules* of 1918: professors Ohiyenko, Tymchenko, Smal-Stotskyi, Hrunskyi, Loboda and specialists Naumenko, Holoskevych, Kurylo, Shal', Hantsov, Nikonovsky (Nimchuk 251). The codification work continued when the Directory Government led by S. Petlyura and V. Vynnychenko came to power. Details of the codification projects are summarized in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Work on codification of the Ukrainian language in the first half of 1919.

Date	Event	Individuals Involved	Leader or Approval	Outcome
January 1919	I. Ohiyenko forms a Commission with the purpose of editing a short orthographic code	Ahafanhel Krymskyi Yevhen Tymchenko Ivan Ohiyenko	I. Ohiyenko	Detailed review of the orthographic code approved by the previous 1918 Commission and composition of <i>Major Rules of the Ukrainian Orthography</i> 'Головніші правила українського правопису'
January 17, 1919	Approval and publication of <i>Major Rules of the Ukrainian Orthography</i> 'Головніші правила українського правопису'	Ahafanhel Krymskyi Yevhen Tymchenko edited the Rules	Approved by the Ministry of Public Education and signed by I. Ohiyenko, A. Krymskyi, and Y. Tymchenko	
March 16, 1919	Creation of the Orthography and Terminology Commission at the newly formed the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences	Ahafanhel Krymskyi Hryhoriy Holoskevych		
Spring and Summer of 1919	A. Krymskyi was working to supplement <i>Major</i>	Ahafanhel Krymskyi	Ahafanhel Krymskyi	New set of rules called 'The Most Essential Rules of the Ukrainian

Date	Event	Individuals Involved	Leader or Approval	Outcome
	<i>Rules and streamline Most Essential Rules</i>			<i>Orthography</i> ‘ <i>Найголовніші правила українського правопису</i> ’
May 17, 1919 and July 12, 1919	Approval of new <i>The Most Essential Rules by the General Meeting of the Ukrainian Academy of Science</i>		Note: in 1920 these rules were endorsed by the Soviet authorities	

Source: Publications by Ohiyenko and Nimchuk (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 12-13, Nimchuk 251-253).

The majority of the rules of Ukrainian orthography were compiled in 1918 and 1919. The 1920s and 1930s were devoted to the contested topic of spelling borrowings, which is the use of the letters ‘r’ and ‘r’ in place of foreign letters ‘h’ and ‘g,’ as well as the use of soft ‘л’ or hard ‘л’ in place of the foreign letter ‘l.’ Ohiyenko’s 1918 *Most Essential Rules* included the following:

1. The letter ‘r’ is to be written according to the pronunciation of the relevant foreign words: *гімназія, телеграф, генерал, газета, термінологія, психологія* (Nimchuk 257). Examples of the use of ‘r’ include: *gymnasia, telegraph, general, gazette, terminology, psychology*. If a transliterated foreign word contained ‘g,’ the letter ‘r’ had to be used in Ukrainian (Nimchuk 257).
2. When a foreign word contains the letter ‘l,’ the corresponding sound, ‘л’ in Ukrainian transliteration, in most cases, should not be palatalized: ‘i.e. write *a, e, o, y, not я, е, ьо, ю:*’ *клас, план, новела, билет, легальний, легенда, легіон, лекція, логика, флот, філологія, аналогія, лояльний, лозунг, Лузитанія, клуб* (Nimchuk 257-258). One can observe inconsistencies in the prescribed use of ‘e’ (produces palatalization) and ‘e’ (does not result in the palatalization of ‘л’ (‘l’)). This inconsistency is marked by [!] in Nimchuk’s article

and could have been a mistake in the original text. Based on the verbiage of the rule, ‘л’ *should not be palatalized,*’ the string of letters following the verbiage should have read ‘*i.e. write а, е, о, у, but not я, є, ъо, ю*’.

The subsequent *Major Rules*¹⁸ also prepared by Ohiyenko, featured some modifications of the previous rules, including the elimination of the ‘е’ or ‘є’ ambiguity:

1. The foreign sound ‘g’ is to be rendered through the letter ‘г’: *гімназія, телеграф, генерал, газета, термінологія, психологія* (Nimchuk 258).

Note: Often, ‘г’ can be written as well: *телеграф, генерал* (Nimchuk 258).

2. When a foreign word features ‘l,’ the corresponding sound ‘л’ in Ukrainian transliteration, in most cases, should not be palatalized, i.e., write а, е, о, у, but not я, є, ъо, ю: *класа, план, новела, билет, легальний, легенда, легіон, лекція, логика, флота, філологія, аналогія, лояльний, лозунг, Лузитанія, клуб* (Nimchuk 258).

Note: In this case, ‘л’ (‘l’) is often palatalized too: *кляса, плян, фльота, новеля, фільольогія*, etc. (Nimchuk 258).

James Dingley characterizes the rules codified by Ohiyenko in 1919 (*Major Rules*) as based “largely on eastern Ukrainian dialects and Russian orthographical tradition” (qtd. in Dingley 177). In the *Essays*, Ohiyenko substantiated the use of hard ‘л’ and ‘г’ in the place of foreign ‘g’ in Ukrainian, based on the etymology of foreign words that, in most cases, entered Ukrainian directly from Greek and could be traced back to ancient religious scripts found in various parts of Ukraine. The practice of rendering ‘g’ as ‘г’ and ‘l’ as hard ‘л’ is indeed similar to Russian. The pronunciation used in Halychyna was different due to the influence of Polish. In the *Essays*, Ohiyenko referred to two areas: Ukraine, which he sometimes called *Great*

¹⁸ ‘Головніші правила українського правопису ухвалені Міністерством народної освіти для шкільного вжитку’ (*Major rules of the Ukrainian Orthography Approved by the Ministry of Public Education for School Use*).

Ukraine, as opposed to *Halychyna* (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 115-121). He does not, however, mention ‘*eastern Ukrainian dialects.*’ One can deduce that both Dingley and Ohiyenko meant the dialects spoken in the territory referred to as *Dnieper Ukraine*, an area of Ukraine that had fallen under the rule of the Russian Empire (Magocsi *Ukraine...* 135, 139-140). Ohiyenko disagreed with the general contention that matching the orthography of borrowed words in Russian and Ukrainian meant that Ukrainian simply followed the Russian fashion or the “Russian orthographical tradition” (qtd. in Dingley 117). In the 17th century and the first half of the 18th century, many borrowings entered the Russian language through speakers of Ukrainian who held positions across Russia (particularly through the Ukrainian clergy), as well as officials of Ukrainian origin who worked for various government institutions (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 118-120). Many borrowings were brought into Russian, not directly from the West, but through Ukraine and in a form that was already Ukrainianized. The use of Greek-origin words in Ukrainian dates back centuries before the development of the close ties and reciprocal influx of words between Ukrainian and Russian (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 119-120). In his earlier recommendations, Ohiyenko proposed to use ‘r’ to render foreign ‘g,’ which the subsequent *Major Rules* acknowledged as a possible orthographical variant, but he ultimately suggested to write ‘r.’

Table 3.2 Comparison of spelling in the use of ‘r’ and ‘r,’ recommended by the *Most Essential Rules 1918*, *Major Rules 1919*, and the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976*.

<i>Most Essential Rules 1918</i>	<i>Major Rules 1919</i>	<i>Russian Spelling (Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976)</i>
Гімназія	Гімназія	Гимназия
Телеграф	телеграф, but also possible телеграф	Телеграф
Генерал	Генерал, but also	Генерал

<i>Most Essential Rules 1918</i>	<i>Major Rules 1919</i>	<i>Russian Spelling (Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976)</i>
	possible Генерал	
Газета	Газета	Газета
Терминологія	Термінологія	Терминология
Психологія	Психологія	Психология

A special chapter of Ohiyenko's *Essays* was devoted to the use of 'г' and 'r' for borrowings. He distinguishes between the first borrowings from Greek that entered Ukrainian between the 8th and 10th centuries from those that were brought to Ukraine via other European languages in later centuries. Ohiyenko argues that the pronunciation of the Greek letter 'ϝ' in the 8th and 10th centuries was similar to /h/ or Ukrainian /r/, and therefore all words that entered Ukrainian at that time were pronounced with /r/ in place of 'ϝ',¹⁹ (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 161-162). In Rome, the Greek letter 'ϝ' was pronounced as /g/ and this spread to the European languages and then to Polish, before gradually entering Ukrainian with new borrowings and as a pronunciation variant for words that had previously been used in the language. As a result, in the 14th century, there was a need in Ukraine for a letter, which would correspond to the sound /g/ (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 163). The letter 'r,' as a symbol corresponding to the European sound /g/, appeared in Ukrainian written documents at the end of the 16th century. 'Grammar' by Meletii Smotrytskyi²⁰ anchored this letter in the Ukrainian language (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 164). Ohiyenko believed that Smotrytskyi had gone too far in recommending the use of 'r' in all Greek words, since this approach disregarded the history of earlier borrowings from Greek and the pronunciation of 'ϝ' in the donor language (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 164). In the *Essays*, Ohiyenko

¹⁹ A different theory stipulates that originally, proto-Slavic contained a voiced velar explosive, 'g,' which in the 9th century lenited to voiced velar fricative /h/ (/r/) (Nimchuk 282).

²⁰ Meletii Smotrytskyi, a clergyman and author of *Slavonic Grammar* (1619) (Magocsi *A History...* 187). Smotrytskyi developed orthographic and orthoepic norms of Church Slavonic in Ukraine. His version of Church Slavonic was greatly influenced by Ukrainian vernaculars. The orthographic rules developed by Smotrytsky were consistently used in the Ukrainian church and circular literature in subsequent years (Nimchuk 244-245).

favored the “g = r” correspondence for Ukrainian and expressed his opinion that the sound ‘g’ was foreign and unnatural to the Ukrainian language. For this reason, Ukrainian tended to render ‘g’ with ‘r’ in many borrowings from German; however, he admitted that it was possible that the sound ‘g’ had existed in the language prior to the 10th century (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 165, 162).

In comparison to Russian and Polish, Ukrainian holds a unique position in regards to rendering Greek ‘Ϟ.’ In both Polish and Russian, the correspondence is “Ϟ = g” (the Russian letter ‘r’ is pronounced as /g/). However, in Ukrainian, Ϟ=h (/r/), and Ukrainian also features the sound /g/ (/r/). Russian does not have a voiced velar fricative comparable to the Ukrainian /r/. Ukrainian acquired the letter ‘r’ and its corresponding sound, /g/, as a result of close ties with Western Europe and the influence of Polish on Ukrainian. This influence was more profound and prolonged on the vernaculars of Halychyna. The magnitude of infiltration of /g/ into the vernaculars of Halychyna troubled Ohiyenko, since he considered this trend as contrary to “*the Ukrainian indigenous tradition and vernacular pronunciation*” (qtd. in Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 166). He denies that the “*Moscow influence*” caused the prevalence of ‘r’ use in the place of foreign ‘g’ in ‘Great Ukraine,’ but, rather, attributes it to the history of Ukrainian culture (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 166). Nevertheless, in the *Most Essential Rules*, Ohiyenko recommended to spell borrowings with ‘r’ in the same customary manner used in Halychyna and preserved use of ‘r’ as optional in the *Major Rules*.

Regarding hard and soft ‘л,’ the earlier *Most Essential Rules* were similar to Russian spelling and prescribed hard ‘л’ only, while the later *Major Rules* introduced soft ‘л’ as an option.

Table 3.3 Comparison of spelling using soft or hard ‘л,’ recommended by the *Most Essential Rules 1918*, *Major Rules 1919* and the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976*.

<i>Most Essential Rules 1918</i>	<i>Major Rules 1919</i>	<i>Russian Spelling (Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary 1976)</i>
Клас	Класа, but also possibly Кляса	Клас
План	План, плян	План
Новела	Новела, новеля	Новелла
Билет	Билет	Билет
Легальний	Легальний	Легальный
Легенда	Легенда	Легенда
Легіон	Легіон	Легион
Лекція	Лекція	Лекция
Логика	Логика	Логика
Флот	Флота	Флот
Филологія	філологія, фільольогія	Филология
Аналогія	Аналогія	Аналогия
Лояльний	Лояльний	Лояльный
Лозунг	Лозунг	Лозунг
Лузитанія	Лузитанія	not provided
Клуб	Клуб	Клуб

Ohiyenko’s point of view on the use of soft and hard ‘л’ in foreign origin words is evident in his *Essays*. He believed that early borrowings of ‘л’ from Greek were not pronounced soft; however, later borrowings that entered Ukrainian from German and Polish came with a soft ‘л’ (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 168). Soft ‘л’ was observed to prevail in Halychyna, where even words that had originally entered the language with hard ‘л’ around the 10th century were attributed soft ‘л,’ following the trend instigated by Polish influence (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 169). Ohiyenko disagreed that if hard ‘л’ was observed in a foreign borrowing it would indicate that the word followed the Russian spelling (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 170). He argued that if a foreign borrowing in Russian and Ukrainian displayed similar spelling, it was because in the 17th century, and at the beginning of the 18th century, Russian adopted many foreign words through the clergy and individuals educated in Ukraine (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 119-120). Ohiyenko uses the word *клас* as

an example of a spelling reflecting the traditional Ukrainian style of pronunciation with hard ‘л’ (this form was introduced into the Russian educational system), while *кляса* represents the Latin-Polish form of the word (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 120). Nevertheless, the *Major Rules* stipulated that ‘л’ could be used in its soft form as well: *кляса, плян, фльота, новеля, фільольогія, etc.*

The variations in spelling suggested by the above guidelines of the *Most Essential Rules* and the *Major Rules* are not limited to questions of ‘р’ or ‘р’ and ‘л’ (hard or soft). Two other widely debated issues can be observed: the rendering of foreign ‘i’ in Ukrainian and the gender of borrowed words as they appear in Ukrainian. The *Most Essential Rules* feature ‘и’ in transliteration of foreign ‘i’ (*термінологія, філологія*), while the *Major Rules* present ‘і’ (*термінологія, філологія, фільольогія*) (Nimchuk 257-258). The list of examples in the *Most Essential Rules* includes the words ‘клас’ and ‘флот’ as masculine gender nouns with hard ‘л’ (Nimchuk 257-258). The *Major Rules* add the variants ‘класа’ (feminine gender, hard ‘л’), ‘кляса’ (feminine gender, soft ‘л’), ‘флота’ (feminine gender, hard ‘л’) and ‘фльота’ (feminine gender, soft ‘л’) (Nimchuk 258). Ukrainian noun gender, similar to other Slavic languages including Polish and Russian, is determined by the structure of the word—specifically, by its ending. When a foreign word entered Ukrainian, it was traditionally attributed with a gender based on its ending, disregarding the word’s actual gender, if there was one, in the donor language (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 187).

In contrast, when borrowing, the Polish language often tried to preserve the original gender of the word and if the foreign word ending contradicted the gender ending required by Polish grammar, the word ending was often altered to conform to grammar rules (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 188-191). This was particularly true for feminine nouns because Polish has a large number of foreign words that were attributed the ‘a’ (feminine) ending (Ohiyenko *Narysy...*

188-190). This Polish tradition heavily influenced western Ukrainian dialects. Some borrowings that underwent Polish transformation penetrated the language of Dnieper Ukraine as well, i.e., *база (basis), криза (crisis), фаза (phase)*. These words were accepted as natural in Ukrainian, since, through Polish, they had already received the widely accepted Ukrainian ‘a’ ending and they did not look foreign at all (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 192). The words *клас – класа, кляса* underwent this transformation as well: Latin feminine *classis* is represented in Polish as feminine *klasa* (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 188). The word *flota* entered Polish from Italian and preserved its feminine ending there. (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 189). The *Essays* included lists and tables of comparison on how borrowed words appeared in Polish and in the vernaculars of Halychyna and Great Ukraine. The word *клас* and *флот* are listed as words used in the areas of Great Ukraine, while *класа, кляса, флота* (Ohiyenko also provided a variant, *фльо́та*) were found in the vernaculars of Halychyna because “*the Ukrainian language in Halychyna [was] following the Polish language*” (qtd. in Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 191). In the *Essays*, Ohiyenko argues that the Ukrainian tradition of borrowing formed as early as the 10th century, long before Russia and Russian existed in their present state (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 190). Numerous written documents dating back to the 11th century provide plenty of examples of borrowings. (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 190). The mere concordance of the gender of a borrowed word in Russian and Ukrainian cannot support the conclusion that the Ukrainian word just followed the Russian model (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 190).

The *Most Essential Rules* contained a prescription for how to treat words beginning with ‘i’²¹: “*At the beginning of a word, where there is no ‘üi’ sound, one should write ‘i’ (not ‘u’)...*”

²¹ Ukrainian ‘i’ is a letter that represents the sound /i/. This sound is represented by the letter ‘и’ in Russian. The letter ‘i’ is not in the modern Russian alphabet.

however, before ‘н’ it is acceptable to write ‘и’²²: *иниий, инколи, иней...*” (qtd. in Nimchuk 279). This topic was also addressed in the orthographic rules adopted some time later. The *Most Essential Rules* on feminine noun case endings: “*Feminine nouns ending in a consonant, acquire the ending ‘u’ in singular genitive case. In singular dative and singular locative, ‘i’ should be written, for example: Genitive case: з ночі, коло печі, з подорожі, цієї соли, нічної тіни, без сповіди, без відповіді, з радості, до смерті. Exception: в осені*” (qtd. in Nimchuk 300).

The *Major Rules* included 28 paragraphs on the spelling of Ukrainian words and 12 paragraphs under the title ‘*Правопис чужих слів в українській мові*’ (Nimchuk 251-252). They addressed, among others, the following issues:

1. Use of –ія, –іє, and –ї in loan words: “*In foreign words, write –ія, –іє, not –іа, –іє: матеріал, геніяльний, спеціальний, фіялка, варіант, диявол, діякон, пієтизм, гієна*”. “*The letter ‘i’ after a vowel in foreign words should be rendered through ‘ї’ (not ‘i’): Каїн, Михаїл, Гавриїл, Рафаїл, Енеїда, архаїчний, героїчний, руїна, архаїзм*” (Nimchuk 309). This orthography followed Ukrainian pronunciation. If a loan word contained ‘іє’ and ‘іа’ letter combinations, /i/ directly influenced the following /e/ and /a/ and made them sound iotified (/ja/ and /je/).
2. Writing of the reflexive suffix –ся: It was to be written with the verb, rather than writing it before the verb as was done in Halychyna, following Polish (Dingley 177).
3. Writing adjectival suffixes: the soft sign is always to be present in adjectival suffixes –ськ-, –цьк- (Dingley 177)
4. Cluster ‘св’ and ‘зв’: no soft sign is needed before ‘в’: *світ, звір* (Dingley 177).

²² Ukrainian ‘и’ is a letter that represents the sound /□/. The corresponding Russian letter ‘ы’ represents the sound /□/, which is close to the Ukrainian /□/, but is not exactly the same.

Ohiyenko posited that borrowed words, in many cases, had entered Ukrainian first from Greek, Polish, or German and were later brought to Russian from Ukrainian (Ohiyenko *Narysy* 119). The earlier rules compiled by Ohiyenko recommended only the Western Ukrainian (Halychyna) technique of rendering foreign ‘g’ through ‘r.’ The subsequent *Major Rules* preserved this Western Ukrainian variant and added the Western Ukrainian option for rendering foreign ‘l.’ The *Major Rules’* prescription to render ‘g’ and ‘l’ in loan words in the same way as they were rendered in the vernaculars of Dnieper Ukraine enticed Dingley to deduce that the rules were largely based on ‘*Eastern Ukrainian dialects*’ (Dingley 177). This conclusion can be attributed to the *Major Rules* only in combination with a note that the rules also included Western Ukrainian variants as fully legitimate options for spelling.

The *Essays* demonstrated that Ohiyenko favored the historical tradition of the ancient times and not the more recent Polonized forms. Nevertheless, he included the spelling variants practiced in Halychyna in both *Most Essential* and *Major Rules*. Both the Western and Dnieper regions of Ukraine had experienced a greater degree of Polish influence than had Russia and this fact had to be reflected, even if it meant the perversion of original forms as they had appeared in earlier Ukrainian, at the time of borrowing from Greek. The spelling variations were primarily a result of Ukraine being partitioned between Poland and Russia for a long period of time. Western Ukraine, particularly Halychyna, underwent a more profound Polish influence compared to Dnieper Ukraine. This history influenced both pronunciation and spelling and the variation could not be ignored during the development of Ukrainian orthographic rules.

Ohiyenko’s codification projects were launched in response to the need for a standard language for a newly formed country. For the first time in centuries, Ukraine had received its own statehood, which incorporated both the Western and Dnieper regions. Different historical

paths produced linguistic and cultural differences for the regions, but both of the regions contributed to Ukrainian civilization, and these differences made Ukrainian culture and language richer and more diverse. It would have been inapt to ignore this fact during codification, especially since codification was meant to contribute to the Ukrainian state-building process. The *Major Rules* were approved five days before the symbolic *Akt Zluky* was brought into force. The unification, inclusiveness, and elimination of the dividing border between Western and Dnieper Ukraine were on the political agenda of the Ukrainian government and these tendencies can be traced to the orthographic rules proposed in 1919.

The codification process was expected to produce linguistic norms, which were meant to guide users of the language towards the elected or developed standard. The more straightforward the rules, the easier it would be to implement and follow them. The incorporation of the country's myth-building needs into the orthographic rules spared the country much discontent on the part of those whose vernacular would have been dismissed as unsuitable for the standard; this, however produced ambiguity, since it left unanswered such questions as soft or hard 'л,' feminine or masculine noun genders, 'r' or 'r?' This ambiguity is evident in Dingley's assigning question marks to rules of hard or soft 'л' and 'i' or 'и' where he provides the summary of Ohiyenko's recommendations and questions (Dingley 177). Had Ohiyenko and his group had an opportunity to continue their work, they may have developed a plan to implement and elaborate these rules and incorporate both Dnieper and Western Ukrainian orthographic traditions into one standard. Unfortunately, Ukraine's independence was short lived, and further codification continued on a different political background.

The *Major Rules (1919)* and the *Most Essential Rules* became the grounds for further work, which continued after the Bolsheviks had taken over Kyiv at the end of 1919. On

November 20, 1920, the Ukrainian Academy of Science approved *The Most Essential Rules (1919)* and the People's Commissar of Education of Soviet Ukraine, H. Hrynko,²³ endorsed the *The Most Essential Rules*, which had been developed and adopted under the Directory government (Nimchuk 252, Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 13). Efforts to develop a standard Ukrainian language did not falter under Bolshevik rule. The Bolsheviks needed the support of the Borot'bists, a party of individuals who adhered to ideas surrounding the cultural and administrative autonomy of Ukraine and thrived to build a new Ukrainian identity. The development of a standard variety was essential for these projects, because a standard would project the unity of the nation by being the common mode of communication; the elevated status of a standard "can mobilize and empower people" (qtd. in Bilaniuk 2). In addition, the Bolsheviks needed the Ukrainian language as a tool for promoting their ideology in Ukraine: eighty per cent of the population were Ukrainians and spoke Ukrainian and not every one of them could understand Russian. (Solchanyk 64, Magocsi *Ukraine...* 231).

