Corporate Social Responsibility and Compensational Incentives
| dc.contributor.advisor | Maung, Min | en_US |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wilson, Craig | en_US |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Yang, Fan | en_US |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Zhang, Ying | en_US |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Mamun, Abdullah | en_US |
| dc.creator | Yang, Feiyi | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-09-30T12:00:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-09-30T12:00:17Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2015-08 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-09-29 | en_US |
| dc.date.submitted | August 2015 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | We construct a measure of CEO concern for non-equity stakeholders based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, and we investigate how such incentives affect firm leverage and cash holding. In general, we find that non-equity stakeholder incentives decrease leverage and increase cash holding, after controlling for CEO managerial incentives and other firm characteristics. Our findings suggest that corporate social responsibility benefit non-equity stakeholders, which may come at the expense of shareholders. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10388/ETD-2015-08-2209 | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.subject | Managerial incentives | en_US |
| dc.subject | Corporate social responsibility | en_US |
| dc.subject | Shareholder interests | en_US |
| dc.subject | Non-equity stakeholder | en_US |
| dc.title | Corporate Social Responsibility and Compensational Incentives | en_US |
| dc.type.genre | Thesis | en_US |
| dc.type.material | text | en_US |
| thesis.degree.department | Edwards School of Business | en_US |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Finance | en_US |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Saskatchewan | en_US |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | en_US |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Science (M.Sc.) | en_US |