RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF FICTION: THE OBJECT THEORY
dc.contributor.advisor | Alward, Peter | |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | Hoffman, Sarah | |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | Howe, Leslie | |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | Teucher, Ulrich | |
dc.contributor.committeeMember | Regnier, Daniel | |
dc.creator | Oriaku, Stephen Ebubechi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-15T20:36:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-09-15T20:36:11Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 2022 | |
dc.date.created | 2022-08 | |
dc.date.issued | 2022-09-15 | |
dc.date.submitted | August 2022 | |
dc.date.updated | 2022-09-15T20:36:11Z | |
dc.description.abstract | This project introduces the paradox of fiction and attempts to resolve the contradiction that the paradox presents. This problem concerns the possibility of experiencing genuine emotional reactions towards fictional characters, given that appreciators do not believe fictional characters exist. In an attempt to remedy the contradiction in the paradox, I argue that a resolution lies in the method of revising or replacing the false proposition in the paradox with a proposition that provides insight into our emotional responses to fiction while avoiding the contradiction in the paradox. To achieve this, I identify three possible strategies for the resolution of the paradox. The first strategy replaces proposition 1 (Emotions towards Fiction) with Kendall Walton’s solution to the paradox. The second strategy argues two separate views for the revision and replacement of proposition 2 (Emotion and Belief) – (a) Non-cognitivist solution to the paradox, and (b) Reality Cognitivist solution to the paradox. The third strategy replaces proposition 3 (Non-belief in Fiction) by considering solutions offered by Colin Radford and a version of the Illusionist’s Theory. Through the process of elimination, I argue that strategies 1, 2a and 3 are inadequate for resolving the paradox, and propose that strategy 2b (which argues the thought theory and object theory models) is a preferred solution to the paradox. Following strategy 2b, the object theory posits that appreciators of fiction believe the objects of their emotions are real but non-existent objects with emotion-inducing properties, which, coupled with the narrative techniques used in fictional works, argue that appreciators of fiction have genuine emotional responses to fiction. By stating that appreciators of fiction have emotional reactions towards fictional characters because they believe these characters are real but non-existent with emotion-inducing properties, the object theory not only avoids the contradiction which the paradox presents but also avoids attributing inconsistent beliefs to appreciators, while providing insight into appreciators’ emotional response to fiction. | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10388/14172 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.subject | Paradox of Fiction | |
dc.subject | Philosophy of Literature | |
dc.subject | Object Theory | |
dc.subject | Meinong | |
dc.subject | Walton | |
dc.subject | Radford | |
dc.subject | Lamarque | |
dc.title | RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF FICTION: THE OBJECT THEORY | |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.type.material | text | |
thesis.degree.department | Philosophy | |
thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
thesis.degree.grantor | University of Saskatchewan | |
thesis.degree.level | Masters | |
thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts (M.A.) |