3.2. Codification in Soviet Ukraine before and during Ukrainianization

The work of the Orthography and Terminology Commission was important in the development of the standard language, and had the potential to bring eastern and western linguistic communities closer together. Formed during the time of the Ukrainian People's Republic, it continued its work under Bolshevik rule. The Commission was headed by A. Krymskyi and managed by H. Holoskevych. In the second half of 1921, the Commission became part of a new agency, the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language, formed under the umbrella of the Academy of Science (Nimchuk 252). In 1921, as a result of the Commission's

²³ Hryhoriy Hrynko, Borot'bist, a member of the first Ukrainian Soviet government (Maistrenko 171). In 1922, Hrynko was expelled from the position of People's Commissar of Education for his 'excessive haste in carrying out ukrainianization' (Solchanyk 68).

work, a book of new rules was prepared. A comparison of the publications of 1919 and 1921 indicated that the new rules had been based on and had supplemented the rules authored by Ohiyenko, and published in 1919 (Nimchuk 253). The new book contained 32 rules on spelling of native words and 14 rules on spelling borrowings (Nimchuk 252). The rules included the most consistent and rational traditions developed by Ukrainian linguists during the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The code of 1921 was highly regarded and led to the 1922 publication of a set of rules, *‘Правописні правила, прийняті Науковим товариством імені Шевченка у Львові.’* (Orthographic Rules Adopted by the Lviv Shevchenko Scientific Society) (Nimchuk 253). As a result, Western Ukraine acquired a set of orthographic rules similar to the Code of 1921. Ukraine made a step towards bringing the linguistic communities of Dnieper and Western Ukraine closer to one another.

The Soviet Orthographic Code of Ukrainian adopted in 1921 prescribed the following use of ‘r,’ ‘r,’ and ‘л’ (soft and hard) in foreign loan words:

1. The sound ‘g’ in foreign words was to be rendered through ‘г’: *гімназія, телеграф, генерал, газета, термінологія, психологія*. However, in a foreign family name, ‘g’ had to be differentiated from ‘h’: *Гюго, Гутгейль, Гріг, Гартман* (Nimchuk 258).
2. In most cases, in foreign words, the sound ‘л’ was not to be palatalized, *‘i.e. write a, e, o, y, not я, є, ьо, ю, after ‘л’:* *класа, план, лавровий, лантух, латинський, новела, білет, легальний, легенда, легіон, лекція, логіка, флота, філологія, аналогія, лояльний, лозунг, Лузітанія, клуб...’* ‘Л’ is soft in only a few words that entered Ukrainian via Polish: *пляшка, клямка, ляда, лямна, канцелярія, льох* (Nimchuk 258).
3. Similar to the *Most Essential Rules*, the Orthographic Code of 1921 stipulated that ‘ія’ and ‘іє’ had to be used to render foreign clusters ‘ia’ and ‘ie’: *матеріал, геніяльний,*

спеціальний, фіялка, варіант. Foreign ‘io’ was to be transliterated as ‘io’ (*ембріон, біоскоп, соціологія*), except in ‘naturalized’ words, for which both ‘io’ and ‘йо’ would have been correct (*курйоз – курйоз, серйозний – серйозний*). Also, the following words were to be written with ‘йо’: *бульйон, мільйон, медальйон*. ‘І’ was to be written for foreign ‘i’ following a vowel: *Каїн, Михаїл, Енеїда, архаїчний, героїчний* (Nimchuk 309).

The short orthographic code of 1921 was not sufficient for the needs of the country and the codification process continued. The next major development in the corpus planning of the Ukrainian language took place in July of 1925. The Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic mandated the creation of an Orthographic Commission under the umbrella of the People’s Commissariat of Education (the Soviet government department responsible for education) (Nimchuk 253). Oleksandr Shumskyi,²⁴ the People’s Commissar of Education of Ukraine, chaired the Commission. Once again, the Commission included many distinguished linguists, and amongst them were individuals who took part in the previous commissions, as well as representatives from Western Ukraine: S. Smal’-Stotskyi, V. Hnatyuk, and V. Simovych. The State Order on the establishment of this Commission emphasized that the Commission was to use the code of 1921 as the foundation for the rules it was to develop and that it was to formulate its recommendations based on the contemporary standard variety, which integrated the major dialects (Nimchuk 254). The results of the groundwork done by Ohiyenko and his group during the time of independent Ukraine penetrated the orthography of Soviet Ukraine. This occurred through the use of rules developed in 1918-1919 for the code of 1921, as well as through individuals appearing in the Orthographic Commissions of independent and Soviet Ukraine.

²⁴ Oleksandr Shumskyi (1890-1946), Ukrainian national-Communist, proponent of Ukrainianization (Magocsi *Ukraine...* 225), former Borotbist (Magocsi *A History...* 532)

Table 3.4 Individuals participating in the work of Orthographic Commissions from 1919-1925. These lists are not exhaustive.

Specialists working with the Codification Commissions in 1918 and in January 1919	Orthographic and Terminological Commission formed in March 1919	Orthographic and Terminological Commission as part of the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language of the Academy of Science 1921	Orthographic Commission of the People's Commissariat of Education 1925
Ohiyenko Tymchenko Smal-Stotskyi Hrunskyi Loboda Naumenko Holoskevych Kurylo Shal' Hantsov Nikonovsky Krymskyi	Krymskyi Holoskevych	Krymskyi Holoskevych	Shumskyi Krymskyi Tymchenko Holoskevych Solohub Yavorskyj Synyavskyi Pylypenko Kurylova (Kurylo) Iohanesen Kasyanenko Richytskyi Kalyuznyi Yalovyi Popov Hrunskyi Hantsov Sulyma Butvyn Koryak Khvyliovyi Yefremov Sekunda Kyrychenko Sokolyankyi Skrypnyk Dyatlov Nakonechnyi Sulyma Nimchynov Bulakhovskyi Kalynovych Demyanchuk Tkachenko Hladkyi

Specialists working with the Codification Commissions in 1918 and in January 1919	Orthographic and Terminological Commission formed in March 1919	Orthographic and Terminological Commission as part of the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language of the Academy of Science 1921	Orthographic Commission of the People's Commissariat of Education 1925
			Smal'-Stotskyi Hnatyuk Simovych

Source: These lists have been developed based on the data presented by Nimchuk (250-256).

All commissions that were working to codify Ukrainian aimed at developing a standard variety, which would represent features of various dialects: they *'all the time kept in mind the spoken dialects and the history of the language'* (qtd. in Nimchuk 255). However, the process of corpus planning in Ukraine differed from the conventional approach to selection, where a specific vernacular was selected as adequate to be included in the standard language, while linguistic features of other vernaculars were dismissed. The Ukrainian specialists involved in the corpus planning were reluctant to elevate a particular variant to the position of standard—rather, they chose to compromise and incorporate. The order establishing the new Commission of 1925 recommended to use the same approach and to continue codification work based on the standard variety that would integrate major dialects (Nimchuk 254). As a result, the Draft Orthographic Code prepared by the Commission of 1926 can be viewed as derived from the Code of 1921.

The spirit of building statehood, which, at the time of independence, fuelled the idea of incorporating the two writing traditions into standard Ukrainian, was still a guiding force for the members of the 1925 Commission. One member, linguist Oleksa Synyavskyi, wrote that all individuals involved in the work of the Commission strived to eliminate linguistic

inconsistencies and they believed that only mutual compromises could eventually direct standard Ukrainian into a single, logically consistent avenue (Nimchuk 263). The development of a viable, uniform language was the Commission's goal. Their plan of action included further work on the rules for spelling borrowed words. In 1926, the Commission produced a Draft Orthographic Code of Ukrainian, based on the rules of 1921 (Nimchuk 258). The Draft contained the following provisions:

1. The letter 'i' was to be used for rendering foreign 'i' when placed after a consonant but before a vowel. It was required to render foreign 'ia' as 'ія,' 'ie' as 'іе,' 'io' as 'іо,' but 'iu' as 'іу': *матеріал, історія, копія, Азія, соціалізм, спеціальний, мініатюрний, палятив, амоніак, діалект, гіяцинт, авдієнція, гієна, клієнт, тріумф, тріумвірат, радіус, консилиум, медіум, ембріон, геліотроп, біоскоп, соціологія, аксіома, Онтаріо*. After vowels, 'i' was to be rendered as 'ї': *Каїн, руїна, егоїст, Енеїда, прозаїк, наївний, целюлоїд* (Nimchuk 310).
2. Foreign 'l' had to be rendered in Ukrainian as hard or soft depending on whether a word had been borrowed, how 'l' had been pronounced in other languages, and the means of borrowing. It was impossible to identify all situations pertaining to 'l' in borrowings; however, in some types of borrowings 'l' was rendered in Ukrainian in a fairly consistent manner:
 - Foreign 'le' was to be rendered as 'ле': *білет, колега, лекція, Каледонія* (Nimchuk 259)
 - In foreign words that had come into Ukrainian from the West (regardless of their origins), especially for words of Greek origin, in most cases, one had to write ла, ло, лу (usually before a hard consonant) and 'л' in the final syllable position: *аероплан, балада, капела, класа, філантропія, Ламартін, Платон, алопатія, аналогія, балон, глобус, лозунг,*

семасіологія, філологічний, Коломбо, блуза, лунатизм, Лувр, балкон, Балкани, адмірал, бал. However, sometimes (especially before if followed by a soft syllable) one had to write *ля, льо, лю* (always *лю* from French *lu* and German *la*): *астролябія, вакуоля, лябіялізація, пляж, абсолютизм, алюміній, люк, флюс, целюльоза, Лютер, Лютеція, альбатрос, альгебра, альманах, асфальт, Альбїон, Альжир, культура, факультет, автомобіль, ансамбль, стиль, Версаль* (Nimchuk 259).

- ‘Л’ was consistently soft in such clusters as: *-лювати – анулювати; -люція – еволюція; -ляндія* (in the names of countries): *Голяндія, Гренляндія; -ляр – екземпляр, окуляр; -лярія – канцелярія; -лятор – акумулятор; -ляція – акумуляція; -льний – актуальний; -льоз, -льоза, -льозний – скрупульозний, целюльоза* (Nimchuk 259-260).

The 1926 *Draft Orthographic Code* contained the following provisions regarding the use of ‘г’ and ‘r’:

1. Foreign ‘h’ and ‘g’ had to be rendered with ‘г’: *агрономія, агент, агітація, егоїст, бравнінг, генерал, гегемонія, гігієна, гігроскоп, гангрена, гімназія, географія, фігура, телеграф.*
2. However, foreign names, family names, and geographical names were to be distinguished in Ukrainian – *г → h* and *г → g*: *Готфїрд, Густав, Гергард, Гетель, Гавтман, Гріт, Чїкаго, Копенгаген, Гранада, Тегран.* Foreign ‘g’ was to be rendered as Ukrainian ‘г’ in geographical names that had entered the Ukrainian language a long time ago: *Галилея, Голгота, Рига, Єгипет, Англія, Киргїзія, Грузія, Греція.* Also, in German geographical names, where ‘g’ followed a consonant, one was to write ‘г’ and not ‘r,’ because in the German language, ‘g,’ in most cases, was not pronounced: *Зальцбург, Гамбург.* All

derivatives were to preserve the spelling of the original noun: *копенгагенський, твінеєць* (Nimchuk 260).

The *Draft* was debated at the Commission meetings and among members of the Ukrainian public. A special All-Ukrainian Conference was held from May 26 to June 6, 1927 to discuss the proposed rules. The debates were intense, especially surrounding the topics of transliteration of foreign ‘l’ and ‘g’-‘h.’ These were challenging issues since the Commission wanted to reach a compromise that could incorporate both the Greek and Western-European traditions. As a result, the rules introduced by the Commission were rather difficult to use: in some words foreign ‘l’ was transliterated as a hard sound, in others, as soft, because the borrowings entered Ukrainian in different ways. The older borrowings, especially those borrowed prior to the mid-nineteenth century, contained a hard ‘л;’ those introduced later contained a soft ‘л.’ Nevertheless the *Draft* was passed and the Ukrainian Orthographic Code was adopted by an order of the People’s Commissar of Education, M. Skrypnyk, on September 6, 1928. This Code prescribed the following treatment of borrowings:

The rule regarding treatment of foreign ‘ia,’ ‘ie,’ ‘iu,’ and ‘io’ changed slightly in comparison with the 1926 Draft Code. Those clusters of letters were to be rendered through ‘ія,’ ‘іє,’ ‘ію,’ and ‘іо’: *матеріал, історія, спеціальний, амоніак, діалект, авдієнція, гієна, клієнт, тріюмф, радіус, консиліум, медіум, ембріон, геїліотрон, біоскоп, соціологія, аксіома, Онтаріо.* ‘l’ after vowels was to be rendered through ‘ї’: *Каїн, руїна, егоїст, Енеїда, наївний, целюлоїд* (Nimchuk 310).

Words of Greek origin, which entered Ukrainian during ancient times with hard ‘л,’ as well as old borrowings from other languages were to be written with hard ‘л’ (ла, ло, лу, л):

1. ла – *атланти, атлас, Лакедемон, латинський, фабула, фаланга, філантропія*, and always ‘а’ after double ‘лл’ – *вілла, Гелладало: аналогія, логіка, диплом, кілограм, пілот, хлор, циклон*, always ‘о’ after double ‘лл’: *Отелло* (Nimchuk 262)
2. лу: *лунатизм, плутократія* (Nimchuk 262)
3. л at the end of a syllable: *адмірал, бал* (meaning grade), but *баль* (meaning banquet or party), *Балкани, фалд, фали* (Nimchuk 262)
4. foreign ‘le’ to be transliterated through ле: *білет, галера, делегат, Палермо, телеграма, холера* (Nimchuk 262)
5. in words of English origin: at the end of a word and before consonants, no ‘ь’: *Албїон, біл, булдог, толкінер, Велз, Далтон* (Nimchuk 262)
6. Soft ‘л’ is to be used for more recent borrowings from Western European languages:
 - ля: *аероплян, баляда, балянс, бациля, гіперболя* (always ‘ля’ in the endings), , *галянтерея, деклямація, заля, іслям, скаля, флякон*. (Nimchuk 262). A few exceptions to this rule were suggested, however.
 - льо: *бальон, бльокада, Кольомбо, льозунг, фльора, фльоата* (Nimchuk 262)
 - лю: *блюза, Лювр, люпа, металюргія* (Nimchuk 262)
 - ль should be written at the end of a syllable: *автомобіль, альгебра, Альжїр, алькоголь, альхемія, асфальт, балькон, бінокль, бухгалтер, васаль, вольт* (Nimchuk 263).

Like the rules regarding ‘л,’ the rules for rendering foreign ‘h’ and ‘g’ were also difficult and ambiguous. If ‘g’ was part of an older borrowing, especially one that entered Ukrainian from Greek, it had to be transliterated through г: *Англія, газ, газета, гама, гегемонія, генеалогія, генерал, геній, географія, граматика, грам, кілограм, Германія, гігієна, Грузія, група, гімназія, гіпс, градус, граф, дифтонг, егоїзм, Рига, трагедія, фігура* (Nimchuk 263).

In newer borrowings coming from Western Europe, however, ‘r’ had to be used in place of the original ‘g’: агент, агітація, агроном, Гюго, гвардія, Гвінея, Гергард, гарантія, гірлянда, глядіатор, грандіозний, Гріг, гума, диригент, інтелігент, літвіст, міграція, Чікаго (Nimchuk 263).

Throughout its work, the Commission carefully considered if a word was Greek or not (Nimchuk 263). Though sometimes it was hard, even for a linguist, to determine if a word had come into Ukrainian from Greek or other languages, the members of the Commission believed that with time, the population would be able to learn and master the spelling of each particular word and subsequently the need to know the etymology of a word would disappear (Nimchuk 263). They believed that the correct spelling would elevate into a writing habit (Nimchuk 263-264). This approach had some merit, since in some other languages—English, for example—a lot of spelling peculiarities had to be memorized. Similarly, one now just remembers when to use hard ‘л’ and soft ‘л’ in modern standard Ukrainian. People spell these words and others correctly not because they know their origin, but rather because they memorized the correct spelling and pronunciation. The members of the Commission believed that the rules they developed would be manageable: 5-10 years later, everything, they hoped, would become natural (Nimchuk 263-264). Though the rules regarding the transliteration of ‘l,’ ‘h,’ and ‘g’ in borrowed words were difficult to use even for linguists, they were unanimously adopted and approved by the Commission. The rules were also accepted beyond the borders of Soviet Ukraine by the Ukrainian population in Halychyna, Bukowyna, Transcarpathia, and by émigrés living overseas (Nimchuk 266). This was an important achievement in the process of developing the standard variety in Ukraine. The nation received a set of rules that codified the spelling, punctuation, phonetic, and morphological structure of the Ukrainian language. The Code

reflected the historical past of the Ukrainian people and the impact of other nations on the language of Ukraine.

The emergence of a standard language can be relatively peaceful and natural, without battles, pressure, or debates. On the other hand the standard may be engineered under circumstances where speakers of rival dialects take zealous actions to ascend their vernacular to the level of a standard (Joseph 60-61). The discontentment of those who failed to ensure their vernacular became a standard could result in their negative outlook on the standard; they may believe their vernaculars are suppressed by the standard and acts of suppression may have indeed taken place. These dynamics may break up the nation and the standard, functioning as a separating factor instead of being a unifying force. The major principle in developing the Ukrainian standard language was to incorporate, rather than select. In this way, the language planners involved in the process of codification between 1918 and 1928 tried to diminish the inevitable effects of a standard variety's separating function.

The incorporation approach, however, was fraught with challenges too. It did not eliminate the rivalry between dialects, but rather shifted it to the level of individual rules, examples, and exceptions. Synyavskyi described the tension between the writing traditions of Dnieper Ukraine and Halychyna at the All-Ukrainian Orthographic Conference as tenacious and lingering, and it was not so much the rivalry of the two orthographic and linguistic traditions, but rather a battle of the two cultural and historical supremacies (qtd. in Nimchuk 260). The incorporation rather than selection approach made the process of codification intense and the resulting orthographic rules were complicated and difficult to use. S. Yefremov, a member of the Commission, sarcastically remarked that this form of compromising had resulted "*in few literate souls remaining in Ukraine*" (qtd. in Nimchuk 264). Despite the intensity of the debates,

the developers of the 1928 rules were linguistically oriented. The arguments of individuals representing both traditions were articulate and substantiated (Nimchuk 260). The members of the Commission were motivated by the desire to use all their linguistic and cultural knowledge to give their nation a standard language capable of reflecting the unique linguistic and cultural traditions of the nation. In this respect, during codification, rationales of political nature were given some consideration, alongside the purely linguistic properties of existent vernaculars.

3.3. Codification of Ukrainian during the Post-Ukrainianization Period (1933-1938)

In 1933, the Soviet government disrupted what was, for the most part, a linguistically motivated process geared at the development of standard Ukrainian. The abolishment of both the NEP and the ukrainianization policy marked the end of a period of relative liberalism in the country. The Soviet authorities undertook to prepare a number of politically motivated changes to the 1928 code. In 1933, the Soviet authorities established another Commission with the assignment of finding and remedying the rules, which, as the government claimed, were taking Ukrainian away from Russian—rules that were seen as bourgeois and nationalistic (Nimchuk 264, 266-267). The new Commission, issued amendments to the rules without any public discussions. The new rules followed the spelling patterns of similar borrowed words in Russian.

1. The Commission compiled a list of words that were supposed to contain hard ‘l’ (л) and those that were to be written with soft ‘l’ (ль).

- ‘Lа,’ ‘lo,’ ‘lu,’ ‘le,’ ‘l’ –borrowings from foreign languages were to be rendered through hard ‘л’: *формула, клас, соціологія, Ла-Мани, пленум, лекція, телеграф* (Nimchuk 268)
- Soft ‘л,’ similar to Russian, was to be used in the words *автомобіль, регулятор, пляж* (Nimchuk 268).

- The transliteration of borrowings from English was to be done through hard ‘л’ (*Мелвелл, голкіпер*), unless a word had been adopted with the soft sound (*біль, бульдог, Вільсон*), or through the years was traditionally pronounced softly (*лямна, заля, новеля*) (Nimchuk 268).
2. The rule regarding foreign ‘h’ and ‘g’ provided that both letters, disregarding their pronunciation, were to be transliterated using ‘г’: гіпотеза, гандбол, Гюго, генерація, графік, гума, міграція, гегемонія, Гете (Nimchuk 268).
 3. The rules of 1933 also changed the Genitive Case endings of third declension feminine nouns from ‘и’ to ‘і.’ If the suffix ‘ен’ was present, the Genitive ‘и’ ending for neuter nouns was left unchanged (*імени*) (Nimchuk 300).
 4. It was recommended to write ‘і’ instead of ‘ї’ after vowels in all borrowings: *героїчний, прозаїк, геніальний, архаїчний, егоїзм, Енеїда* (Nimchuk 310-311).

The Soviet government claimed the *Український правопис* (Ukrainian Orthography) of 1928 oriented the language towards Western bourgeois culture and therefore ought to be abolished. Later changes to Ukrainian orthography, made in 1938, furthered the integration of Russian features into standard Ukrainian (Nimchuk 268-269). The alphabet presented in the 1938 Draft code of Orthographic Rules did not contain letter ‘г’ at all. The Genitive case ending of neuter nouns containing the suffix ‘ен’ was changed to ‘і’ to resemble the Russian style pronunciation and grammar (*імени* (Ukrainian) *имени* (Russian)) (Nimchuk 268-269). The rules of 1938, like the rules of 1933, emphasized that ‘і,’ not ‘ї’ was to be written after vowels in loan words (*героїчний, прозаїк*) (Nimchuk 269). This change directly copied the Russian pronunciation and spelling of corresponding words (*героический, прозаик*). It also initiated the

process of phasing out the presence of ‘ї’ in Ukrainian. The gradual abolishing of ‘ї’ was beneficial for the assimilation of Ukrainian into Russian, since there is no ‘ї’ in Russian.

The history of language development is strongly intertwined with the history of a nation. The structure and elements of a language, reflect the historical path of its speakers and borrowings, and serve as indicators of historical, cultural, and trade ties between the speakers of both donor and recipient languages. Language also marks the separateness of a group (Fasold 3-4). The 1933-38 changes to the spelling rules of borrowed words in Ukrainian removed any differences in the graphical appearance of the borrowed words in both Ukrainian and Russian. Graphically foreign words started to look identical or almost identical in the two languages.

Depriving Ukrainian of its distinct features diminished the separateness of Ukrainian speakers from Russian speakers and eradicated all evidence of the separate historical pathways of the two nations. The new orthography suggested that the borrowings came to Ukrainian from Russian. New orthographic rules in Ukrainian abolished its diversity and created the perception of similarity and indivisibility from Russian culture. Historical connections between Ukraine and other Western civilizations were lost in the language. Through the orthographic rules of 1933 and 1938, the Soviet government rewrote not only the history of the Ukrainian language, but also the history of the nation. Conveniently, this served the purpose of building a new monolithic society.

The changes of 1933 and 1938 also permitted the dictatorial Soviet government to build a rather closed society. The Soviet government did not encourage knowledge of foreign languages or the gaining of international (especially Western) experience by the general public. The amendments to Ukrainian spelling rules eliminated the need to know the spelling of foreign words in order to determine the correct Ukrainian spelling. This resulted in fewer chances that

the country's population would be exposed to potential Western influences through foreign language acquisition. Isolated from the rest of the world, people could receive only the information given to them by the Soviet authorities. Information was censored, altered, and engineered to direct people into believing what the authorities needed them to believe. In this respect, standard Ukrainian was altered on the level of grammar forms, spelling, and even letters of the alphabet to engineer linguistic and historical unity of both Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups.

An alphabet, as a system of writing, is a very important attribute and tool of any language. On the level of symbol-sound, it gives a deeper understanding of the language's contemporary phonological system, as well as the historical mechanisms of its development. An alphabet can serve as a tool for language change; at the same time, it can become the target of a political mandate (Joseph 32-39). The Ukrainian letters 'г' and 'ґ' and their corresponding sounds reflect different histories of the development of Ukrainian and Russian. Eliminating the letter 'г' from the Ukrainian alphabet and replacing it with 'ґ' led to the gradual disappearance of the sound /g/ from Ukrainian. Etymological dictionaries still recommended pronouncing 'г' in many words; however, because this sound was not distinguished in writing and was not supported by a discrete symbol, it began to disappear. A similar fate was in store for the letter 'ї.' In Ukrainian, traditionally, reading and articulation follow exactly the graphic representation of the text (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 14). 'ї' was being eliminated not only from pronunciation but also from borrowed words—authentic Ukrainian words began to lose it. Even the name of the country, *Україна*, was altered to follow the Russian spelling, and was written 'Україна' on the 1944 poster, 'Ukraine is Free!'

Figure 3.1 Poster, “Ukraine is Free!”



Source: Magocsi, Paul Robert. *Ukraine: An Illustrated History*. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 2007. Print

Technological advancement and its call for standardization and automation can be used by social engineers in their efforts to out-manuever the public and attain hidden goals, especially when they can use rationalization and automation as means to deny alternatives and eliminate diversity (Alexander and Schmidt 12-13). Researchers examining the techniques of social engineering expressed this concern primarily because of today’s mass standardization triggered by computerization and automation. The problem is that if there is a force in the society, including official governments, wishing to pursue a hidden agenda, they can exploit the modern world’s move towards standardization to achieve their goals. While Bolshevik social engineers labelled “bourgeois” everyone and everything that ought to be exterminated, in today’s world, a collective action can be induced relatively easily if the elimination of inefficiencies is passed off

as legitimate concern. Current information systems and social networks make individuals easily accessible, meaning all sorts of messages can be delivered instantly to millions of people, with the possibility of measuring the public's response, thereby making the danger of social engineering even more profound today than it was in 1917-1938.

This concern is also relevant to the pre-computer and social networking era, since a quest for efficiency and cost-savings could result in deliberate or accidental propaganda. In the past, propaganda appeared in printed materials such as newspapers, books, and posters as a tool to deliver messages, both hidden and expressed, to the masses. There could be a number of reasons why the poster *УКРАЇНА ВІЛЬНА!* (Ukraine is Free) shows 'I' instead of 'İ' in the word "УКРАЇНА" ("UKRAINE"). For example, the artist's personal unawareness of the correct Ukrainian spelling of the word could have been the reason for the misspelling. However, it could also be a result of the 1933 and 1938 elimination of 'i' from borrowed words—it is possible this elimination pushed its way past borrowed words and into authentic Ukrainian words, i.e., *УКРАЇНА* vs *УКРАЇНА*. Alternatively, one of the reasons could be an effort to make the printing process simpler and cheaper by means of using one symbol, 'I,' to depict both 'I' and 'İ'.

The spelling "УКРАЇНА" leads the reader to mentally pronounce the word 'Ukraine' in a Russian sounding manner, "Україна." If the change of spelling was dictated by an effort to improve the efficiency of printing processes and did not intend to alter the Ukrainian pronunciation, this technological shortcut involuntarily brought Ukrainian closer to Russian in pronunciation. Efforts to improve efficiency of production or technology that are undertaken without consideration for both the human and historical aspects of the matter can result in unanticipated adverse social impact. If the changes involve modern technological systems and,

especially, if the true intentions of a social engineer are passed off as improving efficiency, the resulting problem could be so profound as to incite the emergence of “a wholly new and terrifying social order” (qtd. in Alexander and Schmidt 12). One can argue that although it was simpler and cheaper to maintain one letter in the printing system rather than two, there was a political reason for the new spelling, “УКРАЇНА,” especially if the assimilation of Ukrainian with Russian had become the official policy behind the codification work of 1933 and 1938. Similarly, when the Latin script of the Soviet Central Asian alphabets was replaced with Cyrillic in the 1930s, the authorities could have claimed that the high cost, problems with accessibility of printing equipment, and technical difficulties associated with supporting Latin script made the switch to Cyrillic a rational solution. The true primary reason, however, was ideological: using the same script across the country emphasized that there were no barriers of graphization within the Soviet Union, where Russian was the language of power (Crisp 29, Millar 185-186).

The authorities perceived the symbols ‘r’ and ‘i,’ which are not part of the Russian alphabet, as barriers separating the Ukrainian and Russian languages. Political interference eliminated the letter ‘i’ and the sound it represented from borrowings and this process also began to affect native Ukrainian words. The letter ‘r’ was especially troubling for the Soviet authorities. It not only made Ukrainian printed text look distinctively different from Russian, but it also symbolized the separate history of the development of Ukrainian. It indicated that Ukraine had a historical and cultural past that was different from Russia’s experience. The Russian language contained the sound /g’/; however, it did not have a sound corresponding to the foreign /h/. In this respect, Ukrainian, with the possession of both /g/ and /h/, was better equipped to transliterate foreign words. This feature may have also been troubling for the Soviet authorities because the Russian language, which was glorified as the language of the

‘older brother’ and the language of Lenin, was not supposed to be less versatile than the language of a national minority. The existence of both /g/ and /h/ in Ukrainian aligned the Ukrainian phonological system with the systems of other European languages. In order to align the Ukrainian language with Russian, the authorities sacrificed the sound /g/ (/r/).

One can argue that since /g/ existed in Russian and /h/ did not, in order to bring Ukrainian closer to Russian, it would have made sense to eliminate /h/ and replace it with /g/ throughout the language. This argument would have been true for the phonological, but not the graphical alignment of the two languages. In the 1930s, graphical representation was probably more important for the creation of the right impression. Printed literature was the primary means of reaching the broadest audience. If a Ukrainian text looked like Russian in print, it would project the overall impression that the two languages were the same. Also, printed word was culturally always given more respect in Ukraine and Russia than spoken word.

On the other hand, it would have been very difficult and expensive to change the public’s speaking habits for thousands of words containing /r/ and convert their pronunciation to the Russian-like sound by replacing /r/ with /g/. The Soviet authorities did not have to be concerned with presence of the /r/ sound in Ukrainian. In southern Russian vernaculars this sound is used in place of the standard Russian /g/. Three hundred years of Ukraine being a part of Russia made Russians aware of the Ukrainian sound /h/ corresponding to the Russian /g/. The sound /h/, since it was not a standard Russian sound, was deemed provincial, incorrect and one used only by uneducated speakers. In fact, this preconception made the existence of the authentic Ukrainian sound, /r/, corresponding to the Russian /g/, beneficial to the Soviet language planners. The elimination of /g/ made Ukrainian look inferior and substandard—this was one of the reasons why the Soviet authorities were so zealous in abolishing the letter ‘r.’ The letter was

called bourgeois and everything bourgeois was to be destroyed. In fact, the letter was so troublesome to the totalitarian regime that Stalin personally got involved to ensure that it ceased to exist (Nimchuk 289). The ‘bourgeois’ letter /r/ disappeared, alongside the orthographic rules that were perceived by the Soviet authorities as orienting the Ukrainian language towards the Western, or, as the Soviet propaganda presented them, “bourgeois” cultures.

CHAPTER 4 ELABORATION

4.1. Elaboration during Ukraine's independence (1917-1919) and pre-korenizatsiya (1919-1923)

Elaboration is a stage of language planning aimed at extending the standard variety into new areas of use. This involves developing a specialized terminology (terminology planning), launching standard language acquisition programs, and spreading the standard into all societal domains. The implementation of this stage requires extensive planning and substantial resources. Elaboration is also an on-going process: changes, new concepts, and discoveries call for the development of terms to describe and name them. While codification deals with linguistic aims and forms, elaboration is related to the functions of and attitudes to language (Holmes 102, Hornberger 29). The aspect of attitude towards language is addressed primarily at the securing acceptance stage. At the same time, at the elaboration stage, a new standard language can encounter resistance when introduced to domains that traditionally use a different variety for communication. Resistance can further complicate the intrinsically difficult and complex elaboration stage. In this respect, securing acceptance efforts, if implemented in combination with language elaboration, could ease the process of spreading the new variety within the society and produce better results. Similarly, in the elaboration stage, when a new standard language enters the areas of science, education, literature, and art it gains the endorsement of those realms, which contributes towards building the prestige of the new standard and therefore promotes its acceptance.

Elaboration was an important opportunity for independent Ukraine to promote its language and culture, making these visible within the society and using them as the building blocks of national identity. The elaboration efforts of 1917-1919 were two-fold: on one hand, the government undertook the introduction and spreading of the new Ukrainian orthographic

code across Ukraine, and on the other, the government faced the broader-spectrum need to reintroduce the Ukrainian language into the russified administrative, political, social, and cultural spheres. Along with the Ukrainian language, the new orthographic rules penetrated various areas.

The Bolsheviks also recognized that Ukrainian could serve their political needs. In December 1919, the Eighth Conference of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks passed a resolution “On Soviet Power in Ukraine,” which called to promote the development of the Ukrainian language and culture (Bondarchuk 272, Solchanyk 66). Though the resolution did not specify any practical methods for increasing the prestige of Ukrainian, it showed that the Bolsheviks foresaw the possibility of spreading the Ukrainian language and culture, since it fell in line with their goal to destroy the Russian monarchy. One can view this document as the Bolsheviks’ starting point for their future elaboration plans.

Bolsheviks needed to find support within the local population of Ukraine, as well as from existing political parties. This further enticed the Soviet authorities to make concessions to the pressures of promoting Ukrainian national ideas and to introduce some practical steps supporting Ukrainian language and culture. The Bolsheviks wanted to demonstrate that they were not foreigners in Ukraine and that their ideology had native Ukrainian coloring. On February 27, 1920, the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, a state body of Soviet power in Ukraine, passed a Decree calling for the “*use of Ukrainian in all civil and military entities on par with Great Russian*” (Bondarchuk 273). Since then, government organizations were required to accept applications and other documentations made in Ukrainian. As a result, Soviet civil servants had to possess the necessary language skills to conduct paperwork in Ukrainian. Language acquisition planning, as a component of the

elaboration stage, came to the fore in subsequent government actions because language acquisition programs have a higher probability of success if the language being acquired serves useful functions in the society (Cooper 185). Beginning in February 1920, the Soviet bureaucracy and military personnel in Ukraine were required to know Ukrainian for their daily work. Furthermore, In September 1920, another resolution, which compelled government employees to learn Ukrainian in evening schools, confirmed the language requirement for civil service employees (Bondarchuk 273). The resolutions had clear instructions regarding hiring policies and measures, which, if implemented, would have allowed the inclusion of more Ukrainian speakers into the civil service (Bondarchuk 273). The February 1922 plenary meeting of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine confirmed the commitment to use Ukrainian in its work. The meeting documentation stipulated that the knowledge of Ukrainian was essential for public administration (Bondarchuk 273).

Soviet power could have secured its future in Ukraine only if the Ukrainian people adopted Bolshevik ideologies. In order for the Bolsheviks to appear that they belonged in Ukraine and that the Bolshevik ideology was a domestic phenomenon, they needed to speak the language of their target audience. Their true intention behind introducing Ukrainian into the civil service was not a desire to facilitate bureaucratic procedures for speakers of Ukrainian but rather to make Soviet power appear natural in Ukraine, as well as to increase the number of Ukrainian members in the Communist Party. The government's attempts to conceal its true intentions and to engender the population's collective action indicate the presence of a social engineering agenda (Alexander and Schmidt 9-15). The Bolsheviks played on national sentiments and used the Ukrainian language as a tool when pursuing the goal of gaining local support in Ukraine.

Government resolutions prescribing the introduction of Ukrainian into new areas of use and the promotion of Ukrainian language acquisition contributed to the elaboration process. However, when a language begins functioning in a new area, it is usually not equipped with a sufficient vocabulary. As a result, the elaboration process requires specific projects and resources to allow for the development of the necessary lexical items. In the early twenties, the only foundation that elaboration could rely on was the process of Tsarist Russia russifying Ukraine through bureaucratic control and oppression. This gave the elaboration process a flavor of self-made social engineering: the Bolsheviks were going through a process similar to russification, only this time Ukrainian was the language to be imposed, and the entire process relied solely on prescriptive measures. On the other hand, the government's resolutions were not supported by any proven theory nor any tested experiences and presented no tangible framework for the implementation of the recommendations. No professional task group was created to implement the elaboration policies and no resources were allocated to plan and fund these comprehensive and scientifically substantiated measures. Therefore, the elaboration of 1920 can be considered quakish social engineering, a type of social engineering that does not implement recommendations in practice but relies on ideologies in their stead.

4.2. Elaboration during Ukrainianization

In August of 1923 the first public presentation articulating the principles and steps for implementing ukrainianization was made, based on a number of preceding resolutions passed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (Magocsi *A History...* 538-540). This document declared that the goal of ukrainianization was to remove any cultural inequality resulting from past repressions. In order to achieve this goal, the government called for "the ukrainianization of the entire government apparatus" and the "spreading of knowledge

of the Ukrainian language” in order to “guarantee for the Ukrainian language a position to which it is entitled because of the numerical and other specific importance of the Ukrainian people on the territory of Soviet Ukraine” (qtd. in Magocsi *A History...* 539-540). This regulatory act provided political and legal grounds for numerous elaboration projects.

In looking at the events of the period and the interpretations and opinions expressed by observers and participants of ukrainianization, it is clear that even the implementers of ukrainianization policies had different understandings regarding its ultimate purposes, and therefore different groups tried to achieve different results. Researchers disagree when discussing which actual considerations Moscow had behind their strategy. Under the complicated and difficult circumstances of the civil war, it was important for the Bolsheviks to seek the cooperation of the *Borot'bists* and therefore to demonstrate that they respected the *Borot'bists'* political platform and national sentiments. Lenin's statement at the ninth Congress of the RCP(b) indicates that the Russian Bolsheviks understood the necessity of compromises: “*we promised the Borot'bists maximal concessions...*” (qtd. in Bondarchuk 272). Moscow wanted Ukraine to return under its rule; therefore, the situation forced the Russian Bolsheviks to break away from the chauvinistic policy towards Ukraine, pursued by Tsarist Russia over the centuries. Ukrainianization was an effort to gain control over Ukraine's national renaissance and streamline it into the direction Moscow needed.

Different interpretations of ukrainianization circulated in Ukrainian society, as well as among the implementers of the policy. Many Bolshevik leaders considered the program as a means for spreading socialist ideas and for the ‘sovietization’ of Ukrainian society. For example, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, M. Popov, wrote in one of his articles: “*Ukrainianization has never been and is not our purpose; it*

is solely our means to set up a strong contact with the Ukrainian masses... The practical meaning of ...ukrainianization is to get the masses involved in the domain of the communist influences” (qtd. in Bachynskyj 283). V. Zatonsky, who chaired the revolutionary committee of the Halytska Socialist Soviet Republic in 1920 and was a Commissar of Education of Ukraine in 1922-1924, referred to ukrainianization and industrialization as ways of reaching “*a complete victory of the socialist elements in material and spiritual cultures”* (Bachynskyj 283). The Ukrainian language was a better a tool than Russian for proliferating the Soviet ideology in Ukraine. The Ukrainian language was brought into the area of Soviet propaganda and acquired a number of new words that represented concepts of Soviet ideology. Many of these words originated in Russian and were ukrainianized or translated before being used in Ukrainian. For example, the adjective ‘*советский*’ (Soviet), which originated from the Russian *совет* (council), was not brought into the Ukrainian language in its Russian form. The adjective was re-invented in Ukrainian through translation, using the root of the authentic Ukrainian word *рада* (council). The new term ‘*радянський*’ emerged in the language as a natural phenomenon to denote the ruling power; as such, it appeared in the official name of the republic *Українська Радянська Соціалістична Республіка* (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). The Russian noun ‘*большевик*’ (Bolshevik) got altered into ‘*більшовик*’ to resemble the genuine Ukrainian pronunciation and to seem as its own in the language and also within the local social and political terrains. In trying to legitimize its rule in Ukraine by attracting the local population to its ideas, the Soviet government took the Ukrainian language into an entirely new domain—Soviet political ideology.

The range of opinions about what ukrainianization was meant to achieve included the derussification of the Ukrainian proletariat living in the cities. This task was proposed by V.

Chubar, the chairman of the association in charge of developing and spreading the Ukrainian scientific language (Bachynskyj 283). V. Zatonsky echoed this proposal by saying “we will ensure that the Ukrainian ... when he goes to the city will not be russified” (qtd. in Magosci *A History...* 541). L. Kaganovich²⁵ considered ukrainianization a temporary measure to appease intractable nationalists and to lure them into submission to the Soviet center in Moscow (Bachynkyj 283). O. Shumsky identified the two most important aspects of ukrainianization: the expansion of the role that Ukrainian language and culture played in society and the satisfaction of the interests and needs of the national minorities (Bachynkyj 283). Shumsky was an active promoter of ukrainianization and argued against Russian and russified party leaders who opposed this policy. Overall, he sought expansion of political autonomy for Ukraine as the main goal of ukrainianization (Zaitsev 259). Mykhailo Volobuyev²⁶ headed the campaign for Ukraine’s economic independence. In 1928, he published an article where he argued that Ukraine held the position of a colony in USSR’s economy, just as it had in Tsarist Russia. Volobuyev emphasized that Ukraine’s economy was self-sufficient enough to be directly integrated into the global economy, without going through Russia. These interpretations of the policy provoked enormous controversy and haunted their authors later. Nevertheless, these diverse ideas about ukrainianization were propelling Ukrainian into new spheres and presenting new opportunities for the language to develop its vocabulary.

4.3. The Spread of Ukrainian into the Areas of Publishing and Education

One of the priorities of the elaboration process was to inform speakers that a new standard was being developed and what that new standard language entailed. The publication of

²⁵ Lazar Kaganovich, trusted associate of Stalin, was appointed the first secretary of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine in April 1925.

²⁶ Mykhailo Volobuyev (1900-1932) was a Marxist economist who argued that Ukraine should be in charge of its own economy (Magosci 564, 574, 781).

Ukrainian orthographic codes was especially difficult during Ukraine's independence (1917-1919) due to constant military actions and changes of government. Nevertheless, the printing of textbooks and copies of the new orthographic codes was a priority for the governments of independent Ukraine. In 1918, *The Most Essential Rules of Ukrainian Orthography* ('Найголовніші правила українського правопису') was published in the tenth issue of Ukrainian School magazine (Nimchuk 250). The Ministry of Education of Ukraine immediately undertook steps to publish the required textbooks for schools (Nimchuk 251). In 1919, tens of thousands of copies of the *Major Rules of Ukrainian Orthography* were printed across Western and Eastern Ukraine (Ohiyenko *Narysy...* 13). The war, political instability, and economic ruin were not obstacles for independent Ukraine when it came to printing the new orthographic code. The development of standard Ukrainian was a high political priority and the government perceived it to be in its best interest to make the new Orthographic Code available to the country's population.

An increase in Ukrainian publications provided opportunities for practical applications of the new Orthographic rules. In 1917-1918 the publishing industry flourished in Ukraine; over sixteen million copies of Ukrainian books featuring eighteen hundred titles were published during this time (Magosci *A History...* 491). Furthermore, two hundred and thirty nine newspapers were published in Ukrainian (Bilaniuk 79). Three major Russian-Ukrainian dictionaries came out in 1917-1918 in Kyiv (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 331). In 1918, two Commissions were established within the Ukrainian Academy of Science with the purpose of compiling data for specialized dictionaries (Ohiyenko *Istoriya* 331). Following centuries of oppressive Russian policies, which included a ban on printing books in Ukrainian, the country's freedom and its government support secured the Ukrainian language in the field of publishing.

With the arrival of the Bolsheviks at the end of 1919, the publishing industry suffered an economic collapse and printing in Ukrainian diminished. Publishing in Ukrainian was revived with a resolution passed by the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Ukraine in September 1920: the resolution proposed that each provincial capital should have at least one Ukrainian language newspaper (Bondarchuk 273). In 1921-1922, a number of periodical publications switched to Ukrainian, including one of the central government newspapers, *Visti* (Bondarchuk 272-273). As a result, in 1922, there were one hundred and eighty six Ukrainian newspapers, although still fewer than during the independence years (Bilaniuk 79). In 1920, the Soviet government of Ukraine forced the State Publishing House of Ukraine to ensure that the country had sufficient textbooks and literature in Ukrainian (Bondarchuk 273). Ukrainianization stimulated the growth of Ukrainian newspapers and increased the publishing of books in Ukrainian. At the end of twenties, eighty nine percent of newspapers and eighty percent of books in Ukraine were published in Ukrainian (Bachynkyj 284). By 1930, publication numbers in Ukrainian finally reached the levels maintained during Ukraine's independence (Magosci *A History...* 541). In 1933, three hundred seventy three of four hundred twenty six newspapers were in Ukrainian (Zaitsev 259). The increased appearance of the Ukrainian language in print was a significant progress in overcoming the effects of tsarist oppression, thereby increasing the prestige of the language and spreading the standard variety.

An important component of the elaboration stage of language planning is spreading a language and its standard variety into the realm of education. This ensures the success of language planning efforts and serves as a basis for constructing a national identity. When a particular language is not part of a country's education system this may suggest its inadequacy for education, poor vocabulary, or may signal an unwanted association with a particular group

(Schiffman 57). The governments of independent Ukraine recognized the importance of education in Ukrainian and spread the newly adopted Orthographic rules to schools and universities. The resolution for Ukraine's autonomy passed by *the Tsentral'na Rada* was calling for the ukrainianization of the school system (Magosci *A History...* 472-475). In practice, this political declaration translated to the beginning of ukrainianization in elementary schools and secondary education institutions (gymnasia), as well as the organization of courses in Ukrainian for teachers and the publication of Ukrainian textbooks (Magosci 490-491). These programs continued during the period of the Hetmanate (Magosci *A History...* 491).

The Central Council introduced a system of innovative educational institutions called Ukrainian People's Universities and opened such institutions in many cities. These universities were meant to become centers of knowledge in Ukrainian accessible to the Ukrainian people and aimed to fulfill cultural and educational needs on a community level; however the Council did not bring Ukrainian to the 'classical' universities (Zaval'nyuk 110). The Hetmanate government also made steps towards the ukrainianization of national higher education institutions. In 1918, the Kyiv People's University became the Kyiv State Ukrainian University, and a new University was opened in Kam'yanets'-Podil's'kyj (Magosci *A History...* 491, Zaval'nyuk 113). Ivan Ohiyenko made a substantial contribution to the establishment of the University in Kam'yanets'-Podil's'kyj. He passionately promoted the idea of a University in the city that was the meeting place of the two branches of the Ukrainian culture, Western and Dnieper Ukraine. He succeeded in convincing government officials that there was a need to have a university in Kam'yanets'-Podil's'kyj and he overcame many barriers in the process (Zaval'nyuk 111-113). During the period of the Hetmanate, over one hundred and fifty Ukrainian gymnasia were opened (Lytvyn 232). The Hetmanate is also credited with another important step in the development of

Ukrainian science and education in its establishment of the Ukrainian Academy of Science (Lytvyn 232). The independence years resulted in significant accomplishments in the development of the Ukrainian educational system. This momentum was carried forward into the initial years of Bolshevik rule and continued to fuel the development of the Ukrainian educational infrastructure during the years of ukrainianization.

The Bolsheviks considered the educational system to be the primary means of conveying their ideologies to younger generations since the delivery of socialist ideas to Ukrainophone children in a language they could easily comprehend was most effective. During the early twenties, there was a transition in instruction from Russian to Ukrainian within elementary schools and political education establishments in rural areas. On September 21, 1920 the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine²⁷ passed a resolution requiring all educational institutions to include Ukrainian in their mandatory curricula (Bondarchuk 273). During this time, the Narkomat (Ministry) of Education started developing a plan to incorporate Ukrainian as the language of instruction in education institutions. In February 1922, the government once again confirmed its language policy and its promotion of the Ukrainian language at a plenary meeting: it passed a provision that the language of instruction in schools should reflect the wishes of the local population (Bondarchuk 274). Many Russian party leaders supported a contrary idea: the instructors should determine the language of instruction. This latter position, if adopted, would have been very unfavorable for the Ukrainian language, since higher education, under the tsarist regime, was Russian language-based. The majority of the instructors did not know Ukrainian and it was very unlikely that they would have chosen to use it in their teaching. The government's assertive action opened the door for education in Ukrainian.

²⁷ The Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine carried out functions similar to the Cabinet of Ministers.

In 1923, the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education was given full authority in the area of ukrainianization for the educational system (Magosci *A History...* 543). The People's Commissars of Education, Hryhorij Hryn'ko (1920-1923), Oleksandr Shumyj (1924-1926), and Mykola Skrypnyk (1927-1933), made significant contributions to the development of educational infrastructure and to the ukrainianization of the educational system (Zaitsev 261). The ukrainianization of education enticed intellectuals of Ukrainian orientation to cooperate with the Bolshevik authorities. Teachers and educators actively participated in ukrainianization and promoted Ukrainian language and culture through a network of Ukrainian language classes and lecturing centers (Bachynskyj 282). The spread of Ukrainian in education proved to be successful. In 1927, ninety percent of literacy centers and almost eighty percent of general education schools used Ukrainian as their language of instruction (Bachynkyj 284). By 1929, eighty percent of schools, over sixty percent of professional colleges, and thirty percent more education institutions used Ukrainian as the language of instruction (Zaitsev 259). Ukrainian history, language, literature, and economic geography were mandatory subjects for all students, and at the end of the thirties; knowledge of Ukrainian was a pre-requisite for enrolment in, and graduation from, a higher education institution (Magosci *A History...* 543).

Education is key in upholding a language or a standard variety. The education system reinforces the use of the standard and helps to preserve it by giving it stability (Joseph 45). The progress made in introducing Ukrainian in general, and particularly in introducing the new Ukrainian orthography rules into elementary, secondary, and post secondary institutions during the years of independence, Bolshevik pre-korenizatsiya years, and the ukrainianization period, gave the language stability and generated a sense of worthiness among speakers of Ukrainian. Similarly, the Orthographic Codes of 1933 and 1938 benefited from the reinforcement of formal

education using these norms. The education system secured the permanency and perseverance of the new standard. The norms adopted in 1933 and 1938 (with slight amendments) are still in use in Ukraine today. Generations of people were educated based on these norms, new books were written in the standards of 1933 and 1938, and books from preceding years were either banned or bowdlerized to follow the standard. The Soviet government withheld information about the Orthographic code of 1928 leaving the society with the impression that the existing norms were the only norms ever used in the Ukrainian language. Therefore, at present, it is difficult for the Ukrainian society to accept any alternative to the existing rules as legitimate variability.

4.4. The Spread of Ukrainian to Specialized Areas

During a war, the army is a vital and central force that ensures the continued existence of a nation. Therefore, the army became another attractive arena for elaboration projects during the years of independence and also during the times of Soviet rule. On April 7, 1917, a decision was passed by the All-Ukrainian Military Congress to restructure the army in order to reflect the country's ethnic and territorial make-up (Mirchuk 80). This process created opportunities to form Ukrainian-speaking units and promote national independence ideas within the army (Mirchuk 80-85). The decision further stipulated that military schools were to be opened in ukrainianized units of the army; textbooks for military education were to be published in Ukrainian, and Ukrainian literature was to be supplied to military libraries and schools. The Ukrainian army of the independence period had to adopt the Ukrainian language as an attribute of the nation. The Soviet government also took steps to introduce Ukrainian into the army, and the Bolsheviks, too, understood the importance of the Ukrainian language for their military program. Because they did not want their army to appear as foreign invaders, on February 21, 1920, the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-West Battle-Front sent out instructions to

its military commanders recommending them to use Ukrainian while communicating with the local population. In order to satisfy the need for Soviet military officers to be fluent in Ukrainian, the Soviet authorities established the Schools of Red Sergeants in Kharkiv and Kyiv, and Ukrainian was to be used as the language of instruction in these institutions (Bondarchuk 273). In all these ways, the introduction of Ukrainian to the national army produced an impression of the government's strong endorsement of Ukrainian.

Ukrainianization left its mark on Ukrainian cities—Russification and the migration of Russian workers into Ukraine affected Ukrainian urban centers to a greater extent than Ukrainian rural areas. Most Russophones in Ukraine lived in cities. Industrialization and the beginning of the NEP reversed the decline of urban populations retreating to villages to survive the war and the revolution. Ukrainian cities began to grow at the beginning of twenties with a substantial influx of Ukrainophones from villages (Magocsi *A History...* 540). Traditional speakers of Ukrainian became russified after moving to urban areas and ukrainianization was meant to break that tradition (Magocsi *A History...* 541). Urban signs and posters were written in Ukrainian as a result of laws passed in 1925 when the government invested in repainting and remaking the signage (Magocsi *A History...* 541). The names of the cities, streets, stores, and facilities in Ukrainian greatly enhanced the visibility of the language and served as constant reminder of the existence of Ukrainian ethnicity.

The development of a specialized vocabulary serves the communication needs of specific areas of knowledge, research, and industry. Developing terminology is a continuous process requiring government-supported planning, which from the fifteenth to twentieth century, Ukrainian intellectuals working in conditions of alien cultures could not experience (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 335-336). Independence provided political conditions that favored the spread of

Ukrainian and triggered the need for specialized Ukrainian terminology. Terminology development was part of the elaboration strategy from the outset of Ukrainian language planning. The establishment of a permanent Terminological Commission under the umbrella of the Kyiv Scientific Society in August 1918 generated formalized support for those doing terminology work (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 337). The codification Commission formed on March 16, 1919 was named ‘*Orthographic and Terminological Commission*’ and was intended to work on the development of terminology as well as dealing with orthography (Nimchuk 252). Ukrainian schools and government organizations felt the pressing need to have suitable Ukrainian terminology; therefore, in 1917, numerous individual *ad hoc* groups emerged across Ukraine with the purpose of producing terminological dictionaries (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 336). The work done on Ukrainian terminology during the independence years became the foundation for elaboration achievements in subsequent years, but it was a grueling task for a nation that, for centuries, was deprived of opportunities to use its language in any official capacity.

The collapse of political, administrative, and economic structures caused by the Bolshevik invasion of Kyiv made the task of compiling and publishing dictionaries even more challenging. Thus, the work of both Commissions came to a halt in the winter of 1920-1921 due to a power outage (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 337). The change of government and political structure in Ukraine, from the Directory to the Soviets, may have also played a role in the cessation of work: the members of the Commissions might not have been sure that the Bolshevik government had plans to support their work. The Bolsheviks officially sanctioned the role of the Orthographic and Terminological Commission in 1921 when it was amalgamated into a brand new organization, the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language, which was formed as part of the Academy of Sciences (Nimchuk 252). The amalgamation of the Kyiv Scientific Society

with the Academy of Science introduced the members of Kyiv Scientific Society's permanent Terminological Commission into the Institute as well (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 337). The Institute became a large organization employing highly qualified specialists and linguists and was central to the development of specialized Ukrainian terminology during the years of ukrainianization.

The Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language was organized into six divisions, as follows:

1. Natural Science Division. Sections: botany, geology, geography, zoology, mathematics, medicine, meteorology, physics, and chemistry.
2. Technical Division. Sections: roads and bridges, hydromechanics, mechanics, construction, electrical engineering, mining, agricultural engineering, auto industry, and aviation.
3. Agricultural Division
4. Socio-Historical Division. Sections: sociology, economics, pedagogy and psychology, linguistics, philosophy, and business language.
5. Law Division
6. Art Division. Sections: archaeology, architecture, painting, wood carving, crafts, music, and theatre (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 337).

All divisions of the Institute preferred using authentic Ukrainian words rather than international loanwords. Industry representatives and history books were widely consulted in the process of developing specialized terms (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 338). This methodology of terminology planning differs from the approach that guided the development of terminology in Russia, where preference was given to international loanwords. In order to encourage the influx of materials into the Institute, mail addressed to the Institute did not require postage. Findings were recorded on specially printed terminological cards, an overall number of which reached two million (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 338). Almost twenty dictionaries of specialized terms were published by

the Institute in 1923-1931, and thirty four more were contracted for printing in 1926, but the State Publishing House of Ukraine failed to print them (Ohieynko *Istoriya...* 338-339, 361-362). Prior to publishing a book, the government-run print houses sent the Institute their manuscripts for terminology verification and correction (Ohieynko *Istoriya...* 338-339). This procedure gradually unified terminology use across Ukraine. In 1927, the Institute commenced work to establish its own periodical publication, *Visnyk*, which was supposed to provide the public with a summary of the Institute's accomplishments, lists of prepared and published dictionaries, discussions of relevant linguistic and historical issues, and overall assistance with spreading the functions of Ukrainian to new areas (Ohieynko *Istoriya...* 339). The policy of ukrainianization secured the political and financial support needed for the development of technical terminology in Ukrainian. By streamlining all their work through one organization, the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language allowed for the concentration of funding and professional knowledge, approaching terminology planning with a single methodology and setting up guidelines and authority for the elaboration of Ukrainian and its new standard variety into new areas of use. The increased availability of the required vocabulary and the systemized elaboration efforts facilitated the expansion of the functions of Ukrainian within the society.

The formalization of spelling rules fostered the development and publishing of new Orthographic dictionaries. After the Draft Orthographic Code was adopted in 1926, Hryhorij Holoskevych prepared a new addition to his orthographic dictionary to reflect the new spelling rules. H. Holoskevych was a member of the Orthographic Commissions organized in 1918, 1919, 1921, and 1925. A new (sixth) edition of his dictionary was published in 1926 in Kyiv, and after the adoption of the new orthographic rules in 1928, Holoskevych published a larger, forty-thousand-word edition of the dictionary in 1929 (Holoskevych, preface). Because of the

authorship of the dictionary, sometimes the Orthographic Codes of Ukrainian of 1926 and 1928 are referred to as the Orthographic Rules of Holoskevych. The Ukrainian diaspora in the West accepted the Orthographic rules of 1926 and 1928 and has been using them ever since (Rudnyc'kyj 5-6). Even today, Holoskevych's dictionary is used by many as the guideline for Ukrainian spelling and grammar.

The abandonment of ukrainianization in 1933 reflected adversely on terminology planning and vocabulary development. All work on Ukrainian technical terminology was suspended and, instead, Russian terminological vocabulary was introduced into Ukrainian. Purges at the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language resulted not only in specialists resigning from their work but also in severe political repressions (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 339-340). The change in official policy resulted in the Institute being characterized as producing dictionaries based on bourgeois linguistics and therefore needing reorganization under government control. As a result, the Institute received a new name and a new mandate: all technical terms were now required to follow the Russian model (Ohiyenko *Istoriya...* 340-341). Terms with native roots were abandoned and replaced with Russian-style international words. This process produced the impression that the Ukrainian language was inferior since it did not have authentic scientific terminology. Publication of *Visnyk* was stopped after the Institute's reorganization and the fate of most contributors to *Visnyk* was grave (Ocheretyanko 601). Ukrainian had many words with roots that were different from the roots of corresponding Russian words. If there was a Russian-looking synonym in circulation, post-1933 dictionaries always placed a Russian-looking synonym first and the authentic Ukrainian word, second. Subsequently, in many cases, the Ukrainian version was labeled archaic. The official line started to favor the use of Russian in official functions and, gradually, Russian started to replace Ukrainian in both research and

science. All these changes forced Ukrainian out of the very prestigious area of science and research.

4.5. Communist Party of Bolsheviks Putting down Roots in Ukraine

Ukrainianization resulted in an increase of ethnic Ukrainian members in the Communist party. In 1922, seventy nine percent of the members of the Communist Party of Ukraine considered Russian as their language of communication and only eleven percent spoke Ukrainian (Bondarchuk 274). The ethnic composition of the party in 1922 was as follows: Ukrainians constituted twenty three percent of the membership of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine and in 1933, the membership reached sixty percent (Zaitsev 258). Ukrainians, however, occupied the lower levels of the party hierarchy: they represented sixteen percent of the membership of the Party's Central Committee in 1924, and forty three percent in 1930, and only non-Ukrainians were appointed by Moscow to chair the central Committee in 1923-1953 (Zaitsev 258).

Ukrainian also entered the area of Marxist theory and Bolshevik political ideology. The Ukrainian institute of Marxism-Leninism was opened in Kharkiv in 1924, which for a while was headed by Halychyna native, Matvij Yavorskyj, who developed a Marxist interpretation of the history and class struggle of Ukraine. Together with Mykhailo Hrushevskyj, he challenged the tsarist myths of the common historical past of Russians and Ukrainians (Magosci *A History...* 21-23, 564, Wilson 142, Zaitsev 261). Books propagating Bolshevik ideology were brought to rural Ukrainians by means of mobile libraries (Magosci 2007 226). Elaboration of the Ukrainian language into the domain of Bolshevik propaganda and Marxist theory resulted in a binary transformation of the Ukrainian society: the ethnic composition of the Communist party of Ukraine shifted to include more Ukrainians and the Bolshevik ideology penetrated rural areas

inhabited by speakers of Ukrainian. The Moscow masterminds behind the ‘*putting down roots*’ policy successfully engineered the ukrainianization of the party and the sovietization of the Ukrainian population with one clean shot—the elaboration of Ukrainian into the realm of Marxist theory.

4.6. Literature and Theatre

In the twenties and early thirties, Ukraine experienced a boost of cultural life, as well as a widespread experimentation and innovation in literature, theatre, cinematography, and visual arts. Scholars maintain that this period was characterized by the relative freedom of literature and arts, a search for new forms of cultural expression, and optimism among artists (Bliss Eaton xxiii-xxiv, Magocsi *A History...* 544-545, Wilson 137-142, Zaitsev 261-262). Ukrainian writers formed numerous literary groups and spread the Ukrainian language to various literary genres. Some groups aligned with Proletcult, a Soviet literacy and cultural organization, and developed Ukrainian proletarian literature (Luckyj 167, Zaitsev 261). At the same time, some freedom of cultural expression, still tolerated by the Communist party, fostered the development of non-proletarian styles, such as peasant literature, neoclassicism, symbolism, futurism, and formalism (Zaitsev 261). Ukrainian writers even developed their own line of literature called panfuturism, which incorporated all ‘isms’ (Wilson 136). Literary groups came to life, disintegrated, and re-emerged on a regular basis. Some writers chose to be independent of any group, considering them superfluous and unable to deliver quality literature (Ilnytzkyj 99-100). The diversity of outlooks on literature, its purposes, and forms of expression culminated in Literary Discussion, a social debate, in which many intellectuals participated by making public speeches at gatherings and publishing articles in newspapers and magazines. The vigorous development of literature, sometimes referred to as the Ukrainian Renaissance, was a momentous factor that greatly

promoted the spread of the Ukrainian language and elevated its status. At the same time, adoption of the Orthographic Codes also contributed to literature development because it equipped writers with standard Ukrainian, an important tool.

Les' Kurbas, an actor and theatre director, promoted the development of traditional and avant-garde Ukrainian theatrical art during the years of ukrainianization. He was highly regarded for his own original style and is considered one of the best avant-garde directors, not only of Ukraine, but also of the entire Soviet Union (Bliss Eaton xxiii). In 1922, Les' Kurbas organized an experimental avant-garde theatre in Kyiv, named Berezil', which he later moved to Kharkiv and headed until 1933 (Magocsi *Ukraine...* 228). Berezil's innovative theatrical techniques, the talent of its actors and the creative, collaborative environment drew the attention of the public and artists, making it very popular. Berezil' brought Ukrainian back to the theatrical stage, first in Kyiv and later in Kharkiv, and demonstrated that it was not only suited for peasant-themed repertoire, but also for urban modernistic themes. Les' Kurbas' innovations included Expressionist techniques of stage image, repertoire of gestures, visual device, and interaction with the audience (Wilson 137). Audience interaction produced a major momentum for the elaboration of the Ukrainian language. The plays were in Ukrainian and the actors also communicated with the spectators in Ukrainian. Berezil' not only exposed the audience to the Ukrainian language but also created an impetus for engagement in a conversation in Ukrainian in a public artistic setting. This experience created a sense of comfort for some individuals to use Ukrainian and this feeling could prompt them to choose Ukrainian when communicating in another public sphere. Berezil's work generated a powerful step forward for Ukrainian language and culture.

4.7. Post-Ukrainianization Elaboration

Ukrainian artists embraced the opportunity created by the revolutionary spirit, the country's independence, and ukrainianization, and embarked on the energetic modernization of Ukrainian culture and art. Despite the limitations imposed by Bolshevik ideology, the years of NEP are considered relatively tolerable for intellectuals (Ilnytzkyj 105, Terras 79). Ukrainian artists aspired to take their national culture to a level of originality and authenticity where it would be identified with Ukraine and its people. In its search for distinctly Ukrainian forms of cultural expression, Ukrainian art departed from the tradition of following Russian models (Magocsi *A History...* 544). It culminated in an appeal to artists— get “*away from Moscow!*”— made by a Ukrainian writer, Mykola Khvylyovyj²⁸ (qtd. in Wilson 138, qtd. in Zaitsev 259). The swift development of artistic and intellectual domains in Ukraine surpassed the boundaries determined by Soviet ideology and imperial authority (Ilnytzkyj 105). The spiritual departure of Ukrainian artistry from Russian foundations was a threat to the Soviet empire because it had the potential to become a catalytic force for political disintegration.

By the time Ukraine broke free culturally from Russia, the years of Soviet propaganda had already made substantial advancements in securing the presence, and some degree of acceptance, of socialist ideologies within Ukrainian society. Many Ukrainian artists pushing for the independence of Ukrainian culture expressed their socialist convictions, and the goal of their creative efforts was to build a Ukrainian socialist culture that would serve the needs of both the peasants and the proletariat. For those artists who did not convert to socialist beliefs, the authorities engaged an extensive range of intimidation and censorship tools (Lewis Burgin 36-37, Sicher 181, Terras 79). The Soviet authorities felt it was time to stop supporting Ukrainian

²⁸ Mykola Khvylyovyj (1893-1933), last name at birth Fitylov, a Ukrainian writer who dominated literary politics in Ukraine from 1925-1933 (Luckyj 168, Magocsi *Ukraine...* 226, Zaitsev 259).

culture and redirected the creative process into purely socialist pro-Russian avenues. The Ukrainian language and its official orthography suffered as a result of this change in policy. After years of elaboration, government-promoted contractions of Ukrainian came into play. The Ukrainian language was pushed out of many areas, and where it did remain, it was engineered to exhibit features identical to Russian.

The Communist party began backing away from ukrainianization, engaged in firmer ideological control, and started to steer Ukraine into a stricter integration with the Soviet Union. The authorities blamed artists of practicing bourgeois nationalism in order to subordinate cultural life to a political party doctrine. In 1927 The All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers was formed and party control was felt throughout that organization (Zaitsev 262). The end of NEP and beginning of the first five-year plan was marked by a fast disappearance of any remaining freedom. Artists had to glorify the Communist Party and Stalin in order to survive, and the intensive censorship network ensured that only those works that were strictly in line with the official policy would be published. Through censorship, “Stalin’s First Five-Year Plan effectively subordinated literature and the other arts to the Party’s political and economic programs” (qtd. in Lewis Burgin 37). The official policy engaged in practices similar to the ones used by Tsarist Russia for oppression and russification (Zaitsev 270). However there was a significant difference between tsarist and Stalin’s methods: tsarism engaged only in prohibition, while Stalin’s system introduced editions and insertions to make the original artistic work better reflect the ideological position of the ruling party (Lewis Burgin 38).

Following ukrainianization, the oppression of Ukrainian is evident in the discontinuation of operations by many institutions that promoted Ukrainian language and culture. The government closed down the Research Institute of the History of Ukrainian Culture, the Institute

of Agricultural Economics, the Shevchenko Institute of Literature Studies, and many Ukrainian theatres, including Berezhil' (Zaitsev 270- 271). The number of Russian language theatres between 1931 and 1936 increased from nine to thirty (Magocsi *A History...* 571). All literary groups were dismissed and writers had to become members of the Union of Writers of Ukraine in order to continue their work (Zaitsev 271). The number of the Ukrainian newspapers and magazines decreased: in 1931 ninety percent of newspapers and eighty five percent of magazines were Ukrainian, and in 1940 the corresponding statistics showed that only seventy percent of newspapers and forty five percent of magazines were published in Ukrainian (Zaitsev 270). The attack on Ukrainian led to its retreat from the areas of life where it had recently advanced, and the decrease in its prestige triggered a roll-back to Russian, especially in the east and in urban centers.

The linguistic engineering of assimilating Ukrainian with Russian through the changes to Ukrainian orthographic rules in 1933 and 1938 was an authoritarian act—the government was not interested in the public's opinion. There were no discussions of the new draft rules in the press or at conferences and only 350 copies of the draft changes were published (Nimchuk 269). The government-run education system had no choice but except and reinforce the new spelling rules. In addition, the government used education as an avenue to advance its pro-Russian agenda. The number of Ukrainian language schools decreased substantially during the post-ukrainianization years (Zaitsev 270). In 1938 Russian became the mandatory language for all students and in many schools Russian replaced Ukrainian entirely (Magocsi *A History...*571). The era of intensive language elaboration during ukrainianization came to the end. The Bolsheviks brought the cycle of history back to the practices of intensive eradication of the

Ukrainian language. After ukrainianization had fulfilled its purpose, matters were brought back to the reality of Russian imperial ambitions.

4.8. Ukrainianization and Soviet Social Engineers

The Moscow headquarters of the Communist Party gradually put a firm grip on art in the whole of the USSR—Ukrainian art was to share exactly the same fate as all the other Soviet Republics. The Ukrainian artists and political leaders who truly believed that Soviet structure granted Ukraine the freedom to self-determine its present and future were in fact blinded by communist utopia (Luckyj 167-168). When individuals at power implement a utopian social project they use the masses as their subjects and, as a result, the outcome presents adverse effects for ordinary people (Alexander and Schmidt 3-4). Ukrainianization, or the elaboration stage of language planning, aimed at spreading Ukrainian language to the areas of Bolshevik ideology, government administration, education, science, Russophones, and russified circles of the society. It was an undertaking executed with the help of the social engineering techniques.

Firstly, the policy of ukrainianization was implemented to overcome the Ukrainian political forces that had emerged during the period of national independence. Secondly, when one analyzes the elaboration of Ukrainian into the area of political ideology, the policy appears deceitful. The government was not interested in spreading Ukrainian into new areas of use for the mere sake of elaboration as part of language planning. It was solely concerned about capturing the interest of the Ukrainian crowd through Bolshevik political speeches. Thirdly, building a self-governed socialist society in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian language would have its status dictated by the total number of Ukrainian speakers and their contribution to the economy and society, was a mere utopia. The true power was in Moscow, just as it had been before the Revolution (Luckyj 167-168). The most efficient and rational way for Moscow to rule

Ukraine would be through the Russian language only, which would be even easier to implement in a unified socialist society than it had been in Tsarist Russia (Magocsi *A History...* 533-537). The Russian language could also serve as a unifying symbol for different ethnicities within the USSR. Therefore, ukrainianization was indeed planned to be nothing more than a temporary anomaly of the socialist construction—an illusion created for those who wanted to believe in it. Fourthly, the elaboration of Ukrainian during ukrainianization bears features of self-made social engineering. It did not have the scope of theoretical knowledge supported by successful practical experience to be called sociotechnic proper, but the implementers of the elaboration process possessed sufficient personal knowledge and talent to be able to organize successful social activities on an individual basis. Elaboration greatly relies on bureaucratic control and authoritarian support, which means that elaboration projects ultimately conglomerated into a pool of experiences; however, this process had started as a number of government directives. Fifthly, human beings were not considered as individuals in the elaboration measures; they were just a mass of people targeted by the government policy of spreading Ukrainian. The elaboration aspect of language planning exhibited cases of physical human suffering during the years of ukrainianization and NEP, an instance of dark social engineering. The increasing censorship and oppression of artistic expression also contributed to the human suffering during that period. The era of mass sufferings began with the end of NEP and the beginning of the first five-year plan in 1928 and culminated in 1933 and 1938. These sufferings can be mostly associated with the stage of language planning called securing acceptance.

CHAPTER 5 SECURING ACCEPTANCE

The success of the movement towards linguistic uniformity depends on broad social, political, and cultural variables, as well as the attitudes of various vernacular communities. Status planning is an important stage of standard variety development and must be well designed and executed by the government in order to secure the acceptance of an official language by the public. Because it deals with people's beliefs and attitudes, which often require alteration, securing acceptance is a difficult task. Therefore, this stage of language planning frequently involves social engineering techniques throughout its various status planning projects. The process of elevating the prestige of a standard language is considered to be the first and most important factor in ensuring the favorable perception of a standard language (Joseph 61-62). The prestige of a language is significantly determined by the attitude of a nation's elite towards that language and their role in language planning. Support by the elite class can increase the success of language planning initiatives (Cooper 183). People tend to demonstrate greater openness to concepts and things that are actually or conceptually connected to them. Even minimal involvement by members of the speech community in the process of language standardization may produce a sense of relatedness between the community and the standard, ultimately easing its acceptance. Constructing a standard on the principles of logic enhances its perception as the correct and first-rate form of the language (Joseph 116, 161). This notion of quality and superiority of the standard language can contribute to language acceptance by groups for which these factors are valuable.

Achieving the goal of standard language acceptance depends on many variables, including the availability of resources, the socio-historical situation of the community, and the methods deployed to motivate speakers to use the standard language. Legislation is considered the most direct approach to securing the emergence and survival of the standard language

(Joseph 61). Government can use legislation to initiate, guide, and control the implementation of language policies; however, successful acceptance of the standard is often possible only if the relevant legislation is adopted at the highest level (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 116-117, Willemys 186, 191). Prior to and following the Bolshevik Revolution, the authorities of Ukraine regularly resorted to passing legislation in order to secure compliance with their language policies.

A new standard language reflects the concepts and perceptions that guided the language development process. If a particular vernacular was selected to serve as basis for the standard, the distinct features of that vernacular will be present in the standard language. Their presence will always serve as a reminder of the fact that the community that supplied the vernacular for the standard language possessed some unique qualities that matched the selection criteria. Associating with the standard language strengthens a community through the acquisition of standard language attributes such as purity, primacy, and rightness (Ehret 336). It is insignificant whether one agrees with the reasons for which a particular vernacular was chosen to become the standard or whether one understands the qualities that got attributed to the community as a result of the introduction of the standard. In fact, when circumstances force an individual to use the standard variety, for example in the educational setting, he will involuntarily reinforce those opinions about those qualities without necessarily agreeing with them.

Acceptance of the standard variety by a society can shift the mindset of its members and draw them closer to the notions engineered for them by language planners. Consequently, the acceptance stage of language planning serves as an instrument for altering established attitudes. An opposite directional process can also serve the engineering agenda: if a society is led to change its beliefs and become more susceptible to the standard, the chances of its acceptance

increase. These two processes are entangled in the history of Soviet language planning. On one side, linguists were called to engineer orthographic rules that would allow the government to achieve its goals, and at the same time, Soviet official policies predisposed society to accept the results of the work of the language planners.

In 1917-1919, the leaders of independent Ukraine were committed to supporting initiatives that had potential for securing acceptance of the new Orthographic Code and of Ukrainian as the official language. Printed word is highly regarded in Ukraine; therefore, the decision to print a substantial number of copies of the rules and the appearance of the summary of the rules in media publications swayed the public to receive the new standard favorably. The involvement of prominent scholars in developing the orthographic rules enhanced their credibility. National programs initiated by the first Central Council government were continued by the Hetmanate and positively influenced national esteem; these programs included introducing the Ukrainian language into education and establishing the Ukrainian Academy of Fine Arts, the State Library, the State Archives, and the Ukrainian Academy of Science (Magocsi *Ukraine...* 201). Aspirations of nation building during Ukraine's independence, fuelled government initiatives directed at elevating the prestige of Ukrainian culture to secure the acceptance of both the language and the idea of an independent country. Unfortunately, the short duration of Ukraine's independence did not allow these programs to come to fruition.

The role of the national elite in securing acceptance of the official standard language is significant. Elites are likely to engage in language planning only if it benefits them (Cooper 183). Thus, the Bolshevik leaders' ambitions to intensify their influence in Ukraine by appearing indigenous resulted in the promotion of Ukrainian within their agencies and in the Ukrainian society at large. These efforts, however, had little to do with securing acceptance of Ukrainian

as an official language, and were primarily driven by their desire to ensure the reception of their ideology in Ukraine. Ukrainian was meant to become a medium of communication with the masses and “*a weapon of communist education*” (qtd. in Solchanyk 66). Bolsheviks deployed the myth of a proletarian state to symbolically legitimize their power (Gorham 10). The establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in Kharkiv (1917) was done not for the purpose of building a socialist Ukrainian state and elevating the status of the Ukrainian language, but rather to tempt the Ukrainian people to support the Bolshevik party (Stakhiv 62-63). Ironically, therefore, the promotion of the Ukrainian language was engineered primarily for Ukrainians rather than for the Russian speaking population (von Hagen 370). Nevertheless, official proclamations by Bolshevik rulers favoring Ukrainian elevated its status in society. Those who accepted Bolshevik national policies in Ukraine at their face value believed that the government and the Bolshevik elite endorsed Ukrainian and promoted its use. The resulting increase of language prestige was an inevitable side effect of the Bolsheviks’ attempts to appear indigenous and facilitated acceptance of Ukrainian as the official medium of communication in Soviet Ukraine.

Soviet Ukrainian nationality was institutionalized during the early years of Bolshevik power in Ukraine. Ukrainian culture and language thrived mainly before and during the ukrainianization period. The promotion of Ukrainian was a departure from the internationalist ideology traditionally embraced by Russian Bolsheviks. This produced much confusion within the party and the society. Numerous theories are offered on the Bolsheviks’ undertaking of ukrainianization (Bachynskyj 282-283). Nevertheless, there were groups that genuinely embraced the opportunity to contribute to the development of Ukrainian language and culture. The ideas proposed by Drahomanov and Shevchenko fostered the platform of the Borot’bists’

party. After their unification with the Bolsheviks, the Borot'bists persevered to achieve their objectives through ukrainianization. Ukrainian scholars and artists welcomed the opportunity to advance Ukrainian culture and language and greatly contributed to the elevation of Ukrainian cultural and linguistic prestige.

Ukrainianization was also used to demonstrate to the population of Western Ukraine that Ukrainians could have their national interests satisfied only in Soviet Ukraine. The Bolsheviks wanted to exhibit positive methods of solving national and ethnical issues to the colonial countries in hopes of gaining their support for socialist ideas and a world revolution. They partially attained this external goal, since some Ukrainian émigrés viewed ukrainianization as a positive force and, therefore, they promoted the idea of cooperation with the regime. Some émigrés even returned to Ukraine to play a part in implementing ukrainianization policy (Magosci *A History...* 541-542). They used Ukrainian predominantly in their professional activities, and this factor was an immense force in elevating the prestige and acceptance of Ukrainian.

Other groups were suspicious of Bolshevik official policies or became quickly disillusioned after a brief encounter with them. Upon returning to Ukraine, Volodymyr Vynnychenko realized the hypocrisy of the Bolshevik position and acknowledged that it was not possible to be both a revolutionary and a Ukrainian at the same time (Bilaniuk 79-80). Those who believed the only purpose of ukrainianization was to strengthen Bolshevik rule in Ukraine called the process “false ukrainianization” (Zaitsev 257). Dmytro Dontsov²⁹ illustrated this trend: “*what can the Ukrainian language mean, if it is used to bring anti-Ukrainian ideas by aliens*” (qtd. in Bachynskyj 283). In this respect, ukrainianization was in fact an act of

²⁹ Dmytro Dontsov (1883-1937), born in Dnieper Ukraine, was an ideological inspirer of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). He fled to Halychyna in 1908 and then moved to the West (Magosci *A History...* 597, 738).

sovietization; the program of securing the development and high position of Ukrainian was actually aimed at securing the acceptance of Bolshevik ideology by the Ukrainian population.

In his play ‘Myna Mazailo,’ Mykola Kulish³⁰ gave an unsurpassed sharp and humorous account of ordinary people’s perceptions and attitudes towards ukrainianization in Ukraine. The title of the play is the first and the last name of a Ukrainian man whose family members hold different opinions about government policies in the area of nationalities and languages. Aunt Motya, residing in Kursk (Russia), denounces her Ukrainian roots and adheres to the positions of Russian chauvinism. In the play, however, she speaks mostly in Ukrainian, with the addition of some Russified forms or Russian words. She refers to the new Ukrainian sign of the city name at the railway station as spoilage of the city (Kulish 151). A language that held such low prestige for centuries provoked Aunt Motya’s claim, in Russian, that it would be more decent to be raped than be ukrainianized (Kulish 186). In the text, Kulish wrote that phrase in Ukrainian transliteration rather than in Russian. This gives the reader a perception that Aunt Motya might have said the phrase with a Ukrainian accent: “*По-моему прілічнеє бить изнасілованой, нежелі українізірованой*” (qtd. in Kulish 186). The rhyme and rhythm of her statement as presented in the Ukrainian original intensify its effect.

Russification policies left an imprint in Myna’s mindset: he strongly believes that Russian is the high variety and yearns to become part of it. He suspects ukrainianization to be a manoeuvre to turn him into a back countryman and second-class bureaucrat who will never get a promotion. With the support of his wife and daughter, he plans to change his last name to the Russian-sounding “Mazenin” in order to achieve affiliation with the Russian culture. The announcement of the name change is published in the local newspaper and Aunt Motya frames

³⁰ Mykola Kulish (1892-1937) was a Ukrainian playwright engaged in depicting Soviet reality in Ukraine in the twenties and thirties (Wilson 137, 141).

the page. For Myna, ukrainianization was a threat of derogation and, therefore, it intensified his longing for Russianness, culminating in the name change. Apparently, in some cases ukrainianization efforts produced results other than the growth of Ukrainian culture and the securing of acceptance of Ukrainian language and national identity.

Myna's son, Mokij, is a young Communist, who is portrayed as an enthusiastic promoter of ukrainianization. Though Mokij is optimistic about ukrainianization, Kulish's play satirically depicts the contradictions between Ukrainian national aspirations and Soviet reality. Although ukrainianization contributed to the elevation of the status of Ukrainian culture and language, it could never realize its full potential because of the historical oppression and because the policy was never meant to serve the Ukrainian nation. The suspicions regarding this policy are expressed in the warning by Uncle Taras that (Soviet) ukrainianization was a way to uncover all Ukrainians, and then to destroy them entirely, so that not even a trace of their spirit or scent would be left: *"Їхня українізація – це спосіб виявити всіх нас, українців, а тоді знищити разом, щоб і духу не було..."* (qtd. in Kulish 169). Individuals sharing this opinion did not have to be convinced to accept and use the Ukrainian language; rather, they had a problem accepting the government's language policy because it did not appear trustworthy.

There was no conformity of opinions among Bolshevik party leaders on how much ukrainianization was needed. Some groups in the party, especially Russophones and Russian-by-ethnicity individuals opposed ukrainianization entirely (Bondarchuk 274, Stakhiv 54-55, Zaitsev 258). In 1920, Skrypnyk reported approximately 200 cases of legal lynching for the use of Ukrainian (Bondarchuk 273). Olexandr Shumsky believed that ukrainianization was too slow due to the opposition of the Russian-speaking bureaucracy (Zaitsev 259). The opposition to ukrainianization was evident in some party leaders' promotion of the theory of "[a] struggle of

two cultures” (qtd. in Magosci *A History...* 537). This theory suggested that in a society where two cultures and languages are present, none should receive any particularly special support. A fair competition will secure the victory of the stronger and, therefore, better language. The promoter of this theory, Dmytro Lebid’, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine, posited that the Russian culture of the urban proletariat was higher, and therefore, should not be replaced by the lower and weaker Ukrainian culture (Magosci *A History...* 537). If this approach had been transformed into actual policy, it would have secured an even more prominent place for Russian in Ukraine. The Ukrainian language was weak and Russian enjoyed high status as a result of past language policies directed at oppressing Ukraine. If implemented, the “struggle of two cultures” would have taken place on an unlevel playing field.

Moscow had a tactical consideration in introducing the policy of ukrainianization. The Bolsheviks needed to compromise with the Borot’bists to seek popularity among the Ukrainian masses, and to prevent Ukraine from shifting further away from Russia—a shift that had started in 1917. The Bolshevik government was forced to engage in ukrainianization to strengthen their position in Ukraine, just as they did in 1921 when they allowed private entrepreneurship in trade and industry in order to save the country from complete economic collapse. Disparity between the declared and actual government agendas indicates that the authorities were engaging in social engineering (Alexander and Schmidt 6-7). In order to deal with opposition to ukrainianization within the Bolshevik party, officials at the party’s Moscow headquarters decided to shuffle party executives around and move some of them out of Ukraine (Zaitsev 258). Following this change, those who believed in the freedom of Soviet Union nationalities to self-express and develop their cultures headed ukrainianization. While implementing ukrainianization policy, the Soviet

government in Ukraine immersed itself in “the Utopian atmosphere that communism spread around” (qtd. in Luckyj 168). The availability of utopian ideas for those in power who engage the masses in social projects is fraught with the possibility of deploying social engineering techniques (Alexander and Schmidt 3-4). Indeed, language status planning efforts during ukrainianization were undertaken with the objective of inducing a collective action of acceptance of the Ukrainian language. In the post-ukrainianization years, the Ukrainian masses once again had to accept the new Orthographic code of Ukrainian, alongside the diminishing role of Ukrainian and the increased importance of Russian.

People are more willing to accept things they believe are becoming their own. Therefore, an idea can gain acceptance easily if the members of the group to whom the idea is being proposed begin to consider themselves as contributors to the development of that idea. Members of the Ukrainian Bolshevik elite who were appointed to implement ukrainianization accepted the policy as their own. Among the Bolsheviks were those who felt that socialism and the revolution would benefit from an autonomous Ukraine, and Skrypnyk is considered one of those Bolsheviks (Stakhiv 52-57). Borot’bists that moved under the umbrella of the Bolshevik party also supported ukrainianization because it reflected their original platform (Zaitsev 258). Though ukrainianization processes were initiated in Moscow by resolutions on national questions and *korenizatsiya*, the implementers of ukrainianization took it to heart and tried to make the project as successful as possible.

In order to develop a balanced approach and secure the acceptance of a new standard language, language planners must decide on the allowable degree of direct human intervention in the language during the standardization process. The standard Ukrainian language that was created as a result of codification efforts in 1917-1919, 1921, and 1926 included features

representing several regional varieties. Although none of the regional groups could say that the standard was based exclusively on their vernacular, each could potentially favor acceptance of the standard because it included some distinctive features of their vernacular. Ultimately, the standard was accepted both in Dnieper and Western Ukraine as well as by Ukrainian émigrés living in the West.

Chances of acceptance can also increase if consultations are made with the project's largest stakeholders. The government order establishing the Orthographic Commission of 1925, required the People's Commissariat of Education to hold a special conference, which would provide an opportunity for academia and literature representatives to participate in the development and discussion of spelling and grammar rules (Nimchuk 253-254). The standard is viable if the planners make choices that are beneficial both historically and logically (Joseph 14). The conference was an avenue for sourcing contributions of the best specialists to increase the chances of making well-informed choices. The involvement of professionals from various industries in the process of developing a specialized terminology for the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language also added to the predisposition of Ukrainian society to accept the new standard.

Public involvement in standardization may increase the chances of successful acceptance because through participation, individual members of society might start viewing a standard as a product of their efforts. Moreover, if the public is aware of the standardization process, its stages and what it entails, the language planners can sense at the early stages of standardization if acceptance of a standard would become a problem. In 1926, *The Ukrainian Orthography (Draft)* was published in Kharkiv to foster awareness about the draft rules in broad circles of society including linguists, writers, editors, and teachers (Nimchuk 256). The entire country participated

in intense discussions about the draft rules. The newspaper *Visti VUTVK (Bicmi BYЦBK)* had a special supplementary section for discussions of Ukrainian Orthography (*‘Український правопис: Дискусійний бюлетень’*). Several academic magazines, alongside the non-specialized magazine *Україна (Ukrayina)*, had pages dedicated to the codification processes (Nimchuk 266). These broad public discussions not only made people aware of the upcoming new orthography but also made them participants in the codification process. Between May 26 and June 6, 1927, the draft was discussed, voted on, and adopted in Kharkiv during the national conference that gathered representatives from various regions of Ukraine (Dingley 180, Nimchuk 257, 266). To a certain degree, public discussions facilitated the acceptance of the new code; however, because the rules were complex, there were initially some expressions of dissatisfaction.

After codification is complete, people begin consulting the orthographic rules, and the standard variety becomes thus associated with correctness. The concept of correctness is often considered interconnected with logic: if something can be logically argued, it must be correct. Similarly, a standard language is also expected to be logical (Thomas 160) because it is easier to accept a concept or rule that seems logical. The work undertaken in 1926 to draft a new orthographic code was greatly concerned with questions of logic and linguistic and etymological validation. The Orthographic Commission took into account the historical and literal traditions of the language and tried not to disrupt what was logical in the language (Nimchuk 255). Although the Commission could substantiate the choices it made, it is hard to determine if the logic here made acceptance any easier. The resulting rules were complex and did not necessarily make the acceptance easy for the general public.

Through legislation, governments have an effective tool of resolving issues surrounding the acceptance of prescriptions dictated by the language or any other policy. Legislation provides direct, univocal, and defined guidelines to the society and stipulates penalties for non-compliance. The Soviet Decree of 1920 on the use of Ukrainian in civil and military service set out that violators will be punished as *'dictated by the severity of the military-revolutionary laws'* (qtd. in Bondarchuk 273). The overall reliance on bureaucratic control for the implementation of language policies is a feature of self-made social engineering. However, depending on the gravity of the punishment, it can be viewed as a dark method: *'severity of the military-revolutionary laws'* often meant the death penalty, since human life was not valued by the Soviets. In fact, in the first years of Soviet power, punishment by shooting was a widespread practice.

The Decree on Ukrainianization adopted on August 1, 1923 stipulated that civil servants were given one year to learn Ukrainian. Non-conformity would cause a civil servant to lose his job (Magosci *A History...* 539). The newspaper page that featured Myna Mazailo's announcement about changing his last name also contained a notice from his office that he had been fired for the systematic and deliberate sabotage of ukrainianization (Kulich 202). Dismissal might have also been considered a harsh punishment but at least it had a clear definition of retribution. In this respect, securing acceptance of Ukrainian by the Decree of 1920 could result in more severe punishments than dismissal. The ambiguity of the 1920 Decree provision that non-conformity ought to be punished according to the terms dictated by the revolutionary time could result in executions and killings. In 1928 the resolution of the People's Commissariat of Education officially approved and brought into effect the orthographic code adopted at the All-Ukrainian conference. (Nimchuk 264). It became obligatory to use these norms in official

government domains, education, and media, however non-conformity did not entail any disproportionately severe retribution such as practiced in the early years of the revolution. Draconian punishments, such as arrests, exile, and executions were brought back to secure acceptance of the policies that were behind the orthographic codes of 1933 and 1938. Even if there was no guilt in someone's actions, fabrications were widely used to eliminate the individuals who were perceived by the authorities as a threat to Soviet ideology.

The emergence of new power requires the language to effectively communicate its ideas, goals, and promises in order to gain society's acceptance. Bolsheviks were well aware of this: Karl Marx stipulated that the credibility and authority of a revolutionary movement can be strengthened if language is put to its service (Gorham 4). Language, perceptions, and identities are interconnected concepts that influence one another. Changes introduced into the language can alter speakers' perceptions of the external world and of themselves; however, the opposite can also be true, where a change in people's beliefs and traditions can assist in securing the acceptance of a new official language and the social and political goals attainable by means of language planning. The Bolshevik government never relied solely on language planning tools. It continuously used massive Soviet propaganda to influence society in order to secure acceptance of any government policy, including a new standard language.

The victory of the Bolshevik Revolution brought with it a new social structure—a socialist society. This new society was unlike Russia before the revolution and it was unlike any other country in the world in terms of its ideological, political, social, economic, and administrative organization. Socialism in Russia and other Soviet republics was based solely on Marxist theory without any practical experience to support the argument that socialist society could be a viable project. These facts place the Bolsheviks' construction of a socialist society in

the category of quackish social engineering (Podgórecki 27). Reliance on ideology, engagement, and the manipulation of people's emotions are intrinsic features of quackish social engineering. Communist ideology was elevated to the level of sacredness in the Soviet Union. The history of the Soviet Union is a string of events charged with human emotions, ranging from pride and enthusiasm, to hatred and mortal fear.

The largest ideological project of the Soviet authorities was the creation the “New Soviet Man.” Depending on the means and circumstances, tactics including incentives, propaganda, or mere blustering were used to force the obedient acceptance of this mythical concept and to secure the upbringing of the New Soviet Man. Language planning in the Soviet Union was subordinated to this cause. Bolsheviks wanted to mold the language and the citizens to reflect their ideology (Gorham 10). Nothing was too small or insignificant for the process of shaping the New Soviet Man. Traditions, family allegiances, truth, names, graphical images of letters, literature—everything was altered to create the new Soviet identity. The Soviet totalitarian regime readily sacrificed historical accuracy, social convention, and even human life in the name of attaining its ideological goals.

When trying to alter public conscience, social engineers pay special attention to the young generations. When the youth becomes patriotic and loyal it is easy to manufacture any myth for them and even use them as material for creating these myths (Podgorecki 108). In order to secure its existence and future, the Bolshevik regime needed to ensure that children absorbed the ideology of allegiance to the soviet socialist state. Parents and grandparents of the 20s had been brought up before the Bolshevik Revolution and therefore held values that were contradictory to socialist ideals. As a result, the Bolshevik authorities saw family as a threat and put it under attack. They suggested that the traditional pre-revolution family structure and values

ought to be replaced with new ways of life and new beliefs. The objective of the Soviet educational system was to raise a generation of young communists who would be ready to relinquish family ties as a result of their loyalty to the Communist Party and the Soviet State. The Soviet youth were expected to identify with Bolshevik ideology and collectivism, as well as with new Soviet people and be ready to sacrifice their families in the name of the Soviet power.

The story of Pavlik Morozov is perhaps the best example of an effort to bring about a new Soviet identity. The myth of Pavlik Morozov, a product of falsifications delivered through Soviet propaganda, was created by the Soviet government to destroy traditional family values. Since the beginning of the 1930s, generations of Soviet children, including those residing in Ukraine, were reared on the story of Pavlik Morozov, a boy who caused his father's arrest in the name of Soviet power and was later killed by his relatives in revenge (Conquest 295, Kenez 116). This tragic family story was manipulated and twisted by Soviet propaganda to set a prominent example of young pioneer's³¹ devotion to Soviet power. Children were expected to follow their hero, Pavlik Morozov, who had renounced his bourgeois family values and passed a horrific test to become a New Soviet Man. In this respect, the Soviet approach to raising children is considered an example of dark social engineering. The facts of Pavlik Morozov's story are not quite clear. During Soviet times, a few official versions of the Pavlik Morozov legend were circulated. The events took place in the village of Gerasimovka, in the Urals area of Russia, but Pavlik Morozov and his family were in fact of Belarusian origin; nevertheless, in the Soviet propaganda he was identified as Russian (Csaba 118). It was clear that the authorities did not appreciate Soviet heroes of any ethnic background other than Russian: as a new type of people, Soviets were to be Russian by ethnicity.

³¹ Young pioneer – member of the All-Union Pioneer Organization, a Soviet children's organization established for the purpose of educating of the young generation as “steadfast, revolutionary, communist fighter[s]” (Zalkind 347-354).

The Pavlik Morozov myth did not rely on historical accuracy and his ethnic origin was not the only misrepresentation. The myth had inconsistencies in the accounts of Pavlik's age, physical appearance, how and to whom he reported his father, and the identity of his killers. The actual story cannot be fully verified; however, certain accounts contradict the official version and indicate that Pavlik had never been a pioneer and was a troubled youth who turned against his father not for political reasons but as a result of his parents' marital problems (Csaba 118-120, Kenez 114-116). In order to instill their beliefs, Soviet authorities needed a model for the children of the new society. This form of dark social engineering was used to create a person with tremendous loyalty to Soviet power that could not be stirred by any feelings, such as allegiance to blood relationship, ethnicity, or truth. Children became human raw material for the engineers of a new Soviet society and new Soviet identity. Pavlik's role was to convey the supremacy of Russian ethnicity in the realm of new ideology and loyalty to Soviet power. The new power needed to disconnect children from older generations. Therefore, Pavlik became a tool that partitioned families and removed youth from the influence of parents and grandparents. Family ties were severed and replaced with the sense of Soviet kinship.

Family, however, is a kernel structure in the process of primary language acquisition: language is transmitted by the family in its authentic and unrefined form from generation to generation. Proper names are an integral part of the core native vocabulary. With the new social order being introduced, family structure, family names, and given names were affected. Under the influence of Soviet propaganda, people invented new names and changed their names for ideological reasons, or even to pursue their individualistic inspirations that had little to do with politics. The 1924 Decree of the Soviet government allowed this practice and set out the procedure (Freund 388). Examples of new last names taken by people to reflect the Bolshevik

cause are Maiskaia (*Майская*), Oktiabr'skii (*Октябрьский*), Leninskii (*Ленинский*), Mashiniskii (*Машинский*), Kombainov (*Комбайнов*), and Boitsov (*Бойцов*). Tracing such bold political statements in the following name changes, Khliupina (*Хлюпина*) → Borovaia (*Боровая*), Samodurov (*Самодуров*) → Poliarnyi (*Полярный*), Kurochka (*Курочка*) → Orlov (*Орлов*), is not as straightforward as in the previous examples (Gorham 31). The purpose of the latter changes was likely to revamp personal image. Nevertheless, in both instances people were renouncing their family identity and history. For a person of Ukrainian background, an additional trait could be cleansed: anything in the name that indicated Ukrainian ethnicity, as in the case of Myna Mazailo. On the flipside, individuals who supported Ukrainian national identity and had Russian-sounding last names changed them to Ukrainian; for example, Mykola Khvylyovyj's last name at birth was Fitiiov (Zaitsev 259). Ukrainian culture attributes great importance to names—Ukrainians, like many other groups, believe that a person's last name communicates family history and that, collectively, last names communicate the history of the people. The New Soviet Man, however, was stripped of his ancestry and ethnicity, and his very name served as a dividing point between his old and new identities.

The russification of Ukraine during Soviet times resulted in a widely spread phenomenon of grandparents speaking Ukrainian and their grandchildren speaking only Russian. The new language policy broke an important link of communication between the older and younger generations. It was harder for young people to embrace the values of their grandparents who spoke a language they did not understand and was considered backwards, non-prestigious, bourgeois, and nationalistic by the official propaganda. Grandparents, and in some cases parents, were unable to communicate effectively with their children due to language challenges.

Consequently, the void created in the area of beliefs and moral principles was an excellent opportunity for the state to saturate these young minds with communist ideas.

It is easier to manipulate the minds and modify the behavior of children than adults. In his speech at the Third Congress of the Communist Youth League in 1920, Lenin expressed a concern that the proletariat can only destroy the old way of life but cannot effectively develop and use a new value system because of the rearing in the bourgeois world (Rosenberg 30). The process of overcoming existing traditions, habits, and perceptions was a tedious and time-consuming task. Anything resembling or reinforcing pre-revolutionary values had to be removed from all social, cultural, and official settings. To a great degree, the fate of the revolution depended on the ability of the population to quickly adapt to the new social order (Beer 185-189). Soviet authorities began excluding from the societal domains any ideas that could hamper the acceptance of and adaptation to the new way of life. This project required strict control, leaving no room for any personal freedom. To achieve this state of affairs, the government deployed a massive system of censorship to ensure that memories of the past social order or other associations with western societies would not be triggered.

The totalitarian nature of Soviet society meant government involvement in all aspects of life. If something was published or appeared in society, it had government endorsement and the Soviet government made sure that its endorsement was attached only to the things that could be beneficial for the authorities. Therefore, communist press always gave hostile reviews to anything that fell outside the boundaries of the official ideology (Terras 79). Writers that did not conform to government policies were at risk of incrimination and attacks (Sicher 181). Between 1917-1931, there was elaborate censorship in the Soviet State (Lewis Burgin 35-36). In order to be published, Soviet writers had to engage in self-censorship (Lewis Burgin 34, Yermolayev 10).

Hence, they developed a gap between the opinions they could express publicly and their true beliefs, which they kept to themselves (Nakhimovsky 222). Stalin, himself, engaged in censoring, correcting, and editing literary works. In his letter to Ukrainian playwright Oleksandr Kornijchuk, Stalin notified him that he added a few words on the sixty-eighth page “for greater clarity” (qtd. in Bliss Eaton xxiv). By the end of NEP and beginning of the first five-year plan in 1928, Stalin effectively harnessed Soviet literature to serve the ideological needs of the ruling Communist party.

The introduction and securing acceptance of the Orthographic Codes in 1933 and 1938 did not involve public discussions, printing large numbers of copies, or consultations with specialists. The major tools for securing acceptance were deterrence and ideological myths. Many linguists who contributed to the previous codes had already been arrested or investigated (Dingley 181). The code was introduced as an indisputable prescription for action, and mass repressions obliterated the public’s courage and desire to engage in to accept or not to accept discussions. The myth of the New Soviet Man was instrumental in securing acceptance of the new rules. The main character trait of the engineered Soviet Man was an unbridled devotion to Soviet power and the Communist Party—a devotion so strong that relinquishing one’s origins or killing one’s family members was acceptable in the name of Soviet loyalty. The true Soviet Man would readily accept and salute any decision made by the Soviet authorities. Planting and fostering the Soviet Man’s traits within the social moral fiber facilitated the public’s acceptance of government policies, including a new standard language.

Changes to the orthographic rules were introduced in 1933 and 1938 with the intention of altering Ukrainian orthography to resemble Russian spelling. This process falls in line with the theory and policy of convergence of nations and languages in the Soviet Union (Isayev 352-353,

356). The convergence policy suggests a planning process that leads to the fusion of ethnic groups in the Soviet Union into one homogeneous community, the Soviet people, and promotes the convergence of ethnic languages into one common language (Knowles 150). By injecting Russian grammar forms and words into Ukrainian and by eliminating Ukrainian letters that were non-existent in Russian, the creators of the convergence policy demonstrated their preference for Russian as the future super language. The glorification and accentuation of Russian culture, language, and people began in 1933 (Zaitsev 270). This process in combination with the elimination of authentic Ukrainian forms from the standard language and their replacement with Russian forms prepared a foundation for Russian as the only language of Soviet society.

When high and low language varieties coexist in a society, there is often an issue surrounding the superiority and inferiority of the languages and their respective groups because speakers of the high variety often perceive speakers of a low variety as inferior (Joseph 52). Soviet ideology is partly based on the premise that ideas that do not conform with Soviet doctrines are bourgeois, backward, and inferior. After the attack on the 1928 Orthographic Code labeling it as bourgeois, the use of Ukrainian became associated with bourgeois nationalism (Dingley 181, 184). As a result, Ukrainian was lowered to an inferior status while Russian gained prestige as the language of Bolshevism, Lenin, and the revolution. In the thirties, Russians regained their prominent place in the cultural and political hierarchy and Soviet patriotism began exhibiting characteristics of Russian nationalism (Kappeler 378-379). Together, these factors contributed to the acceptance of Russian as the high variety in Ukraine and encouraged people to embrace it as their language. Fear also strengthened the position of Russian since anyone perceived by Soviet authorities as exhibiting bourgeois traits or behaviors was severely punished in the Soviet Union (Alexopoulos 13-14, 176-180, Rees *Stalinism...* 48).

Therefore, people felt safer when they used Russian in public settings because they did not want to be seen as connected to bourgeois values through the Ukrainian language.

Language planning is the fulfillment of political or social ideals and, as such, it reflects the viewpoints of the groups that determine the social and political order. Both language planning and the standard language project those ideals to society. The Ukrainian Orthographic Codes of 1933 and 1938 were meant to undermine the Ukrainian language and impose Russian on Ukrainians. The acceptance of those Codes by members of the society suggests an intrinsic acceptance of the idea that Russian was becoming the high variety and would eventually become the only language of Ukraine. Ironically, the standard variety was promoted as a strengthening force for national identity, a tool to advance the language, but in reality it would lead to the death of the Ukrainian language.

The NEP introduced elements of a free market economy to the Soviet Union and allowed society to experience life based on principles other than communist doctrines. Culturally, NEP allowed for a multitude of opinions and played a part in developing Ukrainian culture. Over time, NEP was branded as a policy that strengthened bourgeois traditions (Rosenberg 31-32). The New Soviet Man could not be oriented to capitalist economic principles. Instead, he was to possess viewpoints and traits that were different from those brought up in a capitalist regime (Alexopoulos 6). The introduction of the first five-year plan in 1928 reinstated the country to the economic management models of war communism and instituted absolute state control over society (Reiman 106, 117). Command economy became the only acceptable method of managing and organizing the country's industries and commerce. Similarly, the Bolsheviks terminated any cultural ideas that promoted the distancing of society from Moscow. By this time, the Soviet regime had gained strong positions in Ukraine and no longer needed

ukrainianization. Once NEP and ukrainianization had produced the desired results, the Soviet government terminated both policies. From that point on, the government resorted to terror and suppression in order to achieve its goals, commencing one of the darkest periods in the history of social engineering.

Ten years of ukrainianization (1923-1933) transformed Ukraine into a consolidated, modern nation with the Ukrainian-speaking elite working constantly to advance Ukrainian culture. Soviet authorities deemed this state of affairs as threatening to the empire and reopened their pursuit of the cultural and linguistic subordination of Ukraine. In order to reverse Ukraine's progress towards autonomy and to reorient social values to the Soviet identity, the government increased its control over Ukrainian economy and social life by stifling the nation's linguistic and cultural development through the ideological and administrative oppression of its political, cultural, and intellectual elites (von Hagen 371). This was done through massive purges that swept the Soviet Union in 1934-1938 and were subsequently named the Great Terror (Service 27). Such purges started earlier in Ukraine, however, and Ukraine's experience between 1929-1933 was a preface of the difficult times that awaited the Soviet Union during the years of Great Terror (Magocsi *A History...* 567, Zaitsev 266). Arrests, intimidations, and mass killings swept through Ukrainian cities and the countryside and left survivors with no choice but to submit fully to Soviet ideology in order to be spared.

The 1933 introduction of the Orthographic Code directing Ukrainian language towards amalgamation with Russian was not accidental. The Soviet authorities used language planning to gain a stronger grip on Ukraine. Mass repressions turned the Ukrainian people into obedient servants of the state. Therefore, the government had no reason to be concerned with the new standard's reception by the public. Through arrests, false accusations, and executions, the

government ensured acceptance of the orthographic codes (1933 & 1938) and of the concurrent policy of reinforcing the status of the Russian language. Social engineering can be conducted on both the micro- (individuals) and meso-level (organizations and institutions) (Alexander, Schmidt 16); it was carried out in Ukraine accordingly, on both levels. However, considering the targets of persecution, it is also evident that a much broader plane of engineering was used by Soviet authorities who launched a vendetta against entire Ukrainian social classes, regardless of whether or not individual representatives of the class were supporters of Soviet power. Two social classes, the Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasants, were subjected to years of cruelty and persecutions (Kulchytsky *The Phenomenon...* 359). The Soviet authorities identified these classes as the most unreliable, most bourgeois, and least fitting the image of the New Soviet Man. These groups also had the closest connection to the Orthographic Code of 1928: the intelligentsia widely participated in the development of the Code and peasants were the speakers who supplied vernacular forms—as Ukrainophones they were ready and willing users of the Ukrainian standard. These classes were horribly battered during repression periods and lost any strength or motivation to express their opinions on the subject of orthography.

In order to achieve utter conquest, the Soviet government resorted to the destruction of Ukraine's elite. In fact, Ukrainian political elites experienced arrests as early as 1929 (Zaitsev 266). In 1930, a trial was held regarding the Union of Liberation of Ukraine and involved thirty-one individuals, all former members of various Ukrainian political parties, including nine officials of the *Tsentral'na Rada* (Shapoval 333). In January 1933, Stalin sent P. Postyshev as his representative to rule Ukraine; in 1935 Ukraine announced the existence of the All-Ukrainian Borot'bist Center, which was accused of conducting activity deemed hostile to the Soviet rule (Zaitsev 268-269). As a result, former members of the Borot'bists party were persecuted and

members of the Communist party of Ukraine were subjected to the same treatment. In 1937 almost all key officials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine and the government of Ukraine were arrested and killed (Zatsev 269). Of one hundred and two members and candidates to the Central Committee, one hundred were persecuted and most of them shot; of eleven members of the Party's Political Bureau, ten were killed and all nine members of the party's organizational bureau were executed (Zaitsev 269). The organizers and executors of earlier repressions faced the same fate as their victims: in 1939 P. Postyshev was summoned from Ukraine, arrested, and shot (Zaitsev 269). The terror was absolute and all-inclusive, and society descended into a state of constant fear and suspicion. People became afraid to express their opinions and began to conceal their true beliefs.

The achievements of ukrainianization in the area of education were seriously undermined as a result of the Great Terror. In 1927, Olexandr Shumsky, the Commissar of Education and the man responsible for ukrainianization, was exiled from Ukraine for supporting Mykola Khvyliovyj (Zaitsev 259-260). He was accused of propagating nationalistic ideas, was arrested in 1933, and killed in 1946 by security service while returning to Ukraine from exile (Zaitsev 260). According to Postyshev, the following purges were made in the Ukrainian education system in 1933: two thousand people working in education were fired, including two hundred scholars and editors, as well as two hundred department and sector heads (Shapoval 340-341). Education boards also underwent a complete change of personnel: all officers in the regional school boards and ninety percent of members of the district school boards were repressed and replaced (Shapoval 341). Terminations swept secondary and higher schools: four thousand school teachers, two hundred and ten lecturers, and eighteen out of twenty nine directors of the teacher training institutes were fired (Shapoval 341). As a result, the education system lost many

individuals who participated in discussions surrounding the 1926 draft orthographic code and who worked to elaborate the Ukrainian standard through acquisition planning. The Orthographic Code of 1933 not only supplanted the Code of 1928, but nearly all individuals who worked with and used the Code of 1928 in the education system were removed and replaced with those who had no association with the standard adopted in 1928. Essentially, people were shoveled around like dirt to smooth the acceptance of the new standard.

Ukrainian academia was also subjected to repressions and suffered many losses. Hrushevskyj was placed under close surveillance by Soviet secret police and his viewpoints were thoroughly scrutinized by the authorities (Shapoval 330-331). In March of 1931, Hrushevskyj was exiled from Kyiv to Moscow, was arrested a few days after his arrival, and was subjected to exhausting interrogations, during which the police threatened him with execution several times; he died in 1934 (Zaitsev 270-271). The authorities arrested and sentenced economists Volobuyev and Yavorskyj to labor camps, where they both died (Magosci 1996 564). Many linguists were arrested and exiled, or simply executed (Dingley 181). Many members of the Commission who worked on the 1928 Code, including V. Hantsov, A. Prykhodko, S. Pylypenko, O. Synyavsky, A. Krymskyi, O. Kurylo, Y. Tymchenko, M. Sulyma, S. Yefremov, and H. Holoskevych, were accused of bourgeois nationalism and repressed (Magosci *A History...* 565, Nimchuk 266-267, Zaitsev 266). M. Skrypnyk, the Commissar of Education and participant of the 1926 codification project, committed suicide after being accused of counterrevolution and deviation from the official Bolshevik regime (Magosci *A History...* 567). Intellectuals that succeeded to escape purges and continued to work in Ukraine had no choice but to make every effort to firmly secure Soviet Ukraine's image as an integral part of the Soviet Union.

Arrests and executions of Ukrainian artists took place predominantly in 1933-1934. Overall, more than a half of the members of the Association of Writers of Ukraine were arrested between 1934-1938 (Zaitsev 271). The authorities also targeted the intelligentsia and artists who came from Western Ukraine to Dnieper Ukraine during ukrainianization because they were perceived as bourgeois threats (Zaitsev 271). Les' Kurbas died along with other prisoners when a barge transporting them was intentionally sunk in an act of execution (Bliss Eaton xxiii). M. Khvyliovy committed suicide because he could not stand to see his colleagues being falsely accused and executed (Zaitsev 271). He remained a devoted Communist even upon his death by writing in his suicide note 'Long live communism, long live socialist construction, long live the Communist Party!' (qtd. in Luckyj 176). Paradoxically, mass arrests and persecutions inflicted by the Soviet authorities did not shake Khvyliovy's fascination with communist utopia. Nevertheless, he was perceived as a person who was dangerous to Soviet totalitarianism. A fundamental feature of colonial power is that it exists in a perpetual state of fear of being overthrown. The Soviet government's fear of losing Ukraine led to the implementation of various measures in order to strengthen Soviet positions in Ukraine. Artists, who are the cultural leaders of a nation, significantly influence the process of shaping that nation's views on both collective and individual levels. Therefore, up to eighty per cent of Ukrainian intelligentsia were killed or sent to camps by the Soviet authorities (Wilson 146). Artists and academics did not fit with the qualities of the New Soviet Man and, therefore, they had to be neutralized or removed from the new Soviet society in order to prevent their influence on the rest of the population.

Given the shocking nature of the repression exercised by the Soviet government, it is possible, as warned by Semen Petlyura, that the true purpose of ukrainianization was to single out individuals who supported Ukrainian culture and independence and to kill them (Bachynskyj

283). The government was well equipped to undertake cultural cleansing. The 1926 Census included a question to determine one's ethnicity, allowing the government to easily identify each person's ethnicity, class, origin, and whereabouts through the passport system, which was introduced during the first five-year plan (von Hagen 370). If some classes and nationalities were considered enemies of the Soviet power, the authorities had tools to find individual members of those groups. The label 'bourgeois' served as grounds for arrest and execution during the course of the ideological war.


The peasantry was a target of Soviet terror throughout the history of the Soviet Union. The hostile attitudes of Soviet authorities towards peasants were evident through economic and political repression, unbearable taxes, confiscation of 'surpluses,' and massive deportations (Channon 185, Reiman 51-52). Even peasant literature was under attack: writers and poets from the rural areas were labeled as representatives of the "bourgeois literary profession" (qtd. in Ogden 55). Peasant writers were to be de-peasantized, imprisoned, or executed, since the new socialist society had no room for peasant literature (Ogden 53-72). The authorities were particularly preoccupied with the issue of peasantry in literature because peasant writers and poets kept images of the vanishing countryside alive and raised concerns about society turning its back on its traditions, ways of life, and family structure. Looking to the past threatened the survival of the New Soviet Man concept. The myth of Pavlik Morozov was intended to discredit the traditional ways of life of the village. His image allowed the government to proclaim wealthy peasants as enemies of the Soviet power and the traditional village, as an evil and depressing force (Kenez 116). The myth also served as a diversion of attention from the executions being carried out by the Soviet authorities, by depicting enemies of collectivization as the ones who engaged in murders (Kenez 115). Peasants in the Soviet Union were deemed to be

a threat to Soviet power due to their conservatism, adherence to traditions, and opposition to collectivization. Ukrainian peasants were the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism, and as a result they were subjected to the policies aimed at making them weaker as a group.

In order to subjugate the Ukrainian peasantry, Soviet authorities deliberately created conditions that led to a mass starvation in the Ukrainian countryside. The government did this by increasing the grain collection quota in 1932 by 44% (Wilson 145). Other agricultural produce and personal possessions, including clothing, were consistently collected in lieu of grain (Conquest 230, Kulchytsky *Nevidoma...* 303). Villages were not compensated in any way for the expropriated goods. Those who were unwilling or unable to deliver grain because they did not have any left were persecuted as criminals, imprisoned, deported to labor camps, and often executed and their property confiscated (Nezhyvyj 168-169, 193). Even when people began starving to death, the campaign did not stop. The collection teams often found dead bodies in the yards and houses, ignored them, and kept looking for non-existent grain (Nezhyvyj 172). It has been suggested that the purpose of sweeps towards the end of the famine was not grain collection. Dead bodies in a house were proof that there was no food remaining in that house; the true mission of those final raids was to ensure and prove to the government that everybody was dead (Nezhyvyj 172). The Soviet grain collection policy led to the greatest humanitarian disaster in the history of Ukraine. Various sources estimate rural population loss in Ukraine due to deportations, collectivization, and artificial famine in 1932-1933 at 3.5 to 8 million people (Bilocerkowycz 18, Conquest 303-307, Graziosi 6, Kul'chytski 362-414, Levin 34, Nezhyvyj 202). Rural Ukraine was speaking Ukrainian; therefore, the collectivization and the terror-famine was an implacable assault on the existence of the Ukrainian language by eliminating its speakers. In *A History of Ukraine*, Magosci presents a map of population loss in various areas of

Ukraine to illustrate the demographic changes during the period of collectivization and famine (562).

Figure 5.1 Population Loss in Ukraine in 1929-1933



Source: Magocsi, Paul Robert. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto Buffalo London: University of Toronto Press.

Some scholars and members of the public argue that the deliberate famine was an act of genocide, or ethnic cleansing, because the government's grain collection policy led to the eradication of the core group of speakers of the Ukrainian language (Rees *Stalin...* 83, Ryabchuk. 177, Wilson 144-145). There is evidence that the grain procurement goals were not entirely economic but also political. In many cases, the collected grain was left to rot in government yards rather than being distributed to the starving population (Conquest 265-266). Survivors of

the famine also testified that, in many cases, the grain collection teams were destroying cooked or other food that was not suitable for collecting (Kulchytsky *Nevidoma...* 304-306). The purpose of food destruction was to ensure that peasants would indeed die (Kulchytsky *Nevidoma...* 306). In 1930-1933, the government also undertook an initiative to send operational harvesting and milling equipment to scrap yards (Nezhyvyj 153). These actions resulted in crop wastage because it was not harvested and processed in time due to shortages of agricultural equipment. Following the famine, government orders, plans, and actions were made to move people from other republics to repopulate villages that had been wiped out by the famine. This was done to change the ethnic composition of Ukrainian rural areas (Nezhyvyj 185-186,199). Subsequently, Stalin admitted that he had wanted to deport all Ukrainians, but there had been too many to do so (Conquest 334). The famine effectively decreased the number of Ukrainians in Ukrainian villages.

During the famine, the situation in Ukraine was unbearable; people were going mad, committing suicide, eating animals, snails, grass, tree bark, acorns, and manure because it contained whole grains. There were cases of murders for food, cannibalism, and mothers would tell their children to eat them when they died. Desperation drove people to steal. Scavenging even five spikelets left behind on the field after harvesting could lead to ten years of imprisonment or even execution; fishing in the rivers was prohibited and punishable by law (Conquest 234-235,240, 257-258, Kulchytsky *Nevidoma...* 249-250, Nezhyvyj 172, Zaitsev 267-268). In the midst of this dreadful time, some families fell into the squabbles and fights amongst themselves, whereas others demonstrated extraordinary love: in a witness account about a woman exhausted to the point that she could hardly speak, the observer describes how the woman kept telling legends and fairy tales to her four children so they could forget their hunger

for some time (Conquest 256-257). This experience was deeply traumatic and impacted people's perception of human relations, their value of human life, their sense of self-esteem, and of their own identity. The Soviet government's policy led to the destruction of traditional rural ways of life, the degradation of society's value system, the death of millions of people, and the removal of ethnic Ukrainians from their home land, resulting in their dispersal across vast locales of labor camps.

In 1932 passports, which were required for travel within the country, were issued to Soviet citizens; however, peasants were excluded from this system and did not receive passports (Nezhyvyj 172 – 173). The internal passport system was a tool of surveillance and control over urban dwellers. For rural areas, this system meant that peasants were prisoners in their villages. The cities, roads, railway stations, and Russian, Romanian, and Western Ukrainian borders were guarded by military and police and any noticed villagers were arrested, shot, or sent to camps (Conquest 236-237, Nezhyvyj 194-196). Despite the danger, millions were on the move in search for food because staying behind at home meant death for themselves and their family members (Conquest 236-237). Most travelers died on the road, were deported, or killed; however, even if they returned home safely, they often found their families dead. Villages were left without food and without effective means to escape the famine. As a result, millions perished in this tragedy.

Whereas ukrainianization shifted power and societal dynamics towards Ukraine, the famine reversed this process and the power became centralized in Moscow (Bilaniuk 84, Rees *Stalin...* 83-84). The Soviet authorities did not need ukrainianization any more because the Communist ideology had already developed deep roots in rural Ukraine. Allegiance to Soviet power was evident given the cooperation of local Communist party activists with the Red Army

and internal police forces sent to Ukraine from other republics for the purpose of collecting grain (Kulchytsky *Nevidoma...* 263-264, 331, Magosci 558, Nezhyvyj 148). At the end of the famine, when there was no food or goods left for the government to expropriate, these activists were not given any more food allotments. They were left to starve and their fate was similar to that of their victims (Conquest 234, 258). A number of the activists became disillusioned with Soviet power and the tragedy unfolding in Ukraine was unbearable for them. Some were courageous enough to protest, write letters to party leaders, quit the party, and risk their own lives to save others (Nezhyvyj 193). Some grain collectors, from Ukraine and other republics, survived and provided statements about their state of mind during the famine. Others were naive and truly believed in the communist utopia (Nezhyvyj 273). In order to survive, those who realized that things were not right in Ukraine had to persuade themselves of the historical necessity of terror in rural Ukraine to secure “the universal triumph of Communism” (qtd. in Conquest 232-333.) The affliction of the artificial famine in Ukraine was a test that revealed that the Soviet ideology was deeply rooted in the minds of certain segments of the Ukrainian population.

The spread of Soviet ideology within the population served as a foundation for creating the New Soviet Man. It was an undertaking of social engineering, in which people and their language served as the material. Nikolai Bukharin³² stated that executions and labor camps were a means of producing a Communist humanity from the human material of the capitalist epoch (Beer 2). The Ukrainian famine and the multiple waves of purges between 1929 and 1938 ensured that the base material was free of any ideas that could hamper the formation of the Soviet identity. In this sense, the famine was a form of deliberate and brutal ideological warfare against the Ukrainian people (Wilson 145). The population of the Soviet Union was supposed to

³²Nikolai Bukharin was member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until 1929 when he was removed as a result of a conflict with Stalin (Reiman 8, 14, 113, 177-178).

believe and follow only those conventions established by Communist and Soviet ideologists. Language was an important element of the identity of the New Soviet Man and language planning activities were the main tool of this myth.

The important features of the New Soviet Man are enumerated in Nadezhda Krupskaya's³³ article, "*What a Communist Ought to be Like*" (Krupskaya 38-41), and all these characteristics have a connection to the famine. The first, and most important quality is to be a hard worker and appreciate collective work. The famine was designed to ensure that peasants would accept collective and state farms as the only method of agricultural production and organization, and this way, wealthy peasants who were supporting individual farming concepts would disappear (Magosci A History... 557). Post-famine, many peasants tried to escape to urban centers and become industrial workers in order to separate themselves from the setting that was the subject of mass killings.

According to Krupskaya, true followers of the communist ideology had to promote the speedy arrival of the communist era by influencing the masses and convincing them to accept communist ideology (Krupskaya 38-39). The construction of a utopian communist society was the ideological foundation of every project implemented in the Soviet Union. Utopia implies an entirely new way of life, disconnected from any features from one's present or past. The famine served to destroy the anti-socialist elements of rural Ukraine and to bring the victory of communism to the agrarian sector. The Soviet authorities denied the fact that the famine had taken place in Ukraine, since the Soviet doctrine declared the socialism system as working towards the well-being of people not against it (Nezhyvyj 176, 280). Massive campaigns of lies and punishment for the truth were acceptable means of influencing public knowledge. The

³³Nadezhda Krupskaya (1869-1939) was a Russian Bolshevik and a Revolutionary. She was married to Vladimir Lenin. In the Soviet Union, she held the post of Deputy Commissar of Education and profoundly influenced the topic of ideology in education (Freund 318-319).

mention of famine was considered as anti-Soviet propaganda punishable with five or more years in labor camps. Even the word ‘famine’ was forbidden from use (Conquest 258-259). Death records and certificates were forged and altered to remove the cause of death initially stated as hunger, to unknown (Boriak 34).

Figure 5.2 Death Record Issued in Ukraine in 1932 shows that the original cause of death stated as “starvation” was changed to “unknown cause.”

рада <u>Сівабушанська</u> району <u>21-й Сіверський</u> міс. 1932 р.		№ <u>21</u>
Прізвище померлого <u>Коробів</u> його ім'я <u>Фруміна</u> по-батькові <u>Александр</u>		9/86
1. Де загинув (назва району та села або міста, вул., буд. №) <u>в. Дніпропетровська</u>		
2. Дата смерті <u>21-й Сіверський</u> міс. 1932 р. 4. Чоловік, жінка (підкреслити).		
3. Вік <u>8</u> (співідати повних років мав)		
4. Як дитя, що померло, не досягнувши до 1 р., точно вказати: а) народилося <u>1</u> міс. 1932 р.		
б) якщо у матері була померла дитина: перша, друга, або <u>3</u> в) Батьки дитини живуть укупі, чи може розійтися, батько помер, покинув родину, розлучилися тощо <u>вкупі</u> вік матері <u>45</u> років.		
7. Прізвище померлого <u>УСРР</u> 8. Національність <u>Українець</u>		
9. Родина є і померлого: парубок, дівчина, удівець (а), одружений (а), розлучений (а) — підкреслити.		
10. Чи працює: зрозуміло сам, а як не сам, то хто утримував <u>наш державний завод</u>		
11. а) Рідство, промисел, посада і спеціальність у них б) Якщо жив тоштом держави чи громадських організацій, вказати на які саме (пенсія, стипендія тощо) в) Якщо жив в інших джерел, точно вказати в яких саме <u>материнський</u>		
12. Становище в зайнятті: робітник, служб. ремісник, кустар-кооперативний (чл. артілі) чи ні, торгов. помічник у зайнятті член родини тощо — вказати в яких саме. Для сільських господарів: одинок. билик чи член колгоспу (коопат. с.-г. артілі, СОСУ)		<u>чл. с/г артілі „Нагір’я“</u>
13. Назва підприємства, установи чи закладу, завважуючи яко виробництво, де працює, служив або господарює.		<u>в с/г артілі „Нагір’я“</u>
14. Де помер (удома, в лікарні, дит. будинку тощо) <u>вдома</u> Якщо вдома, то чи користувався в лікарні допомогти померлий (так, ні) <u>ні</u>		
15. Причина смерті — вказати докладно <u>невідомо</u> <u>НЕ ВІДГОЛОШЕНО</u>		
16. Дано лікарську довідку № <u>—</u> Чи може запне складено на оголошеного від суду на померлого. <u>—</u>		

Source: Boriak, Hennadii *Sources and Resources on the Famine in Ukraine's State Archival System*. In Hryn, Halyna (ed.) *Hunger by Design: the Great Ukrainian Famine and Its Soviet Context*. Harvard University. 2008. (34) Print.

Any collective memory of the famine was effectively suppressed by the government (Wilson 145). On a personal level, the survival mechanism of denial was an additional force pushing

famine survivors to forget the physical, emotional, and psychological traumas they had endured. All disconnection from reality and an utter denial of truth made it easier for the Soviet government to promote utopian dreams about a happy communist future.

The necessary elements required for constructing a communist society include the subordination of personal interests to common interests, the abandonment of any personal attachments in the name of communist ideals, volunteering or allowing the confiscation of valuables, and the ability to be resolute in the midst of cruelty or dangers associated with military actions (Krupskaya 40). One's connection with traditions, ancestry, and ethnic culture was to be eradicated as characteristics alien to the new Soviet identity. The famine had been an opportunity for grain collectors to practice cruelty and resolution. The task was unbearable and many tried to deal with their psychological trauma by persuading and reminding themselves that they must not give in to pity and must continue the historical revolutionary duty for the goal of a better communist future (Conquest 230, 233-234). The famine extinguished many lives, leaving gaps in communities, families, and generations. Many relationships that existed before the famine had vanished and this resulted in vast disconnects between community members, relatives, and age groups, which facilitated the abandonment of connections to the past on both personal and social levels.

The promotion of Russian in the areas of government administration, ideology, science, and education secured its perception as being a high language. Propaganda about love of the Russian language intensified through the institution of Soviet policies (Bilanuik 85). The Soviet government believed that national languages would gradually die out and was frustrated that there was no evidence that it was actually happening (Bilanuik 85). The famine contributed to the desired statistics of language disappearance: the number of speakers of Ukrainian decreased

by millions (Magosci 562). The famine also indirectly contributed to the spread of the Russian language because the execution of grain collection and other purges by representatives of the State were conducted primarily in Russian or with elements of Russian in the language. It demonstrated to the Ukrainian people that Russian was the language of power that could easily crush millions of people without the faintest glimmer of concern. A person who did not speak Russian was therefore rendered intimidated and insecure and was forced to see a more secure future in Russian. Just as victims of rape try to convince themselves that it was an act of love in order to deal with their abuse, Ukrainian society became more susceptible to massive switches to the Russian language (Ryabchuk 177).

The death record presented above indicates YCPP (Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic) as the entry in the field 'Citizenship.' There are a few more peculiarities in this entry, in addition to the alteration of cause of death. First, the name of the republic was changed to YPCP (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) in 1937 (Zaitsev 253, 270). The Soviet government wanted to emphasize that Ukraine was first and foremost 'Soviet,' and only after that, 'Socialist,' and this order of words also matched the name of the whole Soviet state, the 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.' Second, the record indicates that people in Ukraine identified with the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic as the country of their citizenship, not the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Later, the engineering of the New Soviet Man ultimately resulted in people identifying with the USSR as the only country of their citizenship. The Soviet Republics, including Ukraine, became mere references to geographical locations of residence and lost any affiliation with the concept of citizenship. This document also contains spelling that disappeared from the language with the introduction of new orthography in 1933: спеціальність, смерти

(Boriak 34). These features vanished in “the battle against nationalism on the language front” (qtd. in Dingley 181).

In order to secure the Codes of 1933 and the new alphabet that did not contain ‘r,’ the Orthographic Code of 1928 and the letter ‘r’ were labeled *bourgeois* and were said to represent *bourgeois* ideology. The use of the letter ‘r’ became a crime and could lead to arrest and prosecution for counterrevolutionary activity (Magocsi *A History...* 567). The government’s appeal to ideologies and their engagement in intimidations demonstrates that securing acceptance of the new alphabet is a form of quackish social engineering. However, if one takes into account that purging users of the letter ‘r’ was an element of a policy aimed at establishing totalitarian Soviet control through a national genocide, securing a new alphabet becomes a deplorable technique of dark social engineering. This practice was aligned with initiatives undertaken in other parts of the Soviet Union. The authorities also proclaimed the Latin alphabet as *bourgeois* and replaced it with Cyrillic in the Asian Soviet republics, as well as in Siberia (Kappeler 379). Furthermore, the authorities were concerned with the writing of certain words in capital or lower case. The word ‘God’ was to be written as ‘god’ to reflect the denunciation of religion by the Soviet state³⁴ (Lewis Burgin 39). The battle against nationalism in the area of language and the engineering of the New Soviet Man were carried out on the micro level of spelling, individual letters, and grammatical rules. The famine removed any potential challenges for the acceptance of the 1933 Code since starving children in Ukrainian villages were not preoccupied with grammar and spelling. As the situation worsened, schools stopped functioning and children often became too weak to attend. When the education system resumed work, the rules of 1928 were practically forgotten and the new rules were accepted as the only standard.

³⁴ The editorial to the ninth edition of Holoskevych dictionary published in Great Britain in 1961 denoted that while traditionally religious words were written with a capital first letter in Ukrainian, the dictionary prescribed writing them with small letters due to political reasons (Holoskevych Editorial).

By replacing Ukrainian grammar endings with Russian ones in the 1933 Orthographic Code, the government set a precedent of language borrowing on a level that was not strictly lexical. Shifting the paradigm of Ukrainian case endings towards Russian endings destroyed the integrity of Ukrainian words and intensified the practices of language mixing. The mixture of Ukrainian and Russian called *surzhyk* is not strictly a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian words. Rather, Ukrainian words get russified by adding Russian morphemes and the same is true for Russian words in *surzhyk*: they often have Ukrainian affixes and endings. Since the 1933 Code was the official sanction of mixing, *surzhyk* moved beyond the traditional oral vernaculars. A high degree of penetration of Russian elements was recorded in industrial and professional areas. (Yizhakevych 298-299). This is not surprising, since in 1933, the government eradicated specialized Ukrainian terminology and replaced it with Russian. When a person did not remember a term, there was no motivation to check the dictionary because it was highly probable one would find a Russian-looking word. The changes of 1933 and 1938 produced a situation where society accepted any prescription of language planning. This attitude spread even to *surzhyk*, which was deemed an acceptable means of communication and people readily admitted that they used *surzhyk* and did not want to take any efforts to stop mixing languages. In a way, *surzhyk* was legitimized in 1933 and 1938 in accordance with the theory and policy of convergence of languages. Convergence was designed by Soviet social engineers in order for Russian to soak up Ukrainian.

By resembling Russian, the new standard variety of Ukrainian produced the impression that both languages were virtually the same. This implied that a separate Ukrainian identity was non-existent. The mandate of the new standard language and the elevation of Russian helped the government create the myth of the New Soviet Man who speaks Russian and does not

identify with any particular ethno-geographical area or group other than Russian. Such an individual is easy to move from one site of the socialist construction project to another, ensuring the availability of labor and the indivisible wholeness of the Soviet state. The introduction of Russian-looking features into standard Ukrainian in 1933 and 1938 and the increased role of Russian as the high variety facilitated the centralization of power by Soviet authorities. Russian was the language of the political centre and Russian features in Ukrainian brought Ukrainians closer to the political center. In essence, this was the centralization of power through standard orthography.

Securing acceptance at the stage of language planning requires tremendous government efforts, as well as input from other interested social circles. The language planning stage is more prone to failure than selection or codification. Securing acceptance is interrelated with the elaboration stage and greatly depends on the progress of elaboration. If the governments are willing to invest resources into the securing acceptance phase and endorse the new variety as prestigious, the probability of successful language planning increases. The governments of independent Ukraine tried to achieve the acceptance of Ukrainian as its new standard. Although they had little time, the Orthographic codes created during Ukraine's brief independence became the foundation for the Codes of 1921 and 1928, which were adopted in Soviet Ukraine. In most cases, efforts to secure acceptance of the Ukrainian language during ukrainianization were made by means of sociotechniques proper. Elements of self-made and quakish social engineering were also present, since the language planners relied on legislative orders promoting Ukrainian. Despite other methods, acceptance of the Orthographic Codes of 1933 and 1938 was secured practically entirely by means of dark social engineering. People faced the choice of accepting the new codes or death. Ukraine emerged from the famine and the purges as a different group of

people. They survived as an ethnic group, but were severely undermined and battered into submission. They were more prone to accepting any policy the government would send their way, including the new Orthographic Codes. The Ukrainian people started to drift towards Russian since it provided better hopes for the future, including security and dignity.

CONCLUSIONS

A complete understanding of language planning projects requires the detailed examination of their historical and social context. Therefore, the language planning undertaken in Soviet Ukraine between 1919 and 1938 cannot be analyzed without looking at the political forces driving the social change. Furthermore, historical events, which took place in the years prior to the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine in 1919, had created a peculiar language situation, which, along with the Soviet government's political goals, influenced language planning policy. Annexing the Dnieper Ukraine in 1654 was an important achievement for Russian colonialism. Therefore, substantial efforts were invested in retaining Ukraine, "the jewel in the Russian imperial crown," within the borders of Russia (qtd. in Wilson 151). In order to discourage aspirations of an independent Ukrainian national identity, Ukraine was subjected to political, social, and cultural oppression for centuries. Although tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union were two very different totalitarian powers both in their political structure and administrative organization, they used similar mechanisms to suppress Ukrainian indigenesness. One can observe the similarities of between tsarist and Soviet objectives and implementation of language policies, since these policies were guided predominantly by the colonial ambitions of both governments.

Every stage of language planning reflects the mandates of those who have the power to intervene in the language. Prior to 1917, the linguistic policy in Russia generally pursued the prohibition of Ukrainian in order to ensure the retention of Ukraine within Russia, with short periods of lifts of this ban. However, even those small concessions were intended to undermine the Ukrainian language as they allowed very limited use of Ukrainian in non-strategic and non-prestigious areas. The Soviet government inherited Russian Tsarist colonial attitudes towards

Ukraine and adopted their methods of oppressing and assimilating the Ukrainian language. These sociolinguistic conditions were created to make Ukrainian a non-prestigious variety and therefore an unattractive means of communication. The promotion of bilingualism in Ukraine was one sided: native speakers of Ukrainian learned Russian but the speakers of Russian did not need to know Ukrainian. These policies undermined the existence of a Ukrainian national identity and contributed to implementing the concept of the New Soviet Man.

Language change and language planning never occur in a vacuum and must be considered in the context of other languages (Hornberger 33). Ukraine's servitude and partitioning between various conquerors meant it was influenced by Russian on one side and various European languages on the other. Consequently, the Ukrainian language entered the twentieth century having two language traditions and no standard variety. Ukraine's independence and the Act of Union of 1919 created the first opportunity in history for the development of a unified code of Ukrainian. Linguists who participated in codification projects during the years of independence (1917-1919) made enormous contributions to the development of standard Ukrainian and set the foundation and traditions for subsequent codification efforts.

Driven by aspirations of a unified and independent Ukraine, the language planners chose to include features of both Dnieper and Western Ukrainian traditions, based on linguistic science, history, and etymology. This concept and the Orthographic Codes of independent Ukraine were used as basis for codification projects undertaken in Soviet Ukraine in 1921 and 1926-1928. In this way, language planning traditions that developed in independent Ukraine penetrated Soviet linguistics and language planning. Simultaneously, on the political front, the merging of *Borot'bists* with the Communist Party of Bolsheviks created favorable conditions for allowing 19th century Ukrainian liberation ideas to influence the language policies of Soviet Ukraine. The

adoption of the indigenization policy by the USSR served to lure ethnic groups into staying within the realm of Russia. The Ukrainian version of this policy, ukrainianization, was needed by the Bolsheviks to secure acceptance of their ideology by the people of Ukraine, who, in 1926, were eighty percent Ukrainian, based on ethnicity and language (Magocsi *A History...* 573). These factors contributed to the strengthening and legitimizing of the Ukrainian national identity, an outcome always feared by oppressors of Ukraine.

A strong Ukrainian nation would have been an impediment to Moscow's concentration of control over the country. The famine and purges in Ukraine quickly undid any nation-building progress made during ukrainianization. The famine reversed ukrainianization by destroying the peasantry, which was the ukrainianization policy's base target and support group. Purges against Ukrainian political and cultural elite groups removed the potential danger of educated and progressive individuals leading and inspiring the Ukrainian nation. Since the standard language is considered an important element in nation building, the Soviet authorities made Ukrainian resemble Russian in order to undermine the separateness of the Ukrainian language. The sense of distinct national identity that developed during ukrainianization was replaced through the myth of the New Soviet Man.

Every person, including the New Soviet Man, needs to have a language. Without actually saying it, Soviet authorities engineered conditions for Russian to become the one and only language of the new Soviet society. The Soviet government devised a new standard Ukrainian, which resembled Russian, specifically for groups that were unwilling, indifferent, or had no opportunity to master Russian. Distinctly Ukrainian words were replaced with synonyms, often artificially created, to move Ukrainian vocabulary closer to Russian. The standard language connects the nation to both its past and its future (Cooper 184). This is true

for the Ukrainian Orthographic Codes of 1918-1919, 1921, and 1928, since the codifiers kept the history of the language in mind while developing the rules. The Codes of 1933 and 1938, however, entirely disconnected standard Ukrainian from its historical and etymological background. In this sense standard Ukrainian, just like the concept of the New Soviet Man, had no links to the past and was oriented entirely to the future.

The process of assimilating Ukrainian into Russian continued past 1938: the spelling of any Ukrainian words that was still different from Russian subsequently changed to follow Russian models. After 1933, borrowed foreign words in Ukrainian lost any connection to their original language. They started to look as if they came from Russian, and their spelling came from Russian Orthography. The process of mimicking Russian spelling, grammar rules, and word paradigms contributed to the development of a sense of superiority of the Russian language, because usually there is a drive to follow something more prestigious as it appears better and more attractive. Labeling the standard language developed during ukrainianization as *bourgeois* and *nationalistic* was a social engineering tool designed to achieve the unanimous acceptance of the new rules and vocabulary, since commitment to previous orthography was viewed as disgraceful and dangerous. Fear discouraged the survivors of purges and famine from demonstrating any signs of distinct Ukrainianness, even if they consciously recognized their identity as such.

The crusade against Ukrainian letters did not come to an end with the cessation of the Stalin era or the collapse of the Soviet Union. The battle with Ukrainian letters that are graphically different from the Russian alphabet continues even today. The troublesome letters are no longer labeled “bourgeois,” since this categorization is now archaic, or even humorous. Instead, the letters are considered inconvenient, a characteristic that in our modern, fast-paced

society means these letters will likely be eliminated from the alphabet. Current social engineers may be tempted to take advantage of the modern push to simplify and standardize technological processes. They can make anything disappear, from social habits to letters of the alphabet and they will not be required to explain their true reasons to the public in order to secure support. All that is required is a label that suggests certain elements are hampering the path of technological progress and members of society will be more likely to reject these elements and support their destruction. Moreover, the technological advances of telecommunication have made it possible to deliver an idea to millions without the need for thousand of propaganda agents canvassing the countryside. Social networks can instantly deliver a message to millions of people, and millions will repeat it without any suspicion that it can be part of a hidden plot.

When a country undertakes the project of codifying a vernacular to produce a standard variety, the individuals engaged in the process face numerous pressures. Some of those pressures come from purely linguistic aspects: the forms that are selected to enter the standard have to be linguistically logical and interconnected within the paradigm of norms being established during codification. Since the standard language can be both a uniting and separating force within society, the codifiers face pressures of an ideological nature. As a rule, authorities that order the development of a standard language wish to use the process to their advantage. If their goal is to build a strong national identity, they may order the codifiers to maintain the nation building function of the standard in mind while developing language norms in order to make those norms suitable for propagating national ideas. The standard's nation building function was used in Ukraine during the years of independence and ukrainianization as an attempt to build a united image of the country by shifting the orthographies of Western Ukraine and Dnieper Ukraine closer to one another. Members of the Orthographic Commissions tried to

diminish the effects of the standard's separation potential as much as possible in order to avoid resentment of the standard by any group in Ukrainian society.

The social engineering goal of the 1933 and 1938 codification projects was to dismantle the Ukrainian national identity, since the authorities viewed it as dangerous to Soviet power. The Ukrainian national identity was to be replaced with the myth of the New Soviet Man. The Soviet agenda of engineering the New Soviet Man benefited from the unifying capacity of the standard language. The authorities tried to create a Russian-Ukrainian linguistic commonality by including Russian elements in standard Ukrainian. Both sets of Orthographic codes (1918-1919 & 1928 (1st set), and 1933 & 1938 (2nd set)) projected unity. The first set projected the unity of Western and Dnieper Ukraine, while the second set projected the unity of Ukraine and Russia, and served as a building block for the myth of the New Soviet Man. The language planning processes of 1933 and 1938 did not involve any linguistic considerations and were guided by a purely political agenda. The government did not anticipate any difficulty in spreading and securing the acceptance of the changes to the orthographic rules introduced in 1933 and 1938, even though these changes, were linguistically unsubstantiated. The Soviet authorities resorted to dark engineering to eliminate any potential resistance to the new orthography.

Politically and socially powerful groups undertake language planning in a society in order to fulfill their mandates. Language planning is a purposeful intervention in the language of a nation and involves political, social, and cultural agendas. Whether the government mandate is positive or negative is a question of moral principles and political debate (Thomas 38). Social manipulations, mass arrests, executions, and the famine put the language planning efforts of 1933-1938 in the category of dark social engineering. Since a totalitarian regime operates under the constant fear of being overthrown by those who are oppressed, the Soviet government

showed it was threatened by the graphical representation of letters and spelling of words. By eliminating distinct Ukrainian letters, spellings of foreign borrowings, and grammatical endings, the government devised a language that resembled Russian graphically, phonetically, and grammatically and secured the reign of the Soviet government in Moscow. Whether a standard variety is socially beneficial in building a national identity or becomes a potential cause of ethnolinguistic death depends on the political mandate of the group undertaking the language planning process.

The history of Russia's political impact on standard Ukrainian may be of interest to scholars researching language planning and language change in the context of bilingual societies and political power. It may be used to explain to students of Ukrainian how the differences between the orthographies used in the West and in Ukraine came into existence. It may also provide some understanding of why the issue of the two codes of Ukrainian is the subject of many emotionally charged debates in Ukraine and within the Ukrainian community in the West. Awareness and understanding of the historical roots and political context of the development of the existing standards of Ukrainian may assist individuals involved in and effected by this polarizing issue to build a link between the opposing camps, find shared concepts, and begin appreciating the existing diversity of the language. The study of the history of language planning will contribute to debates about the future of Ukrainian, which has become an important part of the nation building process of independent Ukraine in the 21st century.

WORKS CITED

- Alexander, Jon and Schmidt, Joachim K. H. *Social Engineering: Genealogy of a Concept. Social Engineering*. Ed. Podgórecki, A., Alexander, J. and Schields R. Carleton University Press. 1996. Print.
- Alexopoulos, Golfo. *Stalin's Outcasts. Aliends, Citizens, and the Soviet State, 1926-1936*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 2003. Print.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Uyavleni Spil'noty. Mirkuvannya shchodo Pokhodzhennya i Poshyrennya Natsionalizmu*. Krytyka. Kyiv. 2001. Print.
- Andriyevsky, B. *Do Kharakterystyky Ukrayins'kykh Pravykh Partij*. Berlin: Z Drukarni Hofmana u Zaltsvedeli. 1921. Print
- Andriewsky, Olga. "The Russian-Ukrainian Discourse and the Failure of the "Little Russian Solution", 1782-1917." *Culture, Nation and Identity. The Ukrainian Russian Encounter, 1600-1945*. Ed. Kappeler A., Kohut Z. E., Sysyn, F.W., von Hagen M., Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. 2003. Print.
- Bachynkyj, Dmytro. *Movna Polityka Bilshovykiv v Ukrayini na pochatku 20-x rokiv. Ukrayins'ka Istorychna nauka na porozi XXI stolittya, Mizhnarodny Naukovyj Kongress*. Ed. Vynar, L., Makar, Y. *Chernivtsi 2000*. Chernivtsi: Ruta 2001. Print.
- Beer, Daniel. *Renovating Russia. The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity, 1880-1930*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 2008. Print.
- Bilaniuk, Laada. *Contested Tongues. Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine*. Cornell University Press Ithaca and London. 2005. Print.
- Bilocerkowycz, Jaroslaw. *Soviet Ukrainian Dissent. A Study of Political Alienation*. Boulder and London: Westview Press. 1988. Print.
- Bliss Eaton, Katherine. Introduction. *Enemies of the People. The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s*. Ed. Bliss Eaton, K. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 2002. Print.
- Bondarchuk, Petro. "Movna Polityka Bilshovykiv v Ukrayini na pochatku 20-x rokiv." *Ukrayins'ka Istorychna nauka na porozi XXI stolittya, Mizhnarodny Naukovyj Kongress*. Ed. Vynar, L., Makar, Y. *Chernivtsi 2000*. Chernivtsi: Ruta. 2001. Print.
- Boriak, Hennadii. Sources and Resources on the Famine in Ukraine's State Archival System. *Hunger by Design: the Great Ukrainian Famine and Its Soviet Context*. Ed. Hryn, Halyna. Harvard University. 2008. Print.
- Borys, Jurij. *The Russian Communist Party and Sovietization of Ukraine*. Stockholm: Kungl. Boktryckeriet P.A. Norstedt & Söner. 1960. Print.
- Bushkovitch, Paul What is Russia? National Identity and the State, 1500-1917. *Culture, Nation and Identity. The Ukranian-Russian Encounter, 1600-1945*. Ed. Kappeler, A., Kohut, Z., Sysyn F., von Hagen, M. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Edmonton, Toronto. 2003. Print.
- Channon, John. Stalin and the Peasantry: Reassessing the Postwar Years, 1945-53. *Politics, Society and Stalinism in the USSR*. Ed. Channon, John. University of London in Association with School of Slavonic and East European Studies. 1998. Print.
- Chaplenko, Vasyl'. *Istoriia i a novoï ukrains'koi literaturnoi movy (XVII st.-1933)*. New York. 1970. Print

- Conquest, Robert. *The Harvest of Sorrow. Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*. The University of Alberta Press in Association with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. 1987. Print.
- Cooper, Robert L. *Language Planning and Social Change*. Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press. 1989. Print.
- Crisp, Simon. Soviet Language Planning 1917-1953. *Language Planning in the Soviet Union*. Ed. Kirkwood, M. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1990. Print.
- Csaba, Kathleen. Pavlik Morozov: A Soviet Case Study of "Dark" Social Engineering. *Social Engineering*. Ed. Podgórecki, A., Alexander, J. And Schields R. Carleton University Press. 1996. Print.
- Dingley, James. Ukrainian and Belorussian – a Testing Ground, Language Planning in the Soviet Union. *Language Planning in the Soviet Union*. Ed. Kirkwood, M. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1990. Print.
- Ehret, Rebecca. Language Attitudes and the Linguistic Construction of Ethnic Identity: The Case of Krio in Sierra Leone. *Language Choices. Conditions, Constraints, and Consequences*. Ed. Pütz, Martin. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 1997. Print.
- Fasold, Ralf. *The Sociolinguistic of Society*. Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell. 1984. Print.
- Freund, H. A. *Russia from A to Z*. Sydney, London: Angus and Robertson Ltd. 1945. Print.
- Giles, H., Bourhis, R.Y., & Taylor, D. M. Towards a Theory of Language in Ethnic Group Relations. *Language, Ethnicity, and Intergroup Relations*. Ed. Giles, H. New York: Academic Pres. 1977. Print.
- Gorham, Michael S. *Speaking in Soviet Tongues*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2003. Print.
- Graziosi, Andrea. The Soviet 1931-1933 Famines and the Ukrainian Holodomor: Is a New Interpretation Possible, and What Would Its Consequences Be? *Hunger by Design: the Great Ukrainian Famine and Its Soviet Context*. Ed. Hryn, Halyna. Harvard University. 2008. Print.
- Holmes, Janet. *An introduction to Sociolinguistic*. Harlow, England – London – New York – Reading, Massachusetts, San Francisco, Toronto, Don Mills Ontario, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, Taipei, Cape Town, Madrid, Mexico City, Amsterdam, Munich, Paris, Milan: Longman. 2001. Print.
- Holoskevych, Hryhorij. *Pravopysnyj Slovnyk*. The Publishers Department. The Associations of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd. London. 1961. Print.
- Hornberger, Nancy. Frameworks and Models in Language Policy and Planning. *An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method*. Ed. Ricento, T. Blackwell Publishing. 2006. Print.
- Hrytsak, Y. Natsional'ne Vidrodzhennya (kinets' XVIII – pochatok XX st). *Istoriya Ukrayiny*. Ed. Zaitsev, Y. Lviv. Vydavnytstvo Svit. 1998. Print.
- Il'yin, V. S., Doroshenko K. P., Levchenko S. P., Palamarchuk, L. S., Pylypyns'ky M. M., Srypnyk L. H., Tsilujko K. K., Yurchuk L. A. *Ukrayins'ko-Rosijs'kyj Slovnyk*. 3rd Edition. Vydavnytstvo Naukova Dumka. Kyiv. 1976. Print.
- Ilnytzyj, Oleh S. *Ukrainian Futurism, 1914-1930. A Historical and Critical Study*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1997. Print.
- Isayev, M. I. *National Languages in the USSR: Problems and Solutions*. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 1977. Print.

- Joseph, John Earl. *Eloquence and Power. The Rise of Language Standards and Standard Languages*. London: Frances Printer (Publishers). 1987. Print.
- Kappeler, Andreas. *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*. Longman. Pearson Education. Harlow, England, London, New York. 2001. Print.
- Kenez, Peter. The Birth of the Propaganda State. *Enemies of the People. The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s*. Ed. Bliss Eaton, K. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. Print.
- Knowles, Francis. Language Planning in the Soviet Baltic Republics: An Analysis of Demographic and Sociological Trends. *Language Planning in the Soviet Union*. Ed. Kirkwood, M. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1990 Print.
- Kohut, Zenon E. The Question of Russo-Ukrainian Unity and Ukrainian Distinctiveness in Early Modern Ukrainian Thought and Culture. *Culture, Nation and Identity: the Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600-1945*. Ed. Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn and Mark von Hagen. Edmonton Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. 2003. 57-86. Print.
- Kojder, Andrzej. Sociotechniques under Authoritarianism. *Social Engineering*. Ed. Podgórecki, A., Alexander, J. And Schields R. Carleton University Press. 1996 Print.
- Krupskaya N. What a Communist Ought to Be Like. *Bolshevik Visions: First Phase of the Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia*. Ed. Rosenberg, William G. Ardis, Ann Arbor. 1984. Print.
- Kulchytsky, Stanislav. The Phenomenon of the Soviet State. *Culture, Nation and Identity. The Ukrainian Russian Encounter, 1600-1945*. Ed. Kappeler A., Kohut Z. E., Sysyn, F.W., von Hagen M. (ed.), Edmonton, Toronto. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. 2003. Print.
- Kulchytsky, Stanislav. *Nevidoma Ukrayina. Holodomor 1932 – 1933 yak Henotsyid: Trudnoshchi Usvidomlennya*. Nash Chas. Kyiv. 2008. Print.
- Kulish, Mykola. *Tvory*. New York. Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. Inc. 1955. Print.
- Lewis Burgin, Diana. Sophia Parnok and Soviet-Russian Consorship, 1922-1933. *Enemies of the People. The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s*. Ed. Bliss Eaton, K. (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Print.
- Lieven, Anatol. *Ukraine & Russia. A Fraternal Rivalry*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1999. Print.
- Luckyj, George. Mykola Khvylovy: A Defiant Ukrainian Communist. *Enemies of the People. The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s*. Ed. Bliss Eaton, K. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Print.
- Lytvyn M. Vysvol'ni Zmahannya. 1914-1920. *Istoriya Ukrayiny*. Ed. Zaitsev, Y. Lviv. Vydavnytstvo Svit. 1998. Print.
- Magocsi, Paul Robert. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1996. Print.
- Magocsi, Paul Robert. *Ukraine. An Illustrated History*. University Washington Press. Seattle. 2007. Print.
- Majstrenko, Iwan. *Borot'bism. A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism*. New York: Research Program of the U.S.S.R. Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, Inc. 1954. Print.
- Martin, Terry. An Affirmative-Action Empire: The Emergence of the Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1919-1923. *The Structure of Soviet History: Essays and Documents*. Ed. Suny, R. G. New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. Print.

- Millar, Robert McColl. *Language, Nation and Power*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 2005. Print.
- Milroy, James and Milroy, Lesley. *Authority in Language: Investigating Standard English*. London and New York: Routledge. 1999. Print
- Mirchuk, Petro. *Ukrayins'ka Derzhavnist' . 1917-1920*. Philadelphia. 1967. Print.
- Nakhimovsky, Alice. Death and Disillusion: Il'ia Il'f in the 1930s. *Enemies of the People. The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s*. Ed. Bliss Eaton, K. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Print.
- Nezhyvyj, Oleksandr. *Holodymory v Ukrayini u XX stolitti*. Kyiv. Mizhrehional'na Akademiya Upravlinnya Personalom. 2007. Print.
- Nimchuk, V.V. Problemy Ukrayins'koho Pravopysu v XX stolitti. *Ukrayins'kyj Pravopys (Proekt Najnovishoyi Redaktsiyi)*. Kyiv. Naukova Dumka. 1999. 242-333. Print.
- Ocheretyanko S., Zheleznyak M. *Entsyklopediya Suchasnoyi Ukrayiny. Tom Chotyry*. Kyiv. VAT Politgrafknyha. 2005. Print.
- Ogden, J. Alexander. Overcoming the Destruction of Peasant Russia: The Epic Impulse in Nikolai Kliuev's Late Poetry. *Enemies of the People. The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s*. Ed. Bliss Eaton, K. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Print.
- Ohiyenko, Ivan. *Istoriya Ukrayins'koyi Literaturnoyi Movy*. Winnipeg. Nasha Kul'tura. 1950. Print.
- Ohiyenko, Ivan. *Narysy z Istoriyi Ukrayins'koyi Movy. Systema Ukrayins'koho Pravopysu*. Winnipeg. Volyn. 1990. Print.
- Perrie, Maureen. Nationalism and History: The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin's Russia. *Politics, Society and Stalinism in the USSR*. Ed. Channon, John. School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University of London. 1998. Print.
- Petehrych, V. Kyivs'ka Derzhava. *Istoriya Ukrayiny*. Ed. Zaitsev, Y. Lviv. Vydavnytstvo Svit. 1998. Print.
- Phillipson, Robert and Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove. Lessons for Europe from Lanaguage Policy in Australia. *Language Choices. Conditions, Constraints, and Consequences*. Ed. Pütz, Martin. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 1997. Print.
- Plyushch, P. P. *Istoriya Ukrayins'koyi Literaturnoyi Movy*. Vydavnytstvo Vyshcha Shkola. Kyiv. 1971. Print.
- Podgórecki, Adam. Sociotechnics: Basic Concepts and Issues. *Social Engineering*. Ed. Podgórecki, A., Alexander, J. and Schields R. Carleton University Press. 1996. Print.
- Rees, E.A. Stalin and Russian Nationalism. *Russian Nationalism. Past and Present*. Ed. Hosking, Geoffrey and Service, Robert. In Association with School of Slavonic and East European Studies. University of London. 1998. Print
- Rees, E. A. Stalinism: The Primacy of Politics. *Politics, Society and Stalinism in the USSR*. Ed. Channon, John. School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University of London. 1998. Print
- Reiman, Michal. *The Birth of Stalinism. The USSR on the Eve of the ``Second Revolution``*. Bloomington , Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 1987. Print
- Rosenberg, William G. *Bolshevik Visions: First Phase of the Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia*. Ann Arbor: Ardis. 1984. Print
- Rudnyc'kyj Jaroslav B. *Ukrainian Orthography*. Ukrainian Canadian Committee. Winnipeg. 1949. Print

- Ryabchuk, Mykola. *Vid Malorosiyi do Ukrayiny. Paradoksy zapizniloho natsiyetvorennnya*. Kyiv. Krytyka. 2000. Print
- Service, Robert. Joseph Stalin: The Making of a Stalinist. *Politics, Society and Stalinism in the USSR*. Ed. Channon, John. School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University of London. 1998. Print
- Schiffman, Harold F. *Linguistic Culture and Language Policy*. London and New York: Routledge. 1996. Print.
- Shabliovsky, Yevhen. *Ukrainian Literature Through the Ages*. Kyiv: Mistetstvo Publishers. 1970. Print.
- Shapoval Yuri. The GPU_NKVD as an Instrument of Counter-Ukrainianization in the 1920s and 1930s. *Culture, Nation and Identity. The Ukrainian Russian Encounter, 1600-1945*. Ed. Kappeler A., Kohut Z. E., Sysyn, F.W., von Hagen M. Edmonton, Toronto. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. 2003. Print.
- Sicher, Efraim. The Three Deaths of Isaac Emmanuilovich Babel'. *Enemies of the People. The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s*. Ed. Bliss Eaton, K. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Print.
- Solchanyk, Roman. Language Politics in the Ukraine. *Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages*. Ed. Kreindler, I. Mouton de Gruyter. 1985. Print.
- Stakhiv, Matvij, Dr. *Zvidky Vzyalasyz Sovyets'ka Vlada v Ukrayini Ta Khto Yiyi Pobuduvav?* New York, Detroit, Skrenton: Narodna Volya. 1955. Print.
- Svarnyk I. Doba Kozachchyny. *Istoriya Ukrayiny*. Ed. Zaitsev, Y. Lviv. Vydavnytstvo Svit. 1998. Print.
- Sysyn, Frank E. The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations in Ukrainian Historiography of the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries. *Culture, Nation and Identity. The Ukrainian Russian Encounter, 1600-1945*. Ed. Kappeler A., Kohut Z. E., Sysyn, F.W., von Hagen M. Edmonton, Toronto. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. 2003. Print.
- Terras, Victor. Death of a Poet: Osip Mandelstam. *Enemies of the People. The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s*. Ed. Bliss Eaton, K. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Print.
- Thomas, Linda and Wareing Shân. *Language, Society and Power: An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge. 1999. Print.
- Torke, Hans-Joachim. Moscow and its West: On the "Ruthenization" of Russian Culture in the Seventeenth Century. *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600-1945)*. Ed. Kappeler, Andreas, Kohut, Zenon E., Sysyn, Frank E., von Hagen, Mark. Edmonton. Toronto. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. 2003. Print.
- Tymoshenko, P.D. *Khrestomatiya Materialiv z Istoriyi Ukrayins'koyi Literaturnoyi Movy*. Kyiv. Radyans'ka Shkola. 1959. Print.
- Vasylchuk, Volodymyr. Sotsial'no-Ekonomichni ta Politychni Peredumovy Pereselens'kykh Aktsij v Ukrayini v Kintsi XVIII na Pochatku XIX st. *Ukrayins'ka Istorychna nauka na porozi XXI stolittya, Mizhnarodny Naukovyj Kongress*. Ed. Vynar, L., Makar, Y. Chernivtsi 2000. Chernivtsi: Ruta. 2001. Print.
- von Hagen, Mark. State, Nations, and Identities: The Russian-Ukrainian Encounter in the First Half of the Twentieth Century. *Culture, Nation and Identity. The Ukrainian Russian Encounter, 1600-1945*. Ed. Kappeler A., Kohut Z. E., Sysyn, F.W., von Hagen M. Edmonton, Toronto. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. 2003. Print

- Willemys, Roland. Towards a Plurilingual Urban Environment: Language Policy and Language Planning in Brussels. *Language Choices. Conditions, Constraints, and Consequences*. Ed. Pütz, Martin. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 1997. Print.
- Williams, G. *Variance and Invariance in Language Form and Context*. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, Vol. 2, 219-25, 1981. Print.
- Williams, Glyn. *Sociolinguistics. A Sociological Critique*. London and New York: Routledge. 1992. Print.
- Wilson, Andrew. *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*. Yale University Press. New Haven and London. 2000. Print.
- Woycenko, Ol'ha. *Bowdlerization of Ukrainian Letters*. Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal: Ukrainian Language Association. 1986. Print.
- Yizhakevych H. P. *Ukrayinsko-Rosijski Movni Zv'yazky Radyanskoho Chasu*. Kyiv. Naukova Dumka. 1969. Print.
- Zabuzhko, Oksana. *Polyovi Doslidzhennya z Ukrayins'koho Seksu*. Kyiv:Fakt. 1998. Print.
- Zaitsev O. Mizhvoyennyj Period (1921-1939). *Istoriya Ukrayiny*. Ed. Zaitsev, Y. Lviv. Vydavnytstvo Svit. 1998. Print.
- Zalkind, A. The Pioneer Youth Movement as a Form of Cultural Work Among the Proletariat. *Bolshevik Visions: First Phase of the Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia*. Ed. Rosenberg, William. Ardis, Ann Arbor. 1984. Print.
- Zaval'nyuk Oleksandr. Movna Polityka Bilshovykiv v Ukrayini na pochatku 20-x rokiv. *Ukrayins'ka Istorychna nauka na porozi XXI stolittya, Mizhnarodny Naukovyj Kongress*. Ed. Vynar, L., Makar, Y. Chernivtsi 2000. Chernivtsi: Ruta. 2001. Print.
- Zhivov, Viktor. The Question of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Russian-Ukrainian Relations (Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries). *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600-1945)*. Ed. Kappeler, Andreas, Kohut, Zenon E., Sysyn, Frank E., von Hagen, Mark. Edmonton. Toronto. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. 2003. Print.
- Zhukovsky, Arkadij. Rol' Khrystyianstva v Zhytti Ukrayins'koho Narodu. Istorychni Oriyentyry pro Helihiyu i Tserkvu v Ukrayini. *Ukrayins'ka Istorychna nauka na porozi XXI stolittya, Mizhnarodny Naukovyj Kongress*. Ed. Vynar, L., Makar, Y. Chernivtsi 2000. Chernivtsi: Ruta. 2001. Print.

